assignment on jainism

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In the sixth century BC, Jainism emerged as a result of widespread opposition to the formalized ritualism and hierarchical structure of the Vedic religion. Jainism is one of the religions whose origin can be traced back to the twenty four teachers (tirthankaras - ones who establishes a path or ford), through whom their faith is believed to have been handed down.

Jainism is a sramanic religion. Sramana' is a Sanskrit word that denotes an ascetic or monk. The practice of virtues such as non-violence, renunciation, celibacy, self-control, etc., as well as asceticism, mysticism, meditation, contemplation, silence, and solitude, among others, are distinguishing features of this tradition.

Factors led to the Rise of Jainism in India

The primary cause of the rise of religion was the religious unrest in India in the 6th century BC. Other major factors include:

• For example, the sacrificial ceremonies were too expensive, and the superstitious beliefs and mantras confused people.
• Domination of Brahmans: The Brahmans stated themselves as upper Varna with the highest status in society and demanded several privileges. Thus, these systems naturally divided society and generated tensions.
• Opposition from Kshatriyas and Vaishyas: They reacted strongly against the ritualistic domination of the Brahmans.
• The equality of Jainism: Attracted the masses, which gave relief from the discriminations of the Varna system.
• Use of Simple Language : Mahavira’s religious message was in simple language. The masses were drawn to it because it was in the language they spoke and understood better. Acceptance by the masses soon led to its spread.
• Non­violence and other practical moralities that Jainism advocated attracted people to it.
• Its edge over the Vedic religion was a comparatively easier way to liberation, thereby gaining wider adherence throughout India.

Historical Background of Jainism

According to Jaina traditions, twenty-four Tirthankaras were responsible for the origin and development of Jaina religion and philosophy. Of these, the first twenty-two are of doubtful historicity. In the case of the last two, Parsvanatha and Mahavira, Buddhist works confirm their historicity.

• Adinath/Rishabhdev: The first Tirthankara (supreme preacher) and establisher of the Ikshvaku dynasty.
• Ajita: The second Tirthankara
• Neminatha: the twenty-second Tirthankara
• Parsvanatha believed in the eternity of ‘matter’ .
• The followers of Parsvanatha wore white garments .
• Thus, it is clear that even before Mahavira, some kind of Jaina faith existed.
• Mahavira: The twenty-fourth Tirthankara was Vardhamana Mahavira.

Mahavira and his life

The 24th Tirthankara was Vardhamana Mahavira.

• Birth: Born in Kundagrama (Basukunda), a suburb of Vaishali (Bihar), in 540 BC. 
• Parents: Father Siddhartha (head of the Jnatrikas, a Kshatriya clan) and mother, Trishala, a Lichchavi princess.
• Spouse: Yashoda
• What made Vardhaman Mahavira take up asceticism?
• At the age of thirty, Vardhamana left his home and became an ascetic.
• For twelve years, he lived the life of an ascetic following severe austerities. 
• In the 13th year of his asceticism, at the age of 42, he attained the ‘Supreme Knowledge’ (Kaivalya).
• Titles: He was later known as ‘Mahavira’ (the supreme hero) or ‘Jina’ (the conqueror). He was also hailed as ‘Nirgrantha’.
• Preachings: For the next thirty years, he moved from place to place and preached his doctrines in Kosala, Magadha , and further east.
• Patronage: He often visited the courts of Bimbisara and Ajatasatru.
• Death: He died at Pawa (near Rajagriha) in Patna district at the age of 72 (468 BC).

Jain Councils

Teachings of mahavira.

The ultimate objective of Mahavira’s teachings is how one can attain total freedom from the cycle of birth, life, pain, misery, and death and achieve the permanent blissful state of one's self. This is also known as liberation , Nirvana , absolute freedom , or Moksha .

Pancha Mahavratas in Jainism

Mahavira accepted most of the religious doctrines laid down by Parsvanatha. However, he made some alterations and additions to them. The five doctrines of Jainism (five vows), known as Panchamahavratas, are for the monks.

• Anuvratas: A code of conduct was prescribed for both householders and monks. To avoid evil karma, a householder had to observe the five vows (in their limited nature).
• Jainism believed that the monastic life was essential to attaining salvation, and a householder could not attain it.
• A monk had to observe certain strict rules and abandon worldly possessions.
• According to him, the soul is in a state of bondage created by desire accumulated through previous births.
• The liberated soul then becomes ‘the pure soul ." He thought that all objects, animate and inanimate, had a soul.
• He believed that they felt pain or the influence of injury.
• He advocated a life of severe asceticism and extreme penance to attain ‘nirvana’ or the highest spiritual state.
• The idea of God: He believed that the world was not created by any supreme creator. The world functions according to an eternal law of decay and development.
• View on Vedas: He rejected the authority of the Vedas and objected to Vedic rituals and the supremacy of the Brahmanas.

8 Auspicious Symbols of Jainism

Jainism has several important symbols that hold significant meaning for its followers. Here are some of the key symbols of Jainism:

• Swastika - It signifies the peace and well-being of humans.
• Nandavarta - It is a large swastika with nine endpoints.
• Bhadrasana - A throne is said to be sanctified by the Jaina’s feet.
• Shrivatsa - A mark manifests on the chest of Tirthankara's image and signifies his pure soul.
• Darpana - The mirror which reflects the inner self.
• Minayugala - A couple fish which signifies the conquest over sexual urges.
• Vardhamanaka - A shallow dish is used as a lamp, which shows the increase in wealth, due, and merit.
• Kalasha - A pot filled with pure water.

Five types of knowledge in Jainism

According to Jainism, knowledge is the quality of the soul. Understanding and acquiring knowledge are attained through pramana (instruments of knowledge) and naya (points of view). 

• Mati Jnana: Perception through the activity of sense organs, including the mind.
• Sruta Jnana : Knowledge revealed by the scriptures.
• Avadhi Jnana : Clairvoyant perception.
• Manahparyaya Jnana : Telepathic knowledge
• Kevala Jnana : Temporal knowledge or omniscience.

Mahavira’s teachings were orally transmitted to people. His disciples, Ganadharas, wrote them down in the text form of fourteen ‘Purvas’ and twelve Angas.

Among the 12 Angas, the Acharanga sutta and Bhagavati sutta are the most important. While the former deals with the code of conduct which a Jain monk must follow, the latter expounds the Jaina doctrines comprehensively.

Doctrine of Syadvada and Anekantavada

• According to this concept, identity and difference must exist in reality. 
• Anekantavada has also been interpreted to mean- non-absolutism, intellectual ahimsa, religious pluralism, and rejection of fanaticism.

Sects of Jainism

The Jain order has been divided into two major sects: Svetambara and Digambara.

• The leader of the group that stayed back at Magadha wasof Sthulbhadra.
• During the 12 years of famine, the group in South India stuck to the strict practices, while the group in Magadha adopted a more lax attitude and started wearing white clothes.
• They were called the Terapanthis among the Svetambaras and the Samaiyas among the Digambaras. (This sect came into existence about the sixth century CE).

Sub-sects of Jainism under Digambaras and Svetambaras

Spread of jainism to other parts of india.

Jainism spread to different parts of India during Mahavira's lifetime and after his death. Several factors are responsible for its spread.

• His simple way of life, penance and austerity attracted people towards him.
• Mahavira had eleven disciples known as Ganadharas or heads of schools.
• Arya Sudharma was the only Ganadhara who survived after the death of Mahavira . Mahavira became the first ‘Thera’ (chief preceptor) .
• Role of Jain Monks : Jain monks spread Jainism by visiting several places and holding scholarly discussions exhibiting their personal examples of simplicity, which could significantly influence the people.
• Royal Patronage: The followers of Mahavira slowly spread over the whole country. In many regions, royal patronage was bestowed on Jainism.
• According to Jaina tradition, Udayin , the successor of Ajatasatru, was a devoted Jaina.
• Chandragupta Maurya was a follower of Jainism, and he migrated with Bhadrabahu to the south and spread Jainism.
• During the early centuries of the Christian Era, Mathura and Ujjain became great centres of Jainism.
• Two Theras administered the Jaina order in the days of the late Nanda King: Sambhutavijaya and Bhadrabahu. The sixth Thera was Bhadrabahu, a contemporary of Maurya King Chandragupta Maurya.

Relevance of Jain Ideology in today's World

The doctrines of Jainism with respect to the contemporary world situation are found to be very much relevant. With these doctrines of Jainism, we can bring back the peace and harmony in the society and the world.

• Anektavada highlights the spirit of intellectual and social tolerance in the world.
• Non-violence: The principle of non-violence gained prominence in today's nuclear-weapon world to attain long-lasting peace in society.
• The principle of Aparigraha can help to control consumerist habits as there is a great increase in greed and possessive tendencies.
• The doctrine of Triratna is relevant to present-time situations, which can liberate the souls of women along with men from the subjugation to liberty and freedom.

PYQs on Jainism

Question 1: With reference to Indian history, consider the following texts: (UPSC Prelims 2022)

• Nettipakarana
• Parishishtaparvan
• Avadanashataka
• Trishashtilakshana Mahapurana

 Which of the above are Jaina texts?

• 2 and 4 only

Answer: (b)

Question 2: With reference to the religious practices in India, the "Sthanakvasi" sect belongs to (UPSC Prelims 2018)

• Vaishnavism

Question 3: With reference to the religious history of India, consider the following statements (UPSC Prelims 2017)

• Sautrantika and Sammitiya were the sects of Jainism.
• Sarvastivadin held that the constituents of phenomena were not wholly momentary but existed forever in a latent form.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

• Both 1 and 2
• Neither 1 nor 2

Question 4: Which of the following statements is/are applicable to Jain doctrine? (UPSC Prelims 2013)

• The surest way of annihilating Karma is to practice penance.
• Every object, even the smallest particle, has a soul.
• Karma is the bane of the soul and must be ended.

Select the correct answer using the codes given below.

• 2 and 3 only
• 1 and 3 only

Answer: (d)

FAQs on Jainism

What is jainism.

Jainism is an ancient Indian religion that teaches that the path to liberation and bliss is through harmlessness and renunciation.

What are the five vows of Jainism?

The five doctrines of Jainism (five vows), known as Panchamahavratas, are Ahimsa, Satya, Asteya, Brahmacharya, and Aparigraha.

What are the three Ratnas of Jainism?

In Jainism, the three jewels (also referred to as ratnatraya) are understood as samyag-darsana (“right faith”), samyag-jnana (“right knowledge”), and samyak-charitra (“right conduct”). 

What is the ideology of Jainism?

According to Jainism, the path to enlightenment is through nonviolence and reducing harm to living things (including plants and animals). Jains, like Hindus and Buddhists, believe in reincarnation. Karma determines the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth.

Who are the Tirthankaras?

Tirthankaras are called Arihants/Arahants, individuals who have successfully conquered inner passions. A Tirthankara is not an incarnation of the god. He is an ordinary soul born as a human and attains the state of a Tirthankara due to intense practices of penance, calmness and meditation. 

What is Aryika in Jainism?

Aryika is a female mendicant in Jainism, also known as Sadhvi. A Sadhvi enters the mendicant order by making five vows, i.e., Ahimsa, Satya, Asteya, Brahmacharya and Aparigraha.

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ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY

Jainism is one of the three ancient religions of India, with a value system that puts nonviolence above all else.

Anthropology, Sociology, Religion, Social Studies, Ancient Civilizations, World History, Storytelling

A hand carved statue of Mahavira made from marble, inside a Jain temple in Jaisalmer Fort, Rajasthan, India. Also known as Vardhamana, Mahavira was a tirthankara or a teacher of the dharma.

Photograph by Craig Lovell

Jainism is one of the three most ancient religions of India, with roots that go back to at least the mid-first century B.C.E. Today, it is still an integral part of Indian culture . Jainism teaches that the path to enlightenment is through nonviolence and reducing harm to living things (including plants and animals) as much as possible.

Like Hindus and Buddhists, Jains believe in reincarnation . This cycle of birth, death, and rebirth is determined by one’s karma . Jains believe bad karma is caused by harming living things. To avoid bad karma , Jains must practice ahimsa, a strict code of nonviolence . Jains believe plants, animals, and even some nonliving things (like air and water) have souls, just as humans do. The principle of nonviolence includes doing no harm to humans, plants, animals, and nature. For that reason, Jains are strict vegetarians —so strict, in fact, that eating root vegetables is not allowed because removing the root would kill the plant. However, Jains can eat vegetables that grow above the ground, because they can be picked while leaving the rest of the plant intact. In complete dedication to nonviolence , the highest-ranked Jain monks and nuns avoid swatting at mosquitoes or sweeping a path on the floor so they do not step on an ant. In addition to nonviolence , Jainism has four additional vows that guide believers: always speak the truth, do not steal, show sexual restraint (with celibacy as an ideal), and do not become attached to worldly things.

While it shares many beliefs and values with Hinduism and Buddhism, Jainism has its own spiritual leaders and teachers. Jains honor 24 Jinas, or Tirthankaras: spiritual leaders who achieved enlightenment and have been liberated from the cycle of rebirth. One of the most influential Jinas was Mahavira, born Vardhamana, who is considered the 24th, and final, Jina. He was born into the kshatriya or warrior class, traditionally dated in 599 B.C.E., though many scholars believe he was born later. When he was 30 years old, he renounced his worldly possessions to live the life of an ascetic (one who practices self-denial of worldly things). After over 12 years of intense fasting and meditation, Vardhamana achieved enlightenment and became Mahavira (meaning “Great Hero”). According to tradition, he established a large community of Jain followers: 14,000 monks and 36,000 nuns at the time of his death.

Today, most followers of Jainism live in India, with estimates of upwards of four million followers. Jainism’s teachings have influenced many all over the world. Though born a Hindu, Mahatma Gandhi admired the Jains' commitment to complete nonviolence, and he incorporated that belief into his movement for Indian independence.

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2.1: Jainism- Introduction

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For those who wish to listen to information on the world’s religions here is a listing of PODCASTS on RELIGIONS by Cynthia Eller.

If you have iTunes on your computer just click and you will be led to the listings. phobos.apple.com/WebObjects/MZStore.woa/wa/viewPodcast?id=117762189&s=143441

Here is a link to the site for the textbook REVEALING WORLD RELIGIONS related to which these podcasts were made. thinkingstrings.com/Product/WR/index.html

************************************************************ Jainism was born in India about the same period as Buddhism. It was established by Mahavira (c. 599 – 527 BC) in about 500 B. C. He was born near Patna in what is now Bihar state. Mahavira like Buddha belonged to the warrior caste. Mahavira was called ‘Jina’ meaning the big winner and from this name was derived the name of the religion.

In many senses Jainism is similar to Buddhism. Both developed as a dissension to the Brahmanic philosophy that was dominant during that period in north-east India. Both share a belief in reincarnation which eventually leads to liberation. Jainism is different to Buddhism in its ascetic beliefs. Both these religions emphasize non-violence, but non-violence is the main core in Jainism. Mahavira just like Buddha isn’t the first prophet of his religion. In Jainism like Buddhism there is a belief in reincarnation which eventually leads to liberation. Neither of these religions their religious philosophy around worship. But Jainism is different than Buddhism in its ascetic beliefs. Both these religions emphasis on non-violence, but in Jainism non-violence is its main core.

Jains believe that every thing has life and this also includes stones, sand, trees and every other thing. The fact that trees breath came to be known to the science world only from the 20th century. Mahavira who believed that every thing has life and also believed in non-violence practically didn’t eat anything causing his self- starvation to death. Mahavira was also extremely ascetic and walked around completely naked because of his renouncement of life. After years of hardship and meditation he attained enlightenment; thereafter he preached Jainism for about 30 years and died at Pava (also in Bihar) in 527 BC.

Mahavira’s religion followers are less extreme than him in diets. They are vegetarians. But the religious Jains will do everything possible to prevent hurting any being. They won’t walk in fields where there are insects to prevent the possibility of stepping on them. They also cover their mouth to prevent the possibility of swallowing small invisible microbes. They mostly do not work in professions where there is a possibility of killing any living being like in agriculture instead professions like banking and business. But it is not clear what came first, businessmen who adopted Jain philosophy because it was easy for them to follow or Jainish philosophy which convinced the Jains to adopt non violent professions.

There are two Jain philosophies. Shvetember and Digamber. Digamber monks like Mahavira don’t wear any clothes, but normally they don’t walk like that outside their temples. The Digambers include among them only men. The Shvetembers monks wear white clothes and they include women.

©Aharon Daniel Israel 1999-2000 allowed to use

Contributors and Attributions

• Authored by : Philip A. Pecorino. Located at : http://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialsciences/ppecorino/phil_of_religion_text/CHAPTER_2_RELIGIONS/Jainism.htm . License : CC BY-NC-ND: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives

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• Introduction to Jainism
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• The Jain Experience
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A Hospital for Birds

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Tirthankaras: “Ford-Makers”

Jiva: The Souls of All Beings

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Karma: Clouding of the Soul

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Ahimsa: Reverence for Life

An Ethic for Living

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Anekantavada: The Relativity of Views

Jain Renouncers: Sky Clad and White Clad

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Mendicants and Laity

Temples and Images

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The Jain Symbol

Jainism Outside India

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V.R. Gandhi at the World’s Parliament of Religions

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Jain Immigration

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Building Temples and Networks

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Jain Teachers in the New World

Namaskara Mantra: Beginning with Praise

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The Temple and Image

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Celebrating Mahavira: Mahavira Jayanti and Divali

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Paryushana and the Festival of Forgiveness

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Ahimsa in Daily Life

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“Gateway to Luck”

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Unity: The American Context

Authority Without Monks

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Love and Marriage

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Svadhyaya: Jain Education for Adults in North America

Pathshala: The Next Generation

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Jainism Timeline

6323dddaff85d27ed6f05d9690e4cb70, jainism in the world (text), c. 850 bce parshvanath, twenty-third tirthankara.

In Jainism, a Tirthankara is a spiritual teacher who has overcome the cycle of death and rebirth (samsara). The first Tirthankara is said to have founded Jainism millions of years ago. Historians date the twenty-third Tirthankara, Parshvanath, to the eighth or ninth century BCE.

599 – 527 BCE Mahavira

The twenty-fourth Tirthankara, Mahavira, was born in the 6th century BCE near Patna in what is now the state of Bihar in India. He is said to have been a kshatriya, a prince or warrior, and to have renounced the world to seek self-realization. He attained kaivalya, luminous knowledge, at age 42 and taught for thirty years until his death.

360 BCE Beginning of Digambar/Shvetambar Split

It is said that at a time of famine in the 4th century BCE, part of the Jain community migrated south. When they returned, they found the monks of the north had compiled a version of the scripture with which they did not wholly agree and had taken to wearing simple white clothing rather than maintaining the “sky-clad” traditions. Thus the Shvetambar (“White-clad”) and Digambar (“Sky-clad”) schism constitutes the major sectarian split in the Jain tradition.

400s CE Formation of the Shvetambar Siddhanta

By the fifth century CE, Shvetambar Jains had compiled a canon, commonly called the Siddhanta. The canon includes 45 texts subsumed under six categories, the oldest and most venerated of which are the 12 angas, including the Acharanga.

400s CE Development of Jain Lay Community

By the early centuries of the common era, the Jain tradition had small communities throughout the Indian peninsula. Shvetambars were concentrated in north and west India, the Digambars were principally in south and central India. Although the monastic order remained the core of both Jain communities, in each case a growing number of lay practitioners associated themselves with the tradition. Beginning in the fifth century, Jain literature increasingly concerned itself with regulating non-monastic life, including proper etiquette toward monks and nuns, temple worship, and life-cycle rites.

1000s CE Digambar Community Concentrates in Maharashtra

The Digambar Jain community, which had previously enjoyed royal patronage in south and east India, fell into disfavor as Hindu theism gained popularity in the 11th century CE. Digambars migrated north and westward, settling in Karnataka and Maharashtra, where their descendants have continued to make their homes.

1100s CE Shvetambar Community Concentrates in Gujarat

The tide of Hindu theism that precipitated the emigration of Digambar Jains from southern India swept over northern India as well in the 1100s CE. This shift, coupled with the rise of Islam, resulted in a contraction of the Shvetambar community, which has been concentrated in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh ever since.

1400s CE Sthanakvasi Reform Movement Develops

Beginning around the 10th century CE, there developed a class of monks who lived full-time in temples and exerted increasing control over temple resources. Charges of corruption and spiritual degeneration occurred with increasing frequency, culminating in 1451, when a Shvetambar layman named Lonka Saha launched the Sthanakvasi reform movement. Unlike most Jain groups, Sthanakvasis, or “dwellers in halls” (as opposed to temples), object to the veneration of images, claiming that such activity too easily degenerates into idol-worship. Monks of this movement are recognized by their practice of donning a cloth or mask over the mouth and nose to avoid inadvertently inhaling and thus harming minute life forms.

1500s CE Taranapantha Reform Movement Emerges

Apparently influenced by the Sthanakvasi movement, a small group of Digambars under the leadership of a man by the name of Taranasvami emerged in the 16th century CE. This group became known as the Taranapantha Reform Movement, and like the Sthanakvasis, also banned the worship of images.

1700s CE Birth of Terapantha Reform Movement

Followers of Jainism agree that a person should eschew any action that would harm a living being. But in the eighteenth century CE, a Sthanakvasi monk named Bhikhanji also asserted that a person should avoid any action that would directly affect another sentient being, including saving its life. Bhikhanji believed that to give aid to another not only indicates that one has failed to practice total renunciation, but makes one responsible for any harm that that being may cause in the future. It is said that Bhikhanji’s reform movement is called Terapantha, “the path of the thirteen,” because he could only gather twelve disciples to follow his radical ideas. Today, the Terapantha movement continues as a small but vocal minority of the Shvetambar tradition.

1869 – 1948 CE Friendship of Mohandas Gandhi and Raychandbhai Mehta

Mohandas Gandhi was arguably the greatest champion of nonviolence in the 20th century. Although a Hindu, his appreciation for the profound spiritual significance of ahimsa derived principally from the conversations and correspondence he had with Raychandbhai Mehta, a prominent Jain layman. According to Gandhi, the three men who most deeply influenced his thought were Tolstoy, Ruskin, and Raychandbhai.

1970 CE Shri Chitrabhanu Travels to Geneva

In 1970, Shri Chitrabhanu became the first Jain monk to break the injunction against traveling by airplane when he flew to Geneva to attend the second Spiritual Summit Conference. He arrived in the United States one year later to establish the Jain International Meditation Center in New York and to found and inspire many other Jain centers across the U.S. and the world.

1990 CE “Jain Declaration on Nature”

The “Jain Declaration on Nature'' was a statement on the Jain philosophy of non-violence and its relevance to the ecological crisis. The declaration was presented in 1990 by an international group of Jain leaders to H.R.H. Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh.

2010 CE Jain Temple Opened in Belgium

In 2010, the largest Jain temple outside of India opened its doors in a suburb of Antwerp to serve the thousands of Jains in the area, many of whom are involved in the diamond trade. The community’s spiritual leader, Ramesh Mehta, was also a member of the Belgian Council of Religious Leaders, illustrating the strengthening relationship between the Jain community and other European faith groups.

Jainism in America (text)

1893 ce v.r. gandhi at world’s parliament of religions.

Virchand R. Gandhi (1864-1901), a Bombay lawyer, was the sole Jain at the 1893 World’s Parliament of Religions in Chicago. Following the Parliament, V.R. Gandhi stayed in the U.S. for two years to give some 535 lectures on such topics as Jainism, Yoga, Hindu culture, and Indian philosophy.

1893 CE Shri Lalan Comes to the U.S.

A Jain scholar named Shri Lalan came to the U.S. in 1893 and stayed for over four years. Inspired by the Jain teachings of Shri Lalan, an American woman, Mrs. Howard, became a disciple and a vegetarian.

1896-97 CE V.R. Gandhi Helps Organize Famine Relief

On a second trip to the U.S. and England in 1896-1897, V.R. Gandhi joined with Charles C. Bonney, who had been President of the 1893 World’s Parliament of Religions, to organize a Famine Relief Committee for India. This committee sent about $10,000 and a steamer full of corn to India.

1904-05 CE Jain Temple Replica at St. Louis World’s Fair

A replica of the Jain temple at Palitana in Gujarat was sent by the British government of India to the St. Louis World’s Fair Exposition in 1904. After being in storage for several decades, the temple replica was purchased by the Summa Corporation, which placed it in their Castaways Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. In 1995, the hotel donated the temple replica to the Jain Center of Southern California.

1919 CE Life and Stories of Parsvanatha Published

In 1919, Maurice Bloomfield, Professor of Sanskrit at Johns Hopkins University, published Life and Stories of the Jaina Savior Parsvanatha, one of the first Jain texts published in the U.S.

1933 CE Jain at World Fellowship of Faiths in Chicago

Champatrai Jain, a lawyer from India, presented a talk on “Ahimsa as the Key to World Peace” at the 1933 World Fellowship of Faiths meeting in Chicago.

1959 CE Formation of Jain Groups in the U.S.

In 1959, Jains in New York City organized an informal society. A second group was formed in Michigan soon after.

1966 CE First American Jain Center Established

The first Jain Center in the U.S. was established in New York City in 1966 by a small group of Jain immigrants. Three years later, another Jain center was established in Chicago.

1971 CE Gurudev Chitrabhanu First Visits U.S.

Gurudev Chitrabhanu visited the U.S. in 1971 to spread the message of Jainism and non-violence. His trip made him the first Jain monk to part with the monastic tradition of travel restriction. Later, having left the traditional monkhood, he returned to the United States and became one of the most important religious leaders of the American Jain community. Chitrabhanu established the Jain Meditation International Center in New York City in 1974.

1973 CE Jain Center of Greater Boston Established

Since its founding in 1973, the Jain Center of Greater Boston has made a significant contribution to Jainism in the U.S., promoting Jain philosophy and community. In 1979, the Center began publishing the Jain Study Circular, which has developed nationwide circulation. That same year, the Center’s “Directory of Jains in North America” first appeared, and today is regularly updated. In 1981, the Center became one of the first Jain Centers in North America to have its own temple.

1975 CE Acharya Sushil Kumar First Visits U.S.

Sushil Kumar became a monk in the Shvetambar Sthanakvasi sect of Jainism at the age of 15. He first came to the U.S. in 1975, and was the first Jain monk to travel abroad regularly while remaining a monk — a controversial move. He traveled extensively throughout the world and was an active participant at world conferences on peace and interreligious cooperation. Acharya Sushil Kumar passed away in 1994, at the age of 68.

1975 CE Jain Society of Greater Detroit

The Jain Society of Greater Detroit began in 1975 with about 50 families, but grew to over 250 families by the early 1990s. The Society operates a Jain study class for 100 children, hosts a summer camp, sponsors visiting lectures, and celebrates the Jain festivals. It has designated Thanksgiving Day as Ahimsa Day, a day of non-violence. In 1991, construction began on a million-dollar temple in Farmington Hills, a Detroit suburb.

1980 CE Sushil Kumar Founds International Mahavir Jain Mission

The International Mahavir Jain Mission (IMJM) was founded in Cleveland, Ohio in 1980 by Acharya Sushil Kumar. The purposes of the IMJM include promoting understanding of Jain scriptures, teachings, and practices, and cultivating academic and cultural exchange among Jains. Until his death in 1994, Kumar was the chairperson of IMJM. The society headquarters later moved to Siddhachalam in New Jersey.

1981 CE April 26 Proclaimed as a Day of Ahimsa in Cleveland

In 1981, the mayor of Cleveland and the city’s Jain Society proclaimed April 26, 1981 as a Day of Ahimsa (non-violence) in Cleveland, Ohio.

1981 CE Federation of JAINA Organized

In 1980, the Jain Center of Southern California voted to host a conference that would bring together representatives of all the Jain centers in North America. The conference took place over Memorial Day weekend of the following year. During this three-day meeting, the Federation of Jain Associations in North America (JAINA) was created, and a constitution for the new organization was drafted. JAINA continues to hold national conventions every other year, having convened in New York City (1983); Detroit (1985); Chicago (1987 and 1995); Toronto (1989); Stanford, California (1991); and Pittsburgh (1993).

1983 CE Siddhachalam Established in New Jersey

Siddhachalam was founded in New Jersey in 1983. This rural ashram and temple complex, established by Acharya Sushil Kumar on 108 acres in the foothills of the Pocono Mountains, was created as the first Jain tirtha or pilgrimage place outside of India. The rural center is a residential community for Jain monks and nuns and a retreat center for laity.

1985 CE Jain Digest Begins Publication

Jain Digest, a quarterly publication of the Jain Associations in North America (JAINA), was launched in 1985. The digest contains news from Jain societies throughout the U.S. and Canada. Jain Digest today has readers around the world.

1986 CE First Public Exhibit of Jain Paintings

In 1986 the New York Public Library organized “The World of Jainism,” the first public exhibition of Jain paintings in the U.S. Paintings from the manuscript Kalpa Sutra and other scriptures from the 15th to 19th centuries were featured. The exhibition of Jain paintings was part of the library’s participation in the Festival of India, a two-year-long celebration of Indian culture in the U.S.

1986 CE Indo-American Jain Conference

The Indo-American Jain Conference of the World Jain Congress was convened at Siddhachalam on September 26-28, 1986. The theme of the conference was Jain unity. Twelve hundred participants came from India, Europe, the U.S., Canada, and Africa. The construction of temples, literature, and world peace were among the topics discussed at the conference.

1987 CE Jain Study Circle Established

The Jain Study Circle was established in 1987 to promote study and understanding of the Jain tradition. The Circle organized study groups and took over responsibility for publishing the Jain Study Circular, which had been instituted by the Jain Center of Boston.

1988 CE Jain Temple Opens in Los Angeles

Members of the Jain Center of Southern California initially held their meetings in various community spaces. But in 1988, the JCSC opened their first temple, Jain Bhavan, in Los Angeles.

1991 CE Images Installed at Siddhachalam

From August 2-11, 1991, several thousand Jains came to the hilly countryside near Blairstown, New Jersey, to witness the installation of images of the Tirthankaras in the newly completed temple at Siddhachalam, the first Jain ashram and tirtha in the U.S. The event, called a Pratishta Mahotsav, was overseen by the founder of Siddhachalam, Acharya Sushil Kumar.

1992 CE American Jains at UN Earth Summit

Sushil Kumar represented American Jains in several interreligious events held in conjunction with the U.N. Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

1992 CE First Chaturmas in California

In 1992, the Jain Center of Northern California organized a four-month stay of two Jain monks called Samans, from an order of monks and nuns created by Acharya Tulsi in India specially to be able to travel and teach abroad. During their visit, the two gave lectures in Gujarati, Hindi, and English and provided instruction in Preksha meditation.

1993 CE Dedication of the Jain Temple in Chicago

In 1993, the Jain Society of Metropolitan Chicago dedicated a new temple in Bartlett, Illinois, a western suburb of Chicago. The temple was the largest Jain temple in the U.S. and contains both Shvetambar and Digambar images.

1993 CE Jainism Online

The Jain Bulletin Board System was launched on the Internet in 1993 to provide online information about Jainism. Jain presence online only continued to expand during the following decades, connecting Jains around the world as well as providing a platform for American Jains to engage with one another and with the wider American community.

2001 CE 9/11 Attacks Cause Hateful Backlash

While perpetrators of post-9/11 hate crimes targeted Muslims, many individuals of South Asian and Arab descent were also victims. Along with many communities whose members fit a similar racial profile, Jains collaborated to clarify their religious and cultural traditions to an American audience.

2010 CE Growth and Expansion of Jain Communities

The Jain community of Boston, among others throughout the U.S., experienced so much growth in the early 2000s that a larger building was required for the Jain Center of Greater Boston (JCGB). In 2010, community members moved to a new site in Norwood, a former synagogue that now houses classrooms for Jain education, a large event space, and a remodeled temple. The growth and formalized establishment of Jains in the U.S. is visible in communities across the country, especially apparent in such national groups as JAINA and the many conferences, youth programs, scholarships, and events they oversee.

Selected Publications & Links

Seeling, Holly . “ Authority and Transmission in the 'American' Jain Tradition .” The Pluralism Project , 1991.

Jain, Neelu . “ From Religion to Ethnicity: The Identity of Immigrant and Second Generation Indian Jains in the United States .” National Identities 6, no. 3 (2004): 277.

Bose, Subhindra . “ Indians Barred from American Citizenship .” Modern Review (Calcutta) , 1923, 33 , 691-695.

Jain Quantum

E-jain digest, young jain professionals, explore jainism in greater boston.

Jains first came from India to America in the late 1960s, establishing the Jain Center of Greater Boston (JCGB) in 1973. From 1981 until 2010, members of the JCGB gathered in a former Swedish Lutheran church in Norwood. Since 2010, JCGB have gathered in their own, purpose-built derasar (temple) in Norwood. A second local organization, the Jain Sangh of New England (JSNE), formed in 2000.

A study of the philosophy of Jainism

by Deepa Baruah | 2017 | 46,858 words

Summary : Among the heterodox systems of Indian philosophy, Jainism is regarded as one of the oldest religions in India having its own metaphysics, philosophy and ethics. It has discussed all the important topics of Indian philosophy. The salient features of Jaina philosophy include its realistic classification of being and its theory of knowledge, with its famous doctrines of syādvāda, anekāntavāda and nayavāda.

Copyright: Creative Commons Licence Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)

Source 1: exoticindiaart.com Source 2: shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in

Contents of this online book (  +  /  -  )

The full text of the A study of the philosophy of Jainism in English is available here and publically accesible (free to read online). Of course, I would always recommend buying the book so you get the latest edition. You can see all this book’s content by visiting the pages in the below index:

Article published on 28 January, 2019

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Jainism: A Philosophy Promoting Individualism, Relativity and Co-Existence

In this paper, attempts are made to explore how Jain philosophy promote acceptance of differences hence, peace and multiculturalism. Discussing the doctrines of Karma, Anekantavada, Syadavada and Nyasa, the paper unfolds how the Jain philosophy facilitates an acceptance of individualism and respect for other’s opinions and viewpoints, therefore forming the base for co-existence by implying equality among individuals.

Related Papers

Academia.edu

Dr. CHIRANJIB KUMAR CHOUDHARY (PhD)

The present world has been facing numerous problems such as global warming, climate change, and economic crisis due to human thrust for unlimited wants and in course of that globalization has posed many challenges. People have been looking eagerly for some major solution for all these problems. And that solutions must be nature oriented and ecofriendly and must follow non-violence. Jain philosophy fits in that format as it believes in truth(nature rule) and non-violence(compassion and humanity). Growing stress among human beings due to modern work environment and human conflicts could be solved and digested by meditation-mediation, fasting and social harmony(aparigraha-detachment from some worldly affairs for harmony). Problems are many but solution is only one that is practices of Jain philosophy. Slowly but surely Jainism could paved the way by its practical approach of justified vows. The present paper focuses on the various dimensions of Jain philosophy and its effective role in resolving various issues of globalized world. The paper is reflective in nature and tried to highlight on the important aspect of Jainism in context of modern world and its need to resolve the global challenges, issues and crisis.

Jeffery Long

Religion Compass

AbstractThe Jains have constituted a small but highly culturally significant minority community in the Indian subcontinent for thousands of years. Probably best known for the profound commitment to an ethos of ahimsa, or nonviolence in thought, word, and deed, it is in the areas of nonviolence and ascetic practice that the Jains have had their greatest impact on the Hindu majority. Key themes and topics of ongoing scholarly debate and discussion in relation to Jainism are the question of its origins, the relationship of Jainism to Hinduism, the roles of women—especially ascetics—in the tradition, Jainism and ecology, and finally, the distinctive Jain approach to religious pluralism contained in a set of teachings called the Jain doctrines of relativity—anekantavada, nayavada, and syadvada.

Pisit P. Maneewong

The aim of this research is to undertake a comparative survey of ethics between Jainism and Buddhism. There are three objectives of this paper: 1) to present a brief overview of Jainism, 2) to study the ethics in Jainism, and 3) to make a comparison between the ethics in Jainism and Buddhism. In India, religion is a way of life, a spiritual path and a path to liberation for all seekers. India has been the land of spirituality and philosophy, and it also was the birthplace of the numerous religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. Among Indian religions, Jainism and Buddhism are most related to each other. Jainism and Buddhism are alike in many aspects, having common features, i.e. the origins, the teachings, the followers, and the aim of liberation. Both religions share so many similarities from the outside, yet they are slightly different upon deeper investigation into their detail and information of their teachings. In Jainism, there are twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras or Jinas. The last Tīrthaṅkara, Mahāvīra was a contemporary spiritual leader living in the same period as Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhism. Buddhism differed from the Jainism by teaching an alternative, not practicing extreme asceticism like Jainism did. Both philosophies and teachings continue to share similar terminologies, concepts and ideas of important themes even though the meanings may differ a bit, for example regarding the Mokṣa and Nibbāna ideals, both religions practice to liberate themselves to attain that supreme bliss but their methodologies are different. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to provide a survey of Jain ethics and Buddhist ethics and do a comparative study of ethics between Jainism and Buddhism in overview.

