major earthquake case study

Learning from Megadisasters: A Decade of Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake

March 11, 2021 Tokyo, Japan

Authors: Shoko Takemoto,  Naho Shibuya, and Keiko Sakoda

Today marks the ten-year anniversary of the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE), a mega-disaster that marked Japan and the world with its unprecedented scale of destruction. This feature story commemorates the disaster by reflecting on what it has taught us over the past decade in regards to infrastructure resilience, risk identification, reduction, and preparedness, and disaster risk finance.  Since GEJE, the World Bank in partnership with the Government of Japan, especially through the Japan-World Bank Program on Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Management in Developing Countries has been working with Japanese and global partners to understand impact, response, and recovery from this megadisaster to identify larger lessons for disaster risk management (DRM).

Among the numerous lessons learned over the past decade of GEJE reconstruction and analysis, we highlight three common themes that have emerged repeatedly through the examples of good practices gathered across various sectors.  First is the importance of planning. Even though disasters will always be unexpected, if not unprecedented, planning for disasters has benefits both before and after they occur. Second is that resilience is strengthened when it is shared .  After a decade since GEJE, to strengthen the resilience of infrastructure, preparedness, and finance for the next disaster, throughout Japan national and local governments, infrastructure developers and operators, businesses and industries, communities and households are building back better systems by prearranging mechanisms for risk reduction, response and continuity through collaboration and mutual support.  Third is that resilience is an iterative process .  Many adaptations were made to the policy and regulatory frameworks after the GEJE. Many past disasters show that resilience is an interactive process that needs to be adjusted and sustained over time, especially before a disaster strikes.

As the world is increasingly tested to respond and rebuild from unexpected impacts of extreme weather events and the COVID-19 pandemic, we highlight some of these efforts that may have relevance for countries around the world seeking to improve their preparedness for disaster events.

Introduction: The Triple Disaster, Response and Recovery

On March 11th, 2011 a Magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the northeast coast of Japan, near the Tohoku region. The force of the earthquake sent a tsunami rushing towards the Tohoku coastline, a black wall of water which wiped away entire towns and villages. Sea walls were overrun. 20,000 lives were lost. The scale of destruction to housing, infrastructure, industry and agriculture was extreme in Fukushima, Iwate, and Miyagi prefectures. In addition to the hundreds of thousands who lost their homes, the earthquake and tsunami contributed to an accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, requiring additional mass evacuations. The impacts not only shook Japan’s society and economy as a whole, but also had ripple effects in global supply chains. In the 21st century, a disaster of this scale is a global phenomenon.

The severity and complexity of the cascading disasters was not anticipated. The events during and following the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) showed just how ruinous and complex a low-probability, high-impact disaster can be. However, although the impacts of the triple-disaster were devastating, Japan’s legacy of DRM likely reduced losses. Japan’s structural investments in warning systems and infrastructure were effective in many cases, and preparedness training helped many act and evacuate quickly. The large spatial impact of the disaster, and the region’s largely rural and elderly population, posed additional challenges for response and recovery.

Ten years after the megadisaster, the region is beginning to return to a sense of normalcy, even if many places look quite different. After years in rapidly-implemented temporary prefabricated housing, most people have moved into permanent homes, including 30,000 new units of public housing . Damaged infrastructure has been also restored or is nearing completion in the region, including rail lines, roads, and seawalls.

In 2014, three years after GEJE, The World Bank published Learning from Megadisasters: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake . Edited by Federica Ranghieri and Mikio Ishiwatari , the volume brought together dozens of experts ranging from seismic engineers to urban planners, who analyzed what happened on March 11, 2011 and the following days, months, and years; compiling lessons for other countries in 36 comprehensive Knowledge Notes . This extensive research effort identified a number of key learnings in multiple sectors, and emphasized the importance of both structural and non-structural measures, as well as identifying effective strategies both pre- and post-disaster. The report highlighted four central lessons after this intensive study of the GEJE disaster, response, and initial recovery:

1) A holistic, rather than single-sector approach to DRM improves preparedness for complex disasters; 2) Investing in prevention is important, but is not a substitute for preparedness; 3) Each disaster is an opportunity to learn and adapt; 4) Effective DRM requires bringing together diverse stakeholders, including various levels of government, community and nonprofit actors, and the private sector.

Although these lessons are learned specifically from the GEJE, the report also focuses on learnings with broader applicability.

Over recent years, the Japan-World Bank Program on Mainstreaming DRM in Developing Countries has furthered the work of the Learning from Megadisasters report, continuing to gather, analyze and share the knowledge and lessons learned from GEJE, together with past disaster experiences, to enhance the resilience of next generation development investments around the world. Ten years on from the GEJE, we take a moment to revisit the lessons gathered, and reflect on how they may continue to be relevant in the next decade, in a world faced with both seismic disasters and other emergent hazards such as pandemics and climate change.

Through synthesizing a decade of research on the GEJE and accumulation of the lessons from the past disaster experience, this story highlights three key strategies which recurred across many of the cases we studied. They are:

1) the importance of planning for disasters before they strike, 2) DRM cannot be addressed by either the public or private sector alone but enabled only when it is shared among many stakeholders , 3) institutionalize the culture of continuous enhancement of the resilience .

For example, business continuity plans, or BCPs, can help both public and private organizations minimize damages and disruptions . BCPs are documents prepared in advance which provide guidance on how to respond to a disruption and resume the delivery of products and services. Additionally, the creation of pre-arranged agreements among independent public and/or private organizations can help share essential responsibilities and information both before and after a disaster . This might include agreements with private firms to repair public infrastructures, among private firms to share the costs of mitigation infrastructure, or among municipalities to share rapid response teams and other resources. These three approaches recur throughout the more specific lessons and strategies identified in the following section, which is organized along the three areas of disaster risk management: resilient infrastructure; risk identification, reduction and preparednes s ; and disaster risk finance and insurance.

Lessons from the Megadisaster

Resilient Infrastructure

The GEJE had severe impacts on critical ‘lifelines’—infrastructures and facilities that provide essential services such as transportation, communication, sanitation, education, and medical care. Impacts of megadisasters include not only damages to assets (direct impacts), but also disruptions of key services, and the resulting social and economic effects (indirect impacts). For example, the GEJE caused a water supply disruption for up to 500,000 people in Sendai city, as well as completely submerging the city’s water treatment plant. [i] Lack of access to water and sanitation had a ripple effect on public health and other emergency services, impacting response and recovery. Smart investment in infrastructure resilience can help minimize both direct and indirect impacts, reducing lifeline disruptions. The 2019 report Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity found through a global study that every dollar invested in the resilience of lifelines had a $4 benefit in the long run.

In the case of water infrastructure , the World Bank report Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services: The Case of Japan documents how Sendai City learned from the disaster to improve the resilience of these infrastructures. [ii] Steps included retrofitting existing systems with seismic resilience upgrades, enhancing business continuity planning for sanitation systems, and creating a geographic information system (GIS)-based asset management system that allows for quick identification and repair of damaged pipes and other assets. During the GEJE, damages and disruptions to water delivery services were minimized through existing programs, including mutual aid agreements with other water supply utility operators. Through these agreements, the Sendai City Waterworks Bureau received support from more than 60 water utilities to provide emergency water supplies. Policies which promote structural resilience strategies were also essential to preserving water and sanitation services. After the 1995 Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake (GHAE), Japanese utilities invested in earthquake resistant piping in water supply and sanitation systems. The commonly used earthquake-resistant ductile iron pipe (ERDIP) has not shown any damage from major earthquakes including the 2011 GEJE and the 2016 Kumamoto earthquake. [iii] Changes were also made to internal policies after the GEJE based on the challenges faced, such as decentralizing emergency decision-making and providing training for local communities to set up emergency water supplies without utility workers with the goal of speeding up recovery efforts. [iv]

Redundancy is another structural strategy that contributed to resilience during and after GEJE. In Sendai City, redundancy and seismic reinforcement in water supply infrastructure allowed the utility to continue to operate pipelines that were not physically damaged in the earthquake. [v] The Lifelines report describes how in the context of telecommunications infrastructure , the redundancy created through a diversity of routes in Japan’s submarine internet cable system  limited disruptions to national connectivity during the megadisaster. [vi] However, the report emphasizes that redundancy must be calibrated to the needs and resources of a particular context. For private firms, redundancy and backups for critical infrastructure can be achieved through collaboration; after the GEJE, firms are increasingly collaborating to defray the costs of these investments. [vii]

The GEJE also illustrated the importance of planning for transportation resilience . A Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management shows the role that both national policy and public-private agreements can play. In response to the GEJE, Japan’s central disaster legislation, the DCBA (Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act) was amended in 2012, with particular focus on the need to reopen roads for emergency response. Quick road repairs were made possible after the GEJE in part due to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)’s emergency action plans, the swift action of the rapid response agency Technical Emergency Control Force (TEC-FORCE), and prearranged agreements with private construction companies for emergency recovery work. [viii] During the GEJE, roads were used as evacuation sites and were shown effective in controlling the spread of floods. After the disaster, public-private partnerships (PPPs) were also made to accommodate the use of expressway embankments as tsunami evacuation sites. As research on Resilient Infrastructure PPPs highlights, clear definitions of roles and responsibilities are essential to effective arrangements between the government and private companies. In Japan, lessons from the GEJE and other earthquakes have led to a refinement of disaster definitions, such as numerical standards for triggering force majeure provisions of infrastructure PPP contracts. In Sendai City, clarifying the post-disaster responsibilities of public and private actors across various sectors sped up the response process. [ix] This experience was built upon after the disaster, when Miyagi prefecture conferred operation of the Sendai International Airport   to a private consortium through a concession scheme which included refined force majeure definitions. In the context of a hazard-prone region, the agreement clearly defines disaster-related roles and responsibilities as well as relevant triggering events. [x]

Partnerships for creating backup systems that have value in non-disaster times have also proved effective in the aftermath of the GEJE. As described in Resilient Industries in Japan , Toyota’s automotive plant in Ohira village, Miyagi Prefecture lost power for two weeks following GEJE. To avoid such losses in the future, companies in the industrial park sought to secure energy during power outages and shortages by building the F-Grid, their own mini-grid system with a comprehensive energy management system. The F-Grid project is a collaboration of 10 companies and organizations in the Ohira Industrial Park. As a system used exclusively for backup energy would be costly, the system is also used to improve energy efficiency in the park during normal times. The project was supported by funding from Japan’s “Smart Communities'' program. [xi] In 2016, F-grid achieved a 24 percent increase in energy efficiency and a 31 percent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions compared to similarly sized parks. [xii]

Schools are also critical infrastructures, for their education and community roles, and also because they are commonly used as evacuation centers. Japan has updated seismic resilience standards for schools over time, integrating measures against different risks and vulnerabilities revealed after each disaster, as documented in the report Making Schools Resilient at Scale . After the 2011 GEJE, there was very little earthquake-related damage; rather, most damage was caused by the tsunami. However, in some cases damages to nonstructural elements like suspending ceilings in school gymnasiums limited the possibility of using these spaces after the disaster. After the disaster, a major update was made to the policies on the safety of nonstructural elements in schools, given the need for higher resilience standards for their function as post-disaster evacuation centers [xiii] .

Similarly, for building regulations , standards and professional training modules were updated taking the lessons learned from GEJE. The Converting Disaster Experience into a Safer Built Environment: The Case of Japan report highlights that, legal framework like, The Building Standard Law/Seismic Retrofitting Promotion Law, was amended further enhance the structural resilience of the built environment, including strengthening structural integrity, improving the efficiency of design review process, as well as mandating seismic diagnosis of large public buildings. Since the establishment of the legal and regulatory framework for building safety in early 1900, Japan continued incremental effort to create enabling environment for owners, designers, builders and building officials to make the built environment safer together.

