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1. introduction, 2. human rights discourses and counter-discourses, 3. norms, counter-norms, and institutions, 4. substantive rights and advocacy, 5. conclusion.

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Human Rights in China: A Social Practice in the Shadows of Authoritarianism

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Kelley Loper, Human Rights in China: A Social Practice in the Shadows of Authoritarianism, International Journal of Constitutional Law , Volume 16, Issue 2, April 2018, Pages 730–733, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moy048

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Eva Pils’ important new book, Human Rights in China: A Social Practice in the Shadows of Authoritarianism , is a welcome contribution to scholarship on China. Pils asserts that, despite the oppressive nature of the Chinese Party-State, considerable civil society resistance still exists. Given the wide-ranging nature of her arguments, her book should attract readers from a variety of disciplines such as law, politics, and sociology, among others, and also be of interest to a broader, non-academic audience of China-watchers from all backgrounds.

The complexity of human rights discourse, law, and social practice in the Chinese context requires a multidimensional analysis and Pils’ book meets the challenge. She presents a nuanced study of the Chinese human rights landscape based on years of experience and solid research including exchanges with lawyers, journalists, and other human rights defenders. The book goes beyond a straightforward examination of existing norms, counter-norms, and institutional mechanisms to stress the importance of the practice of human rights advocacy and persistent civil society responses in the face of intensifying repression in the Xi Jinping era.

This approach produces valuable conclusions that challenge some commonly held assumptions. For example, the government frequently contends that new legal protections of rights and/or the rapid growth of the Chinese economy—which has “lifted millions out of poverty” (at 100)—will ultimately result in China’s full transition to a rule-of-law society. Instead, Pils presents a richer, compelling story of a “bottom-up dynamic of human rights” (at 3) in contrast to narratives about pure authoritarian control or top-down “incremental reform” (at 2). Such an account is both long overdue and especially timely as Chinese human rights advocates operate in an increasingly difficult domestic environment and as global trends reduce civil society space even in traditionally more open societies.

The book is well organized. It starts with an assessment of the complex historical and philosophical foundations of contemporary human rights discourse in China. It also presents counterarguments, increasingly used by the Party-State, to refute human rights in the name of sovereignty, harmony, security, and welfare. Such an overview provides a critical reference point for the book’s subsequent discussion of law, institutions, substantive rights, and advocacy.

In Chapter 1, Pils argues that current human rights discourse is grounded in “indigenous resources of political reform advocacy” (at 18). Liberal “Western” traditions of rights have become internalized in Chinese political thought and reform movements since the nineteenth century. She also highlights the ongoing influence of the centuries-old yuan tradition of righting wrongs, including a “letters and visits” procedure that allows petitioners to seek redress outside the formal justice system. To some extent this tradition is consistent with liberal human rights values but also contains more paternalistic elements. For example, petitioners are frequently depicted as supplicants who can only find relief through the assistance of a morally upright official.

The chapter concludes with an account of competing counter-discourses: the Party-State’s arguments that human rights have only a limited—if any —role to play in Chinese governance. Official rhetoric and justifications for repression have persisted and gained force in recent years and the book explores key questions about the extent to which these arguments have taken hold.

Chapter 2 explores the international and domestic rights-protective norms and counter-norms that apply in China and relevant institutional mechanisms. In many ways China has actively engaged with the global human rights system. It has ratified most core United Nations human rights treaties and it regularly takes part in international human rights monitoring procedures, including the Human Right’s Council’s Universal Periodic Review and human rights treaty body reporting exercises. At the domestic level, China has added more concrete references to human rights in the constitution, legislation, and other rules and regulations that govern state policy. It has also drafted two national human rights action plans. Nevertheless, Pils illustrates, in devastating detail, the wide gap between China’s legal and procedural commitments to human rights and the reality of serious human rights violations on the ground. She points out the limits of a simple legal analysis: that “the textual basis for a human rights argument may in fact be thin or contradictory; it may consist in no more than a sentence in the Constitution, or a clause in a treaty that is routinely ignored . . . ” (at 5).

Indeed, rights-protective norms often conflict with other written and unwritten (or “hidden”) rules and counter-norms that may directly infringe on rights, or at least facilitate their violation, creating “confusion and inconsistency” (at 34). In addition, courts and other institutions do not have adequate enforcement powers. Constitutional rights are not justiciable and, in any event, various systems of control limit judicial independence. Some earlier signs of movement toward stronger institutional protection—such as a 2001 decision by the Supreme Peoples’ Court that applied the constitutional right to education—have been short-lived. Pils also notes that various constraints have rendered the “letters and visits” system largely ineffective as an alternative to adjudication.

Existing normative and institutional frameworks for rights protection clearly remain relatively weak, especially in the most sensitive cases. Pils observes, however, that advocates are increasingly adopting creative strategies outside the system utilizing social media and other available channels. Party-State responses, such as the infamous Great Fire Wall that limits access to the Internet, and civil society’s resistance and counter-responses, expose a dynamic interplay full of tensions and ambiguities that belies a one-dimensional description of repression. Pils argues that systemic persecution has actually fueled ongoing resistance. The next three chapters on substantive rights further illustrate this “spectacle of contention between citizens and the Party-State” (at 57).

Pils divides her discussion of particular rights into distinct sections and concludes by challenging the Party-State’s classification and prioritization of economic and social rights over civil and political rights. Her empirically sound analysis demonstrates the causal links between the suppression of expression, systemic torture, arbitrary detention, inequality, and the denial of economic and social rights. She characterizes these rights as “central nodes in a web of interconnected human rights principles” (at 3) and persuasively debunks official counter-discourse that economic rights (measured, incorrectly, as GDP growth) must be addressed before contemplating political reform.