Shubham Srivastava

The ontological view of Jains is concerned primarily with the life and existence rather than the creation of the universe and the conception of God. Jainism, however, cannot be regarded as agnosticism or metaphysical nihilism. It is to the credit of Jain thinkers that they constructed a philosophy and theory of reality out of the negative approach of those who were protesting against the dogmatism of the Vedas. Jainism does not deny reality. Jain philosophers adopted a middle course by propounding a theory that the world consisted of two eternal, uncreated, coexisting but independent categories of substances: The conscious (jiva) and the unconscious (ajiva). They developed the logic that the world is not altogether unknowable; only one should not be absolutely certain about one's assertions. Jain philosophers said that moral and religious values must be brought out of dogmatic slavery. Wisdom must be proved by reason which, in turn, depends on the experiences of self and of others. The human experience based on reason constitutes the data for the discovery of reality. CONCEPT OF GODHOOD: Professor Surendranath Dasgupta, the famous philosopher-historian, has described the concept of Godhood as follows: "The true God is not the God as the architect of the universe, nor the God who tides over our economic difficulties or panders to our vanity by fulfilling our wishes, but it is the God who emerges within and through our value-sense, pulling us up and through the emergent ideals and with whom I may feel myself to be united in the deepest bonds of love. The dominance of value in all its forms presupposes love, for it is the love for the ideal that leads us to forget our biological encumbrances. Love is to be distinguished from passion by the fact that while the latter is initiated biologically, the former is initiated from a devotedness to the ideal. When a consummating love of this description is generated, man is raised to Godhood and God to man." This corresponds to the Jain approach to Godhood. In Jainism, God is the supreme manifestation of human excellence.

While examining a knee-deep contrast and comparison of Jainism and Christianity, an attempt is made to underscore the likenesses amongst all religions assuming the same basic needs for all mankind. Specifically, and with regard to matters of living, the struggle to ascend (moksha) in Jainism is contrasted with Christianity's struggle to improve (sanctification), and the differing roles of each faith's approach to compassion briefly discussed. In matters of truth, whether truth is absolute and what that might mean for all humanity is contrasted between the faiths. The criticisms and modern movements of each faith are shown in their resemblances, along with the author's personal thoughts on the subject of religious faith and its future in America.

Marie-Hélène Gorisse

Abstract, contents and reviews of PDNRL no. 36

The De Nobili Research Library – Association for Indology and the Study of Religion , Himal Trikha

Narendra Bhandari

A Sunday lecture for the Vedanta Society of New York exploring similarities and differences between Jain philosophy and Vedānta, and emphasizing the pluralism of the Jain anekānta doctrine and the approach of Sri Ramakrishna.

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Yale Forum on Religion and Ecology

Overview Essay

Jainism and Ecology

Christopher Key Chapple, Loyola Marymount University

Abstract: Jainism posits the vibrant existence of a living universe. Jains advocate the protection of life, from its most advanced forms down to the microbes and the elements. In addition to exploring the history and philosophy of Jainism and its implications for an ecological worldview, leading voices from the Jain community and the recent “Jain Declaration on the Climate Crisis” will be surveyed.

The Universe Lives

The Jain premise that individual life forms pervade the earth down to the elemental level, paired with the requirement that all harm to life be minimized, predisposes Jainism to a friendliness toward life that lends to what in modern times is referred to as environmental ethics. Because all environments are suffused with life and because life must be honored, Jainism implicitly affirms the basic ideas of ecological ethics and, although a bit more complex, of bioethics. Actions taken by Jain persons, in order to recognize and abide by the teachings of ahiṃsā , must take into consideration the desire on the part of any life form to flourish. This sentiment is expressed in the oldest surviving Jain text as follows:

All breathing, existing, living, sentient beings should not be slain, nor treated with violence, nor abused, nor tormented, nor driven away. This is the pure, unchangeable, eternal law. [1]       

Harm to any life form causes the karma that obstructs one’s energy and consciousness and happiness to densify. Such actions must be avoided.

Since the rise of environmental awareness and concern after the 1984 Union Carbide industrial accident in Bhopal that took thousands of lives, several organizations have taken up the task of ecological advocacy India, most notably the Centre for Science and Environment in New Delhi and the Centre for Environment Education in Ahmedabad. Neither organization focuses particularly on faith-based approaches to environmental advocacy. Most work undertaken by Jains on behalf of environmental issues has been championed by individuals, several of whom will be discussed in this article.

As noted above, environmental or ecological concerns did not enter the modern Indian lexicon until the advent of local disasters that prompted a reconsideration of the prevailing Nehruvian drive toward India’s industrialization following independence from British colonial rule in 1947. Though some concerns had been expressed by Gandhi and others regarding pollution of local water sources, this was not seen to be part of the broad systemic problems that have been revealed since the Bhopal disaster. Since that time, numerous campaigns have been aimed at cleaning India’s rivers, improving air quality, and ensuring the integrity and vitality of the soil. Leaders within these movements include M. C. Mehta who campaigned successfully for the transition to less-polluting compressed natural gas auto-rickshaws and taxis in Delhi and other cities and Vandana Shiva, whose work on behalf of organic agriculture has reached millions of farmers throughout the subcontinent. Because of Jain involvement with numerous businesses, various attempts have been made to infuse business ethics with an ecological sensibility. This article will explore Jain involvement with select businesses at both the theoretical and practical level, examining the writings and work of the late jurist L. M. Singhvi, the late religious leader Acarya Tulsi, educator and activist Satish Kumar, contemporary ethicist Atul Shah, and the Chairman of the Indian Green Building Council, Prem C. Jain.

It is now well recognized that India stands first in the world for polluted cities whose air and water have become quite foul. Litter abounds throughout India. Sewage treatment is woefully inadequate and simply absent from most towns and cities. Industrial and human waste effluent flows into rivers and streams. Particulate matter rises from dung cooking fires and transport vehicles, turning Indian skies gray, choking the population. The World Health Organization has ranked Delhi’s air as the most polluted on the planet and more than 600,000 premature deaths are estimated to occur due to pollution yearly in India. [2]

At a conference convened at Harvard University’s Center for the Study of World Religions in 1998, scholars and activists engaged in a robust conversation about the prospects for a Jain contribution to the contemporary issue of pollution and its mitigation. At the conference, everyone agreed that the situation is dire and unprecedented. This is true of all historic religious; no religion confronted the social sin of ecological imbalance incurred by the human hand as seen in the past century. However, each religion developed a moral code to guide human actions. At the conference, many Jain leaders lifted up the premises and practices of their faith as a torch to light the way out of the current predicament. In particular, Nathmal Tatia suggested that “By strengthening themselves to resist the various temptations put forth by technology and consumer mentality, Jains can perhaps provide an example for living lightly on the planet earth.” [3] Padmanabh S. Jaini cited two examples of Jain innovation in regard to reducing coal pollution and mitigating malaria, stating that “the Jain response to development issues must be mindful of traditional Jain teachings on nonviolence and non-possessiveness.” [4] Sadhvi Shilapi, citing the work on Jain nuns in Bihar to encourage the planting of trees and the adoption of a vegetarian diet, states that “Wants should be reduced, desires curbed, and consumption levels kept within reasonable limits.” [5] Two scholars raised the measured counterpoint that the evidence does not always indicate that Jain vow-based decision making leads to environmentally friendly practice. John Cort pointed out that the Jain focus on one’s liberation from the world ( mokṣa-mārga ) might downplay “the sociobiological contexts in which Jain live and in which any Jain environmental praxis will be located.” [6] Cort also raised the issue that reforestation is sometimes deleterious to those who support themselves by collecting fodder. Paul Dundas noted that Jain acts of worship generally involve the construction of temples and offerings of flowers and other substances, deemed by some Jains to be acts of violence. Dundas, having quoted Abhayadeva Sūri, Haribhadra, and Yaśovijaya, writes that digging in the earth to create wells and temples, clearly an act of violence, constitutes “a lesser evil… is outweighed by the greater goods of water made available to human beings and worship offered to the Jinas.” [7] Simply put, Jains throughout history has advanced an instrumentalist argument in regard to natural resources. If a greater good can be achieved, a little violence is acceptable and even deemed to be necessary. Though he does not state it directly, Dundas implies that this position constitutes an ethical slippery slope, a justification for the anthropocentrism that lies at the core of current ecological crises. Without doubt, simple answers will not suffice.

The Jain approach to environmental ethics rests on premises radically different from those presented in the prophetic monotheisms and racially different from the views held by her sister faiths of Hinduism and Buddhism.  Rather than assenting to the notion that the world was created by a benevolent presiding deity, Jainism holds that the world has always been present and will exist forevermore.  Rather than following an externally imposed moral code, practitioners of the Jain faith are taught the benefits of self-initiated virtuous action to be performed not for the sake of sheer obedience but for the purposes of self-improvement and purification.  In contrast to Hinduism, Jainism does not advocate sacrificial activity such as the killing animals to propitiate wrathful deities.  Jainism does not posit an underlying unifying state of consciousness such as Brahman but insists upon the individual integrity of each and every soul, from beginningless time into an infinite future.  Unlike Buddhism, Jainism posits the reality of a Self or Soul that holds the potential to attain its unique state of freedom.  Buddhism teaches emptiness of self and other; Jainism teaches about a universe filled with innumerable living souls.

Jaina Physics and Metaphysics

The Jaina approach to the natural world is simultaneously respectful and cautious, and above all driven by moral concerns.  First, according to Jaina ontology, the world is suffused with life forces ( jῑva ) that merit protection.  Hence, the lives contained in particles of earth, drops of water, rays of light, gusts of wind, as well as micro-organisms, plants, and animals must be acknowledged and, to the greatest extent possible, not harmed.  Each has entered its particular form due to the materiality of karma.  One must exert caution because each harmful action causes the karma surrounding one’s own soul to thicken and darken, obscuring the radiant consciousness of the soul and blocking its ascent to freedom.  The Jaina universe thus conceived becomes a moral universe.  In order to advance toward freedom, one must develop impeccable adherence to a moral code in order to purge all impedimentary karmas.          

Physics and metaphysics, matter and spirit stand intertwined in the Jaina worldview.  The tradition posits only four forces that do not possess life: matter or pudgala which can manifest as karma, time, space, and movement.   Aside from these, all beings, including elemental realities and plants, possess consciousness, energy, and an innate state of bliss.  The following passage from the Ācārāṅga Sūtra , the oldest extant Jaina text (ca. 350 BCE), gives a sense of how the Jainas regard life to pervade all aspects of the natural world:

As the nature of (human beings) is to be born and grow old, so is the nature of plants is to be born and grow old…. As (humans) fall sick when cut, also that (tree) falls sick when cut; as (the human) needs food, so that (plant) needs food; as the (human) will decay, so that (plant) will decay; as the human is not eternal, so that (plant) is not eternal…. As this is changing, so that is changing. One who injures plants does not comprehend and renounce sinful acts. The one who does not injure plants comprehends and renounces sinful acts. Knowing (those plants), a wise person would not act sinfully toward plants, nor cause others to act so, nor allow others to do so. The who knows the causes of sin relating to plants is called a reward-knowing sage. [8]

This theory of plants accords with what Sir James Frazer observed in The Golden Bough .  He wrote that for the early Austrians, “the tree feels the cut not less than a wounded man his hurt” [9] David Haberman has written about the affection for trees felt in Varanasi, where he notes that the sentiment can be extended to “tree worship worldwide: trees have not only been commonly thought of as animate beings but also as powerful divine beings who when approached in a respectful manner offer in return life-enhancing benefits to human beings.” [10] In the Jaina context, the divinity of the tree would envision the future possibility that the tree, which is divine like all other souls, might take human birth and enter the path toward freedom from all karmic constraints.   This spirit of affection extends to all living beings, to be protected according to the Jaina moral code.

In the coding of a pan-ethical universe, Jainism, particularly in the Tattvārthasūtra (fifth century CE) of Umāsvati, each of the life forms stands within a hierarchy of ascent from elemental beings, microbes, and plants, said to possess the sense of touch; worms, which add the sense of taste; crawling bugs which add smell; flying insects which add sight; and the array of mammals, reptiles, fish, and amphibians who can also hear and think.  Life constantly moves from one form to the next.  A virtuous human may even take birth in a heavenly realm, while a person of dissipation may endure torture in one of the seven hells.  The nature of one’s next birth depends upon action performed in the immediate past body, implying that even microorganisms exert some degree of touch in terms of whom and why they make contact with other forms of life.  The human birth stands supreme, being the only domain through which one can perform the necessary karmic purgations to attain freedom, a state at the edge of the universe untouched by the effects of karma. 

Jaina Vows as Moral Foundation

This coded universe carries a strong message: regardless of one’s station in life, choice by each and every individual determines future circumstance.  If one has earned the good fortune of human birth, a golden opportunity looms: to consciously and purposively commit oneself to the spiritual path of pursuing a life shaped by religiously inspired vows.  These vows, applicable to both laypersons and monastics but in varying degrees of intensity, include a set of five greater vows ( mahāvrata ) and a set of twelve lesser vows ( anuvrata ).  The Ācārāṅga Sūtra lists five forms of intensity for each of the five great vows, summarized as follows:  In the observance of nonviolence ( ahiṃsā ), a monk ( nirgrantha ) must be “careful in his walk;” guard against any thought that “produces cutting or splitting or division and dissension, quarrels, faults, and pains, injures living beings, or kills creatures;” not engage in speech that is “sinful and blamable;” be “careful in lying down his utensils of begging” so as to not “hurt or displace or injure or kill all sorts of living beings,” and must not “eat or drink without inspecting his food and drink” for the same reason ( AS II:15.i.1-5, Jacobi 1968, 203-204). 

The second vow, holding to truth ( satya ), requires the five following qualifications: speaking only after deliberation, not speaking from a place of anger, not speaking out of greed, not speaking due to fear, and not speaking for the purpose of ridicule.  The third vow, not stealing ( asteya ), entails the pronouncement that “I shall neither take myself what is not given nor cause others to take it, nor consent to their taking it” ( AS II.15.iii.).  Because a monk’s livelihood depends upon gathering alms, five further qualifications are given: thoughtfulness about where to ask for food, receipt of permission to do so from one’s supervisory director, moving onto a new place after a fixed period of time in order to not become a burden, always asking permission to visit a new place, and consulting with other monks about the duration of stay. 

The fourth vow involves restraint from sexual thought and activity.  Acknowledging the range of ways in which sexual desire can manifest, the Ācārāṅga Sūtra proclaims: “I renounce all sexual pleasures, either with gods or humans or animals” ( AS II.15.iv).  The five clauses include to “not continually discuss topics relating to women,” to “not regard and contemplate the lovely forms of women,” to “not recall to mind the pleasures and amusements he formerly had with women,” to “not eat and drink too much,” and, to make certain that all options are covered, to “not occupy a bed or couch with women or animals or eunuchs” ( AS II.15.iv).       

The fifth vow, nonpossession ( aparigraha ) requires the monk or nun to renounce all attachments.  The basic monastic vows restrict the postulant to a bare minimum of possessions, generally a change of robes, a begging bowl, and small satchel for carrying books for members of the Svetambara order, and for male members of Digambara communities, no clothes, only a water pot and satchel.  However, the Ācārāṅga Sūtra mandates that the senses must be controlled in each of five expressions.  One must vow to “not be attached to, nor delighted with, nor desiring of, nor infatuated by, nor covetous of, nor disturbed by the agreeable or disagreeable sounds” ( AS II.15.v).  The text goes on to say that “If it is impossible not to hear sounds which reach the ear, the mendicant should avoid love or hate originated by them.”  The same is said of seeing, that if one “sees agreeable and disagreeable forms or colors, one should not be attached.”  This formula repeats for smelling, tasting, and touching. 

The vow-based morality of the monks is somewhat lighter when reinterpreted for lay Jainas.  For instance, Muni Kuśalcanravija states, as summarized by John Cort, a layperson’s adaptation of nonviolence would include “A layperson should not overwork either animals or people… A layperson should not let people and animals in one’s care go hungry.” [11]   Similarly, a Jaina business person is advised not to tell lies ( satya ), to not avoid taxes ( asteya ), to be faithful in marriage and avoid “ardent gazing or lewd gestures” ( brahmacarya ), and to avoid attachment to one’s wealth “limiting either the value of various types of possessions or all of one’s possessions in total.” [12]    To these five basic vows the layperson adds three vows to restrict activity and four additional vows to undertake spiritual practices.  The restrictions of activity include “restricting the geographical limits within which one travels,” “restricting what one uses and consumes,” and “restricting one’s activities, particularly one’s occupation.” [13]   This last vow governs suitable professions with the traditional occupations including merchant, artisan, publisher, jeweler, and so forth, all of which avoid direct harm to complex life forms. 

The four spiritual vows include undertaking a daily 48 minute meditation, periodic stricter restriction prohibiting travel, occasional days of temporary mendicancy, and making regular donations to monastic communities.  All these activities are undertaken within the context of the three moral jewels of the Jaina faith: right outlook, right knowledge, and right action.  The moral life begins with outlook and knowledge, from which proceeds moral action.  Nine principal beliefs characterize the Jaina view of reality, summarized from the Tattvārthasūtra as follows:

• multiple forms of life forces ( jῑva )
• four non-living forces ( ajῑva ): matter/karma, time, space, movement
• influx of karma adhering to the life force ( āsrava )
• bondage of the soul by karma ( bandha )
• auspicious forms of karma ( puṇya )
• inauspicious forms of karma ( papa )
• stopping the influx ( saṃvara ) through adherence to vows
• sloughing off karma ( nirjarā )
• liberation/freedom ( mokṣa/nirvāṇa/kevala ) [14]

By analyzing activity in light of these categories, one applies knowledge leading to propitious action.  The moral life, while essentially teleological, carries benefits in the realm of day to day living, as will be suggested in the examples provided below.

Moral Conscience in Indian History

The influence of Jaina activists in the public sphere has been disproportionate to their numbers throughout Indian history.  From earliest recorded times, they have campaigned (along with the Buddhists) against the violent Brāhmaṇical rituals that involve animal sacrifice, with some success.  The Jainas became particularly influential during the period of approximately 700 to 1200 in two kingdoms, Karnataka in the south and Gujarat in the west.  The Digambara community influenced legislation for a time in the south.  King Kumarapala of Gujarat (ruled 1143-1175 CE) converted to Jainism under the tutelage of the great scholar and Svetambara monk Hemacandra (1089-1172).  Kumarapala enacted Jaina-friendly legislation and public work projects including temple construction.  The Jainas were also somewhat influential at the Mughal court.  In 1587, the Svetambara Jaina teacher Hiravijaya Suri (1527-95 CE) so impressed Emperor Akbar that a decree was issued banning the slaughter of animals in the empire during the week-long Jaina celebration of Paryusan, a time of fasting and forgiveness and reconciliation held every September. [15]     In the main, however, the Jaina community has been a small minority throughout the history of the subcontinent, currently number somewhere between four and six million, less than one half of one percent of the population.  Nonetheless, two 20 th century Jaina figures made significant contributions to moral philosophy within public life in India: Acarya Tulsi (1914-1997) and L. M. Singhvi (1931-2007). Additionally, three 21 st century figures will also be profiled who have advocated for a Jain-informed approach to ecological issues: Satish Kumar, Atul Shah, and Prem Jain (1936-2018).

Acarya Tulsi, Religious Exemplar

Acarya Tulsi was born into a large family in Ladnun, Rajasthan, during British colonial rule.  He entered the Svetambara Terapanthi order of Jaina monks at the age of eleven after meeting Acarya Kalugani, its eighth leader.  This movement, established by Acarya Bhikshu in the 18 th century, started as a more austere branch of the Sthanakvasi Svetambaras, renowned for their eschewal of all images that are generally used as part of worship.  The year of separation came in 1759 when Bhikshu broke all formal ties, bringing six fellow monks with him to establish a new self-initiated order. [16] In many ways, this proved to be a Protestant movement, with Bhikshu decrying the notion that anyone can earn merit through donation.  Only strict adherence to the rules of nonviolence can guarantee spiritual progress.  From the onset, the Terapanthi pioneered education for Jaina nuns, who previously were not given the opportunity for study afforded to men.

Tulsi was elevated to leadership of the order at the age of 22 and presided for many decades over a dynamic period of growth.  The numbers of monks, nuns, and lay followers increased within the Terapanthi community.  A new order of Samanis was established, allowing women in particular to postpone their final vows.  This has allowed the movement to be of service in particular to the growing number of diaspora Jainas.  Samanis have established learning and meditation centers in London, Florida, New Jersey, and Texas.  Acarya Tulsi established a learning institute on a hundred acre campus in his home town of Ladnun in 1970, which achieved status as a deemed university in 1991. 

Whereas Acarya Tulsi’s successor Acarya Mahapragya focused on the development of a spiritual practice known as Preksha Meditation, Tulsi turned his attention in 1949 toward a campaign known as the Anuvrat Movement.  He saw that newly independent India needed a moral compass for guidance and he distilled and reinterpreted the standard Jaina precepts for contemporary times.  Though carrying no legislative weight, they remain a talking point for the process of making moral decisions and have influenced monastic and lay leaders within the Terapanthi community.  The vows are eleven in number, with explanatory subdivisions:

• I will not deliberately kill any innocent creature (includes suicide and foeticide)
• I will not attack anyone (non-support of aggression; advocacy of disarmament)
• I will not take part in violent agitation or any destructive activity
• I believe in human unity (no discrimination allowed based on color, race, gender, caste
• I will practice religious tolerance (no sectarian violence)
• I will be honest in business and general behavior (commit no harm or deception)
• I will practice continence and limit material possessions
• I will not apply unethical means in elections
• I will not encourage or practice evil social customs
• I will lead a life free from addiction (no alcohol, drugs, tobacco)
• I will strive to minimize environmental pollution (no cutting of trees; no wastage of water) [17]

Simplified versions were prepared over a number of years for students, teachers, business people, officers, employees, voters, and for those interested in spiritual practice.  These anuvrats function similarly to the Quaker queries and the Jesuit Examen in that they prompt a reckoning with one’s conscience in a systematic fashion.   Though perhaps originally intended as a social movement with broad impact, they have served to sharpen attention within the Terapanthi community worldwide to the wider implications of Jaina moral teachings. 

When I interviewed Acharya Tulsi in 1989 and asked him about environmental ethics, he smiled and pointed to the few items he owned: his clothes, a few books, a broom, a begging bowl. He commented that this was the model for environmental ethics: learning to do with less. Less possessions, less harm to the environment. [18]

L. M. Singhvi, Barrister

Member of a mixed Hindu-Jaina family, L. M. Singhvi rose to prominence in the fields of law and government.  He served as High Commissioner (Ambassador) from India to Great Britain in the 1990s and as a member of India’s Parliament for many years, in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Representatives) from 1962 to 1967 and in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House; approx. Senate) from 1998 to 2004.  He was tireless in his advocacy of Jaina causes.  He presented the Jain Declaration on Nature to Prince Philip in 1990 on the occasion of Jainism’s participation in the World Wildlife Fund Network on Conservation and Religion.  It was reprinted in 2002 as the appendix to the book Jainism and Ecology.  The Declaration outlines the core principles of Jainism, reframing them as dialogue partners in the emerging discourse on religion and ecology.

The Declaration states that Jainism presents an ecological philosophy and consequently summarizes various aspects of the faith in light of its particular attention to nature.  The first part discusses Jaina teachings on nonviolence, interdependence, recognition of multiple perspectives, emphasis on equanimity, and commitment to compassion, empathy, and charity.  The second section provides a synopsis of Jaina biological categories as delineated earlier in this chapter.  The third and final part highlights the Jain Code of Conduct as exemplary for bringing about environment justice.  Key aspects include the restatement of the five Jaina vows (described earlier in this chapter), the history of Jaina kindness to animals, the Jaina advocacy of vegetarianism, the teachings on restraint and avoidance of waste, and finally, the value of charity in the tradition. [19]   

Decidedly more complex than Acarya Tulsi’s eleven Anuvrats, this Declaration demonstrates the philosophical commitment of the Jaina community not only to regard life but to advocate for sustaining and protecting life in all of its forms.  By asserting the presence of conscious life within soil, rivers, fires, and wind as well as within the overly self-obsessed human realm, Jainism calls for an expansion of view, a broadening of horizon that can serve as an antidote to the damning anthropocentrism that has characterized most of human philosophical endeavor.  When Singhvi writes about compassion and empathy, he intends not to limit one’s scope to the merely human but to include all the animals and plants and the elements themselves. 

Satish Kumar, Contemporary Ethicist

Satish Kumar, who served as a Jain Therapanthi Svetambara monk for nine years before joining the Bhū Dān movement of Vinobha Bhave and subsequently founded Schumacher College in southwest England, has long championed the social engagement of Jain values with public life.  He edited Resurgence , the leading journal for ecological spirituality in Britain, for several decades, contributing himself many pieces on how the Jain value of simplicity intersects with ecological values. [20] At Schumacher College, which Satish Kumar co-founded in 1990, spirituality and ecology are taught in tandem, inspired in large part by the nature-friendly aspects of Jain thought and practice. [21]

Satish Kumar makes direct parallels between Jain philosophy and ecology. He cites Mahavira who “forbade riding on animals” and “taught his disciples that the earth has soul, water has soul, fire has soul, air has soul, and of course all plants and animals have souls.” [22] For him, the Jain vows convey the restraint necessary to encourage a balanced ecological lifestyle.

Atul Shah, Academic and Theoretician

Dr. Atul Shah, professor at Sussex University in England, makes links between the world of business and environmental ethics in his book Jainism and Ethical Finance: A Timeless Business Model . He notes that “Crucially, the concept of ‘society’ extends beyond human communities to other species and ecosystems” and that “Jain philosophy recognizes an intimate link between spiritual practice and consciousness of the natural world. Shah goes on to state that “the conduct of economics has been too anthropocentric” and laments

pollution of the air, seas and soil on a global scale; the unplanned expansion of cities to the detriment of quality of life; as well as the unfolding crisis associated with climatic instability and the growing encroachments on the habitats of other species, threatening their survival and denying them the dignity they deserve.

He suggests that that environmentalism “converges with the Jain belief in the connectedness of all forms of life and the need for us to remember these connections in both our individual and collective decision making.” [23] Spiritual practice in the Jain observance of nonviolence holds ramifications beyond a concern for human well-being. “Arbitrary interference with nature can injure or even eliminate ecosystems, species and organisms on which we depend for our survival.” [24] Shah advocates careful consideration, taking into account unseen possibilities that might cause harm.

One example cited by Shah is Jain Irrigation, a global Jain business. It educates farmers about sustainable agricultural practices and helps them market their produce. This company places “significant investment… in research and development to ensure efficient land use, mammal waste and sustainable productivity and harvesting.” [25] This contrasts starkly with the approach used by Monsanto, an American corporation that through patents and monopolization of seed, fertilizer, insecticides, and herbicides, has destroyed many family farms in India through its “aggressive financialisation.” In contrast, the farmers within the Jain Irrigation network are “supported and nurtured rather than exploited and squeezed.” [26] Additionally, in response to the issue of worldwide climate instability, Jain Irrigation is working intensely at expanding solar operations to meet India’s growing demand for electricity. [27]

Prem C. Jain, Chairman of the Indian Green Building Council

Dr. Prem C. Jain received his Ph.D. in civil engineering from the University of Minnesota in the late 1950s and worked with Carrier Air Conditioning in Syracuse, New York, in the early 1960s. He brought his knowledge and expertise to India and helped contribute to the modernization of India through various undertakings, including AECOM, a corporation that has been “involved in designing and completing 56 LEED certified projects, over 5,000 kilometers of highways, 300 kilometers of metro and 14 sea ports” as well as a Smart Cities program emphasizing sustainable development. [28]   He chairs the Indian Green Building Council and, in an interview held in June, 2017, shared his enthusiasm for energy efficiency for the protection and enhancement of life in all forms.

Prem Jain graduated from Hira Lal Jain Senior Secondary School in Old Delhi’s Sadar Bazar before taking up university studies. He returned to the school as a trustee in the 2010s and has worked to make this historic school, which now serves underprivileged families of various religions, an example of best use of appropriate technology. A water catchment system has been installed on the roof, as well as solar panels that help with basic electricity needs. In an interview on June 28, 2017, he noted that for him, all the elements of the world, earth, water, fire, air, and space, comprise divinity, Bhagavan. Attentiveness to this divinity comprises a universal faith, with “no Hindu, no Muslim, no Christian.” He analyzes the word as follows: “ Bh for the earth, ga for the sky, va for Vayu which means air, a for Agni, and na for water.” The five great elements ( pañca-mahā-bhūta ) comprise the common ground for all experience.

Jain described the first major eco-friendly building that he undertook during the Reagan era in the city of Hyderabad. Microsoft had chosen this area of the country partly because it was free from earthquakes. During the construction of this complex in the 1980s, it was a leading example of the implementation of green building technology. Jain predicts

eventually we will go away from the coal. I am hoping that five years down the line, we will not have to use firepower. We will put in a lot of solar; solar has become very inexpensive now. When I started, the general cost was very high. Now it's very affordable. It's less than the cost of a coal plant with the same solar plant. Then the petrol will eventually be replaced by natural gas. So there is a good chance that five to seven years down the line we will stop polluting. That is the situation. We must get more clean, with all the carbon absorbed. I can say that my grandchildren will have much cleaner air than we have today. [29]

Prem Jain’s optimism arises from his faith in a universal sense of connectivity, grounded in the Jain ethic of nonviolence and the Jain cosmology that sees life in all elements, all beings.

Each of the five figures profiled above are deeply engaged with the process of reflective, constructive environmental ethics. Though not blind to the benefits of modern industrialization, they advocate a return to a simpler lifestyle informed by reverence for life in all its forms rather than blind pursuit of wealth and comfort at any cost.

The Jain Declaration on the Climate Crisis [30]

JAINA (Jain Associations in North America), an amalgam of temples, study groups, and religious and lay leaders, issued declaration on October 17, 2019 that supplements and updates the 1990 Jain Declaration on Nature described above. Drafted by the JAINA Ahimsak Eco-Vegan Committee, the name of the committee itself reflects the face of forward-looking change within the Jain community, many of whom have now taken up the cause of eschewing milk and dairy in favor of a vegan diet. Informed by science, this declaration cites the data on fossil fuel and animal agriculture-related emissions. The amount of CO2 in the atmposphere has increased from 280 parts per million (PPM) in pre-industrial times, to over 415 PPM in 2019. The results are stark: we are in the sixth major extinction event; climate change has resulted in increased human mortality from malnutrition, malaria, diarrhea, and heat stress; sea levels are rising, hurricanes are more destructive, forests are more susceptible to fire; air pollution has adversely affected human health; the range of mosquito borne diseases such as Malaria, Dengue, and Zika has increased. The document cites the need for Jains to reconsider their food sources, the transportation choices, and overall patterns of consumption. Individual Jains are asked to consider nine specific lifestyle changes: 1) calculate one’s carbon imprint; 2) abstain from meat, eggs, and dairy products; 3) minimize food waste; 4) walk and bike when possible; 5) use hybrid or fully electric vehicles when essential; 6) reduce air travel; 7) live in smaller homes; 8) buy fewer consumer goods; 9) “consider how our work or business can benefit the climate for all living beings.” The document ends with two calls-to-action. The first asks the Jain community to “green” its temples by engaging in renewable energy use and eliminating the use of plastics. The second calls for business and government leaders to adopt policies for regenerative agriculture, to “remove subsidies for the meat and dairy industries… and for fossil fuels,” to encourage government support for public transportation, to ban plastics and deforestation, and, finally, to “support practices and vetted technologies to actively remove CO2 from the atmosphere.”  This document extends a call to action for the more than four million Jains worldwide.

In addition to their advocacy of a vegetarian diet and their protests against animal sacrifice, and their charities for schools, hospitals, and free prostheses, Jains have been investing in eco-friendly businesses such as solar power generation and other forms of appropriate technology. The Jain faith offers a multivalent, multi-life perspective on the nature and purpose of the world.  According to Jaina teachings, we live in a moral universe, governed by the laws of cause and effect.  Moral agency requires paying attention and giving reverence to the natural world.  Mahavira advocated the protection of trees, positing that any harm done to nature will immediate constrain and impede the soul.  Adherents to the Jaina faith have produced a biological inquiry that reveals the inter-connectedness of all life forms.  With this insight comes great moral obligation.  Knowing that life depends upon other forms of life, the Jainas urge human beings to be careful and loving in all ways, and to never take more than what is absolutely needed, poignant lessons for today’s world of over-consumption and rapacious use of resources.  Through the moral voice of Jainism, all peoples can be reminded of the sanctity of life.

[1] Ācārāṅga Sūtra  I:4.1, as translated by Hermann Jacobi, Jaina Sutras in Two Parts.  Part One: the Ākārāṅga Sūtra; The Kalpa Sūtra (New York: Dover, 1968, first published, 1884), p. 36.

[2] https://www.economist.com/asia/2016/01/16/particular-about-particulates

[3] Nathmal Tatia, “The Jain Worldview and Ecology” in Jainism and Ecology: Nonviolence in the Web of Life , edited by Christopher Key Chapple (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Center for the Study of World Religions, Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 16.

[4] Padmanabh S. Jaini, “Ecology, Economics, and Development in Jainism” in Jainism and Ecology (above), p. 153. See also Padmanabh S. Jaini.  1979.  The Jaina Path of Purification.  Berkeley: University of California Press.

[5] Sadhvi Shilapi, “Environmental and Ecological Teachings of Mahavira” in Jainism and Ecology , p. p. 164.

[6] John C. Cort, “Green Jainism?” in Jainism and Ecology , p. 70.

[7] Paul Dundas, “The Limits of Jain Environmental Ethic” in Jainism and Ecology , p. 109.

[8] Ibid., I:1.5.6-7, Jacobi 1968, 10-11.   

[9] James George Frazer,   The Golden Bough: A History of Myth and Religion (London: Chancellor Press, 1994, first published, 1922), p. 113. 

[10] David Haberman, People Trees: Worship of Trees in Northern India   (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 57.

[11] John E. Cort, Jains in the World: Religious Values and Ideology in India (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 27.

[12] Ibid., p. 28.

[13] Ibid.,p.  27.

[14] Nathmal Tatia.  Translator.  1994.  That Which Is Tattvārtha Sūtra, A Classic Jain Manual for Understanding the True Nature of Reality.  San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1994.

[15] Paul Dundas, The Jains (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 126.

[16] Ibid., p. 219. 

[17] Mukhya Niyojika Sadhvi Vishrut Vibha, Acharya Shree Tulsi: A Legend of Humanity (New Delhi: Acharya Tulsi Janam Shatabdi Samaroh Samiti, 2012).

[18] Christopher Key Chapple, Nonviolence to Animals, Earth, and Self in Asian Traditions (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).

[19] See “The Jain Declaration on Nature” in Christopher Key Chapple, ed., Jainism and Ecology: Nonviolence in the Web of Life (Cambridge, MA: Center for the Study of World Religions, Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 217-224.

[20] See https://www.resurgence.org/magazine/

[21] https://www.schumachercollege.org.uk/

[22] Satish Kumar, “Jain Ecology,” in Christopher Key Chapple, ed., Jainism and Ecology: Nonviolence in the Web of Life (Cambridge, MA: Center for the Study of World Religions, Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 184.

[23] Atul Shah and Aidan Rankin, Jainism and Ethical Finance: A Timeless Business Model (New York: Routledge, 2017), p. 3.

[24] Ibid., p. 31.

[25] Ibid., p. 97.

[27] Conversations with family member Mayuri Bhandari, 2016-2017.

[28] http://www.aecom.com/in/

[29] Interview, June 28, 2017, at Hira Lal Jain Senior Secondary School, Old Delhi.

[30] https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.jaina.org/resource/resmgr/jaindeclarationonclimatechange/Update_Jain_Declaration_on_C.pdf

Header photo credit: Manas Mandir Jain Temple, Shahapur, India

Since.... 1996

Principles of Jainism

The fundamental principles of Jainism can be briefly stated as follows.

