philosophy abortion essay

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

Publications
Account settings

Preview improvements coming to the PMC website in October 2024. Learn More or Try it out now .

Advanced Search
Journal List
Asian Bioeth Rev
v.14(1); 2022 Jan

The Moral Significance of Abortion Inconsistency Arguments

William simkulet.

1 Park University, Parkville, MO USA

2 Dodge City Community College, Dodge City, KS USA

Most opponents of abortion (OA) believe fetuses matter . Critics argue that OA act inconsistently with regards to fetal life, seeking to restrict access to induced abortion, but largely ignoring spontaneous abortion and the creation of surplus embryos by IVF. Nicholas Colgrove, Bruce Blackshaw, and Daniel Rodger call such arguments inconsistency arguments and contend they do not matter. They present three objections to these arguments — the other beliefs, other actions, and hypocrisy objection. Previously, I argued these objections fail and threaten to undermine ethical inquiry. Colgrove et al. have recently replied, but here, I argue their reply fails as well and raises a new criticism of the other actions’ objection. This essay sets out to show, as well as any philosophical argument can, that inconsistency arguments are morally significant.

Introduction

Nicholas Colgrove, Bruce Blackshaw, and Daniel Rodger ( 2020 ) set out to show that inconsistency arguments “do not matter”; by inconsistency argument , they mean to pick out a variety (Fleck 1979 ; Murphy 1985 ; Ord 2008 ; Lovering 2013 , 2014 , 2017 , 2020 ; Berg 2017 ; Simkulet 2016 , 2017 , 2019a , b , c , 2020 ; Bovens 2006 ; Schlumpf 2019 ) of disparate criticisms identifying apparent inconsistencies in how opponents of abortion (OA) treat fetuses. Unfortunately, this term is misleading, as practically all philosophical arguments involve identifying some form of inconsistency, confusion, or misunderstanding.

Critics of the prolife anti-abortion position argue that OA hold inconsistent moral beliefs; they claim to believe that fetuses are persons from conception, but they neglect the welfare of fetuses who are spontaneously aborted by natural causes, and overlook the well-being of the surplus frozen human embryos created for IVF. Perhaps the strangest argument that Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) label as an inconsistency argument comes from Sister Joan Chittister (Schlumpf 2019 ), who chastises those who call themselves “pro-life” for neglecting the welfare of born persons. Proponents of inconsistency arguments argue that OA hold inconsistent moral beliefs, arguing that upon revision, they will conclude that they either (i) need to do more, or (ii) need not oppose abortion.

Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) contend that such arguments “do not matter.” This paper interprets this as the claim that inconsistency arguments are morally irrelevant for any (widely held) OA view. This paper will show that such arguments are morally relevant to the most widely held OA position.

Another way to read Colgrove et al. is as claiming they “do not matter” because they cannot show that OA need to adopt (ii) over (i). They say, “Inconsistency arguments simply are not equipped to undermine OAs’ views; at most, they reveal what OAs should do (or believe).” (Colgrove et al. 2020 ) This is uncharitable. First, while some inconsistency theorists (Ord 2008 ; Berg 2017 ) might believe that OA do not really believe fetuses are persons from conception, these arguments identify apparent inconsistency, but need not take a stance on how OA ought to resolve this inconsistency. Second, even if OA choose (i) and conclude they ought to do more to prevent spontaneous abortion (education, research, increased access to healthcare (Simkulet 2017 , 2020 ), and perhaps a major shift in social priorities (Ord 2008 ; Berg 2017 ), and more for surplus IVF embryos (adoption, and gestation (Lovering 2020 ; Blackshaw and Colgrove 2020 ; Blackshaw 2021 ), this matters . Colgrove et al. jest that if OA embrace option (i) it would “make the world a (much) worse place (from the critic’s perspective)”; but fail to note that it would make the world a much better place from the perspective of OA!

Complicating matters, there seems to be disagreement among Colgrove, Blackshaw, and Rodger regarding what opposition to abortion requires. Notably, Bruce Blackshaw ( 2021 , 166) contends that Christians ought to act as neighbors, and offers a robust, clear account of what this requires:

Treating frozen embryos as neighbors requires securing them a life like ours through adoption and gestation, and as well as opposing abortion, Christians must work toward this goal for the vast numbers of frozen embryos that would otherwise be discarded.

Blackshaw and Rodger ( 2019 ) attempt to justify OA disinterest in spontaneous abortion, claiming that most cases of spontaneous abortion are not currently preventable; but Blackshaw ( 2021 ) notes that “if we regard all human life as equally valuable, we have at least some obligation toward helping reduce deaths from spontaneous abortion where possible”.

This paper argues that inconsistency arguments matter. It is divided into three main sections. The first draws a distinction between restrictivist and moralist views on abortion, arguing only restrictivist views are OA. The second sets out to defend my earlier criticism (Simkulet 2021 ) of the other beliefs, other actions, and hypocrisy objections from Blackshaw et al.’s ( 2021 ) recent response. The third offers a new argument against the other actions objection; I argue that if this objection were to succeed, it would undermine restrictivist opposition to abortion.

Opposition to Abortion

On miscarriage.

Before his collaboration (Colgrove et al. 2020 ) with Blackshaw and Rodger, Colgrove ( 2019 ) raised a different criticism of Berg’s ( 2017 ) inconsistency argument. Berg argues that because miscarriage is so common, if we believe fetuses matter , we ought to devote more medical resources to protecting them. Colgrove replies that “miscarriage is not a cause of death,” but rather “it is an outcome.” Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) accuse me of the same error.

This is rather uncharitable, but it also misses two key points common in inconsistency arguments. First, if OA believe that fetuses matter, one would expect them to be concerned with both spontaneous and induced abortion, as both are tragic. Second, even if spontaneous abortion has many disparate causes, there may be a common solution. For example, Aspirin can treat a wide variety of conditions, from scraped knee to eye strain to migraine. Many proposals inconsistency theorists discuss (for example, education, gene therapy, and ectogenesis technology) would prevent spontaneous abortion by many different causes. In short, even if miscarriage is not a single cause of death, there is good reason to think a single solution might address many different cases, saving many fetal lives.

On Opposition to Abortion

To play on Colgrove, note that opposition to abortion is not a moral theory, it is an action or stance one can take toward abortion. There are many reasons why one might oppose abortion; one might merely find the word “abortion” to be distasteful, might oppose abortion on teleological grounds, argue that it is outside the scope of medicine, or that it violates the Hippocratic Oath.

However, most opposition to abortion rests on a single belief. Judith Jarvis Thomson ( 1972 ) says, “Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception.” Don Marquis ( 1989 ) says “Many of the most insightful and careful writers on the ethics of abortion… believe that whether or not abortion is morally permissible stands or falls on whether or not a fetus is the sort of being whose life it is seriously wrong to end.”

In short, most opposition to abortion turns on the belief that a fetus matters from conception (or soon afterwards (Marquis 2007 , 2013 ); that the fetus is morally comparable to an adult human person. This view is usually abbreviated as the view that fetuses are persons, broadly construed to mean one of many disparate theories about moral status; that human fetuses are human organisms (Mulder 2013 ), rational substances (Lee and George 2005 ; Beckwith 2007 ; George and Tollefsen 2008 ; Friberg-Fernros 2015 ), have a possible future it would be wrong to deprive them of Marquis 1989 ; Stone 1987 ), etc.

Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) seek to show that inconsistency arguments are morally irrelevant for any (widely held) anti-abortion view, and there seems to be widespread consensus the most widely held anti-abortion view claims fetuses are persons, broadly construed, from conception (PAC). This paper defends the position that inconsistency arguments are morally relevant to the PAC view.

Restrictivism and Moralism

It will be practical to distinguish between two groups of anti-abortion positions — Restrictivism (Davis 1984 ; Carroll and Crutchfield Forthcoming ), the view that we should adopt social policies that restrict a woman’s access to induced abortion, and Moralism , the view that abortion is merely immoral, but that we do not need adopt Restrictivist social policies.

It is not hard to see why PAC theorists might embrace restrictivism. On this view, fetuses are comparable to adult human persons, and society has adopted policies aimed at protecting the rights of adult human persons, so it is prima facie plausible that we should adopt similar social policies regarding fetuses. However, Thomson ( 1972 ) demonstrates that it is not enough to show that fetuses merely have a right to life by way of the violinist case:

Violinist: The Society of Music Lovers kidnaps you and attaches your circulatory system to a famous, innocent, unconscious violinist suffering from a kidney ailment that will kill him unless he remains connected to your kidneys for nine months. (Adapted)

The violinist obviously has a right to life, but Thomson argues that the right to life does not give him the right to use your body; it is morally permissible for you to disconnect yourself from the violinist. Thomson says it would be a “great kindness” to stay attached to the violinist but that you do not have to accede to this.

Disconnecting the violinist from your body is comparable to disconnecting a patient from life support to let him die. Restrictivists might argue that induced abortion is not a matter of letting die; but of killing; but this will not do, as one can terminate a pregnancy without killing the fetus by severing the umbilical cord or removing the uterus, “merely” letting the fetus die. If this distinction mattered, restrictivists would not be anti-abortion, they would merely oppose how most abortions are currently performed.

Thomson shows it is not enough for restrictivists to believe fetuses are persons with a right to life, they must also believe something more , that (a) the fetus’s right to life is a positive right to assistance, or (b) the gestational mother somehow comes to have a special obligation to provide assistance to the fetus. She argues that this special obligation cannot be explained by merely risking the chance of pregnancy, as this would imply any woman who leaves the house without a hysterectomy has consented to pregnancy, even by rape. Furthermore, David Boonin ( 2002 ) argues that even if one consents to provide aid, one can withdraw consent.

Bone Marrow: Your neighbor is diagnosed with a condition that will kill him unless he receives monthly bone marrow transplants over the course of nine months from a match. You are a match and you agree to donate. However, it soon becomes clear that these surgeries ask more than you are willing to give, and you refuse to go in for the second surgery. (Adapted)

These thought experiments demonstrate that restrictivists must do more than argue fetuses are persons, they must argue that the fetus has a positive right to assistance.

However, one can believe abortion is immoral without believing we ought to adopt restrictivist social policies. There are many prima facie immoral things that it would be inappropriate to restrict by law. For example, I think most of us would agree that it is prima facie immoral to waste scarce resources, but that individuals might have a right to do so in some cases. One might hold that it is wrong to waste food without holding that throwing away leftovers should be illegal. Similarly, one might hold that adultery outside of an open marriage is immoral, but that adopting social policies that restrict such behavior would be undesirable, in part, because they are difficult to enforce, and in part because it might incentivize other immoral behavior, such as murdering one’s spouse to keep one’s adultery secret.

Moralism is the view that abortion is often, all things considered, immoral, but does not require that we adopt social policies that restrict woman’s access to abortion. There are many reasons why moralists might reject restrictivism independent of Thomson and Boonin-style concerns.

For example, restrictivist views have a hard time making exceptions for rape cases, despite the fact that many restrictivists believe such exceptions should be made. Rape victims are often reluctant to report rape and reluctant to take medical exams. Convictions in rape cases are difficult to obtain, especially within the short window in which inducing abortion would be medically preferable. As such, restrictivists face a dilemma – (a) if they require proof of rape, then few rape victims are allowed to abort; while (b) if they do not require proof of rape, they encourage women to merely say they were raped (whether true or not), failing to prevent most induced abortions and encouraging deception.

Restrictivists face a similar challenge with regards to self-defense, as all pregnancies are medically risky. The prospect of drawing a nonarbitrary line with regards to legally obligatory medical risk is dubious, but even if such a task could be achieved, those physicians sympathetic to abortion might overestimate risk and those opposing abortion might underestimate or ignore risk. Furthermore, medical risk of abortion increases with malnutrition and other medical emergencies, so those seeking abortion on medical grounds are incentivized to harm themselves to pass this threshold.

In light of these, and other, difficulties, many people who believe abortion are immoral reject restrictivism and adopt moralism. Notably, moralists need not hold that fetuses have a positive right to assistance, like restrictivists. I have contended (Simkulet 2021 ) that most OA believe fetuses have a positive right to assistance — that most OA are restrictivists. Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) claim that I miss “the target,” as one can be an OA without being committed to the belief that fetuses have a positive right to assistance.

Perhaps Colgrove et al. wish OA to pick out both restrictivist and moralist positions, but this will not do. Although moralists believe induced abortion is immoral, they are prochoice, while Colgrove et al. identify OA as prolife. Perhaps Colgrove et al. mean to say restrictivism does not require the belief that fetuses have a positive right to assistance, but this would merely introduce greater inconsistency regarding medical and legal ethics, as illustrated by Thomson ( 1972 ) and Boonin ( 2002 ).

Do Inconsistency Arguments Matter?

Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) raise three objections to inconsistency arguments — the other beliefs, other actions, and hypocrisy objections. I contend (Simkulet 2021 ) these objections threaten to undermine moral analysis completely; opposing parties could always claim to have other beliefs, other actions, or interpret criticism as an ad hominem attack impinging their character.

This section is divided into four subsections. The first looks at two inconsistency arguments. The next three subsections briefly summarize Colgrove et al.’s objections, and my criticisms (Simkulet 2021 ) of these arguments.

Inconsistency Arguments

OA often point to high numbers of induced abortion as a call to action. Upwards of 60% (Boklage 1990 ; Léridon 1977 ) of human pregnancies end in spontaneous abortion, prompting critics to ask why OA do not see spontaneous abortion as a call to action. Toby Ord ( 2008 ) compares spontaneous abortion to a scourge that kills over half of humanity. Berg ( 2017 ) compares it to Heart Disease, Cancer, and Stroke. Faced with these overwhelming numbers, inconsistency theorists conclude that if fetuses matter, then the problem of spontaneous abortion calls for a massive shift in our social and political priorities. I have noted (Simkulet 2021 ) that we recently underwent such a shift to address the COVID-19 pandemic.

Henrik Friberg-Fernros ( 2015 , 2019 , 2018 ) challenges this position, contending that while fetal death is always tragic, not all fetal deaths are equally tragic; that killing is worse than letting die, and even that fetal lives are worth less than adult human lives because they lack time relative interests (Friberg-Fernros 2019 )! However, inconsistency arguments do not assume that all fetal deaths are equally tragic, merely that if fetuses matter, their deaths are tragic.

OA face a dilemma — either they (i) need to do more to prevent fetal death, or (ii) should withdraw opposition to induced abortion. Some proponents think OA should choose (ii) — that the argument demonstrates they do not really believe fetuses are persons. However, others propose a wide variety of methods by which OA might reasonably seek to confront the problem of fetal death, from increased education and better access to healthcare, to technologies like ectogenesis and gene therapy that those on both sides of the abortion debate could reasonably support (Simkulet 2020 ).

While many inconsistency arguments focus on unaddressed fetal loss, Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) also categorize Chittister's tweet (Schlumpf 2019 ) as an inconsistency argument. She asks whether it makes sense to call OA “pro-life” merely because they oppose abortion, noting all OA seem to be concerned with is ensuring the child is born, not fed, educated, or housed; asserting “That’s not pro-life. That’s pro-birth.”

Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) contend that Chittister is using the term “pro-birth” pejoratively, but this is rather uncharitable. The term “pro-life” carries with it a positive emotive context, and when OA present their view as “pro-life,” they may mislead their audience about their position. In contrast, the term “pro-birth” seems to capture the one unifying feature of OA.

Even if Chittister is angry or disappointed that OA misrepresent their position, neglect their moral obligations, or the like… so what? That is how moral judgements work. If you think Φing is wrong, and you see someone Φing, it makes sense to be angry or disappointed. Colgrove et al. speak as though this, and accusations of pro-life hypocrisy are ad hominem attacks on OA; not so. An ad hominem fallacy occurs when one attacks person rather than their argument or view. Inconsistency arguments do not do this; they identify apparent inconsistency within the OA view, and call for change, as Chittister does when she concludes, “We need a much broader conversation on what the morality of pro-life is.”

Other Beliefs Objection and Response

Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) raise three objections to inconsistency arguments. In the first, they contend that inconsistency arguments do not matter because there is a diversity of beliefs among OA, suggesting that no one inconsistency argument undermine them all; “This diversity makes broad accusations of inconsistency problematic.” Following this, one might argue that when an OA is confronted with apparent inconsistency within one view, they can jump ship to another OA view. But moral analysis is not a shell game. If inconsistency arguments identify a problem within even one OA position, they matter; and if they threaten the most widely held OA position, it seems they matter quite a bit.

Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) suggest that OA may have other beliefs which explain away apparent inconsistency and justify their inaction with regards to spontaneous abortion; for example they ask us to consider someone who both opposes induced abortion and opposes universal healthcare; noting these beliefs would justify rejecting the conclusion that we should adopt universal health care to help address the problem of induced and spontaneous abortion (and suffering and death due to lack of medical care, more broadly). To this, I reply (Simkulet 2021 ):

It is not enough to show that some [OA] have some beliefs that are prima facie at odds with some [inconsistency theorist] proposals; they must show that the current level of apparent indifference that many [OA] show is justified by their other beliefs; and it is not clear what set of other beliefs would be both internally consistent and justify the conclusion that while persons [matter], this right requires very little in the way of sacrifice from anyone but gestational mothers.

Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) contend that I argue “this [apparent] indifference must be justified by their other beliefs…” continuing “there is an obvious belief that justifies [OA]’s actions and priorities —… [OA] believe that induced abortion is a more important priority than these other issues.” However, this misses the point. As we have seen above, inconsistency theorists do not claim that OA need to treat the problem of spontaneous abortion as equally important to the problem of induced abortion, but rather they must consistently recognize both are tragic.

Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) continue “induced abortion is the leading preventable cause of death of human beings, as spontaneous abortions are largely unpreventable.” However, they seem to understand “preventable” in an opportunistically narrow way — as preventable with our current technology — to disregard the problem of spontaneous abortion. Amy Berg ( 2017 ) challenges this opportunistically narrow caveat:

But imagine throwing up our hands about a horrible disease… Imagine saying that we should let AIDS, or cancer, or heart disease take its course, rather than expending more effort researching how we might prevent that disease or treat people who contract it. That’s not what we do.

Berg ( 2017 ) notes that just because spontaneous abortion is medically intractable now does not mean it will be in the future, comparing to the AIDs epidemic, “In just a couple of decades, AIDS went from a mysterious underground disease, to a devastating and fatal epidemic, to a relatively manageable chronic condition.”

Perhaps more troublingly, Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) say, “If OAs sincerely believe these claims, then they are acting consistently with their beliefs, and the Other Beliefs Objection succeeds.” Above I have argued that even if one sees one form of abortion as a greater priority than another, this does not justify apparent indifference OAs show with regards to spontaneous abortion.

The real challenge here is “sincerity,” most people have inconsistent beliefs of one form or another and do not realize it; but it is possible that one can realize that they hold two sincere beliefs while also sincerely believing those beliefs to be inconsistent. Consider the problem of evil; one might sincerely believe that God exists, that evil exists, and that God would not allow evil to exist. This belief set is inconsistent, but does not necessarily yield conflicting implications for how we ought to live our lives.

But what if an OA sincerely believes the following?

All human death is morally tragic.
Not all human death is morally tragic.
Propositions (a) and (b) are apparently a contradiction.

It is easy to imagine a Socratic dialogue in which Socrates helps an OA to express position (a) and proposition (b), prompting them to reconsider their position; what’s less easy to imagine is what would happen if an OA freely admits proposition (c), but refuses to reconsider. Moral agency requires some degree of reason-responsiveness, and at least with regards to the topic at hand, it is not clear such an OA would be able to function as a moral agent without rejecting one of these three propositions.

Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) end their reply as follows “If critics of [OA] want to change the subject – to examining whether the things [OA] believe are true or false, rather than fixating on [OA’s] alleged inconstancy — then [our] essay has succeeded.” Here, they again miss the point of inconsistency arguments, as these arguments do set out to examine whether the things [OA] believe are true or false; if the principle of non-contradiction is true, and OA hold contradictory beliefs, then at least one of their beliefs are false !

Why do they miss this point? I cannot be sure, but at times Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) and Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) talk as though inconsistency theorists are uniformly prochoice and hope to convince OA to abandon restrictivism; however, inconsistency arguments might just as easily lead one to believe they ought to do more to prevent spontaneous abortion, address surplus frozen human embryos, and the like. Some inconsistency theorists believe both would lead to less restrictivist opposition to abortion, but this is irrelevant.

What matters is that inconsistency arguments share the same form as the Socratic method, highlighting apparent inconsistency and prompting introspection. Perhaps Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) would also conclude that the Socratic method does not matter , but I hope not.

Other Actions Objection and Response

Colgrove et al.’s second criticism of inconsistency arguments is that they are too specific with their recommendations, suggesting OA can address problems raised by these arguments with different actions than those proposed by inconsistency theorists. For example, rather than adopt and gestate frozen human Embryos, as Lovering ( 2020 ) (and Blackshaw 2021 !) advocate, Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) suggest OA might fight “to change public perception of the status of embryos,” or lobby to change IVF laws.

There are three problems here. First, although inconsistency theorists propose a variety of recommendations, these recommendations are not meant to be exhaustive, but rather representative of the kinds of changes an OA would need to adopt to resolve their apparent inconsistency. Remember, inconsistency theorists argue that OA face a dilemma — either (i) do more, or (ii) abandon their opposition to abortion; to say that an OA can perform other actions to address the problem just is to embrace the first horn of the dilemma.

Second, I have pointed out (Simkulet 2021 ) that the other actions Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) propose are not necessarily mutually exclusive; one might both lobby to change IVF laws and adopt and gestate frozen human embryos. The fact that one lobbies to change IVF laws may reduce the number of surplus embryos created and frozen in the future; but it fails to address the needs of currently existing frozen human embryos, highlighting a third problem, that many of Colgrove et al.’s “other actions” are simply not enough. I illustrate (Simkulet 2021 ) this with a case inspired by James Rachels ( 1979 ):

Jack 2 finds himself in a room with a starving child, surplus sandwich in hand. He receives a call… The caller asks, “Will you donate your sandwich?” and he replies, “I’ll do you one better; I’m going to fight to change the public perception of the status of such starving children and raise awareness!” He proceeds to tweet about the starving child, sets up a donation page to help spread awareness, and posts pictures and videos of the child’s deteriorating state. Jack 2 , an expert in such things, narrates as the child slowly dies.

Jack 2 ’s claim to act to raise awareness pokes fun at Colgrove et al.’s ( 2020 ) proposal to protect frozen embryos by fighting to change public perception. Despite his tweeting, it is clear Jack 2 fails morally — he lets a child starve to death when he could have easily saved that child’s life.

Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) argue that this case is disanalogous to OA (in)action, arguing that OA “live in a world where there are many important issues clamoring for their attention,” and suggest the following case is more analogous:

Jack 100 finds himself in a room with 100 needy children and only enough resources to save 1 child, which he does.

There are three substantive problems with this response. First, the case of Jack 2 is not meant to be analogous to OA inaction (despite poking fun at it); it is meant to demonstrate that merely having other actions is not sufficient to show that inconsistency arguments fail.

Second, the case of Jack 100 begs the question by assuming Jack is saving as many people as possible. However, as Lovering ( 2020 ) and Blackshaw ( 2021 ) seem to show, this simply is not how OA act. Inconsistency theorists argue that OA neglect to address the problems of spontaneous abortion, surplus frozen embryos, and even starving born children. Rather than save all they can, inconsistency theorists contend that OA act like Jack 2 , they do something , but fail to do everything they can.

Third, inconsistency theorists contend that most OA legislation and philosophical literature neglect to discuss the problems of spontaneous abortion, surplus frozen embryos, or starving born children. As such, perhaps the following case would be more analogous:

Jack 300 finds himself in a room with 300 needy children, and he says, “I see 100 needy children, but woe is me I can only save 1,” and so he saves 1 child.

It seems Jack 300 is unreliable; he says he sees 100 needy children in the room, but there are 300 needy children in the room. If we cannot trust Jack 300 to get an accurate headcount, it seems unreasonable to take his word that he is doing all he can.

With the Jack 100 case Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) seem to abandon the other actions objection, instead arguing that OA, like Jack 100 , do the “most good” they can. In short, Blackshaw et al. seem to treat the other actions’ objection as a surrogate for an argument from effective altruism, the view that we should try to do the most good we can. Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) claim that there are many different beliefs about what it means to do the “most good”, and suggest that objectively measuring options might be difficult, as though to claim that it does not matter what other actions OA take as long as they are trying to do the “most good.”

But this will not do. Effective altruism asks us to use reason and empirical evidence to maximize the amount of good we do, and inconsistency arguments seem to show that OA fail to do just this. Like Jack 2 , OA seem to ignore the easily preventable deaths of some with an unearned confidence that their current course of action is sufficient. If OA strive for effective altruism, they should be at least open to the prospect of embracing the first horn of the inconsistency theorist’s dilemma — that maybe should do more. Suppose Jill 100 finds herself in the locked room with Jack 100 , and promises to show Jack 100 how he can save 3 needy children, rather than just 1, with the resources at hand; if Jack 100 seeks to be an effective altruist, should he not at least listen, time permitting?

Effective altruism requires that we guide our choices by reason and evidence; it is not enough to have a sincere belief that one is doing all that one can, the evidence has to back this up. If inconsistency theorists can show that OA are not doing all they can, then they have been succeeding in showing that OA fall short of effective altruism.

Of course, this is exactly what proponents of inconsistency theorists purport to show. Take the aforementioned inconsistency theorist Lovering ( 2020 ) who, like OA restrictivist Blackshaw ( 2021 ), argues that OA should do more than merely fight to change public perception or lobby to change IVF laws, in many cases they ought to also adopt and gestate actually existing frozen human embryos. Of course, not every OA can gestate frozen human embryos — without effective ectogenesis technology and universal healthcare this burden seems to fall on wealthy, female OA alone. However, few OA argue that adopting and gestating these embryos are obligatory for those with the means to do so, and this omission at least appears to be inconsistent with their assertion that all fetuses matter from conception, let alone the position that OA are acting as effective altruists.

Furthermore, Blackshaw ( 2021 ) does not merely side with Lovering regarding OA’s obligations regarding frozen human embryos; he says:

[I]f we regard all human life as equally valuable, we have at least some obligation toward helping reduce deaths from spontaneous abortion where possible. The parable of the Good Samaritan reinforces the notion that Christians do have some responsibility toward this neglected group of human beings, who are also our neighbors.

Here Blackshaw ( 2021 ) contends that these groups — frozen human embryos and those fetuses who die from spontaneous abortion — matter , and that at least some OA — those inconsistency arguments seek to criticize — neglect them. In short, Blackshaw’s ( 2021 ) view seems at odd with the view he expresses in Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) and Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ). This is not meant as a criticism of Blackshaw; philosophers revise their views over time, articles are often published long after their initial submission, and many articles are written for blind review which could disincentivize the author from discussing their previous works.

Note, however, that Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) and Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) set out to argue that inconsistency arguments do not matter for any OA view and in doing so they bite off far more than they can chew. It is easy to contend that all OA have other possible actions – contra Frankfurt ( 1969 ), many philosophers believe alternate possibilities are required for moral agency and responsibility; but it is quite a different matter to argue that all OA are acting as effective altruists, or even that all OA merely sincerely believe they are acting as effective altruists, especially when confronted with criticism from inconsistency theorists. Blackshaw ( 2021 ) contends inconsistency arguments demonstrate that some OA neglect this group, and this alone seems sufficient to show inconsistency arguments are morally significant.

Hypocrisy Objection and Response

In their third objection, Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) contend that inconsistency arguments aim to show that OA are hypocrites, rather than demonstrate inconsistency. I note (Simkulet 2021 ) that Colgrove et al. equivocate between hypocrisy and inconsistency, and that they characterize hypocrisy as a moral failing. Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) say:

[OA] are often described as ’inconsistent’ (hypocrites) in terms of their beliefs, actions and/or priorities…These objections notwithstanding, perhaps some OAs do act in ways that can be shown to be inconsistent with their beliefs. If so, then they are hypocrites. Hypocrisy is a serious charge regarding the character of OAs, but it has nothing to say regarding the validity and consistency of their beliefs—and OAs’ beliefs are surely what critics should primarily be targeting.

In short, it seems that Colgrove et al. mischaracterize inconsistency arguments as ad hominem fallacies; but as we have already seen there is a difference. Inconsistency arguments are simply not aimed at showing OA are hypocrites; only that they have inconsistent beliefs.

In their reply to my previous work (Simkulet 2021 ), Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) say something bizarre “Simkulet offers no empirical evidence regarding [OA’s] supposed lack of interest in relevant issues.” But inconsistency theorists do this ; Lovering ( 2020 ) goes to great lengths to discuss OA who do go out of their way to address these concerns and provides evidence such altruism is rare . Still, it is difficult to take this call for empirical evidence seriously, as neither Colgrove et al. ( 2020 ) nor Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) provide such evidence on behalf of OA.

Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) also challenge my claim (Simkulet 2021 ) that legislation seeking to reduce the creation of surplus IVF embryos would be relatively easy to pass:

Not so. Italy, for example, passed a law in 2004 prohibiting the freezing of embryos, and requiring that all embryos be implanted. (Riezzo et al. 2016 ) The law was swiftly condemned, eventually overturned and, in one case, actions prescribed by the law were declared by the UN to have constituted a ‘human rights violation.’ (Scaffidi 2019 ) Thus, relevant laws would likely face international resistance. So, a central problem Simkulet puts forth as having an ‘easy’ solution does not.

There are two big problems here. First, I propose (Simkulet 2021 ) passing legislation to limit the creation of surplus embryos, not to force all created embryos to be implanted. The difference is obvious, my restrictivist proposal would limit the number of embryos created at a time, so it might take multiple tries before a successful embryo is created.

In contrast, the Italian law seems to place no limits on how many embryos can be created, rather it sets out to force women to undergo invasive, risky medical procedures. IVF has a relatively low chance of success; but imagine more attempts at fertilization succeed than expected; this law would compel physicians to perform, and women to undergo, dangerous medical procedures against their wills. This is hauntingly similar to forcing you to donate bone marrow even at the cost of your life in Boonin’s ( 2002 ) bone marrow case. In short, the Italian law threatens to harm citizens and undermine professional ethics by requiring medically risky and unnecessary interventions without the patient’s consent.

In contrast, my proposal (Simkulet 2021 ) would merely require physicians limit the number of embryos created at one time; not entirely dissimilar from legal limits on how many drugs a physician can prescribe within a period of time. Furthermore, I do not say such legislation would be easy, only “relatively easy” compared to restrictivist legislation – legislation that has far more in common with the Italian law than Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) acknowledge. Both restrictivist legislation and the Italian law seek to undermine women’s rights to control their body and force them to risk their lives for the sake of others. Meanwhile limiting the number of embryos created does not limit one’s reproductive freedom, nor compel them to take on additional medical risk.

Both OA restrictivist legislation and the Italian law seek to limit women’s reproductive choices and force women to take on additional medical risk. Legislation of this kind faces strong opposition from those seeking to protect women’s liberty and reproductive freedom. This kind of legislation also faces strong opposition from biomedical ethicists and medical professionals, as it threatens to violate patient autonomy and the Hippocratic Oath by forcing patient and physician to perform risky medical procedures to benefit a third party, not unlike forcing you to remain attached to the violinist in Thomson’s infamous violinist case (Thomson 1972 ).

