gender inequality in the workplace essay

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Addressing workplace gender inequality: Using the evidence to avoid common pitfalls

Michelle k. ryan.

1 Global Institute for Women's Leadership, The Australian National University, Canberra Australian Capital Territory, Australia

2 Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Groningen, Groningen The Netherlands

In this Landmark article I outline four common missteps that are made when designing and implementing workplace gender equality initiatives: (1) when we don't go beyond describing the numbers; (2) when we try to ‘fix’ women rather than fix systems; (3) when we are overly optimistic about the progress we have made; and (4) when we fail to recognise the intersectionality of the experiences that women face. I will briefly consider each of these missteps in term, presenting research that suggests alternative ways of approaching gender equality initiatives.

INTRODUCTION

Despite much progress in the past 50 years, workplace gender inequality remains a persistent problem. Worldwide, women only occupy about 37 per cent of leadership roles (World Economic Forum,  2022 ), the pay gap sits at approximately 20 per cent (International Labour Oragnisation, 2022 ), and women remain concentrated in low‐status, low‐paid jobs (UN Women,  2022 ). There are countless initiatives designed to address workplace gender equality—those that try to attract women to certain professions and roles where they are under‐represented, those that try to support women's career trajectories, and the those that try to retain women in the workforce. While the impetus behind these initiatives is generally positive, many of these interventions are not based on evidence, in terms of their design, their implementation or in the evaluation of their efficacy.

Most infamous in this space are those initiatives that build on an understanding that much gender discrimination (but certainly not all) is a result unconscious bias. The research most cited to underpin unconscious bias training is work on implicit prejudice and implicit associations (e.g. Devine,  1989 ; Greenwald et al.,  1998 ; Greenwald & Banaji,  1995 ). While there has been theoretical, methodological and psychometric debate about the utility of implicit tests such as the IAT (e.g. Blanton & Jaccard, 2006 ; Nosek & Sriram, 2007 ; see also Jost,  2019 ) what is of more interest here is the utility of unconscious bias training itself. While unconscious bias training is good at awareness raising, it is less effectual at achieving behaviour change or increased gender equality (e.g. Atewologun et al.,  2018 ; Bezrukova et al.,  2016 ; Kalev et al., 2006 ) and has been shown to have unintended negative consequences such as backfiring or feelings of false progress (e.g. Dover et al.,  2020 ; Leslie,  2019 ).

In my current role, as the Director of the Global Institute for Women's Leadership at The Australian National University, I have three key responsibilities (1) to conduct research to better understand gender inequality, (2) to work with organizations and government to translate the evidence base into effective policy and practice and (3) to advocate for social change and gender equality. It is at the nexus of these three endeavours that I can see where we get it right, and where we, unfortunately, get it wrong.

In this Landmark article I outline four common missteps that are made when designing and implementing workplace gender equality initiatives: (1) when we do not go beyond describing the numbers; (2) when we try to ‘fix’ women rather than fix systems; (3) when we are overly optimistic about the progress we have made; and (4) when we fail to recognize the intersectionality of the experiences that women face. I will briefly consider each of these missteps in term, presenting research that suggests alternative ways of approaching gender equality initiatives. 1

WHEN NUMBERS JUST AREN'T ENOUGH

One of the first steps in many gender equality action plans is to do an audit of the representation of women. How many women are in the organization? How many women are in decision‐making roles? How many women are there in senior management and on the boards of directors? This number crunching extends to describing other inequalities: How big is the gender pay gap? How many women were promoted in the last promotions round? What is the success rate of female job applicants? This approach is common in many internal organizational gender equality plans (Ely & Thomas,  2020 ), and as part of many external accreditation programmes (e.g. Rosser et al.,  2019 ). Understanding representation and understanding key metrics of gender equality are a necessary part of achieving gender equality—but they are not sufficient. Such numbers are a great starting point as they identify problem areas to be rectified. But they do not tell the whole story.

In this section, I will outline a body of research on women in leadership and the glass cliff (Haslam & Ryan,  2008 ; Ryan & Haslam,  2005 , 2007 ) that illustrates why we cannot just stop at descriptive numbers. This work suggests that it is not enough to know whether women are in leadership positions, but when they are in leadership positions. It also illustrates the importance of looking at women's experiences in such positions. And finally, it illustrates the importance of understanding the psychological processes behind the appointment of women to leadership positions.

This body of research builds on the metaphor of the glass ceiling, that describes the under‐representation of women in leadership positions, to examine the conditions under which women are likely to be appointed to leadership positions. Almost 20 years of research has demonstrated the phenomenon whereby women are more likely to be appointed to leadership roles during times of crisis (see Morgenroth et al.,  2020 , & Ryan et al.,  2016 , for meta‐analyses and an overview). With the extension of the glass ceiling metaphor—the glass cliff—we hoped to capture the riskiness and precarity of such leadership positions: to give a sense of occupying a position up on high, yet of teetering on the edge.

The phenomenon of the glass cliff was first uncovered as a reaction to a newspaper article in The Times (Judge, 2003 ). This article presented evidence that companies that had more women on their boards of directors, had poorer share prices, and thus the increasing number of women on UK corporate board was ‘wreaking havoc’ on corporate Britain (p. 21). In response, Ryan and Haslam ( 2005 ) proposed an alternative analysis, whereby rather than women causing poor company performance, it was poor company performance that led to women being appointed to boards of directors. We conducted nuanced analysis of board appointments and monthly changes in company share prices that showed that this alternative explanation was indeed the case—(the small number of) women who were appointed to boards of directs, were appointed after a prolonged period of poor share price performance. Share price afterwards did not differ from their male counterparts.

Since this first discovery of the phenomenon, a global body of research on the glass cliff has emerged, one that uses multiple methodologies (archival analyses, experimental studies, case studies, qualitative work) to demonstrate the nuance and underlying processes associated with the glass cliff phenomenon (Morgenroth et al.,  2020 ; Ryan et al.,  2016 ). The glass cliff is not restricted to corporate settings, and has also been found in (a) the political sphere (e.g. Kulich et al.,  2015 ; Ryan et al.,  2010 )—as illustrated by all three of the UK's female Prime ministers: Thatcher (1980s recession), May (Brexit) and Truss (energy crisis and spiralling inflation); (b) sporting contexts (e.g. Wicker et al.,  2019 ); and (c) in non‐government, third sector organizations (e.g., Bogacz‐Wojtanowska et al.,  2018 ).

The importance of the glass cliff here is that it points to the necessity of looking beyond simply the number of women in leadership positions, to understand the circumstances under which women are likely to be appointment to such positions. If we just take the proportion of women in leadership roles as a measure of gender equality, then glass cliff appointments may be seen as an example of progress towards gender equality. But in reality, the opposite may be the case.

The context in which the glass cliff occurs can lead to such positions representing a new and subtle form of sexism or gender discrimination. Such a poisoned chalice potentially sets women up for additional scrutiny, stress and risk of failure. Indeed, the very risk and precarity experienced by those in glass cliff positions may hinder progress towards gender equality. Women in glass cliff positions are likely to face greater challenges in their leadership roles, such as (a) being blamed for negative conditions that were set in train long before they were appointed (Ryan & Haslam,  2005 ), shorter tenure (Glass & Cook,  2016 ) or (c) stress and burnout (Ryan et al.,  2009 ). These additional difficulties may contribute to the stagnation of women's representation in leadership positions, reinforcing stereotypes that women are not suited to leadership.

The glass cliff is just one example where the complexity of gender equality might be hidden behind the top‐line numbers. Understanding the subtlety and nuance behind the numbers gives us a truer sense of our progress towards gender equality. We can think of these in terms of who, when, why and where questions. For example, who bears the brunt of gender inequality—we know that gender inequality is fundamentally intersectional, being exacerbated by other group memberships (see Section ‘ When we are overly optimistic ’, below). When and where does inequality occur. And the big question for us as psychologists, is the why —what are the processes sitting behind the numbers, what drives inequality, and in turn, what do we need to do to help mitigate it.

Exploring beyond the numbers can also help inform us of the most effective ways to attack those problems. In the case of the glass cliff, looking beyond the number of appointments raises a whole new set of research questions to be asked (and answered). Are women preferentially selected by others for leadership in times crisis (yes, according to Haslam & Ryan,  2008 )? Are women appointed because we think they are good at dealing with crisis (no, according to Kulich et al.,  2015 ; Ryan et al.,  2011 ). Do women select these positions because they like a challenge (also no, according to Rink et al.,  2012 )?

WHEN WE TRY TO FIX WOMEN

The question of whether women self‐select into glass cliff positions leads us nicely into our next misstep—the tendency to focus on women when trying to solve the problem of gender inequality. Many of the approaches to improving gender equality recognize that the issues arise from inequalities embedded in our social and organizational structures and systems. Key here are the traditional gender stereotypes about what women and men are like (Ellemers,  2018 ) and what they should be like (Heilman, 2012 ). In particular, many workplace inequalities arise because the societal view of women's warmth is incompatible with societal views of leadership and success that prioritize notions of agency and competence (e.g. Koenig et al.,  2011 ; Schein,  1973 ). Importantly our social and organizational structures and systems are predicated on these gender norms and stereotypes (Eagly et al.,  2000 ), including recruitment, promotion and reward practices; parental leave and childcare policies; and educational systems.

However, this acknowledgement of systemic basis of gender equality often dissipates when it comes to actually implementing interventions and initiatives. There is a relatively consistent underlying assumption within these initiatives that gender inequalities can be addressed with a focus on individual competencies. From this perspective, we can narrow the gender equality gaps by providing women with additional skills and training. For example, initiatives to encourage girls and women in science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM) are often focused on boosting their engagement and ambition (Liben & Coyle,  2014 ). Leadership training courses often focus on teaching women ‘girl boss’ leadership skills (Atir,  2022 ) and encouraging them to take greater risks and make bigger sacrifices, overcome impostor symptom, be authentic at work and negotiate the next promotion or pay rise (Hackworth et al.,  2018 ). This approach is epitomized by the ‘lean in’ approach to gender equality (Sandberg, 2013 ), which seeks to encourage women to make the right choices and have the right mindset.

All of these approaches have, as their implicit theory of change, an understanding that women are in some way broken and not up to the task. The solution is, therefore, seen to be to ‘fix’ them—to change their behaviours, address their skills deficit, remedy their mindset. But the evidence is very clear on this point—it is not women that need fixing, but the deeply entrenched systems of gender inequality that structure our organizations and structure society more broadly.

Below I outline some illustrative research that demonstrates that women's engagement and belonging, their feelings of impostor syndrome and their willingness to take risks are not individual‐level problems that renders them needing to be fixed. Rather, these issues are a direct product of organizational and societal systems, and their experiences in these systems and thus require structural solutions.

Engagement and belonging

One area in which this approach is highly visible is trying to attract and retain girls and women in male‐dominated sectors, such as STEM, finance and construction. Many of initiatives designed to increase gender inequality in these spaces focus on trying to increase girls' and women's interest for and engagement with these sectors (McKinnon,  2022 ), such as the heavily criticized campaign—Science: It's a Girl Thing—from the European Commission, which featured women in fashionable PPE making lipstick (Grosu, 2013 ). What is implicit here is that there is some sort of inherent lack of enthusiasm in women, that needs to be addressed, rather than the fact that women and girls are responding to very real cultural and normative barriers that exclude them (Saucerman & Vasquez,  2014 ).

In a series of studies looking at women in surgery—where women make up less than 25% per cent of the profession—Peters et al. ( 2012 ) examined whether the under‐representation of women may be explained, at least in part, by women's perceptions of, and experiences within, the profession. Across two studies we demonstrated that female surgical trainees perceived a lack of fit between themselves and the prototypical masculine surgeon. In turn, this perceived lack of fit was associated with a reduction in identification with the profession and an increased desire to opt out of the profession.

Similarly, work by Meeussen et al. ( 2022 ) demonstrate than in male‐dominated careers, such as surgery and the veterinary profession, women (compared to men) report less career engagement because of their more frequent experiences of gender discrimination and lower perceived fit with those higher up the career ladder. In turn, these barriers predicted reduced expectations of success in their field and expected success of their sacrifices, which in turn predicted lower willingness to make sacrifices.

Together, these studies suggest the role that external barriers, such as experiences of discrimination and perceptions of fit, play in women's career decision making in male‐dominated professions. Thus, trying to attract and retain women in these spaces by focusing on women themselves is unlikely to be fruitful. Rather, interventions need to address the root of the problem, discriminatory environments and a lack of role models if they want women to come and women to stay (see Casad et al.,  2018 ).

Imposter syndrome

Another area in which has received a lot of attention when it comes to women in the workplace are initiatives that seek to address impostor syndrome. This concept is used to describe individuals who express doubts about their self‐worth, failing to take credit for their successes or attributing their successes to luck. Such individuals worry that others will see them as impostors or frauds. The very use of the term ‘syndrome’ suggests that this experience is an individual‐level problem—a condition that requires diagnosis and treatment and fixing. And indeed, there will be no surprise to find out that there are many initiatives out there that are designed to help individuals, and in particular women, to overcome ‘their’ impostor syndrome. For example, such interventions seek to increase women's confidence, reduce their perfectionism and change their mindsets (Chandra et al.,  2019 ).

However, as Feenstra et al. ( 2020 ) argue, rather than being seen as a personal problem that plagues individual women, it is critical to acknowledge the role that the social and organizational context plays in eliciting feelings of impostorism (see also Kark et al.,  2022 ). Indeed, a series of studies by Begeny et al. ( 2022 ) demonstrate that impostor feelings can be seen as is a direct response to how one is treated by others. In a longitudinal study, we showed that that experiencing fewer expressions of distinctive treatment, such as being asked for advice, resulted in a significant increase in impostor feelings over time. Moreover, in experimental studies we showed that when individuals experience positive distinctive treatment from work colleagues, this significantly reduces impostor feelings.

In this way, characterizing impostor feelings at an individual level is unlikely to be useful, both in terms of running the risk of pathologizing these feelings and in terms of understanding where they come from. Thinking of impostor feelings as a context‐dependent outcome of workplace experiences has clear implications for how we ‘treat’ impostor syndrome. Rather than putting the onus on employees, particularly women, to overcome their own impostor feelings—being more confident and ‘faking it until you make it’—we need to implement more systemic approaches, creating cultures where colleagues are valued and treated with respect.

Risk taking

One common explanation for the persistence of workplace gender inequalities is that women are less willing to take career‐enhancing risks, such as asking for a pay rise or taking on a new position (Byrnes et al.,  1999 ). Indeed, women's risk aversion is a persistent aspect of gender stereotypes, with many arguing that this is an innate difference aspect of gender (Bem, 1974 ). Such an analysis has a number of issues, including the assumption that risk taking is inherent desirable and necessarily career enhancing, and because it fails to recognize the types of risks that women do take in everyday life (Morgenroth et al.,  2018 ). But nonetheless, a key facet of the lean in approach to fixing women is encouraging women to take more risks, including memetic advice such as ‘if you are offered a seat on a rocket ship, do not ask what seat, just get on’ and ‘fortune does favour the bold, and you never know what you are capable of if you do not try’ (Sandberg, 2013 ).

However, research demonstrates that far from being innate, women's willingness to take risks is dependent of their experiences in the workplace. Research conducted by Morgenroth et al. ( 2022 ) looks at gender differences in risk taking through a lens of the anticipated and experienced consequences of risk taking. Across three studies, there was no evidence for gender differences in initial risk taking or in the anticipation of consequences for the risks with which women and men had no prior experience. However, when we looked at actual experiences of risk taking in the workplace—such as taking on a difficult task, speaking up or quitting your job for a new job—men reported more positive consequences for taking risks than women, and as a result, anticipated having a greater likelihood of taking the same risks in the future.

Studies like this question the assumption that it is women's innate risk aversion that underlies workplace gender inequalities. Rather they demonstrate that any aversions women have are likely to be a consequence of their workplace experiences, and indeed, are likely to be informed by the gendered, negative experiences they have when attempting to take risks. For this reason, gender equality initiatives that focus on encouraging women to take more risks are unlikely to succeed, and it is the gendered costs and benefits for risk that need to be addressed.

Taken together, this exploration of some of the common ways in which initiatives target gender equality issues—engagement, impostor syndrome and risk taking—suggest that framing these as individual‐level problems is unlikely to be fruitful. At best, such an approach may provide those individual women who are targeted by such initiatives, usually women that hold a certain amount of privilege (see Section 4) with a short‐term advantage. At worst, such attempts to fix women reinforce the stereotypes and norms that form the basis of structural gender inequalities and become yet another demand on women's time. Interventions should, instead, target the foundational causes of inequality: organizational systems and culture.

WHEN WE ARE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC

If we compare where we are now on the workplace gender equality front, compared to where we have been historically, it is clear that there have been many positive changes—better gender representation, safer working conditions and more equality in terms of pay. But such changes are not linear, and neither are they inevitable. Indeed, over more recent time periods we have seen stagnation in these advances, in in some cases even backsliding (Word Economic Forus,  2022 ). Indeed, current forecasts suggest it will be at anywhere between 132 (Word Economic Forus,  2022 ) and 300 (UN Women,  2022 ) years before we reach global gender equality.

Part of the tension here lies in the degree to which we recognize and celebrate our gender equality accomplishments, and to what extent are we realistic about how much we still have to achieve. This decision is not just about whether or not one wants to be an optimistic person. An understanding of the degree to which gender inequalities persist, and in particular the denial of gender inequality, forms a key aspect of sexist attitudes, such as those captured by the modern sexism scale (Swim et al., 1995 ). Indeed, there are a number of very real consequences of failing to acknowledge the persistence of gender inequality.

Begeny et al. ( 2020 ) looked at what happens when traditionally male‐occupied professions, such as the veterinary profession, attract more women. While having a greater representation of women is clearly progress, some may take it as an indication that the discrimination is no longer a problem. We demonstrated that despite women being the majority of veterinary students and junior vets, female vets still report experiencing discrimination. In a follow‐up experimental study, we illustrated one way in which this discrimination manifests itself. Vets with managerial responsibilities evaluated a male vet as more competent and suggested paying him 8 per cent more than an equally qualified female vet. Key here, these discriminatory evaluations were evident primarily among those who believed women no longer face discrimination in the profession. Thus, even when positive change occurs, discrimination persists, ironically perpetuated by those who believe it is no longer a problem.

Research also demonstrates that progress towards gender equality may be hampered by those who overestimate the rate of progress. A study by Begeny et al. ( 2022 ) surveyed doctors in the United Kingdom who were asked to estimate the representation of women across a number of roles in the medical profession. Both male and female doctors consistently overestimated the number of women in medicine. However, while those women who over‐estimated female representation still supported gender‐equality initiatives, such as initiatives run by the Royal College of Surgeons and the General Medical Council, those men who were over‐optimistic about progress showed significantly lower levels of support. Thus, men who overestimated progress towards gender equality were at highest risk of undermining it (see also Coffé & Reiser, 2021 ).

Recognizing and celebrating progress towards gender equality is important for a sense of hope and collective efficacy, both necessary for continued motivation for change (e.g. Cohen‐Chen & Van Zomeren,  2018 ; Van Zomeren,  2013 ). However, studies like these suggest that there is potentially a fine line between optimism and a failure to recognize persistent inequalities. If we are to close the gap, and it would be nice if we could do so in less than a century, we need a healthy dose of realism and we need to acknowledge what still remains to be done.

WHEN WE AREN'T INTERSECTIONAL

A final common misstep that is taken when trying to address gender inequalities is to treat women as if they are a monolithic, homogenous group. There is often a ‘one size fits all’ approach to interventions and change (Tzanakou,  2019 ). But the experiences within women—between individuals and between different groups of women—are often more varied than the experiences between women and men. There is a need to understand this variety in women's experiences, and how this is determined by other intersecting identities, especially those that are marginalized or stigmatized (e.g. Crenshaw,  1991 ).

What is most troublesome about the one size fits all approach, is that gender interventions and initiatives are most often based on the experiences of the dominant group—such as those women who are white, middle‐class or straight. This is problematic, both because the experiences of such women are by no means universal, and because women not included in this group—for example culturally and linguistically diverse women, working‐class women, and LGBTQI+ women and gender diverse people, often face the greatest inequalities.

For example, research by Opara et al. ( 2020 ) identified that Black and minoritized women's workplaces experienced were very much influenced by their racial identities, including having stereotypes and expectations imposed upon them. Indeed, research demonstrates that Black women are treated on the basis of negative stereotypes that question their competence and their legitimacy (e.g. Williams & Dempsey,  2014 ) or see them as aggressive and masculine (Hall et al.,  2019 ). In contrast, Asian women may be affected by the model minority myth (Cheng et al.,  2017 ) and be seen as hyper‐competent (Liang & Peters‐Hawkins,  2017 ), but at the same time face stereotypes of low agency (Ghavami & Peplau,  2013 ) and hyper‐femininity (Mukkamala & Suyemoto,  2018 ).

These differential experiences mean that homogenous workplace gender equality initiatives are unlikely to be effective. Indeed, Wong et al. ( 2022 ) argue that diversity interventions tend not to take into account the wide variety of women's experiences. Across three studies we demonstrate that women who are racially marginalized need different things from their diversity interventions than do White women. More specifically we found that while White women focused on the needs of initiatives address issues of women's agency, Black women overtly reported the need for initiatives to take into account intersectional differences, such as racialized gender stereotypes where Black women are seen as pushy or overly assertive. Similarly, Asian women reported the need to address challenges to their authority which stem from racialized stereotypes of Asian women as passive and submissive. Importantly, our textual analysis of gender equality websites showed that organizations were less likely to represent the needs of Black and Asian women—a form of intersectional invisibility (Purdie‐Vaughns & Eibach,  2008 )—such that their gender equality advocacy tended to focus on (White women's) issues of agency, rather than issues of racialized stereotyping reported by Black and Asian women.

These findings suggest that if gender equality initiatives are going to be successful, they must take into account the wide variety of women's experiences and needs. Catering for just one group of women is unhelpful, particularly if that group of women as a whole are likely to experience less disadvantage. Interventions need to overtly address the issues faced by all women, not just those in the majority or those with the most privilege. This points to the importance of understanding the intersectional nature of gender inequality—taking into account that these inequalities are exacerbated and qualified by multiple forms of oppression, such as those based on race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, disability, age and linguistic diversity.

CONCLUSIONS

While the majority of gender equality initiatives are founded on good intentions, this in and of itself is not enough to bring about significant and lasting change. As we have seen above, interventions need to be based on a clear evidence base, one that (1) looks beyond the top line numbers to the complexity and nuance of gender inequality; (2) aims to fix the things that actually needs fixing (systems and structures) rather than trying to fix women; (3) celebrates change while at the same time being realistic about the challenges that are to come; and (4) understands the inherently intersectional nature of gender inequality.

