essay about physical self in understanding the self

Do You Know What You Really Look Like?

How we think we look and how we measure up are often not the same..

Posted November 13, 2019 | Reviewed by Gary Drevitch

Notions of what constitutes the psychological self are typically derived from verbal reflection. We are really facile at talking about our beliefs, values, and desires. Beyond that, I am interested in other ways a person constructs a sense of the physical self, ways that are powerful determinants of what we actually do in the world. In a chapter of my book, Physical Intelligence , I consider what it takes for a brain to figure out that it is situated inside a body and how it forms a holistic sense of being.

First and foremost, we neurologists treasure the notion of the body schema, the continuous mapping of body shape that is essential if we want to get into a pair of pants or through a narrow passageway. This idea dates back to the origins of neurology as a specialty, when we were first identifying all the reasons a person can't move deftly. At the opposite extreme, there are those patients with semantic problems who can move just fine, but they can't name body parts or remember the relative topology of where body parts are located. They fail to know that the knee bone is connected to the shin bone and so on.

The sweet spot from a theoretical perspective that connects to many clinical disorders is a kind of body knowledge between these two extremes. In this space sits body identification, our internal belief in what we are shaped like. This, of course, can be far from veridical. Some of us believe we are svelte when we are rotund, for example, while some of us report the opposite.

There is growing interest in determining if this distorted sense of self-identity is a root cause of common eating disorders. A disconnection between self-image and actual body size occurs in one-quarter to one-half of all young adult athletes, in virtually every sport tested. Whether they are driven toward a larger (football) or leaner (distance running, equestrian sports, gymnastics) body type, distortions of body image can dominate their eating behavior, even when their actual weight and musculature are at a performance optimum.

In the neurology clinic, there are migraineurs with something called Alice in Wonderland Syndrome who can be hit by a spreading wave of cortical depression that sweeps across the parietal lobe, profoundly disrupting the computations needed for body identification. At the peak of a migraine aura, they could believe they are 4 or 10 feet tall, with giant heads or huge feet.

The different representations of the body that the brain relies on to anchor our sense of a physical self mostly operate under the hood, hidden from our mental life. Thus, it can be hard to get an intuition of how important body identity actually is. While I could acknowledge this importance conceptually, it remained an abstraction for me—until recently. It became dramatically concrete after my recent orthopedic surgery.

I grew up with wildly lax knees, bow-legged like a cowboy since childhood . My brain had that distorted shape embedded in my body schema and I could accomplish most actions without too much trouble until one of the knees finally wore out. I had a total knee replacement and was excited to start walking without pain.

While doing walking exercises on the second postoperative day, I looked down at my legs and started to swear. The surgeon must have made a mistake inserting the new knee: My foot on that side looked too far lateral, as if the leg was bowed outward instead of inward. It didn't match the old familiar side at all. It was a horrible feeling. If you have ever seen a movie of someone dislocating a joint or getting a horrible fracture, it caused the same impulse to look away in disgust.

What I was experiencing was two senses of self in direct conflict, one old, one new. My body identity is built from years of bow-leggedness. The surgeon had done a perfect job, making my leg perfectly straight; something I had never experienced. I simply could not reconcile the facts provided by my vision with my old identity.

Even today, nine months later, I am surprised when I look down. The new leg still looks odd. I think the slowness of this change in physical identity is an important observation with clinical relevance. It implies that the sense of self formed from our belief of what we look like is deeply rooted. This resistance to change will be an impediment for anyone seeking to adapt their self-image. And for those with a distorted self-image that causes a maladaptive behavior, like too much or too little eating, behavioral interventions aimed at changing their belief may need to be strong and require a considerable amount of time.

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Scott Grafton, MD , is a cognitive neuroscientist at UC Santa Barbara who uses MRI to map how the brain organizes action.

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The Physical Self Concept Analysis

1. introduction.

Physical self-concept (PS) pertains to how persons feel about their physical selves. PS pertains to the descriptive and evaluative beliefs persons hold about their physical selves. These self-beliefs can be about the physical self in general, particular parts of the body, or about physical ability and coordination. Physical self-concept is an important self-construct in that it encompasses the way we feel about ourselves physically and is typically related to many mental health outcomes in adults and children alike. The physical self is an important self-evaluation domain for kids and adults in that it encompasses competence beliefs in a variety of physical activities and can influence one's affective psychological experiences in relation to exercise and a physically active lifestyle. Your physical self-concept can have a significant effect on your self-esteem and overall psychological health. For example, in a study of 6th and 7th graders, Sonstroem and Morgan (1989) found that coordination competence significantly related to general self-esteem in both boys and girls, and the value of strength significantly related to global physical self-worth in boys. Self-perceptions about the physical self usually begin to emerge in early childhood and can change throughout one's lifespan. Because the physical self is multifaceted and hierarchical in nature (Marsh, 1996), exploration of physical self-concept has often been done within specific subdomains of the physical self, such as perceptions of physical fitness or perceptions of body size, and is typically assessed using multidimensional measures. Measures typically used with adult samples include the Physical Self-Perception Profile (PSPP) and the Physical and Aesthetic Self-Description Questionnaire (PAQ/ASD). In answering the question "What actually is the physical self and how is it evaluated?", Shavelson et al. (1976) proposed a model of hierarchical determinants of self-concept in specific domains and suggested that the physical self can be defined in terms of self-esteem, the value one places on oneself in the physical domain, and the self-perceptions of various attributes of the physical self. These are the same components that Marsh identified when he described the theoretical nature of the physical self (1996). More recently, procedural self-concept has been suggested to be another determinant of self-concept and has been defined in terms of how subjects think they ought to think about their physical abilities, one's affect and dispositions following evaluative experiences, and the relationships and affect towards significant others concerning one's own ability (Harter, 1999). Despite the history of research on the physical self and the abundance of measures that have been developed, exploration of the physical self is only beginning, and there is still much to be learned about how the physical self is formed and how it influences the affective experiences, motivations, and consequent behaviors of children and adults.

1.1 Definition of Physical Self Concept

The physical self-concept is the mental picture an individual has of themselves and their physical abilities. It can also consist of the individual's perception of their physical appearance, strength, and agility. It's how an individual sees themselves, both mentally and physically. This self-concept highly influences an individual's self-esteem, motivation to partake in certain activities, and their general well-being. This concept is developed through the culture in which we live and also through the relationships we have with other people. By the age of six, children start to have a stable concept of themselves and their abilities. This makes the study of physical self-concept in children, of age six and above, a very valid topic. There are many ways to how this concept is defined. Marsh (1990) provided a hierarchical, multidimensional model which outlines that physical self-concept is composed of twelve constructs. These can be separated into: global physical self-worth, perceived physical ability, perceived body attractiveness, and fitness. Physical self-worth and perceived physical abilities have strong influences on an individual's motivation and self-esteem. Other researchers have different views on how this concept is defined. Fox and Corbin (1989) describe physical self-perception as a general feeling about one's physical abilities and appearance. This general feeling can be influenced by its four components: physical fitness, academic physical ability, global self-worth, and physical appearance. Nunomara and Marsh (2010) provide another definition and describe physical self-concept as an individual's self-perceptions and self-efficacy regarding their physical attributes and capabilities. Despite the different ways to define this concept, all the definitions provided have a very similar meaning. This can be generalized and say that physical self-concept is how an individual feels and thinks about their attributes in terms of physical ability and appearance.

1.2 Importance of Studying Physical Self Concept

Although it is a topic that has produced great interest in the past several years, physical self-concept is still a very new and relatively un-researched area of study. Most of the research that has been done has been very recent and done over very short periods of time. One of the many reasons that this area of self-concept has so much research potential lies in the fact that it's multi-dimensional. This basically means that it takes into account a wide variety of areas that affect self-concept. Such areas that have been studied in relation to physical self-concept have been global self-esteem and self-perceptions of physical abilities. Also, physical self-concept is subject to change with developmental periods, as it can be derived from experiences and social comparisons with others. High incidences of activity or sports participation increase the likelihood an individual will form strong beliefs about themselves in the physical domain. This may also be due to the fact that the physical self is a salient component of overall self-concept during developmental periods. The fact that the self is such a central focus of life during developmental periods intensifies the need for research in this area. Given that physical self-concept is correlated with psychological well-being in the physical domain and global self-esteem, it's worth noting the correspondences between the enhancement and detriment of physical self-concept and subjective well-being. The relationship between this area of self-concept and psychological well-being has potential to steer research efforts in numerous directions, given that the enhancement of self-esteem is a primary goal of education and mental health promotion across the lifespan. Changes in the perceived physical self are also a likely outcome of physical, cognitive, or psychosocial interventions. Stepwise, experimental designs can be used to evaluate the effects of such interventions on the physical self, making it somewhat easier to determine cause and effect relationships. The directions of such efforts would move society a step closer to certain general goals in the enhancement of well-being for individuals of all ages. This would occur by clarifying how and why changes in behavior or achievement are associated with changes in the physical self.

1.3 Objectives of the Analysis

The main objective of the analysis is to understand how an individual forms evaluative judgment about their body (physical self-concept). More specifically, the analysis will evaluate the influence of predictor variable of the physical self-concept and its impact on the criterion variable. For the purpose of the analysis, the terms of predictor and criterion are used to have a causal effect or impact of one variable on another. Influences on the physical self-concept are seen to be quite varied, and so too are its criterion measures. Preceding research suggests that the formation of the physical self-concept begins in early childhood, influenced by social and cultural factors too numerous to mention. This analysis will focus on the effect of the physical self-concept predictors of social physique anxiety and actual physical fitness, the impact of these variables on the physical self-concept, and their effect on negative affect and psychological health. Another objective is to investigate the higher order construct of the physical self-concept and its various facets and the effect that these facets have on subjective well-being. Shavelson, Hubner and Stanton (1976) and Marsh (1996) propose that the self is a multidimensional structure which encompasses various specific self-beliefs organized into a hierarchical structure. This is also supported by empirical research (for example Fox, 1997; Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2006) that has employed various measures of the physical self-concept which are aligned with the conceptualization of the self as being a multidimensional entity. A common approach in measuring the self is to assess global or higher order self-esteem and efficacy constructs, followed by more specific self-evaluations related to defined domains or tasks. An example would be physical ability self-efficacy, exercising more control over one's thoughts and feelings, leading to the capability to do a better job to complete a specific task and produces a high feeling of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997). Actual performance on the task influences the self-efficacy judgments which in turn affect the specific task self-esteem (Bandura, 1997). These specific self-evaluation constructs are said to have direct and indirect effects on affect and behavior (Marsh, 1996). This approach envisages the self as being an active agent in the self-regulation of behavior and affect, and is to be employed to investigate the effect of the specific self-evaluative facet of the physical self-concept, to the global physical self-esteem and physical self-worth constructs, and their effect on affect and behavior.

2. Factors Influencing Physical Self Concept

Biological factors are the foundation of self-concept. They are constituted by genetic makeup and the physical and physiological aspects of a person. The genetic endowment is responsible for temperament, interests, and intellectual capacities which indirectly affect self-concept. The more intelligent and talented the individual, the more positive their self-concept. The physical aspects, such as attractiveness and appearance, are more directly linked to the self-concept. The social comparison theory suggests that people attribute to their self-concept that which is socially unobservable, as it is in their best interests not to let the categorical secret out (Festinger, 1954). However, people do make comparisons of the observable, and social feedback is very influential in the formation of self-concept. People tend to believe that if others agree with their own evaluation about a physical aspect of themselves, it is a more important aspect of their overall self-concept. Therefore, feedback has a direct effect on beliefs about physical ability and physical self-concept and has a particularly negative effect when it is undesirable and when it is about something of great importance to the individual (Swann, Pelham, and Krull, 1989). This is closely linked with the locus of evaluation for a particular ability, that is whether the person is motivated to participate in something for the pleasure of the activity itself or for the sake of gaining rewards or avoiding punishments. If the locus of evaluation is internal, negative feedback is more likely to be taken seriously, and as a consequence, there is an effect on self-concept. This is particularly relevant to the physical self and the figures that people are motivated to attain.

2.1 Biological Factors

Biological factors are perhaps the most important determinants of physical self-concept. Height, weight, body size, and motor abilities are all, to varying degrees, genetically determined. As mentioned earlier, physical self-concept tends to become more complex with age, and this is often in response to perceived discrepancies between the self and ideal self. One's body size and shape are an important part of overall physical attractiveness and, as such, have a significant impact on self-esteem. Levine and associates (1994) found that girls as young as 5 years of age were concerned about weight and body size, and that by age 7, 50% of girls were dieting. Teasing about body size can lead to even further negative self-evaluations, and in severe cases can lead to eating disorders. Parker and Nichter (1998) argue that teasing occurs most often in social situations where there are audience and aggressor motives, for example, during physical education classes. This exposes a further possible consequence of negative physical self-concept; that unsatisfactory perceptions of the self can have implications on the social identity. He describes the social identity as the self-concept derived from perceived membership in a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership (Tajfred, 1972). In other words, people identifying you as being part of a particular group and treating you in accordance with how they perceive members of that group is likely to have an effect on self-esteem when you value your membership of that group.

2.2 Social Factors

Research concerning the impact of social factors on physical self-concept has flourished in the recent past. However, no two social factors have received more attention than that of physical activity and appearance feedback. In examining the impact of physical activity, Sonstroem presents a model based on the premise that physical activity will heighten physical self-concept only when a certain level of satisfaction has been reached with regards to the activity. Sonstroem believes the activity must promote self-satisfaction as well as perceptions of strength and physical competence. These perceptions then elevate the global self-concept and begin a process of further discernment and enhancement of the self-concept through an increase in the frequency of the activity. The end result is a stronger physical self-concept due to the enhancement process. Sonstroem's model has received much support from findings suggesting physically active individuals typically possess higher physical self-concepts than inactive individuals. For example, in a study comparing the physical self-concept of high school students involved in interscholastic sports with students involved in various in-school fitness programs, Marsh found that the interscholastic athletes rated significantly higher on physical self-worth. This trend was further echoed in a study of middle-aged women involved in a walking program who showed significantly improved physical self-concept compared to a non-exercising control group.

2.3 Psychological Factors

Aim to achieve and maintain the body that one desires is determined by how such factors affect one's beliefs, feelings, and behaviors about the physical self. Psychological factors determine the self-regard one has and the value placed on physical self-concept. This may vary, however, depending on the level of self-esteem or self-acceptance. The self-derogation a person feels is concern about physical inadequacy. This, in turn, will lower self-esteem and will lead to a spiral of self-derogation and depression until some form of appraisal that they are equal to others. The main goal for all human beings is to have a globally positive self-esteem, which will result in a positive self-concept. In today's western society, appearance is a very strong component in a person's overall self-concept, and it is very easy to become more self-critical because we tend to evaluate ourselves to very unrealistically high standards, and most often it is based on "superior" others. This will also reduce self-esteem, and people will generally be less happy unless they compare to an attractive other. A study by Tylka and Hill showed that when using upward appearance comparison, it was linked to negative contingent self-worth and negative affect on women who were overweight and wanted to change their shape. The pressure to be thin by society is very strong and has been shown to negatively affect adolescents and adults, males and females, in Western society. The general consensus of being thin is that it will lead to a happier life, greater success, and more global attractiveness, but this is unrealistic. Failing to meet society's high standards of attractiveness usually leads to body shame where a person feels unworthy and unattractive, and if people are discontent with their physical self, it may lead to social physique anxiety where they believe they are being evaluated on their appearance. This will considerably lower their self-esteem, and they will be more concerned about the behavior and health of their physical self. High anxiety may lead to avoidance of situations where people believe they are being judged on appearance.

2.4 Cultural Factors

This is also referred to as socialization, there exist cultural mandates for many different cultures regarding the "correct" physical self. Individuals tend to define their physical self using the physical attributes that are components of their self schema. Tiggemann and Lynch (2001) propose that those who fit cultural ideals for physical attractiveness will internalize these cultural standards and find their bodies more highly evaluated. This usually results in a greater body image and higher self-esteem. For those who do not fit cultural ideals, the allocation of resources towards appearance is often higher than the average population. This can also result in a negative body image and decreased self-worth, leading to depression and in severe cases, suicide. In Western societies, cultural ideals for physical attractiveness in females are exemplified by a tall, thin figure, and a toned, yet not too muscular figure in males. Research has shown that some African American women are less influenced by mainstream cultural ideals due in part to African American cultural ideals for beauty. This is exemplified by Cross and Sobal's (1996) research comparing Black and White college women's body esteem. It was found that Black women had less body dissatisfaction despite greater body mass and skin fold measures than White women. The media is one of the most powerful sources of cultural ideals. Individuals are frequently confronted with images of physical attractiveness that define cultural ideals. These ideals are often unattainable by the average person and the extent of media exposure is related to increased concerns about weight and overall physical appearance (Tiggemann and Pickering 1996). The media oftentimes presents an unrealistic portrayal of people. This is exemplified by anthropologist Nancy Henley's analysis of physical characteristics of Playboy centerfolds over the years, and physical characteristics of Miss America pageant contestants over the years. The constant images of unattainable beauty can lead to body image disturbances in many people. This topic will be further discussed in chapter six under weight and appearance-related disorders.

3. Measurement and Assessment of Physical Self Concept

It is generally recognized that self-concept is a multi-dimensional construct. The way we think about our physical selves is viewed as a part of a total self-concept and will be widely analyzed in comparison to the self-evaluations made in any other domain of self-concept. As such, it is suggested that the most appropriate way to measure physical self-perceptions is to use a multi-dimensional instrument. The two most frequently cited and employed multi-dimensional measures of physical self-perceptions are the Physical Self-Perception Profile (PSPP) and the Physical Self-Description Questionnaire (PSDQ) and thus will be the main focus of this essay. The PSPP was originally constructed for use with children and adolescents. However, it was extensively revised in 1996 for use with adults. It is based on the premise that perceived physical competence and physical acceptance are the most dominant aspects of physical self-concept, and as such, they should be the main focus of instrument development and research. It is theoretically grounded and strongly influenced by Marsh's (1986) multidimensional physical self-concept model. The PSPP aims to measure the perceived importance, success, and global self-worth associated with physical ability and physical appearance. To assess these factors, the PSPP employs a 4-factor structure of 27 items: 17 items for perceived physical competence and 10 items for perceived physical acceptance. The PSDQ is a multifaceted, theoretically grounded instrument that assesses a multidimensional physical self-concept. It is designed to measure perceptions of the physical self that represent affective, behavioral, and cognitive aspects. This aim is achieved through the assessment of both self-esteem and self-efficacy on each of the nine PSDQ sub-scales.

3.1 Self-Perception Profile for Adults

The Self-Perception Profile for Adults (SPP) was designed to assess the self-concept of adults, independent of the opinion of others. An alternate form is also available for use with the younger child. The focus of the SPP is on four specific domains, two of which are considered to be structural and two of which are considered to be evaluative. The structural components are: 1) Physical (appearance, coordination, health), and 2) the global self-worth. Evaluative components are comprised of 1) self-worth in the specific domain of interest, and 2) the self-discrepancy relative to an ideal self in the specific domain of interest. The SPP contains 80 items, with equal distribution across the four domains. Each domain is also assessed with an equal number of items representing either adequate or inadequate functioning. Items which are not specific to one of the domains have been considered optional, and a decision was made to include them based on the content of the particular item. An example of an optional item would be "Do you have any friends?" An additional phase of the SPP development is under process at this time. It includes the restructuring of the health item(s) which currently are concerned primarily with physical illness or infirmity. An expanded health concept has been proposed for use in a specific Health Profile for the purpose of assessing behavior changes in patients following humiliating and/or deleterious health conditions. This new health concept is a general health/fitness wellness continuum. A qualitative assessment of the global self-worth has also been proposed for use with the SPP.

3.2 Physical Self-Description Questionnaire

Physical self-concept can be assessed using a variety of measures. One of the most widely used measures is the Physical Self-Description Questionnaire (PSDQ). Marsh (1996) reported that the PSDQ is one of the most rigorously validated measures of physical self-concept. The PSDQ is a multi-dimensional measure that has been used with adults and children. It is composed of 11 scales that assess self-concept in the domains of sports, physical activity, endurance, health, appearance, body fat, flexibility, strength, and general physical self-concept. Collectively, these scales have demonstrated acceptable internal consistency reliability, and factor analytic techniques support the multidimensional conceptualization of physical self-concept. A shortened 54-item form of the PSDQ has also been recently validated and could be more appropriate for certain clinical or research settings. The short form of the PSDQ provides a reliable and valid multidimensional measure of physical self-concept in college students. However, due to the specific importance of appearance self-concept for college-age students, this study proposed additional items to further capture this dimension. This research resulted in revision and expansion of the short form (PSDQ-M). The factor structure and scale score reliability of the PSDQ-A and its congruence with the long form support its use in assessing physical self-concept in adolescent populations. With the shortage of PE specific self-concept instruments and the importance of physical domain-specific assessment, a version of the PSDQ has been recently validated for use in an adolescent physical education setting.

3.3 Body Image Assessment

The assessment of body image has been a focus of attention for researchers interested in physical self-concept. As has been noted, the concept of body image is a multidimensional construct. Consequently, no one instrument is adequate to capture the various components of the construct. Scifert and Thomas have suggested that to adequately evaluate the physical self, it is necessary to consider the psychological significance an attribute holds for the individual and the effective meaning of distortion or changing that attribute. Cash and Pruzinsky's Multidimensional Body-Self Relations Questionnaire (MBSRQ) has become a widely used assessment tool for evaluating various components of body image and their relations to other aspects of the self. This is a 69-item instrument that contains several subscales which address important aspects of body image. An evaluation of the MBSRQ by Marsh et al. recommended it as a valid instrument for use in research on the physical self and suggested it is more valid in the context of the objectivist than the subjective self.

