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The direct effect of European Union law
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SUMMARY OF:
Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration – the fundamental principle of direct effect
WHAT DOES THE JUDGMENT ESTABLISH?
- In its judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) enshrines the direct effect of European Union (EU) law.
- The judgment states that EU law not only engenders obligations for EU Member States , but also rights for individuals . Individuals may therefore take advantage of these rights and directly invoke EU law before national and European courts, independently of whether the national law test exists (that is, where there is no judicial remedy under national law).
Horizontal and vertical direct effect
There are two aspects to direct effect: a vertical aspect and a horizontal aspect.
- Vertical direct effect is of consequence in relations between individuals and the country. This means that individuals can invoke a provision of EU law in relation to the state.
- Horizontal direct effect is of consequence in relations between individuals. This means that an individual can invoke a provision of EU law in relation to another individual.
- According to the type of act concerned, the Court has accepted either a full direct effect (i.e. a horizontal direct effect and a vertical direct effect) or a partial direct effect (confined to a vertical direct effect).
Direct effect and primary law
- As far as primary law is concerned, the Court established the principle of direct effect in the Van Gend en Loos judgment. However, it laid down the condition that the obligations must be precise, clear and unconditional and that they must not call for additional measures , either national or European.
- In the Becker judgment, the Court rejected direct effect where the countries have a margin of discretion, however minimal, regarding the implementation of the provision in question. In Kaefer and Procacci v French State , the Court affirmed that the provision in question was unconditional because it left no discretion to the Member States and therefore had direct effect.
Direct effect and secondary law
The principle of direct effect also relates to acts from secondary law , that is acts adopted by the EU institutions, such as regulations, directives and decisions, which are derived from the principles and objectives set out in the treaties . However, the application of direct effect depends on the type of act .
- Regulations are directly applicable in the Member States, as specified in Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union , and have therefore direct effect. However, in line with the general principles, this applies only under the condition that the rules are sufficiently clear, precise and relevant to the situation of the individual litigant (direct effect as clarified by the Politi v Ministero delle finanze Court judgement).
- Directives are acts addressed to Member States which must be transposed into national law. However, in certain cases, the Court recognises the direct effect of directives in order to protect the rights of individuals. Therefore, the Court laid down in its Van Duyn v Home Office judgment that a directive has direct effect when its provisions are unconditional and sufficiently clear and precise and when the Member State has not transposed the directive by the deadline. However, it can only have direct vertical effect – Member States are obliged to implement directives but directives may not be cited by a Member State against an individual (see Ratti judgment).
- Decisions may have direct effect when they refer to a Member State as the addressee. The Court therefore recognises only a direct vertical effect ( Hansa Fleisch v Landrat des Kreises Schleswig-Flensburg judgment).
- International agreements . In its Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd judgment, the Court recognised the direct effect of certain agreements in accordance with the same criteria identified in the Van Gend en Loos case.
- Opinions and recommendations do not have legal binding force. Consequently, they do not have direct effect.
Along with the primacy of EU law (also known as precedence), direct effect is a fundamental principle of EU law.
MAIN DOCUMENT
Judgment of 5 February 1963, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, C-26/62 , ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.
RELATED DOCUMENTS
Judgment of 10 November 1992, Hansa Fleisch Ernst Mundt GmbH & Co. KG v Landrat des Kreises Schleswig-Flensburg, C-156/91 , ECLI:EU:C:1992:423.
Judgment of 12 December 1990, Peter Kaefer and Andréa Procacci v French State, joined cases C-100/89 and C-101/89 , ECLI:EU:C:1990:456.
Judgment of 30 September 1987, Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, C-12/86 , ECLI:EU:C:1987:400.
Judgment of 19 January 1982, Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt, C-8/81 , ECLI:EU:C:1982:7.
Judgment of 5 April 1979, Criminal proceedings against Tullio Ratti, C-148/78 , ECLI:EU:C:1979:110.
Judgment of 4 December 1974, Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office, C-41-74 , ECLI:EU:C:1974:133.