Cultural heritage also plays an important role in creating healthy communities, and the loss or damage of these items can scar the cohesion and identity of a community. The report Resilient Cultural Heritage: Learning from the Japanese Experience shows how the GEJE highlighted the importance of investing in the resilience of cultural properties, such as through restoration budgets and response teams, which enabled the relocation of at-risk items and restoration of properties during and after the GEJE. After the megadisaster, the volunteer organization Shiryō-Net was formed to help rescue and preserve heritage properties, and this network has now spread across Japan. [xiv] Engaging both volunteer and government organizations in heritage preservation can allow for a more wide-ranging response. Cultural properties can play a role in healing communities wrought by disasters: in Ishinomaki City, the restoration of a historic storehouse served as a symbol of reconstruction [xv] , while elsewhere repair of cultural heritage sites and the celebration of cultural festivals served a stimulant for recovery. [xvi] Cultural heritage also played a preventative role during and after the disaster by embedding the experience of prior disasters in the built environment. Stone monuments which marked the extent of historic tsunamis served as guides for some residents, who fled uphill past the stones and escaped the dangerous waters. [xvii] This suggests a potential role for cultural heritage in instructing future generations about historic hazards.

These examples of lessons from the GEJE highlight how investing in resilient infrastructure is essential, but must also be done smartly, with emphasis on planning, design, and maintenance. Focusing on both minimizing disaster impacts and putting processes in place to facilitate speedy infrastructure restoration can reduce both direct and indirect impacts of megadisasters.  Over the decade since GEJE, many examples and experiences on how to better invest in resilient infrastructure, plan for service continuity and quick response, and catalyze strategic partnerships across diverse groups are emerging from Japan.

Risk Identification, Reduction, and Preparedness

Ten years after the GEJE, a number of lessons have emerged as important in identifying, reducing, and preparing for disaster risks. Given the unprecedented nature of the GEJE, it is important to be prepared for both known and uncertain risks. Information and communication technology (ICT) can play a role in improving risk identification and making evidence-based decisions for disaster risk reduction and preparedness. Communicating these risks to communities, in a way people can take appropriate mitigation action, is a key . These processes also need to be inclusive , involving diverse stakeholders--including women, elders , and the private sector--that need to be engaged and empowered to understand, reduce, and prepare for disasters. Finally, resilience is never complete . Rather, as the adaptations made by Japan after the GEJE and many past disasters show, resilience is a continuous process that needs to be adjusted and sustained over time, especially in times before a disaster strikes.

Although DRM is central in Japan, the scale of the 2011 triple disaster dramatically exceeded expectations. After the GEJE, as Chapter 32 of Learning From Megadisasters highlights, the potential of low-probability, high-impact events led Japan to focus on both structural and nonstructural disaster risk management measures. [xviii] Mitigation and preparedness strategies can be designed to be effective for both predicted and uncertain risks. Planning for a multihazard context, rather than only individual hazards, can help countries act quickly even when the unimaginable occurs. Identifying, preparing for, and reducing disaster risks all play a role in this process.

The GEJE highlighted the important role ICT can play in both understanding risk and making evidence-based decisions for risk identification, reduction, and preparedness. As documented in the World Bank report Information and Communication Technology for Disaster Risk Management in Japan , at the time of the GEJE, Japan had implemented various ICT systems for disaster response and recovery, and the disaster tested the effectiveness of these systems. During the GEJE, Japan’s “Earthquake Early Warning System” (EEWS) issued a series of warnings. Through the detection of initial seismic waves, EEWS can provide a warning of a few seconds or minutes, allowing quick action by individuals and organizations. Japan Railways’ “Urgent Earthquake Detection and Alarm System” (UrEDAS) automatically activated emergency brakes of 27 Shinkansen train lines , successfully bringing all trains to a safe stop. After the disaster, Japan expanded emergency alert delivery systems. [xix]

The World Bank’s study on Preparedness Maps shows how seismic preparedness maps are used in Japan to communicate location specific primary and secondary hazards from earthquakes, promoting preparedness at the community and household level. Preparedness maps are regularly updated after disaster events, and since 2011 Japan has promoted risk reduction activities to prepare for the projected maximum likely tsunami [xx] .

Effective engagement of various stakeholders is also important to preparedness mapping and other disaster preparedness activities. This means engaging and empowering diverse groups including women, the elderly, children, and the private sector. Elders are a particularly important demographic in the context of the GEJE, as the report Elders Leading the Way to Resilience illustrates. Tohoku is an aging region, and two-thirds of lives lost from the GEJE were over 60 years old. Research shows that building trust and social ties can reduce disaster impacts- after GEJE, a study found that communities with high social capital lost fewer residents to the tsunami. [xxi] Following the megadisaster, elders in Ofunato formed the Ibasho Cafe, a community space for strengthening social capital among older people. The World Bank has explored the potential of the Ibasho model for other contexts , highlighting how fueling social capital and engaging elders in strengthening their community can have benefits for both normal times and improve resilience when a disaster does strike.

Conducting simulation drills regularly provide another way of engaging stakeholders in preparedness. As described in Learning from Disaster Simulation Drills in Japan , [xxii] after the 1995 GHAE the first Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework was developed as a guide for the execution of a comprehensive system of disaster response drills and establishing links between various disaster management agencies. The Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework is updated annually by the Central Disaster Management Council. The GEJE led to new and improved drill protocols in the impacted region and in Japan as a whole. For example, the 35th Joint Disaster simulation Drill was held in the Tokyo metropolitan region in 2015 to respond to issues identified during the GEJE, such as improving mutual support systems among residents, governments, and organizations; verifying disaster management plans; and improving disaster response capabilities of government agencies. In addition to regularly scheduled disaster simulation drills, GEJE memorial events are held in Japan annually to memorialize victims and keep disaster preparedness in the public consciousness.

Business continuity planning (BCP) is another key strategy that shows how ongoing attention to resilience is also essential for both public and private sector organizations. As Resilient Industries in Japan demonstrates, after the GEJE, BCPs helped firms reduce disaster losses and recover quickly, benefiting employees, supply chains, and the economy at large. BCP is supported by many national policies in Japan, and after the GEJE, firms that had BCPs in place had reduced impacts on their financial soundness compared to firms that did not. [xxiii] The GEJE also led to the update and refinement of BCPs across Japan. Akemi industrial park in Aichi prefecture, began business continuity planning at the scale of the industrial park three years before the GEJE. After the GEJE, the park revised their plan, expanding focus on the safety of workers. National policies in Japan promote the development of BCPs, including the 2013 Basic Act for National Resilience, which was developed after the GEJE and emphasizes resilience as a shared goal across multiple sectors. [xxiv] Japan also supports BCP development for public sector organizations including subnational governments and infrastructure operators. By 2019, all of Japan’s prefectural governments, and nearly 90% of municipal governments had developed BCPs. [xxv] The role of financial institutions in incentivizing BCPs is further addressed in the following section.

The ongoing nature of these preparedness actions highlights that resilience is a continuous process. Risk management strategies must be adapted and sustained over time, especially during times without disasters. This principle is central to Japan’s disaster resilience policies. In late 2011, based on a report documenting the GEJE from the Expert Committee on Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster Management, Japan amended the DCBA (Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act) to enhance its multi-hazard countermeasures, adding a chapter on tsunami countermeasures. [xxvi]

Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance

Disasters can have a large financial impact, not only in the areas where they strike, but also at the large scale of supply chains and national economy. For example, the GEJE led to the shutdown of nuclear power plants across Japan, resulting in a 50% decrease in energy production and causing national supply disruptions. The GEJE has illustrated the importance of disaster risk finance and insurance (DRFI) such as understanding and clarifying contingent liabilities and allocating contingency budgets, putting in place financial protection measures for critical lifeline infrastructure assets and services, and developing mechanisms for vulnerable businesses and households to quickly access financial support. DRFI mechanisms can help people, firms, and critical infrastructure avoid or minimize disruptions, continue operations, and recover quickly after a disaster.

Pre-arranged agreements, including public-private partnerships, are key strategies for the financial protection of critical infrastructure. The report Financial Protection of Critical Infrastructure Services (forthcoming) [xxvii] shows how pre-arranged agreements between the public sector and private sector for post-disaster response can facilitate rapid infrastructure recovery after disasters, reducing the direct and indirect impacts of infrastructure disruptions, including economic impacts. GEJE caused devastating impacts to the transportation network across Japan. Approximately 2,300 km of expressways were closed, representing 65 percent of expressways managed by NEXCO East Japan , resulting in major supply chain disruptions [xxviii] .  However, with the activation of pre-arranged agreements between governments and local construction companies for road clearance and recovery work, allowing damaged major motorways to be repaired within one week of the earthquake. This quick response allowed critical access for other emergency services to further relief and recovery operations.

The GEJE illustrated the importance of clearly defining post-disaster financial roles and responsibilities among public and private actors in order to restore critical infrastructure rapidly . World Bank research on Catastrophe Insurance Programs for Public Assets highlights how the Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency  (JRTT) uses insurance to reduce the contingent liabilities of critical infrastructure to ease impacts to government budgets in the event of a megadisaster. Advance agreements between the government, infrastructure owners and operators, and insurance companies clearly outline how financial responsibilities will be shared in the event of a disaster. In the event of a megadisaster like GEJE, the government pays a large share of recovery costs, which enables the Shinkansen bullet train service to be restored more rapidly. [xxix]

The Resilient Industries in Japan   report highlights how diverse and comprehensive disaster risk financing methods are also important to promoting a resilient industry sector . After the GEJE, 90% of bankruptcies linked to the disaster were due to indirect impacts such as supply chain disruptions. This means that industries located elsewhere are also vulnerable: a study found that six years after GEJE, a greater proportion of bankruptcy declarations were located in Tokyo than Tohoku. [xxx] Further, firms without disaster risk financing in place had much higher increases in debt levels than firms with preexisting risk financing mechanisms in place. [xxxi] Disaster risk financing can play a role pre-disaster, through mechanisms such as low-interest loans, guarantees, insurance, or grants which incentivize the creation of BCPs and other mitigation and preparedness measures.  When a disaster strikes, financial mechanisms that support impacted businesses, especially small or medium enterprises and women-owned businesses, can help promote equitable recovery and help businesses survive. For financial institutions, simply keeping banks open after a major disaster can support response and recovery. After the GEJE, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and local banks leveraged pre-arranged agreements to maintain liquidity, opening the first weekend after the disaster to help minimize economic disruptions. [xxxii] These strategies highlight the important role of finance in considering economic needs before a disaster strikes, and having systems in place to act quickly to limit both economic and infrastructure service impacts of disasters.

Looking to the Future

Ten years after the GEJE, these lessons in the realms of resilient infrastructure, risk identification, reduction and preparedness, and DRFI are significant not only for parts of the world preparing for tsunamis and other seismic hazards, but also for many of the other types of hazards faced around the globe in 2021. In Japan, many of the lessons of the GEJE are being applied to the projected Nankai Trough and Tokyo Inland earthquakes, for example through modelling risks and mapping evacuation routes, implementing scenario planning exercises and evacuation drills , or even prearranging a post-disaster reconstruction vision and plans. These resilience measures are taken not only individually but also through innovative partnerships for collaboration across regions, sectors, and organizations including public-private agreements to share resources and expertise in the event of a major disaster.

The ten-year anniversary of the GEJE finds the world in the midst of the multiple emergencies of the global COVID-19 pandemic, environmental and technological hazards, and climate change. Beyond seismic hazards, the global pandemic has highlighted, for example, the risks of supply chain disruption due to biological emergencies. Climate change is also increasing hazard exposure in Japan and around the globe. Climate change is a growing concern for its potential to contribute to hydrometeorological hazards such as flooding and hurricanes, and for its potential to play a role in secondary or cascading hazards such as fire. In the era of climate change, disasters will increasingly be ‘unprecedented’, and so GEJE offers important lessons on preparing for low-probability high-impact disasters and planning under uncertain conditions in general.

Over the last decade, the World Bank has drawn upon the GEJE megadisaster experience to learn how to better prepare for and recover from low-probability high-impact disasters. While we have identified a number of diverse strategies here, ranging from technological and structural innovations to improving the engagement of diverse stakeholders, three themes recur throughout infrastructure resilience, risk preparedness, and disaster finance. First, planning in advance for how organizations will prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters is essential, i.e. through the creation of BCPs by both public and private organizations. Second, pre-arranged agreements amongst organizations for sharing resources, knowledge, and financing in order to mitigate, prepare, respond and recover together from disasters and other unforeseen events are highly beneficial. Third, only with continuous reflection, learning and update on what worked and what didn’t work after each disasters can develop the adaptive capacities needed to manage ever increasing and unexpected risks. Preparedness is an incremental and interactive process.