Chapter 3 details the range of formal and informal detention facilities in China and continuing arbitrary detention, despite relevant constitutional protections. International and domestic norms have similarly had little impact on the widespread practice of torture or rights violations related to the death penalty. Pils notes the connection between torture and freedom of expression: that torture is frequently aimed at “educating,” “brainwashing” (at 65), or extracting affirmations of guilt to support predetermined judgments. She reflects that the authorities’ “tone of educational superiority” and their obsession with securing statements of culpability are part of broader efforts to assert power through “thought reformation” (at 68).

Chapter 4’s examination of the right to freedom of expression further exposes tendencies toward increased Party-State control. At the same time, however, Pils highlights the tenacity of civil society resistance and questions the effectiveness of the Party-State’s ultimate aim to control “thought,” even beyond expression or speech. She observes that “[e]ven as they face blocks and risks of ‘legal’ sanctions, many keep exercising their free speech rights” and “[n]either criminalization and regulation, nor technology-based control appear to have inculcated genuine social acceptance of these curbs” (at 92).

Chapter 5 exposes the flaws in official claims that economic growth positively correlates with the increasing enjoyment of economic and social rights. Pils details how state development priorities frequently result in the systematic infringement of a variety of rights (despite the existence of relevant, applicable legal norms)—the expropriation of land and mass evictions affecting the right to housing and an adequate standard of living; violence and intimidation, including torture, associated with land takings; discriminatory effects of the household registration system on rural residents and urban migrants from rural areas; environmental degradation such as toxic waste dumped in “cancer villages” and air pollution that affects the right to health; and the suppression of expression that attempts to expose and seek redress for these violations. As one lawyer explains, protests against the denial of socio-economic rights “do not merely concern [economic] interests, they do not merely have to do with money. They directly concern the right to speak” (at 119).

Pils also contends that such protests signal resistance to the “sacrifice theory that subordinates individual socio-economic rights to larger goals” (at 120). In other words, official utilitarian arguments—that development’s benefits outweigh any negative effects on individuals; that those who oppose it are selfish and unwilling to make sacrifices for the community—have not fully taken root. This supports broader conclusions that attempts to control thought, not merely expression, have met with limited success.

Chapter 6 further contextualizes the complex interactions among various state, non-state, and transnational actors that make up the social practice of human rights in China. Pils traces the development of human rights advocacy in the post-Mao era which has “evolved from the acts of a daring few to more coordinated actions making use of technologies to associate, communicate, and express rights-based demands” (at 134). She notes that advocates have more recently moved outside the confines of organizational structures, creating networks and movements to coordinate activities. She details the increasingly repressive environment under Xi Jinping: the detention of the “Feminist Five” in March 2015 and hundreds of human rights lawyers in July 2015; new restrictions limiting advocate’s ability to represent their clients in court; regulation of the activities of domestic and foreign NGOs; and efforts to coopt lawyers to suppress petitions. At the same time, even in the face of such repression, advocates’ “work has effected a broad shift towards more vocal, more fluid and diverse expressions of human rights claims and widening variety of strategies” (at 144).

Despite the book’s account of systematic breaches of human rights, Pils leaves us with some reason for hope. In the face of increasing persecution, human rights defenders continue to resist; as repression intensifies, advocates find new ways to raise their voices; and the Party-State’s attempts to control thought , not just speech, seem to have thus far failed. Pils also maintains that a shift back to twentieth century, authoritarian-style governance is unlikely—if not impossible—in light of current global communication systems and transnational human rights networks.

Pils’ portrayal of human rights in China—how rights are understood, practiced, and denied—reveals a complex dynamic: a multifaceted interaction of diverse arguments, norms, institutions, actors, and strategies. Such diversity and range of voices suggests room for change and marks a significant achievement of China’s indigenous human rights movement. Pils asserts that partial success can be measured “in ordinary people’s ready ability to use human rights language when complaining about injustices [and] . . . the vast amount of information they have been able to collect and disseminate (in China and abroad).” She quotes one oft-repeated phrase among human rights defenders: [h]ai you kong jian (“there is still some space”) (at 135).

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Standing up to China on Human Rights: The Case of the Uyghurs

Vanessa Frangville , Hacer Z. Gonul , Julius Maximilian Rogenhofer

This essay is part of the series “All About China”—a journey into the history and diverse culture of China through essays that shed light on the lasting imprint of China’s past encounters with the Islamic world as well as an exploration of the increasingly vibrant and complex dynamics of contemporary Sino-Middle Eastern relations.  Read more  ...

Over the past decade, China has firmly established itself as a pivotal strategic actor within the global economy, not least because of its $900 bn. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). [1]  The construction of ports, roads, and railways across the entire Eurasian continental landmass intersects with the People Republic of China’s “Made in China 2025” initiative [2] and the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) [3]  in 2016. Together these projects allow China to set commercial standards as well as creating a parallel institutional structure to the Bretton Woods Institutions established at the end of the Second World War. [4]

International scrutiny of China’s political endeavours has largely focused on disputes over islands and freedom of navigation in the South- and East China Seas [5]  as well as China’s growing military presence in Africa. [6]  Beyond exerting its own political interests more boldly, China’s Communist Party (CCP) is seen to engage with governments that America and its European allies consider beyond the pale, often because of the human rights violations committed by such governments. Prime examples of such engagement include Xi Jinping’s warm relations with Sudan’s President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, [7]  who is wanted by an international arrest warrant, and the CCP’s close ties to the political and military leadership of Zimbabwe. [8]

