terrorism opinion essay

Terrorism Essay for Students and Teacher

500+ words essay on terrorism essay.

Terrorism is an act, which aims to create fear among ordinary people by illegal means. It is a threat to humanity. It includes person or group spreading violence, riots, burglaries, rapes, kidnappings, fighting, bombings, etc. Terrorism is an act of cowardice. Also, terrorism has nothing to do with religion. A terrorist is only a terrorist, not a Hindu or a Muslim.

Types of Terrorism

Terrorism is of two kinds, one is political terrorism which creates panic on a large scale and another one is criminal terrorism which deals in kidnapping to take ransom money. Political terrorism is much more crucial than criminal terrorism because it is done by well-trained persons. It thus becomes difficult for law enforcing agencies to arrest them in time.

Terrorism spread at the national level as well as at international level.  Regional terrorism is the most violent among all. Because the terrorists think that dying as a terrorist is sacred and holy, and thus they are willing to do anything. All these terrorist groups are made with different purposes.

Causes of Terrorism

There are some main causes of terrorism development  or production of large quantities of machine guns, atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, nuclear weapons, missiles, etc. rapid population growth,  Politics, Social, Economic  problems, dissatisfaction of people with the country’s system, lack of education, corruption, racism, economic inequality, linguistic differences, all these are the major  elements of terrorism, and terrorism flourishes after them. People use terrorism as a weapon to prove and justify their point of view.  The riots among Hindus and Muslims are the most famous but there is a difference between caste and terrorism.

The Effects Of Terrorism

Terrorism spreads fear in people, people living in the country feel insecure because of terrorism. Due to terrorist attacks, millions of goods are destroyed, the lives of thousands of innocent people are lost, animals are also killed. Disbelief in humanity raises after seeing a terrorist activity, this gives birth to another terrorist. There exist different types of terrorism in different parts of the country and abroad.

Today, terrorism is not only the problem of India, but in our neighboring country also, and governments across the world are making a lot of effort to deal with it. Attack on world trade center on September 11, 2001, is considered the largest terrorist attack in the world. Osama bin Laden attacked the tallest building in the world’s most powerful country, causing millions of casualties and death of thousands of people.

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Terrorist Attacks in India

India has suffered several terrorist attacks which created fear among the public and caused huge destruction. Here are some of the major terrorist attacks that hit India in the last few years: 1991 – Punjab Killings, 1993 – Bombay Bomb Blasts, RSS Bombing in Chennai, 2000 – Church Bombing, Red Fort Terrorist Attack,2001- Indian Parliament Attack, 2002 – Mumbai Bus Bombing, Attack on Akshardham Temple, 2003 – Mumbai Bombing, 2004 – Dhemaji School Bombing in Assam,2005 – Delhi Bombings, Indian Institute of Science Shooting, 2006 – Varanasi Bombings, Mumbai Train Bombings, Malegaon Bombings, 2007 – Samjhauta Express Bombings, Mecca Masjid Bombing, Hyderabad Bombing, Ajmer Dargah Bombing, 2008 – Jaipur Bombings, Bangalore Serial Blasts, Ahmedabad Bombings, Delhi Bombings, Mumbai Attacks, 2010 – Pune Bombing, Varanasi Bombing.

The recent ones include 2011 – Mumbai Bombing, Delhi Bombing, 2012 – Pune Bombing, 2013 – Hyderabad Blasts, Srinagar Attack, Bodh Gaya Bombings, Patna Bombings, 2014 – Chhattisgarh Attack, Jharkhand Blast, Chennai Train Bombing, Assam Violence, Church Street Bomb Blast, Bangalore, 2015 –  Jammu Attack, Gurdaspur Attack, Pathankot Attack, 2016 – Uri Attack, Baramulla Attack, 2017 – Bhopal Ujjain Passenger Train Bombing, Amarnath Yatra Attack, 2018 Sukma Attack, 2019- Pulwama attack.

Agencies fighting Terrorism in India

Many police, intelligence and military organizations in India have formed special agencies to fight terrorism in the country. Major agencies which fight against terrorism in India are Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS), Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), National Investigation Agency (NIA).