Judgment of 14 December 1971, Politi s.a.s. v Ministry for Finance of the Italian Republic, C-43/71 , ECLI:EU:C:1971:122.
last update 25.11.2022
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The Relationship between Supremacy and Direct Effect in European Law
A overview and commentary on the relationship between two fundamental principles of European law, supremacy and direct effect
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Muse, Hassen Mama, The Supremacy Doctrine, Direct, and Indirect Effects and State Liability Under EU Law (August 18, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3676199 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3676199 , 2020
European Union (EU) law or European Community (EC) law is unique international legal order. Its uniqueness depends on the effective or authoritative enforcement mechanisms of the EU law. These authoritative enforcement mechanisms are absent under ordinary public international law or international law. The effective enforcement mechanisms under European legal order have gained the efficacy due to the fact that the hierarchical supremacy that it enjoys over the national laws of the Member States. This leverage allows the EU to become not only international organization but also supranational organization at European level. European Citizens can invoke EU law in national court proceedings. National courts are expected to apply EU law while solving a dispute that arises at national level by their own initiation. Moreover, EU law has the overriding effect (supremacy) over the national laws of the Member States when the conflict occurs between the two or when the national laws of the Member States are inconsistent with the EU one. Furthermore, it has also indirect effect- that the national laws of the Member States are expected to be interpreted in the manners that confirm the purpose and text of the EU laws.
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This article explores the conception of law that underlies the CJEU’s case-law, building on Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR as a topical example. Joxerramon Bengoetxea’s metaphor of the CJEU being a ‘Dworkinian court’ fails to explain fundamental aspects of the Court’s case-law which are incompatible with Dworkin’s theory of law. Instead, the CJEU is committed to an EU legal system which conforms to Joseph Raz’s theory of the necessary conditions for legal systems: comprehensiveness, openness, and a claim of supremacy. Within this paradigm, the supremacy claim of EU law is in need of demystification because it is inherent to any legal system. Paradoxically, while Opinion 2/13 suggests that the EU should be given special treatment in its accession to the ECHR, the Court’s underlying conception of the EU legal system is essentially mimetic of the typical characteristics of national legal systems. This mimetic nature of the EU legal system entails a dissociation between the political and the legal nature of the EU: while the EU is certainly not a state, its legal system is no different from national legal systems.
This article revisits the present and future of the direct effect principle and submits solutions for its appropriate understanding and enforcement. Once the topic has been put into context and it has been shown why direct effect is an evolving notion whose scope goes beyond the Van Gend & Loos judgement and the doctrine originating from it, the study presents five intertwined arguments. First, direct effect has two facets since, aside from a subjective-substitutive form of direct effect, there exists an objective-oppositive manifestation of direct effect, whereby a directly effective European Union (EU) provision entails the disapplication of national law, without either conferring immediately an individual right or replacing the domestic norm in governing the case at hand. Second, the article claims that the obligation to disapply is triggered always by primacy and direct effect, never by primacy alone. In fact, justifying disapplication on the basis only of the primacy principle and not on primacy and direct effect is likely to undermine the logic implied in the relationship between the EU legal order and domestic legal systems. Third, there are legitimate derogations from the obligation to immediately disapply a conflicting domestic provision with EU law endowed with direct effect in so far as they are admitted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the condition that the replacement of a national provision by an EU norm may harm individual rights and/or question the national identity clause enshrined in Article 4(2) Treaty on European Union (TEU). Fourth, the test on clarity, precision and unconditionality for assessing whether an EU norm is directly effective, as it was conceived by the CJEU, is no longer a pillar in the conceptualisation and practice of direct effect. As a matter of fact, only unconditionality, in practice, proves to be the core element of direct effect. Moreover, direct effect and direct applicability are equivalent concepts since unconditionality, as the condicio sine qua non of direct effect, coincides with direct applicability. Fifth, a distinctive quality of direct effect, along with unconditionality, is the creation of an advantage resulting from the application of EU law and the subsequent disapplication of national law. This implies that an EU directly effective provision can never be only in malam partem (ie, detrimental for the individual) and thus disapplication, lacking the existence of an advantage for the individual, shall never come into play. The article concludes that the duty to refine the doctrine of direct effect must be performed, ultimately, by the CJEU. Indeed, only the CJEU can offer guidance to national authorities, since it has an interpretive monopoly on the ifs, whens and hows of direct effect. To this end, it is vital that the EU judges, by rejecting argumentative minimalism brought to its extreme, come to reassert their constitutional role and re-establish the common core of the EU system, beginning with the principles that created and shaped it.