In contrast, it is not clear that my proposed legislation (Simkulet 2021 ) to limit the number of embryos that can be created at a single time, would face much opposition at all. Perhaps eugenicists would oppose such legislation for limiting a parent’s right to choose the “best” fetus from the widest possible net, but this does not seem like a widely held position. Perhaps bioethicists and medical professionals would oppose such legislation believing it cumbersome and impractical, but this seems like a much weaker ground for opposition than the autonomy and professional ethics violations epitomized by OA restrictivist legislation and the Italian law.

The Prochoice Other Beliefs Objection

I have argued (Simkulet 2021 ) that if the other beliefs, other actions, and hypocrisy objections are not successful in showing inconsistency arguments “do not matter,” they threaten to undermine the discipline of ethics. No person has merely one moral belief, so if a diversity of beliefs invalidates moral analysis, ethics is impossible. In all cases in which a person acts morally responsibly (save maybe some interpretations of Frankfurt-style cases (Frankfurt 1969 ), agents have other possible actions, so if merely having other actions was sufficient to disregard moral analysis, ethics fails. Finally, if interpreting moral analysis as an ad hominem attack of hypocrisy was sufficient to rebuff criticism, one can shut down all moral debate merely by being thin-skinned. Here, I have argued that Blackshaw et al. ( 2021 ) fail to defend these objections, and fail to show that inconsistency arguments do not matter.

However, these are lofty claims about the discipline of ethics; let’s consider something a bit more down to Earth. Consider the following case:

Jacqueline is surprised to find herself pregnant, calling into question her school’s sexual education program. While discussing the matter with her physician, she learns that some people believe embryos are persons from conception! She finds this view intuitive and compelling, and outraged by her school’s poor sexual education program, she endeavors to work tirelessly to change the public perception of the status of embryos. Later, her physician expresses concern about her exertion, recommending that she puts her efforts to educate on hiatus during the pregnancy, fearing the worst. Jacqueline faces a choice — (i) continue with her pregnancy for the next 6 months, losing ground on her fight to change public perception of embryos or (ii) induce abortion (perhaps by hysterectomy) and continue the fight. When speaking with her physician, Jacqueline quotes an influential piece of literature (Colgrove et al. 2020 ), “It may be unclear, however, which option is superior. Many considerations apply to each, and they may be highly individualistic.” She continues “Objectively evaluating options to determine the most appropriate action for a particular belief held by a specific individual seems a very difficult task.” Upon careful and thoughtful reflection, she chooses (ii), judging that it will do the most good. After all, her embryo is but one embryo and while it is tragic to disconnect it from her body and let it die, her tireless efforts might do more good overall.

If the other actions objection shields OA from inconstancy arguments, it seems that it equally shields Jaqueline from restrictivist OA arguments that seek to restrict her freedom. Therefore, it seems that Blackshaw et al. face a dilemma — (i) reject the position that merely having other actions, beliefs, etc. is sufficient to shield a position from criticism, or (ii) abandon their opposition to induced abortion. If (i), then inconsistency arguments matter. Then again, if (ii), then it seems as though no ethical arguments matter.

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Beckwith, Francis J. 2007. Defending life: A moral and legal case against abortion choice . New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Berg Amy. Abortion and miscarriage. Philosophical Studies. 2017; 174 (5):1217–1226. doi: 10.1007/s11098-016-0750-z. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
Blackshaw, Bruce Philip. 2021. Is pregnancy really a Good Samaritan act? Christian Bioethics 7(2): 158–168. 10.1093/cb/cbab004.
Blackshaw, Bruce Philip, and Daniel Rodger. 2019. The problem of spontaneous abortion: is the pro-life position morally monstrous? New Bioethics 25(2): 103–120. 10.1080/20502877.2019.1602376. [ PubMed ]
Blackshaw Bruce Philip, Colgrove Nicholas. Frozen embryos and the obligation to adopt. Bioethics. 2020; 34 (8):857–861. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12733. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
Blackshaw, Bruce Philip, Nicholas Colgrove, Daniel Rodger. 2021. Inconsistency arguments still do not matter. Journal of Medical Ethics . 10.1136/medethics-2021-107644. [ PubMed ]
Boklage, C.E. 1990. Survival probability of human conceptions from fertilization to term. International Journal of Fertility 35(2): 75–94. [ PubMed ]
Boonin, David. 2002. A defense of abortion . New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9780511610172.
Bovens Luc. The rhythm method and embryonic death. Journal of Medical Ethics. 2006; 32 (6):355–356. doi: 10.1136/jme.2005.013920. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
Carroll, Emily, and Parker Crutchfield. Forthcoming. The duty to protect, abortion, and organ donation. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics . [ PubMed ]
Colgrove, Nicholas. 2019. Miscarriage is not a cause of death: a response to Berg’s “abortion and miscarriage”. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46(4): 394–413. 10.1093/jmp/jhab010. [ PubMed ]
Colgrove, Nicholas, Bruce Philip Blackshaw, Daniel Rodger. 2020. Prolife hypocrisy: why inconsistency arguments do not matter. Journal of Medical Ethics . 10.1136/medethics-2020-106633. [ PubMed ]
Davis, Nancy. 1984. Abortion and self-defense. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13(3): 175–207. [ PubMed ]
Fleck, Leonard M. 1979. Abortion, deformed fetuses, and the Omega pill. Philosophical Studies 36(3): 271–283. 10.1007/BF00372631. [ PubMed ]
Frankfurt, Harry G. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66(23): 829–839. 10.2307/2023833.
Friberg-Fernros, Henrik. 2015. A critique of Rob Lovering’s criticism of the substance view. Bioethics 29(3): 211–216. 10.1111/bioe.12080. [ PubMed ]
Friberg-Fernros, Henrik. 2018. Within the limits of the defensible: A response to Simkulet’s argument against the pro-life view on the basis of spontaneous abortion. Journal of Medical Ethics 44(11): 743–745. 10.1136/medethics-2017-104688. [ PubMed ]
Friberg-Fernros, Henrik. 2019. Defending the two tragedies argument: A response to Simkulet. Journal of Medical Ethics 45(6): 417–418. 10.1136/medethics-2019-105489. [ PubMed ]
George Robert P, Tollefsen Christopher. Embryo: A defense of human life. New York, NY: Doubleday; 2008. [ Google Scholar ]
Lee, Patrick, and Robert P. George. 2005. The Wrong of Abortion. In Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics , ed. Andrew I. Cohen, and Christopher Heath Wellman. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Léridon, Henri. 1977. Human fertility: The basic components . Translated by Judith F. Helzner. Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press.
Lovering, Rob. 2013. The Substance View: A Critique. Bioethics 27(5): 263–270. 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2011.01954.x. [ PubMed ]
Lovering, Rob. 2014. The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2). Bioethics 28(7): 378–386. 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2012.02006.x. [ PubMed ]
Lovering, Rob. 2017. The Substance View: A Critique (Part 3). Bioethics 31(4): 305–312. 10.1111/bioe.12330. [ PubMed ]
Lovering Rob. A moral argument for frozen human embryo adoption. Bioethics. 2020; 34 (3):242–251. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12671. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
Marquis, Don. 1989. Why abortion is immoral. Journal of Philosophy 86(4): 183–202. 10.2307/2026961. [ PubMed ]
Marquis, Don. 2007. The moral-principle objection to human embryonic stem cell research. Metaphilosophy 38(2–3): 190–206. 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2007.00481.x.
Marquis Don. An argument that abortion is wrong. In: Shafer-Landau Russ., editor. Ethical theory: an anthology. 2. Oxford: Blackwell; 2013. pp. 400–409. [ Google Scholar ]
Mulder, Jack. 2013. A short argument against abortion rights. Think 12(34): 57–68. 10.1017/S1477175613000080.
Murphy, Timothy F. 1985. The moral significance of spontaneous abortion. Journal of Medical Ethics 11(2): 79–83. 10.1136/jme.11.2.79. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ]
Ord, Toby. 2008. The scourge: Moral implications of natural embryo loss. American Journal of Bioethics 8(7): 12–19. 10.1080/15265160802248146. [ PubMed ]
Rachels, James. 1979. Killing and starving to death. Philosophy 54(208): 159–171. 10.1017/S0031819100048415. [ PubMed ]
Riezzo, Irene, Margherita Neri, Stefania Bello, Cristoforo Pomara, and Emanuela Turillazzi. 2016. Italian law on medically assisted reproduction: Do women’s autonomy and health matter? BMC Women’s Health 16: 44. 10.1186/s12905-016-0324-4. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ]
Scaffidi, Sarah. 2019. Forced pregnancy in Italy violated ‘woman’s human right to health’, UN experts rule. UN News , 27 March 2019. https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/03/1035601 . Accessed 11 July 2021.
Schlumpf, Heidi. 2019. Sr. Joan Chittister’s 2004 quote on ’pro-life’ versus ’pro-birth’ goes viral. National Catholic Reporter , 23 May 2019. https://www.ncronline.org/news/politics/sr-joan-chittisters-2004-quote-pro-life-versus-pro-birth-goes-viral. Accessed 11 July 2021.
Simkulet William. A critique of Henrik Friberg-Fernros’s defense of the substance view. Bioethics. 2016; 30 (9):767–773. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12289. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
Simkulet, William. 2017. Cursed lamp: The problem of spontaneous abortion. Journal of Medical Ethics 43(11): 784–791. 10.1136/medethics-2016-104018. [ PubMed ]
Simkulet William. Substance, rights, value, and abortion. Bioethics. 2019; 33 (9):1002–1011. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12616. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
Simkulet William. The two tragedies argument. Journal of Medical Ethics. 2019; 45 (5):304–308. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2018-105145. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
Simkulet, William. 2019c. Two tragedies argument: Two mistakes. Journal of Medical Ethics 45(8): 562–564. 10.1136/medethics-2019-105587. [ PubMed ]
Simkulet William. Abortion and ectogenesis: Moral compromise. Journal of Medical Ethics. 2020; 46 (2):93–98. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2019-105676. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
Simkulet, William. 2021. The inconsistency argument: why apparent pro-life inconsistency undermines opposition to induced abortion. Journal of Medical Ethics . 10.1136/medethics-2020-107207. [ PubMed ]
Stone, Jim. 1987. Why potentiality matters. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17(4): 815–830. 10.1080/00455091.1987.10715920.
Stone, Jim. 1994. Why potentiality still matters. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24(2): 281–293. 10.1080/00455091.1994.10717370.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1972. A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs 1(1): 47–66.

Log in using your username and password

Search More Search for this keyword Advanced search
Latest content
Current issue
BMJ Journals More You are viewing from: Google Indexer

Statistics from Altmetric.com

Request permissions.

If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.

Introduction

Access to safe abortion has been labelled as a fundamental human right by the International Women's Health Coalition, who stated that:

A woman should have the choice to carry a pregnancy to term or not;

Abortion services should be part of a comprehensive sexual health programme;

Lack of funding and illegality do not reduce the number of abortions, they only serve to put the woman's health in danger. 1

In the USA, certain states have introduced laws requiring women to listen to fetal heart beat monitors or to undergo a transvaginal ultrasound scan before being permitted to proceed with an abortion, with the thinly-veiled intent to discourage them.

Recently in the UK, MP Nadine Dorries proposed an amendment to abortion legislation that would have prevented abortion providers, such as Marie Stopes International and the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, from offering pre-abortion counselling to women on the basis that their advice was ‘not independent’. They would instead be directed to ‘Crisis Pregnancy Centres’ for supposedly independent counselling. However, many of these centres are run and funded by religious groups with prominent anti-abortion agendas. 2

The amendment was withdrawn due both to lack of support and to a national campaign against it. But the motives behind the amendment, and the more extreme pieces of legislation being passed in the USA, call for the arguments of legality, morality and access to be re-evaluated.

Traditional arguments

Against abortion.

A common argument against abortion is that it is equivalent to murder – specifically infanticide – and in this way it is immoral and unjustifiable.

One of the best known philosophical arguments to this effect is that of Don Marquis, who claimed that murder is illegal because it deprives the murdered person of their potential future. Consequently, abortion is murder as it deprives the fetus of its potential future, and therefore abortion is morally wrong and should not be allowed from the moment of conception. 3 However, this does not take into consideration that the zygote formed at conception is a very different entity from that which will ultimately be born and go on to experience a future. 4

Therefore, it could be reasoned that Marquis's argument rather endorses a policy of abortion up to the point of viability, as once a fetus has reached this stage it will be highly similar to a newborn child that can go on to experience a future.

For abortion

There are two main arguments in favour of abortion. First, that of Mary Anne Warren, who argued that it is a person , rather than simply a human being, that is entitled to rights, including the right to life. Abortion could therefore be deemed acceptable, as while a fetus is undeniably a human being, it is not a person. Warren goes further by suggesting that intelligent extraterrestrial beings could be regarded as persons and therefore deserving of rights, rather than rights being reserved only for humans, and goes on to list several criteria of personhood, including consciousness, reasoning, activity, communication and self-awareness. 5 This argument is often objected to as it does not take into account that people who are temporarily comatose cannot fulfil her criteria of personhood and therefore could be killed with impunity as a result of her argument. Similarly, infants up to the age of 1 or 2 years can be incapable of fulfilling these criteria and so her argument could be used to justify infanticide. However, Warren has responded that from the point of birth a child does not need to biologically rely on its mother any longer as it can be cared for by anyone; thus if the mother did not want the child, killing it would not be her only option. 5

The second argument is that of Judith Jarvis Thomson in ‘A Defence of Abortion’. Her essay generates several ‘thought experiments’, the most discussed being that of ‘The Violinist’. The world's top violinist falls ill and the Society of Music Lovers kidnaps you and hooks him up to you to make use of your kidneys for the next 9 months until he recovers. If you are parted any sooner, he will die. The essay then goes on to consider several assumptions and reasons that would make it permissible or impermissible to detach the violinist and leave him to die before the 9 months are over. 6

The central principle of the argument is that even though the violinist has a right to life, that right does not supersede your right to choose whether or not to remain connected to the violinist for 9 months. Thomson considers the stance that in this instance you have been kidnapped by the Society for Music Lovers and have not chosen to participate, equating the whole thought experiment to pregnancy as a result of rape, and she accepts that this does not necessarily hold for a pregnancy resulting from consensual heterosexual intercourse. However, this argument relies on the assumption that pregnancy is a foreseeable consequence of heterosexual intercourse.

First, if a heterosexual couple engaging in sexual activity make use of one or more methods of contraception it can be said that while pregnancy is a foreseeable consequence, it is an unlikely one and the woman in this scenario does not morally or philosophically have a responsibility to give life to something that she took so much effort to avoid.

Second, a person may not necessarily associate the act of sexual intercourse with pregnancy; that is to say, when a person meets a member of the opposite sex to whom they are attracted, it is unlikely that their intention is to ‘have a baby’ with them, whereas they may intend to have sexual relations with them. This highlights a psychological separation between sex and ‘making babies’ that may lead to sexual behaviour that makes pregnancy more likely (not using contraception), as pregnancy is no longer a ‘foreseeable’ outcome. This is especially true for young people who are reaching sexual maturity, yet have not reached emotional maturity.

Related to this is the concept of ‘normalised deviance’, where an incorrect or unsafe action is carried out, but no negative consequence results, and so the incorrect or unsafe action becomes viewed as being correct and safe. This can be applied to having unprotected sex, but not getting pregnant. It can also apply to smoking a cigarette but not getting lung cancer. However, the greater the number of times the ‘deviant’ act is committed – be it unprotected sex or smoking cigarettes – the greater the likelihood that a negative consequence will result.

We do not condemn to death those who have contracted lung cancer due to smoking; rather, we offer them help and treatment. Similarly, it can be reasoned that a woman would be within her rights to terminate a pregnancy on the basis of not considering the outcomes of unprotected sexual intercourse, in other words, making a mistake.

A new argument

Access to safe abortion is not only a human right; it is a measure of a society's development with regard to women.

Western society has a strong patriarchal basis, which has at least in part emanated from the influence of Christianity: the Bible and the teachings of the Church historically emphasise a woman's role as being the property of a man and to be subordinate to him. Gender equality only began to take steps forward in the UK as recently as 100 years ago and our society still retains many patriarchal features and influences, as can be seen in another bill proposed by Nadine Dorries, who wished to make abstinence education compulsory in the UK, but only for young girls. 7

The ideology behind singling out young women as being responsible for saying no to sex is born out of the patriarchal notion of hegemonic masculinity: 8 that it is a male's prerogative to be sexually driven and experienced and that it is natural for him to ‘sow his wild oats’, whereas a female should be modest and restrained lest she become pregnant, a condition that would have an irreversible effect on her life. Herein lies the importance of contraception and abortion.

First, contraception theoretically liberates women from the fear of falling pregnant, so allowing a different sexual culture to develop in which women are able to explore their sexuality, experiment and have multiple sexual partners in a way that had previously been the preserve of men. Second, and more importantly, abortion allows women to reverse what used to be an irreversible event in their lives. This comes into a greater degree of conflict with patriarchy and hegemonic masculinity than contraception does and is thus a more controversial issue.

Contraception can be viewed in a positive light by patriarchy and hegemonic masculinity as it can be seen to encourage women to engage in sex as they will not need to worry about the consequence, namely pregnancy. Abortion, however, is less acceptable as it is the act of removing and rejecting the sperm of a male. This goes against hegemonic masculinity and patriarchy, which emphasise the importance of virility and fertility of men. As such, a patriarchal society will be more inclined to oppose access to abortion as it is seen, by extension, to be an act of emasculation.

It is for this reason that access to abortion is such an important measure of progress. A society that permits abortion recognises that women are more important than the ‘seed’ of a male that they may be carrying.

As politicians and lobbying groups of varying backgrounds seek to restrain the rights of women in terms of access to abortion it must be remembered that: abortion is justifiable morally and philosophically; that abortion is a way for an individual woman to correct a mistake that she and her partner have made and avoid an otherwise unavoidable future; and that for women and society as a whole it is part of our further social evolution towards equality.

↵ International Women's Health Coalition . Access to Safe Abortion is a Human Right . 2008. http://www.iwhc.org/storage/iwhc/docUploads/Safe%20Abortion_FINAL.pdf?documentID=420 [accessed 21 March 2012].
Strattton A
Drennan J ,
Howlett E ,

Funding None.

Competing interests None.

Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.

Linked Articles

Highlights from this issue In this issue British Medical Journal Publishing Group BMJ Sexual & Reproductive Health 2013; 39 1-1 Published Online First: 07 Jan 2013. doi: 10.1136/jfprhc-2012-100558

Read the full text or download the PDF:

Subject List
Take a Tour
For Authors
Subscriber Services
Publications
African American Studies
African Studies
American Literature
Anthropology
Architecture Planning and Preservation
Art History
Atlantic History
Biblical Studies
British and Irish Literature
Childhood Studies
Chinese Studies
Cinema and Media Studies
Communication
Criminology
Environmental Science
Evolutionary Biology
International Law
International Relations
Islamic Studies
Jewish Studies
Latin American Studies
Latino Studies
Linguistics
Literary and Critical Theory
Medieval Studies
Military History
Political Science
Public Health
Renaissance and Reformation
Social Work
Urban Studies
Victorian Literature
Browse All Subjects

How to Subscribe

Free Trials

In This Article Expand or collapse the "in this article" section Abortion

Introduction, the biologically defined species homo sapiens.

Substance Dualism
Thomistic, Hylomorphic Substance Dualism
Donceelian Substance Dualism
Don Marquis’s “A Future Like Ours”
Another Variant
Human Organisms as Possessing Thomistic Souls
The Hylomorphic, “Substantial Identity” View of Humans
An Ontologically Neutral, “Substantial Identity” View of Humans
Identity and the Indexical Term “I”
What “We” Essentially Are
The Idea of Fetuses Becoming Persons
Beginning of Existence for Homo sapiens
Importance of the Concept of Identity, or Personal Identity, for the Ethics of Abortion
Identity of Persons and Identity of Organisms
The Moral Irrelevance of General Potentialities to the Right to Life
Organisms Not as Bearers of Rights or Possessors of Interests
Two Problems for the Active versus Passive Potentialities Distinction
Other Arguments
The Concept of a Person
Locke’s Concept of a Person
The Neo-Lockean Concept of a Person
Moral Status and Neo-Lockean Personhood
Capacities as Unnecessary for Being a Person at a Time
The Inconsistency Charge with Respect to the Moral Relevance of Potentialities
Neo-Lockean Persons and the Moral Status of Infanticide
Alternative Defenses of the Impermissibility of Infanticide
Challenging the Common View
Permissibility in Special Circumstances
The Moral Status of Developing Humans
The Case of Rape and the Violinist Analogy
The Tacit Consent Objection
The Responsibility Objection
The General Obligation to Assist Objection
In Support of an Extreme Antiabortion View
Against an Extreme Antiabortion View
Empirical Claims
Moral Claims
Prenatal Deaths and the Extreme Antiabortion Position
Defensive Action, Including Killing, and the Extreme Antiabortion Position
Defensive Action, Including Killing, and Some Moderate Antiabortion Positions
The Punishment of Women Who Have Abortions
Abortion, Infanticide, and the Moral Status of Animals
Prenatal versus Postnatal Obligations

Other Subject Areas

Forthcoming articles expand or collapse the "forthcoming articles" section.

Alfred North Whitehead
Feminist Aesthetics
Find more forthcoming articles...
Export Citations
Share This Facebook LinkedIn Twitter

Abortion by Michael Tooley LAST REVIEWED: 01 September 2022 LAST MODIFIED: 28 May 2013 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0107

Questions concerning the moral and appropriate legal status of abortion are among the most important issues in applied ethics, and answering those questions involves addressing some intellectually very difficult issues. First, many alternatives exist concerning what nonpotential properties suffice to give something moral status. These include (a) having the capacity for thought, (b) having the capacity for rational thought, (c) possessing self-consciousness, (d) being a continuing subject of mental states, (e) being a subject of nonmomentary interests, (f) being an agent, (g) being a moral agent, (h) having consciousness, (i) having both consciousness and desires, and (j) being able to use a language. Deciding which of these, or other alternatives, correctly identifies nonpotential properties sufficient to give one moral status is not at all an easy matter. Second, another crucial and very challenging issue is this. Suppose that property P gives an entity moral status. If something will, in the normal course of development, acquire property P , does that entity then have moral status by virtue of that potentiality? This question, which appears to be crucial for determining the moral status of abortion, is presently the object of serious philosophical disagreement. Finally, given certain answers to the preceding two questions, the moral status of abortion may depend upon answers to questions in areas outside of ethics. Suppose, for example, that something begins to have moral status only when it acquires a capacity for thought. Then the question is when developing members of our species first acquire that capacity. Answering that question, however, depends upon answering philosophical and scientific questions about the nature of human minds, because it may be crucial whether, as some philosophers believe, substance dualism is right, and the human mind is an immaterial entity, or whether, on the contrary, either property dualism or physicalism is correct. If substance dualism is right, then determining when a human first acquires the capacity for thought may depend upon philosophical or religious arguments, whereas if either property dualism or physicalism is correct, the answer will depend instead upon the outcome of demanding scientific investigations in neurophysiology and psychology.

In popular arguments against abortion, perhaps the most common appeal is to the view that any innocent organism that belongs to the biologically defined species Homo sapiens has a right to life. In thinking about this argument, a certain philosophical distinction is crucial—the distinction, namely, between basic moral principles and derived ones, where a basic moral principle is one that does not depend upon nonmoral facts—and thus which, if true, is necessarily true—while a derived moral principle is one that follows from some more basic moral principle, together with some nonmoral fact (or facts) about the world. Given this distinction, the question then is whether the claim that all innocent humans have moral status is being advanced as a basic moral principle or a derived one. Or, to put it slightly differently, the question is whether, if one claims that membership in the biologically defined species Homo sapiens is morally significant, one is claiming that that property is itself a ground of moral status, or whether the claim is rather that there is some other property that all humans possess, and that that property is a ground of a right to life. Some philosophers, such as Wertheimer (see Wertheimer 1974 ) and Wreen (see Wreen 1984 ), have offered arguments that appear to be intended to support the view that membership in the biologically defined species Homo sapiens can itself give something a right to life, while more recently, Wolf-Devine and Devine 2009 appeals to common moral intuitions in support of that view. By contrast, Brandt 1972 advanced a very important counterexample objection to the view that all members of the biologically defined species Homo sapiens have a right to life, by appealing to cases of extreme brain damage, and works by other philosophers, such as Warren 1973 , Tooley 1972 , Tooley 1983 , and Tooley 2009 , have argued that the principle in question cannot be a basic moral principle, by appealing to such things as the possibility of intelligent extraterrestrials. If that conclusion is right, as the overwhelming majority of philosophers believe, one must next consider whether the claim that all members of the biologically defined species Homo sapiens have a right to life can or cannot be derived from more basic moral truths. Many philosophers, such as Tooley (see Tooley 1983 and Tooley 2009 ), have argued that it cannot, and thus that it is not true that all innocent members of the species Homo sapiens have a right to life.

Brandt, R. B. “The Morality of Abortion.” The Monist 56.4 (1972): 503–526.

DOI: 10.5840/monist197256430

Argues that it is not true that all innocent members of the biologically defined species Homo sapiens have moral status, because there are counterexamples, such as the case of the complete destruction of a human’s upper brain, leaving one with a living human being that has neither psychological capacities nor potentialities.

Tooley, Michael. “Abortion and Infanticide.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2.1 (1972): 37–65.

Introduces in section III, “The Basic Issue: When Is a Member of the Species Homo sapiens a Person?” (pp. 43–50), the idea of the complete psychological reprogramming of a person’s brain to argue that a human person could be destroyed without killing any human organism, and thus that the “right to life” would be more accurately characterized as the right of a person to continue to exist.

Tooley, Michael. “Persons and Human Beings.” In Abortion and Infanticide . By Michael Tooley, 50–86. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Contains three arguments for the irrelevance of species membership: (1) Brandt’s upper brain death argument; (2) the possibility of intelligent extraterrestrials possessing a right to life; and (3) the possibility of genetic changes in humans that brought it about that normal adult humans were no longer capable of higher mental processes.

Tooley, Michael. “Two Biological Antiabortion Arguments.” In Abortion: Three Perspectives . By Michael Tooley, Celia Wolf-Devine, Philip E. Devine, and Alison M. Jaggar, 21–35. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Sets out three objections to the view that it is a true, basic moral principle that membership in the species Homo sapiens gives one a right to life: (1) the counterexample objection; (2) a basic moral principles versus derived moral principles objection; and (3) the complete psychological reprogramming of humans objection.

Warren, Mary Anne. “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion.” The Monist 57.1 (1973): 43–61.

DOI: 10.5840/monist197357133

In this article, Warren refers to the possibility of extraterrestrial persons to support the conclusion that the proposition that it is wrong to kill members of the biologically defined species Homo sapiens is not plausibly viewed as a basic moral principle.

Wertheimer, Roger. “Philosophy on Humanity.” In Abortion Pro and Con . Edited by Robert L. Perkins, 67–95. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1974.

An attempt to offer a sustained argument for the view that all biologically human organisms have a right to life. Fails to set out the crucial distinction between basic moral principles and derived ones in a clear fashion, and does not address any of the familiar objections to his central thesis.

Wolf-Devine, Celia, and Philip E. Devine. “Abortion: A Communitarian Pro-Life Perspective.” In Abortion: Three Perspectives . By Michael Tooley, Celia Wolf-Devine, Philip E. Devine, and Alison M. Jaggar, 65–119. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

In their contribution to this debate volume, Wolf-Devine and Devine contend in section 4, “The Status of the Unborn” (pp. 82–91), that it is a foundational principle that it is wrong to kill one’s fellow humans, and argue that this conclusion can be justified by appealing to one’s ordinary moral intuitions.

Wreen, Michael. “In Defense of Speciesism.” Ethics and Animals 5.3 (1984): 47–60.

Involves a very different defense of the view that species membership provides something with a right to life, arguing that fairness requires those of us who are persons to ascribe a right to life to other members of our species who will never be persons, through no fault of their own.

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content on this page. Please subscribe or login .

Oxford Bibliographies Online is available by subscription and perpetual access to institutions. For more information or to contact an Oxford Sales Representative click here .

