economic sanctions essay

• Search Menu
• Advance articles
• Author Guidelines
• Submission Site
• Open Access
• About International Studies Perspectives
• About the International Studies Association
• Editorial Board
• Advertising and Corporate Services
• Journals Career Network
• Self-Archiving Policy
• Dispatch Dates
• Journals on Oxford Academic
• Books on Oxford Academic

• < Previous

Economic Sanctions in Flux: Enduring Challenges, New Policies, and Defining the Future Research Agenda

• Article contents
• Figures & tables
• Supplementary Data

Bryan R Early, Menevis Cilizoglu, Economic Sanctions in Flux: Enduring Challenges, New Policies, and Defining the Future Research Agenda, International Studies Perspectives , Volume 21, Issue 4, November 2020, Pages 438–477, https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekaa002

• Permissions Icon Permissions

Policymakers employ economic sanctions to deal with a wide range of international challenges, making them an indispensable foreign policy tool. While scholarship on sanctions has tended to focus on the factors affecting their success, newer research programs have emerged that explore the reasons for why sanctions are threatened and initiated, the ways they are designed and enforced, and their consequences. This scholarship has yielded a wealth of new insights into how economic sanctions work, but most of those insights are based on sanctions observations from the 20 th Century. The ways that policymakers employ sanctions have fundamentally changed over the past two decades, though, raising concerns about whether historically derived insights are still relevant to contemporary sanctions policies. In this forum, the contributors discuss the scholarly and policy-relevant insights of existing research on sanctions and then explore what gaps remain in our knowledge and new trends in sanctions policymaking. This forum will inform readers on the state of the art in sanctions research and propose avenues for future research.

Los legisladores emplean sanciones económicas para tratar diferentes desafíos internacionales, lo que las convierte en una herramienta de política exterior indispensable. Mientras que el estudio de las sanciones tendía a centrarse en los factores que afectan su éxito, surgieron programas de investigación más nuevos en los que se analizan los motivos por los cuales se amenaza con imponer sanciones y estas se llevan a cabo, las maneras en que están diseñadas y ejecutadas, y sus consecuencias. Este estudio generó una gran cantidad de ideas nuevas sobre el funcionamiento de las sanciones económicas, pero la mayoría de estas está basada en observaciones de las sanciones del siglo XX. Sin embargo, las maneras en que los legisladores emplean las sanciones cambiaron especialmente en las últimas dos décadas, lo que genera preocupación sobre si las ideas tradicionales siguen siendo relevantes para las políticas de sanciones contemporáneas. En este foro, se informa a los lectores sobre la vanguardia en la investigación de sanciones y propone vías para futuras investigaciones. Los colaboradores analizan las percepciones académicas y relevantes para la política de la investigación existente sobre sanciones y, luego, exploran cuáles son las brechas que existen en nuestro conocimiento y las nuevas tendencias en la legislación de sanciones.

Les décideurs politiques utilisent les sanctions économiques pour faire face à un large éventail de problématiques internationales, ce qui en fait un outil indispensable de politique étrangère. Alors que les études sur les sanctions ont eu tendance à se concentrer sur les facteurs qui influent sur le succès des sanctions, certains programmes de recherche qui ont vu le jour plus récemment explorent les raisons pour lesquelles des menaces de sanctions sont lancées et des sanctions imposées, comment ces sanctions sont élaborées et appliquées, ainsi que leurs conséquences. Ces études ont été une mine de nouvelles connaissances sur le fonctionnement des sanctions économiques, mais la plupart de ces connaissances sont fondées sur des observations de sanctions du 20e siècle. Les diverses façons dont les décideurs politiques utilisent les sanctions ont toutefois fondamentalement changé au cours des deux dernières décennies, ce qui amène à s'interroger sur la pertinence des connaissances acquises par le passé par rapport aux politiques de sanctions contemporaines. Ce forum informe les lecteurs sur l’état de la recherche en matière de sanctions et propose des pistes pour les recherches futures. Les contributeurs discutent de l’éclairage scientifique et pertinent en matière de politiques qu'ont apporté les recherches existantes sur les sanctions, puis examinent les lacunes qui subsistent dans nos connaissances, ainsi que les nouvelles tendances en matière d’élaboration de politiques relatives aux sanctions.

Email alerts

Citing articles via.

• Recommend to your Library

Affiliations

• Online ISSN 1528-3585
• Print ISSN 1528-3577
• Copyright © 2024 International Studies Association
• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Institutional account management
• Rights and permissions
• Get help with access
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing

Subscribe to this week in foreign policy, richard n. haass rnh richard n. haass.

June 1, 1998

• 16 min read

Economic sanctions are increasingly being used to promote the full range of American foreign policy objectives. Yet all too often sanctions turn out to be little more than expressions of U.S. preferences that hurt American economic interests without changing the target’s behavior for the better. As a rule, sanctions need to be less unilateral and more focused on the problem at hand. Congress and the executive branch need to institute far more rigorous oversight of sanctions, both prior to adopting them and regularly thereafter, to ensure that the expected benefits outweigh likely costs and that sanctions accomplish more than alternative foreign policy tools.

POLICY BRIEF #34

The widespread use of economic sanctions constitutes one of the paradoxes of contemporary American foreign policy. Sanctions are frequently criticized, even derided. At the same time, economic sanctions are fast becoming the policy tool of choice for the United States in the post-cold war world. The United States now maintains economic sanctions against dozens of countries; indeed, sanctions are so popular that they are being introduced by many states and municipalities. What is critical, moreover, is not just the frequency with which economic sanctions are used but their growing importance for U.S. foreign policy.

Sanctions—defined as mostly economic but also political and military penalties introduced to alter political and/or military behavior—are employed by the United States to discourage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, bolster human rights, end terrorism, thwart drug trafficking, discourage armed aggression, promote market access, protect the environment, and replace governments.

To accomplish foreign policy ends, sanctions take the form of arms embargoes, foreign assistance reductions and cut-offs, export and import limitations, asset freezes, tariff increases, revocation of most favored nation (MFN) trade status, negative votes in international financial institutions, withdrawal of diplomatic relations, visa denials, cancellation of air links, and prohibitions on credit, financing, and investment.

What explains this popularity? Sanctions can offer what appears to be a proportional response to a challenge in which the interests at stake are less than vital. In addition, sanctions are a way to signal official displeasure with a certain behavior. They can serve the purpose of reinforcing a commitment to a behavioral norm, such as respect for human rights or opposition to proliferation. American reluctance to use military force is another motivation. Sanctions provide a visible and less expensive alternative to military intervention and to doing nothing. The greater reach of media is still another explanation. The CNN effect can increase the visibility of problems in another country and stimulate a desire on the part of Americans to respond. The increased strength of single issue constituencies in American politics is also a factor. Small, organized, focused groups—often acting through Congress—can have an impact far beyond their actual strength, especially when no equally focused countervailing force exists.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from recent American use of economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes:

• Sanctions alone are unlikely to achieve desired results if the aims are large or time is short. Sanctions—even when comprehensive and enjoying almost universal international backing for nearly six months—failed to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. In the end, it took Operation Desert Storm. Other sanctions have also fallen short. The Iranian regime continues to support terrorism, oppose the Middle East peace process, and press ahead with its nuclear weapons program. Fidel Castro is still in place atop a largely authoritarian political and economic system. India and Pakistan were not deterred from testing nuclear weapons by the threat of draconian penalties. Libya has refused to produce the two individuals accused of the destruction of Pan Am 103. Sanctions could not persuade Haiti’s junta to honor the results of an election. Nor could they dissuade Serbia and others to call off their military aggression. And China continues to export sensitive technologies to selected countries and remains a society where human rights are violated.
• Nevertheless, sanctions can on occasion achieve (or help to achieve) various foreign policy goals ranging from the modest to the fairly significant. Sanctions introduced in the aftermath of the Gulf War increased Iraqi compliance with resolutions calling for the complete elimination of its weapons of mass destruction and diminished Iraq’s ability to import weapons. In the former Yugoslavia, sanctions were one factor contributing to Serbia’s decision to accept the Dayton agreement in August 1995. China appears to have shown some restraint in exporting nuclear and ballistic missile parts or technologies.
• Unilateral sanctions are rarely effective. In a global economy, unilateral sanctions tend to impose greater costs on American firms than on the target, which can usually find substitute sources of supply and financing.
• Secondary sanctions can make matters worse. Trying to compel others to join a sanctions effort by threatening secondary sanctions against third parties unwilling to sanction the target can cause serious harm to a variety of U.S. foreign policy interests. This is what happened when sanctions were introduced against overseas firms who violated the terms of U.S. legislation affecting Cuba, Iran, and Libya. This threat may have had some deterrent effect on the willingness of certain individuals to enter into proscribed business activities, but at the price of increasing anti-American sentiment, stimulating challenges within the World Trade Organization, and drawing attention away from the provocative behavior of the target governments.

More generally, sanctions can have the perverse effect of bolstering authoritarian, statist societies. By creating scarcity, they enable governments to better control distribution of goods. The danger is both moral, in that innocents are affected, as well as practical, in that sanctions that harm the population at large can bring about undesired effects that include bolstering the regime, triggering large scale emigration, and retarding the emergence of a middle class and civil society. Smart or designer sanctions are at best a partial solution. Gathering the necessary knowledge about assets, and then moving quickly enough to freeze them, can often prove impossible.

• Sanctions can be expensive for American business, farmers, and workers. There is a tendency to overlook or underestimate the direct cost of sanctions, perhaps because their costs do not show up in U.S. government budget tables. Sanctions do, however, affect the economy by reducing revenues of U.S. companies and individuals. Moreover, even this cost is difficult to measure because it needs to reflect not simply lost sales but also forfeited opportunities. Sanctions cost U.S. companies billions of dollars a year in lost sales and returns on investment—and cost many thousands of workers their jobs.
• Sanctions tend to be easier to introduce than to lift. It is almost always more difficult to change the status quo than to continue with it. It is often difficult or impossible to build a consensus for rescinding a sanction, even if there has been some progress on the matter of concern, if the sanction has been shown to be feckless or counterproductive, or if other interests can be shown to suffer as a result. This is likely to become the case with India and Pakistan, where U.S. sanctions introduced in the wake of the May 1998 nuclear tests will frustrate attempts to influence their behavior in this or other areas. The Bosnia case involves a powerful example of the danger of locking in sanctions, as the inability to amend or lift UN sanctions that blocked military support to all protagonists in the Bosnian war worked to the disadvantage of the weaker Bosnian side.
• Sanctions fatigue tends to settle in over time and international compliance tends to diminish. Inevitably, the issue that led to sanctions being introduced loses its emotional impact. Concerns over the humanitarian impact of sanctions also weaken resolve. At the same time, the target country has time to adjust. Working around sanctions, import substitution, and any improvement of living standards due to adaptation all make sanctions bearable. All of these factors have eroded the impact of sanctions against Iraq, Libya, and Cuba.

A New Approach

The conclusion is clear: All too often, the economic, humanitarian, and foreign policy costs of U.S. sanctions far outweigh any benefits. What, then, could and should be done?

Here are some guidelines to inform U.S. policy:

A corollary to the above is no less important: Broad sanctions should not be used as an expressive tool in a manner not justified by a careful accounting of likely costs and benefits . Again, sanctions are serious business. Sanctions are a form of intervention. Depending upon how they are used, they can cause great damage to innocent people—as well as to American business, workers, and U.S. foreign policy interests. In addition, sanctions can reduce U.S. leverage. Elimination of education, training, and aid for foreign militaries, mandated by Congress to express displeasure with Pakistan and Indonesia, reduced U.S. influence with a powerful constituency in both those countries. Foreign policy is not therapy, and its purpose is not to feel good but to do good. The same holds for sanctions.