Visnyk of the Lviv University. Series International Relations
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EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials UK Version (7th edn)
- Preface to the 7 th Edition
- New to this Edition
- Table of Abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Table of Cases
- Table of Treaties, European Legislative Instruments And National Legislation
- 1. The Development of European Integration
- 2. Membership: Crisis, Conceptions and Challenges
- 3. The Institutions
- 4. Competence
- 5. Instruments and the Hierarchy of Norms
- 6. Legislation and Decision-Making
- 7. Decision-Making and New Forms of Governance
- 8. The Nature and Effect of EU Law: Direct Effect and Beyond
- 9. The Application of EU Law: Remedies in National Courts
- 10. The Relationship Between EU Law and National Law: Supremacy
- 11. EU International Relations Law
- 12. Human Rights in the EU
- 13. Enforcement Actions Against Member States
- 14. Preliminary Rulings
- 15. Review of Legality: Access
- 16. Review of Legality: Grounds of Review
- 17. Damages Actions and Money Claims
- 18. The Single Market
- 19. Free Movement of Goods: Duties, Charges, and Taxes
- 20. Free Movement of Goods: Quantitative Restrictions
- 21. Free Movement of Capital and Economic and Monetary Union
- 22. Free Movement of Workers
- 23. Freedom of Establishment and to Provide Services
- 24. Citizenship of the European Union
- 25. Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination
- 26. AFSJ: EU Criminal Law
- 27. Competition Law: Article 101
- 28. Competition Law: Article 102
- 29. Competition Law: Mergers
- 30. The State and the Common Market
p. 225 8. The Nature and Effect of EU Law: Direct Effect and Beyond
- Paul Craig Paul Craig Emeritus Professor of English Law, St John's College, University of Oxford
- , and Gráinne de Búrca Gráinne de Búrca Florence Ellinwood Allen Professor of Law, New York University School of Law
- https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198859840.003.0008
- Published in print: 21 July 2020
- Published online: September 2020
All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses the doctrine of direct effect. In a broad sense direct effect means that provisions of binding EU law, which are sufficiently clear, precise, and unconditional to be considered justiciable, can be invoked and relied on by individuals before national courts. The legal effect of directives is complex. They have vertical but not horizontal direct effect. The ECJ has however crafted a growing number of qualifications to the proposition that directives do not have horizontal direct effect. The result is that directives can still have ‘legal effect’ on private parties in various ways through the principle of indirect effect/harmonious interpretation; incidental effect; fundamental rights; general principles of law; and where a regulation makes reference to a directive. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning direct effect in relation to the UK post-Brexit.
- European Union
- direct effect
- horizontal direct effect
- vertical direct effect
- legal effect
- indirect effect
- EU directives
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IMAGES
VIDEO
COMMENTS
In this essay, it will be argued that direct effect and supremacy are definitely closely linked and both play fundamental roles in EU integration and ensuring that EU law is correctly enforced.
The main purpose of this essay is to analyse which doctrine has had the bigger impact on EU law: direct effect or supremacy. The essay consists of an introductory section which sets the context, three chapters and a list of sources.
To conclude, this essay has critically discussed the supremacy of EU law and the primacy of EU Law over National laws. It has highlighted that direct effect of EU law is now firmly established through case law such as Van Gend en Loos etc, which allows the consistent implementation of EU law provisions across all member states.
As an overview, DoS refers to the capacity of EU to take precedence over inconsistent national law whereas DDE enables EU law to be invoked directly into national courts. What is DoS? The logical and reasoning development of the DoS was founded ECJ.
In its judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) enshrines the direct effect of European Union (EU) law. The judgment states that EU law not only engenders obligations for EU Member States, but also rights for individuals.
In a series of important rulings the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has developed the doctrine of supremacy of European Union (EU) over national law. According to the European Community law, where there is conflict between European law and the law of Member States, European law highly prevails.
A overview and commentary on the relationship between two fundamental principles of European law, supremacy and direct effect
The principle of direct effect was created by the ECJ in the revolutionary case of Van Gend en Loos. Effectively it confers direct effect on EC law provisions, provided that they fulfil the criteria of being clear, precise and unconditional.
It starts with a discussion on the principle of direct effect and indirect effect, with reference to regulations, directives and international agreements. It then considers the doctrine of supremacy or primacy of EU law with reference to a selection of Member States and the UK.
This chapter discusses the doctrine of direct effect. In a broad sense direct effect means that provisions of binding EU law, which are sufficiently clear, precise, and unconditional to be considered justiciable, can be invoked and relied on by individuals before national courts. The legal effect of directives is complex. They have vertical but ...