About Philosophy »
Meet the Editorial Board »
A Priori Knowledge
Abduction and Explanatory Reasoning
Abstract Objects
Addams, Jane
Adorno, Theodor
Aesthetic Hedonism
Aesthetics, Analytic Approaches to
Aesthetics, Continental
Aesthetics, Environmental
Aesthetics, History of
African Philosophy, Contemporary
Alexander, Samuel
Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
Anarchism, Philosophical
Animal Rights
Anscombe, G. E. M.
Anthropic Principle, The
Aquinas, Thomas
Argument Mapping
Art and Emotion
Art and Knowledge
Art and Morality
Astell, Mary
Aurelius, Marcus
Austin, J. L.
Bacon, Francis
Bayesianism
Bergson, Henri
Berkeley, George
Biology, Philosophy of
Bolzano, Bernard
Boredom, Philosophy of
British Idealism
Buber, Martin
Buddhist Philosophy
Burge, Tyler
Business Ethics
Camus, Albert
Canterbury, Anselm of
Carnap, Rudolf
Cavendish, Margaret
Chemistry, Philosophy of
Childhood, Philosophy of
Chinese Philosophy
Cognitive Ability
Cognitive Phenomenology
Cognitive Science, Philosophy of
Coherentism
Communitarianism
Computational Science
Computer Science, Philosophy of
Computer Simulations
Comte, Auguste
Conceptual Role Semantics
Conditionals
Confirmation
Connectionism
Consciousness
Constructive Empiricism
Contemporary Hylomorphism
Contextualism
Contrastivism
Cook Wilson, John
Cosmology, Philosophy of
Critical Theory
Culture and Cognition
Daoism and Philosophy
Davidson, Donald
de Beauvoir, Simone
de Montaigne, Michel
Decision Theory
Deleuze, Gilles
Derrida, Jacques
Descartes, René
Descartes, René: Sensory Representations
Descriptions
Dewey, John
Dialetheism
Disagreement, Epistemology of
Disjunctivism
Dispositions
Divine Command Theory
Doing and Allowing
du Châtelet, Emilie
Dummett, Michael
Dutch Book Arguments
Early Modern Philosophy, 1600-1750
Eastern Orthodox Philosophical Thought
Education, Philosophy of
Engineering, Philosophy and Ethics of
Environmental Philosophy
Epistemic Basing Relation
Epistemic Defeat
Epistemic Injustice
Epistemic Justification
Epistemic Philosophy of Logic
Epistemology
Epistemology and Active Externalism
Epistemology, Bayesian
Epistemology, Feminist
Epistemology, Internalism and Externalism in
Epistemology, Moral
Epistemology of Education
Ethical Deontology
Ethical Intuitionism
Events, The Philosophy of
Evidence-Based Medicine, Philosophy of
Evidential Support Relation In Epistemology, The
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Ethics
Evolutionary Epistemology
Experimental Philosophy
Explanations of Religion
Extended Mind Thesis, The
Externalism and Internalism in the Philosophy of Mind
Faith, Conceptions of
Feminist Philosophy
Feyerabend, Paul
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb
Fictionalism
Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics
Film, Philosophy of
Foot, Philippa
Foreknowledge
Forgiveness
Formal Epistemology
Foucault, Michel
Frege, Gottlob
Gadamer, Hans-Georg
Geometry, Epistemology of
God and Possible Worlds
God, Arguments for the Existence of
God, The Existence and Attributes of
Grice, Paul
Habermas, Jürgen
Hart, H. L. A.
Heaven and Hell
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Aesthetics
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Metaphysics
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Philosophy of History
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Philosophy of Politics
Heidegger, Martin: Early Works
Hermeneutics
Higher Education, Philosophy of
History, Philosophy of
Hobbes, Thomas
Horkheimer, Max
Hume, David: Aesthetics
Hume, David: Moral and Political Philosophy
Husserl, Edmund
Idealizations in Science
Identity in Physics
Imagination
Imagination and Belief
Immanuel Kant: Political and Legal Philosophy
Impossible Worlds
Incommensurability in Science
Indian Philosophy
Indispensability of Mathematics
Inductive Reasoning
Instruments in Science
Intellectual Humility
Intentionality, Collective
James, William
Japanese Philosophy
Kant and the Laws of Nature
Kant, Immanuel: Aesthetics and Teleology
Kant, Immanuel: Ethics
Kant, Immanuel: Theoretical Philosophy
Kierkegaard, Søren
Knowledge-first Epistemology
Knowledge-How
Kristeva, Julia
Kuhn, Thomas S.
Lacan, Jacques
Lakatos, Imre
Langer, Susanne
Language of Thought
Language, Philosophy of
Latin American Philosophy
Laws of Nature
Legal Epistemology
Legal Philosophy
Legal Positivism
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm
Levinas, Emmanuel
Lewis, C. I.
Literature, Philosophy of
Locke, John
Locke, John: Identity, Persons, and Personal Identity
Lottery and Preface Paradoxes, The
Machiavelli, Niccolò
Martin Heidegger: Later Works
Martin Heidegger: Middle Works
Material Constitution
Mathematical Explanation
Mathematical Pluralism
Mathematical Structuralism
Mathematics, Ontology of
Mathematics, Philosophy of
Mathematics, Visual Thinking in
McDowell, John
McTaggart, John
Meaning of Life, The
Mechanisms in Science
Medically Assisted Dying
Medicine, Contemporary Philosophy of
Medieval Logic
Medieval Philosophy
Mental Causation
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice
Meta-epistemological Skepticism
Metaepistemology
Metametaphysics
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysical Grounding
Metaphysics, Contemporary
Metaphysics, Feminist
Midgley, Mary
Mill, John Stuart
Mind, Metaphysics of
Modal Epistemology
Models and Theories in Science
Montesquieu
Moore, G. E.
Moral Contractualism
Moral Naturalism and Nonnaturalism
Multiculturalism
Murdoch, Iris
Music, Analytic Philosophy of
Nationalism
Natural Kinds
Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics
Naïve Realism
Neo-Confucianism
Neuroscience, Philosophy of
Nietzsche, Friedrich
Nonexistent Objects
Normative Ethics
Normative Foundations, Philosophy of Law:
Normativity and Social Explanation
Objectivity
Occasionalism
Ontological Dependence
Ontology of Art
Ordinary Objects
Other Minds
Panpsychism
Particularism in Ethics
Pascal, Blaise
Paternalism
Peirce, Charles Sanders
Perception, Cognition, Action
Perception, The Problem of
Perfectionism
Persistence
Personal Identity
Phenomenal Concepts
Phenomenal Conservatism
Phenomenology
Philosophy for Children
Photography, Analytic Philosophy of
Physicalism
Physicalism and Metaphysical Naturalism
Physics, Experiments in
Political Epistemology
Political Obligation
Political Philosophy
Popper, Karl
Pornography and Objectification, Analytic Approaches to
Practical Knowledge
Practical Moral Skepticism
Practical Reason
Probabilistic Representations of Belief
Probability, Interpretations of
Problem of Divine Hiddenness, The
Problem of Evil, The
Propositions
Psychology, Philosophy of
Quine, W. V. O.
Racist Jokes
Rationalism
Rationality
Rawls, John: Moral and Political Philosophy
Realism and Anti-Realism
Realization
Reasons in Epistemology
Reductionism in Biology
Reference, Theory of
Reid, Thomas
Reliabilism
Religion, Philosophy of
Religious Belief, Epistemology of
Religious Experience
Religious Pluralism
Ricoeur, Paul
Risk, Philosophy of
Rorty, Richard
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
Rule-Following
Russell, Bertrand
Ryle, Gilbert
Sartre, Jean-Paul
Schopenhauer, Arthur
Science and Religion
Science, Theoretical Virtues in
Scientific Explanation
Scientific Progress
Scientific Realism
Scientific Representation
Scientific Revolutions
Scotus, Duns
Self-Knowledge
Sellars, Wilfrid
Semantic Externalism
Semantic Minimalism
Senses, The
Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology
Shepherd, Mary
Singular Thought
Situated Cognition
Situationism and Virtue Theory
Skepticism, Contemporary
Skepticism, History of
Slurs, Pejoratives, and Hate Speech
Smith, Adam: Moral and Political Philosophy
Social Aspects of Scientific Knowledge
Social Epistemology
Social Identity
Sounds and Auditory Perception
Space and Time
Speech Acts
Spinoza, Baruch
Stebbing, Susan
Strawson, P. F.
Structural Realism
Supererogation
Supervenience
Tarski, Alfred
Technology, Philosophy of
Testimony, Epistemology of
Theoretical Terms in Science
Thomas Aquinas' Philosophy of Religion
Thought Experiments
Time and Tense
Time Travel
Transcendental Arguments
Truth and the Aim of Belief
Truthmaking
Turing Test
Two-Dimensional Semantics
Understanding
Uniqueness and Permissiveness in Epistemology
Utilitarianism
Value of Knowledge
Vienna Circle
Virtue Epistemology
Virtue Ethics
Virtues, Epistemic
Virtues, Intellectual
Voluntarism, Doxastic
Weakness of Will
Weil, Simone
William of Ockham
Williams, Bernard
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Early Works
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Later Works
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Middle Works
Wollstonecraft, Mary
Privacy Policy
Cookie Policy
Legal Notice
Accessibility

[66.249.64.20|185.147.128.134]
185.147.128.134

school Campus Bookshelves
menu_book Bookshelves
perm_media Learning Objects
login Login
how_to_reg Request Instructor Account
hub Instructor Commons
Download Page (PDF)
Download Full Book (PDF)
Periodic Table
Physics Constants
Scientific Calculator
Reference & Cite
Tools expand_more
Readability

selected template will load here

This action is not available.

2.5: Common Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis and Kristina Grob)

Last updated
Save as PDF
Page ID 30135

Golden West College via NGE Far Press

11 Common Arguments about Abortion Nathan Nobis and Kristina Grob 27

1 Introduction

Abortion is often in the news. In the course of writing this essay in early 2019, Kentucky, Mississippi, Ohio, Georgia, Alabama and Missouri passed legislation to outlaw and criminalize abortions starting at six to eight weeks in pregnancy, with more states following. Federal law, however, generally permits abortions, so it is unclear what the legal outcome here will be.

Abortion is a political issue – with different political parties tending to have different perspectives on the issue – because abortion is a moral or ethical issue. (These two words mean the same thing).

Some believe that abortions are typically morally permissible , or not wrong , and so believe that abortions should be legal. If doing something isn’t wrong, it shouldn’t be illegal: criminalizing actions that aren’t wrong is a form of injustice.

Other believe that abortion is morally wrong, that it’s often wrong, maybe nearly always or even always .

Some people argue that even though they believe abortion is wrong, it should remain legal: after all, if every morally wrong action was illegal, we would all be in jail! Seriously though, there are many actions that are morally wrong, even really hurtful, that the government shouldn’t try to prevent or punish. (You can supply the potential examples to make the point). They might also think that, for a variety of other reasons, their personal moral views on the issues shouldn’t be made into law for all.

Others argue that abortions are wrong and should be illegal. What types of wrongdoing should be illegal? This question isn’t easy to answer: it’s abstract and general. One answer is that seriously, extremely wrong actions should be illegal . This might seem plausible, since many illegal actions are seriously wrong, but since there are other very wrong actions that shouldn’t be illegal, this answer isn’t perfect.

2 Defining “Abortion”

Abortion might personally affect you or someone you know: you or a partner, spouse, relative or friend may have had an abortion, have considered abortion, or will have an abortion. But what is an abortion? There are a number of common definitions, some of which are better and others which are worse:

Definition 1 : An abortion is the murder of an unborn baby or child .

Definition 2 : An abortion is the intentional termination of a fetus to end a pregnancy.

Definition 3: An abortion is the intentional killing of a fetus to end a pregnancy.

Definition 3 is best. We’ll explain why after we show the problems with the first two definitions.

2.1 “Murdering Babies”

Definition 1 is common with certain groups of people, but even people who think abortion is wrong should reject it.

“Murder” means “wrongful killing,” and so this definition implies that abortion is wrong by definition , which it isn’t. This definition means that to know that abortion is wrong, we’d just need to reflect on the meaning of the word, and not give any reasons to think this. Murder is wrong by definition, but to know that any particular killing is murder, we need arguments. (Compare someone who calls the death penalty murder : we know it’s killing, but is it wrongful killing? We can’t just appeal to the definition of “murder”: we need arguments that this is wrongful killing). This definition also means that someone who claims that abortion is not wrong says that “Wrongful killing is not wrong,” which makes no sense. We can even call this a “question-begging” definition, since it assumes that abortion is wrong, which can’t be assumed . So this definition is problematic, even if abortion is wrong.

Definition 1 also describes fetuses as “babies” or “children.” While people are usually free to use whatever words how they want, people can say things that are false: calling something something doesn’t mean it’s really that thing. And the beginnings of something are usually not that thing: a pile of lumber and supplies is not a house; fabric, buttons and thread are not a shirt, and an embryo or early fetus is not a baby or child. So it’s false and misleading to call embryos and early fetuses “babies” or “children.”

Defining abortion in terms of “babies” seems to again result in a “question-begging” definition that assumes that abortion is wrong, since it is widely and correctly believed that it’s wrong to kill babies. We understand, however, that it’s wrong to kill babies because we think about born babies who are conscious and feeling and have other baby-like characteristics: these are the babies we have in mind when we think about the wrongness of killing babies, not early fetuses. Describing early fetuses as “babies” characterizes them either as something they are not or, at least, assumes things that need to argued for, which is misleading, both factually (in terms of what fetuses are like) and morally (insofar as it’s assumed that the rules about how babies should be treated clearly and straightforwardly apply to, say, embryos).

Part of the problem with this definition is that terms like “babies” and “children” encourage strong emotional responses. Babies and children are associated with value-laden terms such as innocence , vulnerability , preciousness , cuteness , and more. When we refer to unborn human beings as fetuses , some people become defensive because they see the word “fetus” as cold and sterile. But “fetus” is merely a helpful, and accurate, name for a stage of development, as is “baby,” “child,” “adolescent,” and “adult.” Distinguishing different stages of human development doesn’t commit anyone to a position on abortion, but it does help us understand what an abortion is .

In sum, defining abortion in terms of “murdering babies” is a bad definition: it misleads and assumes things it shouldn’t. Even those who think that abortion is wrong should not accept it.

2.2 “Termination”

The second definition describes abortion as an intentional action. This is good since a pregnant woman does not “have an abortion” if her pregnancy ends because of, say, a car accident. And “spontaneous abortions” or miscarriages are not intentional actions that can be judged morally: they just happen.

Definitions, however, are supposed to be informative, and the vague word “termination” doesn’t inform. If someone had literally no idea what an abortion was, it would be fair for them to ask what’s exactly involved in a “termination” of a pregnancy. A discussion between persons A and B – who knows nothing about abortion – might go like this:

“There is a pregnant woman (or girl) who does not want to have a baby, a living baby, obviously. And so we are going to do something to something insider her – that is developing into that living baby – so she does not have that baby. The action we are going to do is the ‘termination.’”

“ That something inside her, developing into that living baby, it is living? ”

“Yes. It started from a living egg and sperm cell.”

“So you are making something living not living , right? That sounds like killing something, right?”

Person B’s reasoning seems correct: abortions do involve killing. The word “termination” obscures that fact and so makes for an unclear definition. This doesn’t make the definition wrong ; to “terminate” something means to end it in some way , and abortion ends the development of a fetus. But it doesn’t say how abortion ends that development and so is not ideal.

Why might someone accept this definition? Probably because they are reasoning this way:

Killing is wrong. So if abortion is killing, then it’s wrong. But I don’t believe that abortion is wrong, or I am unsure that abortion is wrong, so I don’t want to call it a ‘killing,’ since that means it’s wrong.

The problem here is the first step. Not all killing is wrong . Lots of killing is perfectly fine and raises no moral issues at all: killing mold, killing bacteria, killing plants, killing fleas, killing random cells and tissues (even ones that are human, say cheek cells or skin cells), and more. We don’t even need to observe that it’s sometimes not wrong to kill adult human beings to make the point that not all killing is wrong.

This means that it’s not problematic to define abortion in terms of “killing.” The important questions then are, “Is abortion wrongful killing, or killing that’s not wrong?” and “When, if ever, might it be wrongful killing and when, if ever, might it be permissible killing? And why ?”

2.3 “Killing”

A final definition understands abortion in terms of an intentional killing of a fetus to end a pregnancy . This definition is accurate , informative since it tells us how the fetus would be “terminated”, and morally-neutral : it doesn’t assume that the killing involved in abortions is not wrong or that it’s wrong. This is a good definition. 28

3 Why Most Abortions Occur

The Guttmacher “Fact Sheet” 29 provides an overview of the research on why abortions occur and other relevant information:

This information suggests, at least, that if women were economically better off, had better access to affordable child-care and other forms of support, and had ready access to more reliable forms of contraception, there would likely be fewer abortions.

4 Bad Arguments: “Question-Begging” Arguments & “Everyday” Arguments

We’ll now discuss some commonly given arguments about abortion that, unfortunately, are rather poor.

4.1 “Question-begging” Arguments

Many common arguments about abortion are what’s called “question-begging,” which means the reason given for the conclusion assumes that conclusion. This means that you wouldn’t accept the reason as a good reason to believe the conclusion unless you already believed that conclusion! This is circular reasoning, and arguments like this are always bad.

4.1.1 “Against” Abortion:

Many common arguments against abortion are question begging. Here are some:

Abortion – killing fetuses to end pregnancies – is wrong because:

These premises all assume that abortion is wrong. To explain:

People would believe these claims only if they already believed abortion is wrong, so these claims should not sway anyone who wants to think critically about the issues.

4.1.2 “For” Abortion:

People who think abortion should be allowed also sometimes give question-begging arguments. Here are a few:

Abortion is not wrong because:

These premises likewise assume their conclusions. To explain:

Question-begging arguments are common, on many issues – not just abortion, and they should be rejected, by everyone, always.

4.2 “Everyday” Arguments

Now we will discuss some other common arguments, that you might often hear or read about, that are also poor but often not because they are question-begging. We’ll begin with some arguments against abortion.

4.2.1 “Against” Abortion

4.2.1.1 “Abortion ends a life.”

People often ask, “When does life begin?” Some people wonder if fetuses are “alive,” or when they become “life.” Some argue abortion is wrong because “life begins at conception,” whereas those who support abortion sometimes respond that “fetuses aren’t even alive!” There are a lot of debates here, and to get past them, we need to ask what is meant by alive, living or a life .

This is often considered a “deep” question, but it’s not. Consider this: are eggs (in women) alive? Are sperm cells alive? Yes to both, and so when a sperm fertilizes an egg, what results is a biologically living thing. Above, we defined abortion as a type of killing and, of course, you can only kill living things. So, yes, fetuses are alive, biologically alive , from conception: they are engaged in the types of life processes reviewed on page 1 of any biology textbook.

Some people think that fetuses being alive shows that abortion is wrong, and so they enthusiastically argue that fetuses are biologically alive. Some who think that abortion is not wrong try to argue that fetuses are not even alive. These responses suggest concern with an argument like this:

The second premise, however, is obviously false: uncontroversial examples show it. Mold, bacteria, mosquitos and plants are biologically alive, but they aren’t wrong to kill. So, just as acknowledging that abortion involves killing doesn’t mean that abortion is wrong, recognizing that biological life begins at conception doesn’t mean that abortion is wrong either.

Now, perhaps people really mean something like “morally significant life” or “life with rights,” but that’s not people what say: if that’s what they mean, they should say that.

4.2.1.2 “Abortion kills babies and children.”

Classifying fetuses as babies or children obscures any potentially relevant moral differences between, say, a 6-week old fetus and a 6-day old baby or 6-year old child. This claim assumes that fetuses – at any stage of development – and babies are the same sort of entity. This claim involves loaded emotional language, is inaccurate and is question-begging, as we discussed above in the section on definitions: this saying doesn’t contribute to a good argument.

4.2.1.3 “Abortion is murder.”

Murder is a term for a specific kind of killing. As a moral term, it refers to especially wrongful killing. As a legal term, it refers to intentional killing that is both unlawful and malicious. Since abortion is legal in the US, most abortions cannot be legally classified as murder because they are not illegal or unlawful. Moreover, abortions don’t seem to be done with malicious intent. When people claim that abortion is murder, what they seem to mean is either that abortion should be re-classified as murder or that abortion is wrong , or both. Either way, arguments are needed to support that, not question-begging slogans.

4.2.1.4 “Abortion kills innocent beings.”

Fetuses are often described as “innocent,” meaning that they have done nothing wrong to deserve being killed. Since killing anyone innocent is wrong, this suggests that abortion is wrong. “Innocence,” however, seems to be a concept that only applies to beings that can do wrong and choose not to. Since fetuses can’t do anything – they especially cannot do anything wrong that would make them “guilty” – the concept of innocence does not seem to apply to them. So saying that banning abortion would “protect the innocent” is inaccurate since abortion doesn’t kill “innocent” beings: the concept of innocence just doesn’t apply.

4.2.1.5 “The Bible says abortion is wrong.”

People often appeal to religion to justify their moral views. Some say that God thinks abortion is wrong, but it’s a fair question how they might know this, especially since others claim to know that God doesn’t think that. In reply, it is sometimes said that the Bible says abortion is wrong (and that’s how we know what God thinks).

But the Bible doesn’t say that abortion is wrong: it doesn’t discuss abortion at all. There is a commandment against killing , but, as our discussion above makes clear, this requires interpretation about what and who is wrong to kill: presumably the Bible doesn’t mean that killing mold or bacteria or plants is wrong. And there are verses (Exodus 21:22-24) that, on some translations, suggest that fetuses lack the value of born persons, since penalties for damage to each differ. This coincides with common Jewish views on the issue, that the needs and rights of the mother outweigh any the fetus might have.

However any verses are best interpreted, they still don't show that abortion is wrong. This is because the Bible is not always a reliable guide to morality, since there are troubling verses that seem to require killing people for trivial “crimes,” allow enslaving people (and beating them), require obeying all government officials and more. And Jesus commanded loving your neighbor as yourself, loving your enemies and taking care of orphans, immigrants and refugees, and offered many other moral guidelines that many people regard as false. 30 Simple moral arguments from the Bible assume that that if the Bible says an action is wrong, then it really is wrong (and if the Bible says something’s not wrong, it’s not wrong ), and both premises don’t seem to be literally true.

This all suggests that people sometimes appeal to the Bible in selective and self-serving ways: they come to the Bible with their previously-held moral assumptions and seek to find something in the Bible to justify them.

There is an interesting Biblical connection here worth mentioning though. Some argue that if women who want abortions are prevented from having them, that forces them to remain pregnant and give birth and that this is like forcing women to be like the “Good Samaritan” who went out of his way, at expense to himself, to help a stranger in great need (Luke 10:25-37). (The analogy is imperfect, as analogies always are).

The problem is in no other area of life is anyone forced to be a Good Samaritan like a pregnant woman would: e.g., you can’t be forced to donate an organ to anyone in need (even to your child or parent); you can’t even be forced to donate your organs after you are dead! Nobody other than pregnant women would be forced by the government – under threat of imprisonment or worse – to use their body to help sustain someone else’s life. It is unfair to require women to be Good Samaritans but allow the rest of us to be like the “priest” and “Levite” in the story who helped nobody.

Nevertheless, it’s important to remember that laws should not be based on any particular religions. If you are not, say, a Hindu, or a Buddhist, or a Rastafarian, you probably don’t want laws based solely on one of those religion’s values. Laws should be religiously-neutral; on that we all should agree.

4.2.1.6 “Abortion stops a beating heart.”

This claim, if given as an argument, assumes that stopping a beating heart is wrong . The assumption, however, is just obviously untrue: e.g., during open heart surgery, surgeons temporarily stop the patient’s heart so that repair can be made to the still heart: they would permanently stop that heart if they replace it with an artificial heart. If there were somehow an independently beating heart, attached to nobody, that heart wouldn’t be wrong to stop. Whether a heart is wrong to stop or not depends on who is around that heart and their value or rights, not anything about that heart by itself. Finally, embryos and early fetuses do not even have hearts , as critics of recent “heartbeat” bills have observed! (The heart fully develops much later in pregnancy.)

If, however, this widely expressed concern about a heartbeat isn't meant to be taken literally, but is merely a metaphor or an emotional appeal, we submit that these are inappropriate for serious issues like this one.

4.2.1.7 “How would you like it if . .?”

Some ask, “How would you like it if your mother had had an abortion?” Others tell stories of how their mother almost had an abortion and how they are grateful she didn’t. Questions and stories like these sometimes persuade, but they shouldn’t. Consider some other questions:

All sorts of actions would have prevented each of our existences – if your parents had acted differently in many ways, you wouldn’t be here to entertain the question: at best, someone else would be 31 – but these actions aren’t wrong.

Some might reply that if you had been murdered as a baby, you wouldn’t be here to discuss it. True, but that baby was conscious, had feelings, and had a perspective on the world that ended in being murdered: an early fetus is not like that. We can empathetically imagine what it might have been like for that murdered child; we can’t do that with a never-been-conscious fetus, since there’s no perspective to imagine.

In sum, these are some common arguments given against abortion. They aren’t good. Everyone can do better.

4.2.2 Common Arguments “For” Abortion

Many common arguments “for” abortion are also weak. This is often because they simply don’t engage the concerns of people who oppose abortion. Consider these often-heard claims:

4.2.2.1 “Women have a right to do whatever they want with their bodies . . .”

Autonomy , your ability to make decisions about matters that profoundly affect your own life, is very important: it’s a core concern in medical ethics. But autonomy has limits: your autonomy doesn’t, say, justify murdering an innocent person , which is what some claim abortion is. The slogan that “women can do what they want . .” does not engage that claim or any arguments given in its favor, so it’s inadequate.

4.2.2.2 “People who oppose abortion are just trying to control women.”

They might be trying to do this. But they might be trying to ban abortion because they believe that abortion is wrong and should be illegal . Speculations about motives don’t engage or critique any arguments they might give to think that. (If you doubt that thinking critically about arguments and evidence here would do any good, do they have any better ideas that might do more good?).

4.2.2.3 “Men shouldn’t make decisions about matters affecting women.”

Insofar as women profoundly disagree on these issues, some women must be making bad decisions about matters affecting women: all women can’t be correct on the issues. And some men can understand that some arguments (endorsed sometimes by both women and men) are bad arguments and give good arguments on the issues. Someone’s sex or gender has little to no bearing on whether they can make good arguments about matters that affect them or anyone else. Furthermore, the existence of transgender men who have given birth further undermines the thought that one sex or gender is apt to have more correct views here.

4.2.2.4 “Women and girls will die if abortion isn’t allowed.”

This is true . However, this fact is apt to not be persuasive to some people who think that abortion is wrong: they will respond, “If someone dies because they are doing something wrong like having an abortion , that’s ‘on them,’ not those who are trying to prevent that wrong.” Observing that women will die if abortions are outlawed doesn’t engage any arguments that abortion is wrong or give much a reason to think that abortion is not wrong. Again, this type of engagement is necessary for progress on these issues.

In sum, while we agree that people who think that abortion is generally not morally wrong and should be legal are correct , they sometimes don’t offer very good reasons to think this, just like the opponents of abortion. An analysis of the more nuanced reasons in favor of abortion provided by philosophers will yield proper support for this viewpoint.

For Review and Discussion:

1. Do the reasons that people get abortions matter for its moral permissibility? Why or why not?

2. Describe the common arguments against abortion and assess them. Are they good or bad arguments? Do they make assumptions or claims that are problematic? Do the reasons provided actually provide evidence and reasons to oppose abortion?

3. Describe the common arguments for abortion and assess them. Are they good or bad arguments? Do they make assumptions or claims that are problematic? Do the reasons provided actually give evidence and reasons to support abortion?

The role of philosophy in the contemporary abortion debate

Affiliation.

1 Department of Philosophy, Walsh University, Box 1106, 2020 East Maple St., North Canton, OH 44720, USA. [email protected]
PMID: 15675038
DOI: 10.1080/13803600490489924

Inspired by Patrick Lee's "A Christian Philosopher's View of Recent Directions in the Abortion Debate," this essay raises the question of how effective philosophical arguments can be in determining the moral status of legalized abortion. On one hand, Christian philosophers have been successful in explaining both the humanity and the personhood of the unborn child, as well as exposing the incoherence of those who would deny the unborn child's humanity or personhood. Nevertheless, in order to confront the pro-abortion position in its most radical form, a much more complex philosophical argument must be given. Following thinkers such as Alasdaire MacIntyre, Christian philosophers must articulate and promote a philosophical position according to which morality is conceived in richer terms than the mere respecting of individual rights. The social dimension of human nature must be rediscovered in order that the happiness and welfare of others becomes a desirable goal in and of itself. According to a morality where individual rights is the bottom line (for example, that of Judith Jarvis Thompson), women very well may have the right to "extricate" themselves from their pregnancy even when doing so will result in the death of their child. What must be explained, therefore, is the more profound insight that social morality is equally concerned with obligations to others, including those who are most helpless and unable to speak for themselves.

Abortion, Induced / ethics*
Beginning of Human Life
Christianity*
Embryo Research / ethics
Embryo, Mammalian*
Moral Obligations*
Personhood*
Philosophy*
Pregnant Women
Social Responsibility
Value of Life*

Four pro-life philosophers make the case against abortion

To put it mildly, the American Philosophical Association is not a bastion of pro-life sentiment. Hence, I was surprised to discover that the A.P.A. had organized a pro-life symposium, “New Pro-Life Bioethics,” at our annual conference this month in Philadelphia. Hosted by Jorge Garcia (Boston College), the panel featured the philosophers Celia Wolf-Devine (Stonehill College), Anthony McCarthy (Bios Centre in London) and Francis Beckwith (Baylor University), all of whom presented the case against abortion in terms of current political and academic values.

Recognizing the omnipresent call for a “welcoming” society, Ms. Wolf-Devine explored contemporary society’s emphasis on the virtue of inclusion and the vice of exclusion. The call for inclusion emphasizes the need to pay special attention to the more vulnerable members of society, who can easily be treated as non-persons in society’s commerce. She argued that our national practice of abortion, comparatively one of the most extreme in terms of legal permissiveness, contradicts the good of inclusion by condemning an entire category of human beings to death, often on the slightest of grounds. There is something contradictory in a society that claims to be welcoming and protective of the vulnerable but that shows a callous indifference to the fate of human beings before the moment of birth.

There is something contradictory in a society that claims to be protective of the vulnerable but shows a callous indifference to the fate of human beings before the moment of birth.

Mr. McCarthy’s paper tackled the question of abortion from the perspective of equality. A common egalitarian argument in favor of abortion and the funding thereof goes something like this: If a woman has an unwanted pregnancy and is denied access to abortion, she might be required to sacrifice educational and work opportunities. Since men do not become pregnant, they face no such obstacles to pursuing their professional goals. Restrictions to abortion access thus places women in a position of inequality with men.

Mr. McCarthy counter-argued that, in fact, the practice of abortion creates a certain inequality between men and women since it does not respect the experiences, such as pregnancy, which are unique to women. Some proponents of abortion deride pregnancy as a malign condition. A disgruntled audience member referred to pregnant women as “incubators.” Mr. McCarthy argued that authentic gender equality involves respect for what makes women different, including support for the well-being of both women and children through pregnancy, childbirth and beyond. He pointed out that in his native England, pregnant women acting as surrogates are given a certain amount of time after birth to decide whether to keep the child they bore and not fulfill the conditions of the surrogacy contract. This is done out of acknowledgment of the gender-specific biological and emotional changes undergone by a woman who has nurtured a child in the womb.

The most compelling argument against abortion remains what it has been for decades: Directly killing innocent human beings is gravely unjust.

Mr. Beckwith explored the question of abortion in light of the longstanding philosophical dispute concerning the “criteria of personhood.” The question of which human beings count as persons is closely yoked to the political question of which human beings will receive civil protection and which can be killed without legal penalty. The personhood criteria range from the most inclusive (genetic identity as a member of the species Homo sapiens ) to the more restrictive (evidence of consciousness) to the most exclusionary (evidence of rationality and self-motivating behavior).

Archbishop Robert J. Carlson of Saint Louis, center, offers the sign of peace to Bishop William M. Joensen Des Moines, Iowa, as U.S. bishops from Iowa, Kansas, Missouri and Nebraska concelebrate Mass in the crypt of St. Peter's Basilica at the Vatican Jan. 16, 2020. The bishops were making their "ad limina" visits to the Vatican to report on the status of their dioceses to the pope and Vatican officials. (CNS photo/Paul Haring)

Mr. Beckwith has long used the argument from personal identity (the continuity between my mature, conscious self and my embryonic, fetal and childhood self and my future older, possibly demented self) to make the case against abortion, infanticide and euthanasia. To draw the line between personhood and non-personhood after conception or before natural death is to make an arbitrary distinction—and a lethal one at that. Mr. Beckwith noted, however, that none of the usual candidates for a criterion of personhood is completely satisfying. Even the common pro-life argument from species membership could, unamended, smack of a certain materialism.

The most compelling argument against abortion remains what it has been for decades: Directly killing innocent human beings is gravely unjust. Abortion is the direct killing of innocent human beings. But political debate rarely proceeds by such crystalline syllogisms. The aim of the A.P.A.’s pro-life symposium was to amplify the argument by showing how our practice of abortion brutally violates the values of inclusion, equality and personhood that contemporary society claims to cherish. In the very month we grimly commemorate Roe v. Wade, such new philosophical directions are welcome winter light.

John J. Conley, S.J., is a Jesuit of the Maryland Province and a regular columnist for America . He is the current Francis J. Knott Chair of Philosophy and Theology at Loyola University, Maryland.

