essay on indifference is a power

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Indifference is a power

As legions of warriors and prisoners can attest, stoicism is not grim resolve but a way to wrest happiness from adversity.

by Lary Wallace   + BIO

We do this to our philosophies. We redraft their contours based on projected shadows, or give them a cartoonish shape like a caricaturist emphasising all the wrong features. This is how Buddhism becomes, in the popular imagination, a doctrine of passivity and even laziness, while Existentialism becomes synonymous with apathy and futile despair. Something similar has happened to Stoicism, which is considered – when considered at all – a philosophy of grim endurance, of carrying on rather than getting over, of tolerating rather than transcending life’s agonies and adversities.

No wonder it’s not more popular. No wonder the Stoic sage, in Western culture, has never obtained the popularity of the Zen master. Even though Stoicism is far more accessible, not only does it lack the exotic mystique of Eastern practice; it’s also regarded as a philosophy of merely breaking even while remaining determinedly impassive. What this attitude ignores is the promise proffered by Stoicism of lasting transcendence and imperturbable tranquility.

It ignores gratitude, too. This is part of the tranquility, because it’s what makes the tranquility possible. Stoicism is, as much as anything, a philosophy of gratitude – and a gratitude, moreover, rugged enough to endure anything. Philosophers who pine for supreme psychological liberation have often failed to realise that they belong to a confederacy that includes the Stoics. ‘According to nature you want to live ?’ Friedrich Nietzsche taunts the Stoics in Beyond Good and Evil (1886):

O you noble Stoics, what deceptive words these are! Imagine a being like nature, wasteful beyond measure, indifferent beyond measure, without purposes and consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and desolate and uncertain at the same time; imagine indifference itself as a power – how could you live according to this indifference? Living – is that not precisely wanting to be other than this nature? Is not living – estimating, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be different? And supposing your imperative ‘live according to nature’ meant at bottom as much as ‘live according to life’ – how could you not do that? Why make a principle of what you yourself are and must be?

This is pretty good, as denunciations of Stoicism go, seductive in its articulateness and energy, and therefore effective, however uninformed.

Which is why it’s so disheartening to see Nietzsche fly off the rails of sanity in the next two paragraphs, accusing the Stoics of trying to ‘impose’ their ‘morality… on nature’, of being ‘no longer able to see [nature] differently’ because of an ‘arrogant’ determination to ‘tyrannise’ nature as the Stoic has tyrannised himself. Then (in some of the least subtle psychological projection you’re ever likely to see, given what we know of Nietzsche’s mad drive for psychological supremacy), he accuses all of philosophy as being a ‘tyrannical drive’, ‘the most spiritual will to power’, to the ‘creation of the world’.

The truth is, indifference really is a power, selectively applied, and living in such a way is not only eminently possible, with a conscious adoption of certain attitudes, but facilitates a freer, more expansive, more adventurous mode of living. Joy and grief are still there, along with all the other emotions, but they are tempered – and, in their temperance, they are less tyrannical.

I f we can’t always go to our philosophers for an understanding of Stoicism, then where can we go? One place to start is the Urban Dictionary . Check out what this crowdsourced online reference to slang gives as the definition of a ‘stoic’:

stoic Someone who does not give a shit about the stupid things in this world that most people care so much about. Stoics do have emotions, but only for the things in this world that really matter. They are the most real people alive. Group of kids are sitting on a porch. Stoic walks by. Kid – ‘Hey man, yur a fuckin faggot an you suck cock!’ Stoic – ‘Good for you.’ Keeps going.

You’ve gotta love the way the author manages to make mention of a porch in there, because Stoicism has its root in the word stoa , which is the Greek name for what today we would call a porch. Actually, we’re more likely to call it a portico, but the ancient Stoics used it as a kind of porch, where they would hang out and talk about enlightenment and stuff. The Greek scholar Zeno is the founder, and the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius the most famous practitioner, while the Roman statesman Seneca is probably the most eloquent and entertaining. But the real hero of Stoicism, most Stoics agree, is the Greek philosopher Epictetus.

He’d been a slave, which gives his words a credibility that the other Stoics, for all the hardships they endured, can’t quite match. He spoke to his pupils, who later wrote down his words. These are the only words we know today as Epictetus’, consisting of two short works, the Enchiridion and the Discourses , along with some fragments. Among those whom Epictetus taught directly is Marcus Aurelius (another Stoic philosopher who did not necessarily expect to be read; his Meditations were written expressly for private benefit, as a kind of self-instruction).

Among those Epictetus has taught indirectly is a whole cast of the distinguished, in all fields of endeavour. One of these is the late US Navy Admiral James Stockdale. A prisoner of war in Vietnam for seven years during that conflict, he endured broken bones, starvation, solitary confinement, and all other manner of torture. His psychological companion through it all were the teachings of Epictetus, with which he had familiarised himself after graduating from college and joining the Navy, studying philosophy at Stanford University on the side. He kept those teachings close by in Vietnam, never letting them leave his mind even when things were at their most dire. Especially then. He knew what they were about, those lessons, and he came to know their application much better than anyone should have to.

Stockdale wrote a lot about Epictetus, in speeches and memoirs and essays, but if you want to travel light (and, really, what Stoic doesn’t?), the best thing you could take with you is a speech he gave at King’s College London in 1993, published as Courage Under Fire: Testing Epictetus’s Doctrines in a Laboratory of Human Behavior (1993). That subtitle is important. Epictetus once compared the philosopher’s lecture room to a hospital, from which the student should walk out in a little bit of pain. ‘If Epictetus’s lecture room was a hospital,’ Stockdale writes, ‘my prison was a laboratory – a laboratory of human behaviour. I chose to test his postulates against the demanding real-life challenges of my laboratory. And as you can tell, I think he passed with flying colours.’

‘You are unfortunate in my judgment, for you have never been unfortunate’

Stockdale rejected the false optimism proffered by Christianity, because he knew, from direct observation, that false hope is how you went insane in that prison. The Stoics themselves believed in gods, but ultimately those resistant to religious belief can take their Stoicism the way they take their Buddhism, even if they can’t buy into such concepts as karma or reincarnation. What the whole thing comes down to, distilled to its briefest essence, is making the choice that choice is really all we have, and that all else is not worth considering. ‘Who […] is the invincible human being?’ Epictetus once asked, before answering the question himself: ‘One who can be disconcerted by nothing that lies outside the sphere of choice.’

Any misfortune ‘that lies outside the sphere of choice’ should be considered an opportunity to strengthen our resolve, not an excuse to weaken it. This is one of the truly great mind-hacks ever devised, this willingness to convert adversity to opportunity, and it’s part of what Seneca was extolling when he wrote what he would say to one whose spirit has never been tempered or tested by hardship: ‘You are unfortunate in my judgment, for you have never been unfortunate. You have passed through life with no antagonist to face you; no one will know what you were capable of, not even you yourself.’ We do ourselves an immense favour when we consider adversity an opportunity to make this discovery – and, in the discovery, to enhance what we find there.

Another shrewdly resourceful Stoic mind-hack is what William B Irvine – in his book A Guide to the Good Life: The Ancient Art of Stoic Joy­ (2009)– has given the name ‘negative visualisation’. By keeping the very worst that can happen in our heads constantly, the Stoics tell us, we immunise ourselves from the dangers of too much so-called ‘positive thinking’, a product of the mind that believes a realistic accounting of the world can lead only to despair. Only by envisioning the bad can we truly appreciate the good; gratitude does not arrive when we take things for granted. It’s precisely this gratitude that leaves us content to cede control of what the world has already removed from our control anyway.

How did we let something so eminently understandable become so grotesquely misunderstood? How did we forget that that dark passage is really the portal to transcendence?

M any will recognise in these principles the general shape and texture of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT). Indeed, Stoicism has been identified as a kind of proto-CBT. Albert Ellis, the US psychologist who founded an early form of CBT known as Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) in 1955, had read the Stoics in his youth and used to prescribe to his patients Epictetus’s maxim that ‘People are disturbed not by things but by their view of things.’ ‘That’s actually the “cognitive model of emotion” in a nutshell,’ Donald Robertson tells me, and he should certainly know, as a therapist who in 2010 wrote a book on CBT with the subtitle ‘Stoic Philosophy as Rational and Cognitive Psychotherapy’.

This simplicity and accessibility ensure that Stoicism will never be properly embraced by those who prefer the abstracted and esoteric in their philosophies. In the novel A Man in Full (1998), Tom Wolfe gives Stoicism, with perfect plausibility, to a semi-literate prison inmate. This monologue of Conrad Hensley’s may be stilted, but there’s nothing at all suspect about the sentiment behind it. When asked if he is a Stoic, Conrad replies: ‘I’m just reading about it, but I wish there was somebody around today, somebody you could go to, the way students went to Epictetus. Today people think of Stoics – like, you know, like they’re people who grit their teeth and tolerate pain and suffering. What they are is, they’re serene and confident in the face of anything you can throw at them.’

Marcus Aurelius started each day telling himself: ‘I shall meet with meddling, ungrateful, violent, treacherous, envious, and unsociable people’

Which leads us naturally to ask just what it was that was thrown at them. We’ve already noted that Epictetus had the whole slavery thing going on, so he checks out. So does Seneca, in spite of what many have asserted – most recently the UK classicist Mary Beard in an essay for the New York Review of Books that asks: ‘How Stoical Was Seneca?’ before providing a none-too-approving answer. What Beard’s well-informed and otherwise cogent essay fails to allow for is just how tough it must have been for Seneca – tubercular, exiled, and under the control of a sadistically murderous dictator – no matter what access he sometimes had to life’s luxuries. It was Seneca himself who said that ‘no one has condemned wisdom to poverty’, and only an Ancient Greek Cynic would try to deny this. Besides, Seneca would have been the first to tell you, as he told a correspondent in one of his letters: ‘I am not so shameless as to undertake to cure my fellow-men when I am ill myself. I am, however, discussing with you troubles which concern us both, and sharing the remedy with you, just as if we were lying ill in the same hospital.’

Marcus Aurelius lay ill in that hospital, too. As beneficiary of the privileges of emperor, he also endured the struggles and stresses of that very same position, plus a few more besides. I know better than to try to improve on the following accounting, provided in Irvine’s A Guide to the Good Life :

He was sick, possibly with an ulcer. His family life was a source of distress: his wife appears to have been unfaithful to him, and of the at least 14 children she bore him, only six survived. Added to this were the stresses that came with ruling an empire. During his reign, there were numerous frontier uprisings, and Marcus often went personally to oversee campaigns against upstart tribes. His own officials – most notably, Avidius Cassius, the governor of Syria – rebelled against him. His subordinates were insolent to him, which insolence he bore with ‘an unruffled temper’. Citizens told jokes at his expense and were not punished for doing so. During his reign, the empire also experienced plague, famine, and natural disasters such as the earthquake at Smyrna.

Ever the strategist, Marcus employed a trusty technique in confronting the days that comprised such a life, making a point to tell himself at the start of each one of them: ‘I shall meet with meddling, ungrateful, violent, treacherous, envious, and unsociable people.’ He could have been different about it – he could have pretended things were just hunky-dory, especially on those days when they really were, or seemed to be. But how, then, would he have been prepared to angle both into the wind and away from it – adapting, always, to fate’s violently vexing vicissitudes? Where would that have left him when the weather changed?

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How Stoic Indifference Unlocks Resilience

Introduction: stoicism and the power of indifference.

Indifference is a particularly key word in Stoic philosophy , but before we go too deeply into defining what it is to be indifferent and how to use it, I think it’s worth having a little look at Stoicism from a distance to frame our discussion.

From the markets of Athens to the offices of Silicon Valley, philosophy has tightly woven itself into the story of human history.

From the ideology that’s shaped our cultures to the personal values that guide the behavior of individuals.

From it’s birth in the bustling Agora of Athens, Stoic philosophy was designed to help guide people down a path to happiness, virtue , peace of mind, and a mental resilience to the suffering and hardship we all feel from the outside world.

The Ancient Greeks, and later the Romans, found that the wisdom of Stoicism really did what they said on the tin when applied to day-to-day life. Its effectiveness, combined with the simplicity and ease with which it can be applied to daily life, meant that it quickly became one of the more popular philosophies of the time.

Its echoes can still be heard today in the boardrooms of tech giants and in the daily lives of everyday individuals like you and me.

Because Stoicism addresses a universal human pursuit: the search for a meaningful, resilient, and content life in the face of the unpredictable and often difficult winds of fate.

“To bear trials with a calm mind robs misfortue of its strength and burden.” – Seneca

A Stoic Equation:

Indifference + Rationality = A Good Life

Let’s have a look at what ‘indifference’ really means in the context of Stoic teaching.

Indifference, as a word, can often feel loaded with passive or even dismissive connotations. If we hear that person is ‘indifferent’, it can sound like they’re apathetic or even lazy. It’s not generally a good thing these days.

However, in a Stoic context, the term means something different.

“For Stoics, external things are not good or bad in the strongest sense. They don’t make our souls better or worse, or affect our fulfilment (eudaimonia) in life. What matters ultimately is the use we make of them, good or bad, virtuous or vicious.” – Donald Robertson

To a Stoic , to be indifferent is not to be uncaring; when done right, it’s simply the wisdom to recognize what is within our control and what is not and the ability to detach our emotional wellbeing from the things we can do nothing about.

“To live a good life: We have the potential for it. If we can learn to be indifferent to what makes no difference. This is how we learn: by looking at each thing, both the parts and the whole. Keeping in mind that none of them can dictate how we perceive it. They don’t impose themselves on us. They hover before us, unmoving. It is we who generate the judgments – inscribing them on ourselves. And we don’t have to. We could leave the page blank – and if a mark slips through, erase it instantly. Remember how brief is the attentiveness required. And then our lives will end.” Marcus Aurelius . Meditations . XI. 16

To the Stoics, there are so many areas of life that are outside our control. But instead of this reality causing hopelessness and depression, it can be used as a source of liberation.

It means that our path to a happy life is clear.

It’s not about controlling everything around us in an attempt to block out the unpredictability and risks of life (which is not possible); it’s about shifting our focus inwards and developing a state of mind that is stable and durable despite these things.

This idea is where the Stoic concept of indifference intersects with the broader philosophical landscape.

Adorn thyself with simplicity and with indifference towards the things which lie between virtue and vice. – Marcus Aurelius . Meditations. VII. 31

For the Stoics, external events, be that a crash in the economy, a war, or falling out with a loved one, were ‘indifferent’ when it came to whether or not they were morally good or bad.

They neither added to nor detracted from the intrinsic value of a human being. The true measure of a person was their virtue, or their ability to act with virtue in response to these events.

We can think of it like this: while most people engage in a never-ending scramble to control the uncontrollable and try to force the external world to align with what they want it to be (which is often not possible), the Stoics discovered a different, more rational, path.

They taught that instead of trying to shoehorn the world and make it conform to what you want it to be, we should instead turn our attention inward and work towards developing ourselves into the person we want to be.

Through this practice, we control what we can control and avoid trying to control what we can’t. As a result, we find that we are effective, and we avoid the pitfalls of trying to control the uncontrollable. Pitfalls that often lead to frustration and irritation.

So, through understanding and practicing the art of indifference to the external, we can achieve that much-coveted “ eudaimonia ”, the Stoic’s word for a good life.

Conclusion:

I’d like to end with the following:

We live in a world where our mastery has expanded to include things from splitting the atom to encoding the human genome. We’re more connected than ever before, have access to more information than ever before, and our quality of life, for the most part, has never been better.

However, there is one frontier that has progressed more slowly and perhaps even receded in recent centuries: the mastering of one’s own mind.

Here, the Stoics, in their ancient wisdom, offer us a compass, and a piece of that compass is the application of selective indifference.