These lessons from the GEJE on the importance of BCPs and pre-arranged agreements both emphasize larger principles that can be brought to bear in the context of emergent climate and public health crises. Both involve planning for the potential of disaster before it strikes. BCPs and pre-arranged agreements are both made under blue-sky conditions, which allow frameworks to be put in place for advanced mitigation and preparedness, and rapid post-disaster response and recovery. While it is impossible to know exactly what future crises a locale will face, these processes often have benefits that make places and organizations better able to act in the face of unlikely or unpredicted events. The lessons above regarding BCPs and pre-arranged agreements also highlight that neither the government nor the private sector alone have all the tools to prepare for and respond to disasters. Rather, the GEJE shows the importance of both public and private organizations adopting BCPs, and the value of creating pre-arranged agreements among and across public and private groups. By making disaster preparedness a key consideration for all organizations, and bringing diverse stakeholders together to make plans for when a crisis strikes, these strengthened networks and planning capacities have the potential to bear benefits not only in an emergency but in the everyday operations of organizations and countries.

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Additional Resources

Program Overview

• Japan-World Bank Program on Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Management in Developing Countries

Reports and Case Studies Featuring Lessons from GEJE

• Learning from Megadisasters: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake  (PDF)
• Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  (PDF)
• Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services: The Case of Japan  (PDF)
• Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management  (PDF)
• Resilient Infrastructure PPPs  (PDF)
• Making Schools Resilient at Scale  (PDF)
• Converting Disaster Experience into a Safer Built Environment: The Case of Japan  (PDF)
• Resilient Cultural Heritage: Learning from the Japanese Experience  (PDF)
• Information and Communication Technology for Disaster Risk Management in Japan
• Resilient Industries in Japan : Lessons Learned in Japan on Enhancing Competitiveness in the Face of Disasters by Natural Hazards (PDF)
• Preparedness Maps for Community Resilience: Earthquakes. Experience from Japan  (PDF)
• Elders Leading the Way to Resilience  (PDF)
• Ibasho: Strengthening community-driven preparedness and resilience in Philippines and Nepal by leveraging Japanese expertise and experience  (PDF)
• Learning from Disaster Simulation Drills in Japan  (PDF)
• Catastrophe Insurance Programs for Public Assets  (PDF)
• PPP contract clauses unveiled: the World Bank’s 2017 Guidance on PPP Contractual Provisions
• Learning from Japan: PPPs for infrastructure resilience

Audiovisual Resources on GEJE and its Reconstruction Processes in English

• NHK documentary: 3/11-The Tsunami: The First 3 Days
• NHK: 342 Stories of Resilience and Remembrance
• Densho Road 3.11: Journey to Experience the Lessons from the Disaster - Tohoku, Japan
• Sendai City: Disaster-Resilient and Environmentally-Friendly City
• Sendai City: Eastern Coastal Area Today, 2019 Fall

[i]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.63

[ii]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.63

[iii]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.8

[iv]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.71

[v]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.63

[vi]   Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  report, p.115

[vii] Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  report, p.133

[viii]   Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management  report, p.30

[ix]   Resilient Infrastructure PPPs  report, p.8-9

[x]   Resilient Infrastructure PPPs  report, p.39-40

[xi]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p.153.

[xii]   Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  report, p. 132

[xiii]   Making Schools Resilient at Scale  report, p.24

[xiv]   Resilient Cultural Heritage  report, p.62

[xv]   Learning from Megadisasters  report, p.326

[xvi]   Resilient Cultural Heritage  report, p.69

[xvii]   Learning from Megadisasters  report, p.100

[xviii] Learning from Megadisasters  report, p.297.

[xix]  J-ALERT, Japan’s nationwide early warning system, had 46% implementation at GEJE, and in communities where it was implemented earthquake early warnings were successfully received. Following GEJE, GOJ invested heavily in J-ALERT adoption (JPY 14B), bearing 50% of implementation costs. In 2013 GOJ spent JPY 773M to implement J-ALERT in municipalities that could not afford the expense. In 2014 MIC heavily promoted the L-ALERT system (formerly “Public Information Commons”), achieving 100% adoption across municipalities. Since GEJE, Japan has updated the EEWS to include a hybrid method of earthquake prediction, improving the accuracy of predictions and warnings.

[xx]  Related resources: NHK, “#1 TSUNAMI BOSAI: Science that Can Save Your Life”  https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ondemand/video/3004665/  ; NHK “BOSAI: Be Prepared - Hazard Maps”  https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ondemand/video/2084002/

[xxi]  Aldrich, Daniel P., and Yasuyuki Sawada. "The physical and social determinants of mortality in the 3.11 tsunami." Social Science & Medicine 124 (2015): 66-75.

[xxii]   Learning from Disaster Simulation Drills in Japan  Report, p. 14

[xxiii]  Matsushita and Hideshima. 2014. “Influence over Financial Statement of Listed Manufacturing Companies by the GEJE, the Effect of BCP and Risk Financing.” [In Japanese.] Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineering 70 (1): 33–43.  https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jscejsp/70/1/70_33/_pdf/-char/ja .

[xxiv]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p. 56

[xxv]  MIC (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications). 2019. “Survey Results of Business Continuity Plan Development Status in Local Governments.” [In Japanese.] Press release, MIC, Tokyo.  https://www.fdma.go.jp/pressrelease/houdou/items/011226bcphoudou.pdf .

[xxvi]   Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management  report, p.17.

[xxvii]  The World Bank. 2021. “Financial Protection of Critical Infrastructure Services.” Technical Report – Contribution to 2020 APEC Finance Ministers Meeting.

[xxviii]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p. 119

[xxix]  Tokio Marine Holdings, Inc. 2019. “The Role of Insurance Industry to Strengthen Resilience of Infrastructure—Experience in Japan.” APEC seminar on Disaster Risk Finance.

[xxx]  TDB (Teikoku DataBank). 2018. “Trends in Bankruptcies 6 Years after the Great East Japan Earthquake.” [In Japanese.] TDB, Tokyo.  https://www.tdb.co.jp/report/watching/press/pdf/p170301.pdf .

[xxxi]  Matsushita and Hideshima. 2014. “Influence over Financial Statement of Listed Manufacturing Companies by the GEJE, the Effect of BCP and Risk Financing.” [In Japanese.] Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineering 70 (1): 33–43.  https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jscejsp/70/1/70_33/_pdf/-char/ja .

[xxxii]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p. 145

Case Study: Predicting the Next Big Earthquake

Recent earthquake activity.

USGS Recent Worldwide Earthquake Activity To explore individual earthquakes in more depth, click on the UTC Date-Time field. Show me how Hide Details for accessing USGS Recent Worldwide Earthquake Activity Scroll the list to look over earthquakes that have occurred in the last seven days. To explore individual earthquakes in more depth, follow the COMMENTS links. Scroll to the bottom of the list to view recent Earthquakes plotted on a world map. What is the magnitude of the most recent recorded earthquake? How many earthquakes were recorded for the last seven days? Of those earthquakes, how many were of a magnitude 7.0 or greater? IRIS Seismic Monitor Click on the map to zoom to specific regions. Click on individual earthquakes to see lists of others nearby. Show me how Hide Details for accessing the IRIS Seismic Monitor Click on the map to zoom to specific regions. Click on individual earthquakes to see lists of others nearby. Where are earthquakes concentrated?

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How Haiti Was Devastated by Two Natural Disasters in Three Days

By Tim Wallace ,  Ashley Wu and Jugal K. Patel Aug. 18, 2021

Aug. 14 Epicenter

of earthquake

Aug. 16 Storm path of Grace

A magnitude-7.2 earthquake struck Haiti Saturday morning, killing more than 1,900 and leaving thousands injured and displaced from their homes. As people in the affected regions in the country’s southwest worked to recover with scarce res ources , a severe storm — Grace, then a tropical depression — drenched Haiti in heavy rain on Monday, bringing with it flash floods and the threat of mudslides , which could further delay recovery.

Area affected by earthquake

and storm in Haiti

Lower population

Damage reported

Petit-Trou-de-

Anse-à-Veau

Aug. 16, 8 p.m.

Storm batters Haiti

Aug. 17, 2 a.m.

Path of Tropical

Storm Grace

Aug. 16, 2 p.m.

Very strong shaking

Strong shaking

Moderate shaking

Light shaking

Path of Grace,

now a tropical storm

Although some light shaking from the earthquake could be felt as far as Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, 80 miles from the epicenter, major damage was concentrated in the country’s Nippes, Sud, and Grand’Anse departments. When the shaking subsided, vast swaths of Haiti had ever so slightly moved. The map below shows displaced areas in Haiti, evidence of where the earth shifted after the earthquake.

Petit-Trou-

Epicenter of

magnitude-7.2

How much the ground

sank or rose

1 foot or more

A number of homes and school buildings were damaged in Les Cayes, a seaport community about 20 miles from the earthquake’s epicenter. Local hospitals were quickly overwhelmed , and a very limited number of doctors and surgeons worked through the night to triage victims. Temporary operating rooms near the main airport in Les Cayes were erected, as people tried to evacuate their loved ones to Port-au-Prince for emergency care.

Even before the quake, living conditions had been unstable for many Haitians as the pandemic added to severe poverty, gang violence and political trauma — the still-unsolved July 7 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse .

The earthquake also destroyed several churches that have served as sources of aid and stability to surrounding communities, especially to those that receive little support from the government.

Among the collapsed buildings in Les Cayes was Hôtel Le Manguier, where rescue teams continued to dig through the rubble and remove debris in the days after the earthquake hit.

Hôtel Le Manguier in Les Cayes

Jan. 24, 2020

Aug. 15, 2021

People in Les Cayes who lost their homes spent Monday night sheltering under plastic sheets in makeshift camps or fleeing flooded refugee camps as the storm passed through.

Jérémie, the capital city of the Grand’Anse department in Haiti, also suffered severe damage. Just five years ago, Jérémie was hit by Hurricane Matthew , which destroyed a wave of development that had brought hotels, cell phone service and new roads to the previously isolated region. Saturday’s earthquake caused destruction that overwhelmed the city’s main hospital and triggered a landslide that cut off access to the road leading to the city.

Like in Les Cayes, several churches in Jérémie were damaged, including the St. Louis King of France Cathedral, a landmark place of worship in the area that had also been damaged by Hurricane Matthew.

St. Louis King of France Cathedral in Jérémie

Aug. 14, 2020

Petit-Trou-De-Nippes

In Petit-Trou-De-Nippes, just five miles from the earthquake’s epicenter, phone lines were down in the area with no news immediately available. Landslides in nearby cities were recorded, according to the National Human Rights Defense Network, leaving parts of the Nippes department accessible only by motorcycle or sea.

Because of an editing error, an earlier version of this article misspelled the given name of the Haitian president who was assassinated last month. He was Jovenel Moïse, not Juvenel.

Explore Our Weather Coverage

Extreme Weather Maps: Track the possibility of extreme weather in the places that are important to you .

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Evacuating Pets: When disaster strikes, household pets’ lives are among the most vulnerable. You can avoid the worst by planning ahead .

Climate Change: What’s causing global warming? How can we fix it? Our F.A.Q. tackles your climate questions big and small .

Earthquake case studies

Earthquake case studies Below are powerpoint presentations discussing the primary and secondary effects and immediate and long-term responses for both the Kobe, Japan and Kashmir, Pakistan earthquakes.