Terrorism has become a global threat which needs to be controlled from the initial level. Terrorism cannot be controlled by the law enforcing agencies alone. The people in the world will also have to unite in order to face this growing threat of terrorism.

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How to defeat terrorism: Intelligence, integration, and development

Subscribe to global connection, norman loayza nl norman loayza lead economist, development research group - world bank.

July 25, 2016

My partner was caught at the Istanbul airport during the latest terrorist attack. She hid in a closet with a few people, including a small girl, disconcerted and afraid. And when the attack was over, she saw the blood, desolation, chaos, and tears of the aftermath. This was a horrific moment. Yet, it paled in comparison to what the injured and dead and their relatives had to suffer.

It seems that terrorism and political violence are becoming more prevalent and intense. They have been, however, long brewing and have affected many countries around the world. In the 1980s, my home country, Peru, suffered immensely from terrorism: The badly called “Shining Path” organization, with its communist ideology and ruthless tactics, terrorized first rural communities and then large cities with deadly bombs in crowded places and assassinations of official and civil society leaders.

A few years ago, Phil Keefer, lead economist at the World Bank, and I edited two books on what we perceived to be the main security threats of our time: terrorism and drug trafficking . We thought that the answers had to come from research, and we tried to gather the best available evidence and arguments to understand the links between these security threats and economic development.

After the myriad of recent terrorist attacks—in Istanbul, Munich, Nice, Bagdad, Brussels, and Paris, to name a few—we found it important to recap lessons learned. These lessons are not just academic: Understanding the root causes of terrorism can lead to policies for prevention and for reducing the severity of attacks. To defeat terrorism, a policy strategy should include three components: intelligence, integration, and development.

Intelligence . A terrorist attack is relatively easy to conduct. Modern societies offer many exposed and vulnerable targets: an airport, a crowded celebration by the beach, a bus station at peak hours, or a restaurant full of expats. And the potential weapons are too many to count: a squadron of suicide bombers, a big truck ramming through the streets, two or three comrades armed with semi-automatic guns. It is impossible to protect all flanks, and some of the measures taken to prevent the previous terrorist attacks are, well, frankly silly. For a strategy to have any chance against terrorism, it should be based on intelligence. Intelligence implies understanding the motivations, leadership structure, and modus operandi of terrorist organizations, and developing a plan that can anticipate and adapt to their constantly morphing operations. Importantly, the ideological dimension should not be ignored because it explains the extremes to which terrorists are willing to arrive: A suicide attack requires a person who has muted both his basic survival instinct and all sense of natural compassion for others. It was radical communism in the 1970s and 1980s; it is a perverted and fanatical misrepresentation of Islam nowadays. An intelligence strategy that targets the sources of terrorism, both the perpetrators and the social movements that underlie them, should be the first component of the campaign against terror.

Integration. Foreigners living in the U.S. like to make fun of Hollywood movies and the social rituals that Americans go through each year: Halloween and Thanksgiving are in many respects more popular than Christmas. Yet, thanks to these cultural norms along with widespread economic opportunities and equality under the law, the U.S. has mostly succeeded in what many countries, including some European ones, have failed: the integration of people of different ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. The U.S. is no paradise of integration, but the social melting pot does work for immigrants: Within a generation or two, Mexican Americans, Italian Americans, Iranian Americans, and so forth are just Americans, with a single national identity and, at least by law, the same rights and obligations. In some European countries, in contrast, many immigrants feel like second-class citizens. There is little that can inflame more hatred than the feeling of being excluded, and a misguided search for a sense of belonging can be the trigger that incites religious, ethnic, and ideological radicalization. This may explain why France has suffered more from terrorist acts perpetrated by their own residents than the U.S. or U.K., that paradoxically are substantially more engaged in the war against ISIS and al-Qaeda. Social integration—especially of immigrants—through explicit and targeted programs from education at an early age to immigration and citizenship reforms is a key component in the fight against terrorism.       