Indifference, as we’ve seen, isn’t about neglect or apathy. It’s a way in which we can recognize that the world around us will happen as it happens, regardless of how we want it to behave. And by accepting this reality and detaching our emotions from it, we are able to remain resilient in the face of it’s change.

Instead, we can learn to focus on who we are and how we respond to the world around us. Something that is our responsibility and within our control.

“Don’t let the force of an impression when it first hits you knock you off your feet; just say to it: Hold on a moment; let me see who you are and what you represent. Let me put you to the test.” – Epictetus . Discourses 2.17

In doing so, we become the people we want to be, regardless of our environment, and we become happier as a result, getting closer to the Stoic ideal of eudaimonia.

Further Reading:

For those looking to dive a little deeper into Stoicism, you can find more here at Orion Philosophy or read some of the original texts outlined below:

Meditations by Marcus Aurelius: A Roman Emperor’s personal journal and reflective notes, offering a window into Stoic philosophy in practice for everyday life.

Discourses by Epictetus: A collection of teachings by the former slave turned Stoic philosopher.

Letters from a Stoic by Seneca: Letters from one of the richest men in the Roman Empire, discussing Stoic principles with a friend, and their application.

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The Power of Indifference

Earlier this week I received a copy of the magazine that an article of mine appeared in. As I was flipping though it I noticed an article written by Eckhart Tolle, the best-selling author of The Power of Now. One of the main themes of Tolle’s work is that when you are in the present moment, ‘in the now,’ you cannot be harmed by the past and you aren’t anxious about the future. You are fully absorbed with what is happening around you at that very moment.

Fast forward to a few days later, I’m at the office and we are talking about how to combat the negative energy that has been flowing from a couple of individuals and affecting the rest of us. One person suggested the strategic placement of a smoky crystal to suck up the negative energy. Another suggested we burn white sage, in an ancient smudging ritual, to rid the place of evil spirits. It was at that moment that the big boss walked in and listened to our conversation. After a few minutes he came out with something pretty simple, yet pretty profound. He said, “I don’t care.”

We all kind of laughed because that’s such a ‘guy’ thing to say to something that’s way out there. But he meant it both literally and figuratively. Literally he meant – this stuff makes no sense to me, so I have no interest in what you’re talking about, but he also said, “Why would you let what other people do bother you? Who cares?”

Over the next couple of days I contemplated the power behind the concept of those words, I Don’t Care. If you don’t care about something, it has no power over you. It can’t touch you and it can’t move you.

Aren’t so many of us caught up in this Narcissistic web and while we’re trying to find our way out, we keep getting sucked back in, because a narcissist knows just what our hooks are. They know how to tug on our heart strings to draw us back into the fold. If we didn’t care, there is nothing they could say, or do that would have any effect on us.

To most , indifference is a destination that we are struggling to get to. We hope that in time we won’t care, but right now we are still battling with our feelings and struggling with our will power. But what if we took a page from Tolle’s philosophy and we didn’t just wish for indifference somewhere in the future, what if we could recognize that this present moment is all that we have and if we could practice what we want to feel in the now, rather than some time later, wouldn’t we feel more empowered and in control?

As Tolle suggests, to be present, means shifting your perception. You may, at times, find your mind wondering back to your painful past, or on things that you are still hoping will happen in the future, when that happens, you bring yourself back to where you are and what you are doing. So in kind, when we are practicing indifference, we shift our perception and when painful things start to creep up on us, we reel it back into indifference.

The power of Indifference is like a shield and when you’re in the middle of a battle with yourself, or someone else, create the image of you holding up a shield in your mind, deflecting hurtful words, or cruel actions, while saying in your mind, ‘I Don’t Care, I Don’t Care.’ This allows these things to just bounce off of you. The words, I Don’t Care are powerful. They mean that there is nothing that you can do to hurt me. I have taken back my power and I am fully in control.

When you care about someone who is unreliable, unhealthy and reckless with your emotions, you will never have peace and you will be in a constant battle with yourself trying to maintain some semblance of equilibrium. When you have decided that you are done and you’re making the transition out of your relationship, utilize the power of indifference, even if you’re not there yet. Shift your mindset and say the words, I Don’t Care, not only will you find yourself truly in a state of not caring a lot faster than you ordinarily would, but you’ll free up your mind to focus on your own life and truly not care about what your ex is up to.

The late Wayne Dyer often said, “What other people think of you is none of your business,” and he is absolutely right. Not everyone is going to like us – not everyone has to. Other people have baggage that has nothing to do with you and they often act out in ways that can be pretty mean and hurtful. As long as your actions always come from a place of integrity, then what other people say and how they act towards you should have no bearing on your wellbeing.

For recovering Codependents, that are used to trying to please everybody and make everything their fault, that can be a tall order. The alternative is to let your emotions get the better of you and stay in a place of weakness, ripe for further abuse. Remember no one can hurt you without your permission. Indifference is a boundary that we set to protect ourselves, when we need the most protection. It is another tool in our arsenal to mental health.

When you don’t care nothing can penetrate you. When you don’t care you go on about your day, not being affected by other people’s stuff. Being indifferent means being in control. It’s a higher state of enlightenment, where we let go of our attachments to people and things. “Attachment is the root of all suffering,” Buddha was quoted as saying. When you let go of your attachments and you practice mindful indifference, it brings you to a state of inner peace. which is what we should all be striving for.

Dysfunctional people will always try to get a rise out of you, just to prove they can, or because of jealousy or some other baggage they may carry. By reacting to it, you feed their need to be in control. So the next time someone wants to say or do something that hurts you, detach yourself from the event,  say to yourself, “I don’t care,” and let it bounce off of you. As soon as someone knows they have no effect on you they’ll search for an easier target and leave you alone to live your life in peace.

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42 Comments

I am afraid I have to disagree with the whole indifference way of being. I am a 55 year old woman who has experienced bullying as a child, betrayal from most family members over the years, lies, BS and little people with big egos who if they don’t have them stroked turn rather toxic.

As a result I have been through every level of hurt, devastation, mistrust and downright unhappiness. The end result…… indifference. But it cannot be seen as a positive thing as I feel I am devoid of most emotions and therefore only half living. It’s like a defence cloak around me but to not feel is to not live.

I have two little doggies who I can lavish love on without fear of being hurt and they lavish their love on me also – thank goodness! It’s a tough argument really because yes, it is empowering to a point to be able to switch off and not get hurt, but I believe it’s an unhealthy way to exist and one can find themselves feeling very isolated.

So I would urge your readers not to try to take themselves 100% to this state of being because it really isnt all its cracked up to be and should be exercised with moderation and caution.

Thank you for your article and imhope you will appreciate my experiencial comments.

I think we are talking about apples and oranges. What I’m trying to convey is look at the source. Don’t absorb what they say and do. Pass it back and stop caring about what toxic people say.

Thank you for this. I am currently on a path to strengthening my mental health and not allowing others to affect me is a huge part of that. This was an excellent read.

WOW! I really needed to read this today. I would like to immensely thank you for writing this article.

Its very beautifully written. Only thing wasnt enough for me was to just keep thinking I don’t care…..I had to mouth it to make it happen !! Surprisingly only then i was heard, till them never was !!

Thank you so much for sharing this! It’s reaffirming to know that not caring is necessary to walk away and heal and doesn’t make you a heartless person. I just recently left a two-year relationship with a narcissist. I spent the past year or so uselessly screaming into the wind, trying to get her to understand that I wasn’t who she thought I was and that her constant criticism and blame are unfounded. I slowly came to the realization that she didn’t care who I was. She needed me to be there to take all of the blame, the insults, the temper tantrums, and in return, I was supposed to spend all of my time and attention on her, especially making sure that I didn’t trip that wire that would make her explode. I finally got fed up recently, and realized that I just didn’t care. I stopped worrying about what her friends and family thought of me after she fed them stories about her reality of me, what she thought of me, and how she was going to perceive and react to my every move. I stopped worrying if she would explode if I did, or more often, didn’t do something. I packed up my belongings while she shouted how useless I was and that’s why I had to leave (even though it was completely my choice to remove myself). Even in the middle of her rage, I found myself not caring at all. What she said didn’t matter anymore. Her perception was only one person’s perception. Even if her friends and family bought in to it, that was ok! I knew the truth about myself and it had little to do with what she said or had said about me. I had disconnected emotionally, and that knot in my stomach that happened every time I could sense her rage coming on was gone. I walked away feeling nothing but relief. It really helped to have a new sense of purpose outside of trying to make her happy, and meditation also helped to calm my anxiety and see everything a bit more clearly.

LOVE THIS ARTICLE. I HAVE BEEN ON THIS SITE ALL DAY . THANK YOU

Thanks so much for this one, Savannah! I reached conscious indifference yesterday and what was so interesting is my Narc. g/f actually called me out on it. But what I said in my head is, “well Darlin’ you can dish it out, but you can’t take it can ya?” So I feel stronger after reading this piece and all the comments. I am back to wanting to wait for her to be in a “discard” phase of the cycle. I love the other articles that explain I don’t need “closure, the last word, or permission to walk away.” That concept has brought me so much peace today. I unfollowed her on FB today. I think I might practice conscious indifference until she comes up with the bright idea to leave me. I am also using Non Violent Communication tools too. Just mirroring back to her what I am guessing she might be feeling and needing. Otherwise, I really don’t know what to say to her. Last night she wanted a little fight/reaction asking, “Are you upset with me?” and I have learned over time there is no real answer to this. If there IS something I am upset about it gets immediately defended against, turned completely around, and blamed on me. So now I just play dumb, say I’m tired, or I was upset about something else, which is usually true too and interestingly enough, she never displays any empathy for harsh things that go on in my life. One example is we went away for a few days to celebrate our year anniversary and my birthday which were two days apart in March 2016. Coming home, we had planned a stop over at my apartment for one night, then we were continuing on to her city, when I learned of a terrible tragedy had befallen my doctor in town and his family (wife and child). I expressed my shock and grief and the morning we were to leave, said to my Narc g/f, “I need to stay home, stabilize, process this pain and see my counselor in person.” She was miffed. No sympathy or empathy at ALL about the deaths of these three lovely, innocent people. Simply how this would affect HER!!! She says,”well, now I can leave. Take care.” That was it. She left. Then a text from her car saying, “Really…you change your mind so suddenly. I never know what to expect with you!!!” This after we had lovingly celebrated our anniversary and she had gone all out to help celebrate my birthday with a card, cake, flowers…that I did SPECIFICALLY ask for. So I was impressed by her efforts there. However, her lack of empathy is truly frightening. Thus I don’t know what she is capable of in us breaking up. I am safe in another city, but just to be sure, I am doing my best to let this be her idea. My question today is: if I am at peace, do I go on FB and initiate contact to be “sweet” and “keep the peace,” even if I am NOT inclined to contact her, just to keep up our routine and keep her calm OR do I just shine it on and since there has been no formal break up yet, just say: I know our routine but she knows my email, phone and FB, so if she wants contact she’ll initiate? If I avoid her like that she will continue to feel my indifference and it wont feel to her like HER idea to break up. Every time we have sort of broken up, she always INSISTS I did it. Even though only once did I say, “Unless you can come to couples counseling with me, I can’t continue.” But then I back-tracked. She did agree to counseling and then she back-tracked. There was no counseling after that point.

Thanks so much for all your blogs and help. The blogs and comments are educating me and keeping me safe!!

Couldn’t it be argued however that Narcs thrive on their indifference. This very same wall that guards them from their victims? so why train or suggest a codependent learns how to be something they detest so much? more guarded in this uncaring way?

Well Grr codependents get wrapped up in making other people happy. They will forgo their own needs for the sake of the needs of others, so it’s important that they learn to stop caring so much about what other’s think and contrary to your comment, Narcs care very much what other people think of them.

Please keep writing to us! These articles are such a source of comfort and provide some answers about these predators. After spending 12 years with an N and at 57 years old starting over and I mean over has been a tremendous struggle. It is hard to watch them move on to NW so seamlessly . They leave so many messes behind that they cannot clean up.

BRILLIANT post!! Thankyou! I found out the indifference idea by mistake and started out by saying to myself everytime I thought about my ex and what she was doing, “It’s none of my business”. It wasn’t easy but it worked. I still want to know what she’s up to but it IS getting easier. I just think about how I was permanently in internal agony when I was with her and how much better I feel (mostly) now I’m not! The post here though makes more sense. Saying, “I don’t care” is more powerful than the “none of my business” tack because it puts me in control. Reading this is so uplifting…. I’m really looking forward to when I care so little she just won’t exist. Thanks Savannah I’m getting better all the time because of your posts.

I have to log in daily. I am going on a month no contact. Although I am still very logical and really have nothing to say to him. He has not tried contacting me, which is normal for him. I still feel empty and depressed without the turmoil. I miss my high and extreme lows. I am sick. I hate that this is who I am. Why cant I stay angry? Why do I start wanting to be hurt over and over? When will this cycle end. 6 years and I cant feel okay without it. I am the problem.

Being I different will also help when people labelled you?

Just about to leave a six year marriage (almost ten years altogether) and still struggling to believe he’s a narc, or antisocial, but as I detach more and more it is more obvious. I’ve been so disappointed over the years that I subconsciously became numb as a self-defense mechanism, I suppose, now I’m struggling to feel anything genuine, to know my own needs and desires. I came to this site wondering how to break the pattern, since my previous long term relationship was also with a (much more blatantly abusive) narc/psychopath. I guess rather than being able to identify a narc to avoid entering a relationship with them, what one needs to do is make themselves impervious to an N’s superficial charms by raising their self-esteem and confidence getting to know and love themselves. The indifference is a good short-term method of self-preservation, but certainly not healthy to sustain indefinitely. I’m looking forward to rebuilding myself. Yoga seems like a good place to start!

My initial reaction was like Kimmie’s, isn’t indifference their MO? Isn’t that how they taught themselves how to survive troubled childhoods? So I thought about it some more and came to the conclusion that it’s ok to use indifference to shield oneself from only those who hurt us, not everyone like they do. Also from a state of enlightenment, we do it consciously not haphazardly. And finally as adults, we are able to make a distinction between a situation that necessitates such a response and one that is harmless. I’m in a state of indifference at the moment, but I can’t tell if I’m faking it or if it has finally sunk in ! R.

There are so many things I can relate to with this topic. Realizing it is one thing versus acting on it to take responsibility for myself. I can honestly say I have taken the mentality of “I don’t care” to create boundaries. Soft lines of boundaries. Because I have children involved with the person I deal with makes it very difficult to maintain. I never know what to expect including using my children as pawns with his behavior. No one, not even my own mother understands. My family sees the “I don’t care” attitude as selfish. Because of my disability, current custody is primarily with the father. It’s his mission to completely isolate me from everyone including my children for his control. We have been divorced for eleven years now. He has remarried. I liked his wife as she is the boys step mother. However, I have become aware that she is manipulating like he is to create more smoke and mirrors to discredit me with my actions. Thanks for listening. Any words of support would be greatly appreciated.

I struggle with this. I hated his INDIFFERENCE to al of my pain. It is excrutiating I feel like if I’m indifferent, .then I’m not being authentic to who I am and I’m being just like him. It’s hard. How do I do it without feeling like I’m just as big of a jerk as he is?

Kimmie this is really about not owning other people’s problems, passing them back to the person they belong to and going on with your day without internalizing any of their drama. You can still be authentic and not take responsibility for other people’s baggage.

I am trying to remember that I don’t care, and all the times he hurt and humiliated me without conscience. I shouldn’t feel bad!!

Notes for myself to remember: I don’t care. Indifference. He is no longer my business. what he does or wants with me or with anyone else is irrelevant.

The not caring advice is great, but indifference can become an all-pervasive burden.

Exactly! I’ve started to tell myself “I don’t care. It’s none of my business.” His life is none of my business. When he texts me that he’s seeing someone else (just to provoke a response) then I tell myself “I don’t care. It’s none of my business.”