3.4 Other Methods of Measurement

The fourth method that Marsh (1996) discusses highlights recent work on the development of specific questionnaires to assess physical self-concept in differing populations. The O'Brien Cousins and Johnston (2004) article highlights the development of a physical self-concept questionnaire for female adolescents with an intellectual disability. The study argues that the development of such questionnaires is crucial to obtain valid measures of physical self and self-esteem and further assist in intervention strategies to increase such measures. The importance of this type of work cannot be underestimated as traditional measures of physical self have been developed for the mainstream population and may not be suitable for use with people who have a physical disability. The use of item generation based on interviews and focus groups and questioning techniques such as the use of photographs makes these methods much more likely to produce a valid measure of self-perception in differing populations. This is in keeping with recent critiques of self-concept measures (Harter, 1999) that have noted that traditional methods of questionnaire development have been limited by an overuse of quantitative statistical methods and item generation by adult researchers, frequently resulting in a questionnaire that is neither reliable nor valid in the intended population.

4. Implications and Applications of Understanding Physical Self Concept

Relationships with family and peers become particularly important in the early adolescent years when youngsters take on more responsibility for managing these relationships on their own. Friends because Physical Self Concept (PSC) develops through social experiences and feedback "The most likely route to feelings of self-esteem and self-worth from abilities is through the interpretations and appraisals of significant others" (Fox 2000). Feedback is particularly significant in the development of physical abilities and competencies as these are qualities that are assessed easily and publicly by others. Preadolescent children can accurately assess their physical competencies as these are specific concrete abilities and they receive an increasing amount of social comparison and feedback about these abilities from family, peers, and teachers. Youngsters are motivated to participate in social and physical activities which they think they can complete and in which they perceive a low risk of failure, Biddle and Asare (2003) outline assessment of ability and expectancy of success as the most consistent findings in achievement goal research in young athletes. Ability self-perceptions play a fundamental role and have a motivational significance in both the initiation and the maintenance of involvement in sport and physical activity. Success and failure experiences can have a lasting influential effect on the beliefs formed and serve as a fundamental source of information to update self-perceptions of physical competence. Perception of improvement and competition in a certain movement or sport task can also serve to enhance the self-perception of ability and act as a motivating factor to increase activity involvement.

4.1 Body Image and Self-Esteem

The way in which an individual perceives their body image has been a key area of focus within the psychological literature of physical self-concept. This area of focus is predominantly grounded on the theoretical perspective of social comparison (Festinger, 1954), which postulates that individuals determine their own 'self-worth' and 'self-image' based on comparisons to other individuals within society. It is often suggested that a person's subjective interpretation of their body is an important aspect which directly influences their physical self-concept (Fox, 1997). Individuals who are satisfied with their body image will tend to display a more positive self-perception in comparison to those who are dissatisfied with their body image and conversely influence mood states. This has been supported in several studies which have shown that negative body image is associated with a more complex and restrictive cognitive schema and lower global self-esteem (Williamson et al., 2010), while those who are content with their body image tend to display a more positive self-schema and higher global self-esteem (White et al., 2004). Moreover, subjective body image has a perceived 'temporal stability'. This is most evident using body image dissatisfaction as it is now considered to be a global epidemic in western society with 80% of women being dissatisfied with their body image (McLaren et al., 2002) and 50% of men expressing similar concerns (Hanchon, 2008). Therefore, this has potential long-term effects on an individual's self-esteem and their self-perception. Global self-esteem has been suggested to mediate the relationship between body image and self-perception with changes in self-esteem predicting changes in body image, while changes in body image tend to be followed by changes in self-esteem (Son and Kim, 2007). This is concerning as global self-esteem tends to develop during the early stages of adolescence and will peak during the age of 18. This has become a prominent public health issue as poor body image has been associated with various mental disorders and self-destructive behaviors in adolescence (O'Dea, 2005).

4.2 Physical Self Concept in Sports and Exercise

Physical self-concept relates closely to the perceived classes, tolerance, and virtue of the outstanding to physical capacities, and it is the subject of numerous public sector, stipulated melioration, and extensive therapy styles as it is consistently hindered in violation of others. Historically, annals concerning the physical self in the sports and exercise environment have emerged from the analysis of discrete aspects such as tolerance to exercise, global physical self-worth, or more recently models designating a hierarchical nature for the composition of physical self-concept. An experimental example of this research is in a study by Fox reported in 1995 which utilized the kind of exercise self-concept (an individual's perception of their ability in the specific task) in a test of the 'correspondence hypothesis' specified in the enhanced views of exercise self-concept model. The enhanced views model postulates that the four factors of ability, global self-worth, and perceived and actual fitness will have different effects on different exercise tasks. A positive correspondence between the self-perception of ability and the perception of the ability requirement of the task would represent optimal benefits for self-concept to the extent that over time, changes in the exercise self-concept should result in similar changes in task behavior. Fox found these results to be generally consistent and thus a broad base in support of the model, with most striking results coming from differing effects of actual fitness on the perceived fitness for sedentary and physically active participants. This study has implications for comprehensive research on the masses of people contingent to changes in lifestyle involving the undertaking of exercise and sports tasks as it may be particularly problematic for the less physically able, identified as a sector of people who tend to have lower physical self-concept. Aforementioned research in this area has largely been based on solution-focused interventions designed to enhance self-esteem and repeal the negative effects of physical self-concept through the alteration of behavior.

4.3 Psychological Well-being and Mental Health

Psychological well-being and mental health, which are of major public health importance, could be negatively affected by the dissatisfaction on the physical self. Despite the increasing evidence of the association, the casual pathways and mediators are still a little unclear. Some researchers have suggested a diathesis stress model in which a negative physical self concept can act as a diathesis which makes an individual more vulnerable to body dissatisfaction and further psychopathology when exposed to stress; in this case the stress could be due to life changes such as leaving home, bereavement, unemployment, onset of an illness etc. It has been found that those who are dissatisfied with their physical self, particularly their body image are more likely to feel anxious or depressed, making them more susceptible to further psychiatric morbidity. Unfortunately body and muscle dysmorphic disorders are prevalent in today's society, with sufferers having a distorted body image, and holding beliefs that they are 'too small' or 'insufficiently lean', this can take over their lives and lead to steroid abuse and eating disorders, it is of interest to the effect that these disorders have on the physical self concept, and the possibility of reversing the negative effects on these disorders, hopefully to prevent more serious mental disorders from arising. Evidently most research to date has taken a more negative focus on the physical self concept and its. An understanding the potential the physical self concept has to affect mental health, opened up a number of possibilities in terms of using it to promote positive mental health and prevent disorders. It has been suggested that exercise is a mediator between the physical self and mental health. This fits in with the revised self efficacy model that suggests self efficacy does not directly affect behaviour, but is mediated by outcome expectations; in this case the physical self concept is the self efficacy and getting changed behaviour is the expectation of a more positive physical self from exercise. The expectation of a better physical self can lead to improved body image and physical self worth, with the effect of greatly reducing psychological distress. There is also potential for using the physical self concept to increase motivation for exercise and sport, thereby increasing exercise behaviour which will benefit the physical health and psychological wellbeing. More recently there has been developing interest into various cognitive behavioural interventions to affect the physical self concept or more importantly the negative attributions made to physical ability and body image, with the aim to prevent or alleviate mental disorders. Although there has been increasing interest in using the physical self to improve mental health, most of the research to date has taken a more negative focus on the physical self concept and its imagined potential to hinder health.

4.4 Body Image and Media Influence

Body image and self-esteem are theorized to play a significant role in the development of the physical self-concept. Cash and Pruzinsky (2002) suggested that a person's evaluation of his or her physical appearance and the subsequent feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with that evaluation influence the person's overall sense of physical self-worth. This sentiment is echoed by Marsh and Magntie (1992) who proposed that self-concept is a hierarchical, multi-dimensional structure in which perceived competence and importance of different self attributes influences the domain specific self-concepts. As appearance is a highly valued social attribute, those who place great importance on appearance with form appearance self-schema which links their perceived physical attributes with their overall physical self-concept (Cash and Pruzinsky, 2002). Using the temporal model of self-esteem it would be expected that those who are satisfied with their appearance would have higher physical self-esteem and regard their physical self as a positive attribute in their overall self-worth. Conversely it would be expected that those who are dissatisfied with their appearance would have lower physical self-esteem and place less importance on this aspect of themselves, ultimately becoming a more dissatisfied or less important aspect of their overall self-concept (Marsh and Magsntie, 1992). An example of the former can be seen in a study of African American girls by Mendelson and Papacharissi (2007) which showed that higher satisfaction with physical appearance predicted higher physical self-worth and thus higher global self-esteem.

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July 12, 2023

How the Brain Creates Your Physical Sense of Self

New insight comes from zapping a region, known as the anterior precuneus, that causes people to feel dissociated from their body

By Diana Kwon

Jasper James/Getty Images

The 19th-century philosopher William James proposed that the self could be split into two parts . The first was an “I” that physically perceives and experiences the world, and the second was a “me” that encompasses a mental narrative about oneself, based on one’s past experiences. Neuroscientists equipped with high-tech tool kits have begun to achieve some success in the long-running search to find the brain areas responsible for creating these two aspects of the self.

The discovery of “me” came first. The default-mode network , a term coined by neurologist Marcus Raichle in 2001 , has emerged as a key player in the “me” aspect of the self. This collection of brain areas is active when a person is not focused on a task, and researchers have found that it plays an important role in processing self-referential thoughts . “[This network] has kind of been baptized as the center for the sense of self,” says Josef Parvizi , a neurologist and a professor at Stanford University who researches the self.

The “I,” in contrast, has been harder to pin down—at least until very recently. The awareness we have that we inhabit a body (call it an essential “I-ness”) forms a bridge that constantly switches back and forth between a conscious and unconscious state of mind. Suppose you’re sitting at the kitchen table or standing waiting for a train. Unless you’re in pain, you have no moment-by-moment awareness of your hand, your shin, your big toe or even your body as a whole. But as soon as you think of any of these spots, you can feel their presence immediately. “I-ness” is that feeling that you indeed occupy your own body.

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In searching for the “I” in the brain, researchers reasoned that the default mode network would be a logical starting point. Of particular interest was a segment of the network known as the posteromedial cortex (PMC), located near the back of the head in the region where the two hemispheres meet. Neuroimaging studies had shown that the PMC was active while people were recalling memories or engaging in the type of mind-wandering that tends to spur self-related thoughts. So scientists wanted to see whether disrupting brain activity in this region could somehow change a study participant’s physical sense of self. But when Parvizi and others disrupted brain activity in the PMC by injecting electric currents into the brains of individuals with epilepsy, they failed to alter the physical “I” feeling. (These studies are typically conducted in people who have epilepsy because doctors implant electrodes in the brains of these research volunteers to monitor their brain activity prior to surgery.)

Then, in 2018, Parvizi encountered a patient with epilepsy who came to him with an unusual set of symptoms. During seizures, the patient said, he would enter a strange state of dissociation that caused him to lose his sense of coordination and feel disconnected with his inner self. When Parvizi and his colleagues probed the patient’s brain to find the source of his seizures, the team found that they originated in a specific region of the PMC known as the anterior precuneus.

This serendipitous discovery led to Parvizi and his colleagues’ latest study, published in Neuron in June , in which they recruited eight people with epilepsy whose seizures stemmed from areas other than the PMC to ensure they were examining people who had healthy tissue in the region they were investigating. All eight participants had electrodes implanted into the PMC for electrical stimulation.

Zapping the anterior precuneus caused all eight individuals to report alterations in their subjective experiences similar to what the person with seizures stemming from that region reported. These changes included a feeling of floating, dizziness, a lack of focus and a sense of detachment from themselves. Some participants remarked that the detachment was reminiscent of what they’d felt while on psychedelics. “We discovered that by stimulating this particular region, we can cause distortions in our sense of physical being,” Parvizi says.

“The findings are original and highly interesting” and contribute to a better understanding of how the brain processes the sense of bodily self, says Henrik Ehrsson , cognitive neuroscientist at the Karolinska Institute in Sweden who was not involved in the recent study. Ehrsson adds that the authors’ results align with prior work from his own group , which found the anterior precuneus to be active when individuals’ bodily self-perception was altered using an out-of-body illusion that made participants feel as though their real body was no longer a part of themselves. (Participants were made to feel as though they occupied another body by viewing a video of a stranger’s body being touched while they received touches on the same parts of their own body at the same time.) Ehrsson adds that because Parvizi and his team relied on participant’s self-reports in their study, it would be beneficial to also examine how stimulating this brain region changes the bodily self through more objective means, such as behavioral experiments.  

To determine how the anterior precuneus was related to the default-mode network, Parvizi and his team placed five of the participants in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner and recorded their brain activity while they were at rest. The researchers found that the parts of the anterior precuneus that led to changes in participants’ sense of bodily self were not part of the default-mode network, although they formed connections with regions within that network. This finding implies that there are two different systems for processing the self, says study co-author Dian Lyu, a postdoctoral scholar at Parvizi’s lab at Stanford. “One is a narrative self, based on memory, and the other is the bodily self,” she says. In other words, “me” and “I” are located in separate networks within the brain. One of the big question Lyu is looking to address in future studies is how, exactly, these two networks interact.

Parvizi hopes that this research will help illuminate what happens in conditions, such as depression, that are characterized by excessive rumination and negative thoughts about oneself. Such individuals can find themselves stuck in a pattern of seeing everything around them in terms of themselves while losing the ability to see thing from a third-person perspective, Parvizi says. Thus, he wonders whether an emerging understanding of how the “I” and “me” networks interact to color our memories based on our subjective experiences of the world—coupled with new insights into whether cross talk between the networks turns hyperactive in individuals with depression—could reveal a way to help people escape from this terrible cycle.

Sahib Khalsa , a psychiatrist and neuroscientist at the Laureate Institute for Brain Research in Oklahoma, who was not involved in this work, says that the study may help explain elements of out-of-body experiences that people report while on drugs such as psychedelics or through non-pharmacological means, such as lying in a sensory deprivation tank, where individuals float in a dark, water-filled container and are cut off from their senses. Khalsa notes that he and his colleagues have found changes in the precuneus—the brain area linked to the sense of bodily self in Parvizi’s study—and other related regions in people who have undergone floatation therapy . He adds that this research also provides a potential brain area to target therapeutically in people with conditions in which dissociation is a common symptom, such as functional neurological disorders , where problems in the functioning of the nervous system can lead to a wide range of symptoms, and trauma-related disorders. “There’s an exciting array of studies that can be conducted based on this work,” Khalsa says.

The Physical Self Concept Analysis Essay

Human development life span is a process that begins between conception and birth of a child and proceeds till old age. The process involves personal growth both mentally and physically, however, the rate of growth differs from one individual to the other such that some children or adolescents will be more physically developed (height and muscles) than others of the same age. Despite genetic and environmental factors having an influence on physical development, some concepts including cephalocaudal, proximodistal, and Orthogenetic principles explain the pattern of human growth and development. Indeed, the physical posture of an individual becomes more balanced as he/she develops from infancy to adulthood.

The physical body of an individual during infancy is largely disproportional. According to the cephalocaudal principle, the head occupies 50% of the body size of a two-month fetus but as physical development occurs, the body becomes more proportional with the head accounting for 12% of body length and 2% of body weight while the legs accounting for 50% of body length in an adult person (Siegleman and Rider, 2008, p.128). This concept views physical growth and development to progress from the head downwards, with the trunk growing fastest during the first year after birth and the legs growing fastest thereafter. Siegelman and Rider (2008, p. 128) also describe the physical growth in terms of proximodistal concept where the internal organs and chest are said to grow faster during the early period of infancy and then the growth spreads to the extremities (arms) thereafter. The third concept, Orthogenetic, provides a different view with the body being seen to initially grow universally with no differentiation and then thereafter the body organs become differentiated and organized as the developmental process progresses.

Given that physical growth is influenced by the brain and endocrine system, any interference of the neural system or secretion of body hormones will interfere with the physical developmental process. The reasons why different children will exhibit different physical developmental patterns will therefore not only be due to genetic and environmental factors but also to the different hormonal influences, for instance, where the pituitary glands are unable to secrete adequate growth and activating hormones, an individual may experience retarded growth, while where the adrenal androgens are insufficient, the bones and muscles may not develop effectively (Siegleman and Rider, 2008, p.125).

These concepts of human physical development are important since they give an understanding of human growth as an organized sequence that needs to be followed throughout the life of an individual. In addition to enhancing knowledge on developmental patterns from conception to adulthood, they give an important illustration of the reasons behind the unequal rate of physical development between individuals. For instance, an infant has the most rapid growth rate and highly sensitive reflexes (Siegleman and Rider, 2008, p.131); children of two and above years have steady growth and their physical behavior more or less controllable while their physical health may be enhanced not only by nutrition but also physical activity; the adolescents’ physical growth spurt due to increased hormonal secretion and setting in of maturation, where the body takes shape (for both girls and boys) and sexual maturation is reached.

With the understanding of these concepts, a psychologist will be in a better position to establish the causes of certain developmental deficiencies in some individuals and apply corrective measures early enough. Moreover, the psychologist will be able to provide convincing explanations and counseling to individuals who may be psychologically affected by their alleged physical difference, which may or may not necessarily be a developmental problem but a differing growth rate from others.

Sigelman, C. K. and Rider, E. A. (2008). Life-Span Human Development . Sixth Edition. NY: Cengage Learning.

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• Published: 07 August 2023

The self, its body and its brain

• Morten Overgaard   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-1215-5355 1 ,
• Catherine Preston 2 &
• Jane Aspell 3  

Scientific Reports volume  13 , Article number:  12761 ( 2023 ) Cite this article

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• Human behaviour
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The body is intrinsic to our sense of self and as such, any theoretical account of the self should also include contributions of the body. This Collection incorporates a series of papers that demonstrate the inextricable relationship between body and self. The papers include studies of body illusions and studies of observed differences in bodily experience in participants with psychiatric and physical conditions. Papers in the Collection also address methodological issues, because measuring and manipulating the bodily self does not come without challenges; subjective experiences are difficult to capture empirically. Making progress on these methodological limitations is crucial to further develop experimental design and thus our understanding of self-body relations.

Cognitive neuroscience and its neighbouring disciplines have for decades investigated human behaviour and its neural correlates. By far, most of this research has conceived of mental states as “internal”—states that exist inside the heads of individuals. This approach has led to many important findings, yet has also had to confront important challenges. One such problem is that the cognitive concept of mind has been historically defined and investigated context-free—even excluding the rest of the body, of which the brain is one part. Another problem is that the cognitive concept of mind in most cases only implicitly refers to “the self”—the subject having the mental states in question. Well-known classical cognitive models (e.g. working memory 1 ) as well as more recent models (e.g. Prediction Coding 2 ) only refer to an experiencing or subjective self implicitly. Indeed, an experiencing subject/self is rarely directly addressed.

However, every feeling, thought and behaviour occurs in the context of the body, and thus it is intuitive that embodied experience may impact our mental processing and sense of self, and vice versa. Examples of this relationship can be found within papers from the current Collection, with the suggestion that the way we process external stimuli is mediated by an interaction between our own expectations and their locations relative to the body 3 . Additionally, many people with psychiatric conditions experience differences in bodily experience. For example, people with schizophrenia often have disrupted body awareness 4 and people with eating disorders might have impaired multisensory processing 5 or experience reduced pleasure from touch 6 . Moreover, physical conditions, such as chronic pain and changes in the body that occur as a result of pregnancy and childbirth are also thought to be related to changes in our bodily experience 7 , 8 .

The concept of “the self” has a peculiar and complicated place in cognitive science. Ever since William James 9 outlined different concepts of the self, philosophers and psychologists have worked to refine these concepts. Supplementing James' inventory of physical self, mental self, spiritual self, and the ego, Neisser 10 suggested distinctions between ecological, interpersonal, extended, private, and conceptual aspects of self. More recently, reviewing a contentious multidisciplinary collection of essays, Strawson 11 found an overabundance of delineations between cognitive, embodied, fictional, and narrative selves, among others.

Whereas some of these definitions fit into classical cognitive science categories—e.g. the self as a meta-representation—the most fundamental concept is the self as “subjectivity” or “a point of view” 12 . In any conscious experience, the experienced object is experienced from a certain point of view (“my own”) and all conscious experiences are experienced by a conscious experiencer or subject . The existence of a self in this understanding is derivable from any possible experience, as even experiences without self-knowledge are experienced from a specific point of view 13 . According to this logic, an organism that never has any subjective experiences is not considered a “subject”, while an organism that has even the most rudimentary experiences has all that is required to be considered a “subject”. In this way, the concepts of consciousness and self necessitate each other at a very basic level. Taken together, these illustrate some of the challenges in cognitive neuroscience that are fundamental and seemingly inherent to the discipline. To move forward, we must integrate a number of outstanding questions to answer these challenges.

One key question is: how do we measure and manipulate the self? The attempt to “measure” subjective phenomena has unfolded into a debate between direct and indirect approaches. Intuitively, direct approaches seem the most informative in this regard, as subjects must communicate their own experiences 14 . However, as subjective reports have demonstrable limits (e.g. lack of insight into personal bias, memory problems etc.), some scientists refrain from their use and insist on the use of objective measures only 15 .