The good news is that social psychology is perfectly situated to rise to all of these challenges. First, we are well placed to understand the processes and contexts that sit behind the top line numbers. For example, as we have seen, social psychological theories can help us understanding the gendered stereotypes than underlie our social and organizational policies and practices (e.g. Eagly et al.,  2000 ; Ellemers,  2018 ; Heilman, 2012 ; Koenig et al.,  2011 ). They can also help us understanding how workplace experiences can affect gendered workplace choices (e.g. Begeny et al.,  2022 ; Meeussen et al.,  2022 ; Morgenroth et al.,  2022 ).

Second, within our theories we have the ability to ensure we are asking the appropriate questions and that we are framing our questions at the right level of analysis—at the level of the individual, the group or at a societal level—and an understanding that the individual level is not always the most appropriate. For example, the social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner,  1979 ; Turner et al.,  1987 ) provides a clear framework to examine how our group memberships, and the contexts in which we are embedded, may impact upon our attitudes and behaviours, particularly at work (Haslam,  2004 ).

Third, through concepts like modern sexism (Swim et al., 1995 ), social psychology can provide an understanding of the perniciousness of the denial of sexism and the subsequent outcomes, such as continued gender discrimination and a lack of support for gender equality initiatives (see Begeny et al.,  2020 , 2022 ). This is particularly important as such views provide a strong basis to the backlash that is levelled against gender equality initiatives (Flood et al.,  2021 ). Indeed, more recent theories of sexism, such as the belief in sexism shift (Zehnter et al., 2021 ), indicate that there are increasingly prevalent views that men are now the key victims of sexism (Ryan & Zehnter,  2022 ), a view that is likely to exacerbate resistance to change.

Finally, while not yet an integrated part of social psychology, there are some excellent examples of how to make our research more intersectional (Bowleg,  2017 ; Cole,  2009 ; Rosenthal,  2016 ). This intersectionality can be implemented in terms of the types of research questions we ask and the make‐up of our samples (Purdie‐Vaughns & Eibach,  2008 ; Remedios & Snyder,  2015 ) and even the way we do open science (Sabik et al.,  2021 ). Importantly, while much of the intersectional advances have been made at the intersection of gender and race; there is still much to be done in acknowledging other intersectional identities, such as those based on age, class, disability and sexuality.

Taken together, while the evidence shows us that there have clearly been missteps on the way, the evidence also demonstrates that social psychology is in an excellent position to play an important role as we stride forward towards gender equality.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

All authors declare no conflict of interest.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Landmark articles are, by tradition, single authored papers, but of course the work that is discussed in the paper could only have been conducted in collaboration. Thanks to all my terrific colleagues with whom I've had the pleasure to work with, in particular to Thekla Morgenroth, Chris Begeny, Alex Haslam and Kim Peters whose work contributed significantly to the ideas in this paper. This paper was supported in part by a European Research Council consolidator Grant (725128).

Ryan, M. K. (2023). Addressing workplace gender inequality: Using the evidence to avoid common pitfalls . British Journal of Social Psychology , 62 , 1–11. 10.1111/bjso.12606 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]

1 This Landmark Article builds on a short opinion piece I wrote for Nature: Ryan ( 2022 )

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Gender Inequality in the Workplace

This essay will examine the issue of gender inequality in the workplace. It will explore the various forms this inequality takes, such as wage gaps, underrepresentation in leadership roles, and discriminatory practices. The piece will discuss the root causes of gender inequality, including societal norms, unconscious bias, and structural barriers. It will also highlight the impact of this inequality on individuals and organizations and discuss efforts and strategies to promote gender equality in the workplace, including legislative measures, corporate policies, and grassroots activism. More free essay examples are accessible at PapersOwl about Critical Theory.

How it works

Gender inequality in the workplace has been an ongoing issue for decades now. Men and women have never been on the same page when it comes to work. Women have always been known to be more of caregivers and men have been given the tougher tasks. Gender stereotypes have always played a major role in assigning women to lower paying and lower status jobs in comparison to men. Discrimination against women can occur in many ways throughout the workplace, such as, during recruitment, hiring, and even during employment.

For example, if a construction position were to open up, they would choose a male over a female to be the new employee since construction is more of a masculine job. Over the years, women have received more degrees, master’s degrees, and doctorate degrees than men. Yet, women in the U.S. workforce still earn less than a man with no degree would earn. Despite being more educated than men and making up nearly half of the workforce, women are promoted at work far less often than men would be. It is a proven fact that women make up less than 5 percent of CEOs, while men make up the rest of the 95 percent with far less knowledge than women have. It did not matter then and it does not matter now in this generation of people making it difficult for women to fulfill a ¨man’s¨ duty. With that being said, discrimination against women is attributing to gender identity in the workplace still to this day.

DEGGANS, JEROME. “Gendered Inequalities in the Workplace Revisited: Masculinist

Dominance, Institutionalized Sexism, and Assaultive Behavior in the #Metoo Era.” Contemporary Readings in Law & Social Justice, vol. 10, no. 2, July 2018, pp. 43–49. EBSCOhost, doi:10.22381/CRLSJ10220182.

This article reviews and advances existing literature concerning gendered inequalities in the workplace. With an audience of adults between the ages of 25-70 it uses information from many reliable resources. Among these are ABC news, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Washington Post, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commision, and etc. Deggans begins by talking about his analyses that he has performed on the basis of helping women in the workplace. It brings discrimation in by talking about the sexaul harassment charges filed by industries. This was said to be an issue as to why women are denied professional opportunities. He says in this article that men have been ¨falsely¨ accused of sexual assault or have said that they do not want to work with a certain women.

This article is going to support what I am talking about by giving statements that agree with the fact that there is gender inequality in the workplace. In the line, ¨Gender inequalities are especially blatant in the workplace. For instance, on average women are more likely to work part-time, be employed in low-paid jobs and not take on management positions ¨(Deggans, para.3). This piece of information will work well in my essay by simply stating that women are known to take lower level jobs than men. Along with this piece of information comes a lot that is present throughout Jeromes article.

Kamal Nath, Akshaya. “Corporate Governance Case for Board Gender Diversity: Evidence from Delaware Cases.” Albany Law Review, vol. 82, no. 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 23–119. EBSCOhost, databases.mwsu.edu:2048/login?url=http://databases.mwsu.edu:2052/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=134950112&site=ehost-live score=site.

This article over court cases gives out an abundant amount of cases from delaware. DIrected towards anybody that has a case or has had a case and needs helping it, it separates each piece of information. Starts with the rationale for board gender diversity regulations talking about the difference between an equality case and a business case. Next header is called ¨Why corporate governance case¨. It just gives questions over what you should ask when in a court case over gender identity or how to answer questions asked. Next one talks about the delaware cases and why they are going to talk about them. Following that is a list of 6 cases. And then relevant studies that can be incorporated into the essay to give backup information over the many cases.

A lot of this information can be used in the essay in order to give factual information over my topic. I can use the cases, for example the one called, ¨in re del monte foods co. shareholders litigation¨ which was based in 2011. It explores the impediments to board monitoring and accesses merits of monitoring related arguments for board gender diversity. All of the cases are super valid to where the analysis offered insights into the functioning of members of the board and their interaction with management in which they were considered.

Scarborough, William J., et al. “Support of Workplace Diversity Policies: The Role of Race, Gender, and Beliefs about Inequality.” Social Science Research, vol. 79, Mar. 2019, pp. 194–210. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.01.002.

In this peer review journal called, ¨Support of Workplace Diversity Policies: The Role of Race, Gender, and Beliefs about Inequality¨ written by William J. Scarborough. It talks about the workplace diversity policies and how they are more effective when they are supported by managers and workers. They analyzed data from a survey experiment designed to assess public opinion about a range of workplace diversity policies. They examined how support for these policies among employed respondents varies by race, gender, and by the targeted population. All of their findings highlight the role of inequality beliefs in shaping workers support for diversity policies, suggesting directions for future research on how such beliefs are developed.

Much of the information in this can be used in my essay in support of the points I am going to be making. In this essay it says that, ¨Companies are pumping more money and devoting more energy than ever before into efforts to increase and support workplace diversity¨ (Scarborough, para.1). By saying this, Scarborough is proving that even though diversity in the workplace is bad now, it will not always be that way. Information to back this up is present all throughout the peer review journal in ways that will make the essay stand factual.

“There’s a ‘Gender Earnings Gap’ but ‘Paying Women Well’ Won’t Close It.” AEI, www.aei.org/publication/there-really-is-no-gender-wage-gap-there-is-a-gender-earnings-gap-but-paying-women-well-wont-close-that-gap/.

In the article titled, ¨ There really is no ‘gender wage gap.’ There’s a ‘gender earnings gap’ but ‘paying women well’ won’t close that gap¨, written by Carpe Diem goes against what my point is. It talks about the wage gap and pay between women and men in certain jobs. It starts by saying that men and women do slightly different jobs just because that’s what they choose to do, but if they did the same job then they would get paid the same. It then says It’s an important, but overlooked point that there really is no gender wage gap, rather, there’s a gender earnings gap and that pay gap has almost nothing to do with gender discrimination. That is, there is almost no evidence that men and women working in the same position with the same background, education and qualifications are paid differently. Having them doing the exact same jobs, but saying that men will get more money is completely against the law.

An abundant amount of the information in this will help out my article. I could use the line, ¨Therefore, if the goal is to close the gender earnings gap, Sandberg’s solution to start paying women well will fail – men and women are both getting paid well when they both work in the same position and have the same job qualifications¨ (Diem, para.10). This supports it by simply saying that the gender earnings gap will never change and their will always be discrimination in the workplace. Much of the information will be good in supporting an opposition side to gender identity in the workplace going against women.

Verniers, Catherine, and Jorge Vala. “Justifying Gender Discrimination in the Workplace: The Mediating Role of Motherhood Myths.” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 1–23. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0190657.

The article, ¨Justifying gender discrimination in the workplace¨ written by Catherine Verniers and Jorge Vala is one that will support my essay very well. It talks about the issues of gender inequality in employment and how it has rose in policies and in advanced industrial countries. It then goes on to talk about how they were all aimed at tackling gender discrimination regarding the recruitment process, salary between men and women, and promotion. But still gender inequalities in the workplace still continue to occur. In Verniers and Valas research they documented the psychosocial process involved in the persistence of gender discrimination against women in the workplace. With all of their research and documentations they succeeded in making an article over why women stand out in the workplace over men.

This agreeing article supports the claim by giving valid information such as the sentence, ¨There is evidence that gender inequalities in the workplace stem, at least in part, from the discrimination directed against women. Indeed, several studies have documented personal discrimination against women by decision makers¨ (Verniers, par.3). It also has an abundant amount of other information that can fully support what I am going to talk about such as the information listed in paragraphs two and three giving facts over gender identity.

Dellinger, Kirsten, and Christine Williams. Gender and Sexuality in the Workplace: Research in the Sociology of Work Vol 20. Emerald Group Publishing Ltd, 2010.

In the book Gender and Sexuality in the workplace written by Christine Williams and Kirsten Dellinger, gender inequality in the workplace is portrayed in such a way that makes women seem like nothing in comparison to men. It is directed towards women over the age of 25 that feel like they are not getting treated fairly compared to men in the workplace. The book talks about how at one point women were actually getting paid more than men, but instead of rewarding them, it was reported as a problem. It then goes to talking about the different jobs that men and women concentrate in. Along with that is the feminist revolution of of the 1990s transforming the understanding of men’s power in society. This book also tries to get its readers to understand that women are just as powerful as men if you give them a chance to be so.

This book will help in the claim by giving information such that, ¨women developed so called feminine qualities… because they were trapped in jobs where they were required to be submissive, solicitous, and nurturing… put a man in such a job and he too would develop these qualities¨ (Kirsten, Williams, para.5). This piece of information would play a huge part in the essay by giving good ground on the fact that there is discrimination because people do not think that women would fit the criteria of a masculine like job. There are also cases listed in the book that will give proof that there is such thing as gender stereotypes in the workplace still to this day.”

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Open Access

Peer-reviewed

Research Article

Justifying gender discrimination in the workplace: The mediating role of motherhood myths

Contributed equally to this work with: Catherine Verniers, Jorge Vala

Roles Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing

* E-mail: [email protected]

Affiliations Paris Descartes University, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris, France, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

Roles Conceptualization, Funding acquisition, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing

Affiliation Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

• Catherine Verniers, 

• Published: January 9, 2018
• https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190657
• Reader Comments

18 Jul 2018: Verniers C, Vala J (2018) Correction: Justifying gender discrimination in the workplace: The mediating role of motherhood myths. PLOS ONE 13(7): e0201150. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201150 View correction

The issue of gender equality in employment has given rise to numerous policies in advanced industrial countries, all aimed at tackling gender discrimination regarding recruitment, salary and promotion. Yet gender inequalities in the workplace persist. The purpose of this research is to document the psychosocial process involved in the persistence of gender discrimination against working women. Drawing on the literature on the justification of discrimination, we hypothesized that the myths according to which women’s work threatens children and family life mediates the relationship between sexism and opposition to a mother’s career. We tested this hypothesis using the Family and Changing Gender Roles module of the International Social Survey Programme. The dataset contained data collected in 1994 and 2012 from 51632 respondents from 18 countries. Structural equation modellings confirmed the hypothesised mediation. Overall, the findings shed light on how motherhood myths justify the gender structure in countries promoting gender equality.

Citation: Verniers C, Vala J (2018) Justifying gender discrimination in the workplace: The mediating role of motherhood myths. PLoS ONE 13(1): e0190657. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190657

Editor: Luís A. Nunes Amaral, Northwestern University, UNITED STATES

Received: October 6, 2017; Accepted: December 18, 2017; Published: January 9, 2018

Copyright: © 2018 Verniers, Vala. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Data Availability: All relevant data are available from the GESIS Data Archive (doi: 10.4232/1.2620 and doi: 10.4232/1.12661 ).

Funding: This work was conducted at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Portugal, and supported by a travel grant of the European Association for Social Psychology, http://www.easp.eu/ , and a travel grant of the Association pour la Diffusion de la Recherche en Psychologie Sociale, http://www.adrips.org/wp/ , attributed to the first author. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Introduction

The latest release from the World Economic Forum—the Gender Gap Report 2016 [ 1 ]–indicates that in the past 10 years, the global gender gap across education and economic opportunity and politics has closed by 4%, while the economic gap has closed by 3%. Extrapolating this trajectory, the report underlines that it will take the world another 118 years—or until 2133 –to close the economic gap entirely. Gender inequalities are especially blatant in the workplace. For instance, on average women are more likely to work part-time, be employed in low-paid jobs and not take on management positions [ 2 , 3 ].

There is evidence that gender inequalities in the workplace stem, at least in part, from the discrimination directed against women. Indeed, several studies have documented personal discrimination against women by decision makers (for meta-analyses see [ 4 , 5 ], some of them having more specifically examined the role of the decision makers’ level of sexist attitudes on discriminatory practices. For instance, Masser and Abrams [ 6 ] found in an experimental study that the higher the participants scored in hostile sexism, the more they were likely to recommend a male candidate rather than a female one for a managerial position. In spite of consistent evidence that higher sexism is related to greater bias toward working women [ 7 ], little is known regarding the underlying processes linking sexism to discrimination. This question remains an important one, especially because the persistence of gender discrimination contradicts the anti-discrimination rules promoted in modern societies. In fact, the issue of gender equality in employment has given rise to numerous policies and institutional measures in advanced industrial countries, all aimed at tackling gender discrimination with respect to recruitment, promotion and job assignment. In the USA, for instance, the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1963 Equal Pay Act provided the legal foundation for the implementation of anti-discrimination laws within the workplace. The Treaty on the European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, all contain provisions relating to the promotion of equality between women and men in all areas, and the prohibition of discrimination on any ground, including sex. The member states of the European Union must comply with these provisions [ 8 ]. In this respect, some countries have incorporated legislation on equal treatment of women and men into general anti-discrimination laws (e.g., Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, Great Britain), while other countries have opted for a specific gender equality act (e.g., Spain). Comparable policies have been implemented in the Asian-Pacific area, with countries including gender equality into broad anti-discrimination laws (e.g., Australia), and other countries having passed laws especially dedicated to addressing discrimination against women (e.g., Japan, the Philippines). The purpose of this research is to further explore the psychosocial process involved in the stubborn persistence of gender discrimination in the workplace, using a comparative and cross-sectional perspective of national representative samples.

Psychosocial processes involved in justified discrimination

According to several lines of research [ 9 – 13 ], the expression of prejudice in contexts where social and political anti-discrimination values are prevalent implies justifications. Crandall and Eshleman [ 10 ] defined justifications as “any psychological or social process that can serve as an opportunity to express genuine prejudice without suffering external or internal sanction”. According to social dominance theory, justification of practices that sustain social inequality arises through the endorsement of legitimizing myths [ 13 ]. Moreover, research conducted in the field of system justification theory has extensively documented an increased adherence to legitimizing ideologies (including social stereotypes, meritocracy, political conservatism, etc.) in contexts where motivation to justify unequal social arrangements is heightened [ 14 – 17 ]. Relying on this literature Pereira, Vala and Costa-Lopes [ 18 ] provided evidence of the mediational role of myths about social groups on the prejudice-support for discriminatory measures relationship. Specifically, they demonstrated that the myths according to which immigrants take jobs away from the host society members and increase crime rates mediated the relationship between prejudice and opposition to immigration (see also [ 19 ]). We assume that an equivalent mediational process underlies the justification of gender discrimination in the workplace or, put differently, that the sexism-opposition to women’s career relationship is mediated by legitimizing myths. Glick and Fiske [ 20 ] conceptualised sexism as a multidimensional construct that encompasses hostile and benevolent sexism, both of which having three components: paternalism, gender differentiation and heterosexuality. We suspect that the gender differentiation component of sexism in particular may be related to gender discrimination in the workplace, because the maintenance of power asymmetry through traditional gender roles is at the core of this component [ 20 ]. Accordingly, it is assumed that the higher the endorsement of sexist attitudes regarding gender roles in the family, the higher the opposition to women’s work. In support of this assumption, Glick and Fiske [ 21 ] stated that gender roles are part of the more general interdependence between women and men occurring in the context of family relationships and, importantly, that these traditional, complementary gender roles shape sex discrimination. However, given that the expression of hostility towards women became socially disapproved [ 22 , 23 ] and that gender discrimination in the workplace is subjected to sanctions (see for instance [ 24 ]), the release of sexism with regard to women’s role in the family and women’s professional opportunities may require justification [ 10 , 19 ].

Motherhood myths as a justification for gender discrimination

Compared with other intergroup relations, gender relations present some unique features (e.g., heterosexual interdependence; [ 25 , 26 ] and accordingly comprise specific myths and ideologies aimed at maintaining the traditional system of gender relations [ 27 – 29 ]. For instance, the belief that marriage is the most meaningful and fulfilling adult relationship appears as a justifying myth, on which men and women rely when the traditional system of gender relations is challenged by enhanced gender equality measured at the national level [ 30 ]. Drawing on this literature, we propose that beliefs that imbue women with specific abilities for domestic and parental work ensure that the traditional distribution of gender roles is maintained. In particular, we suggest that motherhood myths serve a justification function regarding gender discrimination against women in the workplace. Motherhood myths include the assumptions that women, by their very nature, are endowed with parenting abilities, that at-home mothers are bonded to their children, providing them unrivalled nurturing surroundings [ 31 , 32 ]. Conversely, motherhood myths pathologised alternative mothering models, depicting employed mothers as neglecting their duty of caring, threatening the family relationships and jeopardizing mother-children bondings (see [ 33 ] for a critical review of these myths). Motherhood myths have the potential to create psychological barriers impairing women’s attempt to seek power in the workplace [ 34 ] and men’s involvement in child care [ 35 – 37 ]. We suggest that beyond their pernicious influence at the individual level of parental choices, motherhood myths might operate more broadly as justifications for gender discrimination regarding career opportunity. This question is of particular relevance given that equal treatment in the workplace appears even more elusive for women with children—the maternal wall [ 38 ] (see also [ 39 – 45 ]). At the same time, recognizing the pervasive justifying function of motherhood myths may help understand the psychosocial barriers faced not only by women who are mothers, but by women as a whole since "women are expected to become mothers sooner or later" (Dambrin & Lambert [ 46 ], p. 494; see also [ 47 ]). Relying on previous work documenting the mediational role of legitimizing myths on the prejudice—discrimination relationship [ 18 , 19 ] we suggest that the myths according to which women pursuing a career threaten the well-being of the family mediates the relationship between sexist attitudes regarding gender roles and opposition to women’s work.

Exploring gender and time as possible moderators of the hypothesized mediation

Besides the test of the main mediational hypothesis, the present research sought to explore time and gender as possible moderators of the assumed relationship between sexism, motherhood myths and discrimination. A review of the historical development of gender equality policies confirms that the implementation of laws and regulations aimed at eliminating gender discrimination in the workplace is a lengthy process (e.g., for the European countries see [ 48 ]; for the USA see [ 49 ]). In fact, although the basic principle of anti-discrimination has been enacted by many countries in the second half of the 20 th century, some measures are still adopted nowadays, such as the obligation for employers to publish information by 2018 about their bonuses for men and women as part of their gender pay gap reporting, a provision recently taken by the UK government. As egalitarian principles have gradually progressed in societies, it is likely that the expression of intergroup bias has become steadily subjected to social sanction. Thus, “as with racism, normative and legislative changes have occurred in many industrialized societies that make it less acceptable to express sexist ideas openly” (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, [ 50 ], p. 843; see also [ 51 ]). Accordingly, gender discrimination within organizations became less intense and more ambiguous [ 52 – 54 ]. In line with this reasoning, the use of motherhood myths as a justification for unequal career opportunities may have increased over time. Conversely, it has been suggested that along with the increasing female participation in the labour market over the last decades, a positive attitude regarding the government-initiated women-friendly policies now coexists with an adherence to traditional family values and norms [ 55 ]. There is a possibility that the coexistence of contradictory norms in the same culture may leave some room for the expression of gender bias (i.e., a normative compromise, [ 56 ]), reducing slightly the need to rely on justifications to discriminate against working women. The present research will examine these possibilities by studying the role of motherhood myths on the sexism—discrimination relationship in 1994 and 2012.

Another possible moderator examined in the present study is the respondents' gender. Basically, the reason why people rely on justifications is to express their genuine prejudices without appearing biased. Consistent evidence, however, suggests that the perpetrator’s gender affects people’s perception of sexism towards women: given that sexism is generally conceived as involving a man discriminating against a woman, men are perceived as prototypical of the perpetrator [ 57 , 58 ]. As a consequence, sexist behaviours carried out by males are perceived as more sexist than the same behaviours enacted by females [ 59 , 60 ]. Moreover, the expression of sexism by women may go undetected due to the reluctance of women to recognize that they might be harmed by a member of their own gender group [ 22 ]. Taken together, these findings suggest that a woman is more likely than a man to express sexist bias without being at risk of appearing sexist. In line with this reasoning, one could assume that men need to rely on justifications to discriminate to a greater extent than women do. Alternatively, women expressing sexism against their ingroup members are at risk of being negatively evaluated for violating the prescription of feminine niceness [ 61 , 62 ]. As a consequence, women might be inclined to use justifications to discriminate in order to maintain positive interpersonal evaluations. An additional argument for assuming that women may rely on motherhood myths lies in the system justification motive. According to system justification theory [ 63 , 64 ], people are motivated to defend and justify the status quo, even at the expense of their ingroup. From this perspective, the belief that every group in society possesses some advantages and disadvantages increases the belief that the system is balanced and fair [ 29 , 65 ]. Motherhood myths imbue women with a natural, instinctual and biologically rooted capacity to raise children that men are lacking [ 66 ]. In addition, they convey gender stereotype describing women in positive terms (e.g., considerate, warm, nurturing) allowing a women-are-wonderful perception [ 27 ]. As a consequence, women are likely to rely on motherhood myths to restore the illusion that, despite men structural advantage [ 67 , 68 ], women as a group still possess some prerogatives [ 34 ].