Development. One of the puzzles in the evidence on terrorism is that while it tends to be led (and sometimes even perpetrated) by well-off and educated people, it represents the complaints and grievances of the disenfranchised, the poor, and the unemployed. The hundreds of thousands of unemployed and discouraged young men in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Somalia, South Africa, and Brazil are the potential armies of common and political violence. In South Africa and Brazil, lacking an overriding communal ideology, this violence is expressed in robberies, homicides, and common crime. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the violence is mostly political, taking the shape or at least the cover of religious fundamentalism. Somehow in Somalia, violence has adopted both criminal and political expressions: We worry about Somali pirates as much as we do about Somali jihadists. (On the link between vulnerable youth and violence, it is telling that the name of the main terrorist organization in Somalia, al-Shabaab, means literally “The Youth”) But there is hope. A couple of decades ago, thousands of unemployed young people joined terrorist organizations in Cambodia, Colombia, and Peru, when these countries were fragile. Since their economies started growing and providing employment, these armies for criminal and political violence have started to fade away. Investing in development, conducting economic reforms, and providing (yes, equal) opportunities is the third component of a winning strategy against terrorism.

A sound military and police strategy is undoubtedly important to counter terrorism. However, it’s not sufficient in the long run. If we want to defeat terrorism permanently and completely, we need to tackle it comprehensively, using political and military intelligence, social integration, and economic development.

For more, please see Keefer, Philip and Norman Loayza, Editors. Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness . Cambridge University Press. 2008.

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How Terrorism Is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence

Virginia Held, How Terrorism Is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence , Oxford University Press, 2008, 205pp., $45.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780195329599.

Reviewed by Igor Primoratz, University of Melbourne

This is a book on terrorism and political violence more generally, written by a philosopher and accordingly focusing on conceptual and moral, rather than empirical or historical, questions. The book is meant for fellow philosophers and political theorists, but it is written clearly and without philosophical jargon, and will be accessible, and of much interest, to the general reader too.

While political violence is a traditional topic in political and moral philosophy, terrorism -- the type of political violence generally considered most difficult to defend -- was not much discussed before the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001. Virginia Held is one of the few philosophers who gave it sustained attention before it became a fashionable topic. The present book is a collection of seven essays she has published over the last twenty-odd years and one previously unpublished paper. Some essays discuss terrorism or political violence generally, while others look into such related issues as the ways the media deals with political violence, or collective responsibility for ethnic hatred and violence. There is also an essay on the methods of moral inquiry.

In her approach to moral questions, Held combines consequentialism, deontological ethics and the ethics of care. The relevance of the last approach to discussing issues of political violence is rather limited, and Held's position on terrorism and political violence is grounded in consequentialist and deontological considerations of a more traditional type. So is just war theory, but Held's views are not a version of that theory. Indeed, she doubts that just war theory can be of much help in understanding and judging contemporary armed conflicts.

The title of the book might be thought somewhat misleading, as Held does not so much seek to show how terrorism is wrong as how it can be right. To be sure, a title highlighting the latter prospect probably would not have been a good idea in the current atmosphere of the "war on terror." This "war" is both driven and defended by a "moral clarity" claimed by leaders of some major powers and by many analysts and commentators. Held rightly challenges this facile "moral clarity," according to which all terrorism is morally the same, clearly distinct from war, and a monopoly of insurgents, who are both amoral and utterly irrational and fanatical, and therefore never to be engaged with in dialogue or negotiation. She goes on to argue that we should not adopt a sweeping moral rejection of all terrorism, whatever the cause it serves, the circumstances in which it does so, and the consequences of refraining from it; that terrorism is not "uniquely atrocious"; and that it is not necessarily morally worse than war.