The first fundamental principle of Jainism is that, man’s personality is dual, that is, material and spiritual. Jaina philosophy regards that every mundane soul is bound by subtle particles of matter known as Karma from the very beginning. It considers that just as gold is found in an alloy form in the mines, in the same way mundane souls are found along with the Karma bondage from time eternal. The impurity of the mundane soul is thus treated as an existing condition.

The second principle that man is not perfect is based on the first principle. The imperfectness in man is attributed to the existence of Karma in his soul. The human soul is in a position to attain perfection and in that true and eternal state it is endowed with four characteristics, viz., Ananta-darsana, Ananta-Jnana, Ananta-virya and Ananta-sukha, i. e., infinite perception or faith, infinite knowledge, infinite power and infinite bliss.

Even though man is not perfect, the third principle states that by his spiritual nature man can and must control his material nature. It is only after the entire subjugation of matter that the soul attains perfection, freedom and happiness. It is emphatically maintained that man will be able to sail across the ocean of births and achieve perfection through the control of senses and thought.

The last basic principle stresses that it is only each individual that can separate his own soul and the matter combined with it. The separation cannot be effected by any other person. This means that man himself, and he alone, is responsible for all that is good or bad in his life. He cannot absolve himself from the responsibility of experiencing the fruits of his actions. This principle distinguishes Jainism from other religions, e. g., Christianity, Islam and Hinduism.

No God, nor His prophet or deputy or beloved can interfere with human life. The soul, and that alone, is directly and necessarily responsible for all that it does. God is regarded as completely unconcerned with creation of the universe or with any happening in the universe. The universe goes on of its own accord. Because of this definite attitude towards God, Jainism is accused of being atheistic. It is true in the sense that Jainism does not attribute the creation of universe to God. But at the same time Jainism cannot be labeled as atheistic because it believes in Godhood, in innumerable gods, in Punya and Papa, i. e., merit and demerit, in religious practices, etc. According to Jainism the emancipated soul is considered as God and it is absolutely not concerned with the task of creation of this world.

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Jaina Philosophy

The Jains are those who consider that the teaching of the omniscient Jinas is the expression of the eternal essential nature of the universe. The only extant teaching is that of Mahāvīra (traditional dates 599–527/510 BCE, in Magadha, South of modern Bihar), the last Jina of the current cosmic period.

In their practice, Jaina renunciants follow a rigorous method towards salvation, in which a non-violent way of life, the renunciation from a worldly ego, the dissociation of self and non-self, and a gradual purification of the self towards unobstructed knowledge, become as many different facets of the same effort to access to a superior order of being in which each self manifests its true nature.

This path came to involve structured monastic and lay communities; sets of practices—ritual and devotional acts, ascetic practices, rules of life; as well as conceptions of the world deposited in canonical and post-canonical corpuses, in systematic treatises, or in narrative literature. Jaina Philosophy is the set of philosophical investigations developed by thinkers as they appear in these different corpuses (Malvania & Soni 2007; Potter & Balcerowicz 2013, 2014). While several trends can be observed from the canonical period to modern thinkers via the mystics, the following principles are shared: Jaina metaphysics is an atomist and dualist conception of the world, it focuses on the nature of the self, on that of karmic matter, as well as on their principles of association. Jaina ethics consists of practices focused on non-violence, non-absolutism and non-attachment, which aim to disentangle the self and karmic matter and which help one to reach omniscience. Besides, Jaina philosophers are particular renown for developing a realist epistemology centered on “many-sidedness”.

Jaina philosophy is composed in Ardhamāgadhī, Jaina Māhārāṣṭrī, Śaurasenī, Sanskrit, Apabhraṃśa, Braj Bhāṣā, Kannada, Tamil, Gujarati, Hindi, to quote only the main languages. This entry provides Sanskrit terms only, because Sanskrit became the lingua franca of philosophical inter-doctrinal discussions in South Asia at the turn of the common era.

1.1 Escaping rebirths through self-sacrifice

1.2 non-violence as a characteristic mark of jainism, 1.3 the categories of reality, 1.4 liberation as unobstructed knowledge, 2.1 six types of substances, 2.2 an atomism, 2.3 a reasoned anthropocentrism, 2.4 of self and karma: which type of dualism for the jaina philosopher, 2.5 the universe as seen by the omniscient ones, 3.1 the main types of knowledge, 3.2 authoritative teaching, 3.3 inferential reasoning and the debating hall, 3.4.1 on making distinctions, 3.4.2 from the paradoxes of causation to accounting for change and persistence, 3.4.3 existence, non-existence, and the modes of predication, 3.4.4 the doctrine of perspectives, general introductions, primary literature, secondary literature, other internet resources, related entries, 1. ethics of renunciation: from self-sacrifice to non-violence and omniscience.

Jaina teaching firstly aims to promote a type of behavior, a method to concretely modify an unsatisfying situation, not by modifying one’s environment, but by modifying oneself. More precisely, individuals aim at freeing themselves from the infinite cycle of painful rebirths. In order to achieve this, they are meant to progress within a spiritual path thanks to an internal sacrifice based on ascetic practices of renunciation. The Jain who aspires to final emancipation abandons worldly life, notably all her possession. This correct behavior ( samyak carita ) consists in an extreme self-control. Jainism is an arduous path, in which the disciple needs methods to assist her, as described in length notably in the Later Chapters ( Uttarādhyayana , 2 nd century BCE–1 st century CE [Utt.]). One such method is an incitement to cultivate a pessimistic attitude towards the world. For example, the twelve contemplations ( anuprekṣā ), which are pre-meditative states, are incitements towards the contemplation of human beings and of their relation to the surrounding world, which prompt the awareness that:

• everything in the world is not enduring;
• all beings are helpless;
• when an individual is spiritually free, only she has been able to achieve it, and only she can enjoy it, no other individual can assist and share, each individual is isolated;
• all the relationships of an embodied self are temporary, not real;
• empirical reality from life to death to life is endless and full of calamities;
• the empirical universe is an abode for selves that do not know their real nature;
• embodied selves are bound in impure, rotten and stinking bodies;
• the influx of karmic matter is the main cause of miseries;
• the stoppage of the influx of karmic matter is possible by means of penances;
• the purification of karmic matter that is already bound is possible by means of penances;
• the doctrine ( dharma ) preached by the Jinas leads to spiritual freedom;
• human enlightenment is rare and difficult to obtain, it is an essential duty of all humans to get it prior to their death ( Treatise on What There Is , TS 9.7).

A peculiarity of Jainism is to essentially associate these renunciatory liberating practices with the imperative of non-violence ( ahiṃsā ) (Donaldson & Bajželj 2021). More precisely, at the heart of Jainism is the belief according to which each living being is the transitory embodiment of a permanent divine-like self ( jīva ), which is unobstructed consciousness. In this conception, a human being can clear her self from all the obstructions she currently experiences until she becomes the unobstructed consciousness she essentially is. Now, this conception also implies the non-harming ( ahiṃsā ) of the other divine-like selves which, in turns, implies a constant awareness of their presence and true nature, as well as self-mastery and careful behavior. In one of the most ancient Jaina texts, the Canonical Text on Behavior ( Ācārāṅgasūtra , ĀS), written in early Ardhamāgadhī around the 4 th –3 rd centuries BCE, practices conducive to liberation are presented in the following way:

ĀS 1.1.21. For the sake of survival, for the sake of praise, honor, reverence, for the sake of birth, death, liberation, for the sake of prevention of miseries… ĀS 1.1.22. …some monk either indulges himself in action causing violence to the beings or earth-body through various kinds of weapons, makes others to cause violence to the beings of earth-body, or approve of others causing violence to the beings of earth-body. ĀS 1.1.23. Such an act of violence proves baneful for him. Such an act of violence deprives him of enlightenment. ĀS 1.1.24. He (the true ascetic), comprehending it, becomes vigilant over the practice of self-discipline. ĀS 1.1.25. Hearing from the Venerable Mahāvīra himself or from the monks, one comes to know: it (i.e., causing violence to the beings of earth-body), in fact, is the knot of bondage; it, in fact, is the delusion; it, in fact, is the death; it, in fact, is the hell.

Concretely, to get closer to the realization of our real nature consists of being aware of the presence of other selves in living beings around oneself and of acting in a non-harming way towards them. This gave rise to practices of renunciation:

• practices of non-violence, such as not eating meat, not drinking non-filtered water containing microscopic forms of life, or walking with extreme caution and restrictions;
• practices towards self-control, like meditation or mortification of the flesh;
• practices of abstinence, in the line of no sexual intercourse, no food for given periods of time, non-possession up to the nudity of some monks; and
• penances, today mainly consisting in fasts and recitation of prayers.

One can only notice the strict character of these norms of action. Jaina thinkers have developed thorough classifications as a backdrop of these norms (Balbir 1999). First, classifications on the types of violence to be avoided, that include not only direct harmful acts, but also delegated ones, as well as the bare fact of permitting a harmful act by letting it happen. Besides, acts can be physical, verbal or mental ones. This forms the ground of a moral theory in which our responsibility extends far beyond commonly shared conceptions.

Next to this, living beings are classified, from one-sensed beings, like earth-beings, water beings or plants, to five-senses beings, like humans, mammals, or gods. In this classification, only human beings can get liberated. So even if gods have more felicity than human beings, this is not the ultimately desired state. With such a conception, Jainism propounds a type of reasoned anthropocentrism, inasmuch as there is a unicity and rarity of the human life, without it being central. Besides, one should avoid to harm even the microscopic life forms present in the soil. This version of non-violence is so extreme that one’s restrained action is very close to one’s mere absence of act, since even breathing, drinking water, or walking can prove harmful.

On a methodological level, one can also only notice the thorough use of lists in this philosophical paradigm, the more striking example is probably to be found in the Canonical text on possibilities ( Sthānāṅgasūtra , 3 rd –2 nd centuries BCE [Ṭhāṇ.]), in which philosophical considerations take the form of ordered lists of items, starting with singletons in chapter one (e.g., one Mahāvīra in this cosmic cycle), continuing with lists of two items in chapter two (e.g., the self versus non-self stuff), and so on up to the tenth chapter, that presents lists of ten items (e.g., there are ten characteristics of the Jaina path, namely patience, liberation, honesty, kindness, humbleness, truth, self-discipline, austerity, detachment and chastity).

The difficulty of following these norms of action gave rise to two important changes in Jaina conceptions of the world (Johnson 1995). First, in early canons, violent acts are the only direct factors of bondage; while in later canonical texts, passions came to play an important role, which means that one’s intention to harm is valued in the calculus of one’s bondage. In this dynamic, non-intentional harmful act can be forgiven. Second, the difficulty to follow these norms is one of the fields in which the many-sided perspectival stance of Jaina philosophers emerged, since an action can be qualified as harmful from a given perspective, while qualified as non-harmful—therefore permitted—from another perspective.

Now, next to be able to determine whether an act is harmful or not is the question to determine what is a self and what is not.

The Treatise on What There Is ( Tattvārthasūtra , TS), associated with the name of Umāsvāmin and probably written by multiple authors around 150–400 CE, is traditionally considered as the first work and main representative of classical Jaina philosophy. It is the oldest extant Jaina treatise in Sanskrit. It aims to integrate themes tackled in canonical literature in a coherent philosophical system. The Treatise on what there is , opens with the following verses:

TS 1.1. The path to liberation is constituted by right view ( darśana ), right knowledge, and right conduct. TS 1.2. Right view is confidence in the categories. TS 1.4. The categories are self, non-self, inflow [of karmic matter], bondage [with karmic matter], stoppage [of the inflow], destruction [of the bondage], liberation. TS 5.1. The inanimate entities (= non-self) are medium of motion ( dharma ), medium of rest, space and matter. TS 5.2. [These] together with the selves are the substances. TS 5.38. (exists only in some textual traditions). Time is also a substance.

So, there are seven categories and six types of substance. The first category consists in selves, which are a type of substance, while the second category, the non-self stuff, encompasses the five remaining types of substance. These two categories will be dealt with in more depth in the section on metaphysics ( §2.1 ). Next to these, are the inflow of harmful and harmless karmic matter into a sentient substance ( āsrava ); the mutual intermingling of sentient and non-sentient karmic matter caused by wrong belief, non-renunciation, carelessness, passions and vibrations set in the soul through mind, body and speech ( bandha ); the stoppage of the inflow of karmic matter into a sentient substance that results from right conduct ( saṃvara ); the gradual dissociation of karmic matter from a sentient substance ( nirjarā ); and the state of complete annihilation of karmic matter in the pure sentient substance ( mokṣa ). For this section on ethics, what is important to keep in mind is that five out of the seven elementary categories are not ontological ones, but define the way by means of which the self, which is primarily active consciousness, relates to things which are not conscious and passive.

First, this means that the categories relevant in this metaphysics are introduced inasmuch as a good understanding of their nature is essential in characterizing the practice that will make one progress in the path towards liberation.

these categories ( tattva ) are essentially “facts” about the nature of existence which enable those who analyse them properly to plot their route to liberation. (Johnson 2014)

As such, there is an inbuilt soteriological concern of Jaina ontology and metaphysics.

Third, the core categorical differentiation distinguishes between what is animate and conscious and what is not. Such an impermeable distinction is especially essential in a conception in which one needs to be able to know precisely how much her acts are correct, respectively incorrect, because the harm done to others binds her. This was an important part of the discussions concerning monastic practices.

Next to these considerations, epistemological concerns are likewise prevalent in the shaping of the metaphysical and soteriological edifices. This is due to the fact that Jaina practices aim at the practitioner’s liberation from wrong conceptions ( mithyātva ). In the Treatise on What There Is , the self is defined in the following way:

TS 2.8. The defining characteristic of the self is experience ( upayoga ).

This definition is further commented in the Commentary on the Treatise on What There Is ( Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya [TSBh]), written in Sanskrit by Umāsvāti (400–450 CE), by dividing this experience into cognition ( jñāna ) and indeterminate perception ( darśana ) (TSBh 2.9.1).

This stress on epistemic abilities is not typical of Jainism. Indeed, in most South Asian philosophico-religious traditions, the divine, the absolute, is usually primarily knowledge ( jñāna ), consciousness ( cit ), insight ( prajñā ), the subject of experience ( puruṣa ) or the seer ( draṣṭṛ ). Therefore, Jaina conceptions of the self ( ātman , jīva ) as ultimately unobstructed consciousness are no exception here.

Nor is the fact that our spiritual progress consists in a progress which is virtuous and epistemic at the same time. To explain, karma is in Jainism conceived as a subtle type of matter that fills all cosmic space. Its specific property is to develop the consequences of our virtuous, respectively unethical, acts. And then, due to passions which act as a glue, karmic matter sticks to the self and obstructs its potency. Let us think of someone’s reflection in a mirror as a type of expression of herself. Now, imagine that the mirror is red, with the pun that the Sanskrit expression “ rāga ” means both “red object” and “attachment, passion.” In such a situation, the person will have a red, therefore distorted, vision of herself. Jaina thinkers teach us that karmic matter function likewise, it has the shape of one’s impetus towards objects and, doing so, it impedes one’s epistemic competence, as she approaches things as part of a given limited project she has. From this, getting rid of specific intentions, acting in an equanimous virtuous way is also burning karma is also acquiring the means to see things in a less distorted way. That is to say things as they are instead of things as I intend them to be . This is this removal of wrong habits that enables right knowledge and right sight to take place, and that explains that the acquisition of higher faculties of knowledge is ensured by renunciation from passions and the corresponding destruction of karmic bondage.

In general, within a framework that admits the karma theory:

• The acquisition of higher epistemic abilities is ensured by moral behavior and the corresponding destruction of karma. In this dynamic, theories of karma blur the distinction between epistemology and soteriology.
• Metaphysical investigations focus on the world qua knowable. For example, Jainas derive the expression “ loka ”, “the universe”, not from the Sanskrit etymology “open space”, but from the root “ lok -”, “to see”, inasmuch as the universe is conceived as “that which is seen by the omniscient one” (Dundas 2002). In general, theories of karma blur the distinction between epistemology and metaphysics.
• Even a clod of earth exists as earth because it has earned its particular niche in the wider system of life processes due to its previous deeds. In consequence, the world of nature cannot be separated from the moral order. In general, theories of karma blur the distinction between metaphysics and soteriology.

2. A complete worldview: metaphysics, taxonomies, cosmology

We have just seen that the Jaina ethical effort is focused on distinguishing what is the self from what it is not. This is what explains that Jaina metaphysics is regularly presented as a dualism that conceives the world a resulting from the activity of the elements belonging to these two everlasting uncreated coexisting and independent categories (Dixit 1971). This conception is close to that of Sāṃkhya philosophy, which admits of two irreducible categories, namely the Experiencer ( puruṣa ) and the Experienced ( prakṛti ), and which considers philosophy as the activity whose main goal is the disentanglement of these two categories. Now, besides these shared fundamental conceptions, both classifications deeply diverge (Bronkhorst 2007).

In Jainism, the self ( jīva ) is more precisely unobstructed consciousness that concretely experiences cognition and perception. It is also what desires pleasure, reads pain, acts beneficially or harmfully and experiences the fruit thereof. In other words, being an influential active self is a condition of possibility for the individual to make or unmake herself in the world, which is perceived by Jains as a condition of possibility for ethical responsibility. Here, their conception differs from the one of Sāṃkhya philosophers, who consider that in deepest reality, the self has never acted, and that all perceived activity is actually performed by non-self stuff trying to imitate the self. From this, selves have never genuinely been bound by karma, and realizing this proper nature of things thanks to the yogic practice of meditation is alone sufficient to free from rebirth and karmic retribution. For more on yoga and meditative practices in Jainism, see the Treatise on yoga ( Yogaśāstra [YŚ]) by Hemacandra (1089–1172) (Chapple 2016; Tatia 1951).

Despite the success of this conception and the fact that Jaina philosophers share most of the necessary elements to also subscribe to this conception, they will not take this direction. The reason for this is that they need an active self, because moral distinctions lose their value on the hypothesis of the passivity of the soul. On this point, they are also severe critics of theories of the creation of the world by God ( Īśvara ), in which the intelligent subject is the mere product of an external intelligent principle; or of the fatalist theory according to which all things are fixed; to indicate but a few interlocutors.

Besides, Jaina philosophers consider that there are as many selves as there are living beings in the world. Each has a persisting self-identity preserved even in the ultimate condition, which is a condition of possibility for ethical responsibility. Concerning one’s responsibility for a series of acts, Jaina authors are highly critical, both of the Buddhist conception according to which there is no self, and of the Brahmanic conception according to which the individual self is ultimately undifferentiated with the universal self.

Finally, there is a fixed amount of selves in the universe. Not only the non-liberated ones go from one birth to the other in this cosmic cycle, but it will be the same ones who will continue to do so in the next cosmic cycle, and so on. Besides, a self is fit, respectively unfit, for liberation. When a self is unfit, no amount of good act can change this fact.

Second, the category of non-self ( ajīva ) deals with the matter and organisational principles thereof. To begin with, space ( ākāśa ) is an all-pervading single indivisible whole that includes both the part occupied by the world of things ( loka ) and the void and empty part beyond it ( aloka ). A point of space ( pradeśa ) is conceived as that which can be obstructed by one indivisible atom of matter and which can give space to all types of particles.

Now, space by itself is not a sufficient condition of motion and of rest. To avoid chaos, it is necessary to also postulate a medium of motion ( dharma ), as well as a medium of rest ( adharma ). The traditional metaphor is that, as water is the condition of the motion of fish, dharma and adharma are the condition of all motions. Here lies another specificity of Jainism. While in other systems, dharma (etymologically “what sustains”) represents the only really sustainable stream of acts, the virtuous way of life, the worthy behavior, one’s teaching or religion, here it stands for the medium of motion, while meritorious behavior is “ puṇya ” (respectively, non-meritorious behavior is “ pāpa ”). This is an instance of a Jaina tendency to physicalize the philosophical and ethical concepts. If we understand dharma as the universal law establishing what is fit and what is not, hereby accounting for movements with an intention, we can understand that in the early Jaina conceptions, in which the concrete acts, not the intention, are foremost, dharma becomes what accounts for movements in general.

Together, space, the medium of motion and the medium of rest are the conditions of motion of things that can move, while they are themselves unaffected by movement. They are devoid of the qualities of taste, color, smell, sound, contact. They pervade the whole universe, yet they are non-physical, non-atomic and non-discrete. These three substances form a unity, they have the same all-embracing size and continuous form. They are distinguished merely because of the difference in their respective functions. They are the conditions for the subsistence of all things, selves and matter, the connecting environment which binds together the isolated phenomena into an ordered whole.

As for matter ( pudgala ), it is the material cause of body, speech, mind and breath. This means that in this conception, not only bodies ( śārira ), but also the physical mind, words, thoughts and breath, are types of subtle material substances. Matter is especially what accounts for the existence of karma, a subtle type of matter. To explain, there is a pan-Indian conception that what has parts is impermanent. In Jainism, matter is the only type of substance that can associate or dissociate and, therefore, that has parts. Therefore, impermanence only comes from one’s association with matter. Contrarily to matter, (i) a self is a single atom devoid of parts and totally independent from both other selves and other substances; (ii) space, medium of motion and medium of rest are each a single indivisible whole that occupies all cosmic space; and (iii) time has no extension.

Furthermore, Jaina thinkers develop a complex system, with calculations, to explain the practical effects of karma, for example the precise mass of material particles assimilated after a given act, or the duration and intensity of this assimilation. This resembles physics, and one specificity of Jaina philosophy is to focus on developing this complex system of the mechanisms of karma, as seen in the Essence of [the teachings of] Mahāvīra ( Gommaṭasāra [GS]) of Nemicandra (10 th century CE). There are eight types of karmic matter (see TS 8.5), divided in four harming ( ghātiyā ) and four non-harming ( aghātiyā ) types (Jaini 1979). The harming types of karmic matter are:

• delusory karma ( mohanīya ), which reduces one’s innate bliss and brings about attachment to incorrect views. It notably distorts one’s appreciation of the categories of reality;
• knowledge-obstructing karma ( jñāna-avaraṇīya ), which covers the self, the mind and the senses, therefore impedes their natural abilities;
• perception-obstructing karma ( darśanāvaraṇīya ), which impedes one’s intuitions;
• obstacle karma ( antarāya ), which reduces one’s innate energy.

And the four non-harming types of karmic matter are:

• feeling karma ( vedanīya ), which determines whether the experiences of the self are pleasant or not;
• name karma ( nāman ), which determines what sort of rebirth is attained;
• life karma ( āyus ), which decides the duration of one’s life;
• clan karma ( gotra ), which determines one’s status within a species (Wiley 2011).

Finally, time is what accounts for becoming. Time is not treated with other substances, because it has no extension. From this, it is not considered as a substance properly speaking, only in some aspects. Especially, its existence can only be extrapolated from our awareness of phenomena. There is an absolute time ( kāla ), which is eternal, and a relative time ( samaya ), with a beginning and variations, determined by the motion in things. Time is called the destroyer, because all things are liable to dissolution of form in the cyclic course of time.

The whole physics of Jainism is an atomism. In this, Jaina conceptions are close to those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. An atom ( paramāṇu ) is infinitesimal, ultimate and eternal. From this, it is neither created nor destroyed. Now, contrarily to the conceptions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, according to which God ( Īśvara ) is the one who presides over the association of these atoms and creates the world as we experience it, Jaina philosophers hold that there is no such entity. For them, atoms have always been there and their association follows natural laws. Jaina philosophers are especially critical of an attitude that does not favor ethical responsibility, and the recognition that an external consciousness is responsible for the state of the world risks to undermine this ethical responsibility beyond repair. According to them, ethics especially requires that the individual can make or unmake herself in this world. This is partly what explains that there is a lengthy tradition of refutations by both Jaina and Buddhist philosophers of the Naiyāyika arguments in favor of the fact that God is the sustainer of the world.

Next to this, an atom is not necessarily material. Indeed, selves are a type of atom. Matter exists as atom or as aggregate ( skandha ). The aggregates, produced out of a mutual attraction of atoms, vary from binary to infinite compounds and every perceivable object, that is to say every object endowed with a form, is an aggregate. As such, atoms are the formless basis of all forms, although sometimes it is said that it has form inasmuch as it can be perceived by the omniscient ones. Furthermore, in contradistinction with the conception of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and in agreement with Leucippus and Democritus, Jaina philosophers hold that an atom of one type is first undifferentiated, similar to any other atom of the same type, and then develops differentiated characteristics so as to become an atom of earth, an atom of water, etc. Atoms therefore acquire a kind of taste, color, smell, contact, as well as weight, the heavier moving downwards and the lighter upwards. An interesting characteristic of Jainism is that an atom may develop a motion so swift that it traverses in one moment the whole universe. This explains that some saints, who are well advanced in the path that consists in realizing the proper nature of things, can perform this miracle.

Finally, atoms can contract and expand. When in subtle state, innumerable atoms occupy the space of one gross atom. Matter is an eternal substance undetermined with regards to quantity and quality. It is because the atoms in it can expand that matter may increase or diminish in volume without addition or loss of particles. For a self, which also is an atom and which has dimensions although it is not material, this means that it is capable of expansion and contraction. The self is actually co-extensive with the physical body it occupies. This is what explains that we have sensations from the top of the head to the tip of the toes. This means that the self is of a very small size when it starts in the womb, then it expands and, at the end of each earthly life, it contracts again into the seed of the next birth. To explain how this works, Jaina philosophers use metaphors such as that of a lamp: whether placed in a small pot or in a larger room, a lamp illumines the whole space. In the same way, the self imparts consciousness according to the dimensions of the body it occupies. Another specificity of Jainism is the belief according to which, under special circumstances, an embodied self can expand beyond its body, up to the size of the universe, and act outside of it. This projection, called “ samudghāta ”, “extermination”, enables her to annihilate specific karmic matter (Pragya 2021).

Jaina thinkers excel in developing lengthy and highly technical classifications. A core classification is the taxonomy that distinguishes the types of embodied selves according to the number of senses they possess. This taxonomy has retained its importance for contemporary practitioners, notably because it defines the extent of demerit acquired when one actually harms a living being.

There, the first category gathers all the living beings possessing only one sense, namely that of touch. This concerns either plants, or the elemental selves which gets embodied in an atom of earth, of water, of fire, or of air, either gross or subtle. In consequence, there are souls also in things such as stones and metals. However, it is not always the case that a self gets embodied in these atoms. When there is no self in it, the atom is purely inanimate matter, unable to suffer. In opposition to this, each plant or animal is necessarily the host of a self, this is what makes it alive. Concerning plants, some can also be the host of several selves, as in the case of moss. This also concerns the most basic life form, called “ nigoda ”, “idle”, and which consists in clusters of minute beings with little hope for liberation. They can be found everywhere, including in air, tissues of plants, or flesh of animals. The offense must be strong for a self once embodied in a human being to get embodied as a nigoda . One famous example is that of Makkhali Gośāla, leader of the heretic Ājīvika movement, who was disrespectful and challenged Mahāvīra. Furthermore, if a plant dies, its self transmigrates and gets re-embodied in another, more or less subtle, body. In this case, the body of the plant is not alive anymore, but it is still inhabited by the selves of the bacteria that work towards its decomposition. To conclude on one-sensed beings, they possess the sense of touch. This means that they cannot see, hear, smell, taste, nor think, but they have a minimal conscious activity in the form of the tactile experience. Besides, even in a crude not developed way, they can already experience pleasure and pain.

Next to the one-sensed beings are all the animals. First, worms and every being in their category, like leeches, mollusks, or a type of phytophagous beetles, are two-sensed beings, possessing both touch and taste. Then, ants and all the beings in their category, like phytophagous insects, termites and millipedes, are three-sensed beings, and are also able to smell. They are followed by the four-sensed beings who can also see, like bees and similar beings as flies, mosquitoes, butterflies or scorpions. Finally, human beings and all the beings in their category, like fish, reptiles, birds, quadrupeds, demons and gods, are five-sensed beings, enjoying touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing. Amongst them, some also have an intellect ( manas ), considered by some authors as a sixth sense.

It is interesting to note that the English expression “animal” denotes what is animated, what has a soul. While in Jainism, what is animated, what has a soul ( jīva ), also includes the immobile plants and elemental beings. In this conception, the Sanskrit expression for animal is “ tiryañc -”, “what is able to cross a spatial area”.

It is hard to understand what is not alive in this system. Therefore, acting in a non-harmful way is close to non-acting. In practice, while the lay community should avoid harming the beings with two or more senses, the monastic community is supposed to also avoid harming the one-sensed beings. With such a norm of action, monks and nuns cannot cook, nor perform a range of acts necessary for their survival. From this, a system of redistribution of merit and demerit is developed for the lay people, who perform some violent acts for their survival, but are redeemed in providing the means to live to the monastic community.

Each self is eternal and, as such, it has no beginning nor end. At the same time, each self is constantly experiencing change, because it is essentially active. This is a core teaching of Jainism to which we will come back in the section 3.4 on epistemology, namely, that every existing thing is at the same time persistent and changing (Bajželj 2013). This is one of the doctrinal points that prompted Jaina thinkers to speak in terms of many-sided objects of knowledge.

Now, this means that even the omniscient one who fully manifests the qualities of consciousness still has modal variations on its consciousness, like momentary and innately arising modes of absolute knowledge and of absolute perception that continuously succeed to one another being qualitatively identical, just as the innately produced modes of time are qualitatively identical to one another (Bajželj 2018).

Besides, this also means that contrarily to the Sāṃkhya view, modifications are not only in the realm of matter. Selves also are experiencing states.

But this, in turns, entails that a change happens both at the level of matter and at the radically distinct level of selves. A phenomenon that helps us understand how this works in the Jaina view is the functioning of “life karma”. First, death is not an end, but a reappraisal of the entanglement of one self with matter, regulated by karma. The fact that the life karma decides the duration of one’s life means nothing less that when one dies, say, because of a car accident, these external forces are only the material cause of the death of the embodied self, while the fruition of her life karma is the efficient cause of her death. In such a conception, death happens as the fruit of the actions that one has herself performed in a previous life.

Before we continue, it is worthy to note that one’s acts do not genuinely determine the moment of one’s death in this life, but in the next one. Besides, when death happens, the most recent volitional activities have an impact. All in all, one’s very last breath can influence the specific outcome of the determination of the life karma for one’s next life. This is what explains that the Jains seek a good death. Such a good death is a death without strong volitions, free from fears and desires. This, in turn, is what explains the popularity of the ritual fast to death, called “ sallekhana ”, and that has caused some legal and cultural turmoil in recent years.

Second, since everything is already determined at the moment of death, one’s transition from death to the being in a womb or other type of new type of life is considered instantaneous, there is no waiting period, since everything is already decided.

To come back to our main discussion, and try to understand how one’s acts in the previous life also engender a duration determination for this experience, a parallel with the process of sedimentation is helpful. Take a muddy water, leave it without any movement for a sufficient amount of time, and the different types of substances involved in this mixture will separate, the more gross particles being at the bottom. In this process, time differs for each mixture, since the speed of the disentanglement depends upon the nature of the substances involved. The same phenomenon happens with the self and its bodies, since their type of entanglement in the previous life mechanically has an effect on the lapse of time that the next entanglement will last. And this has nothing to do with a deserved punishment after some fault, nor with a deserved reward after some good deed. This has to do with the laws of physics. In the Treatise on What There Is , we can find calculations such as this one:

TS 8.15. Bondage to life karma lasts up to thirty-three ocean-measured periods (that is, 1/3 × 8,400,00 × 8,400,00 × 10 7 years).

With the sedimentation metaphor, it is still not clear why the efficient cause of death, the exhaustion of one’s life force, is not enough, and why material factors are here also needed. This cannot mean that Jainism is a type of occasionalism, since originated aggregates are efficient causes in their own realm. But at least, such a conception is only possible if one conceives the world as a rational whole in which things make sense together, even though only the omniscient ones can experience that.

The beginning of an answer to this question can be found in a second tradition, next to that of the Treatise on What There Is . This tradition is that of Kundakunda. “Kundakunda” is actually not a single author, but the name that stands for the collective authorship of a Jaina textual tradition composed in Prakrit (Jaina Śaurasenī) between the third and the eighth centuries CE around Karnataka in the South of India (Balcerowicz 2017). Kundakunda’s textual tradition is as influent as the TS, and is regularly revered as sacred texts in Jaina temples. This textual tradition represents within Jainism a movement focused on the self, in which the religious practice that matters is the inward experience that is self-knowledge. The central teaching of Kundakunda in his Essence of the self ( Samayasāra [SSā]) is that karmic matter is never genuinely mixed with the self. Therefore, it is close to Sāṃkhya conceptions, while keeping the Jaina specificity of an essentially active self (Bronkhorst 2010). There, the self is modified by modifications of consciousness ( adhyavasāna ) and by states ( bhāva ). However, it is possible to distinguish between different types of activities, some of them not bringing about karmic retribution. And this is exactly Kundakunda’s move when he redefines the self as not the agent of what happens in the material world of karma. For him, the self is active only in its own domain. Concretely, the self is the material cause only of the modifications of consciousness, while karmic matter is the indirect instrumental cause of wrong modifications of it. In turn, the self is the indirect instrumental cause of karmic modifications, but only as a king indirectly causes the virtue in his subjects when he acts in a virtuous way and is taken as a model.

To summarize, we have seen in the Treatise on What There Is that karmic matter and the self intermingle in the same way some liquids do, since their respective nature is not modified by this mixture and can get separated. Indeed, in muddy water, water actually stays water; while sedimentary dust actually stays sedimentary dust. Then, we have seen that in the Essence of the self , the association between the self and karmic matter can be though of in terms of kings acting as models. Another metaphor is that of a mirror-like crystal: if a flower reflected in a crystal is red, we see the crystal as if it was red, while it is not. Likewise, the self sees attachment and wrong notions superposed with it, not being it. All in all, in both textual lineages, what really matters is that the two—self and karmic matter—keep their essential distinct natures. Besides, the world is a whole in which things are mechanically combined together. Even though the types of substances are radically separated, they co-exist within the same conditions and so they experience synchronized modifications (Gorisse 2019).

Furthermore, Jaina authors believe that the life of the universe is a process without beginning nor end, that passes through an ongoing series of cosmic cycles, each of which is billions of years in duration. The question of an origin and end of the universe does not arise, since the latter is eternal. What matters is the transition between two types of periods. The universe goes through a series of cycles, each of which lasts several billion years. The wheel of time experiences one descending cycle, which passes through six periods during which prosperity, happiness, and morality decline; and one ascending cycle, which passes through six periods during which prosperity, happiness, and morality increase. These periods are characterized by the possibility—respectively the impossibility—of individual liberation while they happen. Indeed, on one hand, it takes a minimum of suffering to want to engage in the path of liberation. and on the other hand, serenity must be sufficiently accessible to be able to properly engage in ascetic practices. On the day when Kṛṣṇa left the earth, in the third millennium BCE, after the great battle described in the The Great [Epic of the Dynasty] of the Bhāratas ( Mahābhārata ), we entered into the fifth descending period of the cycle. It is therefore expected that things will go from bad to worse in our world for a few millennia before they get better again. This means that it is no longer possible to achieve enlightenment in the current period, because the world order is too unstable.

We started this entry by stating that the Jains are those who consider that the teachings of the omniscient Jinas are the expression of the eternal essential nature of the universe, and that the only extant teaching is that of Mahāvīra “the Great Hero” (traditional dates 599–527/510 BCE), the twenty-fourth and last Jina of the current cosmic period. Mahāvīra is an older contemporary of the Buddha and has a biography very close to that of the latter. Notably, he left his royal family, became an ascetic and founded a community made of mendicant ascetics and lay followers. One notable difference being that he follows a tradition that was existing long before him.

So, at every cosmic cycle, the doctrine is taught by 24 such omniscient Jinas. These are also called “ tīrthaṅkara ” (ford makers). Since Vedic times, a tīrtha refers to holy spots in shallow waters, where people perform acts of devotion, especially bathing, which is considered as purifying sins. These shallow waters can also be a crossing place symbolizing the junction between mundane world and sacred realm. In this line, a tīrthaṅkara is a spiritual pioneer able to cross beyond the perpetual flow of earthly life and, as such, he or she (they do not have a sexual identity at this stage) acts as a model mediating the passage between a mundane state of our selves and a state of unobstructed consciousness in act. It is important to notice that these liberated beings know all, but are by essence unable to influence the course of action of the world, since they do not have intentions and that they are radically isolated from anything else.