The aim of the present study is to test the main hypothesis (H1) that motherhood myths are a justification that mediates the relationship between sexism and opposition to women’s work following the birth of a child. Additionally, two potential moderators of this mediational process are considered. The present research tests the exploratory hypotheses that (H2) the assumed mediational process is moderated by time and (H3) by participants’ gender. We tested these hypotheses using the Family and Changing Gender Roles module of the International Social Survey Programme [ 69 , 70 ]. This international academic project, based on a representative probabilistic national sample, deals with gender related issues, including attitudes towards women’s employment and household management. Hence this database enables a test of the proposed mediational model on a large sample of female and male respondents and data gathered 18 years apart.

We used the 2012 and 1994 waves of the ISSP Family and Changing Gender Roles cross-national survey [ 69 , 70 ]. The ISSP published fully anonymized data so that individual survey participants cannot be identified. The two databases slightly differed regarding the involved countries, some of which did not participate in the two survey waves. In order to maintain consistency across the analyses, we selected 18 countries that participated in both survey waves (i.e., Austria, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the USA). The data file for the 2012 survey wave included 24222 participants (54.4% female participants), mean age = 49.38, SD = 17.54, and the data file for the 1994 survey wave included 27410 participants (54.4% female participants), mean age = 44.26, SD = 17.07.

The main variables used in this study are the following:

One indicator was used to capture sexism: “A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family”. This item taps into the gender differentiation component of sexism [ 20 , 25 ]. Participants answered on a 5 point likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree. Data was recoded so that the higher scores reflected higher sexism.

Motherhood myths.

Two indicators were used that capture the myths about the aversive consequence of mother’s work for her child and the family: “A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works” and “All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job”. Participants answered on a 5 point likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree. Data was recoded so that the higher scores reflected higher endorsement of motherhood myths.

Opposition to women’s career.

Two indicators were used to capture the opposition to women’s professional career following the birth of a child: “Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time, part-time or not at all when there is a child under school age?” and “Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time, part-time or not at all after the youngest child starts school?” Participants answered on a scale ranging from 1 = work full time, 2 = work part-time, 3 = stay at home.

In addition, the first step of our analyses involved the following control variables: participant’s gender and age, partnership status, educational level, subjective social status, attendance of religious services and political orientation.

The following section presents the results of a four-step analysis: The first step consists of a preliminary hierarchical regression analysis to establish the respective contributions of demographical variables, sexism and motherhood myths to opposition to women’s work. The second step is dedicated to a test of the construct validity of the proposed measurement model using Confirmatory Factor Analyses. The third step involves a test of the hypothesized mediation. Finally, the last step is a test of the hypothesized moderated mediations.

Step 1: Hierarchical regression analysis

Inspection of the correlation matrix ( Table 1 ) indicates that all the correlations are positive, ranging from moderate to strong. The pair of items measuring motherhood myths presents the strongest correlation ( r (48961) = .633), followed by the pair of items measuring opposition to women’s career ( r (45178) = .542).

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https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190657.t001

We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis to establish the respective contributions of demographical variables, sexism and motherhood myths to opposition to women’s work. In block 1, participant’s gender (male = -1, female = 1) and partnership (no partner = -1, partner = 1) were entered together with standardized scores of age, years of schooling, subjective social status, attendance of religious services and political orientation. Block 2 included sexism, the myths about the aversive consequence of mother’s work for her child and for family (all standardized). Predictors in block 1 accounted for 9% of the variance, F (7, 10140) = 157.89, p < .001. The analysis revealed the significant effects of participant’s gender ( B = -.033, SE = .006, p < .001), age ( B = .058, SE = .006, p < .001), years of schooling ( B = -.135, SE = .007, p < .001), subjective social status ( B = -.057, SE = .007, p < .001), religiosity ( B = .076, SE = .006, p < .001) and political orientation ( B = .04, SE = .006, p < .001). Partnership was unrelated to opposition to women’s career ( B = .002, SE = .006, p = .77). Taken together the results indicate that the higher the time of education and the subjective social status, the lower the opposition to women’s work. Conversely, the higher the age, religiosity and political conservatism, the higher the opposition to women’s work. Finally, results indicate that opposition to women’s work is more pronounced amongst men than amongst women. When entered in block 2, sexism and motherhood myths accounted for an additional 18% of the variance, indicating that these variables significantly improved the model’s ability to predict opposition to women’s work, over and above the contributions of gender, partnership, education, social status, religiosity and political orientation (Δ R 2 = .18), Δ F (3, 10137) = 854.04, p < .001. Specifically, the analysis revealed the significant effects of sexism ( B = .151, SE = .006, p < .001), myth about the aversive consequence of mother’s work for her child ( B = .10, SE = .007, p < .001) and myth about the aversive consequence of women’s work for family ( B = .09, SE = .007, p < .001). It should be noted that the effect of participant’s gender virtually disappeared after controlling for sexism and motherhood myths ( Table 2 ). In addition, we performed this hierarchical regression analysis separately for the two waves and consistently found that the variables of our model (sexism and the motherhood myths) explained more variance than the demographical variables.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190657.t002

Step 2: Confirmatory factor analyses

We conducted a CFA to check the construct validity of the proposed measurement model. CFA and subsequent analyses were all performed using R. 3.4.1 and the Lavaan package [ 71 ]. The loading of the single indicator of the sexism variable and the loading of the first indicator of the motherhood myths and opposition variables were constrained to 1.00 [ 72 ], and the three variables were allowed to correlate. Results show a good fit to the data, χ 2 (3, N = 42997) = 400.36, p < .001, CFI = .993, RMSEA = .05 [90% CI = .05, .06], SRMR = .01, AIC = 540804. In addition, we estimated an alternative model in which all items loaded on a unique latent variable. This alternative model shows a poorer fit to the data, χ 2 (5, N = 42997) = 8080.28, p < .001, CFI = .867, RMSEA = .19 [90% CI = .19, .19], SRMR = .07, AIC = 548480. The comparison of the two models indicates that the proposed measurement model fits the data better than the alternative one, Δ χ 2 (2, 42997) = 7679.9, p < .001. We repeated this comparison in each country and results confirm that the proposed measurement model fits better in all countries (see S1 Table for comparative test of the goodness of fit of the hypothesized measurement model vs. alternative measurement model in each country).

We tested the measurement invariance of the CFA model across the two survey waves. To do this, we conducted a model comparison to test for configural and metric invariances. Results indicate that the configural invariance can be retained, χ 2 (6, N = 42997) = 513.05, p < .001, CFI = .991, RMSEA = .06 [90% CI = .05, .06], SRMR = .01, AIC = 537580. When constraining the loadings to be equal across waves fit indices remain satisfactory, χ 2 (8, N = 42997) = 679.58, p < .001, CFI = .989, RMSEA = .06 [90% CI = .05, .06], SRMR = .02, AIC = 537743. The change in CFI is below the cutpoint of .01, indicating that the metric invariance can be retained and that further comparisons of the relationships between constructs across survey waves can be performed [ 73 , 74 ]. Furthermore, we repeated this comparison in each country and results support the configural invariance of the CFA model across survey waves in all countries. In addition, the full metric invariance is obtained in all but three countries—Poland, Slovenia and the USA. In these countries, the CFIs are larger than the cutpoint of .01, indicating a lack of full metric invariance. Nonetheless, we were able to retain a partial metric invariance of the CFA model across the survey waves by setting free one non-invariant loading [ 75 ], (see S2 Table for the test of the invariance of the measurement model across survey waves by country).

We tested the measurement invariance of the CFA model across gender groups using the same procedure as for the test of the measurement invariance across survey waves. The baseline model constraining the factor structure to be equal in the two gender groups shows good fit to the data, χ 2 (6, N = 42943) = 440.95, p < .001, CFI = 0.993, RMSEA = .05 [90% CI = .05, .06], SRMR = .01, AIC = 539573, indicating that the configural invariance is achieved for the two groups. Then we fitted a more restricted model in which the factor loadings were constrained to be equal across groups. This model allows testing for the metric invariance (equal loadings) of the model across gender. Once again, the results indicate that this constrained model show good fit to the data, χ 2 (8, N = 42943) = 469.14, p < .001, CFI = 0.992, RMSEA = .05 [90% CI = .04, .05], SRMR = .01, AIC = 539598. Furthermore, the Δ CFI is below the cutpoint of .01, indicating that the metric invariance can be retained [ 75 ]. This result confirms that cross gender comparisons of the relationships between constructs can reasonably be performed. Furthermore, we repeated this procedure in each country. Once again, the Δ CFIs are below the cutpoint of .01, indicating that the configural invariance of the CFA model across gender groups is achieved in all countries (see S3 Table for the test of the invariance of the measurement model across gender groups by country).

Step 3. Mediation analysis

Overview of the analysis strategy..

This study main hypothesis is that (H1) the more people hold sexist attitude regarding gender roles, the more they endorse motherhood myths, which in turn enhances the opposition to women’s career after the birth of a child. In order to test this assumption, we ran mediational analyses using structural equation modelling. First, we examined the goodness of fit of the hypothesized mediational model and compared it with the goodness of fit of two alternative models. In the first alternative model, motherhood myths predict sexism that, in turn, predicts opposition. In the second alternative model, opposition to women’s career predicts motherhood myths. After having established that the hypothesized model adequately fit the data, we examined the coefficients for the hypothesized relationships between variables.

Goodness of fit of the models.

Inspection of the fit indices indicates that the hypothesized model fits the data better than the first alternative model in 16 out of the 18 analysed countries ( Table 3 ). Thus, in these countries the data is better accounted for by a model stating motherhood myths as a mediator of the sexism-opposition to women’s career relationship, rather than by a model stating sexism as a mediator of the myths-opposition to women’s career relationship. The comparison of the fit indices indicates that the two models fit the data to almost the same extent in the two remaining countries (i.e., Czech Republic, and Philippines). Finally, the second alternative model—where opposition to women’s career predicted motherhood myths and sexism—shows very poor fit to the data in all countries. This result suggests that endorsement of motherhood myths is not a mere consequence of discrimination.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190657.t003

Test of the relationships between variables.

The goodness of fit of the proposed mediational model having been established in 16 countries out of 18, we next examined the coefficients for the hypothesized relationships in these countries. Table 4 shows the results of the mediation analysis in the 16 retained countries. The total effect of sexism on opposition to women’s career is positive and significant in all countries. The direct effect is reduced in all countries when controlling for the indirect effect through motherhood myths. As recommended in the literature, the indirect effects were subjected to follow-up bootstrap analyses using 1000 bootstrapping resamples [ 76 ]. The null hypothesis is rejected and the indirect effect is considered significant if the 95% confidence intervals (CI) do not include zero. All bias corrected 95% CI for the indirect effect excluded zero, indicating that in line with H1, endorsement of motherhood myths is a significant mediator of the relationship between sexism and opposition to women’s career in all countries.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190657.t004

In order to provide an overview of the proposed mediational model, we next present the analyses conducted on the total of the 16 countries retained. The hypothesized mediational model shows acceptable fit to the data, χ 2 (4, N = 38178) = 971.09, p < .001, CFI = .983, RMSEA = .08 [90% CI = .07, .08], SRMR = .04, AIC = 473476. Inspection of the fit indices of the first alternative model where endorsement of motherhood myths predicted sexism that, in turn, predicted opposition confirms that this alternative model shows poorer fit to the data than the proposed model, χ 2 (4, N = 38178) = 7583.1, p < .001, CFI = .870, RMSEA = .22 [90% CI = .21, .22], SRMR = .13, AIC = 480088. The second alternative model, where opposition to women’s career predicted motherhood myths shows poor fit to the data, χ 2 (5, N = 38178) = 14224.61, p < .001, CFI = .756, RMSEA = .27 [90% CI = .26, .27], SRMR = .21, AIC = 486728, and accordingly fits the data less well than the proposed mediational model, Δ χ 2 (1, 38178) = 13254 p < .001. As can be seen in Fig 1 , the standardized regression coefficient for the direct effect of sexism on opposition to women’s career is significant ( β = .16, p < .001). In addition, the unstandardized estimate for the indirect effect excludes zero (.13, SE = 0.003, bias corrected 95% CI [.12, .13]) and, therefore, is significant. Taken together, analyses conducted on the whole sample, as well as on each country separately, support our main assumption that endorsement of motherhood myths is a significant mediator of the relationship between sexism and opposition to women’s career.

The coefficient in parentheses represents parameter estimate for the total effect of prejudice on opposition to women’s career. *** p < .001.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190657.g001

Step 4. Moderated mediation analyses

Indirect effect through survey waves..

The moderated mediation model was estimated using a multiple group approach. This model exhibits good fit to the data, χ 2 (6, N = 38178) = 438.88, p < .001, CFI = .992, RMSEA = .06 [90% CI = .05, .06], SRMR = .01. The standardized coefficients for the total effect are .50 in the 2012 survey, and .52 in the 1994 survey. The unstandardized estimates for the indirect effect is .10, SE = 0.003, bias corrected 95% CI [.10, .11] in the 2012 survey, and .11, SE = 0.003, bias corrected 95% CI [.10, .11] in the 1994 survey. The intervals do not include zero, indicating that motherhood myths are a significant mediator of the relationship between sexism and opposition to women’s career in both survey waves. The difference between the indirect effect in 2012 and 1994 is not significant (-.003, SE = 0.004, bias corrected 95% CI [.-.01, .00]). We repeated the moderated mediation analysis in each country. As can be seen in Table 5 , the indirect effect reaches significance in each survey wave in all countries. The indirect effect is not moderated by the survey year, except in Great Britain where the indirect effect, although still significant, decreased between 1994 and 2012, and Bulgaria, Poland, and Russia where the indirect effect slightly increased between 1994 and 2012.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190657.t005

Indirect effect as a function of the respondents’ gender.

The moderated mediation model exhibits good fit to the data, χ 2 (6, N = 38124) = 402.46, p < .001, CFI = .993, RMSEA = .06 [90% CI = .05, .06], SRMR = .01. The total effect of sexism on opposition to women’s career is positive and significant for both men ( β = .52, p < .001) and women ( β = .50, p < .001). The standardized indirect effect of sexism on opposition to women’s career through motherhood myths is .27 in the male subsample, and .29 in the female subsample. The unstandardized estimates for the indirect effect is .11, SE = 0.003, bias corrected 95% CI [.10, 12] in the male sample, and .10, SE = 0.003, bias corrected 95% CI [.09, .10] in the female sample. The intervals do not include zero, indicating that motherhood myths are a significant mediator of the relationship between sexism and opposition to women’s career among both men and women respondents. The difference between the indirect effect among men and women is not statistically significant (.01, SE = 0.004, bias corrected 95% CI [.00, .01]). We repeated this analysis in each country separately (see Table 6 ). Results confirm that the indirect effect of sexism on opposition to women’s career through motherhood myths is not moderated by the respondents’ gender in 15 out of the 16 countries. The only exception is Poland. In this country, the indirect effect is stronger for the female than for the male respondents.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190657.t006

Using a large representative sample of respondents from various countries the present research documented a psychosocial process of justification of discrimination against working women with children. As a preliminary step, hierarchical regression analysis established that sexism and motherhood myths predict opposition to women’s work, over and above gender, partnership, education, social status, religiosity and political orientation. Furthermore, structural equation modellings on the whole sample, as well as on each country separately, confirmed our main hypothesis that endorsement of motherhood myths mediates the relationship between sexism and opposition to women’s career following a birth. In addition, test of the moderated mediation indicated that the indirect effect reaches significance in each survey wave in almost all countries examined without substantial difference. Only in Bulgaria, Poland, and Russia did the indirect effect slightly increase between 1994 and 2012, suggesting that motherhood myths is more a justification for the expression of sexism nowadays than in the late 20 th century. Great Britain shows a reverse pattern with a slight decrease of the indirect effect between the two waves. However, besides these minor variations, it should be noted that motherhood myths remain a significant mediator of the sexism-opposition to women’s career relationship in all countries. The present research also considered participants' gender as a potential moderator of the indirect effect, and results indicated that the process of justification of discrimination against working women does not differ as a function of the respondents' gender. The only exception to this finding is Poland where the indirect effect is indeed stronger among women than among men. An examination of the specific features of female employment in this country sheds some light on this result. Young women in Poland are better educated than young men and are more likely to have permanent employment than men [ 77 ]. At the same time however, working women spend on average two and a half hours per day on unpaid work more than men—which is reflected by the fact that more than 1 in 3 women reduce their paid hours to part-time, while only 1 in 10 men do the same—and are predominant users of parental leave [ 3 ]. It is noteworthy that reduced working hours (and long periods of leave) hinders female career progression through less training, fewer opportunities for advancement, occupational segregation, and lower wages [ 78 , 79 ]. Accordingly, in Poland women earn 9% less than men (one of the lowest gender pay gap in OECD) but the pay gap reaches 22% by presence of children (above the OECD average of 16%; [ 77 ]). The fact that women appear even more inclined than men to rely on motherhood myths to justify gender discrimination is consistent with a system justification perspective [ 63 ]. Drawing on the logic of cognitive dissonance theory, system justification theory in its strong form posits that members of disadvantaged groups may be even more likely than members of advantaged groups to support existing social inequalities [ 64 ]. The rational is that members of disadvantaged groups would experience psychological discomfort stemming from the concurrent awareness of their ingroup's inferiority within the system, and of their ingroup's contribution to that system. Justification of the status quo would therefore reduce dissonance [ 80 ]. The finding that women strongly rely on motherhood myths to justify gender discrimination precisely in a country with strong motherhood penalty can be regarded as an expression of this system justification motive.

The present research sheds new light on the effect of macrolevel inequality on the justification of discrimination, and more broadly on the process of legitimation of gender inequalities [ 9 , 81 ]. In a recent study, Yu and Lee [ 82 ] found a negative association between women’s relative status in society and support for gender equality at home. More specifically, the authors found that although respondents in countries with smaller gender gaps express greater support for women’s participation in the labour force, they still exhibit less approval for egalitarian gender roles within the household, in particular regarding the share of domestic chores and childcare. As an explanation, the authors argued that the less traditional the gender division of labour is in a society, the more people need to express their freedom of maintaining these roles and to defend the gender system, leading to the endorsement of gender differentiation in the private sphere. However, the present research allows an alternative explanation for this seemingly paradoxical finding to be suggested. At a macrolevel, higher gender equality conveys strong suppressive factors (which reduce the expression of prejudice) by demonstrating that the society promotes egalitarianism between women and men. In parallel, the gender specialization in the division of the household responsibilities and especially regarding childcare provides a strong justifying factor (which releases prejudice) by emphasising essential differences between gender groups [ 26 ]. Thus, the counterintuitive finding that the more egalitarian a society is, the less people support gender equality at home may indeed reflect an attempt to justify the release of genuine sexism. Conversely, it is likely that a less egalitarian society brings with it some degree of tolerance towards gender discrimination, reducing the need to rely on justifications to express sexism. A closer look at our results regarding Norway and Japan supports this view. Norway and Japan appears as especially contrasted regarding gender equality, in particular with regard to economic participation and opportunity [ 1 ]. According to the World Economic Forum, Norway has the second smallest gender gap in the world. In addition, gender equality promotion is frequently mobilised both in political debates and in mainstream society [ 55 ]. For its part, Japan ranks 101 st on the overall gender gap index, which makes Japan well below average compared to other advanced industrial countries [ 83 ]. Besides this gender gap, consistent research reports a unique trivialisation of anti-gender equality discourses in the media [ 84 ] and of gender-based discriminatory behaviours in the workplace, including sexual harassment [ 85 ]. Comparing the strength of the indirect effect of sexism on opposition to women’s career through motherhood myths in these two countries ( Table 4 ), it is noteworthy that the coefficient is larger in Norway than in Japan. This result gives support to the assumption that macrolevel gender (in)equality affects the psychological process of justification at the individual level. Future studies should clarify how macrolevel inequalities impact societal norms, which in turn influence legitimation processes.

It is also worth noting that the justifying function of motherhood myths is established in all analysed countries despite some notable differences between parental leaves policies and practices. For instance, the United States are the only OECD country to offer no nationwide entitlement to paid leave, neither for mothers nor for fathers [ 86 ]. On the other hand, the Nordic nations, with Norway and Sweden in the lead, are in the vanguard of progressive policy-making regarding shared parental leave entitlement: Sweden was the first country in the world in 1974 to offer fathers the possibility of taking paid parental leave, quickly joined by Norway in 1978 [ 87 ]. More recently in 2007, Germany introduced a new law aiming at encouraging shared parental leave. In practice, the length of the financial support for parental leave can increase from 12 to 14 months provided that fathers use the parental benefit for at least 2 months. Recent research aiming at investigating whether German men who take parental leave are judged negatively in the workplace revealed that, in contrast with women who experience penalty for motherhood [ 40 ], fathers do not face backlash effect when they take a long parental leave [ 88 ]. The authors concluded that "gender role attitudes have changed". Tempering this view, the present study indicates that even in countries promoting incentives for fathers to take parental leave, motherhood myths—and specifically the belief that mother's work threatens the family—are still a justification for gender discrimination in the workplace. With regard to practices, it should be noted that shared parental leave policies, whose purpose is to foster gender equality in the labor market, often fail to meet this objective, with the majority of fathers actually taking the minimum length of leave entitlement, or no parental leave at all, and the majority of mothers still facing the majority of childcare [ 88 ]. Once again, more research is needed to document the process of mutual influences between changing family policies and the maintenance of the gender status quo via justifying beliefs.

Limitations and future directions

Although the hypothesized mediational process is supported by the data, and is in line with previous experimental findings [ 19 ], conclusion regarding causality are necessarily limited due to the correlational nature of the research. We hope that these preliminary findings will open the way to experimental studies allowing for a conclusion on the direction of causality between variables and the further documenting of the behavioural consequences of the endorsement of motherhood myths. For instance, future studies should consider the extent to which motherhood myths interact with organizational norms to constrain the hiring and promotion of women. Castilla and Benard [ 89 ] showed that when an organization explicitly values meritocracy, managers favour a male employee over an equally qualified female employee. One explanation for this seemingly paradoxical results lies in the legitimation function of meritocracy [ 17 ] which is likely to release the expression of sexism. We suggest that when organizations promote egalitarian norms, or put differently, when organizations set suppression factors, then motherhood myths may serve as a justification for unequal gender treatment regarding career outcomes.

