meaning of the representation

Definition of 'representation'

representation

representation in British English

Representation in american english, examples of 'representation' in a sentence representation, cobuild collocations representation, trends of representation.

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American English : representation / rɛprɪzɛnˈteɪʃən /
Brazilian Portuguese : representação
Chinese : 代表
European Spanish : representación
French : représentation
German : Vertretung
Italian : rappresentanza
Japanese : 代表
Korean : 대표
European Portuguese : representação
Latin American Spanish : representación
Thai : การมีตัวแทน

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Definition of representation noun from the Oxford Advanced American Dictionary

representation

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Political Representation

The concept of political representation is misleadingly simple: everyone seems to know what it is, yet few can agree on any particular definition. In fact, there is an extensive literature that offers many different definitions of this elusive concept. [Classic treatments of the concept of political representations within this literature include Pennock and Chapman 1968; Pitkin, 1967 and Schwartz, 1988.] Hanna Pitkin (1967) provides, perhaps, one of the most straightforward definitions: to represent is simply to “make present again.” On this definition, political representation is the activity of making citizens’ voices, opinions, and perspectives “present” in public policy making processes. Political representation occurs when political actors speak, advocate, symbolize, and act on the behalf of others in the political arena. In short, political representation is a kind of political assistance. This seemingly straightforward definition, however, is not adequate as it stands. For it leaves the concept of political representation underspecified. Indeed, as we will see, the concept of political representation has multiple and competing dimensions: our common understanding of political representation is one that contains different, and conflicting, conceptions of how political representatives should represent and so holds representatives to standards that are mutually incompatible. In leaving these dimensions underspecified, this definition fails to capture this paradoxical character of the concept.

This encyclopedia entry has three main goals. The first is to provide a general overview of the meaning of political representation, identifying the key components of this concept. The second is to highlight several important advances that have been made by the contemporary literature on political representation. These advances point to new forms of political representation, ones that are not limited to the relationship between formal representatives and their constituents. The third goal is to reveal several persistent problems with theories of political representation and thereby to propose some future areas of research.

1.1 Delegate vs. Trustee

1.2 pitkin’s four views of representation, 2. changing political realities and changing concepts of political representation, 3. contemporary advances, 4. future areas of study, a. general discussions of representation, b. arguments against representation, c. non-electoral forms of representation, d. representation and electoral design, e. representation and accountability, f. descriptive representation, other internet resources, related entries, 1. key components of political representation.

Political representation, on almost any account, will exhibit the following five components:

some party that is representing (the representative, an organization, movement, state agency, etc.);
some party that is being represented (the constituents, the clients, etc.);
something that is being represented (opinions, perspectives, interests, discourses, etc.); and
a setting within which the activity of representation is taking place (the political context).
something that is being left out (the opinions, interests, and perspectives not voiced).

Theories of political representation often begin by specifying the terms for the first four components. For instance, democratic theorists often limit the types of representatives being discussed to formal representatives — that is, to representatives who hold elected offices. One reason that the concept of representation remains elusive is that theories of representation often apply only to particular kinds of political actors within a particular context. How individuals represent an electoral district is treated as distinct from how social movements, judicial bodies, or informal organizations represent. Consequently, it is unclear how different forms of representation relate to each other. Andrew Rehfeld (2006) has offered a general theory of representation which simply identifies representation by reference to a relevant audience accepting a person as its representative. One consequence of Rehfeld’s general approach to representation is that it allows for undemocratic cases of representation.

However, Rehfeld’s general theory of representation does not specify what representative do or should do in order to be recognized as a representative. And what exactly representatives do has been a hotly contested issue. In particular, a controversy has raged over whether representatives should act as delegates or trustees .

Historically, the theoretical literature on political representation has focused on whether representatives should act as delegates or as trustees . Representatives who are delegates simply follow the expressed preferences of their constituents. James Madison (1787–8) describes representative government as “the delegation of the government...to a small number of citizens elected by the rest.” Madison recognized that “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.” Consequently, Madison suggests having a diverse and large population as a way to decrease the problems with bad representation. In other words, the preferences of the represented can partially safeguard against the problems of faction.

In contrast, trustees are representatives who follow their own understanding of the best action to pursue. Edmund Burke (1790) is famous for arguing that

Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interest each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole… You choose a member, indeed; but when you have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of Parliament (115).

The delegate and the trustee conception of political representation place competing and contradictory demands on the behavior of representatives. [For a discussion of the similarities and differences between Madison’s and Burke’s conception of representation, see Pitkin 1967, 191–192.] Delegate conceptions of representation require representatives to follow their constituents’ preferences, while trustee conceptions require representatives to follow their own judgment about the proper course of action. Any adequate theory of representation must grapple with these contradictory demands.

Famously, Hanna Pitkin argues that theorists should not try to reconcile the paradoxical nature of the concept of representation. Rather, they should aim to preserve this paradox by recommending that citizens safeguard the autonomy of both the representative and of those being represented. The autonomy of the representative is preserved by allowing them to make decisions based on his or her understanding of the represented’s interests (the trustee conception of representation). The autonomy of those being represented is preserved by having the preferences of the represented influence evaluations of representatives (the delegate conception of representation). Representatives must act in ways that safeguard the capacity of the represented to authorize and to hold their representatives accountable and uphold the capacity of the representative to act independently of the wishes of the represented.

Objective interests are the key for determining whether the autonomy of representative and the autonomy of the represented have been breached. However, Pitkin never adequately specifies how we are to identify constituents’ objective interests. At points, she implies that constituents should have some say in what are their objective interests, but ultimately she merely shifts her focus away from this paradox to the recommendation that representatives should be evaluated on the basis of the reasons they give for disobeying the preferences of their constituents. For Pitkin, assessments about representatives will depend on the issue at hand and the political environment in which a representative acts. To understand the multiple and conflicting standards within the concept of representation is to reveal the futility of holding all representatives to some fixed set of guidelines. In this way, Pitkin concludes that standards for evaluating representatives defy generalizations. Moreover, individuals, especially democratic citizens, are likely to disagree deeply about what representatives should be doing.

Pitkin offers one of the most comprehensive discussions of the concept of political representation, attending to its contradictory character in her The Concept of Representation . This classic discussion of the concept of representation is one of the most influential and oft-cited works in the literature on political representation. (For a discussion of her influence, see Dovi 2016). Adopting a Wittgensteinian approach to language, Pitkin maintains that in order to understand the concept of political representation, one must consider the different ways in which the term is used. Each of these different uses of the term provides a different view of the concept. Pitkin compares the concept of representation to “ a rather complicated, convoluted, three–dimensional structure in the middle of a dark enclosure.” Political theorists provide “flash-bulb photographs of the structure taken from different angles” [1967, 10]. More specifically, political theorists have provided four main views of the concept of representation. Unfortunately, Pitkin never explains how these different views of political representation fit together. At times, she implies that the concept of representation is unified. At other times, she emphasizes the conflicts between these different views, e.g. how descriptive representation is opposed to accountability. Drawing on her flash-bulb metaphor, Pitkin argues that one must know the context in which the concept of representation is placed in order to determine its meaning. For Pitkin, the contemporary usage of the term “representation” can signficantly change its meaning.