I have been ‘no contact’ for 6 months. I think of him daily. I have now begun to face the feelings that I’m trying to avoid. I will look a picture of him and remember how he made me feel and really think about what he would say to hurt me. I am slowly desensitizing myself to those feelings by facing them and associating the awful feelings with him. I tried to avoid everything that reminded me of him, but that didn’t work. Facing the feelings and just getting comfortable with them is helping. I write and reread my journals from our relationship, especially the entries about how much he hurt me. At first the only thing I could remember were the good times. Now I am remembering more and more of the hurtful things and that is putting him in true perspective for me. Thanks for your blog and everyone’s contributions! It is really helping! Trauma bonds are real!

the simplicity of this article is just fabulous! I dont care, bounce off you!!!! someone who has discarded you? what they do is none of your concern anymore, fact… learn from this!!!! good energy we must supply for ourselves!!!! what goes around comes around eventually….. courage!!!!!! 🙂

I think this has been one of *the’* most helpful articles. Although Savannah, you have assisted my healing more than words can clearly express. Sometimes I can relate so strongly to what you are expressing I feel like you are commentating on my own life!

i managed to reach indifference in my long battle last year and the more he tried to provoke me it was so ridiculous I would burst out laughing but it worked in the end,and i have also succeeded in stopping my cyber stalking for three months now

P.S. Vive.L’Indifference!

I just LOV3 this post, Savannah ! I really enjoyed your story about you and the others @ work devising New Age solutions to neutralize negative energies: Then.. Enter the Boss who gets straight to the point with I DONT CARE! (LOL) As you say, a simple yet powerful mantra to inspire us all and a state to aspire to. It has cheered me up; I had a melancholy few days but I feel OK now!! Thank you so much x x

Thanks Savannah. This week has been a struggle not with my Narc but with myself. Being a recovering co-dependent feels like a one step forward two steps back process. I have been so accustom to negative “your not good enough” attention that even without my Narc I still seek it out in all aspects of my life. It’s as if my mind says subliminally, he’s not here to abuse you or play head games – find something else or someone else to fill that spot. I recognize it. I just don’t know how to correct it.

It’s like I fear happiness, I don’t understand. Back at the couple hours at a time Again!!

What a fantastic analogy RNH. It’s kind of like when you move away from home at the beginning you really miss it and you just want to be home. You surround yourself with all the things that remind you of home because it’s what you’re used to and where you feel the most comfortable. You will seek out things that bring you that familiar feeling – hopefully we can address your concerns in next week’s blog on self-esteem.

The other night I was on LinkedIn and I stumbled upon my ex narc ‘friend’s’ page (before I blocked it) and despite feeling better these days, just seeing it made me cry for 5 mins. Just shows the importance of no contact. I still can’t be in any contact with anything that is his.

A friend of mine is very career ambitious and she recently had an interview with a high institution. She’s always wanted higher prestige, a bigger title b/c this is where she gets her self-esteem. She was messaging me on the ride home where she said something like, ‘This is a day in my life. Very lonely.’

I think she uses the career climb to fill an emptiness inside her. While ambitions are great to have, to feel like you NEED this external validation can be as bad as one who craves drugs or abuse. Even if she gets this job I know she’ll still be unhappy with herself.

I also read an interesting article about some transgenders who after their surgery, regretted it and wanted to go back to their original sex b/c they found a year later the change did not cure the depression and emptiness inside them.

It got me thinking how one has to fix the real problem and if one doesn’t know where that real problem stems, outside factors will never solve it, but might only make it worse once someone learns that there’s nothing external that can be done about it.

I’ve had this problem myself where too often in the past I’d become fixated on some guy’s approval, even if he was not as smart or accomplished as I was. It’s like I needed him to recognize this in me. Losing that validation is one of the most painful parts of rejection. We just have to train ourselves not to involve ourselves with it or or care.

Thank you Savannah I re – read your post, three times now, this ordinarily comes easy to me. On this occasion it’s a concentrated deliberate effort., that’s required, on my part. And I will read it again, when I need the reminder. You’re an amazing women ❤️❌⭕️

It has been 10 weeks no contact and I have come out of the addiction to him. I really was getting to the point where I didn’t like him when he discarded me. I have lost friends in cults and knew about Love Bombing and am shocked that this happened to me. How did I not see it? It feels good not to care about him anymore. I only feel bad about what happened to me. Savannah, your blog has saved me from going back to him. Thank you so much.

This tool of indifference is extremely powerful. I think most of us who have found ourselves in a relationship with a narcissist can successfully break free once we realize that our love, empathy and ability to give them the benefit of the doubt is something that they are not capable of reciprocating. Coming to the realization that we deserve so much better, then steeling ourselves to practice indifference as they scramble to keep us on the hook is not only empowering, but a great step in implementing the self care you wrote about last week.

Wow what a powerful piece you have written. It really hit home with me. Even though it’s been 17 years since I went NO CONTACT with my malignant narcissist older sister I still allow all the old hurtful memories of her evilness affect my life. After reading this article I now realize I am still letting her have control over my life and well being. As of today I am practicing the “I don’t care” philosophy and striving for peace of mind and soul in my daily life. Thank you so much for your wonderful articles.

I think I’ve finally got to the point where ‘I don’t care’ which I thought I would never reach. I’ve been 8 weeks No Contact and it feels great that he is not my problem anymore. I accept him for what he is and realise I derseve better than being in his harem waiting my turn. He is my past and that’s where he belongs.

For me the ability to truly not care, as I mentioned, comes from not “needing” anything from the person anymore, and the ability to not need came when I finally loved myself. No longer do I need to search for love and caring elsewhere because my love tank is full because I love myself fully. I am truly free at last.

What if your reaction is motivated because you refuse to put up with the behaviour and your response is driven by that and not because you care. You simply want to respond because you don’t care anymore. I guess, I can then acknowledge who they are and that they want a reaction, even a negative one. But why should I have to change because of them. It’s not authentic to me. This is what I find challenging. Then I say well I gotta do what I don’t want to cause this will work. But I don’t like it Can I do it, yes, I do it nonetheless cause I really want the result. N gone out of my life, forevermore

Knowing your situation as I do the issue for you is that his persistent harassment is making you feel bad. It’s making you frustrated, annoyed and all kinds of bad things. If you can take yourself to a place of mindful indifference then whatever he does won’t matter.

How timely is this!! I used to look at his fb page all the time, only to be upset and wonder why he could do all these wonderful things with everyone but me. Then I made my word of the year INDIFFERENCE. Unfortunately I let him creep back in time and time again. Most recently I decided enough is enough. I remembered my power word, INDIFFERENCE and every day when I write in my journal, I write INDIFFERENCE. It truly is amazing how the pain goes away when you say….it doesn’t matter what he does or who he is with….he’s not a part of my life anymore.

Right. That is why some contact works with me, as we are neighbors, but I really don’t care anymore, and his power is gone. You have to be not dependent on him in any way, to not care and truly detached, not wanting or caring anything. It’s great. The power is gone. And now that you mention work, I think that is why the “drama” at work doesn’t bother me. I don’t care. I care about working together and I, in the now, thank and praise my co-workers for their good care and teamwork and help and ignore any talk that could be drama, and I have great evenings at work.

This is hard. you said,Savannah you took a couple of days to contemplate this. What is the switch from seeing it is good and being able to not care? Just controlling your thinking? Coincidentally I had to fight that my”antagonist” used that term on me after typical reeling me in by his saying he was going to rehab for alcohol after 30 years. Worked on me after almost 4 mos of no contact I had employed. He lives in my apartment building and parks next to me. I am able to see and hear when he comes out in the hall and can avoid him. He cannot tell if he will run in to me. But I just go right back in my apt when I hear him. But he caught me and gave me the immediate news in end of March and I encouraged him and gave him nice bottled waters and fruit but did not let him touch me other than a hug like a pal would give. After a while he saw that his attempts to get me to his apartment hasn’t worked and when I called him about something he said I DON’T CARE when asking him why he had not notified me about something. Then immediately said he he did not know why he said it and that he care “a LOT”..He went on to act aloof, and I think he was enjoying feeling like he rejected ME this time so I have gone no contact again. I have strong feelings for him or the closeness I had with him. I have no such with anyone else, and I think that also is what pulls me in. I would never be able to work out a marriage with him, and he tried to get me to leave mine and MARRY him. OH WHAT A EARLY HELL THAT WOULD BE . He was never faithful to his 2 marriages. My study of Narcissism and reading you has kept me safe and and been my constant reminder to not let my fantasies and thinking motivate me into tragedic temptations. OH man what a GODSEND. This is no way a critique of your writings today. I think some of us need more help with the step of getting there. By the way- I am holding to no contact-no matter what anniversaries of his monthly chips he gets and this last one was 6 months is he has indeed stayed sober. He was predator like with me in the beginning and I was turned away by that-and then out of boredom let myself get pulled in. My childhood Mother experience was much lke your Savannah. We survived that-that is amazing You gotta think of that B.B. King song where he says “NOBODY loves me but my Mother .AND SHE COULD BE JIVING TOO”.. mine was and not hiding it too well. THANKS. I always look for your article on Monday morning.

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An Analysis of The Perils of Indifference by Elie Wiesel

The perils of indifference rhetorical analysis.

Delivered in the late 20th century, Elie Wiesel’s speech, “The Perils of Indifference,”emerged from the shadows of a tumultuous era marked by global conflicts, ideological struggles, and the harrowing aftermath of World War II. It was a time when the wounds of the Holocaust were still fresh, and the world grappled with the collective guilt and moral reckoning that accompanied the revelation of Nazi atrocities.

The Perils of Indifference | Analysis 

Wiesel’s oration exhibits a remarkable command of language, employing rhetorical devices with adeptness and finesse. His skillful use of evocative imagery captivates the audience, forging an emotional connection that resonates long after the speech concludes. The vivid tableau he paints, replete with haunting descriptions of suffering and oppression, evokes a profound sense of empathy and compels listeners to confront the harsh realities of indifference.

Moreover, Wiesel’s eloquence lies in his ability to weave personal anecdotes and historical references into a cohesive narrative. By drawing on his own experiences as a Holocaust survivor, he imbues the speech with authenticity and credibility. The inclusion of historical allusions allows him to situate indifference within a broader context, heightening its significance and underscoring its implications for humanity at large.

One notable strength of Wiesel’s speech lies in its adept use of rhetoric. He employs an array of persuasive techniques, such as appeals to emotion, logic, and ethics, to elicit a response from his audience. By presenting a cogent argument supported by poignant examples and profound moral reasoning, he establishes his credibility as a voice of authority on the perils of indifference.

The Perils of Indifference | Historical Background

To fully comprehend the significance of Elie Wiesel’s speech, “The Perils of Indifference,” it is essential to consider its politico-historical context. By situating the speech within the broader landscape of its time, we can appreciate the profound implications of Wiesel’s words.

The politico-historical backdrop against which Wiesel spoke was characterized by the ongoing Cold War, a protracted ideological battle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Amidst the pervasive threat of nuclear war and the specter of mutually assured destruction, the speech resonated as a poignant reminder of the potential devastation wrought by indifference, not only in the face of genocide but also in the realm of global diplomacy and power politics.

Moreover, Wiesel’s address took place in the wake of significant human rights movements and social upheavals that sought to challenge entrenched systems of discrimination and oppression. From the civil rights movement in the United States to anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa, society grappled with questions of equality, justice, and the responsibility of the privileged to address systemic injustices.

Through his eloquence and literary acumen, Wiesel deftly wove together the threads of history, politics, and morality. His profound insights and use of evocative language appealed to the intellectual and emotional sensibilities of his audience, transcending mere politico-historical context to achieve a call for change and timeless essence. 

The Perils of Indifference | Title

The title highlights the collective responsibility to combat indifference, underscoring that a society that tolerates or succumbs to indifference risks its own moral decay and the erosion of fundamental values. The combination of  “perils”  and  “indifference”  creates a powerful juxtaposition, emphasizing the negative repercussions that arise when we fail to respond actively to the plight of others. It suggests that indifference, far from being a benign stance, can enable and sustain atrocities, social injustices, and the erosion of human dignity.

The Perils of Indifference | Intent

Wiesel’s primary intent was to inform his audience of the profound dangers and consequences of indifference. He sought to jolt individuals out of their complacency and challenge the prevailing apathy that allows atrocities and social injustices to persist. His use of vivid language, poignant imagery, and emotional appeals aimed to evoke a visceral response, kindling a sense of moral urgency and compelling his listeners to confront the stark realities of indifference. Through his eloquent storytelling and personal anecdotes, he endeavored to forge a profound emotional connection, inviting listeners to imagine themselves in the shoes of the oppressed and marginalized. Wiesel aimed to galvanize his audience into becoming agents of change. By weaving historical references and universal moral principles into his speech, his intent was to awaken the conscience of his audience, challenging them to confront the perils of indifference head-on and inspiring them to actively engage in the pursuit of a more compassionate and equitable society.

The Perils of Indifference | Implications

Wiesel’s speech serves as a clarion call, challenging individuals and societies to reckon with the moral consequences of indifference. It exposes the insidious nature of apathy and highlights the dire ramifications of remaining silent in the face of injustice. By elucidating the interconnectedness of humanity, Wiesel underscores the notion that indifference toward suffering and oppression erodes the very fabric of our shared humanity.

A pertinent reminder that history is not confined to the past but echoes through the present and shapes the future is highlighted through the speech. Wiesel’s emphasis on memory and historical awareness serves as a cautionary tale, urging the audience to learn from the horrors of the past in order to prevent their recurrence. By examining the Holocaust and other atrocities, the speech prompts people to confront the enduring dangers of indifference in contemporary society.

He also brings forth the power of individual agency and the responsibility each person bears in shaping the course of human events. It focuses on the importance of personal conscience and moral courage, imploring individuals to reject complacency and actively engage in promoting justice and empathy. Urging the audience to see within themselves and actively work towards a profound change.

The paramount implication was the insinuation to reevaluate the foundations of our ethical frameworks and societal structures. Wiesel challenges prevailing notions of political expediency and self-interest, advocating for a moral compass rooted in compassion and solidarity. The speech imparts a sense of urgency, underscoring the need for collective action in the face of indifference. Wiesel’s call to mobilize against societal apathy resonates as a rallying cry for individuals and communities to stand up against injustices, no matter how seemingly insurmountable.

The Perils of Indifference | Rhetorical Analysis

Elie Wiesel employs  ethos  in multiple ways throughout his speech. His personal experience as a Holocaust survivor, coupled with his status as an esteemed author and Nobel laureate, bolsters his credibility and expertise on the subject matter. By sharing his own traumatic journey and emphasizing his lifelong commitment to remembrance, he forges a deep personal connection with the audience. Throughout the speech, he utilizes inclusive language, employing pronouns like  “us” and “we”  to blur the distinction between himself and the listeners. This rhetorical strategy fosters a sense of unity and common purpose, positioning Wiesel as a member of the audience rather than a distant or detached figure. This inclusive ethos encourages the audience to identify with his cause and join him in advocating for a more compassionate and engaged society.

He effectively utilizes  logos  by employing historical evidence, cause-and-effect reasoning, challenging prevailing mindsets, and presenting pragmatic arguments. He references the Holocaust, one of the darkest chapters in human history, as a stark example of the consequences of indifference. Through the logical appeal of his arguments, he compels the audience to critically examine their own indifference and confront the consequences it entails. By grounding his speech in rationality and reasoned analysis, Wiesel encourages the audience to reject indifference and embrace a more compassionate and engaged approach to the world.