In the context of research on the bodily self, which often involves inducing illusory ownership over fake bodies/body parts (body illusions), subjective measures typically take the form of questionnaires, which include made-up of statements, such as “I felt as if the rubber hand was my hand”, to which participants respond on a Likert scale 16 . “Objective” measures of these illusions include proprioceptive (hand) drift and skin conductance responses to threats applied to the embodied hands/bodies 17 , 18 . Within this Collection, rubber hand illusion (RHI) studies used both subjective (embodiment questionnaire) and objective (including proprioceptive drift) measures to examine the effect of the RHI on peripersonal space and perceived position of the body midline 19 . Although global findings across the different measures demonstrated similar effects for both of these studies, dissociations were also apparent between the different types of measures. This suggests that different objective and subjective measures are vulnerable to different biases or may be capturing different aspects or levels of bodily self-representation.

Even in the pursuit of a gold-standard objective measure, when considering the intrinsic link between subjectivity and the bodily self, there seems no way around using subjective reports 20 . In order to arrive at any “stand-alone”’ objective method, one must have “calibrated it” with something else in order to know that this particular behaviour can be considered a measure of—e.g. body ownership—and not something else. This would typically involve reliably associating a subjective report with a particular behaviour—a process by which one would “import” all the weaknesses related to subjective reports that one tried to avoid in the first place. Accordingly, we should learn to live with the inclusion of subjective measures in study design, and do our best to develop them to overcome their methodological problems.

Another central question is how to think of the bodily correlates of a self in this basic sense. Modern scientific thinking normally dictates that we cannot conceive of a mental phenomenon that does not have a specific neural (physical) counterpart. Nevertheless, with the basic understanding of the self mentioned above, subjectivity is an intrinsic aspect of all mental functions: Our perceptions, thoughts, emotions, and decisions are all our own. For this reason, it may seem unrealistic to identify one neural region or process that is specific for subjectivity so that it turns it “on” and “off”—without turning everything mental “on” and “off” in parallel. In turn, this may force us to rethink how we conceive of mind–body relations. The recent surge in publications on interoception—the brain’s processing of internal bodily signals—highlights the importance of the ever-present sensory input from the body to the brain and how it may be a crucial component enabling subjectivity. Damasio 21 proposed the importance of interoceptive brain areas to self long before recent empirical studies demonstrated links between interoceptive processing and consciousness 22 and self 23 , 24 . In support of this, the paper by Saini and colleagues 25 within this Collection propose that depersonalisation disorder—a condition in which there is a profound alteration to the experience of self and subjectivity—may arise from a disrupted integration between interoceptive and exteroceptive signals. Many more studies on the links between interoception and self are needed, but experimental studies on interoception have been plagued by the confounds affecting methods to measure interoceptive accuracy. Here, Wallman-Jones et al. 26 report that vigorous physical activity increases interoceptive accuracy irrespective of attentional focus.

Although questions about how to understand relations between mind, brain, and the rest of the body are fundamental and very difficult to answer theoretically, continued methodological developments will hopefully lead to a growing body of evidence suggesting concrete links between the above. These links are what science has to explain in the coming decades, and they already demonstrate what we have historically overlooked—that the body shapes the mind and vice versa.

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Overgaard, M., Preston, C. & Aspell, J. The self, its body and its brain. Sci Rep 13 , 12761 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-39959-w

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Article contents

Self and identity.

• Sanaz Talaifar Sanaz Talaifar Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin
•  and  William Swann William Swann Department of Psychology, University of Texas
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.242
• Published online: 28 March 2018

Active and stored mental representations of the self include both global and specific qualities as well as conscious and nonconscious qualities. Semantic and episodic memory both contribute to a self that is not a unitary construct comprising only the individual as he or she is now, but also past and possible selves. Self-knowledge may overlap more or less with others’ views of the self. Furthermore, mental representations of the self vary whether they are positive or negative, important, certain, and stable. The origins of the self are also manifold and can be considered from developmental, biological, intrapsychic, and interpersonal perspectives. The self is connected to core motives (e.g., coherence, agency, and communion) and is manifested in the form of both personal identities and social identities. Finally, just as the self is a product of proximal and distal social forces, it is also an agent that actively shapes its environment.

• self-concept
• self-representation
• self-knowledge
• self-perception
• self-esteem
• personal identity
• social identity

Introduction

The concept of the self has beguiled—and frustrated—psychologists and philosophers alike for generations. One of the greatest challenges has been coming to terms with the nature of the self. Every individual has a self, yet no two selves are the same. Some aspects of the self create a sense of commonality with others whereas other aspects of the self set it apart. The self usually provides a sense of consistency, a sense that there is some connection between who a person was yesterday and who they are today. And yet, the self is continually changing both as an individual ages and he or she traverses different social situations. A further conundrum is that the self acts as both subject and object; it does the knowing about itself. With so many complexities, coupled with the fact that people can neither see nor touch the self, the construct may take on an air of mysticism akin to the concept of the soul (Epstein, 1973 ).

Perhaps the most pressing, and basic, question psychologists must answer regarding the self is “What is it?” For the man whom many regard as the father of modern psychology, William James, the self was a source of continuity that gave individuals a sense of “connectedness” and “unbrokenness” ( 1890 , p. 335). James distinguished between two components of the self: the “I” and the “me” ( 1910 ). The “I” is the self as agent, thinker, and knower, the executive function that experiences and reacts to the world, constructing mental representations and memories as it does so (Swann & Buhrmester, 2012 ). James was skeptical that the “I” was amenable to scientific study, which has been borne out by the fact that far more attention has been accorded to the “me.” The “me” is the individual one recognizes as the self, which for James included a material, social, and spiritual self. The material self refers to one’s physical body and one’s physical possessions. The social self refers to the various selves one may express and others may recognize depending on the social setting. The spiritual self refers to the enduring core of one’s being, including one’s values, personality, beliefs about the self, etc.

This article focuses on the “me” that will be referred to interchangeably as either the “self” or “identity.” We define the self as a multifaceted, dynamic, and temporally continuous set of mental self-representations. These representations are multifaceted in the sense that different situations may evoke different aspects of the self at different times. They are dynamic in that they are subject to change in the form of elaborations, corrections, and reevaluations (Diehl, Youngblade, Hay, & Chui, 2011 ). This is true when researchers think of the self as a sort of scientific theory in which new evidence about the self from the environment leads to adjustments to one’s self-theory (Epstein, 1973 ; Gopnick, 2003 ). It is also true when researchers consider the self as a narrative that can be rewritten and revised (McAdams, 1996 ). Finally, self-representations are temporally continuous because even though they change, most people have a sense of being the same person over time. Further, these self-representations, whether conscious or not, are essential to psychological functioning, as they organize people’s perceptions of their traits, preferences, memories, experiences, and group memberships. Importantly, representations of the self also guide an individual’s behavior.

Some psychologists (e.g., behaviorists and more recently Brubaker & Cooper, 2000 ) have questioned the need to implicate a construct as nebulous as the self to explain behavior. Certainly an individual can perform many complex actions without invoking his or her self-representations. Nevertheless, psychologists increasingly regard the self as one of the most important constructs in all of psychology. For example, the percentage of self-related studies published in the field’s leading journal, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , increased fivefold between 1972 and 2002 (Swann & Seyle, 2005 ) and has continued to grow to this day. The importance of the self becomes evident when one considers the consequences of a sense of self that is interrupted, damaged, or absent. Epstein ( 1973 ) offers a case in point with an example of a schizophrenic girl meeting her psychiatrist:

Ruth, a five year old, approached the psychiatrist with “Are you the bogey man? Are you going to fight my mother? Are you the same mother? Are you the same father? Are you going to be another mother?” and finally screaming in terror, “I am afraid I am going to be someone else.” [Bender, 1950 , p. 135]

To provide a more commonplace example, children do not display several emotions we consider uniquely human, such as empathy and embarrassment, until after they have developed a sense of self-awareness (Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989 ). As Darwin has argued ( 1872 / 1965 ), emotions like embarrassment exist only after one has a developed a sense of self that can be the object of others’ attention.

The self’s importance also is evident when one considers that it is a pancultural phenomenon; all individuals have a sense of self regardless of where they are born. Though the content of self-representations may vary by cultural context, the existence of the self is universal. So too is the structure of the self. One of the most basic structural dimensions of the self involves whether the knowledge is active or stored.

Forms of Self-Knowledge

Active and stored self-knowledge.

Although i ndividuals accumulate immeasurable amounts of knowledge over their lifespans, at any given moment they can access only a portion of that knowledge. The aspects of self-knowledge held in consciousness make up “active self-knowledge.” Other terms for active self-knowledge are the working self-concept (Markus & Kunda, 1986 ), the spontaneous self-concept (McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978 ), and the phenomenal self (Jones & Gerard, 1967 ). On the other hand, “stored self-knowledge” is information held in memory that one can access and retrieve but is not currently held in consciousness. Because different features of the self are active versus stored at different times depending on the demands of the situation, the self can be quite malleable without eliciting feelings of inconsistency or inauthenticity (Swann, Bosson, & Pelham, 2002 ).

Semantic and Episodic Representations of Self-Knowledge

People possess both episodic and semantic representations of themselves (Klein & Loftus, 1993 ; Tulving, 1983 ). Episodic self-representations refer to “behavioral exemplars” or relatively brief “cartoons in the head” involving one’s past life and experiences. For philosopher John Locke, the self was built of episodic memory. For some researchers interested in memory and identity, episodic memory has been of particular interest because it is thought to involve re-experiencing events from one’s past, providing a person with content through which to construct a personal narrative (see, e.g., Eakin, 2008 ; Fivush & Haden, 2003 ; Klein, 2001 ; Klein & Gangi, 2010 ). Recall of these episodic instances happens together with the conscious awareness that the events actually occurred in one’s life (e.g., Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997 ).

Episodic self-knowledge may shed light on the individual’s traits or preferences and how he or she will or should act in the future, but some aspects of self-knowledge do not require recalling any specific experiences. Semantic self-knowledge involves memories at a higher level abstraction. These self-related memories are based on either facts (e.g., I am 39 years old) or traits and do not necessitate remembering a specific event or experience (Klein & Lax, 2010 ; Klein, Robertson, Gangi, & Loftus, 2008 ). Thus, one may consider oneself intelligent (semantic self-knowledge) without recalling that he or she achieved stellar grades the previous term (episodic self-knowledge). In fact, Tulving ( 1972 ) suggested that the two types of knowledge may be structurally and functionally independent of each other. In support of this, case studies show that damage to the episodic self-knowledge system does not necessarily result in impairment of the semantic self-knowledge system. Evaluating semantic traits for self-descriptiveness is associated with activation in brain regions implicated in semantic, but not episodic, memory. In addition, priming a trait stored in semantic memory does not facilitate recall of corresponding episodic memories that exemplify the semantic self-knowledge (Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992 ). The tenuous relationship between episodic and semantic self-knowledge suggests that only a portion of semantic self-knowledge arises inductively from episodic self-knowledge (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002 ).

Recently some researchers have questioned the importance of memory’s role in creating a sense of identity. For example, at least when it comes to perceptions of others, people perceive a person’s identity to remain more intact after a neurodegenerative disease that affects their memory than one that affects their morality (Strohminger & Nichols, 2015 ).

Conscious and Nonconscious Self-Knowledge (Sometimes Confused With Explicit Versus Implicit)

Individuals may be conscious, or aware, of aspects of the self to varying degrees in different situations. Indeed sometimes it is adaptive to have self-awareness (Mandler, 1975 ) and other times it is not (Wegner, 2009 ). Nonconscious self-representations can influence behavior in that individuals may be unaware of the ways in which their self-representations affect their behavior (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995 ). Some researchers have even suggested that individuals can be unconscious of the contents of their self-representations (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2003 ). It is important to remember that consciousness refers primarily to the level of awareness of a self-representation, rather than the automaticity of a given representation (i.e., whether the representation is retrieved in an unaware, unintentional, efficient, and uncontrolled manner) (Bargh, 1994 ).

A key ambiguity in recent work on implicit self-esteem is defining its criterial attributes. One view contends that the nonconscious and conscious self reflect fundamentally distinct knowledge systems that arise from different learning experiences and have independent effects on thought, emotion, and behavior (Epstein, 1994 ). Another perspective views the self as a singular construct that may nevertheless show diverging responses on direct and indirect measures of self due to factors such as the opportunity and motivation to control behavioral responses (Fazio & Twoles-Schwen, 1999 ). While indirect measures such as the Implicit Association Test do not require introspection and as a result may tap nonconscious representations, this is an assumption that should be supported with empirical evidence (Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006 ).

Issues of direct and indirect measurement are a key consideration in research on the implicit and explicit self. Indirect measures of self allow researchers to infer an individual’s judgment about the self as a result of the speed or nature of their responses to stimuli that may be more or less self-related (De Houwer & Moors, 2010 ). Some researchers have argued that indirect measures of self-esteem are advantageous because they circumvent self-presentational issues (Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999 ), but other researchers have questioned such claims (Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007 ) because self-presentational strivings can be automatized (Paulhus, 1993 ).

Recent findings have raised additional questions regarding the validity of some key assumptions regarding research inspired by interest in implicit self-esteem (for a more optimistic take on implicit self-esteem, see Dehart, Pelham, & Tennen, 2006 ). Although near-zero correlations between individuals’ scores on direct and indirect measures of self (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000 ) are often taken to mean that nonconscious and conscious self-representations are distinct, other factors, such as measurement error and lack of conceptual correspondence, can cause these low correlations (Gawronski et al., 2007 ). Some researchers have also taken evidence of negligible associations between measures of implicit self-esteem and theoretically related outcomes to mean that such measures may not measure self-esteem at all (Buhrmester, Blanton, & Swann, 2011 ). A prudent strategy is thus to consider that indirect measures reflect an activation of associations between the self and other stimuli in memory and that these associations do not require conscious validation of the association as accurate or inaccurate (Gawronski et al., 2007 ). Direct measures, on the other hand, do require validation processes (Strack & Deutsch, 2004 ; Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990 ).

Global and Specific Self-Knowledge

Self-views vary in scope (Hampson, John, & Goldberg, 1987 ). Global self-representations are generalized beliefs about the self (e.g., I am a worthwhile person) while specific self-representations pertain to a narrow domain (e.g., I am a nimble tennis player). Self-views can fall anywhere on a continuum between these two extremes. Generalized self-esteem may be thought of as a global self-representation at the top of a hierarchy with individual self-concepts nested underneath in specific domains such as academic, physical, and social (Marsh, 1986 ). Individual self-concepts, measured separately, combine statistically to form a superordinate global self-esteem factor (Marsh & Hattie, 1996 ). When trying to predict behavior it is important not to use a specific self-representation to predict a global behavior or a global self-representation to predict a specific behavior (e.g., Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005 ; Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007 ; Trzesniewski et al., 2006 ).

Actual, Possible, Ideal, and Ought Selves

The self does not just include who a person is in the present but also includes past and future iterations of the self. In addition, people tend to hold “ought” or “ideal” beliefs about the self. The former includes one’s beliefs about who they should be according to their own and others’ standards while the latter includes beliefs about who they would like to be (Higgins, 1987 ). In a related vein, possible selves are the future-oriented positive or negative aspects of the self-concept, selves that one hopes to become or fears becoming (Markus & Nurius, 1986 ). Some research has even shown that distance between one’s feared self and actual self is a stronger predictor of life satisfaction than proximity between one’s ideal self and actual self (Ogilvie, 1987 ). Possible selves vary in how far in the future they are, how detailed they are, and how likely they are to become an actual self (Oyserman & James, 2008 ). Many researchers have studied the content of possible selves, which can be as idiosyncratic as a person’s imagination is. The method used to measure possible selves (close-ended versus open-ended questions) will affect which possible selves are revealed (Lee & Oyserman, 2009 ). The content of possible selves is also socially and contextually grounded. For example, as a person ages, career-focused possible selves become less important while health-related possible selves become increasingly important (Cross & Markus, 1991 ; Frazier, Hooker, Johnson, & Kaus, 2000 ).

Researchers have been interested in not just the content but the function of possible selves. Thinking about successful possible selves is mood enhancing (King, 2001 ) because it is a reminder that the current self can be improved. In addition, possible selves may play a role in self-regulation. By linking present and future selves, they may promote desired possible selves and avoid feared possible selves. Possible selves may be in competition with each other and with a person’s actual self. For example, someone may envision one possible self as an artist and another possible self as an airline pilot, and each of these possible selves might require the person to take different actions in the present moment. Goal striving requires employing limited resources and attention, so working toward one possible self may require shifting attention and resources away from another possible self (Fishbach, Dhar, & Zhang, 2006 ). Possible selves may have other implications as well. For example, Alesina and La Ferrara ( 2005 ) show how expected future income affects a person’s preferences for economic redistribution in the present.

Accuracy of Self-Knowledge and Feelings of Authenticity

Most individuals have had at least one encounter with an individual whose self-perception seemed at odds with “reality.” Perhaps it is a friend who believes himself to be a skilled singer but cannot understand why everyone within earshot grimaces when he starts singing. Or the boss who believes herself to be an inspiring leader but cannot motivate her workers. One potential explanation for inaccurate self-views is a disjunction between episodic and semantic memories; the image of grimacing listeners (episodic memory) may be quite independent of the conviction that one is a skilled singer (semantic memory). Of course, if self-knowledge is too disjunctive with reality it ceases to be adaptive; self-views must be moderately accurate to be useful in allowing people to predict and navigate their worlds. That said, some researchers have questioned the desirability of accurate self-views. For example, Taylor and Brown ( 1988 ) have argued that positive illusions about the self promote mental health. Similarly, Von Hippel and Trivers ( 2011 ) have argued that certain kinds of optimistic biases about the self are adaptive because they allow people to display more confidence than is warranted, consequently allowing them to reap the social rewards of that confidence.

Studying the accuracy of self-knowledge is challenging because objective criteria are often scarce. Put another way, there are only two vantage points from which to assess a person: self-perception and the other’s perception of the self. This is true even of supposedly “objective” measures of the self. An IQ test is still a measure of intelligence from the vantage point of the people who developed the test. Both vantage points can be subject to error. For example, self-perceptions may be biased to protect one’s self-image or due to self-comparison to an inappropriate referent. Others’ perceptions may be biased because of a lack of cross-situational information about the person in question or lack of insight into that person’s motives. Because of the advantages and disadvantages of each vantage point, self-reports may be better for assessing some traits (e.g., those low in observability, like neuroticism) while informant reports may be better for others (such as traits high in observability, like extraversion) (Vazire, 2010 ).

Furthermore, self-perceptions and others’ perceptions of the self may overlap to varying degrees. The “Johari window” provides a useful way of thinking about this (Luft & Ingham, 1955 ). The window’s first quadrant consists of things one knows about oneself that others also know about the self (arena). The second quadrant includes knowledge one has about the self that others do not have (façade). The third quadrant consists of knowledge one does not have about the self but others do have (blindspot). The fourth quadrant consists of information about the self that is not known to oneself or to others (unknown).

Which of these quadrants contains the “true self”? If I believe myself to be kind, but others do not, who is right? Which is a reflection of the “real me”? One set of attempts to answer this question has focused on perceptions of authenticity. The authentic self (Johnson & Boyd, 1995 ) is alternatively termed the “true self” (Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014 ), “real self” (Rogers, 1961 ), “intrinsic self” (Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2001 ), “essential self” (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014 ), or “deep self” (Sripada, 2010 ). Recent research has addressed both what aspects of the self other people describe as belonging to a person’s true self and how individuals judge their own authenticity.

Though authenticity has long been the subject of philosophical thought, only recently have researchers begun addressing the topic empirically, and definitional ambiguities abound (Knoll, Meyer, Kroemer, & Schroeder-Abe, 2015 ). Some studies use unidimensional measures that equate authenticity to feeling close to one’s true self (e.g., Harter, Waters, & Whitesell, 1997 ). A more elaborate and philosophically grounded approach proposes four necessary factors for trait authenticity: awareness (the extent of one’s self-knowledge, motivation to expand it, and ability to trust in it), unbiased processing (the relative absence of interpretative distortions in processing self-relevant information), behavior (acting consistently with one’s needs, preferences, and values), and relational orientation (valuing and achieving openness in close relationships) (Kernis, 2003 ). Authenticity is related to feelings of self-alienation (Gino, Norton, & Ariely, 2010 ). Being authentic is also sometimes thought to be equivalent to low self-monitoring (Snyder & Gangestad, 1982 )— someone who does not alter his or her behavior to accommodate changing social situations (Grant, 2016 ). Authenticity and self-monitoring, however, are orthogonal constructs; being sensitive to environmental cues can be compatible with acting in line with one’s true self.

Although some have argued that the ability to behave in a way that contradicts one’s feelings and mental states is a developmental accomplishment (Harter, Marold, Whitesell, & Cobbs, 1996 ), feelings of authenticity have been associated with many positive outcomes such as positive self-esteem, positive affect, and well-being (Goldman & Kernis, 2002 ; Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008 ). One interesting line of research examines the interaction of authenticity, power, and well-being. Power can increase feelings of authenticity in social interactions (Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011 ), and that increased authenticity in turn can result in higher well-being (Kifer, Heller, Peruvonic, & Galinsky, 2013 ). Another line of research examines the relationship between beliefs about authenticity (at least in the West) and morality. Gino, Kouchaki, and Galinsky ( 2015 ) suggest that dishonesty and inauthenticity share a similar source: dishonesty involves being untrue to others while inauthenticity involves being untrue to the self.

Metacognitive Aspects of Self

Valence and importance of self-views.