The scope and import of any moral assessment of terrorism depends on just what is meant by "terrorism". Accordingly, Held discusses at some length the question of how the term should be defined. The usage over the two centuries or so since the term entered political and moral discourse in the West has been notoriously confusing, fraught with moral emotions and political passions, and plagued by relativism and double standards. It is in such cases that philosophy can demonstrate its relevance to public debates by clarifying central concepts and main positions, spotting missteps in argument, exposing prejudice and double standards, and thus facilitating more rational and discerning moral deliberation and choice. Most definitions of terrorism crafted by philosophers acknowledge the two traits that make up the core concept underlining all shifts in descriptive and evaluative meaning: terrorism is violence aiming at intimidation (fear, terror). Beyond this, philosophers tend to disagree, most importantly on whether terrorism is violence against civilians (non-combatants, innocent people), or can also target members of the military and security services and highly placed government officials. This is the question of a narrow vs. wide definition. A wide definition is in line with common use over two centuries, whereas a narrow definition is revisionary. Yet a narrow definition may be more appropriate in the context of moral assessment of violence and terrorism. Surely there is a considerable moral difference between planting a bomb in an office of (what is considered) an extremely oppressive government and killing a number of its officials, and planting a bomb in a coffee shop and killing a number of common citizens.

Held prefers a wide definition, for reasons I do not find convincing. One is common use. Held points out that the attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, or much Palestinian violence directed at Israeli soldiers, would not count as terrorism on a narrow definition, while the bombing of Dresden or Hiroshima would, and finds these implications unacceptable. To me, they seem just right. She quotes Walter Laqueur's remark that "most terrorist groups in the contemporary world have been attacking the military, the police, and the civilian population" (p. 55) as showing the inadequacy of a narrow definition. But surely the fact that a group has engaged in terrorism to an extent sufficient to consider it a terrorist group does not turn every act of political violence committed by the group into an act of terrorism. Finally, Held rejects narrow definitions on the ground that "it is not at all clear who the 'innocent' are as distinct from the 'legitimate' targets. We can perhaps agree that small children are innocent, but beyond this, there is little moral clarity" (pp. 19-20). Yet even if only "small children" were morally protected against violence that would be a weighty consideration, as indiscriminate political violence against civilians or common citizens is bound to kill and maim children too. Moreover, there are other classes of civilians that are just as clearly innocent in the relevant sense, i.e. innocent of the (alleged) injustice or oppression: opponents of the government, those too old or infirm to take part in political life, or those inculpably ignorant of the immorality of their government's policies.

The book offers two somewhat different definitions of terrorism: as "political violence that usually spreads fear beyond those attacked" and "perhaps more than anything else … resembles small-scale war" (p. 21), and as political violence employed with "the intention either to spread fear or to harm non-combatants" (p. 76). Both definitions run together war and terrorism, and imply that an act of war proper, i.e. one aimed at a legitimate military target, counts as terrorism. For, as Trotsky pointed out in his defense of the "red terror", "war … is founded upon intimidation… . [It] destroys only an insignificant part of the conquered army, intimidating the remainder and breaking their will" ( Terrorism and Communism , Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961, p. 58). Held accepts this implication of her position; I find it problematic.

Philosophers working with a wide definition of terrorism usually distinguish terrorism that targets the military and high government officials and terrorism that attacks common citizens, and argue that the former type of terrorism can be morally justified in certain circumstances, while the latter type is never, or almost never, justified. Held does not take this line. Her book offers two different justifications of terrorist violence, and both apply to the latter as well as the former kind of terrorism.

The first is in terms of the responsibility of citizens in a democracy for what their government does on their behalf. This justification is only suggested at several points in the book and is never developed and defended from likely objections. Held does not make it clear whether she sees common citizens as proper objects of terrorist violence because, as voters, they authorize the government's actions and policies (p. 20), or on account of various types and degrees of support they give the government (pp. 56, 78). Both these lines of argument are open to serious queries.

Held's second justification of terrorism, presented in chapter 4 )“Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals”) is carefully spelled out. It focuses on the issue of human rights. When human rights of a person or group are not respected, what may we do in order to ensure that they are? On one view, known as consequentialism of rights, if the only way to ensure respect of a certain right of A and B is to infringe on the same right of C, we will be justified in doing so. Held does not accept such trade-offs in rights with the aim of maximizing their respect. But she points out that rights sometimes come into conflict, whether directly or indirectly. When that happens, we cannot avoid comparing the rights involved in terms of their stringency and making certain choices. That applies to the case of terrorism too. Terrorism violates some human rights of its victims. But its advocates claim that in certain circumstances a limited use of terrorism is the only way of bringing about a society in which the human rights of all will be respected.