What is becoming increasingly clear, however, is that China is now also emerging as a key normative actor in the global political sphere. As such, the CCP seeks to redefine the boundaries of legitimate state actions in its own interest. While China’s interests may align with most Western liberal democracies with respect to environmental issues and climate change, [9]  the CCP’s quest for normative leadership is a grave threat to the notion of universal human rights. The Chinese state’s severe violations of its own citizens’ human rights are exemplified by its crackdown on its Uyghur Muslim minority, primarily resident in the Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang. In a time where American commitments to universalism and human rights are already fragile, the CCP’s crackdown is not just a human catastrophe for the more than ten million Uyghurs living in China, it is a threat to the survival of the principle of universal human rights.

The Police State in Xinjiang

Beijing has turned Xinjiang into a security state that is extreme even by Chinese standards. Repression has been rife in Xinjiang for years, but has worsened in the past year. Such repression primarily targets Uyghurs and Kazakhs, who have linguistic and cultural ties to Turkey and the Middle East and are considered by Beijing to be a hindrance to the development of a ‘harmonious society.’ In addition to traditional coercive policing measures and a disproportionate military presence in the region, the police began to leverage digital surveillance technology to monitor almost all public and private activity. [10]  The commencement of such measures follows shortly after the installation in August 2016 of the hard-line Party Secretary Chen Quanguo, previously in charge of Tibet, in Xinjiang.

Beijing puts extreme efforts to ensure ‘stability’ in Xinjiang by using a sophisticated high-tech surveillance system. Technology is used to scan the collected photos and videos in order to identify “dangerous” or “overtly religious” conduct. [11]  Moreover, the CCP is piloting a new ‘spy birds’ surveillance drone program in the Xinjiang region. [12]  The police also has access to the personal data of Uyghurs and Kazakhs through targeted monitoring of their mobile phones.  The data is collated in an ‘integrated joint operations platform’ that stores data ranging from consumer habits to banking activity, health status and DNA profiles of all inhabitants of Xinjiang. [13]  These programs can, for example, match faces caught on surveillance cameras to a watch-list of suspects. They are the work of a state-run defence contractor that is developing software designed to help predict terrorist attacks before they occur. [14]

Even more devastating than the abovementioned surveillance policies is the construction and large-scale use of internment camps. [15]  Around one million people suspected of being ‘politically unreliable are sent for ‘re-education.’ Ostensibly, the detention camps promise ‘transformation through education’ or ‘counter-extremism education.’ However, witness testimonies suggest the prevalence of torture inside the camps. [16]  In addition, Muslims are forced to renounce Islam, drinking alcohol and eating pork. [17]  The detainees are kept at the facilities indefinitely, without any indictment, due process, or fair hearing.

The CCP argues such measures are necessary given repeated eruptions of violence, [18]  which authorities blame on Islamic extremists and Middle Eastern influence but which activists believe are driven by the repression of the Uyghurs. Even those Uyghurs who have so far avoided detention are afraid of being outside. As Bernand Zand describes, the city of Kashgar in westernmost China feels like Baghdad after the war. [19]

The International Response to the Crackdown

The construction of a police state in the region since Chen Quanguo’s appointment drew little international attention until recently. While the international academic community made continuing efforts over the past few months to raise awareness of the on-going abuses in Xinjiang, media coverage of the plight of the Uyghurs significantly intensified after the UN voiced alarm over Chinese political camps last August, marking a welcome change. China’s mass detention of Uyghurs subsequently moved from a few timid lines to the front pages of major media all around the world.

The information blockade by the Chinese State, however, still hinders international experts to report on the concrete situation in Xinjiang, as the CCP first denied the existence of such camps, and later, only acknowledged the existence of “re-education programs” in “vocational schools.” Meanwhile, journalist Megha Rajagopalan, famous for her extensive reporting on repression in Xinjiang, was compelled to leave China after Beijing refused to renew her visa, a situation also experienced by French correspondent Ursula Gauthier in late 2015 after she denounced the Chinese state’s treatment of its Muslim minorities.

Reports have revealed that the Chinese state has extended the crackdown beyond its borders, using coercion and threats to silence the Uyghur diaspora. China notably refused to renew the passports of Uyghurs living overseas, and signed cooperation agreements with countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia to arrest and deport recalcitrant Uyghurs. [20]  After Malaysia sent back eleven Uyghurs fleeing China via Thailand a few months ago, its new Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed openly criticized China for its repressive policies. Fearing economic retaliation, Muslim countries involved in the BRI have been deafeningly silent over China’s crackdown on its Turkic Muslim community. [21]  Turkey also failed to address the issue, blocking media reports critical of China’s policies in Xinjiang. [22]  Protests have emerged in Pakistan and Kazakhstan, but overall the Uyghur crisis remains too contentious for many Muslim states unwilling to jeopardize their economic ties with China. [23]

Reactions from liberal democracies, on the other hand, were rather slow. A number of states raised the Xinjiang issue and asked for the end of illegal detentions at the UN Human Rights Council held in September. Most attention is henceforth directed toward Geneva where China will undergo its third Universal Periodic Review in November.