For Pitkin, disagreements about representation can be partially reconciled by clarifying which view of representation is being invoked. Pitkin identifies at least four different views of representation: formalistic representation, descriptive representation, symbolic representation, and substantive representation. (For a brief description of each of these views, see chart below.) Each view provides a different approach for examining representation. The different views of representation can also provide different standards for assessing representatives. So disagreements about what representatives ought to be doing are aggravated by the fact that people adopt the wrong view of representation or misapply the standards of representation. Pitkin has in many ways set the terms of contemporary discussions about representation by providing this schematic overview of the concept of political representation.

1. Formalistic Representation : Brief Description . The institutional arrangements that precede and initiate representation. Formal representation has two dimensions: authorization and accountability. Main Research Question . What is the institutional position of a representative? Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives . None. ( Authorization ): Brief Description . The means by which a representative obtains his or her standing, status, position or office. Main Research Questions . What is the process by which a representative gains power (e.g., elections) and what are the ways in which a representative can enforce his or her decisions? Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives . No standards for assessing how well a representative behaves. One can merely assess whether a representative legitimately holds his or her position. pdf include--> ( Accountability ): Brief Description . The ability of constituents to punish their representative for failing to act in accordance with their wishes (e.g. voting an elected official out of office) or the responsiveness of the representative to the constituents. Main Research Question . What are the sanctioning mechanisms available to constituents? Is the representative responsive towards his or her constituents’ preferences? Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives . No standards for assessing how well a representative behaves. One can merely determine whether a representative can be sanctioned or has been responsive.

Brief Description . The ways that a representative “stands for” the represented — that is, the meaning that a representative has for those being represented.

Main Research Question . What kind of response is invoked by the representative in those being represented?

Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives . Representatives are assessed by the degree of acceptance that the representative has among the represented.

Brief Description . The extent to which a representative resembles those being represented.

Main Research Question . Does the representative look like, have common interests with, or share certain experiences with the represented?

Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives . Assess the representative by the accuracy of the resemblance between the representative and the represented.

Brief Description . The activity of representatives—that is, the actions taken on behalf of, in the interest of, as an agent of, and as a substitute for the represented.

Main Research Question . Does the representative advance the policy preferences that serve the interests of the represented?

Implicit Standards for Evaluating Representatives . Assess a representative by the extent to which policy outcomes advanced by a representative serve “the best interests” of their constituents.

One cannot overestimate the extent to which Pitkin has shaped contemporary understandings of political representation, especially among political scientists. For example, her claim that descriptive representation opposes accountability is often the starting point for contemporary discussions about whether marginalized groups need representatives from their groups.

Similarly, Pitkin’s conclusions about the paradoxical nature of political representation support the tendency among contemporary theorists and political scientists to focus on formal procedures of authorization and accountability (formalistic representation). In particular, there has been a lot of theoretical attention paid to the proper design of representative institutions (e.g. Amy 1996; Barber, 2001; Christiano 1996; Guinier 1994). This focus is certainly understandable, since one way to resolve the disputes about what representatives should be doing is to “let the people decide.” In other words, establishing fair procedures for reconciling conflicts provides democratic citizens one way to settle conflicts about the proper behavior of representatives. In this way, theoretical discussions of political representation tend to depict political representation as primarily a principal-agent relationship. The emphasis on elections also explains why discussions about the concept of political representation frequently collapse into discussions of democracy. Political representation is understood as a way of 1) establishing the legitimacy of democratic institutions and 2) creating institutional incentives for governments to be responsive to citizens.

David Plotke (1997) has noted that this emphasis on mechanisms of authorization and accountability was especially useful in the context of the Cold War. For this understanding of political representation (specifically, its demarcation from participatory democracy) was useful for distinguishing Western democracies from Communist countries. Those political systems that held competitive elections were considered to be democratic (Schumpeter 1976). Plotke questions whether such a distinction continues to be useful. Plotke recommends that we broaden the scope of our understanding of political representation to encompass interest representation and thereby return to debating what is the proper activity of representatives. Plotke’s insight into why traditional understandings of political representation resonated prior to the end of the Cold War suggests that modern understandings of political representation are to some extent contingent on political realities. For this reason, those who attempt to define political representation should recognize how changing political realities can affect contemporary understandings of political representation. Again, following Pitkin, ideas about political representation appear contingent on existing political practices of representation. Our understandings of representation are inextricably shaped by the manner in which people are currently being represented. For an informative discussion of the history of representation, see Monica Brito Vieira and David Runican’s Representation .

As mentioned earlier, theoretical discussions of political representation have focused mainly on the formal procedures of authorization and accountability within nation states, that is, on what Pitkin called formalistic representation. However, such a focus is no longer satisfactory due to international and domestic political transformations. [For an extensive discussion of international and domestic transformations, see Mark Warren and Dario Castioglione (2004).] Increasingly international, transnational and non-governmental actors play an important role in advancing public policies on behalf of democratic citizens—that is, acting as representatives for those citizens. Such actors “speak for,” “act for” and can even “stand for” individuals within a nation-state. It is no longer desirable to limit one’s understanding of political representation to elected officials within the nation-state. After all, increasingly state “contract out” important responsibilities to non-state actors, e.g. environmental regulation. As a result, elected officials do not necessarily possess “the capacity to act,” the capacity that Pitkin uses to identify who is a representative. So, as the powers of nation-state have been disseminated to international and transnational actors, elected representatives are not necessarily the agents who determine how policies are implemented. Given these changes, the traditional focus of political representation, that is, on elections within nation-states, is insufficient for understanding how public policies are being made and implemented. The complexity of modern representative processes and the multiple locations of political power suggest that contemporary notions of accountability are inadequate. Grant and Keohane (2005) have recently updated notions of accountability, suggesting that the scope of political representation needs to be expanded in order to reflect contemporary realities in the international arena. Michael Saward (2009) has proposed an innovative type of criteria that should be used for evaluating non-elective representative claims. John Dryzek and Simon Niemayer (2008) has proposed an alternative conception of representation, what he calls discursive representation, to reflect the fact that transnational actors represent discourses, not real people. By discourses, they mean “a set of categories and concepts embodying specific assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions, and capabilities.” The concept of discursive representation can potentially redeem the promise of deliberative democracy when the deliberative participation of all affected by a collective decision is infeasible.

Domestic transformations also reveal the need to update contemporary understandings of political representation. Associational life — social movements, interest groups, and civic associations—is increasingly recognized as important for the survival of representative democracies. The extent to which interest groups write public policies or play a central role in implementing and regulating policies is the extent to which the division between formal and informal representation has been blurred. The fluid relationship between the career paths of formal and informal representatives also suggests that contemporary realities do not justify focusing mainly on formal representatives. Mark Warren’s concept of citizen representatives (2008) opens up a theoretical framework for exploring how citizens represent themselves and serve in representative capacities.