Due to constraints related to the availability of data in the ISSP base, only one indicator was used to capture sexism. This can be regarded as a limitation providing that sexism is typically defined as a complex construct [ 20 ]. We argue that measuring the gender differentiation component of sexism through a single item represents a valid approach, as suggested by previous research indicating that single-item measures may be as reliable as aggregate scales [ 90 – 94 ]. However, using a multiple-item measure of sexism in future studies would provide a more comprehensive examination of the relations between the different components of sexism and opposition to gender equality in the workplace.

The present research focused on opposition to mothers' work as an indicator of gender discrimination. However, evidence suggests that motherhood myths may justify discrimination towards women as a whole rather than mothers only. First, as previously mentioned social roles create gender expectations [ 95 ] so that all women are expected to become mothers [ 47 ]. Furthermore, research using implicit association test indicate that people automatically associate women with family role [ 96 ]. As a consequence, it is plausible that employers rely on motherhood myths to discriminate against women in general regarding recruitement, performance evaluation, and rewards, arguing that women will sooner or later be less involved in work and less flexible for advancement than men [ 97 ]. This justification is compatible with the employers' reluctance to hire women and promote them to the highest positions even in the absence of productivity differences [ 98 ].

Practical implications

In this study we were able to document that motherhood myths are a widespread justification for gender discrimination in the workplace, including in countries with anti-discrimination laws and advanced family policies. From this regard, the present findings help understand the paradoxical effects of family-friendly policies on women's economic attainment. Mandel and Semyonov [ 99 ], using data from 20 countries, found evidence that family policies aimed at supporting women's economic independence, and including provision of childcare facilities and paid parental leaves, increase rather than decrease gender earning gaps. This unexpected effect is due to the fact that family policies are disproportionally used by mothers rather than fathers, with the consequence that mothers are concentrated in part-time employment, female-typed occupations, yet underrepresented in top positions. The authors concluded that "there are distinct limits to the scope for reducing gender wage inequality in the labor market as long as women bear the major responsibility for household duties and child care" (p. 965). We would add that there are strong barriers to the scope for attaining gender equality at home as long as motherhood myths are uncritically accepted and used as justification for unequal gender arrangements. Recent works provided evidence of the efficiency of interventions aimed at reducing sexist beliefs [ 100 ] and at recognizing everyday sexism [ 101 ]. In the same vain, interventions aimed at informing people that motherhood myths are socially constructed and maintained [ 33 ], and that they affect women's advancement and fathers' involvement [ 35 ], would represent a first step towards the reduction of discrimination by depriving individuals of a justification for gender inequalities.

The present research builds on and extends past findings by demonstrating that men and women rely on the belief that women’s work threatens the well-being of youth and family to justify discrimination against working women. If, at an individual level, this process allows discrimination to be exhibited without appearing prejudiced [ 10 ], at the group and societal levels, such a process may contribute to the legitimation and reinforcement of the hierarchical power structure [ 63 ]. By documenting a pervasive process by which people invoke motherhood myths to hinder women’s economic participation, the present research emphasizes the need to be vigilant about any attempts to promote a return to traditional gender roles, an issue of central importance given the contemporary rollback of women’s rights in advanced industrial countries [ 102 ].

Supporting information

S1 table. comparative test of the goodness of fit of the hypothesized measurement model vs. alternative measurement model..

All differences are significant at p < .001.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190657.s001

S2 Table. Test of the invariance of the measurement model across survey waves by country.

In Poland and Slovenia partial metric invariance of the measurement model was attained by setting free the loading of the item “ Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time , part-time or not at all after the youngest child starts school ?” on the “opposition” latent variable. This partly constrained model show good fit indices in Poland, χ 2 (7, N = 2248) = 36.18, p = .006, CFI = .990, RMSEA = .06 [90% CI = .04, .08], and Slovenia, χ 2 (7, N = 1867) = 12.92, p = .058, ns , CFI = .999, RMSEA = .03 [90% CI = .00, .05]. In the USA, partial metric invariance of the measurement model was attained by setting free the loading of the item “ All in all , family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job ” on the “motherhood myths” latent variable, χ 2 (7, N = 2117) = 11.08, p = .069, ns , CFI = .999, RMSEA = .02 [90% CI = .00, .04].

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190657.s002

S3 Table. Test of the invariance of the measurement model across gender groups by count.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190657.s003

S1 Supplementary Information. Additional details concerning the way the research was conducted.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190657.s004

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to Virginie Bonnot, Cícero Pereira, and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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Women are advancing in the workplace, but women of color still lag behind

A little over 100 years ago, the U.S. Congress ratified the 19th amendment, which ruled that women could not be denied the right to vote because of their sex. This amendment was the result of hard-fought efforts from many women (and some men) who recognized that disenfranchisement then, as now, was a blight on the nation and hindered the U.S.’s potential to achieve its stated goals of becoming a functioning democracy. The 19th amendment was especially significant for Black women who, despite the 15th amendment’s promises of voting rights regardless of race, still could not vote because of their gender. The fact that it took two different constitutional amendments—passed a half century apart—to secure Black women’s right to vote underscores how both race and gender have always mattered in significant ways when it comes to women of color.

A century later, race and gender continue to create divergent and uneven outcomes for women of all races and for men of color. This is particularly evident in the underrepresentation and experiences of women employed in professional occupations. An oft-cited statistic, for instance, reveals that as a result of factors including, but not limited to, motherhood penalties, gender discrimination, and occupational segregation, women make 79 cents for every dollar men earn. But Black women earn only 64 cents on the dollar, and for Latinas it is a dismal 54 cents. As it was in the early 20th century, women of color continue to experience occupational and economic disadvantages that reflect the ways both race and gender affect their work experiences.

How do racism and sexism impact women of color in professional settings? Research indicates that both factors adversely affect women in a variety of occupations through stifled leadership opportunities, the ongoing persistence of specific forms of sexual harassment, and subtle but pervasive doubts about competence, intelligence, and skill that are unrelated to actual performance.

For instance, in today’s professional occupations, networks, mentors, and connections play important roles in advancement. Research indicates that Black women are more ambitious and more likely to say that they want to advance in their companies than their white women counterparts, but are less likely to find mentors who will aid their climb up the corporate ladder. As sociologist Tsedale Melaku points out , sometimes this is a function of white executives’ unfamiliarity and discomfort with Black women. As one attorney in Melaku’s study notes, executives who rarely, if ever, have Black people in their personal or professional circles may be uncertain or uncomfortable interacting with them as peers. Other times, this lack of mentoring is a consequence of intentional exclusion when leaders make it a point not to include Black women in teams, as mentees, or on important projects. But either way, these patterns thwart Black women’s mobility in organizations and their ability to realize ambitions and secure leadership roles. And Black women are left to struggle harder to access and advance in these professions, with occupational underrepresentation and wage disparities to show for it.

It is important to note that these issues are not limited to Black women. In a recent study, sociologist Margaret Chin finds that Asian American women experience racialized and gendered forms of sexual harassment that leads to isolation and results in exclusion from leadership opportunities. Latinas, too, find that coworkers may interact with them based on stereotypes that they are unintelligent or illegally in the country, depictions that then require extra work to disprove.

Women of color are usually underrepresented in professional, high status jobs in law, medicine, academia, and business. When they do make it to these rarified roles but are the only ones in an organizational setting, they are more likely to doubt the company’s commitment to inclusion and equity and thus are more likely to want to pursue opportunities elsewhere.

Yet we know that when companies put measures into place that focus on achieving more gender diversity, women of color often lose out unless there is an explicit focus on race as well as gender. Affirmative action policies put into place in the wake of the civil rights movement have disproportionately benefited white women, and this is certainly true in today’s workplaces. This is not to say that white women face an easy road, particularly in professions that are disproportionately dominated by men. But race and racism create specific, unique challenges for women of color that are too easily ignored with broad platitudes that seek to advance women’s representation without questioning which women are most likely to benefit.

My recent book, Flatlining: Race, Work, and Health Care in the New Economy , highlights how some of these intersections of race and gender impact health care professionals. Black women doctors in my study observed that both race and gender were key factors that shaped the challenges they face in the field. Despite being 7% of the U.S. population, Black women are a paltry 3% of medical doctors today, a disparity that has devastating consequences for health equity in a rapidly diversifying society. Working in a profession dominated by men, Black women doctors are very attuned to the ways that sexism impacts their lives. For instance, nearly every Black woman doctor with whom I spoke shared accounts of being mistaken for a nurse rather than a doctor, so much so that they argued that when it came to their everyday interactions, gender was a much more significant factor than race. As Ayana, a neonatologist, put it, “I see my coworkers that are males and the race doesn’t matter. If you’re male, they will call you a doctor. If you’re female, they will call you a nurse. But it’s regardless of your race. I see my white coworkers, even just because they’re female they still call them nurse.”

Race and racism create specific, unique challenges for women of color that are too easily ignored with broad platitudes that seek to advance women’s representation without questioning which women are most likely to benefit.

However, this unfortunately common microaggression—and the fact that, for women doctors, it transcends race—does not mean that Black women were oblivious to or shielded from racism in the medical profession. In fact, they astutely noted that structural factors also established a context that perpetuated racial disparities in the field. Bella, a geneticist, pointed out that she entered into her field with the intention of reducing racial health disparities. However, the extremely low numbers of Black doctors in her specialty area put her at a disadvantage when it came to finding mentors who could guide her in that goal, as most of her white senior colleagues did not share her focus on providing genetic services to Black populations who might otherwise be overlooked and ignored. Bella told me, “I find it difficult to identify mentors or people who are familiar with those populations, people who are also passionate about educating those populations about genetic services or resources. So I have not really had much luck identifying people who are working with those populations who can help me better address some of the needs or some of the disparities that I see.”

Black women in other health care professions faced different challenges. In fact, one of the most interesting findings from my study was how much Black workers’ experiences varied depending on the occupations in which they were employed. While Black women doctors encountered persistent, daily gender biases that occurred in the context of structural, racialized barriers—both of which made advancement in the profession difficult—Black women nurses reported few instances with gender biases and instead described routine, frequent, and explicitly racist encounters with colleagues. Nurses were not employed in a culturally masculinized space like Black doctors, but in the absence of overt gender bias, they dealt with racist interactions with white coworkers. Melinda, a nurse who primarily tended to new mothers in the postpartum unit of a hospital, recounted one such interaction with a colleague. While discussing an upcoming after-work gathering, a coworker informed Melinda that she would only be welcome in this colleague’s home if she was there to clean it. As Melinda shared, “[She] actually said to me, we were talking about after work getting together, hanging out, and said, ‘Oh, you can come to my house, but you’d have to be carrying a pail and wearing a rag on your head to come to my home.’”

And these experiences still varied from those of Black women technicians, who did not describe overt, explicitly gendered biases in their work. Rather, they described friction with (mostly white) women nurses who, stressed out by policies that encouraged overwork and emboldened by a lack of organizational restraint, assigned them extra work that was not delegated to white colleagues. Amber put it this way: “The nurses are always full throttle. When they answer the phone, I can guarantee you, there’s always an attitude.” Though Amber experienced tensions with nurses, these difficulties were not synonymous with what Black women nurses and doctors described. Thus, even in spaces where Black workers are underrepresented, it is critical not to assume that they all share common experiences.

These intersecting factors help highlight some of the common challenges Black women workers encounter, but they also underscore that policies designed to improve gender parity in workplaces will not be successful if they ignore the ways that the issues women face in the workplace are also shaped by race, as well as other factors—citizenship, occupational status, sexual identity, and more. This also applies to companies that profess their commitment to achieving racial equity and state their opposition to systemic racism, as many are now doing in the wake of national protests against racial inequality. It remains to be seen whether these companies will take the long-term, sustained, comprehensive actions that would be necessary to make the changes they now say they wish to see. But it’s also clear that without a comparable commitment to identifying and resolving the challenges women of all races face in the modern workplace, these efforts cannot succeed either.

The good news is that there is some research that documents ways that organizations—both in health care and in other industries—can become more equitable. Changing hiring practices so that organizations pair with institutions that are known for training workers of color is a first step. For instance, universities like Meharry Medical College and Xavier University in New Orleans produce a disproportionate number of Black students who go on to become physicians. Organizations can partner with places like these that are renowned for training skilled Black workers. Additionally, collecting data to understand what challenges and obstacles their employees are facing, particularly those from underrepresented groups, is important as well. Companies can also directly involve managers in developing solutions, rather than tinkering around the edges of existing policies. Organizations can also enact paid leave for all workers—or better yet, lobby for federal policies ensuring paid sick and parental leave policies, so that these policies are available to all workers regardless of their place of employment. And companies can change aspects of their culture that allow sexual harassment to flourish, since, as the #MeToo movement has shown us, this is a major problem for many vulnerable workers in virtually every industry.

Ultimately, race and gender continue to matter in complicated, intersecting ways for women workers today. While the U.S. has undoubtedly made some key social progressions since women finally achieved suffrage in 1920, we run the risk of hindering further gains if we fail to learn the lessons from that time. As we continue to develop various initiatives and policies to reflect a rapidly diversifying population, it’s important to not to repeat the mistakes of the past by again leaving women of color ignored and overlooked.

This piece is part of 19A: The Brookings Gender Equality Series.  Learn more about the series and read published work »

About the Author

Adia harvey wingfield, professor of sociology – washington university in st. louis, more from the 19a series.

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Gender inequality in the workplace: The fight against bias

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The fight against gender discrimination

What does it look like today?

Steps managers can take to eliminate gender inequality in organizations

Steps employees can take to combat gender inequality.

True gender equality is intersectional

The Equal Pay Day , a symbolic event created to highlight wage inequity, fell on March 24 this year. This day shows how far into the year — 83 more days in 2021 — women need to work just to be able to earn the same that men earned in the previous year. Gender inequality in the workplace isn’t limited to unequal wages, either. Women, especially black women, LGBTQ+ women, and women of color, continue to face barriers to move into leadership positions and are likely to face microaggressions — offensive statements or insensitive questions — related to race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual identity. Leaders need to close gender gaps in career advancement and eliminate workplace discrimination . There are concrete ways to achieve this ideal — transparent salaries, flexible work options, training opportunities for women, and a focus on well-being and mental health. Employees, too, can play a part in ensuring gender equity on all fronts by becoming allies , speaking up against instances of discrimination, and giving honest feedback to leaders. Before we lay down some tactics to combat gender inequality, let’s take a look at how and when the first steps were taken.

The fight against gender discrimination started in the 19th century

In 1872, Belva Ann Lockwood , an attorney, persuaded the U.S. Congress to pass a law guaranteeing equal pay for women employed as federal employees. Nearly a century later, t he Equal Pay Act was passed in 1963, making it law to pay equal wages to men and women in all workplaces. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 granted equal rights to women in all areas of employment and was amended in 1991 to allow women to sue employers for sexual harassment. Despite the federal law against gender inequality and discrimination, it creeps into workplaces in insidious ways. While some progress has been made, gender inequality continues to persist even today .

Gender inequality in the workplace: What does it look like today?

Gender inequality in the workplace takes many forms — unequal pay, disparity in promotions, incidents of sexual harassment, and racism. Often, it presents itself in more nuanced ways, like fewer opportunities for women who are mothers and a higher incidence of burnout in women.

Unequal pay

Equal pay for men and women is still not a reality. In 2020, women earned 84% of what men earned for the same job, and Black and Latina women earned even less . This gender pay gap has persisted over the past years, shrinking by just 8 cents in 25 years. There are multiple reasons to blame, including “sticky floors” that result from traditional social norms that keep women from choosing higher-paying roles and male-dominated industries, unequal access to education, and discrimination.

In addition, women, especially those living intersectional realities like transgender and immigrant women, grapple with a fear of negotiating pay and being penalized if they do. One recent study questioned this idea and found that women ask for pay raises just as often as men, but they get it only 15% of the time as compared to 20% when men ask.

Barriers to Promotion

There is a “ broken rung ” at the manager level: “For every 100 men promoted to manager, only 86 women are promoted.” This problem is compounded at higher levels of leadership: fewer women managers means there are fewer candidates to promote to heads of department, directors, and C-suite positions, too. You can see this lack of representation clear as day: 62% of C-suite positions are held by white men, compared with 20% taken up by white women (greater than the 13% occupied by men of color) and a mere 4% by women of color.

Plus, managers frequently identify candidates for employment opportunities by relying on their personal networks for recommendations, which usually consists of “people like them” (same gender, race, identity ). This further perpetuates the imbalance in representation.

Bias against mothers

Mothers, and women of child-bearing age, are less likely to receive a callback from hiring managers, even when their résumés are identical to the résumés of male applicants or childless women. This points to gender biases rooted in the “work/family narrative,” which views women through the caregiver/mother lens. The (erroneous) conclusion is that their devotion to family and childcare makes them less committed and unable to put in long hours like their male counterparts, especially at high-level jobs. The pandemic’s “gender effect” dealt a further blow, driving nearly 2 million women , especially mothers with young children, to consider downshifting their careers or leaving the workforce.

Higher burnout in women

Research shows that more women than men, especially in higher-up positions, are burned out and dealing with constant stress in the work environment. The pandemic nearly doubled the burnout gap between men and women. This makes women more prone to accepting “accommodations” like part-time work or internal roles that further derail their careers and contribute to gender inequality.

Incidents of sexual harassment

Thirty-five percent of women in the U.S. experience sexual harassment at some point during their careers: a sign that sexism is overlooked in the workplace. Sexual harassment could also be a direct side effect of disparity in pay and promotions. Following the #MeToo movement that started in October 2017, incidents of sexual coercion and unwanted sexual attention declined . But there has been a sharp increase in hostility towards women — a survey uncovered that gender harassment (sexist remarks and inappropriate stories from male colleagues) spiked to 92% in 2018, from 76% in 2016.

Experiences in racism

Compared to white women, women of color and women with marginalized identities face a higher rate of disrespectful and “othering” microaggressions like being questioned or interrupted. Women of color also do not have active allies at work. White employees think of themselves as allies to women of color, but less than half actually take even basic actions like calling out bias or rallying for new opportunities for women of color. Often, this is because white "allies" and women of color have very different ideas of what’s helpful.

According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2020 , none of us will see gender equality during our lifetimes. Before the pandemic, the report estimated it would take us 99.5 years to achieve gender parity. The Covid-19 pandemic set us back by a whole generation — the 2021 report states that the gender gap will not close for 135.6 years because it impacted women (especially mothers, black women, and senior women) harder than men. However, these predictions are based on the current state of gender inequality. We can start making a meaningful impact now to bridge the gap:

1. Educate employees on unconscious gender bias

Everyone can have unconscious biases and prejudices about people or groups. Offer implicit bias training through the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to managers to make them aware of these hidden biases towards minorities so that they can actively avoid discriminatory behavior and make more informed decisions to promote gender equality.

2. Appoint diverse interviewers and implement longer shortlists to hire more women in top positions

Research shows that an extended shortlist of candidates for open positions creates more gender diversity because it pushes managers to think beyond the gender stereotypes associated with a role. Train Human Resources managers on how to make these types of longer shortlists when hiring, especially for male-dominated roles, so that more women get recruited in top positions. Take steps to ensure interviewer diversity when reviewing résumés and conducting interviews. Research shows that women are more attracted to roles when they see that the interviewer is a woman.

3. Conduct an audit and make salaries transparent

Conduct a company-wide audit to ensure that men and women in the same roles get paid equally. Use the findings to adjust salaries and close any gender wage gaps . In 2013, Buffer adopted complete transparency and disclosed all salaries . As a result, their job applications rose from 1,263 in the 30 days before the announcement to 2,886 in the next month, expanding the talent pool.

4. Give employees the flexibility to work when and where works for them

The pandemic has proven that remote work is equally, if not more, productive . Provide flexibility in when and where employees can work. For women, this flexibility in work hours can prove to be a “critical enabler” of retention in the workforce because it allows them to maintain a work-life balance. However, if your organization follows a hybrid model, beware of falling prey to presenteeism , where men who choose to go to an office may be more ‘visible’ at work and therefore disproportionately rewarded.

5. Provide development opportunities to enable women to transition to higher-skilled roles

Provide women with opportunities to learn new skills and become more tech-savvy. Between 40 million and 160 million women globally are estimated to transition to higher-skilled jobs by 2030, which could lead them to more productive and better-paying work. Prioritizing women’s advancement has many benefits for organizations, too, including high revenue growth, more innovation, and increased customer satisfaction.

6. Empower women through coaching sessions

Women are disproportionately affected by Covid-19, and coaching empowers them to stay and advance in the workforce. But there is a gender gap in access to coaching , too. Provide women with regular coaching sessions so they can build skills and develop the mindsets they need to thrive, especially in leadership roles. BetterUp Labs coached 440 women across different organizations and found that the coaching sessions helped women achieve giant strides in self-awareness, inclusive leadership , and overall employee experience.

7. Provide resources to improve well-being and mental health

At any given time, 55% of the workforce is languishing . Make mental fitness part of the company culture by modeling empathy and training managers to be more empathetic. Offer personalized support to meet women where they are at and help them grow in their careers .

8. Establish mentor-mentee relationships

Give employees scheduled time to participate in mentoring programs . Mentoring programs benefit the mentor as much as the mentee, according to a recent study . Provide opportunities for women to take up mentoring positions because it helps them see themselves as leaders and role models. There’s another benefit when women mentor men — it helps to eliminate gender bias .

9. Offer at least 4 months for paid parental leave

Paid time off to nurture a new child has immense health and career benefits. Establish generous policies for maternity leave, with a minimum of four months . Provide separate parental leave for fathers, like Sweden and Iceland , to encourage men to take time off and share in household responsibilities as well as let women back into the workforce.

Employees, too, can play an active role in advancing gender equality in their workplaces. Individuals who are proactive at work help in creating a better future and prevent the recurrence of existing problems.

1. Participate in DEIB initiatives at your organization

DEIB initiatives benefit everyone in the workplace. When you participate in DEIB initiatives , you can bring your own experience and use it to promote change. Even if you are not part of an underrepresented group, using your voice to help others who may be facing barriers helps you grow too .

2. Call out instances of gender discrimination or biases

Just like the #MeToo movement started with one instance of speaking out against sexual harassment, taking a stand even if you are alone can bring about lasting change and empower others to speak up.

3. Join or build a women’s Employee Resource Group

ERG groups help develop internal leaders, educate employees, and have a positive impact on retention. Join or create an ERG to help build psychologically safe spaces for women, women with disabilities, women of color, and LGBTQ+ women.

4. Become a mentor to women and women of color

Your lived experiences are far more valuable and truthful than any other resources provided to other women in the workforce. Use them to share lessons while mentoring women.

5. Provide honest feedback to leaders on their gender inequality initiatives

Employee feedback on initiatives around advancing gender equality can be a driver of change. Be honest with your employers about what’s working and what’s not.