Besides, after Mahāvīra’s liberation, liberation is not possible anymore in our realm for cosmic reasons. However, there are other realms, in which gods and demons notably live. Jainas have developed a complex model of the universe (Dundas 2005). Canonical literature (3 rd century BCE—6 th century CE) already includes description of the universe, but it is between the 3 rd and the 13 th centuries CE that specialized texts specifically dedicated to cosmography are composed, amongst them, the influential Compendium of Middle Earth ( Jambūdvīpasaṃgrahaṇī [JDS]) of Haribhadra Sūri (770 CE). There, the universe is described as being constituted of two parts. On one hand, the world ( loka ), extremely vast, but finite, is occupied by living beings and by things; on the other hand, the rest ( aloka ) surrounds the world with its infinite and empty space.

The inhabited world is made of a succession of island-continents, oceans, hells and paradises. It measures the distance traveled by a god who flies for six months at a speed of sixteen million kilometers per second. In this world, human beings live only in Middle-earth, also called the Island-Continent of the Rose Apple Tree ( Jambūdvīpa ). Middle Earth is, as its name suggests, central. Its surface is extremely small compared to the rest of the world. The different parts of the universe are defined in relation to the possibility—respectively the impossibility—of liberation therein and the region of Middle Earth is the only region from which it is possible to achieve liberation. Such a representation is conducive to remember the rare and central character of human birth, which alone can lead to liberation. Moreover, the extent and complexity of the whole is a constant reminder of the skills of the omniscient Jinas who were able to teach such a system.

Around the 16 th c., the world is presented in the form of a human being, thus emphasizing the similarities between the structure of the world and the inner struggle faced by each individual. Moreover, the extremely detailed depiction of the world provides a backdrop, both for the initiation tales of pious Jains found in narrative literature, and for meditative practices, some of which involve the contemplation of a holy object. Ultimately, the precision with which the authors describe the world allowed Jainism to stand out more clearly from other worldviews. Indeed, only the values of Jainism prevail in these descriptions of the universe. In this sense, the universe thus represented becomes an emblem of religious identity, as well as a guide to religious practice, because, above all else, the Jaina world is the abode of beings on the path of liberation (Dundas 2005).

3. Epistemology

It is now clear that Jaina philosophy is essentially directed at the individual effort of distinguishing the self and non-self stuff, until one reaches liberation. Besides, the self is traditionally defined as experience of consciousness, which consists in cognition ( jñāna ) and indeterminate perception ( darśana ). This will bring epistemological considerations at the core of Jaina philosophical investigations. First, there are many classifications of the different types of knowledge recognized by Jaina philosophers. The Treatise of What There Is attempts at collecting and organizing the types of knowledge mentioned in earlier literature into four types of indeterminate perception, whose study is not developed; and eight types of cognition, namely ordinary cognition of the senses, testimonial cognition, mental cognition, cosmic cognition, absolute cognition, and their faulty counterparts, namely wrong ordinary cognition of the senses, wrong testimonial cognition and wrong mental cognition (Shastri 1990; Balcerowicz 2017; den Boer 2020).

A few remarks are in order. First, the distinction between cognition and indeterminate perception is inherited from older canonical sources and is discarded by most epistemologists after the seminal work of Siddhasena Mahāmati (710–780 CE), who indicates in his Guide of Logic ( Nyāyāvatāra [NA]) that indeterminate perception collapses with cognition when perceptual experience already retains some details. However, it gave the opportunity for Jaina philosophers to assimilate a distinction that was especially important for Buddhist philosophers between conceptual and non-conceptual cognition.

Second, Jaina philosophers were influenced by the Nyāya classification, which was the cornerstone of all the South Asian epistemological edifice, and that recognizes five means of knowledge ( pramāṇa ), namely perception, inference, testimony and analogy. Jainas assimilated this model by admitting these means of knowledge either as subtypes of ordinary cognition, or as testimonial cognition.

Third, whatever enters our cognitive apparatus is a result of a contact with what exists. The senses, which include the mind, are an intermediary between our self and the object of knowledge, but the self can also know the object of knowledge directly. Mental, cosmic and absolute cognitions are such direct types of knowledge, while ordinary cognition and testimonial cognition are mediated ones. For Jainas, direct knowledge of the soul is called “ pratyakṣa ” (directly present to the soul); while in other systems, “ pratyakṣa ” (present before the eyes) is what stands for everyday life perception, therefore mediated by the organs of senses. This leads to competitive classifications by Jaina authors in their attempts at being understood by their non-Jaina interlocutors (Clavel 2015).

Fourth, the material cause of cognitive error is wrong perception ( mithyādarśana ), which is due to knowledge obstructing karma. Therefore, error can only affect types of cognition of selves who are still entangled with this type of karma. Conversely, error cannot affect cosmic and absolute cognition, which can be experienced only when all one’s knowledge obscuring karma has been removed.

In this conception in which human beings are in principle able to experience up to absolute cognition, it becomes possible even for someone who is not yet liberated to have a share in this, by relying on the teaching of liberated beings. Such a possibility is especially valuable, since knowing the phenomena unknowable by ordinary cognition, like the nature of the self, what happens after death, or the primary cause and final end of the world, is essential inasmuch as it conditions one’s spiritual progress towards the realization of a proper human life. In this dynamic, Jaina philosophers consider that a discourse is authoritative if it is uttered by such a liberated teacher, who is called “the one who has achieved, who is apt, reliable” ( āpta ).

First, Jaina philosophers are here not concerned with everyday life testimony, but with soteriological testimony.

Second, with this definition of an authoritative discourse, they are opposing the conceptions of the exegetes of the Veda, who consider that an authoritative discourse is by definition non-human, whatever one’s spiritual advancement, since the universal validity of a corpus can only come from the power of language itself.

Third, we said that liberated beings were absolutely isolated not interacting life-monads. However, one reaches a state of experience of absolute cognition before reaching liberation. More precisely, when all knowledge obscuring karmas are removed, one still has to wait for a long time for non-harming karmas to also be exhausted. This is within this laps of time that the teaching of the Jinas happens.

Fourth, direct disciples of the liberated beings also experience extra mundane types of cognition, although lesser ones. This make them the perfect medium to interpret the sacred teaching and transmit it to us. In such a way that “correct interpretation depends upon a teacher-pupil lineage or upon one”s own seniority and wisdom’ (Jyväsjärvi 2010). Indeed, an advanced monk is by definition both more knowledgeable and less deceptive (Flügel 2010 [2016]). The fact that one can access soteriological relevant knowledge thanks to monks who are living members of a lineage of interpretation is in part what explains the importance of theories of interpretation in Jaina philosophy, as well as the fact that the commentaries are regularly more important than the canon itself.

In the Manual for the behavior of laymen which is casket of jewel ( Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakâcāra [RKŚĀ]), Samantabhadra (530–590 CE) characterizes the authoritative teacher in the following way:

RKŚĀ 1.6. This one is called the reliable one who has no hunger, thirst, old age, affliction (of body and of mind), birth, death, fear, pride, attachment, aversion, delusion.

The fact that the authoritative speaker is presented as a God-like entity who has moral aptitudes before he has intellectual ones, since, as we have seen, this is a step to reach unobstructed, absolute, knowledge, has a series of consequences on Jaina epistemology (Gorisse 2022a). Especially, since these liberated beings have no intention, an authoritative teacher who gives instructions does good to the people without being motivated by passions. He acts for the benefit of humanity on account of his very nature, like a drum giving out sound at the touch of a beater does not want anything for itself:

RKŚĀ 1.8. Un-egoistically and dispassionately a teacher instructs from truth what is suitable. What (else) does a muraja -drum require to sound but the touch of a skillful hand?

One consequence is that in Jainism, testimonial cognition can be considered as a proper means of knowledge, because knowledge acquired thanks to the teaching of an authoritative person is proper knowledge of what exists as it is , and not knowledge of what exists as intended . Now, this holds only if he authoritative speaker belongs to the very specific category of speakers that we have seen. This has the consequence that what is recognized as an authoritative discourse are the Jaina sacred Scriptures and their commentaries.

Finally, we should keep in mind that this is consistently within an apologetic objective to defend one’s own scriptural tradition (Qvarnström 2006) and to attack the one of others that the different philosophico-traditions of India aimed to rationally justify a given set of claims and that they developed their logical frameworks in the form of what can rightfully be called a “systematic philosophy”, as we will investigate in the next paragraph. One issue in which the co-existence of a more systematic and a more dogmatic approach is manifest is the shift that happened with notably the Buddhist Dharmakīrti (550–610) in his Considerations on knowledge ( Pramāṇavārttika [PV]), when a transition was made from external criteria for the reliability of a discourse, like the existence of an authoritative utterer; to internal criteria, like soundness of the assertions themselves, or ability of the proponent to show a proof for these assertions. The Jaina tradition experiences this shift especially with the author Samantabhadra in his Investigation on Authority ( Āpta-mīmāṁsā [ĀMī]) (Balcerowicz 2016a).

A type of cognition that has a particular importance in South Asian philosophy is that of inference ( anumāna ). Inference is the type of cognition through which epistemic agents acquire new knowledge by means of reasoning upon what can be concluded with certainty from previously acquired knowledge. This is what is expressed by the Sanskrit expression “ anumāna ”, “the knowledge that follows [another knowledge]”. For example, when Devadatta wants to buy mangos, he wants to know which ones taste juicy before he buys them. At this point, he is not yet allowed to taste them, but he can reason based upon the color of the mangos and upon his past experience of a given color being associated with a given taste. In such a situation, the regularity of Devadatta’s past experience is not a coincidence, the co-presence of the property of having a given taste with the property of having a given color is guaranteed by the fact that both occurrences rely on the same causal complex, namely, a given stage of ripeness of the fruit at stake. This type of reasoning based on a necessary relationship between two properties is what is called “inference”. In technical terms, there is a transmission of certainty from the established knowledge that an “evidence-property” ( hetu ) is ascribed to a given object, to the new knowledge that a “target-property” ( sādhya ) is ascribed to the same object. This transmission of certainty is based on the “invariable concomitance” ( vyāpti ) between the two inferential properties. Vyāpti originally means “pervasion” and is used in this technical sense, because the pervasion of a property by another property, as in “whenever there is a Sissoo tree, there is a tree”, is the model for situations of necessary co-presence of the evidence-property with the target-property.

Inference has been thoroughly studied and its use strictly codified by the different philosophico-religious traditions of South Asia, Jainism included, because it provides the structure of scientific reasoning. Indeed, the conclusion of an inferential reasoning is considered as a scientific truth inasmuch as this type of reasoning relies on the emancipation from contextual parameters and on the guarantee that the isolated relations are necessary ones.

In concert, inferential reasoning has a strong argumentative potential. To explain, by means of stating an inferential reasoning, it is possible to bring somebody else to the awareness of these truths. Such a series of statements, even though it is not properly speaking a type of cognition by itself, is metaphorically called “inference for others” ( parārthānumāna ), in opposition to the “inference for oneself” ( svārthānumāna ), which is a genuine type of cognition. An inference for others is traditionally used in a philosophical debate in order to convince an interlocutor of a different faith who has different beliefs concerning what there is. In Jainism, there is an abundant literature of stories of conversion as the outcome of such debates, as well as the development of debating techniques to support one’s inferential reasoning (Gorisse 2018). Furthermore, the different traditions share the belief that from this truth-preserving argument, it is possible to define the standards of an ideally organized rational discussion, the outcomes of which are necessary true statements, and in the course of time, these philosophers developed a common inter-doctrinal framework of argumentation for philosophical discussions (Gorisse 2017).

From these observations, it comes as no surprise that the study of the rules to attack and defend the statement of an inference constitutes an important part of the logical investigations in Jainism. It also comes as no surprise that these considerations developed in close relationship with the logical investigations led by the other traditions of classical Indian philosophy. More precisely, Jaina authors routinely reference the Treatise on Logic ( Nyāyasūtra [NS]), the epistemological treatise of the Naiyāyika tradition, composed by Gautama in the second century CE, which is the pan Indian inter-doctrinal reference work for the characterization of inference. Next to this, later Jaina authors consistently engaged in discussions with the Buddhists, in particular with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, in the context of developing their theories of inference. The deep influence of Dharmakīrti’s epistemology and theories of argumentation on Jain philosophers can for example be seen in Vidyānandin’s reuse of some of the latter’s arguments in his Investigation into the True Teaching ( Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā [SŚP]) (Trikha 2017).

The more systematic analysis of inference in Jainism begins with the Śvetāmbara philosopher Siddhasena Mahāmati and his younger Digambara contemporary Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa (720–780), author of the Royal Commentary [to the Treatise on What there is] ( Rājavārttika [RV]) (Balcerowicz 2016b; Shah 1967), and develops through a continued line of commentaries until authors like Vādi Devasūri (1143 CE) in his Commentary on the explanation of the nature of modes of knowledge and perspectives ( Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṃkāra [PNT]) and later authors like Yaśovijaya (1638–1688 CE) and his Manual of Jain Logic ( Jainatarkabhāṣā [JTBh]) (Ganeri 2008). One of the main inter-doctrinal line of discussions and controversies in this conceptual framework is to bring the probative inferential argument to its minimal form by reducing the number of necessary statements. In these attempts, Jaina philosophers are traditionally considered as the ones to go the furthest. More precisely, the Treatise on Logic and its Commentary to the Treatise on Logic ( Nyāyasūtra bhāṣya , NSBh) by Vātsyāyana (450–500 CE) had brought an old model with explicit psychological conditions like doubt and desire to know, to a model linked only with the structure of the argument. There, the only good way to express a truth-preserving argument consists of a group of five statements expressing the thesis, the evidence, the account, the application and the conclusion in the inference. Jaina authors acknowledge this model and use Naiyāyika traditional examples, like:

[Thesis] Sound is impermanent, [Evidence] Because it is a product. [Account] Whatever is such is alike, like a pot. [Application] And this is a product. [Conclusion] Therefore it is impermanent.

But for Jaina authors, only pedagogical reasons can motivate a philosopher to fully state an argument in this way. To explain, only the first two statements are necessary steps to ensure the adhesion of the interlocutor. In his Guide of logic , Siddhasena makes it clear, first, that the evidence is the central cog of the inferential reasoning; second, that the statement of the thesis is also indispensable, as it indicates the goal of the inference. Its absence would be like observing an archer without knowing what his target is, that is to say without the possibility to know whether he is skillful or not.

A second major line of inter-doctrinal discussions and controversies in this conceptual framework is to aim towards a theory of the proper relationship between the target-property and the evidence-property. A first attempt to distinguish between arbitrary and necessary relationships is offered by the Buddhist Dignāga (480–540 CE), according to which the evidence-property is necessarily concomitant with the target-property if and only if it is possible to prove that the evidence-property is present in the case under consideration, in similar cases and in no dissimilar cases. In our example, it means that the property “being a product” has to be present in impermanent things like sound and pots, and absent in permanent things like the self. Jaina authors show that the three conditions of Dignāga are neither necessary, nor sufficient, and that what ultimately counts is that the evidence-property cannot be thought of otherwise than in the presence of the target-property. To explain, the only ultimately relevant criteria for the correctness of an inference is that its evidence-property is known as being “impossible otherwise” ( anyathānupapatti ) than in the presence of the target-property. One specificity of the Jaina tradition is to consider that this necessary concomitance between the inferential properties is known thanks to another type of cognition, “ tarka ” (here, not used in its traditional technical sense of “suppositional reasoning”), which functions as a direct discernment of universals. More precisely, it is clear that necessary concomitance cannot be known by customary perception, since perception deals only with particulars, and that even the biggest list of particular instances would not suffice to reach certainty. Yet, we can realize that if something with certain properties exists, something else with certain properties must also exist. It is not the same type of realization as the inferential one, since it is linked with the Jaina epistemological theory of particular-in-universal, according to which an object is a complex having both an existent universal aspect and an existent particular aspect (see next section on many-sidedness). Therefore, in the same situation in which one grasps a particular Sissoo, one can also grasp the common properties shared by all Sissoos.

3.4 Realism and many-sidedness

This complexity of the object of knowledge in Jaina philosophy has a deeply ramified history. At the time of Mahāvīra around the fifth–sixth centuries BCE, a practice was observed in the numerous movements of wandering mendicants: instead of answering philosophical questions in a one-sided way, the teacher was analyzing ( vibhajya ) them, showing their different presuppositions and possible meanings. Probably inherited from exegetical practices of interpretation of sacred texts, which dominantly consisted in analyzing the many perspectives that one could have on a single sentence. In Jainism, one of the most famous examples of this practice is to be found in the Venerable Exposition of teaching ( Bhagavatīsūtra , or Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra [Viy.]; old parts 5 th –2 th centuries BCE, new 2 nd century BCE to 1 st century CE), in which the disciple Indrabhūti Gautama asks to the monk Jamāli:

Is the “ loka ” (here meaning both “world” and “self”) eternal or is it, Jamāli, non-eternal?

Being asked in this manner, Jamāli was doubtful and wanted to know, but was overwhelmed with confusion. He was unable to speak in reply and remained silent. When Jamāli was confused, Bhagavān Mahāvīra addressed him as follows:

The world is, Jamāli, eternal […] it was, it is and it will be […]. The world is, Jamāli, non-eternal. For it becomes progressive after being regressive. And it becomes regressive after being progressive. The soul is, Jamāli, eternal. For it did not cease to exist at any time. The soul is, Jamāli, non-eternal. For it becomes animal after being a hellish creature, becomes a man after becoming an animal and it becomes a god after being a man.

So in this example, the Jaina teacher insists on the fact that:

• with respect to its substance, the self is eternal, like atoms are.
• but with respect to its modes, the self is non-eternal, like combinations of atoms.

Here, Mahāvīra does not make contradictory predications, but he refutes extremes views, which are considered as wrong, by making explicit the parameters of the different predications. It is interesting to notice that at the same period, the Buddha, who also uses distinctions of the sort in his speech, is known to refuse to answer questions of the sort (Matilal 1981).

Now, this way of making distinctions in predication should be thought of in close connection with considerations about causation. Indeed, the Jaina teacher also insists on the fact that one can give a proper account of a causal process only when one acknowledges both persistence and change.

To explain, it is not so obvious that we are legitimate in considering ourselves as being the same individual in time, since after all, the cells in our body are continuously replaced, none of the cells that currently constitute me will exist in seven years, each will have been renewed. Conversely, how are we to account for change? Any mechanical explanation of it fails, like Zeno’s arrow that has to travel half the way before it meets its target, but before it meets the half, it has to travel half the half, and before that, half of the half of the half, and so, ad infinitum , without being able to even start the movement. There is a problem with our way of accounting for change. Noticing this state of affair, South Asian philosophers engaged in raging debates around the paradoxes of causality at the turn of the CE. In a nutshell, if someone says “the potter makes the pot”, there are several types of possible stance on this:

• one can say that the effect “pot” already exists prior to the fruition of its immediate cause;
• one can say that it does not, hence the relevance of the causation process;
• some that it is neither existent, nor non-existent before the causation process;
• and one can also say that it both exists and does not exist prior to that.

While philosophers from different lineages have been variously depicted as holding one or the other of these alternatives, Jainas are consistently depicted as holding the last one and it is regularly considered as a Jaina specificity to hold that something both exists and does not exist prior to the causation process. But of course, Jains are far from being the only ones to claim so. Besides, they claim more precisely that what exists is at once originating, decaying and persisting in an essential and simultaneous way:

TS 5.29. Existence is endowed with production, decay and duration.

Indeed, any existing entity is both made of permanent atoms, sometimes including a permanent self; and partaking to the manifold and changing world we experience (Soni 1991). Here, while it is produced:

• the pot is already existent with respect to its substance ( dravya ), the clay;
• yet formerly non-existent with respect to its particular modes ( paryāya ; guṇa ): shape, function, etc.

Jaina philosophers insist on the fact that none of these aspects is more important than the other one. This means that substance and mode co-exist not in , but as a single discrete entity in Jainism. This single discrete entity is called a many-sided object of knowledge ( prameya , vastu ). This is the famous doctrine of the many-sidedness of things ( anekāntavāda ). It notably goes against the Vaiśeṣika conception, according to which qualities, like “being ochre”, exist independently of substances like “pots”, and are linked with them thanks to a relation of inherence. It also goes against the Buddhist conception, according to which only what is a non-complex unity is real (Gorisse 2022b). By the way, Jainas are realist philosophers who consider that human beings know a world that exists in its particularity independently of their knowledge of it, in such a way that the fact that our assertions can be specified following many perspectives can only come from the fact that the known object itself has many aspects.

Now, this conception led Jaina thinkers to claim that what surrounds us is at the same time existent and non-existent. Because, this complex object is existent as permanent with respect to its substance, yet non-existent as permanent with respect to its states. The Jaina author who spends the most time on elucidating in which sense existence and non-existence can be predicated to an object is probably Haribhadrasūri in his Victory banner of the theory of non-one-sidedness ( Anekāntajayapatākā [AJP]) (Mundra 2022; Van Den Bossche 1995). Now, Jainas are known to go further and to introduce not two, but seven modes of predication. Haribhadra is deeply influenced by the Investigation on Authority ( Āptamīmāṃsā [Āmī]) of Samantabhadra, which is amongst the first to teach that:

Āmī 14. An entity is somehow possessed of the character “being”, somehow possessed of the character “non-being”, somehow possessed of both, and somehow indescribable—all these four features characterizing it in accordance with the speaker’s intention and not in an absolute fashion. Āmī 15. Certainly, who will not allow that an entity is possessed of the character “being” so far as its own form etc. are concerned; while it is possessed of the character “non-being” so far as opposite is the case? For if that be not so, this entity will not be viewed as having a fixed nature of its own.

This means that existence is a property of something, inasmuch as this thing exists in relation to the substance, locus, time and state that are its own. In this dynamic, existence is identity with oneself. While non-existence is difference, and accounts for change. We need to recognize the non-existence of the thing in relation with forms, etc. which are alien to it. As such, the not-being blue is part of the essence of the red pot. Only thanks to this can the thing have that particular essence, because something is what it is as opposed to what it is not. This is close to the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of identity in difference ( bhedābheda ) (Uno 1997). Now, when we act in our every day life, our decisions involve objects more complex than that, i.e., objects which are existent with respect to some parameters and non-existent with respect to other parameters. Besides, also inexpressibility is somehow a property of the thing, in the sense that sometimes, existence and non-existence are considered simultaneously, and that this is impossible to express. In my everyday life, I act being surrounded by things which are all this, this is why existence, non-existence and inexpressible combine into not two, but seven modes of predication, namely, I can say that something exist; does not exist; exist and does not exists; is inexpressible; exist and is inexpressible; does not exist and is inexpressible; or exist, does not exist and is inexpressible.

Trying to make sense of the fact that a substance is at the same time persistent and subject to modification within a single coherent metaphysical system is the old problem of the articulation of the one and the many. The solution that Jaina philosophers brought to this issue with all these doctrines linked with many-sidedness, is probably their major contribution to philosophy (Radhakrishnan 1923; Padmarajiah 1963; Shah 2000; Barbato 2018). The last doctrine which will retain our attention here is the doctrine of perspectives ( nayavāda ). From Siddhasena Mahāmati, Akalaṅka, and their respective lineage of commentaries, see especially Siddharṣigaṇi’s Commentary to the Guide of Logic ( Nyāyâvatāravivṛtti [NAv], 900 CE) and Prabhācandra’s Sun [that opens] the lotus of the knowable ( Prameyakāmalamārtaṇḍa [PKM], 980–1065 CE), the doctrine of perspective is a technical apparatus that deals with our ways to know something, like a meta-epistemology. It provides an exhaustive classification of the main epistemic perspectives through which one can consider the essentially complex knowable from the most inclusive to the most particular perspective. Indeed, human epistemic faculties are such that they subsume diversity under unity, otherwise nothing would be intelligible nor communicable, and that from this, the fundamental complexity of the object of knowledge is resolved. Now, there are different ways to subsume diversity under unity or, to say it differently, different types of epistemic attention and different contexts of assertion. And the doctrine of perspective enables to specify the main favored types of attention that are active during the performance of a knowledge statement.

Building on this, Jaina philosophers came to explain the resisting divergences between the different philosophical systems as resulting from an initial choice of an epistemic perspective. In this dynamic, they classify the historical philosophical systems with which they interact as developed not within a perspective, but within the erroneous radicalization of a perspective, because each tradition depicted focuses on a given aspect of the knowable, since each also refutes other unaddressed aspects. This will get clearer if we introduce each perspective:

• The first type of perspective, called the “comprehensive” ( naigama ), is close to the Jaina position. It is the attitude of the knowing subjects who focus on both unity and difference, but not at the same time. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers are representatives of its erroneous developments, because they consider that what exists, the reality robust to philosophical investigations, is either a substance or a property. They excel in identifying the fundamental differences between the types of objects of knowledge, but they fail to understand that it is the very same object that is grasped under it substantial or its modal aspect.
• The second type of perspective, called the “synthesizing” ( saṃgraha ) is the attitude of the knowing subjects who focus on unity, either unity of all things that exist, or unity of all things which are a given type of substance. For Jaina philosophers, Advaita-vedānta and Sāṃkhya thinkers are representatives of its erroneous developments, as they consider that the only robust reality is a single permanent reality that includes everything. Hence, they excel in identifying the imperceptible connections and the homogeneity underlying the diversity of objects of knowledge, but they fail to also understand the fundamental differences between them.
• In contrast to this epistemic attitude, the third type of perspective, called the “empirical”, on worldly transactions ( vyavahāra ), is that of the knowing subjects who focus on difference. Cārvāka thinkers are representatives of its erroneous developments, because they consider that the robust reality is the one that human beings encounter every day and that is useful to them. As such, they excel at identifying modes and epistemic constructs active in the formulation of theses that rely on more than just sense faculties, but they fail to see that also metaphysical theses are relevant and that what we call “substance”, like selves, exists and are not entirely similar with the modes that we encounter in every day life.
• Besides, the fourth type of perspective, the “actual”, on what is directly present to the senses ( ṛjusūtra ) is the stance of the knowing subjects who focus on what is present in front of us at the moment, that is to say on difference that is currently manifested. Buddhist thinkers are representatives of its erroneous developments, because they consider that only what is grasped in experience exists, nothing beyond, and that the only robust reality is an extremely transient and particular reality. They therefore excel in identifying the epistemic constructions active when operations of synthesis are performed on objects of knowledge, but they fail to understand also the elements of fundamental permanence that exist in them.
• The three last perspectives are those of the knowing subjects who focus on the word. Grammarians are representatives of their erroneous developments, because they consider that the robust reality is the linguistic element that expresses the world. They excel at identifying the semantic distinctions relevant to denote a given referent. But while they do so, they fail to also understand that only a plurality of frames of reference could enable to cover the integrality of referential situations that one might experience. The fifth type of perspective, the “semantic” ( śabda ), deals more precisely with grammatical rules. It is the perspective of the knowing subjects who focus on the word as expressing difference based on grammatical categories.
• While the sixth, “etymological” ( samabhirūḍha ) is concerned with difference based on etymology.
• And the seventh, the “actual etymological” ( evaṃbhūta ), with difference based on etymology that is currently manifested.

In his Establishment of all objects ( Sarvārthasiddhi [SAS]), Pūjyapāda (540–600 CE) explains that like a piece of cloth fulfils a purpose only if its different threads are woven; in the same way, the different perspectives fulfil a purpose only if they work together, and that isolated, they do not convey even a little faith. The doctrine of perspectives seems to be the Jaina reaction to philosophical and religious pluralism in classical India. To explain, there exist resisting divergences concerning the nature of the ultimate constituent of the world, the ways in which they interact, their origin; the position of human beings in all this and the conception of the way in which we should act. No strictly regulated philosophical debate has been able to overcome these differences. Jaina thinkers are likewise not trying to flatten these irreducible views within a single conception. Rather, they show how each could contribute to the whole picture.

To conclude, philosophy within Jainism is mainly the means to come to know the categories that are the selves and karmic matter, which are especially relevant for our liberation. Many tools help us within this effort:

• the Scriptures—the teaching of beings experiencing absolute knowledge—which, in turn, can be fully understood only by beings with a similar mind. Here, the more advanced on the path, the more senior the member of the monastic community, the better her understanding. This explains the huge number of hermeneutics techniques come from this faith in the Scriptures, which are considered by some Jains as scientific treatises.
• our faculties of knowledge like perception, inference and the art of debate, up to a range of super-natural faculties of knowledge. Here too, a knowledge claim is to be analyzed through different types of perspectives.
• an openness to this higher order of being within ourselves, notably through meditation.
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Beginnings of Jaina Ontology and Its Models

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• Published: 23 August 2021
• Volume 49 , pages 657–697, ( 2021 )

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The paper analyses the beginnings of systematic ontology in Jainism, which appears to have began after first century CE, albeit certain ontology-relevant terminology in a nascent form was present earlier. A clear expression of systematic ontological reflection is the existence of models that organize ideas and categories in a more consistent conceptual scheme. Jainism follows similar developments that had earlier taken shape in in the early Buddhist Abhidharma, proto-Sāṁkhya-Yoga and proto-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In addition, the paper argues that the models, five in total, can be used as a methodological tool to distinguish various historical layers in early Jaina writings.

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Introduction

The sources on the early history of Jainism and its philosophy are extremely scarce and scattered. Jaina writings of any relevance to the research on the history of its earliest thought and pre-classical development comprise (1) the canonical literature ( āgama ) of the Śvetāmbaras codified during the third council ( vācanā , or ‘recitation session’) of Valabhī on the Kāṭhiyāvāṛ peninsula of Saurāṣṭra some time between 450 and 480 CE, convened by Devarddhi-gaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa, (2) the semi-canonical ‘substitute’ Footnote 1 writings of the Digambaras, knows as siddhānta (‘established doctrine’), largely compilations in nature, Footnote 2 primarily the triad of Puṣpadanta’s and Bhūtabali’s Canon in Six Parts ( Cha-kkhaṁḍâgame , ṢKhĀ; third cent. CE or later), Guṇadhara’s Exposition of Passion ( Kasāya-pāhuḍa , KP; third cent. CE or much later) and Bhūtabali’s Great Treatise ( Mahā-baṁdha , MB; third–fourth cent. CE or later), and (3) the extra-canonical collection of the Sayings of the Seers ( Isi-bhāsiyāiṁ , Isibh), a compilation of various hymns and stray verses, the composition of which spans the period of a few centuries, with the oldest layers going back to perhaps the fifth/forth century BCE in the the form of what may be a genuine excerpt from the original teachings of Ājīvika Gośāla Maṅkhaliputra, or Maskarin Gośāla (Gosālīputra; Pāḷi: Makkhali Gosāla; Prakrit: Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta) and the earliest historical reference to Pārśva ( Pāsa ), whereas the youngest layers may date back to approximately the second century CE.

The oldest philosophically relevant portions of the Śvetāmbara canonical works, are mostly contained in some fragments of: The Canonical Book on Conduct ( Āyāraṁga-sutta , Āyār), including its Chapters on Virtue ( Bambha-cerāiṁ / Brahma-caryāṇi ); The Canonical Book against [Heretical] Books ( Sūya-gaḍaṁga ; Sūy) ; The Later Chapters (Uttarajjhayaṇa-sutta ; Uttar); The Story of the King Paesi ( Paesi-kahāṇaya / Pradeśi-kathānaka ) Footnote 3 being a fragment of Replies to Royal Queries ( Rāya-paseṇiya ; RP); The Lecture of Explanations ( Viyāha-pannatti ; Viy), popularly known as the Venerable Book ( Bhagavatī-sūtra ), including its fifteenth chapter The Emission of Fiery Lustre ( Teya-nisagga ); besides some early sections of other texts of importance for the monastic discipline such as Ten Chapters for the Study Outside of Regular Study Hours ( Dasa-veyāliya-sutta ; DVe); The Book on Demotion ( Cheya-sutta / Cheda-sūtra ); and a whole group of texts on the obligatory rites ( āvassaya / āvaśyaka; ĀvS). Footnote 4 Some oldest portions of the Śvetāmbara canon have been assigned by Ohira ( 1982 , 1 ff.) to the period of ‘6/5th–4th centuries B.C.)’, however such early dating is acceptable only in the sense that selected few singular passages in the way they are preserved in the canon may go back to earlier formulations dating back to the beginnings of Jainism and Ājīvikism, viz. fifth century BCE. The Digambara writings may also contain some material older then the date of the extant redactions but due to their strongly compilatory character are difficult to discern.

The stray bits and pieces of information that are contained in these sources suffer from a number of deficiencies when it comes to establishing an approximate picture or the moment of gradual emergence and an early development of Jaina philosophy. The sources are extremely fragmentary, often difficult to date and never organized in any coherent model to the extent that it is practically impossible to speak of any early Jaina philosophy cultivated as a rational enquiry of coherent nature, based on rationally adduced arguments that are also falsifiable, etc. Instead, as it appears, we usually deal with assorted ideas that should rather be classified as early Jaina thought , being inherently linked to monastic discipline and salvific goal, not necessarily a reasoned systematic philosophy.

Truly philosophical issues, ontological models, epistemological matters or logical principles are never discussed in any systematic manner in the first centuries after the emergence of Jainism. Footnote 5 When such ideas first occur, they do not form any consistent system yet. Rather, they are ad hoc solutions to particular questions or consist in asceticism-related terminology which would later be elaborated in a philosophical direction. Further, we should not confuse the occurrence—in a particular passage—of certain nomenclature, such as jīva , ajīva , karman , jñāna , loka etc., that only later grew into technical terminology as building blocks of particular ontology or epistemology, with genuine philosophical reflection.

The situation is comparable to the case of the Vedic and early Upaniṣadic thought that contains a number important terms and concepts foundational for the subsequent emergence of Indian philosophy as a reasoned, rational, systematic, coherent, consistent, comprehensive reflection on the reality, that is, on all that is there, reflection supported by reason and some kind of evidence and grounded in an continuous attempt to explain why and how the reality is there, and how we can know it. The sheer presence in the Veda s or Upaniṣad s of certain terminology pregnant with future philosophic richness does not turn these texts into philosophical treatises or their thought into philosophy, similarly as the presence of particular nomenclature and conceptions embedded in the myths retold by ‘the collective author’ Homer does not make the mythological contents of the Iliad and the Odyssey genuine philosophy. To speak of Vedic philosophy or of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads is as problematic (and perhaps even nonsensical) as to speak of the oxymoronic ‘philosophy of Zen’. Accordingly, to read the eidetic and philosophically matured semantics into such ancient textual strata would be a methodological flaw. Footnote 6 This is what I mean when I speak of an absence of ‘truly philosophical issues’, and by implication of ‘truly ontological’ and ‘truly epistemological’ ones. Under genuinely philosophical approach, I understand rational, coherent and systematic enquiry concerning the structure of the world, its essence, causal background, means of knowing it, etc., with implied attempts to rationally justify one’s claims or refute counterclaims with arguments that refer to facts or events observable to anyone, that can be verified and rationally rejected and that are formulated in a manner that consciously avoids contradictions, etc. To maintain that the world is a huge doughnut of blazing fire with a secured flat surface in the middle inhabitable by humans, invisible ghosts and fairies because one has heard so in a mountain cave from the archangel Gabriel does not constitute a philosophy, not only because not everybody is on speaking terms with the archangel and because such claims are not intersubjectively verifiable either. To counter a view at a certain time or in a particular geographical region, the people did not develop philosophy, one may not apply an all-too-easy argument that they in fact did but it is only due to our lack of transmitted information, not to the actual absence of their philosophical reflection, that we cannot prove it beyond doubt. By analogy, the ‘lack of evidence’ could also be used to support the claim that the ancient Indians flew a man to the Moon, but the evidence has somehow not survived. To meaningfully speak of any evidence for the existence of philosophy or for the Moon flight at an early period, we do need either some pieces of relevant information in the form of transmitted fragments or debris (of texts or of the spaceship) that the people engaged in the enterprise or at least a (more mature and complex) developmental stage attested at a later point of time that would allow us to infer that it must have been preceded by an earlier phase required for the latter stage to emerge in such a developed form. In the context of Jaina philosophy, we do not have any such evidence. The earliest traceable, extant textual fragments do not engage in matters of ontology and epistemology (unlike morality and soteriology). Once these issues are discussed, the enquiry seems to enter a rather nascent form, and the reader is presented with particular claims and schemes as a matter of belief, mostly with no justification and argument.

I would argue that one of palpable evidences for an emerging genuine philosophical system at a historical early stage is the existence of particular models that attempt to consistently portray certain structures postulated to exist either out there, as ontological frameworks, or within, as epistemological theories. Such models attempt to organise what is there in a reasoned, coherent, consistent and comprehensive manner as an explanatory device of the world structure. In addition, they propose particular structures of the world, of all that exists and cannot exist, that consist of certain basic components that are not reducible to other elements. Such a move is an application of an important law of parsimony, or philosophical razor, that requires one to balance various arguments for and against a particular category, component or structure. This is also a philosophically important step.