Wiesel paints vivid images resorting to the usage of  pathos  to stir audiences’ emotions. He recounts the story of a young Jewish boy from the Carpathian Mountains, a symbol of innocence and vulnerability, who was ultimately engulfed by the horrors of the Holocaust. By personalizing the suffering, Wiesel appeals to the audience’s empathy, igniting an emotional response. For instance, he describes the cries of mothers and children separated forever, stirring the audience’s emotions and motivating them to take action against indifference.

Wiesel’s use of  rhetorical questions is another poignant technique that elicits an emotional response. For example, he asks “

“What are we worth? What are you worth? ”

These rhetorical yet probing questions force the audience to confront their own humanity and reflect on their moral obligations. By appealing to their sense of self and collective responsibility, he instilled a sense of moral urgency. Powerful and evocative language  such as  “anguish,” “despair,”  and  “suffering”  vividly describe the atrocities of the Holocaust. By employing such emotionally charged language, he evokes a visceral response in the audience, appealing to their empathy and compeling them to confront the emotional weight of indifference.

Wiesel employs  parallelism   to lend rhythm and coherence to his speech. Through parallel structure, he juxtaposes contrasting ideas and reinforces key points. For instance, he states:

“Indifference is not a beginning; it is an end. And, therefore, indifference is always the friend of the enemy, for it benefits the aggressor—never his victim.”  

This parallel structure emphasizes the dichotomy between indifference and its consequences, strengthening the impact of his message.

He also stresses the use of  repetition  to evoke a sense of urgency and emphasize key ideas. The repetition of the phrase  “ I remember”   serves as a powerful refrain, highlighting the importance of memory and historical awareness. Through repetition, Wiesel reinforces the imperative to learn from the past and actively confront indifference in the present.

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Essay on Indifference: Affect and Thinking From Spinoza to Freud and Deleuze

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The Perils of Indifference

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Analysis: “The Perils of Indifference”

By opening his speech with his own story, Wiesel presents at once the devastating effects of indifference and the impact achievable by those who reject indifference. Wiesel is speaking at the White House on the 54th anniversary of his liberation from the Nazis’ death camp Buchenwald. He states that, at the time of his liberation, despite his freedom, he felt no joy: “He was finally free, but there was no joy in his heart. He thought there never would be again” (Paragraph 2). This observation makes clear the severity of the effects of the Holocaust, which was enabled by indifference, on this child’s psyche. Yet in this same paragraph, Wiesel introduces the theme of The Interconnectedness of Humanity —though he felt no joy in that moment, he did feel gratitude. With this emotion, which he believes “is what defines the humanity of the human being” (Paragraph 3), Wiesel suggests some restoration of what was stolen from this boy.

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Religion, Difference, and Indifference

• First Online: 12 April 2017

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• Lois Lee 3  

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In earlier studies of indifference to religion, I have been largely critical – of (i) conceptual imprecision, (ii) the exaggeration of indifference to religion as an empirical reality, especially in so-called secular societies, and (iii) the claims to power that self-identification as ‘indifferent’ can be bound up with – an critique that has some similarities to critical religion and critical secular approaches to the ‘secular’. This chapter shifts attention to the more constructive ways that social researchers might work with indifference to religion – as an undeniably significant feature in many contemporary societies, as a crucial component to theories about religion and modernity, as a methodological challenge, and even as an ethical imperative. This chapter proceeds on the understanding that each of these has a bearing on the other, whilst explorations of each and all contribute to the ongoing task of refining conceptual understandings of ‘indifference to religion’.

This chapter has been developed as part of research considering religion and its ‘others’ for the European Research Council (ERC) project, ‘Is Religion Special?’ (grant 283867). I am also grateful to participants at the ‘Indifference to Religion’ meeting, Frankfurt, Oct 2014, and to the members of the Religion and Political Theory (RAPT) Centre, UCL, for their careful and insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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I differentiate between ‘nonreligion’ and ‘secularity’ according to the model developed in Lee ( 2012a , 2014 and 2015b ). In this, nonreligion indicates phenomena that are identified in contradistinction to religion – New Atheism, for example, Secular Humanism or more informal practices such as declining to participate in religious traditions – whilst secularity indicates the primacy of ‘this-worldly’ concerns and the subordination of religious, spiritual and nonreligious concerns to those (though religious, spiritual and nonreligious concerns may still be present as secondary concerns in secular contexts). According to this model, we can contrast a secular school curriculum, the typical curriculum provided by liberal states, with a nonreligious curriculum, examples of which can be found in State Atheist regimes. ‘Areligiosity’ is used to denote the absence of any connection with religion (or nonreligion) (ibid.); and ‘religion’ and ‘spirituality’ are differentiated in this chapter according to the model suggested in Heelas and Woodhead ( 2005 ), in which traditional theist religion is distinguished from subjectivist modes of spirituality in which the existential is channeled through the individual rather than experienced as an external force.

See Pasquale ( 2007 ), Zuckerman ( 2010 ) and Bullivant and Lee ( 2012 ) for short reviews of this literature.

On the distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ atheism, see Bullivant ( 2013 ). On secularity as the irrelevance of religion, see Bruce ( 2002 ); discussed in Lee ( 2015a , b , 53).

This argument is particularly developed in Recognizing the Non-religious: Reimagining the Secular (Lee 2015b ).

But see Blankholm ( 2017 – this volume) on complications with the concept of ‘ignorance’.

My approach may be seen as consistent with different approaches, such as Catto’s ( 2017 – this volume) distinction between indifference and nonreligion in her work and Quack and Schuh’s ( 2017 – S 12f) view of indifference as a special form of nonreligion. Highlighting the ambiguity of the notion of indifference is about recognising that these apparently contradictory proposals may both be true, whilst different conceptual approaches to the nonreligious (see cf. Lee 2012, 2015b and Quack 2014 ) are also impactful. Indifference to religion is a position set apart from religion, making it nonreligious (in both Lee and Quack’s senses), but it may also be a position set apart from the ‘religion-related’ (Quack 2014 ) too, making it neither religious nor nonreligious (in Lee’s sense) but veering instead towards the ‘areligious’ (Lee 2015a , b ; Wallis 2014 also takes this approach). Even in this model though, indifference occupies a grey area between the nonreligious and the areligious.

See, for example, Keysar and Navarro-Rivera ( 2013 ); and Woodhead ( 2014 ).

More detail of these methods can be found in Lee ( 2015a , b ) and a full review is provided in Lee ( 2012b , Ch. 4).

For an extended discussion of complexity and hybridity in nonreligious populations, see af Burén (2015) .

Pseudonyms are used to preserve participants’ anonymity, and some details of participants’ work and cultural lives are changed for this reason.

One interesting methodological prospect would be to investigate engagement with religion alongside engagement with other things. This would help ascertain the extent to which indifference to religion is a particular characteristic, rather than an expression of a generally indifferent attitude; or maybe part of a wider category of subjects provoking indifference.

Cf. Simeon Wallis’s 2014 study of indifference of young people in UK.

See also Cotter ( 2017 – this volume).

Atko Remmel’s ( 2017 – this volume) attempt to apply the question schedule used in my UK-based research to an Estonian sample – and the challenges he encountered in that attempt – is a fascinating and powerful demonstration of how a cross-cultural exploration of indifference is needed, as is the retuning of methodological instruments in response to such differences.

Cf. Lee ( 2013 ) on pervasiveness of indifference, and its stability over time.

I am grateful to David Voas for discussion on this point.

See also Lee ( 2015a , b ) on the distinction between secularity (as the subordination of religious matters) and nonreligion (as difference from religion); and Wallis ( 2014 ) on my distinction between nonreligion and areligion (that is, the total absence of engagement with religion). Wallis argues that what many researchers identify as ‘indifference’ are really occasions of areligion rather than nonreligion, and that my suggestion that indifference is a form of difference from religion, albeit a minimal or mild one, may be confusing.

In this, my thought is informed by work from critical religion scholars – Timothy Fitzgerald ( 2000 , 2007 ) and Russell McCutcheon ( 2007 ) – though I resolve this critique in a different way.

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Lee, L. (2017). Religion, Difference, and Indifference. In: Quack, J., Schuh, C. (eds) Religious Indifference. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48476-1_6

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"The Perils of Indifference": a Rhetorical Analysis

Table of contents, ethos: establishing credibility, pathos: emotional appeal, logos: logical argument, repetition and parallelism, call to action.

• Wiesel, E. (1999). The Perils of Indifference. Speech delivered at the Millennium Lecture Series, The White House, Washington, D.C.
• Kopelson, K. (2001). Elie Wiesel and the Politics of Moral Leadership. Temple University Press.
• Kramp, M. A. (2007). Coming to Terms with Indifference: The Rhetoric of Elie Wiesel's Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech. Rhetoric Review, 26(2), 165-184.
• Labrie, R. P. (2007). Silence, Postmemory, and the Dialogic Work of Echo in Elie Wiesel's Testimonial Rhetoric. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 40(4), 389-409.
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A Reflection on Elie Wiesel’s Speech, “The Peril’s of Indifference”

Elie Wiesel’s speech, “The Peril’s of Indifference” discusses the tragedy of the indifference that is present in humanity. How sometimes people and countries choose to ignore an issue and be indifferent towards it because that is the easier route than to get involved and try to help.

I can see indifference all around me. An example of when I have been tempted by indifference and many people in today’s society are tempted is when homeless people or beggars stand on the side of the road. It makes a lot of people very uncomfortable to see these people with their signs asking for anything they can get. Often times I have kept my head down and pretended not to notice them so that I don’t feel as guilty. This is true indifference towards those who are in need, choosing to ignore instead of help.

I have chosen to turn away from indifference and decided to act, thus braving the awkwardness of involving myself in someone else’s despair, when I went on a mission trip to Jeremie, Haiti. The community and families who I stayed with while in Haiti were incredibly poor, the majority of them lacking sufficient access to food, water, clothing, and shelter. It could be difficult to look at and experience at times, witnessing their everyday struggles. Hearing about death of children and family members due to murder, suicide, lack of nutrition and proper shelter, and many more tragedies. However, going through the uncomfortable parts of the trip was well worth the feeling of knowing that after leaving the group I went with and I had made an huge impact on many people’s lives, providing them not only with food and shelter, but more importantly with hope, and a realization that people do care about them, and that they are not forgotten.

Elie Wiesel describes indifference as friend of “the enemy”, therefore in order to not give in to “the enemy” I will strive to not practice indifference no matter how much more difficult that makes my life. Also, to encourage those around me to do the same. Wiesel also claims that the human being become less indifferent and more human.” I think that in some cases this is true but really it depends on the human being. To an extent humans are learning from their past mistakes and the fault in their indifference, however, indifference can be very tempting so I think, for the most part, human beings are still very guilty of it.

4 Comments on A Reflection on Elie Wiesel’s Speech, “The Peril’s of Indifference”

Brian Waryck

Since you say it depends on the person, what are some times that indifference could be a good thing?

I can’t think of a time when indifference is a good thing. I was just saying that that not all people have moved away from being indifferent towards human, many people are still guilty of being indifferent towards those in need.

“but more importantly with hope, and a realization that people do care about them, and that they are not forgotten.”

This is so nice, I’m sure they are really glad for all the help you provided, the more I read this blogs more compelled I am do a mission like that.

Winnie Todo

In what ways to strive to not be indifferent in your everyday life! I know that you made a huge impact in your mission trip, which just leads me to ask after seeing how much of a difference it made in the lives of the Haitian families, were you inspired to lead others to feel significant and spoken for here in the United States?

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The Dangers of Indifference

Re “A refugee lesson for Europe” (Oct. 9): Roger Cohen brings us a necessary reminder about the refugee crisis. The word “Indifference” engraved at the entrance to Milan’s Holocaust memorial reinforces the concept that the opposite of love isn’t hate, it’s apathy. Indifference makes the victims invisible. Nobody cared when Jews were hauled through the elegant avenues of Milan to the central railway station for deportation to the concentration camps starting in 1943.

Now fast-forward to today, and there is some improvement through the creation of a shelter with beds, food and clothing. I reflect on Pope Francis’ recent message of reaching out to the downtrodden during his visit to the United States. But the echoes of indifference will grow louder each day that society looks the other way. The consequences are deadly.

Steven A. Ludsin East Hampton, N.Y.

The writer was a member of the President’s Commission on the Holocaust and the first U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council.

Rags to riches in India?

Re “A reason to thank politics” (Sept. 30): Manu Joseph’s claim that politics is the only area in which smart, impoverished people in India have a chance to shine cannot go unchallenged. There are many examples of individuals born in poverty who rose to prominence in a variety of fields, such as engineering, law, medicine and science. They did so by sheer hard work and perseverance — and of course a little luck. Manmohan Singh, the former prime minister, who says he was so poor when young that he had to study under street lamps at night, went on to study economics at Cambridge, and became a distinguished economist long before he entered politics.

More importantly, however, there are programs designed specifically to help bright youngsters from the poorest and lowest rungs of society, such as the Super Thirty program of Anand Kumar in Patna. Smart students, boys as well as girls, from disadvantaged families, some from the Dalit community, are selected through an entrance test and brought to Patna, the capital of Bihar, and provided free room and board and coaching for the highly competitive Indian Institute of Technology entrance exam. There are similar programs, on a smaller scale, throughout the country.

Although it is true that a lot of bad things happen in India, some good things do too, and that needs and deserves to be acknowledged.

Chelluri Sastri Halifax, Nova Scotia

Defending Nepal’s Constitution

Re “Slipping backward in Nepal” (Editorial, Oct. 1): Readers should be excused for thinking of Nepal’s new Constitution as retrograde. In fact, it is one of the most progressive documents, one that enshrines in law the rights of minority communities and a mixed system of proportional representation. The Constituent Assembly of Nepal — a directly elected body charged with drafting a new charter — overwhelmingly voted for the Constitution. That there are shortfalls in the undertaking is natural, and the governing parties have repeatedly invited the disaffected parties for talks.

What has muddied the waters is the way India has subverted the constitution-making process of a sovereign nation by overtly and covertly championing the case of a subset of Nepalis who are living near the Indian border. When India failed to stop the promulgation of the Constitution, it reverted to imposing a de facto blockade of the landlocked Nepal in contravention to existing international laws to which it is a signatory.

Niraj Shrestha, Ashburn, Va.

Who’s playing the demagogue?

Re “The Republican attack on Muslims” (Editorial, Sept. 24): I was stunned to read your allegations that Ben Carson is a bigot and demagogue for saying Islamic Shariah law is inconsistent with the values of liberal democratic societies. The editorial tries to draw a parallel between Judaism, Catholicism and Islam. “As for Shariah law,” it states, “Catholicism has canon law and Judaism has the Halakha and nobody is painting them as threats to the republic.” This is not correct. Canon law has no civil-binding power over Catholics, whereas Shariah law does over Muslims.

Moreover, you lump Dr. Carson together with all the other potential Republican candidates, creating a cumulative effect that attempts to make the reader believe there is hardly any difference between Dr. Carson and Donald Trump, since you accuse both men of having succumbed to the tactics of spreading “demagogy,” and of displaying that “pernicious habit among the leaders of the Republican Party” of playing with fire.

Furthermore, you find it “unintentionally funny” that Dr. Carson — “as an African-American” and a “member of a much-belittled minority” — holds the view of other minorities (Muslims) that he does. The editorial is an example of the very faults you accuse Dr. Carson of possessing: bigotry and demagogy.

Zbigniew Janowski, Essex, Md.

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Justifying the principle of indifference

Jon williamson.

Philosophy Department, SECL, University of Kent, Kent, CT2 7NF UK

This paper presents a new argument for the Principle of Indifference. This argument can be thought of in two ways: as a pragmatic argument, justifying the principle as needing to hold if one is to minimise worst-case expected loss, or as an epistemic argument, justifying the principle as needing to hold in order to minimise worst-case expected inaccuracy. The question arises as to which interpretation is preferable. I show that the epistemic argument contradicts Evidentialism and suggest that the relative plausibility of Evidentialism provides grounds to prefer the pragmatic interpretation. If this is right, it extends to a general preference for pragmatic arguments for the Principle of Indifference, and also to a general preference for pragmatic arguments for other norms of Bayesian epistemology.