We won't achieve true gender equality until it is intersectional

“All inequality is not created equal,” Kimberlé Crenshaw said, pointing to the fact that varied and overlapping identities compound experiences of discrimination. Some women experience discrimination based on their gender, while other women may face, in addition to gender, inequalities arising from race, ability, sexual orientation, caste, and class. Even Equal Pay Day is not equal for all women : white women may have had to work until March 24, 2021, to make as much as their male counterparts did in 2020, but Black women would have to work until August 3, 2021, to earn what men did in 2020, and Latina women, until October 21, 2021. Until workplaces acknowledge these complex layers and make systemic changes, gender equality will remain a distant dream. Learn how BetterUp can help your organization support women and underrepresented groups and help change behavior and culture across the organization.

Thrive in your workplace

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Maggie Wooll, MBA

Maggie Wooll is a researcher, author, and speaker focused on the evolving future of work. Formerly the lead researcher at the Deloitte Center for the Edge, she holds a Bachelor of Science in Education from Princeton University and an MBA from the University of Virginia Darden School of Business. Maggie is passionate about creating better work and greater opportunities for all.

Women in the workplace: The millenary fight against gender bias

What gender inclusive means, and why your use of pronouns matters, work has changed in countless ways, but gender bias persists, defining the gender gap in coaching: what it is and how to fix it, superhero-ines: 3 skills women use to conquer obstacles at work, many working parents feel guilt, but some groups feel it more than others, what’s the deal with gender pronouns why language matters, how performance reviews can reinforce gender bias: 5 steps to avoid it, managers say men and women differ in these five areas: is it true, similar articles, supportive managers boost lgbtqia+ professional confidence by 39%, 9 ways to promote equity in the workplace (and how to lead by example), breaking the glass ceiling at work and unleashing your potential, women experience increased stress in male-dominated industries, stay connected with betterup, get our newsletter, event invites, plus product insights and research..

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Why Aren’t We Making More Progress Towards Gender Equity?

• Elisabeth Kelan

Research on how “gender fatigue” is holding us back.

Despite many of the advances we’ve made toward gender equality in the past few decades, progress has been slow. Research shows that one reason may be that many managers acknowledge that the bias exists in general but fail to recognize it in their daily workplace interactions. This “gender fatigue” means that people aren’t motivated to make change in their organizations. Through ethnographic studies and interviews across industries, the author identified several rationalizations managers use to deny gender inequality. First, they assume it happens elsewhere, at a competitor, for example, but not in their own organization. Second, they believe that gender inequality existed in the past but is no longer an issue. Third, they point to the initiatives to support women as evidence that inequality has been addressed. Last, when they do see incidents of discrimination, they reason that the situation had nothing to do with gender. Until we stop denying inequality exists in our own organizations, it will be impossible to make progress.

Organizations have worked towards achieving gender equality for decades. They’ve invested resources into developing women’s careers. They’ve implemented bias awareness training. Those at the top, including many CEOs, have made public commitments to make their workplaces more fair and equitable. And, still, despite all of this, progress towards gender equality has been limited. In fact, many managers struggle to recognize gender inequalities in daily workplace interactions.

• EK Elisabeth Kelan is a Professor of Leadership and Organisation and a Leverhulme Trust Major Research Fellow at Essex Business School at University of Essex in the United Kingdom.

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Gender inequality as a barrier to economic growth: a review of the theoretical literature

• Open access
• Published: 15 January 2021
• Volume 19 , pages 581–614, ( 2021 )

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• Manuel Santos Silva 1 &
• Stephan Klasen 1  

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In this article, we survey the theoretical literature investigating the role of gender inequality in economic development. The vast majority of theories reviewed argue that gender inequality is a barrier to development, particularly over the long run. Among the many plausible mechanisms through which inequality between men and women affects the aggregate economy, the role of women for fertility decisions and human capital investments is particularly emphasized in the literature. Yet, we believe the body of theories could be expanded in several directions.

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1 Introduction

Theories of long-run economic development have increasingly relied on two central forces: population growth and human capital accumulation. Both forces depend on decisions made primarily within households: population growth is partially determined by households’ fertility choices (e.g., Becker & Barro 1988 ), while human capital accumulation is partially dependent on parental investments in child education and health (e.g., Lucas 1988 ).

In an earlier survey of the literature linking family decisions to economic growth, Grimm ( 2003 ) laments that “[m]ost models ignore the two-sex issue. Parents are modeled as a fictive asexual human being” (p. 154). Footnote 1 Since then, however, economists are increasingly recognizing that gender plays a fundamental role in how households reproduce and care for their children. As a result, many models of economic growth are now populated with men and women. The “fictive asexual human being” is a dying species. In this article, we survey this rich new landscape in theoretical macroeconomics, reviewing, in particular, micro-founded theories where gender inequality affects economic development.

For the purpose of this survey, gender inequality is defined as any exogenously imposed difference between male and female economic agents that, by shaping their behavior, has implications for aggregate economic growth. In practice, gender inequality is typically modeled as differences between men and women in endowments, constraints, or preferences.

Many articles review the literature on gender inequality and economic growth. Footnote 2 Typically, both the theoretical and empirical literature are discussed, but, in almost all cases, the vast empirical literature receives most of the attention. In addition, some of the surveys examine both sides of the two-way relationship between gender inequality and economic growth: gender equality as a cause of economic growth and economic growth as a cause of gender equality. As a result, most surveys end up only scratching the surface of each of these distinct strands of literature.

There is, by now, a large and insightful body of micro-founded theories exploring how gender equality affects economic growth. In our view, these theories merit a separate review. Moreover, they have not received sufficient attention in empirical work, which has largely developed independently (see also Cuberes & Teignier 2014 ). By reviewing the theoretical literature, we hope to motivate empirical researchers in finding new ways of putting these theories to test. In doing so, our work complements several existing surveys. Doepke & Tertilt ( 2016 ) review the theoretical literature that incorporates families in macroeconomic models, without focusing exclusively on models that include gender inequality, as we do. Greenwood, Guner and Vandenbroucke ( 2017 ), in turn, review the theoretical literature from the opposite direction; they study how macroeconomic models can explain changes in family outcomes. Doepke, Tertilt and Voena ( 2012 ) survey the political economy of women’s rights, but without focusing explicitly on their impact on economic development.

To be precise, the scope of this survey consists of micro-founded macroeconomic models where gender inequality (in endowments, constraints, preferences) affects economic growth—either by influencing the economy’s growth rate or shaping the transition paths between multiple income equilibria. As a result, this survey does not cover several upstream fields of partial-equilibrium micro models, where gender inequality affects several intermediate growth-related outcomes, such as labor supply, education, health. Additionally, by focusing on micro-founded macro models, we do not review studies in heterodox macroeconomics, including the feminist economics tradition using structuralist, demand-driven models. For recent overviews of this literature, see Kabeer ( 2016 ) and Seguino ( 2013 , 2020 ). Overall, we find very little dialogue between the neoclassical and feminist heterodox literatures. In this review, we will show that actually these two traditions have several points of contact and reach similar conclusions in many areas, albeit following distinct intellectual routes.

Although the incorporation of gender in macroeconomic models of economic growth is a recent development, the main gendered ingredients of those models are not new. They were developed in at least two strands of literature. First, since the 1960s, “new home economics” has applied the analytical toolbox of rational choice theory to decisions being made within the boundaries of the family (see, e.g., Becker 1960 , 1981 ). Footnote 3 A second literature strand, mostly based on empirical work at the micro level in developing countries, described clear patterns of gender-specific behavior within households that differed across regions of the developing world (see, e.g., Boserup 1970 ). Footnote 4 As we shall see, most of the (micro-founded) macroeconomic models reviewed in this article use several analytical mechanisms from "new home economics”; these mechanisms can typically rationalize several of the gender-specific regularities observed in early studies of developing countries. The growth theorist is then left to explore the aggregate implications for economic development.

The first models we present focus on gender discrimination in (or on access to) the labor market as a distortionary tax on talent. If talent is randomly distributed in the population, men and women are imperfect substitutes in aggregate production, and, as a consequence, gender inequality (as long as determined by non-market processes) will misallocate talent and lower incentives for female human capital formation. These theories do not rely on typical household functions such as reproduction and childrearing. Therefore, in these models, individuals are not organized into households. We review this literature in section 2 .

From there, we proceed to theories where the household is the unit of analysis. In sections 3 and 4 , we cover models that take the household as given and avoid marriage markets or other household formation institutions. This is a world where marriage (or cohabitation) is universal, consensual, and monogamous; families are nuclear, and spouses are matched randomly. The first articles in this tradition model the household as a unitary entity with joint preferences and interests, and with an efficient and centralized decision making process. Footnote 5 These theories posit how men and women specialize into different activities and how parents interact with their children. Section 3 reviews these theories. Over time, the literature has incorporated intra-household dynamics. Now, family members are allowed to have different preferences and interests; they bargain, either cooperatively or not, over family decisions. Now, the theorist recognizes power asymmetries between family members and analyzes how spouses bargain over decisions. Footnote 6 These articles are surveyed in section 4 .

The final set of articles we survey take into account how households are formed. These theories show how gender inequality can influence economic growth and long-run development through marriage market institutions and family formation patterns. Among other topics, this literature has studied ages at first marriage, relative supply of potential partners, monogamy and polygyny, arranged and consensual marriages, and divorce risk. Upon marriage, these models assume different bargaining processes between the spouses, or even unitary households, but they all recognize, in one way or another, that marriage, labor supply, consumption, and investment decisions are interdependent. We review these theories in section 5 .

Table 1 offers a schematic overview of the literature. To improve readability, the table only includes studies that we review in detail, with articles listed in order of appearance in the text. The table also abstracts from models’ extensions and sensitivity checks, and focuses exclusively on the causal pathways leading from gender inequality to economic growth.

The vast majority of theories reviewed argue that gender inequality is a barrier to economic development, particularly over the long run. The focus on long-run supply-side models reflects a recent effort by growth theorists to incorporate two stylized facts of economic development in the last two centuries: (i) a strong positive association between gender equality and income per capita (Fig. 1 ), and (ii) a strong association between the timing of the fertility transition and income per capita (Fig. 2 ). Footnote 7 Models that endogenize a fertility transition are able to generate a transition from a Malthusian regime of stagnation to a modern regime of sustained economic growth, thus replicating the development experience of human societies in the very long run (e.g., Galor 2005a , b ; Guinnane 2011 ). In contrast, demand-driven models in the heterodox and feminist traditions have often argued that gender wage discrimination and gendered sectoral and occupational segregation can be conducive to economic growth in semi-industrialized export-oriented economies. Footnote 8 In these settings—that fit well the experience of East and Southeast Asian economies—gender wage discrimination in female-intensive export industries reduces production costs and boosts exports, profits, and investment (Blecker & Seguino 2002 ; Seguino 2010 ).

Income level and gender equality. Income is the natural log of per capita GDP (PPP-adjusted). The Gender Development Index is the ratio of gender-specific Human Development Indexes: female HDI/male HDI. Data are for the year 2000. Sources: UNDP

Income level and timing of the fertility transition. Income is the natural log of per capita GDP (PPP-adjusted) in 2000. Years since fertility transition are the number of years between 2000 and the onset year of the fertility decline. See Reher ( 2004 ) for details. Sources: UNDP and Reher ( 2004 )

In most long-run, supply-side models reviewed here, irrespectively of the underlying source of gender differences (e.g., biology, socialization, discrimination), the opportunity cost of women’s time in foregone labor market earnings is lower than that of men. This gender gap in the value of time affects economic growth through two main mechanisms. First, when the labor market value of women’s time is relatively low, women will be in charge of childrearing and domestic work in the family. A low value of female time means that children are cheap. Fertility will be high, and economic growth will be low, both because population growth has a direct negative impact on long-run economic performance and because human capital accumulates at a slower pace (through the quantity-quality trade-off). Second, if parents expect relatively low returns to female education, due to women specializing in domestic activities, they will invest relatively less in the education of girls. In the words of Harriet Martineau, one of the first to describe this mechanism, “as women have none of the objects in life for which an enlarged education is considered requisite, the education is not given” (Martineau 1837 , p. 107). In the long run, lower human capital investments (on girls) lead to slower economic development.

Overall, gender inequality can be conceptualized as a source of inefficiency, to the extent that it results in the misallocation of productive factors, such as talent or labor, and as a source of negative externalities, when it leads to higher fertility, skewed sex ratios, or lower human capital accumulation.

We conclude, in section 6 , by examining the limitations of the current literature and pointing ways forward. Among them, we suggest deeper investigations of the role of (endogenous) technological change on gender inequality, as well as greater attention to the role and interests of men in affecting gender inequality and its impact on growth.

2 Gender discrimination and misallocation of talent

Perhaps the single most intuitive argument for why gender discrimination leads to aggregate inefficiency and hampers economic growth concerns the allocation of talent. Assume that talent is randomly distributed in the population. Then, an economy that curbs women’s access to education, market employment, or certain occupations draws talent from a smaller pool than an economy without such restrictions. Gender inequality can thus be viewed as a distortionary tax on talent. Indeed, occupational choice models with heterogeneous talent (as in Roy 1951 ) show that exogenous barriers to women’s participation in the labor market or access to certain occupations reduce aggregate productivity and per capita output (Cuberes & Teignier 2016 , 2017 ; Esteve-Volart 2009 ; Hsieh, Hurst, Jones and Klenow 2019 ).

Hsieh et al. ( 2019 ) represent the US economy with a model where individuals sort into occupations based on innate ability. Footnote 9 Gender and race identity, however, are a source of discrimination, with three forces preventing women and black men from choosing the occupations best fitting their comparative advantage. First, these groups face labor market discrimination, which is modeled as a tax on wages and can vary by occupation. Second, there is discrimination in human capital formation, with the costs of occupation-specific human capital being higher for certain groups. This cost penalty is a composite term encompassing discrimination or quality differentials in private or public inputs into children’s human capital. The third force are group-specific social norms that generate utility premia or penalties across occupations. Footnote 10

Assuming that the distribution of innate ability across race and gender is constant over time, Hsieh et al. ( 2019 ) investigate and quantify how declines in labor market discrimination, barriers to human capital formation, and changing social norms affect aggregate output and productivity in the United States, between 1960 and 2010. Over that period, their general equilibrium model suggests that around 40 percent of growth in per capita GDP and 90 percent of growth in labor force participation can be attributed to reductions in the misallocation of talent across occupations. Declining in barriers to human capital formation account for most of these effects, followed by declining labor market discrimination. Changing social norms, on the other hand, explain only a residual share of aggregate changes.

Two main mechanisms drive these results. First, falling discrimination improves efficiency through a better match between individual ability and occupation. Second, because discrimination is higher in high-skill occupations, when discrimination decreases, high-ability women and black men invest more in human capital and supply more labor to the market. Overall, better allocation of talent, rising labor supply, and faster human capital accumulation raise aggregate growth and productivity.

Other occupational choice models assuming gender inequality in access to the labor market or certain occupations reach similar conclusions. In addition to the mechanisms in Hsieh et al. ( 2019 ), barriers to women’s work in managerial or entrepreneurial occupations reduce average talent in these positions, resulting in aggregate losses in innovation, technology adoption, and productivity (Cuberes & Teignier 2016 , 2017 ; Esteve-Volart 2009 ). The argument can be readily applied to talent misallocation across sectors (Lee 2020 ). In Lee’s model, female workers face discrimination in the non-agricultural sector. As a result, talented women end up sorting into ill-suited agricultural activities. This distortion reduces aggregate productivity in agriculture. Footnote 11

To sum up, when talent is randomly distributed in the population, barriers to women’s education, employment, or occupational choice effectively reduce the pool of talent in the economy. According to these models, dismantling these gendered barriers can have an immediate positive effect on economic growth.

3 Unitary households: parents and children

In this section, we review models built upon unitary households. A unitary household maximizes a joint utility function subject to pooled household resources. Intra-household decision making is assumed away; the household is effectively a black-box. In this class of models, gender inequality stems from a variety of sources. It is rooted in differences in physical strength (Galor & Weil 1996 ; Hiller 2014 ; Kimura & Yasui 2010 ) or health (Bloom et al. 2015 ); it is embedded in social norms (Hiller 2014 ; Lagerlöf 2003 ), labor market discrimination (Cavalcanti & Tavares 2016 ), or son preference (Zhang, Zhang and Li 1999 ). In all these models, gender inequality is a barrier to long-run economic development.

Galor & Weil ( 1996 ) model an economy with three factors of production: capital, physical labor (“brawn”), and mental labor (“brain”). Men and women are equally endowed with brains, but men have more brawn. In economies starting with very low levels of capital per worker, women fully specialize in childrearing because their opportunity cost in terms of foregone market earnings is lower than men’s. Over time, the stock of capital per worker builds up due to exogenous technological progress. The degree of complementarity between capital and mental labor is higher than that between capital and physical labor; as the economy accumulates capital per worker, the returns to brain rise relative to the returns to brawn. As a result, the relative wages of women rise, increasing the opportunity cost of childrearing. This negative substitution effect dominates the positive income effect on the demand for children and fertility falls. Footnote 12 As fertility falls, capital per worker accumulates faster creating a positive feedback loop that generates a fertility transition and kick starts a process of sustained economic growth.

The model has multiple stable equilibria. An economy starting from a low level of capital per worker is caught in a Malthusian poverty trap of high fertility, low income per capita, and low relative wages for women. In contrast, an economy starting from a sufficiently high level of capital per worker will converge to a virtuous equilibrium of low fertility, high income per capita, and high relative wages for women. Through exogenous technological progress, the economy can move from the low to the high equilibrium.

Gender inequality in labor market access or returns to brain can slow down or even prevent the escape from the Malthusian equilibrium. Wage discrimination or barriers to employment would work against the rise of relative female wages and, therefore, slow down the takeoff to modern economic growth.

The Galor and Weil model predicts how female labor supply and fertility evolve in the course of development. First, (married) women start participating in market work and only afterwards does fertility start declining. Historically, however, in the US and Western Europe, the decline in fertility occurred before women’s participation rates in the labor market started their dramatic increase. In addition, these regions experienced a mid-twentieth century baby boom which seems at odds with Galor and Weil’s theory.

Both these stylized facts can be addressed by adding home production to the modeling, as do Kimura & Yasui ( 2010 ). In their article, as capital per worker accumulates, the market wage for brains rises and the economy moves through four stages of development. In the first stage, with a sufficiently low market wage, both husband and wife are fully dedicated to home production and childrearing. The household does not supply labor to the market; fertility is high and constant. In the second stage, as the wage rate increases, men enter the labor market (supplying both brawn and brain), whereas women remain fully engaged in home production and childrearing. But as men partially withdraw from home production, women have to replace them. As a result, their time cost of childrearing goes up. At this stage of development, the negative substitution effect of rising wages on fertility dominates the positive income effect. Fertility starts declining, even though women have not yet entered the labor market. The third stage arrives when men stop working in home production. There is complete specialization of labor by gender; men only do market work, and women only do home production and childrearing. As the market wage rises for men, the positive income effect becomes dominant and fertility increases; this mimics the baby-boom period of the mid-twentieth century. In the fourth and final stage, once sufficient capital is accumulated, women enter the market sector as wage-earners. The negative substitution effect of rising female opportunity costs dominates once again, and fertility declines. The economy moves from a “breadwinner model” to a “dual-earnings model”.

Another important form of gender inequality is discrimination against women in the form of lower wages, holding male and female productivity constant. Cavalcanti & Tavares ( 2016 ) estimate the aggregate effects of wage discrimination using a model-based general equilibrium representation of the US economy. In their model, women are assumed to be more productive in childrearing than men, so they pay the full time cost of this activity. In the labor market, even though men and women are equally productive, women receive only a fraction of the male wage rate—this is the wage discrimination assumption. Wage discrimination works as a tax on female labor supply. Because women work less than they would without discrimination, there is a negative level effect on per capita output. In addition, there is a second negative effect of wage discrimination operating through endogenous fertility. Since lower wages reduce women’s opportunity costs of childrearing, fertility is relatively high, and output per capita is relatively low. The authors calibrate the model to US steady state parameters and estimate large negative output costs of the gender wage gap. Reducing wage discrimination against women by 50 percent would raise per capita income by 35 percent, in the long run.

Human capital accumulation plays no role in Galor & Weil ( 1996 ), Kimura & Yasui ( 2010 ), and Cavalcanti & Tavares ( 2016 ). Each person is exogenously endowed with a unit of brains. The fundamental trade-off in the these models is between the income and substitution effects of rising wages on the demand for children. When Lagerlöf ( 2003 ) adds education investments to a gender-based model, an additional trade-off emerges: that between the quantity and the quality of children.

Lagerlöf ( 2003 ) models gender inequality as a social norm: on average, men have higher human capital than women. Confronted with this fact, parents play a coordination game in which it is optimal for them to reproduce the inequality in the next generation. The reason is that parents expect the future husbands of their daughters to be, on average, relatively more educated than the future wives of their sons. Because, in the model, parents care for the total income of their children’s future households, they respond by investing relatively less in daughters’ human capital. Here, gender inequality does not arise from some intrinsic difference between men and women. It is instead the result of a coordination failure: “[i]f everyone else behaves in a discriminatory manner, it is optimal for the atomistic player to do the same” (Lagerlöf 2003 , p. 404).

With lower human capital, women earn lower wages than men and are therefore solely responsible for the time cost of childrearing. But if, exogenously, the social norm becomes more gender egalitarian over time, the gender gap in parental educational investment decreases. As better educated girls grow up and become mothers, their opportunity costs of childrearing are higher. Parents trade-off the quantity of children by their quality; fertility falls and human capital accumulates. However, rising wages have an offsetting positive income effect on fertility because parents pay a (fixed) “goods cost” per child. The goods cost is proportionally more important in poor societies than in richer ones. As a result, in poor economies, growth takes off slowly because the positive income effect offsets a large chunk of the negative substitution effect. As economies grow richer, the positive income effect vanishes (as a share of total income), and fertility declines faster. That is, growth accelerates over time even if gender equality increases only linearly.

The natural next step is to model how the social norm on gender roles evolves endogenously during the course of development. Hiller ( 2014 ) develops such a model by combining two main ingredients: a gender gap in the endowments of brawn (as in Galor & Weil 1996 ) generates a social norm, which each parental couple takes as given (as in Lagerlöf 2003 ). The social norm evolves endogenously, but slowly; it tracks the gender ratio of labor supply in the market, but with a small elasticity. When the male-female ratio in labor supply decreases, stereotypes adjust and the norm becomes less discriminatory against women.