Given these changes, it is necessary to revisit our conceptual understanding of political representation, specifically of democratic representation. For as Jane Mansbridge has recently noted, normative understandings of representation have not kept up with recent empirical research and contemporary democratic practices. In her important article “Rethinking Representation” Mansbridge identifies four forms of representation in modern democracies: promissory, anticipatory, gyroscopic and surrogacy. Promissory representation is a form of representation in which representatives are to be evaluated by the promises they make to constituents during campaigns. Promissory representation strongly resembles Pitkin’s discussion of formalistic representation. For both are primarily concerned with the ways that constituents give their consent to the authority of a representative. Drawing on recent empirical work, Mansbridge argues for the existence of three additional forms of representation. In anticipatory representation, representatives focus on what they think their constituents will reward in the next election and not on what they promised during the campaign of the previous election. Thus, anticipatory representation challenges those who understand accountability as primarily a retrospective activity. In gyroscopic representation, representatives “look within” to derive from their own experience conceptions of interest and principles to serve as a basis for their action. Finally, surrogate representation occurs when a legislator represents constituents outside of their districts. For Mansbridge, each of these different forms of representation generates a different normative criterion by which representatives should be assessed. All four forms of representation, then, are ways that democratic citizens can be legitimately represented within a democratic regime. Yet none of the latter three forms representation operates through the formal mechanisms of authorization and accountability. Recently, Mansbridge (2009) has gone further by suggesting that political science has focused too much on the sanctions model of accountability and that another model, what she calls the selection model, can be more effective at soliciting the desired behavior from representatives. According to Mansbridge, a sanction model of accountability presumes that the representative has different interests from the represented and that the represented should not only monitor but reward the good representative and punish the bad. In contrast, the selection model of accountability presumes that representatives have self-motivated and exogenous reasons for carrying out the represented’s wishes. In this way, Mansbridge broadens our understanding of accountability to allow for good representation to occur outside of formal sanctioning mechanisms.

Mansbridge’s rethinking of the meaning of representation holds an important insight for contemporary discussions of democratic representation. By specifying the different forms of representation within a democratic polity, Mansbridge teaches us that we should refer to the multiple forms of democratic representation. Democratic representation should not be conceived as a monolithic concept. Moreover, what is abundantly clear is that democratic representation should no longer be treated as consisting simply in a relationship between elected officials and constituents within her voting district. Political representation should no longer be understood as a simple principal-agent relationship. Andrew Rehfeld has gone farther, maintaining that political representation should no longer be territorially based. In other words, Rehfeld (2005) argues that constituencies, e.g. electoral districts, should not be constructed based on where citizens live.

Lisa Disch (2011) also complicates our understanding of democratic representation as a principal-agent relationship by uncovering a dilemma that arises between expectations of democratic responsiveness to constituents and recent empirical findings regarding the context dependency of individual constituents’ preferences. In response to this dilemma, Disch proposes a mobilization conception of political representation and develops a systemic understanding of reflexivity as the measure of its legitimacy.

By far, one of the most important shifts in the literature on representation has been the “constructivist turn.” Constructivist approaches to representation emphasize the representative’s role in creating and framing the identities and claims of the represented. Here Michael Saward’s The Representative Claim is exemplary. For Saward, representation entails a series of relationships: “A maker of representations (M) puts forward a subject (S) which stands for an object (O) which is related to a referent (R) and is offered to an audience (A)” (2006, 302). Instead of presuming a pre-existing set of interests of the represented that representatives “bring into” the political arena, Saward stresses how representative claim-making is a “deeply culturally inflected practice.” Saward explicitly denies that theorists can know what are the interests of the represented. For this reason, the represented should have the ultimate say in judging the claims of the representative. The task of the representative is to create claims that will resonate with appropriate audiences.

Saward therefore does not evaluate representatives by the extent to which they advance the preferences or interests of the represented. Instead he focuses on the institutional and collective conditions in which claim-making takes place. The constructivist turn examines the conditions for claim-making, not the activities of particular representatives.

Saward’s “constructivist turn” has generated a new research direction for both political theorists and empirical scientists. For example, Lisa Disch (2015) considers whether the constructivist turn is a “normative dead” end, that is, whether the epistemological commitments of constructivism that deny the ability to identify interests will undermine the normative commitments to democratic politics. Disch offers an alternative approach, what she calls “the citizen standpoint”. This standpoint does not mean taking at face value whomever or whatever citizens regard as representing them. Rather, it is “an epistemological and political achievement that does not exist spontaneously but develops out of the activism of political movements together with the critical theories and transformative empirical research to which they give rise” (2015, 493). (For other critical engagements with Saward’s work, see Schaap et al, 2012 and Nässtrom, 2011).

There have been a number of important advances in theorizing the concept of political representation. In particular, these advances call into question the traditional way of thinking of political representation as a principal-agent relationship. Most notably, Melissa Williams’ recent work has recommended reenvisioning the activity of representation in light of the experiences of historically disadvantaged groups. In particular, she recommends understanding representation as “mediation.” In particular, Williams (1998, 8) identifies three different dimensions of political life that representatives must “mediate:” the dynamics of legislative decision-making, the nature of legislator-constituent relations, and the basis for aggregating citizens into representable constituencies. She explains each aspect by using a corresponding theme (voice, trust, and memory) and by drawing on the experiences of marginalized groups in the United States. For example, drawing on the experiences of American women trying to gain equal citizenship, Williams argues that historically disadvantaged groups need a “voice” in legislative decision-making. The “heavily deliberative” quality of legislative institutions requires the presence of individuals who have direct access to historically excluded perspectives.

In addition, Williams explains how representatives need to mediate the representative-constituent relationship in order to build “trust.” For Williams, trust is the cornerstone for democratic accountability. Relying on the experiences of African-Americans, Williams shows the consistent patterns of betrayal of African-Americans by privileged white citizens that give them good reason for distrusting white representatives and the institutions themselves. For Williams, relationships of distrust can be “at least partially mended if the disadvantaged group is represented by its own members”(1998, 14). Finally, representation involves mediating how groups are defined. The boundaries of groups according to Williams are partially established by past experiences — what Williams calls “memory.” Having certain shared patterns of marginalization justifies certain institutional mechanisms to guarantee presence.

Williams offers her understanding of representation as mediation as a supplement to what she regards as the traditional conception of liberal representation. Williams identifies two strands in liberal representation. The first strand she describes as the “ideal of fair representation as an outcome of free and open elections in which every citizen has an equally weighted vote” (1998, 57). The second strand is interest-group pluralism, which Williams describes as the “theory of the organization of shared social interests with the purpose of securing the equitable representation … of those groups in public policies” ( ibid .). Together, the two strands provide a coherent approach for achieving fair representation, but the traditional conception of liberal representation as made up of simply these two strands is inadequate. In particular, Williams criticizes the traditional conception of liberal representation for failing to take into account the injustices experienced by marginalized groups in the United States. Thus, Williams expands accounts of political representation beyond the question of institutional design and thus, in effect, challenges those who understand representation as simply a matter of formal procedures of authorization and accountability.