An Appeal to Principled Unity

Such public criticism of the human right abuses perpetrated by the Chinese state is, of course, commendable and important. Recognising and speaking out against human rights violations is one significant way in which the notion of universal human rights is maintained. However, because of their disparate nature, it is doubtful that these criticisms will have an appreciable impact on CCP decision-making. This likelihood of CCP indifference to criticism is amplified by the fact that beyond the Middle East and Central Asia many of the most significant countries, from a geopolitical and economic perspective, are either keen recipients of Chinese investment [24]  or eager to export their own products to China’s more than 1.4 billion consumers. 25]

While such economic incentives tempt even the world’s most resilient economies, the immediate benefits of Chinese foreign direct investment or market access often cloud the long term downsides of these arrangements, whether in the form of technology transfer to Chinese enterprises or dependency on Chinese capital. More importantly, by looking the other way when the Chinese state commits severe human rights abuses, China’s trading partners themselves contribute to the erosion of the  de facto  significance of universal rights.   

The world’s liberal democracies must unite in taking a principled approach against the mass observation and incarceration of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. If liberal democracies are serious about protecting the principle of universal human rights, they must factor human rights considerations into their trading arrangements with China. The authors of this article recognise the difficulties of implementing such policies, but submit that these steps are a price worth paying to protect one of the most important aspects of the post-World War Two consensus. A concrete step in this direction could take the form of targeted sanctions and travel restrictions on the individual CCP members involved in the autocracies. In fact, such sanctions are already being contemplated by the United States Congress under the Global Magnitsky Act. [26]

[1]  Tom Hancock, “China encircles the world with One Belt, One Road strategy,”  The Financial Times , May 4, 2017,  https://www.ft.com/content/0714074a-0334-11e7-aa5b-6bb07f5c8e12 .

[2]  Scott Kennedy, “Made in China 2025,”June 1, 2015,  Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) ,  https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025 .

[3]  Salvatore Babones, “China's AIIB Expected To Lend $10-15B A Year, But Has Only Managed $4.4B In 2 Years,”  Forbes , January 16, 2018,  https://www.forbes.com/sites/salvatorebabones/2018/01/16/chinas-aiib-expected-to-lend-10-15b-a-year-but-has-only-managed-4-4b-in-2-years/#7aa129c837f1 .

[4]  See About the Bretton Woods Institutions,  http://www.brettonwoods.org/page/about-the-bretton-woods-institutions .

[5] See Global Conflict Tracker,  https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/territorial-disputes-in-the-south-china-sea .

[6]  Lina Benabdallah, “China-Africa military ties have deepened. Here are 4 things to know,” July 6, 2018,  The Washington Post ,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/06/china-africa-military-ties-have-deepened-here-are-4-things-to-know/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9dee40eaeaca .

[7]  Jake Rashbass, “Sudan's Bashir to visit China despite international arrest warrant,”  Reuters , August 30, 2015,  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-bashir-china/sudans-bashir-to-visit-china-despite-international-arrest-warrant-idUSKCN0QZ0P220150830 .

[8]  Vasabjit Banerjee and Timothy S. Rich, “Diamonds and the Crocodile: China’s Role in the Zimbabwe Coup,”  The Diplomat , November 22, 2017,  https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/diamonds-and-the-crocodile-chinas-role-in-the-zimbabwe-coup/ .

[9]  Edward Wong, “China Is a Climate Leader but Still Isn’t Doing Enough on Emissions, Report Says,”  The New York Times,  July 19, 2018,  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/world/asia/china-climate-change-report.html .

[10]   Keith Zhai and Edwin Chan, “China Uses Facial Recognition to Fence In Villagers in Far West,”  Bloomberg News , January 17, 2018,  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-17/china-said-to-test-facial recognition-fence-in-muslim-heavy-area .

[11]  Sarah Cook, “China’s Ever-Expanding Surveillance State,”  The Diplomat,  April 25, 2018,  https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/chinas-ever-expanding-surveillance-state/ .

[12]  Stephen Chen, “China takes surveillance to new heights with flock of robotic Doves, but do they come in peace?”  South China Morning Post,  June 24, 2018,  https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2152027/china-takes-surveillance-new-heights-flock-robotic-doves-do-they .

[13]  Matthew Brown, “China sparks human rights outcry by ramping up DNA testing in Muslim-dominated region,”  The Independent,  May 17,  2017,   https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-expands-dna-testing-xinjiang-muslims-security-crackdown-human-rights-watch-a7739791.html .

[14]  Tom Philips, “China testing facial-recognition surveillance system in Xinjiang – report,” The Guardian,  June 18, 2018,  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/18/china-testing-facial-recognition-surveillance-system-in-xinjiang-report .

[15]  Rian Thun, “China’s Mass Internment Camps Have No Clear End in Sight,”  Foreign Policy , August 22, 2018,  https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/22/chinas-mass-internment-camps-have-no-clear-end-in-sight/ .

[16]  Lucas Niewenhuis, “Re- Education Camps in China’s ‘No-Rights Zone’ for Muslims: What Everyone Needs to Know,”  SupChina , August 22, 2018,  https://supchina.com/2018/08/22/xinjiang-explainer-chinas-reeducation-camps-for-a-million-muslims/ .

[17]  Greey Shik and Dake Kang, “Muslim Forced To Drink Alcohol And Eat Pork In China’s ‘Re-Education’ Camps, For Met Inmate Claims,”  The Independent,  May 18, 2018,  https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-re-education-muslims-ramadan-xinjiang-eat-pork-alcohol-communist-xi-jinping-a8357966.html .

[18]  “Xinjiang attack: four ‘terrorists’ and one bystander killed, says China,” Reuters in Beijing, reported in  The Guardian , December 29, 2016,  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/29/xinjiang-attack-four-terrorists-and-one-bystander-killed-says-china .