The aim of this paper is to provide a systematic overview of such basic ontological models that are traceable in Jaina thought from its early stages (first century CE) till the fourth/fifth century CE, viz. till the beginnings of the classical period of the Jaina philosophy, which commences with Umāsvāmin’s ground-breaking Treatise on Reality ( Tattvârtha-sūtra , TS; around 350/400 CE). In addition, I attempt to provide a time frame for each of these models when they seem to emerge for the first time in Jaina literature. In total, as we shall see, we can distinguish five such ontological models, with minor variants. In most of them, we find similar items, but they are organised differently under different headings depending on the character of the model.

The importance of such a survey of the earliest ontological models is that they present a development of basic concepts of Jaina ontology, consistently dualistic from the earliest detectable times, being rooted in the dichotomy of jīva–ajīva . An additional advantage of such an overview is that it can serve as a useful methodological tool to date other texts in which these models occur, or to check for their internal cohesion, to determine various interpolations or historical layers co-existing in texts that should rather be considered compilations than authored by one and the same person, albeit the the application of this method is not always as straightforward. As I demonstrate elsewhere Footnote 7 , the usability of this method can be instantiated with the case of ‘Kundakunda’, who should be considered, as I argue, a ‘collective thinker’ to whom a range of textual fragments of different periods were ascribed, complied and redacted under one umbrella name. Footnote 8

A natural worry with this approach may concern the problem of the dating of the models in question that are in turn used to date other texts; this could lead to a kind of vicious circle that the models themselves, being difficult to date, serve as a standard to date other texts, likewise difficult to date. Indeed, some of these model are traceable to the canonical literature which is in itself difficult to date, also because the canonical texts consist of various layers belonging to different historical strata. Fortunately, the models, as I would argue, can be dated on the basis of relative chronology, with points of reference for their dating completely independent of the texts that would subsequently be dated on their basis, and therefore such an approach does not involve any kind of circularity. Further, I argue that the models, at least in some cases, can be dated on the basis external to the history of Jainism inasmuch as they reflect certain philosophical ideas that can be observed in other philosophical systems in India at a particular point of time relevant to the emergence of these models or passages in which these models occur.

What is characteristic of all these models is that all of them are historically rooted in quintessentially soteriological ideas; however, with the exception of Model 2 (see below), they present a relatively soteriology-independent representation of ontological categories within the universe structure. Prior to the first such models within Jainism, we find at least two or three consistent attempts to develop, in a systematic way, a model of basic reals that would be both comprehensive and exhaustive, that is, that would postulate all necessary and required components to satisfactorily explain the complexities of the world and its phenomena and as well as incorporate all existent Footnote 9 components of the universe. Prior to c. 100 CE, similar attempts were undertaken by (1) the early Abhidharma tradition of Buddhism, which organised all the phenomena into basic constituents ( dharma ) and the five aggregates ( pañca-skandha ), by (2) the proto-Sāṁkhya in the form of Sāṁkhya-Yoga of the period 100 BCE—100 CE, known from the Mokṣa-dharma-parvan or from Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddha-carita , that distinguished various sets of the reals ( tattva ) ranging from seventeen to thirty, Footnote 10 and most probably (3) a kind of proto-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika known as the ‘ yoga ’, being one of the three methodological currents of Ānvīkṣikī and mentioned in Kauṭilya’s Artha-śāstra , Footnote 11 which was composed, compiled and redacted between 100 BCE and 100 CE. Footnote 12 Like these earlier ontological models, also Jaina classifications were attempts made in the same direction to present all structural elements of the universe that are either explanatorily necessary or factually existent, Footnote 13 even though not required to understand the world structure and its functioning.

The aspiration to determine a set of basic units of the world was noticeable much earlier in Indian thought as abundantly attested in the earliest Upaniṣad s, when various models were tested. For instance, the Br̥had-āraṇyakôpaniṣad offers a few competing models, just to mention two of them (1) BĀU 2.5.1–14 enumerates earth, water, fire, wind or air ( vāyu ), the sun, space directions ( diś ; or the space?), the moon, lightning, thunder, the space ( ākāśa ; or aether?), moral law ( dharma ), truth ( satya ), humanity ( mānuṣa ) and the self ( ātman ), all known as the vital juices ( madhu ); (2) BĀU 3.2.13 mentions: the human being ( puruṣa ), speech, fire, wind, breath, the sight, the sun, the mind, the moon, space directions, the hearing, the earth, the body, the space, the self, plants, body hair, trees, head hair, water, blood and semen as the elements of the visible, tangible world, with the invisible brahman implied as what is behind all this. Similarly, the Aitareyôpaniṣad speaks of the five gross elements ( mahā-bhūta ), i.e. the earth, wind, the space, waters and lights, their combinations, various categories living beings, gods and ultimately brahman (AU 3.3), and the Chāndogyôpaniṣad itemizes a hierarchy of entities on several occasions (e.g., ChU 7.2.1; 7.4.2; 7.6.1; etc.). Other examples of attempts to classify the reals that make up the world are numerous. Much of such early Brahmanic speculations are focused on ritual-related items and very frequently ritual components, including Vedic mantra s, assume cosmic dimension and become constituent elements of the world (BĀU 1.1.1; 2.5.1; 3.2.13; 3.9; ChU 1.1.2; 1.3.7; 1.6; etc.). Similar attempts are also found in non-Brahmanical traditions, including the Buddhist model of the five skandha s and a plethora of dharma s. In the account of the Sāmañña-phala-sutta , we find the materialist Ajita Keśakambalin (Pāḷi: Ajita Kesakambala) who explains the self and consciousness as consisting, or resulting from a particular composition, of the four elements ( cātum-mahābhūtiko ), and thereby seems to reduce the reality to the earth, water, fire and wind (DN 2.23, p. 55). In the same text, Ājīvikism-affiliated Kakuda Kātyāyana (Pāḷi: Pakudha Kaccāyana) Footnote 14 speaks of seven bodies ( kāya ) that make up the world, namely the earth, water, fire, wind, pleasure ( sukha ), pain ( dukkha ) and living element ( jīva ) (DN 2.26, p. 56).

Conspicuously, in the Sāmañña-phala-sutta account of the Jaina teacher Nirgrantha Jñātr̥putra (Pāḷi: Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta), or Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, we find no trace of any philosophical reflection whatsoever that would comprise ontological or epistemological elements even in a nascent form. The teacher is depicted as exclusively preoccupied with asceticism and ascetic restraint (DN 2.28–29, p. 57). Similarly, his teacher and co-founder of Ājīvikism, Footnote 15 Maskarin Gośāla devotes no attention philosophical issues, in particular to epistemology or ontology, and instead is concerned with karmic retribution, asceticism and rebirth. He does speak of cosmological issues though, namely he provides complex enumerations of rebirth classes and rebirth loci, but such classifications are not concerned with ontology per se but rather with religious cosmology and various possibilities of rebirth depending on one’s past deeds in view of karmic retributions (DN 2.20–21, p. 53–54). As such, they should be treated as direct extensions of moral-salvific speculations: they arrange particular loci of future birth to correspond to various kinds of conduct in order to illustrate a moral principle of karmic retribution, according to which laudable behaviour involves auspicious rebirth and evil deeds incur miserable fate. One should not confuse a cosmological model contained in Gosāla’s speculation, which describes various types and hierarchies of living beings, potential rebirths and possible localities, or world strata in which one may be reborn depending on one’s karman , with an ontological model or a framework that presupposes some kind of ontological reflection. It is true that such a cosmological model may serve, and indeed later on in history of Ājīvikism and Jainism did serve as a foundation for their ontology, but an existence of particular cosmology does not necessarily presuppose any existent ontology. Such a cosmology, in the form attested at this early stage in Ājīvikism, but also in Jainism, had a direct relevance for their monastic code of conduct, morality and salvific doctrine alone. Unlike ritual-centred Upaniṣadic ontology, Jaina ontological speculations developed against the backdrop of salvific processes, ascetic practices, karmic bonds and retribution, moral responsibility etc., for instance with moral terms such dharma and adharma assuming an ontological dimension.

A closer analysis of canonical material may demonstrate that an emergence of Jaina ontology, probably around the first century CE, came in steps, and was not an instantaneous discovery of a more or less complete system. Footnote 16 First, out of concepts related to the theory of salvific path and models explaining the workings of karmic retribution, some concepts of irreducible ‘reals’ as ontological categories developed that later merged into more consistent explanatory models. This came hand in hand with the emergence of epistemological models that aimed at explaining and justifying the emerging ontological concepts.

Even a cursory glance at the Canon in Six Parts (ṢKhĀ), with its repetitive character, which already organizes the doctrinal contents in a slightly more systematic manner, unlike the more incoherent early Śvetāmbara canonical works (due to a gradual process of their composition and compilation) Footnote 17 , shows these dependencies. The text begins with the mention of certain basic categories of living beings and of certain aspects important in their analysis:

[2] Thus, with the purpose of investigation stages regarding these fourteen categories of living beings, the following precisely fourteen stages regarding them should be known. [3] Namely: [4] rebirth destinations ( gati ), [the number of] sense organs ( indriya ), body [types] ( kāya ), activities ( yoga ), genders ( veda ), passions ( kaṣāya ), [types of] cognition ( jñāna ), restraints ( samyama ), views ( darśana ), soul colourings ( leśyā ), [types of] emancipatable [beings] ( bhavya ), propriety ( samyaktva ), [types of] beings endowed with mind ( saṁjñin ) and absorption ( āhāra ) [of karmic matter by the soul, of food by the body]. Footnote 18

The point of departure is a classification of living beings into fourteen categories ( jīva-samāsa ) and their respective analysis proceeds via investigation stages, or factors ( mārgaṇā-sthāna ), which constitute a pre- anuyoga-dvāra device, or means of analysis well known from The Lecture of Explanations (Viy) or from the tradition of the Treatise on Reality (TS). Footnote 19 All of these fourteen stages ( ṭhāṇa , sthāna ), elaborated in the subsequent sūtra s, are primarily of relevance to ascetic practice, which should lead to spiritual upliftment on the path to liberation. Based on these fourteen investigation factors is a hierarchy, or the fourteen stages of living beings ( jīva-sthāna ), comparable to a later classification of the fourteen stages of virtue ( guṇa-sthāna ) Footnote 20 and itself a result of a simplification of earlier lists mentioning twenty items. Footnote 21 Neither this nor other early lists include typically ontology-related terminology, except for jīva . However, we may detect some kind of epistemological model behind the above scheme: the fourteen stages of analysis serve as methodological devices to examine a particular subject, namely the living beings that stand in the centre of Jaina ethics. Nowhere in the whole text do we find a similar analysis, clad in a shape of a model, of basic structural elements of the world independent of the salvific focus that could be considered a systematic ontological theory. One should not take, for example, the systematics of the animate world found in the text (ṢKhĀ 1.1.24 ff.) as an instance of such an ontological theory: the systematics serves to demonstrate the importance of the fourteen investigation stages and moral competence that is reflected in the hierarchy of the animate world.

The above is an illustration that a systematic organisation of epistemological devices into models or schemes Footnote 22 developed slightly earlier than similar ontological models, even though certain ontology was already presupposed or taken for granted, such as the distinction into loka (the inhabitable world space) and aloka (the uninhabitable rest of the space). In this sense we may speak of certain priority of epistemological reflection over ontological analysis which later finds an interesting parallel in most philosophical treatises in India in which epistemology precedes ontology. Footnote 23

A research on the earliest Jaina philosophy is seriously hampered by the way early Jaina writings were collected and codified. A typical feature of the Śvetāmbara canon, but largely the same remark applies to Digambara canonical writings, is that—similar to the Pāḷi canon—the contents was largely reworked, rewritten, readjusted, standardised and unified in terms of terminology, expressions etc. One of numerous evidences for that is that we find exactly the same blocks of texts, whole passages, that were simply copied-and-pasted in various canonical works, and in the process the original, older readings were effaced and replaced with newer readings that conformed to the standardised doctrine at the moment of the codification of the canon. In the redaction process, also changes were introduced to the language, and very frequently the earlier Ardhamāgadhī was replaced or admixed with Jaina Mahārāṣṭrī (Śvetāmbara) or Jaina Śaurasenī (Digambara). A large number, if not most, of such traces that attest to the fact that the original readings were ‘updated’ and ‘modernized’ to later standards date back to the period of final redactions of the Śvetāmbara canon, which took place between the fourth and fifth centuries, in particular in early 4th century CE at two concurrent and competing councils in Mathurā and Valabhī, convoked by Nāgārjuna-sūri and Skandila-sūri (Khaṇḍila), respectively, both producing divergent versions and readings, and finally at the third council of Valabhī (c. 450–480 CE), meant to preserve and retrieve the canonical books ( pustakârohaṇa ). Footnote 24 In the process, ‘not only were the works written formerly at Mathurā and Valabhī again written and codified, but some more were written.’ Footnote 25 The emendation, interpolation and update processes, which easily allowed for changes, were facilitated also by the fact that, prior to that moment, there was no rigidly established version of the main texts that would be preserved in writing, for ‘those saints who kept Mss. were denounced’ and in addition ‘penances were prescribed to those who wrote even one letter.’ Footnote 26 The copy-and-paste practice, which concerned either a recurrent group or list of connected terms or a paragraph ( ālāvaga ; Skt. ālāpa / ālāpaka ) or descriptive passages ( vaṇṇaā , Skt. varṇaka ), was standardised in a way described by Kapadia ( 2000 , pp. 59–60): ‘Several vaṇṇaās which were occurring in more than one Āgama were written out at full length only once, and then they were not reproduced ad verbatim , a second time, but only a reference was made to them by writing the word vaṇṇaā , by indicating their source, by alluding to a parallel person or an object, by mentioning the words occurring in the beginning and the end or by writing the word jīva (sic; rather jāva —P.B.), a stenographic symbol. The ālāvagas , too, were similarly treated.’ A good and traceable example of the process is provided by the versions of canonical writings redacted under the supervision of Nāgārjuna, the so-called Nāgārjunīya readings, but also Skāndilīya variants, obliterated at the third council of Valabhī. The Nāgārjunīya s are now altogether absent in the main canonical corpus except stray traces to be occasionally found in some commentaries. For instance, in his commentary Uttarâdhyayana-ṭīkā , Śānti-sūri occasionally makes use of the Nāgārjunīya recension. Footnote 27

Since the same passages, or blocks of texts, were stamped over earlier passages in various works, this makes it practically impossible to trace the actual development of terminology, not to mention the evolution of the concepts behind them. Much of what we can do is to attempt to reconstruct certain earlier stages overwritten with later increments and ‘improvements’, and the key to such a reconstruction can be for instance the evidence of incomplete obliteration of earlier stages, that is such cases in which textual revisions of particular passages are not complete, and some earlier terminology is still palpable. This is what undertake in this paper as well.

As I argue below, in early Jainism, we can distinguish five basic ontological models (with some variants) meant to enumerate fundamental ontological categories with which Jainism explained the complexity of the world as a background for its soteriological goal ( mokṣa ). Interestingly, the subsequent historical developments did not add much new to these models. They all are dualistic in their basic structure and divide all entities into two main types: living elements ( jīva ) and lifeless elements ( ajīva ). This distinction into jīva–ajīva seems to be the earliest and most basic ontological division, and it is practically omnipresent, found in all strata of early (and of course, later) Jaina writings. It served as the fertile ground for further developments in to main directions: the primarily ontological one (Models 1, and 3–5*) and the primarily soteriological-moral one (Model 2), all of which appear to have branched off this original stem. This root character is the main reason, beside the ubiquity of both terms, why I consider the jīva–ajīva distinction as historically primary, earlier than another distinction jīva–pudgala (see below). I shall briefly describe them in the chronological order.

Model 1 , in three reconstructable variants, due to is greatest simplicity and the least number of elements which were later expanded, has to be postulated as structurally the earliest explanatory structure, attested in oldest available Jaina sources, albeit it is nowhere listed exactly in its full and complete form as such, except for occasional references to its single components. The model simply enlists all the elements, without providing any justification, and reflects the earliest attested ontology of the Jainas, but does certainly not date back to the very beginnings of Jainism. It’s fullest version could be suggested as follows:

The above model is, I admit, nowhere mentioned explicitly in early Jaina writings in this precise form, but its existence has to be postulated for several reasons. One of them is that Model 3 (see below) presupposes it, the other is that some traces of it can unearthed from otherwise strongly unified (in terms of standardised and repeatable expressions, passages and descriptions) canonical corpus of Jaina writings. It also seems that this model successfully merged later on with Model 3, which introduces a similar categorisation, but based on the idea of the extensive entities ( atthi-kāya / asti-kāya ). Since, as I argue, the asti-kāya scheme (Model 3) became prevalent and dominant before the final redaction of the canon at the third council of Valabhī, the copy-and-paste redaction technique obliterated most original cases (but fortunately not all) in which the elements of Model 1 feature on their own (sc. jīva , dharma etc.), viz., without the subsequent appendage of º asti-kāya (sc. jīvâsti-kāya , dharmâsti-kāya etc.), characteristic of Model 3.

Model 1.2 serves as an explanatory background for a passage found in the canonical Book of Interpretative Positions ( Ṭhāṇ’aṁga-sutta ). The book itself is practically impossible to date because, by its nature, it classifies various entities numerically in an increasing order, a manner similar to the Buddhist canonical Aṅguttara-nikāya , or the Gradual Collection , in which each successive classification of items is increased by one. Due to its structure, new textual layers could easily be added at any time and earlier readings modified, any particular portion of the text can hardly be assigned to any particular time frame. The text as a whole certainly belongs to the final canonical stage of the fifth century. Footnote 28 However, its particular portions are certainly centuries earlier. The passage in question lists important constituent elements of all that exists, and provides some reason why these elements exist:

[4] It has never happened nor happens nor will happen this way that living elements ( jīva ) will become lifeless elements ( ajīva ), and that lifeless elements will become living elements – also in such a manner the continuity of the world as one has been propounded. [6] It has never happened nor happens nor will happen this way that the [inhabitable] world space ( loka ) will become the [uninhabitable] non-world space ( aloka ) or that the [uninhabitable] non-world space ( aloka ) will become the [inhabitable] world space ( loka ) – also in such a manner the continuity of the world as one has been propounded. [7] It has never happened nor happens nor will happen this way that the [inhabitable] world space ( loka ) will penetrate into the [uninhabitable] non-world space ( aloka ) or that the [uninhabitable] non-world space ( aloka ) will penetrate into the [inhabitable] world space ( loka ) – also in such a manner the continuity of the world as one has been propounded. [9] As long as the stretch for movement of living elements ( jīva ) and matter particles ( pudgala ) exists, so long there exists the [inhabitable] world space ( loka ); as long as the [inhabitable] world space exists, so long there exist the stretch for movement of living elements and matter particles – also in such a manner the continuity of the world as one has been propounded. [10] Accordingly, at absolutely all ends of the [inhabitable] world space ( loka ) matter particles which touch the loose side are turned rough (impenetrable) Footnote 29 , so that neither living elements nor material particles can go outside beyond the end of the [inhabitable] world space – also in such a manner the continuity of the world as one has been propounded. Footnote 30

The passage explicitly mentions the following categories, the first two being the principal ones: (1) living elements ( jīva ) and (2) lifeless elements ( ajīva ) (verse 4), which comprises elements other than jīva , (3) the inhabitable world space ( loka ) and the uninhabitable non-world space ( aloka ), both being the subdivision of space ( ākāśa ), implied here (verses 6–7); and (4) material particles ( pudgala ), that—beside living elements—move around within the world space (verses 9–10). As verses 9–10 explain, what keeps the two kinds of space, the inhabitable world ( loka ) and the uninhabitable non-world ( aloka ) apart is the same principle that is responsible for the movement of living elements ( jīva ) and matter particles ( pudgala ) within the inhabitable world ( loka ). Thus, the text provides some explanation for the role of dharma and adharma , (without the terms themselves being mentioned explicitly) understood as ontological principles that facilitate movement and rest of jīva and pudgala within the realm of the inhabitable world. Footnote 31

Model 1.2 goes back to the period the 2nd–3rd century CE, i.e. to the time when most probably, first, the expressions dharma ( dhammo ) and adharma ( ahammo ) adopt their additional, kinetic meanings, beside the standard of righteousness ( dharma ) and unrighteousness ( adharma ), namely the principle of motion and the principle of rest; and second, when the term pudgala is adopted by the Jainas in the particular Jaina meaning of ‘matter’ or ‘matter particles’. It seems that the model was subsequently absorbed into later models or accordingly redrafted and assimilated (‘updated’) with new revisions of texts, which may be the reason why it is no longer preserved in its full-fledged form, but can easily be deduced from texts.

The model is also preserved in an old portion of the Sayings of the Seers ( Isi-bhāsiyāiṁ ), a passage formally ascribed to Pārśva, which contains a reference to three basic elements only: the living beings ( jīva ), lifeless elements ( ajīva ), matter ( pudgala ), and perhaps also space, implied by the term ‘world’ ( loka ). Neither the passage in question nor the whole text of The Sayings of the Seers know the dyad of dharma and adharma in their latter kinetic meanings. However, the principles of motion and rest may there be indirectly implied – as in the above case of the Ṭhāṇ’aṁga-sutta – through the idea of the upward and downward movements ( gati : ūrdhva-gamin , adho-gamin ) of living beings and matter particles:

[1] What is this world? [The world] is the living element ( jīva ), the lifeless element ( ajīva ). [5] [The world] is the world because it sees. … [7] The course (mode of existence) [of the world] is called [a course] of living beings and of matter particles. [8] The condition [of the world] is: beginningless, endless, transforming. [9] Living elements move upwards, particles of matter move downwards. Footnote 32

This and similar passages could be the source of the later concept of the twin kinetic principles, more pronounced in the above quoted Ṭhāṇ’aṁga-sutta section than in the Isi-bhāsiyāiṁ . I fail to find any traces of the terms dharma and adharma in their kinetic meaning which may be older than the beginnings of the common era.

It appears that Model 1.2 may have had its predecessor (Model 1.1) at some stage (see below):

It was only some time later that the category of lifeless elements ( ajīva ) came to be replaced with ‘matter’, or material stuff ( pudgala ), the result being Model 1.3:

In Model 1.3 , the earlier, well established term ajīva —explicitly mentioned in Model 1.1 , and implied in Model 1.2 , of transitory character between 1.1 and 1.3—is replaced with the new term. The time stamp for this variant (as well as for Model 1.2, which I take to have preceded it) is the introduction of a novel term pudgala (still absent in Model 1.1 ), and therefore Models 1.1 and 1.2 must be considered slightly earlier. It was probably around 2nd–3rd centuries CE that the new ontological category was introduced, namely material stuff / matter, or pudgala , in its technical sense, a term entirely absent in the Brahmanical texts, including Upaniṣad s, the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra , the Nyāya-sūtra etc. Footnote 33

The term pudgala —Pāḷi puggala or puṁgala —is well attested in the early strata of Buddhist writings in the sense of ‘person’, ‘personality’, provisional individual entity embedded in the saṁsāra and correlated with the existence of the aggregates ( skandha ), or a transitional, phenomenal basis of consciousness to which the attributes of a person are ascribed. Footnote 34 It is distinguished from the idea (postulated by other systems) of an eternal self, permanent soul, or ātman , being the perduring, individual, conscious substratum that transmigrates and may become liberated at some point, the existence of which Buddhism vehemently denied from its beginnings. As Tedesco ( 1947 , p. 172) rightly points out, ‘the term no doubt belonged already to the Buddhistic Proto-Canon, and probably had there the form * puggala -.’ As such, it should therefore be considered mainly of Buddhist, rather than of, generally speaking, Śramaṇic provenance, for there is no evidence for it in early Jaina texts at all (unlike the term ajīva ). There is hardly any reception of the term in non-Buddhist systems of thought for centuries either.

The term pudgala is uniquely attested in the Caraka-saṁhitā ( Śarīra-sthāna ) in a strongly Sāṁkhya -influenced passage that dates to the period ca. 100–200 CE Footnote 35 and that collects various synonyms to designate ‘the soul’, or the inhabitant of the body, with a longer list of synonyms to follow, among which we also find pudgala , a clear reminiscence of the Buddhist term in this particular context. Footnote 36 This can be the time when the term leaves the strictly Buddhist domain and gradually infiltrates other systems. It is most plausible that the Caraka-saṁhitā evidence coincides with the time when also the Jainas gradually adopted the term in a new peculiar meaning. Therefore, we may assume that the Jainas may have adopted the term pudgala in a meaning similar to the Buddhist one around the same time.

An evidence for the adaptation process is provided by a fragment from the Viyāha-pannatti , which in all probability belongs to the first two centuries of the common era. Footnote 37 This is a crucial transitional passage—before pudgala ultimately assumes its other meanings of ‘matter’, or ‘material stuff’, ‘atomic matter’, and, later on, becomes ‘matter’ as one of the dravya s, ‘substances’ incorporated into Model 5. The passage in question, which clearly displays the Buddhist influence and marks a stage when the term is adopted by the Jainas, concerns the relevant question what the difference between the living jīva and pudgala (which I translate below as ‘stuff’) is:

[59. Indrabhūti Gautama asks:] Sir, is the living being a stuff-possessor ( pudgalin ) or the stuff ( pudgala )? [Mahāvīra replies:] Oh, Gautama, just as [a person] with an umbrella is an umbrella-possessor, [a person] with a stick – a stick-possessor, [a person] with a pot – a pot-possessor, [a person] with a cloth – a cloth-possessor, [a person] with a hand – a hand-possessor, exactly in the same manner, Gautama, in dependence on (with respect to) the sense of hearing, the sense of vision, the sense of smell, the sense of taste [and] the sense of touch, [the soul ( jīva ) is] a stuff-possessor ( pudgalin ), [and] in dependence on (with respect to) the soul ( jīva ) [itself, the soul is] the stuff ( pudgala ). … Gautama, in this sense, in dependence on (with respect to) the soul ( jīva ) [itself, the soul] is not a stuff-possessor, [but it] is the stuff [itself]. … [61. Gautama asks:] Sir, is the liberated living being ( siddha ) a stuff-possessor ( pudgalin ) or the stuff ( pudgala )? [Mahāvīra replies:] Oh, Gautama, the liberated living being is not a stuff-possessor ( pudgalin , poggali ) or the stuff ( pudgala, poggala ). Gautama, in dependence on (with respect to) the soul ( jīva ) [itself, the soul] is [the stuff itself]. Footnote 38

The reply indicates that the soul always – whether in an embodied state within the saṁsāra or as a liberated being – remains ‘the stuff’ ( pudgala ), or a concrete individual, endowed with its separate identity, individual history and consciousness. Footnote 39 This is precisely the meaning which closely approximates the Buddhist meaning of the term. At the same time, the embodied soul, unlike the liberated one, is a stuff-possessor ( pudgalin ), that is, endowed with material stuff, of which its body is composed: the soul is the owner of the matter, or material body.

Further, before the term adopts its later meaning of ‘matter’, it is colloquially used to denote ‘essence’, ‘stuff’, ‘material stuff’ or ‘matter’ in the common, non-technical sense. It occurs for instance in canonical sections concerned with food and plants that probably belong to approx. first–second century CE. Footnote 40 The term poggala / puggala is found in the Āyāraṁga-sutta in a passage on collecting alms, in which it means ‘the matter of flesh/fish’ with no bones. Footnote 41 Similarly, in the Sūya-gaḍaṁga , in the chapter On the [proper] understanding of food ( Āhāra-pariṇṇā ), pudgala denotes ‘the essence / substance / raw matter of the body.’ Footnote 42 The same meaning is also reflected in the following Viyāha-pannatti excerpt of approximately the same period: ‘In summer, heat-born living beings ( jīva ) and material stuff ( pudgala ) are born, come forth, are brought together [and] originate in the bodies of plants.’ Footnote 43 Here, both living beings, as loci of consciousness, and the flesh, or material stuff in the colloquial sense, conjoin to produce plants. Footnote 44 At this stage, which I take to be later than the above-quoted Viyāha-pannatti passage expounding the living being both as pudgala and pudgalin (Viy 2 8.10.437 = Viy 3 8.10.59, 61), the individual character of the person carried by ‘ pudgala ’ is already obsolete, and the term comes near its later technical meaning.

Once both (1) pudgala is established in its meaning as ‘matter’ and (2) the term for atoms, paramâṇu , is adopted, it is only later that these two ideas are combined into the concept of ‘atomic matter’ or ‘matter that consists of atoms’ ( paramâṇu-poggala ). The idea of matter per se does not logically require the idea of atoms, as instantiated by the tradition of Sāṁkhya-Yoga, which knows the former, but not the latter, so these two should be clearly distinguished, and their combination into one unified idea is not logically required. The designation for atoms, paramâṇu , enters Jaina ontology most probably some time in the second–third centuries CE under the influence of the tradition of Vaiśeṣika/Ānvīkṣikī atomism, which knows the idea and the term, as attested in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra (VS(C) 4.1.7), and in the Caraka-saṁhitā (Car 1 4.7.17 = Car 2 4.7.17 = Car 3 4.7.18). With this, I do not intend to say that the Jainas adopted the very idea of atoms. They must have known it before, because we have some palpable evidence that its twin-system of Ājīvikism developed this idea very early, as attested for instance in the Sāmañña-phala-sutta , and it is most likely that the Jainas used this concept as well. Footnote 45 The Jainas merely adopted the designation itself, a term which was a standard at that time, as they did with another term, pramāṇa , and many others. The combination of the two conceptually rather distinct concepts, matter ( pudgala ) and atoms ( paramâṇu ), happens in probably the third century CE, and thereafter matter is primarily understood of atomic nature, and the standard term is paramâṇu-poggala / paramâṇu-pudgala , as attested on numerous occasions. Footnote 46 What follows is the division of matter ( pudgala ) into atoms ( paramâṇu ) and, as a result, into parts ( deśa ) and, technically speaking, spatial units ( pradeśa ) is introduced. Parts are natural divisions of any entity, but a novel technical term is pradeśa , or spatial unit, and this marks a new development in the understanding of the structure of matter.

We can detect, as I suggest, the following development: at a certain stage (the beginnings of the common era, which may coincide with the external evidence of the Caraka-saṁhitā ), the Buddhist term pudgala enters Jaina vocabulary still retaining its Buddhist meaning of ‘the person’, ‘an embodied individual self’. In the next step, the meaning of ‘the person’ is relinquished, because of its semantic overlap with two other terms: jīva and ātman ( attā, āyā ), and pudgala comes to refer to either (1) ‘the flesh’ or ‘material stuff’ of the body alone, or (2) to the body itself, being the material part ( pudgala ) of the individual (pudgala), who is at the same time the stuff-possessor ( pudgalin ). Footnote 47 It will occur only later, after second/third century, under the influence of Vaiśeṣika ontology, especially atomism, that pudgala will assume its final, technical meaning of ‘matter’, esp. ‘material atom’. Model 1.3, structurally speaking, should be understood to be a simplified version of—and therefore later than—Model 1.2, when it was discovered that the category of ajīva became redundant, since it overlapped with the matter, space, principle of motion and principle of rest. Certainly, it is possible to argue the other way round, namely that Model 1.2 is an extended version of Model 1.3, and should be considered later. Such hypotheses, however, cannot explain two transitions: the first transition is from Model 1.1, which already contains the category of ajīva , to Model 1.3 without the term (whereas Model 1.2 would have to add it again); and the second transition, from Model 1.2 (with ajīva as a meta-category comprising its four subdivisions) to Model 3, that of the five extensive entities ( atthi-kāya / asti-kāya ), which normally does not include the extensive entity of the lifeless element (* ajīv’atthi-kāya / * ajīvâsti-kāya ). My hypothesis does not have this weakness.

Further, when we assume that Model 1.3 was conceptualised around third century under the influence of Vaiśeṣika ontology, we can retrogressively date Models 1.1 and 1.2 as earlier. Accordingly, we can recapitulate the above discussion that Model 1, with its three variants developed over the period of roughly three centuries, namely, between the first and third centuries CE.

The crucial problem remains, namely which textual passages—beside the two excerpts fro the Ṭhāṇ’aṁga-sutta and Isi-bhāsiyāiṁ cited above—could serve as a direct supportive evidence for this model, for indeed there seems to be no single list that enumerates all the items jīva , pudgala , ākāśa , dharma and adharma as such to be found in extant Jaina writings? To explain this absence, we should recall that the final version of the canon was strongly reworked, in particular, the readings earlier than the fourth century that reflected earlier doctrinal phases, were ‘improved’ and adjusted to updated doctrinal needs with the copy-and-paste redaction technique. I suggest that some traces of the earlier layers that involve Model 1 can still be found. A good example is the following passage of the Ṭhāṇ’aṁga-sutta :

[441/479] Five extensive entities ( asti-kāya ) have been taught, namely: the extensive entity of the principle of motion ( dharmâsti-kāya ) and the extensive entity of the principle of rest ( adharmâsti-kāya) , the extensive entity of space ( ākāśâsti-kāya ), the extensive entity of the living element ( jīvâsti-kāya ) [and] the extensive entity of the lifeless elements ( ajīvâsti-kāya ). … [450/488] A person in transmigrational bondage does not know and does not see the five stages (factors) in all their circumstances, namely: [1] the extensive entity of the principle of motion ( dharmâsti-kāya ), [2] the extensive entity of the principle of rest ( adharmâsti-kāya ), [3] the extensive entity of space ( ākāśâsti-kāya ), [4] the living being ( jīva ), [5] the matter in the form of atoms ( paramâṇu-pudgala ). … And the saint ( arhant ), the victor ( jina ), the omniscient ( kevalin ), who is endowed with perfect cognition and belief, knows and sees all these in all their circumstances, namely: [1] the extensive entity of the principle of motion <up to> [5] the matter in the form of atoms ( paramâṇu-pudgala ). Footnote 48

The paragraph first provides a standard list of the five extensive entities ( asti-kāya ), which are comprised in Model 3 (see below). This is precisely one of such standardised enumerations, or recurrent connected terms ( ālāvaga , ālāpaka ), that are repeated throughout the canonical books, which confirms that passages that refer to the enumeration of ontological entities must have been reworked and unified to conform to the standard of the late fifth century (the Valabhī council). However, what follows immediately after, namely a list of the very same five extensive entities to be partially known by a person in transmigrational bondage ( chadmastha ) and fully known by the omniscient Jina, reveals a peculiar feature: instead of the expected jīvâsti-kāya and pudgalâsti-kāya , we read jīva and paramâṇu-pudgala . There is no doctrinal ground that could explain this irregularity, except the assumption that it is due to an omission on the part of the redactor to append jīva with º asti-kāya . Similarly, paramâṇu-pudgala must also belong to an earlier doctrinal phase, before the idea of pudgalâsti-kāya was introduced with Model 3. This sequence that preserves earlier terminology, in particular jīvaṁ and poggalaṁ (or paramâṇu-poggalaṁ ), instead of what one would expect, namely jīv’atthi-kāyaṁ and poggal’atthi-kāyaṁ , is repeated further on in some stray cases in the canonical book. Footnote 49

We find such an irregularity in other canonical texts, for instance in the Viyāha-pannatti , where the five items are appended to another list, Footnote 50 or in the Rāya-paseṇiya , which deals with the same five extensive entities, the last two listed in the historically earlier versions of jīva and paramâṇu-pudgala , followed by five more items:

A person in transmigrational bondage does not see the ten stages (factors) in all their circumstances, namely: [1] the extensive entity of the principle of motion ( dharmâsti-kāya ), [2] the extensive entity of the principle of rest ( adharmâsti-kāya ), [3] the extensive entity of space ( ākāśâsti-kāya ), [4] the living being not bound by the body ( aśarīra-baddha jīva ), [5] the matter in the form of atoms ( paramâṇu-pudgala ), [6] sound ( śabda ), [7] smell ( gandha ), [8] speech ( vāc ), [9] that this [particular person] will become or will not become [liberated], [10] that this [particular person] will or will not make an end to all suffering. And the saint ( arhant ), the victor ( jina ), the omniscient, who is endowed with perfect cognition and belief knows and sees all these in all their circumstances, namely: [1] the extensive entity of the principle of motion <up to> [10] [this particular person] will not make [an end to all suffering]. Footnote 51

The passage indicates that the original enumeration concerned simple terms: jīva up to poggala , and only later º atthi-kāe was added. The original, unmodified, or atthi-kāe -less elements of the above enumeration neatly correspond to Model 1.3: principle of motion (dharma), principle of rest ( adharma ), space ( ākāśa ), living beings ( jīva ) and matter ( pudgala ).