• Multilateral support for economic sanctions should normally constitute a prerequisite for their use by the United States. Such support need not be simultaneous, but it should be all but certain and likely to follow with little delay. Unilateral sanctions should be avoided except in those circumstances in which the United States is in a unique situation to derive leverage based on the economic relationship with the target. This is not so much a normative assertion as a pragmatic one, based on the overwhelming evidence that unilateral sanctions achieve little.
• Secondary sanctions are not a desirable means of bringing about multilateral support for sanctions. Instituting sanctions against those who do not comply with the sanctions at issue is an admission of a diplomatic failure to persuade. It is also an expensive response. The costs to U.S. foreign policy, including the state of relations with major partners and U.S. efforts to build an effective WTO, almost always outweigh the potential benefits of coercing friends to join sanctions.
• Economic sanctions should focus on those responsible for the offending behavior or on penalizing countries in the realm that stimulated sanctions in the first place. A focused response helps avoid jeopardizing other interests and the entire bilateral relationship with the target over one area of disagreement; causes less collateral damage to innocents; and makes it less difficult to garner multinational support. Sanctions designed to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are a prime example. Where there are transgressions, the United States should direct any sanction against the foreign firm involved or, if the government is to blame, should cut off technological cooperation or trade in this area. A corollary is that political sanctions should be used sparingly if at all. We should resist the temptation to break diplomatic relations or cancel high-level meetings. Such interactions provide opportunities for U.S. officials to make their case to governments and publics and help the United States as much or more as the targeted party.
• Sanctions should not be used to hold major or complex bilateral relationships hostage to a single issue or set of concerns. This is especially the case with a country such as China, where the United States has to balance interests that include maintaining stability in South Asia and on the Korean Peninsula, discouraging any support for the weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile programs of rogue states, managing the Taiwan-China situation, and promoting trade, market reform, and human rights. A nearly identical argument could be made about the wisdom of applying broad sanctions against Russia or India because of their transgressions in one realm. The alternative to broad sanctions in such instances is either to adopt narrow sanctions that are germane to the issue at hand or to turn to other policy tools.
• Humanitarian exceptions should be included as part of any comprehensive sanctions. Innocents should not be made to suffer any more than is absolutely necessary. Including an exception that allows a target to import food and medicine should also make it easier to bring about domestic and international support.
• Policymakers should prepare and send to Congress a policy statement before or soon after a sanction is put in place. Such statements should be clear as to the purpose of the sanction; the required legal and/or political authority; the expected impact on the target, including possible retaliatory steps; the probable humanitarian consequences and steps to minimize them; the expected costs to the United States; prospects for enforcing the sanction; the degree of international support or opposition that can be anticipated; and an exit strategy, i.e., the criteria for lifting the sanction. (To cite just one example, the 1994 legislation that led to sanctions in 1998 against India lacks any road map for how the sanctions might be reduced or lifted.) In addition, policymakers should explain why a particular sanction was selected as opposed to other sanctions or other policy tools.
• All sanctions embedded in legislation should provide for presidential discretion in the form of a waiver authority. Discretion would allow the President to suspend or terminate a sanction if he judged it was in the interests of national security to do so. Such latitude is needed if relationships are not to become hostage to one interest and if the executive is to have the flexibility needed to explore whether the introduction of limited incentives can bring about a desired policy end. Waivers (exercised in May 1998) in laws calling for secondary sanctions against non-American firms doing business with Iran, Libya, and Cuba had a salutary effect on U.S. foreign policy, although they did nothing for U.S. firms still precluded from operating in these countries by the primary sanctions. The absence of waivers is likely to haunt U.S. policy toward India and Pakistan. Sanctions will make it more difficult to influence future Indian and Pakistani decisions involving the deployment or even use of nuclear weapons—and could contribute to instability inside Pakistan, thereby eroding control over these weapons.
• The federal government should challenge the right of states and municipalities to institute economic sanctions against companies and individuals operating in their jurisdiction. The Constitution may not settle the struggle between the executive and legislative branches over the foreign affairs power, but it limits the struggle to the federal branch. Those states and municipalities that are adopting selective purchasing laws that prohibit public agencies from purchasing goods and services from companies doing business in or with particular target countries are overstepping their bounds. The Clinton administration should join forces with those representatives of the business community that have filed a suit to enjoin Massachusetts from enforcing its law that would effectively ban the state from doing business with companies active in Myanmar.
• U.S. intelligence capabilities must be reoriented to meet the demands created by sanctions policy. The ability to design and implement smart sanctions will require extraordinary collection requirements. But the demand for better intelligence support of sanctions policy also involves analysis. A unit should be established to prepare predictions of the likely impact of sanctions on the target state and others. Analysts could help identify particular vulnerabilities of target states or leaders, examine likely reactions by the target and third parties, and monitor the impact of a sanction over time.
• Any sanction should be the subject of an annual impact statement. Such a statement, to be prepared by the executive branch and submitted in unclassified form to Congress, should provide far more in the way of information and analysis than the pro forma documents written to justify many current sanctions. It should include an assessment of the extent to which the sanction has served its purposes; the economic, political and/or military impact on the target; any humanitarian effect; the reactions of the target country; the degree of international compliance and non-compliance; and the financial costs to U.S. businesses, workers and the U.S. government.

Thinking Outside the (Tool) Box

There is no quick fix to the sanctions problem. Passing legislation along the lines of the proposed Enhancement of Trade, Security, and Human Rights Sanctions Reform Act would introduce greater scrutiny of sanctions before and after their introduction. Greater executive activism and discretion would also help. The Clinton administration can be faulted for its failure to veto laws calling for secondary sanctions and for its haste in implementing sanctions triggered by India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests.

This said, the challenge goes beyond improving sanctions, something that will tend to make them narrower and less unilateral. The more fundamental question is one of the selection of the most appropriate foreign policy tool to deal with a particular challenge. Sanctions of any sort must be weighed against the likely costs and benefits of military action, covert programs, and both public and private diplomacy.

Sometimes it will be better to use military force. This was the lesson of Desert Storm and Bosnia—and may yet prove to be the lesson of Kosovo. Cuba is also worth considering in this context. Rather than tighten sanctions (which increased the misery of the Cuban people) and go along with Congress’s introduction of secondary sanctions against U.S. allies, the Clinton Administration might have been wiser to launch a cruise missile salvo to take out the MIGs that shot down the unarmed plane flown by Cuban exiles. More broadly, it can be argued that American dollars, tourists, and ideas constitute a greater threat to Fidel Castro and communism in Cuba than the embargo.

In other instances, focused sanctions appear attractive. A more appropriate response to India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests would have been export controls designed to slow missile and nuclear bomb development and deployment. With Haiti, narrow sanctions aimed at the illegitimate leadership would not have triggered the human exodus that pressured the Administration into an armed intervention that could have proved extremely costly. Differences with China and Russia over their technology and weapons exports would best be dealt with by narrow sanctions. This said, sanctions will not be able to carry the full burden on non-proliferation policy, and policy tools ranging from preventive attacks on rogue state facilities to more robust defenses will need to be considered.

The principal alternative to economic sanctions, however, is best described as conditional engagement , i.e., a mix of narrow sanctions and political and economic interactions that are limited and made conditional on specified behavioral changes. A package of incentives tied to specific actions has helped manage North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. It might also prove effective with Iran under its new leadership and help India and Pakistan manage their nuclear standoff.

What these examples make clear is that there is no tool that is always preferable to sanctions, any more than sanctions themselves offer a universal answer. A one-size-fits-all approach to foreign policy is bound to fail. But the trend is no less clear. While there will be those instances in which sanctions can help, either alone or more likely in conjunction with other tools, recent history strongly suggests that the potential of sanctions to contribute to American foreign policy will be modest—and that asking more of them than that promises to be counterproductive.

Foreign Policy

The Brookings Institution, Washington DC

10:00 am - 11:15 am EDT

Constanze Stelzenmüller

April 22, 2024

April 17, 2024

University of Minnesota

Digital conservancy.

•   University Digital Conservancy Home
• University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• Dissertations and Theses
• Dissertations

View/ Download file

Persistent link to this item, appears in collections, description, suggested citation, udc services.

• About the UDC
• How to Deposit
• Policies and Terms of Use

Related Services

• University Archives
• U of M Web Archive
• UMedia Archive
• Copyright Services
• Digital Library Services
• News & Events
• Staff Directory
• Subject Librarians
• Vision, Mission, & Goals

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

• We're Hiring!
• Help Center

Essay On Economic Sanctions

Related Papers

Averani Averani

Peyman Majidzadeh

Economic sanctions achieve their intended political objective if the cost of defiance becomes greater than the cost of compliance for the target, forcing an alteration to the objectionable policy towards which sanctions were initially enacted. Sanctions models have evolved over time in response to political dynamics and resiliency of target regimes. The most recent model to emerge is called the bargaining approach, under which sanctions become "a form of persuasion, a tool for encouraging targeted regimes to reevaluate their policy options." Consequently, "sanctions are not as policy unto themselves but are part of a continuum of policy instruments from the negative to the positive, designed to encourage political compromise and spark a process of dialogue and negotiation," provided that the leadership of the target is willing to cooperate and negotiate. Sanctions under this model are intended to instigate bargaining and compromise, rather than be punitive, to reduce or end a conflict caused by an objectionable action by the target. This thesis contributes to the literature on sanctions and resilience tactics through a comprehensive analysis of the sanctions imposed on Iran for over three decades. It investigates how the application of a bargaining model of sanctions successfully increased the cost of defiance for Iran, effecting enough pressure on the regime to concede to the sanctions' objectives and alter its objectionable policy, resulting in a peaceful resolution to an international dispute. It argues that the shift in sanctions narrative by the senders downplayed the role of ideology in Iran's hybrid regime, which had been historically used to reinforce the regime's counter-narrative against sanctions and maintain its legitimacy. Findings of this thesis are important for future episodes of sanctions in complex cases, such as Iran's, as it documents how the perceived and intended objectives of sanctions can converge to achieve an optimum result with a non-zero-sum outcome. Specifically, this thesis seeks to answer the following questions: First, given that hybrid regimes are expected to be short-lived under external shocks such as economic sanctions, how did Iran's hybrid regime survive international sanctions for almost three decades and why? Second, how and when did sanctions function differently, leading to Iran's altered policy on a core issue of its sovereignty without compromising on its legitimacy at home and abroad?

Daniel Vasconcelos

New trends in global energy affairs have instigated states to use economic and energy resources to uphold their energy security. More importantly, they also triggered states to widen the scope of their geopolitical and geoeconomic instruments in order to accommodate novel strategic goals. In this scenario, it is vital to analyze through a reliable framework the actors, interactions, and possible outcomes involved with the use of energy sources in states' foreign policies. In this research, we analyze the main dynamics that surround the use of energy statecraft among countries. Delving into the literature of economic statecraft and, more specifically, energy statecraft, we offer a new outlook over the feasibility of using renewable sources as instruments of energy statecraft. The literature is hitherto conservative to acknowledge that renewables are as viable as other sources, stating that they lack not only market robustness but also geopolitical importance. We provide empirical evidence to support the idea that renewable sources should also be considered as a valid form of energy statecraft, with the caveat that they manifest through particular dynamics and under specific conditions. This research builds a comprehensive picture of the dynamics, actors, and interactions involved in the application of renewables as instruments of energy statecraft. By investigating China's energy investments in Brazil, it provides an updated study of energy politics in China, its intersection with China's foreign policy and grand strategy, investment trends in the energy sector, and its interaction with Brazilian government and market. Chinese energy companies are increasingly investing abroad. By taking advantage of an international environment where renewables are on the spotlight, China is widening its access to strategic resources and technology. This has consequently helped to address over-capacity issues in China and convey the Chinese government’s interests. Evidence shows that commercial actors in the renewable energy sector acted accordingly to the Chinese government's long term interests, even though specific controls over their operation were hard to detect. Chinese investments in Brazil corroborated with this: the volume and scope of China’s presence in the Brazilian power sector appear that Brazil is the “locus of experimentation” for China’s renewable energy statecraft. This study concludes that renewable energy sources have become one among many other tools of energy statecraft. We provide a new perspective that renewables are viable tools when comprised of a positive, long-term engagement strategy, with several implications. China’s investments in Brazil demonstrate that not only an international environment conducive to the application of statecraft is necessary, but also that the target state’s ability to resist a sanctioning state’s strategy can dictate how successful it will be. In this case, we contend that Brazil needs a more robust strategy to welcome Chinese investments, whereas China holds the necessary conditions previewed by theory to effectively turn its energy statecraft into positive perceptions concerning its green development and renewables industry, enhancing China’s soft power and economic presence worldwide.

Irfan Iftekhar

Asian Perspective

When do sanctions succeed in nuclear inhibition? Is there a generalizable framework to estimate sanction effectiveness against nuclear aspirants? Instead of relying on partial equilibrium analysis, we conceptualize sanctions as three sequential phases—imposition of economic pain, conversation to political pressure, and creation (or failure thereof) of zone of possible agreement (ZOPA). The effectiveness of each phase is subject to phase-specific contextual variables, an aggregation of which helps measure individual sanction's effectiveness, conduct cross-case comparison, and estimate one's replicability in other cases. To illustrate its analytical utility, we analyze the divergent sanction outcomes between Iran in 2012–2015 and North Korea in 2013–2017. Iran was economically more vulnerable and politically less resilient, and its bargaining position was closer to a ZOPA than North Korea was. Our analysis questions the utility of economic sanctions against North Korea and helps expand the discussion away from the policy obsession with the role of China. Theoretically, it rectifies an imbalance against qualitative and holistic approach in the sanction literature and contributes to discussions about nuclear inhibition strategies.

Routledge Handbook of Security Studies (2nd Ed.)

Olivier Schmitt

Eileen Filmus

World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development

Zahir Quraeshi

nazik esenamanova

RELATED PAPERS

Heather Chingono

Zeineb Chennouf زينب شنوف

Mohammed Nuruzzaman

Journal of Conflict Resolution

E. Hafner-burton

Jason W Warren

Gyubin Choi

Samireh Ahmadi

Farhad Moshtagh Sefat

Clara PORTELA

M. Sc. Thesis (Université de Montréal)

Valérie Kindarji

CEPS Working Paper

ILARIA ANNA COLUSSI

Rustem Nemetullaiev

International Journal

Ali Fathollah-Nejad

Geopolitica

Raffaele Mauriello د. رافائل مائوریلو

Remy Nabeel Bargout

Andreas Warntjen

Journal of Current Chinese Affairs

Jeremy Garlick

Felix Berenskoetter

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

Shohreh Shahabi

Jari Eloranta

Liviu Horovitz

Noemi Rocca

Jennifer Kesteleyn

Security Studies Vol. 17, No. 3 (2008): 438-467

Steven Lobell

Serdar Acar

Javi-Yav Ghahreman

International Security

Evan Resnick

Seetha Kannan

Rishika Chauhan

Lauren Monaghan

RELATED TOPICS

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024

Find anything you save across the site in your account

Why Sanctions Too Often Fail

By Robin Wright

Unwilling to invoke military might, President Joe Biden has orchestrated an astonishing array of sanctions on Russia and its power brokers with lightning speed. On Thursday, with the ruble worth only a cent, he claimed that they were working. “The severe economic sanctions on Putin and all those folks around him, choking off access to technology as well as cutting off access to the global financial system—it’s had a profound impact already,” he said , before a cabinet meeting. The tough reality, however, is that sanctions often fail to sufficiently or efficiently squeeze regimes, whether the goal is to end a war, stop genocide, limit the bomb, or undermine oppression. They have a long and mixed history, dating back to ancient Greece, when Pericles sanctioned other city-states. The obstacles are many. In 1806, Napoleon imposed sanctions to curtail European trade with Britain, but even his own brother, who assumed the Spanish throne, couldn’t enforce them. Sanctions were not wielded as an independent instrument of foreign policy until the twentieth century. Since the Second World War, they’ve become the most popular tool short of military intervention. Globalization has magnified the interdependence of nations, and sanctions provide a low-risk, high-profile response to aggression.