Many Bayesians are committed to some version or other of the Principle of Indifference, which holds that in certain situations one’s degrees of belief should be equivocal. Section  1 introduces three such versions in order of increasing strength. In Section  2 , I develop a consequentialist argument for the strongest version. This can be thought of as motivating the principle in terms of its pragmatic consequences: if one is to minimise worst-case expected loss, then one should satisfy the Principle of Indifference. As I explain in Section  3 , an analogous argument can be constructed to motivate the strongest version of the principle in terms of its epistemic consequences: if one is to minimise worst-case expected epistemic inaccuracy, then one should satisfy the Principle of Indifference. In Section  4 , we shall see that this sort of epistemic consequentialist argument conflicts with Evidentialism, which holds that one’s beliefs are epistemically rational if and only if they are compatible with one’s evidence. In Section  5 I argue that this is a worry not only for the epistemic justification presented in Section  3 , but also for any epistemic justification of the Principle of Indifference: one should not be able to provide an argument for a Principle of Indifference purely in terms of its epistemic consequences, because the Principle of Indifference goes well beyond the evidence, and epistemic considerations should at most motivate conforming to the evidence. I argue that this concern also calls into question epistemic arguments for other Bayesian norms, such as Probabilism (the view that the strengths of one’s beliefs should be probabilities). For this reason, Bayesians are on safer ground motivating norms in terms of their pragmatic consequences, rather than their epistemic consequences.

Three versions of the principle of indifference

Whilst radical subjectivist Bayesians would want to maintain that there are very few constraints on rational belief and would reject the Principle of Indifference (e.g., de Finetti 1937 ), many Bayesians are committed to some version or other of the Principle of Indifference. Objective Bayesians often explicitly endorse norms on belief which imply the Principle of Indifference, such as the Maximum Entropy Principle (Jaynes 1957 ; Williamson 2010 ). Moreover, as Hawthorne et al. ( 2017 ) argue, Bayesians who endorse any principle which requires calibration of degrees of belief to some probabilities of which one has evidence—e.g., the Principal Principle, the Reflection Principle, or any testimony principle which posits deference to expert authorities—are also committed to a version of the Principle of Indifference.

The Principle of Indifference has been formulated in many ways. In this paper we shall consider three versions, which will be introduced in this section in order of increasing strength.

We shall assume the following context in this section. First, we shall focus on a particular agent and suppose that there is a most fine-grained set Ω of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions that this agent can entertain or express: these are the agent’s basic possibilities . Any other expressible proposition can be thought of as a subset of Ω, the subset of possibilities in which that proposition is true. For example, a simple artificial agent may be speculating about the results of an experiment with three possible outcomes, ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 respectively, in which case we might have Ω = { ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 }; if ω 1 is a positive outcome then the proposition that outcome is not positive can be thought of as the subset { ω 2 , ω 3 }⊆Ω. Expressible propositions can thus be represented by members of the power set Ω of Ω. The Principle of Indifference is well known to lead to complications or inconsistencies on infinite domains, and its application there is very controversial (see, e.g., Keynes 1921 , Chapter 4). For this reason, we restrict our attention here to the case in which Ω is finite. Having said that, it is worth pointing out that the principles of indifference which we discuss here can be extended in a consistent way to the case in which an agent’s language can be modelled as a first-order predicate language and the (infinitely many) basic possibilities represent truth assignments to the atomic propositions of the language—see Williamson ( 2017 ). To keep things simple, we shall suppose that the agent in question cannot express higher-order probability propositions—propositions about chances or about degrees of belief—if she could, we would have to consider a variety of further norms on degree of belief and specify how they interact with the Principle of Indifference.

Suppose that available evidence E constrains the agent’s belief function P , which represents her degrees of belief in the various propositions that she can express, to lie in some convex set 𝔼 of probability functions. 1 For instance, evidence E might consist of a set of expressible propositions; in this case, E constrains belief function P to lie in the convex subset E of probability functions which give probability 1 to each proposition in E . To return to our simple example, if E contains only the proposition that the experiment did not yield a positive outcome, { ω 2 , ω 3 }, then 𝔼 = { P : P ( ω 2 ) + P ( ω 3 ) = 1} and 𝔼 is convex. In general, however, we shall not assume that the available evidence E consists entirely of propositions that the agent can express, i.e., propositions in the domain Ω of the belief function P . For example, evidence E might alternatively consist of evidence of chances, which, we have assumed, is not expressible in the sense outlined above. If E determines just that the chance function P ∗ lies in convex 𝔼, a Bayesian who endorses some form of calibration to chances will want to say that the agent’s belief function P should also lie in E . Thus if E says that P ∗ ({ ω 2 , ω 3 }) = 0.9, so P ∗ ∈ 𝔼 = { P : P ( ω 2 ) + P ( ω 3 ) = 0.9}, then arguably also P ∈ 𝔼, which is a convex set of probability functions. If E is inconsistent, we shall take 𝔼 = ℙ , the whole space of probability functions on Ω.

Let us now turn to the first of the three versions of the Principle of Indifference that we shall consider in this paper. This first version says that if there is no evidence at all then one should believe each basic possibility to the same extent:

We shall call the probability function that gives the same probability to each basic possibility the equivocator function and denote it by P = :

PI1 is visualised in Fig.  1 . Here there are three basic possibilities, Ω = { ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 }. The triangle and its interior represent the set of probability functions: each vertex represents the function that gives probability 1 to the corresponding basic possibility and probability 0 to each of the other two; an edge represents the set of probability functions that give probability 0 to the basic possibility at the opposite vertex; all other probability functions are in the interior. If there is no evidence, E = ∅ , then 𝔼 is the entire set of probability functions on Ω, and PI1 says that P should be set to the equivocator function, the mid-point of the triangle, which gives probability 13 to each basic possibility.

Visualisation of PI1

The second version of the Principle of Indifference that we shall consider says that if the evidence treats each basic possibility symmetrically, then one should believe each such possibility to the same extent:

• PI2 : If E is invariant under permutations of the ω ∈Ω, then P = P = . 2

This implies PI1, since if E is empty then it is invariant under permutations of the basic possibilities. PI2 is depicted in Fig.  2 . Here 𝔼 is a strict subset of the set of probability functions, invariant under 120 ∘ rotations.

Visualisation of PI2

The third version of the Principle of Indifference says that if it is compatible with the evidence to believe each basic possibility to the same extent, then one should do so:

• PI3 : If P = ∈ 𝔼 then P = P = .

This principle, depicted in Fig.  3 is stronger still, implying PI2 and thereby also PI1. 3

Visualisation of PI3

Pragmatic justification: controlling loss

Having introduced some principles of indifference, in this section I shall develop a consequentialist argument for PI3 which appeals to some technical results of Landes and Williamson ( 2013 ). In this section, PI3 will be explicitly motivated in terms of its pragmatic consequences: it turns out that satisfying PI3 is advantageous in that it minimises worst-case expected loss. Later, in Section  3 , we shall see that an argument with the same formal structure can be recast in epistemic consequentialist terms.

The argument presented here does more than justify the Principle of Indifference; it also justifies other Bayesian norms. In particular, it justifies Probabilism—the claim that P should be a probability function—and a calibration norm, which says that P should be calibrated to chances. Thus in this section, we shall not presume Probabilism, nor shall we assume that P should be calibrated to chances, as we did in Section  1 . Instead, we shall derive these norms. Let E be the set of evidentially-compatible chance functions : evidence determines that the chance function P ∗ lies within set 𝔼 ⊆ ℙ , and 𝔼 is the smallest such set (there is no strict subset 𝔼 ′ ⊂ 𝔼 such that the evidence determines that P ∗ ∈ 𝔼 ′ ). 4 I shall argue that the agent’s degrees of belief should be representable by a function P within the set E . P is thus a probability function and is also calibrated to chances insofar as there is evidence of chances. In addition, we shall also see that P should satisfy PI3.

In this section we assume, purely for ease of exposition, that E is closed (i.e., contains its limit points) as well as convex. As before, we presuppose a finite set Ω of basic possibilities, e.g., Ω = { ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 }, and we construe expressible propositions as subsets of Ω, e.g., F = { ω 2 , ω 3 }. A partition π of propositions is a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets of Ω. For example, {{ ω 1 },{ ω 2 , ω 3 }} is a partition of propositions. π will denote the set of all partitions of propositions.

We shall suppose that an agent’s degrees of belief can be represented by a function b e l : Ω→ ℝ ≥ 0 which attaches a non-negative real number to each expressible proposition. For example, one such belief function might set b e l ({ ω 1 }) = 6, b e l ({ ω 2 , ω 3 }) = 9,…. The set of belief functions is a much wider class of functions than the set of probability functions. I shall argue that, in order to minimise worst-case expected loss, the agent’s belief function should be a probability function, in E , which satisfies the Principle of Indifference PI3.

Normalisation

First, as a technical convenience, we shall normalise the belief functions. Roughly speaking, we divide all degrees of belief by the maximum amount of belief distributed amongst a partition of propositions. More precisely, for M = max π ∈π∑ F ∈ π b e l ( F ) we normalise belief function b e l by considering instead belief function B : Ω→[0,1] defined by:

For example, if b e l ({ ω 1 }) = 6, b e l ({ ω 2 , ω 3 }) = 9, b e l ({ ω 2 }) = 12, b e l ({ ω 3 }) = 12,… and the partition of propositions {{ ω 1 },{ ω 2 },{ ω 3 }} is given maximum belief, M = 30, then b e l would be normalised to give B ({ ω 1 }) = 0.2, B ({ ω 2 , ω 3 }) = 0.3, B ({ ω 2 }) = 0.4, B ({ ω 3 }) = 0.4,…. The symbol B will denote the set of all normalised belief functions. For each such function B ,

in virtue of the procedure used to normalise B . Note that the set ℙ of all probability functions P : Ω→[0,1] is a subset of B , since,

Thus if B ({ ω 1 }) = 0.2, B ({ ω 2 , ω 3 }) = 0.3 then B is not a probability function. The task is to show that whilst in general a belief function B may lie outside the space of probability functions (Fig.  4 ), in order to minimise worst-case expected loss the agent’s belief function should lie inside 𝔼 ⊆ ℙ and should be the equivocator function P = , if the equivocator function is in E . This will establish PI3.

Belief function B outside the space ℙ of probability functions

Next, we need to be more specific about the notion of loss under consideration. Suppose the agent is not aware of the choices she will need to make, and is thus not aware of the actual losses (or gains) which will be incurred by her degrees of belief. What should she expect of her losses? Let L ( F , B ) denote the loss (aka disutility) one should anticipate will be incurred by adopting belief function B when F turns out to be true. 5 We shall interpret this as the loss specific to F , i.e., the loss in isolation from losses incurred by B on other propositions which may be implied by F or which may imply F . We shall suppose:

• L1 : One should not anticipate any loss when one fully believes a proposition that turns out to be true: L ( F , B ) = 0 if B ( F ) = 1. (Fully believing the truth leads to the best outcome.)
• L2 : One should anticipate that the loss L ( F , B ) will strictly increase as B ( F ) decreases from 1 towards 0. (The less credence one gives to the truth, the worse the outcome.)
• L3 : L ( F , B ) should depend only on B ( F ), not on B ( F ′ ) for F ′ ≠ F . (This represents the interpretation of L ( F , B ) as the loss incurred on F in isolation from that incurred on other propositions.)
• L4 : Losses should be presumed to be additive when the space Ω of basic possibilities is generated by independent subspaces: whenever ω ∈Ω takes the form ω 1 ∧ ω 2 where ω 1 ∈Ω 1 and ω 2 ∈Ω 2 , B (Ω) = 1, and Ω 1 and Ω 2 are independent in the sense that B ( F 1 × F 2 ) = B ( F 1 ) B ( F 2 ) for all F 1 × F 2 = { ω 1 ∧ ω 2 : ω 1 ∈ F 1 , ω 2 ∈ F 2 } , then L ( F 1 × F 2 , B ) = L 1 ( F 1 , B ⇂ Ω 1 ) + L 2 ( F 2 , B ⇂ Ω 2 ) , where L 1 and L 2 are the loss functions on Ω 1 and Ω 2 respectively.

It turns out that these conditions force the loss function to be logarithmic:

for some positive constant k (Landes and Williamson 2013 , Theorem 1).

Expected loss

Next, let us consider expected loss. If the chance function is P ∗ , what is the expected loss incurred by B over all the expressible propositions? A function which measures expected loss is called a scoring rule . 6 In fact, there are a range of plausible scoring rules. For example, both the following measures seem equally reasonable:

Since there is no single scoring rule that stands out as being most appropriate, we shall consider a whole class of scoring rules, indexed by a function g : π→ ℝ ≥ 0 which attaches a non-negative weight to each partition:

S π corresponds to the case in which each partition receives weight 1; S Ω corresponds to the case in which each partition of size 2 receives weight 1 and all other partitions get weight 0. 7

We shall impose two conditions on g . First, g is inclusive : every proposition F is in some partition that is given positive weight (otherwise, that proposition will not contribute to the score). Second, g is unbiased : it is invariant under permutations of the basic possibilities ω ∈Ω (otherwise, some possibilities are singled out a priori as more important than others). The weighting functions for S π and S Ω satisfy these two conditions.

Given the anticipated loss function set out above, we have that

Worst-case expected loss

Now, the precise chance function P ∗ will usually not be known, so the expected loss is not fully accessible to the agent. The evidence only determines that P ∗ lies in the set E of evidentially-compatible chance functions. The evidence does, however, permit us to calculate the worst-case expected loss,

We can thus ask, which belief function B would incur minimum worst-case expected loss? I.e., which B achieves

It turns out (see Landes and Williamson 2013 , Theorem 2) that the belief function B ∈ B that incurs minimum worst-case expected loss is the probability function in E which has maximum generalised entropy :

This is depicted in Fig.  5 . Since B ∈ 𝔼 ⊆ ℙ , this establishes that the optimal belief function B is a probability function (i.e., Probabilism) and that the optimal belief function B is in the set E of evidentially-compatible chance functions (Calibration).

The optimum belief function B is the calibrated probability function with maximum generalised entropy

Moreover, the equivocator function is the probability function in ℙ that has maximum generalised entropy (Landes and Williamson 2013 , Corollary 6). Hence, if the equivocator function is in E then it is bound to be the belief function that minimises worst-case expected loss. This establishes that if P = ∈ 𝔼 then the optimal belief function B is the equivocator function P = . This is PI3, the strongest of the three principles of indifference. Note that PI3 still holds even if we drop the assumptions of closure and convexity of the set E of evidentially-compatible chance functions (Landes and Williamson 2013 , Theorem 3).