[19]  Bernhard Zand, “A Surveillance State Unlike Any the World Has Ever Seen,”  Spiegel Online,  July 26, 2018,  http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/china-s-xinjiang-province-a-surveillance-state-unlike-any-the-world-has-ever-seen-a-1220174.html .

[20]  Linah Alsaafin, “Uyghurs Arrested in Egypt Face Unknown Fate,”  Al Jazeera , July 27, 2017,  https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/07/uighurs-arrested-egypt-face-unknown-fate-170721101113091.html .

[21]   Samuel Ramani , “Iran’s Careful Approach to China’s Uyghur Crackdown,”  The Diplomat,  September 18, 2018,  https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/irans-careful-approach-to-chinas-uyghur-crackdown/ .

[22]  Tugrul Keskin, “Uyghur Diaspora in Turkey, Current Conditions and Future Projections,”  China and the Middle East Blog , January 5, 2017,  http://chinaandthemiddleeast.blogspot.com/2017/01/a-new-article-uyghur-diaspora-in-turkey.html .

[23]  Alexandra Ma, “Why the Muslim World isn’t Saying Anything about China’s Repression and ‘Cultural Cleansing’ of its Downtrodden Muslim Minority,”  Business Insider , August 27, 2018,  https://www.businessinsider.com/why-muslim-countries-arent-criticizing-china-uighur-repression-2018-8 .

[24]  Phillippe Le Corre, “Brexit: What’s Next for the China-UK Relationship?”  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,  February 19, 2018,  https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/19/brexit-what-s-next-for-china-uk-relationship-pub-75633 .

[25]  Helen Reid, “China Remains Germany’s Biggest Trading Partner in 2017,”  Reuters,  February 21, 2018,  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-economy-trade/china-remains-germanys-biggest-trading-partner-in-2017-idUSKCN1G5213 .

[26]  Shannon Tiezzi, “US Congress Members Want Sanctions on China Over Xinjiang Crackdown,”  The Diplomat,  August 30, 2018,  https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/us-congress-members-want-sanctions-on-china-over-xinjiang-crackdown/ .

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• Human Rights Quarterly

Human Rights and China

• David P. Forsythe
• Johns Hopkins University Press
• Volume 23, Number 4, November 2001
• pp. 1098-1105
• 10.1353/hrq.2001.0048
• View Citation

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Human Rights in China, Tibet and Dafur Essay

Darfur conflict, china-tibet, works cited.

Speaking about the human rights issues which are connected to present day situations in the world, two situations could be outlined, one of them is China-Tibet situation, and the Darfur War or the Darfur conflict, and it should be mentioned that both of these situations involve China in a way or another.

The situation in Sudan provokes the fears of the world community for several years. This is the most prolonged conflict in Africa, in course of which serious violations of the human rights took place and humanitarian catastrophes occurred.

In spite of the progress, achieved in the process of regulating the situation, and the ongoing process of peaceful settlement, the atmosphere of intensity is preserved in the country, and scale military attacks on innocent civilians still occur in the Darfur region. The government of Sudan does not always go to rapprochement, appealing to the principle of international law about the nonintervention into the internal affairs of state. There fore it can be seen that the human rights issue is still not solved, attacks on citizens continues, also there are problems, which are concerned to the access to humanitarian organizations, intimidations, pursuits and violations by the law-enforcement organs. The absence of safety beyond the camps boundaries prevented the internally displaced persons from returning to native places, and the realization of the villages’ restoration. It should be mentioned that china plays a major role in the Darfur conflict being the 40% share owner of international consortium extracting oil in Sudan. In addition, using this revenue, China compensates her money in buying the oil, by selling arms to Sudanese regime which was used in killing innocent people and had a huge factor in the Darfur conflict. The human rights organizations mention that for four long years, China was a major, if not the chief obstacle to international efforts to bring security to Darfur. Beijing blocked vetoed or diluted resolutions at the U.N. Security Council that would have authorized a protection operation or sanctions on Khartoum for continued intransigence.

The violations of human rights in Tibet were considered a major issue for the last half a decade. The problem of the independence of Tibet has been one of the most delicate for the Communist government of China. Beijing insists that the Tibetan region is a historical part of China, and the numerous enemies of central authorities continue to attain its independence. In 1959 one of the largest uprisings against the Chinese military presence in the region flared up – the appearance of Tibetans were depressed, and the Dalai-lama together with 150 thousands of his compatriots left to India in order to head the government of Tibet in the expulsion. International discussions took place on these issues and the Chinese government took obligations on improving the situation in the country. Specifically, under these obligations the International Olympic Committee assigned the 2008 games to Beijing. Only in reality the management of China did not intend to radically change its relation to the oppositionists in Tibet.

In addition the known fact of Chinese private patronage to the Government in Sudan and being a factor in the genocide that happened in Darfur, played a major role in the way China reacted to the riots in Lhasa on the eve of the Olympic games. For the Tibetans it’s a vital question too, the Olympic Games taking place in Beijing is like an act of encouragement to the activities of the Chinese government. Although these riots probably would not lead to a boycott of the Olympics in the international world, it may lead to solving the situation which could not be solved for more than 50 years.

Prunier , Gérard. “Sudan: irreconcilable differences”. mondediplo.com. 2002. Web.

“TIBET Proving Truth From Facts”. The Department of Information and International Relations, Central Tibetan Administration. 1996.

Angle, Stephen C. Human Rights and Chinese Thought: A Cross-Cultural Inquiry. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002

Beck , Lindsay.” China ready to tackle unrest in Tibetan regions”. Reuters. 2008. Web.