Most popular

Your source for jobs, books, retreats, and much more.

The latest from america

Your complimentary articles

You’ve read one of your four complimentary articles for this month.

You can read four articles free per month. To have complete access to the thousands of philosophy articles on this site, please

Liberty, Logic & Abortion

Mark goldblatt analyses the moral and legal arguments on both sides of america’s most divisive issue..

January 22nd has evolved into a national red letter day of sorts, the anniversary of the Supreme Court’s landmark 1973 Roe v. Wade decision. Commemorations abound, typically sloganeering rallies, and mainstream journals churn out perfunctory retrospectives. Still, abortion remains the most divisive issue in the United States since the abolition of slavery. In fact, the very details of the ruling seem to recede, year by year, deeper into a foam of overwrought rhetoric. Specifically, therefore: Roe guaranteed a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy in the first trimester (in all instances) and in the second trimester (to safeguard her own well-being, broadly defined); only in the third trimester of pregnancy, the Roe decision held, could the rights of the fetus be taken into account and abortion restricted by the state.

What I’m about to argue is that the debate over abortion now continues on three distinct but inter-related levels. The first level, which might charitably be called Popular Arguments , consists of absolutist slogans and unexamined logic; it’s this level of argumentation that often crops up at unpleasant dinner parties and on phone-in talk shows. The second level consists of nuanced speculations on natural law and individual rights; it’s conducted by moral philosophers beneath the radar of the mass media. The third level consists of evolving theories of constitutional interpretation; it’s conducted in the courts by legal scholars. To get at the second and third levels of the abortion debate, however, it’s useful to address the popular arguments – if only to demonstrate that the issues involved are necessarily nuanced and evolving.

On the ‘pro-choice’ side of the abortion debate, two popular arguments dominate:

A woman has the right to control her own body. Though the reasoning is much older, the feminist author Susan Brownmiller attributes the precise wording to Patricia Maginnis, founder of an illegal abortion referral service in California in the years prior to Roe. As a defense of abortion rights, however, the argument is either demonstrably false or logically meaningless. Even if we grant the contentious point that the fetus is part of the woman’s body, it’s simply untrue that American citizens, male or female, exercise absolute sovereignty over their own bodies. If that were the case, not only would 49 states have to join Nevada in the legalization of prostitution, they would also have to permit the selling of internal organs for transplant – which would in turn warrant the bodily exploitation of poor people by wealthy people. For good reason, therefore, there’s no right to absolute bodily sovereignty. However, if we take Maginnis’s words in a weaker sense –Abortion specifically, that a woman’s right to control her body extends to include the right to terminate a pregnancy – we’re left with a tautology: a woman should have the right to an abortion because a woman has the right to an abortion.

Without access to legal abortions, women will be forced to obtain unsafe, illegal abortions . Let’s again grant the hidden premises, namely: 1) if states could outlaw abortions altogether, many would, and 2) women in those states who couldn’t afford to travel would turn to ‘back alley’ alternatives. This is, nevertheless, an attempt to resolve a moral question on practical grounds. The danger is that identical logic could be applied to, say, cockfighting. Like abortion, cockfighting is apt to continue despite sanctions, so legalization would let the government ensure its conduct under more wholesome circumstances. Certainly, practical considerations can influence our decision to enforce a law, or mitigate the penalty when a law is broken; they cannot, however, determine the morality of the law itself.

The ‘pro-life’ camp rests its case on a single popular argument:

Abortion is murder . The hidden premise here is that the unborn life, from its conception, constitutes a legal person. Even among those who profess this, however, few adhere to its literal truth. The equation of abortion with murder logically entails its banning in all circumstances – including to save the mother’s life, or to end a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest. Yet according to a 2000 Los Angeles Times poll, 85% of Americans would allow abortions if the mother’s physical health is at risk, 54% if her emotional health is at risk – numbers impossible to reconcile with the 57% who claim that abortion is murder.]

Common sense, moreover, urges that we distinguish among the intrinsic values of a two-celled embryo, a second-trimester fetus, and a two-week-old baby. Such distinctions are, indeed, made by most pro-life apologists; the proof is their quick condemnation of violence at abortion clinics. But if those apologists considered abortion literally murder, then such violence would represent a morally justifiable response to infanticide – even as bombing a guards’ barracks at a Nazi death camp would be morally justifiable.

Clearly, then, the popular pro-choice and pro-life arguments dissolve under logical scrutiny. Which leads to the second level of the debate, the exchanges among moral philosophers. Without exception, these arguments hinge on a fundamental conflict of rights: the right to life of a potential human being (to omit the word potential is to presuppose what one side wouldn’t admit) versus a liberty-right of a pregnant woman.

The pro-choice side has put forward two notable arguments on this level:

The sick violinist analogy . Two years prior to Roe, Judith Jarvis Thompson published an influential essay called ‘A Defense of Abortion’ in which she developed an analogical case for a woman’s right to end a pregnancy. Suppose, Thompson writes, you awakened to find yourself hooked up through intravenous tubes to a desperately ill violinist. The violinist, you’re informed, requires the shared use of your kidneys for nine months – or else he’ll die. Clearly, it would be generous if you agree to continue such an arrangement. But can the state compel you to save the violinist? Clearly not. Likewise, Thompson reasons, the state cannot compel a woman to continue a pregnancy.

The problem with Thompson’s argument, as Ronald Dworkin points out in his book Life’s Dominion , is that it assumes “a pregnant woman has no more moral obligation to a fetus she is carrying … than anyone has to a stranger.” The analogy fails to take into account the unique bond between fetus and mother. But if the law disregarded that relationship, one consequence would be no natural presumption on the mother’s behalf in custody disputes – so if both parents sought custody of their child, the mother’s chances would be no better than 50-50. Such logic would, at minimum, allow husbands to leverage more lenient terms of separation in exchange for a promise not to seek primary custody.

The pre-sentient fetus, although it may have a ‘detached’ value, has no ‘derivative’ rights . Though skeptical of Thompson’s analogical argument, Dworkin himself develops a multilayered defense of abortion rights in Life’s Dominion . He grants, from the start, what many pro-choice advocates deny: that the unborn life, at whatever stage, possesses an intrinsic value. Even in its embryonic phase, it’s more than a protoplasmic blob, waiting to be surgically disposed of. Human life, according to Dworkin, from conception to expiration, “is sacred just in itself.” It is people’s sense of that essential sanctity that forms what he calls the ‘detached’ objection to abortion (‘detached’ since he’s detaching the objection from any thought that the fetus possesses rights of its own). This accounts for the rape and incest exceptions many pro-lifers allow – they don’t really think that the fetus is the equivalent of a person, or that abortion is therefore the moral equivalent of murder. But their perception of the sanctity of human life, in every stage, leads them, except in extreme cases, to condemn the practice. Dworkin then distinguishes the ‘detached’ objection, based on human sanctity, from the ‘derivative’ objection, based on the right to life a fetus might derive from its own interest in being born. The latter objection, Dworkin terms “scarcely comprehensible” for the pre-sentient fetus, noting that to possess a ‘right’, something must first possess an ‘interest’. And to possess an interest, a thing must be sentient. For example, a mink is sentient; people ascribe different levels of consciousness to minks, but no one disputes that a mink seeks to avoid physical pain. Minimally, it follows, a mink has an interest in avoidance of pain. Whether a mink derives rights from that interest is, again, arguable. Animal rights activists argue it does; fur designers argue it doesn’t.

The onset of sentience in fetal development (occurring near the end of the second trimester, with the first hints of a nervous system) is key for Dworkin because a non-sentient thing cannot possess even a minimal ‘interest’ in the avoidance of pain; hence, the pre-sentient fetus cannot derive rights based on nonexistent interests.

Dworkin’s case is powerful. On the one hand, he addresses the qualms of many pro-life advocates whose sense that abortion is evil admits inexplicable exceptions in instances of rape and incest. On the other hand, his distinction between the pre- and post-sentient fetus parallels Roe ’s own distinction between abortions in the first two trimesters and abortions in the third trimester.

As with the popular level of the abortion debate, there is only one significant pro-life counter-argument on the second more nuanced level.

The argument from natural law . The principal objection to Dworkin’s analysis is taken from natural law theory. Natural law effectively unites the derivative and detached objections to abortion and, thereby, transcends the logical pitfalls inherent in each individually. The premise underlying natural law is that God is a willing partner in every act of procreation. It’s not requisite to the derivative case, as Dworkin presupposes, to hold that the fetus has interests of its own in its pre-sentient stage; rather, natural law teaches that God has an interest in the fetus . Moreover, according to natural law, it’s from God’s interest in the fetus, signaled by his creation of an immaterial soul, that the fetus derives its right to life . So, too, though Dworkin doesn’t acknowledge it, natural law underlies his ‘detached’ objection to abortion based on people’s sense of the essential sanctity (Dworkin’s choice of words is significant) of human life in every stage. For that sense, however vague, is predicated on the belief that human beings are distinct from, and more valuable than, other living things. The only aspect of human beings that might ‘sanctify’ them, even in Dworkin’s limited usage, is a God-created soul. Brute intelligence cannot serve as the criterion for sanctity – or else killing a mentally retarded person would be less evil than killing a university professor. Without an implicit recognition of man’s spiritual nature, in other words, Dworkin’s invocation of sanctity becomes meaningless.

It is simply the case that many Americans cling to the notion of a third active participant in the process of human creation – namely, God. The readiness of many pro-life advocates to permit an exception to save the mother’s life becomes explainable, in this view, in virtually quantitative terms: the mother’s life carries both her own and God’s interests – from which a full panoply of rights derive; the fetus’s life carries God’s interests alone, from which only a partial set of rights derive. By two criteria to one, the mother’s life wins out. To be sure, a natural law conception of rights was critical to Thomas Jefferson when he wrote that all men were created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights . The singular noun ‘Creator,’ notwithstanding the limited Deistic meaning Jefferson himself might have attached to it, is inexplicable without reference to ensoulment. For in what sense would God be counted the Creator of every person except as the Creator of his soul? Two human parents are a person’s creators , in the plural, with regard to his material nature. It is God’s creative interest in every human soul,according to Jefferson’s formulation, that endows people with unalienable rights. And it is the existence of these unalienable rights that the positive statutes of the Constitution were arguably designed to safeguard.

Which leads us, finally, to the third level of the abortion debate, a level more sophisticated than the sloganeering of public rallies and more pragmatic than the rarefied speculations of moral philosophers; it’s the level engaged by legal scholars, consisting of variant readings of precedent and conflicting theories of constitutional interpretation. The issue also narrows from a consideration of abortion per se to a consideration of the Roe v. Wade decision of 1973. Three positions, at minimum, must be considered:

Roe v. Wade was the right decision for the right reason . Justice Harry Blackmun, author of Roe , declared that states couldn’t enact bans on abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy because such laws violated a woman’s constitutional right to privacy in the personal matter of procreation. Yet the Constitution itself doesn’t mention a right to privacy. There was, however, a specific precedent for such a right in the 1965 Griswold v. Connecticut decision wherein the Supreme Court overturned laws forbidding the sale of contraceptives to adults – on the grounds that people enjoyed a constitutional right to private decision-making in certain personal matters that no legislation could rescind. The Griswold ruling, itself, was based on the ‘due process’ clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: “Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Court ruled that buying contraceptives, as a private matter which harms no one, is a ‘liberty’ guaranteed under the amendment. The conceptual leap from Griswold to Roe isn’t far – unless, of course, the fetus were considered a ‘person’ with its own set of rights. In that case, Griswold might still stand, but Roe, because of the harm done to the fetus/person, would fall by the wayside. Indeed, if the fetus were considered a person under the Constitution, states would be compelled to ban abortion by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment – the fetus itself would qualify for equal protection. The question of whether to permit abortion couldn’t, in that case, be left to individual states any more than the question of whether to permit infanticide. Yet even before Roe , many states permitted abortions in the first two trimesters. Thus, historically speaking, there is no case for the pre-sentient fetus as a fully-protected constitutionally-defined person.

To summarize Blackmun’s argument in the Roe decision: since the pre-sentient fetus cannot be defined as a person under the Constitution, and since the right to privacy in the matter of procreation has been affirmed by the Griswold case, it’s unconstitutional for states to prohibit abortions – at least until the fetus develops into a constitutionally-recognizable person.

Roe v. Wade was the right decision for the wrong reason. The feminist lawyer, Catherine MacKinnon, though vehemently pro-choice, has criticized the right-to-privacy argument used by Blackmun to decide Roe. MacKinnon reads the Blackmun decision to mean that a state has no compelling interest to interfere in actions occurring in the privacy of the home, and she worries that the state might thereby forfeit the right to rescue a battered wife from her abusive husband. But,as Ronald Dworkin points out, MacKinnon’s has failed to distinguish among three senses ‘privacy’. The right to privacy can be construed as an assertion of spatial sovereignty (“I control what happens in my home.”) or of confidentiality (“No one has a right to know what happens in my home.”) or of freedom in decision-making on private matters (“Certain issues are mine alone to decide.”). The thrust of Blackmun’s right to privacy argument is only the third sense. A battered wife, thus, would still be entitled to the state’s protection; indeed, her liberty interest, affirmed in the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees her freedom from physical coercion and virtually obliges the state to take action on her behalf.

Nevertheless, many feminists maintain that women’s abortion rights should rest on the state’s burden to promote gender equality – a burden mandated, it’s argued, by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: “No State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The state, according to the standard reading of the clause, cannot enact legislation to curb the liberty of a particular class of citizens – it cannot, for example, make a law restricting the access of black people to bank loans. Banning abortions, the argument goes, would prevent only women from getting them – thus curbing only their liberty; the ban would have no practical effect on men. Therefore, such a ban seems to violate the equal protection clause. But the immediate reply is that banning abortions means men cannot get them either – a liberty their biology renders moot. There is, however, a deeper, more controversial, version of this argument, associated with Mackinnon and Andrea Dworkin. It begins by observing that the decision to bear a child significantly impacts a woman’s social and economic status. According to a 1995 Census Bureau report, women earn only 76 cents for every dollar their male counterparts earn. However, among women aged 27-33 who’ve never had a child , the figure is 98 cents. In short, there exists a distinct correlation between a woman’s decision to start a family and her future ability to earn money at a rate comparable to a man. Moreover – and here the argument’s more controversial elements emerge – a woman cannot be held fully responsible for her pregnancy because sexual intercourse, in a patriarchal society, is inevitably coercive, an act of aggression by which women’s subservient status is maintained. Dworkin has famously asserted that sex is never wholly consensual – a position caricatured (inaccurately) as the equation of sex with rape. In reality, Dworkin’s argument is more subtle; the true insidiousness of patriarchal culture, she contends, is that it instills an unconscious sense of the rightness of sociallyconstructed gender roles. Men are conditioned to find pleasure in dominance, whereas women – against their self-interest – are conditioned to enjoy submissiveness. Thus, Dworkin reasons, sex is always coercive; a woman’s decision to become pregnant can never be construed as free. The state itself, in a patriarchal society, is complicit in every unwanted pregnancy. And since the state has a responsibility, stemming from the equal justice guarantee under the Fourteenth Amendment, to promote gender equality, it must ensure women legal recourse to end their pregnancies.

The difficulty with Dworkin’s reasoning is that it constitutes less a specific argument than a fully-formed ideology. If you accept the premises, it becomes a powerful pro-choice case. But there’s no compelling objective evidence to accept her premises about men and women.

Moving on, there is the argument that abortion rights should be grounded in the First Amendment’s non-establishment of religion clause rather than the Fourteenth’s due process or equal protection clauses. The argument runs as follows: Since, as we’ve seen, the pre-sentient fetus cannot be deemed a person under the Constitution’s definition, the issue of life’s beginning must remain a question of personal religious conviction – not statutory determination. Thus, to curtail a woman’s access to an abortion is tantamount to the state’s prescribing a religious belief. The state cannot, in other words, insist that life begins at conception – individuals may believe that, but they cannot band together, even through the exercise of electoral majority, and thereby deprive others of a liberty rooted in religious dissent.

As we’ll see, however, the principle of non-establishment of religion cuts both ways in assessing the Roe decision.

Roe v. Wade was the wrong decision . Given the Griswold decision as the precedent for a right to privacy, and plausible further support from the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the nonestablishment of religion clause of the First Amendment, the classification of Roe as an outright constitutional error would seem dubious. Nevertheless, a case can be made that cedes to Roe both legal precedence and interpretive likelihood but argues against the decision on the grounds that it violates the underlying vision of the Constitution. The Constitution, remember, was written “to form a more perfect union” – a perfection that can only be gauged in terms of the government’s ongoing ability to secure certain individual rights based on the equality of every citizen before the law. But which rights? The right to vote? To be sure. To worship freely? Yes, certainly. The right to a high school education. Again, yes. To a job? Probably not. To urinate in public? No. To drive 90 miles per hour on the interstate? No. Though a person may develop a temporary interest in public urination or highway speeding, he never acquires a corresponding right . Evidently, then, the individual rights a government does well to secure are circumscribed occasionally by a concern for collective well-being. The public interest, in other words, can at least occasionally trump the private.

Now consider whether there exists a ‘right’ of reproductive choice – and for the moment, let’s concern ourselves not with the contentious question of abortion but with the largely settled question of procreation . Imagine the case of a mentally retarded couple who want a child. In the first half of the last century, this issue was far from settled; 24 states, between 1911 and 1930, enacted sterilization laws aimed at the mentally retarded. The Supreme Court itself upheld the constitutionality of such laws in 1927 – a decision featuring Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s now infamous remark: “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”

From a utilitarian view, which prioritizes the collective weal, it’s bad for a mentally retarded couple to procreate. It’s indisputable that their offspring are more likely to be mentally retarded than the offspring of a couple in which neither parent is retarded, or in which only one parent is; it’s also indisputable that a mentally retarded child is more likely to require public assistance. How, then, does the private interest of the mentally retarded couple trump the collective interest? Whence, given the likelihood of a burdensome outcome, a mentally retarded couple’s right to procreation?

The answer returns us to the second level of the abortion debate, to the theory of natural law and unalienable rights. The equality of persons before the law derives not from a measurable equality, such as I.Q.. That equality plainly doesn’t exist. Rather, equality before the law derives from a immeasurable equality – namely, God’s endowment of a soul. Though the collective weal might be served by social programs that presorted individuals according to their unequal endowments, that channeled only the intellectually promising towards higher education and only the physically gifted towards sports, the suggestion is constitutionally repugnant because the collective weal is trumped by the equal endowments of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness – equal endowments which, in the only coherent reading of Jefferson’s words, are themselves rooted not in our physical but in our spiritual natures.

In short, if we understand the Constitution as the system of positive laws by which Jefferson’s ‘unalienable rights’ are secured, then the Constitution implicitly compels the states to recognize ensoulment – that is, God’s work in the creation of personhood – as the starting point for equality before the law. Even if, as Ronald Dworkin contends, the fetus has no interest in its own survival, and thus derives no right to life from its own interest, nevertheless, God’s unique interest in the fetus’s existence, signaled by the act of ensoulment, might well be sufficient to secure the fetus’s unalienable right to life. The difficulty with the Roe decision now becomes manifest: on the one hand, the states must affirm ensoulment as the actualizing element of legal protection; on the other hand, the states, in the wake of Roe , cannot define the moment of ensoulment before the third trimester.

Let me restate that. If the Constitution is meant to secure the unalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, it compels states to recognize ensoulment by God as the basis of human equality. If that’s indeed how the Constitution is understood, then, strangely enough, by denying the possibility of ensoulment at conception, Roe violates the nonestablishment of religion clause of the First Amendment.

That would, I think, comprise a knockdown argument against Roe were it not necessarily prefaced by the word if . The linking of the Constitution to the unalienable rights passage in the Declaration is one way to understand the Constitution – perhaps the likeliest way. But it’s not the only way. The Constitution can also be understood as merely a set of practical guidelines – a means to procure civil order rather than a reflection of higher ideals. Or it can be understood as a compromise between pragmatic and idealistic ends. As your understanding of the Constitution’s intention changes, so necessarily must your method of interpretation.

So what’s the status of Roe v. Wade in 2002? It may be that the single thread by which the decision hangs is the legal principle of stare decisis – that is, the respect current courts owe prior courts’ rulings. In other words, unless incontrovertible evidence can be marshaled that a past case was decided erroneously, the earlier decision must stand. The defense of Roe on these grounds was made eloquently by the Supreme Court’s majority ruling in the 1992 case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey . It merits quoting at length:

Overruling Roe ’s central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result under stare decisis principles, but would seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law. Where the Court acts to resolve the sort of unique, intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe, its decision has a dimension not present in normal cases, and is entitled to rare precedential force to counter the inevitable efforts to overturn it and to thwart its implementation. Only the most convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the first was anything but a surrender to political pressure and an unjustified repudiation of the principle on which the Court staked its authority in the first instance.

The principle of stare decisis , in short, upholds Roe because no knockdown argument against the decision has emerged. There have been telling arguments against Roe – as I’ve endeavored to show. But no knockdown argument. Moreover, it’s fair to speculate that no such knockdown argument can emerge since it would have to establish the full personhood of a pre-sentient fetus. This differentiates the issue of abortion from the issue of slaveholding – an instance in which stare decisis was unable to uphold the legality of an institution – since the full personhood of human beings of African ancestry became, in time, undeniable.

What, then, is the status of the abortion debate? Certainly, the practice of abortion, even at the stage prior to the sentience of the fetus, is an offense against the concept of a rightsendowing God – a concept on which the republic was founded. Perhaps it’s even an offense against God Himself, an offense for which its practitioners may answer in a divinely just hereafter. But it is an offense against no person – at least insofar as the term ‘person’ can be consistently defined. For that reason, the Roe decision, on the basis of stare decisis , must stand.

Mark Goldblatt is a journalist who has written opinion columns for many of the major US papers. He teaches the Bible in the History of Ideas at Fashion Institute of Technology of the State University of New York. His latest book is the novel Africa Speaks .

This site uses cookies to recognize users and allow us to analyse site usage. By continuing to browse the site with cookies enabled in your browser, you consent to the use of cookies in accordance with our privacy policy . X

Read our research on: Gun Policy | International Conflict | Election 2024

Regions & Countries

2. social and moral considerations on abortion.

Relatively few Americans view the morality of abortion in stark terms: Overall, just 7% of all U.S. adults say abortion is morally acceptable in all cases, and 13% say it is morally wrong in all cases. A third say that abortion is morally wrong in most cases, while about a quarter (24%) say it is morally acceptable most of the time. About an additional one-in-five do not consider abortion a moral issue.

A chart showing wide religious and partisan differences in views of the morality of abortion

There are wide differences on this question by political party and religious affiliation. Among Republicans and independents who lean toward the Republican Party, most say that abortion is morally wrong either in most (48%) or all cases (20%). Among Democrats and Democratic leaners, meanwhile, only about three-in-ten (29%) hold a similar view. About four-in-ten Democrats say abortion is morally acceptable in most (32%) or all (11%) cases, while an additional 28% say abortion is not a moral issue.

White evangelical Protestants overwhelmingly say abortion is morally wrong in most (51%) or all cases (30%). A slim majority of Catholics (53%) also view abortion as morally wrong, but many also say it is morally acceptable in most (24%) or all cases (4%), or that it is not a moral issue (17%). And among religiously unaffiliated Americans, about three-quarters see abortion as morally acceptable (45%) or not a moral issue (32%).

There is strong alignment between people’s views of whether abortion is morally wrong and whether it should be illegal. For example, among U.S. adults who take the view that abortion should be illegal in all cases without exception, fully 86% also say abortion is always morally wrong. The prevailing view among adults who say abortion should be legal in all circumstances is that abortion is not a moral issue (44%), though notable shares of this group also say it is morally acceptable in all (27%) or most (22%) cases.

Most Americans who say abortion should be illegal with some exceptions take the view that abortion is morally wrong in most cases (69%). Those who say abortion should be legal with some exceptions are somewhat more conflicted, with 43% deeming abortion morally acceptable in most cases and 26% saying it is morally wrong in most cases; an additional 24% say it is not a moral issue.

The survey also asked respondents who said abortion is morally wrong in at least some cases whether there are situations where abortion should still be legal despite being morally wrong. Roughly half of U.S. adults (48%) say that there are, in fact, situations where abortion is morally wrong but should still be legal, while just 22% say that whenever abortion is morally wrong, it should also be illegal. An additional 28% either said abortion is morally acceptable in all cases or not a moral issue, and thus did not receive the follow-up question.

Across both political parties and all major Christian subgroups – including Republicans and White evangelicals – there are substantially more people who say that there are situations where abortion should still be legal despite being morally wrong than there are who say that abortion should always be illegal when it is morally wrong.

A chart showing roughly half of Americans say there are situations where abortion is morally wrong, but should still be legal

Public views of what would change the number of abortions in the U.S.

Americans more likely to say additional support for women would reduce the number of abortions than say the same about stricter laws

Asked about the impact a number of policy changes would have on the number of abortions in the U.S., nearly two-thirds of Americans (65%) say “more support for women during pregnancy, such as financial assistance or employment protections” would reduce the number of abortions in the U.S. Six-in-ten say the same about expanding sex education and similar shares say more support for parents (58%), making it easier to place children for adoption in good homes (57%) and passing stricter abortion laws (57%) would have this effect.

While about three-quarters of White evangelical Protestants (74%) say passing stricter abortion laws would reduce the number of abortions in the U.S., about half of religiously unaffiliated Americans (48%) hold this view. Similarly, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say this (67% vs. 49%, respectively). By contrast, while about seven-in-ten unaffiliated adults (69%) say expanding sex education would reduce the number of abortions in the U.S., only about half of White evangelicals (48%) say this. Democrats also are substantially more likely than Republicans to hold this view (70% vs. 50%).

Democrats are somewhat more likely than Republicans to say support for parents – such as paid family leave or more child care options – would reduce the number of abortions in the country (64% vs. 53%, respectively), while Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say making adoption into good homes easier would reduce abortions (64% vs. 52%).

Majorities across both parties and other subgroups analyzed in this report say that more support for women during pregnancy would reduce the number of abortions in America.

A chart showing Republicans more likely than Democrats to say passing stricter abortion laws would reduce number of abortions in the United States

A majority of Americans say women should have more say in setting abortion policy in the U.S.

A chart showing seven-in-ten Democrats say women should have more say than men in setting abortion policy in the U.S.

More than half of U.S. adults (56%) say women should have more say than men when it comes to setting policies around abortion in this country – including 42% who say women should have “a lot” more say. About four-in-ten (39%) say men and women should have equal say in abortion policies, and 3% say men should have more say than women.

Six-in-ten women and about half of men (51%) say that women should have more say on this policy issue.

Democrats are much more likely than Republicans to say women should have more say than men in setting abortion policy (70% vs. 41%). Similar shares of Protestants (48%) and Catholics (51%) say women should have more say than men on this issue, while the share of religiously unaffiliated Americans who say this is much higher (70%).

How do certain arguments about abortion resonate with Americans?

Seeking to gauge Americans’ reactions to several common arguments related to abortion, the survey presented respondents with six statements and asked them to rate how well each statement reflects their views on a five-point scale ranging from “extremely well” to “not at all well.”

About half of U.S. adults say if legal abortions are too hard to get, women will seek out unsafe ones

The list included three statements sometimes cited by individuals wishing to protect a right to abortion: “The decision about whether to have an abortion should belong solely to the pregnant woman,” “If legal abortions are too hard to get, then women will seek out unsafe abortions from unlicensed providers,” and “If legal abortions are too hard to get, then it will be more difficult for women to get ahead in society.” The first two of these resonate with the greatest number of Americans, with about half (53%) saying each describes their views “extremely” or “very” well. In other words, among the statements presented in the survey, U.S. adults are most likely to say that women alone should decide whether to have an abortion, and that making abortion illegal will lead women into unsafe situations.

The three other statements are similar to arguments sometimes made by those who wish to restrict access to abortions: “Human life begins at conception, so a fetus is a person with rights,” “If legal abortions are too easy to get, then people won’t be as careful with sex and contraception,” and “If legal abortions are too easy to get, then some pregnant women will be pressured into having an abortion even when they don’t want to.”

Fewer than half of Americans say each of these statements describes their views extremely or very well. Nearly four-in-ten endorse the notion that “human life begins at conception, so a fetus is a person with rights” (26% say this describes their views extremely well, 12% very well), while about a third say that “if legal abortions are too easy to get, then people won’t be as careful with sex and contraception” (20% extremely well, 15% very well).

When it comes to statements cited by proponents of abortion rights, Democrats are much more likely than Republicans to identify with all three of these statements, as are religiously unaffiliated Americans compared with Catholics and Protestants. Women also are more likely than men to express these views – and especially more likely to say that decisions about abortion should fall solely to pregnant women and that restrictions on abortion will put women in unsafe situations. Younger adults under 30 are particularly likely to express the view that if legal abortions are too hard to get, then it will be difficult for women to get ahead in society.

A chart showing most Democrats say decisions about abortion should fall solely to pregnant women

In the case of the three statements sometimes cited by opponents of abortion, the patterns generally go in the opposite direction. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say each statement reflects their views “extremely” or “very” well, as are Protestants (especially White evangelical Protestants) and Catholics compared with the religiously unaffiliated. In addition, older Americans are more likely than young adults to say that human life begins at conception and that easy access to abortion encourages unsafe sex.

Gender differences on these questions, however, are muted. In fact, women are just as likely as men to say that human life begins at conception, so a fetus is a person with rights (39% and 38%, respectively).

A chart showing nearly three-quarters of White evangelicals say human life begins at conception

Analyzing certain statements together allows for an examination of the extent to which individuals can simultaneously hold two views that may seem to some as in conflict. For instance, overall, one-in-three U.S. adults say that both the statement “the decision about whether to have an abortion should belong solely to the pregnant woman” and the statement “human life begins at conception, so the fetus is a person with rights” reflect their own views at least somewhat well. This includes 12% of adults who say both statements reflect their views “extremely” or “very” well.

Republicans are slightly more likely than Democrats to say both statements reflect their own views at least somewhat well (36% vs. 30%), although Republicans are much more likely to say only the statement about the fetus being a person with rights reflects their views at least somewhat well (39% vs. 9%) and Democrats are much more likely to say only the statement about the decision to have an abortion belonging solely to the pregnant woman reflects their views at least somewhat well (55% vs. 19%).

Additionally, those who take the stance that abortion should be legal in all cases with no exceptions are overwhelmingly likely (76%) to say only the statement about the decision belonging solely to the pregnant woman reflects their views extremely, very or somewhat well, while a nearly identical share (73%) of those who say abortion should be illegal in all cases with no exceptions say only the statement about human life beginning at conception reflects their views at least somewhat well.

A chart showing one-third of U.S. adults say both that abortion decision belongs solely to the pregnant woman, and that life begins at conception and fetuses have rights

In their own words: How Americans feel about abortion

A chart showing Americans express a range of strong emotions when asked to describe feelings on abortion

When asked to describe whether they had any other additional views or feelings about abortion, adults shared a range of strong or complex views about the topic. In many cases, Americans reiterated their strong support – or opposition to – abortion in the U.S. Others reflected on how difficult or nuanced the issue was, offering emotional responses or personal experiences to one of two open-ended questions asked on the survey.