Similarly, in the lesson specifically dealing with the five asti-kāya s (called: dasamo uddeso atthi-kāya ), we find a section on the constitution of the space ( āgāsa ), including the structure of the world ( loka ). The passage mentions two standard subdivisions of the space: the world space and the non-world space ( loyâgāse ya aloyâgāse ya ). Further, the question is then discussed, what is found within the world space ( loyâgāse ):

[Indrabhūti Gautama asks:] Sir, are there in the world space living elements, parts of living elements and spatial units of living elements, and [in] lifeless elements, parts of lifeless elements and spatial units of lifeless elements? [Mahāvīra replies:] Gautama, there are living elements, parts of living elements and spatial units of living elements, as well as [in] lifeless elements, parts of lifeless elements and spatial units of lifeless elements. … The lifeless elements are taught to be two-fold: perceptible and imperceptible. The perceptible [elements] are taught to be four-fold: particles ( skandha ), parts of particles, spatial units of particles and matter-stuffs in the form of atoms ( paramâṇu-pudgala ). The imperceptible [elements] are taught to be five-fold: the extensive entity of the principle of motion, but the extensive entity of the principle of motion has no parts; spatial units of the extensive entity of the principle of motion; the extensive entity of the principle of rest, but the extensive entity of the principle of rest has no parts; spatial units of the extensive entity of the principle of rest; the time. Footnote 52

The passage itemizes the main components of the space ( ākāśa ): living beings ( jīva ) and lifeless elements ( ajīva ), the latter subdivided into: matter ( pudgala ), principle of motion ( dharma ) and principle of rest ( adharma ). Again, this corresponds to Model 1.2.

Another useful evidence is provide by Digambara writings. The Canon in Six Parts , in a chapter On dialectical ways of analysis of bondage ( Baṁdhaṇâṇiyoga-ddāra ; ṢKhĀ 5.6) describes the elements involved in the process of bondage ( baṁdhana ), which is an alternative description for the impact of karman ( kamma-vibhāsā ), and—in a sequence of sūtra s—mentions the following elements relevant for Model 3, however with conspicuous omissions: jīva (ṢKhĀ 5.6.7, 13–19), ajīva (ṢKhĀ 5.6.7, 20–23), dhamm’atthiyā adhamm’atthiyā āgās’atthiyā (ṢKhĀ 5.6.30–31) and poggalā (ṢKhĀ 5.6.34). As earlier, we can also here observe that the three elements dhamm’atthiyā adhamm’atthiyā āgās’atthiyā were reworked whereas the remaining ones—viz. jīva , ajīva and poggala —were not. It was possible to change dhamma in this passage (but often in other, similar passages) to dhamm’atthiyā , adhamma to adhamm’atthiyā and āgāsa to āgās’atthiyā because all the three occur exclusively as main terms, i.e. never occur in compounds, whereas jīva and ajīva frequently also feature as members of a compound (e.g. jīva-bhāva-baṁdho , ajīva-bhāva-baṁdho ) which prevents an easy supplementation with º atthiyā , automatically appended at the end, after the respective term. Also the commentator Vīrasena is aware of this absence in the case of the remaining standard asti-kāya s. Footnote 53 The actual model behind this enumeration is Model 1.2.

A very similar discussion is repeated (copied-and-pasted) in another section of the Viyāha-pannatti (Viy 2 10.1.475 = Viy 3 10.1.8–9) with respect to cardinal directions ( disa / diś ), an equivalent expression for ‘space’ ( ākāśa ). As in the preceding paragraph on the composition of ākāśa / āgāsa , also here the elements found in the space are mentioned as: jīva and ajīva , with their spatial elements, or parts ( deśa ) and spatial units ( pradeśa ): jīva , jīva-desa , jīva-padesā , and ajīva , ajīva-desa , ajīva-padesā . The latter is then subdivided into the perceptible ( rūvī / rūpin ) matter ( poggala ), or matter-stuffs in the form of atoms ( paramâṇu-poggalā ), and the imperceptible elements ( arūvī / arūpin ) that bifurcate into the extensive entity of the principle of motion ( dhamm’atthi-kāe ) and the extensive entity of the principle of rest ( adhamm’atthi-kāe ), both with their detailed subdivisions into parts and spacial units ( desā / deśa and padesā / pradeśa ). As in the case discussed above, also here phenomenal time (Pkt.: addhā-samae , Skt. * adhvan-samaya / addhā-samaya ) is appended at the very end of the with no elaboration (unlike all the remaining items), which is an evidence that the passage was reworked at a later stage, when the redactor felt obliged to include time, recognised as a separate substance ( dravya ) in the fifth century CE. Footnote 54 The ontological scheme behind this enumeration is again Model 1.2 . This section is, and rightly so, classified by Ohira ( 1994 ) as belonging to the fifth canonical stage, or 4th/5th century, before (as I argue) the framework of substance ( dravya ), characteristic of Model 5, was added, however—as we can clearly see—the passage partly preserves earlier terminology.

To contrast these incomplete enumerations with a similar standard list of the extensive entities found regularly elsewhere, we see that, on numerous other parallel occasions, parts ( deśa ) and spatial units ( pradeśa ) of all the extensive entities are discussed, except phenomenal time ( addhā-samaya ), and these passages specify the items in extenso as asti-kāya s, viz. dhamm’atthi-kāya-desā adhamm’atthi-kāya-desā āgās’atthi-kāya-desā jīv’atthi-kāya-desā poggal’atthi-kāya-desā or dhamm’atthi-kāya-paesā adhamm’atthi-kāya-paesā āgās’atthi-kāya-paesā jīv’atthi-kāya-paesā poggal’atthi-kāya-paesā . Footnote 55 A typical instance is provided by a Viyāha-pannatti passage that—like the few passages mentioned above that partly preserve earlier terminology—also discusses the structure of the space and of the world, and specifies that there are five extensive entities, and each of them is listed as atthi-kāe . Footnote 56 These instances offer the enumerations when the update process was completely successful, that is, all terms in the sequence were appended with º atthi-kāya , unlike the few stray passages mentioned before, which preserve earlier readings.

Another indirect evidence is provided by later literature which occasionally lists the asti-kāya s in a manner corresponding to this model, as does Nemicandra who first defines the extensive entities (DS 24), and then enumerates them without the º atthi-kāya element:

There are innumerable [spatial units] in the living elements ( jīva ), infinite [spatial units] in the principle of motion ( dharma ), principle of rest ( adharma ) and in space ( ākāśa ); in the perceptible ( mūrta ) [matter ( pudgala )], there are three [kinds of] spatial units. Time ( kāla ) has one [spatial unit], therefore it is not an extensive entity ( kāya ). Footnote 57

A we can see, there is ample evidence to be detected that help us uncover the earlier terminological strata and to reconstruct three variants of Model 1, in the historical sequence of 1.1 → 1.2 → 1.3, that developed over the first three centuries CE.

Model 2 is likewise quite early and enumerates certain categories from the point of view of basic relations and interdependencies that occur between two fundamental ontological categories, namely living beings ( jīva ) and lifeless elements ( ajīva ), and their knowledge is considered directly relevant for liberation:

There are practically two variants of this model: the shorter with seven items, and the extended one with the addition of two more, merit and demerit. The model rests on the same dichotomy of jīva–ajīva as variants 1.1 and 1.2 of Model 1. Indeed, like all other Jaina models, also this one is clearly dualistic, however in this particular case all the categories characterise a linear sequence of complex developments that relate the two basic categories of sentient jīva and insentient ajīva , an ‘evolution’ which begins with establishing a relation between the two in the form of the influx of karman and ends with a complete liberation of the soul from the fetters of all lifeless elements.

Two aspects call here for special attention. First, we can observe certain analogy to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga dualistic model, known from the earliest developmental stages of this system. In it, the relation between two principles of conscious/sentient puruṣa (a principle of consciousness) and insentient prakr̥ti (a principle of matter-and-activity) triggers a linear process of evolution through a number of stages, such as → objective consciousness ( buddhi ), or the awareness of objects other than consciousness, → subjective consciousness ( ahaṁkāra ), or the awareness of consciousness itself, → the inner instrument ( manas ) that coordinates sensory and other data and → the elements ( mahā-bhūta ) that make up all the graspable objects, with some modifications at various stages. Once the link between the two main principles is removed, liberation follows, known as kevala or kaivalya , that is separation, exclusivity or detachment of the two principles. Similarly in Jainism, structurally the model is quite similar in the sense that all other categories that ensue from the linkage between the sentient jīva and the insentient ajīva represent a gradual step-by-step evolution till the moment of final separation of the two, which is liberation. The precondition for saṁsāra is the inter-linkage of jīva and ajīva , the course of saṁsāra is determined by the subsequent categories and the end of saṁsāra , known as liberation, is precisely a complete disengagement, or cessation of any links between both principles.

Second, it seems probably no coincidence that the liberated soul is known in Jainism as kevalin , viz. the one who has accomplished ‘the absolute isolation’ or ‘unique (perfect) knowledge’, known as kevala , being also a foundational term for the tradition of Sāṁkhya-Yoga and epitomised later as ‘pure, unique knowledge’ (SK 64cd: viśuddhaṁ kevalam … jñānam ). In the proto-Sāṁkhya stage, Footnote 58 as attested in the layers of the Mokṣa-dharma-parvan , we find the expression of kevalaṁ jñānam on a number of occasions. Footnote 59

Both these models are structurally very similar: both begin with two separate, irreducible categories of the sentient and the insentient, and—through a sequence of processes that are experienced in a series of rebirths in the saṁsāra due to a linkage between the two—culminate in the state of their separation, which defines what liberation is.

These two structural affinities may point to an important historical dependence of Jainism on proto-Sāṁkhya-Yoga. The roots of this model most probably go back to the beginnings of Jainism, inasmuch as the model includes some technical terminology attested in earliest portions of Jaina texts ( jīva and ajīva ). However, in the developed form as textually attested, the model assumed its final form much later, perhaps 1st–2nd centuries CE or even slightly later. A prior existence of a linear model of evolution of secondary categories other than the pair of primary ones in proto-Sāṁkhya-Yoga may have helped organise various items that related jīva and ajīva in Jainism into a similar ‘evolution’ model. The model combines the concepts that often circulated independently, such as the ultimate goal of existence, viz. liberation ( mokṣa ), the pairs jīva–ajīva, puṇya–pāpa or āsrava–saṁvara linked to the ideas of karman , karmic bondage ( bandha ) and its eradication ( nirjarā ). At some point of time, all these elements were brought together into one model, which gradually evolved to comprise either seven Footnote 60 or nine elements Footnote 61 .

This model clearly derives from elements of the ascetic practice that should finally lead to liberation, and contains terminology related to the salvific path. The particular elements that jointly make up this explanatory scheme seem early and individually often occur in historically early passages of the canon. Occasionally, they do occur jointly in one text, albeit not necessarily listed in a linear sequence. For instance, they are found in the ninth book, Lesson of Mahākāsava ( Mahākāsav’ajjhayaṇaṁ ), of the Isi-bhāsiyāiṁ . It is a relatively early text (first century BCE/first century CE?), containing no technicalities, no specialised terminology, based on very simple images, devoted to the ascetic path, as described by Mahākāśyapa, and taking karman in an early, popular, non-technical meaning of ‘deed, act that brings about future retribution’ or ‘results of former deeds that are to take fruition’, not yet linked to the specialised idea of matter ( pudgala ), or karmic matter. The verses practically contain all nine standard elements of Model 2, some of them mentioned a few times, except that (1) āsrava / āsava , Footnote 62 or influx of karman , is conveyed with terms upādāna and ādāna , ‘accumulation/acquisition of karman ’ (v. 9), (2) mokṣa is likewise not mentioned by name directly but is described as ‘the highest eternal and unchangeable state’ (v. 31), and (3) ajīva is not directly mentioned. The most relevant verses read as follows:

[4] Control ( saṁvara ) and eradication ( nirjarā ) [lead to] the destruction of of merit ( puṇya ) and demerit ( pāpa ). One should properly practice control and eradication in every way. … [9] Eradication ( nirjarā ) – which [occurs] with the accumulation ( upādāna ) [of karman or] without the accumulation ( ādāna ) [of karman and which] is accompanied by the fruition [of the accumulated karman] or by its opposite (sc. the removal of karman ) – can always be brought about by asceticism ( tapas ) that exhausts [the karman ]. [10] The living being ( jīva ), in the realm of the saṁsāra , always binds ( bandhati ) karman and always eradicates ( nirjarayati ) [it]. But the best [means to eradicate it] is considered to be asceticism ( tapas ). … [30] Neither previous activities ( yoga ) accompany [the self] nor do the body, speech and mind; and there is no return [to saṁsāra ] in any way at all because there is no karman [any longer]. [31] Thereafter, because there is no acquisition of a new [embodied existence], because the karmic veils are destroyed [and] because there exist [only] the true characteristics [of the soul, the soul] is ecstatic. This is the highest eternal and unchangeable [state]. Footnote 63

The term upādāna ( uvāyāṇa ) is well known from Buddhist context, for instance as the ninth element, ‘clinging, grasping’, of doctrine of dependent origination ( pratītya-samutpāda ). Perhaps, upādāna was the earlier term to denote the accumulation of karmic results that was subsequently replaced with purely Jaina technical term āsava / āsrava .

The model is also indirectly referred to in the Samavāy’aṁga-sutta (Samav 2 1.3) with some items in the following list of the pairs: self ( ātman / ātā )— non-self ( anātman / aṇāyā ); punishment ( daṇḍa / daṁḍa )—non-punishment; action ( kriyā / kiriyā )—non-action; the inhabitable world ( loka )—the uninhabitable non-world ( aloka ); righteousness ( dharma / dhamma )—non-righteousness ( adharma / adhamma ); merit ( puṇya / puṇṇa )— demerit ( pāpa / pāva ); bondage ( bandha / baṁdha )—liberation ( mokṣa / mokkha ); influx ( āsrava / āsava )— control ( saṁvara ); sensation, or experience ( vedanā / veyaṇā )— eradication ( nirjarā / nijjarā ).

Further, Model 2 is hinted at in The Canonical Book against [Heretical] Books ( Sūya-gaḍaṁga ; Sūy) with three terms mentioned explicitly, āsrava , saṁvara and nirjarā , and two terms, jīva and mokṣa , implied with sattāṇa ( sattvānām ) as a synonym to jīva and the consequence of the teaching of the doctrine of moral activity, all the terms integrated into this model:

The one who knows the afflictions of living beings as well as the influx ( āsrava ) and the control (stoppage; saṁvara ) [of karman ], the one who knows the suffering [of living beings] and eradication ( nirjarā ) [of karman ] is capable of teaching the doctrine of moral activity [that leads to liberation]. Footnote 64

The doctrine of moral activity ( kiriya-vāyaṁ , kriyā-vāda ), referred to in the above citation, is known from the first and oldest part of the Buddhist canonical Points of Debate ( Kathā-vatthu ; KVu 1.6, p. I:141), hence this citation must postdate the relevant sections of the Kathā-vatthu .

In a later section of the Sūya-gaḍaṁga , and in a passage of the identical wording found in the Viyāha-pannatti , the model becomes a part of the edifying knowledge of the best among the laypeople,

who become the followers of Jaina ascetics, who have understood [what] living beings and lifeless elements [are, and] who have grasped merit and demerit, who are expert as regards the influx and control (stoppage) [of karmic matter], the experience [of the results karmic matter], eradication [of karmic matter], the subject of actions (i.e. the self), the bondage and liberation. Footnote 65

As Ohira ( 1982 : 168–169, § 435) notes, the Jaina layperson was expected to know elements of this model at the final canonical stage (latter half of 4th–5th centuries CE), which indicates that the model was well established in the whole Jaina community by that time to the extent that even the lay people were expected to know it.

It seems that all earliest references to Model 2 mention the categories of merit ( puṇya ) and demerit ( pāpa ), which means that the seven-link version is a case of later simplification of the model, in which these two items were found redundant and removed.

Model 3 is quite conspicuous due to an addition of a novel and unique concept of extensive entities ( asti-kāya ), which become a descriptive framework for all the categories. In it, the living beings are introduced side by side with expressly enumerated sub-varieties of lifeless elements ( ajīva ), without the term ajīva being explicitly mentioned.

The model has already been discussed above in the context of the reconstruction of the variants of Model 1, which—as I argue—were replaced with it in the fifth century, after Model 3 set the standard. The main feature of Model 3 is the addition of the term (and idea) of atthi-kāya (S. asti-kāya ), or ‘extensive entities’. The popularity of the model in the fifth century contributed to the fact that, at the time of the final redaction of the Śvetāmbara canon in Valabhī, it overrode the previous versions of Model 1 with a simple addition of º atthi-kāya to all the items of the list. Model 3 often serves to project the a new main ontological opposition: jīv’atthi-kāya and poggal’atthi-kāya , Footnote 66 which for a while replaces the former division of jīva – ajīva , with the idea of ajīva , and consequently ajīv’atthi-kāya / ajīvâsti-kāya , no longer required.

The term atthi-kāya occurs in the Sayings of the Seers ( Isi-bhāsiyāiṁ ) only once, in an interpolated portion that in all probability belongs to the youngest layers of the text, perhaps 4th century CE. Incidentally, the thirty-first hymn, in which the interpolated idea occurs, contains one of the oldest historical layers of the whole collection, going back perhaps even to Pārśva himself. Both the complexity and the way the terms are introduced ( se jahā nāmate ) may suggest that the concept of atthi-kāya was perceived to be a novelty:

It never happens that the world did not exist, it never happens that the world does not exist, and it never happens that the world will not exist. [The world] existed, exists and will exist. The world is unending, eternal, everlasting, indestructible, perpetual, permanent. And so are the so-called five extensive entities: it never happens that they did not exist <etc. … up to> [they are] permanent . And thus is the world: it never happens that it did not exist <etc. … up to> [they are] permanent. Footnote 67

Clearly, the italicised mention of the five extensive entities is appended at the very end of the hymn, which had originally been completed with the enumeration of the qualities of the eternal world (‘unending, etc.’): once the atthi-kāya interpolation is removed, the text not only retains its integrity but turns out even more consistent. Footnote 68 This whole passage, including the much later interpolated part, can be regarded as a genuine beginning of Jaina ontology, i.e. Jaina reflection on the actual structure of the being, not simply on the structural layers of the universe ( loka – aloka , etc.), which rather belong to the sphere of cosmology.

Apart from a large number of references to asti-kāya s in the Śvetāmbara canon, it contains numerous detailed descriptions and discussion of all the five, Footnote 69 that is in this particular sequence: dhamm’atthi-kāya , adhamm’atthi-kāya , āgās’atthi-kāya , jīv’atthi-kāya and poggal’atthi-kāya . The idea of the five extensive entities is also well known to the Digambara authors of The Canon in Six Parts ( Cha-kkhaṁḍâgame ), which occasionally mentions some elements of this model (without extensively enumerating them in a list), such as for instance dhamm’atthiyā ( dharmâsti-kāya ), adhamm’atthiyā ( adharmâsti-kāya ), āgās’atthiyā ( ākāśâsti-kāya ) (ṢKhĀ 5.3.30), and which also applies these ideas in its analysis of the world.

The category of ‘extensive entity’ (Pkt. atthi-kāya , Skt. asti-kāya ), or ‘the body which is there’, does not occur in any other philosophical system in India and is specific to Jainism. It was an attempt to classify basic structural elements of being that are not further reducible to any other category, such as ajīva (‘lifeless element’). ‘Extensive entity’ is a generic term which covers the quadruplet of the principle of motion, the principle of rest, space and matter. Also this structural element, i.e. irreducibility of the five extensive entities, similar to the ontological categories in the Vaiśeṣika system or elementary constituents of reality ( dhamma , dharma ) in the Abhidharma Buddhism, attests to the concept of the five extensive entities being a later development.

With Model 3—with which Jaina philosophers conceived of a generic abstract idea, or meta-category ( asti-kāya ), to cover the actual categories as components of the world (present also in variants of Model 1), which was a philosophically vital step of abstraction—their ontology began to develop more seriously and independently of other philosophical systems and external influences. Generally, it seems, the beginnings of Jaina ontology, also including Model 1, were not significantly dependent on other systems, and this conclusion is buttressed for instance by the particular usage of such terms as dhamma / dharma and adhamma / adharma adopted by the Jainas as principles of motion and rest, quite distinct from general understanding of these terms in ancient India. The only dependence on other ontologies is conspicuously detectable in Model 2, which apparently adopted certain ‘evolution’ scheme from proto-Sāṁkhya-Yoga, with its contents remaining independent of external influence.

The Jainas must have been aware that their Model 3 was unique to them and not shared, or even not understood, by other systems. This is well illustrated in a (fictitious) story dating back to the period of the fourth (probably mid-fourth) century CE Footnote 70 preserved in the Jaina canonical Lecture of Explanations (Viy 7.10), which purports to describe events contemporaneous with the life of Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, who incidentally is portrayed to present Model 3. The text describes how certain representatives of other systems (Pr. anna-utthiyā ; S. anya-tīrthika ) were debating near the capital of Rājagr̥ha:

[3] Thus this ascetic Jñatr̥putra (i.e. Vardhamāna) teaches the five extensive entities, namely: The extensive entity as the principle of motion ( dharmâsti-kāya ) ‹etc., up to› the extensive entity as space ( ākāśâsti-kāya ). Then, out of these five, the ascetic Jñatr̥putra considers four extensive entities as lifeless extensive entities ( ajīvâsti-kāya ), namely: the extensive entity as the principle of motion ( dharmâsti-kāya ), the extensive entity as the principle of rest ( adharmâsti-kāya ), the extensive entity as space ( ākāśâsti-kāya ), the extensive entity as matter ( pudgalâsti-kāya ). And the ascetic Jñatr̥putra considers only one of them, viz. the extensive entity as the living being ( jīvâsti-kāya ), as an imperceptible thing ( arūpi-kāya ) and as a living thing ( jīva-kāya ). Similarly, out of these five, the ascetic Jñatr̥putra considers four extensive entities as imperceptible things ( arūpi-kāya ), namely: the extensive entity as the principle of motion ( dharmâsti-kāya ), the extensive entity as the principle of rest ( adharmâsti-kāya ), the extensive entity as space ( ākāśâsti-kāya ) and the extensive entity as the living being ( jīvâsti-kāya ). However, the ascetic Jñatr̥putra considers only one, i.e. the extensive entity as matter ( pudgalâsti-kāya ), as a perceptible thing ( rūpi-kāya ) and as a lifeless thing ( ajīva-kāya ). What should we think of this? … [6] When the representatives of other systems saw venerable Indrabhūti Gautama (an elder disciple of Vardhamāna) passing by, they began to talk among themselves: “O, Dear to Gods, I have no idea about this subject but, look, just nearby venerable Gautama is passing by. Let me enquire with venerable Gautama about this issue!”. Footnote 71

In this fictitious story the representatives of other systems (Pr. anna-utthiyā ; S. anya-tīrthika ) are completely unfamiliar with the idea of the extensive entities ( asti-kāya ) and approach a representative of Jainism to explain it to them. In the subsequent sections of Chapter 7 (Viy 7) this idea is elaborated even further, the next chapter (Viy 8) proceeds with the exposition and focuses on the matter ( poggala , pudgala ): it is only at the very end of the whole account (Viy 3 8 § 49, p. 326.24) that matter, being one of the extensive entities, happens to be mentioned as a kind of substance ( davva , dravya ), which seems again to be a later interpolation introduced by the compilers in order to update the earlier classification to the standards of the mid-fifth century when the canon was finally redacted and the concept of substance and the corresponding term dravya found their way in Jaina ontology (see below). This attests to the historical antecedence of the extensive entities featuring in Model 4 with respect to the later Model 5 (based on the idea of dravya ) and to the introduction of the scheme of substances into Jainism at a later point of time.

The same passage of the Lecture of Explanations contains also a unique explanation of this novel and unusual term asti-kāya :

Then this venerable [Indrabhūti] Gautama said to these representatives of other systems as follows: “Verily, we do not say that existence ( asti-bhāva ) does not exist ( nâsti ); we do not say that non-existence ( nāsti-bhāva ) exists ( asti ). O, Dear to Gods, we say that every existence ( asti-bhāva ) exists ( asti ); we say that every non-existence ( nāsti-bhāva ) does not exist ( nâsti ). Footnote 72

The short passage is directly appended to the discussion of the asti-kāya s, and the two equivocal terms— asti-bhāva and nāsti-bhāva —are meant to explain the nature of the asti-kāya s: these are the truly existent entities ( bhāva ) of which existence can genuinely be predicated of ( asti-bhāva ). The opposite of the asti-kāya s is that which is absolutely non-existent, entities ( bhāva ) that do not exist at all and of which non-existence is predicated of ( nāsti-bhāva ). This explanation rests on the ideal of the correspondence theory of truth: what exists has to be spoken of as existent, what does not exist is necessarily to be declared non-existent, and such is a true speech. What is indirectly implied is that the set of the asti-kāya s, being the existent entities, exhausts all that exists ( asti-bhāva ).

A observation of similar kind is found in other works, for instance in the Dravya-saṁgraha of Nemicandra, who also relates the name asti-kāya to existence, but its historical value is much lower inasmuch as this kind of etymologising does not reflect the historical genesis of the term asti-kāya at all, and therefore such kinds of explanations should not be retrospectively projected onto the historical beginnings of the term:

Since these exist, the supreme victors ( jina ) say that these exist like bodies ( kāya ) that have numerous parts, and because of that these are extensive entities. Footnote 73

A separate question is what the origins of the term could have been. I have no answer to this. This would probably require much more material for a reliable historical and semantic analysis how this term could have originated. What is relevant in this context is, however, that the earliest Digambara sources provide an alternative reading of the terms ending with º atthiya (not with º atthi-kāya ), namely dhamm’atthiya , adhamm’atthiya , āgās’atthiya , as well as jīv’atthiya and poggal’atthiya , and such a reading occurs also with the terms being primary members of compounds. Footnote 74 These could be Sanskritised either as dharmâstika or dharmârthika , etc., but certainly not dharmâsti-kāya , etc. Such an alternative reading should also be taken into consideration in any further analysis. Somehow, the terms in this form structurally resemble terminology related to the epistemological realm, namely the two viewpoints ( naya ): davv’atthiya and pajjāv’atthiya , Sanskritised either as dravyârthika – paryāyârthika (substance- and mode-expressive viewpoints) or as dravyâstika – paryāyâvastika (substantial / attributive view points), of much later provenance. Later Digambara tradition consistently reads atthi-kāya (alternatively metri causa : atthī-kāya ), as attested for instance in Nemicandra’s works. Footnote 75

Model 3* is found in the first Jaina Sanskrit work, in Umāsvāmin’s Tattvârtha-sūtra (TS 5.1), composed around 350–400 CE. I clearly differentiate between Umāsvāmin (c. 350–400), the author of the Sūtra , and Umāsvāti (c. 400–450), the author of the Tattvârthâdhigama-bhāṣya (TBh), both of the Gupta period. Footnote 76 It is clearly a later version or an elaboration of Model 3, and we can call it Model 3*. Its distinct feature is that it completely leaves out living beings ( jīva ) and seems to suggest that these were no longer classifiable as extensive entities ( jīvâsti-kāya ) by that time, and instead the model focuses on lifeless extensive entities ( ajīvâsti-kāya ):

The relevant passage reads: ‘Lifeless extensive entities ( ajīvâsti-kāya ) are principle of motion ( dharmâ °), principle of rest ( adharmâ °), space ( ākāśâ °), matter ( pudgalâ °).’ Footnote 77 The classification could theoretically presuppose that there is also an extensive entity as living being ( jīvâsti-kāya ). However it does not, because, first, the idea of living extensive element ( jīvâsti-kāya ) is nowhere mentioned by name or alluded to in the whole Tattvârtha-sūtra , and second, it is excluded by the next aphorism (TS 5.2; see below), which explicitly includes living beings ( jīva ) among substances ( dravya ), but not among extensive entities. The Tattvârtha-sūtra classification is reflected also in the later strata of the Śvetāmbara canon. An appendage to the same passage of the Lecture of Explanations quoted earlier in the context of Model 3 introduces the idea of ajīvâsti-kāya : ‘Thus, [Mahāvīra] Jñātr̥putra teaches that there are four extensive entities which are lifeless extensive entities.’ Footnote 78

A transitory scheme resembling Model 3* is also presented in a later portion of the The Later Chapters ( Uttarajjhayaṇa-sutta , Uttar 36.5–6), appended at the end of the whole work, after two verses specifying the well-known and much earlier established dualistic system of living beings ( jīva ) and lifeless elements ( ajīva ) as constituting the world ( loka ):

[1] Now, hear from me, with focused mind, about the division into living beings ( jīva ) and lifeless elements ( ajīva ), after having known which, a monk succeeds in self-discipline ( samyama ). [2] Living beings ( jīva ) as well as lifeless elements ( ajīva ) are called “this world”. The space ( ākāśa ) which is the place for [only] lifeless elements ( ajīva ) is called the non-world ( aloka ). … [5–6] (a) The extensive entity as the principle of motion ( dharmâsti-kāya ) alongside (b) its parts and (c) its spatial units, (d) [the extensive entity as] the principle of rest ( adharmâsti-kāya ) alongside (e) its parts and (f) its spatial units, (g) space ( ākāśa ) alongside its (h) parts and (i) its spatial units as well as (j) phenomenal time divided into units ( addhā-samaya ) – [these are] the ten imperceptible entities. Footnote 79

The model is conspicuous for at least two features. First, it confirms our understanding of the Tattvârtha-sūtra , in which the concept of extensive entity ( asti-kāya ) was by that time limited to lifeless elements ( ajīva ), because all varieties of extensive entities were presented as subcategories of lifeless elements. Second, the classification leaves material extensive entity ( pudgalâsti-kaya ) out, and introduces in its place a category of time under a technical term of addhā-samaya , or ‘phenomenal time’, i.e. not an abstract time as a substance but the time which is directly felt and consciously experienced as a temporal flow divisible into time units (moments).

Model 4 seems similar to Model 1, except that it, first, does not explicitly mention lifeless elements ( ajīva ) in its structure, but instead immediately sets out to enumerate their sub-categories alone, and second, introduces time under the generic term kāla , not the specific addhā-samaya (‘phenomenal time’). One might argue that this may actually represent even and older scheme than Model 1, inasmuch as its form seems simpler. However, since it contains an important addition to the model, time ( kāla ), which belongs to much later historical strata than Model 1, we should rather assume that it is a later classification in a simplified version that merely happens to resemble the much earlier Model 1.

The earliest occurrence of this model, as it seems, is attested in The Later Chapters ( Uttarajjhayaṇa-sutta ):

[7] The principle of motion ( dharma ), the principle of rest ( adharma ), space ( ākāśa ), time ( kāla ), matter ( pudgala ) and living beings ( jantu = jīva ) – these are described as the world ( loka ) by the Jinas, who see best. [8] The principle of motion ( dharma ), the principle of rest ( adharma ) and space ( ākāśa ) are described [each] as unitary (numerically one) substance. Further, infinite substances [comprise] time ( kāla ), matter ( pudgala ) and living beings ( jantu = jīva ). Footnote 80

Verse 7 is found alongside an explanatory passage (Uttar 28.8–14), which is probably slightly younger and which contains a number of historically later elements, such as the qualities mentioned in Kaṇāda’s Vaiśeṣika-sūtra (VS(C) 1.1.5). It was apparently appended to the preceding verse (Uttar 28.7) as its updated elaboration. In this historically still slightly later appendage in the same text (Uttar 28.14), we also find the enumeration of soteriological categories, already known from Model 2 (see above).

Model 5 introduces still one more important idea, that of substance ( dravya ). The locus classicus is Umāsvāmin’s Tattvârtha-sūtra in the versions preserved in its both commentaries: Umāsvāti’s Commentary [providing] the Understanding of the Reality ( Tattvârthâdhigama-bhāṣya , TBh) and Pūjyapāda Devanandin’s The Demonstration of All Things ( Sarvârtha-siddhi , SSi). Model 5 lists five items, excluding time, whereas it’s other version, Model 5*, adds time, known as kāla , not addhā-samaya (‘phenomenal time’) , as the sixth substance.

The idea of substance ( davva , dravya ) does not occur even once in the Sayings of the Seers ( Isi-bhāsiyāiṁ ) or in oldest portions of canonical texts, which means that early Jaina ontology did not know the concept of substance and the term for it ( davva , dravya ) was gradually introduced into the early Jaina ontology later, under the influence of the early Vaiśeṣika and the Ānvīkṣikī system. In the case of the Tattvârtha-sūtra , it is imposed on or appended to the earlier Model 3 of the extensive entities ( asti-kāya ) as an innovation.

Whether we accept the Śvetāmbara cautious reading: ‘According to some, also time is [a substance]’ (TS 1 /TS 2 (TBh) 38: kālaś cêty eke ), or the Digambara reading: ‘Also time is [a substance]’ (TS 3 (SSi) 39: kālaś ca ), both demonstrate that already at the time of the final redaction of the text there existed an ontological model of substances which included also time, albeit its ontological status as a separate substance was not universally accepted. This in turn attests to the model’s nascent phase around 400 CE, ergo the model did not exist before. The specification of time as substance (TS 38 or 39) is separated from the list of substances (TS 1–2 or 1–3) by three dozens of sūtra s which may indicate that the insertion of time to the original text of Tattvârtha-sūtra happened at the redaction stage by the commentators (TBh, SSi) who integrated the new idea in the body of the sūtra s. Model 5, which was adopted from the Vaiśeṣika ontology and which enlists substances, set the standard for future Jaina ontology. Its version, Model 5*, is found also in the canon, for instance in a Viyāha-pannatti passage that lists all the six substances, which comprise the five asti-kāya and the phenomenal time ( addhā-samaya ). Footnote 81

Interestingly, the new classification is introduced into Jaina works by way of imposing it on a pre-existing model (usually the classification of extensive entities, the asti-kāya s), typically by appending the new classificatory term ‘substance’ to an earlier section of a particular text and linking both models (say, the older model of extensive entities and the new one of substances) through one or more terms, such as ‘matter’. For instance, the description of an earlier model, e.g. Model 3 or Model 3* of extensive entities ( asti-kāya ), concludes with ‘matter’ ( pudgala ), and then the text continues to explain that matter (as the last element of the older model) is, in addition, classifiable as one of substances, which are now all incorporated into the new Model 5. This is done also in Sanskrit works, precisely in the Treatise on the Reality ( Tattvârtha-sūtra ; TS 5.1–2) around 350–400 CE, in which Model 3* is extended to Model 5. First, four lifeless extensive entities ( ajīvâsti-kāya ) are enumerated (Model 3*; TS 5.1: ajīvā-kāyā dharmâdharmâkāśa-pudgalāḥ ). Then (TS 1 /TS 2 5.2: dravyāṇi jīvāś ca ; or TS 3 5.2–3 in SSi reading), these are equated with substances and the new scheme of substances ( dravya ) is said to also include living beings ( jīva ) that but no longer classified as extensive entities ( asti-kāya ). Subsequently, between 540–600 CE, in his commentary, Sarvârtha-siddhi , Pūjyapāda Devanandin explicitly adds time ( kāla ) as one more substance in its right place, i.e. where the substances are first discussed at the beginning of Chapter 5, and not towards its end (SSi 5.3: evam etāni vakṣyamāṇena kālena saha ṣaḍ dravyāṇi bhavanti ). The introduction of time into the Treatise on the Reality (TS) happened, it seems, probably later, and did not belong to the original model found there.

What transpires from a comparison of all these models (see Recapitulation below) is that practically from the very beginnings of Jaina—consistently dualistic—ontology, based on the duality of living beings ( jīva ) and lifeless elements ( ajīva ), we deal with practically six basic categories— jīva , ajīva , dharma , adharma , ākāśa and pudgala —which are sometimes extended with kāla (Models 4, 5*), sometimes abridged. A rather different trajectory is taken by Model 2. The main difference between all these models, which are almost identical, lies practically in how and, most importantly, under what class heading ( tattva , asti-kāya , dravya ) these basic categories are organised and classified. As I have tried to demonstrate, the minor changes, reflected in the class headings, developed over the period of approximately four centuries, perhaps even less, and came in a manner in which most of the actual ontological contents of a previous model was retained but a new heading was superimposed on it. It is, therefore, these class headings that crucially reflect historical developmental stages of basic structure as reflected in Model 1, as earlier demonstrated, and a reference to these headings alone (not to the components of a given model, which recur over centuries) can be treated as historical marker. The only exception to the rule is Model 2, which developed parallelly to all other models, and retained, as it seems, its original structure throughout the centuries. Like in the case of the gradual transformations of (the variants of) Model 1 to more complex models 3, 4 and 5, it is not impossible that Model 2 also had its earlier versions that may be grouped into a sequence of such gradual transitions from an earlier version to what we eventually classify as Model 2.