Cohen, Robert. “Calling on China: The China-Darfur Connection” Brookings.edu. (2004). Web.

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IvyPanda. (2024, March 11). Human Rights in China, Tibet and Dafur. https://ivypanda.com/essays/human-rights-in-china-tibet-and-dafur/

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IvyPanda . 2024. "Human Rights in China, Tibet and Dafur." March 11, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/human-rights-in-china-tibet-and-dafur/.

1. IvyPanda . "Human Rights in China, Tibet and Dafur." March 11, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/human-rights-in-china-tibet-and-dafur/.

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IvyPanda . "Human Rights in China, Tibet and Dafur." March 11, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/human-rights-in-china-tibet-and-dafur/.

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Human Rights in China

The name People’s Republic of China seems a contradiction of its meaning. If indeed its name is the People’s Republic of China than why did it massacre peaceful protestors with tanks and machine guns? But the Chinese government argues that the force was necessary for maintaining a national order (Muzhi Zhu). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is actually an authoritarian state in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the main source of power.

At the national and regional levels, party members hold almost all the top government, police, and military positions. The country’s authority rests with members of the Politburo (China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999). CCP stresses that it needs to maintain stability and social order. The Government’s poor human rights record in 1999 shows the extent at which the Government intensified efforts to suppress its 1. 27 billion people.

A crackdown against a newly formed opposition party, which began in the fall of 1998, broadened and intensified during the year. By the end of 1998, almost all of the key leaders of the China Democracy Party (CDP) were serving long prison terms or were in custody without any formal charges, and only a handful of members nationwide dared to remain active publicly (China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999). Tens of thousands of members of the Falun Gong spiritual movement were arrested after the movement was banned in July.

Thereafter, several leaders of the movement were sentenced to long prison terms in late December, and hundreds of others were sentenced to reeducation through labor. Late in the year, according to some reports, the government started confining some Falun Gong adherents to psychiatric hospitals (China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999). The government continued to commit widespread and well-documented human rights abuses in violation of internationally accepted terms.

These abuses stemmed from the government’s extremely limited tolerance of public unrest. The Constitution and laws provide for fundamental human rights however, these rights are often ignored in practice. Abuses included instances of extra-judicial killings, torture and mistreatment of prisoners, forced confessions, arbitrary arrest and detention, lengthy incommunicado detention, and denial of due process(Amnesty International. “China, violations of human rights). Prison conditions at most facilities remained very harsh.

In many cases, especially in sensitive political cases, the judicial system denied criminal defendants basic legal safeguards and due process of the law, merely because authorities attached higher priorities to maintaining public order and suppressing political opposition than to enforcing the legal norms of the country (Amnesty International. “China, violations of human rights). The government infringed on citizens’ privacy rights. The government tightened restrictions on freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

They also increased controls on the internet, which caused self-censorship by journalists. They severely restricted freedom of assembly, and continued to restrict freedom of association. They continued to restrict freedom of religion, and intensified its controls on unregistered churches (China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999). The Government also continued to restrict freedom of movement, meaning they do not permit independent domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in order to monitor public human rights conditions.

Discrimination and violence against women, including coercive family planning practices, which sometimes include forced abortion and forced sterilization is a major problem, as well as prostitution, trafficking of women and children, abuse of children, and discrimination against the disabled and minorities (Amnesty International. “China, no one is safe”). The Government continued to restrict tightly worker rights, and forced labor in prisons.

Particularly serious human rights abuses persisted in some minority areas, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang, where restrictions on religion and other basic freedoms have increased over time (Amnesty International. “China, no one is safe”) But in 1996 China released a report that claimed. “China’s national economy maintained steady, rapid and sound growth, the efforts to build up democracy and a legal system were notably strengthened, and the human rights conditions maintained a good momentum of continuous improvement and promised further progress”(Muzhi Zhu).

The Chinese government also goes on to list that there has been a decrease in the population of poverty-stricken Chinese, increased levels of local democracy, and a “severe crackdown” on crime. They also say that increases in the protection of the rights of workers, and the rise in education levels have increased the quality of human rights in the country (Muzhi Zhu). If indeed the countries authority rests with the Politburo, then it can easily release and make up these statistics.

Actually, according to a release by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, in February 25, 2000, manipulation of the press by the government for political purposes increased during the year of 1999. After authorities moved at the end of 1998 to close a number of newspapers and fire several editors, a more cautious atmosphere developed. As part of its crackdown against the popular Falun Gong spiritual movement, the government has also employed every element of the state-controlled media to conduct a nationwide anti-Falun Gong propaganda (Amnesty International.

China, violations of human rights). The press however, has still continued to report on cases of corruption and abuse of power by some local officials. Actually, it is also estimated that several thousand, are detained in violation of international human rights instruments for peacefully expressing their political, religious, or social views (Amnesty International. “China, violations of human rights). Another current problem is torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment. The law in China prohibits torture.

However, police and other members of the security have employed torture and degrading treatment in dealing with detainees and prisoners (Amnesty International. “China, violations of human rights). Former detainees and the press reported credibly that officials have used electric shocks, prolonged periods of solitary confinement, incommunicado detention, beatings, shackles, and other forms of abuse against detained men and women (Amnesty International. “China, violations of human rights).

Prominent dissident Liu Nianchun, who was released in December 1998, reported that guards used an electric stun gun on him (China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999). Persons detained pending trial were particularly at risk during pretrial detention, due to weaknesses in the legal system or lack of the implementation of the revised Criminal Procedure Law. In February a domestic publication reported that an engineer in Liaoning province, who was suspected of theft, suffered brain damage as a result of hours of beatings while in police custody.