The model generates a U-shaped relationship between economic development and female labor force participation. Footnote 13 In the preindustrial stage, there is no education and all labor activities are unskilled, i.e., produced with brawn. Because men have a comparative advantage in brawn, they supply more labor to the market than women, who specialize in home production. This gender gap in labor supply creates a social norm that favors boys over girls. Over time, exogenous skill-biased technological progress raises the relative returns to brains, inducing parents to invest in their children’s education. At the beginning, however, because of the social norm, only boys become educated. The economy accumulates human capital and grows, generating a positive income effect that, in isolation, would eventually drive up parental investments in girls’ education. Footnote 14 But endogenous social norms move in the opposite direction. When only boys receive education, the gender gap in returns to market work increases, and women withdraw to home production. As female relative labor supply in the market drops, the social norm becomes more discriminatory against women. As a result, parents want to invest relatively less in their daughters’ education.

In the end, initial conditions determine which of the forces dominates, thereby shaping long-term outcomes. If, initially, the social norm is very discriminatory, its effect is stronger than the income effect; the economy becomes trapped in an equilibrium with high gender inequality and low per capita income. If, on the other hand, social norms are relatively egalitarian to begin with, then the income effect dominates, and the economy converges to an equilibrium with gender equality and high income per capita.

In the models reviewed so far, human capital or brain endowments can be understood as combining both education and health. Bloom et al. ( 2015 ) explicitly distinguish these two dimensions. Health affects labor market earnings because sick people are out of work more often (participation effect) and are less productive per hour of work (productivity effect). Female health is assumed to be worse than male health, implying that women’s effective wages are lower than men’s. As a result, women are solely responsible for childrearing. Footnote 15

The model produces two growth regimes: a Malthusian trap with high fertility and no educational investments; and a regime of sustained growth, declining fertility, and rising educational investments. Once wages reach a certain threshold, the economy goes through a fertility transition and education expansion, taking off from the Malthusian regime to the sustained growth regime.

Female health promotes growth in both regimes, and it affects the timing of the takeoff. The healthier women are, the earlier the economy takes off. The reason is that a healthier woman earns a higher effective wage and, consequently, faces higher opportunity costs of raising children. When female health improves, the rising opportunity costs of children reduce the wage threshold at which educational investments become attractive; the fertility transition and mass education periods occur earlier.

In contrast, improved male health slows down economic growth and delays the fertility transition. When men become healthier, there is only a income effect on the demand for children, without the negative substitution effect (because male childrearing time is already zero). The policy conclusion would be to redistribute health from men to women. However, the policy would impose a static utility cost on the household. Because women’s time allocation to market work is constrained by childrearing responsibilities (whereas men work full-time), the marginal effect of health on household income is larger for men than for women. From the household’s point of view, reducing the gender gap in health produces a trade-off between short-term income maximization and long-term economic development.

In an extension of the model, the authors endogeneize health investments, while keeping the assumption that women pay the full time cost of childrearing. Because women participate less in the labor market (due to childrearing duties), it is optimal for households to invest more in male health. A health gender gap emerges from rational household behavior that takes into account how time-constraints differ by gender; assuming taste-based discrimination against girls or gender-specific preferences is not necessary.

In the models reviewed so far, parents invest in their children’s human capital for purely altruistic reasons. This is captured in the models by assuming that parents derive utility directly from the quantity and quality of children. This is the classical representation of children as durable consumption goods (e.g., Becker 1960 ). In reality, of course, parents may also have egoistic motivations for investing in child quantity and quality. A typical example is that, when parents get old and retire, they receive support from their children. The quantity and quality of children will affect the size of old-age transfers and parents internalize this in their fertility and childcare behavior. According to this view, children are best understood as investment goods.

Zhang et al. ( 1999 ) build an endogenous growth model that incorporates the old-age support mechanism in parental decisions. Another innovative element of their model is that parents can choose the gender of their children. The implicit assumption is that sex selection technologies are freely available to all parents.

At birth, there is a gender gap in human capital endowment, favoring boys over girls. Footnote 16 In adulthood, a child’s human capital depends on the initial endowment and on the parents’ human capital. In addition, the probability that a child survives to adulthood is exogenous and can differ by gender.

Parents receive old-age support from children that survive until adulthood. The more human capital children have, the more old-age support they provide to their parents. Beyond this egoistic motive, parents also enjoy the quantity and the quality of children (altruistic motive). Son preference is modeled by boys having a higher relative weight in the altruistic-component of the parental utility function. In other words, in their enjoyment of children as consumer goods, parents enjoy “consuming” a son more than “consuming” a girl. Parents who prefer sons want more boys than girls. A larger preference for sons, a higher relative survival probability of boys, and a higher human capital endowment of boys positively affect the sex ratio at birth, because, in the parents’ perspective, all these forces increase the marginal utility of boys relative to girls.

Zhang et al. ( 1999 ) show that, if human capital transmission from parents to children is efficient enough, the economy grows endogenously. When boys have a higher human capital endowment than girls, and the survival probability of sons is not smaller than the survival probability of daughters, then only sons provide old-age support. Anticipating this, parents invest more in the human capital of their sons than on the human capital of their daughters. As a result, the gender gap in human capital at birth widens endogenously.

When only boys provide old-age support, an exogenous increase in son preference harms long-run economic growth. The reason is that, when son preference increases, parents enjoy each son relatively more and demand less old-age support from him. Other things equal, parents want to “consume” more sons now and less old-age support later. Because parents want more sons, the sex ratio at birth increases; but because each son provides less old-age support, human capital investments per son decrease (such that the gender gap in human capital narrows). At the aggregate level, the pace of human capital accumulation slows down and, in the long run, economic growth is lower. Thus, an exogenous increase in son preference increases the sex ratio at birth, and reduces human capital accumulation and long-run growth (although it narrows the gender gap in education).

In summary, in growth models with unitary households, gender inequality is closely linked to the division of labor between family members. If women earn relatively less in market activities, they specialize in childrearing and home production, while men specialize in market work. And precisely due to this division of labor, the returns to female educational investments are relatively low. These household behaviors translate into higher fertility and lower human capital and thus pose a barrier to long-run development.

4 Intra-household bargaining: husbands and wives

In this section, we review models populated with non-unitary households, where decisions are the result of bargaining between the spouses. There are two broad types of bargaining processes: non-cooperative, where spouses act independently or interact in a non-cooperative game that often leads to inefficient outcomes (e.g., Doepke & Tertilt 2019 , Heath & Tan 2020 ); and cooperative, where the spouses are assumed to achieve an efficient outcome (e.g., De la Croix & Vander Donckt 2010 ; Diebolt & Perrin 2013 ). As in the previous section, all of these non-unitary models take the household as given, thereby abstracting from marriage markets or other household formation institutions, which will be discussed separately in section 5 . When preferences differ by gender, bargaining between the spouses matters for economic growth. If women care more about child quality than men do and human capital accumulation is the main engine of growth, then empowering women leads to faster economic growth (Prettner & Strulik 2017 ). If, however, men and women have similar preferences but are imperfect substitutes in the production of household public goods, then empowering women has an ambiguous effect on economic growth (Doepke & Tertilt 2019 ).

A separate channel concerns the intergenerational transmission of human capital and woman’s role as the main caregiver of children. If the education of the mother matters more than the education of the father in the production of children’s human capital, then empowering women will be conducive to growth (Agénor 2017 ; Diebolt & Perrin 2013 ), with the returns to education playing a crucial role in the political economy of female empowerment (Doepke & Tertilt 2009 ).

However, different dimensions of gender inequality have different growth impacts along the development process (De la Croix & Vander Donckt 2010 ). Policies that improve gender equality across many dimensions can be particularly effective for economic growth by reaping complementarities and positive externalities (Agénor 2017 ).

The idea that women might have stronger preferences for child-related expenditures than men can be easily incorporated in a Beckerian model of fertility. The necessary assumption is that women place a higher weight on child quality (relative to child quantity) than men do. Prettner & Strulik ( 2017 ) build a unified growth theory model with collective households. Men and women have different preferences, but they achieve efficient cooperation based on (reduced-form) bargaining parameters. The authors study the effect of two types of preferences: (i) women are assumed to have a relative preference for child quality, while men have a relative preference for child quantity; and (ii) parents are assumed to have a relative preference for the education of sons over the education of daughters. In addition, it is assumed that the time cost of childcare borne by men cannot be above that borne by women (but it could be the same).

When women have a relative preference for child quality, increasing female empowerment speeds up the economy’s escape from a Malthusian trap of high fertility, low education, and low income per capita. When female empowerment increases (exogenously), a woman’s relative preference for child quality has a higher impact on household’s decisions. As a consequence, fertility falls, human capital accumulates, and the economy starts growing. The model also predicts that the more preferences for child quality differ between husband and wife, the more effective is female empowerment in raising long-run per capita income, because the sooner the economy escapes the Malthusian trap. This effect is not affected by whether parents have a preference for the education of boys relative to that of girls. If, however, men and women have similar preferences with respect to the quantity and quality of their children, then female empowerment does not affect the timing of the transition to the sustained growth regime.

Strulik ( 2019 ) goes one step further and endogeneizes why men seem to prefer having more children than women. The reason is a different preference for sexual activity: other things equal, men enjoy having sex more than women. Footnote 17 When cheap and effective contraception is not available, a higher male desire for sexual activity explains why men also prefer to have more children than women. In a traditional economy, where no contraception is available, fertility is high, while human capital and economic growth are low. When female bargaining power increases, couples reduce their sexual activity, fertility declines, and human capital accumulates faster. Faster human capital accumulation increases household income and, as a consequence, the demand for contraception goes up. As contraception use increases, fertility declines further. Eventually, the economy undergoes a fertility transition and moves to a modern regime with low fertility, widespread use of contraception, high human capital, and high economic growth. In the modern regime, because contraception is widely used, men’s desire for sex is decoupled from fertility. Both sex and children cost time and money. When the two are decoupled, men prefer to have more sex at the expense of the number of children. There is a reversal in the gender gap in desired fertility. When contraceptives are not available, men desire more children than women; once contraceptives are widely used, men desire fewer children than women. If women are more empowered, the transition from the traditional equilibrium to the modern equilibrium occurs faster.

Both Prettner & Strulik ( 2017 ) and Strulik ( 2019 ) rely on gender-specific preferences. In contrast, Doepke & Tertilt ( 2019 ) are able to explain gender-specific expenditure patterns without having to assume that men and women have different preferences. They set up a non-cooperative model of household decision making and ask whether more female control of household resources leads to higher child expenditures and, thus, to economic development. Footnote 18

In their model, household public goods are produced with two inputs: time and goods. Instead of a single home-produced good (as in most models), there is a continuum of household public goods whose production technologies differ. Some public goods are more time-intensive to produce, while others are more goods-intensive. Each specific public good can only be produced by one spouse—i.e., time and good inputs are not separable. Women face wage discrimination in the labor market, so their opportunity cost of time is lower than men’s. As a result, women specialize in the production of the most time-intensive household public goods (e.g., childrearing activities), while men specialize in the production of goods-intensive household public goods (e.g., housing infrastructure). Notice that, because the household is non-cooperative, there is not only a division of labor between husband and wife, but also a division of decision making, since ultimately each spouse decides how much to provide of his or her public goods.

When household resources are redistributed from men to women (i.e., from the high-wage spouse to the low-wage spouse), women provide more public goods, in relative terms. It is ambiguous, however, whether the total provision of public goods increases with the re-distributive transfer. In a classic model of gender-specific preferences, a wife increases child expenditures and her own private consumption at the expense of the husband’s private consumption. In Doepke & Tertilt ( 2019 ), however, the rise in child expenditures (and time-intensive public goods in general) comes at the expense of male consumption and male-provided public goods.

Parents contribute to the welfare of the next generation in two ways: via human capital investments (time-intensive, typically done by the mother) and bequests of physical capital (goods-intensive, typically done by the father). Transferring resources to women increases human capital, but reduces the stock of physical capital. The effect of such transfers on economic growth depends on whether the aggregate production function is relatively intensive in human capital or in physical capital. If aggregate production is relatively human capital intensive, then transfers to women boost economic growth; if it is relatively intensive in physical capital, then transfers to women may reduce economic growth.

There is an interesting paradox here. On the one hand, transfers to women will be growth-enhancing in economies where production is intensive in human capital. These would be more developed, knowledge intensive, service economies. On the other hand, the positive growth effect of transfers to women increases with the size of the gender wage gap, that is, decreases with female empowerment. But the more advanced, human capital intensive economies are also the ones with more female empowerment (i.e., lower gender wage gaps). In other words, in settings where human capital investments are relatively beneficial, the contribution of female empowerment to human capital accumulation is reduced. Overall, Doepke and Tertilt’s ( 2019 ) model predicts that female empowerment has at best a limited positive effect and at worst a negative effect on economic growth.

Heath & Tan ( 2020 ) argue that, in a non-cooperative household model, income transfers to women may increase female labor supply. Footnote 19 This result may appear counter-intuitive at first, because in collective household models unearned income unambiguously reduces labor supply through a negative income effect. In Heath and Tan’s model, husband and wife derive utility from leisure, consuming private goods, and consuming a household public good. The spouses decide separately on labor supply and monetary contributions to the household public good. Men and women are identical in preferences and behavior, but women have limited control over resources, with a share of their income being captured by the husband. Female control over resources (i.e., autonomy) depends positively on the wife’s relative contribution to household income. Thus, an income transfer to the wife, keeping husband unearned income constant, raises the fraction of her own income that she privately controls. This autonomy effect unambiguously increases women’s labor supply, because the wife can now reap an additional share of her wage bill. Whenever the autonomy effect dominates the (negative) income effect, female labor supply increases. The net effect will be heterogeneous over the wage distribution, but the authors show that aggregate female labor supply is always weakly larger after the income transfer.

Diebolt & Perrin ( 2013 ) assume cooperative bargaining between husband and wife, but do not rely on sex-specific preferences or differences in ability. Men and women are only distinguished by different uses of their time endowments, with females in charge of all childrearing activities. In line with this labor division, the authors further assume that only the mother’s human capital is inherited by the child at birth. On top of the inherited maternal endowment, individuals can accumulate human capital during adulthood, through schooling. The higher the initial human capital endowment, the more effective is the accumulation of human capital via schooling.

A woman’s bargaining power in marriage determines her share in total household consumption and is a function of the relative female human capital of the previous generation. An increase in the human capital of mothers relative to that of fathers has two effects. First, it raises the incentives for human capital accumulation of the next generation, because inherited maternal human capital makes schooling more effective. Second, it raises the bargaining power of the next generation of women and, because women’s consumption share increases, boosts the returns on women’s education. The second effect is not internalized in women’s time allocation decisions; it is an intergenerational externality. Thus, an exogenous increase in women’s bargaining power would promote economic growth by speeding up the accumulation of human capital across overlapping generations.

De la Croix & Vander Donckt ( 2010 ) contribute to the literature by clearly distinguishing between different gender gaps: a gap in the probability of survival, a wage gap, a social and institutional gap, and a gender education gap. The first three are exogenously given, while the fourth is determined within the model.

By assumption, men and women have identical preferences and ability, but women pay the full time cost of childrearing. As in a typical collective household model, bargaining power is partially determined by the spouses’ earnings potential (i.e., their levels of human capital and their wage rates). But there is also a component of bargaining power that is exogenous and captures social norms that discriminate against women—this is the social and institutional gender gap.

Husbands and wives bargain over fertility and human capital investments for their children. A standard Beckerian result emerges: parents invest relatively less in the education of girls, because girls will be more time-constrained than boys and, therefore, the female returns to education are lower in relative terms.

There are at least two regimes in the economy: a corner regime and an interior regime. The corner regime consists of maximum fertility, full gender specialization (no women in the labor market), and large gender gaps in education (no education for girls). Reducing the wage gap or the social and institutional gap does not help the economy escaping this regime. Women are not in labor force, so the wage gap is meaningless. The social and institutional gap will determine women’s share in household consumption, but does not affect fertility and growth. At this stage, the only effective instruments for escaping the corner regime are reducing the gender survival gap or reducing child mortality. Reducing the gender survival gap increases women’s lifespan, which increases their time budget and attracts them to the labor market. Reducing child mortality decreases the time costs of kids, therefore drawing women into the labor market. In both cases, fertility decreases.

In the interior regime, fertility is below the maximum, women’s labor supply is above zero, and both boys and girls receive education. In this regime, with endogenous bargaining power, reducing all gender gaps will boost economic growth. Footnote 20 Thus, depending on the growth regime, some gender gaps affect economic growth, while others do not. Accordingly, the policy-maker should tackle different dimensions of gender inequality at different stages of the development process.

Agénor ( 2017 ) presents a computable general equilibrium that includes many of the elements of gender inequality reviewed so far. An important contribution of the model is to explicitly add the government as an agent whose policies interact with family decisions and, therefore, will impact women’s time allocation. Workers produce a market good and a home good and are organized in collective households. Bargaining power depends on the spouses’ relative human capital levels. By assumption, there is gender discrimination in market wages against women. On top, mothers are exclusively responsible for home production and childrearing, which takes the form of time spent improving children’s health and education. But public investments in education and health also improve these outcomes during childhood. Likewise, public investment in public infrastructure contributes positively to home production. In particular, the ratio of public infrastructure capital stock to private capital stock is a substitute for women’s time in home production. The underlying idea is that improving sanitation, transportation, and other infrastructure reduces time spent in home production. Health status in adulthood depends on health status in childhood, which, in turn, relates positively to mother’s health, her time inputs into childrearing, and government spending. Children’s human capital depends on similar factors, except that mother’s human capital replaces her health as an input. Additionally, women are assumed to derive less utility from current consumption and more utility from children’s health relative to men. Wives are also assumed to live longer than their husbands, which further down-weights female’s emphasis on current consumption. The final gendered assumption is that mother’s time use is biased towards boys. This bias alone creates a gender gap in education and health. As adults, women’s relative lower health and human capital are translated into relative lower bargaining power in household decisions.

Agénor ( 2017 ) calibrates this rich setup for Benin, a low income country, and runs a series of policy experiments on different dimensions of gender inequality: a fall in childrearing costs, a fall in gender pay discrimination, a fall in son bias in mother’s time allocation, and an exogenous increase in female bargaining power. Footnote 21 Interestingly, despite all policies improving gender equality in separate dimensions, not all unambiguously stimulate economic growth. For example, falling childrearing costs raise savings and private investments, which are growth-enhancing, but increase fertility (as children become ‘cheaper’) and reduce maternal time investment per child, thus reducing growth. In contrast, a fall in gender pay discrimination always leads to higher growth, through higher household income that, in turn, boosts savings, tax revenues, and public spending. Higher public spending further contributes to improved health and education of the next generation. Lastly, Agénor ( 2017 ) simulates the effect of a combined policy that improves gender equality in all domains simultaneously. Due to complementarities and positive externalities across dimensions, the combined policy generates more economic growth than the sum of the individual policies. Footnote 22

In the models reviewed so far, men are passive observers of women’s empowerment. Doepke & Tertilt ( 2009 ) set up an interesting political economy model of women’s rights, where men make the decisive choice. Their model is motivated by the fact that, historically, the economic rights of women were expanded before their political rights. Because the granting of economic rights empowers women in the household, and this was done before women were allowed to participate in the political process, the relevant question is why did men willingly share their power with their wives?

Doepke & Tertilt ( 2009 ) answer this question by arguing that men face a fundamental trade-off. On the one hand, husbands would vote for their wives to have no rights whatsoever, because husbands prefer as much intra-household bargaining power as possible. But, on the other hand, fathers would vote for their daughters to have economic rights in their future households. In addition, fathers want their children to marry highly educated spouses, and grandfathers want their grandchildren to be highly educated. By assumption, men and women have different preferences, with women having a relative preference for child quality over quantity. Accordingly, men internalize that, when women become empowered, human capital investments increase, making their children and grandchildren better-off.

Skill-biased (exogenous) technological progress that raises the returns to education over time can shift male incentives along this trade-off. When the returns to education are low, men prefer to make all decisions on their own and deny all rights to women. But once the returns to education are sufficiently high, men voluntarily share their power with women by granting them economic rights. As a result, human capital investments increase and the economy grows faster.

In summary, gender inequality in labor market earnings often implies power asymmetries within the household, with men having more bargaining power than women. If preferences differ by gender and female preferences are more conducive to development, then empowering women is beneficial for growth. When preferences are the same and the bargaining process is non-cooperative, the implications are less clear-cut, and more context-specific. If, in addition, women’s empowerment is curtailed by law (e.g., restrictions on women’s economic rights), then it is important to understand the political economy of women’s rights, in which men are crucial actors.

5 Marriage markets and household formation

Two-sex models of economic growth have largely ignored how households are formed. The marriage market is not explicitly modeled: spouses are matched randomly, marriage is universal and monogamous, and families are nuclear. In reality, however, household formation patterns vary substantially across societies, with some of these differences extending far back in history. For example, Hajnal ( 1965 , 1982 ) described a distinct household formation pattern in preindustrial Northwestern Europe (often referred to as the “European Marriage Pattern”) characterized by: (i) late ages at first marriage for women, (ii) most marriages done under individual consent, and (iii) neolocality (i.e., upon marriage, the bride and the groom leave their parental households to form a new household). In contrast, marriage systems in China and India consisted of: (i) very early female ages at first marriage, (ii) arranged marriages, and (iii) patrilocality (i.e., the bride joins the parental household of the groom).

Economic historians argue that the “European Marriage Pattern” empowered women, encouraging their participation in market activities and reducing fertility levels. While some view this as one of the deep-rooted factors explaining Northwestern Europe’s earlier takeoff to sustained economic growth (e.g., Carmichael, de Pleijt, van Zanden and De Moor 2016 ; De Moor & Van Zanden 2010 ; Hartman 2004 ), others have downplayed the long-run significance of this marriage pattern (e.g., Dennison & Ogilvie 2014 ; Ruggles 2009 ). Despite this lively debate, the topic has been largely ignored by growth theorists. The few exceptions are Voigtländer and Voth ( 2013 ), Edlund and Lagerlöf ( 2006 ), and Tertilt ( 2005 , 2006 ).

After exploring different marriage institutions, we zoom in on contemporary monogamous and consensual marriage and review models where gender inequality affects economic growth through marriage markets that facilitate household formation (Du & Wei 2013 ; Grossbard & Pereira 2015 ; Grossbard-Shechtman 1984 ; Guvenen & Rendall 2015 ). In contrast with the previous two sections, where the household is the starting point of the analysis, the literature on marriage markets and household formation recognizes that marriage, labor supply, and investment decisions are interlinked. The analysis of these interlinkages is sometimes done with unitary households (upon marriage) (Du & Wei 2013 ; Guvenen & Rendall 2015 ), or with non-cooperative models of individual decision-making within households (Grossbard & Pereira 2015 ; Grossbard-Shechtman 1984 ).