Another way of reenvisioning representation was offered by Nadia Urbinati (2000, 2002). Urbinati argues for understanding representation as advocacy. For Urbinati, the point of representation should not be the aggregation of interests, but the preservation of disagreements necessary for preserving liberty. Urbinati identifies two main features of advocacy: 1) the representative’s passionate link to the electors’ cause and 2) the representative’s relative autonomy of judgment. Urbinati emphasizes the importance of the former for motivating representatives to deliberate with each other and their constituents. For Urbinati the benefit of conceptualizing representation as advocacy is that it improves our understanding of deliberative democracy. In particular, it avoids a common mistake made by many contemporary deliberative democrats: focusing on the formal procedures of deliberation at the expense of examining the sources of inequality within civil society, e.g. the family. One benefit of Urbinati’s understanding of representation is its emphasis on the importance of opinion and consent formation. In particular, her agonistic conception of representation highlights the importance of disagreements and rhetoric to the procedures, practices, and ethos of democracy. Her account expands the scope of theoretical discussions of representation away from formal procedures of authorization to the deliberative and expressive dimensions of representative institutions. In this way, her agonistic understanding of representation provides a theoretical tool to those who wish to explain how non-state actors “represent.”

Other conceptual advancements have helped clarify the meaning of particular aspects of representation. For instance, Andrew Rehfeld (2009) has argued that we need to disaggregate the delegate/trustee distinction. Rehfeld highlights how representatives can be delegates and trustees in at least three different ways. For this reason, we should replace the traditional delegate/trustee distinction with three distinctions (aims, source of judgment, and responsiveness). By collapsing these three different ways of being delegates and trustees, political theorists and political scientists overlook the ways in which representatives are often partial delegates and partial trustees.

Other political theorists have asked us to rethink central aspects of our understanding of democratic representation. In Inclusion and Democracy Iris Marion Young asks us to rethink the importance of descriptive representation. Young stresses that attempts to include more voices in the political arena can suppress other voices. She illustrates this point using the example of a Latino representative who might inadvertently represent straight Latinos at the expense of gay and lesbian Latinos (1986, 350). For Young, the suppression of differences is a problem for all representation (1986, 351). Representatives of large districts or of small communities must negotiate the difficulty of one person representing many. Because such a difficulty is constitutive of representation, it is unreasonable to assume that representation should be characterized by a “relationship of identity.” The legitimacy of a representative is not primarily a function of his or her similarities to the represented. For Young, the representative should not be treated as a substitute for the represented. Consequently, Young recommends reconceptualizing representation as a differentiated relationship (2000, 125–127; 1986, 357). There are two main benefits of Young’s understanding of representation. First, her understanding of representation encourages us to recognize the diversity of those being represented. Second, her analysis of representation emphasizes the importance of recognizing how representative institutions include as well as they exclude. Democratic citizens need to remain vigilant about the ways in which providing representation for some groups comes at the expense of excluding others. Building on Young’s insight, Suzanne Dovi (2009) has argued that we should not conceptualize representation simply in terms of how we bring marginalized groups into democratic politics; rather, democratic representation can require limiting the influence of overrepresented privileged groups.

Moreover, based on this way of understanding political representation, Young provides an alterative account of democratic representation. Specifically, she envisions democratic representation as a dynamic process, one that moves between moments of authorization and moments of accountability (2000, 129). It is the movement between these moments that makes the process “democratic.” This fluidity allows citizens to authorize their representatives and for traces of that authorization to be evident in what the representatives do and how representatives are held accountable. The appropriateness of any given representative is therefore partially dependent on future behavior as well as on his or her past relationships. For this reason, Young maintains that evaluation of this process must be continuously “deferred.” We must assess representation dynamically, that is, assess the whole ongoing processes of authorization and accountability of representatives. Young’s discussion of the dynamic of representation emphasizes the ways in which evaluations of representatives are incomplete, needing to incorporate the extent to which democratic citizens need to suspend their evaluations of representatives and the extent to which representatives can face unanticipated issues.

Another insight about democratic representation that comes from the literature on descriptive representation is the importance of contingencies. Here the work of Jane Mansbridge on descriptive representation has been particularly influential. Mansbridge recommends that we evaluate descriptive representatives by contexts and certain functions. More specifically, Mansbridge (1999, 628) focuses on four functions and their related contexts in which disadvantaged groups would want to be represented by someone who belongs to their group. Those four functions are “(1) adequate communication in contexts of mistrust, (2) innovative thinking in contexts of uncrystallized, not fully articulated, interests, … (3) creating a social meaning of ‘ability to rule’ for members of a group in historical contexts where the ability has been seriously questioned and (4) increasing the polity’s de facto legitimacy in contexts of past discrimination.” For Mansbridge, descriptive representatives are needed when marginalized groups distrust members of relatively more privileged groups and when marginalized groups possess political preferences that have not been fully formed. The need for descriptive representation is contingent on certain functions.

Mansbridge’s insight about the contingency of descriptive representation suggests that at some point descriptive representatives might not be necessary. However, she doesn’t specify how we are to know if interests have become crystallized or trust has formed to the point that the need for descriptive representation would be obsolete. Thus, Mansbridge’s discussion of descriptive representation suggests that standards for evaluating representatives are fluid and flexible. For an interesting discussion of the problems with unified or fixed standards for evaluating Latino representatives, see Christina Beltran’s The Trouble with Unity .

Mansbridge’s discussion of descriptive representation points to another trend within the literature on political representation — namely, the trend to derive normative accounts of representation from the representative’s function. Russell Hardin (2004) captured this trend most clearly in his position that “if we wish to assess the morality of elected officials, we must understand their function as our representatives and then infer how they can fulfill this function.” For Hardin, only an empirical explanation of the role of a representative is necessary for determining what a representative should be doing. Following Hardin, Suzanne Dovi (2007) identifies three democratic standards for evaluating the performance of representatives: those of fair-mindedness, critical trust building, and good gate-keeping. In Ruling Passions , Andrew Sabl (2002) links the proper behavior of representatives to their particular office. In particular, Sabl focuses on three offices: senator, organizer and activist. He argues that the same standards should not be used to evaluate these different offices. Rather, each office is responsible for promoting democratic constancy, what Sabl understands as “the effective pursuit of interest.” Sabl (2002) and Hardin (2004) exemplify the trend to tie the standards for evaluating political representatives to the activity and office of those representatives.

There are three persistent problems associated with political representation. Each of these problems identifies a future area of investigation. The first problem is the proper institutional design for representative institutions within democratic polities. The theoretical literature on political representation has paid a lot of attention to the institutional design of democracies. More specifically, political theorists have recommended everything from proportional representation (e.g. Guinier, 1994 and Christiano, 1996) to citizen juries (Fishkin, 1995). However, with the growing number of democratic states, we are likely to witness more variation among the different forms of political representation. In particular, it is important to be aware of how non-democratic and hybrid regimes can adopt representative institutions to consolidate their power over their citizens. There is likely to be much debate about the advantages and disadvantages of adopting representative institutions.

This leads to a second future line of inquiry — ways in which democratic citizens can be marginalized by representative institutions. This problem is articulated most clearly by Young’s discussion of the difficulties arising from one person representing many. Young suggests that representative institutions can include the opinions, perspectives and interests of some citizens at the expense of marginalizing the opinions, perspectives and interests of others. Hence, a problem with institutional reforms aimed at increasing the representation of historically disadvantaged groups is that such reforms can and often do decrease the responsiveness of representatives. For instance, the creation of black districts has created safe zones for black elected officials so that they are less accountable to their constituents. Any decrease in accountability is especially worrisome given the ways citizens are vulnerable to their representatives. Thus, one future line of research is examining the ways that representative institutions marginalize the interests, opinions and perspectives of democratic citizens.