One open-ended question asked respondents if they wanted to share any other views or feelings about abortion overall. The other open-ended question asked respondents about their feelings or views regarding abortion restrictions. The responses to both questions were similar.

Overall, about three-in-ten adults offered a response to either of the open-ended questions. There was little difference in the likelihood to respond by party, religion or gender, though people who say they have given a “lot” of thought to the issue were more likely to respond than people who have not.

Of those who did offer additional comments, about a third of respondents said something in support of legal abortion. By far the most common sentiment expressed was that the decision to have an abortion should be solely a personal decision, or a decision made jointly with a woman and her health care provider, with some saying simply that it “should be between a woman and her doctor.” Others made a more general point, such as one woman who said, “A woman’s body and health should not be subject to legislation.”

About one-in-five of the people who responded to the question expressed disapproval of abortion – the most common reason being a belief that a fetus is a person or that abortion is murder. As one woman said, “It is my belief that life begins at conception and as much as is humanly possible, we as a society need to support, protect and defend each one of those little lives.” Others in this group pointed to the fact that they felt abortion was too often used as a form of birth control. For example, one man said, “Abortions are too easy to obtain these days. It seems more women are using it as a way of birth control.”

About a quarter of respondents who opted to answer one of the open-ended questions said that their views about abortion were complex; many described having mixed feelings about the issue or otherwise expressed sympathy for both sides of the issue. One woman said, “I am personally opposed to abortion in most cases, but I think it would be detrimental to society to make it illegal. I was alive before the pill and before legal abortions. Many women died.” And one man said, “While I might feel abortion may be wrong in some cases, it is never my place as a man to tell a woman what to do with her body.”

The remaining responses were either not related to the topic or were difficult to interpret.

Sign up for our Religion newsletter

Sent weekly on Wednesday

Report Materials

Table of contents, majority of public disapproves of supreme court’s decision to overturn roe v. wade, wide partisan gaps in abortion attitudes, but opinions in both parties are complicated, key facts about the abortion debate in america, about six-in-ten americans say abortion should be legal in all or most cases, fact sheet: public opinion on abortion, most popular.

About Pew Research Center Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. Pew Research Center does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts .

Table of Contents
Random Entry
Chronological
Editorial Information
About the SEP
Editorial Board
How to Cite the SEP
Special Characters
Advanced Tools
Support the SEP
PDFs for SEP Friends
Make a Donation
SEPIA for Libraries
Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

Friends PDF Preview
Author and Citation Info
Back to Top

Parenthood and Procreation

The ethics of parenthood and procreation apply not only to daily acts of decision-making by parents and prospective procreators, but also to law, public policy, and medicine. Two recent social and technological shifts make this topic especially pressing. First, changing family demographics mean that children are increasingly reared in blended families, by single parents, or by same-sex partners, prompting questions of who should be considered a child’s parent and what good parenting requires. Second, the development and proliferation of “Assisted Reproductive Technology” (ART) raises questions concerning access to the technology, its permissibility, and its use to enhance future children or prevent the birth of children with certain conditions. Recent debate in ethics and political philosophy has focused on the following questions:

Are there any procreative rights? If so, what are they? What, if anything, limits them? When, if at all, is it morally permissible to procreate? What may procreators permissibly aim at in choosing characteristics of potential children? What are the moral constraints on the means of procreation?

What are the grounds of parenthood? In what respects is parenthood a biological or natural relationship, and in what respects a social or conventional one?

What are the scope and limits of parental rights and responsibilities? What must parents provide for their children? How should their parental responsibilities weigh against other obligations? What should parents be allowed to do, and when may, or must, public agencies intervene? What, if anything, does society owe parents? What do co-parents owe each other?

In the following entry, we divide these questions into three sequential stages: the ethics of procreation (creating a child), to which we devote two sections, and then becoming parents (acquiring parental rights and responsibilities) and being parents (holding and discharging parental rights and responsibilities).

1. Foundations

2.1 defenses of a right to procreate, 2.2 conservative perspectives on procreative autonomy, 2.3 feminist perspectives on procreative autonomy, 2.4 anti-natalism, 3.1 the non-identity problem and impersonal considerations, 3.2 assisted reproductive technologies, 3.3 “surrogacy” and contractually assisted reproduction, 3.4 enhancement, 3.5 state policies, 3.6 a right not to procreate, 4.1 genetic accounts, 4.2 labor-based accounts, 4.3 intentional and voluntarist accounts, 4.4 causal accounts, 5.1 parental rights, 5.2 parental responsibilities, other internet resources, related entries.

A parent is someone with weighty rights and responsibilities regarding a given child. Parents usually have decision-making rights over most areas of their child’s life and rights to exclude others from making such decisions. So long as parents fulfill requirements to nourish, educate, and provide healthcare for their children, they may make many decisions over how and what their child eats, dresses, plays, studies, and with whom he or she interacts. Section 5 surveys controversies regarding the content of these rights and responsibilities.

“Parenthood” has distinct senses: biological, social, legal, and moral. These categories present problems at the margins. While the idea of a biological parent seems self-evident, modern reproductive technology complicates it, as a child can have genetic parents (gamete providers, who supply the sperm or egg) and a third, gestational, parent. Each of these is a biological parent, by virtue of making a biological contribution to producing the child. The recent technology of mitochondrial replacement therapy, in which the nucleus of a fertilized egg is transferred to a second egg for medical reasons, introduces further complications, as additional genetic material—mitochondrial DNA—is supplied by the donor egg cell.

Biological parents are commonly distinguished from social parents, who rear the child and are socially perceived as responsible for it. Adoptive parents, or parents who rear children created with donated gametes and gestated by a third party, are social, but not biological, parents. (Biological parents need not be social parents, as biological parents give up children for adoption, donate gametes, or work as gestational parents.) The category of social parent presents borderline cases when a given community does not socially recognize those rearing a child as parents. This might occur with a mother’s unmarried partner, two friends rearing children together, other relatives like grandparents rearing the child, or when a community participates in child-rearing. Legal and moral criteria for the acquisition of parental rights and responsibilities should clearly designate whom society should recognize as having them.

Legal parenthood consists in possessing legal parental rights and responsibilities. Historically, in the US, a pregnant woman’s husband has been presumed to be her child’s legal father: marriage, not biology, underpins the legal relation. This has faced legal challenges from genetic fathers (Rosenman 1995; see Hubin 2003 on fatherhood). Law in different jurisdictions is also increasingly recognizing legal parental rights on the basis of same-sex marriage. The rise of ART has prompted many questions regarding assignment of legal parenthood when there are contending claims—as between a couple who commissioned a contract pregnancy and the contracting gestational parent. They have also stretched the understanding of parenthood, as when the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized three legal parents ( A.A. v. B.B. , 2007 ONCA 2)—a lesbian couple and sperm donor. The wider use of ART and gamete donation, along with broader recognition of same-sex marriage and changing social attitudes towards polyamory, have led some philosophers to argue for rethinking the family to include more than two social and legal parents, on grounds including child welfare, social justice, and environmental impact (see, e.g., Cutas 2011, Shrage 2018, Gheaus 2019, Grill 2020).

Legal, social, and biological parenthood can be conceptually distinguished; however, parenthood is arguably fundamentally a moral relationship, and its moral grounds and obligations should be considered in resolving the borderline cases. Moral parenthood is possession of moral parental rights and responsibilities. These may differ in content from legal rights and responsibilities—we might think parents morally ought to do more than they are legally required to do, for example. The moral grounds for assigning parental rights can also differ from their legal assignment. Of course, legal assignment of parenthood may trigger moral obligations, due to a general moral obligation to obey the law or because the legal parent is best-placed to rear the child. But moral theories of parenthood give independent grounds for parental rights, on the basis of which particular legal arrangements may be criticized.

The interrelation of legal, moral, social, and biological parenthood depends on the particular moral theory of how one becomes a parent. For example, on a genetic account, biology determines moral parental status, whereas on an intentional account, biology will be less morally salient. Section 4 reviews these theories.

2. Procreative Autonomy

20 th -century international human rights documents explicitly codify the right “to marry and found a family” (United Nations 1948, Article 16), and thus some writers argue that liberal constitutions implicitly enshrine a right to procreate (Hill 1991). A right to procreate could be construed negatively or positively. As a negative right, it would be a right against coercive interference in decisions regarding procreation. As a positive right, it would be an entitlement to assistance in procreation.

This entry does not consider abortion. Although positions on procreative autonomy are not independent of positions on abortion, the extensive philosophical debate about abortion must be dealt with independently. The issue of contraception can be touched on briefly here. While some religious views oppose contraception, this position is not widely defended in philosophical ethics. However, philosophical debate has recently emerged over “conscientious objections” by pharmacists. In some jurisdictions, pharmacists opposing abortion have a legal right to refuse to dispense emergency contraception, on the (medically controversial) basis that it acts as an abortifacient. This right has been defended on the grounds that pharmacists’ freedom of conscience outweighs the inconvenience to women (if they can obtain the drug elsewhere). Others have argued that such refusals constitute serious harms to women, not mere inconveniences, and that similar objections would not be permitted in non-procreative cases, such as a vegetarian pharmacist who refused to dispense materials tested on animals (LaFollette and LaFollette 2007; Fenton and Lomasky 2005; McLeod 2010; Kelleher 2010; McLeod 2020).

A negative moral right to procreate—also discussed under the label of “reproductive liberty” or “procreative liberty”—may be grounded in autonomy rights to control one’s body and make certain important decisions for oneself (Dworkin 1993). Violations could involve direct physical coercion such as rape or forced abortion or sterilization, or coercive interference with decisions regarding sexual activity or contraception. Involuntary physical interventions such as forced contraception, sterilization, or abortion were practiced in twentieth-century eugenic movements. Their wrongness is now generally acknowledged, but critics see continuity between such racist policies and contemporary moderately coercive policies such as making contraceptive implants the condition of medical aid for impoverished women, particularly for women of color (see Roberts 1997).

A right to procreate may also be grounded in the strong interest people have in creating a child, giving birth, and parenting (Robertson 1994). Because this justification does not concern a right to use one’s body, but to realize the important interest in creating and rearing a child, it can be taken to imply a positive (as well as a negative) right to procreate. Such a positive right could also entail a claim to sufficient environmental resources to raise children justly (Gheaus 2016a; Roberts 2015) or to funding for ART (Robertson 1994). Given that a distinct right to parent could be met through adoption, some suggest that financial barriers to ART where children are available for adoption would be justified (De Wispelaere and Weinstock 2014). Others have criticized the way that focusing on a right to procreate perpetuates the “biogenetic bias” that favors genetic ties over social ones (Boucai 2016) or challenged the idea that the value of establishing a parenting relationship can ground a right to create someone with the special vulnerabilities of children to their parents (Hannan and Leland 2018).

Liberal theory has tended to support some sort of right to procreative autonomy. At its strongest, the “repro-libertarian” approach opposes regulations on reproductive decisions and ART unless they can be shown to threaten harm to others. Repro-libertarianism is grounded in the values of individual equality and autonomy (Feinberg 1986; Dworkin 1993). The basic thought is that interfering in procreation involves illiberal interference with the person and her choices. Further, some authors hold that ART ought to be universally available provided it does not harm others, because any restrictions would constitute unequal treatment of those who cannot conceive through sexual intercourse (whether due to infertility or because they do not form a “traditional” family) (Harris 1998).

Repro-libertarians have been concerned to show that assumptions about the inherent wrongness or harmfulness of ART are not justified. In particular, they have argued that conservative opposition to cloning, genetic selection, surrogacy, and harvesting fetal ovarian tissue is based in undefended traditionalism (Harris 1998; cf. Glover 1998; Buchanan et al. 2000, chap. 2).

Communitarian conservative approaches to procreative liberty tend to regard procreation as part of a dense web of practices that gain their meaning and value from being part of a comprehensive way of life. Efforts to increase procreative autonomy—particularly through biotechnology—risk meddling with such ways of life (Sandel 2007). Thus, communitarian conservatives view ART with suspicion. The 20 th -century record of Nazi “eugenics” programs, forced abortion as a population-control mechanism, and widespread nonconsensual sterilization in many countries, including the United States, is adduced as support for pessimism about technological, policy-driven, or self-indulgent interventions in procreation (Meilaender 1987).

Communitarian conservatives typically oppose the use of ART. They also criticize talk of rights in discussion of procreation and parent-child relations. As Murray writes: “Procreative liberty’s problems began when it appropriated the abstract principle—the right to choose—and ripped it out of the rich context that provided its moral heft” (Murray 2002, 42).

Communitarian conservatives need not deny that persons have a strong interest in autonomy regarding procreative decisions. The point is that this interest is both generated and delimited by a particular communal context. They believe there is no right to reproductive autonomy, because reproductive choices gain their meaning and value from this context.

Some philosophers argue for limiting the moral right to procreate to married or long-term male-female couples on harm-based grounds (Almond 2006). Some claim that same-sex and single parenting harm children. While the empirical debate cannot be addressed here, there seems to be a lack of evidence that same-sex parenting harms children. For example, an American Sociological Association review finds a “clear consensus in the social science literature” that children of same-sex parents are no worse off than children of different-sex parents (see Manning et al., 2014). In any case, since evidence suggests that high-conflict families or divorce can harm children, such arguments risk inconsistency if not applied to male-female couples at risk of divorce or sub-par parenting.

Feminist perspectives on procreative autonomy are diverse, but they share a commitment to opposing patriarchy and promoting people’s (particularly women’s) abilities to determine the shape of their own lives, where this includes sexual and reproductive autonomy. While some feminists also take communitarian, repro-libertarian, or more nuanced liberal perspectives, other feminists criticize those approaches. One general theme of feminist criticism is that mainstream procreative ethics often employs abstractions which obscure the impact of policies on women’s bodies, as well as the real-world context of socio-economic pressures (e.g., Overall 2012). Much feminist work, then, begins with women’s embodied experience in pregnancy, as caregivers, and as subject to distinct, gendered, social and economic pressures (e.g., Mullin 2005; Satz 2010; Gheaus 2016b).

The feminist concern to enable women to control their own lives and bodies suggests sympathy with the repro-libertarians’ focus on autonomy and equality. But many feminists are skeptical of the reproductive biotechnology establishment, which remains preponderantly white, upper-middle class, male, and corporate. Hence feminists have charged that repro-libertarianism would exacerbate existing power inequalities (Corea 1985; Sherwin 1987, 1992; Rothman 1989; Dodds and Jones 1989a; Baron 2019). While this establishment represents itself as empowering women, many feminists charge that it succeeds only in disempowering them: it conscripts poorer women into service for people who are usually wealthier; it creates new expectations that may subtly coerce women to pursue fertility treatments or other medical interventions; and it inevitably reflects the cultural, economic, sexist, and racist biases of the society at large (Brazier 1998; Roberts 1997).

Some feminists have also raised the concern that any putative right to procreate threatens to give men power over women. In addition to empowering the mostly male scientific establishment, a right to procreate could empower a man to prevent his erstwhile partner from aborting her pregnancy (Overall 1993). Thus the importance of a right not to procreate has led many feminists to place the various strands of procreative autonomy within a nexus of interests.

Critiques of the concept of procreative autonomy as misleading or empty rhetoric reflect a larger feminist project critical of autonomy construed as individual choice: within an inegalitarian social and economic system, some feminists argue, pressures on choice will ensure that supposedly free choices disadvantage women (e.g. Dodds and Jones, 1989a). This is particularly problematic when the medical establishment presents burdensome technologies as the expected norm. Choices are shaped by the salient alternatives, so that the widespread adoption of new medical technologies will affect women’s choices (as the normalization of testing for Downs’ syndrome shapes women’s choice to undergo such testing). The point is not that adopting new technology is always problematic, but that the repro-libertarian framework for evaluating it is naïve and misleading (Sherwin 1992; see also 3.5 below, State Policies). These concerns extend to the way in which reproductive policy and technologies shape, and are shaped by, race as well as gender (Roberts 1997; Russell 2018).

A further feminist concern is that the rhetoric surrounding reproductive biotechnology commodifies women’s bodies, devalues women’s role in reproduction, and treats women as mere means rather than ends in themselves. For instance, some reproductive services entail so-called “womb rental,” “egg harvesting,” or “surrogate motherhood” (Rothman 1989; Ber 2000; Anderson 1990; Baron 2019). Feminists such as Corea argue that the reproductive biotechnology establishment relies on a distorted and stereotyped picture of the nature, desires, and needs of women, as well as the success rate of the technologies it purveys, and that these technologies result in physical harms to women (Corea 1985; Brazier 1998).

By conceptualizing women and their fetuses or newborns as having conflicting interests, rather than as in symbiotic harmony (as they usually are), the medical establishment promotes an adversarial view which lends itself to overriding pregnant women’s treatment decisions. Such interventions, such as court-ordered C-sections, are especially problematic when similar interventions would not be imposed on parents to save a born child’s life (such as a court-ordered blood transfusion); this inconsistency suggests a bias against pregnant women’s decision-making capacity. Understandings of pregnancy and motherhood, feminists argue, need to be enriched by considering women’s experience of pregnancy and moving away from an antagonistic medical model, as well as appreciating how that model has been socially constructed (Purdy 1990; Kukla 2005; Mullin 2005).

Feminist care ethics, which early on took the mother-child relationship as the model of caring (e.g., Held 1987), has provided a rich conceptual resource for feminist procreative ethics. The influence of care ethics can be seen, for example, in arguments which foreground the value of intimate mother-fetus relationships in examining the moral basis of parenthood and the legitimacy of contract pregnancy (e.g., Gheaus 2016b). In light of the challenge to traditional understandings of parenthood posed by new ARTs, Mary Lyndon Shanley has argued for caregiving as the ground of moral parenthood (Shanley 2018).

Finally, much feminist scholarship has focused on the unequal division of labor between parents within the household and its effect on girls’ life chances, and hence on the state’s role in addressing this gendered division of parenting labor and defining the legal institution of the family (Okin 1989, Card 1996, Schouten 2019; see also 3.5 below). Feminist perspectives appear throughout the discussion below. (See also the entry on feminist perspectives on the family .)

A further set of objections to the unburdened exercise of procreative autonomy is anti-natalist. Anti-natalism is opposition to procreation. In its local form anti-natalism applies only to particular people in certain instances. In the case where a child would predictably experience a life so miserable as to be not worth living, it may be argued that procreation would be wrongful. Whether there are such lives—and if so, what characterizes them—is controversial, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that a life can be so irremediably miserable that it is of no benefit to the individual who endures it. Arguably, the lives of those born with Tay-Sachs disease fit this description, and many argue that it is immoral to knowingly bring such children into the world. Some authors go much further than this, arguing that procreating is wrong unless the parent has reason to think he or she can provide the child with a good chance of a normal life. The general claim is that certain types of individuals have an interest in not being brought into existence on account of the quality of life they would have were they created (McMahon 1998; Roberts 1998). ARTs allowing post-menopausal women to give birth have prompted objections to post-menopausal motherhood on grounds of child welfare; but such arguments seem to employ double standards (see Cutas 2007). Cassidy holds that prospective parents who believe they will not be sufficiently competent should not procreate (Cassidy 2006). Relatedly, Benatar argues that autonomy rights cannot permit risking severe harm to children; those who risk transmitting HIV, for instance, cannot assert a right to reproduce (Benatar 2010). Local anti-natalism is also supported by the judgment that wrongful birth, birth which wrongfully imposes undue risk and harm on a resulting child, is possible (Shiffrin 1999).

Global anti-natalism opposes procreation in general. One global anti-natalist position holds that in all cases procreation is a harm to those brought into being. Benatar argues that while existence brings pains as well as pleasures, non-existence is a lack of pains and pleasures. While pain is bad, absence of pain and pleasure is not bad, so it is always worse to be than not to be (Benatar 1997, 2006; see also discussion of Shiffrin 1999, below; for responses, see Overall 2012, Benatar and Wasserman 2015). Other global anti-natalist positions focus on harms or costs to others. An environmentalist anti-natalism argues that procreation is wrong for the same reasons overconsumption is (Young 2001, MacIver 2015). An opportunity-cost anti-natalism argues that the money spent on rearing a child would be better spent on ameliorating the lives of those already existing (Rachels 2014). And a misanthropic anti-natalism argues that humans cause so much harm – to other humans, non-human animals, and the environment – that there is a duty not to procreate (Benatar 2015). Others have argued that the availability of children needing homes creates strong moral reasons to adopt rather than to procreate (Friedrich 2013, Rulli 2014). There are also intermediate positions. For example, Sarah Conly argues that the interests that ground a right to procreate can be satisfied with only one child and so it may be permissible to restrict the number of children an individual creates when costs to third parties from overpopulation are substantial (Conly 2005, 2016; see also Statman 2005).

Note that anti-natalists do not always defend legal restrictions, because interfering with procreation may involve intolerably illiberal coercion of the person. Even those who do think that there are circumstances in which interference with procreation can be justified accept that there are important countervailing values. For example, Benatar notes that the moral costs of forced abortion or sterilization are “immense,” but thinks that the moral costs of moderate coercion or directive counseling should be weighed against the moral costs of harm to future children (Benatar 2010; see also the discussion of parental licensing in Section 5.2 below).

One response to anti-natalist views is to provide a justification for the decision to procreate. Some authors, agreeing that procreation requires a justification and that many common reasons for procreating carry no moral weight, locate a possible justification in the unique nature of the parent-child relationship, the desire for pregnancy, or the desire to pass on valuable family traits (Overall 2012, Rulli 2016, Brake 2015, Ferracioli 2018; on whether one can make a rational decision to have a child, see Paul 2015 and Krishnamurthy 2015).

3. The Morality of Procreation

For the most part, secular debates about the morality of procreation focus on whether and when procreation is impermissible, rather than whether it might be obligatory (though see Smilansky 1995 and Gheaus 2015 on whether there could be a duty to procreate). The debates concerning the impermissibility of procreation raise deep issues in metaphysics and value theory (Belshaw 2003; Holtug 2001; Kavka 1982; Rachels 1998). We restrict our discussion to moral issues rather than legal ones, and assume throughout that reproduction is fully voluntary and informed—that is, neither coerced nor accidental.

It might be hoped that we could give a full account of permissible procreation by appealing only to the interests of the individuals affected by procreative decisions. Unfortunately, there is reason to think that this may not be possible. Consider the following sort of case, introduced into the literature by Parfit (1984), and known as the non-identity problem (Hanser 1990; Harman 2004; Woodward 1986; entry on the nonidentity problem ):

Marie is taking a drug that she knows will cause a birth defect—say, a withered arm—in any child that she conceives (call this child “Amy”). In 3 months this drug will have passed from her body, and she will be able to conceive a child free from this defect (call this child “Sophie”). Intuitively, Marie does something wrong in deciding to have Amy rather than Sophie.

Non-identity cases of this kind are called “same-number” cases because they involve comparing situations that contain the same number of individuals. Other versions of the non-identity problem involve different-number (or non-comparative) choices:

Sri has a genetic condition that she knows will cause any child she conceives to be born with a serious cognitive disability. Despite knowing this fact, Sri deliberately conceives and gives birth to a seriously cognitively disabled child, Aarav.

Assume, plausibly, that Amy and Aarav have lives that are worth living. Does Marie do something wrong in conceiving and giving birth to Amy? Does Sri do something wrong conceiving and giving birth to Aarav? Many are inclined to think that they do, but it is unclear how we can capture this wrongness by appeal only to the interests of the individuals involved. This is because wronging someone seems to presuppose that things could have gone otherwise for that individual, but things could not have gone otherwise for either Amy or Aarav. Sri’s putative wrong consists in creating Aarav, and doing otherwise would have entailed creating no one. Her action has no victim and therefore sets back no one’s interests. Amy isn’t made worse off by Marie’s actions, for had Marie waited another three months before conceiving she would have given birth to a different child (Sophie) instead of Amy. It is therefore difficult to see how Marie might have harmed or wronged Amy.

It is also prima facie implausible that the interests of other parties explain why these actions would be wrong: they are wanted and their births don’t harm their community. The non-identity problem is not solely a problem for the morality of procreation. Anyone who affects the welfare of future people in identity-affecting ways may face it. Readers interested in general approaches to the non-identity problem should consult the relevant entry. Here we discuss just those aspects bearing on the ethics of becoming parents (see also Hanser 1990; Vehmas 2002).

Feinberg (1992) compares situations like the Marie and Sri cases with cases in which someone is harmed in the course of being saved from a greater harm (e.g., his leg is broken while his life is being saved). In both cases an evil or harm is justified in virtue of the fact that it is a necessary condition of a greater good—in the one case saving a person’s life, in the other case bringing a life into existence. Shiffrin (1999), however, holds that harming someone to save them from a greater harm is morally distinct from harming them to impose a “pure benefit” on them. Shiffrin claims that we have serious qualms about harming someone without their consent to secure a pure benefit for them, even when we can be sure that they would regard the pure benefit as far outweighing the harm (see also Steinbock and McClamrock 1994). She concludes that procreation is routinely more morally problematic than is generally recognized.

Shiffrin’s attempt to drive a wedge into Feinberg’s analogy raises questions of its own. First, one might challenge the assumption that life is a pure benefit. Even if we assume that Amy’s life would be worth living, creating her would be a benefit only on a rather peculiar conception of what a “benefit” entails. Amy is not better off than she otherwise would have been, for there is no way that she otherwise would have been. Furthermore, the argument may prove too much. If one is never justified in harming someone (without their consent) to impose a pure benefit on them, and if existence always involves some form of harm, then it must always be wrong to bring someone into existence. A global form of anti-natalism (see Section 2.4 ) thereby seems to be the price of this solution to the non-identity problem.

A number of authors, including Parfit, argue that we need to appeal to impersonal considerations to solve the non-identity problem. Several of these solutions appeal to the role morality of parents. According to Freeman, “The principle of parental responsibility requires that individuals should desist from having children unless certain minimum conditions can be satisfied. Responsible parents want their children to have good and fulfilling lives” (1997, 180). Freeman goes on to claim that the principle of parental responsibility entails that the very young and very old should not become parents. Similarly, Purdy claims that one shouldn’t reproduce unless one can ensure that one’s children will have a decent life, with clean water, nutritious food, shelter, education, and medical care counting as basic prerequisites (Purdy 1995). Purdy’s position seems to imply that many—even most—of the world’s children have been wrongly brought into existence. More recently, Wasserman has argued that whether it is permissible to bring a child into existence with certain characteristics (such as impairments), depends on the reasons the prospective parents have for creating such a child. These should be reasons that concern the good of the child, which can still support creating a child whose life will predictably go worse than that of another child who could be created instead (Wasserman 2005). Others have taken similar reasoning to show that prospective parents can be morally criticized for their attitudes to future children, such that the desire to have a child with a harmful condition is wrongful (Kahane 2009).

Not all of those who have written on the non-identity problem accept that Marie does wrong in deciding to have Amy rather than Sophie, or that Sri does wrong in reproducing. Indeed, some find the suggestion that it is wrong to (knowingly) bring disabled children into the world abhorrent due to the implications of such views for individuals with disabilities. Asch holds that a woman has a right to an abortion, but also that it would be wrong to have an abortion to prevent the birth of a disabled child. Abortion on such grounds is immoral, she argues, because it communicates that “disability is so terrible it warrants not being alive” (Asch 1999, 387). The argument could easily be extended to decisions about whether to conceive a certain type of child. Does prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion, or preimplantation genetic diagnosis, communicate that disability is so terrible it warrants not being alive? On its face this claim is contestable; the associated decisions are highly specific to each case. And even if such acts did communicate something, it is unclear that it would be a thesis about relative qualities of life (see also Buchanan et al. 2000, chap. 7). For more discussion of the ethics of creating people with disabilities see encyclopedia article on disability: health, well-being, and personal relationships .

Suppose that competent adults have the liberty to procreate. Are there limits on the means that they may take in order to do so? In this and the following section we focus on three methods of ART that have generated controversy: gamete donation, in vitro fertilization (IVF), and commercial surrogacy. (Here we focus on technologies already widely used; for a discussion of reproductive human cloning, see the entry on cloning. )

Most discussion has centered on whether it is permissible for prospective parents to avail themselves of these novel technologies for procreation. There has also been some debate over whether people have a claim to access these technologies through public health care systems or private health insurance. Most rich countries with universal health care provide some treatment for infertility. For example, the United Kingdom’s National Health Service funds a limited number of cycles of IVF for couples who meet eligibility criteria. Given limited resources, providing ART takes away from money that could be spent on other health care interventions (Roberts 1997). In this context it is particularly important whether infertility is properly considered a disease or disability in need of treatment (Neumann 1997; McLeod 2017). Another broad social concern raised by all these technologies is their role in the reproduction of race; when such technologies are used to produce racially similar children, they may perpetuate the idea of race as natural, as opposed to a social construction (Russell 2018).

Gamete donation involves the provision of gametes by a man or woman who is not intended to be the resulting child’s social parent. Insemination by another man is not a new technology per se, but the modern phenomena of sperm banking and anonymous providers have led some to question the morality of artificial insemination by donor (AID). Some objections clearly have a religious basis; we therefore do not discuss them here. But some conservatives about procreative liberty have also developed secular objections to gamete donation. The most interesting of these focuses on the practice of paying gamete providers. For example, Thomas Murray criticizes “insemination by vendor” on the grounds that it inserts the values of the marketplace into family life and thereby threatens to undermine it (Murray 1996, 34). The process of harvesting ova also involves serious risks to the woman providing them, which are discussed in the description of the IVF process below.

A different set of concerns centers on the moral responsibilities of gamete providers. Since in most jurisdictions gamete providers must waive all parental claims over their genetic offspring, it has been widely assumed that they do not have moral parental responsibilities. Several philosophers have, however, argued that gamete donation is morally dubious, precisely because providers take their parental responsibilities too lightly (Benatar 1999; Nelson 1991; Moschella 2014). The argument can be challenged in at least two ways. First, we might challenge the claim that gamete providers typically treat their parental responsibilities too lightly by transferring or alienating them (Bayne 2003, Page 1985), especially in the case when gamete donation occurs in a context in which assisted reproduction is regulated and would-be gamete recipients are screened. Second, one could argue that in the broad nexus of persons responsible for creating a child through assisted reproduction, the contribution of gamete providers is not especially morally significant (Fuscaldo 2006). (See the entry on gamete donation and sale .) However, recent critics have argued that gamete donors morally cannot transfer or alienate their parental responsibilities because these involve maintaining particular relationships which cannot be transferred (Weinberg 2016; see also Brandt 2017).

A distinct debate concerns the permissibility of procreating using anonymous gamete donors. Velleman argues that this practice is wrong because it frustrates children’s interest in knowing their genetic forebears (Velleman 2005). In response, Haslanger argues that not only does this view make certain forms of adoption morally suspect, it presupposes implausible connections between genetics, identity, and human flourishing (Haslanger 2009). Policy debates over anonymous gamete donation have expanded to the question of whether donor-conceived individuals—as adults—have the right to know who their genetic parents are (Melo‐Martín 2014; Groll 2020). Anonymous donation is now illegal in a number of jurisdictions.