The actual application of these models can provide us with a useful method to determine the cohesion and integrity of a particular text or a passage and also its historical time reference. For instance, a mention of the classification of substances (Model 5/5*) in a particular passage sets an earliest possible time limit for it as ca. 400 CE. Further, a text which refers to extensive entities and is oblivious to the concept of substance cannot be later that ca. 400 CE. It is, of course, possible that two or more models can co-occur in one text. The best example is the Tattvârtha-sūtra itself, which lists Model 2, a variant (3*) of Model 3, and Model 5. In such cases, the latest model is the terminus post quem for the work. Further, the method can help us determine that a particular text is a compilation of various historical layers in case we find in it a continuous passage referring only to extensive entities with no mention of substances, and another passage basing its ontology on the concept of substance alone. Also the occurrence of time in a classification can be treated as a historical indicator.

Recapitulation of all models

I deliberately speak of ‘substitute’ canon in the sense that the texts substitute what was believed to be the original teachings of Mahāvīra Vardhamāna contained in the 14 Ancient Texts (Prakrit: Puvva , Sanskrit: Pūrva ), which were subsequently lost, and then partially preserved in other writings, the Aṅga s. There are indications (e.g. in the Sarvârtha-siddhi of Pūjyapāda Devanandin, SSi 1.20) that still in the sixth century, the Digambaras recognised certain texts, called aṅga etc., whose titles resemble some works of the Śvetāmbara canon, and which replaced the Puvva s. The authority of these texts was subsequently discarded, and supplanted with new works that, according to much later tradition, were partly based on the teachings of the monk Dharasena, who was believed to remember some portions of earlier teachings and to transmit these to his disciples on Mount Girnār. In distinction to much of the Śvetāmbara canon, the Digambara Siddhānta is ascribed to two persons, Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali. Cf. Fujinaga ( 2007 ).

Cf. Dixit ( 1971 , pp. 79–83).

Edited and translated by Bollée ( 2002 ).

See Balcerowicz ( 2016b , p. 206).

It would therefore be a mistake to consider the ascetics and religious activists such as Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, Gautama Buddha or Maskarin Gośāla genuine philosophers.

On the distinction between religious and non-religious (including philosophy) frameworks, see: B alcerowicz ( 2018 ).

See: Balcerowicz ( forthcoming ).

That is, thinkable, in the sense: postulated to exist. Obviously, non-existent element could not be included, but also elements which are unthinkable, ergo inexpressible, could not be incorporated either.

Cf. Larson ( 1979 , pp. 95–134, esp. 104 ff.).

It is the famous passage which specifies that ‘the system of methodological enquiry comprises proto-Sāṁkhya, proto-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the materialists’ (AŚ 1.2.10: sāṁkhyaṁ yogo lokāyataṁ cêty ānvīkṣikī ); see: Balcerowicz ( 2012 ).

The standard six categories of substance ( dravya ), quality ( guṇa ), movement ( karman ), the universal ( sāmānya ), the individuator/particular ( viśeṣa ) and inherence, well-known from the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra , may have already been in existence in the proto-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika current, which was closely affiliated to the medical tradition of the Caraka-saṁhitā , some portions of which pre-date the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra . There, we find the six Vaiśeṣika categories regularly mentioned in the text as important classifying devices as well as enumerated, CS 1 1.1.9 = CS 2 /CS 3 1.1.28–29:

maharṣayas te dadr̥śur yathā-vaj-jñāna-cakṣuṣā /

sāmānyaṁ ca viśeṣaṁ ca guṇān dravyāṇi karma ca // 28 //

samavāyaṁ ca taj jñātvā tantrôktaṁ vidhim āsthitāḥ /

lebhire paramaṁ śarma jīvitaṁ cāâpy anitvaram // 29 //

[* CS 1 : tena rṣayas .]

Explanatorily necessary are those elements of a model of the universe that are not necessarily directly perceptible or inferable but postulated to exist because the explanatory model (whether in philosophy, science, or even theology, etc., or any other rationally constructed system) or the proposed mechanics of the world requires it for some (better or worse justified) reason as indispensable for the completeness of the model, such as for instance the Higgs boson first postulated by Peter Higgs, or – in the case of Jainism – the principles of movement and rest ( dharma , adharma ) to explain the phenomenon of motion/action/change and immobility/inactivity. Factually existent are those elements which are directly observable or inferable in a way which is not seriously questionable (for a sceptic, this would still remain insufficient).

On his relation to Ājīvikism, see: Balcerowicz ( 2016a , pp. 10, 314–315).

On Gośāla’s influence on Vardhamāna, the probable teacher-disciple relation between the two, see: B alcerowicz ( 2016a , pp. 11–43, 315). On relationship between Ājīvikism and Jainism, see: Balcerowicz ( 2016a passim ) and Balcerowicz ( 2020 ).

A useful preliminary study on the subject was done already by Dixit ( 1971 ).

I distinguish between the two processes, even though they may overlap. A gradual process of composition indicates that some portions of the final version of text were gradually extended and elaborated by subsequent authors, who themselves wrote new portions inserted within earlier layers. A gradual process of compilation means that different blocks of earlier texts, that functioned independently, in their own right, were brought together into a new larger text.

ŚKhĀ 1.1.2–4: [2] etto imesiṁ co’ddassaṇhaṁ jīva-samāsāṇaṁ maggaṇa-ṭṭhadāe tattha imāṇi co’ddassa cêva ṭṭhāṇāṇi ṇādavvāṇi bhavaṁti . [3] tam jahā . [4] gai iṁdie kāe joge vede kasāe ṇāṇe saṁjame daṁsaṇe lessā bhaviya sammatta saṇṇi ākarae cêdi .

See Dixit ( 1971 , pp. 18–21).

See: Glasenapp ( 1942 , pp. 75–92), ( 1999 , pp. 221–225), Tatia ( 1951 , pp. 268–280), JSK II: 245–247.

See Dixit ( 1971 , pp. 14–16).

On the development of epistemological models see: Balcerowicz ( 2016c ).

Most philosophical texts begin with the discussion of the epistemic means to know and justify main claims of the particular system, or with a pramāṇa section. It is only after the proper instruments of knowing are established that the enquiry moves to other issues, such as Dharma, liberation, suffering etc.

On the redaction process, see Kapadia ( 2000 , pp. 55–63). Cf. also Dundas ( 2002 , pp. 70–73).

K apadia ( 2000 , p. 58).

Kapadia ( 2000 , p. 56).

Chatterjee ( 2000 , p. 230).

See, e.g., Ohira ( 1994 , p. 4, § 11): ‘The Sthāna and the Samavaya … their numerically ordered collection of the conceptual items developed in the long course of the canonical period’.

Cf. the usage of the quality lukkha / rūkṣa , as one of two qualities (beside viscosity, niddha / snigdha ) in TS 5.32 that bind atoms into particles. Viscosity makes the bounding possible, and roughness is its opposite.

Ṭhāṇ 1 10.704 = Ṭhāṇ 2 10.704 ≈ Ṭhāṇ 3 10.888 = Ṭhāṇ 4 10.1: [4] ṇa evaṁ 1 bhūtaṁ vā bhavvaṁ vā bhavissati vā jaṁ jīvā ajīvā bhavissaṁti ajīvā vā jīvā bhavissaṁti evaṁ pp’egā 1 loga-ṭṭhitī paṇṇattā . [6] ṇa evaṁ 1 bhūtaṁ vā bhavvaṁ vā bhavissati vā jaṁ loge aloge bhavissati aloge vā loge bhavissati evaṁ pp’egā 2 loga-ṭṭhitī paṇṇattā . [7] ṇa evaṁ 1 bhūtaṁ vā bhavvaṁ vā bhavissati vā jaṁ loge aloge pavissati aloge vā loge pavissati evaṁ pp’egā 2 loga-ṭṭhitī paṇṇattā . [9] jāva tāva jīvāṇa ya poggalāṇa ya gati-pariyāe 3 tāva tāva loe, jāva tāva loge tāva tāva jīvāṇa ya poggalāṇa ya gati-pariyāe 3 evaṁ pp’egā 2 loga-ṭṭhitī paṇṇattā . [10] savvesu vi ṇaṁ log’aṁtesu abaddha-pāsa-puṭṭhā poggalā lukkhattāe 4 kajjaṁti, jeṇaṁ jīvā ya poggalā ya ṇo saṁcāyaṁti bahiyā log’aṁtā gamaṇayāe evaṁ pp’egā 2 loga-ṭṭhitī paṇṇattā.

1 Ṭhāṇ 1,2 : etaṁ . 2 Ṭhāṇ 1,2 : evaṁ pegā . 3 Ṭhāṇ 1,2 : gati-paritāne . 4 Ṭhāṇ 1,2 : lukkhattāte .

This model is alluded to also elsewhere with the sequence of jīvā ya poggalā ya , e.g. in Ṭhāṇ 1 182, 334 = Ṭhāṇ 3 189, 389.

Isibh 31: [1.] ke ’yaṁ loe? jīvā c’eva ajīvā c’eva … [5.] lokatîti loko. [6.] jīvāṇa ya puggalāṇa ya gatī ’ti āhitā. [7.] jīvāṇaṁ c’eva puggalāṇaṁ c’eva gatī … [8.] aṇādīe aṇidhaṇe gati-bhāve. [9.] gammatîti gatī . … [a.] uddha-gāmī jīvā, ahe-gāmī poggalā .

Cf. Ohira ( 1994 , p. 113 § 257): ‘The word jīva distinguished from ajīva occurs decisively in the third canonical stage, where ajīva denotes pudgala on the whole. The usage of ajīva in the sense of asti-kāyas minus jīva and addhā-samaya arises in the fourth-fifth canonical stages.’

See, e.g., Collins ( 1982 , pp. 160–165). Cf. also Châu ( 1999 , pp. 130–143).

Cf. Meulenbeld ( 1999 –2002, IA, 112): ‘The version of Sāṁkhya as found in the Carakasaṁhitā is earlier than that of the Sāṁkhyakārikā , which belongs to about the period A.D. 350–450, and may belong to the period of Pañcaśikha and the Ṣaṣṭitantra , i.e. about 100 B.C.–A.D. 200.’

Car 1,2 4.4.8 = Car 3 4.4.7: hetuḥ kāraṇaṁ nimittam akṣaraṁ kārtā mantā veditā boddhā draṣṭā veditā boddhā draṣṭā dhātā brahmā viśvakarmā puruṣaḥ prabhavo ’vyayo nityo guṇī grahaṇaṁ pradhānam avyaktaṁ jīvo jñaḥ pudgalaś cetanāvān vibhur ātmā cêndriyâtmā cântarâtmā cêti .

Ohira ( 1994 , p. 58) places it in the third canonical stage, or between 1st cent. BCE/1st cent. CE and 3rd cent. CE.

Viy 2 8.10.437 = Viy 3 8.10.59, 61: [59] jīve ṇaṁ bhante. kiṁ poggalī poggale? goyamā, jīve poggalī pi, poggale vi . goyamā se jahānāmae chatteṇaṁ chatti, daṁḍeṇaṁ daṁdī, ghaṭeṇaṁ ghaṭī, paḍeṇaṁ paḍī, kareṇaṁ karī, evām eva – goyamā jīve vi soiṁdiya-cakkh’iṁdiya-ghāṇ’iṁdiya-jibbh’iṁdiya-phās’iṁdiyāiṁ paḍucca poggalī, jīvaṁ paḍucca poggale. … goyamā jīvaṁ paḍucca se teṇ’aṭṭheṅaṁ goyamā evaṁ vuccai: siddhe no poggalī, poggale . … [61] siddhe ṇaṁ bhante. kiṁ poggalī poggale? goyamā, no poggalī pi, poggale. goyamā, jīvaṁ paḍucca, se teṇ’aṭṭheṇaṁ goyamā .

On this passage, cf. Deleu ( 1970 , p. 158): (423b) The soul ( jīva ) is poggali scil. possesses atoms of matter, namely in the senses, as well as poggala , i.e. individual. This is also true for every being in the saṁsāra , but not for the Siddha who is only poggala ’; and Ohira ( 1994 , p. 113 § 258): ‘The Jainas insist in VIII.10.360 that a saṁsāri jīva is a pudgala (an individual) on the basis of being a jīva , and he is also a pudgali (a possessor of pudgala ) on the basis of possessing indriyas , inasmuch as a person having a daṇḍa (stick) is called a daṇḍi . A siddha is said to be neither a pudgala nor a pudgali . The word pudgala retains here the sense of an individual soul which is a well-known Buddhist technical term.’ Cf. also F lügel ( 2012 , pp. 162–163).

Ohira ( 1994 , pp. 117–118, § 274) assigns the sections of Sūy 1 2.3 (slightly earlier) and Viy 3 7.3 (slightly later) to ‘to the second through early third canonical stages’ (3rd cent. BCE–3rd cent. CE). The section of Āyār 1 2.1.1.10.404 = Āyār 3 1.1.9.392 quoted below must also belong to the same period.

Āyār 1 2.1.1.10.404 = Āyār 3 1.1.9.392 explains that the monk should abstain from: maṁsaṁ vā macchaṁ vā bahu-kaṁṭagaṁ , or ‘meat or fish containing a lot of bones’, nowadays regularly mistranslated by the Jaina community, e.g., as ‘fruits with many seeds and stones’ (Āyār 4 2.1.1.9.71, vol. 2, p. 130), which is meant to conceal the fact that early Jaina monks did consume meat and vegeterianism in Jainism was a later development.

Sūy 1 2.3.732 = Sūy 2 2.3.675: puḍhavi-joṇiyāṇaṁ rukkhāṇaṁ sarīrā … nānā-viha-sarīra-poggala-viuvviyā… ‘The bodies of trees, which are [born] from the womb of earth are transformed into the flesh (matter) of various bodies…’

Viy 2 7.3.345 = Viy 3 7.3.2: gimhsāsu ṇaṁ bahave usiṇa-joṇiyā jīvā ya puggalā ya vaṇassati-kāiyattāe vakkamaṁti viukkamaṁti cayaṁti uvavajjaṁti . Cf. also Viy 2 2.5.27 = Viy 3 2.5.137.

Similar meaning of pudgala is found also in Viy 2 1.6.77, Viy 2 2.5.127, 19.7.739 = Viy 3 1.6.26 [1], 19.7.2.

B alcerowicz ( 2016b , pp. 126–136), chapter ‘3.2.1.6. Atomism and Elements’ in Ājīvikism.

For instance Viy 1.10.1, 2.10, 5.7–8, 6.7, 8.2, 8.9–10, 9.1, 12.4, 12.7, 12.10, 14.4, 17.7, 16.8, 18.4, 18.6, 18.8, 18.10, 20.2–3, 25.3–4, not to mention other canonical books. Ohira ( 1994 ) assigns these passages to the third canonical stage, or ‘1st century B.C./1st century A.D.–3rd century A.D.’

See Schubring ( 2000 , p. 132, § 59): ‘ poggala , the word for atom, applied in its basic meaning as a “concrete body” in Viy 176b, whereas in 240 it means the part of an individual.’

Ṭhāṇ 1,2 5.3.441, 450 = Ṭhāṇ 3 5.3.479, 488: [441/479] paṁca atthi-kāyā pannattā taṁ jahā – dhamm’atthi-kāe adhamm’atthi-kāe āgās’atthi-kāe jīv’atthi-kāye poggal’atthi-kāe . [450/488] paṁca ṭhāṇaiṁ chaumatthe savva-bhāveṇaṁ na jānati na pāsati, taṁ jahā – dhamm’atthi-kāyaṁ adhamm’atthi-kāyaṁ āgās’atthi-kāyaṁ jīvaṁ paramâṇu-poggalaṁ… etāṇi cêva uppanna-nāṇa-daṁsaṇa-dhare arahā jiṇe kevalī savva-bhāveṇaṁ jāṇati pāsati taṁ jahā – dhamm’atthi-kāyaṁ jāva paramâṇu-poggalaṁ .

E.g. Ṭhāṇ 1,2 5.6.478 = Ṭhāṇ 3 5.6.521 with the addition of ‘sound’ ( saddaṁ ), Ṭhāṇ 1,2 5.7.567 = Ṭhāṇ 3 5.7.667 with the addition of ‘sound and smell’ ( saddaṁ gaṁdhaṁ ), and similarly in Ṭhāṇ 5.8, with further addition of ‘speech’ ( vātaṁ ).

Viy 2 17.4.733 = Viy 3 17.4.2: pāṇâtivāe musa-vāe jāva micchā-daṁsaṇa-salle, pāṇâtivāya-veramaṇe jāva micchā-daṁsaṇa-salla-veramaṇe, puḍhavi-kāe jāva vaṇassati-kāe, [1] dhamm’atthi-kāe [2] adhamm’atthi-kāe [3] āgās’atthi-kāe [4] jīve asarīra-paḍibaddhe [5] paramâṇu-poggale … etāṇi cêva uppanna-nāṇa-daṁsaṇa-dhare arahā jiṇe kevalī savva-bhāveṇaṁ jāṇati pāsati taṁ jahā – dhamm’atthi-kāyaṁ jāva no vā karissai .

RP 1 234, p. 190 = RP 2 73, p. 371 = RP 3 771, p. 197: dasa-ṭṭhāṇāiṁ chaumatthe maṇusse savva-bhāveṇaṁ na pāsai, taṁ jahā – [1] dhamm’atthi-kāyaṁ [2] adhamm’atthi-kāyaṁ [3] āgās’atthi-kāyaṁ [4] jīvaṁ asarīra-baddhaṁ [5] paramâṇu-poggalaṁ [6] saddaṁ [7] gaṁdhaṁ [8] vāyaṁ [9] ayaṁ jine bhavissai vā no bhavissai [10] ayaṁ savva-dukkhāṇaṁ aṁtaṁ karessai vā no vā . etāṇi cêva uppanna-nāṇa-daṁsaṇa-dhare arahā jiṇe kevalī savva-bhāveṇaṁ jāṇati pāsati taṁ jahā – dhamm’atthi-kāyaṁ jāva no vā karessai .

Viy 2 2.10.145–148 = Viy 3 2.10.10–14: loyâgāse ṇaṁ bhaṁte kiṁ jīvā jīva-desā jīva-padesā ajīvā ajīva-desā ajīva-padesā? goyamā jīvā vi jīva-desā vi jīva-padesā vi, ajīvā vi ajīva-desā vi ajīva-padesā vi. … je ajīvā te du-vidhā paṇṇattā, taṁ jahā – rūvī ya arūvī ya. je rūvī te cau-vvidhā paṇṇattā, taṁ jahā – khaṁdhā khaṁdha-desā khaṁdha-padesā paramâṇu-poggalā. je arūvī te paṁca-vidhā paṇṇattā, taṁ jahā – dhamm’atthi-kāe no dhamm’atthi-kāyassa dese dhamm’atthi-kāyassa padesā, adhamm’atthi-kāe no adhamm’atthi-kāyassa dese, adhamm’atthi-kāyassa padesā, addhā-samae .

The section is repeated both in Viy 2 11.10.510 = Viy 3 11.10.15–16 and in Viy 2 20.2.781 = Viy 3 20.2.2 with an explicit mention of the previous section of Viy 2.10.

ṢKhĀ-DhṬ 5.6.30, vol. 14, p. 29.3: jīv’atthiyā poggal’atthiyā ettha kiṇ ṇa parūvidā? ṇa tāsiṁ sakkiriyāṇaṁ sagamaṇāṇaṁ dhamm’atthiyâdīhi saha aṇādika-vissasā-baṁdhâbhāvado .

See: E mmrich ( 2003 ).

E.g. Viy 2 13.4.578–581 = Viy 3 13.4.29–35, 45–50, 52–58, 66 ff.

Viy 2 13.4.575 = Viy 3 13.4.23: kim iyaṁ bhaṁte loe tti pavuccai? goyamā paṁc’atthi-kāyā, esa ṇaṁ evatie loe tti pavuccai, tam jahā – dhamm’atthi-kāe, adhamm’atthi-kāe jāva poggal’atthi-kāe .

hoṁti asaṁhā jīve dhammâdhamme aṇaṁta āyāse /

mutte tiviha padesā kālass’ego ṇa teṇa so kāo //

Cf. Larson ( 1979 , p. 72).

For instance MBh 1 12.241.8cd = MBh 2 12.255.8cd:

evaṁ yo vindate ’tmānaṁ kevalaṁ jñānam ātmana //

MBh 2 12.192.63–64 = MBh 1 12.187.53:

na tu tapyati tattva-jñaḥ phale jñāte taraty uta /

evaṁ ye vidur ādhyâtmaṁ kevalaṁ* jñānam uttamam /

[* MBh 1 : kaivalyaṁ .]

MBh 1 21.212.52 = MBh 2 12.224.89:

na ca strī na pumāṁś câiva yathâiva na napuṁsakaḥ /

kevala-jñāna-mātraṁ tat tasmin sarvaṁ pratiṣṭhitam //

TS 1.4: jīvâjīvâsrava-bandha-saṁvara-nirjarā-mokṣās tattvam .

Uttar 28.14:

jīvâjīva ya bandho ya puṇṇaṁ pāvâsavā tahā /

saṁvaro nijjarā mokkho santee tahiyā nava // 14 //

The term is directly mentioned in Isibh 34.6, in a negated form: aṇāsave

Isibh 9.4, 9–10, 31:

saṁvaro nijjarā c’eva puṇṇa-pāva-viṇāsaṇaṁ /

saṁvaraṁ nijjaraṁ c’eva savvahā sammam āyare // 4 //

sopāyāṇā nirādāṇā vipākêyara-saṁjuyā /

uvakkameṇa tavasā nijjarā jāyae sayā // 9 //

saṁtataṁ bandhae kammaṁ nijjarei ya saṁtataṁ /

saṁsāra-goyaro jīvo viseso u tavo mao // 10 //

puvva-jogā asaṁgattā kāū vāyā maṇo i vā /

egato āgatī c’eva kammâbhāvā ṇa vijjatī // 30 //

paraṁ ṇav’aggahâbhāvā suhī āvaraṇa-kkhayā /

atthi lakkhaṇa-sabbhāvā nicco so paramo dhuvaṁ // 31 //

Sūy 1.12.12:

aho vi sattāṇa viuṭṭaṇa ca jo āsavaṁ jāṇai saṁvaraṁ ca /

dukḥaṁ ca jo jāṇai nijjaraṁ ca so bhāsium arihai kiriya-vāyaṁ //

Sūy 1.3.715, p.187.15–16 = Viy 3 2.5.130 = Viy 3 2.5.11, p. 100.5–6: samaṇôpavāsagā bhavaṁti abhigaya-jīvâjīvā uvaladdha-puṇṇa-pāvā āsava-saṁvara-veyaṇa-ṇijjara-kiriyâhikaraṇa-baṁdha-mokkha-kusalā…

E.g. Viy 2.7, 2.10.

Isibh 1 31.47–50: loe ṇa katāi ṇ’āsī ṇa katāi ṇa bhavati ṇa katāi ṇa bhavissati, bhuviṁ ca bhavati ya bhavissati ya, dhuve ṇitie sāsae akkhae avvae avaṭṭhie nicce. se jahā nāmate pañca atthi-kāyā ṇa kayāti ṇ’āsī < jāva > ṇiccā. evām eva loke vi ṇa kayāti ṇ’āsī < jāva > ṇicce.

The final phrase evām eva loke vi ṇa kayāti ṇ’āsī < jāva > ṇicce is a recapitulation of the passage explaining that the world cannot cease to exist, and the introduction of the five extensive entities breaks up the argument.

For instance in the Viyāha-pannatti alone, not to mention other works: Viy 2.7, 2.10, 7.10, 8.9–10, 13.4, 20.2, 25.4; further e.g. Samav 2 5.5.1, p. 334.12–13.

The passage is classified by Ohira ( 1994 , p. 56) as belonging to Section V, i.e. ‘the fourth–early fifth stage (4th century A.D.).’

Viy 3 7.10.3, 6, p. 312–313: [3] … evaṁ khalu samaṇe ṇātaputte paṁca atthi-kāe paṇṇaveti, taṁ jahā – dhamm’atthi-kāyaṁ jāva āgās’atthi-kāyaṁ. tattha ṇam samaṇe ṇataputte cattāri atthi-kāe ajīva-kāe paṇṇaveti, taṁ° – dhamm’atthi-kāyaṁ adhamm’atthi-kāyaṁ āgās’atthi-kāyaṁ poggal’atthi-kāyaṁ. egaṁ ca samaṇe ṇayaputte jīv’atthi-kāyaṁ arūvi-kāyaṁ jīva-kāyaṁ pannavetti. tattha ṇaṁ samaṇe ṇāyaputte cattāri atthi-kāe arūvi-kāe pannaveti, taṁ jahā – dhamm’atthi-kāyaṁ adhamm’atthi-kāyaṁ āgās’atthi-kāyaṁ jīv’atthi-kāyaṁ. egaṁ ca ṇaṁ samaṇe ṇāyaputte poggal’atthi-kāyaṁ rūvi-kāyaṁ ajīva-kāyaṁ pannavetti. se kaham etaṁ manne evam? … [6] tae ṇaṁ te anna-utthiyā bhagavaṁ goyamaṁ adūra-sāmaṁteṇam vīraivayamāṇaṁ pāsaṁti, pāsettā annam annaṁ saddāveṁti, annam annaṁ saddāvettā evaṁ vayāsī – evam khalu devāṇuppiyā! amhaṁ imā kahā avippakaḍā, ayaṁ ca ṇaṁ gotame amhaṁ adūra-sāmaṁteṇaṁ vītīvayati, taṁ seyaṁ khalu devāṇuppiyā! amhaṁ gotamaṁ eyam aṭṭhaṁ pucchittae tti.

Viy 2 7.10.377 = Viy 3 7.10.6 [2]: tae ṇaṁ se bhagavaṁ goyame te anna-uttie evaṁ vayāsī – no khalu devâṅuppiyā atthi-bhāvaṁ natthi tti vayāmo, natthi-bhāvaṁ atthi tti vayāmo. amhe ṇaṁ devâṇuppiyā savvaṁ atthi-bhāvaṁ atthī ti vayāmo, savvaṁ natthi-bhāvaṁ natthī ti vayāmo .

saṁti jado teṇ’ede atthîti bhaṇaṁti jiṇa-varā jamhā /

kāyā iva bahu-desā tamhā kāyā ya atthi-kāyā ya //

ṢKhĀ 5.6.30–31, 34: [30] jo so aṇādi-vissasā-baṁdho ṇāma so tiviho – dhamm’atthiyā adhamm’atthiyā āgās’atthiyā cêdi. [31] dhamm’atthiyā dhamm’atthiya-desā dhamm’atthiya-padesā, adhamm’atthiyā adhamm’atthiya-desā adhamm’atthiya-padesā, āgās’atthiyā āgās’atthiya-desā āgās’atthiya-padesā, edāsiṁ tiṇṇaṁ pi atthiāṇam aṇṇoṇṇa-padesa-baṁdho hodi ; and ṢKhĀ-DhṬ 5.6.30, vol. 14, p. 29.3: jīv’atthiyā poggal’atthiyā ettha kiṇ ṇa parūvidā?…

GSā-J 620: davvaṁ chakkam akālaṁ paṁc’atthī-kāya-saṇṇidaṁ / and DS 23a–24: … paṁca athi-kāyā du //

kāyā iva vahu-desā tamhā kāyā ya atthi-kāyā ya //

A group of other researchers supports this view, see: Williams ( 1963 , pp. 1–4), P hoolchandra ( 1997 , pp. 56–77), Zydenbos (1983, pp. 9–13), B ronkhorst (1985, pp. 163–178); see also Balcerowicz (2008, pp. 34–35). A few others follow the (later) Śvetāmbara tradition that the Bhāṣya is an autocommentary by Umāsvāti, see: Sanghvi ( 1974 , pp. 15–51), Ohira ( 1982 , pp. 24–53), Dhaky ( 1996 ). For a recent review of different positions on the authorship and date, see: den B oer ( 2020 , pp. 47–67).

TS 5.1: ajīvā-kāyā dharmâdharmâkāśa-pudgalāḥ .

Viy 2 7.10.377 = Viy 3 7.10.3: tattha ṇaṁ Ṇāyaputte cattāri atthi-kāe ajīva-kāe paṇnaveti .

Uttar 36.1–2, 5–6:

jīvâjīva-vibhattiṁ suṇeha me ega-maṇā io /

jaṁ jāṇiūṇa bhikkhū sammaṁ jayai saṁjame // 1 //

jīvā cêva ajīvā ya esa loe viyāhie /

ajīva-desam āgāse aloge se viyāhie // 2 //

dhamm’atthikāe tad-dese tap-paese ya āhie /

ahamme tassa dese ya tap-paese ya āhie // 5 //

āgāse tassa dese ya tap-paese ya āhie //

addhā-samae cêva arūvī dasahā bhave // 6 //

Uttar 28.7–8:

dhammo ahammo āgāsaṁ kālo puggala-jantavo /

esa logo tti pannatto jiṇehiṁ vara-daṁsihiṁ // 7 //

dhammo ahammo āgāsaṁ davvaṁ ikkikkam āhiyaṁ /

aṇantāṇi ya davvāṇi kālo puggala-jantavo // 8 //

Viy 2 25.4.881 = Viy 3 25.4.8: kati-vidhā ṇaṁ bhaṁte savva-davvā pannattā? goyamā cha-vihā savva-davvā pannattā, taṁ jahā – dhamm’atthi-kāya adhamm’atthi-kāya jāva addhā-samaye .

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Emmrich, C. (2003). How many times? Pluralism, dualism or monism in early Jaina temporal description. In: Balcerowicz, P. (ed.) Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion . Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (pp. 71–90).

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Isibh = Isi-bhāsiyāiṁ [ R̥ṣi-bhāṣitāni ]. (1) Schubring, Walther: Isibhāsiyāiṁ. Ein jaina Text der Frühzeit . Nachrichten von der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Göttingen 1942: Nr.1, S.481–576, 1952: Nr. 2 S.21–52. (2) [German translation and edition:] Schubring, Walther: Isibhāsiyāiṁ. Aussprüche der Weisen aus dem Prakrit der Jainas . Übersetzt nebst dem revidierten Text. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 14, de Gruyter, Hamburg 1969. (3) [English translation and edition:] Schubring, Walther: Isibhāsiyāiṁ. A Jaina text of early period . L.D. Series 45, L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 1974.

JSK = Varṇī, Jinendra (ed.): Jainendra Siddhānta Kośa . Parts 1–5, Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Jaina Grantha-mālā 38, 40, 42, 44, 48 [Saṁskr̥ta Granthāṅka], Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha Prakāśana, Delhi 1997, 1999, 2000.

Kapadia, H. R. (2000). A history of the Canonical Literature of the Jainas (Revised) . Ahmedabad: Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre. first edition: 1941.

KP = Guṇadhara: Kasāya-pāhuḍa ( Kaṣāya-prābhr̥ta ). Phūlacandra Siddhāntaśāstrī; Kailashchandra Sidhāntaśāstrī (eds.): Kasāya-pāhuḍa of Guṇadhara with Jayadhavalā-ṭīkā of Vīrasena . 16 Vols., All-India Digambara Jaina Sangha, Mathura 1942–1988.

KVu = Kathā-vatthu . Taylor, A. C. (ed.). (1894–1897). Kathā-vatthu . 2 Vols., Pali Text Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Larson, G. J. (1979). Classical Sāṁkhya: An interpretation of its history and meaning with the Sāṁkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakr̥ṣṇa (romanized text with translation) (Second revised). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

MB = Bhūtabali: Mahā-baṁdha ( Mahā-bandha ). Phūlacandra Siddhāntaśāstrī (ed.): Mahādhavalā-siddhāntaśāstra of Bhūtabali . 7 Vols., Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha Prakāśana, Vārāṇasī 1947–1958.

MBh = Mahā-bhārata . (1) Sukthankar, V.S. et al. (ed.): The Mahābhārata for the first time critically edited . 30 Vols. Bhandarkar Oriental Institute, Poona 1933–1966. (2) Krishnacharya, T.R.; Vyasacharya, T.R. (eds.): Sriman Mahabharatam. A New Edition Mainly Based on the South Indian Texts, with Footnotes and Readings / Śrīman Mahābhāratam Saṭippaṇam . 17 Vols. [Madhva Vilâs Book Depot, Kumbakonam]. Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay 1906–1910.

Meulenbeld, G. J. (1999–2002). A history of Indian Medical Literature. 5 vols., Groningen Oriental Studies. Groningen: Egbert Forsten.

Ohira, S. (1982). A study of the Tattvārthasūtra with Bhāṣya with special reference to authorship and date . L.D. Series 86. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology.

Ohira, S. (1994). A study of the Bhagavatı̄sūtra: A chronological analysis . Ahmedabad: Prakrit Text Society.

Olivelle, P. (1998). The early upaniṣads: Annotated text and translation . New York: Oxford University Press.

Phoolchandra 1997 = See: SS 1 .

RP = Rāya-paseṇiya [ Rāja-praśnīya-sūtra ]. (1) Yuvācārya Śrī Miśrīmalajī Mahārāj ‘Madhukar’ (ed.); Śrī Ratan Muni (Hindi tr.): Rājapraśnīya-sūtra. Second Upānga Rājaprashniya Sūtram [Original Text, Hindi Version. Notes, Annotations and Appendices etc.] . Jināgama Grantha-mālā 15, Śrī Āgama Prakāśana Samiti, Beawar (Byāvar / Rājasthān) 1982. (2) Muni Dīparatnasāgar (ed.): Āgama-suttāṇi (saṭīkaṁ). Bhāgaḥ 8: Vipāka-śrutāṅga-sūtraṁ, Aupapātika-upāṅga-sūtraṁ, Rāja-praśnīya-upāṅga-sūtraṁ . Āgama Śruta Prakāśan, Ahamadābād 1998 [Ravivār 2056]. (3) Gaṇādhipati Tulsī, Ācārya Mahāprajña (eds.): Uvaṁga-suttāṇi 4: Ovāiyaṁ, Rāyapaseṇiyaṁ, Jīvâjīvâbhigame . Jaina Viśvabhāratī Saṁsthān, Lāḍnūn 1987.

Samav = Samavāy’aṁga-sutta [ Samavāyâṅga-sūtra ]. See: Ṭhāṇ 1, 2, 4 .

Sanghi, S. (1974). Pt. Sukhlalji’s commentary on Tattvārtha Sūtra of Vācaka Umāsvāti . Translated by K.K. Dixit. 2nd ed. L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 2000 (first edition: 1974).

Schubring, W. (2000). The Doctrine of the Jainas . Translated from the German by Wolfgang Beurlen. Revised edition, by Willem B. Bollée and Jayandra Soni, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 2000 [first edition: 1962; German original: Die Lehre der Jainas: nach den alten Quellen dargestellt . Walter de Gruyter, Berlin–Leipzig 1935].

ṢKhĀ = Puṣpadanta; Bhūtabali: Cha-kkhaṁḍâgame [ Ṣaṭ-khaṇḍâgama ]. (1) Hirarlal Jain, Phoolachandra Siddhanta Shastri, Balachandra Sidhanta Shastri (eds.): Shatkhandagama of Pushpadanta and Bhootabali with the Commentary Dhavala of Veerasenacharya . Edited with Introduction, Hindi translation, Notes and Indexes. 16 Vols., Jaina Sāhityoddhāraka Fund, Amaravati 1939–1959 [revised fourth edition: Jain Saṁskr̥ti Saṁrakṣak Saṅgha, Solāpur 2000]. (2) Sumatibāī Śāhā (ed.): Śrī Bhagavān Puṣpadanta-Bhūtabalī praṇīta Ṣaḍ-khaṇḍâgama . Ācārya Śāntisāgar ‘Chāṇī’ Smr̥ti Granthamālā, Buṛhāṇa/Mujaphpharnagar 2005. (3) Partial English translation: Jain, Nand Lal (tr.); Jain, Ashok Kumar (ed.): Satkhandāgama (Six-volume Canon) by Ācārya Shri Puṣpadanta and Būtabali. Dhavalā Commentary by Ācārya Śhri Vīrsena. Jīvastāna (States of Jīva). Sat-prarūpaṇā – 1 (Enunciation of Existence – 1) . Pandit Phool Chandra Shastri Foundation / Shri Ganesh Varni Digamber Jain Sansthan; 2004, Roorkee / Varanasi 2004.