Self-knowledge may be positively or negatively valenced. Having more positive self-views and fewer negative ones are associated with having higher self-esteem (Brown, 1986 ). Both bottom-up and top-down theories have been used to explain this association. The bottom-up approach posits that the valence of specific self-knowledge drives the valence of one’s global self-views (e.g., Marsh, 1990 ). In this view, someone who has more positive self-views in specific domains (e.g., I am intelligent and attractive) should be more likely to develop high self-esteem overall (e.g., I am worthwhile). In contrast, the top-down perspective holds that the valence of global self-views drive the valence of specific self-views such that someone who thinks they are a worthwhile person is more likely to view him or herself as attractive and intelligent (e.g., Brown, Dutton, & Cook, 2001 ). The reasoning is grounded in the view that global self-esteem develops quite early in life and thus determines the later development of domain-specific self-views.

A domain-specific self-view can vary not only in its valence but also in its importance. Domain-specific self-views that one believes are important are more likely to affect global self-esteem than those self-views that one considers unimportant (Pelham, 1995 ; Pelham & Swann, 1989 ). As James wrote, “I, who for the time have staked my all on being a psychologist, am mortified if others know much more psychology than I. But I am contented to wallow in the grossest ignorance of Greek” ( 1890 / 1950 , p. 310). Of course not all self-views matter to the same extent for all people. A professor of Greek studies is likely to place a great deal of importance on his knowledge of Greek. Furthermore, changes to features that are perceived to be more causally central than others are believed to be more disruptive to identity (Chen, Urminsky, & Bartels, 2016 ). Individuals try to protect their important self-views by, for example, surrounding themselves with people and environments who confirm those important self-views (Chen, Chen, & Shaw, 2004 ; Swann & Pelham, 2002 ) or distancing themselves from close friends who outperform them in these areas (Tesser, 1988 ).

Certainty and Clarity of Self-Views

Individuals may feel more or less certain about some self-views as compared to others. And just as they are motivated to protect important self-views, people are also motivated to protect the self-views of which they are certain. People are more likely to seek (Pelham, 1991 ) and receive (Pelham & Swann, 1994 ) feedback consistent with self-views that are highly certain than those about which they feel less certain. They also actively resist challenges to highly certain self-views (Swann & Ely, 1984 ).

Another construct related to certainty is self-concept clarity. Not only are people with high self-concept clarity confident and certain of their self-views, they also are clear, internally consistent, and stable in their convictions about who they are (Campbell et al., 1996 ). The causes of low self-concept clarity have been theorized to be due to a discrepancy between one’s current self-views and the social feedback one has received in childhood (Streamer & Seery, 2015 ). Both high self-concept certainty and self-concept clarity are associated with higher self-esteem (Campbell, 1990 ).

Stability of Self-Views

The self is constantly accommodating, assimilating, and immunizing itself against new self-relevant information (Diehl et al., 2011 ). In the end, the self may remain stable (i.e., spatio-temporally continuous; Parfit, 1971 ) in at least two ways. First, the self may be stable in one’s absolute position on a scale. Second, there may be stability in one’s rank ordering within a group of related others (Hampson & Goldberg, 2006 ).

The question of the self’s stability can only be answered in the context of a specified time horizon. For example, like personality traits, self-views may not be particularly good predictors of behavior at a given time slice (perhaps an indication of the self’s instability) but are good predictors of behavior over the long term (Epstein, 1979 ). Similarly, more than others, some people experience frequent, transient changes in state self-esteem (Kernis, Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993 ). Furthermore, there is a difference between how people perceive the stability of their self-views and the actual stability of their self-knowledge. Though previous research has explored the benefits of perceived self-esteem stability (e.g., Kernis, Paradise, Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000 ; Kernis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1989 ), a recent program of research on fixed versus growth mindsets explores the benefits of the malleability of self-views in a variety of domains (Dweck, 1999 , 2006 ). For example, teaching adolescents to have a more malleable (i.e., incremental) theory of personality that “people change” led them to react less negatively to an immediate experience of social adversity, have lower overall stress and physical illness eight months later, and better academic performance over the school year (Yeager et al., 2014 ). Thus, believing that the self can be unstable can have positive effects in that one negative social interaction, or an instance of poor performance is not an indication that the self will always be that way, and this may, in turn, increase effort and persistence.

Organization of Self-Views

Though we have already touched on some aspects of the organization of self (e.g., specific self-views nested within global self-views), it is important to consider other aspects of organization including the fact that some self-views may be more assimilated within each other. Integration refers to the tendency to store both positive and negative self-views together, and is thought to promote resilience in the face of stress or adversity (Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2007 ). Compartmentalization refers to the tendency to store positive and negative self-views separately. But both integration and compartmentalization can have positive and negative consequences and can interact with other metacognitive aspects of the self, like importance. For example, compartmentalization has been associated with higher self-esteem and less depression among people for whom positive components of the self are important (Showers, 1992 ). On the other hand, for those whose negative self-views are important, compartmentalization has been associated with lower self-esteem and higher depression.

Origins and Development of the Self

Developmental approaches.

Psychologists have long been interested in when and how infants develop a sense of self. One very basic question is whether selfhood in infancy is comparable to selfhood in adulthood. The answer depends on definitions of selfhood. For example, some researchers have measured and defined selfhood in infants as the ability to self-regulate and self-organize, which even animals can do. This definition bears little resemblance to selfhood in adulthood. Nativist and constructivist debates within developmental psychology (and language development in particular) that grapple with the problem of the origins of knowledge also have implications for understanding origins of the self. A nativist account (e.g., Chomsky, 1975 ) that considers the human mind to be innately constrained to formulate a very small set of representations would suggest that the mind is designed to develop a self. Information from the environment may form specific self-representations, but a nativist account would posit that the structure of the self is intrinsic. A constructivist account would reject the notion that there are not enough environmental stimuli to explain the development of a construct like the self unless one invokes a specific innate cognitive structure. Rather, constructivists might suggest that a child develops a theory of self in the same way scientific theories are developed (Gopnik, 2003 ).

Because infants and children cannot self-report their mental states as adults can, psychologists must use other methods to study the self in childhood. One method involves studying the development of children’s use of the personal pronouns “me,” “mine,” and “I” (Harter, 1983 ; Hobson, 1990 ). Another method that is used cross-culturally, mirror self-recognition (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979 ; Lewis & Ramsay, 2004 ), has been associated with brain maturation (Lewis, 2003 ) and myelination of the left temporal region (Carmody & Lewis, 2006 , 2010 ; Lewis & Carmody, 2008 ). Pretend play, which occurs between 15 and 24 months, is an indication that the self is developing because it requires the toddler’s ability to understand its own and others’ mental states (Lewis, 2011 ). The development of self-esteem has also historically been difficult to study due to a lack of self-esteem measures that can be used across the lifespan. Recently, psychologists have developed a lifespan self-esteem scale (Harris, Donnellan, & Trzesniewski, 2017 ) suitable for measuring global self-esteem from ages 5 to 93.

The development of theory of mind, the understanding that others have minds separate from one’s own, is also closely related to the development of the self. For example, people cannot make social comparisons until they have developed the required cognitive abilities, usually by middle childhood (Harter, 1999 ; Ruble, Boggiano, Feldman, & Loebl, 1980 ). Finally, developmental psychology is also useful in understanding the self beyond childhood and into adolescence and beyond. Adolescence is a time where goals of autonomy from parents and other adults become particularly salient (Bryan et al., 2016 ), adolescents experiment with different identities to see which fit best, and many long-term goals and personal aspirations are established (Crone & Dahl, 2012 ).

Biological Approaches

Biological approaches to understanding the origins of the self consider neurological, genetic, and hormonal underpinnings. These biological underpinnings are likely evolutionarily driven (Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007 ). Neuroscientists have debated the extent to which self-knowledge is “special,” or processed differently than other kinds of knowledge. What is clear is that no brain region by itself is responsible for our sense of self, but different aspects of the self-knowledge may be associated with different brain regions. Furthermore, the same region that is implicated in self-related processing can also be implicated in other types of processing (Ochsner et al., 2005 ; Saxe, Moran, Scholz, & Gabrieli, 2006 ). Specifically, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) have been associated with self-related processing (Northoff Heinzel, De Greck, Bermpohl, Dobrowolny, & Panksepp, 2006 ). But meta-analyses have found that the mPFC and PCC are recruited during the processing of both self-specific and familiar stimuli more generally (e.g., familiar others) (Qin & Northoff, 2011 ).

Twin studies of personality traits can shed light on the genetic bases of self. For example, genes account for about 40% to 60% of the population variance in self-reports of the Big Five personality factors (for a review, see Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001 ). Self-esteem levels also seem to be heritable, with 30–50% of population variance accounted for by genes (Kamakura, Ando, & Ono, 2007 ; Kendler, Gardner, & Prescott, 1998 ).

Finally, hormones are unlikely to be a cause of the self but may affect the expression of the self. For example, testosterone and cortisol levels interact with personality traits to predict different levels of aggression (Tackett et al., 2015 ). Differences in levels of and in utero exposure to certain hormones also affect gender identity (Berenbaum & Beltz, 2011 ; Reiner & Gearhart, 2004 ).

Intrapsychic Approaches

Internal processes, including self-perception and introspection, also influence the development of the self. One of the most obvious ways to develop knowledge about the self (especially when existing self-knowledge is weak) is to observe one’s own behavior across different situations and then make inferences about the aspects of the self that may have caused those behaviors (Bem, 1972 ). And just as judgments about others’ attributes are less certain when multiple possible causes exist for a given behavior, the same is true of one’s own behaviors and the amount of information they yield about the self (Kelley, 1971 ).

Conversely, introspection involves understanding the self from the inside outward rather than from the outside in. Though surprisingly little thought (only 8%) is expended on self-reflection (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982 ), people buttress self-knowledge through introspection. For example, contemporary psychoanalysis can increase self-knowledge, even though an increase in self-knowledge on its own is unlikely to have therapeutic effects (Reppen, 2013 ). Writing is one form of introspection that does have psychological and physical therapeutic benefits (Pennebaker, 1997 ). Research shows that brief writing exercises can result in fewer physician visits (e.g., Francis & Pennebaker, 1992 ), and depressive episodes (Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988 ), better immune function (e.g., Esterling, Kiecolt-Glaser, Bodnar, & Glaser, 1994 ), and higher grade point average (e.g., Cameron & Nicholls, 1998 ) and many other positive outcomes.

Experiencing the “subjective self” is yet another way that individuals gain self-knowledge. Unlike introspection, experiencing the subjective self involves outward engagement, a full engagement in the moment that draws attention away from the self (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1990 ). Being attentive to one’s emotions and thoughts in the moment can reveal much about one’s preferences and values. Apparently, people rely more on their subjective experiences than on their overt behaviors when constructing self-knowledge (Andersen, 1984 ; Andersen & Ross, 1984 ).

Interpersonal Approaches

At the risk of stating the obvious, humans are social animals and thus the self is rarely cut off from others. In fact, many individuals would rather give themselves a mild electric shock than be alone with their thoughts (Wilson et al., 2014 ). The myth of finding oneself by eschewing society is dubious, and one of the most famous proponents of this tradition, transcendentalist Henry David Thoreau, actually regularly entertained visitors during his supposed seclusion at Walden (Schulz, 2015 ). As early as infancy, the reactions of others can lay the foundation for one’s self-views. Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969 ; Hazan & Shaver, 1994 ) holds that children’s earliest interactions with their caregivers lead them to formulate schemas about their lovability and worth. This occurs outside of the infant’s awareness, and the schemas are based on the consistency and responsiveness of the care they receive. Highly consistent responsiveness to the infant’s needs provide the basis for the infant to develop feelings of self-worth (i.e., high global self-esteem) later in life. Though the mechanisms by which this occur are still being investigated, it may be that self-schemas developed during infancy provide the lens through which people interpret others’ reactions to them (e.g., Hazan & Shaver, 1987 ). Note, however, that early attachment relationships are in no way deterministic: 30–45% of people change their attachment style (i.e., their pattern of relating to others) across time (e.g., Cozzarelli, Karafa, Collins, & Tagler, 2003 ).

Early attachment relationships provide a working model for how an individual expects to be treated, which is associated with perceptions of self-worth. But others’ appraisals of the self are also a more direct source of self-knowledge. An extremely influential line of thought from sociology, symbolic interactionism (Cooley, 1902 ; Mead, 1934 ), emphasized the component of the self that James referred to as the social self. He wrote, “a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind” ( 1890 / 1950 , p. 294). The symbolic interactionists proposed that people come to know themselves not through introspection but rather through others’ reactions and perceptions of them. This “looking glass self” sees itself as others do (Yeung & Martin, 2003 ). People’s inferences about how others view them become internalized and guide their behavior. Thus the self is created socially and is sustained cyclically.

Research shows, however, that reflected appraisals may not tell the whole story. While it is clear that people’s self-views correlate strongly with how they believe others see them, self-views are not necessarily perfectly correlated with how people actually view them (Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979 ). Further, people’s self-views may inform how they believe others see them rather than the other way around (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993 ). Lastly, individuals are better at knowing how people see them in general rather than knowing how specific others view them (Kenny & Albright, 1987 ).

Though others’ perceptions of the self are not an individual’s only source of self-knowledge, they are an important source, and in more than one way. For example, others’ provide a reference point for “social comparison.” According to Festinger’s social comparison theory ( 1954 ), people compare their own traits, preferences, abilities, and emotions to those of similar others, making both upward and downward comparisons. These comparisons tend to happen spontaneously and effortlessly. The direction of the comparison influences how one views and feels about the self. For example, comparing the self to someone worse off boosts self-esteem (e.g., Helgeson & Mickelson, 1995 ; Marsh & Parker, 1984 ). In addition to increasing self-knowledge, social comparisons are also motivating. For instance, those undergoing difficult or painful life events can cope better when they make downward comparisons (Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985 ). When motivated to improve the self in a given domain, however, people may make upward comparisons to idealized others (Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & Kuyper, 1999 ). Sometimes individuals make comparisons to inappropriate others, but they have the ability (with mental effort) to undo the changes made to the self-concept as a result of this comparison (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995 ).

Others can influence the self not only through interactions and comparisons but also when an individual becomes very close to a significant other. In this case, according to self-expansion theory (Aron & Aron, 1996 ), as intimacy increases, people experience cognitive overlap between the self and the significant other. People can acquire novel self-knowledge as they subsume attributes of the close other into the self.

Finally, the origins and development of the self are interpersonally influenced to the extent that our identities are dependent on the social roles we occupy (e.g., as mother, student, friend, professional, etc.). This will be covered in greater detail in the section on “The Social Self.” Here it is important simply to recognize that as the social roles of an individual inevitably change over time, so too does their identity.

Cultural Approaches

Markus and Kitayama’s seminal paper ( 1991 ) on differences in expression of the self in Eastern and Western cultures spawned an incredible amount of work investigating the importance of culture on self-construals. Building on the foundational work of Triandis ( 1989 ) and others, this work proposed that people in Western cultures see themselves as autonomous individuals who value independence and uniqueness more so than connectedness and harmony with others. In contrast to this individualism, people in the East were thought to be more collectivist, valuing interdependence and fitting in. However, the theoretical relationship between self-construals and the continuous individualism-collectivism variable have been treated in several different ways in the literature. Some have described individualism and collectivism as the origins of differences in self-construals (e.g., Gudykunst et al., 1996 ; Kim, Aune, Hunter, Kim, & Kim, 2001 ; Singelis & Brown, 1995 ). Others have considered self-construals as synonymous with individualism and collectivism (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002 ; Taras et al., 2014 ) or have used individualism-collectivism at the individual level as an analog of the variable at the cultural level (Smith, 2011 ).

However, in contrast to perspectives that treat individualism and collectivism as a unidimensional variable (e.g., Singelis, 1994 ), individualism and collectivism have also been theorized to be multifaceted “cultural syndromes” that include normative beliefs, values, and practices, as well as self-construals (Brewer & Chen, 2007 ; Triandis, 1993 ). In this view, there are many ways of being independent or collectivistic depending on the domain of functioning under consideration. For example, a person may be independent or interdependent when defining the self, experiencing the self, making decisions, looking after the self, moving between contexts, communicating with others, or dealing with conflicting interests (Vignoles et al., 2016 ). These domains of functioning are orthogonal such that being interdependent in one domain does not require being interdependent in another. This multidimensional picture of individual differences in individualism and collectivism is actually more similar to Markus and Kitayama’s ( 1991 ) initial treatment aiming to emphasize cultural diversity and contradicts the prevalent unidimensional approach to cultural differences that followed.

Recent research has pointed out other shortcomings of this dichotomous approach. There is a great deal of heterogeneity among the world’s cultures, so simplifying all culture to “Eastern” and “Western” or collectivistic versus individualistic types may be invalid. Vignoles and colleagues’ ( 2016 ) study of 16 nations supports this. They found that neither a contrast between Western and non-Western, nor between individualistic and collectivistic cultures, sufficiently captured the complexity of cross-cultural differences in selfhood. They conclude that “it is not useful to characterize any culture as ‘independent’ or ‘interdependent’ in a general sense” and rather advocate for research that identifies what kinds of independence and interdependence may be present in different contexts ( 2016 , p. 991). In addition, there is a great deal of within culture heterogeneity in self-construals For example, even within an individualistic, Western culture like the United States, working-class people and ethnic minorities tend to be more interdependent (Markus, 2017 ), tempering the geographically based generalizations one might draw about self-construals.

Another line of recent research on the self in cultural context that has explored self-construals beyond the East-West dichotomy is the study of multiculturalism and individuals who are a member of multiple cultural groups (Benet-Martinez & Hong, 2014 ). People may relate to each of the cultures to which they belong in different ways, and this may in turn have important effects. For example, categorization, which involves viewing one cultural identity as dominant over the others, is associated positively with well-being but negatively with personal growth (Yampolsky, Amiot, & de la Sablonnière, 2013 ). Integration involves cohesively connecting multiple cultures within the self while compartmentalization requires keeping one’s various cultures isolated because they are seen to be in opposition. Each of these strategies has different consequences.

Finally, the influence of religion remains significant in many parts of the world (Georgas, van de Vijver, & Berry, 2004 ; Inglehart & Baker, 2000 ), and so religion is also an important source of differences in self-construal. These religious traditions provide answers to the question of how the self should relate to others. For example, Buddhism emphasizes the interdependence of all things and thus agency does not necessarily reside in individual actors. Moreover, for Buddhists the boundaries between the self and the other are insignificant, and in fact the self is thought to be impermanent (see Garfield, Nichols, Rai, Nichols, & Strohminger, 2015 ).

Motivational Properties of the Self

Need for communion, agency, and coherence.

Understanding what motivates people is one of social psychology’s core questions, and a variety of motives have been proposed. Three motives that are particularly important to self-processes are the need for communion (belonging and interpersonal connectedness), the need for agency (autonomy and competence), and the need for coherence (patterns and regularities). The needs for communion and agency are the foundations of many aspects of social behavior (Baumeister & Leary, 1995 ; Wiggins & Broughton, 1991 ). Among attitude researchers, constructs similar to communion and agency (i.e., warmth and competence) represent the two basic dimensions of attitudes (e.g., Abele & Wojciszke, 2007 ; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007 ; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005 ). Of even more relevance to the self, communion and agency correspond with the dual forms of self-esteem (e.g., Franks & Marolla, 1976 ; Gecas, 1971 ). That is, self-esteem can be broken down into two components: self-liking and self-competence (Tafarodi & Swann, 2001 ). Self-competence is an evaluation of one’s ability to bring about a desired outcome while the need for communion is an evaluation of one’s goodness, worth, and lovability. Each of these dimensions of self-esteem predicts unique outcomes (e.g., Bosson & Swann, 1999 ; Tafarodi & Vu, 1997 ).

Those who do not fulfill their communion needs have poorer physical outcomes such as relatively poor physical health, weakened immune functioning, and higher mortality rates (House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988 ; Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996 ). As far as psychological outcomes, people who lack positive connections with others also experience greater loneliness (Archibald, Bartholomew, & Marx, 1995 ; Newcomb & Bentler, 1986 ), while those with rich social networks report higher levels of happiness and life satisfaction (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999 ). People’s sense of autonomy also contributes to psychological well-being (Ryff, 1989 ) and encourages people to strive for high performance in domains they care about. Autonomy strivings can also be beneficial in that they contribute to people’s need for self-growth (e.g., Heine, Kitayama, & Lehman, 2001 ; Taylor, Neter, & Wayment, 1995 ).

Finally, a great deal of support exists for the notion that people have a fundamental need for psychological coherence or the need for regularity, predictability, meaning, and control (Guidano & Liotti, 1983 ; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006 ). Coherence is a distinct from consistency because it refers specifically to the consistency between a person’s enduring self-views and the other aspects of their psychological universe (English, Chen, & Swann, 2008 ). The coherence motive may be even more basic than the needs for communion and agency (Guidano & Liotti, 1983 ; Popper, 1963 ). That is, self-views serve as the lenses through which people perceive reality, and incoherence degrades the vision of reality that these lenses offer.

When people feel that their self-knowledge base is incoherent, they may not know how to act, and guiding action is thought to be the primary purpose of thinking in the first place (James, 1890 / 1950 ).

Self-Enhancement and Self-Verification Motives

Drawing on Prescott Lecky’s ( 1945 ) proposition that chronic self-views give people a strong sense of coherence, self-verification theory posits that people desire to be seen as they see themselves, even if their self-views are negative. Self-views can guide at least three stages of information processing: attention, recall, and interpretation. In addition, people act on the preference for self-confirmatory evaluations ensuring that their experiences reinforce their self-views. For example, just as those who see themselves as likable seek out and embrace others who evaluate them positively, so too do people who see themselves as dislikable seek out and embrace others who evaluate them negatively (e.g., Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989 ). The theory suggests that people both enter and leave relationships that fail to satisfy their self-verification strivings (Swann, De La Ronde, & Hixon, 1994 ), even divorcing people who they believe have overly positive appraisals of them (for a review, see Kwang & Swann, 2010 ). People may also communicate their identities visually through “identity cues” that enable others to understand and react accordingly to that identity (Gosling, 2008 ). People seek verification of their specific as well as global (self-views). They are especially inclined to seek self-verifying evaluations for self-views that are certain or important (Pelham & Swann, 1994 ; Swann & Pelham, 2002 ).