Yet sanctions generate meaningful change only about forty per cent of the time . Years of sanctions failed in North Korea, Venezuela, and Iraq. Cuba has faced layers of U.S. trade and arms embargoes since 1960. The Communist regime is still in power. The Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad , faced multiple sanctions for his brutal repression after the Arab Spring uprising, in 2011, turned into a civil war. Hundreds of thousands have died, yet Assad is still firmly entrenched in Damascus. Sanctions are often sagas. Success in South Africa took three decades. The Iran model, which the U.S. has invoked for Russia, has had gyrating effects. Sanctions also produce heartbreak. The agony is the differential in timing . A gun, shell, or bomb can kill in seconds. Sanctions take a comparative eon in the scheme of war or a humanitarian crisis. “They rarely work,” Benn Steil, of the Council on Foreign Relations, told me. “But, when they do work, they tend to take a very long time.”

The main flaws are usually the exemptions, known as carve-outs, that provide financial lifelines. Humanitarian goods—food, medical equipment, education materials—are generally exempt. But enforcement of sanctions on everything else is up to individual nations, which can amend or bend the rules for their own economic needs. In 1966, the U.N. for the first time issued sanctions that sought regime change after Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, declared independence from Britain to preserve white-minority rule. The Security Council imposed an economic embargo on Rhodesia, but only on ninety per cent of the country’s exports. For years, the U.S. Congress approved an additional carve-out that allowed the import of Rhodesian chromium, a key component in American jet engines, cars, and stainless steel. (Rhodesia was then one of three major world suppliers; the Soviet Union was another.) It took more than a decade —of civil war and sanctions—for the Rhodesian regime to cede power to a democratically elected government. Along the way, some twenty thousand died.

Russia benefits from a similar carve-out—for now. Western sanctions allow it to keep selling energy, the largest source of Moscow’s revenues. Last year, Russia earned a hundred and nineteen billion dollars from oil-and-gas sales—when the price averaged only sixty-nine dollars a barrel. This month, prices soared to a hundred and fifteen dollars a barrel. Even if the West, under mounting pressure, does opt to sanction Russian energy resources, it could backfire —creating an oil crisis in the West and driving up prices globally, while Russia simply switches to other buyers. (Many countries, notably China , have not cut off trade with Russia.)

South Africa, during the era of racial apartheid, was widely considered a rare sanctions success story, Steil told me. In 1962, a resolution by the U.N. General Assembly called on member states to sever all diplomatic, military, and economic ties. Yet carve-outs in subsequent international sanctions again diluted their effect. International sanctions excluded “strategic materials,” as well as coal, diamonds, and some forms of gold, which South Africa produced in abundance. As a result, sanctions had minimal impact on the daily life of ruling whites. Over time, South Africa became more self-sufficient . Facing an embargo on energy imports, it developed a world-class system to make oil from coal. Once dependent on arms imports, it ramped up production and became a net exporter. And, for all the pressure and cut-offs, South Africa was still able to develop its first nuclear device in 1982, and by 1989 it had six bombs . The white government finally released Nelson Mandela in 1990. Amid tectonic global political shifts, apartheid ended—three decades after the first sanctions.

Iraq was one of the worst sanctions failures, demonstrating that dictators willing to starve their people and isolate their countries can simply ignore them. In 1990, President Saddam Hussein’s unprovoked invasion of Kuwait spawned the same kind of international fury visible today over Putin’s aggression against Ukraine. Within four days of Iraq’s attack, the U.N. imposed sanctions that banned world trade with Baghdad. Saddam refused to withdraw. Six months later, a U.S.-led military assault expelled Iraqi forces, but the Iraqi leader refused to comply with the terms of the ceasefire. Sanctions dragged on. The toll was horrific. By 1997, a third of Iraqi children were malnourished, according to UNICEF . In 1999, the Red Cross reported that the economy of Iraq—which once had one of the highest standards of living in the oil-rich Middle East—was “in tatters.” The suffering had little impact on Saddam; he balked at coöperating with U.N. inspectors charged with monitoring his weapons of mass destruction. In 2003, the U.S. launched a second invasion —and Saddam was eventually caught and executed. Dictators often ignore sanctions, no matter the cost to themselves or their states. Putin, so far, seems not to care, either.

Sanctions and embargoes on North Korea, first imposed after the Korean War in the nineteen-fifties, have been a total failure. Over three generations, the Kim dynasty has only become more belligerent, better armed, and more obstinate. In 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright went to Pyongyang to offer a deal —some sanctions relief and humanitarian aid in exchange for limits on its ambitious ballistic-missile program. North Korea was emerging from a historic four-year famine that reportedly killed millions, but the talks failed. Four subsequent U.S. Presidents imposed ever-tougher sanctions on North Korea. The world’s most isolated regime is now estimated to have dozens of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles to fire them across Asia and the Pacific.

The Biden Administration said that the new sanctions on Russia were based on the “Iran model.” But four decades of embargoes and sanctions on Tehran have repeatedly failed to change the regime’s calculus. The U.S. first imposed sanctions after fifty-two American diplomats were taken hostage in Tehran, in 1979; it took fourteen months to free them. More sanctions were imposed in the mid-nineteen-eighties for state sponsorship of terrorism. Sanctions were intensified in the nineteen-nineties and again in 2005, amid suspicions about Iran’s ambition to make a nuclear bomb. In 2013, Tehran, under a new President, finally agreed to negotiate. “I racked up about a million frequent-flier miles to get this much concerted action on Iran,” Stuart Levey, the Treasury official who orchestrated sanctions on Iran, told me.

Sanctions, however, are also subject to the whims of domestic politics. Three years into the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Donald Trump abandoned it and imposed more than a thousand new sanctions on Tehran. His goal was to get Iran to negotiate a broader deal. He failed abysmally. In retaliation, Iran breached limits on its nuclear program.

Sanctions rarely change a regime’s ideology or behavior. Russia will, no doubt, face severe economic pain for its invasion of Ukraine. Putin “grossly underestimated” the political will of the West to enact such a complex set of sanctions, including on Putin, Steil told me. In a joint statement on Friday, the G-7 warned that it will continue to impose “severe” sanctions. The group of the world’s most powerful economies demanded that Russia end its invasion. But history shows that the economic weapon is a limited one. And sanctions alone are unlikely to get the ruthless thug in Moscow to stop.

More on the War in Ukraine

How Ukrainians saved their capital .

A historian envisions a settlement among Russia, Ukraine, and the West .

How Russia’s latest commander in Ukraine could change the war .

The profound defiance of daily life in Kyiv .

The Ukraine crackup in the G.O.P.

A filmmaker’s journey to the heart of the war .

Sign up for our daily newsletter to receive the best stories from The New Yorker .

By signing up, you agree to our User Agreement and Privacy Policy & Cookie Statement . This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

By Ronan Farrow

By Eric Lach

By Andrew Marantz

By Adam Iscoe

ESSAY SAUCE

FOR STUDENTS : ALL THE INGREDIENTS OF A GOOD ESSAY

Essay: Economic sanctions

Essay details and download:.

• Subject area(s): Politics essays
• Reading time: 10 minutes
• Price: Free download
• Published: 15 November 2017*
• File format: Text
• Words: 2,786 (approx)
• Number of pages: 12 (approx)

Text preview of this essay:

This page of the essay has 2,786 words. Download the full version above.

Definitions of economic sanctions across political science scholarship range from general economic punishments to narrow economic coercion deployed solely for political goals, without concurrent military action. Most broadly, a sanction is ‘the use of economic capacity by one international actor, be it a state or international organisation, or by a group of such actors, against another international actor, or group of actors, with the intention of (a) punishing the latter for its breach of a certain rule or (b) preventing it from infringing a rule which the party applying sanctions deems important.’ Under the mandate of the United Nations (UN) Charter, Chapter VII, Article 41, the UNSC is endowed with the power to ‘decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.’ As such, since 1945, economic sanctions have become a key mechanism by which to express the political will of the UN and, by proxy, the liberal bastions of the West.

Though sanctions are a 20th century convention that has been used since World War II, general scepticism about efficacy rendered sanctions a peripheral policy tool until the 1980s. Indeed, it was not until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 that economic sanctions became the preferred compellence tactic. Jones locates the rise of sanctions in the 1990s within the proliferation of the American neo-liberal project amid post-Soviet transition. Unlike the traditional tools of military intervention, sanctions signalled disapproval and resoluteness while also mitigating domestic costs and espousing pillars of Wilsonian idealism.

Such exhibitionist American triumphalism in the post-Soviet era concurrently resulted in a shift in sanctions’ objectives. During the Cold War, regime change was an insignificant goal in economic sanctions; in contrast, between 1990 and 2005, 70 per cent of sanctions targeted regime change. Thus, today, the scope of sanctions focuses on broad ideological transformation rather than limited behavioural alterations. Indeed, such is the democratic bent of modern sanction policies that liberal arguments tend to condemn authoritarianism without a framework for evaluating authoritarian structural variation. Consequently, modern sanction policies are particularly wrapped up in prototypes of capitalism and liberalism. Though Western policymakers espouse the viability and usefulness of sanctions, the majority of scholars remain deeply divided and perpetuate the question, ‘do economic sanctions work?’

THE LOGIC OF COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS:

Given Wilsonian idealism embedded within modern economic sanction policies, it is no surprise that support for economic sanctions emerges from liberal theorists. Neoliberalism perpetuates a belief that comprehensive sanctions will squeeze a target country’s economy and heighten domestic hardship to the point of rising domestic discontent, consequently forcing the government into concession. It was this liberal logic that underpinned the comprehensive sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s and resulted in a drastic humanitarian crisis and the deleterious Oil-for-Food program but failed to induce measurable reforms from Saddam Hussein’s regime. The immense failures of comprehensive sanctions in the 1990s resulted in popular calls from UN and Western leaders for ‘targeted sanction’ policies. Thus, today, support for sanctions divides between comprehensive and targeted sanctions. Nevertheless, the majority of scholars generally coalesce around the idea that sanctions have a variable, weak record.

Comprehensive sanctions are sanctions that directly restrict trade and financial interaction with international markets. Huffbauer, Schott, and Elliot are largely optimistic in their assessment of economic sanctions and claim that they are successful about one third of the time. In their seminal work, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, Hufbauer et. al. define economic sanctions as ‘the deliberate government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of ‘customary’ trade or financial relations.’ They divide the political aims of a sanction into five broad objectives: 1) ‘change target country policies in relatively modest way; 2) ‘destabilize the target government’; 3) ‘disrupt a minor military adventure’; 4) ‘impair the military potential of the target country’; 5) ‘change target country policies in a major way.’ While they are clear in their intent to include only sanctions deployed under political objectives, their cases do not draw such a stark line and include moments in which sanctions were included with other conventional war methods, such as sanctions that occurred during World War II and the Korean War. While their data analysis suggests a largely impressive success rate, they fail to look solely at economic coercion without concurrent military action and often falsely include trade-motivated barriers with their data set.

Martin adds to Hufbauer et. al.’s optimism, proposing that the factors underpinning the success of economic sanctions are the participation of chief trading partners and the willingness for states to cooperate. To support this argument, she operationalizes traditional game-theory concepts of cooperation into statistical analysis. Ultimately, she finds that credibility is germane, if not essential, to the success of any sanction and can be established through two avenues: 1) ‘self-imposed costs’ and 2) ‘international institutions.’ In the first, when the sender does not internalise the costs of a sanction, the credibility of the sanction is much lower than when the costs are high. In the second, international organisations provide legitimacy to the sanction by linking together the demands of many states. Thus, for Martin, multilateral approaches that involve leading trade partners are most successful.

Despite this optimism for multilateral, comprehensive sanctions, the failure of sanction policies suggest that sanctions are failing to properly target governments and compel them into compliance. Indeed many of the consequences of comprehensive sanctions have been heightened political obstinacy and population indigence. In response to these failures, scholars have responded with a targeted sanction framework, which attempts to target specific political elites and impose severe costs directly on these perpetrators of international norm violations.

CRITICISM OF COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS:

While general neo-liberal enthusiasm about the usefulness of sanctions may be politically pertinent, the bulk of scholars find such optimism to be incredibly naïve. Empirical evidence suggests that sanctions rarely work. Indeed, despite their deployment in foreign security strategies, sanctions rarely have the capacity to induce changes in a target country. Thus, the literature that is sceptical of sanction efficacy is quite broad and deep, incorporating a vast spectrum of theoretical perspectives. Critics of comprehensive sanctions espouse diverse arguments that fall broadly into two disparate streams of criticism. First, most scholars who subscribe to realist theorisation argue that sanctions are not potent enough to induce political changes, thereby failing to promote security. Second, human security theorists argue that comprehensive sanctions misdirect economic consequences onto innocent civilians and foment severe humanitarian crises.