Epistemic justification: reducing inaccuracy

The above argument for the Principle of Indifference sought to justify it in terms of its pragmatic consequences: PI3 needs to hold if one is to minimise worst-case expected loss. Interestingly, exactly the same formal argument can be cast in terms of epistemic consequences. The only change involves interpreting the function L as a measure of epistemic inaccuracy, instead of a loss function. Thus our four desiderata become:

• E1 : L ( F , B ) = 0 if B ( F ) = 1. (Fully believing the truth yields no inaccuracy.)
• E2 : Inaccuracy L ( F , B ) strictly increases as B ( F ) decreases from 1 towards 0. (The less credence one gives to the truth, the greater the inaccuracy.)
• E3 : Inaccuracy L ( F , B ) depends only on B ( F ), not on B ( F ′ ) for F ′ ≠ F . (This represents the interpretation of L ( F , B ) as the inaccuracy of one’s degree of belief in F , in isolation from inaccuracy on other propositions.)
• E4 : Inaccuracy is additive when the space Ω of basic possibilities is generated by independent subspaces: whenever ω ∈Ω takes the form ω 1 ∧ ω 2 where ω 1 ∈Ω 1 and ω 2 ∈Ω 2 , B (Ω) = 1, and Ω 1 and Ω 2 are independent in the sense that P ∗ ( F 1 × F 2 ) = P ∗ ( F 1 ) P ∗ ( F 2 ) for all F 1 × F 2 = { ω 1 ∧ ω 2 : ω 1 ∈ F 1 , ω 2 ∈ F 2 }, then L ( F 1 × F 2 , B ) = L 1 ( F 1 , B ⇂ Ω 1 ) + L 2 ( F 2 , B ⇂ Ω 2 ) , where L 1 and L 2 are the inaccuracy functions on Ω 1 and Ω 2 respectively.

The only formal difference here is that E4 appeals to objective independence, i.e., independence with respect to the chance function P ∗ , rather than subjective independence with respect to the belief function B .

Everything else follows through as before, but under an epistemic interpretation rather than a pragmatic interpretation. The four conditions set out above force the inaccuracy measure to be logarithmic:

A scoring rule now measures expected inaccuracy, rather than expected loss. As before, we consider consider a whole class of scoring rules generated by the inclusive and unbiased weighting functions. For any such weighting function, the (normalised) belief function which minimises worst-case expected inaccuracy is a probability function, in the set E of functions that are calibrated to chances, that has maximum generalised entropy. In particular, this optimal belief function satisfies PI3. The Principle of Indifference can thus be motivated in terms of epistemic rationality: supposing that epistemic rationality requires minimising worst-case expected inaccuracy, degrees of belief must then satisfy principle of indifference PI3.

We thus appear to be spoilt for choice when justifying the Principle of Indifference. The formal argument for the Principle of Indifference can be given either a pragmatic reading, which appeals to the notion of anticipated loss, or an epistemic reading, which appeals to the notion of inaccuracy. The question arises, should one prefer an epistemic justification over a pragmatic justification or vice versa?

Rather than evaluate the details of the particular argument presented above, I will suggest a general answer to this question, in the hope that a general answer will remain pertinent should new pragmatic or epistemic arguments for the Principle of Indifference be put forward in the future. The answer that I will present is that the pragmatic line of argument should be preferred, because of an inconsistency between the epistemic line of argument and Evidentialism.

Evidentialism

In this section we shall explore the Evidentialism thesis and we shall see that this thesis is inconsistent with the epistemic line of argument presented above.

Consider the following principle: one’s beliefs are rational if and only if they are compatible with one’s evidence. There are compelling reasons to think that the ‘if’ is too strong here: rationality seems to demand more than compatibility with evidence. For example, suppose that a patient has evidence that the chance that she will survive her cancer ( s ) given a certain genetic profile ( g ) is 0.8, i.e., P ∗ ( s | g ) = 0.8, and that the chance she has genetic profile g is 0.7, i.e., P ∗ ( g ) = 0.7. Regarding survival, these two facts imply that P ∗ ( s ) ∈ [0.56,0.86]. 8 Assuming that one should calibrate degrees of belief to chances, insofar as one has evidence of them, the patient should believe s to some degree within the same interval, P ( s ) ∈ [0.56,0.86]. Now, it is known that a high degree of belief in survival after cancer influences the chance of survival itself (e.g., Soler-Vila et al. 2005 ). It is thus in the patient’s interest that she adopts a degree of belief in s that is at the higher end of the range. So there is a sense in which the patient’s degree of belief would be irrational were it not sufficiently close to 0.86: rationality requires more than mere compatibility with the evidence, because a degree of belief of 0.56 is compatible with the evidence yet apparently irrational. This sense of rationality is pragmatic however—it is motivated by the need to survive, rather than the quest for truth. There is nothing to say that a higher degree of belief is epistemically more appropriate than a lower degree of belief. After all, just as higher degrees of belief lead to higher chances of survival, so do lower degrees of belief lead to lower chances of survival—we may suppose here that all degrees of belief within the interval [0.56,0.86] are equally well calibrated to the chances. 9

This sort of example, which shows that there can be pragmatic grounds for going beyond the evidence, suggests a reformulation of the above principle:

Having stated the Evidentialism principle, let us consider some points of clarification.

When formulating evidentialism, ‘epistemically justified’ is sometimes used instead of ‘epistemically rational’. Thus Conee and Feldman ( 2004 , p. 83) provide the following formulation of evidentialism: ‘Doxastic attitude D towards proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only if having D towards p fits the evidence S has at t .’ The two terms are often used interchangeably, although ‘epistemically rational’ could be interpreted as a slightly more permissive classification than ‘epistemically justified’: that beliefs are justified suggests that there exists some justification that rules them in as appropriate beliefs, whereas beliefs might be classified as rational just in case there are no grounds for ruling them out as irrational. Here we shall stick with ‘epistemically rational’, which is more familiar in the Bayesian context. I use ‘one’s beliefs’ to denote a belief state—perhaps a set of propositions in the case of qualitative beliefs or a belief function in the case of Bayesian degrees of belief.

DeRose ( 2000 , §1) notes that there is a sense in which one ought not believe a proposition unless one believes it on the basis of one’s evidence—i.e., one ought not believe it for mistaken reasons, even if that belief is, in fact, compatible with one’s evidence. As DeRose ( 2000 ) suggests, this consideration points to a distinction between different kinds of ‘oughts’: a strong notion which presumes correct ‘basing’ and the weaker notion of the Evidentialism thesis as stated above. The distinction can be put thus: one rationally believes if and only if one’s beliefs are rational (i.e., one’s belief state is compatible with one’s evidence) and that belief state is properly believed on the basis of one’s evidence. The stronger sense of rationality is clearly a different sense than that employed in the standard Bayesian notion of rational degree of belief. The Bayesian notion is oblivious to the actual genesis of beliefs, caring only whether the values in question are appropriate in the circumstances.

There is a further ambiguity that needs to be addressed. Baehr ( 2009 ) suggests that, whilst there is a sense of epistemic rationality in which Evidentialism is true, there is another sense in which the epistemic rationality of one’s beliefs depends on whether the gathering of evidence was defective. According to this stronger ‘ought’, one ought to gather enough evidence and gather it correctly, as well as ensure that beliefs are appropriate given that evidence. This is a rather complex ‘ought’: the individual who deliberately or negligently sees no evil and hears no evil may be both epistemically defective (as is someone who sees and hears evil but fails to believe it) and morally defective (as is someone who sees, hears and believes evil but fails to speak out against it). Again, there is no need for the Bayesian to deny this stronger ‘ought’—it suffices to observe that the Bayesian is primarily interested in the weaker sense of epistemic rationality. As in the case of believing on the basis of the evidence, it is plausible that an adequate account of the stronger ‘ought’ will need to invoke an adequate account of the weaker notion as a component, so Evidentialism will be at least part of the story.

It is important to note that Evidentialism as stated above is simply a biconditional claim, a characterisation of rational belief rather than an analysis of it. It is therefore important to distinguish Evidentialism from an evidentialist epistemology, i.e., a detailed epistemological theory under which Evidentialism turns out to be true. Such an epistemological theory would have as a minimum to give detailed accounts of: rationality; the distinction between epistemic and pragmatic rationality; doxastic deliberation; compatibility; the nature of evidence; and what it is to possess evidence. Work towards an evidentialist epistemology from an internalist point of view can be found in Conee and Feldman ( 2004 ), Dougherty ( 2011 ) and McCain ( 2014 ), for example, and Williamson ( 2000 ) develops an evidentialist epistemology from the externalist perspective (see Williamson 2000 , §9.8). Clearly, one does not need to provide a detailed evidentialist epistemology in order to advocate Evidentialism.

Bayesian Evidentialism

Whilst advocates of Evidentialism are not bound to provide a detailed theory of each of the terms that occur in the Evidentialism claim, it is incumbent upon proponents of the claim to clarify when it applies. In particular, it is important to be clear about what a belief state is and when a belief state is compatible with evidence. Given our concern with norms of Bayesian rational degree of belief in this paper, we shall explicate Evidentialism by appealing to the concepts set out in Sections  1 and  2 . Thus a belief state is construed as a (normalised) belief function B and a belief function B is compatible with evidence just in case B ∈ E, the set of evidentially-compatible chance functions.

The motivation behind this explication of compatibility with the evidence appeals to the idea that degrees of belief should be calibrated to chances (a principle common to both the pragmatic approach and the epistemic approach under consideration here). Recall that 𝔼 is defined in Section  2 as the smallest set of probability functions that contains the chance function P ∗ , as far as can be determined by the evidence E . If beliefs should be calibrated to chances then a belief function is compatible with evidence just when it is calibrated to a chance function that is compatible with evidence. This yields the claim that B is compatible with the evidence if and only if B ∈ E. This claim can be motivated more precisely as follows.

First we shall see that if B ∉E then B is incompatible with evidence. Suppose first that E is a set of expressible propositions—propositions that are not statements about chances. Then 𝔼 is the set of all probability functions that give maximal probability to propositions in E , 𝔼 = { P ∈ ℙ : P ( 𝜃 ) = 1 for all 𝜃 ∈ E }. Now if B ∉E then there is some 𝜃 ∈ E such that B ( 𝜃 ) < 1. Such a belief function would be problematic. It would be Moore-paradoxical to recognise that 𝜃 is evidence yet not to fully believe 𝜃 . In general, one ought to calibrate one’s beliefs to truths, insofar as one has evidence of them, yet this belief function is not calibrated. Hence, this belief function B is incompatible with evidence. This argument can be extended to the case in which E provides evidence of non-trivial chances. If B ∉E then there is some 𝜃 such that B ( 𝜃 )≠ P ∗ ( 𝜃 ) for any P ∗ ∈ E. This is also problematic: one ought to calibrate one’s degrees of belief to chances, insofar as one has evidence of them, yet this belief function is not calibrated. Hence, this belief function is incompatible with the evidence.

On the other hand, if B ∈ 𝔼 then B is compatible with the evidence, for the following reason. That B ∈ 𝔼 means that as far as can be determined from E , B may well be the true chance function. Suppose new evidence is subsequently obtained that determines that B is indeed the true chance function P ∗ . This new evidence is clearly compatible with the old evidence E . Call the new evidence base E ′ and the new set of evidentially-compatible chance functions E ′ . Now, B is compatible with E ′ : E ′ , we may assume, is consistent, so there must be some belief function compatible with E ′ ; however, as we have just seen, any belief function outside E ′ is incompatible with E ′ ; hence, B , the only function in E ′ , is compatible with E ′ . Since B is compatible with E ′ as a whole, it must be compatible with each item of evidence in E ′ . Hence it is compatible with each item of evidence in E ⊆ E ′ , and therefore with E as a whole.

This provides some motivation for the view that belief function B is compatible with evidence just when B ∈ E. Below, we will revisit the question whether this characterisation is appropriate. In the meantime, we are now in a position to state a Bayesian explication of Evidentialism:

• BE Belief function B is epistemically rational if and only if B ∈ E.

We shall call this specialisation of Evidentialism to degree of belief Bayesian Evidentialism .

Note that BE circumvents one immediate concern with Evidentialism in the Bayesian framework. This is the concern that Probabilism appears to conflict with Evidentialism. For example, according to Probabilism, one ought to fully believe all logical truths, even those for which one has no evidence that they are logical truths. Thus one ought to fully believe that the millionth digit of π is 5, even if one has no evidence that this is so. Probabilism, then, seems to be a constraint on rational degree of belief that operates independently of the evidence, contrary to Evidentialism. In response to this concern, it suffices to point out that Probabilism is treated as an idealisation by the Bayesian: Probabilism is usually advocated on the grounds that it is a simple and powerful approximation to a more nuanced, correct norm. In some cases, such as the application of Bayesianism to mathematics (Corfield 2001 ), one may need to invoke a more nuanced norm, but Probabilism suffices for most practical applications of Bayesianism. BE circumvents these issues by building Probabilism into compatibility with the evidence: since 𝔼 is construed as the set of chance functions compatible with the evidence, it is a subset of ℙ , the set of all probability functions. Thus there is no conflict between Probabilism and BE. This means that BE should also be treated as an idealisation—an approximation to a more nuanced claim that would incorporate the more nuanced, correct norm which Probabilism approximates.

Another point of clarification. In the cancer example at the start of this section, we supposed that all degrees of belief within the interval [0.56,0.86] were equally well calibrated to the chances. Consider a modification to the example where this is not the case: suppose that individuals with degree of belief P ( s ) ≥ 0.86 have chance 0.86 of survival, those with degree of belief P ( s ) ≤ 0.56 have chance 0.56 of survival and those with degree of belief strictly between 0.56 and 0.86 have some chance of survival other than that degree of belief, and that these facts are part of the patient’s evidence. In this case, only the endpoints of the interval, 0.86 and 0.56, are possible values of degrees of belief that are calibrated to the chances. This modified example shows that, in general, some chance functions that are compatible with evidence may not also be interpretable as belief functions compatible with evidence. The set E was construed in Section  2 as the set of chance functions that are compatible with the evidence. In its role in BE, E also needs to be construed as a set of belief functions compatible with the evidence. Thus we must take E to be the set of those chance functions compatible with evidence to which belief functions can be calibrated . This qualification avoids a worry about Evidentialism of Reisner ( 2015 ).

Note finally that the evidence may be inconsistent, or it may be the case that there is no chance function compatible with the evidence which can also be interpreted as a belief function. Which belief functions are compatible with the evidence in such situations? Whilst this question needs answering, it involves some subtleties that are somewhat tangential to the concerns of this paper. For the purposes of this paper, we may simply stipulate that 𝔼 = ℙ , the set of all probability functions, in both these cases. See e.g., Williamson ( 2010 , §3.3.1) for a fuller discussion.

Evidentialism and the Principle of Indifference

Having explicated Evidentialism in terms of BE, we can now move on to its connection to the Principle of Indifference. The important point for our purposes is that BE is inconsistent with the claim that if a belief function is epistemically rational then it satisfies Principle of Indifference PI3. According to BE, any belief function that is compatible with evidence is epistemically rational; there is no further requirement that one’s degrees of belief should equivocate between the basic possibilities. For example, if there is no evidence at all, then any belief function satisfies the evidence, in particular, a belief function B 0 that gives ω , one of the basic possibilities, degree of belief 0. BE would deem such a belief function to be epistemically rational. On the other hand, if the claim that epistemic rationality requires PI3 is true then this belief function B 0 is not epistemically rational: one would need to give ω degree of belief 1/|Ω| rather than 0. Hence, the claim that epistemic rationality requires PI3 contradicts BE. This claim was the conclusion of the epistemic justification of the Principle of Indifference presented in Section  3 . Consequently, the epistemic justification is in tension with Evidentialism.

On the other hand, BE is not inconsistent with the claim that if a belief function is rational simpliciter then it satisfies the Principle of Indifference PI3. BE is a claim about epistemic rationality, whilst this claim invokes rationality simpliciter . This claim is the upshot of the pragmatic justification of the Principle of Indifference of Section  2 . Therefore, the pragmatic justification is not in tension with Evidentialism. The advocate of the pragmatic justification can say one of two things about the relation between BE and the claim that rationality requires the Principle of Indifference: either she can point out that there is more to rationality than epistemic rationality, as demonstrated by the cancer example at the start of this section, or she can deny that there is such a thing as ‘epistemic rationality’, perhaps motivated by scepticism about the tenability of a sharp distinction between pragmatic and epistemic rationality or justification. Either way, the proponent of the pragmatic justification of the Principle of Indifference can deny that indifference is a requirement of epistemic rationality. Hence, there is no tension with Evidentialism, under this view. 10

Before exploring some of the consequences of the conflict between Evidentialism and the epistemic justification of the Principle of Indifference, let us consider a possible response to the claim that there is such a conflict. One might suggest that ‘compatible with the evidence’ should be reinterpreted as follows. Instead of saying that B is compatible with the evidence just when B ∈ E, one might say that B is compatible with the evidence just when B = P E‡, the probability function in E with maximum generalised entropy. With this stricter interpretation of ‘compatible with the evidence’, the conflict between Evidentialism and the epistemic justification of Section  3 dissolves, because the epistemic justification implies compatibility with the evidence in the new sense.