In particular, it is necessary for to acknowledge the biases of representative institutions. While E. E. Schattschneider (1960) has long noted the class bias of representative institutions, there is little discussion of how to improve the political representation of the disaffected — that is, the political representation of those citizens who do not have the will, the time, or political resources to participate in politics. The absence of such a discussion is particularly apparent in the literature on descriptive representation, the area that is most concerned with disadvantaged citizens. Anne Phillips (1995) raises the problems with the representation of the poor, e.g. the inability to define class, however, she argues for issues of class to be integrated into a politics of presence. Few theorists have taken up Phillip’s gauntlet and articulated how this integration of class and a politics of presence is to be done. Of course, some have recognized the ways in which interest groups, associations, and individual representatives can betray the least well off (e.g. Strolovitch, 2004). And some (Dovi, 2003) have argued that descriptive representatives need to be selected based on their relationship to citizens who have been unjustly excluded and marginalized by democratic politics. However, it is unclear how to counteract the class bias that pervades domestic and international representative institutions. It is necessary to specify the conditions under which certain groups within a democratic polity require enhanced representation. Recent empirical literature has suggested that the benefits of having descriptive representatives is by no means straightforward (Gay, 2002).

A third and final area of research involves the relationship between representation and democracy. Historically, representation was considered to be in opposition with democracy [See Dahl (1989) for a historical overview of the concept of representation]. When compared to the direct forms of democracy found in the ancient city-states, notably Athens, representative institutions appear to be poor substitutes for the ways that citizens actively ruled themselves. Barber (1984) has famously argued that representative institutions were opposed to strong democracy. In contrast, almost everyone now agrees that democratic political institutions are representative ones.

Bernard Manin (1997)reminds us that the Athenian Assembly, which often exemplifies direct forms of democracy, had only limited powers. According to Manin, the practice of selecting magistrates by lottery is what separates representative democracies from so-called direct democracies. Consequently, Manin argues that the methods of selecting public officials are crucial to understanding what makes representative governments democratic. He identifies four principles distinctive of representative government: 1) Those who govern are appointed by election at regular intervals; 2) The decision-making of those who govern retains a degree of independence from the wishes of the electorate; 3) Those who are governed may give expression to their opinions and political wishes without these being subject to the control of those who govern; and 4) Public decisions undergo the trial of debate (6). For Manin, historical democratic practices hold important lessons for determining whether representative institutions are democratic.

While it is clear that representative institutions are vital institutional components of democratic institutions, much more needs to be said about the meaning of democratic representation. In particular, it is important not to presume that all acts of representation are equally democratic. After all, not all acts of representation within a representative democracy are necessarily instances of democratic representation. Henry Richardson (2002) has explored the undemocratic ways that members of the bureaucracy can represent citizens. [For a more detailed discussion of non-democratic forms of representation, see Apter (1968). Michael Saward (2008) also discusses how existing systems of political representation do not necessarily serve democracy.] Similarly, it is unclear whether a representative who actively seeks to dismantle democratic institutions is representing democratically. Does democratic representation require representatives to advance the preferences of democratic citizens or does it require a commitment to democratic institutions? At this point, answers to such questions are unclear. What is certain is that democratic citizens are likely to disagree about what constitutes democratic representation.

One popular approach to addressing the different and conflicting standards used to evaluate representatives within democratic polities, is to simply equate multiple standards with democratic ones. More specifically, it is argued that democratic standards are pluralistic, accommodating the different standards possessed and used by democratic citizens. Theorists who adopt this approach fail to specify the proper relationship among these standards. For instance, it is unclear how the standards that Mansbridge identifies in the four different forms of representation should relate to each other. Does it matter if promissory forms of representation are replaced by surrogate forms of representation? A similar omission can be found in Pitkin: although Pitkin specifies there is a unified relationship among the different views of representation, she never describes how the different views interact. This omission reflects the lacunae in the literature about how formalistic representation relates to descriptive and substantive representation. Without such a specification, it is not apparent how citizens can determine if they have adequate powers of authorization and accountability.

Currently, it is not clear exactly what makes any given form of representation consistent, let alone consonant, with democratic representation. Is it the synergy among different forms or should we examine descriptive representation in isolation to determine the ways that it can undermine or enhance democratic representation? One tendency is to equate democratic representation simply with the existence of fluid and multiple standards. While it is true that the fact of pluralism provides justification for democratic institutions as Christiano (1996) has argued, it should no longer presumed that all forms of representation are democratic since the actions of representatives can be used to dissolve or weaken democratic institutions. The final research area is to articulate the relationship between different forms of representation and ways that these forms can undermine democratic representation.

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G. Democratic Representation

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

FairVote Program for Representative Government
Proportional Representation Library , provides readings proportional representation elections created by Prof. Douglas J. Amy, Dept. of Politics, Mount Holyoke College
Representation , an essay by Ann Marie Baldonado on the Postcolonial Studies website at Emory University.
Representation: John Locke, Second Treatise, §§ 157–58 , in The Founders’ Constitution at the University of Chicago Press
Popular Basis of Political Authority: David Hume, Of the Original Contract , in The Founders’ Constitution at the University of Chicago Press

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Politics of Representation

The Politics of Representation

From #oscarssowhite to #rhodesmustfall , #dontpinkmydrink and the recent criticisms of Comic Relief’s fundraising campaigns , we are watching a tide of conflict that questions who is represented in the public sphere, which spaces matter, and how modes of depiction are inherently powerful and political. At the core of this debate are unresolved tensions about whether we can disentangle identity from representation, and if so, how. With this in mind, we discuss how we can grapple with these issues, and how the crossovers between academia, journalism, the media, and the world of NGOs create space to reflect bravely and honestly on the particular complexities of representation in research.

Moving our gaze to the practice and culture of research in the academy and beyond, we see a re-emergence of decolonial movements along with calls to diversify the curriculum. These bring forth new discussions on representation in the context of belonging, the legitimacy of entrenched thought and knowledge, and the erasure of marginalised voices.

In many ways the politics of representation is a slippery concept, difficult to pin down and attach to a specific meaning; in part we see it as the contested space between the subject, the representation of the subject and self-representation. This conceptualisation leads us to ask: is there a way to do representation ‘right’? And importantly, who gets to decide what is ‘right’?

Inspired by a conference we hosted at the University of Cambridge entitled ‘The Ethical Debates of Representation in Research’ we found a stark need and desire amongst researchers to openly discuss these particular issues with sensitivity, reflexivity and democratic engagement in order to better address and conceptualise the meaning and ramifications of representation. At the core of this conversation is an intent to ensure that our scholarship is cognisant of the politics of representation, which in turn requires the further development of inclusive and open spaces for deeper and more nuanced analysis.

Focusing on contestations and innovations in the social sciences, we aim to use this special section to draw attention to different challenges related to representation. We begin with two conceptual pieces, exploring representation and identity within feminist movements and the politics of refugee representation. Over the coming month, we will move to more practical issues of representation: representation of people within policy and data, representations by humanitarian agencies and within literature. We will then examine the ways in which researchers have engaged with ideas of representation within their research that aim to navigate the structural issues addressed previously. The final piece questions who is able to participate in conversations about representation, whilst exploring pragmatic considerations of positionality within activist movements.