REALIST CRITICISM. From a realist perspective, Pape takes direct issue with Hufbauer et. al.’s inflated optimism. Calling for more orthodoxy in their classification, he defines sanctions as measures taken to ‘coerce the target government to change its political behaviour’ through ‘[lowering] the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by reducing international trade.’ Additionally, he ignores economic coer cion deployed in instances of 1) sanctions without political objectives; 2) ‘trade wars’, 3) ‘economic warfare’ – instances in which economic actions are taken in conjunction with other coercive tactics, such as naval blockades. Eviscerating Hufbauer et. al.’s data set, Pape finds that sanctions have a pitiful success rate of less than 5 per cent. Beyond this critique, Pape contests that sanctions will not be effective against the strength of a modern nation-state: ‘Nationalism often makes states and societies willing to endure considerable punishment rather than abandon their national interests.’

While some scholars totally dismiss sanctions, some realists point out that success is largely situational. Miyagawa critiques Hufbauer et. al.’s confidence; however, he largely views the success of economic sanctions as contingent on scope and strength. Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz present a similar analysis that bases sanction efficacy on potency. Through game theory modelling, they demonstrate that when the impact of imposed sanctions exceeds the anticipated impact, sanctions will induce a change in the target state. Miers and Morgan, using the classic model of chaos theory, argue that multilateral sanctions are largely ineffective but that unilateral sanctions preserve a strong potency. Ultimately, their argument starkly contrasts the prevailing belief that the UN Security Council is an effective institution through which to impose sanctions.

HUMANITARIAN CRITICISM. In stark contrast with the realist perspective, which argues that sanctions are weak tools of securitisation, human security proponents argue that comprehensive sanctions foment humanitarian crises without properly targeting the governing elites and inducing political transformations. According to Hastings, human security advocates the redirection of security strategies away from traditional military and paramilitary strategies toward a human-focused strategy. More concretely, he advocates for a refocus on human security indicators such as ‘economic, food, health, environmental, political, community/social, and individual personal security’ and promotes a multidimensional vision of national security.

THE LOGIC OF TARGETED SANCTIONS

After the apparent humanitarian failures of comprehensive sanctions in Iraq in the 1990s, the majority of the international community distanced their policies from comprehensive sanction strategies and focused more on targeting individual elite authoritarians. According to Biersteker and Eckert, ‘targeted sanctions’ or ‘smart sanctions’ are ‘typically applied either as incentives to change behaviour or as preventive measures, as in the case of sanctions against individuals or entities that facilitate terrorist acts.’ Policies for targeted sanctions include numerous specific tactics: freezing assets of the governmental or national elites; trade restrictions on specific products; travel restrictions; political bans from international organisations or diplomatic efforts. Proponents of these targeted programs subscribe largely to liberal theoretical perspectives while also accepting conditional nuances of authoritarian institutional frameworks. Ultimately, arguments for targeted sanctions argue these frameworks are more effective because they are presumed to address the problems wrought by circumstances of ‘inverted liberalism’ and elite buffers.

By distancing sanction policies away from traditional liberal discourse, theorists proposed a more nuanced ‘inverted liberalism.’ Under ‘inverted liberalism,’ populations residing under authoritarian leadership have extremely limited influence over governmental policies and are by-and-large restricted from domestic movements against their leaders. Unlike classical liberalism, this model of inverted liberalism suggests that the directive of ‘smart sanctions’ more clearly targets the authoritarian leaders who would be insulated from comprehensive sanctions on their population.

Rather than supporting comprehensive sanctions, many liberal scholars support targeted sanctions policies, arguing that they directly impose costs on special interest groups and leaders of authoritarian states. Under this logic, comprehensive sanctions adversely compromise the welfare of citizens while largely failing to influence key political leaders or elites. For targeted sanction success stories, scholars point to the empirical examples of sanctions against Libya and Egypt. In his analysis of sanctions and human security, Peksen shows that both forms of sanctions result in the deterioration of individual freedoms. Nevertheless, targeted sanctions have summarily less of an adverse impact on human rights violations, suggesting that targeted sanctions are a more humane alternative. Thus, the overarching logic suggests that smart sanctions would effectively ‘raise the target regime’s costs of non-compliance while avoiding the collateral damage that comes with comprehensive trade embargoes.’

Today, targeted sanctions characterise the majority of sanctions imposed by the UN and Western democracies. Giumelli identifies three causes for this shift away from comprehensive sanctions toward targeted sanctions: 1) international audiences grew very critical of comprehensive sanctions after the failures of the 1990s; 2) comprehensive sanctions had largely failed to induce regime change or weaken authoritarian elites; and 3) comprehensive sanctions had caused massive humanitarian crises for civilian populations. With specific targeted audiences, policymakers assume ‘that the policy of a state (or a political group) will change as a consequence of the pressure imposed on key individuals and non-state entities in the decision-making process.’ Consequently, under a targeted sanction policy, elite classes of people would no longer be able to shift the costs of sanctions onto disenfranchised subsets of the population.

Despite the theoretical benefits of targeted sanction programs, the reality of these targeted programs is that the goals for the sanctions were very limited and not focused on the bold aims of regime change. Since 1990, targeted sanctions have been the guiding light for sanction doctrines. Furthermore, while many liberal theorists evangelise targeted sanctions as an ideal policy solution, the reality is that targeted sanctions have a fairly spotted success rate. Thus, liberal preoccupation with sanctions is largely supported by a theoretical faith in non-military coercion, rather than strong empirical evidence to support sanction policies.

CRITICISM OF TARGETED SANCTIONS

While ‘smart sanctions’ have been the sanction framework utilised by the UNSC and Western states since the mid-1990s, these policies have largely been ineffective. Though politically appealing because they are domestically salient and limit humanitarian costs in the target country, scholars are largely critical of targeted sanction programs. While many aspects of ‘smart sanctions’ are decidedly not smart, the three major problems identified by scholars revolve around 1) limited potency and 2) inaccuracy of the target.

First, sanctions are decidedly less potent. Mack and Kahn write that a successful sanction requires striking targets with powerful consequences and that targeted sanctions tend to be less potent. Drezner echoes this assessment, saying that smart sanctions are ‘less promising in coercing the target government into making concessions.’ Likewise, Cortright and Lopez argue that the UN targeted sanctions programs, which have comprised the entirety of UN sanctions since the 1990s, have had decidedly mediocre outcomes. Even Hufbauer and Oegg, who are largely supportive of sanctions as a general foreign policy tool, find that targeted sanctions enhance the illusion of action for the sanctioners: ‘targeted sanctions may satisfy the need in sender states to “do something,” they may slake humanitarian concerns, and they may serv e to unify fraying coalitions.’ While human security proponents encourage targeted sanctions that minimise humanitarian costs, their record has been decidedly weak.

Second, smart sanctions are harder to craft. It is difficult to identify responsible parties and impose sanctions that will compel alterations. According to Mack and Khan, the inherent policy delays in formulating and imposing sanctions provide elites with a buffer in which they can insulate themselves from the sanctions. In particular, the popular solutions to freeze foreign assets are less potent because leaders have lag time to withdraw foreign assets before sanctions implementation. Expanding upon Mack and Khan, Jones uses a case study of Myanmar to understand the smart sanction failures. He argues that targeted sanctions programmes imposed on Myanmar were neither potent enough nor properly directed toward the responsible political elites. Beyond individual case studies, in her comprehensive look at UN smart sanctions, Elliott finds that the UN’s record has been decidedly weak. Cortright and Lopez reach similar conclusions, finding that very few of the US targeted sanction policies from 1990 to 2002 have been effective. In sum, while the targeted sanction policies attempt to circumvent innocent populations and hone in on authorities or elites, the policies have been largely haphazard and ineffective.

A closer look at the paradox of economic sanctions points to an underlying shortcoming in the literature: the compulsion among scholars to attach universal norms to a highly contextual issue. While rises in economic interdependence certainly provide a compelling case for sanctions, the liberal logic fails to integrate a more subtle narrative about authoritarianism and how differing authoritarian structures or hybrid-regimes will react to sanction policies. Realism also falls short by failing to identify subnational idiosyncrasies in state behaviour. Methodologically, the majority of the scholars employ rigorous quantitative evaluations of sanctions and generally attempt to identify externally applicable trends through panel designs. While these techniques are robust and produce compelling evidence for the failures of sanctions, they do little to identify why sanctions do not produce their intended results.

In juxtaposition, the varied, often contradictory, assessments of comprehensive and targeted sanctions underscore the complexity of understanding and evaluating economic sanctions. Scholarly intentions to attach universal proscriptions to sanction policies tend to overlook the nuances of individual cases. As such, comprehensive panel studies fail to explain situations of divergence from the expected norms. Ultimately, these assessments fail to rationalise the differential outcomes in sanction failures and successes. In response to this shortcoming, this paper conducts a comparative case study of Iran and North Korea. While both sanction programs emerged in response to their respective nuclear development programs, the sanctions have had drastically different results.

...(download the rest of the essay above)

About this essay:

If you use part of this page in your own work, you need to provide a citation, as follows:

Essay Sauce, Economic sanctions . Available from:<https://www.essaysauce.com/politics-essays/economic-sanctions/> [Accessed 27-04-24].

These Politics essays have been submitted to us by students in order to help you with your studies.

* This essay may have been previously published on Essay.uk.com at an earlier date.

Essay Categories:

• Accounting essays
• Architecture essays
• Business essays
• Computer science essays
• Criminology essays
• Economics essays
• Education essays
• Engineering essays
• English language essays
• Environmental studies essays
• Essay examples
• Finance essays
• Geography essays
• Health essays
• History essays
• Hospitality and tourism essays
• Human rights essays
• Information technology essays
• International relations
• Leadership essays
• Linguistics essays
• Literature essays
• Management essays
• Marketing essays
• Mathematics essays
• Media essays
• Medicine essays
• Military essays
• Miscellaneous essays
• Music Essays
• Nursing essays
• Philosophy essays
• Photography and arts essays
• Politics essays
• Project management essays
• Psychology essays
• Religious studies and theology essays
• Sample essays
• Science essays
• Social work essays
• Sociology essays
• Sports essays
• Types of essay
• Zoology essays

Turning Sanctions into Reparations: Lessons for Russia/Ukraine

Jan 30, 2023 | Content , Essays , Online Scholarship , Ukraine

EVAN J. CRIDDLE *

Within the past year, members of Congress have introduced nearly a dozen bills to make Russia pay for its military aggression against Ukraine. This Essay argues that none of the bills are satisfactory because they would either violate international law or fail to deliver meaningful compensation to Ukraine. Instead, the Essay urges policymakers to use economic sanctions as leverage to compel Russia to make reparations through an international claims-settlement process.

Introduction

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the international community launched a vigorous counteroffensive without firing a shot. Over thirty States imposed economic sanctions against Russia, including sweeping asset freezes, import bans, export controls, and investment restrictions. [1] Russia lost access to nearly half of its central bank reserves, valued at roughly $300 billion, [2] as well as its $10 billion sovereign direct investment fund. [3] Foreign regulators targeted Russian officials and oligarch-allies of the Kremlin, seizing mega-yachts, helicopters, real estate, and artwork worth tens of billions of dollars, and blocking hundreds of millions of dollars in private bank accounts. [4] These measures delivered a heavy blow to the Russian economy, but they failed to achieve their primary purpose: compelling Russian President Vladimir Putin to call off his ruinous “special military operation.” [5] Rather than back down, Putin pressed forward with a brutal campaign that systematically reduced Ukrainian cities to rubble.

As this tragedy was unfolding, international observers began to inquire whether economic sanctions, which have failed so spectacularly to curb Russian aggression, [6] might be repurposed to alleviate suffering in Ukraine. Some commentators urged the United States and its allies to confiscate and transfer Russia’s frozen assets to Ukraine as humanitarian aid. [7] Others proposed using frozen assets to bankroll Ukraine’s national defense or to promote reconstruction after the war. [8] Each of these suggestions found supporters in Congress, generating a flurry of bills to unlock Russia’s frozen assets for Ukraine’s benefit.

Part I of this Essay sorts through these legislative proposals to expose their legal and practical deficiencies. Most of these proposals would authorize the Executive Branch to confiscate Russian assets, violating international investment law and triggering duties of repayment under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and customary international law. [9] Some members of Congress have called for abolishing Russia’s sovereign immunity as a way to deliver financial assistance to Ukraine, [10] but this would violate the United States’ obligations under customary international law. Congress could authorize the forfeiture of private Russian assets linked to public corruption or other criminal activities, as some policymakers have proposed, [11] but those assets are insufficient to bankroll Ukraine’s reconstruction. Thus, none of the bills introduced in Congress would secure substantial reparations for Ukraine while also respecting the rule of international law.

Part II outlines a better strategy for leveraging Russia’s frozen assets to secure reparations for Ukraine. Under international law, the United States and its allies may use asset freezes, trade and investment restrictions, and other economic sanctions to compel Russia to compensate Ukraine for the harm produced by its illegal invasion. The greater the injuries caused by Russian attacks, the greater Russia’s legal obligation to compensate Ukraine at the end of the war. For this strategy to work, however, the United States and its partners must remain patient and resolute, keeping Russian assets on ice and refusing to lift other sanctions until Russia compensates Ukraine. While this strategy will take time to bear fruit, it is realistic to expect that it will generate substantial (if imperfect) compensation for Ukraine without undermining international law.