The problem with this strategy is that the suggested reinterpretation is not a viable interpretation of ‘compatible with the evidence’. This should already be clear, given the motivation for BE provided above. To highlight how wrong the reinterpretation is, suppose that E is correct but is incomplete, i.e., every proposition in E is true but E does not determine the truth of every proposition. Let ω ∗ be the truth function that represents the true state of the world. Since E is correct, ω ∗ ∈ E. Since E is incomplete, there is some proposition 𝜃 such that ω ∗ ( 𝜃 ) = 1 (i.e., 𝜃 is true) but P E‡( 𝜃 ) < 1. 11 Under the proposed reinterpretation, P E‡ is the only belief function compatible with the evidence. Therefore the belief function that coincides with the truth function ω ∗ is deemed to be incompatible with the evidence. This is perverse: despite the fact that the truth is consistent with the evidence, believing the truth is deemed incompatible with the evidence. The original interpretation of ‘compatible with the evidence’ does not suffer from this problem.

Thus, the proposed reinterpretation is not viable—it strays too far from our usual understanding of ‘compatible’. The conflict between Evidentialism and the epistemic justification of the Principle of Indifference stands.

This epistemic justification is, however, consistent with a significant weakening of the Evidentialism thesis:

This Supervenience thesis is consistent with the view that compatibility with the evidence is neither sufficient nor necessary for epistemic rationality. Particular implementations of the Supervenience thesis might reinstate necessity, however. One might, for instance, hold that degrees of belief should be compatible with evidence, i.e., B ∈ E, and, in addition, B should have maximum generalised entropy. In any case, according to Supervenience, the evidence is only a part of the story.

In the literature, it is not always clear whether an author is endorsing the Evidentialism thesis or the Supervenience thesis. Thus it is not always clear whether the inconsistency identified above arises. For example, Mittag ( 2015 , §1) cites Bertrand Russell as an early evidentialist. Russell did indeed say some things which accord with this. For example,

the reason for believing no matter what must be found, after sufficient analysis, in data, and in data alone. Russell ( 1948 , p. 401.)

Despite this, Russell ( 1948 , p. 404) explicitly advocates PI1 and PI2. Since the Principle of Indifference apparently goes well beyond the data, the inconsistency between the epistemic justification of the Principle of Indifference and Evidentialism might seem to pose a problem for Russell. However, it is not entirely clear that Russell was a genuine evidentialist, i.e., an advocate of Evidentialism rather than Supervenience. Without further textual evidence, we cannot conclude that Russell falls foul of this inconsistency.

On the other hand, we have seen that it is indeed clear that a proponent of the epistemic justification of the Principle of Indifference cannot consistently also advocate Evidentialism. We shall suggest next that this inconsistency reflects negatively on the epistemic justification.

Consequences for consequentialism

Thus far we have seen that the Principle of Indifference can be given a pragmatic justification in terms of avoiding avoidable loss; it can also be given an epistemic justification in terms of reducing inaccuracy; however, this latter form of justification conflicts with Evidentialism. We shall now explore some of the consequences of this tension.

The pragmatic vs the epistemic interpretation

Let us first turn to the main question of the paper: should the new formal justification of the Principle of Indifference be given a pragmatic reading in terms of loss or an epistemic reading in terms of inaccuracy? I shall argue as follows. Evidentialism is prima facie plausible, and, moreover, extant objections to Evidentialism miss the mark. Therefore, the conflict between the epistemic argument and Evidentialism should be taken to reflect negatively on the epistemic argument. On the other hand, the pragmatic version of the justification coheres well with Bayesianism, and as we have seen, is not in tension with Evidentialism. On balance, then, Evidentialism favours the pragmatic interpretation of Section  2 over the epistemic interpretation of Section  3 .

First, Evidentialism is, at least prima facie , rather plausible. Beliefs can be useful in various ways, as we saw in the cancer example. However, their epistemic value lies in the extent to which they latch on to the truth. In that sense, the epistemic aim of belief is truth. Now, evidence and inference appear to provide our only route to truth. Unless one can infer something about a proposition from one’s evidence, there is no reason to suspect that the proposition is true. 12 Beliefs are epistemically rational, then, just when they are compatible with (what can be inferred from) evidence.

In order to provide a full defence of Evidentialism, one would need to develop a detailed evidentialist epistemology which validates the principle. This will not be attempted here, for two reasons. First, this is a major enterprise, and not one that can be adequately carried out in the remaining pages of this paper. Second, any detailed epistemological theory is likely to involve so many controversial components as to render the whole less plausible than the Evidentialism principle itself. Hence, such a theory will not be very confirmatory.

Instead, I shall aim to explain why key objections related to Evidentialism miss the mark in the sense that they do not help the proponent of the epistemic justification of the Principle of Indifference. Whilst this will not go far enough to establish the truth of Evidentialism, when taken together with the prima facie plausibility of Evidentialism it will arguably render Evidentialism in a strong position.

Objections to Evidentialism offer no succour to proponent of the epistemic justification for six main reasons. (i) Some are objections to evidentialist principles other than the Evidentialism thesis as explicated by BE. For example, Sharadin ( 2016 ) observes that non-evidential considerations can play a role as motivating reasons for beliefs (a self-fulfilling prophesy, such as belief in survival after cancer, can be such a consideration). However, as Sharadin acknowledges, this fact would not undermine the normative version of Evidentialism set out above (Sharadin 2016 , §3). (ii) Some are objections to features of evidentialist epistemologies, rather than to the Evidentialism thesis itself. For example, there are many objections to features and details of Conee and Feldman’s epistemological theory, such as to its internalism (see, e.g., Dougherty 2011 , Part V). There are also many objections to Timothy Williamson’s externalist epistemology, such as to its identification of evidence and knowledge (see, e.g., Williamson 2015 ). These features are not implied by Evidentialism, so problems with these features do not falsify Evidentialism. (iii) Some objections arise from showing that Evidentialism turns out false under one or other non-evidentialist epistemology (see, e.g., Stich 1990 ; Axtell 2011 ). As noted above, any detailed epistemological theory will be so controversial as to offer little scope for confirming or undermining Evidentialism. (iv) Some are objections to arguments in favour of Evidentialism, rather than to Evidentialism itself. For example, Steglich-Petersen ( 2008 ), Yamada ( 2010 ), Sharadin ( 2016 ) and Rinard ( 2017 , §8) provide objections to an argument for Evidentialism put forward by Shah ( 2006 ). (v) Some are objections which, if successful, would not only undermine Evidentialism but would also undermine Bayesianism, so cannot be used to favour the epistemic argument over Evidentialism for the purposes of justifying the Principle of Indifference. For example, as discussed in Section  4 , DeRose ( 2000 , §1) and Baehr ( 2009 ) are concerned that Evidentialism handles too weak a sense of epistemic rationality. However, the weak sense is precisely the sense of epistemic rationality that Bayesianism tackles. (vi) Some objections, if successful, would not only undermine Evidentialism but would also undermine the epistemic argument so do not help proponents of such a justification of the Principle of Indifference. For example, Marušić ( 2012 ) argues that decisions and promises require believing propositions which may be contrary to the evidence. If so, these are beliefs which are also more inaccurate than those in accord with the evidence. To take another example, Littlejohn ( 2012 , §7.3) argues against Evidentialism by claiming that belief is factive. As we shall see below (c.f. principle I5), this claim is as unattractive to the proponent of an inaccuracy argument as it is to the evidentialist.

We have seen that objections to Evidentialism fail to help the proponent of the epistemic justification of the Principle of Indifference. Since Evidentialism is prima facie plausible, the fact that Evidentialism is in tension with the epistemic justification casts some doubt on that justification.

On the other hand, no such doubt is cast on the pragmatic version of the justification of PI3. This is because, as we saw above, there is no tension between Evidentialism and the pragmatic justification. Furthermore, the pragmatic justification is relatively unproblematic because it rests on the idea that one should avoid avoidable loss, and this goal is central to Bayesianism. The main existing argument for Probabilism—the Dutch book argument (de Finetti 1937 )—is based on exactly this premiss, since it shows that degrees of belief must be probabilities if one is avoid avoidable sure loss in a particular betting set-up. Moreover, Bayesianism is intended as a practical theory which can guide decision making, and the supposition behind Bayesian decision theory is that one should avoid avoidable loss by maximising expected utility. The pragmatic reading of the justification of the Principle of Indifference is clearly also of the form avoid avoidable loss : in this case, avoid avoidable worst-case expected loss . Hence, the pragmatic reading coheres well with Bayesianism.

In sum, then, the epistemic justification of Section  3 comes out worse than the pragmatic justification of Section  2 from its clash with Evidentialism.

Other epistemic justifications of the Principle of Indifference

It is worth noting that the epistemic argument of Section  3 is not the only epistemic argument for the Principle of Indifference. Pettigrew ( 2016b ), for example, gives another argument in terms of epistemic inaccuracy. This argument is for PI1; recall that this says that when there is no evidence one should believe each basic possibility to the same extent. Suppose, then, that there is no evidence, E = ∅ . Pettigrew supposes that a measure I ( ω , B ) of inaccuracy measure should satisfy the following two requirements. First, there is no other belief function B that has as low inaccuracy as the equivocator function for all basic possibilities: if B ≠ P = then there is some ω such that I ( ω , B ) > I ( ω , P = ). Second, Pettigrew requires that I is invariant under isomorphisms acting on the set of propositions. (As with the earlier requirement that a weighting function be unbiased, this second requirement ensures that inaccuracy measures are invariant under permutations of the basic possibilities.) The first requirement forces the equivocator function to be less inaccurate than B for some basic possibility, and the second forces the inaccuracy of the equivocator function to be the same for every basic possibility. Hence the equivocator function is the belief function with minimum worst-case inaccuracy, where the worst case is taken over all ω . Thus, Pettigrew argues, PI1 must hold if one is to minimise worst-case inaccuracy.

It is important to observe that the grounds for preferring the pragmatic justification of Section  2 over the epistemic version of Section  3 also apply to other epistemic justifications of the Principle of Indifference, such as Pettigrew’s justification. This is because it is the claim that epistemic rationality requires the Principle of Indifference that is inconsistent with Evidentialism, and any epistemic justification of the Principle of Indifference will yield that claim. Thus, if this inconsistency favours the pragmatic justification of Section  2 over the epistemic justification of Section  3 , it also favours the pragmatic justification of Section  2 over any other epistemic justification of the Principle of Indifference.

A further worry is relevant here. Any other epistemic justification of the Principle of Indifference that appeals to inaccuracy will need to provide an account of inaccuracy that is somewhat different to that given in Section  3 . Such an account of inaccuracy will hinge on a complex package of claims which can be hard to justify. This complexity, when contrasted with the simplicity and prima facie plausibility of Evidentialism, may cast further doubt on the inaccuracy account.

To get a sense of this complexity, consider that any account of epistemic inaccuracy which underpins a purely epistemic justification of the Principle of Indifference will depend upon the following claims I1–5, which I shall collectively call the Inaccuracy Package :

In the case of our epistemic justification of Section  3 , a logarithmic function was singled out as most appropriate. Pettigrew ( 2016b ) favours the quadratic Brier score, though his justification of PI1 considered a class of inaccuracy measures. Different classes of inaccuracy measures have appeared in the literature, often delineated by technical fruitfulness rather than philosophical considerations—e.g., ‘strictly proper’ inaccuracy measures are particularly conducive to proving the required theorems (Landes 2015 ). As yet, we are far from a consensus as to which functions are appropriate as inaccuracy measures. Worse, it is controversial whether inaccuracy is the sort of thing which can be measured by a single number, and which depends only on the belief function in question and the true state of the world. It is still an open question whether the quest for an inaccuracy measure will turn out to be as quixotic as the closely related quest for a measure of verisimilitude. This stands in contrast to loss (negative utility), which is so well entrenched within the Bayesian framework that Bayesians find it uncontroversial that one can measure loss by a single number that depends on the belief function and the state of the world.

In the epistemic justification of Section  3 , the norm is to minimise worst-case expected f . In Pettigrew’s justification, it is to minimise worst-case f . Another norm often invoked by proponents of inaccuracy arguments is to avoid dominated f . Note that these norms conflict; we saw that the first norm warrants PI3 but the second norm does not. Apparently, the third norm, which can be used to motivate Probabilism, cannot be used to justify even PI1 (Pettigrew 2016a , Chapter 12). Therefore, the proponent of inaccuracy arguments needs to provide grounds for singling out which norm, or which combination of norms, should be applied. This has not been done as yet.

Inaccuracy needs to be a purely epistemic standard if it is to provide a purely epistemic justification of the Principle of Indifference. Now, the word ‘inaccuracy’ has epistemic connotations, but in the light of the epistemic justification of Section  3 , which characterises the inaccuracy measure in just the same way that the measure of loss was characterised in Section  2 , one might worry whether inaccuracy is just loss in disguise. This casts some doubt on whether inaccuracy is a purely epistemic consideration. Is minimisation of inaccuracy an appropriate standard ? Truth is uncontroversially an epistemic standard, but a small improvement in the accuracy of a belief is less obviously so—in many circumstances, a miss is as good as a mile, and one might hold that truth is the only epistemic standard to which beliefs should conform.

Truth is an epistemic standard but it is not normally thought of as necessary for rationality of belief. Even if minimisation of inaccuracy is an epistemic standard, some further consideration—currently lacking—needs to be provided before we can be convinced of its necessity for rationality. Furthermore this consideration needs to be clearly epistemic. Suppose our beliefs fit our evidence; should we follow norm N ( f ) in addition? f doesn’t tell us any more about what is true than the evidence does. Of course, we might worry that we’ll lose out in proportion to our inaccuracy—but then avoiding inaccuracy is a pragmatic desideratum, rather than an epistemic one.

Now, N ( f ) can only be sufficient for epistemic rationality if no other norm is necessary. One concern for sufficiency is a slippery slope: if accuracy is necessary for rationality, then why isn’t truth also necessary? The proponent of inaccuracy arguments needs to say why such a move is not warranted. The proponent will want to resist such a move, not only because requiring truth over and above controlling inaccuracy contradicts the sufficiency of N ( f ), but also because if rational belief is factive then very implausible principles of indifference will follow. For example, suppose that truth were also necessary for rationality of belief in the sense that a degree of belief in basic possibility ω which surpasses some threshold τ , P ( ω ) > τ , is epistemically rational only when ω is true. Unless the evidence forces the truth of some possibility ω , it is impossible to determine for sure whether ω is true, and hence whether it is epistemically rational to set P ( ω ) > τ . Hence, the Bayesian can normally only be sure of following this truth norm by setting P ( ω ) ≤ τ for every ω , i.e., by being sufficiently indifferent between the basic possibilities. In cases where, for some ω , evidence fails to force the truth of ω but implies that the chance of ω exceeds the threshold, P ∗ ( ω ) ≥ τ , this truth norm violates the requirement that P ∈ E. Advocating degrees of belief which are incompatible with the evidence clearly goes much further than most Bayesians would like.