For the 70% of individuals with globally positive self-views (e.g., Diener & Diener, 1995 ), self-verification may look like self-enhancement strivings (Brown, 1986 ) in that it will compel people to seek and prefer positive feedback about the self. In fact, even people with negative self-views tend to self-enhance when they do not have the cognitive resources available to reflect on their self-views and compare it to the feedback available (Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990 ). In addition, people have a tendency to self-enhance before they self-verify (Swann et al., 1990 ). Other evidence for self-enhancement includes the tendency for people to view themselves as better than average, though this may be most likely for ambiguous traits that can describe a wide variety of behaviors because the evidence that people use to make self-evaluations is idiosyncratic (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989 ).

It is important to remember in discussions of self-verification and self-enhancement that people do not seek to see themselves as they actually are but rather as they see themselves . As mentioned in the section on accuracy, this self-view may overlap to varying degrees with “reality” or others’ perceptions of the self.

The Social Self

Identity negotiation.

People’s self-views influence the kinds of relationships they will engage in, and people can take on numerous identities depending on the situation and relationship. Identity negotiation theory (Swann & Bosson, 2008 ) suggests that relationship partners establish “who is who” via ongoing, mutual, and reciprocal interactions. Once people establish a “working consensus” for what roles each person will take in the relationship (e.g., Swann & Bosson, 2008 ), their agreed-upon expectations help disconnected individuals collaborate toward common obligations and goals, with some commitment to each other. Identity negotiation processes help define relationships and serve as a foundation for organized social activity. The identities that people negotiate tend to align with their chronic self-views. People follow these identity-negotiating processes, albeit largely unintentionally, during each of several successive stages of social interaction. Identities only survive to the extent that they are nourished and confirmed by the social environment, so negotiating identities in relationships is one way an individual ensures the survival of their self-views.

Personal and Social Self-Knowledge

Researchers have historically distinguished between two types of identity: personal and social. Personal identity refers to those features of the self that distinguish us from others while social identity refers to features of the self that are a source of commonality with others, such as group memberships. Once formed, social identities have a powerful influence on thought and behavior (Tajfel, 1981 ; Tajfel & Turner, 1979 ). Social category memberships can influence a person’s self-definition as much or more than idiosyncratic personal attributes (Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008 ). One version of social identity theory posits that people enter groups that they view as both positive and distinctive to bolster their self-views (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1988 ). Evidence shows that people display a strong ingroup bias, or tendency to favor their own group relative to outgroups (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1985 ; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971 ). This bias, along with the outgroup homogeneity effect whereby people see outgroup members as more similar than ingroup members (Linville & Jones, 1980 ) facilitates people’s ability to dehumanize members of outgroups. Dehumanization, perceiving a person as lacking in human qualities, then allows for the justification and maintenance of intergroup prejudice and conflict (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, & Leyens, 2005 ; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003 ).

Self-categorization theory, in contrast to emphasizing motivation as in social identity theory, stresses the perceptual processes that lead humans to categorize the world into “us” and “them” (Turner, 1985 ; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987 ). Other approaches argue that social identities reduce uncertainty (e.g., Hogg, 2007 , 2012 ), make the world more coherent (e.g., Ellemers & Van Knippenberg, 1997 ), or protect people from the fear of death (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002 ). Though these approaches emphasize cognitive aspects of group membership, group-related emotions are also an important component of social identity. For instance, intergroup emotions theory proposes that a person’s emotional reactions toward other social groups can change in response to situationally induced shifts in self-categorization (Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009 ).

Whatever the nature of the motive that causes people to identify with groups, although group memberships are critical for survival, they can also place people in grave danger when they motivate extreme action on behalf of the group. Research on identity fusion, which occurs when the boundaries between one’s personal and social identities become porous, shows how strong alignment with a group can lead to fighting and dying for that group at great personal cost (Whitehouse, McQuinn, Buhrmester, & Swann, 2014 ). This occurs when people come to view members of their social group as family (Swann et al., 2014 ).

Some research has investigated how personal and social identities are cognitively structured (Reid & Deaux, 1996 ). The segregation model of identity assumes that social and personal attributes are distinct (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991 ) while the integration model suggests that identities and attributes coexist in a limited set of cognitive structures. Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Cotting ( 1999 ) suggest that what constitutes social versus personal identity should not be determined by the attribute itself but rather the function it is serving (i.e., connecting the self to other people or distinguishing the self from other people). Similarly, optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991 ) argues that individuals have an inherent drive to identity with groups but an equally important drive to maintain their individuality. To cope, they strive to find a balance between these opposing forces by finding an identity that supports both the individual’s need for autonomy and affiliation.

For most people, gender and ethnicity are important social identities, and there is variation in the strength of people’s identification with these groups (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992 ). In terms of how gender affects the expression of the self, girls are often socialized to prioritize the qualities that align them to others, while boys are taught to prioritize the qualities that distinguish and differentiate them from others (e.g., Spence, Deaux, & Helmreich, 1985 ). Moreover, women’s self-esteem tends to be connected more to their relational qualities, while men’s self-esteem is linked to their independent qualities (Josephs, Markus, & Tafarodi, 1992 ).

Though society has made great strides in allowing men and women to embrace identities of their own choosing (e.g., Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2004 ), traditional social expectations about what it means to be a man or a women persist. For example, gender stereotypes have remained constant over the past thirty years even as women have made significant professional and political gains (Haines, Deaux, & Lofaro, 2016 ). These stereotypes remain entrenched for men as well. England ( 2010 ) argues that for the gender revolution to be complete, not only should traditionally male professions and domains be open to women but traditionally female domains should be increasingly occupied by men. This would help move society closer to attaining gender equality while signaling that traditionally female-dominated roles are equally valued.

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ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Physical self matters: how the dual nature of body image influences smart watch purchase intention.

• 1 School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China
• 2 School of Information Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China
• 3 Southern Hospital of Southern Medical University, Guangzhou, China

To determine the role of physical self in body-involving consumption, we explore how body image influences purchasing intention toward hybrid products with body-involving features. In this study, we establish the dual nature of body image: specifically, body image influences intention to purchase via the perception of utilitarian value and symbolic value. Further, we find a competitive mediation in which positive body image (PBI) negatively influences purchase intention (direct effect), while PBI is positively related to purchase intention via utilitarian and symbolic value (indirect effect). This indicates that without the mediation testing of the utilitarian-symbolic framework, the positive influence of body image will be “hidden.” Additionally, the mediated effect of symbolic value is moderated by personal innovativeness toward technology (PITT), suggesting that a consumer’s knowledge of wearables enhances the effect of body image. With the introduction of body image, this paper provides a more comprehensive model to analyze purchase intention with regard to digital products with body-involving features.

Introduction

Mobile health (m-health) emphasizes the role of mobile technology in health promotion ( Lupton, 2018 ). Digital products such as smart phones, smart watches, and smart bracelets enable consumers to record and receive feedback on their health condition, and they further empower consumers in self-care ( Wu et al., 2019 ; Su et al., 2020 ). International Data Corporation (IDC) has predicted that the wearables market will maintain double-digit growth from 2020 through 2024, with the shipment volume to reach a total of 637.1 million units in 2024. 1 Thus, the rapid spread of wearables such as smart watches provide a promising platform for m-health service via empowering consumers to perform self-care and self-management.

Recent studies have reached a consensus that digital wearables are categorized as hybrid products, as they involve features of different products ( Chuah et al., 2016 ; Nieroda et al., 2018 ). For instance, they involve features of both mass fashion (e.g., more affordable fashion) and luxury fashion (e.g., demonstrating higher social status) ( Nieroda et al., 2018 ), have both utilitarian and non-utilitarian aspects ( Choi and Kim, 2016 ), and are both fashion (e.g., are visible to others) and technology (e.g., increase productivity) ( Chuah et al., 2016 ). Health-related wearables have similar hybrid characteristics: on one hand, smart watches have functions including activity tracing, sleep monitoring and heart rate recording, and such functions meet users’ demand for health-related functionality; on the other hand, smart watches are also viewed as fashionable accessories that signal users’ social image and social status ( Chuah, 2019 ). Given these characteristics, digital wearables as hybrid products have unique features that distinguish them from traditional digital devices.

Two reasons drive this research. First, as hybrid products, the body-involving feature of smart watches has been neglected in previous literature. Body-involving products can be defined as products for which consumers make purchase decisions relying on information about their body ( Rosa et al., 2006 ), and these products include cosmetic surgery, weight loss services, fitness services, and fitness accessories. Prior research assumes that consumers make decisions based solely on the perception of the product (e.g., perceived value, quality, and usefulness), ignoring the fact that the perception of one’s own body also relates to the decision making process ( Rosa et al., 2006 ; Gillen and Dunaev, 2017 ; Yim and Park, 2019 ). Body-involving features should be taken into consideration and incorporated into a more comprehensive model that will help researchers understand the hybrid feature of digital wearables. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, research on the body dimension of digital wearables is lacking, and our study intends to fill this gap.

Second, despite the role of self-concepts in consumption has been noticed in past works, such as consumption can build extended self ( Belk, 1988 ), with the emergence of digital wearables, the relationship between physical self and consumption has remained unknown. According to multiple self-aspects framework, self-concepts are multiple, specifically, one’s self-concept includes the acknowledgment of roles, identities and social relationships; some selves are more decisive than others ( Elster, 1987 ; McConnell, 2011 ). Similarly, some research argue that self is multifaceted and hierarchically organized, and one dimension of self has different subareas (e.g., peers and significant others of social self) ( Marsh and Shavelson, 1985 ). Following this stream, self-concepts can be divided into global self and domain-specific self. For example, global self-esteem is one’s attitude toward the self as a totality ( Rosenberg et al., 1995 ), whereas specific esteem, such as academic esteem, reflects one’s agreement with indicators of academic achievement ( Marsh, 1990 ). The global self is associated with psychological wellbeing, and domain-specific self is more relevant to specific behavior ( Rosenberg et al., 1995 ). Physical self involves the perception and evaluation of one’s physical ability and appearance ( Shavelson et al., 1976 ). Previous research has found that the physical self-influences behaviors. For example, according to the self-discrepancy theory, the discrepancy between actual and ideal self generates specific emotions ( Higgins, 1987 ), similar results have been found in physical self-research such as body image discrepancy ( Thompson and Gray, 1995 ), more recent research indicates that patients will experience self-fragmentation, and injured self will alter one’s internal motivation ( Sebri et al., 2020 ), patients’ psychological states are related to their perception of the discrepancy between actual and ideal physical self ( Triberti et al., 2019 ).

Millennials are young consumers born between1980s and 2000s, past research indicate that their consumption motivation are more sophisticated than other groups ( Shin et al., 2017 ), but our knowledge on how physical self-influence millennials’ consumption in digital wearables are still lacking. Therefore, based on the work of Chuah et al. (2016) and Yim and Park (2019) , we evaluate the theoretical foundation of body-involving consumption based on self-concepts. Past research has noted the role of self-concepts in consumption behavior, with most focusing on global self-concepts (e.g., self-esteem, self-image, and identity), arguing that symbolic consumption can facilitate realize idealized self ( Hogg and Michell, 1996 ; Banister and Hogg, 2004 ), and extended self can be built ( Belk, 1988 ). In this study, we consider body image as domain-specific self (physical self) rather than global self to study how body-involving features influence purchase intention. With the introduction of utilitarian (e.g., benefits to health) and symbolic value (e.g., benefits to social image), we posit that the mechanism that physical self-determines consumer behavior differs from that of global self-concepts.

Theoretical Foundation

Utilitarian value perspective.

The utilitarian value perspective suggests that IT users evaluate technology according to the extent to which their goal can be realized with the technology ( Bernardi et al., 2019 ).

In this stream of literature, the theory of reasoned action (TRA) and the theory of planned behavior (TPB) have been widely used to understand users’ intention and behavior related to technology ( Cenfetelli, 2004 ). Following this stream, the technology acceptance model (TAM) posits that perception of technology at the individual level can be used to account for the adoption of technology, such as perception of usefulness, perception of ease of use, and task-technology fit. This logic has been similarly applied to the consumption of wearables. For instance, in the case of smart watch consumption, both perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use (PEOU) have been proven to increase consumers’ adoption intention ( Choi and Kim, 2016 ; Chuah et al., 2016 ). In research on health-related technology, the perception of usefulness for health (e.g., health management) has been proven to positively influence an individual’s intention to use wearables ( Hung and Jen, 2012 ). It has also been established that patients who are satisfied with the health-related value of mobile health monitoring services (MMSs) are more likely to use MMSs ( Xiaofei et al., 2021 ). In sum, the underlying assumption of utilitarian value perspective is that individuals consciously evaluate the goals. However, recent behavior science indicates that goal-directed behavior can be evoked by pre-existent or unconscious factors ( Custers and Aarts, 2010 ), as noted by Triberti et al. (2016) that traditional perspective cannot fully explain why the perception of value differs among individuals in technology adoption. To assess the pre-existent role of physical self, we incorporate the perception of utilitarian value (health function) as part of our model.

Symbolic Value Perspective

Although utilitarian value perspective has been widely applied in technology diffusion, some argue that the perception of technology is also related to external variables; in other words, the perception of technology is affected by factors beyond technology ( Swanson, 2019 ). For example, the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) and technology acceptance 2 (TAM2) theory both propose that non-utilitarian factors involving social influence, i.e., social image and social norms, should be taken into consideration ( Venkatesh et al., 2003 ). Similarly, emotional design emphasizes non-utilitarian factors (e.g., aesthetic, pleasure) in technology usage other than utility factors ( Heidig et al., 2015 ). In contrast with the utilitarian view, symbolic value perspective emphasizes that certain product attributes meet the non-utilitarian demands that involve expressing one’s unique personality or indicating expected social status ( Tian et al., 2001 ; Wilcox et al., 2009 ). From this perspective, the consumption of counterfeit products, luxury products, and name-brand products are motivated by the symbolic value rather than a specific function or the quality of products ( Wilcox et al., 2009 ; Wolter et al., 2016 ).

In the context of technology consumption, the symbolic value of digital devices has been proven to enhance purchase intention. For instance, in a study of migrant workers in the emerging market, Huang and Wang (2018) found that name-brand smartphone consumption is driven by consumers’ motivation to associate themselves with people with higher social status, or in other words, the symbolic value contributes to the purchase decision. In another research, perceived self-expressiveness and the need to represent one’s uniqueness as part of one’s social image has been proven to be related to digital consumption ( Choi and Kim, 2016 ). Further supporting this point, the visibility of a smart watch, i.e., being noticed by other people, has been found to increase purchase intention ( Chuah et al., 2016 ). Further, Nieroda et al. (2018) proposed that digital wearables are used by some consumers to communicate idealized social image, i.e., there is symbolic meaning of wearables. Therefore, we have adopted the symbolic value perspective as a portion of our model.

The Dual Nature of Body Image

In this study, we define physical self as the perception and evaluation of physical self-worth, such as bodily attractiveness and physical conditioning ( Fox and Corbin, 1989 ; Marsh and Redmayne, 1994 ). In this research, we apply body image as a general measure of physical self. Body image is defined as individual’s evaluation of their body and appearance, and it can be divided into negative and positive body image (PBI) ( Cash and Pruzinsky, 2002 ). Negative body image is defined as perceived inconsistencies between people’s actual and ideal body attributes ( Heron and Smyth, 2013 ). As suggested by Cash et al. (2004) , negative body image is related to body image dissatisfaction, as discontent with one’s body image has psychological consequences (i.e., personal distress and adaptive functioning). PBI broadly refers to the acceptance of and appreciation for one’s body, i.e., resistance to social pressure associated with unhealthy and unrealistic body images or emphasizing the physical function of the body rather than appearance ( Tylka and Wood-Barcalow, 2015b ).

The dual nature of body image refers to the fact that the perception of one’s body and appearance is determined by both physical and social factors ( Thompson and Hirschman, 1995 ; Stowers and Durm, 1996 ). For instance, individuals may have a negative body image due to being overweight, and their assessment of their weight may be based on an accurate evaluation of their physical condition; other individuals with a healthy weight may negatively evaluate their body image just because their bodies are contrary to media-portrayed ideals (e.g., men need a six-pack in order to be masculine), and this process of evaluation is affected by social norms ( Andrew et al., 2014 ). Therefore, we propose that the dual nature of body image influences behavioral intention via the perception of utilitarian value and symbolic value, and in the context of digital wearable consumption, body image drives both health motivation and self-affirmation.

Body Image as a Health Motivation Driver

Health motivation refers to consumers’ goal-directed arousal related to the belief that they should perform preventive actions prior to the emergence of health problems ( Moorman, 1990 ; Moorman and Matulich, 1993 ). Health motivation has been proven to increase health information searching and health behaviors ( Moorman and Matulich, 1993 ). Empirical research reveals that body image is associated with health promoting and health compromising behaviors, which are driven by health motivations, while the effects of PBI and negative image on health motivation differ.

PBI has been proven to be related to higher health motivation. For instance, PBI has been found to increase health promoting behaviors including sun protection, skin screening and seeking medical suggestions ( Andrew et al., 2014 ). However, individuals with negative body image tend to present lower health motivation. Individuals with negative body image experience more social physique anxiety, so they are less likely to place themselves in situations where others may evaluate their body and appearance, such as gyms and sports teams, which further prevents them from engaging in exercise ( Brudzynski and Ebben, 2010 ). Similarly, negative body image has been found to increase exercise avoidance via embarrassment; in other words, individuals dissatisfied with their bodies are more inclined to avoid health behaviors since they tend to avoid been viewed as unskilled in exercise ( More et al., 2019 ). Therefore, body image (PBI and negative body image) is connected to health-related behaviors.

Body Image as a Symbolic Consumption Driver

Body image is socialized; that is, the perception and evaluation of one’s body is dominated by existing cultural ideals, social norms, and moralistic prescriptions ( Thompson and Hirschman, 1995 ), and therefore, body image has been considered as part of physical body-worth, which is related to self-concept ( Lowery et al., 2005 ). For instance, self-esteem has been proven to be associated with body image, and PBI predicts positive self-image or self-esteem, so feeling satisfaction about one’s body and appearance is expected to increase one’s confidence ( Thompson and Gray, 1995 ; Stowers and Durm, 1996 ).

According to self-affirmation theory, individuals are motivated to maintain the integrity of self, so perceived failures to meet social norms may result in adaptive motivations to defend the integrity of the self ( Sherman and Cohen, 2006 ). Consistent with these conceptualizations, recent research reveals how body image influences consumption behavior. For instance, consumers with poor body image demonstrate more preference for augmented reality (AR) based product presentation than for traditional web-based presentation, and the preference for AR can be explained by the fact that the AR-based product presentation portrays a better body image ( Yim and Park, 2019 ). In other words, the image provided by AR can maintain the socially expected body image. Similarly, women exposed to female models’ images experienced body image threats and insecurity, and they also tend to own more shoes and handbags, since accessories facilitate maintenance of their bodily attractiveness ( Boyce et al., 2012 ). In this view, symbolic consumption is critical to maintain body image regulated by culture. Therefore, body image can drive consumers to make consumption decisions that promote an idealized social image.

Utilitarian Value, Symbolic Value and the Dual Nature of Body Image

Smart watches possess utilitarian value through their health monitoring and tracing capabilities, and symbolic value has been represented by the improvement of social image or social status. Under the framework of utilitarian-symbolic value, the dual nature of body image is expected to be related to both utilitarian and symbolic value. For instance, for consumers with PBI, since their health motivation is higher, they may value the health benefits of smart watches; on the other hand, based on the view of body image as a self-affirmation motivation driver, body image may motivate consumers to pay more attention to the appearance of smart watches because they are seeking symbolic value in order to maintain an idealized social image. Thus, past research has ignored the role of body image and failed to investigate the potential link between utilitarian-symbolic value and the dual nature of body image. Given the dual nature of body image, we expect that body image relates to purchase intention via utilitarian and symbolic value.

According to the literature discussed above, both utilitarian value (e.g., monitoring, tracing and feedback) and symbolic value (e.g., demonstration of social image) are expected to influence the purchase of wearables. Taking the dual nature of body image into account, we assume that body image influences both utilitarian and symbolic value and further determines purchase intention regarding smart watches.

Direct Effect of Positive Body Image

Empirical research has proven that negative body image is more likely to motivate consumers to purchase than PBI. For instance, a consumer with a poor evaluation of their own body is more likely to purchase accessories to restore their bodily attractiveness ( Boyce et al., 2012 ). Comparatively, a consumer who is more confident in their body is less likely to buy body-involving products ( Rosa et al., 2006 ), and in a study on cosmetics consumption, PBI failed to predict higher consumption intention ( Gillen and Dunaev, 2017 ). Thus, we propose that:

H1.Positive body image decreases purchase intention regarding smart watches

Mediation Role of Perceived Usefulness for Health

This study focuses on the health-related functions of smart watches, and we redefine perceived usefulness for health as the extent to which a consumer believes that the use of a smart watch will provide health-related benefits, such as health tracing, health management, health monitoring. Since body image is a health motivation driver, and PBI predicts higher health motivation and more health behaviors ( Andrew et al., 2014 ), it is reasonable to assume that consumers with PBI pay more attention to the health-related function of smart watches. Therefore, PBI is related to higher perception of a smart watch’s health functions, or in other words, individuals with PBI are more likely to value the health-related features of digital wearables.