As this collection is part of a continuing conversation, we are simultaneously launching it with a new collective ‘The Politics of Representation ’, based out of the Faculty of Education, University of Cambridge. We aim to expand this conversation, build networks across the UK and globally, and encourage shifts in institutional culture and practice.

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ILO Supervisory system

Employers’ or workers’ organizations can make a representation against any member State alleging ineffective observance of a ratified Convention.

The representation procedure is governed by article 24 of the ILO Constitution, under which an industrial association of employers or of workers has the right to present to the ILO Governing Body a representation against any member State which, in its view, “has failed to secure in any respect the effective observance within its jurisdiction of any Convention to which it is a party”.

A three-member tripartite committee of the Governing Body may be set up to examine the representation and the government’s response. The report that the committee submits to the Governing Body sets out the legal and practical aspects of the case, examines the information submitted and concludes with recommendations.

Moreover, if the government does not take the necessary measures, the Committee of Experts may be requested to follow up the case or, in the most serious instances, the case may lead to a complaint, in which case the Governing Body may decide to establish a Commission of Inquiry. Finally, representations concerning the application of Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 are usually referred for examination to the Committee on Freedom of Association, in accordance with the procedure for the examination of representations.

See also the Note on the voluntary conciliation in the context of the ILO's supervisory system

Latest reports of Committees (March 2024):

Poland (Conventions Nos. 87 and 98) - GB.350/INS/17/3 ( Report and decision )
Poland (Conventions Nos. 87, 98 and 135) - GB.350/INS/17/4 ( Report and decision )
Ecuador (Convention No. 169) - GB.350/INS/17/5 ( Report and decision )

List of representations

Procedure for the examination of representations (Standing Orders)

Electronic form for the submission of a representation

Constituents guide on the Representation procedure

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All the details you might have missed in Taylor Swift and Post Malone's 'Fortnight' music video

Taylor Swift has released the music video for the lead single from "The Tortured Poets Department."
Swift and her collaborator on the song, Post Malone, star in the video, alongside some famous faces.
Swift has described the video as "the perfect visual representation" of her new album.

Taylor Swift released a new music video on Friday for "Fortnight," her collaboration with Post Malone , which serves as the opening track of her latest album, " The Tortured Poets Department ."

The 4-minute video, directed by Swift and shot entirely in black and white — Swift recruited Martin Scorsese's cinematographer of choice, Rodrigo Prieto, for the job once again — sees the pop star move between being locked in a psychiatric hospital to working in a typewriter-filled office and then finally a lab where she undergoes electroshock therapy.

Malone, meanwhile, plays what Swift has called the music video's "tortured tragic hero," who hides his and Swift's past relationship as he shares her torment.

"When I was writing the 'Fortnight' music video, I wanted to show you the worlds I saw in my head that served as the backdrop for making this music," Swift wrote on social media.

"Pretty much everything in it is a metaphor or a reference to one corner of the album or another," she continued. "For me, this video turned out to be the perfect visual representation of this record and the stories I tell in it."

Longtime fans of Swift shouldn't be surprised; the record-breaking singer-songwriter has always hidden winks, callbacks, and thematic parallels in her songs and videos.

Here's a full breakdown of some details you might have missed in the music video for " Fortnight ."

Swift wears a white dress that looks a lot like the one she wore to the 2024 Grammys.

As soon as Swift stepped onto the red carpet at the 2024 Grammys, many immediately began inspecting it closely for potential Easter eggs.

Little did we know it would be an Easter egg itself.

While the dress doesn't exactly match the one Swift wore on the red carpet, it's possible that it is still a design from Schiaparelli, the fashion house behind the Grammy's dress. Like Swift's dress, the Schiaparelli gown Natasha Lyonne wore to the Golden Globes featured an exaggerated neckline .

With its garter, the dress could also be a wedding gown. There are references to marriage throughout Swift's new album.

"At dinner you take my ring off my middle finger and put it on the one people put wedding rings on, and that's the closest I've come to my heart exploding," Swift sings in the title track "The Tortured Poets Department."

The marriage topic also appears in "So Long, London," "But Daddy I Love Him," "Fresh Out The Slammer," "loml," "imgonnagetyouback," and "The Manuscript."

In the next scene, Swift is seen in a Victorian-era mourning dress.

After we see her dressed as a bride, Swift walks through a door and into an office where she's dressed in a Victorian-esque mourning dress. This change reflects the song's message about losing a great love and being unable to move on.

This style of dress Swift was popular during the 63-year reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1901), who set the standard by wearing black for more than 33 years after she lost her husband, Prince Albert.

As the blog Million Graves noted, wearing black "allowed our ancestors to let the world know that grief was in their hearts without them having to say a word."

Swift also nods to her affinity with the Victorian era on "I Hate It Here," one of the bonus tracks for "The Tortured Poets Department," in which she sings about her desire to escape the modern age.

"My friends used to play a game where we would pick a decade we wished we could live in instead of this/ I'd say the 1830s but without all the racists and getting married off for the highest bid."

The numbers on the pill bottles refer to Swift's birthdate and the release of "The Tortured Poets Department."

"I took the miracle move-on drug, the effects were temporary," Swift sings at this point in the video as she acquiesces and swallows one of the pills.

The dates —12/13/1989 and 04/19/2024 — suggest that Swift's character has literally loved this person her whole life.

Swift resembles silent film star Clara Bow, whom she pays homage to on the album's closing track.

When we first see Swift in the "Fortnight" video, she is styled to resemble a 1920s screen siren with her thin, drawn-on eyebrows and bobby-pinned hair. She's also wearing a ribbon choker, a popular trend among flapper girls of the 1920s.

The iconic actor who popularised the flapper girl look in Hollywood was Clara Bow , whom Swift named the final track of "The Tortured Poets Department" after.

Swift appears to be signaling an affinity with the original "It" girl who captured the public's attention (and came under its scrutiny) who once astutely said of the persona she had created: "All the time the flapper is laughing and dancing, there's a feeling of tragedy underneath, she's unhappy and disillusioned, and that's what people sense."

When Swift wipes her face, she reveals several facial tattoos. They are identical to Malone's real tattoos.

Malone is well known for his inked visage and has at least 14 tattoos covering his face.

Later in the video, Malone is seen without his tattoos.

The facial inversion image — Swift with the tattoos and Malone without — is perhaps a way to show audiences that the two lovers are one and the same.

Swift has previously alluded to this kind of relationship, singing about her and her love's "twin fire signs" in the song "State Of Grace."

There is a fountain pen on the desk next to Swift's typewriter.

Swift once explained that she mentally categorizes her songs into three categories based on the kind of pen she imagines writing them with quill pen lyrics, fountain pen lyrics, and glitter gel pen lyrics.

Swift explained what falls under the category of fountain pen lyrics, telling Apple Music listeners in a voice note that they are "modern, personal stories written like poetry about those moments you remember all too well where you can see, hear, and feel everything in screaming detail."

It's likely clear to everyone who has listened that "The Tortured Poets Department" is an album written almost exclusively with a fountain pen.

Ethan Hawke and Josh Charles play the doctors in a fun nod to the similarity between the name of her album and their 1989 film, "Dead Poets Society."

When Swift first announced that her 11th studio album was called "The Tortured Poets Department," comparisons between the name and that of the film released in 1989 ( famously the same year Swift was born ) were made.