Voigtländer and Voth ( 2013 ) argue that the emergence of the “European Marriage Pattern” is a direct consequence of the mid-fourteen century Black Death. They set up a two-sector agricultural economy consisting of physically demanding cereal farming, and less physically demanding pastoral production. The economy is populated by many male and female peasants and by a class of idle, rent-maximizing landlords. Female peasants are heterogeneous with respect to physical strength, but, on average, are assumed to have less brawn relative to male peasants and, thus, have a comparative advantage in the pastoral sector. Both sectors use land as a production input, although the pastoral sector is more land-intensive than cereal production. All land is owned by the landlords, who can rent it out for peasant cereal farming, or use it for large-scale livestock farming, for which they hire female workers. Crucially, women can only work and earn wages in the pastoral sector as long as they are unmarried. Footnote 23 Peasant women decide when to marry and, upon marriage, a peasant couple forms a new household, where husband and wife both work on cereal farming, and have children at a given time frequency. Thus, the only contraceptive method available is delaying marriage. Because women derive utility from consumption and children, they face a trade-off between earned income and marriage.

Initially, the economy rests in a Malthusian regime, where land-labor ratios are relatively low, making the land-intensive pastoral sector unattractive and depressing relative female wages. As a result, women marry early and fertility is high. The initial regime ends in 1348–1350, when the Black Death kills between one third and half of Europe’s population, exogenously generating land abundance and, therefore, raising the relative wages of female labor in pastoral production. Women postpone marriage to reap higher wages, and fertility decreases—moving the economy to a regime of late marriages and low fertility.

In addition to late marital ages and reduced fertility, another important feature of the “European Marriage Pattern” was individual consent for marriage. Edlund and Lagerlöf ( 2006 ) study how rules of consent for marriage influence long-run economic development. In their model, marriages can be formed according to two types of consent rules: individual consent or parental consent. Under individual consent, young people are free to marry whomever they wish, while, under parental consent, their parents are in charge of arranging the marriage. Depending on the prevailing rule, the recipient of the bride-price differs. Under individual consent, a woman receives the bride-price from her husband, whereas, under parental consent, her father receives the bride-price from the father of the groom. Footnote 24 In both situations, the father of the groom owns the labor income of his son and, therefore, pays the bride-price, either directly, under parental consent, or indirectly, under individual consent. Under individual consent, the father needs to transfer resources to his son to nudge him into marrying. Thus, individual consent implies a transfer of resources from the old to the young and from men to women, relative to the rule of parental consent. Redistributing resources from the old to the young boosts long-run economic growth. Because the young have a longer timespan to extract income from their children’s labor, they invest relatively more in the human capital of the next generation. In addition, under individual consent, the reallocation of resources from men to women can have additional positive effects on growth, by increasing women’s bargaining power (see section 4 ), although this channel is not explicitly modeled in Edlund and Lagerlöf ( 2006 ).

Tertilt ( 2005 ) explores the effects of polygyny on long-run development through its impact on savings and fertility. In her model, parental consent applies to women, while individual consent applies to men. There is a competitive marriage market where fathers sell their daughters and men buy their wives. As each man is allowed (and wants) to marry several wives, a positive bride-price emerges in equilibrium. Footnote 25 Upon marriage, the reproductive rights of the bride are transferred from her father to her husband, who makes all fertility decisions on his own and, in turn, owns the reproductive rights of his daughters. From a father’s perspective, daughters are investments goods; they can be sold in the marriage market, at any time. This feature generates additional demand for daughters, which increases overall fertility, and reduces the incentives to save, which decreases the stock of physical capital. Under monogamy, in contrast, the equilibrium bride-price is negative (i.e., a dowry). The reason is that maintaining unmarried daughters is costly for their fathers, so they are better-off paying a (small enough) dowry to their future husbands. In this setting, the economic returns to daughters are lower and, consequently, so is the demand for children. Fertility decreases and savings increase. Thus, moving from polygny to monogamy lowers population growth and raises the capital stock in the long run, which translates into higher output per capita in the steady state.

Instead of enforcing monogamy in a traditionally polygynous setting, an alternative policy is to transfer marriage consent from fathers to daughters. Tertilt ( 2006 ) shows that when individual consent is extended to daughters, such that fathers do not receive the bride-price anymore, the consequences are qualitatively similar to a ban on polygyny. If fathers stop receiving the bride-price, they save more physical capital. In the long run, per capita output is higher when consent is transferred to daughters.

Grossbard-Shechtman ( 1984 ) develops the first non-cooperative model where (monogamous) marriage, home production, and labor supply decisions are interdependent. Footnote 26 Spouses are modeled as separate agents deciding over production and consumption. Marriage becomes an implicit contract for ‘work-in-household’ (WiHo), defined as “an activity that benefits another household member [typically a spouse] who could potentially compensate the individual for these efforts” (Grossbard 2015 , p. 21). Footnote 27 In particular, each spouse decides how much labor to supply to market work and WiHo, and how much labor to demand from the other spouse for WiHo. Through this lens, spousal decisions over the intra-marriage distribution of consumption and WiHo are akin to well-known principal-agent problems faced between firms and workers. In the marriage market equilibrium, a spouse benefiting from WiHo (the principal) must compensate the spouse producing it (the agent) via intra-household transfers (of goods or leisure). Footnote 28 Grossbard-Shechtman ( 1984 ) and Grossbard ( 2015 ) show that, under these conditions, the ratio of men to women (i.e., the sex ratio) in the marriage market is inversely related to female labor supply to the market. The reason is that, as the pool of potential wives shrinks, prospective husbands have to increase compensation for female WiHo. From the potential wife’s point of view, as the equilibrium price for her WiHo increases, market work becomes less attractive. Conversely, when sex ratios are lower, female labor supply outside the home increases. Although the model does not explicit derive growth implications, the relative increase in female labor supply is expected to be beneficial for economic growth, as argued by many of the theories reviewed so far.

In an extension of this framework, Grossbard & Pereira ( 2015 ) analyze how sex ratios affect gendered savings over the marital life-cycle. Assuming that women supply a disproportionate amount of labor for WiHo (due, for example, to traditional gender norms), the authors show that men and women will have very distinct saving trajectories. A higher sex ratio increases savings by single men, who anticipate higher compensation transfers for their wives’ WiHo, whereas it decreases savings by single women, who anticipate receiving those transfers upon marriage. But the pattern flips after marriage: precautionary savings raise among married women, because the possibility of marriage dissolution entails a loss of income from WiHo. The opposite effect happens for married men: marriage dissolution would imply less expenditures in the future. The higher the sex ratio, the higher will be the equilibrium compensation paid by husbands for their wives’ WiHo. Therefore, the sex ratio will positively affect savings among single men and married women, but negatively affect savings among single women and married men. The net effect on the aggregate savings rate and on economic growth will depend on the relative size of these demographic groups.

In a related article, Du & Wei ( 2013 ) propose a model where higher sex ratios worsen marriage markets prospects for young men and their families, who react by increasing savings. Women in turn reduce savings. However, because sex ratios shift the composition of the population in favor of men (high saving type) relative to women (low saving type) and men save additionally to compensate for women’s dis-saving, aggregate savings increase unambiguously with sex ratios.

In Guvenen & Rendall ( 2015 ), female education is, in part, demanded as insurance against divorce risk. The reason is that divorce laws often protect spouses’ future labor market earnings (i.e., returns to human capital), but force them to share their physical assets. Because, in the model, women are more likely to gain custody of their children after divorce, they face higher costs from divorce relative to their husbands. Therefore, the higher the risk of divorce, the more women invest in human capital, as insurance against a future vulnerable economic position. Guvenen & Rendall ( 2015 ) shows that, over time, divorce risk has increased (for example, consensual divorce became replaced by unilateral divorce in most US states in the 1970s). In the aggregate, higher divorce risk boosted female education and female labor supply.

In summary, the rules regulating marriage and household formation carry relevant theoretical consequences for economic development. While the few studies on this topic have focused on age at marriage, consent rules and polygyny, and the interaction between sex ratios, marriage, and labor supply, other features of the marriage market remain largely unexplored (Borella, De Nardi and Yang 2018 ). Growth theorists would benefit from further incorporating theories of household formation in gendered macro models. Footnote 29

6 Conclusion

In this article, we surveyed micro-founded theories linking gender inequality to economic development. This literature offers many plausible mechanisms through which inequality between men and women affects the aggregate economy (see Table 1 ). Yet, we believe the body of theories could be expanded in several directions. We discuss them below and highlight lessons for policy.

The first direction for future research concerns control over fertility. In models where fertility is endogenous, households are always able to achieve their preferred number of children (see Strulik 2019 , for an exception). The implicit assumption is that there is a free and infallible method of fertility control available for all households—a view rejected by most demographers. The gap between desired fertility and achieved fertility can be endogeneized at three levels. First, at the societal level, the diffusion of particular contraceptive methods may be influenced by cultural and religious norms. Second, at the household level, fertility control may be object of non-cooperative bargaining between the spouses, in particular, for contraceptive methods that only women perfectly observe (Ashraf, Field and Lee 2014 ; Doepke & Kindermann 2019 ). More generally, the role of asymmetric information within the household is not yet explored (Walther 2017 ). Third, if parents have preferences over the gender composition of their offspring, fertility is better modeled as a sequential and uncertain process, where household size is likely endogenous to the sex of the last born child (Hazan & Zoabi 2015 ).

A second direction worth exploring concerns gender inequality in a historical perspective. In models with multiple equilibria, an economy’s path is often determined by its initial level of gender equality. Therefore, it would be useful to develop theories explaining why initial conditions varied across societies. In particular, there is a large literature on economic and demographic history documenting how systems of marriage and household formation differed substantially across preindustrial societies (e.g., De Moor & Van Zanden 2010 ; Hajnal 1965 , 1982 ; Hartman 2004 ; Ruggles 2009 ). In our view, more theoretical work is needed to explain both the origins and the consequences of these historical systems.

A third avenue for future research concerns the role of technological change. In several models, technological change is the exogenous force that ultimately erodes gender gaps in education or labor supply (e.g., Bloom et al. 2015 ; Doepke & Tertilt 2009 ; Galor & Weil 1996 ). For that to happen, technological progress is assumed to be skill-biased, thus raising the returns to education—or, in other words, favoring brain over brawn. As such, new technologies make male advantage in physical strength ever more irrelevant, while making female time spent on childrearing and housework ever more expensive. Moreover, recent technological progress increased the efficiency of domestic activities, thereby relaxing women’s time constraints (e.g., Cavalcanti & Tavares 2008 ; Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu 2005 ). These mechanisms are plausible, but other aspects of technological change need not be equally favorable for women. In many countries, for example, the booming science, technology, and engineering sectors tend to be particularly male-intensive. And Tejani & Milberg ( 2016 ) provide evidence for developing countries that as manufacturing industries become more capital intensive, their female employment share decreases.

Even if current technological progress is assumed to weaken gender gaps, historically, technology may have played exactly the opposite role. If technology today is more complementary to brain, in the past it could have been more complementary to brawn. An example is the plow that, relative to alternative technologies for field preparation (e.g., hoe, digging stick), requires upper body strength, on which men have a comparative advantage over women (Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn 2013 ; Boserup 1970 ). Another, even more striking example, is the invention of agriculture itself—the Neolithic Revolution. The transition from a hunter-gatherer lifestyle to sedentary agriculture involved a relative loss of status for women (Dyble et al. 2015 ; Hansen, Jensen and Skovsgaard 2015 ). One explanation is that property rights on land were captured by men, who had an advantage on physical strength and, consequently, on physical violence. Thus, in the long view of human history, technological change appears to have shifted from being male-biased towards being female-biased. Endogeneizing technological progress and its interaction with gender inequality is a promising avenue for future research.

Fourth, open economy issues are still almost entirely absent. An exception is Rees & Riezman ( 2012 ), who model the effect of globalization on economic growth. Whether global capital flows generate jobs primarily in female or male intensive sectors matters for long-run growth. If globalization creates job opportunities for women, their bargaining power increases and households trade off child quantity by child quality. Fertility falls, human capital accumulates, and long-run per capita output is high. If, on the other hand, globalization creates jobs for men, their intra-household power increases; fertility increases, human capital decreases, and steady-state income per capita is low. The literature would benefit from engaging with open economy demand-driven models of the feminist tradition, such as Blecker & Seguino ( 2002 ), Seguino ( 2010 ). Other fruitful avenues for future research on open economy macro concern gender analysis of global value chains (Barrientos 2019 ), gendered patterns of international migration (Cortes 2015 ; Cortes & Tessada 2011 ), and the diffusion of gender norms through globalization (Beine, Docquier and Schiff 2013 ; Klasen 2020 ; Tuccio & Wahba 2018 ).

A final point concerns the role of men in this literature. In most theoretical models, gender inequality is not the result of an active male project that seeks the domination of women. Instead, inequality emerges as a rational best response to some underlying gender gap in endowments or constraints. Then, as the underlying gap becomes less relevant—for example, due to skill-biased technological change—, men passively relinquish their power (see Doepke & Tertilt 2009 , for an exception). There is never a male backlash against the short-term power loss that necessarily comes with female empowerment. In reality, it is more likely that men actively oppose losing power and resources towards women (Folbre 2020 ; Kabeer 2016 ; Klasen 2020 ). This possibility has not yet been explored in formal models, even though it could threaten the typical virtuous cycle between gender equality and growth. If men are forward-looking, and the short-run losses outweigh the dynamic gains from higher growth, they might ensure that women never get empowered to begin with. Power asymmetries tend to be sticky, because “any group that is able to claim a disproportionate share of the gains from cooperation can develop social institutions to fortify their position” (Folbre 2020 , p. 199). For example, Eswaran & Malhotra ( 2011 ) set up a household decision model where men use domestic violence against their wives as a tool to enhance male bargaining power. Thus, future theories should recognize more often that men have a vested interest on the process of female empowerment.

More generally, policymakers should pay attention to the possibility of a male backlash as an unintended consequence of female empowerment policies (Erten & Keskin 2018 ; Eswaran & Malhotra 2011 ). Likewise, whereas most theories reviewed here link lower fertility to higher economic growth, the relationship is non-monotonic. Fertility levels below the replacement rate will eventually generate aggregate social costs in the form of smaller future workforces, rapidly ageing societies, and increased pressure on welfare systems, to name a few.

Many theories presented in this survey make another important practical point: public policies should recognize that gender gaps in separate dimensions complement and reinforce one another and, therefore, have to be dealt with simultaneously. A naïve policy targeting a single gap in isolation is unlikely to have substantial growth effects in the short run. Typically, inequalities in separate dimensions are not independent from each other (Agénor 2017 ; Bandiera & Does 2013 ; Duflo 2012 ; Kabeer 2016 ). For example, if credit-constrained women face weak property rights, are unable to access certain markets, and have mobility and time constraints, then the marginal return to capital may nevertheless be larger for men. Similarly, the return to male education may well be above the female return if demand for female labor is low or concentrated in sectors with low productivity. In sum, “the fact that women face multiple constraints means that relaxing just one may not improve outcomes” (Duflo 2012 , p. 1076).

Promising policy directions that would benefit from further macroeconomic research are the role of public investments in physical infrastructure and care provision (Agénor 2017 ; Braunstein, Bouhia and Seguino 2020 ), gender-based taxation (Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura 2012 ; Meier & Rainer 2015 ), and linkages between gender equality and pro-environmental agendas (Matsumoto 2014 ).

See Echevarria & Moe ( 2000 ) for a similar complaint that “theories of economic growth and development have consistently neglected to include gender as a variable” (p. 77).

A non-exhaustive list includes Bandiera & Does ( 2013 ), Braunstein ( 2013 ), Cuberes & Teignier ( 2014 ), Duflo ( 2012 ), Kabeer ( 2016 ), Kabeer & Natali ( 2013 ), Klasen ( 2018 ), Seguino ( 2013 , 2020 ), Sinha et al. ( 2007 ), Stotsky ( 2006 ), World Bank ( 2001 , 2011 ).

For an in-depth history of “new home economics” see Grossbard-Shechtman ( 2001 ) and Grossbard ( 2010 , 2011 ).

For recent empirical reviews see Duflo ( 2012 ) and Doss ( 2013 ).

Although the unitary approach has being rejected on theoretical (e.g., Echevarria & Moe 2000 ; Folbre 1986 ; Knowles 2013 ; Sen 1989 ) and empirical grounds (e.g., Doss 2013 ; Duflo 2003 ; Lundberg et al. 1997 ), these early models are foundational to the subsequent literature. As it turns out, some of the key mechanisms survive in non-unitary theories of the household.

For nice conceptual perspectives on conflict and cooperation in households see Sen ( 1989 ), Grossbard ( 2011 ), and Folbre ( 2020 ).

The relationship depicted in Fig. 1 is robust to using other composite measures of gender equality (e.g., UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index or OECD’s Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) (see Branisa, Klasen and Ziegler 2013 )), and other years besides 2000. In Fig. 2 , the linear prediction explains 56 percent of the cross-country variation in per capita income.

See Seguino ( 2013 , 2020 ) for a review of this literature.

The model allows for sorting on ability (“some people are better teachers”) or sorting on occupation-specific preferences (“others derive more utility from working as a teacher”) (Hsieh et al. 2019 , p. 1441). Here, we restrict our presentation to the case where sorting occurs primarily on ability. The authors find little empirical support for sorting on preferences.

Because the home sector is treated as any other occupation, the model can capture, in a reduced-form fashion, social norms on women’s labor force participation. For example, a social norm on traditional gender roles can be represented as a utility premium obtained by all women working on the home sector.

Note, however, that discrimination against women raises productivity in the non-agricultural sector. The reason is that the few women who end up working outside agriculture are positively selected on talent. Lee ( 2020 ) shows that this countervailing effect is modest and dominated by the loss of productivity in agriculture.

This is not the classic Beckerian quantity-quality trade-off because parents cannot invest in the quality of their children. Instead, the mechanism is built by assumption in the household’s utility function. When women’s wages increase relative to male wages, the substitution effect dominates the income effect.

The hypothesis that female labor force participation and economic development have a U-shaped relationship—known as the feminization-U hypothesis—goes back to Boserup ( 1970 ). See also Goldin ( 1995 ). Recently, Gaddis & Klasen ( 2014 ) find only limited empirical support for the feminization-U.

The model does not consider fertility decisions. Parents derive utility from their children’s human capital (social status utility). When household income increases, parents want to “consume” more social status by investing in their children’s education—this is the positive income effect.

Bloom et al. ( 2015 ) build their main model with unitary households, but show that the key conclusions are robust to a collective representation of the household.

This assumption does not necessarily mean that boys are more talented than girls. It can be also interpreted as a reduced-form way of capturing labor market discrimination against women.

Many empirical studies are in line with this assumption, which is rooted in evolutionary psychology. See Strulik ( 2019 ) for references. There are several other evolutionary arguments for men wanting more children (including with different women). See, among others, Mulder & Rauch ( 2009 ), Penn & Smith ( 2007 ), von Rueden & Jaeggi ( 2016 ). However, for a different view, see Fine ( 2017 ).

They do not model fertility decisions. So there is no quantity-quality trade-off.

In their empirical application, Heath & Tan ( 2020 ) study the Hindu Succession Act, which, through improved female inheritance rights, increased the lifetime unearned income of Indian women. Other policies consistent with the model are, for example, unconditional cash transfers to women.

De la Croix & Vander Donckt ( 2010 ) show this with numerical simulations, because the interior regime becomes analytically intractable.

We focus on gender-related policies in our presentation, but the article simulates additional public policies.

Agénor and Agénor ( 2014 ) develop a similar model, but with unitary households, and Agénor and Canuto ( 2015 ) have a similar model of collective households for Brazil, where adult women can also invest time in human capital formation. Since public infrastructure substitutes for women’s time in home production, more (or better) infrastructure can free up time for female human capital accumulation and, thus, endogenously increase wives’ bargaining power.

Voigtländer and Voth ( 2013 ) justify this assumption arguing that, in England, employment contracts for farm servants working in animal husbandry were conditional on celibacy. However, see Edwards & Ogilvie ( 2018 ) for a critique of this assumption.

The bride-price under individual consent need not be paid explicitly as a lump-sum transfer. It could, instead, be paid to the bride implicitly in the form of higher lifetime consumption.

In Tertilt ( 2005 ), all men are similar (except in age). Widespread polygyny is possible because older men marry younger women and population growth is high. This setup reflects stylized facts for Sub-Saharan Africa. It differs from models that assume male heterogeneity in endowments, where polygyny emerges because a rich male elite owns several wives, while poor men remain single (e.g., Gould, Moav and Simhon 2008 ; Lagerlöf 2005 , 2010 ).

See Grossbard ( 2015 ) for more details and extensions of this model and Grossbard ( 2018 ) for a non-technical overview of the related literature. For an earlier application, see Grossbard ( 1976 ).

The concept of WiHo is closely related but not equivalent to the ‘black-box’ term home production used by much of the literature. It also relates to feminist perspectives on care and social reproduction labor (c.f. Folbre 1994 ).

In the general setup, the model need not lead to a corner solution where only one spouse specializes in WiHo.

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Acknowledgements

We thank the Editor, Shoshana Grossbard, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge funding from the Growth and Economic Opportunities for Women (GrOW) initiative, a multi-funder partnership between the UK’s Department for International Development, the Hewlett Foundation and the International Development Research Centre. All views expressed here and remaining errors are our own. Manuel dedicates this article to Stephan Klasen, in loving memory.

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Santos Silva, M., Klasen, S. Gender inequality as a barrier to economic growth: a review of the theoretical literature. Rev Econ Household 19 , 581–614 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-020-09535-6

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What does gender equality look like today?

Date: Wednesday, 6 October 2021

Progress towards gender equality is looking bleak. But it doesn’t need to.

A new global analysis of progress on gender equality and women’s rights shows women and girls remain disproportionately affected by the socioeconomic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, struggling with disproportionately high job and livelihood losses, education disruptions and increased burdens of unpaid care work. Women’s health services, poorly funded even before the pandemic, faced major disruptions, undermining women’s sexual and reproductive health. And despite women’s central role in responding to COVID-19, including as front-line health workers, they are still largely bypassed for leadership positions they deserve.

UN Women’s latest report, together with UN DESA, Progress on the Sustainable Development Goals: The Gender Snapshot 2021 presents the latest data on gender equality across all 17 Sustainable Development Goals. The report highlights the progress made since 2015 but also the continued alarm over the COVID-19 pandemic, its immediate effect on women’s well-being and the threat it poses to future generations.

We’re breaking down some of the findings from the report, and calling for the action needed to accelerate progress.

The pandemic is making matters worse

One and a half years since the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic, the toll on the poorest and most vulnerable people remains devastating and disproportionate. The combined impact of conflict, extreme weather events and COVID-19 has deprived women and girls of even basic needs such as food security. Without urgent action to stem rising poverty, hunger and inequality, especially in countries affected by conflict and other acute forms of crisis, millions will continue to suffer.

A global goal by global goal reality check:

Goal 1. Poverty

In 2021, extreme poverty is on the rise and progress towards its elimination has reversed. An estimated 435 million women and girls globally are living in extreme poverty.

And yet we can change this .

Over 150 million women and girls could emerge from poverty by 2030 if governments implement a comprehensive strategy to improve access to education and family planning, achieve equal wages and extend social transfers.