IVF involves fertilizing ova outside the womb and transferring resulting embryos into the uterus. The woman whose ova are used is given a hormone treatment that induces producing multiple ova, which are harvested by a needle inserted through the vaginal wall. Fertilization may involve incubating the ovum in sperm or injecting a single sperm into the ovum in intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI). Several embryos are transferred into the uterus after three to five days. Since the birth of the first “test-tube baby” in 1978, IVF has become a fairly common procedure for addressing certain forms of infertility.

Objections to IVF have focused on negative consequences for the women or their offspring and on wider societal implications. Stimulation of the ovaries may lead to ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, a potentially serious condition. Like any surgical procedure there are risks involved in retrieval of ova. Transferring multiple embryos increases risk of multiple pregnancy, which can be risky for both mother and fetuses. Fetuses born as a result of IVF may be at an increased risk of birth defects, lower birth weights, and premature birth (Bower and Hansen 2005; Reefhuis et al. 2009). The absolute risk of these problems remains relatively low, however, and so they do not seem to justify a blanket prohibition on IVF. Similar objections to those raised against gamete donation have also been raised against IVF, including that it commodifies children and female reproduction. Feminists have developed a more subtle critique. Sherwin (1987) argues that the powerful desires that many people, especially women, have for their own biological children are the product of problematic social arrangements and cultural values. While reproductive technologies like IVF may help some (privileged) women get what they want, they also further entrench the oppressive societal values that create these powerful desires in the first place.

IVF typically results in creating more embryos than are used in the fertility treatment. The remaining embryos may be given to other women for implantation, donated for research, destroyed, or cryogenically stored. There are likely over a million cryogenically stored embryos in the United States alone (Christianson et al. 2020). Depending on one’s view of the moral importance of human embryos this may be considered an especially worrying consequence of IVF. People who believe that such embryos have the same moral status as humans will judge that destroying them is wrong and creating them without a plan for implantation is comparably bad. The use of surplus embryos as a source of totipotent stem cells for medical research has generated objections from religious groups and conservatives opposed to abortion. Consistency would seem to require that anyone who objects to using these embryos in research ought also to object to their creation in the first place, since it almost inevitably results in surplus embryos that will eventually be destroyed.

Perhaps the most controversial form of assisted reproduction is so-called “surrogate” motherhood or contract pregnancy. Such arrangements can take many forms, but the most widely discussed involves two parties, a contracting couple and a “surrogate” or gestational mother. The gestational mother carries a child derived from the gametes of one or both members of the contracting couple and agrees to give the child over to the couple after birth. Surrogacy is now regulated in most countries. Commercial surrogacy is widely, although not universally, illegal, driving an increase in international surrogacy. Many more jurisdictions permit so-called “altruistic” surrogacy, which does not involve paying the surrogate mother over and above compensating her for direct costs.

Many of the disputes surrounding contract pregnancy focus on the question of who should be given parental rights and responsibilities if the arrangement breaks down. (In some cases, neither party to the arrangement wants to keep the baby; in other cases both parties want to keep it.) Indeed, much of the impetus for recent accounts of the grounds of parenthood has derived from attempts to adjudicate such disputes (Shanley 2018, and see section 4 ).

Repro-libertarians insist that a right to procreative autonomy entails protecting most methods of “collaborative reproduction,” so long as they are safe and consensual (Robertson 1994, chap. 6). For them, the right to procreate is a special case of the right to make binding contracts (see Straehle, 2019). But it is not settled whether such contracts ought to be legal and, if so, enforceable.

One central point of contention is whether gestational surrogacy involves commodification—for example, by entailing that the gestational mother is selling her baby—or whether it is no different in kind from other forms of paid childcare (Anderson 1990; Radin 1996; Glover et al. 1989; Shanley 1993; but see also Arneson 1992). It is also disputed whether a parental right acquired through gestation can be contractually transferred: on a gestationalist view which grounds the right to parent in the intimate relationship between gestator and fetus, the justification of the right entails that it is not subject to transfer (Gheaus 2016b, and see 4.2).

A distinct concern has to do with whether anyone who undertakes a contractual obligation to surrender custody of future children can do so autonomously. Some writers argue that such decisions cannot be autonomous, and hence that surrogacy contracts should not only be unenforceable but also illegal (Dodds and Jones 1989b; see Purdy 1989 and Oakley 1992 for a response).

Contract pregnancy is also criticized on grounds of harm to women. One such harm is that, in practice, it treats women as, and reinforces the perception of them as, mere fetal “containers” (Purdy 1990, Satz 2010, Baron 2019). The fact that it gives medical staff and intending parents extensive control over women’s sexuality and their bodies is particularly troubling in the context of gender inequality (Satz 2010). But others reject bans on surrogacy contracts as paternalistic, unduly limiting women’s freedom. Nevertheless, even those who defend contract pregnancy urge that safeguards, such as mandated post-natal waiting periods during which the gestational mother is permitted to change her mind or age-based restrictions on who may enter into such contracts, should be in place to protect the interests of the child and of the gestator (Steinbock 1988; Straehle 2016; see also Botterell and McLeod 2016).

More recently, the discussion has moved to ethical analyses of international surrogacy arrangements. These have typically involved commissioning parents from high-income countries and surrogate mothers from poorer populations in less wealthy countries, including India and Thailand. The vast power differentials between the parties, expanded roles for surrogacy agencies brokering the arrangements, and loose regulatory regimes have made for heightened concern about exploitation and other potential wrongs (Panitch 2013, and see discussion in Purdy 1989, Wilkinson 2016).

Some couples who undergo IVF also opt for preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) whereby the genomes of their embryos are analyzed and particular embryos then selected for implantation. This is more common among couples at risk for transmitting a genetic disease or who are trying to create a child compatible with an existing ill child so that she can be used as a source of donated stem cells. However, it can be used for selecting for or against other traits, such as sex, or disability—for example, some deaf parents want to raise children who inherit their deafness. Such uses of PGD are controversial (on sex selection see Heyd 2003; Robertson 2003; Purdy 2007; ESHRE Task Force 2013; on selecting deafness see Karpin 2007; Fahmy 2011; Schroeder 2018).

Current technology is mostly limited to selecting among existing embryos. However, the recent development of CRISPR-Cas9 genome editing techniques has finally made it possible to genetically alter gametes and embryos in vivo. This has made questions about the permissibility of genetic enhancement pressing.

Several critics of genetic enhancement argue that permitting enhancement is liable to undermine important human values. Sandel argues that the control that enhancement technology would allow parents is liable to undermine their humility in the face of the gift of their children, impose responsibilities that we are not prepared to deal with, and threaten social solidarity (Sandel 2007). Habermas argues that parents who genetically enhance their children will, through the control they exert, prevent their children from entering relationships of moral equality and undermine their ability to be autonomous (Habermas 2003). Both have been criticized for exaggerating the likely effects of permitting enhancement technologies (Fenton 2006; Lev 2011).

A second argument against permitting parents to genetically enhance their offspring is that it is liable to exacerbate unfairness. Enhancements will probably be available only to richer parents. As a result, their offspring, who are already advantaged over their peers, would be even better able to compete against them (Etieyibo 2012).This is commonly raised as a particular objection to genetic (or other biomedical) enhancements, but it is not clear why there is something distinctive about genetic enhancement that renders it more troubling than other ways in which parents attempt to enhance their children, such as private schooling.

The fairness objection also assumes that the advantages of genetic enhancement are competitive advantages, so that an enhancement would make the recipient better able to compete with others for goods such as careers and social status. This assumption underlies concerns both that the availability of enhancements would exacerbate existing inequalities and that if universally available they would be collectively self-defeating (as, for example, if everyone were to add 6 inches to their height) (Glannon 2001). However, this assumption might be false; for example, literacy is a non-genetic enhancement which is beneficial both to the literate person and others (Buchanan 2008).

While most discussions of the ethics of genetic enhancement have focused on whether the practice is ever permissible, some ethicists argue that it is not only permissible for parents to enhance their children, but a positive duty. Savulescu (2001) argues for what he calls the Principle of Procreative Beneficence: couples should use pre-genetic diagnosis and selective abortion to choose the child, of the children they could have, who will have the best life. This naturally extends to using genetic enhancement. Savulescu’s justification for the principle of Procreative Beneficence is that it seems irrational not to select the best child when no other reasons are relevant to one’s choice. But this seems like a very weak principle: it seems likely that at least some other reason will frequently apply. For example, prospective parents might just prefer to leave their child’s genetic makeup up to chance. If this is not an irrational preference, then it plausibly gives some reason for them not to select any particular embryo to implant. Savulescu’s view is extended in further papers which claim that the principle of Procreative Beneficence has greater moral weight than simply being a tiebreaker when no other reasons apply (Savulescu and Kahane 2009, 281; for criticism see Parker 2010, Carter and Gordon 2013, Bennett 2014). These and related issues are discussed at length in the entries on enhancement and eugenics .

Finally, controversy is not limited to genetic interventions: there are live debates about whether parents may choose (male) circumcision, clitoridectomy, marrow donation, sex assignment of inter-sexed children, and other surgical interventions (see, e.g., Benatar and Benatar 2003 on circumcision; Parens 2006, on surgically shaping children).

Many bioethicists move beyond a focus on individual rights to consider broader effects of reproductive policy. As discussed in 2.2, these include communitarian conservatives who are concerned with the effects of reproductive policy, particularly regarding ARTs, on social attitudes towards the value of life and the meaning of family (Sandel 2007). They also include liberals who share values of autonomy and equality with repro-libertarians, and as a result treat market exchanges and consensual services as “innocent until proven guilty.” But rather than focusing just on the effects of particular procreative choices, these liberals also attend to the impact of institutionalizing practices such as genetic selection or IVF within a society that aims to maintain liberal background institutions (Glover et al. 1989; Buchanan et al. 2000; Brock 2005). Institutionalization foregrounds concerns that liberals focused on individual choices downplay, such as the effects of large numbers, the incentives that policies create, and opportunity costs. Thus for policy liberals it will be impossible to determine the scope of procreative rights without considering institutional structure and social context, given reasonable assumptions about human motivations.

For instance, when many people make similar reproductive choices, the resulting “baby boom” may reshape the social, economic, political, and environmental landscape. Such concerns apply to the use of ARTs, such as for sex selection: sex ratios might become grossly skewed in countries with a strong preference for male children (Xue 2010). Such societal consequences are also predicted by disability theorists who argue that normalizing genetic testing and embryo selection or abortion to prevent certain impairments could lead to increased stigma against and decreased resources for people with such impairments (see also the entry on disability ). Such concerns might provide grounds for restricting ARTs or incentivizing their use.

Much recent debate has focused on the effects of the legal institution of the family on procreative choices and child welfare. Arguments for incentivizing procreation within marriage assume that children reared within marriages will benefit as contrasted with those reared outside marriages (Galston 1991, chap. 10; but see Young 1995). Others have argued that legally separating marriage and parenting will allow the state to support both children and their caregivers more directly (Shrage 2018) or that recognizing more than two parents will benefit children as well as serving broader social goals such as resource conservation (Gheaus 2019, Grill 2020). Such revisionist arguments extend to legal institutionalization of non-parental care for children: for example, Gheaus has argued for the institutional provision of non-parental care on child welfare grounds (Gheaus 2011, 2018b), and Brake for the legal recognition of paid childcare workers as family (Brake 2018). Liberal feminists have argued for state family policy—such as parental leave and incentives for egalitarian co-parenting—to promote gender equality (e.g., Schouten 2019). Adoption policy has also been the focus of recent discussion, with debates over open adoption and attention to the difficulties of LGBT adoption (Haslanger and Witt 2006; Baylis and McLeod 2014, Part IV). Family policy also has effects on racial equality, as Dorothy Roberts points out in her criticism of state policies on terminating parental rights which disporpotionately affect black families (Roberts 2006).

Liberal accounts of procreative autonomy may face problems in a context of social inequality and over-population. Some affirm procreative autonomy, but regard it as compatible with apparently coercive population policies such as limitations on the number of children particular persons may have. This may be because they regard procreative autonomy as a merely prima facie right, less weighty than other rights, such as the right to a minimally decent quality of life (Bayles 1979). Or they may conceive of procreative autonomy more narrowly than is commonly done (O’Neill 1979; Hill 1991). O’Neill, for example, construes procreative autonomy as requiring an intention to rear the resulting child so that it has a life at least normal for its society. Without such intentions, parents are not exercising a right to procreate, and thus policies to curtail their behavior do not constitute coercive infringements of procreative autonomy. Recent work in this area has examined the extent to which the state is justified in restricting procreation in light of its environmental costs (e.g., Conly 2016). In sum, on such views, procreative autonomy is one among many important forms of autonomy, which may conflict among themselves, and with the state’s legitimate (or compulsory) ends such as the provision of public goods and compliance with national constitutions. Talk of rights, from such a standpoint, is appropriate only within a nexus of liberties, claims, powers, and ends. From such a perspective, the implications of a right to procreative autonomy are much less straightforward than from the individually focused repro-libertarian perspective.

One further problem for liberals is posed by divergent societal views on the nature of the good for children. Respecting such divergent views seems to be required by equal respect, but this is in tension with the need to define standards for child welfare and parental authority. For example, balancing child welfare and parent autonomy may be difficult in culturally diverse societies, in which state standards of child welfare may be criticized as discriminatory against child-rearing practices of cultural minorities (e.g., Dwyer 2018; for discussion of child welfare and state neutrality, see Fowler 2010 and 2014).

While we have set aside the question of abortion, we will briefly address two other cases in which avoiding procreation and parenthood has been taken as protected by procreative autonomy. First is the case of legal paternity assignment for the purposes of child support, particularly in the case of “involuntary fathers.” Second is the case of the disposition of frozen embryos created from the gametes of two people who now disagree on their use. We can usefully distinguish rights not to become a gestational parent, not to become a legal parent, and not to become a genetic parent (Cohen 2007, 1140). The cases we are concerned with in this section relate to the two latter (alleged) rights: not to become a legal or a genetic parent.

While avoiding unwanted paternity has become a topic for the “men’s rights” movement, arguments for a “father’s right to choose” can begin from feminist defenses of procreative autonomy. What is at issue here is not whether an unwilling father has the right to compel a pregnant woman to have an abortion – this would be an intolerable invasion of her procreative autonomy – but whether he should be assigned the legal status, and legal support obligations, of fatherhood. If women have the right to avoid the status and burdens of motherhood, by parity of reasoning – the argument goes – men should have the right to avoid the status and burdens of fatherhood. Of course, the physical burdens of pregnancy provide a clear disanalogy between the cases (for related legal arguments against arguing from abortion cases to genetic parenthood cases, see Cohen 2007). But dismissing the comparison too quickly risks inattention to the costs of “forced fatherhood” on worse-off men (and their disproportionate enforcement on men of color in the US) (Brake 2005). Some would argue that even if men have the right to avoid involuntary fatherhood (especially in cases such as a “purloined sperm” case, in which they can deny moral responsibility), the claims of children outweigh a right not to become a parent (Overall 2012).

Cases of dispute over frozen embroyos, such as Evans v. the United Kingdom , foreground issues of privacy and control over one’s genetic material – especially, whether there is a right not to become a genetic parent (again, here we set aside the question of the moral status of the embryo). In the Evans case, a couple produced embryos through IVF, intending to procreate together, but separated before the embryos could be implanted. Subsequently, the man involved asked that the embryos be destroyed; the law required that both parties consent for the procedure to continue. The woman brought a legal challenge, hoping to proceed with implantation.

Considerations of procreative autonomy, control of one’s genetic material, could be brought to bear on either side here. Is there a right not to become a genetic parent, and if so, does it override any other rights or moral considerations pertinent to such disagreements? A right not to become a genetic parent could be grounded in privacy or property right in one’s genetic material (including informational). But once the embryo is intentionally created with the consent of the gamete donor, it may be argued that any prior property claims are ceded; the genetic contribution cannot be retrieved from this “miscible joint property” (Chan and Quigley 2007; see also Cohen 2007). On one feminist perspective, the woman who has undergone IVF ought to control the embryos, because of the additional burdens of the procedure and any future treatments on her (Overall 1995).

The resolution to these questions depends, at least in part, on the underlying moral grounds of parenthood. For example, if one acquires parental moral obligations by causing a child to exist, that will have very different implications than if one only acquires such obligations through a voluntary undertaking. The next section will examine such accounts of the moral grounds of parenthood.

4. Becoming Parents

In virtue of what does one become a moral parent, i.e., a primary bearer of parental rights and/or parental responsibilities with respect to a particular child? We can distinguish four general answers: genetic, labor-based, intentional (or voluntarist), and causal accounts. On monistic versions, only one of these properties generates parental relationships. On pluralistic accounts, more than one of these relations can ground parenthood.

Some contemporary discussions assume that moral parental rights and responsibilities or obligations are inseparable (Bayne and Kolers 2003). But Archard has argued that this “parental package” view is untenable (Archard and Benatar 2010, 22–25; Archard 2010; see also Austin 2007, chap. 3). To take Archard’s example, an estranged, abusive parent may have moral and legal support obligations but no parental rights; obligations to ensure a child is provided for do not entail parental rights. It is more plausible, as Archard notes, that parental rights and responsibilities—which, as contrasted with obligations, concern the hands-on, day-to-day rearing of the child—come together. Even these, in some circumstances, might come apart—as when an estranged parent retains some decision-making rights but holds no responsibilities. Moreover, the grounds for parental rights and parental responsibilities may be distinct, even if parents typically have both. For example, Millum argues for a labor-based account of parental rights but a voluntarist account of parental responsibilities (Millum 2017).

Genetic theories ground parenthood in the relation of direct genetic derivation. Geneticism thus places parenthood in the nexus of other familial relations, such as being a sibling, cousin, and so on, which appear to have a genetic basis and which appear (at least to some) to come along with certain moral rights and responsibilities.

Hall (1999) defends geneticism by appeal to the Lockean notion of self-ownership. Since genetic parents own the genetic material from which the child is constituted, they have a prima facie parental claim to the child. There are a number of problems with this line of argument (Kolers & Bayne 2001) and it is an argument that Locke himself rejected (Franklin-Hall 2012). First, it subsumes parental relations under property relations, by attempting to derive a claim about parenthood from premises involving claims about ownership. The plausibility of this derivation is based on emphasizing parental rights associated with exclusivity and authority, and downplaying parental responsibilities. Those responsibilities—to both child and community—pull sharply against a property-based analysis of parenthood. Second, taking self-ownership seriously entails that children own themselves, and this surely defeats any proprietary claim that their parents might have in them (Archard 1990). Third, genetic parents do not provide the material from which the child is constituted in utero; that derives from the gestational mother, not the genetic parents (Silver 2001). Of course, the child’s genetic make-up structures that matter, but to argue for the priority of the genetic over the gestational contribution is to argue for the priority of form over matter, and it is not obvious that this can be done.

Other arguments for geneticism derive from considering paternity, in that direct genetic derivation appears to provide the most plausible account of the basis of fatherhood. Several recent legal cases have overturned adoptions on the grounds that the estranged father, unidentified at the time of birth, has returned to claim the child (Rosenman 1995, Shanley 1995). Supporters of these decisions endorse the view that unalienated genetic claims to children can override months or even years of rearing by the adoptive parents, as well as the earlier failure of the father to claim the child. Similarly, in “surrogacy” cases, many writers have argued—or simply assumed—that a genetic father may have his own child by contracting with a surrogate mother. This seems to presuppose a genetic account of paternity; and it is a small step from a genetic account of paternity to a genetic account of parenthood. One need appeal only to the principle of “parity,” according to which the sort of relationship that makes one person a parent suffices to make anyone else a parent (Bayne & Kolers 2003; Austin 2004).

An alternative account views parents’ work, rather than their genetic relationships, as essential to the parental relation. According to these labor-based accounts, people who play or have played a parental role in a child’s life have thereby become the parents. In this spirit, a number of authors have argued that the primary ground of parenthood is the gestational relation (Rothman 1989; Feldman 1992). In reproductive contexts in which a child’s gestational mother differs from its genetic mother—as in egg (or embryo) donation and gestational surrogacy—it is therefore the gestational mother who has the primary claim to parental rights and responsibilities. This line of argument can be expanded to include people besides the gestational mother who have taken a parental role in rearing a child (Millum 2010; 2017).

Three main considerations are presented in favor of labor-based accounts. One focuses on the interests of the child. Where a child has been looked after by a person or people for some time, it is thought to be very damaging for her to be taken away from them (Archard 2004). In the case of gestation, since the gestational mother is guaranteed to be identifiable at birth, it may be thought in the best interests of the child that she be regarded as the mother (Annas 1984). Moreover, the child and gestator are already involved in an intimate relationship at birth, which it is arguably prima facie wrong to sever (Gheaus 2018a). However, while recognizing the gestational mother or caregivers as parents will sometimes serve the best interests of the child, it is implausible that this will always be the case. This argument might, at best, ground laws presuming that the gestational mother and rearing parents have a claim to be the legal parents. Since there will likely be cases in which being reared by someone else would be better for the child, it will be difficult to justify the assignment of parenthood on the grounds of labor in every case.

A second line of argument appeals to what parents deserve for the work they do. Gestational mothers typically invest a substantial amount of effort into the child. In Narayan’s words, a gestational mother typically undergoes “considerable discomfort, effort, and risk in the course of pregnancy and childbirth” (Narayan 1999, 81; also Gheaus 2012). While this account appears to give a special role to gestational mothers, it can include parenting partners who help bear the costs or contribute to establishing a relationship (for example, by viewing an ultrasound image together). Similarly, the people who care for a child invest a great deal of work. It might therefore be thought that they deserve to be the parents (Millum 2010; 2017).

Labor-based accounts have the advantage over genetic accounts that they can explain why the individuals they pick out as the parents ought to have parental rights. They also incorporate adoptive and other non-biological parental relationships into a single account of parenthood, whereas genetic accounts seem forced to view non-biological parenthood as a distinct type of normative relationship. Objections to gestationalist accounts of parenthood may start from the problem of paternity: if gestation is necessary for parenthood, how can men become fathers (Bayne & Kolers 2003)? Broader labor-based accounts that count the work of other caregivers can explain fatherhood, but they still seem to give the gestational mother veto power over other potential parents. As Barbara Katz Rothman puts it: “if men want to have children, they will either have to develop the technology that enables them to become pregnant … or have children through their relationships with women” (Rothman 1989, 257). Some will find this implausible.

A third approach to parenthood, popular with legal theorists, appeals to intentions as the ground of parenthood (Hill 1991; Parker 1982; Shultz 1990; Stumpf 1986). Intentionalists motivate their position by appeal to cases like the following. The Khans wish to have a child “of their own.” They screen egg and sperm providers and find providers who satisfy their requirements. They then select a gestational mother, who carries the fetus to term and then hands the infant over to the Khans. Intentionalists argue that because they “carefully and intentionally orchestrated the procreational act, bringing together all the necessary components with the intention of creating a unique individual whom they intend to raise as their own” (Hill 1991, 359), the Khans should be regarded as the child’s sole parents.

Another argument for intentionalism appeals to the “case of the misplaced sperm”:

Bruce is about to undergo some risky medical treatment, and has placed some of his sperm in a sperm-bank in case he needs it at a later date. Through a bureaucratic mishap, Bruce’s sperm is swapped with that of a sperm-donor and is used by Bessie to produce a child. Does Bruce acquire parental rights and responsibilities over Bessie’s child?

Intuitions vary here, but there is at least some pull towards denying that Bruce’s genetic relation to Bessie’s child gives him any parental claim over it. The reason Bruce lacks a parental relation to Bessie’s child seems to be that he didn’t intentionally bring the child into existence.

Intentionalism construes parenthood as relying on facts about agency rather than biology; for the intentionalist, parenthood is fundamentally a moral relationship rather than a biological one (see Fuscaldo 2006, for discussion). Some philosophical defenses of intentionalism appeal to a voluntaristic account of responsibilities in general (Van Zyl 2002). If special obligations to particular others are generally acquired voluntarily, then it is plausible that parental obligations are also voluntarily incurred (O’Neill 1979; Brake 2005, 2010; for criticism see Prusak 2011a, b). Furthermore, parental obligations are role obligations. While it is a matter of debate whether any role obligations can be acquired involuntarily, it is at least plausible that roles assumed as adults (as opposed to roles one is born into) require voluntary acceptance. Finally, parental role obligations are conventional: their scope and content varies by jurisdiction and society. This suggests an unfairness if such extensive obligations are incurred involuntarily (Brake 2010). On the other hand, once it is recognized that parental obligations are conventional, the content of parental obligations and the voluntary actions required to acquire them can be explained with reference to social conventions of parenthood (Millum 2008; 2017). Another defense of intentionalism appeals to parental autonomy, as opposed to the way in which obligations are incurred: Richards argues for a variant of the intentional view according to which parental rights derive from “a right to continue [projects] we have underway” (Richards 2010, 23).

One objection to intentionalism concerns the content of the intentions that are supposed to ground parenthood. Consider a case in which a couple conceives by accident and then form intentions to give up the baby for adoption rather than rear it. This intention endures until 15 minutes after birth, at which point they change their minds and decide to rear the child. It is highly implausible that for the first 15 minutes of the child’s life they are no more its parents than anyone else.

Perhaps the most widespread objection to the voluntarist account is that it seems to absolve unintending procreators from parental obligation. However, many share the view that procreators, intending or not, who voluntarily engaged in sex have a moral responsibility to a resulting child due to their role in causing it to exist (Austin 2007; Fuscaldo 2006; Millum 2008).

Whatever the prospects of a voluntarist account of parenthood, a voluntarist account of familial relations in general is implausible. The duties that siblings have to each other, or that children have to their parents, are not easily understood as voluntary undertakings. This is a problem for voluntarist accounts of parenthood to the extent that duties between parents and children should fit within a wider framework of familial duties (Rachels 1989; Mills 2003; see Mullin 2010, for discussion; and the entry on special obligations ).

Finally, parenthood may be grounded in causation (Nelson 1991; Bigelow et al. 1988; Blustein 1997; Archard 2010). A causal account differs from intentionalism in that one can cause something without intending to do so. Indeed, one can cause a certain state of affairs even when one is unaware that one’s actions could do so. One needn’t have grasped the connection between sexual intercourse and pregnancy in order to be the cause of a child’s existence.

One of the attractions of causalism is its promise to account for the plausibility of genetic, labor-based, and intentional accounts of parenthood. Genetic, gestational, and caregiving relationships contribute to the child’s existence or development, and, in the cases that some intentionalists appeal to, the commissioning couple are a cause of the child’s existence. Causalism offers to explain its competitors.

But causal accounts face problems: first, what is meant by “causation” in this context? ‘But-for’ causation is too weak to ground parenthood, because its scope is so wide: for example, procreation might not have occurred ‘but-for’ the urgings of would-be grandparents or the actions of the match-making friend who introduced the parents. This is the “too many parents” problem (Hanna 2019). But it is unclear what notion of causation the causal theorist should adopt instead of ‘but-for’ causation (Blustein 1997). Second, what implications does the causal account have? Even with a satisfactory account of causation it may be unclear whom the account ascribes parenthood to in any particular case—or if it is clear enough, there is a risk of an ad hoc account of causation tailor-made for this purpose. Concern with the arbitrariness of the causal chain by means of which a child may be created leads writers such as Fuscaldo (2006) to emphasize that what is wanted is not a theory of causation but of agency (see also Austin 2004, 2007). This leads causal theorists back in the direction of intentionalism.

A related problem is that causal accounts often leave it unclear how causal responsibility generates moral responsibility. Sometimes it appears that the thought is that procreators, by causing a child to exist, have placed it in a needy position and so owe it, as compensation, “procreative costs.” But these costs are arguably not equivalent to the weighty responsibilities of parenthood (Brake 2010). The question is whether, as a result of causal responsibility for their existence, parents merely owe children repair of their needy condition, by fostering survival to adulthood, or whether such “procreative costs” include a richer set of parental responsibilities, such as a duty to love and to make the child “content with his condition” (Prusak 2011b, 67).

One final alternative, as noted above, is a ‘pluralist’ account which allows that more than one of these relations (such as causation or intention) may be sufficient, but not necessary, for parenthood (Bayne and Kolers 2003). Pluralist accounts have not yet been developed in depth.

Having outlined the main theories of the grounds of parenthood, we turn now to questions concerning the morality of being a parent.

5. Being Parents

Parents have moral and legal rights regarding their children. They have the liberty to make decisions on behalf of their children regarding matters such as diet, schooling, association with others, and—more controversially—religious observance, and the right to exclude others from such decision-making. Such rights decrease in strength and scope as children gain decision-making capacity, yet until the child reaches moral or legal competence, issues of substituted judgment and surrogate decision-making remain (Ross 2002).

Parental rights’ content, extent, and relation to parental obligations is determined by the underlying theory of why parents possess such rights. On the child-centered or fiduciary model, parental rights piggyback on parental responsibilities to children, which are morally fundamental. One such theory is Blustein’s “priority thesis.” According to the priority thesis, parents acquire rights in order to carry out their responsibilities; thus responsibilities are morally prior to rights (Blustein 1982, 104–114). As Archard writes, “A parent can choose for his child, and exclude others from the making of these choices, only in the service of and thus constrained by a duty to care for the child. It is in the first instance because a dependent child must have decisions made for it that a designated parent is entitled to make those decisions.” (Archard 2010, 108; see also Brennan and Noggle 1997; Austin 2007).

Other theories of parental rights focus on parents’ interests. Historically, parenthood has often been regarded as a possessory (or proprietary) relationship. Some genetic accounts of parenthood imply the proprietarian view that parents own their children (see 4.1; Hall 1999; Narveson 2002). However, property rights seem inappropriate here for several reasons: children cannot be sold and they cannot be used however the parent wishes. While it might be responded that parental property rights are limited, prohibiting sale and certain uses, this does not address the more fundamental objection that persons cannot be property.

Other theories provide more plausible support for parent-centered, as opposed to child-centered, accounts of parental rights in terms of parents’ interests. Brighouse and Swift argue for parental rights on the basis of the irreplaceable good offered by parenting. Because parenting is a project with goods which cannot be obtained through other activities, such as the responsibility of caring for a child and the receipt of children’s spontaneous trust, affection, and intimacy, the interest in parenting should be protected. On this account, parental rights, not parental obligations, are fundamental, because the parents’ interests are the basis for the right (Brighouse and Swift 2006, 2014; see also Shoeman 1980). One line of objection is to ask whether the interest in parenting is likely to be undermined by state intervention in parental decision-making. Here we can usefully distinguish at least three different kinds of parental interests which could ground parental rights to control aspects of their children’s lives: interests in being a fiduciary, interests in intimacy, and interests in “nurturing, counseling, and education.” Intimacy and being a fiduciary, which Brighouse and Swift appeal to, arguably need not be undermined by intervention – whereas an interest in authentically nurturing children into adults might (Altman 2018).