Effects of the Italian earthquake – http://www.bbc.co.uk/learningzone/clips/the-italian-earthquake-the-aftermath/6997.html Responses to Italian earthquake – http://www.bbc.co.uk/learningzone/clips/the-italian-earthquake-the-emergency-response/6998.html The Kobe earthquake – http://www.bbc.co.uk/learningzone/clips/the-kobe-earthquake/3070.html General effects & responses & Kobe (Rich) & Kashmir (Poor)

O Ltb Eartqaukes Cs from donotreply16 Kobe earthquake (Rich country)

Koberevision from cheergalsal Haiti 2010 – Poor country Picture Facts On 12th January, an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale struck close to Haiti’s capital Port-au-Prince The earthquake occurred at a destructive plate margin between the Caribbean and North American Plates, along a major fault line. The earthquakes focus was 13km underground, and the epicentre was just 25km from Port-au-Prince Haiti has suffered a large number of serious aftershocks after the main earthquake

Primary effects About 220,000 people were killed and 300,000 injured The main port was badly damaged, along with many roads that were blocked by fallen buildings and smashed vehicles Eight hospitals or health centres in Port-au-Prince collapsed or were badly damaged. Many government buildings were also destroyed About 100,000 houses were destroyed and 200,000 damaged in Port-au-Prince and the surrounding area. Around 1.3 million Haitians were displaced (left homeless)

Secondary effects Over 2 million Habitats were left without food and water. Looting became a serious problem The destruction of many government buildings hindered the government’s efforts to control Haiti, and the police force collapsed The damage to the port and main roads meant that critical aid supplies for immediate help and longer-term reconstruction were prevented from arriving or being distributed effectively Displaced people moved into tents and temporary shelters, and there were concerns about outbreaks of disease. By November 2010, there were outbreaks of Cholera There were frequent power cuts The many dead bodies in the streets, and under the rubble, created a health hazard in the heat. So many had to be buried in mass graves

Short-term responses The main port and roads were badly damaged, crucial aid (such as medical supplies and food) was slow to arrive and be distributed. The airport couldn’t handle the number of planes trying to fly in and unload aid American engineers and diving teams were used to clear the worst debris and get the port working again, so that waiting ships could unload aid The USA sent ships, helicopters, 10,000 troops, search and rescue teams and $100 million in aid The UN sent troops and police and set up a Food Aid Cluster to feed 2 million people Bottled water and water purification tablets were supplied to survivors Field hospitals were set up and helicopters flew wounded people to nearby countries The Haitian government moved 235,000 people from Port-au-Prince to less damaged cities

Long-term responses Haiti is dependent on overseas aid to help it recover New homes would need to be built to a higher standard, costing billions of dollars Large-scale investment would be needed to bring Haiti’s road, electricity, water and telephone systems up to standard, and to rebuild the port Sichuan, China 2008 – Poor country case study Picture On 12th May at 14:28pm, the pressure resulting from the Indian Plate colliding with the Eurasian Plate was released along the Longmenshan fault line that runs beneath. This led to an earthquake measuring 7.9 on the Richter scale with tremors lasting 120 seconds.

Primary effects · 69,000 people were killed · 18,000 missing · 374,000 were injured · between 5 -11 million people were missing · 80% of buildings collapsed in rural areas such as Beichuan county due to poorer building standards · 5 million buildings collapsed

Secondary effects · Communication were brought to a halt – neither land nor mobile phones worked in Wenchuan · Roads were blocked and damaged and some landslides blocked rivers which led to flooding · Fires were caused as gas pipes burst · Freshwater supplies were contaminated by dead bodies

Immediate responses · 20 helicopters were assigned to rescue and relief effects immediately after the disaster · Troops parachuted in or hiked to reach survivors · Rescuing survivors trapped in collapsed buildings was a priority · Survivors needed food, water and tents to shelter people from the spring rains. 3.3 million new tents were ordered.

Long-term responses · Aid donations specifically money – over £100 million were raised by the Red Cross · One million temporary small were built to house the homeless · The Chinese government pledged a $10 million rebuilding funds and banks wrote off debts by survivors who did not have insurance

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Why Earthquakes In Haiti Are So Catastrophic

Jaclyn Diaz

Locals recover their belongings Sunday from their homes destroyed in the earthquake in Camp-Perrin in Les Cayes, Haiti. Joseph Odelyn/AP hide caption

Locals recover their belongings Sunday from their homes destroyed in the earthquake in Camp-Perrin in Les Cayes, Haiti.

It happened again.

Over the weekend, Haiti was hit by a magnitude 7.2 earthquake that crumbled homes and buildings and killed more than 1,200 people.

Rescuers are still working to find survivors amid the rubble. The death count is expected to rise.

More than a decade ago, a similar quake left an estimated 220,000 dead, more than 1 million people displaced and roughly 300,000 injured.

These two events are part of Haiti's history of major destructive earthquakes, records of which go back centuries.

Researchers say the country's unique geology make it seismically active — and prone to devastating earthquakes. A combination of factors, however, leaves the country especially susceptible to damage from these events.

Why is Haiti so susceptible to earthquakes?

Haiti sits on a fault line between huge tectonic plates, big pieces of the Earth's crust that slide past each other over time. These two plates are the North American plate and the Caribbean plate.

There are two major faults along Hispaniola, the island shared by Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

A map of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti shows dotted orange lines indicating fault lines. The nation sits on a fault line between huge tectonic plates of the Earth's crust — the North American plate and the Caribbean plate. Alyson Hurt/NPR hide caption

The southern one is known as the Enriquillo-Plantain Garden fault system.

It's this fault that the U.S. Geological Survey says caused Saturday's quake and the same one that caused the January 2010 earthquake.

The USGS believes the Enriquillo-Plantain Garden fault zone can be blamed on other major earthquakes from 1751 to 1860. The agency said none of these quakes has been officially confirmed in the field as associated with this fault, however.

Haiti Quake: Ruin And Recovery

The anatomy of a caribbean earthquake, a history of catastrophic earthquakes in haiti.

One of the earliest major recorded earthquakes in Haiti occurred in the 1700s, according to the USGS. Others followed, with researchers cataloging events that left hundreds dead and destroyed homes and businesses.

• Nov. 21, 1751: A major earthquake destroys Port-au-Prince and causes major destruction in nearby towns. Witness accounts of the event from the National Centers for Environmental Information recount the devastation . "Houses and factories were thrown down at St.-Marc, Lkogbne, and Plaine du Cul-de-sac. Crevices formed and abundant springs of nauseous water broke forth," researchers who witnessed the event described it. "Great landslips occurred and the beds of the rivers changed direction."
• June 3, 1770: An earthquake hits Port-au-Prince again. Researchers described the event as "one of the strongest shocks recorded on the Island of Haiti." An estimated 200 people in the nation's capital died as a result of the earthquake.
• April 8, 1860: This earthquake occurred farther west of the 2010 earthquake, near Anse-à-Veau, and was accompanied by a tsunami. "At Anse-a-Veau, crevasses sliced across the streets and 124 houses were demolished; at Miragoane, the bridge sank; at Petit Goave, all the houses were abandoned ... ," researchers said of the event. "Ships in the harbor of Les Cayes felt the shock, as did ships at sea."

Before the 2010 earthquake, there hadn't been another major quake along the Enriquillo-Plantain Garden fault zone for about 200 years.

In January 2010, people work to free trapped victims from the rubble of a collapsed building after an earthquake in Haiti's capital of Port-au-Prince. Gerald Herbert/AP hide caption

In January 2010, people work to free trapped victims from the rubble of a collapsed building after an earthquake in Haiti's capital of Port-au-Prince.

Building to withstand hurricanes, not earthquakes

The USGS says it recorded 22 magnitude 7 or larger earthquakes in 2010, the same year as the devastating earthquake in Haiti. However, despite an active year, almost all the fatalities were produced by the major temblor that hit on Jan. 12 of that year, the USGS said.

It struck around the densely populated capital of Port-au-Prince, contributing to the high death toll.

But the way structures are built in Haiti is also believed to have contributed to the loss of life and property.

Due to the 1751 and 1770 earthquakes and minor quakes that occurred between them, local authorities started requiring building with wood and forbade building with masonry, according to the USGS.

A woman tries to recover her belongings Sunday amid the rubble of her home destroyed by the quake in Camp-Perrin in Les Cayes. Joseph Odelyn/AP hide caption

A woman tries to recover her belongings Sunday amid the rubble of her home destroyed by the quake in Camp-Perrin in Les Cayes.

In the years since, Haitians have focused on building their homes to withstand the bigger threat in the neighborhood — hurricanes.

Structures made of concrete and cinder block hold up well during storms but are more vulnerable during earthquakes, according to The Associated Press .

More earthquakes may be ahead

In 2012, researchers wrote that the 2010 earthquake "may mark the beginning of a new cycle of large earthquakes on the Enriquillo fault system after 240 years of seismic quiescence."

"The entire Enriquillo fault system appears to be seismically active; Haiti and the Dominican Republic should prepare for future devastating earthquakes," researchers said.

It's still too early to determine the long-term impact of Saturday's earthquake. What is certain is the unique pressures facing Haitians in the days ahead.

The country still has not fully recovered from the 2010 earthquake and Hurricane Matthew in 2016.

Latin America

Ariel henry will become haiti's prime minister, ending a power struggle.

Haiti was already suffering from political instability following last month's assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. Moïse's death has since left a power vacuum that's been filled by interim Prime Minister Ariel Henry, a 71-year-old neurosurgeon and public official.

The nation is also bracing for another threat as Tropical Depression Grace threatens to bring heavy rains on Monday.

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3.9: Case Studies

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Video explaining the seismic activity and hazards of the Intermountain Seismic Belt and the Wasatch Fault, a large intraplate area of seismic activity.

North American Earthquakes

Basin and Range Earthquakes —Earthquakes in the Basin and Range Province, from the Wasatch Fault (Utah) to the Sierra Nevada (California), occur primarily in normal faults created by tensional forces. The Wasatch Fault, which defines the eastern extent of the Basin and Range province, has been studied as an earthquake hazard for more than 100 years.

New Madrid Earthquakes (1811-1812) —Historical accounts of earthquakes in the New Madrid seismic zone date as far back as 1699 and earthquakes continue to be reported in modern times [ 11 ]. A sequence of large (M w >7) occurred from December 1811 to February 1812 in the New Madrid area of Missouri [ 12 ]. The earthquakes damaged houses in St. Louis, affected the stream course of the Mississippi River, and leveled the town of New Madrid. These earthquakes were the result of intraplate seismic activity [ 9 ].

Charleston (1868) —The 1868 earthquake in Charleston South Carolina was a moment magnitude 7.0, with a Mercalli intensity of X, caused significant ground motion, and killed at least 60 people. This intraplate earthquake was likely associated with ancient faults created during the breakup of Pangea. The earthquake caused significant liquefaction [ 13 ]. Scientists estimate the recurrence of destructive earthquakes in this area with an interval of approximately 1500 to 1800 years.

Great San Francisco Earthquake and Fire (1906) —On April 18, 1906, a large earthquake, with an estimated moment magnitude of 7.8 and MMI of X, occurred along the San Andreas fault near San Francisco California. There were multiple aftershocks followed by devastating fires, resulting in about 80% of the city being destroyed. Geologists G.K. Gilbert and Richard L. Humphrey, working independently, arrived the day following the earthquake and took measurements and photographs [ 14 ].

Alaska (1964) —The 1964 Alaska earthquake, moment magnitude 9.2, was one of the most powerful earthquakes ever recorded. The earthquake originated in a megathrust fault along the Aleutian subduction zone. The earthquake caused large areas of land subsidence and uplift, as well as significant mass wasting.

Video from the USGS about the 1964 Alaska earthquake.

Loma Prieta (1989) —The Loma Prieta, California, earthquake was created by movement along the San Andreas Fault. The moment magnitude 6.9 earthquake was followed by a magnitude of 5.2 aftershock. It caused 63 deaths, buckled portions of the several freeways, and collapsed part of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge.

This video shows how shaking propagated across the Bay Area during the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.

This video shows the destruction caused by the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.

Global Earthquakes

Many of history’s largest earthquakes occurred in megathrust zones, such as the Cascadia Subduction Zone (Washington and Oregon coasts) and Mt. Rainier (Washington).

Shaanxi, China (1556) —On January 23, 1556 an earthquake of an approximate moment magnitude 8 hit central China, killing approximately 830,000 people in what is considered the most deadly earthquake in history. The high death toll was attributed to the collapse of cave dwellings ( yaodong ) built in loess deposits, which are large banks of windblown, compacted sediment (see Chapter 5 ). Earthquakes in this are region are believed to have a recurrence interval of 1000 years. [ 15 ].

Lisbon, Portugal (1755) —On November 1, 1755 an earthquake with an estimated moment magnitude range of 8–9 struck Lisbon, Portugal [ 13 ], killing between 10,000 to 17,400 people [ 16 ]. The earthquake was followed by a tsunami.