I. Legislative Proposals

Russian aggression has inflicted catastrophic destruction and suffering in Ukraine. Missile and artillery strikes, aerial bombardment, and kamikaze drone attacks have devastated major cities, including Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mariupol, and Severodonesk, inflicting trillions of dollars in damage. [12] Thousands of Ukrainians have perished, many as victims of Russian war crimes. [13] Many more have suffered serious mistreatment, including torture, at the hands of Russia’s military. [14] Given the scale and gravity of these harms and Ukraine’s urgent need for financial assistance, it makes sense that sympathetic policymakers in the United States would explore every option to make Russia “pay a heavy price” for its aggression in Ukraine. [15]

Unfortunately, recent congressional proposals to hold Russia financially accountable for its aggression have serious flaws. Nearly all of the bills proposed to date raise serious constitutional concerns, and most would violate the United States’ obligations under international law. Others are too limited in scope to move the needle on Ukraine’s relief and reconstruction.

Confiscation

In the first weeks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, members of Congress circulated a series of bills to empower President Biden to confiscate Russia’s frozen assets for the benefit of Ukraine. “Confiscation,” for these purposes, refers to extinguishing a party’s legal interests in assets and vesting title in the U.S. government. [16] Authorizing the Executive Branch to confiscate Russia’s frozen assets could make hundreds of billions of dollars available to Ukraine, bolstering its national defense, alleviating suffering, and advancing its eventual reconstruction after the war.

Federal legislation does not currently allow the Executive Branch to confiscate Russian assets. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does empower the President to block transactions involving foreign assets during a national emergency, [17] and President Biden has used this authority to immobilize Russian assets in the United States. [18] However, IEEPA does not permit the Executive Branch to confiscate foreign assets unless the United States “is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals.” [19] Thus far, these prerequisites for asset confiscation are not satisfied: the United States has not suffered an “attack” from Russia within the meaning of the IEEPA, [20] and President Biden has declared that the United States “will not be directly engaged” in Ukraine’s self-defense “either by sending American troops to fight in Ukraine or by attacking Russian forces.” [21] In recognition of these limitations, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has emphasized that confiscating Russian assets is “not something that is legally permissible in the United States.” [22] IEEPA does not allow the Executive Branch to confiscate and transfer Russian assets to Ukraine.

Several bills would alter the status quo by empowering the President to confiscate Russia’s frozen assets. [23] A representative example is the Asset Seizure for Ukraine Reconstruction Act (ASURA), introduced by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and several colleagues. [24] This draft legislation would empower the President to confiscate assets “valued in excess of $2,000,000” that are subject to U.S. sanctions based on “corruption, human rights violations, the malign influence of the Russian Federation, or conflicts in Ukraine.” [25] Confiscated assets would “vest in the Government of the United States,” after which they could be liquidated or sold for Ukraine’s benefit. [26]

ASURA quickly attracted constitutional objections. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argued that the bill would violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it did not afford an opportunity for foreign asset holders to challenge confiscations in court. [27] In response to this concern, Representatives Tom Malinowski and eighteen co-sponsors proposed a watered down version of ASURA in the House of Representatives. [28] The House version does not purport to expand the President’s confiscation authority but instead merely expresses the “sense of Congress” that “[t]he President should take all constitutional steps to seize and confiscate assets . . . of foreign persons whose wealth is derived in part through corruption linked to or political support for the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin.” [29]

Even setting aside due process objections to ASURA, there are reasons to question whether Congress can and should authorize the President to confiscate Russian assets. For example, confiscating assets from Russia—a nominally “friendly” foreign power—without compensation would violate the Takings Clause, as the Supreme Court held nearly a century ago in Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States . [30] Thus, even if Congress were to expand the President’s statutory authority to confiscate Russian assets, the Constitution would prevent the President from using this authority to take Russian assets without compensation.

Confiscating Russian assets would also violate international law. Under customary norms of international investment law, the wholesale confiscation of Russian assets would constitute a wrongful expropriation, triggering a duty of compensation. [31] If the United States unilaterally confiscated Russia’s frozen assets for Ukraine’s benefit, therefore, Russia could claim a right to reimbursement under international law. [32]

Neither the Senate nor the House version of ASURA is currently on track to become law, and that is almost certainly for the best. [33] As noted, the Senate version is unconstitutional and would violate the United States’ obligations under international law. The House version avoids these pitfalls, but only because it does not grant any new powers to the Executive Branch. Under both versions, the President is unable to confiscate Russia’s frozen assets without leading the United States into combat—a step that the White House has firmly ruled out. Thus, neither version of ASURA offers a workable solution for delivering financial assistance to Ukraine.

Another option for unlocking Russia’s frozen wealth is asset forfeiture. Under current federal law, asset forfeiture takes three forms. First, some federal criminal statutes, such as the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), authorize the federal government to initiate in personam actions for criminal forfeiture of property connected to various illegal activities. [34] Second, the federal government may seek civil forfeiture of property linked to certain designated crimes, such as embezzlement and money laundering, through in rem civil actions. [35] Third, under the Tariff Act of 1930, the federal government may initiate administrative forfeiture proceedings in rem against certain types of personal property that have been seized under U.S. customs laws, including a “vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or baggage” valued at $500,000 or less. [36] Together, these three avenues for asset forfeiture offer opportunities for the Executive Branch to harvest the ill-gotten gains of Russian oligarchs and corrupt politicians for Ukraine’s benefit.

Recognizing the potential of asset forfeiture, the Biden administration in April 2022 proposed a “comprehensive legislative package” to “establish new authorities for the forfeiture of property linked to Russian kleptocracy.” [37] The White House proposal would establish “a new, streamlined administrative process,” backstopped by expedited judicial review, to facilitate the administrative forfeiture of private assets belonging to sanctioned Russian nationals which are related to specified unlawful conduct. [38] The White House plan would also facilitate criminal forfeiture by expanding RICO’s definition of “racketeering” to include sanctions evasion and by “making it unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess proceeds directly obtained from corrupt dealings with the Russian government.” [39] Forfeited assets would then be earmarked “to remediate harms of Russian aggression toward Ukraine.” [40] Several Senators have endorsed the White House plan and are collaborating across the political aisle to develop draft legislation that would expand the administration’s authority to pursue forfeiture against private Russian assets. [41]

Expanding domestic forfeiture law in these ways could unlock hundreds of millions of dollars for Ukraine’s benefit, [42] but Congress must first resolve some significant legal issues. [43] As Professor Paul Stephan has observed, the White House proposal raises several due process concerns. [44] First, applying new forfeiture legislation retroactively to Russian assets seized at the beginning of the war might infringe the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. [45] Second, due process might also require that federal agencies strengthen procedural safeguards by giving foreign asset-holders individualized notice of forfeiture proceedings. [46] Third, applying forfeiture to conduct that bears no meaningful connection to the United States might implicate due process concerns to the extent that it would extend the reach of U.S. law to transactions with no meaningful contact to the United States. [47] If Congress wants to prevent Russia from challenging the White House plan successfully in court, any legislation it enacts must attend to these constitutional concerns.

Even if Congress manages to pass new legislation expanding the federal government’s forfeiture powers, this victory would be little more than symbolic when assessed against the backdrop of Russia’s financial accountability for the war in Ukraine. The harm Ukraine has suffered from Russian attacks—whether measured in lives lost, property damage, or the disruption of economic activity—is many orders of magnitude greater than the value of the yachts, planes, real estate, and other private assets that the United States and its partners have seized from Russian elites. The only way to make significant headway on Russia’s financial obligations to Ukraine would be to tap Russia’s massive central bank reserves and sovereign wealth funds. Yet, the White House’s “comprehensive legislative package” for asset forfeiture would not leave those sovereign assets untouched. Any serious effort to make Russia pay for Ukraine must therefore venture beyond asset forfeiture to find mechanisms for accessing Russia’s sovereign wealth.

Abrogating Sovereign Immunity

With these concerns in mind, some commentators have called for Congress to abrogate Russia’s immunity from civil litigation in domestic courts. [48] At present, the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) does not permit aggrieved parties to bring civil actions against foreign States, much less to execute judgments against foreign central bank reserves, based on injuries suffered in armed conflicts. [49] This means that the federal government may not pursue forfeiture against Russia’s sovereign assets, and Ukrainian plaintiffs cannot sue Russia in U.S. courts for injuries caused by Russian attacks. [50] If Congress were to eliminate Russia’s sovereign immunity under the FSIA, this would establish a powerful new mechanism to make Russia pay for its aggression against Ukraine.

Representatives Debbie Dingell and Fred Upton have introduced legislation to make this idea a reality. Their proposed Ukrainian Sovereignty Act would eliminate sovereign immunity for civil actions seeking money damages “for physical injury, including death, property damage, or loss of property caused by [a] foreign state’s invasion of another sovereign nation located in Europe . . . by or at the direction of the foreign state,” provided that the invasion was condemned by the U.N. General Assembly and both chambers of Congress. [51] The Ukrainian Sovereignty Act also provides that the sovereign assets of an aggressor State—including central bank reserves—“shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by [an American] court.” [52] These provisions would clear the way under domestic law for Ukrainian civilians to sue Russia in U.S. courts. [53]

Whether the Ukrainian Sovereignty Act would pass muster under international law is another matter. In an influential 2012 judgment, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State , the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared that customary international law entitles States to immunity from civil litigation in foreign courts for claims arising from war-related injuries. [54] In particular, the ICJ held that war crimes committed by German armed forces against Italian civilians during World War II were covered by sovereign immunity because they involved the exercise of sovereign powers ( acta jure imperii ), rather than commercial activities ( acta jure gestionis ). [55] According to the ICJ, sovereign immunity barred litigation in Italian courts as a threshold matter even if Germany’s war crimes violated peremptory norms of general international law ( jus cogens ). [56] Although the ICJ’s opinion remains controversial [57] and lacks the formal status of binding precedent under international law, [58] it shapes how international lawyers understand the customary international law of State immunities today. [59]

The ICJ’s analysis in the Jurisdiction Immunities case suggests that Russia also enjoys sovereign immunity in U.S. courts. Russia’s aggression, however contemptible, is a military campaign that entails the exercise of sovereign powers. Russia has not waived its sovereign immunity, nor is it likely to do so. Although Russia’s armed attacks violate jus cogens norms, including the prohibitions of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, this would not diminish Russia’s immunity from litigation in foreign courts under the ICJ’s reading of customary international law. Consequently, if Congress were to abrogate Russia’s sovereign immunity, it could set the United States on a course to violate international law. If the United States wants to deliver the message that international law—including the prohibition against aggression, which Russia has so flagrantly violated— is worthy of respect, it would be a mistake for Congress to disregard Russia’s sovereign immunity under international law.

Members of Congress deserve praise for exploring every option to hold Russia accountable financially for its aggression in Ukraine. Russia’s brazen violation of Ukraine’s sovereign rights cries out for robust remedies. In the final analysis, however, there is little that Congress can do to hold Russia accountable within the constraints imposed by the Constitution and international law. Congress may strengthen the federal government’s authority to compel the forfeiture of private Russian assets, but this would produce only a tiny fraction of the funds needed for Ukraine’s relief and reconstruction. When it comes to Russia’s central bank reserves and other sovereign assets, the Constitution and international law afford Congress little room to maneuver. Thus, if U.S. policymakers want to make Russia pay for its war crimes in Ukraine, they would do well to look for solutions outside Congress.

II. How To Make Russia Pay

Fortunately, there is another way that the United States and its partners can make Russia pay for Ukraine: they can use asset freezes, trade restrictions, and other economic sanctions as leverage to compel Russia to deliver war reparations through an international claims-settlement mechanism. Unlike the flashy legislative proposals that have dominated public debates since the outset of the war, a strategy based on multilateral economic coercion could eventually succeed in delivering significant reparations to Ukraine without violating the Constitution and international law.

Russia’s Responsibility To Make Reparation

As a first step, the United States and its partners should put Russia on notice that it bears financial responsibility under international law for the catastrophic harm it has caused in Ukraine. An “essential principle” of international law is that every internationally wrongful act triggers a duty to provide “reparation.” [60] As the Permanent Court of Justice explained in the Chorzów Factory case, this “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.” [61] When restitution in kind is not possible or would be insufficient to compensate an injured State for their loss, international law requires the “payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear” plus “damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it.” [62]   Since Russia’s invasion into Ukraine constitutes a manifest violation of the U.N. Charter, [63] there can be no serious question that Russia bears responsibility under international law to compensate Ukraine in full for the grave injuries produced by its armed attacks. Ideally, the United States and its partners would seek additional resolutions from international institutions, such as the U.N. General Assembly, condemning Russia’s aggression and affirming Russia’s obligation to make full reparation to Ukraine.

Economic Sanctions as Countermeasures

Next, the United States and its partners should make clear that they are using asset freezes and other economic sanctions as countermeasures to compel Russia to satisfy its responsibility to compensate Ukraine.

Under international law, a “countermeasure” is an “act of non-compliance, by a State, with its obligations owed to another State,” taken “in response to a prior breach of international law by that other State and aimed at inducing it to respect its obligations.” [64] To be permissible under international law, countermeasures may only be used to induce a recalcitrant State to comply with its international obligations. [65] Moreover, countermeasures must, “as far as possible, be taken in such a way” that they can be reversed as soon as the recalcitrant State has resumed compliance with international law. [66] States therefore may not use countermeasures to confiscate foreign assets, because this would result in a permanent deprivation. [67] Instead, when a State freezes or seizes foreign property as a countermeasure, it must preserve the property so that the property can be returned intact when countermeasures end.