The parental-interest account of parents’ rights addresses problems raised within political philosophy for the family. Brighouse and Swift generate their account partly in response to the challenge of redistribution of children: if the state should promote child welfare, why should children not be redistributed at birth to the best prospective parents, to maximize children’s welfare? But as Gheaus points out, while Brighouse and Swift provide an account of fundamental parental rights, they do not explain why biological parents have rights to rear their biological children, rather than such children being redistributed to better prospective parents, who could thereby undertake their own parenting projects (Gheaus 2012). One response to this concern is to separate the question of how someone obtains parental rights (the topic of the previous section) from the question of whose interests—parent, child, or both—those rights ultimately protect (Millum 2017). Brighouse and Swift also aim to address the family’s notorious effect on equal opportunity – different parenting practices, such as reading bedtime stories, can greatly affect children’s life chances. On their account, certain inequality-producing institutions such as private schools and inheritances are not protected under parents’ rights – but practices essential to parents’ interest in intimacy, such as bedtime stories, are. (For a reply, see Engster 2019.) Finally, a dual-interest view, grounding rights in interests of both parents and children, is also possible (Macleod 2015).

One question concerning parental rights is their strength. Parental rights entitle parents to exclude others, including the state, from child-rearing decisions. For critics, the absolute exclusivity typical of contemporary western nuclear families gives parents too much power over the vulnerable children in their care (Card 1996, Gheaus 2011; see also Gheaus 2018b).

An important set of questions about the content of parental rights concerns their scope. While it is widely agreed that parents have rights to make many day-to-day decisions on behalf of their children, a number of purported rights have been questioned.

One controversial right is the right to infuse children with parents’ religious beliefs. On the one hand, handing down such beliefs to children is, to many, a key aspect of the parental project (Brighouse and Swift 2006, 2014; Galston 2011). On the other hand, Clayton argues that raising one’s child in a religion violates a requirement of liberal neutrality, which applies to parents just as it applies to states (Clayton 2006; also Coleman 2003). From a feminist perspective, Okin argued that religious infusion could affect girls’ developing self-respect and equal opportunity (Okin 1994; cf. Chambers 2017, Chapter 6; Schouten 2017). Even if such arguments theoretically justify state intervention, their proponents must explain how, in practice, the state could intervene in the intimate parent-child relationship without psychologically harming children.

Another set of questions concerns parental authority over medical interventions. Critics have argued that circumcision of male children violates their bodily integrity; but children’s rights to bodily integrity must be weighed against other morally weighty interests, including the child’s own interest in community membership (Benatar and Benatar 2003, Mazor 2019). Likewise, there is controversy over whether parents should have the right to prevent transgender adolescents from receiving puberty-blocking treatment; here, harm to transgender children must be weighed (Priest 2019). In such conflicts, there are tensions between parental control rights and children’s rights, but also between different understandings of what the child’s best interests require (particularly when the child lacks decision-making capacity). (See entry on children’s rights .)

A related debate concerns the authority of parents to control their child’s education. Most discussion of this issue has focused on religion-based objections to the duration or content of public schooling. This was the context in which Feinberg originally discussed the child’s “right to an open future,” which he regards as a constraint on parental discretion regarding their child’s schooling (1980, see below for further discussion). A key challenge is how to justify these objections. One strategy is to cite the parents’ right to freedom of religion, but then some argument must be given for why the apparent interests of a child in being educated should be sacrificed to their religious freedom. A separate question regarding parental rights and education is whether parents are ethically permitted to confer advantages on their children through private schooling, particularly when doing so is expected to reduce the quality of education available to other children (Swift 2003).

Other questions concerning parental rights concern exclusivity and the number of possible parents. As step-parenting, procreation involving multiple biological, gestational, and social parents, and other diverse family forms become more prevalent, why should the number of parents be limited to two? As noted in Section 1 above, a Canadian court recognized a child as having three parents. Relatives in addition to the parents are frequently involved in raising children, even in cultures in which the nuclear family is considered the norm. In the United States, nearly 3 million grandparents have primary responsibility for children living in their homes and it has been argued that grandparental rights should be legally recognized (Henderson 2005). Further, some philosophers have argued for legal recognition or support for non-parental care, as in, for example, African-American practices of “othermothering” or “revolutionary parenting.” This would permit more adults to contribute to children’s development, thereby arguably benefiting children (Card 1996; Gheaus 2011 and 2019; hooks 1984; Collins 1991; Mullin 2005; see also 3.5 above).

So far, we have considered parental rights as parents’ moral and legal claims to make, and exclude others from, decisions regarding their child. But some philosophers have argued for other rights held by parents—namely, positive rights to social support for child-rearing. These proposals are discussed in 5.2, as they aim at helping parents discharge their responsibilities.

Parenthood inhabits the intersection of two distinct relationships: a custodial relationship between parent and child, and a trustee relationship between the parents and the larger society or other collective. Both may generate responsibilities.

The custodial relationship involves a set of duties aimed at, and justified by, the welfare of the child. As custodian, the parent is under a limited obligation to work for and organize his or her life around the welfare and development of the child, for the child’s sake. Analysis of the content of parental responsibilities has therefore mostly focused on the rights of the child. Feinberg’s right to an “open future” can be read as a limit on parental discretion (see 5.1). It can also be interpreted as giving children positive claims to certain goods, such as an education that leaves them with a wide range of valuable life plans to choose from. Whether there is such a positive right and in what it consists are matters of dispute (Liao 2015; Mills 2003; Lotz 2006 and 2014; Millum 2014; essays in Archard and Macleod 2002; entry on children’s rights ). Another question is whether parental responsibilities end when the child reaches adulthood, or whether they are lifelong (Weinberg 2018).

Societies, families, and cultural groups also have interests in the welfare of children. For instance, the state has an interest in the reproduction of its workforce and its citizens; hence parental decisions that threaten the child’s chances of becoming a fully participating citizen may come under special state scrutiny. Distinct groups, such as the state and cultural groups, may make conflicting claims on the parents as trustees. For instance, in order to promote culturally prescribed norms, parents might seek to remove their child from school, or have their daughter undergo clitoridectomy; yet the state may claim that such a decision violates the parents’ trustee relationship on grounds that the state has a compelling interest in securing the full citizenship capacities and rights of its citizens (Galston 1995; Okin 1989; Chambers 2017, Chapter 6). Moreover, discharging parental responsibilities must be balanced with discharging obligations of distributive and global justice (Archard and Macleod 2002, Part III; Macleod 2010).

Indeed, some philosophers argue that parental responsibilities include duties towards social or environmental justice. For example, parents arguably have a duty of egalitarian justice to guide their children away from “expensive consumption habits” (Zwarthoed 2017). They may, as parents, have duties to address climate change, on behalf of their children’s, or children’s children’s, interests (Cripps 2017; see also Gheaus 2016a, 2019). This may also apply to special duties of adoptive parents, especially in inter-racial adoptions (Haslanger and Witt 2006, see also Baylis and McLeod 2014).

All parents fail to meet their responsibilities at some point. We would not expect someone to raise a child without making mistakes along the way. However, at some point, excusable parental failings shade into neglect and abuse. Exactly what counts as child abuse is a matter for debate. However, if abuse marks a threshold above which it is permissible for others—particularly the state—to intervene, then a clear definition is needed (Archard 2004, chap. 14).

By the time neglect or abuse has reached the point that the state intervenes, irreparable damage has often been caused, and the actions that can be taken to improve a child’s situation are likely to be limited. Some philosophers argue that prospective parents should be screened ahead of time for their ability to parent and those who are deemed unlikely to be able to fulfill their parental responsibilities should not be granted parental licenses. The argument in favor of licensing parents may appeal primarily to the harms to children that occur if unfit people are allowed to parent (LaFollette 1980, 2010) or to the wider impact on society from rearing children who are unlikely to become good citizens (McFall 2009). Either way proposals for parental licensing schemes must show that it is possible prospectively to identify individuals who are likely to be neglectful or abusive parents with sufficient accuracy, show that the schemes do not violate the rights of prospective parents (on this see Liao 2015), and explain how they are to be enforced. The latter is perhaps the hardest challenge: without resorting to compulsory sterilization how can people be prevented from having children without licenses? (McFall 2009, 122) Of course, there could be penalties for unlicensed parents, or their children could be subject to confiscation, but such policies risk inadvertently penalizing the children they were intended to assist. Moreover, enforcement would disproportionately burden women. As gestators, women might be subjected to de facto forced abortions; women are also more likely to be primary caregivers, and thus subjected to greater interference and monitoring (Engster 2010). A further question is whether onerous licensing policies for adoptive parents can be justified in the absence of more general parental licensing schemes (McLeod and Botterell 2014).

Finally, children need a great deal of care if they are to grow up into autonomous, healthy adults and good citizens. Parents clearly have the responsibility to provide some of this care, and the state has the obligation to step in when parents are failing to do as they should. However, there is an open question about what the state should provide in cases that do not involve abuse or neglect. As Alstott has argued, parenting imposes opportunity costs on parents, for example, in earning potential. Moreover, child-care labor remains gender-structured, with women performing by far the greater share. On these grounds Alstott argues for caregiver accounts to ensure equal opportunity, for example, allocating educational funds to parents (Alstott 2004). One pertinent question is whether parenting should be considered a private good, like an expensive taste which it would be unjust for society to subsidize (Taylor 2009). Some have responded that it is a matter of justice due to its effects on equal opportunity for women and full participation of women as equal citizens (Okin 1989; Kittay 1999; Schouten 2019). Others have argued for collective social responsibility for children on grounds such as children’s welfare and their status as a public good, providing positive externalities by reproducing society and producing workers who will support the current generation in old age (George 1987; Archard 2004; Engster 2010; Olsaretti 2013; Millum 2017).

Almond, Brenda, 2006, The Fragmenting Family , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Alstott, Anne, 2004, No Exit: What Parents Owe their Children and What Society Owes Parents , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Altman, Scott, 2018, “Parental Control Rights,” in Brake and Ferguson 2018, pp. 209–226.
Anderson, Elizabeth, 1990, “Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?,” Philosophy & Public Affairs , 19: 71–92.
Annas, George, 1984, “Redefining Parenthood and Protecting Embryos: Why We Need New Laws,” The Hastings Center Report , 51: 50–52.
Archard, David, 1990, “Child Abuse: Parental Rights and the Interests of the Child,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 7: 183–194
–––, 2004, Children: Rights and Childhood , 2nd ed., New York: Routledge.
–––, 2010, “The Obligations and Responsibilities of Parenthood,” in Archard and Benatar 2010, pp. 103–127.
Archard, David and David Benatar, (eds.), 2010, Procreation and Parenthood , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Archard, David and Colin Macleod, (eds.), 2002, The Moral and Political Status of Children: New Essays , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Arneson, Richard, 1992, “Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 21(2): 132–164.
Asch, Adrienne, 1999, “Can Aborting ‘Imperfect’ Children be Immoral?,” in Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine , 5 th ed., ed. John D. Arras & Nancy K. Rhoden, Mountain View, CA: Mayfield.
Austin, Michael, 2004, “The Failure of Biological Accounts of Parenthood,” The Journal of Value Inquiry , 38: 499–510.
–––, 2007, Conceptions of Parenthood , Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Baron, Teresa, 2019, “Nobody Puts Baby in the Container: The Foetal Container Model at Work in Medicine and Commercial Surrogacy,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 36(3): 491–505.
Bayles, Michael D., 1979, “Limits to a Right to Procreate,” in O’Neill and Ruddick 1979, pp. 13–24.
Baylis, Françoise, and Carolyn McLeod (eds.), 2014, Family-Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bayne, T., 2003, “Gamete Donation and Parental Responsibility,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 20(3): 77–87.
Bayne, T., and A. Kolers, 2003, “Toward a Pluralistic Account of Parenthood,” Bioethics , 17(3): 221–42.
Belshaw, Christopher, 2003, “More Lives, Better Lives,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 6: 127–41.
Benatar, David, 1997, “Why it is Better Never to Come into Existence,” American Philosophical Quarterly , 34: 345–55.
–––, 1999, “The Unbearable Lightness of Bringing into Being,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 16(2): 173–80.
–––, 2006, Better Never to Have Been , Oxford: Clarendon.
–––, 2010, “The Limits of Reproductive Freedom,” in Archard and Benatar 2010, pp. 78–102.
–––, 2015, “The Misanthropic Argument for Anti-natalism,” in Hannan, Brennan, and Vernon 2015, pp. 34–64.
Benatar, David and Michael Benatar, 2003, “Between Prophylaxis and Child Abuse: The Ethics of Neonatal Male Circumcision,” American Journal of Bioethics , 3: 35–48.
Benatar, David, and David Wasserman, 2015, Debating Procreation: Is It Wrong to Reproduce? , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bennett, Rebecca, 2014, “When Intuition Is Not Enough: Why the Principle of Procreative Beneficence Must Work Much Harder to Justify Its Eugenic Vision,” Bioethics , 28(9): 447–455.
Ber, Rosalie, 2000, “Ethical Issues in Gestational Surrogacy,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics , 21: 153–69.
Bigelow, J., J. Campbell, S. Dodds, R. Pargetter, E. Prior and R. Young, 1988, “Parental Autonomy,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 5: 3–16.
Blustein, Jeffrey, 1982, Parents and Children: The Ethics of the Family , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 1997, “Procreation and Parental Responsibility,” Journal of Social Philosophy , 28(2): 79–86.
Boucai, Michael, 2016, “Is assisted procreation an LGBT right?” Wisconsin Law Review , 2016(6): 1065–1125.
Botterell, Andrew and Carolyn McLeod, 2016, “Licensing Parents in International Contract Pregnancies,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 33(2): 178–196.
Bower, Carol and Michèle Hansen, 2005, “Assisted reproductive technologies and birth outcomes: overview of recent systematic reviews,” Reproduction, Fertility and Development , 17(3): 329–333.
Brake, Elizabeth, 2005, “Fatherhood and Child Support: Do Men have a Right to Choose?,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 22(1): 55–73.
–––, 2010, “Willing Parents: A Voluntarist Account of Parental Role Obligations,” in Archard and Benatar 2010, pp. 151–177.
–––, 2015, “Creation Theory: Do Genetic Ties Matter?,” in Hannan, Brennan, and Vernon 2015, pp. 129–149.
–––, 2018, “Paid and Unpaid Care: Marriage, Equality, and Domestic Workers,” in Brake and Ferguson 2018, pp. 75–94.
Brake, Elizabeth and Lucinda Ferguson (eds.), 2018, Philosophical Foundations of Children’s and Family Law , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brandt, Reuven, 2017, “The Transfer and Delegation of Responsibilities for Genetic Offspring in Gamete Provision,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 34(5): 665–678.
Brazier, Margaret, 1998, “Reproductive Rights: Feminism or Patriarchy?,” in Harris and Holm 1998, pp. 66–76.
Brennan, Samantha and Robert Noggle, 1997, “The moral status of children: Children’s rights, parents’ rights, and family justice,” Social Theory and Practice , 23(1): 1–26.
Brighouse, Harry and Adam Swift, 2006, “Parents’ Rights and the Value of the Family,” Ethics , 117(1): 80–108.
–––, 2014, Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child Relationships , Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Brock, Dan, 2005, “Shaping Future Children: Parental Rights and Societal Interests,” Journal of Political Philosophy , 13(4): 377–98.
Buchanan, Allen, 2008, “Enhancement and the Ethics of Development,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal , 18(1): 1–34.
Buchanan, Allen, et al., 2000, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Card, Claudia, 1996, “Against Marriage and Motherhood,” Hypatia , 11(3): 1–23.
Carter, J. Adam and Emma C. Gordon, 2013, “Intelligence, Wellbeing, and Procreative Beneficence,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 30(2): 122–135.
Cassidy, Lisa, 2006, “That Many of Us Should Not Parent,” Hypatia , 21(4): 40–57.
Chambers, Clare, 2017, Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defence of the Marriage-Free State , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chan, Sarah, and Muireann Quigley, 2007, “Frozen Embryos, Genetic Information and Reproductive Rights,” Bioethics , 21(8): 439–448.
Christianson, Mindy S., et al., 2020 “Embryo cryopreservation and utilization in the United States from 2004–2013.” F&S Reports , 1(2): 71–77.
Clayton, Matthew, 2006, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cohen, Glenn, 2007, “The Constitution and The Rights Not to Procreate,” Stanford Law Review , 60(4): 1135–1196.
Coleman, Joe, 2003, “School Choice, Diversity, and a Life of One’s Own,” Theory and Research in Education , 1(1): 101–120.
Collins, Patricia Hill, 1991, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment , New York: Routledge.
Conly, Sarah, 2005, “The right to procreation: Merits and limits,” American Philosophical Quarterly , 42(2): 105–115.
–––, 2016, One Child: Do We Have a Right to More? , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Corea, Gena, 1985, The Mother Machine , New York: Harper & Row.
Cripps, Elizabeth, 2017, “Do parents have a special duty to mitigate climate change?,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics , 16(3): 308–325.
Cutas, Daniela, 2007, “Postmenopausal Motherhood: Immoral, Illegal? A Case Study,” Bioethics , 21(8): 458–463.
–––, 2011, “On Triparenting: Is Having Three Committed Parents Better Than Having Only Two?,” Journal of Medical Ethics , 37(12): 735–738.
De Wispelaere, Jurgen, and Daniel Weinstock, 2014, “State Regulation and Assisted Reproduction: Balancing the Interests of Parents and Children,” in Baylis and McLeod 2014, pp. 131–150.
Dodds, Susan and Karen Jones, 1989a, “Surrogacy and Autonomy,” Bioethics , 3(1): 1–17.
–––, 1989b, “Response to Purdy’s ‘Surrogate Mothering’,” Bioethics , 3: 35–39.
Dworkin, Ronald, 1993, Life’s Dominion , New York: Knopf.
Dwyer, James G., 2018, “Regulating Child Rearing in a Culturally Diverse Society,” in Brake and Ferguson 2018, pp. 273–292.
Engster, Daniel, 2010, “The Place of Parenting within a Liberal Theory of Justice: The Private Parenting Model, Parental Licenses, or Public Parental Support?,” Social Theory and Practice , 36(2): 233–62.
–––, 2019, “Equal Opportunity and the Family: Levelling Up the Brighouse-Swift Thesis,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 36(1): 34–49.
ESHRE Task Force on ethics and Law 20, 2013, “Sex Selection for Non-medical Reasons,” Human Reproduction , 28: 1448–1454
Etieyibo, Edwin, 2012, “Genetic Enhancement, Social Justice, and Welfare-Oriented Patterns of Distribution,” Bioethics , 26(6): 296–304.
Fahmy, Melissa Seymour, 2011, “On the supposed moral harm of selecting for deafness.” Bioethics , 25(3): 128–136.
Feinberg, Joel, 1980, “On the Child’s Right to an Open Future,” in Whose Child? , W. Aiken and H. LaFollette (eds.), Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 124–53.
–––, 1986, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (Volume 1: Harm to Others), New York: Oxford University Press.
–––, 1992, “Wrongful Life and Counterfactual Harming,” in Freedom & Fulfillment , Joel Feinberg, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Feldman, S., 1992, “Multiple Biological Mothers: The Case for Gestation,” Journal of Social Philosophy , 23: 98–104.
Fenton, Elizabeth, 2006, “Liberal Eugenics and Human Nature—Against Habermas,” Hastings Center Report , 36(6): 35–42.
Fenton, Elizabeth and Loren Lomasky, 2005, “Dispensing with liberty: Conscientious refusal and the ‘morning-after pill’,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy , 30: 579–592.
Ferracioli, Luara, 2018, “Procreative-Parenting, Love’s Reasons and the Demands of Morality,” Philosophical Quarterly , 68(270): 77–97.
Fowler, Timothy, 2010, “The problems of liberal neutrality in upbringing,” Res Publica , 16(4): 367–381.
–––, 2014, “Perfectionism for children, anti-perfectionism for adults,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 44(3–4): 305–323.
Franklin-Hall, Andrew, 2012, “Creation and Authority: The Natural Law Foundations of Locke’s Account of Parental Authority,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 42(3–4): 255–280.
Freeman, Michael, 1997, The Moral Status of Children: Essays on the Rights of Children , The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
Friedrich, Daniel, 2013, “A Duty to Adopt?,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 30(1): 25–39.
Fuscaldo, Giulianna, 2006, “Genetic Ties: Are they Morally Binding?,” Bioethics , 20(2): 64–76.
Galston, William, 1991, Liberal Purposes , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 1995, “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” Ethics , 105: 516–34.
–––, 2011, “Parents, government, and children: Authority over education in a pluralist liberal democracy.” Law & Ethics of Human Rights 5(2): 285–305.
George, R., 1987, “Who Should Bear the Cost of Children?,” Public Affairs Quarterly , 1: 1–42.
Gheaus, Anca, 2011, “Arguments for Nonparental care for Children,” Social Theory and Practice , 37(3): 483–509.
–––, 2012, “The Right to Parent One’s Biological Baby,” Journal of Political Philosophy , 20(4): 432–455, first published online 2011, doi:10.1111/j.1467–9760.2011.00402.x
–––, 2015, “Could There Ever Be a Duty to Have Children?,” in Hannan, Brennan, and Vernon 2015, pp. 87–106.
–––, 2016a, “The Right to Parent and Duties Concerning Future Generations,” Journal of Political Philosophy , 24(1): 487–508, doi:10.1111/jopp.12091
–––, 2016b, “The Normative Importance of Pregnancy Challenges Surrogacy Contracts,” Analize: Journal of Gender and Feminist Studies , 6(20): 20–31.
–––, 2018a, “Biological Parenthood: Gestational, Not Genetic,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 96(2): 225–240.
–––, 2018b, “Children’s Vulnerability and Legitimate Authority over Children,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 35(1): 60–75.
–––, 2019, “More Co-Parents, Fewer Children: Multiparenting and Sustainable Population,” Essays in Philosophy , 20(1): 3–23.
Glannon, Walter, 2001, Genes and Future People: Philosophical Issues in Human Genetics , Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Glover, Jonathan, 1998, “Eugenics: Some Lessons from the Nazi Experience,” in Harris and Holm 1998, pp. 55–65.
Glover, Jonathan, et al., 1989, Fertility & the Family: The Glover Report on Reproductive Technologies to the European Commission , London: Fourth Estate.
Grill, Kalle, 2020, “How Many Parents Should There Be in a Family?,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 37(3): 467–484.
Habermas, Jurgen, 2003, The Future of Human Nature , Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hall, Barbara, 1999, “The origin of parental rights,” Public Affairs Quarterly , 13: 73–82.
Hanna, Jason, 2019, “Causal parenthood and the ethics of gamete donation,” Bioethics , 33(2): 267–273.
Hannan, Sarah, Samantha Brennan, and Richard Vernon, (eds.), 2015, Permissible Progeny , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hannan, Sarah, and R. J. Leland, 2018 “Childhood bads, parenting goods, and the right to procreate.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy , 21(3): 366–384.
Hanser, Matthew, 1990, “Harming Future People”, Philosophy and Public Affairs , 19(1): 47–70.
Harman, Elizabeth, 2004, “Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?”, Philosophical Perspectives , 18: 89–113.
Harris, John, 1998, “Rights and Reproductive Choice,” in Harris and Holm 1998, pp. 5–37.
Harris, John and Soren Holm, (eds.), 1998, The Future of Human Reproduction: Ethics, Choice and Regulation , Oxford: Clarendon.
Haslanger, Sally, 2009, “Family, Ancestry and Self: What is the Moral Significance of Biological Ties?,” Adoption & Culture , 2(1): 91–122.
Haslanger, Sally and Charlotte Witt, eds., 2006, Adoption Matters: Philosophical and Feminist Essays , Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Held, Virginia, 1987, “Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View,” in Science, Morality, and Feminist Theory , eds. Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 13 (Supplementary Volume): 111–137.
Henderson, Tammy L., 2005, “Grandparent Visitation Rights: Successful Acquisition of Court-Ordered Visitation,” Journal of Family Issues , 26(1): 107–137.
Heyd, David, 2003, “Male or Female, We Will Create Them: The Ethics of Sex Selection for Non-Medical Reasons,” Ethical Perspectives , 10(3–4): 204–214.
Hill, J. L., 1991, “What does it mean to be a ‘Parent’? The claims of biology as a basis for parental rights,” New York University Law Review , 66: 353–420.
Holtug, Nils, 2001, “On the Value of Coming into Existence,” The Journal of Ethics , 5: 361–84.
hooks, bell, 1984, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center , Boston: South End Press.
Hubin, Don, 2003, “Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity,” The Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy , 13: 29–80.
Kahane, Guy, 2009, “Non-identity, self-defeat, and attitudes to future children.” Philosophical Studies , 145(2): 193–214.
Karpin, Isabel, 2007, “Choosing disability: preimplantation genetic diagnosis and negative enhancement,” Journal of Law and Medicine , 15(1): 89–102.
Kavka, Gregory S., 1982, “The Paradox of Future Individuals,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 11(2): 93–112.
Kelleher, J. Paul, 2010, “Emergency Contraception and Conscientious Objection,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 27(3): 290–304
Kittay, Eva, 1999, Love’s Labor , New York: Routledge.
Kolers, Avery and T. Bayne, 2001, “”Are You My Mommy?“ On the Genetic Basis of Parenthood,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 18(3): 273–85.
Krishnamurthy, Meena, 2015, “We Can Make Rational Decisions to Have a Child: On the Grounds for Rejecting L.A. Paul’s Arguments,” in Hannan, Brennan, and Vernon 2015, pp. 170–183.
Kukla, Rebecca, 2005, Mass Hysteria: Medicine, Culture, and Mothers’ Bodies , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
LaFollette, Hugh, 1980, “Licensing Parents,” Philosophy & Public Affairs , 9(2): 183–97.
–––, 2010, “Licensing Parents Revisited,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 27(4): 327–343.
LaFollette, Eva and Hugh LaFollette, 2007, “Private consciences, public acts,” Journal of Medical Ethics , 33: 249–254.
Lev, Ori, 2011, “Will Biomedical Enhancements Undermine Solidarity, Responsibility, Equality and Autonomy?,” Bioethics , 25(4): 177–184.
Liao, S. Matthew, 2015, The Right to Be Loved , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lotz, Mianna, 2006, “Feinberg, Mills, and the Child’s Right to an Open Future,” Journal of Social Philosophy , 37(4): 537–551.
–––, 2014, “Adoptee Vulnerability and Post-Adoptive Parental Obligation,” in Baylis and McLeod 2014, pp. 198–221.
MacIver, Corey, 2015, “Procreation or Appropriation?,” in Hannan, Brennan, and Vernon 2015, pp. 107–128.
Macleod, Colin, 2010, “Parental Responsibilities in an Unjust World,” in Archard and Benatar 2010, pp. 128–150.
–––, 2015, “Parental Competency and the Right to Parent,” in Hannan, Brennan, and Vernon 2015, pp. 227–245.
Manning, W., M. Fettro, and E. Lamidi, 2014, “Child Well-Being in Same-Sex Parent Families: Review of Research Prepared for American Sociological Association Amicus Brief,” Population Research & Policy Review , 33(4): 485–502.
Mazor, Joseph, 2019, “On the Strength of Children’s Right to Bodily Integrity: The Case of Circumcision,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 36(1): 1–16.
McFall, Michael T., 2009, Licensing Parents: Family, State, and Child Maltreatment , Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
McLeod, Carolyn, 2010, “Harm or Mere Inconvenience? Denying Women Emergency Contraception,” Hypatia , 25(1): 11–30.
–––, 2017, “The medical nonnecessity of in vitro fertilization.” IJFAB: International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics , 10(1): 78–102.
–––, 2020, Conscience in Reproductive Health Care: Prioritizing Patient Interests , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McLeod, Carolyn, and Andrew Botterell, 2014, “‘Not for the Faint of Heart’: Assessing the Status Quo on Adoption and Parental Licensing,” in Baylis and McLeod 2014, pp. 151–167.
McMahan, Jeff, 1998, “Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the Morality of Causing People to Exist,” in J. Coleman and C. Morris, (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Meilaender, Gilbert, 1987, The Limits of Love: Some Theological Explorations , University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Melo‐Martín, Inmaculada De, 2014, “The ethics of anonymous gamete donation: is there a right to know one’s genetic origins?” Hastings Center Report , 44(2): 28–35.
Mills, Claudia, 2003, “The Child’s Right to an Open Future?,” Journal of Social Philosophy , 34(4): 499–509.
Millum, Joseph, 2008, “How Do We Acquire Parental Responsibilities?,” Social Theory and Practice , 34(1): 71–93
–––, 2010, “How Do We Acquire Parental Rights?” Social Theory and Practice , 36(1): 112–132.
–––, 2014, “The Foundation of the Child’s Right to an Open Future,” Journal of Social Philosophy , 45(4): 522–538.
–––, 2017, The Moral Foundations of Parenthood . New York: Oxford University Press.
Moschella, Melissa, 2014, “Rethinking the moral permissibility of gamete donation.” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics , 35(6): 421–440.
Mullin, Amy, 2005, Reconceiving Pregnancy and Childcare: Ethics, Experience, and Reproductive Labor , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 2010, “Filial Responsibilities of Dependent Children,” Hypatia , 25(1): 157–173.
Murray, Thomas H., 1996, The Worth of a Child , Berkeley: University of California Press.
–––, 2002, “What Are Families for? Getting to an Ethics of Reproductive Technology,” The Hastings Center Report , 32(3): 41–45.
Narayan, U., 1999, “Family Ties: Rethinking Parental Claims in the Light of Surrogacy and Custody,” in Narayan and Bartkowiak 1999, pp. 65–86.
Narayan, U. and J.J. Bartkowiak, 1999, Having and Raising Children: Unconventional Families, Hard Choices, and the Social Good , University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Narveson, Jan, 2002, Respecting Persons in Theory and Practice , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Nelson, James Lindemann, 1991, “Parental Obligations and the Ethics of Surrogacy: A Causal Perspective,” Public Affairs Quarterly , 5: 49–61.
Neumann, Peter J, 1997, “Should health insurance cover IVF? Issues and options.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law , 22(5): 1215–1239.
Oakley, Justin, 1992, “Altruistic Surrogacy and Informed Consent”, Bioethics , 6(4): 269–87.
Okin, Susan Moller, 1989, Justice, Gender, and the Family , New York: Basic Books.
–––, 1994, “ Political Liberalism , Justice, and Gender,” Ethics , 105: 23–43.
Olsaretti, Serena, 2013, “Children as Public Goods?” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 41(3): 226–258.
O’Neill, Onora, 1979, “Begetting, Bearing, and Rearing,” in O’Neill and Ruddick 1979, pp. 25–38.
O’Neill, Onora and William Ruddick, 1979, (eds.), Having Children: Philosophical and Legal Reflections on Parenthood , New York: Oxford University Press.
Overall, Christine, 1993, Human Reproduction: Principles, Practices, Policies , Toronto: Oxford University Press.
–––, 1995, “Frozen Embryos and ’Fathers’ Rights’: Parenthood and Decision Making in the Cryopreservation of Embryos,” in Joan Callahan, ed., Reproduction, Ethics, and the Law: Feminist Perspectives , Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
–––, 2012, Why Have Children?: The Ethical Debate , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Page, Edgar, 1985, “Donation, Surrogacy, and Adoption,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 2(2): 161–172; reprinted in B. Almond and D. Hill, (eds.), Applied Philosophy , Routledge: New York, 1992.
Panitch, Vida, 2013, “Surrogate tourism and reproductive rights,” Hypatia , 28(2): 274–289.
Parens, Erik, (ed.), 2006, Surgically Shaping Children , Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Parfit, D., 1984, Reasons and Persons , Oxford: Clarendon.
Parker, Michael, 2010, “An Ordinary Chance of a Desirable Existence,” in Archard and Benatar 2010, pp. 57–77.
Parker, P., 1982, “Surrogate Motherhood: The Interaction of Litigation, Legislation, and Psychiatry,” International Journal of Law and Psychiatry , 5: 341–54.
Paul, Laurie, 2015, “What You Can’t Expect When You’re Expecting,” Res Philosophica , 92(2). doi:10.11612/resphil.2015.92.2.1
Priest, Maura, 2019, “Transgender Children and the Right to Transition: Medical Ethics When Parents Mean Well but Cause Harm,” The American Journal of Bioethics , 19(2): 45–59.
Prusak, Bernard, 2011a, “The Costs of Procreation,” Journal of Social Philosophy , 42(1): 61–75.
–––, 2011b, “Breaking the Bond: Abortion and the Grounds of Parental Obligations,” Social Theory and Practice , 37(2): 311–332.
Purdy, Laura, 1989, “Surrogate Mothering: Exploitation or Empowerment?,” Bioethics , 3(1): 18–34.
–––, 1990, “Are Pregnant Women Fetal Containers,” Bioethics , 4(4): 273–291
–––, 1995, “Loving Future People,” in J. Callahan, (ed.), Reproduction, Ethics and the Law , Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
–––, 2007, “Is Preconception Sex Selection Necessarily Sexist?,” Reproductive BioMedicine Online , 15(2): 33–37.
Rachels, James, 1989, “Morality, Parents, and Children,” in Graham and LaFollette (eds.), Person to Person , Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Rachels, Stuart, 1998, “Is it Good to Make Happy People?,” Bioethics , 12(2): 93–110.
–––, 2014, “The Immorality of Having Children,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 17(3): 567–582.
Radin, Margaret Jane, 1996, Contested Commodities , Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Reefhuis, J., et al., 2009, “Assisted reproductive technology and major structural birth defects in the United States,” Human Reproduction , 24(2): 360–6.
Richards, Norvin, 2010, The Ethics of Parenthood , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Roberts, Dorothy, 1997, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty , New York: Pantheon.
–––, 2006, “Feminism, Race, and Adoption Policy,” in Haslanger and Witt 2006, pp. 234–246.
–––, 2015, “Reproductive Justice, Not Just Rights,” Dissent , 62(4): 79–82.
Roberts, Melinda, 1998, Child Versus Childmaker , Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Robertson, John, 1994, Children of Choice , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
–––, 2003, “Extending Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Medical And Non-Medical Uses,” Journal of Medical Ethics , 29(4): 213–216.
Rosenman, A.S., 1995, “Babies Jessica, Richard and Emily: The Need for Legislative Reform of Adoption Laws,” Chicago Kent Law Review , 70: 1851–95.
Ross, Lainie Friedman, 2002, Children, Families, and Health Care Decision Making , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rothman, Barbara K., 1989, Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society , New York: W.W. Norton.
Rulli, Tina, 2014, “The Unique Value of Adoption,” in Baylis and McLeod 2014, pp. 109–130.
–––, 2016, “Preferring a Genetically-Related Child,” Journal of Moral Philosophy , 13(6): 669–698, doi: 10.1163/17455243-4681062
Russell, Camisha A., 2018, The Assisted Reproduction of Race , Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Sandel, Michael J., 2007, The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Satz, Debra, 2010, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Savulescu, Julian, 2001, “Procreative Beneficence: Why we Should Select the Best Children,” Bioethics , 15(5–6): 413–426.
Savulescu, J. and G. Kahane, 2009, “The Moral Obligation to Create Children with the Best Chance of the Best Life,” Bioethics , 23(5): 274–290.
Schouten, Gina, 2019, Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schroeder, S. Andrew, 2018, “Well-Being, Opportunities, and Selecting for Disability,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy , 14(1). doi:10.26556/jesp.v14i1.353
Shanley, Mary Lyndon, 1993, “‘Surrogate Mothering’ and Women’s Freedom: A Critique of Contracts for Human Reproduction,” Signs , 18(3): 618–39.
–––, 1995, “Fathers’ Rights, Mothers’ Wrongs? Reflections on Unwed Fathers’ Rights and Sex Equality,” Hypatia , 10(1): 74–103.
–––, 2018, “Surrogacy: Reconceptualizing Family Relationships in an Age of Reproductive Technologies,” in Brake and Ferguson 2018, pp. 293–312.
Sherwin, Susan, 1987, “Feminist Ethics and In Vitro Fertilization,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 13 (Supplementary Volume): 276–284.
–––, 1992, No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Health Care , Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Shiffrin, Seana Valentine, 1999, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm,” Legal Theory , 5(2): 117–148.
Shoeman, Ferdinand, 1980, “Rights of Children, Rights of Parents and the Moral Basis of the Family,” Ethics , 91: 6–19.
Shrage, Laurie, 2018, “Decoupling Marriage and Parenting,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 35(3): 496–512.
Shultz, M. M., 1990, “Reproductive Technology and Intent-based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality,” Wisconsin Law Review , 297(2): 297–398.
Silver, Lee, 2001, “Confused Meanings of Life, Genes, and Parents,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences , 34(4): 647–661.
Smilansky, Saul, 1995, “Is there a moral obligation to have children?,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 12(1): 41–53.
Statman, Daniel, 2005, “The Right to Parenthood.” Ethical Perspectives , 10(3): 224–235.
Steinbock, Bonnie, 1988, “Surrogate Motherhood as Prenatal Adoption,” Law, Medicine, and Health Care , 16(1–2): 44–50.
Steinbock, B. and R. McClamrock, 1994, “When Is Birth Unfair to the Child?,” Hastings Center Report , 24(6): 15–21.
Straehle, Christine, 2016, “Is There a Right to Surrogacy?,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 33(2): 146–159.
Stumpf, Andrea, 1986, “Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies,” The Yale Law Journal , 96: 187–208.
Swift, Adam, 2003, How Not to be a Hypocrite: School Choice for the Morally Perplexed Parent , Psychology Press.
Taylor, Robert, 2009, “Children as Projects and Persons: A Liberal Antinomy,” Social Theory and Practice , 35(4): 555–576.
United Nations General Assembly, 1948, Universal Declaration of Human Rights , General Assembly resolution 217 A (III), 10 December 1948.
Van Zyl, Liezl, 2002, “Intentional Parenthood and the Nuclear Family,” Journal of Medical Humanities , 23: 107–18.
Vehmas, Simo, 2002, “Is It Wrong to Deliberately Conceive or Give Birth to a Child with Mental Retardation?,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy , 27(1): 47–63.
Velleman, J. David, 2005, “Family History,” Philosophical Papers , 34(3): 357–378.
Wasserman, David, 2005, “The Nonidentity Problem, Disability, and the Role Morality of Prospective Parents,” Ethics , 116: 132–152.
Weinberg, Rivka, 2016, The Risk of a Lifetime: How, When, and Why Procreation May be Permissible , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2018, “The Endless Umbilical Cord: Parental Obligation to Grown Children,” Journal of Practical Ethics , 6(2): 55–72.
Wilkinson, Stephen, 2016, “Exploitation in International Paid Surrogacy Arrangements,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 33(2): 125–145.
Woodward, James, 1986, “The Non-Identity Problem,” Ethics , 96: 804–831.
Young, Iris Marion, 1995, “Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family Values,” Ethics , 105: 535–556.
Young, Thomas, 2001, “Overconsumption and Procreation: Are they Morally Equivalent?,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 18(2): 183–192.
Zwarthoed, Danielle, 2017, “Parental Education and Expensive Consumption Habits,” Journal of Applied Philosophy , 35(4): 825–843.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Bayne, Time and Kolers, Avery, “Parenthood and Procreation”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (e.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/parenthood/ >. [This was the previous entry on parenthood and procreation in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy —see the version history .]