The police eventually determined that the engineer was innocent and released her. She later sued the local government. Chinese reporters who attended her trial said that there were efforts in court to intimidate them. (China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999). However, the Chinese Government has also stated, “the Chinese judiciary deals with every complaint of torture promptly after it is filed, and those found guilty are punished according to law” (Muzhi Zhu).

For the first time in 1998, as part of its campaign to address police abuse, the government published national torture statistics, along with 99 case studies, in a volume entitled “The Law Against Extorting a Confession by Torture. ” The book, which was published by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, stated that 126 people died during police interrogation in 1993 and 115 died in 1994. Incidentally, most cases of torture are believed to go unreported (China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999).

Perhaps one of the most shocking things in the Chinese human rights debate deals with the corruption within the court system. Official government statistics report that there are some 230,000 persons in reeducation-through-labor camps, sentenced to up to 3 years through administrative procedures, and not by a trial (China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999). The Chinese Constitution states that the courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power independently (Muzhi Zhu).

However, this has not been the case because the judiciary is subject to policy guidance from both the government and the Communist Party. It has been found that at both the central and local levels, the government and the CCP frequently interfere in the findings of the judicial system and take a hand in deciding court decisions (Amnesty International. “China, violations of human rights). Another problem is that judges are appointed by the people’s congress at the corresponding level of the judicial structure, which can lead to an undue influence by local politicians over the judges they appoint(Amnesty International.

China, violations of human rights). During a May 1998 conference at a Beijing university, one expert estimated that more than 70 percent of commercial cases in the lower courts were decided according to the wishes of local officials rather than by the law. ( Amnesty International. “China, violations of human rights) State-run media published numerous articles calling for an end to such “local protectionism” and demanded the development of a judiciary that is independent of interference by officials.

Amnesty International. “China, violations of human rights) Another violation of the Human rights code consists of the right to privacy. Government interference in daily personal and family life continues to decline for the average citizen (Amnesty International. “China, no one is safe”). In some urban areas, most people still depend on government-linked work units for housing, permission to have a child, approval to apply for a passport, and other aspects of ordinary life.

Despite legal protections, authorities often do not respect the privacy of citizens (Amnesty International. “China, no one is safe”). Although the law requires warrants before law enforcement officials can search premises, this provision has frequently been ignored. However, the Public Security Bureau and the procuratorate can issue search warrants on their own authority (Amnesty International. “China, no one is safe”). The Constitution states, “freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens are protected by law”( Muzhi Zhu).

However, in practice, authorities often monitor telephone conversations, electronic mail, and internet-communications of foreign visitors, businessmen, diplomats, and journalists, as well as activists, and others. The security services routinely monitor and enter the residences and offices of foreigners to gain access to their computers, telephones, and fax machines (Amnesty International. “China, violations of human rights). Authorities also open and censor domestic and international mail.

Han Chunsheng, a Voice of America (VOA) listener who allegedly sent over 20 letters criticizing of the Government to a VOA mailbox, remains in prison on an 8-year sentence for counterrevolutionary incitement and propaganda (Amnesty International. “China, violations of human rights). Government security even monitors and sometimes restricts contact between foreigners and citizens (Amnesty International. “China, violations of human rights).

Further problem of the Chinese Human rights debates addresses the fact that it is often dangerous and ill advised for protestors to peaceably assemble and protest the government. The Constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly. However, the government severely restricts this right in practice (China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999). The Constitution stipulates that such activities may not challenge, so to speak “party leadership”, or infringe upon the “interests of the State”(China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999).

Protests against the political system or national leaders are prohibited. Authorities deny permits and quickly move to suppress demonstrations involving expression of negative political views (China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999). At times police used force against demonstrators. In January the Western Press reported that one protester was killed and more than 100 others injured when police dispersed some 3,000 villagers in the province of Hunan, who were protesting corrupt government and high taxes (China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999).

Last March in the city of Suining, in Sichuan province, police reportedly beat demonstrators in an attempt to disperse a three-day protest by machinery factory workers over unpaid benefits (China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999). In April two groups of CDP members in Hangzhou attempted to lay wreaths for victims of the Tiananmen massacre in two different parks. Police reportedly dispersed one group, and arrested three participants. The other group was able to hold its vigil (China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999).

In October a violent protest reportedly broke out in Panzhihua, in Sichuan province, after police refused to help a robbery victim who subsequently was knifed by his attackers. Many of those protesting were injured in clashes with the police; 10 people were reportedly arrested (China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999). In late October, police in Ganzi, an autonomous region in western Sichuan, reportedly clashed with up to 3,000 ethnic Tibetans who were protesting the arrest of 3 monks.

One of the monks arrested was the respected Buddhist teacher Sonam Phuntsok, from the nearby Dargye Monastery. The police reportedly fired upon the crowd, injuring some protestors. It is unknown whether any persons were killed, but up to 80 ethnic Tibetans reportedly were detained in connection with the incident (Amnesty International. “China, no one is safe”). To help combat human rights violations Chinese leaders have appealed to western powers to impose sanctions on the Chinese. Some legislators include the prohibition of high Chinese government officials to come to the United States.

Trade restrictions on certain goods, and less money to be given as foreign aid to China are a probable solution. According to Chinese Wei Jingsheng, China is at a critical juncture where its leaders really need economic support from the United States. “This is the moment when America should be adding more pressure, asking them to change more, to reform more” (Wei Jingsheng). Also the Chinese leaders are not so amenable to reason as they are to pressure, and the United States has tremendous influence on China’s policies.