Valdivia, Chile (1960) —The May 22, 1960 earthquake was the most powerful earthquake ever measured, with a moment magnitude of 9.4–9.6 and lasting an estimated 10 minutes. It triggered tsunamis that destroyed houses across the Pacific Ocean in Japan and Hawaii and caused vents to erupt on the Puyehue-Cordón Caulle (Chile).

Video describing the tsunami produced by the 1960 Chili earthquake.

Tangshan, China (1976) —Just before 4 a.m. (Beijing time) on July 28, 1976 a moment magnitude 7.8 earthquake struck Tangshan (Hebei Province), China, and killed more than 240,000 people. The high death toll is attributed to people still being asleep or at home and most buildings being made of URM.

Sumatra, Indonesia (2004) —On December 26, 2004, slippage of the Sunda megathrust fault generated a moment magnitude 9.0–9.3 earthquake off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia [ 17 ]. This megathrust fault is created by the Australia plate subducting below the Sunda plate in the Indian Ocean [ 18 ]. The resultant tsunamis created massive waves as tall as 24 m (79 ft) when they reached the shore and killed more than an estimated 200,000 people along the Indian Ocean coastline.

Haiti (2010) —The moment magnitude 7 earthquake that occurred on January 12, 2010, was followed by many aftershocks of magnitude 4.5 or higher. More than 200,000 people are estimated to have died as a result of the earthquake. The widespread infrastructure damage and crowded conditions contributed to a cholera outbreak, which is estimated to have caused thousands more deaths.

Tōhoku, Japan (2011) —Because most Japanese buildings are designed to tolerate earthquakes, the moment magnitude 9.0 earthquake on March 11, 2011, was not as destructive as the tsunami it created. The tsunami caused more than 15,000 deaths and tens of billions of dollars in damage, including the destructive meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear power plant.

9. Hildenbrand TG, Hendricks JD (1995) Geophysical setting of the Reelfoot rift and relations between rift structures and the New Madrid seismic zone. U.S. Geological Survey, Washington; Denver, CO

11. Feldman J (2012) When the Mississippi Ran Backwards: Empire, Intrigue, Murder, and the New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811 and 1812. Free Press

12. Fuller ML (1912) The New Madrid earthquake. Central United States Earthquake Consortium, Washington, D.C.

13. Talwani P, Cox J (1985) Paleoseismic evidence for recurrence of Earthquakes near Charleston, South Carolina. Science 229:379–381

14. Gilbert GK, Holmes JA, Humphrey RL, et al (1907) The San Francisco earthquake and fire of April 18, 1906 and their effects on structures and structural materials. U.S. Geological Survey, Washington, D.C.

15. Boer JZ de, Sanders DT (2007) Earthquakes in human history: The far-reaching effects of seismic disruptions. Princeton University Press, Princeton

16. Aguirre B.E. (2012) Better disaster statistics: The Lisbon earthquake. J Interdiscip Hist 43:27–42

17. Rossetto T, Peiris N, Pomonis A, et al (2007) The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004: observations in Sri Lanka and Thailand. Nat Hazards 42:105–124

18. Satake K, Atwater BF (2007) Long-Term Perspectives on Giant Earthquakes and Tsunamis at Subduction Zones. Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences 35:349–374. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.earth.35.031306.140302

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• 03 April 2024

Taiwan hit by biggest earthquake in 25 years: why scientists weren’t surprised

• Gemma Conroy

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A building in Hualien, Taiwan, leans dangerously after a magnitude-7.4 earthquake on 3 April 2024. Credit: VCG via Getty

Scientists warn that more shocks are likely after Taiwan was rocked by the most powerful earthquake to hit the island in 25 years. The quake killed several people, flattened buildings and triggered landslides. Geologists say that the epicentre was in a complex network of offshore faults, which makes aftershocks or even another quake a possibility.

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GIS-based multicriteria evaluation for earthquake response: a case study of expert opinion in Vancouver, Canada

• Original Paper
• Open access
• Published: 30 October 2020
• Volume 105 , pages 2075–2091, ( 2021 )

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• Blake Byron Walker   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-1983-3147 1 ,
• Nadine Schuurman 2 ,
• David Swanlund 2 &
• John J. Clague 3  

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GIS-based multicriteria evaluation (MCE) provides a framework for analysing complex decision problems by quantifying variables of interest to score potential locations according to their suitability. In the context of earthquake preparedness and post-disaster response, MCE has relied mainly on uninformed or non-expert stakeholders to identify high-risk zones, prioritise areas for response, or highlight vulnerable populations. In this study, we compare uninformed, informed non-expert, and expert stakeholders’ responses in MCE modelling for earthquake response planning in Vancouver, Canada. Using medium- to low-complexity MCE models, we highlight similarities and differences in the importance of infrastructural and socioeconomic variables, emergency services, and liquefaction potential between a non-weighted MCE, a medium-complexity informed non-expert MCE, and a low-complexity MCE informed by 35 local earthquake planning and response experts from governmental and non-governmental organisations. Differences in the observed results underscore the importance of accessible, expert-informed approaches for prioritising locations for earthquake response planning and for the efficient and geographically precise allocation of resources.

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1 Introduction

Between 1980 and 2018, there were 1397 deadly earthquakes on Earth, causing an estimated 822,499 deaths and economic losses of US$ 935bn (Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gersellschaft 2019 ). Of those events, 115 (8%) were classified as catastrophic, accounting for 98% of the total deaths and 94.6% of the total economic loss in this time period (ibid).

Given the high loss of life and damage in catastrophic events, many governmental organisations in high-risk areas have sought to develop, improve, and implement major earthquake preparedness and response plans. Priorities of response efforts in the event of a major earthquake are to rapidly address injuries, conduct evacuations, and assess, contain, and repair damage to critical infrastructure. As such, an understanding of the geographical distribution of vulnerable populations (e.g., elderly persons), emergency services, and key economic infrastructure is vital to informing rapid and efficient dispatch of available resources (City of Vancouver 2013 ).

1.1 Tectonic context

This study focusses on the City of Vancouver, home to approximately 631 000 residents with a total of 2.8 million residents in the metropolitan region (Statistics Canada 2016 ). The city is located in south-western British Columbia, approximately 200 km from the Cascadia Subduction Zone, where the oceanic Juan de Fuca plate is moving down beneath the continental North America plate.

The two plates are “locked” over a width of several tens of kilometres along the east-dipping fault that separates them, storing elastic energy that will eventually be released when the fault slips, producing a giant earthquake (magnitude ≥ 9). Geological studies have shown that such earthquakes occur at intervals of approximately 300–800 years (Atwater and Hemphill-Haley 1997 ; Atwater et al. 2004 ; Goldfinger et al. 2012 ) and affect an area of about 100,000 km 2 , extending northward from coastal California to south-western British Columbia. The most recent of these earthquakes happened on 26 January 1700 (Atwater et al. 2005 ; Ludwin et al. 2005 ). It equalled or exceeded in size the strongest earthquakes in recorded history (including the giant earthquake in Chile in 1960 and the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake in Japan, which triggered a tsunami that killed over 16,000 people and resulted in the Fukushima nuclear reactor meltdown).

Although by far the largest, subduction earthquakes are just one of three types of earthquakes that occur in this region. Some of the numerous faults within the crust of the North America plate are “active” that is they have been the source of earthquakes with magnitudes up to about 7.5 during the postglacial period (Clague 2002 ). A few of these faults are near enough to Vancouver that should one of them generate a large earthquake, it would be damaging and likely deadly. Earthquakes also occur within the subducting Juan de Fuca plate as it arches downwards into Earth’s mantle. These earthquakes, which have a maximum magnitude of about 7, are deeper than those in the North American crust, and thus produce less severe ground motions than crustal earthquakes. However, they are more common than crustal earthquakes and far more common than subduction events–three larger than magnitude 6.5 have occurred beneath Puget Sound in the past 75 y, all of them damaging (Clague 2002 ).

By weighting current knowledge of the frequency and likely hypocentres of the three types of earthquakes that occur in the Pacific Northwest, researchers estimate that there is a 10–20% probability that Vancouver will be impacted by a damaging earthquake before the middle of the century (Onur et al. 2004, 2006; Ventura et al. 2005 ). Data published by the Natural Resources Canada (Halchuk et al. 2015 , 2016 ) indicate that Vancouver could experience ground motions during a subduction or nearby crustal of slab earthquake that are strong enough to cause considerable damage to buildings, including some designed to be earthquake resistant. Details of future seismic events and their potential damage to the built environment in the Vancouver metropolitan area are uncertain, but the aforementioned findings underscore the necessity for preparedness and response planning in the Pacific Northwest.

1.2 Socioeconomic context

Research efforts seeking to identify priority response areas have placed considerable focus on physical vulnerability, using soil stability and architectural data to map earthquake damage risk. In our previous study of earthquake vulnerability in the neighbouring city of Victoria (Walker et al. 2014 ), we argued for the necessity of accounting for social and economic vulnerability, as certain subpopulations may require more assistance due to limited material or social capital, health-related barriers to recovery, or a greater risk of injury following a major seismic event. This consideration has since been implemented in several more recent analyses, including Fallah et al. ( 2015 ), Bahadori et al. ( 2017 ), Banica et al. ( 2017 ), Armaş et al. ( 2017 ), and Jihye and Jinsoo (2019), all of whom used multiple social and/or socioeconomic variables or indices in modelling vulnerability to seismic events.

The City of Vancouver comprises a dense inner city surrounded by medium- and low-density suburban neighbourhoods and features a mean population density of 5.4 thousand persons per square kilometre (Statistics Canada 2016 ). Its age distribution is similar to the Canadian average, although a disproportionately high proportion of the population lives alone (nearly 40% of all household; ibid). Although colloquially recognised as a wealthy city, in the year 2015, 3.8% of households had a post-tax annual income of less than CAD $5000, and the proportion of Vancouver residents in the low-income range (17.2%) is nearly double the Canada-wide rate (9.2%); among persons 65 years of age or older, this is nearly triple (14.6% in Vancouver, compared to 5.1% Canada-wide; ibid). Additionally, a comparatively high proportion of persons with no knowledge of an official language (6.8%, compared to the national average of 1.9%) may represent barriers for many to social and economic support. Nearly a quarter (23.3%) of all dwellings in Vancouver was built before 1960, and 48.4% before 1980 (Statistics Canada 2016 ), which may also constitute a high risk of structural damage in the event of a major earthquake in the region.

In order to deploy professionals and volunteers efficiently and effectively, locations in the Vancouver metropolitan region must be prioritised, for example, to set up disaster staging areas and emergency shelters near vulnerable populations, such as those whose socioeconomic characteristics are outlined above. However, a significant challenge is posed by the prioritisation of various attributes representing vulnerability/importance, necessitating a formal framework for comparison and analysis.

1.3 Multicriteria evaluation

In the context of disaster response, multicriteria evaluation (MCE) frameworks have been used in both scientific and governmental/planning spheres due their relative ease of implementation (Rashed and Weeks 2003 ; Akgun and Türk 2010 ; Martins et al. 2012 ; Walker et al. 2014 ). Decision makers can select and assign arithmetic weights to decision variables by their perceived or measured importance. The quantified variable scores are then arithmetically combined to produce suitability/priority scores for potential decision scenarios and alternatives (Malczewski 1999 , 2006 ).

With the GIS-based MCE methodology, a decision problem is initially defined, typically taking the form of “where are the most suitable locations for X” (Malczewski 2006 ). A set of decision criteria deemed relevant to X are then selected. The simplest form of MCE requires that each candidate location be individually rated along a suitability scale, separately for each location in the study area. When conducted for all candidate locations, this results in a suitability map for each criterion (Rinner 2007 ). The assigned suitability scores are then arithmetically combined accordingly to a selected decision rule to compute a final suitability score for each candidate location. This process is shown in Fig.  1 .