There is another, more well known, worry about I4–5, presented by Greaves ( 2013 , p. 918):

Emily is taking awalk through the Garden of Epistemic Imps. Achild plays on the grass in front of her. In anearby summerhouse are n further children, each of whom may or may not come out to play in aminute. They are able to read Emily’s mind, and their algorithm for deciding whether to play outdoors is as follows. If she forms degree of belief 0that there is now achild before her, they will come out to play. If she forms degree of belief 1that there is achild before her, they will roll afair die, and come out to play iff the outcome is an even number. More generally, the summerhouse children will play with chance (1 − 12 q ( C 0 )), where q ( C 0 ) is the degree of belief Emily adopts in the proposition ( C 0 ) that there is now achild before her. Emily’s epistemic decision is the choice of credences in the proposition C 0 that there is now achild before her, and, for each j = 1,…, n , the proposition C j that the j th summerhouse child will be outdoors in afew minutes’ time.

The problem is as follows. Assume Emily knows all the facts set out above. Emily’s evidence determines that C 0 is true. The Bayesian will want to say that she should fully believe C 0 . Then, for j = 1,…, n , the chance of each C j will be 12 and the Bayesian will prescribe degree of belief 12 in each C j . These latter degrees of belief will be deemed inaccurate by some typical inaccuracy measures f , leading to low overall accuracy. Much greater total accuracy would be achieved if Emily were to fully disbelieve C 0 , contrary to her evidence, and fully believe C 1 ,…, C 10 , which would then all be true. Now, if following N ( f ) were necessary and sufficient for rationality of belief then Emily should adopt the latter beliefs. Such a norm, which requires violating the evidence, would be very unpalatable to the Bayesian. 13

Such examples strengthen the conflict between Evidentialism and inaccuracy arguments. Evidentialism states that compatibility with the evidence is necessary and sufficient for rationality of beliefs. Inaccuracy arguments can conflict both the necessity and sufficiency of this claim: whilst the fact that inaccuracy arguments are used to justify the Principle of Indifference contradicts sufficiency, the Epistemic Imps example tells against necessity.

The Inaccuracy Package, then, is not only complex, it is also riddled with lacunae and challenges. This is not to say that all these challenges are insuperable, rather that, currently, the Inaccuracy Package is merely a promissory note. On the other hand, I have argued that Evidentialism is prima facie plausible and objections to Evidentialism miss the mark. Consequently, Evidentialism is more credible than the Inaccuracy Package, and, because of the inconsistency between inaccuracy arguments and Evidentialism, a pragmatic justification of the Principle of Indifference will be on firmer ground than any epistemic justification which appeals to inaccuracy.

Let us consider a response to this line of argument, to be found in some comments of Pettigrew ( 2016b , §3.1). Pettigrew expresses the worry that evidentialists need to invoke multiple cognitive goals. For example, it is not enough to fit our beliefs to the evidence we have—we ought to gather new evidence too. On the other hand, proponents of inaccuracy arguments need only invoke a single cognitive virtue, namely accuracy. According to Pettigrew, the single goal of accuracy explains both the need to fit evidence and the need to gather new evidence because they both help to reduce inaccuracy. Thus the Inaccuracy Package should be preferred over Evidentialism on the grounds that the former is more explanatory than the latter.

There are various compelling rejoinders open to the evidentialist, however. First, avoiding inaccuracy fails to explain the need to fit evidence. As Pettigrew acknowledges, examples like the Epistemic Imps example set out above show that one should not always fit the evidence if one is to minimise inaccuracy. Second, avoiding inaccuracy also fails to explain the need to gather new evidence. If accuracy were the only goal, one should not gather new evidence wherever that evidence is likely to lead to less accurate degrees of belief—i.e., one should not gather evidence that is likely to reveal that the chances are such as to lead to higher values of the chosen inaccuracy measure f when degrees of belief are calibrated to those chances. Third, although the proponent of inaccuracy arguments might claim that the inaccuracy approach is more explanatory, that plays into the hands of the evidentialist, whose objection is precisely that inaccuracy arguments explain too much : they explain pragmatic norms such as the Principle of Indifference when they should only be explaining epistemic norms. Fourth, it is far from clear that the evidentialist fails to explain both the need to gather evidence and the need to fit beliefs to evidence. BE cashes out Evidentialism in terms of calibration of degrees of belief to chances. Better calibration to chances can explain the need to gather more evidence of chances as well as to fit degrees of belief to current evidence of chances.

Consequently, Pettigrew’s response does not succeed. The inconsistency between Evidentialism and inaccuracy arguments for the Principle of Indifference does indeed favour the former over the latter. A Bayesian seeking a justification for the Principle of Indifference should prefer a pragmatic justification over the epistemic justification of Section  3 .

Inaccuracy arguments in general.

We have seen that inaccuracy arguments for the Principle of Indifference are problematic, and that pragmatic arguments arguably fare better in motivating the Principle of Indifference. But these worries extend beyond the Principle of Indifference. This is because inaccuracy arguments for the Principle of Indifference are of exactly the same kind as inaccuracy arguments for other norms of Bayesianism—not only Probabilism but also norms, such as the Principal Principle, which require calibration of degrees of belief to chances (see, e.g., Joyce 1998 ; Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010a , b ). If these arguments fail with respect to the Principle of Indifference, then that is a problem for the Inaccuracy Package in general. The whole project of using inaccuracy arguments to provide an epistemic consequentialist justification of Bayesianism is brought into question.

One possible response to this problem is to somehow differentiate inaccuracy arguments for the Principle of Indifference from those for other Bayesian norms, in order to prevent objections to the former from affecting the latter. Perhaps the most promising point of differentiation is in the choice of norm—I2 of the Inaccuracy Package. If one restricts inaccuracy arguments by appealing solely to avoiding dominance of inaccuracy, not worst-case inaccuracy nor worst-case expected inaccuracy, one may hope to firewall Probabilism and the Principal Principle from the inconsistency with Evidentialism. As noted above, avoiding dominance of inaccuracy can be used to justify Probabilism and the Principal Principle, but not the Principle of Indifference. The proponent of inaccuracy might then accept that the Principle of Indifference is a pragmatic norm, but maintain that Probabilism and the Principal Principle are epistemic norms, to be justified in terms of avoiding inaccuracy. But what are the grounds for dismissing the suggestion that one should minimise worst-case inaccuracy or minimise worst-case expected inaccuracy? As yet, we are lacking a principled answer to this question.

Even if a principled response can be given to this question, proponents of inaccuracy arguments are left with a further question: why should some norms of Bayesianism—e.g., Probabilism—be given a non-pragmatic justification and others—such as the Principle of Indifference—a pragmatic justification? Having two forms of justification seems otiose, especially when one can get away with a single, unified, pragmatic justification of all the norms of Bayesianism, such as that provided in Section  2 .

Epistemic Consequentialism

The conflict between Evidentialism and inaccuracy arguments for Bayesianism renders the latter implausible, if the above reasoning is sound. But inaccuracy arguments for Bayesianism are the best available epistemic consequentialist arguments for Bayesianism. So epistemic consequentialism in general is on thin ice. If Bayesianism can’t be justified in terms of its epistemic consequences, the pragmatic approach remains the most promising.

Of course epistemic consequentialism isn’t a one-horse race. Reliabilism is an alternative option to inaccuracy arguments for Bayesian norms. In the context of degrees of belief, the reliabilist approach has been much less thoroughly investigated than the inaccuracy approach, but Dunn ( 2015 ) has suggested that the reliabilist approach is preferable to the inaccuracy approach. Besides taking issue with the inaccuracy approach, Dunn argues for an alternative that measures the reliability of a belief-formation process by how well calibrated the resulting degrees of belief are to chances. There are three main worries about this sort of approach, as we shall now see.

First, a Bayesian calibration norm is one of the things that we would like to justify—a justification which itself appeals to calibration is hardly likely to be very convincing there.

Second, it appears that this reliability account might conflict with Probabilism, which would be a serious concern for the Bayesian. 14 Suppose that a visual process is correct 95% of the time and an auditory process is correct 80% of the time. Someone who sees no evil and hears no evil would be perfectly rational, under this sort of reliabilist approach, to believe that there is no evil to degree 0.95 and to degree 0.8—i.e., to believe the same proposition to two different degrees, contradicting Probabilism. One might try to save Probabilism by modifying the account to characterise rationality in terms of the reliability of the process determining the belief function as a whole, rather than individual degrees of belief. In our example, if the prior probability that there is no evil present is 0.5, then its posterior probability, given that evil is neither seen nor heard, is about 0.99, so this latter (unique) degree of belief would be rational. 15 But then Probabilism follows too easily—it follows directly from the stipulation that the one should focus on the reliability of the belief function as a whole, together with the stipulation that rationality is assessed in terms of calibration to chances and the assumption that chances are probabilistic. For such a move to be convincing, the two stipulations would need to be given some independent motivation. This is currently lacking.

The third worry about this reliabilist approach is that, although it is unclear whether or not such a line of argument will extend to justifying the Principle of Indifference, difficulties arise either way. On the one hand, so-called ‘concentration theorems’ suggest that probability functions that are indifferent (i.e., have maximum entropy) are overwhelmingly likely (see, e.g., Jaynes 2003 , §11.4), so perhaps a case can be made for an indifferent belief function being better calibrated to chances. But then there would be a conflict between reliabilism, which would deem the Principle of Indifference to be an epistemic norm, and Evidentialism, which would class it as non-epistemic. This takes the epistemic consequentialist back to square one, a conflict with Evidentialism. On the other hand, if the Principle of Indifference does not admit a reliabilist justification, the epistemic consequentialist is left with the problem of motivating a mixture of pragmatic and epistemic justifications for different Bayesian norms, instead of simply adopting a unified pragmatic justification, such as that of Section  2 .

Given the current state of play, then, Bayesianism is best motivated pragmatically. Epistemic consequentialism remains an interesting project, but there is a lot more to do before either an approach based on the Inaccuracy Package or a reliabilist approach can offer a viable alternative to pragmatic justifications of Bayesian norms in terms of avoiding avoidable losses.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council and to the Leverhulme Trust for supporting this research, to Teddy Groves for commenting on a previous version of this paper, and to Jeff Dunn, Michael Wilde and the anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.

1 A set of probability functions is convex if, for any two probability functions P and Q that are in the set, any convex combination R of P and Q , defined by R ( ω ) = λ P ( ω ) + (1 − λ ) Q ( ω ) for some λ ∈ [0, 1] and each ω ∈Ω, is also in the set. Non-convex sets introduce complexities which would obscure the main points of this paper, and as we shall see later, they do not affect the key results.

2 E is invariant under permutations of the ω ∈Ω if for any permutation π on Ω, permuting each ω to π ( ω ) in each statement in E yields the same set E of probability functions. This corresponds to rotational symmetry of 𝔼 in the simplex ℙ : symmetry under rotation by 120 ∘ in Fig.  2 .

Note that PI3 only implies PI2 under the convexity assumption. Without convexity, PI2 is implausible, because in that case PI2 may require that P ∉E, i.e., that P should lie outside the set 𝔼 of probability functions that are compatible with the evidence.

4 We thus presume that the chance function P ∗ is a probability function. The definition above presupposes that the chance function is defined on the same domain Ω as the agent’s belief function P . However, this presupposition is not essential. Suppose instead that the chance function is defined on some other domain, which may include certain propositions not expressible in Ω and which may not include certain propositions expressible in Ω. In that case, we take the set evidentially-compatible chance functions to be the set 𝔼 of probability functions on domain Ω that are consistent with evidence of chances in E : any Q ∈ 𝔼 is consistent with evidence of chances in E and any probability function Q defined on Ω that is consistent with evidence of chances in E is in the set E. As noted in the previous section, we do not assume that the evidence E consists of propositions expressible in Ω.

5 The quantity L ( F , B ) is not interpreted as a formal expectation, for two reasons. First, since one of our goals is to motivate Probabilism, we are not in a position to presuppose that any such belief distribution is a probability function, which it would need to be in order to define a formal expectation. To get round this problem, one might suggest that one could generalise the notion of formal expectation to weight the loss by normalised degree of belief, rather than probability. However, a second problem would then arise, as follows. The expectation would need to be an average, taken over all possible decision scenarios, of the loss incurred in each scenario, weighted by the degree to which one believes that scenario will obtain. It is unrealistic to think that one could enumerate all possible decision scenarios (i.e., all possible losses as well as all possible sets of options) and specify a degree of belief in each scenario obtaining. Certainly, we shall not assume here that the domain of the agent’s belief function is large enough to include every possible decision scenario.

6 Here we take the expectation with respect to chance, P ∗ , rather than normalised degree of belief, B . Partly, this is because chance is assumed to be probabilistic but B is not. This is in line with the standard view of scoring rules in the statistical literature (e.g., Grünwald and Dawid 2004 ), though some works in the philosophical literature do weight by non-probabilistic belief (e.g., Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010a ). More fundamentally, we focus on the concept of objective expectation rather than subjective expectation on the grounds that: (i) objectively expected loss gives a better estimate of actual loss than subjectively expected loss where the two disagree; and (ii) evidence tells us something about the chances (namely that P ∗ ∈ E) so objectively expected loss is sufficiently accessible for our purposes. One might counter that—just as objectively expected loss is preferable to subjectively expected loss—it would equally be better to focus on the actual loss function rather than anticipated loss L ( F , B ) = − k log B ( F ). However, the actual loss function is not normally known, even to within some well circumscribed subset of possible loss functions. The fact is that whilst evidence usually tells us quite a lot about chances, it rarely tells us much about the losses we will be incurred in all future decision scenarios.

7 Each F ⊆Ω is in precisely one two-membered partition, namely { F , F ̄ }, so S P Ω ( P ∗ , B ) = ∑ F ⊆ Ω P ∗ ( F ) L ( F , B ) = ∑ π = { F , F ¯ } 1 ∑ G ∈ π P ∗ ( G ) L ( G , B ) .

8 This follows because P ∗ ( s ) = P ∗ ( s | g ) P ∗ ( g ) + P ∗ ( s |¬ g ) P ∗ (¬ g ) = 0.8 × 0.7 + P ∗ ( s |¬ g ) × 0.3 and P ∗ ( s |¬ g ) ∈ [0, 1].

9 Other pragmatic considerations may apply to the doctor who is treating the patient. If the arguments of Section  2 are sound then one might argue that the doctor ought to believe s to some degree sufficiently close to 0.71, the maximum entropy value. Again, this is for pragmatic reasons—other values incur an avoidable increase in worst-case expected loss.

10 On the second view—denying epistemic rationality—the proponent of a pragmatic justification of the Principle of Indifference will deny the force of Evidentialism as well as the force of the epistemic justification.

11 The probability function with maximum generalised entropy will give a proposition that is not constrained to have probability 1 a probability lower than 1—see Landes and Williamson ( 2013 , Proposition 18).

12 Perhaps certain logical or mathematical truths can be inferred without evidence. But then they can trivially also be inferred from evidence. Perhaps certain other propositions are self-evident. But then they too can be inferred from evidence.

13 Easwaran and Fitelson ( 2012 ) present some other situations in which avoiding inaccuracy requires violating the evidence.

14 I am very grateful to Jeff Dunn for pointing this out.

15 Let e , s and h denote respectively that there is no evil present, no evil has been seen, no evil has been heard. Suppose that seeing and hearing evil are probabilistically independent conditional on the presence or absence of evil. We have that P ( e ) = 0.5, P ( s | e ) = P (¬ s |¬ e ) = 0.95, P ( h | e ) = P (¬ h |¬ e ) = 0.8. Hence, P ( e | sh ) = P ( s | e ) P ( h | e ) P ( e ) P ( s | e ) P ( h | e ) P ( e ) + P ( s | ¬ e ) P ( h | ¬ e ) P ( ¬ e ) = 0.95 × 0.8 × 0.5 0.95 × 0.8 × 0.5 + 0.05 × 0.2 × 0.5 ≈ 0.987.

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