While it doesn't seem as if the film directly influenced the record, Swift has decided to lean into the jokes by casting two of the film's stars for the video: Ethan Hawke and Josh Charles.

"Tortured poets, meet your colleagues from down the hall, the dead poets," Swift wrote of her decision to cast the two actors.

Moreover, from their labcoats seen in a behind-the-scenes photo Swift shared on Instagram, it appears Hawke and Charles are playing older versions of their "Dead Poets Society" characters.

Swift and Malone are seen reading "The Story Of Us."

Swift's character is seen reading to Malone from a notebook with the word "US" written on the back.

It is a reference to Swift's heartbreak ballad " The Story Of Us " from her 2010 album, " Speak Now ."

The song served as the fourth single from that album and began getting promoted on April 19, 2011 — exactly 13 years ago, when Swift released "The Tortured Poets Department" and the "Fortnight" music video.

A black dog runs across the screen as Swift undergoes treatment.

"The Black Dog" is the name of one of the bonus tracks that appears on "The Tortured Poets Department: The Anthology" and on a special variant of the album that was promoted before its release.

While the song "The Black Dog" in question is actually a London-based bar where Swift discovers an old flame has taken their new lover, Swift plays with the metaphor behind the phrase here.

Originally found in English folklore, black dogs are generally considered sinister or malevolent. They have come to be regarded as a symbolic representation of melancholy or depression in modern times.

Swift's polygraph reveals the truth she keeps singing in the chorus.

"I love you, it's ruining my life," Swift and Malone hypnotically harmonize as the song's repeated refrain.

The phrase is picked up and scribbled out on the polygraph, a machine commonly known as a lie detector test.

Lastly, Swift features illustrations of cats and a ball of yarn in the video's end card.

"The Tortured Poets Department" may be Swift exploring the darker sides of fame and relationships, but she remains one of the world's foremost cat ladies.

Would it really be a Taylor Swift video without at least one Easter egg about her beloved feline friends?

Main content

A Facebook user roasted the popular kids book 'Love You Forever.' The internet is divided

The 1986 book by robert munsch tells the story of a mother and son throughout their lives. while it has been wildly popular over the decades, some can't help but question some 'unsettling' aspects.

Since it was published in 1986, the children's book "Love You Forever" has sold many millions of copies and become a treasured item in many families.

Written by Robert Munsch, the story illustrates the relationship between a mother and son as they both age. The mother sings a lullaby to her son as a baby and each subsequent stage of his life, but some of those stages are a little strange, writes Marlene Kern Fischer , a New York mother, blogger and author who posted on Facebook about "Love You Forever."

"When her son grows up, the mother drives across town and sneaks into his house when it’s dark to sing to him and rock him," she wrote in the post, which has since caused a stir. "Does no one else find this incredibly unsettling?"

Comments on the post are divided between the "love it" and "hate it" crowds, with many defending the 38-year-old book as a touching story about the circle of life and the love between a parent and child.

USA TODAY talked with Fischer this week about the controversy, how she cried the first time she read it and what she thinks about the hubbub her post caused.

Unpopular opinion: 'I hate the book'

Fischer acknowledges the emotional weight of "Love You Forever."

"Anyone who doesn't cry when reading this book has a heart of stone," Fischer told USA TODAY Monday.

But "somehow, I feel that my emotions are being played upon," she wrote in the Facebook post. "Here I was a brand-new mom seeing my entire life with my son flash before my eyes."

But that wasn't Fischer's only complaint. Though the book's first pages are sweet, things get weird when the little boy becomes a teenager and the mother continues to go into her son's room, and rock him while singing the lullaby, Fischer said.

"Okay, when my boys were teens, if they had caught me rocking them, they would have gone ballistic and probably screamed, 'WTF?' before putting a lock on their door," she said on Facebook. But then the book gets "even stranger," she said.

"When her son grows up, the mother drives across town and sneaks into his house when it’s dark to sing to him and rock him. Does he not have a significant other?" Fischer vented on Facebook. "Or has the mother ruined any chance of him finding a partner by her bizarre behavior."

Fischer stressed that she may be overthinking what is meant to be a book about "a parent's love and enduring traditions."

"However, it just never made sense to me," she wrote. "I hate the book."

Commenters explain deep feelings about 'Love You Forever'

Commenters on Fischer's post had plenty to say, with one woman saying that at 50, she still lays her head on her dad's chest to listen to his heartbeat.

"If either one of them asked to rock me, I would absolutely let them do it," she wrote. "All of my friends are losing parents and children (to death, college, etc.) and those connections mean more to me than ever before."

Another wrote that whenever her dad took her and her sister to the bookstore, she would always look for "Love You Forever" and re-read it.

"I believe it helped shape me into the empathetic adult I am today," she commented. "Even at a young age, I remember grasping the symbolism, not taking it too literally, but understanding the deep love that is felt there."

Another joked that "no one gets upset about Goldie Locks breaking and entering, stealing porridge and sleeping in random bears’ beds!"

"Clearly children's books are not meant to be taken SO literally," she wrote. "This boy reminds me so much of my sons and it’s so special to me."

Other users also admit to disliking 'Love You Forever'

Many others agreed with Fischer.

"I always assumed the son having no one next to him when the mom creeps in was likely because of the mother's strange attachment," one woman commented.

Another wrote that they were relieved to learn they weren't the only one who dislikes the book.

"That mom is creating a mama's boy for life, which is toxic to his eventual romantic relationships," they wrote. "That fictional mother needs to learn a lesson in boundaries! And so does that grown adult son!"

How Robert Munsch came up with 'Love You Forever'

In an interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation when "Love You Forever" became the No. 1 children's book on the New York Times, Munsch explained that the lullaby from the book was one that he and his wife came up with to comfort themselves after having two stillborn children.

"I get more letters on this than all my other stories combined and some of them get very heavy," he says in the interview before reading a letter from parents who had lost their daughter and buried his book with her.

"People who have grief experiences in their families find it a very nice book, although the people who just like to rock their kids to bed at night find it a very nice book, too," he said. "People use it whenever they want to express how they feel about family issues. It seems to help people do that."

USA TODAY has reached out to Munsch about some of the debate over his book.

Fischer noted that she respects the fact that Munsch wrote the story for his two stillborn children , and she understands that loss personally, "which is truly tragic," she wrote. "I can understand his motivation."

How is Fischer responding to all the hubbub?

Fischer's post is continuing to gather attention, something she seems to be taking in stride.

"Other than politics this has been one of my most polarizing posts," she told USA TODAY. "Everyone and their cousin has a VERY strong opinion about this book. You either love it or hate it.

"I actually received hate comments from readers who were opposed to my opinion, which honestly was meant to be a light tongue-in-cheek piece," she continued. "On the other hand, a lot of people who disliked the book felt validated by my words."

Fischer is the author of "I Was Hoping to Age Like a Fine Wine But I'm Feeling More Like an Avocado," a collection of personal stories about aging, parenting and other life events that came out Tuesday. It's available for purchase online.

You can also follow her blog , called Thoughts From Aisle 4.