Example of a multicriteria evaluation of nine candidate locations, with two decision criteria combined using a weighted linear combination decision rule. Criterion A is weighted to be half as important as Criterion B

1.4 Decision weights

Despite significant progress in recent years, studies found in the literature rely almost exclusively on factors being weighted by researchers or the semi-informed/non-expert public, such that the weights assigned to decision variables/risk factors reflect their potentially limited knowledge and fail to incorporate more thoroughly informed expert knowledge from applied disaster planning domains. Several notable exceptions appear in the literature, including Sinha et al. ( 2016 ), who involved seven non-academic experts in conducting pairwise comparisons of selected risk factors to derive factor weights for an earthquake risk assessment in Delhi, India. These authors selected an intermediate-complexity multicriteria decision model, which while resulting in stable factor weights, required a MCE expert to facilitate the pairwise comparison and computation process. Delavar et al. ( 2015 ) asked five experts to directly rate hospitals’ seismic vulnerability on a single numerical scale, using the results to predict vulnerability for out-of-sample hospitals in Tehran. Neither of these studies describe the selected experts (e.g., their professional domains or levels of experience), so it is unclear to what degree their professional knowledge was sufficient for holistically informing the decision problems analysed. While these two studies made important progress by underscoring the importance of expert opinion, we argue that the elicitation of knowledge from a greater number of experts from a variety of related professional spheres is crucial to implementing a reliable MCE for disaster planning and management.

A significant challenge arises in the need to strike a balance between several considerations when designing multicriteria decision processes for disaster vulnerability and response. In addition to the need for expert knowledge, the algorithmic or statistical sophistication of a model, which might result in more quantitatively stable results, must be balanced against usability, such that a selected MCE tool or process should be usable in decision making circles without the need for a trained MCE expert facilitator. In their comprehensive review of decision making approaches to natural hazard management and planning problems, Simpson et al. ( 2016 ) highlight recent advances in advanced statistical MCE approaches such as Bayesian decision modelling, but underscore that expert judgement remains crucial for managing uncertainty. In this study, we argue that an easily replicable, expert-driven methodology, is crucial if it is to be used in real-world planning. Accordingly, we explore the use of a statistically simple approach to map earthquake experts’ knowledge about population vulnerability and critical infrastructure in Vancouver, Canada, in order to identify zones of elevated importance should a major earthquake occur. This knowledge is especially useful for optimising the placement of staging areas and emergency shelters, targeting initial post-earthquake reconnaissance missions, and mobilising professional and volunteer first responders and support teams.

1.5 Data and methods

Based on previous published studies, the City of Vancouver’s Earthquake Preparedness Strategy (2013), and preliminary telephone discussions with eight non-academic earthquake experts from government and private enterprise, we selected 26 geographical features and population characteristics relevant to earthquake response planning and grouped them into seven categories. The categories and their contingent features are shown in Table 1 . Rather than using rates, we mapped the total population and the total number of persons in vulnerable categories, as the absolute number of individuals provide a better representation of total potential demand for emergency services.

Two groups of respondents were selected: A non-expert group and an expert group. These groups were contacted in early October 2015, and all surveys were completed between 14 and 29 October 2015.

1.6 Expert survey

For the expert group, we compiled a list of 35 professionals in earthquake planning and response from private and governmental organisations in the Metro Vancouver area. We contacted each person by telephone or e-mail and asked them to participate in an anonymous online survey. They were first provided a brief description of the study and asked to provide feedback on the features and categories included prior to receiving the survey. The survey was updated based on their initial feedback, resulting in the categories and features shown in Table 1 .

Each respondent was then asked to independently rate each of the 26 features on a Likert scale ranging from 0 to 5, where 0 indicates that the given feature has no importance to post-earthquake response and 5 indicates the highest importance. The respondents were then asked to independently rate each category as a whole, according to the same Likert scale. This scale was selected for ease-of-use and interpretation and to assess if a simple survey instrument is sufficient for capturing expert opinion. Following a visual evaluation of the resulting frequency distributions, the median Likert scores for each category and for each feature were captured and used in the final analysis.

1.7 Non-expert survey

The non-expert group comprised five undergraduate geography students in a multicriteria evaluation course in Metro Vancouver. The students first conducted a review of the academic and non-academic literature on earthquake response and multicriteria evaluation for disaster response planning. This literature review included all articles cited herein and was, followed by group discussions facilitated by the lead author of this paper. The students were neither given any additional information, nor did they have contact with the expert group or see the expert survey results. We can therefore define this group as an informed, non-expert group of local resident stakeholders.

The non-expert group was asked to use an Analytic Hierarchy Process, facilitated using the AHP toolset in the geographical information systems software IDRISI Selva (v. 17.2). The AHP method, which is described in greater detail by Saaty (1990), was chosen because its use of pairwise comparisons simplifies the selection of factor weights for non-experts, despite its relatively complex calculation. AHP has been used in similar studies of population vulnerability to earthquakes (e.g., Han and Kim 2019 ). The non-expert group rated every pairwise combination of features within each category, based on their perceived relative importance (e.g., how important are fire halls compared to hospitals?). The non-expert group thereafter rated the categories, again using the pairwise comparison procedure. For each pairwise comparison, the group conducted deliberations in order to select a consensus-based pairwise weight. The lead author observed this process during their deliberations, but did not provide any input or feedback to the group.

1.8 Multicriteria weight derivation

To assess differences in approaches to MCE for disaster planning, three separate MCEs were conducted: (a) one using equal factor weights; (b) a second using AHP-derived factor weights from non-experts consensus, and (c) a third using median-based factor weights derived from experts:

MCE-Uninformed assumes that all factors are of equal importance, resulting in category weights proportional to the number of factors selected for a given category. This model represents the most simple and easy-to-implement method, but should be interpreted as an uninformed approach to the multicriteria decision problem.

MCE-Non-Expert is based on informed consensus among non-experts, i.e., the factor weights derived from the non-expert AHP. This is the most arithmetically complex method of the three used in this study and requires MCE expert facilitation.

MCE-Expert is based on informed expert opinion, i.e., the survey results completed by disaster response and planning professionals. This MCE used the simple Likert scale, easily administrable online and requiring no facilitation.

We tabulated the survey results and visually examined the resulting response distributions for normality. As the Likert scale responses did not exhibit normal distributions, the use of mean and standard deviation as measures of central tendency was precluded (Sullivan and Artino 2013 ). Therefore, we calculated the median for each feature and each category, and computed the Fleiss' kappa score (exact method) to assess the level of agreement between respondents.

1.9 Spatial data processing

We downloaded infrastructure data from Vancouver Open Data, BC Hydro, and DMTI Geospatial. Soil liquefaction risk data were acquired from the British Columbia Geological Survey.

We downloaded socioeconomic data for every census dissemination area (DA) in the study area for 2016, which is the most recent census year in Canada. A DA comprises a geographical area with 400–700 residents, the borders of which are selected to maximise within-DA demographic/socioeconomic heterogeneity, while adhering to administrative boundaries and street networks.

For all features except the census variables, their values were standardised on a scale from zero to one using a linear transformation (i.e., minimum value = 0; maximum value/2 = 0.5; maximum value = 1). For the census variables, we used a base 10 log-transformation to improve normality of their respective distributions, which were heuristically and statistically assessed prior to modelling. Values with an anticipated positive effect on response priority (e.g., social vulnerability represented by persons ages 65 +) were scaled positively, while those representing an inverse importance (e.g., income, such that high-income populations are assumed to have greater economic resilience in the event of an earthquake) were scaled negatively.

In order to map the geographical distributions of the features and MCE results, we generated a hexagonal base grid over the study area, with a spatial resolution of 50 m (i.e., each hexagonal cell of the grid has a radius and side length of 50 m). All features were mapped using this grid. A hexagonal structure was selected because it provides a more accurate spatial representation of both discrete features and continuous surfaces when mapped, compared to the traditional square-cell raster grid (de Sousa and Leitão 2018 ). All point features were assigned to the hexagon in which they were contained, and all polygon features were assigned to the hexagon containing the highest proportion of their total area.

To produce the final three MCE maps, we overlaid all hexagonal feature grids and arithmetically weighted and combined them as shown in Fig.  1 . All map preparation was completed using ESRI ArcGIS (v. 13).

As observed by the lead author, the non-expert group reached consensus for all pairwise combinations of features, resulting in the factor weights shown in Table 2 . However, the group decided after extended discussion that all categories had equal importance, acknowledging that they lacked sufficient expertise in disaster response planning and management necessary to prioritise one category over any other.

Twenty-seven expert surveys were completed, for a total of 866 data points. There were 12 instances of a missing response. Missing responses were randomly distributed across respondents, categories, and features. Missing values were therefore individually excluded from the analysis. The resulting Fleiss’ kappa score of 0.144 (27 expert rating on 33 subjects) indicates mild agreement of ratings among respondents. The resulting category and factor weights are shown in Table 2 .

The resulting maps display some similarities corresponding to the locations of features selected for the study. As shown in Fig.  2 , the uninformed (equally weighted) model indicates several high priority locations in the downtown area and along the primary north–south and east–west traffic corridors. This model resulted in comparatively high importance assigned to many areas dispersed throughout the study area, including along arterial roads and secondary commercial zones along the eastern periphery of the study area, e.g., bordering the neighbouring city of Burnaby. The main bridges connecting the downtown area with central Vancouver were not highlighted, although these are likely to be crucial for earthquake response efforts.

Unweighted MCE results (equal weights for all features and categories, representing an uninformed decision model)

The map displaying the informed non-expert MCE results show distributions of priority areas (Fig.  3 ) similar to those on the unweighted map. The large high-priority region bordering the Salish Sea and Richmond in the south-west corner of the study area reflects the disproportionately high risk associated with liquefaction potential assigned by the non-expert group. Priority areas are more geographically dispersed in the non-expert results than in the unweighted results. Some areas featuring higher importance scores are observed in the eastern half of the study area, where more low-income neighbourhoods are located.

Non-expert-weighted MCE results derived from the informed non-expert group using AHP methodology

The expert-weighted MCE results are shown in Fig.  4 . As in the unweighted and non-expert MCE results, the downtown area contains several high-priority locations, as well as the major north–south and east–west traffic corridors. Fewer areas exhibit high priority than in the previous two MCE models, indicating a more precise definition and focus on zones where disaster response teams might be deployed. For example, the expert results highlight high-density traffic and economic centroids in the central business district (e.g., the central train station and the stadium), without the immediate surroundings (primarily high-density residential towers and office towers) being identified as priority zones.

Expert-weighted MCE results derived from informed expert group responses to the Likert scale questionnaire

Figure  5 displays the differences between the non-expert and the expert MCE results. Blue (negative values) indicate that expert scores are higher than non-expert scores, whereas yellow (positive values) indicate that the non-expert scores are higher. The results indicate that non-experts rated liquefaction risk as a relatively important variable, while experts indicated higher importance for evacuation centres, which appear as blue hexagons dispersed throughout the study area. There are also small differences corresponding to a relatively lower importance given by experts to socioeconomic vulnerability. However, the predominantly residential areas across the study area (appearing as a green background intersected by the light-green road grid) do not appear to differ in importance between the two. The perimeter of Stanley Park, the northernmost prominence in the study area, featured a noticeable difference of importance scores, although this area features a low-capacity two-lane road and very few points of economic interest.

Difference map obtained by subtracting expert scores from non-expert scores

3 Discussion

There are similarities among the three MCE models, in that all three highlighted priority zones in the easternmost section of False Creek, an area comprising the high-capacity Cambie Bridge, an arena and football stadium, and many utilities and points of economic importance. Main north–south transportation routes and economic cores also featured prominently in the results, and both the expert and non-expert participant groups produced similarly criterion weights for senior populations and total populations.

However, several geographical differences are notable and may indicate significant implications for resource allocation in post-disaster response scenarios. Relative to the non-experts, the experts tended to prioritise immediate response measures (e.g., evacuation shelters and emergency services) over socioeconomic vulnerability. As a result, the expert-derived map indicates more precise locations for response priority, which is likely to be of greater value for planning purposes, such that distinct zones can be identified in advance and response staging areas established.

In the case of emergency services, we see more variation among the non-expert group, which was also observed as uncertainty during that part of their deliberation process. The ways in which emergency services are utilised and potential barriers to their deployment during a major earthquake were areas of significant uncertainty, and the non-expert group consensus was characterised by a low degree of confidence in their ability to select accurate weights. High uncertainty was also observed, while they sought to specify an appropriate weight for bridges.