Ordinarily, only a State that has suffered injury from a breach of international law may use countermeasures against a responsible State. When an “obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole” ( erga omnes ), however, any State may use countermeasures to compel “cessation of the internationally wrongful act” and “performance of the obligation of reparation . . . in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.” [68]

These features of international law would support efforts by the United States and its partners to use economic sanctions as countermeasures against Russia. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine violates an obligation erga omnes —the bedrock legal requirement to refrain from “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.” [69] In addition to the original act of invasion, Russia’s war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine also violate obligations erga omnes . [70] Accordingly, all States are entitled under international law to demand that Russia cease its belligerent conduct and make reparations, including though the payment of compensation. [71] States may also use asset freezes, trade restrictions, and other economic sanctions as countermeasures to compel Russia to compensate Ukraine for its injuries. [72] Although the United States and its partners may not confiscate Russian assets as a countermeasure, [73] nothing would prevent them under international law from maintaining asset freezes for as long as it takes to convince Russia to compensate Ukraine.

The Long Road to Reparations

International economic sanctions rarely succeed in persuading States to call off armed conflict, [74] so it should come as no surprise that asset freezes and other economic sanctions have not yet convinced Putin to pull out of Ukraine. This does not mean that economic sanctions cannot persuade Russia to provide redress after the war. In the past, the international community has used economic sanctions successfully on a number of occasions to make uncooperative States disgorge reparations. For instance, following the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq provided compensation to Kuwait through the U.N. Compensation Commission (UNCC) in exchange for relief from international economic sanctions. [75] Similarly, in 2003, Libya abandoned its nuclear aspirations, dismantled its missile and chemical weapons programs, and compensated terrorism victims in return for sanctions relief. [76] These examples demonstrate that economic sanctions can be powerful tools for extracting reparation even from rogue States ruled by obstinate autocrats.

Applying this strategy to Russia might seem unpromising because its success would depend on Putin’s willingness to make concessions in exchange for easing sanctions. Putin has staked his political reputation on thumbing his nose at foreign adversaries, such as the European Union and the United States. All signs suggest that he is settling in for a long campaign in Ukraine, wagering on Russia’s ability to outlast Ukrainian resistance and international outrage. [77] Putin might win this bet; with energy prices surging and with weak Ukrainian grain exports threatening global food supplies, [78] it is unclear how long world leaders will be able to sustain, let alone ratchet up, economic sanctions against Russia. Trade and investment restrictions are a double-edged sword, inflicting economic pain not only on Russia, but also on the European Union, the United States, and the broader global economy. Over time, economic and political pressures are likely to limit how long the United States and its partners can maintain costly trade and investment restrictions.

Even so, time is not necessarily on Putin’s side. As long as economic sanctions remain in place, Russia will find it difficult to promote economic growth, attract foreign capital, maintain liquidity, and buffer its economy against currency volatility. Moreover, as far as asset freezes are concerned, the United States and its partners can afford to be patient. Preventing Russia from accessing its frozen central bank reserves and other sovereign wealth imposes minimal costs on the United States and its partners. There is no way Russia can recover its sovereign assets and the frozen wealth of its ruling elite without cooperation from the United States and its partners. Hence, if Russia wants to reclaim any of its frozen assets, it will have no choice but to meet sanctioning States at the negotiation table. If history is any guide, Russia will eventually accept a deal on war reparations in exchange for normalizing trade relations, unblocking private assets, and reclaiming some portion of its sovereign wealth. When that day arrives, a comprehensive negotiated settlement on reparations could unlock a substantial percentage of Russia’s frozen assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction.

There are a variety of models for how Russian assets could be dispersed to the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian nationals. Russia could make a lump sum payment to Ukraine to resolve all war-related claims, perhaps paid in part from central bank reserves and other assets currently locked in offshore accounts. Russia and Ukraine could establish a bilateral claims-settlement body akin to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, which handled expropriation claims arising from the Iran Hostage Crisis. [79] The United Nations could revive the recently shuttered UNCC to handle Ukrainian claims against Russia. [80] Each of these models would present daunting administrative challenges. [81] Those responsible for distributing reparations would have to take care to allocate funds prudently, efficiently, and equitably to advance relief and reconstruction while avoiding institutional corruption and weeding out fraudulent claims. Ultimately, however, all of these approaches offer practical mechanisms for delivering reparations to Ukraine.

Pending a comprehensive settlement on war reparations, the United States and its partners can leverage Russia’s frozen assets to assist Ukraine in other ways. Some U.S. officials have called for a new “Marshall Plan” to support Ukraine through international loans and other financial assistance. [82] Were this proposal to become a reality, the United States could condition financial assistance on Ukraine’s agreement to repay international loans using Russian reparations. This debt repayment strategy could help to defuse domestic political opposition to international development assistance, while also strengthening the resolve of the United States and its partners to keep sanctions in place until Russia eventually relents on war reparations.

Congress’s problematic proposals to convert Russia’s frozen assets into reparations for Ukraine should serve as a cautionary tale about the legal limits of economic sanctions. Both domestic constitutional law and international law constrain how the United States may handle frozen assets. When deployed as countermeasures, asset freezes may be used only for limited purposes under international law. States may not use confiscate foreign assets, nor may they abrogate foreign sovereign immunity through asset forfeiture or civil litigation in domestic courts.

If Congress were to proceed down one of those legally proscribed paths, as some members of Congress have proposed, the costs for the United States would be high. Confiscating Russian assets or abrogating Russia’s sovereign immunity would undermine international norms that safeguard trillions of dollars in U.S. direct foreign investment abroad, potentially inviting retaliation from Russia and setting a dangerous precedent for future international disputes. [83] These measures may also discourage foreign direct investment in the United States, threaten the dollar’s pole position as a favored currency for foreign central bank reserves, and weaken the United States’ ability to use economic sanctions to influence other States’ behavior in future crises. Moreover, responding to Russian aggression with illegal expropriations would play into Putin’s hands by eroding the rules-based international order. It would add fuel to Putin’s argument that Russia’s adversaries have equally dirty hands, so there is no meaningful difference between Russia’s “special military operation” and the sanctions other States have levied in response. The United States and its partners need not play into this false narrative. By adhering strictly to the law of countermeasures, they can compel Russia to compensate Ukraine while also upholding the rule of international law.

So far, the Biden administration has adhered to this playbook. [84] The Treasury Department has kept Russia’s sovereign assets on ice, while the Department of Justice has sought opportunities to target Russian oligarchs for criminal, civil, and administrative forfeiture based on their personal criminal activities. These measures might appear feeble and ineffective in comparison to Putin’s ruthless military campaign, but it is still too early to assess their full impact. Viewed on a longer time horizon, the economic sanctions against Russia are laying the groundwork for a negotiated endgame in which Russia will pay dearly for its aggression—likely using assets that are currently frozen around the world. In the meantime, Congress would be wise to hold the course, resisting the temptation to enact hasty statutory shortcuts that would violate the Constitution and international law.

[*] Ernest W. Goodrich Professor, William & Mary Law School. This essay has benefited from conversation with Scott Anderson, Chimène Keitner, and Paul Stephan, as well as workshop participants at William & Mary Law School.

[1] See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Prohibits Transactions with the Central Bank of Russia and Imposes Sanctions on Key Sources of Russia’s Wealth , (Feb. 28, 2022), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0612; Elena Chachko & J. Benton Heath, A Watershed Moment for Sanctions? Russia, Ukraine, and the Economic Battlefield , 116 Am. J. Int’l L. Unbound 135, 135-36 (2022).

[2] New Financial and Trade Sanctions Against Russia , Cong. Res. Serv. (Mar. 17, 2022), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12062#:~:text=Tightening%20Financial%20Sanctions.&text=3771%3B%20H.R.,entities%20incorporated%20in%20Russia%20(H.R..

[3] John Hyatt, How Putin Used Russia’s Sovereign Wealth Fund to Create a “State-Sponsored Oligarchy , ” Forbes, Mar. 8, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnhyatt/2022/03/08/sanctions-on-russian-fund-show-dashed-hope-of-moscows-cooperation-with-democracies/?sh=1a90fb99a431.  

[4] Fact Sheet: President Biden’s Comprehensive Proposal to Hold Russian Oligarchs and Elites Accountable , White House (Apr. 28, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/28/fact-sheet-president-bidens-comprehensive-proposal-to-hold-russian-oligarchs-accountable/ [hereinafter Biden Proposal ].

[5] Andrew Osborn & Polina Nikolskaya, Russia’s Putin Authorizes ‘Special Military Operation’ Against Ukraine , Reuters (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-authorises-military-operations-donbass-domestic-media-2022-02-24/.

[6] Before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, economic sanctions also failed to persuade Russia to withdraw from Crimea, which it had seized in 2014. See Anders Åslund & Maria Snegovaya, The Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia and How They Can Be Made Even More Effective (Atlantic Council 2021), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/The-impact-of-Western-sanctions-on-Russia-and-how-they-can-be-made-even-more-effective-5.2.pdf (observing that “Western sanctions have not succeeded in forcing the Kremlin to fully reverse its actions and end aggression in Ukraine”).

[7] E.g. , Simon Johnson & Oleg Ustenko, A Basic Income for Ukrainians, Paid for with Frozen Russian Assets , Politico (Mar. 2, 2022), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/03/02/frozen-russian-assets-humanitarian-relief-00013286.

[8] E.g. , Laurence H. Tribe, “ Does American Law Currently Authorize the President to Seize Sovereign Russian Assets? ,” Lawfare, May 23, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/does-american-law-currently-authorize-president-seize-sovereign-russian-assets; Philip Zelikow & Simon Johnson, How Ukraine Can Build Back Better: Use the Kremlin’s Seized Assets to Pay for Reconstruction , Foreign Aff. (Apr. 19, 2022), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-19/how-ukraine-can-build-back-better.

[9] See Asset Seizure for Ukraine Reconstruction Act § 2(1), H.R. 6930, 117th Cong. (Apr. 28, 2022) [hereinafter House ASURA]; Asset Seizure for Ukraine Reconstruction Act, S. 3838, 117th Cong. (2022) [hereinafter Senate ASURA]; Oligarch Asset Forfeiture Act, H.R. 7086, 117th Cong. (2022); Make Russia Pay Act, H.R. 7083, 117th Cong. (2022); Repurposing Elite Luxuries into Emergency Funds for Ukraine Act, H.R. 7596, 117th Cong. (2022); Yachts for Ukraine Act, H.R. 7187, 117th Cong. (2022).

[10] See Ukrainian Sovereignty Act, H.R. 7205, 117th Cong. (2022).

[11] See Confiscating Corrupt Criminal Proceeds Act of 2022, H.R. 7015, 117th Cong. (2022).

[12] Paola Tamma, Payback Time: The West Studies How To Make Russia Foot the War Bill , Politico (Apr. 12, 2022), https://www.politico.eu/article/payback-time-west-make-russia-pay-war-ukraine-bill/.

[13] Ukraine: Civilian Casualty Update 27 June 2022 , U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 27, 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/06/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-27-june-2022.

[15] Remarks by President Joe Biden on the Assistance the United States Is Providing to Ukraine , White House, Mar. 16, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/16/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-assistance-the-united-states-is-providing-to-ukraine/.

[16] Cf. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime art. 2(g), G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (2001). (defining “confiscation” as “permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority”).

[17] 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (2001).

[18] Fact Sheet: United States, G7 and EU Impose Severe and Immediate Costs on Russia , White House, Apr. 6, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/06/fact-sheet-united-states-g7-and-eu-impose-severe-and-immediate-costs-on-russia/.

[19] 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C); see also Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 411, as amended   50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(1) (providing that “[d]uring the time of war the President may” order the confiscation of enemy assets to “vest . . . in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States”); Scott R. Anderson & Chimène Keitner, The Legal Challenges Presented by Seizing Frozen Russian Assets , Lawfare (May 26, 2022), https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-challenges-presented-seizing-frozen-russian-assets (explaining why the IEEPA does not permit confiscating Russia’s frozen assets).

[20] See Paul B. Stephan, Seizing Russian Assets , 17 Capital Mkts. L.J. (forthcoming). But see Tribe, supra note 7 (arguing that Russian cyberattacks should be considered sufficient to permit asset confiscation under IEEPA).

[21] Joseph R. Biden, Jr., What America Will and Will Not Do in Ukraine , N.Y. Times, (May 31, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/31/opinion/biden-ukraine-strategy.html.

[22] Transcript of Press Conference from Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen in Bonn, Germany (May 18, 2022), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0793.

[23] See sources cited supra note 8.

[24] Senate ASURA, supra note 8.

[25] Id. § 2(a)-(b).

[26] Id. § 2(c).

[27] See Jeff Stein, ACLU Helped Defeat Plan To Seize Russian Oligarchs’ Funds for Ukraine , Wash. Post (Apr. 8, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2022/04/08/aclu-ukraine-russia-oligarchs/ (discussing the ACLU’s pushback against the Senate’s ASURA).

[28] House ASURA, supra note 8.

[29] Id. § 2(2).

[30] See 282 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1931). In contrast, Congress may authorize the confiscation of “enemy” property without compensation during armed conflict. United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 11 (1926).