Based on the utilitarian perspective, the user’s rational evaluation of whether a technological innovation can realize the user’s goal is the determinant of technology adoption. In this view, the TAM has been widely applied to investigate utilitarian value related to technology. TAM has been built upon TRA and TPB, and it insists that individuals rationally evaluate the potential profits of technological innovations ( Cenfetelli, 2004 ; Bernardi et al., 2019 ). The core construct of TAM is perceived usefulness, which is measured in the working context or in organizations. This logic has been applied to health-related technologies, indicating that perceived usefulness for health is an important predictor of a user’s intention to adopt mobile health services and hardware ( Guo et al., 2020 ; Xiaofei et al., 2021 ). Based on the literature discussed above, body image can be viewed as driving force behind health motivation, and individuals with higher PBI are more inclined to pursue healthy behaviors; therefore, we propose that:

H2.Positive body image enhances purchase intention by increasing perceived usefulness for health

Mediation Role of Value-Expressive and Social-Adjustive Functions

According to functional theories of attitude (FTA), attitudes are not irrational but perform valuable functions, and individuals change or hold their attitudes because these attitudes serve a purpose ( Smith et al., 1956 ; Katz, 1960 ; Shavitt, 1989 ). Attitudes can perform functions such as expressing one’s values value-expressive function (VEF) or helping self-presentation social-adjustive function (SAF) ( Shavitt, 1989 ; Wilcox et al., 2009 ). SAF refers to the social symbolic function of specific products that can facilitate the realization of self-presentation (i.e., displaying images related to wealth and higher social status to others), while VEF refers to the demonstration of individuals’ personal value (i.e., conveying personality to others) through the ownership of products ( Wilcox et al., 2009 ). SAF and VEF have been widely used to account for the functions that attitudes perform in symbolic consumption decisions. For instance, perceived self-expressiveness has been found to have a positive role in smart watch adoption ( Choi and Kim, 2016 ), both SAF and value-expressiveness function predict luxury brand consumption ( Schade et al., 2016 ), and research has revealed the more complicated mediation effect of SAF and value-expressiveness function on counterfeit luxury consumption ( Wang et al., 2020 ). Similarly, we propose that the perception of symbolic value (value-expressive and SAF) predicts the consumption of smart watches.

According to the symbolic value perspective, the presentation of higher social status or favorable social image is an important motivation for consumption decisions. This assumption is in line with earlier research arguing that self-perceptions (e.g., self-esteem or self-image) and body image can be improved via consumption in some circumstances ( Sirgy, 1982 ; Thompson and Hirschman, 1995 ). Based on the assumption that body image is a driving force of self-affirmation motivation, body image is related to both SAF and value-expressiveness function. Specifically, consumers with PBI are more motivated to purchase body-involving products because they are more interested in maintaining their positive self-concept ( Rosa et al., 2006 ; Merle et al., 2012 ). In other words, PBI drives consumers to affirm their positive self-concept through consumption. Both SAF and VEF are expected to be influenced by PBI; therefore, we propose that:

H3.Positive body image enhances purchase intention by increasing value-expressive function

H4.Positive body image enhances purchase intention by increasing social-adjustive function

Moderating Role of Personal Innovativeness Toward Technology

Compared with other types of personal technology such as smartphones, common consumers are less familiar with digital wearables since digital wearables are cutting-edge technology ( Choi and Kim, 2016 ), and consumers have limited knowledge of the function of the latest technological innovations ( Yang, 2005 ). Therefore, consumers with personal traits such as innovativeness are more likely to be familiar with digital wearables. The concept of personal innovativeness toward technology (PITT) has been developed to identify individuals who tend to adopt the latest information technology innovations earlier than others ( Agarwal and Prasad, 1998 ). Consumers with higher PITT have been found to obtain knowledge regarding a specific product category, so PITT is more than a personality trait: it also drives consumers to seek information about technology products ( Varma Citrin et al., 2000 ).

Following this logic, consumers who are more familiar with digital innovations (e.g., with direct and indirect knowledge of smart watches) are more likely to perceive both the utilitarian and symbolic value of this technology because they pay more attention to technology-related knowledge and information. Higher PITT predicts that customers will assign a higher degree of perceived usefulness ( Lu et al., 2005 ) and relative advantage to a product ( Yang et al., 2012 ), and similarly, consumer innovativeness (measured by the tendency to buy new products) has been found to increase consumers’ continuance intention with regard to smart watch usage ( Hong et al., 2017 ). Therefore, we propose that consumers with higher innovativeness are more likely to perceive both utilitarian and symbolic value:

H5(a).Personal innovativeness toward technology enhances the purchase intention by strengthening the relationship between positive body image and perceived usefulness for health

H5(b).Personal innovativeness toward technology enhances the purchase intention by strengthening the relationship between positive body image and value-expressive function

H5(c).Personal innovativeness toward technology enhances the purchase intention by strengthening the relationship between positive body image and social-adjustive function

Methodology

Data collection.

Data was collected via mobile phone from students attending a university in China. Participants were recruited through campus WeChat groups, and samples with answering time less than 60 s were deleted. We collected 369 valid online questionnaires, and as 303 respondents did not have smart watches, we used these 303 samples to perform the PLS-SEM analysis. Of the respondents, 44.88% were female and 55.12% were male, so the distribution of gender was well balanced from the demographic perspective. Also of all respondents, 32.67% were aged 18–21, 43.89% were aged 22–25, 17.82% were aged 26–29 and 5.61% were aged 30 and above, so the distribution of age was consistent with the predominant purchasers of digital wearables. Overall, the selected sample was well balanced. Demographic descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1 .

Table 1. Demographic descriptive statistics ( N = 303).

Analytical Approach

Data analysis was performed using structural equation modeling with partial least squares (PLS-SEM) in SmartPLS 3 3.2.9.. We use the PLS-SEM method for two reasons. First, this study entails multiple mediation and moderation requirements, and PLS has been recommended for complex model estimation. For instance, in models involving multiple mediators, PLS has an advantage because it considers all mediators simultaneously in one model rather than using a piecemeal approach ( Hair, 2017 ). Second, compared to traditional covariance-based structural equation modeling (CB-SEM), PLS-SEM uses weighted composites of indicator variables as proxies, which relaxes the assumptions of CB-SEM based on sum scores. This quality makes it suitable for situations where the theory is less developed ( Henseler et al., 2014 ). Since the theory used in our model was not estimated in prior studies, we used PLS-SEM instead of CB-SEM to introduce new variables and new paths.

We used scales validated in previous studies for all constructs (see Supplementary Appendix A ). The items were measured using a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 ( totally disagree ) to 5 ( totally agree ). PBI items were adopted from Tylka and Wood-Barcalow’s (2015a) original research and translated into Chinese, and they have been proven to have reliability and validity for Chinese respondents ( Swami et al., 2016 ).

PEOU was measured with three items adapted from Davis (1989) . Perceived usefulness to health (PUH) was measured with three items adapted from Hung and Jen (2012) . VEF was measured with three items and SAF was measured with four items, which were adapted from Wilcox et al. (2009) . PITT was measured with three items adapted from Agarwal and Prasad (1998) . Purchase intention (PI) was measured with two items developed by Kim and Shin (2015) . In terms of control variables, cost (CT) was measured with two items adapted from Shin (2009) , and we also included demographic variables, such as gender, age and income, as control variables.

Measurement Model

To evaluate the measurement model, we assessed reliability and validity. Table 2 exhibits the factor loadings, Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability and average variance extracted (AVE) for our constructs. First, most loadings were above the recommended threshold of 0.70, three loadings of PBI were lower than 0.70, including pbi1 (0.545), pbi5 (0.672), and pbi8 (0.695), and one PBI item was removed because its loading was lower than 0.5 (“I am comfortable in my body”). As suggested by Hair (2017) , three items with loadings lower than 0.7 were deleted to check the increase of composite reliability, and as the increase was minimal (0.918 vs. 0.916), these three items were not removed. The Cronbach’s Alpha and composite reliability of PBI were 0.897 and 0.916 respectively, indicating that the PBI items were reliable. All values of the Cronbach’s Alpha were above the threshold (0.6), and the composite reliability was higher than the accepted threshold (0.70). These results indicated that the measurement of constructs was reliable.

Table 2. Loadings, reliability, and convergent validity.

Second, the AVE was used to assess the convergent validity, and as shown in Table 1 , all AVE values were higher than the threshold (0.50) ( Fornell and Larcker, 1981 ). In addition to evaluating convergent validity, we evaluated discriminant validity using the approach proposed by Fornell and Larcker (1981) . According to Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) criterion, to determine the discriminant validity, the square root of each construct’s AVE is expected to be above the coefficient of bivariate correlations with other constructs. According to results of Table 3 , discriminant validity of most constructs is established because the square root of each construct’s AVE is higher than the correlation coefficients between all opposing constructs. However, the square root of the AVE of SAF and VEF is close to the correlation coefficients between SAF and VEF (0.823 vs. 0.768; 0.819 vs. 0.768), and SAF explains the variance similarly to VEF; in other words, SAF and VEF are correlated. This is because SAF and VEF are highly related sub-dimensions of the same latent construct (FTAs) ( Wilcox et al., 2009 ). To eliminate the potential collinearity caused by the difference in the way researchers and respondents understood the questionnaire constructs (e.g., for some respondents the concept of “express myself” in VEF may be equivalent to “a symbol of social status”), we follow recommendations in using the variance inflation factor (VIF). The VIF values of SAF and VEF were 2.688 and 2.847, respectively, lower than the threshold of 3.3, indicating no collinearity between constructs ( Kock and Lynn, 2012 ).

Table 3. Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) criterion.

Mediation Effects Test

In a departure from to the traditional classification of full, partial and no mediation suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) and Zhao et al. (2010) proposed three types of mediation: complementary, competitive and direct-only mediation. To assess the mediation effects, we follow an approach proposed by Zhao et al. (2010) .

We first assess the significance of the indirect effect (β x→m × β m→y ), and then we further assess the significance of the direct effect (β x→y ). Complementary partial mediation is determined when direct effect is significant and shares the same direction with indirect effect, or in other words, when β x→m × β m→y × β x→y is positive. In contrast, competitive partial mediation occurs when indirect and direct effect are both significant but move in different directions, i.e., β x→m × β m→y × β x→y is negative. Particularly in competitive mediation, non-significant total effect does not indicate the lack of mediation; for instance, indirect and direct effects of opposite signs may result in the non-significance of the total effect. First, as shown in Table 4 , the indirect effect via utilitarian value (PBI→PHU→PI) was significant (β = 0.047, p < 0.01), and the indirect effect via social symbol value (PBI→SAF→PI) was significant (β = 0.034, p < 0.05). Second, the direct effect (PBI→PI) was also significant but with opposite signs (β = −0.119, p < 0.05), indicating a competitive mediation between PBI and PI. Taking all of these effects together, we conclude that PBI enhances purchase intention regarding smart watches via perceived usefulness for health and SAF. The results of the path coefficients are exhibited in Figure 1 .

Table 4. PLS regression results for the mediation model.

Figure 1. PLS regression results for models without moderation.

Moderating Effects Test

Moderated mediation indicates that either or both of the paths of independent variables to mediating variables (β x→m ) and from mediating variables to dependent variables (β m→y ) vary across levels of the moderator; in other words, indirect effect is contingent on the moderator ( Edwards and Lambert, 2007 ; Preacher et al., 2007 ).

We used the moderated mediation analysis approaches to test the moderating effects. As shown in Table 5 , three distinct models were tested. The first model (Model 1) estimates the moderating effects of PITT on the direct relationship between PBI and PI(β x→y ), and thus it tests the total effect without mediating effects. The second model (Model 2-1, Model 2-2, Model 2-3) estimates the moderating role of PITT on the first-stage indirect effects, i.e., the effect of PBI on PUH, VEF, and SAF, respectively (β x→m ). The third model estimates the moderating role of PITT on the second-stage indirect effect, i.e., the simultaneous effects of PUH, VEF, and SAF on PI (β m→y ) and on the direct effect (β x→y ).

Table 5. PLS regression results for the moderated mediation model.

As indicated by results of Model 2-2 and Model 2-3 in Table 5 , two of the moderating effects of PITT on the first-stage mediation were significant (β = 0.219, p < 0.001 and β = 0.184, p < 0.001, respectively), indicating the moderating role of PITT on the effects of PBI on SAF and VEF. First-stage results suggest that individuals with higher PITT perceive more symbolic value associated with smart watches. Turning to the results of second-stage mediation (Model 3), we observe that the coefficients of PUH and SAF were significant (β = 0.302, p < 0.001 and β = 0.314, p < 0.001). The moderating effect of PITT on the relationship between PBI and SAF in Model 2-2 and on the relationship between SAF and PI were both significant. Taken together, these results indicate that the moderated mediation effect in the indirect effect of PBI on PI via SAF is not zero. This result suggests that the mediation effects partially depend on the extent of PITT ( Figure 2 ).

Figure 2. PLS regression results for the models with moderation.

Additionally, we observe that control variables are non-significant except for cost, and the perception of higher cost predicts higher purchase intention. This finding contrasts with some past research ( Kim and Shin, 2015 ), while some studies argue that high prices in emerging markets are the signal of luxury brands ( Sharma et al., 2020 ). We assume that consumers of digital wearables treat price as a decision reference, or in other words, price is the signal of symbolic value for smart watch consumers.

Further Explanation of the Dual Nature of Body Image

As discussed above, we assume that body image is a health motivation driver and a symbolic consumption driver, to further prove these assumptions we propose that:

H6(a).Positive body image enhances health motivation

H6(b).Positive body image enhances symbolic consumption motivation

Symbolic consumption motivation was measured with social identity. Social identity refers to a social psychological process in which individual categorize himself as a member of specific groups, such as teams, class, or organizations ( Henri and Turner, 1986 ). In consumption behaviors, consumers purchase specific products to signal favorable social identity, especially for conspicuous products with symbolic value ( Wilcox et al., 2009 ). In this research, we used three items adopted from Moorman (1990) to measure health motivation, and social identity was measured with three items from Huang and Wang (2018) , the reliability and validity meet the threshold as in section “Methodology” (see Supplementary Appendix B ). Using the same sample as in section “Methodology”, we conclude that H6 (a) and H6 (b) are supported, and PBI has a stronger relationship with health motivation compared with social identity (see Figure 3 ).

Figure 3. PLS regression results for the dual nature model.

Key Findings

Drawing on the TAM and on FTA, we find that PBI influences intention to purchase via the perception of technology value and symbolic value, thus establishing the dual nature of body image. First, individuals with a positive evaluation of their own body and appearance (PBI) do not exhibit more purchase intention regarding smart watches, while negative body image predicts a higher degree of purchase intention. Second, PBI increases purchase intention via the perception of the utilitarian value, i.e., the health-related value, of smart watches. Among individuals who evaluate their body image positively, respondents present a higher perception of smart watches’ health promoting functions. Third, PBI increases purchase intention via symbolic value. Specifically, individuals with a more PBI perceive more SAF (e.g., that smart watches gain the owner higher social status and more visibility), which further increases purchase intention.

Additionally, we have proven that PITT moderates the mediating role of SAF. For a summary of the main conclusions (please see Table 6 ). These findings have significant implications regarding digital wearables, as outlined below.

Table 6. Summary of results.

Theoretical Contribution

According to our knowledge, this study is the first work to assess the role of physical self in consumption behavior. Self-concepts are individuals’ evaluation toward themselves such as self-esteem (global perceptions of one’s worth) ( Harter and Leahy, 2001 ), compared to global self-concepts, body is considered as domain-specific self-concepts (e.g., body size satisfaction and appearance esteem). Although body image has been widely applied in research into health management topics such as eating disorders and obesity ( Cash and Pruzinsky, 2002 ), the relationship between body image and consumption has remains unknown. For instance, researchers do not agree on how body image (either negative or positive) affects purchase intention ( Rosa et al., 2006 ), this research establishes that without considering the dual nature of body image (indirect effect), such mechanisms cannot be revealed. Therefore, in the view of physical self, we reveal the mechanism driving the effect of body image by introducing the dual nature of body image and demonstrating that body image is a health motivation driver (e.g., influencing the perception of utilitarian value) and also a self-affirmation motivation driver (e.g., influencing the perception of symbolic value).

In other words, our research provides a theoretical framework to understand the role of physical self-concepts in consumption. Self-concepts define who we are and become a driving force to influence consumption decision, however, self-concepts is also multi-dimensional ( Belk, 1988 , 2013 ), the investigation into body-involving products (e.g., clothes, sports, and wearables) requires the introduction of body dimension of self. Furthermore, our findings have implications for research based on self-concepts that self-concepts (global or domain-specific) should be recognized as antecedent variables, and their significance in motivating consumers’ decisions should be given more consideration.

Practical Implications

Although designers and researchers have cumulative knowledge of marketing strategy for digital wearables, our results have two critical implications for design and marketing.

First, the hybrid nature of digital wearables does not necessarily relate to hybrid marketing strategy, i.e., advertisements do not need to emphasize devices’ utilitarian and symbolic value simultaneously. Our results suggest that for consumers with PBI, the health-related function will have direct and significant convincing power, while the realization of symbolic value depends on the knowledge on digital products. More importantly, the health-related functions can attract consumers’ attention. For instance, most mainstream design tends to transform smart watches into mini smartphones (e.g., they have payment, messaging and notification features), and the overlap between smartphones and smart watches increases the burden of making a purchase decision.

Second, designers wish to copy the experience of traditional luxury wearables; convincing consumers that the ownership of smart watches can have symbolic value has already become a prevalent strategy. However, our results indicate that consumers’ past experience may not fully apply to digital wearables, i.e., the perception of symbolic value is affected by the perception of body image. Specifically, consumers with positive attitudes toward their own body and appearance tend to focus on the symbolic value, while negative body image decreases the effect of symbolic value. Additionally, consumers’ knowledge of digital wearables may limit their perception of symbolic value. Compared with more traditional and prevalent luxury wearables, consumers are less familiar with digital wearables. We therefore posit that strategies that are successful for luxury wearables may not work on all potential consumers of digital wearables. For example, given Apple’s advantage in brand premium, Huawei and Xiaomi, two of Apple’s major competitors in China, adopted the differentiation strategy by releasing cheaper smart bracelets from 2016 to 2018. These products have a smaller screen but similar health functions to the Apple Watch.

Limitations and Future Studies

Although the model proposed in this study provides a more comprehensive perspective from which to understand a consumer’s intention to purchase a smart watch, our findings have several limitations. First, our samples are limited to college students, and due to its exploratory purpose, our study uses a convenient sampling method. Despite the fact that young students are a major portion of digital wearable consumers, older respondents (e.g., age 30–40) with different careers should be involved in future research, since consumers with various socioeconomic statuses (SES) and at different life stages may hold different attitudes about their physical self, and the dual nature of physical self may be influenced by these factors. Second, although we tested the theoretical validity of physical self in the context of digital product consumption, a deeper exploration of physical self in wearable consumption is needed. Since studies considering the body-involving features of digital wearables were rare in the past, the theoretical framework applied in this article requires more solid theoretical discussions (e.g., the links to identity, self-image, and self-efficiency). Third, the diffusion of technology involves multiple stages, such as adoption, acceptance, routinization, exploration and infusion, while this research only focuses on purchase intention, we suggest future research to investigate other related topics, for instance, using samples with actual purchase behavior.

Data Availability Statement

The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/ Supplementary Material , further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author/s.

Author Contributions

TW developed the theoretical framework and performed the online survey and wrote the manuscript with support from SL. YS suggested the selection of measurements and checked the manuscript. All authors discussed the results and contributed to the final manuscript.

This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Award Nos. 71531007, 71622002, 71471048, 71471049, 71490720, and 71771065) and Guangzhou Science and Technology Plan Project: Research and Development of Diagnosis and Treatment System for Common Diseases of Middle-aged and Elderly People Based on Artificial Intelligence (Project No. 202103000037).

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Publisher’s Note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

Supplementary Material

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.846491/full#supplementary-material

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Keywords : physical self, body image, smart watch, competitive mediation, mobile health

Citation: Wang T, Sun Y and Liao S (2022) Physical Self Matters: How the Dual Nature of Body Image Influences Smart Watch Purchase Intention. Front. Psychol. 13:846491. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.846491

Received: 31 December 2021; Accepted: 14 February 2022; Published: 25 March 2022.

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Copyright © 2022 Wang, Sun and Liao. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Teng Wang, [email protected]

Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

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“I” and “Me”: The Self in the Context of Consciousness

James (1890) distinguished two understandings of the self, the self as “Me” and the self as “I”. This distinction has recently regained popularity in cognitive science, especially in the context of experimental studies on the underpinnings of the phenomenal self. The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and attempt to precisely distinguish between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. This distinction was originally based on the idea that the former (“Me”) corresponds to the self as an object of experience (self as object), while the latter (“I”) reflects the self as a subject of experience (self as subject). I will argue that in most of the cases (arguably all) this distinction maps onto the distinction between the phenomenal self (reflecting self-related content of consciousness) and the metaphysical self (representing the problem of subjectivity of all conscious experience), and as such these two issues should be investigated separately using fundamentally different methodologies. Moreover, by referring to Metzinger’s (2018) theory of phenomenal self-models, I will argue that what is usually investigated as the phenomenal-“I” [following understanding of self-as-subject introduced by Wittgenstein (1958) ] can be interpreted as object, rather than subject of experience, and as such can be understood as an element of the hierarchical structure of the phenomenal self-model. This understanding relates to recent predictive coding and free energy theories of the self and bodily self discussed in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy.