The non-expert group’s knowledge stemmed mainly from a brief review of the relevant academic literature, resulting in a degree of distance from the practise of disaster management. As such, more abstract variables, such as socioeconomic status, were given relatively high priority. This was clearly evident during the deliberation process, in which members of the non-expert group routinely referred to academic articles. The nature of scientific publishing and its focus on methodological and theoretical advancement may therefore have disproportionately preconditioned the non-expert group to assign higher weights to more abstract variables. Similarly, this non-expert group, comprising university students, exhibited strong interest in the methodological sophistication of AHP compared to the expert group, who indicated that the use of a Likert scale and the mapping of median values was sufficient for capturing expert knowledge and opinion.

However, several similarities in the results (e.g., shelters and utilities) indicate that the importance of certain features was accurately assessed by the non-expert group. Additionally, several clusters of priority are common between both maps, particularly around the downtown and primary north–south traffic corridors. These similar results may indicate that the use of informed non-expert knowledge also may be valid for planning and response purposes, although we nevertheless underscore the necessity of experiential, professional knowledge and opinion in this process.

An important consideration in the interpretation of our results is the concept of trade-off, wherein the diminishing effect of a relatively low category score can be overridden by relatively high weights assigned to its constituent variables. For example, compared to non-experts, the expert group assigned a lower category weight to evacuation shelters, but a higher weight to its individual variables.

3.1 Study limitations

Weighted linear combination is conceptually simple and easy to implement, making this an attractive methodology for non-experts. However, the use of the simplest variant, the unweighted (uninformed) WLC model, induces a high degree of sensitivity to the number of factors in each category, i.e., a category with more factors will be disproportionately weighted against a category with fewer factors. The selection and categorisation of factors therefore constitutes an important consideration in the model-building process. Furthermore, the WLC decision rule assumes that all criteria can be traded-off for another; a high suitability according to criterion A can compensate for a low suitability according to criterion B. A significant barrier in the use of MCE is that this approach brings an implicit assumption that features/factors can be reasonably measured against one another, and that degrees of trade-off between factors are logical. However, in the context of disaster response planning, the features and categories used in this study cannot necessarily compensate for one another; i.e., an ambulance cannot function as a fire rescue vehicle. As such, detailed qualitative consideration of each feature’s purpose and means of use in the event of an earthquake is essential to planning. Alternatively, the implementation of quantitative trade-off decision rules (e.g., Ordered Weighted Averaging) may improve model accuracy, although the correct use of such tools requires close expert facilitation, because they are arithmetically and conceptually complex.

It has long been understood that the definition of criteria and categories constitutes a vital step in the MCE model design process, in which data availability often plays a central role (Malczewski 2000 ). The necessity for decision criteria to be comprehensive, operationalizable, mutually independent for the purposes of modelling, and non-redundant poses further challenges in light of the need for MCE models to be utilisable, e.g., with a minimal number of decision criteria (Keeney 1980 ). The spatial units for analysis also impact MCE results, due to both the size and configuration of, for example, census areas or the hexagonal grid used in this analysis; this issue is more widely recognised in geographic information science as the modifiable areal unit problem. The use of small-area census data induces several sources of potential error. The modifiable areal unit problem formalises the ecological fallacy in this context, such that absolute boundaries between census dissemination areas fail to represent gradients and within-unit heterogeneity, for example, in areas that feature mixed-density housing and greenspace. Given these limitations, Malczewski ( 2000 ) argues that MCE is more suitable for exploratory decision analysis than prescriptive assignment of optimal locations for a given decision problem.

The use of separate methods to derive factor weights from non-expert and expert respondents limits their comparability and prevents any quantifiable or robust inference addressing potential differences in prioritisation between the participant groups. However, this approach enabled us to explore consensus building among informed laypersons and contrast the results against those generated by experts. Due to our emphasis on anonymity and participants’ time constraints, we were not able to hold focus groups or ask experts to develop consensus in groups. Future research should focus on deriving more qualitative and contextual information from expert participants, and engagement of relevant policymakers may be a valuable element of future study.

In order to improve the accuracy of spatial multicriteria models and the degree of nuance with which they represent human decision making, further analysis should implement more nuanced weighting functions (e.g., implementing non-linear standardisation functions to better approximate the importance of a given feature/category) and trade-off capabilities (e.g., Ordered Weighted Averaging). The core challenge in employing these more sophisticated methods is that they greatly increase model complexity, requiring close facilitation when working with disaster planning and response experts. For example, in order to implement a logistic function to model the importance of socioeconomic vulnerability, the steepness and thresholds of the function require careful consideration and discussion in order to correctly parameterise the function. These values are best generated from a combination of statistical analysis and qualitative heuristics, for which expert experience and opinion are vital.

The selection of decision criteria was significantly impacted by data availability, for example, the capacity of emergency services and earthquake response teams and their respective spatial distributions, which may play a significant role in the allocation of resources immediately following a major seismic event.

Another important opportunity for model improvement lies in the development of local factor weights, which enable certain geographical areas to be weighted according to local factors, such as cultural or economic importance (Malczewski 2011 ; Malczewski and Liu 2014 ). Similarly, however, the implementation of local weights is more statistically complex than the methods used in this study and may significantly limit the usability of an MCE approach for applied disaster response planning.

4 Conclusions

In this paper, we present an expert-driven and replicable methodology for conducting GIS-based multicriteria evaluation (MCE) to support earthquake planning and response operations. The tools and methods can be easily replicated with free open-source data and software, and do not require MCE expert facilitation or complex arithmetic/statistical calculations.

By contrasting equally weighted, non-expert-weighted, and expert-weighted MCE results, we observed differences in the locations and scores that are highlighted on their respective maps and that indicate the need to leverage expert opinion in the spatial decision process. While the inclusion of expert opinion necessitates additional time and effort, the differences between uninformed, non-expert, and expert models highlighted in our results demonstrate that expert input may significantly impact the results and their implementation in planning and response. Highlighting geographical zones of increased importance can play an important role in the spatial allocation of resources (e.g., seismic upgrades to existing structures, location allocation for emergency services and volunteer brigades, information campaigns for particularly vulnerable populations, soil stability testing), while also serving as a potential tool for citizen engagement and education (e.g., emphasising the need for household/business evacuation plans and response kits in vulnerable areas).

We assert that GIS-based MCE can provide a useful means of identifying priority zones, and furthermore, may be a useful tool for urban planning and location analysis of emergency services in earthquake risk areas. However, a balance between ease-of-use, comprehensiveness of decision criteria, and validity of factor weights is crucial for correctly informing spatial decisions in the context of natural hazard planning and response, and call for further research to improve the application and usability of expert-driven MCE, particularly in low-resource, high-risk settings.

Availability of data and material

All data used in this study are freely available through open data portals online, except for those data acquired at cost from DMTI Spatial.

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Acknowledgements

The authors wish first and foremost to thank all survey participants for their valuable input and feedback. Many thanks to the reviewers, whose feedback and recommendations were crucial in improving upon the original manuscript. We wish also to thank the undergraduate students who participated in this study, whose interpretations of the literature and deliberations during the consensus-building process made important contributions to this study. BBW is supported by the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung).

Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.. No project-specific funding was acquired nor used for this study.

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Blake Byron Walker

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Nadine Schuurman & David Swanlund

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BBW, NS, and JC conceptualised the study. BBW and DS conducted the data acquisition, preparation, and analysis. All authors contributed to the interpretation of results and manuscript preparation.

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Walker, B.B., Schuurman, N., Swanlund, D. et al. GIS-based multicriteria evaluation for earthquake response: a case study of expert opinion in Vancouver, Canada. Nat Hazards 105 , 2075–2091 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-020-04390-1

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Received : 18 March 2020

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Published : 30 October 2020

Issue Date : January 2021

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-020-04390-1

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Geography Revision

Revision materials to support you in preparing for your GCSE Geography exams. 

GCSE | AQA |  The Challenge of Natural Hazards | Case Study – HIC Earthquake

• What is a natural hazard?
• Types of Natural Hazards
• Hazard Risk
• Plate Tectonics
• Why do tectonic plates move?
• The global distribution of volcanoes and earthquakes
• Destructive plate margins
• Conservative plate margins
• Constructive plate margins

Causes of earthquakes

• Measuring Earthquakes

What are the effects of earthquakes?

• Responses to Earthquakes

Case Study – HIC Earthquake

• Case Study – LIC Earthquake
• Why do people live in tectonically active areas?
• Managing Tectonic Hazards
• Global Atmospheric Circulation

Revision Notes

Measuring earthquakes

Responses to earthquakes

Case Study – LIC/NEE Earthquake

Interactive Revision

• On 24 August 2016, a magnitude 6.2 earthquake hit central Italy near Norcia.
• The earthquake’s epicentre was shallow, at a depth of 5.1 km.
• It was the strongest quake in Italy since the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, which killed over 300 people.
• The Amatrice earthquake was felt over 100 miles away, including in Rome.
• Amatrice, the town closest to the epicentre, suffered significant social, economic, and environmental impacts.
• Italy’s seismic activity is due to its location on the Eurasian and African plate collision border, creating multiple fault lines.
• Two major fault lines, north-south and east-west, contribute to the country’s geological instability.
• The Apennines are stretching northwest at about 3 mm per year, causing pressure buildup along faults, leading to earthquakes when released.

Primary Effects

The  primary effects  of the Amatrice earthquake include:

• Two hundred ninety-nine people died, 400 were injured, and 4454 were homeless.
• 293 historic buildings were damaged or destroyed, including the Basilica of San Francesco in Amatrice
• Over half the buildings in Amatrice were damaged or destroyed. Despite their reinforcements, 80 per cent of the buildings in the old town were affected.
• Although the government allocated €1 billion for building improvements since the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, many properties did not meet seismic building standards. The uptake of the funding had been low.
• Despite being restored in 2012, the school in Amatrice collapsed, indicating substandard building practices.

Secondary Effects

The secondary effects of the Amatrice earthquake include:

• Landslides blocked roads, making access to the area difficult.
• Local residents suffered psychological damage.
• Individuals were reported to have been involved in looting.
• Unsafe buildings led to the town centre being cordoned off. This had a negative impact on  tourism .
• Ninety per cent of barns and stalls for sheep, goats, and cattle in the affected area were destroyed, alongside the mechanical milking systems. As a result, farmers struggled to milk by hand, leaving their cattle at risk of mastitis, an udder-tissue disease. Farmers struggled to make a living in the aftermath of the earthquake.
• The earthquake resulted in an estimated $11 billion in economic losses.

Immediate Responses

• Ten thousand homeless people were accommodated in 58 tent camps.
• Sports halls were converted to provide shelter, and hotels on the Adriatic coasts were used to home people temporarily.
• Many rescue workers arrived within an hour of the earthquake. Five thousand soldiers, alpine guides, and the Italian Red Cross were involved in searching for survivors, providing food and water, and supplying tents. Seventy dog teams and twelve helicopters were involved in the rescue effort.
• Six of the Vatican’s 37 firefighters have travelled to Amatrice to help civil  protection  workers look for survivors.
• A temporary hospital was set up, and patients at Amazatrice Hospital, severely damaged during the earthquake, were transferred to a nearby hospital in Rieti.
• Appeals were made by the national blood donation service to ensure demand was met.
• Facebook activated safety check features so local people could inform family and friends they were safe.
• Locals removed passwords from Wi-Fi at the Italian Red Cross’s request so rescue teams could communicate more effectively.
• The Italian Government announced a €50 million emergency response. Taxes for residents were cancelled, and reconstruction work began immediately.