Cambridge Dictionary +Plus

Meaning of represent in English

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represent verb ( ACT FOR )

All the local churches were represented at the memorial service .
All the nations of the world will be represented at the conference .
A group of four teachers were delegated to represent the school at the union conference .
They purport to represent the wishes of the majority of parents at the school .
A friend of the victim was subpoenaed as a witness by lawyers representing the accused .
alternatively
bargain something away
change over
compensation
make up for something
someone's answer to someone/something idiom
step into the breach idiom
sub out something
substitutability
substitutable
substitution

You can also find related words, phrases, and synonyms in the topics:

represent verb ( DESCRIBE )

¼ and 0.25 are different ways of representing the same fraction .
The wild cards are represented here by asterisks .
The decimal system represents numbers in terms of groups of ten.
Each number on the scale represents twice the speed of the preceding number .
Writers of realist novels try to represent life as it is.
anti-realism
anti-realist
complementary
confederate
naturalistically
non-figurative
non-representational
poetic licence

represent verb ( BE )

The course represents excellent value for money .
This huge , unfinished building represents the last hurrah of the former regime .
The new price represents a saving of more than 40 percent .
This new policy represents a change of direction for the government .
Her father's blessing represented a bestowal of consent upon her marriage .
account for something
be a thing idiom
existential
existentially
have legs idiom
self-existence
self-existent

represent | American Dictionary

representation

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anonymously

without the name of someone who has done a particular thing being known or made public

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COMMENTS

Representation Definition & Meaning
representation: [noun] one that represents: such as. an artistic likeness or image. a statement or account made to influence opinion or action. an incidental or collateral statement of fact on the faith of which a contract is entered into. a dramatic production or performance. a usually formal statement made against something or to effect a ...
REPRESENTATION
REPRESENTATION definition: 1. a person or organization that speaks, acts, or is present officially for someone else: 2. the…. Learn more.
REPRESENTATION Definition & Meaning
Representation definition: the act of representing.. See examples of REPRESENTATION used in a sentence.
REPRESENTATION definition
REPRESENTATION meaning: 1. a person or organization that speaks, acts, or is present officially for someone else: 2. the…. Learn more.
Representation
A representation acts or serves on behalf or in place of something. A lawyer provides legal representation for his client. A caricature is an exaggerated representation or likeness of a person.
representation noun
representation by a lawyer; direct representation in Parliament; Whether guilty or innocent, we are still entitled to legal representation. They had a strong representation in government. The task force had broad representation with members drawn from different departments. The party has increased its representation in Parliament.
REPRESENTATION definition and meaning
10 meanings: 1. the act or an instance of representing or the state of being represented 2. anything that represents, such as a.... Click for more definitions.
representation noun
1 [uncountable, countable] the act of presenting someone or something in a particular way; something that shows or describes something synonym portrayal the negative representation of single mothers in the media The snake swallowing its tail is a representation of infinity.
representation
There has been a decline in union representation in the auto industry. → proportional representation 2 [ countable] a painting, sign, description etc that shows something representation of The clock in the painting is a symbolic representation of the passage of time. 3 [ uncountable] the act of representing someone or something representation ...
Representation Definition & Meaning
Representation definition, the act of representing. See more.
REPRESENTATION
REPRESENTATION definition: 1. speaking or doing something officially for another person: 2. the way someone or something is…. Learn more.
Representation Definition & Meaning
b chiefly British : a formal and official complaint about something. Our ambassador has made representations to their government. REPRESENTATION meaning: 1 : a person or group that speaks or acts for or in support of another person or group; 2 : something (such as a picture or symbol) that stands for something else.
representation, n.¹ meanings, etymology and more
There are 19 meanings listed in OED's entry for the noun representation, three of which are labelled obsolete. See 'Meaning & use' for definitions, usage, and quotation evidence. representation has developed meanings and uses in subjects including. visual arts (Middle English) theatre (late 1500s) philosophy (early 1600s) law (early 1600s ...
Representation
What is explicitly or literally described, depicted, or denoted in a sign, text, or discourse in any medium as distinct from its symbolic meaning, metaphoric meaning, or connotations: its manifest referential content, as in 'a representation of…' See also mimesis; naturalism; referentiality. 6. How (in what ways) something is depicted ...
Representation
Define representation. representation synonyms, representation pronunciation, representation translation, English dictionary definition of representation. n. 1. The act of representing or the state of being represented. 2. Something that represents, as: a. An image or likeness of something.
Represent Definition & Meaning
The meaning of REPRESENT is to bring clearly before the mind : present. How to use represent in a sentence. to bring clearly before the mind : present; to serve as a sign or symbol of; to portray or exhibit in art : depict…
Representation (arts)
Representation (arts) Representation is the use of signs that stand in for and take the place of something else. [1] It is through representation that people organize the world and reality through the act of naming its elements. [1] Signs are arranged in order to form semantic constructions and express relations.
Representation Definition & Meaning
Representation definition: The act of representing or the state of being represented.
Representation
representation, in government, method or process of enabling the citizenry, or some of them, to participate in the shaping of legislation and governmental policy through deputies chosen by them.. The rationale of representative government is that in large modern countries the people cannot all assemble, as they did in the marketplace of democratic Athens or Rome; and if, therefore, the people ...
REPRESENT
REPRESENT meaning: 1. to speak, act, or be present officially for another person or people: 2. to be the Member of…. Learn more.
Political Representation
Political representation occurs when political actors speak, advocate, symbolize, and act on the behalf of others in the political arena. In short, political representation is a kind of political assistance. This seemingly straightforward definition, however, is not adequate as it stands. For it leaves the concept of political representation ...
The Politics of Representation
These bring forth new discussions on representation in the context of belonging, the legitimacy of entrenched thought and knowledge, and the erasure of marginalised voices. In many ways the politics of representation is a slippery concept, difficult to pin down and attach to a specific meaning; in part we see it as the contested space between ...
How the Clenched Fist Became a Black Power Symbol
The clenched fist has been closely tied to social tumult throughout history, yet the gesture's representation of strength and hope endures. Its message? We shall overcome. To some, a clenched fist ...
Representation procedure (Art.24)
The representation procedure is governed by article 24 of the ILO Constitution, under which an industrial association of employers or of workers has the right to present to the ILO Governing Body a representation against any member State which, in its view, "has failed to secure in any respect the effective observance within its jurisdiction of any Convention to which it is a party".
Megan Fox Signs With UTA
EXCLUSIVE: UTA has signed actress and writer Megan Fox for representation in all areas.. Fox came to international stardom in the late 2000s with her breakout starring role as Mikaela in ...
Taylor Swift's 'Fortnight': the Details You Might Have Missed in Video
Originally found in English folklore, black dogs are generally considered sinister or malevolent. They have come to be regarded as a symbolic representation of melancholy or depression in modern ...
DAQUANTE CAPION
It can also mean...". DAQUANTE CAPION | "Whitewashing history" is a term that refers to distorting or erasing the representation of non-white people in history. It can also mean... | Instagram
'Love You Forever' kids book gets roasted on Facebook, debate ensues
A Facebook user roasted the popular kids book 'Love You Forever.' The internet is divided The 1986 book by Robert Munsch tells the story of a mother and son throughout their lives.
REPRESENT
REPRESENT definition: 1. to speak, act, or be present officially for another person or people: 2. to be the Member of…. Learn more.