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Tim Bayne and Avery Kolers, the authors of the previous version of this entry, for allowing the use of several passages from their original entry—mainly in section 4.

Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

Info about mirror sites

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Don’t Be Fooled By Trump’s Failure to Endorse a Nationwide Abortion Ban

F ormer President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that he favors state control over abortion law and policy and declined to endorse a nationwide ban. He also claimed that the Supreme Court’s overturning of Roe v. Wade in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization was favored by “all legal scholars” on “both sides.” Abortion is “where everybody wanted it, from a legal standpoint,” according to Trump.

All of this is patently false, of course. Decades of legal scholarship and advocacy support the federal constitutional right to abortion that Dobbs eliminated. Some scholars who support legal abortion as a matter of policy have criticized the result the Court reached in Roe , but they are in the minority. Others have critiqued the reasoning of Roe v. Wade . Some, like Ruth Bader Ginsburg , prefer the equality rationale of Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), where the Court noted the central importance of reproductive freedom to women’s ability to participate fully and equally in the social, political, and economic life of the nation. But the notion that all or most legal scholars wanted the Court to obliterate the right to choose abortion is ludicrous.

No one should be fooled by Trump’s failure to endorse any of the proposed nationwide abortion bans, a move designed to appear “moderate” and lull voters into a false sense of complacency. Make no mistake: a second Trump administration will empower an anti-abortion movement determined to make abortion illegal everywhere. Even if Republicans do not take over Congress, there are plans in place to make medication abortion unavailable and to resurrect the 1873 Comstock Act, an archaic anti-vice law, to ban abortion nationwide. Proponents of fetal personhood, which defines an embryo as a legal person from the moment of fertilization, will be closer to realizing their goal, threatening not only abortion and miscarriage care but also IVF and common forms of contraception. Trump promotes the grotesque lie that Democrats want to “execute babies” to distract from his own party’s extremism.

Trump peddles these false and misleading claims because he understands that the truth about abortion endangers his candidacy and Republicans generally. Far from ending the controversy, returning abortion to the states already has led to outcomes wildly out of step with public opinion. Doctors and hospitals routinely deny patients basic medical care, including miscarriage treatment, because they are not close enough to death to have their rights outweigh those of an embryo or fetus. State laws with no or ineffective exceptions force children, survivors of rape and incest, and people with nonviable fetuses to carry pregnancies regardless of the consequences to their health and future fertility. Maternal health deserts multiply because doctors fear criminal and civil liability. Abortion bans exacerbate a maternal and infant mortality crisis that makes pregnancy a mortal danger to American women— especially Black women , who are almost three times more likely to die from pregnancy and childbirth than their white counterparts.

Read More: How Louisiana Has Become a Microcosm of the Abortion Access Fight

Even people with qualms about abortion in theory don’t favor these horrific results in fact. Recent polling from Gallup and Axios respectively reveals supermajority popular opposition to total and near-total bans on abortion, and majority support , even among Republicans, for keeping the government out of reproductive health care decisions altogether. Every ballot initiative since Dobbs has been resolved in favor of abortion rights and access. In fact, abortion motivates Americans to turn out and vote for candidates who support reproductive freedom.

Perhaps the most pernicious of Trump’s lies is that returning abortion to the states is a victory for democracy. Depriving people of the right to make the most basic decisions about their bodies and lives is deeply undemocratic and a hallmark of authoritarian regimes worldwide. Extreme abortion bans and fetal personhood laws pass despite popular opposition because of unchecked partisan gerrymandering that gives Republicans supermajorities. Even the most conservative lawmakers live in fear of a primary challenge from the right if they support any exceptions, however minor and ineffective, to total abortion bans. Trump says abortion law after Dobbs is “all about the will of the people.” But in fact, Republicans are scrambling to take decisions about abortion out of the people’s hands by preventing referenda from reaching the ballot, protecting state courts that defy public opinion from accountability for their decisions, and disenfranchising voters.

The GOP has long used abortion to secure the support of voters to promote a much broader right-wing agenda. Trump, as promised, packed the federal judiciary with jurists who would destroy the government’s ability to regulate corporations, combat climate change and political corruption, enact sensible gun-safety laws, provide for affordable health care, expand opportunities for women and people of color, fight discrimination, protect the rights of workers and immigrants, ask the wealthy to pay their fair share in taxes, and so on. The problem is that a majority of Americans actually support each of the policies the Right is determined to undo. To remain in power, Republicans must undermine democratic institutions and practices. Partisan and racial gerrymandering, voter suppression, and the evisceration of campaign finance regulation and voting rights laws are longstanding strategies; more recently, election denialism, insurrection, political violence, and white supremacist resurgence—all fomented by Trump—place democracy and the rule of law in mortal danger. All of this is at stake in Trump’s ultimate lie: his claim to be a champion of democracy rather than the architect of its demise.

More Must-Reads From TIME

The 100 Most Influential People of 2024
The Revolution of Yulia Navalnaya
6 Compliments That Land Every Time
Stop Looking for Your Forever Home
If You're Dating Right Now , You're Brave: Column
The AI That Could Heal a Divided Internet
Fallout Is a Brilliant Model for the Future of Video Game Adaptations
Want Weekly Recs on What to Watch, Read, and More? Sign Up for Worth Your Time

Study Guides
Homework Questions

Short Responsive Essay #2

Newsletters
Account Activating this button will toggle the display of additional content Account Sign out

Arizona’s Zombie Abortion Ban Is Back. It’s Every State’s Future If Trump Wins.

On Tuesday, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that its total abortion ban, a seemingly dead law dating back to 1864, is once again enforceable, despite more recent legislation that seemed to supersede it. The zombie ban makes virtually all abortions a felony, imposing a prison sentence of two to five years for any provider. There is no exception for rape or incest. The law was enacted before women could vote, and was long presumed to be permanently unenforceable. But the Arizona Supreme Court’s conservative majority, by a 4–2 margin, has now revived it. Republican governors appointed all seven justices on the bench, and the GOP recently expanded the court to entrench this far-right majority—which had no trouble finding that a ban enacted in an era in which women were chattel remains good law in 2024. As a result of this ruling, in 14 days almost every abortion in Arizona will be a crime, and nearly every clinic will close its doors. For all intents and purposes, it’s 1864 again for pregnant people in Arizona.

The decision should serve as a warning for the rest of the country, in light of ongoing efforts to revive the Comstock Act: In the hands of a far-right court, a dead, openly misogynistic, wildly unpopular abortion ban can spring back to life with a vengeance.

This zombie law was passed in 1864, long before Arizona was a state, and was codified in 1901, at which point it included a narrow exception to save the patient’s life. Much more recently, Arizona has passed less restrictive abortion laws, including a 15-week ban that appeared to wipe out more severe bans that preceded it. In late 2022, after the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade, the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that the two conflicting abortion laws in the state had to be reconciled, or “harmonized.” It maintained that abortion would remain legal through 15 weeks when provided by licensed physicians in compliance with the state’s other laws.

But on Tuesday, the Arizona Supreme Court, tasked with finally “harmonizing” Arizona’s 15-week abortion ban with the total ban dating back to hoop skirts, ruled that in the aftermath of Roe ’s reversal in Dobbs, the total ban takes precedence: The more recent 15-week restriction, wrote the majority, “does not create a right to, or otherwise provide independent statutory authority for, an abortion that repeals or restricts” the 1864 law, “but rather is predicated entirely on the existence of a federal constitutional right to an abortion since disclaimed” by Dobbs. In other words, in “harmonizing” the two laws, the harsher one wins out—even though, as the dissenters noted, the Legislature seemed to override this absolute ban when passing the recent 15-week limit. And so, starting in two weeks, even rape victims at the earliest stage of pregnancy may not obtain a legal abortion in Arizona.

Since Dobbs, nearly two dozen states have banned or limited access to the procedure. Arizona now joins those states with almost no exceptions , according to the Guttmacher Institute. As was the case with the far-right Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of that state’s constitution last week , the majority simply ignored any evidence that the original meaning and text of the recent law provided greater protections for reproductive freedom. Instead, the majority rejected the Legislature’s evident intent to supplant the Civil War–era law with a more lenient ban. As a consolation, it gestured toward the fact that Arizona voters will likely have an opportunity to enact a ballot initiative restoring reproductive rights. So Arizona now joins Florida as a state in which the high court takes away reproductive freedom with one hand while allowing it to go to a popular vote with the other. Abortion-rights groups say they have enough signatures to put the abortion amendment on the November ballot, creating a fundamental right to receive abortion care until viability. Unlike Florida, where amendments need 60 percent approval to pass, Arizona allows amendments to take effect with simple majority support. (Note, as well, that two justices in the majority on Tuesday have retention elections in November; if ousted, Democratic Gov. Katie Hobbs can replace them with progressives.)

In an election year in which winning the state of Arizona is an absolutely essential factor for the GOP, the abortion dog continues to catch the electoral car in ways that can only hurt Donald Trump and the GOP extremists who seek to harm women’s health and equality. So long as voters are aware of the game as it’s being played and what the stakes will be, Republicans faces the potential for heaving losses. So these efforts to do that which is extraordinarily unpopular must happen via subterfuge, wink-wink nudge-nudge public statements about states’ rights and not taking a national position on abortion, while the courts and would-be Trump administration functionaries do all the quiet dirty work. The self-evident tension between the massive public rebuke of Dobbs —in the form of state ballot initiatives and referenda , local special elections , and state Supreme Court races —and the unabating efforts by rogue legislatures and fringe Supreme Courts to roll back abortion rights, was in evidence with Donald Trump’s refusal to state a coherent position on abortion on Monday : Turning back the clock for women is a demonstrably losing issue at the ballot box. And when candidate Trump says he wants to return the issue of abortion to the states, what he is really saying is that Arizona is free to return the issue to the time before doctors understood the value of hand-washing . (Also, why would anyone take his word on anything, ever?)

What happened in Alabama in February , in Florida last week, and in Arizona on Tuesday makes it clear that returning the reproductive freedom landscape to the Victorian age requires subverting whatever happens in elections. That’s why this massive rollback will be achieved by antidemocratic measures, including promises to breathe new life into the Comstock Act, and revanchist theocratic decisions from courts attempting to do away with IVF and rape exceptions in the name of fetal and embryonic personhood .

Comstock, in particular, is an instructive comparison here. That 1873 law, read expansively, bans all abortions , including both medication and in-clinic procedures. Indeed, far-right lawyers are at the Supreme Court trying to weaponize it against abortion pills right now. Trump’s top lawyers, including Jonathan Mitchell, have said that they plan to use Comstock as a nationwide ban on abortion if Trump regains office. They tell us that they intend to stay quiet about this scheme until after the election, at which point they will prepare for an executive order accompanied by prosecutions and regulations that make abortion a federal felony in all 50 states. The plot is similar to what just happened in Arizona: Republicans enacted a seemingly moderate 15-week ban, only to stand by and watch as their colleagues on a GOP-packed court resuscitated a total ban passed during the Civil War. Democratic Attorney General Kris Mayes—who beat her anti-abortion opponent in 2022 by 280 votes—has said she won’t prosecute violations of the law. But GOP county attorneys have rejected Mayes’ efforts to shield doctors and may well seek to charge any providers that stay open, throwing access into immediate jeopardy.

The next time someone tells you they really worry about abortion rights, but that President Biden is just too old , please gently remind them that Joe Biden is not, in fact 160. That is the age of the law that will soon be sending abortion providers to prison in Arizona if they attempt to assist a victim of rape or incest. If edgy modernity is truly your thing, be afraid of Republican judges who are at war with modernity itself; they will gladly welcome the assistance of pro-choice voters whose apathy facilitates the rollback of women’s equal citizenship. And it’s now abundantly clear that we’re not rolling back the tape to the 1970s or to the 1920s. The project is to set your clocks back to the time when women didn’t even matter enough to have a vote.

IMAGES

≫ Legalization of Abortion Free Essay Sample on Samploon.com
Discursive Essay On Abortion
≫ Pro Choice: Abortion is Moral Free Essay Sample on Samploon.com
Essay on Abortion: Pro-Life and Pro-Choice Perspectives
A Discursive essay on abortion.
Abortion: Pros And Cons

VIDEO

Judith Jarvis Thomson "A Defense of Abortion"

COMMENTS

The Moral Significance of Abortion Inconsistency Arguments
This essay sets out to show, as well as any philosophical argument can, that inconsistency arguments are morally significant. Keywords: Abortion, Reproductive ethics, Spontaneous ... Davis, Nancy. 1984. Abortion and self-defense. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13(3): 175-207. Fleck, Leonard M. 1979. Abortion, deformed fetuses, and the Omega ...
Philosophical aspects of the abortion debate
Overview. The philosophical arguments in the abortion debate are deontological or rights-based. The view that all or almost all abortion should be illegal generally rests on the claims: (1) that the existence and moral right to life of human beings (human organisms) begins at or near conception-fertilization; (2) that induced abortion is the deliberate and unjust killing of the embryo in ...
Philosophy and the Morality of Abortion
3. The Politics of Philosophy. The abortion argument resolves itself into a conflict between two moral and conceptual constructions, within each of which the question has an obvious and unassailable answer. Hence, as has been noted, the remarkable confidence with which both sides hold their convictions.
The moral and philosophical importance of abortion
A new argument. Access to safe abortion is not only a human right; it is a measure of a society's development with regard to women. Western society has a strong patriarchal basis, which has at least in part emanated from the influence of Christianity: the Bible and the teachings of the Church historically emphasise a woman's role as being the property of a man and to be subordinate to him.
Abortion
To have an abortion would be, by definition, homicide. The extreme liberal view is held by proponents (abortionists). They claim that human personhood begins immediately after birth or a bit later (Singer). Thus, they consider the relevant date is at birth or a short time later (say, one month).
A Defense of Abortion
A Defense of Abortion. " A Defense of Abortion " is a moral philosophy essay by Judith Jarvis Thomson first published in Philosophy & Public Affairs in 1971. Granting for the sake of argument that the fetus has a right to life, Thomson uses thought experiments to argue that the right to life does not include, entail, or imply the right to use ...
2.6: The Better (Philosophical) Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis
12 Better (Philosophical) Arguments about Abortion Nathan Nobis and Kristina Grob 32. 1 Introduction . We argue that abortion should not be illegal because most abortions are not morally wrong (and so they are not seriously or extremely wrong).So, states are making bad moral and legal moves, to say the least, in trying to criminalize abortions, at least when they are done early in pregnancy ...
PDF Abortion and Social Justice
1. Questions about the moral status of abortion, and debates about whether. abortion should be legal have occupied a central and highly contentious place in. public discourse and philosophical writing for more than four decades.1 These. debates are highly polarized: debaters rarely agree on shared assumptions or.
Abortion rights and against
Abortion Rights. For and Against. [email protected]. This book features opening arguments followed by two rounds of reply between two moral philosophers on opposing sides of the abortion debate. In the opening essays, Kate Greasley and Christopher Kaczor lay out what they take to be the best case for and against abortion rights.
Abortion
The Biologically Defined Species Homo sapiens. In popular arguments against abortion, perhaps the most common appeal is to the view that any innocent organism that belongs to the biologically defined species Homo sapiens has a right to life. In thinking about this argument, a certain philosophical distinction is crucial—the distinction, namely, between basic moral principles and derived ones ...
5.1: Arguments Against Abortion
5.1.1 Fetuses are human. 5.1.2 Fetuses are human beings. 5.1.3 Fetuses are persons. 5.1.4 Fetuses are potential persons. 5.1.5 Abortion prevents fetuses from experiencing their valuable futures. We will begin with arguments for the conclusion that abortion is generally wrong, perhaps nearly always wrong. These can be seen as reasons to believe ...
The Right to Choose an Abortion
ness and sophistication in Frances Kamm's Creation and Abortion.2 The argument is rigorous, penetrating, and subtle throughout and Kamm is A review essay of F. M. Kamm, Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, I 992). Parenthetical page references in the text are to this work.
PDF Abortion: Three Perspectives
chapter entitled "Abortion rights and Gender Justice: An essay on Politi-cal Philosophy." Jaggar maintains that the right to abortion is essential to women's equality, because child bearing and child rearing are burdens peculiar to women, and because prolifers have not met their philosophical burden to demonstrate the unborn's personhood.
2.5: Common Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis and Kristina Grob)
11 Common Arguments about Abortion Nathan Nobis and Kristina Grob 27. 1 Introduction. Abortion is often in the news. In the course of writing this essay in early 2019, Kentucky, Mississippi, Ohio, Georgia, Alabama and Missouri passed legislation to outlaw and criminalize abortions starting at six to eight weeks in pregnancy, with more states following.
PDF The Rights of Abortion: A Kantian Perspective
Abortion, the intentional termination of a human pregnancy, has been a divisive topic in America's courts for generations. In order to be able to discuss the legality of the issue, one must ... find abortion impermissible. In this essay, I showed that Judith Jarvis Thompson outlines clear rights of the mother and fetus in abortion. Then, I ...
The role of philosophy in the contemporary abortion debate
Abstract. Inspired by Patrick Lee's "A Christian Philosopher's View of Recent Directions in the Abortion Debate," this essay raises the question of how effective philosophical arguments can be in determining the moral status of legalized abortion. On one hand, Christian philosophers have been successful in explaining both the humanity and the ...
Opinion
The Case Against Abortion. Nov. 30, 2021. Crosses representing abortions in Lindale, Tex. Tamir Kalifa for The New York Times. Share full article. 3367. By Ross Douthat. Opinion Columnist. A ...
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Philosopher Who Defended Abortion, Dies at 91
Steve Pyke/Getty Images. Judith Jarvis Thomson, who created new fields of inquiry in philosophy through her writings on abortion and a moral thought experiment that she named the "Trolley ...
The Ethics Of Abortion Philosophy Essay
The Ethics Of Abortion Philosophy Essay. Abortion has been the source of considerable debate for many years. Most people feel strongly one way or another, which makes it a pretty heated topic of conversation. The fight between pro-life and pro-choice is an ongoing battle and the ethical dilemma within this controversy is far more complicated ...
Four pro-life philosophers make the case against abortion
To put it mildly, the American Philosophical Association is not a bastion of pro-life sentiment. Hence, I was surprised to discover that the A.P.A. had organized a pro-life symposium, "New Pro ...
Liberty, Logic & Abortion
Articles Liberty, Logic & Abortion Mark Goldblatt analyses the moral and legal arguments on both sides of America's most divisive issue.. January 22nd has evolved into a national red letter day of sorts, the anniversary of the Supreme Court's landmark 1973 Roe v.Wade decision. Commemorations abound, typically sloganeering rallies, and mainstream journals churn out perfunctory retrospectives.
2. Social and moral considerations on abortion
Social and moral considerations on abortion. Relatively few Americans view the morality of abortion in stark terms: Overall, just 7% of all U.S. adults say abortion is morally acceptable in all cases, and 13% say it is morally wrong in all cases. A third say that abortion is morally wrong in most cases, while about a quarter (24%) say it is ...
Parenthood and Procreation
Parenthood and Procreation. First published Thu Jan 26, 2012; substantive revision Wed Mar 31, 2021. The ethics of parenthood and procreation apply not only to daily acts of decision-making by parents and prospective procreators, but also to law, public policy, and medicine. Two recent social and technological shifts make this topic especially ...
The Abortion Fight Is a War on Poor Women
In an 1859 essay, he argued that these laws defined the crime of abortion too leniently. "By the Moral Law, THE WILFUL KILLING OF A HUMAN BEING AT ANY STAGE OF ITS EXISTENCE IS MURDER."
Opinion
Anti-abortion activists are also trying to conjure a past, in the form of the long-dormant Comstock Act, that gives government the power to regulate the sexual lives of its citizens.
The High Stakes of Trump's Abortion Lies
Perhaps the most pernicious of Trump's lies is that returning abortion to the states is a victory for democracy. Depriving people of the right to make the most basic decisions about their bodies ...
I served on the Florida Supreme Court. What the new majority just did
On April 1, the Florida Supreme Court, in a 6-1 ruling, overturned decades of decisions beginning in 1989 that recognized a woman's right to choose—that is, whether to have an abortion—up ...
Short Responsive Essay #2 (docx)
Philosophy document from Al Ain University of Science and Technology Abu Dhabi campus, 3 pages, Exploring Perspectives on Abortion Christian Whiteman In this essay, I will argue that while abortion involves the termination of a potential human life, it is not necessarily immoral, as the moral status of the fetus is not equivalent to that of a fully
Arizona's Zombie Abortion Ban Is Back. It's Every State's Future If
It maintained that abortion would remain legal through 15 weeks when provided by licensed physicians in compliance with the state's other laws. Advertisement. Advertisement. Advertisement.
Opinion
Ms. Smith is a Democratic senator from Minnesota and a former Planned Parenthood executive. A long discredited, arcane 150-year-old law is back in the news in 2024, and that should terrify anyone ...

The Moral Significance of Abortion Inconsistency Arguments

Introduction

Opposition to Abortion

On Opposition to Abortion

Restrictivism and Moralism

Do Inconsistency Arguments Matter?

Inconsistency Arguments

Other Beliefs Objection and Response

Other Actions Objection and Response

Hypocrisy Objection and Response

The Prochoice Other Beliefs Objection

Log in using your username and password

You are here

Statistics from Altmetric.com

Introduction

Traditional arguments

For abortion

A new argument

Linked Articles

Read the full text or download the PDF:

How to Subscribe

In This Article Expand or collapse the "in this article" section Abortion

Related Articles Expand or collapse the "related articles" section about

Other Subject Areas

Abortion by Michael Tooley LAST REVIEWED: 01 September 2022 LAST MODIFIED: 28 May 2013 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0107

2.5: Common Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis and Kristina Grob)

11 Common Arguments about Abortion Nathan Nobis and Kristina Grob 27

The role of philosophy in the contemporary abortion debate

Four pro-life philosophers make the case against abortion

Most popular

The latest from america

Liberty, Logic & Abortion

Regions & Countries

Public views of what would change the number of abortions in the U.S.

A majority of Americans say women should have more say in setting abortion policy in the U.S.

How do certain arguments about abortion resonate with Americans?

In their own words: How Americans feel about abortion

Sign up for our Religion newsletter

Report Materials

Bibliography

Parenthood and Procreation

1. Foundations

2. Procreative Autonomy

3. The Morality of Procreation

4. Becoming Parents

5. Being Parents

Acknowledgments

Support SEP

Don’t Be Fooled By Trump’s Failure to Endorse a Nationwide Abortion Ban

More Must-Reads From TIME

Short Responsive Essay #2

Arizona’s Zombie Abortion Ban Is Back. It’s Every State’s Future If Trump Wins.

IMAGES

VIDEO

COMMENTS