Long-term Responses 

• Students were educated in neighbouring schools, while 12 classrooms were constructed in prefabricated buildings in Amatrice.
• Six months following the earthquake, the government promised to move people from temporary camps into wooden houses.
• The cost of rebuilding was reduced by tax incentives, allowing 65 per cent of total renovation costs to be used as tax breaks.
• Villages were rebuilt, with the building of the same character through a €42 million government initiative called ‘Italian Homes’.
• A year on, 2.4 million tons of debris and rubble remained in the areas affected by the earthquake.
• At 3:34 am on 27 February 2010, an 8.8 magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of central Chile.
• The earthquake happened at a destructive plate margin , where the Nazca Plate subducts the South American plate.
• A series of smaller aftershocks followed it.
• Tsunami warnings were issued due to waves travelling from the epicentre across the Pacific Ocean at speeds of about 800 km/h.
• Around 500 people died, and 12,000 people were injured. Over 800,000 people were affected.
• Two hundred twenty thousand homes, 4500 schools, 56 hospitals, and 53 ports were destroyed.
• Santiago Airport and the Port of Talahuanao were severely damaged.
• The earthquake disrupted power, water supplies and communications across Chile.
• The cost of the earthquake is estimated to be US$30 billion.
• Tsunami waves devastated several coastal towns.
• The  tsunami  struck several Pacific countries; however, warnings prevented a loss of life.
• A fire at a Santiago chemical plant led to the local area being evacuated.
• Landslides destroyed up to 1500 km of roads, cutting off remote communities for days.
• Emergency services responded quickly.
• International support provided field hospitals, satellite phones and floating bridges.
• Within 24 hours, the north-south highway was temporarily repaired, allowing aid to be transported from Santiago to areas affected by the earthquake.
• Within ten days, 90% of homes had restored power and water.
• US$60 million was raised after a national appeal, which funded 30,000 small emergency shelters.
• Chile’s government launched a housing reconstruction plan just one month after the earthquake to help nearly 200,000 families.
• Chile’s strong economy reduced the need for foreign aid to fund rebuilding.
• The recovery took over four years.

Christchurch

• The earthquake struck New Zealand’s South Island, 10km west of Christchurch, at 12:51 pm on 22nd February 2011, lasting just 10 seconds.
• It measured 6.3 on the Richter Scale and had a shallow depth of 4.99 km.
• The quake occurred along a conservative margin between the Pacific and Australasian plates.

The  primary effects  included:

• Christchurch, New Zealand’s second city, experienced extensive damage
• 185 people were killed
• 3129 people were injured
• 6800 people received minor injuries
• 100,000 properties were damaged, and the earthquake demolished 10,000
• $28 billion of damage was caused
• water and sewage pipes were damaged
• the cathedral spire collapsed
• liquefaction  destroyed many roads and buildings
• 2200 people had to live in temporary housing

The  secondary effects  included:

• five Rugby World Cup matches were cancelled
• schools were closed for two weeks
• 1/5 of the population migrated from the city
• many businesses were closed for a long time
• two large aftershocks struck Christchurch less than four months after the city was devastated
• Economists have suggested that it will take 50 to 100 years for New Zealand’s economy to recover
• 80% of respondents to a post-event survey stated that their lives had changed significantly since the earthquake

The  immediate responses  included:

• around $6-7 million of aid was provided
• International aid was provided
• The Red Cross and other charities supplied aid workers
• rescue crews from all over the world, including the UK, USA, Taiwan and Australia, provided support
• more than 300 Australian police officers flew into Christchurch three days after the earthquake. They were sworn in with New Zealand policing powers and worked alongside New Zealand officers, enforcing law and order and reassuring the people of Christchurch
• 30,000 residents were provided with chemical toilets

The long-term responses included:

• the construction of around 10,000 affordable homes
• water and sewage were restored by August 2011
• the New Zealand government provided temporary housing
• Many NGOs provided support, including Save the Children
• Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority was created to organise the rebuilding of the region. It had special powers to change planning  laws and regulations.
• A 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck off Japan’s northeast coast, 250 miles from Tokyo, at a depth of 20 miles on March 11, 2011, at 2:46 pm local time.
• Occurred 250 miles off the northeast coast of Honshu, Japan’s main island.
• The earthquake resulted from the subduction of the Pacific Plate beneath the Eurasian Plate, a destructive plate margin.
• Built-up friction over time led to a massive ‘megathrust’ earthquake.
• Energy release was 600 million times the energy of the Hiroshima nuclear bomb.
• Post-earthquake studies found a thin, slippery clay layer in the subduction zone , which allowed a significant plate displacement of 164 feet and contributed to the massive earthquake and tsunami .
• The combination of the earthquake’s shallow depth and high magnitude generated a devastating tsunami.
• 15,894 people died, and 26,152 were injured.
• 130,927 displaced, with 2,562 missing.
• 332,395 buildings, 2,126 roads, 56 bridges, and 26 railways damaged or destroyed.
• 300 hospitals damaged, 11 destroyed.
• Over 4.4 million households in northeast Japan were without electricity.
• Significant disruptions to Japan’s transport network.
• Coastal land subsidence by over 50 cm in some areas.
• Due to tectonic shifts, North East Japan moved 2.4 m closer to North America.
• Pacific plate slipped westwards by 20 to 40 m.
• Seabed near the epicentre shifted by 24 m; off Miyagi province by 3 m.
• Earthquake altered Earth’s axis by 10 to 25 cm, shortening the day by 1.8 microseconds.
• Liquefaction damaged 1,046 buildings in Tokyo’s reclaimed land areas.
• The earthquake cost was estimated at US$235 billion, making it the most expensive natural disaster in history.
• Tsunami waves up to 40m high caused widespread devastation, killing thousands and causing damage and pollution up to 6 miles inland; only 58% heeded tsunami warnings.
• Fukushima nuclear power station experienced a meltdown in seven reactors; radiation levels spiked to over eight times the norm.
• Transport networks in rural areas were severely disrupted; the tsunami destroyed major roads and railways and derailed trains.
• The ‘Japan Move Forward Committee’ suggested young adults and teenagers could aid in rebuilding efforts.
• Coastal changes included a 250-mile stretch of coastline dropping by 0.6m, allowing the tsunami to travel further inland.
• The Japan Meteorological Agency issued tsunami warnings three minutes after the earthquake.
• Scientists had been able to predict where the tsunami would hit after the earthquake using modelling and forecasting technology so that responses could be directed to the appropriate areas.
• Rescue workers and around 100,000 members of the Japan Self-Defence Force were dispatched to help with search and rescue operations within hours of the tsunami hitting the coast.
• Although many search and rescue teams focused on recovering bodies washing up on shore following the tsunami, some people were rescued from under the rubble with the help of sniffer dogs.
• The government declared a 20 km  evacuation  zone around the Fukushima nuclear power plant to reduce the threat of radiation exposure to local residents.
• Japan received international help from the US military, and search and rescue teams were sent from New Zealand, India, South Korea, China and Australia.
• Access to the affected areas was restricted because many were covered in debris and mud following the tsunami, so it wasn’t easy to provide immediate support in some areas.
• Hundreds of thousands of people who had lost their homes were evacuated to temporary shelters in schools and other public buildings or relocated to other areas.
• Many evacuees came from the  exclusion zone  surrounding the Fukushima nuclear power plant. After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown, those in the area had their radiation levels checked, and their health monitored to ensure they did not receive dangerous exposure to radiation. Many evacuated from the area around the nuclear power plant were given iodine tablets to reduce the risk of radiation poisoning.
• One month post-disaster, Japan established the Reconstruction Policy Council for National Recovery, focusing on tsunami-resilient communities.
• The government allocated 23 trillion yen for a ten-year recovery plan, introducing ‘Special Zones for Reconstruction’ to attract investments in Tohoku.
• Coastal protection policies involving seawalls and breakwaters were adopted to withstand tsunamis with a 150-year recurrence interval.
• Enacted ‘Act on the Development of Tsunami-resilient Communities’ prioritizing human life and promoting infrastructure and defence measures against major tsunamis.
• Post-earthquake, Japan faced economic challenges, with the disaster impacting stock market values and raising concerns about economic recovery.
• Infrastructure repair included 375 km of the Tohoku Expressway and Sendai Airport runway, with significant efforts from the Japanese Defence Force and the US Army.
• Reconstruction efforts also focused on restoring energy, water supply, and telecommunications infrastructure, achieving significant restoration rates by November 2011.

L’Aquila

• A 6.3 magnitude earthquake hit L’Aquila, central Italy, on 6 April 2009, resulting in 309 fatalities.
• The main shock occurred at 3.32 am, causing extensive damage to the 13th-century city, situated approximately 60 miles northeast of Rome.
• This event was Italy’s most severe earthquake since the 1980 Irpinia earthquake.
• The earthquake’s cause was normal faulting on the northwest-southeast-trending Paganica Fault, influenced by extensional tectonic forces from the Tyrrhenian Basin’s opening.
• L’Aquila experienced several thousand foreshocks and aftershocks since December 2008, with over thirty exceeding a 3.5 Richter magnitude.
• The L’Aquila earthquake damaged or collapsed 3,000 to 11,000 buildings, injuring around 1,500 people, and made approximately 40,000 homeless.
• Twenty children were among the 309 fatalities, and around 40,000 individuals were displaced, with 10,000 housed in coastal hotels.
• The European Union estimated the earthquake’s total damage to be US$1.1 billion.
• Historic buildings sustained severe damage, leading to widespread abandonment. Streets were blocked by fallen masonry, and a significant aftershock damaged the local hospital.
• The Basilica of Saint Bernardino, a major Renaissance church, and its campanile were severely damaged.
• Modern structures, including the earthquake-proof wing of L’Aquila Hospital, also suffered extensive damage, leading to its closure.
• Displaced persons found temporary shelter in tented camps and hotels along the coast.
• Aftershocks from the L’Aquila earthquake triggered landslides and rockfalls, damaging homes and transportation infrastructure.
• A burst main water supply pipeline near Paganio caused a landslide and mudflow.
• Student enrollment at L’Aquila University declined post-earthquake.
• The scarcity of housing led to increased house prices and rents.
• Much of the city’s central business district was cordoned off due to unsafe buildings, resulting in some areas remaining as ‘red zones’.
• These ‘red zones’ have negatively impacted business, tourism , and income in the area.
• Hotels sheltered 10,000 people; 40,000 tents were distributed to the homeless.
• Some train carriages were repurposed as shelters.
• Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi offered his homes for temporary shelters.
• Italian Red Cross, supported by dog units and ambulances, searched for survivors and set up a temporary hospital.
• The Red Cross distributed water, meals, tents, and blankets; the British Red Cross raised £171,000.
• Mortgages, Sky TV, gas, and electricity bills were suspended.
• Italian Post Office provided free mobile calls, raised donations, and offered free delivery for small businesses.
• L’Aquila declared a state of emergency, facilitating international aid from the EU and USA.
• EU granted US$552.9 million from its Solidarity Fund for rebuilding efforts.
• Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) did not provide aid, deeming Italy capable with its resources and EU support.
• A torch-lit procession and Catholic mass are held on the anniversary for remembrance.
• Residents were exempt from taxes in 2010.
• Students received free public transport , discounts on educational equipment, and an exemption from university fees for three years.
• Home reconstruction took years; historical centres may take 15 years to rebuild.
• Six scientists and one government official were initially convicted of manslaughter for not predicting the earthquake, sentenced to six years in prison, and fined millions in damages.
• In November 2014, the convictions of the six scientists were overturned by Italian courts.

New Zealand 2016

• A magnitude-7.8 earthquake hit New Zealand’s South Island on November 14th, 2016, at 00.02 am, resulting in at least two fatalities.
• The quake was felt up to 120 miles away, including in Wellington, the capital on the North Island.
• A tsunami warning was issued two hours post-quake, advising people on the eastern coast to move inland or higher ground.
• Two people died.
• Fifty people were injured.
• Sixty people needed emergency housing.
• Over 190km of roads and 200km of railway lines were destroyed
• Twenty thousand buildings were damaged or destroyed.
• Water, sewerage & power supplies were cut off.
• Total damage is estimated at US $8.5 billion.
• One hundred thousand landslides blocked roads and railways.
• A landslide blocked the Clarence River, causing flooding. Ten farms were evacuated.
• The earthquake triggered a tsunami of 5m, leaving debris up to 250 metres inland.
• A tsunami warning was issued, and residents were told to reach higher ground.
• Hundreds were housed in emergency shelters.
• Two hundred vulnerable people were evacuated by helicopter.
• Power was restored within hours. International warships were sent to Kaikoura with food, medicine and portable toilets.
• Temporary water supplies were set up.
• Other countries sent food and medicine.
• $5.3 million from the District Council for repairs and rebuilding.
• Road and rail routes reopened within two years.
• A relief fund was set up to provide basic supplies.
• By March 2017, a permanent water main had been laid in Kaikoura. the new pipe was designed to move with any future earthquakes so it wouldn’t break

Case study – LIC/NEE earthquake

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