Goal 2. Zero hunger

The global gender gap in food security has risen dramatically during the pandemic, with more women and girls going hungry. Women’s food insecurity levels were 10 per cent higher than men’s in 2020, compared with 6 per cent higher in 2019.

This trend can be reversed , including by supporting women small-scale producers, who typically earn far less than men, through increased funding, training and land rights reforms.

Goal 3. Good health and well-being

Disruptions in essential health services due to COVID-19 are taking a tragic toll on women and girls. In the first year of the pandemic, there were an estimated 1.4 million additional unintended pregnancies in lower and middle-income countries.

We need to do better .

Response to the pandemic must include prioritizing sexual and reproductive health services, ensuring they continue to operate safely now and after the pandemic is long over. In addition, more support is needed to ensure life-saving personal protection equipment, tests, oxygen and especially vaccines are available in rich and poor countries alike as well as to vulnerable population within countries.

Goal 4. Quality education

A year and a half into the pandemic, schools remain partially or fully closed in 42 per cent of the world’s countries and territories. School closures spell lost opportunities for girls and an increased risk of violence, exploitation and early marriage .

Governments can do more to protect girls education .

Measures focused specifically on supporting girls returning to school are urgently needed, including measures focused on girls from marginalized communities who are most at risk.

Goal 5. Gender equality

The pandemic has tested and even reversed progress in expanding women’s rights and opportunities. Reports of violence against women and girls, a “shadow” pandemic to COVID-19, are increasing in many parts of the world. COVID-19 is also intensifying women’s workload at home, forcing many to leave the labour force altogether.

Building forward differently and better will hinge on placing women and girls at the centre of all aspects of response and recovery, including through gender-responsive laws, policies and budgeting.

Goal 6. Clean water and sanitation

In 2018, nearly 2.3 billion people lived in water-stressed countries. Without safe drinking water, adequate sanitation and menstrual hygiene facilities, women and girls find it harder to lead safe, productive and healthy lives.

Change is possible .

Involve those most impacted in water management processes, including women. Women’s voices are often missing in water management processes. 

Goal 7. Affordable and clean energy

Increased demand for clean energy and low-carbon solutions is driving an unprecedented transformation of the energy sector. But women are being left out. Women hold only 32 per cent of renewable energy jobs.

We can do better .

Expose girls early on to STEM education, provide training and support to women entering the energy field, close the pay gap and increase women’s leadership in the energy sector.

Goal 8. Decent work and economic growth

The number of employed women declined by 54 million in 2020 and 45 million women left the labour market altogether. Women have suffered steeper job losses than men, along with increased unpaid care burdens at home.

We must do more to support women in the workforce .

Guarantee decent work for all, introduce labour laws/reforms, removing legal barriers for married women entering the workforce, support access to affordable/quality childcare.

Goal 9. Industry, innovation and infrastructure

The COVID-19 crisis has spurred striking achievements in medical research and innovation. Women’s contribution has been profound. But still only a little over a third of graduates in the science, technology, engineering and mathematics field are female.

We can take action today.

 Quotas mandating that a proportion of research grants are awarded to women-led teams or teams that include women is one concrete way to support women researchers. 

Goal 10. Reduced inequalities

Limited progress for women is being eroded by the pandemic. Women facing multiple forms of discrimination, including women and girls with disabilities, migrant women, women discriminated against because of their race/ethnicity are especially affected.

Commit to end racism and discrimination in all its forms, invest in inclusive, universal, gender responsive social protection systems that support all women. 

Goal 11. Sustainable cities and communities

Globally, more than 1 billion people live in informal settlements and slums. Women and girls, often overrepresented in these densely populated areas, suffer from lack of access to basic water and sanitation, health care and transportation.

The needs of urban poor women must be prioritized .

Increase the provision of durable and adequate housing and equitable access to land; included women in urban planning and development processes.

Goal 12. Sustainable consumption and production; Goal 13. Climate action; Goal 14. Life below water; and Goal 15. Life on land

Women activists, scientists and researchers are working hard to solve the climate crisis but often without the same platforms as men to share their knowledge and skills. Only 29 per cent of featured speakers at international ocean science conferences are women.

 And yet we can change this .

Ensure women activists, scientists and researchers have equal voice, representation and access to forums where these issues are being discussed and debated. 

Goal 16. Peace, justice and strong institutions

The lack of women in decision-making limits the reach and impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and other emergency recovery efforts. In conflict-affected countries, 18.9 per cent of parliamentary seats are held by women, much lower than the global average of 25.6 per cent.

This is unacceptable .

It's time for women to have an equal share of power and decision-making at all levels.

Goal 17. Global partnerships for the goals

There are just 9 years left to achieve the Global Goals by 2030, and gender equality cuts across all 17 of them. With COVID-19 slowing progress on women's rights, the time to act is now.

Looking ahead

As it stands today, only one indicator under the global goal for gender equality (SDG5) is ‘close to target’: proportion of seats held by women in local government. In other areas critical to women’s empowerment, equality in time spent on unpaid care and domestic work and decision making regarding sexual and reproductive health the world is far from target. Without a bold commitment to accelerate progress, the global community will fail to achieve gender equality. Building forward differently and better will require placing women and girls at the centre of all aspects of response and recovery, including through gender-responsive laws, policies and budgeting.

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Gender Discrimination in the Workplace Essay

In the gender discrimination at workplace essay below, you will discover the different forms of bias and judgement present at places of work in the USA and Saudi Arabia.

Introduction

Gender discrimination in the workplace continues to be a disturbing problem to various women in USA and the rest of the world as well. It is considered to be quite widespread and virtually every woman must have suffered from one form of discrimination or another due to her gender.

Even in the current age, women still experience discrimination in their places of work and despite having similar skills as their male counterparts; they still can earn a two third of what the men can earn irrespective of their qualification and experience which might be same as or more than that of men.

Gender discrimination in the work place is the favoring of one gender against the other in terms of recruitment, job assignment, and termination of employment, compensation and promotion.

Discrimination in the work place may be intentional or unintentional and might be prompted by prejudice or ignorance. Women and men are always subjected to different treatment in the work place; in some circumstances, men may be treated more than women while in some other cases women are treated better than men.

Despite the fact that both men and women joint the work place with predetermined gender differences which is used as a basis for the preferential treatment they receive, it is in rare circumstances that gender differences in the treatment of both men and women is associated with preexisting perceptions (Bell, McLaughlin & Sequeira 67).

This essay will document gender bias and gender discrimination in the context of social and physical and the social confines of the work place that is experienced at work in the context of United States of America and Saudi Arabia.

Traditionally, gender discrimination emphasized sex discrimination and the two were used synonymously. The most powerful form of discrimination in a work place is when a particular group is adversely affected by the procedures that are followed in making decision or during work place practices.

It might be agreed that work practices may not be intentioned to discriminate against any group, but they might have the impact of offering fewer opportunities to either gender (Mayer 1).

Gender discrimination, sexual harassment and glass ceiling

There is a relationship between gender discrimination, glass ceiling and sexual harassment and all the three are hindrance to women occupying executive or managerial positions.

There are three main forms of gender discrimination, namely: overt discrimination, sexual discrimination and glass ceiling. All the three negatively impact on the status of women.

Women have been the victims of gender discrimination in various business organizations in the United States of America despite efforts of numerous legislations and strong feminist activists to combat it.

Overt Discrimination

This is understood as the use of gender as a parameter for making employment related decisions. This form of discrimination was the objective of Title VII in the USA which formed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

This Act prohibited all forms of sex-based discrimination in matters of employment like hiring, promotion and firing. Examples of over discrimination are the refusal by employees to hire women or the practice of paying women low wages due to their gender.

Over discrimination has led to occupational sex segregation in the Saudi Arabia. The stereotyping of particular job as for women or men are evident in the US where women makeup the majority of nurses, flight attendance and secretaries which are characterized by low pay, short career ladder and low status while men make up the majority of pilots, physicians and executives.

In the USA, women are considered to occupy low organizational status and low organizational status and power (Gregory 209).

Sexual Harassment

This is another form of gender discrimination and manifests itself in employment based discrimination. There are two guidelines that define the illegality of sex harassment, these are: quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment.

Quid pro quo involves the inducing of a woman through employment so as to receive sexual factors or compliance. It is the coercive form of quid pro quo that is considered as gender discrimination.

Most of this form of gender discrimination is perpetuated by managers and supervisors of an organization. Hostile harassment on the other and is witnessed when sexual favors can interfere with employees’ work performance or when sexual behavior is used to create an intimidating work environment. Sexual harassment is considered as a tool for occupational sex segregation.

Glass Ceiling

This is considered as a fundamental factor that hinders women from accessing employment and status. Glass ceiling affects women in an organization.

Glass ceiling are understood as those invisible man-made barriers which hinder women from progressing beyond certain levels. In the US for example, it is estimated that women make up 30 percent of managers but only 5 percent make up the executive managers.

These factors are linked to gender stereotypes. It is difficult to eradicate glass ceiling by use of legislation (Bell, McLaughlin and Sequeira 70).

Gender Discrimination in the United States of America

Gender discrimination in the United States of America is an ancient phenomenon since it assumes the dimension of discrimination against women which is global.

Just like in other various parts of the world, gender discrimination is ripe in the USA. It is global knowledge that the position of women is marginalized in the society in various aspects of production.

Women are guaranteed limited access to education, they lack power to own property, they have limited exposure to education and training facilities and they have limited opportunities for employment than men.

The reluctance of the USA to ratify the Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination against Women which was adopted by the United Nations is a clear indication of how deeply entrenched gender discrimination is in the USA.

However despite the inability of the USA to ratify the CEDAW, they have enacted legislations and numerous statutes which are aimed at safeguarding of women from all forms of discrimination and particularly in the working environment.

Previously, it was the duty of the states to define the kind of employment that women were entitled to do. All aspects of discrimination in the USA was taken care by the Title VII but despite of this, and in spite of the fact that women are gaining entry into the labor force, there still exists inequalities in wage structure.

Gender discrimination is experienced when one gender is given preference or is treated less than the other gender. Women on several occasions are given little preference than men because of their sex.

Wage equality and sexual harassment are the predominant forms of gender discrimination. Despite various regulations to promote equality, there are still some cases of discrimination in work place.

Women do not measure up to men in various aspects of employment particularly regarding income, the rate or frequency of employment and the range of occupation. Glass ceiling exists to prevent women from being discriminated upon (Bell, McLaughlin and Sequeira 69).

Gender discrimination in the work place is a common phenomenon in the United States of America. Women find it difficult to secure employment as compared to men.

This is associated with the snaky behavior of women in the USA. There are existent laws that provide for protection against any discrimination in their workplace.

This however has not prevented employees from facing various forms of harassment and discrimination in employment based gender.

In the USA, sex discrimination rare its ugly face in various forms and the common form of gender discrimination id the exclusion of women from the labor market just because of the fact that they are women.

It involves the association of particular jobs as for men only of for women only or by application of the glass ceiling rule that defines how far women should go in the corporate or government ladder (Dipboye and Colella 174).

The most widespread form of gender discrimination is sexual harassment. This happens when an employer connects the job status of the employee to their sexual suggestion.

This is totally contrary to laws of employment which prohibit the subjecting of women to sexually charged or hostile work place environment.

Sexual harassment includes posting on obscene photos that can offend fellow workers, slur on the appearance of the fellow workers or making derogatory comments in respect to women’s pregnancy (Brayton 1).

The prohibition of gender discrimination under title VII was considered as relieve for all women and a new dawn of seeking inequality in the work place but still the practice is widespread.

It is estimated that in the USA, the female gender are still occupied with jobs that are deemed to be typically for women like secretaries, administration scale workers as well as sales clerks.

According to the women’s policy research institute in Washington, for every $75 cent that a lady earns, a man earns $1. Gender discrimination has been implemented by some multinational companies operating in the USA and which claim that they are protecting certain bilateral treaty provision that gives them leeway to employ staff of their own choice. This might be a recipe for discrimination (Mayer 1).

In the USA women suffer from gender discrimination in a various work place spheres like hiring, promotion and salary. In terms of hiring, few women find employment as compared to the population of women who graduate from College.

With regards to promotion, women occupy lower positions. Women are not represented in the top hierarchy of various organizations and the problem is not due to the fact they are not adequately trained but because they are discriminated because of their gender. Salary wise, women often make little money that the one made by their male counterparts (Isaacs 1).

Gender Discrimination in Saudi Arabia Work Place

In the case of Saudi Arabia, their current policies and programs are geared towards the emancipation of women in the labor market. Despite the efforts by the government to ameliorate the position of women in the spheres of employment, women are still the minority in the work place and it is estimated that they make approximately 15 percent of the population in the labor force.

The marginalization of women in the work place is linked to the existing legislative, social, occupational and educational constraints that hinder the participation of Saudi women in the labor market.

Gender based discrimination in Saudi Arabia is evident in the statistics of job population; men occupy approximately 85 percent of the labor force.

Women in Saudi Arabia account for the large group of the unemployed population. Gender discrimination in the Saudi work force market has its roots in the country’s education system which fails to prepare women for managerial positions and other competitive roles in the society.

Saudi laws guarantee that a woman is entitled to work but the same laws specify the environment that women should apply their labor and this is considered a form of sex segregation where women are placed in certain positions that are considered feminine in nature and are less fit for men. In the private sector for example, women have access to narrow range of jobs mainly in private business and banks (AlMunajjed 4).

Though Saudi Arabia has made significant progress in combating discrimination in the work place, the progress has never been even and specifically in areas like women in paid employment and their treatment of migrant workers.

Women in the Saudi Arabia are experiencing difficulties in their entry into the labor force. It is estimated that the rate of women participation the workforce in Saudi Arabia has been on the rise.

Women are a minority in occupying jobs in the managerial positions and they experience restriction in their choice for labor market and employment. Women experience a lot of harassment in the work place and they also suffer from offensive comments.

Violence, discrimination and segregation are some of the common practices that affect woman in Saudi Arabia and it is deeply rooted in the Muslim tradition and the rigid social stratification structure which insubordinates women and makes them to appear impure or inferior to men.

Gender discrimination has made it hard for Saudi women to secure employment, to secure better training or to get equal pay for their work done. There is also widespread discrimination against women in terms of hiring and recruitment.

Various employers have refused to accommodate the needs of women that are occasioned by their gender but which conflict with work practice for example pregnancy (International Labor Office 3).

In Saudi Arabia, gender discrimination and inequalities apply to women’s employment opportunities. Traditionally in Saudi Arabia, business and government sector are predominantly preserve of men and they were limitedly exposed to family oriented systems, in this regard, men differed from women based on their perceptions, the beliefs and the expectations of a typical Saudi Arabian work pace. Yes, gender discrimination and segregation is prevalent in Saudi Arabia but it is being slowly eliminated.

Manifestation of Gender Discrimination

Overall, gender discrimination is reflected in the following areas:.

Pay gap: there is often widespread discrimination and bias in the distribution of bonus and performances which may be related to the salary, it has been established that women are paid lower salaries than their male counterparts for similar work done.

This equality is reflected in their entire career life. Consequently, in the salary cadre women concentrate on lower jobs in their occupations.

Recruitment, conditions of services, retention and promotion: there is a lot of occupational segregation in terms of career development in Saudi Arabia and US.

It has been established that men occupy two-third of the management, professional and senior jobs. There is also a likelihood of men progressing up the career ladder faster than their female counterparts, which is a reflection of discrimination in the work place.

Recruitment: gender discrimination is also evidenced in the recruitment and the selection process. In this circumstance, men dominate highly paying jobs while women are recruited to occupy the low paying jobs.

In Saudi Arabia, informal recruitment and personal referral are the common modes of recruitment. These informal methods of recruitment have the tendency of propagating women exclusion in certain job fields.

Consequently, women are more likely to be asked questions which touch on their family background during the recruitment and this is considered an issue of gender discrimination.

Progression in career paths: women are in most circumstances trapped in lower paying jobs. Women can only be promoted to supervisory positions but their male counterparts have the likelihood of being promoted to managerial posts.

Work place culture: there are several culture issues that form the basis of gender discrimination in the work place. Networking activities and sports only place focus on male dominated sports.

These cultural issues may be stereotyping and sexist in form. This alienates women hence creating exclusionary feeling of undervaluing their participation and confidence.

The practice and culture of long working for long hours serves to discriminate against those employees who have tight family responsibility who, on several occasions are women (Equality and Human Rights Commission 9).

Theories of Gender Discrimination in the Work Place

There are various theories that are used to account for gender discrimination in the work place. There are certain cases of discrimination bias which are encouraged by the structures and practices of an organization as well as the environment and the dynamics what individuals operate.

Gender discrimination can also be depicted in the established rules of success where men are promoted or employed based on their performance while ladies secure employment or promotion based on their appearance.

There are various theories that seek to explain the prevalence of gender discrimination on the workplace. These theories are the sex plus theory, rational bias theory and the disparate treatment theory.

Sex plus theory is defined by the gender and the marital status of the employee. Gender discrimination can also be evidenced on the benefits provided by an employee to workers.

Most employees fail to factor in the fact that female employees have special sex based disabilities and health care demands like bearing children and pregnancy. This unique sex based features of women should be made so as to enable women to fully participate in the labor force and failure to address this needs can amount to discrimination (Brayton 1).

Disparate Treatment Theory

This theory holds that employers are directly accountable and are responsible for their organizational structures and the institutional practices that may enable the practice of discrimination bias in the work place.

There are situations where women managers with similar qualifications and same training and experience as their male counterparts and in similar positions earn fewer wage.

Modern organizations are slowly embracing team work which leads to the increase in the number of individuals who are charged with the art of decision making.

The increased use of team work to make decisions has heightened discrimination bias which affects the ability of women to develop or grow within the organization.

It may be hard to imagine or understand how organizational structure or the practices of institutions or the dynamics of work place can lead to gender discrimination.

There is disparate treatment theory which occurs when individuals are treated differently due to their group or association to particular group.

Examples of disparate treatment theory are: the unwillingness of employees to hire women due to their gender, the reluctance by the management of an organization to place women in career track positions, offering of small salary to an employee just because she is a woman and the asking of male like questions to female candidates during an interview.

Consequently, there is the traditional version of disparate treatment theory which defines discrimination in the work place as an individual and measurable practice.

It explains work place discrimination as intentional. According to the theory, individuals are consciously motivated to practice discrimination; it argues that discrimination is product of decision by an individual with stereotypical belief towards particular group of individuals.

Disparate treatment theory explains discrimination by unraveling the mind and the decisions of the individual actor and what motivates him to discriminate.

Various kinds of disparate treatment theory are: individual disparate treatment theory and systemic disparate treatment theory. It is important to comprehend disparate treatment theory in terms of dissimilarities as opposed to the conscious motives to discriminate for equity to be realized in the work place. There is also disparate impact theory which describes discrimination in form of consequences and not the motive (Green 94).

Rational Bias Theory

Another theory is that examines the prevalence of discrimination in the work place is the rational bias theory. Despite of numerous efforts to promote equality in the place of work, discrimination against certain groups still occurs, women have particularly bore the brunt of gender discrimination.

This results in women doing poorly than men in terms or economic strength, income and unemployment. This discrimination is reflected in their salaries where women earn less than men.

This theory predicts discrimination may be influenced by situations or circumstances whereby a demonstration of bias may attract rewards or sanctions.

According to the proponents of the theory, external pressure from the superiors can justify gender discrimination, it explains that there can be valid forms of discrimination which have basis in fact and which relies on particular stereotypes to arrive at a predictive accuracy (Larwood, Szwajkowski and Rose 9).

Sex plus Theory

This is the theory that captures all forms of gender based discrimination on account of pregnancy in the work place. The theory explains all forms of discrimination of pregnant women, it is considered out of law to terminate the contract of an employee due to pregnancy.

This theory argues that any sexual behavior in the office by an employer should be accompanied by a proof that the discrimination was not only driven by gender but by additional characteristics.

This form of discrimination holds the employers accountable when it happens that they have discriminated against women, sex plus discrimination is clearer and it happens when an employer does not discriminate against all the females and it only deals with subset or a category like Married woman.

It also covers the discrimination of women based on their marital status. This theory is used to describe a situation where an employee is categorized by the employer based on sex and another physical characteristic (Shetreet 255)

To overcome gender discrimination in the work place in Saudi Arabia, it is imperative for the government to introduce various reforms which will prepare women for competitive jobs.

This should include labor market reforms that will seek to promote gender equality as well as to create a favorable environment that can favor the participation of Saudi women in senior and managerial jobs which were traditionally preserved for men.

It is the responsibility of human resources management to enforce anti-discrimination policies in the company. This has never been the case because the organization’s management considers gender discrimination as a casual topic and hence is unable to prevent other forms of gender discrimination.

Most corporate organizations relegate the matter of gender discrimination to the periphery hence making its enforcement hard. Gender discrimination is often sustained by variables which are inherent and indigenous to the company and the company’s work environment.

There may be some circumstances where working conditions in a work environment dominated by men and work and lifestyle which is structured to fit male have the net effect of adversely impacting on the female workers. It is the corporate policies and practices of a company that sustain or eliminate the presence of gender discrimination in a work environment.

Gender discrimination in the work place needs to be addressed because it affects talent utilization in the work place as well as the quality of employee experiences.

It is imperative to understand the dynamics and other underlying issues in gender discrimination so as to prevent it. Gender discrimination is an organizational problem and it mentally and psychologically affects women who feel that they are discriminated against. This experience can lead women to have a negative perception about the organization.

Works Cited

Al Munajjed, Mona. “Women’s Employment in Saudi Arabia: A Major Challenge”. Booz Media , 2010. Web.

Bell, Myrtle., McLaughlin, Mairi and Sequeira, John. “Discrimination, harassment and the glass ceiling: Women executives as change agents”. Journal of Business Ethics 37.1 (2002): 65-76.

Brayton, Purcell. “Workplace Harassment and Employment Discrimination”. Brayton Law, 2011. Web.

Dipboye, Robert and Colella Adrienne. Discrimination at Work: the Psychological and Organizational Bases . New York, NY: Rutledge, 2005. Print.

Equality and Human Rights Commission. “Sex discrimination and gender pay gap report of the Equality and Human Rights Commission”. Equality and Human Rights Commission , 2009. Web.

Green, Tristin. “Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory”. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 38.1 (2003): 91-157.

Gregory, Raymond. Women and Workplace Discrimination: Overcoming Barriers to Gender Equality . Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003. Print.

International Labor Office. “Discrimination at Work in the Middle East and North Africa. International”. Labor Office , n.d. Web.

Isaacs, Ellen. “Gender discrimination in the workplace”. Isaacs-Gender Discrim , n.d. Web.

Larwood, Laurie., Szwajkowski, Eugene and Rose, Suzanna. “Sex and race relationship resulting from manager-client relationships: applying the rational choice theory of managerial discrimination”. Sex Roles 18.1 (1988): 9-29.

Mayer, Donald. “Gender discrimination”. Reference for Business , 2011. Web.

Shetreet, Simon. Women in Law . New York, NY: Kluwer Law International, 1998. Print.

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