ṢKhĀ-DhṬ = Vīrasena: Cha-kkhaṁḍâgama-Dhavalā-ṭīkā . See: ṢKhĀ 1 .

SSi = Pūjyapāda Devanandin: Sarvârtha-siddhi . (1) Phoolchandra Shastri (ed.): Ācārya Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārthasiddhi [ The commentary on Ācārya Griddhapiccha’s Tattvārtha-sūtra ]. Edited and translated [into Hindi]. Vāraṇāsī 1934 [reprinted: Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Jaina Grantha-mālā 13, Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha Prakāśana, Delhi 2000]. (2) Jinadasa Śastri (ed.): Tattvârtha-vr̥ttiḥ Sarvârtha-siddhiḥ – Pūjapāda-Devanandin . Śrīsekhārāma Nemicandra Granthāmālā 128, Devajī Sakhārām Diśī & Māṇikacandra-digambara-jaina-parīkṣālaya-mantri, Ṣodaśapur 1939.

Sūy = Sūya-gaḍaṁga [ Sūtra-kr̥tâṅga / Sūtra-kr̥d-aṅga ]. (1) Muni Jambūvijaya (ed.): Sūyagaḍaṁgasuttaṁ . Jaina-Āgama-Series 2(2), Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay 1978. (2) Muni Dīparatnasāgar (ed.): Āgama-suttāṇi (saṭīkaṁ). Bhāgaḥ 2: Sūtra-kr̥tāṅga-sūtram (mūlam + Abhayadeva-sūri-viracitā vr̥ttiḥ) . Āgama Śruta Prakāśan, Ahamadābād 1998 [Ravivār 2056].

Tatia, N. (1951). Studies in Jaina Philosophy . Calcutta: Jain Cultural Research Society. [reprinted: P.V. Research Institute/Jainashram, Varanasi 1987].

TBh = Umāsvāti: Tattvârthâdhigama-bhāṣya . (1) See: TS 1 , TS 2 (TṬ).

Tedesco, P. (1947). Sanskrit pudgala - “Body; Soul.” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 67 (3), 172–177.

Ṭhāṇ = Ṭhāṇ’aṁga-sutta [ Sthānâṅga-sūtra ]. (1) Muni Jambūvijaya (ed.): Ṭhāṇaṁgasuttaṁ and Samavāyaṁgasuttaṁ (Sthānāṅga-sūtra and Samavāyāṅga-sūtra) . Jaina-Āgama-Series 3, Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay 1985. (2) Muni Jambūvijaya (ed.): Sthāṇaṅgasutta with the commentary by Ācārya Śrī Abhayadev-Sūri Mahārāja . 3 Parts, Jaina-Āgama-Series 19, Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay 2003. (3) Muni Dīparatnasāgar (ed.): Āgama-suttāṇi (saṭīkaṁ). Bhāgaḥ 3: Sthānāṅga-sūtram (mūlam + Abhayadeva-sūri-viracitā vr̥ttiḥ) . Āgama Śruta Prakāśan, Ahamadābād 1998 [Ravivār 2056]. (4) Muni Nathamala; Ācārya Tulsī (eds.): Aṅga-suttāṇi 1: Āyāro, Sayagaḍo, Ṭhāṇaṁ, Samavāo . Jaina Viśva Bhāratī, Lāḍnūṁ 1974 [ Vikrama-saṁvat 2031].

TS = Umāsvāmin: Tattvârtha-sūtra . (1) [Śvetāmbara redaction:] Mody, Keshavlal Premchand (ed.): Tattvārthādhigama by Umāsvāti being in the Original Sanskrit with the Bhāṣya by the author himself . Bibliotheca Indica New Series 1044, 1079, 1118, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1903, 1904, 1905. (2) [Śvetāmbara redaction:] Hīrālāl Rasikdās Kāpaḍiya [Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia] (ed.): Tattvārthādhigamasūtra (A Treatise on the Fundamental Principles of Jainism) by His Holiness Śrī Umāsvāti Vāchaka, together with His connective verses commented upon by Śrī Devaguptasūri & Śrī Siddhasenagaṇi and His own gloss elucidated by Śrī Siddhasenagaṇi, edited with Introduction in English and Sanskrit . 2 Vols., Sheth Devchand Lalbhai Jain Pustakoddhar Fund Series Nos. 67 and 76, Jivanachand Sakerchand Jhaveri, Bo 1926 (Part I: Chapters I–V), 1930 (Part II: Chapters VI–X). (3) [Digambara redaction:] See: SSi.

Uttar = Uttarajjhayaṇa-sutta [ Uttarâdhyayana-sūtra ]. (1) See: Charpentier, Jarl: The Uttarâdhyayanasūtra . An introduction, text, critical notes and a commentary. Archives d’Etudes Orientales , Vol. 18:1–2, Uppsala 1921–1922. (2) Muni Nathmal [Tatia] (ed.): Dasaveāliyaṁ taha Uttarajhayaṇāṇi . Introduction: Ācārya Tulsī. Jaina Śvetāmbara Terāpṁthī Mahāsabhā, Kalakattā (Calcutta) 1966 [Saṁ. 2023]. (3) Muni Puṇyavijayaji and Pt. Amritlāl Mohanlāl Bhojak (ed.): Dasaveyāliyasuttaṁ, Uttarajhayaṇāiṁ and Āvassayasuttaṁ . Jaina-Āgama-Series 15, Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay 1977. (4) English translation: Jacobi, Hermann: Jaina Sūtras, Part II: Uttarâdhyayana Sūtra and Sūtrakr̥tāṅga . Sacred Books of the East 45, Bombay–Oxford 1895 [reprinted: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1999].

Viy = Viyāha-pannatti / Viyāha-paṇṇatti / Bhagavaī-viyāha-paṇṇaṭṭī [ Bhagavatī Vyākhyā-prajñapti / Bhagavatī-sūtra ]. (1) Viyāhapannatti with Abhayadeva’s Vr̥tti . Āgamodaya-samiti, Bomvay 1918–1921. (2) Muni Dīparatnasāgar (ed.): Āgama-suttāṇi ( saṭīkaṁ ) . Bhāgaḥ 6: Bhagavatī-aṅga-sūtram ( mūlam + Abhayadeva-sūri-viracitā vr̥ttiḥ ). 6 Vols., Āgama Śruta Prakāśan, Ahamadābād 1998 [Ravivār 2056]. (3) Bechardas J. Doshi; Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak (ed.): Viyāhapaṇṇattisuttaṁ . 3 parts, Jaina-Āgama-Series 4, Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay 1974–1982. (4) Ācārya Tulsī; Mahāprajña (ed.): Bhagavai Viāhapaṇṇattī . Parts 1–4, Jaina Viśvabhāratī Saṁsthān, Lāḍnūn 1994–2007. (5) Amar Muni; Srichand Surana Saras (ed., English tr.): Illustrated Shri Bhagavati Sutra (Vyakhya Prajnapti) . Original Text with Hindi and English Translations, Elaboration and Multicoloured Illustrations. 3 vols., Padma Prakashan, Delhi 2005, 2006, 2008 [chapters 1–9].

von Glasenapp, H. (1942). The Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy . Translated from the Original German by G. Barry Gifford. Bai Vijaibai Jivanlal, Panalal Charity Fund, Bombay [German original: Die Lehre vom Karman in der Philosophie der Jainas nach den Karmagranthas dargestellt . Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, Leipzig 1915].

von Glasenapp, H. (1999). Jainism: An Indian Religion of Salvation . Transl. by Shridhar B. Shrotri. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi. [German original: Der Jainismus. Eine indische Erlösungsreligion . Berlin 1925; 2. ed.: Hager, Berlin 1964].

VS(C) = Kaṇāda: Vaiśeṣika-sūtra [Candrānanda’s recension]. Muni Jambuvijaya (ed.): Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda . With the Introduction by Anantalal Thakur. Gaekwad’s Oriental Series 136, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1961.

Williams, R. (1963). Jaina Yoga: A survey of the Mediaeval Śrāvakācāras. London Oriental Series 14 . London: Oxford University Press.

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The paper contains some material that was in part presented as ‘A Note on the Oeuvre of the “Collective Thinker” Kundakunda. The Case of the Pañcâstikāya-saṅgraha ( Paṁc’atthiya-saṁgaha )’ at the 20th Anniversary Jaina Studies Workshop: History and Current State of Jaina Studies, SOAS, London, on 24 March 2018. A part of the research work on this paper has been supported by the National Science Centre of Poland (Research Project: ‘History of Classical Indian Philosophy: Buddhism, Scepticism and Materialism’, 2016/23/B/HS1/00536).

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Balcerowicz, P. Beginnings of Jaina Ontology and Its Models. J Indian Philos 49 , 657–697 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09480-3

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Article: Jainism in scientific terms

Although Jain Follower of the 24 Jinas or an adjective describing Jain teachings or practices. The term 'Jaina' is also used although 'Jain' is more common. " >Jain dharma or belief developed over many centuries, it can be thought of in terms of modern science. This rich inheritance of universal philosophy on a scientific basis means that many Jain concepts have more relevance now than ever before. However, factors such as the technical terminology and language of the original works present obstacles for contemporary readers and mean that key concepts need to be recast. It is extremely important to reinterpret the foundations of Jainism in the light of recent scientific findings, since some of the answers that individuals seek now were given by Jain Follower of the 24 Jinas or an adjective describing Jain teachings or practices. The term 'Jaina' is also used although 'Jain' is more common. " >Jains many centuries ago.

A summary of the essence of Jain belief may be termed the ‘ Four Noble Truths ’. Drawn from the ancient scriptures , these use the vocabulary of modern science to describe the basic Jain principles of the soul and karma . These truths set out the path to spiritual liberation . The concepts of karmic matter and the working of karma through the cycle of rebirth are likened to photons and computers. Contemporary research into emotional intelligence underlines the vital importance of listening and empathy to being a good lay Jain. The four noble truths are related to other summaries of Jain doctrine , such as the ‘three jewels’ and the svastika . The two distinctive elements of Jain philosophy are the doctrines of:

• ‘qualified assertion’ – syād-vāda
• ‘truth from many viewpoints’ – anekānta-vāda .

These philosophical approaches embrace uncertainty in human experience, stressing that the individual cannot grasp the complete truth.

What is important is the quality of being Jain. That is, instead of Jain-ism, this article focuses on Jain-ness.

Reinterpretation

The ancient Jain texts are written in an obscure technical language that makes them almost impenetrable to a modern readership. Some of the concepts are very deep and to contemporary readers it is surprising that these could have been propounded in a non-scientific era. The texts were also originally written down in Sanskrit and Prakrit , which are unknown to most contemporary Jain Follower of the 24 Jinas or an adjective describing Jain teachings or practices. The term 'Jaina' is also used although 'Jain' is more common. " >Jain followers, especially perhaps those Jain Follower of the 24 Jinas or an adjective describing Jain teachings or practices. The term 'Jaina' is also used although 'Jain' is more common. " >Jains who live outside India. In addition, Rite A sequence of actions that must be followed to perform a religious ceremony. The set of actions is largely symbolic, for example offering food to statues symbolises sacrificing to a deity. The ritual actions are often accompanied by set phrases. " >rituals and obscure interpretations have arisen over the centuries that can be confusing.

There is a clear need to reinterpret these concepts so they can be understood by the present generation and generations to come.

‘Four noble truths’

To help contemporary readers understand more clearly, here are four axioms that have been formulated from various old scriptures and translated into English. While using the terminology of modern science, these echo the notion of the ‘ Four Noble Truths ’ of Buddhism .

The first three truths set out the science of the soul , and the three parts of the fourth truth give their Jain applications.

The foundation of Jainism starts with the first noble truth, which asserts the existence of karmic particles or ‘karmons ‘, as they are called here. These are unusual elementary particles in the sense that they interact with the soul as if they were spiritual photons. That is, Jainism explains life through the interaction of such small invisible atomic particles and the soul.

The four noble truths present the way to reach the ultimate end of Jain belief, which is becoming a siddha or liberated soul – that is, achieving mokṣa .

A full discussion of these concepts of Jain dharma is given in Four Noble Truths ( Chatvarwe Arya Satya ) (Mardia 1990), written with the help of many prominent gurus and scholars .

‘Four Noble Truths’ of Jain dharma Image by K. V. Mardia © K. V. Mardia

‘Karmons’

The extremely minute particles that form karmic matter are here called ‘karmons ‘. These karmons are embedded in the soul , obscuring the inherent key properties of the soul such as infinite bliss.

Invisible particles such as photons, which give light, became known only at the beginning of the last century. So it is surprising that the Jina A 'victor' in Sanskrit, a <strong>Jina</strong> is an enlightened human being who has triumphed over karma and teaches the way to achieve liberation. A synonym for <strong>Tīrthaṃkara</strong>, which means 'ford-maker' or one who has founded a community after reaching omniscience through asceticism. The most famous 24 – Ṛṣabha to Mahāvīra – were born in the Bharata-kṣetra of the middle world, but more are found in other continents. There have been Jinas in the past and there will be some in the future. " >Jinas could put forward such a concept of ‘spiritual photons’ so many centuries ago. If they are physical particles then it is still a challenge for science to hunt for their existence.

The second noble truth implies that this karmic matter is responsible for different species. So in some sense karmic particles are far more subtle than DNA Shortened term for deoxyribonucleic acid. Found in the cell of a living being, a DNA molecule holds genetic instructions for the development and functioning of that organism. DNA contains genes, which pass on characteristics from parent to child. A living being produced by sexual reproduction inherits DNA from both parents, which is unique to it. " >DNA . It has only recently become clear through genomics that there is hardly any difference between the genes in human beings and chimpanzees and many others. There are also questions that prompt a further look into Jain belief and cloning . The Jain belief is that all souls are separate entities – that is, individuals – whereas cloning might imply that a new life can begin in this way. But this is a misunderstanding because cloning only implies changing the genetic code of an existing egg. Therefore the same soul continues, so the fundamental Jain principle is still valid.

Karmic process

The concepts of karmons and karmic activity lead to an explanation of the cycle of birth and rebirth through karmic matter, which is covered in the third noble truth.

Without conscious effort or deliberation, human beings keep absorbing karmons through activity and throw some out after their effect has taken place. Thus the soul has what might be thought of as a karmic computer. This personal karmic computer keeps records and also dictates some tasks from previous records – that is, past lives. The fundamental aim in life is to remove this old karmic matter as well as to stop the inflow of new karmons, resulting in new karmic matter. So this karmic process can be stopped and rehabilitated through Jainness .

One of the key negatives responsible for heavy karmic matter, as given in the fourth noble truth, is kaṣāya s – passions or emotions. These passions may be destructive or positive. The destructive emotions are composed of:

• anger – krodha
• greed – lobha
• ego – māna
• deceit – māyā .

In English the initials of these words form the acronym AGED, introduced by Gurudev Chitrabhanu in the late 20th century. This is an apt acronym because the passions have an ageing effect.

Indeed, the term ‘ Jina ‘, from which ‘ Jain Follower of the 24 Jinas or an adjective describing Jain teachings or practices. The term 'Jaina' is also used although 'Jain' is more common. " >Jaina ‘ is derived, stands for the one who has conquered these inner enemies. Surprisingly, Albert Einstein ’s idea of a follower of a true religion ( Nature 1940: 146) is:

a person who is religiously enlightened appears to me to be one who has, to the best of his ability, liberated himself from the fetters of his selfish desires[.]

Emotional intelligence

The ability to accept other people’s emotions is crucial to being a good Jain Follower of the 24 Jinas or an adjective describing Jain teachings or practices. The term 'Jaina' is also used although 'Jain' is more common. " >Jain . This can be thought of in modern terms as having well developed emotional intelligence.

In the present time there has been considerable work done on understanding human emotions, including the rise of interest in ’emotional intelligence’ or EQ – emotional quotient. This can be understood as being both in contrast to and complementary to IQ Abbrevation of the term 'intelligence quotient'. This is a score indicating intelligence, which derives from standardised tests that use an average score of 100 within an age group. " >IQ – intelligence quotient.

One of the key factors in EQ is achieving emotional intelligence. This is similar to samyaktva – first awakening – which is the fourth step of the Jain guṇa -sth āṇa . One of the key qualities in EQ is empathy – that is, the ability to sense how other people feel. It is the capacity to accept another person’s feelings. It may be described as the quality of being able to:

• listen to others without getting carried away by personal emotions
• distinguish between what others do or say and one’s own personal judgements.

This is the definition of a śrāvaka – the term used for a Jain lay man , which means a great listener.

Summaries of Jain belief

Jain svastika Image by Malaia / Stannered © public domain

The ‘ Four Noble Truths ’ of Jain dharma explained in this article are reminiscent of the ‘Four Noble Truths ‘ of Buddhism . There are several well-known ways of synthesising Jain principles . These commonly take the form of numbered qualities or definitions. Since some of them are probably thousands of years old, the aim of providing a symbolic representation of key ideas is very traditional. The more contemporary method of the four noble truths can be linked to two of the conventional symbolic summaries.

The four noble truths are connected to the ‘three jewels ‘ – ratna-traya – of the Jain Follower of the 24 Jinas or an adjective describing Jain teachings or practices. The term 'Jaina' is also used although 'Jain' is more common. " >Jains , which consist of:

• right faith – samyak-darśana
• right knowledge – samyak-jñāna
• right conduct – samyak-cāritra .

The table makes clear the relationship between the four noble truths and the three gems.

Belief in these four truths taken together represents ‘right faith’.

In deva- pūjā – a worship Rite A sequence of actions that must be followed to perform a religious ceremony. The set of actions is largely symbolic, for example offering food to statues symbolises sacrificing to a deity. The ritual actions are often accompanied by set phrases. " >ceremony in a temple – a composite svastika is used, which has three layers. This can also be thought of as equivalent to the four noble truths. The symbol’s four arms represent the cycle of birth and rebirth going into the four different states of existence – Gati Type of destiny, mode of rebirth in the cycle of rebirth. There are four:<br /><ul><li>god</li><li>human being</li><li>animal</li><li>infernal being.</li></ul><br />Also one of the 14 'gateways' or categories of investigation of <strong>mārgaṇā</strong> or 'soul-quest'. " >gati . The four dots in between the arms symbolise the four parts of the Jain community – monks and nuns , lay men and lay women . Together with the cycle of birth and rebirth , these make up the first layer, which is the third truth. The second layer is the three dots representing the three jewels, which comprise the four truths as a whole. The top layer is a crescent disc with a dot. This represents liberation – mokṣa – which is covered in the first and last truths.

Note that there are other symbolic summaries in the Jain faith. For example, the siddha-cakra – ‘circles of Jina A 'victor' in Sanskrit, a <strong>Jina</strong> is an enlightened human being who has triumphed over karma and teaches the way to achieve liberation. A synonym for <strong>Tīrthaṃkara</strong>, which means 'ford-maker' or one who has founded a community after reaching omniscience through asceticism. The most famous 24 – Ṛṣabha to Mahāvīra – were born in the Bharata-kṣetra of the middle world, but more are found in other continents. There have been Jinas in the past and there will be some in the future. " >Jinas ’ – is made up of the nine dignitaries – Nava-pada . The highest beings or concepts of Jainism, these are:

• five supreme beings
• four essentials – the three jewels plus ‘right austerity ‘.

These four essentials or fundamentals are similar to the eightfold path of Buddhism.

Śvetāmbara Nun A woman who has taken a public vow to withdraw from ordinary life to enter religious life and advance spiritually. Frequently, nuns perform physical austerities or undergo physical hardships in order to progress spiritually. " >nuns meditate Image by Claude Renault © CC BY 2.0

Although knowledge is crucial to spiritual progress, Jain Follower of the 24 Jinas or an adjective describing Jain teachings or practices. The term 'Jaina' is also used although 'Jain' is more common. " >Jain philosophy stresses that a lack of certainty is not to be feared. Instead, it should be welcomed in some respects as uncertainty contributes, paradoxically, to greater understanding. The field of Jain logic contains the two important ideas of:

• ‘ doctrine of qualified assertion’ – syād-vāda

The concept of syād-vāda means that only what is known at a particular time and place, involving those specific circumstances, can be stated with any degree of certainty. It asserts that there are many aspects of reality , which no one person can know. Examples can be found in chapter nine of Mardia 1990/2007. The notion of syād-vāda stresses that nothing is absolute. Karl Popper, one of the greatest logicians of the last century, also emphasised principles of non-absolutism in science.

Secondly, Jain logic recommends elements of relativism in thinking, in the holistic principle of anekānta-vāda . This notion may be translated as ‘truth from many viewpoints’. The concept of anekānta-vāda holds that the same thing can be seen from many various standpoints and thus appears different to each viewer. Each distinct view may contain a glimpse of the truth. The truth of reality cannot be understood from a single point of view. See chapter nine of Mardia 1990/2007 for examples. In fact, relativism in thinking and open-mindedness is needed for a true Jain.

Thus the label ‘Jainism’ is a misnomer for what can be termed ‘Jain-ness ‘ or the ‘Jain spirit’.

Full details

An overview of Jain beliefs about the soul on the BBC website, provided as part of the Religions section.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/jainism/beliefs/soul.shtml

The Indian scholar M. R. Gelra of the Jain Vishva Bharati Institute in Ladnun, Rajasthan, has written a book called Science and Jainism: Perspectives, Issues and Futuristic Trends . It is available to read online on the HereNow4U website.

http://www.herenow4u.net/index.php?id=cd8688

Professor M. R. Gelra summarises the Jain faith and how it relates to science in the preface to his 2007 book Jain Studies and Science . The full text is available to read online on the HereNow4U website.

http://www.herenow4u.net/index.php?id=67812

The HereNow4U website presents an essay by Manikant Shah based on the work of Professor L. C. Jain, director of the Vidyasagar Research Institute in Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh, India. The 2011 essay points out some connections between Jain beliefs and scientific discoveries.

http://www.herenow4u.net/index.php?id=79264

Sohan Raj Tater's 2008 article on the HereNow4U website examines the relationship between the Jain theory of karma and contemporary scientific work in genetics.

http://www.herenow4u.net/index.php?id=66478

The third edition of this book by Jethalal S. Zaveri and Muni Shri Mahendra Kumar discusses the relationships of Jain philosophy, modern physics and Western philosophy. The full text is available to read online on the HereNow4U website.

http://www.herenow4u.net/index.php?id=cd10554

• a Abhinandana
• a Abhiṣeka
• a Ācāra
• a Ācārāṅga-sūtra
• a Ācārya
• a Achalbhrata
• a Aḍhāī-dvīpa
• a Adho-loka
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• a Advaita Vedānta
• a Āgama
• a Aghātīya
• a Aghātīya-karman
• a Agnibhuti
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• a Ahimsa Day
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• a Akbar the Great
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• a Alauddin Khalji
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• a Anaśana
• a Anekānta-vāda
• a Aṅga
• a Aniconism
• a Anojjā
• a Antarāla
• a Antarāya-karma
• a Aṇu
• a Aṇu-vrata
• a Anukampā
• a Anuprekṣā
• a Anusvāra
• a Apabhraṃśa
• a Aparigraha
• a Ārambha
• a Ārambhaja
• a Āratī
• a Ardhamāgadhī Prākrit
• a Arhaṃ
• a Arśana-āvaraṇīya-karma
• a Ārta-dhyāna
• a Āryikā
• a Āryikā Jñānamati
• a Āśātanā
• a Āścarya
• a Asceticism
• a Aspiration
• a Āsrava
• a Aṣṭa-maṅgala
• a Aṣṭāpada
• a Astikāya
• a Astrolabe
• a Aticāra
• a Atiśayakṣetra
• a Atithisaṃvibhāgavrata
• a Ātma-vāda
• a Ātman
• a Auṃ
• a Aurangzeb
• a Auspicious
• a Austerity
• a Avadhāna
• a Avadhi-jñāna
• a Āvaraṇī-yakarman
• a Avasarpiṇī
• a Avatāra
• a Avidyā
• a Āyāga-paṭa
• a Āyambil
• a Āyu-karma
• a Āyurveda
• b Bāhubali
• b Bālāvabodha
• b Bhadrankarvijay
• b Bhagavant
• b Bhaktāmara-stotra
• b Bhāṣā
• b Bhāṣya
• b Bhaṭṭāraka
• b Bhāva
• b Bhāva-pūjā
• b Bhāvanā
• b Bhavana-vāsin
• b Bhavyatva
• b Bhoga-bhūmi
• b Bhogopabhoga
• b Bollywood
• b Brahmā
• b Brahma-deva
• b Brahmacārī
• b Brāhmaṇa
• b Braj Bhāṣā
• b Bright fortnight
• b British Raj
• b Buddhi-sagar
• c Caityavāsin
• c Cakravartin
• c Cakreśvarī
• c Cāmara
• c Candanā
• c Candragupta
• c Candraprabha
• c Cāritra
• c Cāritramohanīya-karman
• c Carũrī
• c Caturvidha-saṅgha
• c Caturviṃśati-stava
• c Cāturyāma
• c Chadmastha
• c Cheda-sūtra
• c Christian
• c Christianity
• c Commentary
• c Confession
• c Congregation
• c Consecration
• c Cosmology
• c Cremation
• c Cūrṇi
• d Dādā-guru
• d Dāna
• d Daṇḍa
• d Dark fortnight
• d Darśana
• d Darśanamohanī-yakarman
• d Daśa-lakṣaṇa-parvan
• d Delhi Sultanate
• d Derāsar
• d Deśāvakāśika-vrata
• d Detachment
• d Devanāgarī
• d Devānandā
• d Devarddhi-gani
• d Dhanuṣ
• d Dhāra
• d Dharma-dhyāna
• d Dharma-sāgara
• d Dharmastikaya
• d Dhātakīkhaṇḍa
• d Dhyāna
• d Dig-vrata
• d Digambara
• d Dīkṣā
• d Dīvālī
• d Divya-dhvani
• d Doṣa
• d Dravya-pūjā
• d Duṣamā
• d Duṣamā-duṣamā
• d Duṣamā-suṣamā
• d Dveṣa
• d Dvīpa
• e East India Company
• e Eightfold Path
• e Ekānta-vāda
• e Ekendriya
• e Eschatology
• e Etc up to
• f Farmān
• f Fatehpur Sikri
• f Festschrift
• f Firuz Shah
• f Fly-Whisks
• f Four Noble Truths
• g Gaṇa
• g Gaṇadhara
• g Ganadharavada
• g Gaṇeśa
• g Gaṇin
• g Garbha-gṛha
• g Garuḍa
• g Ghātī-yakarman
• g Ghātīya
• g Ghaznavid
• g Ghiyasuddin Tughlaq
• g Gotra-karma
• g Gujarāt
• g Guṇa
• g Guṇa-sthāna
• g Guṇa-vrata
• g Guruṇī
• h Hagiography
• h Haṃsa
• h Haribhadra
• h Hariṇaigameṣin
• h Hiṃsā
• h Hīravijaya
• h Horoscope
• h Hrīṃ
• i Iconoclasm
• i Iconography
• i Indian Independence
• i Indrabhūti Gautama
• i Initiation
• i Intercession
• i Invocation
• i Islamicate
• i Iṣṭadevatā
• i Īśvara
• j Jaina Devanāgarī
• j Jaina Śaurasenī
• j Jaina-dharma
• j Jainaśāsana
• j Jaisalmer
• j Jamāli
• j Jambū-dvīpa
• j James Burgess
• j Janma-kalyāṇa
• j Jarā
• j Jāti
• j Jina-āgama
• j Jina-bhavana
• j Jina-bimba
• j Jina-mātā
• j Jinacandra-sūri
• j Jinadatta
• j Jinaprabha
• j Jīva
• j Jñāna
• j Jñāna-āvaraṇīya-karma
• j Jñāna-āvarṇiya
• j Jñānsundar
• j Jyotiṣka
• k Kāla
• k Kālakācārya-kathā
• k Kālidāsa
• k Kalpa-sūtra
• k Kalpa-vṛkṣa
• k Kalyāṇaka
• k Kalyanvijay
• k Kamaṇḍalu
• k Kamaṭha
• k Karma-bhūmi
• k Karma-grantha
• k Karma-prakṛti
• k Karma-vāda
• k Karnataka
• k Kaṣāya
• k Kathā
• k Kāvya
• k Kāya
• k Kāyotsarga
• k Keśa-loca
• k Kevala-jñāna
• k Kharatara-gaccha
• k Knowledge
• k Kriyā
• k Kriyā-vāda
• k Kṛṣṇa
• k Kṣamā-śramaṇa
• k Kṣapakaśreṇi
• k Kṣatriya
• k Kṣullaka
• k Kundakunda
• l Lāñchana
• l Lands of Action
• l Laukāntika
• l Lavaṇa-samudra
• l Leśyā
• l Liṅga
• l Linguistics
• l Loka-ākāśa
• l Loka-puruṣa
• l Loka-vāda
• l Lotus lake
• m Madhya-loka
• m Mahā-videha
• m Mahā-vrata
• m Mahābhārata
• m Mahāmastakābhiṣeka
• m Māhārāṣṭra
• m Māhārāṣṭrī Prākrit
• m Mahattarā Yākinī
• m Mahāvīr Jayantī
• m Mahāvīra
• m Makāra
• m Makkhali Gośāla
• m Māna-stambha
• m Manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna
• m Maṇḍala
• m Maṇḍapa
• m Maṅgala
• m Manuṣya-loka
• m Marāṭhī
• m Mārgaṇā
• m Marudevī
• m Maṭha
• m Mati-jñāna
• m Mauryaputra
• m Mendicant lineage
• m Mithyādṛṣṭi
• m Mohandas Gandhi
• m Mohanīya-karma
• m Mokṣa
• m Monastic order
• m Monasticism
• m Monotheism
• m Mount Meru
• m Mount Sammeta
• m Mṛgāvatī
• m Muhammad bin Tughlaq
• m Muhpattī
• m Mūla-sūtra
• m Mūlaguṇa
• m Mumbaī
• m Munisuvrata
• m Murad Bakhsh
• m Mūrti-pūjaka
• m Mysticism
• n Nābhi
• n Nāga-kal
• n Nāgapurīya Tapā-gaccha
• n Nāgarī
• n Nāma-karma
• n Namaskāra-mantra
• n Nandīśvara-dvīpa
• n Nandivardhana
• n Nandyāvarta
• n Nāraka
• n Nāraki
• n Nasalisation
• n Nātha
• n Navrātrī
• n Naya-vāda
• n Nidāna
• n niggaṃthāṇa vā 2
• n niggaṃtho vā 2
• n Nikṣepa
• n Nirgrantha
• n Nirjarā
• n Nirvāṇa
• n Niṣidhi
• n No-kaṣāya
• o Ocean of milk
• o Omniscience
• o Ordination
• p Padmaprabha
• p Padmāsana
• p Padmāvatī
• p Pādukā
• p Palanquin
• p Pañca-muṣṭi
• p Pāṇḍava
• p Paṇḍit
• p Pandit Dalsukh D. Malvania
• p Pandit Sukhlalji
• p Pāṇipātra
• p Pāpa
• p Paramātman
• p Parameṣṭhin
• p Pāraṇā
• p Parigraha
• p Pariṇāma
• p Parīṣaha
• p Parokṣa
• p Pārśva
• p Pārśvanātha
• p Paryāya
• p Paryuṣaṇ
• p Paṭa
• p Pātra
• p Philology
• p Picchikā
• p Pilgrimage
• p Poṣadha
• p Possession
• p Pothī
• p Pradakṣiṇā
• p Pradeśa
• p Prākāra
• p Prakīrṇaka-sūtra
• p Prākrit
• p Pramāda
• p Pramukhā
• p Prati-vāsudeva
• p Pratikramaṇa
• p Pratimā
• p Pratiṣṭhā
• p Pratyākhyāna
• p Pratyakṣa
• p Pravacana
• p Prāyaścitta
• p Pre-modern
• p Predestination
• p Protestant
• p Provenance
• p Pūjā
• p Pujārī
• p Pukharavara-dvīpa
• p Puṇya
• p Pūrva
• p Puṣkara-dvīpa
• p Puṣpadanta
• q Qur’an
• r Rāga
• r Rāhu
• r Rainy season
• r Rajasthan
• r Rajasthani
• r Rājimatī
• r Rajoharaṇa
• r Rāma
• r Rāmāyaṇa
• r Rās-garbā
• r Rathanemi
• r Ratna-traya
• r Rātri-bhojana
• r Raudra-dhyāna
• r Renunciation
• r Retroflex
• r Revatī
• % Ṛg-veda
• % Ṛṣabha
• % Ṛṣabhanātha
• s Saciyā Mātā
• s Sādhu
• s Sādhvī
• s Sāgāra
• s Śaivaism
• s Śaka-saṃvat
• s Sallekhanā
• s Śalya
• s Samacatuṣṭha
• s Samādhimaraṇa
• s Samaṇi
• s Sāmarambha
• s Samavasaraṇa
• s Sāmāyika
• s Saṃbhava
• s Saṃjñā
• s Saṃkalpaja
• s Saṃsāra
• s Samudghāta
• s Saṃvara
• s Saṃvega
• s Samyak-cāritra
• s Samyak-darśana
• s Samyak-jñāna
• s Samyaktva
• s Saṃyama
• s Sanctuary
• s Sandalwood
• s Saṇgha
• s Śānti
• s Sapta-bhaṅgi-naya
• s Sārambha
• s Sarasvatī
• s Sarvajña
• s Sāsan-devi
• s Śāsana-devatā
• s Śāstra
• % Ṣaṭ-jīvanikāya
• s Satī
• s Satīmātā
• s Scripture
• s Secularism
• s Śenāī
• s Śeṣavatī
• s Sevā
• s Seven fields of donation
• s Shah Jahan
• s Shantidas Jhaveri
• s Siddha-śilā
• s Siddhacakra or Navadevatā
• s Siddhānta
• s Siddhārtha
• s Śikṣā-vrata
• s Śīla
• s Śītala
• s Śiva
• s Somanatha
• s Śraddhā
• s Śramaṇa
• s Śrāvaka
• s Śrāvakācāra
• s Śrāvikā
• s Śreyāṃsa
• s Śrī
• s Śrīvatsa
• s Śruta-jñāna
• s Śruta-pañcamī
• s Sthānaka-vāsin
• s Sthāpanācārya
• s Sthāvara
• s Strīmukti
• s Stūpa
• s Subcontinent
• s Sudarshana
• s Śuddhi
• s Śūdra
• s Śukla-dhyāna
• s Sulasā
• s Sundarśrī
• s Supārśva
• s Sūri
• s Suṣamā
• s Suṣamā-duṣamā
• s Suṣamā-suṣamā
• s Sūtra
• s Suyam me ausam! Tenam bhagavaya evamakkhayam
• s Svādhyāya
• s Svāhā
• s Śvetāmbara
• s Śvetāmbara Terāpanthin
• s Śvetāmbaras
• s Syād-vāda
• t Tapā-gaccha
• t Tāraṇ Svāmī Panth
• t Tattvārtha-sūtra
• t Temple-city
• t The Enlightenment
• t Three worlds
• % Ṭīkā
• t Tīrtha
• t Tīrthaṃkaranāma-karman
• t Tīrthankara
• t Transliteration
• t Trasa-nāḍī
• t Triśalā
• t Triṣaṣṭi-śalākā-puruṣa-caritra
• u Universal History
• u Upādhyāya
• u Upāṅga
• u Upaniṣads
• u Upāsaka
• u Upāśraya
• u Ūrdhva-loka
• u Utsarpiṇī
• u Uttarādhyayana-sūtra
• v Vāhana
• v Vaimānika
• v Vairāgya
• v Vaiṣṇava
• v Vaiśramaṇa
• v Vaiśya
• v Valabhī
• v Vanaspatikāya
• v Vaṇik
• v Varṇa
• v Vāsudeva
• v Vāsupūjya
• v Vayubhūti
• v Vedanīya-karma
• v Vegetarianism
• v Vernacular
• v Vidyā
• v Vidyā-devī
• v Vihāra
• v Vijñapti-patra
• v Vikrama-saṃvat
• v Vikṛti
• v Vipāka
• v Virji Vora
• v Virodhaja
• v Vīrya
• v Viṣṇu
• v Vītarāga
• y Yakṣa
• y Yakṣī
• y Yaśoda
• y Yaśovijaya
• y Yātrā
• y Yoginī

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