[31] See G.A. Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Countries in Which They Live, A/RES/40/144, 13 Dec. 1985, Art. 9 (“No alien shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her lawfully acquired assets.”).

[32] See Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 31, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) [hereinafter ARSIWA] (“The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”).

[33] The House bill sailed through the House in a near-unanimous vote, only to languish in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See All Actions H.R. 6930—117th Cong. (2021-2022), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/6930/all-actions. The Senate version never made it out of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. See Action Overview S.3838—117th Cong. (2021-2022), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/3838/actions.

[34] 18 U.S.C. § 982 (2016).

[35] Id. §§ 981, 983-85.

[36] 19 U.S.C. §§ 1905-09; see generally Types of Federal Forfeiture , U.S. Dep’t of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/afms/types-federal-forfeiture#:~:text=Description,part%20of%20the%20defendant’s%20sentence (discussing these three varieties of forfeiture).

[37] Biden Proposal , supra note 4.

[40] Id. Consistent with the White House proposal, Representative Tim Burchett has introduced a bill in the House to encourage the use of civil forfeiture to strip assets from Belorussian and Russian nationals to fund humanitarian relief in Ukraine. See Confiscating Corrupt Criminal Proceeds Act of 2022, H.R. 7015, 117th Cong. (2022).

[41] See KleptoCapture: Aiding Ukraine Through Forfeiture of Russian Oligarchs’ Illicit Assets , Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing (July 19, 2022), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/kleptocapture-aiding-ukraine-through-forfeiture-of-russian-oligarchs-illicit-assets (discussing these efforts).  

[42] Time will tell to what extent federal agencies will be able to establish the factual predicate for criminal, civil, or administrative forfeiture by connecting specific Russian assets to illegal activities in the United States or abroad.

[43] See Rishi Batra, Resolving Civil Forfeiture Disputes , 66 U. Kansas L. Rev. 399, 409-10 (2017) (observing that victim compensation is a traditional objective of civil forfeiture law).

[44] Statement of Paul B. Stephan, University of Virginia School of Law, Before a Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee on KleptoCapture: Aiding Ukraine through Forfeiture of Russian Oligarchs’ Illicit Assets, on July 19, 2022, at 5-12, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony%20-%20Stephan%20-%202022-07-19.pdf.

[45] Id. at 6-8 (discussing the Supreme Court’s retroactivity analysis in Landgraf v. USI Film Prod. , 511 U.S. 244, 267 (1994)).

[46] See id. at 11-12 (discussing this concern).

[47] See id. at 9 (expressing concern that expanding liability under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to transactions without substantial contacts to the United States would constitute an assertion of “universal jurisdiction over bribery and related corruption” everywhere in the world); see generally Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law , 48 Harv. Int’l L.J. 121, 123 (2007) (explaining how “constitutional limits—most notably those contained in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause— . . . restrict the ability of the United States to apply extraterritorially . . . U.S. code provisions outlawing conduct that is  not  subject to universal jurisdiction under international law”).

[48] See, e.g. , Tim Hutchinson et al., How the US Can Make Russia Pay Ukrainians for Destroying their Country , CNN (Apr. 11, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/11/opinions/ukraine-russia-monetary-damages-legislation/index.html.

[49] 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-05. For an illuminating discussion of the FSIA’s application to frozen Russian assets, see Ingrid Wuerth, Does Foreign Sovereign Immunity Apply to Sanctions on Central Banks? , Lawfare, Mar. 7, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/does-foreign-sovereign-immunity-apply-sanctions-central-banks.

[50] The FSIA does not bar plaintiffs from bringing civil actions against individual Russian officials or oligarchs, but some Russian officials could claim immunity ratione personae for their involvement in the Ukraine invasion. See Chanka Wickremasinghe, Immunities Enjoyed by Officials of States and International Organizations , in International Law 349, 362-69 (Malcolm Evans ed., 5th ed. 2018) (discussing these features of foreign official immunity under international law).

[51] Ukrainian Sovereignty Act, supra note 9, § 2(a).

[52] Id. § 2(b).

[53] The Biden administration would also have to permit individual claimants to access frozen Russian assets for the satisfaction of judgments, rather than keep them blocked to maintain leverage for future negotiations with Russia.

[54] Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece intervening), 2012 ICJ Rep. 99.

[55] Id. at 125, ¶ 60.

[56] Id. at 134-35, 140-42, ¶¶ 77, 92-97.

[57] See Simoncioni v. Repubblica Federale di Germania, Corte cost., 22 ottobre 2014 n. 238, Gazzetta Ufficiale [G.U.] (ser. spec.) n. 45, 29 ottobre 2014, I, 1, http://gazzettaaufficiale.it , translated at http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S238_2013_en.pdf (declining to follow the Jurisdictional Immunities judgment); Claire E.M. Jervis, Jurisdictional Immunities Revisited: An Analysis of the Procedure Substance Distinction in International Law , 30 Eur. J. Int’l L. 105, 105 (2019) (critiquing the ICJ’s “sclerotic approach to the interaction between substantive and procedural law in the Jurisdictional Immunities case”); Kimberley N. Trapp & Alex Mills, Smooth Runs the Water Where the Brook Is Deep: The Obscured Complexities of Germany v. Italy, 1 Cambridge J. Int’l & Comp. L. 153 (2012) (exploring alternative approaches the Court could have taken to deciding the case).

[58] See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of the particular case.”).

[59] See, e.g. , Monica Hakimi, Constructing an International Community , 111 Am. J. Int’l L. 317, 334 (2017) (“The ICJ’s jurisprudence . . . limits the authority of international or national courts to enforce  jus cogens  norms.”).

[60] Factory at Chorzów (Pol. v. F.R.G.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A.) No. 17 (Sept. 13), at 47.

[63] See Aggression Against Ukraine, G.A. Res. A/RES/ES-11/1, Mar. 2, 2022, https://unwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/A_RES_ES-11_1-EN.pdf (deploring “in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter”).

[64] Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law 20 (2005); see also Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Reports (1997) 1, ¶¶ 82-87; Air Services Agreement Case (France v. United States), 18 RIAA 416, ¶ 83 (1978); ARSIWA, supra note 32, ch. V (discussing circumstances precluding wrongfulness generally).

[65] ARSIWA, supra note 32, art. 49(1) (“An injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations . . . .”).

[66] Id. art. 49(3).

[67] See Elizabeth Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures 15 (1984).

[68] Id. art. 48(1)-(2); see also Martin Dawidowicz, Public Law Enforcement Without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of State Practice on Third-Party Countermeasures and Their Relationship to the UN Security Council , 77 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 333 (2007) (arguing that customary international law authorizes these “collective countermeasures”); Evan J. Criddle, Standing for Human Rights Abroad , 100 Cornell L. Rev. 269, 297-332 (2015) (explaining how States may apply countermeasures in the interests of foreign “beneficiaries”).

[69] U.N. Charter art. 2(4).

[70] See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. V. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 32, ¶¶ 33–34 (Feb. 5) (characterizing the prohibitions against aggression and genocide and “the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person” as “obligations erga omnes ”) .

[71] See U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Thematic Study of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, Including Recommendations Aimed at Ending Such Measures , 7–8 ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/33 (Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://www.ohchr.org/ Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A-HRC-19-33_en.pdf (“Where human rights or other obligations owed to the international community as a whole (obligations erga omnes ) are concerned, any State may take lawful measures against the State that breached the said erga omnes obligation . . . .”); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Power and Purpose of International Law: Insights from the Theory and Practice of Enforcement 245 (2008) (“[T]he weight of opinion supports the right of states to take countermeasures in cases of erga omnes obligations with a jus cogens character.”); Tams, supra note 58, at 249–51 (“[I]ndividual States are entitled to take countermeasures in response to systematic or large-scale breaches of obligations erga omnes .”).

[72] See Omer Yousif Elegab, The Legality of Non-forcible Counter-measures in International Law 64-65 (1988) (explaining that countermeasures may be used to seek compensation for internationally wrongful acts).

[73] See id. at 111 (“[N]o form of confiscatory expropriation will be acceptable as counter-measures.”); David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures , 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 817, 824 (2002) (“Whatever countermeasure a state selects has to be capable of being reversed.”); Evan Criddle, Rebuilding Ukraine Will Be Costly. Here’s How to Make Putin Pay. , Politico, Mar. 30, 2022, (explaining that this principle applies to frozen Russian assets); Paul Stephan, Response to Philip Zelikow: Confiscating Russian Assets and the Law , Lawfare, May 13, 2022 (explaining why states under international law may seize, but not confiscate, foreign state assets under the international law of countermeasures). But see Philip Zelikow, A Legal Approach to the Transfer of Russian Assets to Rebuild Ukraine , Lawfare, May 12, 2022 (arguing that asset confiscation would be a lawful countermeasure).

[74] See Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered 10 (3d ed. 2007) (finding that “most attempts at altering military adventures [through sanctions] have not been successful”).

[75] See Lea Brilmayer, Understanding “IMCCs”: Compensation and Closure in the Formation and Function of International Mass Claims Commissions , 43 Yale J. Int’l L. 273, 297-98 (2018).

[76] See Jonathan B. Schwartz, Dealing with a “Rogue State”: The Libya Precedent , 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 553 (2007) (discussing negotiations leading to this result).

[77] See Catherine Belton, Putin Thinks West Will Blink First in War of Attrition, Russian Elites Say , Wash. Post (June 3, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/03/russia-putin-economy-attrition-war/.

[78] See European Council, Infographic – Ukrainian Grain Exports Explained , https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ukrainian-grain-exports-explained/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2022) (explaining that Russian aggression has disrupted Ukrainian grain exports and impacted global grain prices); European Parliament, Briefing: Economic Repercussions of Russia’s War on Ukraine – Weekly Digest (Dec. 20. 2022), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/733754/IPOL_BRI(2022)733754_EN.pdf (discussing economic pressures on European countries resulting from regional sanctions against Russian oil and natural gas).

[79] See Brilmayer, supra note 68, at 296-97.

[80] See id. at 297-98.

[81] For example, if Russia were to make a lump sum payment to Ukraine, Ukraine would have to decide how to allocate these funds to ameliorate suffering and promote reconstruction. This might include establishing an institutional mechanism at the national level to distribute reparations directly to private claimants. Alternatively, Russia and Ukraine could establish an international claim-settlement mechanism, such as a bilateral claims-settlement body. In either scenario, the vast number of potential claimants would present enormous administrative challenges.

[82] See Kate Connolly, Pete Buttigieg Calls for a New Marshall Plan to Rebuild Ukraine , Guardian (May 24, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/20/pete-buttigieg-says-us-backs-new-marshall-plan-to-rebuild-ukraine.

[83] See Bureau of Economic Analysis, Direct Investment by Country and Industry, 2020 , https://www.bea.gov/news/2021/direct-investment-country-and-industry-2020 (noting $6.15 trillion in U.S. direct investment abroad at the end of 2020).

[84] See Readout of Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) Task Force Deputies Meeting , U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sept. 30, 2022, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/readout-russian-elites-proxies-and-oligarchs-repo-task-force-deputies-meeting (“Together with our partners, the steps we have taken so far have immobilized Russian assets as one of several means to induce Russia to come into compliance with its international law obligations, including the obligation to pay reparations.”).

Image credit: chuttersnap, CC0 1.0: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/deed.en

Subscribe to Updates From HILJ

Type your email…

Economic Sanctions Against Iran Argumentative Essay

Living in the global society, it is important to follow the rules created for this society. When one country refuses to meet the requirements and tries to live in accordance with personal rules, the whole world may stand against it. Such situation has happened with Iran, the country which ahs decided to develop personal nuclear program. The importance for the country and the danger for the whole world from the nuclear weapon are obvious.

Having developed a nuclear weapon, Iran will have an opportunity to dictate their rules for other countries keeping them in stress, while others countries will have either to submit or to wait for the implementation of the warnings. The situation created around Iran and its nuclear program is advantageous, as for me, because the country has strong arguments which can help it avoid the punishment from the USA and other Western countries.

Trying to present the situation in brief, the following information should be stated. Iran has decided to develop a nuclear program. The reasons for such decision are numerous; however, the most important of them is that Iran has all the necessary resources and knowledge.

Therefore, Iran is a country, which can allow itself develop and create an atom bomb (YouTube, 2012). However, the USA and the European Union strongly disagree with this decision and try to do all possible to prevent Iran from continuing their nuclear program. Therefore, the country has appeared in a complicated situation as in care it refuses to stop its nuclear program, the USA and other countries threaten to stop consuming its oil which may negatively influence the economy of Iran.

However, Iran, in its tern, threatens to block the Strait of Hormuz, which is recognized to be an extremely important waterway for various countries, including the USA (the United States and other countries are provided with oil through the channel). Anyway, the government of the USA is ready to take certain actions and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, if Iran acts.

Generally, while speaking about economic sanctions, one is to keep in mind that they are to be imposed in order to achieve international political objectives.

While Iran refused to freeze its nuclear program, the United States and the European Union decided to impose additional sanctions, in order to concentrate on the country’s additional trade. However, nobody will deny the fact that the financial sanctions had a moderate impact on Iran’s uranium enrichment program.

Taking into account the report the general director of IAEA provided the governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency with, some important aspects of Iran’s nuclear program were clarified.

First of all, it should be pointed out that possible military dimensions of Iran’s uranium program were revealed; the document contains information on Iran’s nuclear program and depicts information, which “indicates that Iran has carried out … activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device” (Joyner, 2011, para. 3).