Introduction

Almost 130 years ago, James (1890) introduced the distinction between “Me” and “I” (see Table ​ Table1 1 for illustrative quotes) to the debate about the self. The former term refers to understanding of the self as an object of experience, while the latter to the self as a subject of experience 1 . This distinction, in different forms, has recently regained popularity in cognitive science (e.g., Christoff et al., 2011 ; Liang, 2014 ; Sui and Gu, 2017 ; Truong and Todd, 2017 ) and provides a useful tool for clarifying what one means when one speaks about the self. However, its exact meaning varies in cognitive science, especially in regard to what one understands as the self as subject, or “I.”

Quotes from James (1890) illustrating the distinction between self-as-object (“Me”) and self-as-subject (“I”) and a quote from Wittgenstein (1958) illustrating his distinction between the use of “I” as object and as subject.

The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and take a closer look at the conceptual distinction between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. I will suggest, following James (1890) and in opposition to the tradition started by Wittgenstein (1958) , that in this context “Me” (i.e., the self as object) reflects the phenomenology of selfhood, and corresponds to what is also known as sense of self, self-consciousness, or phenomenal selfhood (e.g., Blanke and Metzinger, 2009 ; Blanke, 2012 ; Dainton, 2016 ). On the other hand, the ultimate meaning of “I” (i.e., the self as subject) is rooted in metaphysics of subjectivity, and refers to the question: why is all conscious experience subjective and who/what is the subject of conscious experience? I will argue that these two theoretical problems, i.e., phenomenology of selfhood and metaphysics of subjectivity, are in principle independent issues and should not be confused. However, cognitive science usually follows the Wittgensteinian tradition 2 by understanding the self-as-subject, or “I,” as a phenomenological, rather than metaphysical problem [ Figure ​ Figure1 1 illustrates the difference between James (1890) and Wittgenstein’s (1958) approach to the self]. By following Metzinger’s (2003 , 2010 ) framework of phenomenal self-models, and in agreement with a reductionist approach to the phenomenal “I” 3 ( Prinz, 2012 ), I will argue that what is typically investigated in cognitive science as the phenomenal “I” [or the Wittgenstein’s (1958) self-as-subject] can be understood as just a higher-order component of the self-model reflecting the phenomenal “Me.” Table ​ Table2 2 presents some of crucial claims of the theory of self-models, together with concise references to other theories of the self-as-object discussed in this paper.

An illustration of James (1890) and Wittgenstein’s (1958) distinctions between self-as-object (“Me”) and self-as-subject (“I”). In the original formulation, James’ (1890) “Me” includes also physical objects and people (material and social “Me”) – they were not included in the picture, because they are not directly related to consciousness.

Examples of theories of the self-as-object (“Me”) in the context of consciousness, as theories of the phenomenal self, with representative quotes illustrating each position.

“Me” As An Object Of Experience: Phenomenology Of Self-Consciousness

The words ME, then, and SELF, so far as they arouse feeling and connote emotional worth, are OBJECTIVE designations, meaning ALL THE THINGS which have the power to produce in a stream of consciousness excitement of a certain particular sort ( James, 1890 , p. 319, emphasis in original).

James (1890) chose the word “Me” to refer to self-as-object. What does it mean? In James’ (1890) view, it reflects “all the things” which have the power to produce “excitement of a certain particular sort.” This certain kind of excitement is nothing more than some form of experiential quality of me-ness, mine-ness, or similar - understood in a folk-theoretical way (this is an important point, because these terms have recently acquired technical meanings in philosophy, e.g., Zahavi, 2014 ; Guillot, 2017 ). What are “all the things”? The classic formulation suggests that James (1890) meant physical objects and cultural artifacts (material self), human beings (social self), and mental processes and content (spiritual self). These are all valid categories of self-as-object, however, for the purpose of this paper I will limit the scope of further discussion only to “objects” which are relevant when speaking about consciousness. Therefore, rather than speaking about, for example, my car or my body, I will discuss only their conscious representations. This limits the scope of self-as-object to one category of “things” – conscious mental content.

Let us now reformulate James’ (1890) idea in more contemporary terms and define “Me” as the totality of all content of consciousness that is experienced as self-related. Content of consciousness is meant here in a similar way to Chalmers (1996) , who begins “ The conscious mind ” by providing a list of different kinds of conscious content. He delivers an extensive (without claiming that exhaustive) collection of types of experiences, which includes the following 4 : visual; auditory; tactile; olfactory; experiences of hot and cold; pain; taste; other bodily experiences coming from proprioception, vestibular sense, and interoception (e.g., headache, hunger, orgasm); mental imagery; conscious thought; emotions. Chalmers (1996) also includes several other, which, however, reflect states of consciousness and not necessarily content per se , such as dreams, arousal, fatigue, intoxication, and altered states of consciousness induced by psychoactive substances. What is common to all of the types of experience from the first list (conscious contents) is the fact that they are all, speaking in James’ (1890) terms, “objects” in a stream of consciousness: “all these things are objects, properly so called, to the subject that does the thinking” (p. 325).

The self understood as “Me” can be understood as a subset of a set of all these possible experiences. This subset is characterized by self-relatedness ( Figure ​ Figure2 2 ). It can be illustrated with sensory experiences. For example, in the visual domain, I experience an image of my face as different from another person’s face. Hence, while the image of my face belongs to “Me,” the image of someone else does not (although it can be experimentally manipulated, Tsakiris, 2008 ; Payne et al., 2017 ; Woźniak et al., 2018 ). The same can be said about my voice and sounds caused by me (as opposed to voices of other people), and about my smell. We also experience self-touch as different from touching or being touched by a different person ( Weiskrantz et al., 1971 ; Blakemore et al., 1998 ; Schutz-Bosbach et al., 2009 ). There is even evidence that we process our possessions differently ( Kim and Johnson, 2014 ; Constable et al., 2018 ). This was anticipated by James’ (1890) notion of the material “Me,” and is typically regarded as reflecting one’s extended self ( Kim and Johnson, 2014 ). In all of these cases, we can divide sensory experiences into the ones which do relate to the self and the ones which do not. The same can be said about the contents of thoughts and feelings, which can be either about “Me” or about something/someone else.

A simplified representation of a structure of phenomenal content including the metaphysical “I,” the phenomenal “Me,” and the phenomenal “I,” which can be understood (see in text) as a higher-level element of the phenomenal “Me.” Each pair of nodes connected with a yellow line represents one type of content of consciousness, with indigo nodes corresponding to self-related content, and black nodes corresponding to non-self-related content. In some cases (e.g., pain, emotions, interoceptive, and proprioceptive sensations), the black nodes are lighter and drawn with a dashed line (the same applies to links), to indicate that in normal circumstances one does not experiences these sensations as representing another person (although it is possible in thought experiments and pathologies). Multisensory/multimodal interactions have been omitted for the sake of clarity. All of the nodes compose the set of conscious thoughts, which can be formulated as “I experience X.” In normal circumstances, one does not deny ownership over these thoughts, however, in thought experiments, and in some cases of psychosis, one may experience that even such thoughts cease to feel as one’s own. This situation is represented by the shape with a dashed outline. Moreover, in special cases one can form meta-delusions, i.e., delusions about delusions – thoughts that my thoughts about other thoughts are not my thoughts (see text for description).

Characterizing self-as-object as a subset of conscious experiences specifies the building blocks of “Me” (which are contents of consciousness) and provides a guiding principle for distinguishing between self and non-self (self-relatedness). However, it is important to note two things. First, the distinction between self and non-self is often a matter of scale rather than a binary classification, and therefore self-relatedness may be better conceptualized as the strength of the relation with the self. It can be illustrated with an example of the “Inclusion of Other in Self” scale ( Aron et al., 1992 ). This scale asks to estimate to what extent another person feels related to one’s self, by choosing among a series of pairs of more-to-less overlapping circles representing the self and another person (e.g., a partner). The degree of overlap between the chosen pair of circles represents the degree of self-relatedness. Treating self-relatedness as a matter of scale adds an additional level of complexity to the analysis, and results in speaking about the extent to which a given content of consciousness represents self, rather than whether it simply does it or not. This does not, however, change the main point of the argument that we can classify all conscious contents according to whether (or to what extent, in that case) they are self-related. For the sake of clarity, I will continue to speak using the language of binary classification, but it should be kept in mind that it is an arbitrary simplification. The second point is that this approach to “Me” allows one to flexibly discuss subcategories of the self by imposing additional constraints on the type of conscious content that is taken into account, as well as the nature of self-relatedness (e.g., whether it is ownership of, agency over, authorship, etc.). For example, by limiting ourselves to discussing conscious content representing one’s body one can speak about the bodily self, and by imposing limits to conscious experience of one’s possessions one can speak about one’s extended self.

Keeping these reservations in mind two objections can be raised to the approach to “Me” introduced here. The first one is as follows:

• simple (1) Speaking about the self/other distinction does not make sense in regard to experiences which are always “mine,” such as prioprioception or interoception. This special status may suggest that these modalities underpin the self as “I,” i.e., the subject of experience.

This idea is present in theoretical proposals postulating that subjectivity emerges based on (representations of) sensorimotor ( Gallagher, 2000 ; Christoff et al., 2011 ; Blanke et al., 2015 ) or interoceptive signals ( Damasio, 1999 ; Craig, 2010 ; Seth et al., 2011 ; Park and Tallon-Baudry, 2014 ; Salomon, 2017 ). There are two answers to this objection. First, the fact that this kind of experience (this kind of content of consciousness) is always felt as “my” experience simply means that all proprioceptive, interoceptive, pain experiences, etc., are as a matter of fact parts of “Me.” They are self-related contents of consciousness and hence naturally qualify as self-as-object. Furthermore, there is no principled reason why the fact that we normally do not experience them as belonging to someone else should transform them from objects of experience (content) into a subject of experience. Their special status may cause these experiences to be perceived as more central aspects of the self than experiences in other modalities, but there is no reason to think that it should change them from something that we experience into the self as an experiencer. Second, even the special status of these sensations can be called into question. It is possible to imagine a situation in which one experiences these kinds of sensations from an organ or a body which does not belong to her or him. We can imagine that with enough training one will learn to distinguish between proprioceptive signals coming from one’s body and those coming from another person’s (or artificial) body. If this is possible, then one may develop a phenomenal distinction between “my” versus “other’s” proprioceptive and interoceptive experiences (for example), and in this case the same rules of classification into phenomenal “Me” and phenomenal “not-Me” will apply as to other sensory modalities. This scenario is not realistic at the current point of technological development, but there are clinical examples which indirectly suggest that it may be possible. For example, people who underwent transplantation of an organ sometimes experience rejection of a transplant. Importantly, patients whose organisms reject an organ also more often experience psychological rejection of that transplant ( Látos et al., 2016 ). Moreover, there are rare cases in which patients following a successful surgery report that they perceive transplanted organs as foreign objects in themselves ( Goetzmann et al., 2009 ). In this case, affected people report experiencing a form of disownership of the implanted organ, suggesting that they may experience interoceptive signals coming from that transplant as having a phenomenal quality of being “not-mine,” leading to similar phenomenal quality as the one postulated in the before-mentioned thought experiment. Another example of a situation in which self-relatedness of interoception may be disrupted may be found in conjoint twins. In some variants of this developmental disorder (e.g., parapagus, dicephalus, thoracopagus) brains of two separate twins share some of the internal organs (and limbs), while others are duplicated and possessed by each twin individually ( Spencer, 2000 ; Kaufman, 2004 ). This provides an inverted situation to the one described in our hypothetical scenario – rather than two pieces of the same organ being “wired” to one person, the same organ (e.g., a heart, liver, stomach) is shared by two individuals. As such it may be simultaneously under control of two autonomous nervous systems. This situation raises challenging questions for theories which postulate that the root of self-as-subject lies in interoception. For example, if conjoint twins share the majority of internal organs, but possess mostly independent nervous systems, like dicephalus conjoint twins, then does it mean that they share the neural subjective frame ( Park and Tallon-Baudry, 2014 )? If the answer is yes, then does it mean that they share it numerically (both twins have one and the same subjective frame), or only qualitatively (their subjective frames are similar to the point of being identical, but they are distinct frames)? However, if interoception is just a part of “Me” then the answer becomes simple – the experiences can be only qualitatively identical, because they are experienced by two independent subjects.

All of these examples challenge the assumption that sensori-motor and interoceptive experiences are necessarily self-related and, as a consequence, that they can form the basis of self-as-subject. For this reason, it seems that signals coming from these modalities are more appropriate to underlie the phenomenal “Me,” for example in a form of background self-experience, or “phenomenal background” ( Dainton, 2008 , 2016 ), rather than the phenomenal “I.”

The second possible objection to the view of self-as-object described in this section is the following one:

• simple (2) My thoughts and feelings may have different objects, but they are always my thoughts and feelings. Therefore, their object may be either “me” or “other,” but their subject is always “I.” As a consequence, even though my thoughts and feelings constitute contents of my consciousness, they underlie the phenomenal “I” and not the phenomenal “Me.”

It seems to be conceptually misguided to speak about one’s thoughts and feelings as belonging to someone else. This intuition motivated Wittgenstein (1958) to write: “there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have toothache. To ask ‘are you sure it is you who have pains?’ “would be nonsensical” ( Wittgenstein, 1958 ). In the Blue Book, he introduced the distinction between the use of “I” as object and as subject (see Table ​ Table1 1 for a full relevant quote) and suggested that while we can be wrong about the former, making a mistake about the latter is not possible. This idea was further developed by Shoemaker (1968) who introduced an arguably conceptual truth that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun, or IEM in short. For example, when I say “I see a photo of my face in front of me” I may be mistaken about the fact that it is my face (because, e.g., it is a photo of my identical twin), but I cannot be mistaken that it is me who is looking at it. One way to read IEM is that it postulates that I can be mistaken about self-as-object, but I cannot be mistaken about self-as-subject. If this is correct then there is a radical distinction between these two types of self that provides a strong argument to individuate them. From that point, one may argue that IEM provides a decisive argument to distinguish between phenomenal “I” (self-as-subject) and phenomenal “Me” (self-as-object).

Before endorsing this conclusion, let us take a small step back. It is important to note that in the famous passage from the Blue Book Wittgenstein (1958) did not write about two distinct types of self. Instead, he wrote about two ways of using the word “I” (or “my”). As such, he was more concerned with issues in philosophy of language than philosophy of mind. Therefore, a natural question arises – to what extent does this linguistic distinction map onto a substantial distinction between two different entities (types of self)? On the face of it, it seems that there is an important difference between these two uses of self-referential words, which can be mapped onto the experience of being a self-as-subject and the experience of being a self-as-object (or, for example, the distinction between bodily ownership and thought authorship, as suggested by Liang, 2014 ). However, I will argue that there are reasons to believe that the phenomenal “I,” i.e., the experience of being a self-as-subject may be better conceptualized as a higher-order phenomenal “Me” – a higher-level self-as-object.

Psychiatric practice provides cases of people, typically suffering from schizophrenia, who describe experiences of dispossession of thoughts, known as delusions of thought insertion ( Young, 2008 ; Bortolotti and Broome, 2009 ; Martin and Pacherie, 2013 ). According to the standard account, the phenomenon of thought insertion does not represent a disruption of sense of ownership over one’s thoughts, but only loss of sense of agency over them. However, the standard account has been criticized in recent years by theorists arguing that thought insertion indeed represents loss of sense of ownership ( Metzinger, 2003 ; Billon, 2013 ; Guillot, 2017 ; López-Silva, 2017 ). One of the main arguments against the standard view is that it runs into serious problems when attempting to explain obsessive intrusive thoughts in clinical population and spontaneous thoughts in healthy people. In both cases, subjects report lack of agency over thoughts, although they never claim lack of ownership over them, i.e., that these are not their thoughts. However, if the standard account is correct, obsessive thoughts should be experienced as belonging to someone else. The fact that they are not suggests that something else must be disrupted in delusions of thought insertion, i.e., sense of ownership 5 over them. If one can lose sense of ownership over one’s thoughts then it has important implications, because then one becomes capable of experiencing one’s thoughts “as someone else’s,” or at least “as not-mine.” However, when I experience my thoughts as not-mine I do it because I’ve taken a stance towards my thoughts, which treats them as an object of deliberation. In other words, I must have “objectified” them to experience that they have a quality of “feeling as if they are not mine.” Consequently, if I experience them as objects of experience, then they cannot form part of my self as subject of experience, because these two categories are mutually exclusive. Therefore, what seemed to constitute a phenomenal “I” turns out to be a part of thephenomenal “Me.”

If my thoughts do not constitute the “I” then how do they fit into the structure of “Me”? Previously, I asserted that thoughts with self-related content constitute “Me,” while thoughts with non-self related content do not. However, just now I argued in favor of the claim that all thoughts (including the ones with non-self-related content) that are experienced as “mine” belong to “Me.” How can one resolve this contradiction?

A way to address this reservation can be found in Metzinger’s (2003 ; 2010 ) self-model theory. Metzinger (2003 , 2010 ) argues that the experience of the self can be understood as underpinned by representational self-models. These self-models, however, are embedded in the hierarchical representational structure, as illustrated by an account of ego dissolution by Letheby and Gerrans (2017) :

• simple  Savage suggests that on LSD “[changes] in body ego feeling usually precede changes in mental ego feeling and sometimes are the only changes” (1955, 11), (…) This common temporal sequence, from blurring of body boundaries and loss of sense of ownership for body parts through to later loss of sense of ownership for thoughts, speaks further to the hierarchical architecture of the self-model. ( Letheby and Gerrans, 2017 , p. 8)

If self-models underlying the experience of self-as-object (“Me”) are hierarchical, then the apparent contradiction may be easily explained by the fact that when speaking about the content of thoughts and the thoughts themselves we are addressing self-models at two distinct levels. At the lower level we can distinguish between thoughts with self-related content and other-related content, while on the higher level we can distinguish between thoughts that feel “mine” as opposed to thoughts that are not experienced as “mine.” As a result, this thinking phenomenal “I” experienced in feeling of ownership over one’s thoughts may be conceived as just a higher-order level of Jamesian “Me.” As such, one may claim that there is no such thing as a phenomenal “I,” just multilevel phenomenal “Me.” However, an objection can be raised here. One may claim that even though a person with schizophrenic delusions experiences her thoughts as someone else’s (a demon’s or some malicious puppet master’s), she can still claim that:

Yes, “I” experience my thoughts as not mine, but as demon’s.” My thoughts feel as “not-mine,” however, it’s still me (or: “I”) who thinks of them as “not-mine.”

As such, one escapes “objectification” of “I” into “Me” by postulating a higher-level phenomenal-“I.” However, let us keep in mind that the thought written above constitutes a valid thought by itself. As such, this thought is vulnerable to the theoretical possibility that it turns into a delusion itself, once a psychotic person forms a meta-delusion (delusion about delusion). In this case, one may begin to experience that: “I” (I 1 ) experience that the “fake I” (I 2 ), who is a nasty pink demon, experiences my thoughts as not mine but as someone else’s (e.g., as nasty green demon’s). In this case, I may claim that the real phenomenal “I” is I 1 , since it is at the top of the hierarchy. However, one may repeat the operation of forming meta-delusions ad infinitum (as may happen in psychosis or drug-induced psychedelic states) effectively transforming each phenomenal “I” into another “fake-I” (and consequently making it a part of “Me”).

The possibility of meta-delusions illustrates that the phenomenal “I” understood as subjective thoughts is permanently vulnerable to the threat of losing the apparent subjective character and becoming an object of experience. As such it seems to be a poor choice for the locus of subjectivity, since it needs to be constantly “on the run” from becoming treated as an object of experience, not only in people with psychosis, but also in all psychologically healthy individuals if they decide to reflect on their thoughts. Therefore, it seems more likely that the thoughts themselves cannot constitute the subject of experience. However, even in case of meta-delusions there seems to be a stable deeper-level subjectivity, let us call it the deep “I,” which is preserved, at least until one loses consciousness. After all, a person who experiences meta-delusions would be constantly (painfully) aware of the process, and often would even report it afterwards. This deep “I” cannot be a special form of content in the stream of consciousness, because otherwise it would be vulnerable to becoming a part of “Me.” Therefore, it must be something different.

There seem to be two places where one can look for this deep “I”: in the domain of phenomenology or metaphysics. The first approach has been taken by ( Zahavi and Kriegel, 2016 ) who argue that “all conscious states’ phenomenal character involves for-me-ness as an experiential constituent.” It means that even if we rule out everything else (e.g., bodily experiences, conscious thoughts), we are still left with some form of irreducible phenomenal self-experience. This for-me-ness is not a specific content of consciousness, but rather “refers to the distinct manner, or how , of experiencing” ( Zahavi, 2014 ).

This approach, however, may seem inflationary and not satisfying (e.g., Dainton, 2016 ). One reason for this is that it introduces an additional phenomenal dimension, which may lead to uncomfortable consequences. For example, a question arises whether for-me-ness can ever be lost or replaced with the “ how of experiencing” of another person. For example, can I experience my sister’s for-me-ness in my stream of consciousness? If yes, then how is for-me-ness different from any other content of consciousness? And if the answer is no, then how is it possible to distil the phenomenology of for-me-ness from the metaphysical fact that a given stream of consciousness is always experienced by this and not other subject?

An alternative approach to the problem of the deep “I” is to reject that the subject of experience, the “I,” is present in phenomenology (like Hume, 1739/2000 ; Prinz, 2012 ; Dainton, 2016 ), and look for it somewhere else, in the domain of metaphysics. Although James (1890) did not explicitly formulate the distinction between “Me” and “I” as the distinction between the phenomenal and the metaphysical self, he hinted at it at several points, for example when he concluded the Chapter on the self with the following fragment: “(...) a postulate, an assertion that there must be a knower correlative to all this known ; and the problem who that knower is would have become a metaphysical problem” ( James, 1890 , p. 401).