There has however been some good news; one overseas human rights group reported in January that there has been some 9,000 cases of mishandling of justice discovered in 1998 and that 1,200 police officers had been charged with criminal offenses (Muzhi Zhu). It is also said that authorities will continue a nationwide crackdown on police corruption and abuses. Government statistics released in March showed that in 1998 corruption prosecutions were up 10 percent, to over 40,000 investigations and 26,000 indictments of officials ((Muzhi Zhu).

In January there were reports that Public Security Bureau Deputy Minister, Li Jizhou, was detained for corruption. Several other high-ranking party officials also were prosecuted on corruption charges during the year. Also late in the year, National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman, Li Peng issued a warning on police corruption (Jingsheng Wei). All though these are small steps they are steps in the right direction to help bring to an end the atrocities committed by Chinese officials.

And the Chinese people can look up to the words of Wei Jingsheng. “Some say that after the student protests of 1989 and the massacre at Tiananmen Square in 1989, democracy and freedom in China died. I do not believe this to be so, and only have some patience and you will see what happens in a generation or two; wait and witness the backbone people can show when they are fighting for their freedom. As Czechoslovakia democrat Tomas G. Masaryk said in totalitarian Central Europe nearly 50 years: “Dictators always look good until the last minutes. “

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• 1991: China issues a white paper on the human rights

On November 1, 1991, the State Council Information Office published a white paper entitled "China's Human Rights Situation" [ full text ] . This document of about 45,000 words includes the foreword and 10 other parts. It mainly described China's basic position and policies on human rights issues, as well as a large number of facts that introduced a fundamental change in China's human rights situation after the founding of the People's Republic of China. All of these contributed to the international community's understanding of the human rights situation in China.

The white paper pointed out that the human rights situation of a country cannot be objectively observed if its relationship with the country's history is cut off and divorced from the country's condition. It also cannot be measured according to a single model or condition of other countries and regions. China's human rights have three notable features: comprehensiveness, fairness and authenticity. Although China has made great achievements in safeguarding and promoting human rights, there are still many areas that require improvements. The acts of continuing to promote the development of human rights and striving to realize the full range of human rights required by China's socialist regime are still the long-term historical goals of the Chinese people and government.

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• The State Council Information Office published a white paper entitled "China's Human Rights Situation".

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UN Taps China, Which Commits Crimes Against Humanity, For New Group Protecting ‘Human Rights’ In Mining

T he United Nations (U.N.) selected China — a country that perpetrates genocide and crimes against humanity — to sit on a new panel intended to advance human rights in mining of critical minerals.

China was one of the 23 countries named Friday that will sit on the U.N.’s new Critical Energy Transition Minerals’ Panel, which will work “to develop a set of global common and voluntary principles to safeguard environmental and social standards” and “embed justice” in the mining of key raw materials needed to build green energy technologies.

The State Department, which declared China is committing genocide in 2021, recently published a report on human rights in China describing the genocide as ongoing, and the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (USCC) found that China exploits child and forced labor in Congolese mines.

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“A world powered by renewables is a world hungry for critical minerals,” U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres said of the new coalition. “For developing countries, critical minerals are a critical opportunity — to create jobs, diversify economies, and dramatically boost revenues. But only if they are managed properly. The race to net zero cannot trample over the poor. The renewables revolution is happening — but we must guide it towards justice.”

The panel will focus specifically on the mining of copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt and rare earth elements, according to the U.N. While China dominates in critical mineral mining and refining globally, the country’s inclusion in the coalition may raise some questions given its poor record on human rights.

The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) genocide and crimes against humanity are ongoing, according to the State Department’s 2023 human rights report. Among other “significant human rights issues,” the Chinese government has arrested and detained more than one million predominantly-Muslim minority in internment camps, required an unknown number of Uyghurs to take part in “re-education” programs and to work as de facto slave laborers.

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Additionally, third-party analysts — such as the Center for Strategic International Studies and Sheffield Hallam University — have also concluded that global supply chains for some green energy products, like solar panel components, are very likely to have links to Uyghur forced labor.

Concerns about Uyghur slave labor tainting global green energy supply chains prompted the U.S. government to craft and enact the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act in 2021. The law is designed to prevent products links to Uyghur slave labor from entering the U.S., according to its text.

Chinese human rights violations in the critical minerals space are happening beyond China’s borders as well.

Chinese companies control about 80% of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) production of cobalt, which is an essential component of green technologies like electric vehicle batteries, according to the USCC and the Cobalt Institute . The DRC is thought to sit on more cobalt than any other country in the world, and the Department of Labor estimates that at least 25,000 children work in Congolese cobalt mines.

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“To this day, child and forced Congolese laborers toil in hazardous conditions to extract cobalt from unsafe mines including artisanal mines in the DRC,” Republican Rep. Chris Smith said during a November 2023 USCC hearing. “Hastily dug artisanal mines are always subject to collapsing—and many have indeed collapsed, crushing, amputating, and killing miners, including children.”

Democratic Oregon Sen. Jeff Merkley echoed Smith during that same hearing.

“Facilitated by widespread corruption in the DRC’s mining sector, Chinese companies and the Chinese government directly profit from forced and child labor used to mine these minerals, extending their abusive practices across continents,” Merkley said .

The U.N., the Chinese Foreign Ministry and the State Department did not respond immediately to requests for comment.

First published by the Daily Caller News Foundation .

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