However, taking into consideration Iran’s agreement with the IAEA, one can conclude that there are certain key aspects, which are not highlighted in the report. For instance, there is no information about the location of Iran’s uranium stores as well as about the details of uranium enrichment process. In other words, the report is mostly related to the development of nuclear weapon.

Another important aspect, which cannot be neglected, is Iran’s claims that more uranium is to be produced to help people who need medical treatment. “In order to provide medical assistance to 800,000 cancer patients, Iran needs to enrich uranium up to 20% to be able to feed Tehran’s (research) reactor that produces the needed radioisotopes” (“Uranium Enrichment Begins at Iranian Site,” 2012, para. 8).

Having considered all the facts devoted to this situation, I made a conclusion that I cannot agree with the phrase that economic sanctions against Iran will be effective in changing its behavior with regard to its nuclear weapons program.

The very fact that the USA imposed its sanctions on Iran in December 2011 and Iran still continues developing its program and is not going to stop its work says much about the seriousness of its intentions (Blocking the Strait of Hormuz: Options for GCC Countries, 2012).

To understand the reasons of my point of view and to try to create another, opposite opinion, I will try to present two points of view giving objective arguments in favor of each statement, whether economic sanctions against Iran will be effective in changing its behavior or not.

The fact the development of the nuclear weapon in Iran has become familiar for the whole world and the global society beliefs that this is the fact that threatens them. Therefore, Iran must stop its program and refuse from possessing the nuclear weapon. However, Iran disagrees with such claim and continues its program. The USA and the European Union understand that Iran should be not only threaten, but also punished, therefore, they impose several sanctions.

The European Union refuses to purchase oil from Iran. The decision was made in December, 2011, but the crisis will come in July 1, 2012 when the contract will end, and the countries are not going to sing a new contract with Iran which may become one of the reasons for conflict. The ban on oil purchases from Iran will cover imports of crude oil, petroleum products and petrochemical products. European market has about a fifth of Iran’s oil exports.

The European Union did not want to come to military measures in solving the problem and they have decided to act in such a way. Alain Juppé, France’s foreign minister said, “To avoid any military solution, which could have irreparable consequences, we have decided to go further down the path of sanctions.

It is a good decision that sends a strong message and which I hope will persuade Iran that it must change its position, change its line and accept the dialogue that we propose” (Castle & Cowell, 2012). Trying to harm Iran as more as possible, the USA does all possible to impact it and make it stop nuclear program.

The intention to make Japan, the Asian country which has been working with Iran in many years, says that he USA will not stop before anything. However, up to now Iran remains stable and does not want to refuse from its nuclear program.

The firm insisting of Iran on its position and the lack of desire to agree on the demands of the USA and the European Union proves that Iran has some arguments in response. Thus, Iran threatens to block the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, Iran does not believe that the ban on oil purchase from Iran will be spread on Asia. The Europe is ready to refuse from Iranian oil as it has some reserves and other sources of oil, but the situation in Asia is absolutely different.

The intention of the USA and the European Union to cut Iran’s oil exports will be implemented by no means, but how the Asian countries are going to respond is a good question. China, Japan, India and South Korea are the largest exporters of Iranian oil. Their point of view in the relation to ban is very important.

Being the largest importer of Iranian oil, China will not risk its relationships with this country. The import of Iranian oil to Beijing accounts for about 20% of all shipments from Tehran. Of course, if China supports sanctions, Iran will appear in a complicated and unfavorable situation, however, it is very doubtful that China dares for such an action.

The situation is also complicated by the fact that not only political issues are involved, but the economical as well that makes the decision too difficult. Stephen Joske of the Economist Intelligence Unit said “As far as politics is concerned, it was clear during the Arab Spring that China maintains a status quo against the governments in the region. On the economic front, China is far more reliant on imported oil than it has ever been in the past” (Singh, 2012).

However, the political ties with the USA may impact the situation, still, it is doubtful. India and Iran have been developing rather successful and effective relationships, therefore, it is doubtful that India will want to break its historic relationships with Iran. Moreover, it seems obvious that the price on oil is important for India and Iran gives it appropriate price (Singh, 2012).

Thus, looking at the created situation, the question raises whether sanctions are effective or not in general. Smith (2004) is sure that the effectiveness of sanctions is rather questionable. In most cases, if the national opposition is absent, sanctions will just encourage the target government to continue its actions which may cause political and economical problems.

Moreover, the sanctions are effective when the target government is weaker and does not have any aspects for contradiction the sanctions are going to be effective, otherwise, the sanctions will only make the target government more courageous and resolute (Smith, 2004). The situation with the USA and the European sanctions against Iran can prove this idea.

Therefore, taking into account the arguments stated above I strongly believe that neither the USA, nor the European Union will be able to impact Iran’s decisions in continuing its nuclear program.

I am sure that Asian countries will not refuse from their close ties with Iran just because the USA does not want another country to possess nuclear weapon. The position of the USA may be understood, however, it seems that all the statements about the international safely are empty. The USA cares only about their interests and the sanction is one more proof.

This sanction will harm simple people, but the US government thinks about the more important aspects, about the international polices, therefore, they are not interested in something lower. I strongly believe that economic sanctions of the USA and the European Union against Iran will not be effective in changing its behavior with regard to its nuclear weapon program.

Iran has several serous counterarguments, which are going to be helpful for Iran to protect their position. Such friendly countries as India, China and South Korea do not have any desire to spoil economic relationships with Iran even for the political benefit in one sphere of international relationships.

Reference List

Blocking the Strait of Hormuz: Options for GCC Countries. (2012). Al Jazeera Centre for Studies . Web.

Castle, S. & Cowell, A. (2012). Europe and U.S. Tighten Vise of Sanctions on Iran . The New York Times . Web.

Joyner, D. (2011). Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Legal Mandate of the IAEA. University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Web.

Mosaic Special: Iran and the Nuclear Threat. (2012). YouTube. Web.

Singh, P. P. (2012). Iran oil sanctions divide Asia’s four largest economies . BBC News . Web.

Smith, M. S. (2004). Sanctions: Diplomatic Tool, or Warfare by Other Means? Beyond Intractability . Web.

Uranium Enrichment Begins at Iranian Site. (2012). The CNN Wire Staff. Web.

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2024, January 26). Economic Sanctions Against Iran. https://ivypanda.com/essays/economic-sanctions-against-iran/

"Economic Sanctions Against Iran." IvyPanda , 26 Jan. 2024, ivypanda.com/essays/economic-sanctions-against-iran/.

IvyPanda . (2024) 'Economic Sanctions Against Iran'. 26 January.

IvyPanda . 2024. "Economic Sanctions Against Iran." January 26, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/economic-sanctions-against-iran/.

1. IvyPanda . "Economic Sanctions Against Iran." January 26, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/economic-sanctions-against-iran/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Economic Sanctions Against Iran." January 26, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/economic-sanctions-against-iran/.

• The Strait of Hormuz's Geopolitical Significance
• The Strait of Hormuz: Importance and Current Situation
• Iranian Threat to Close Strait of Hormuz
• The Strait of Hormuz Choke Point
• Strait of Hormuz: Political Geography
• The Conflict of Interest Between Iran and the USA
• Uranium Mining and Issues Tied to It
• Country Music Legend: George Strait
• Possible Options for Iran in Case of US or Israel Attacks
• The Iranian Nuclear Program
• Libyan Conflict Involvement
• Role of United Arab Emirates in Iraq-Kuwait War
• The dispute about the Persian Gulf name
• UAE-Afghanistan Foreign Relations, Assistance & Promotion
• The United Arab Emirates & Afghanistan Foreign Relations

• Share full article

Advertisement

Supported by

U.S. Restores Oil Sanctions on Venezuela as Hopes Dim for Free Election

The Biden administration had temporarily lifted sanctions after President Nicolás Maduro agreed to make free elections possible. Now Mr. Maduro has put up barriers to a credible vote.

By Genevieve Glatsky

When the government of President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and his country’s opposition signed an agreement in October to work toward free and fair elections this year, it was seen as a glimmer of hope after years of authoritarian rule and economic free fall.

The United States, as a sign of good will, temporarily lifted some of the economic sanctions that have crippled the country’s crucial oil industry.

But six months later, the Maduro government has made several moves that have dimmed the chances of legitimate elections, and a frustrated Biden administration on Wednesday announced that it was letting the sanctions relief expire.

The reinstatement of the penalties could carry significant consequences for the future of Venezuela’s democracy, for its economy and for migration in the region.

“Maduro and his representatives did not fully comply with the spirit or the letter of the agreement,” said a senior administration official who spoke with a group of journalists on background to discuss a sensitive diplomatic matter.

Another top official discussing the restored sanctions cited the “disqualification of candidates and parties on technicalities, and what we see as a continued pattern of harassment and repression against opposition figures and civil society.”

The sanctions relief will expire at midnight on Wednesday, but the official said there would a be a “45-day wind-down period for transactions related to the oil-and-gas sector operations” so that the expiration “does not provoke uncertainty in the global energy sector.”

The Venezuelan government did not immediately respond to a request for comment. But in a televised address on Monday, Mr. Maduro, anticipating that the sanctions would be restored, said, “We are not a gringo colony. Venezuela is going to continue its economic march.”

The United States has placed sanctions on some Venezuelan leaders for years, but the Trump administration tightened them significantly in 2019, after the United States accused Mr. Maduro of fraud in the last presidential election.

The move was meant to force the Maduro government from power, but Mr. Maduro has managed to retain his grip, even as the sanctions have led to economic misery for many Venezuelans.

Venezuelan oil imports to the United States — its biggest customer — have been effectively banned. Oil is Venezuela’s main source of export income, and the sanctions have dealt a devastating economic blow that has contributed to a mass exodus of Venezuelans.

The sanctions relief allowed Venezuela to sell its crude freely for a period of six months.

Mr. Maduro, who has been in power for 11 years, has long sought the lifting of sanctions, while the United States and its allies in the Venezuelan opposition have demanded that Mr. Maduro allow competitive elections that could give his political opponents a legitimate shot at winning.

While the agreement last year , signed in Barbados, was a significant step forward, many were skeptical that Mr. Maduro would ever allow an election with any real possibility that he might lose.

Just days after the agreement was signed, a former Venezuelan lawmaker, María Corina Machado, won a primary election with more than 90 percent of the vote. Her victory and a high turnout showed, according to experts, that she stood a strong chance of defeating Mr. Maduro in a free and fair election.

Since then, the Maduro government has put up more barriers to prevent the possibility of a competitive vote.

The country’s top court disqualified Ms. Machado in January over what the judges claimed were financial irregularities that occurred when she was a national legislator. Those types of disqualifications are a common tactic used by Mr. Maduro to keep strong competitors off the ballot.

Then the government, using technical electoral maneuvers, prevented an opposition coalition from putting forward another preferred candidate. The opposition was ultimately allowed to put forth a different candidate, Edmundo González, a former diplomat, but it is unclear is if his name will appear on the ballot in the July 28 election.

One opposition party was allowed to officially register another candidate: Manuel Rosales, the governor of the populous state of Zulia, whose candidacy is widely seen as rubber-stamped by Mr. Maduro, according to political analysts.

An unclassified U.S. intelligence report in February stated that Mr. Maduro was likely to win the election and remain in power “because of his control of state institutions that influence the electoral process and his willingness to exercise his power.”

While the Maduro administration had placed allies on Venezuela’s electoral council, the intelligence report said it was “also trying to avoid blatant voting fraud.”

Six of Ms. Machado’s campaign aides have been arrested and six more have gone into hiding since arrest warrants were issued against them. Men on motorbikes have attacked supporters at her events. Many Venezuelans living abroad have been unable to register to vote because of expensive and cumbersome requirements.

Now that sanctions have been reinstated, experts say it is unlikely the Venezuelan government will reconsider its antidemocratic actions.

The Maduro government does not “have any further reason to make more concessions or even maintain some of the concessions that they have made so far,” said Mariano de Alba, a senior adviser for International Crisis Group, a think tank. “So we could be walking toward a more uneven playing field on the electoral side.”

The move could also affect migration in the region.

Exhausted by years of economic struggle and a lack of freedoms, hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans have tried to reach the United States border in the last two years, creating a political and humanitarian crisis for the Biden administration.

Around the time of the Barbados agreement, Venezuela also agreed to accept Venezuelan migrants deported from the United States, a move meant to help show that President Biden was aggressively tackling record border crossings and to deter other Venezuelans who might be considering the journey.

But those deportation flights stopped in February without an explanation. Now that sanctions are reinstated, they are unlikely to resume.

Sanctions relief also had a modest but notable effect on the Venezuelan economy over the past six months, according to experts. Oil exports recently hit a four-year high and inflation hit a decade low .

But the resumption of sanctions could reverse those gains. A struggling economy along with the strong possibility that Mr. Maduro could win another illegitimate election could lead to another surge in migration, experts said.

While the Biden administration said it would restore the sanctions, another U.S. official said the government could still allow individual companies on a case-by-case basis to do business with Venezuela’s oil-and-gas sector.

Allowing such limited business to continue with Venezuela gives the United States some leverage in discussions with the Maduro government, experts said.

We've detected unusual activity from your computer network

To continue, please click the box below to let us know you're not a robot.

Why did this happen?

Please make sure your browser supports JavaScript and cookies and that you are not blocking them from loading. For more information you can review our Terms of Service and Cookie Policy .

For inquiries related to this message please contact our support team and provide the reference ID below.