“I” As A Subject Of Experience: Metaphysics Of Subjectivity

Thoughts which we actually know to exist do not fly about loose, but seem each to belong to some one thinker and not to another ( James, 1890 , pp. 330–331).

Let us assume that phenomenal consciousness exists in nature, and that it is a part of the reality we live in. The problem of “I” emerges once we realize that one of the fundamental characteristics of phenomenal consciousness is that it is always subjective, that there always seems to be some subject of experience. It seems mistaken to conceive of consciousness which do “fly about loose,” devoid of subjective character, devoid of being someone’s or something’s consciousness. Moreover, it seems that subjectivity may be one of the fundamental inherent properties of conscious experience (similar notions can be found in: Berkeley, 1713/2012 ; Strawson, 2003 ; Searle, 2005 ; Dainton, 2016 ). It seems highly unlikely, if not self-contradictory, that there exists something like an objective conscious experience of “what it is like to be a bat” ( Nagel, 1974 ), which is not subjective in any way. This leads to the metaphysical problem of the self: why is all conscious experience subjective, and what or who is the subject of this experience? Let us call it the problem of the metaphysical “I,” as contrasted with the problem of the phenomenal “I” (i.e., is there a distinctive experience of being a self as a subject of experience, and if so, then what is this experience?), which we discussed so far.

The existence of the metaphysical “I” does not entail the existence of the phenomenal self. It is possible to imagine a creature that possesses a metaphysical “I,” but does not possess any sense of self. In such a case, the creature would possess consciousness, although it would not experience anything as “me,” nor entertain any thoughts/feelings, etc., as “I.” In other words, it is a possibility that one may not experience self-related content of consciousness, while being a sentient being. One example of such situation may be the experience of a dreamless sleep, which “is characterized by a dissolution of subject-object duality, or (…) by a breakdown of even the most basic form of the self-other distinction” ( Windt, 2015 ). This is a situation which can be regarded as an instance of the state of minimal phenomenal experience – the simplest form of conscious experience possible ( Windt, 2015 ; Metzinger, 2018 ), in which there is no place for even the most rudimentary form of “Me.” Another example may be the phenomenology of systems with grid-like architectures which, according to the integrated information theory (IIT, Tononi et al., 2016 ), possess conscious experience 6 . If IIT is correct, then these systems experience some form of conscious states, which most likely lack any phenomenal distinction between “Me” and “not-Me.” However, because they may possess a stream of conscious experience, and conscious experience is necessarily subjective, there remains a valid question: who or what is the subject of that experience?

The question of what exactly is the metaphysical subject of experience can have different answers. There has been a long history of theories of the self ( Barresi and Martin, 2011 ) and some of them directly address this issue. Platonic or Cartesian notions of the soul are good examples of an approach providing one answer to this question: conscious experience is subjective, because there exists a non-material being (self, soul) which is the subject of this experience (see Table ​ Table3 3 ). Other solutions tend to either define the self in less metaphysically expensive ways ( Johnston, 1987 ; Strawson, 2000 ; Dainton, 2008 ), define it as a formal feature of consciousness ( Searle, 2005 ), or deny the need to postulate its existence ( Metzinger, 2003 ). What is crucial here, however, is that the problem of the metaphysical self is a different issue and requires a different methodology, than the problem of the phenomenal self.

Examples of theories of the self-as-subject (“I”) in the context of consciousness, as theories of the metaphysical self, with representative quotes illustrating each position.

What sort of methodology, then, is appropriate for investigating the metaphysical self? It seems that the most relevant methods come from the toolbox of metaphysics. This toolbox includes classical philosophical methods such as thought experiments and logical analysis. However, methodology of metaphysics is an area of open discussion, and at present there are no signs of general consensus. One of the most debated issues in this field, which is especially relevant here, is to what extent the methodology of metaphysics is continuous with the methodology of natural sciences (see Tahko, 2015 , Chapter 9 for an overview). The positions span the spectrum between the claim that science and metaphysics are fully autonomous on the one side and the claim that metaphysics can be fully naturalized on the other. Discussing this issue goes way beyond the scope of this paper. However, if these two areas are at least to some extent related (i.e., not fully autonomous), then one may argue that scientific methods can be at least of some relevance in metaphysics and consequently for investigations of the metaphysical “I.”

One example in which empirical results seem to be able to influence theoretical investigations of the metaphysical self is through imposing constraints on philosophical theories. For example, because the metaphysical self is inherently related to consciousness, we should expect that different theories of consciousness should place different constraints on what a metaphysical self can be. Then, if one theory of consciousness acquires stronger empirical support than the others, we can also treat this as evidence for the constraints on the self that this theory implies.

Let us look at an example of IIT to illustrate this point. According to IIT ( Oizumi et al., 2014 ; Tononi et al., 2016 ) the content of conscious experience is defined by the so-called informational “complex” which is characterized by maximally integrated information (which can be measured by calculating the value of Φ max ). This complex then defines the stream of conscious experience. However, what happens if there is more than one such complex in one person? In this case, as Tononi et al. (2016) wrote:

According to IIT, two or more non-overlapping complexes may coexist as discrete physical substrates of consciousness (PSCs) within a single brain, each with its own definite borders and value of Φ max . The complex that specifies a person’s day to day stream of consciousness should have the highest value of Φ max – that is, it should be the “major” complex. In some conditions, for example, after a split-brain operation, the major complex may split. In such instances, one consciousness, supported by a complex in the dominant hemisphere and with privileged access to Broca’s area, would be able to speak about the experience, but would remain unaware of the presence of another consciousness, supported by a complex in the other hemisphere, which can be revealed by carefully designed experiments. ( Tononi et al., 2016 , p. 455)

This fragment suggests that in IIT the metaphysical “I” can be understood as tied to a complex of maximally integrated information. In this case, a split-brain patient would possess two metaphysical selves, because as a consequence of an operation her or his brain hosts two such complexes. On the face of it, it seems to be a plausible situation ( cf. Bayne, 2010 ). However, in the sentence which immediately follows, Tononi et al. (2016) suggest that:

• simple  An intriguing possibility is that splitting of the PSC may also occur in healthy people during long-lasting dual-task conditions – for example, when driving in an auto-pilot like manner on a familiar road while listening to an engaging conversation ( Tononi et al., 2016 , p. 455)

The implications of this possibility are much more severe, because it postulates that in a matter of minutes or seconds a complex can dynamically divide into several complexes, and individual complexes can merge into one major complex. How do the complexes understood in this way then relate to the metaphysical “I”? Unfortunately, IIT is silent about this issue, but there seem to be at least two responses to this question. First, one may argue that the self does not need to be limited to one complex, but that the same metaphysical “I” can be present in all of the simultaneous streams of consciousness (complexes). However, this solution is at odds with both common-sense intuition and IIT itself. It would presuppose not only an extremely disunified view of consciousness, but even lead to self-contradictory consequences. The metaphysical “I” can be thought of as the metaphysical fact that any given stream of consciousness is subjectively experienced by some “self” (regardless of what that self might be). However, in a disunified view of an organism’s consciousness this metaphysical “I” would at the same time a) be the subject of experience of all of the complexes within this organism, and b) be the subject of experience of only one of these complexes while being blind to the others (as claimed by IIT: two complexes are not “co-conscious” with each other). It presents a contradiction and strongly suggests that the metaphysical “I” cannot be underpinned by multiple independent complexes. It leaves us with the second option, which is to bite the bullet and accept that IIT implies that the metaphysical “I” persists either as long as a given complex, or for an even shorter period of time, for example for just up to a few seconds, as suggested by Strawson (2000 , 2010 ). It means that if IIT (and the analysis outlined above) is correct then the metaphysical “I” turns out to be radically different from our intuitive understanding of subject-of-experience as persisting continuously life-long stream of consciousness. However, if empirical evidence in support of the current version of IIT becomes strong enough, it may suggest that our common-sense intuitions about self-as-subject may be mistaken. On the other hand, different theories of phenomenal consciousness (and even different versions of IIT) may imply different constraints on the metaphysical “I,” and the extent to which they are supported by empirical evidence may suggest a way to say something about what the subject of conscious experience is.

Overall, assuming that metaphysics is not fully independent from science, the relevant methodology for investigating the metaphysical “I” is a combination of toolboxes of metaphysics and empirical science. This contrasts with the phenomenal “Me,” where the relevant toolkit includes methods from phenomenology and science. The second point, which has been illustrated with an example of IIT, is that it is important to explicitly spell out the implications of different theories of consciousness in regard to what is the subject of conscious experience, as it may provide the best way forward towards solving this issue.

Understanding Predictive Coding Theories Of The Self

Recently, there has been a huge number of attempts to explain the self through the framework of predictive coding (PC) and the free energy principle (FEP). In this final section of the paper, I will use PC theories of the self as a working example demonstrating practical consequences of implementing the Jamesian distinction between “Me” and “I.” I will suggest that PC theories of the self target different dimensions of self-as-object, understood as a hierarchical structure of self-models ( Metzinger, 2003 , 2010 ), and as such provide a valuable framework to understand the self. However, I will also explain why PC and the FEP do not allow us to say much about self-as-subject (the metaphysical “I”).

According to PC, the brain can be understood as an inference machine which hosts and continuously updates a probabilistic model of the world, which it uses to infer hidden causes behind the sensory data (for a more detailed introduction see: Friston et al., 2006 ; Friston, 2009 , 2010 ; Friston and Kiebel, 2009 ; Hohwy, 2013 ; Clark, 2016 ). It accomplishes this by continuously issuing predictions and comparing them with sensory data, with the discrepancy between predictions and data being propagated further up the hierarchy as prediction errors. As such, PC postulates that the brain can be seen as a hierarchical structure of generative models (which are responsible for issuing predictions). Prediction errors which arise at lower levels serve as data to be compared with predictions at the higher levels. This view of the mind inverts the classical feedforward view in which perception is a predominantly bottom-up process. In PC, instead, perception is mostly driven by top-down predictions, with bottom-up prediction errors serving the function of feedback helping to choose model with the most explanatory power. Moreover, in an extension of PC, which is known as active inference, action is also understood as a way of maximizing the fit of one’s internal models to reality. The main idea behind active inference is that rather than changing the model in order to better fit the data, one can act on the world and change it according to predictions issued by the currently dominating model. As a consequence, the whole perception-action cycle can be understood as driven by one overarching goal, i.e., long-term minimization of prediction errors.

The FEP is a further generalization of PC. It postulates that all living organisms operate under the principle to minimize the so-called “variational free energy,” which is an information theoretical measure which roughly can be understood as a measure of uncertainty ( Friston et al., 2006 ; Friston, 2009 ). One of the main claims of this theory is that organisms which act according to FEP (i.e., they act in a way to minimize free energy in the long term) will, in effect, implicitly approximate Bayesian inference. It means that they will combine their prior knowledge (represented by their model of the world) with the incoming sensory input in a mathematically optimal way.

Both PC and the FEP have recently gained huge popularity and motivated a number of theories attempting to explain various aspects of cognition within this framework. It includes numerous attempts to understand different facets of the self, such as sense of bodily ownership ( Apps and Tsakiris, 2014 ), sense of self in agency and perception ( Hohwy, 2007 ), the influence of interoception on self-consciousness ( Seth et al., 2011 ; Seth, 2013 ), social aspects of the self ( Moutoussis et al., 2014 ; Friston and Frith, 2015 ), the relationship with minimal phenomenal selfhood ( Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013 ), and even psychodynamical interpretations of the self ( Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010 ; Fotopoulou, 2012 ). The most comprehensive treatment of the self from the PC perspective ( Hohwy and Michael, 2017 ) also exemplifies most of the crucial points made by other PC theories of the self. At the beginning of their paper Hohwy and Michael (2017) describe the self in the following words:

• simple  We use a general computational framework for brain function to develop a theory of the self. The theory is that the self is an inferred model of endogenous, deeply hidden causes of behavior. (…) we discuss why such a set of hidden endogenous causes should qualify as a self. ( Hohwy and Michael, 2017 , p. 363)

The self, as seen from this perspective, is essentially a hierarchical model of endogenous hidden causes of sensory input. Or, in more classical terms, it can be said that it is a hierarchical representational structure ( cf. Clark, 2016 ; Williams, 2017 ) which allows one to distinguish between endogenous causes (what is caused by me) and exogenous causes (what is caused by something else). This distinction can be illustrated with an example of a comparison between seeing a movement of my virtual hand and of a virtual hand of someone else. If adequately prepared, in both cases the image of a hand and its movement may be identical. However, in one case I can realize that the movement of the hand is congruent with my intentions (manifested through my actions performed using a computer controller) and, as a consequence, infer that the cause of the hand’s movement is me. On the other hand, I may fail to notice any congruence between my intentions and the movement and hence infer that the hidden cause behind the movement I observe is some other person. According to Hohwy and Michael (2017) , the self is just a set of such hidden endogenous causes. Although not necessarily in full agreement with this picture in regard to the details, all other PC theories of the self listed above also speak about the self as underpinned by hierarchy of generative models, which are preoccupied with conducting probabilistic inference aimed to infer hidden causes of observed data patterns. This inference is then postulated to underlie specific types of conscious self-experience, i.e., different facets of the sense of self.

As such, one common theme among all PC theories of the self is the following: aspects of conscious experience of the self are underpinned by a representational structure in the form of hierarchical generative models. In its core, it is the same idea as the one introduced earlier by Metzinger (2003 , 2010 ), i.e., that our phenomenal experience of the self is underpinned by a representational structure of unconscious self-models (see also: Crane, 2003 ; Chalmers, 2004 , for a discussion about the relationship between representational and conscious content). Once an unconscious self-model enters conscious awareness, it generates a corresponding self-related conscious content (see: Metzinger, 2006 , 2014 , for an explicit distinction between the levels of representations and conscious content in regard to the bodily self). The same mechanism is at work in PC theories – the dynamic process of model selection leads to suppression of some models but allows other models to enter awareness in the form of conscious content. This mechanism allows PC to explain self-related content of consciousness, which is essentially nothing else than the James’ (1890) self-as-object of experience. This is how PC and the FEP help to understand the phenomenal “Me” – by describing the structure and dynamics of the underlying representational architecture.

To what extent PC and FEP can provide us with any help when confronted with the task to explain the metaphysical “I”? Here, I will argue that in contrast to the phenomenal “Me,” the issues pertaining to the metaphysical “I” are outside of its reach. The reason for this is a consequence of the fact that PC is in principle agnostic in regard to the issue of what brings representational content into the scope of conscious experience. In general, this can be regarded as an advantage, because this way PC accounts of self-experience can avoid the burden of being hostage to any specific theory of consciousness, and stay in principle compatible with most of them (e.g., see Hohwy, 2013 , Chapter 10 for an attempt to combine PC with ideas from Global Neuronal Workspace theory: Dehaene and Changeux, 2011 ; Dehaene, 2014 ). However, it also makes PC fundamentally underspecified when treated as a theory which is used to explain issues related to consciousness. While, as suggested before, PC is a valuable framework to describe the representational structure underlying conscious content, it runs into problems when used to explain why certain content is conscious in the first place. One way in which PC and FEP can attempt to retain relevance is by aiming to explain access consciousness ( Block, 1995 ) – a functional mechanism which allows that “some of the attended information eventually enters our awareness and becomes reportable to others” ( Dehaene, 2014 ). However, the problem of the metaphysical “I” becomes a relevant issue only when approached in the context of phenomenal consciousness – the type of consciousness which is loaded with the burden of the so-called “hard problem” ( Chalmers, 1996 ).

This is where PS and FEP encounter a dead end, as the problem enters the area which belongs more to metaphysics than empirical science (at least in the light of the current state of affairs). In order to provide an account of the metaphysical self, one needs to begin with at least some form of a theory of phenomenal consciousness and its place in physical reality. At present FEP (and PC) does not provide such a theory. Recently, Friston (2018) suggested that FEP can be used to understand consciousness, although the fact that he discusses consciousness in functionalist terms (consciousness is related to counterfactual inference 7 ) suggests that his proposal aims to explain access consciousness, making it irrelevant for the problem of metaphysical “I.”

To summarize, the fact that PC and the FEP are not theories of phenomenal consciousness, and seem not to impose any constraints on these theories, has important consequences for what type of self they can explain. As I argued, they have the potential to substantially contribute to the issue of different levels of the phenomenal “Me” (self-as-object) by describing the structure and dynamics of the level of representational content, which are reflected at the level of conscious experience. However, they are not suited to explain the metaphysical “I” (self-as-subject) because they do not address the issue of the place of consciousness in nature. Hence, the main claim is that while PC can be seen as a useful framework to investigate phenomenology of “Me,” it is in principle unsuitable to provide answers to questions about the metaphysics of “I.”

I placed the debate of the self in the domain of consciousness (as opposed to the self understood as e.g., a representational structure, a physical object, or a spiritual entity) and argued that (1) conceptually, the distinction between “Me” and “I” may reflect the distinction between theoretical problems of the phenomenal self and the metaphysical self, respectively (although the notion of for-me-ness may complicate this picture), and (2) that what is described in the literature as the phenomenal “I” can be regarded as just a higher-level part of the phenomenal “Me” [which can be understood as Metzinger’s (2018) phenomenal self-model].

The first claim draws attention to the distinction between “I” and “Me,” which suggests that these two theoretical issues should be investigated independently, using two different methodologies. While “Me” can be investigated using phenomenology and scientific methodology, “I” is typically a metaphysical problem (perhaps with the exception of non-deflationary understandings of for-me-ness) and it is arguable to what extent it can be approached using standard scientific methods. Therefore, it is important to clearly state which problem one approaches when discussing the self in the context of consciousness (see Tables ​ Tables2 2 , ​ 3 3 for some examples).

The second claim, the postulate to treat what is usually described as phenomenal “I” as just a part of the phenomenal “Me,” has two implications. The first is constructive. Investigating issues which are typically regarded in cognitive science as “I” from the perspective of “Me” may contribute towards better understanding of self-consciousness by emphasizing that these two research areas may have much more in common than it appears. Rather than using two distinct terms, which suggest that we are dealing with two fundamentally different problems, we may approach them as just two facets of the same multidimensional research problem. One such approach is to treat both of them as just different levels in the hierarchical structure of the phenomenal self-model ( Metzinger, 2003 , 2009 , 2010 ), an approach which can be (and implicitly is) shared by recent theories of the self, especially within the framework of PC.

The second implication is pragmatic. Refraining from using the term “I” when speaking in the context of phenomenology and using it only in the metaphysical context may reduce conceptual confusion in regard to this term. However, it will also mean forfeiting an important distinction (“Me” versus “I”) which has already gained traction in cognitive science. As such, the choice to eliminate the term “I” in the context of phenomenology is a repelling option, but may be beneficial in the long term. Alternatively, one may use more specific terms, such as “sense of ownership over an experience” to reflect what is meant by “I” in the Wittgensteinian tradition, or, e.g., “sense of ownership of interoceptive signals” when discussing the role of interoception. A second option may be to recast the distinction used in cognitive science in different terms. One proposal is to explicitly speak about it as the distinction between the experience/sense of “Me” versus the experience/sense of “I” (rather than just “Me” and “I”). The task here would be, however, to prove that there is a qualitative difference between them, and to demarcate the exact border.

Author Contributions

The article has been solely the work of MW.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Jakob Hohwy, Tim Bayne, Jennifer Windt, Monima Chadha, and the members of Cognition and Philosophy Lab at Monash University (especially Julian Matthews) for discussions about the issues described in the paper. The author also wants to thank the reviewers and the editor for helpful comments on how to improve the manuscript.

Funding. This article was supported by the Australian Research Council Grant No. DP160102770.

1 Therefore, whenever I use the term “I" I mean self-as-subject (of experience), and whenever I use the term “Me" I mean self-as-object (of experience). This assumption reflects James’ (1890) understanding of these terms (see Table ​ Table1 1 ). I also assume, following James (1890) , that these two categories are mutually exclusive, i.e., if something is an object of experience then it cannot simultaneously be a subject of experience, and vice versa.

2 Wittgenstein (1958) himself did not discuss the issue of phenomenology of the self. However, his approach to the distinction between the use of “I” as subject and “I” as object can be seen as a starting point for contemporary discussions of phenomenology of the self-as-subject.

3 Whenever I use the prefix “phenomenal” I mean “the conscious experience of.” For example, when I write phenomenal “I”, I mean: the conscious experience of self as subject of experience (“I”). In a similar fashion I use the prefix “metaphysical” when I mean “the metaphysical entity of.”

4 Chalmers (1996) also lists “sense of self,” although it is highly controversial whether it can be treated as a distinctive type of conscious content.

5 Sometimes referred to as sense of authorship.

6 “IIT allows for certain simple systems such as grid-like architectures, similar to topographically organized areas in the human posterior cortex, to be highly conscious even when not engaging in any intelligent behavior” ( Tononi et al., 2016 , p. 460).

7 For example, he writes: “So where does consciousness emerge? The proposal offered here is that conscious processing has a temporal thickness or depth, which underwrites inferences about the consequences of action. This necessarily lends inference a purposeful and self-evidencing aspect that has the hallmarks of consciousness” ( Friston, 2018 , p. 1).

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Home / Essay Samples / Sociology / Sex, Gender and Sexuality / Understanding My Sexual Self: A Journey of Self-Discovery

Understanding My Sexual Self: A Journey of Self-Discovery

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• Topic: Finding Yourself , Personality , Sex, Gender and Sexuality

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