Even when that is so, it is not enough to make resort to terrorism justified. But it will be justified if an additional condition is met: that of distributive justice. If there is a society where the human rights of a part of the population are respected, while the same rights of another part of the population are being violated, and if the only way of putting an end to that and bringing about a society in which human rights of all are respected is a limited use of terrorism, and finally, if terrorism is directed against members of the first group, which until now has been privileged as far as respect of human rights is concerned -- then terrorism will be morally justified. This is an argument of distributive justice, brought to bear on the problem of violations of human rights. It is more just to equalize the violations of human rights in a stage of transition to a society where the rights of all are respected, than to allow the group which has already suffered large-scale violations of human rights to suffer more such violations (assuming that in both cases we are dealing with violations of the same, or equally stringent, human rights). Human rights of many are going to be violated in any case. "If we must have rights violations, a more equitable distribution of such violations is better than a less equitable one" (p. 88).

This is an original, deontological cum consequentialist justification of terrorism. Neither the indispensable contribution of terrorism to bringing about equal respect of human rights of all nor the justice in the distribution of violations of such rights in the transition stage is, in itself, enough to justify its use. Each is necessary, and jointly the two are sufficient for its justification. Obviously, a critique that reduces Held's position to either of its prongs falls short of the mark. So does the objection that terrorism is as a matter of fact highly unlikely ever to help usher in a better, more just society. If so, that tells against terrorism, rather than against Held's (or any other) stringent moral requirements for a morally defensible recourse to it.

Another objection is that in allowing for sacrificing such basic human rights as the right to life and to bodily security of individual victims of terrorism for the sake of a more just distribution of violations of the same rights within a group in the course of transition to a stage where these rights will be respected throughout that group, Held adopts a collectivistic position that offends against the principles of separateness of persons and respect for persons. In response, Held argues that

to fail to achieve a more just distribution of violations of rights (through the use of terrorism if that is the only means available) is to fail to recognize that those whose rights are already not fairly respected are individuals in their own right, not merely members of a group … whose rights can be ignored. … Arguments for achieving a just distribution of rights violations need not be arguments … that are more than incidentally about groups. They can be arguments about individuals' rights to basic fairness. (pp. 89-90)

Still, a common citizen belonging to the relatively privileged section of the population has done nothing to forfeit her right to life. If she is killed by a terrorist seeking to make the distribution of right to life violations in the entire population more just, her right to life is violated for reasons to do with the group: for the sake of more justice within the group. This has nothing to do with her sins of commission or omission, and in this sense Held's is a collectivistic argument -- and an argument that I, for one, do not find convincing. Held argues that, if we fail to resort to terrorism in the circumstances described in her argument, we thereby fail to recognize that individuals belonging to the disadvantaged section of the population "are individuals in their own right," rather than merely members of a group whose human rights can be ignored. This argument is predicated on moral equivalence of acts and omissions, and on ascription of negative responsibility. This, too, I find problematic. We do not fail to respect the right to life of disadvantaged individuals when we fail to kill or maim other individuals, personally innocent of the plight of the former. The disadvantaged individuals do not have a right that we should engage in terrorism in their behalf, and we do not have a duty to do that. Indeed, I believe we have a duty not to do that.

Whether Held's two-prong justification of terrorism can be successfully defended against this and other possible objections or not, it remains an original, complex, and highly important position on the morality of terrorism. The essay presenting it is the centerpiece of Held's book and her most valuable contribution to the discussion of terrorism as far as fellow philosophers are concerned. The general reader will find much of interest in all the essays in this book. In the wider context of public debate about terrorism and the "war" against it, Held provides a strong antidote to the simplistic deliverances of "moral clarity" many of our political leaders and "public intellectuals" claim to possess.

528 Terrorism Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

⁉️ how to write a terrorism essay: do’s and don’ts, 🏆 best terrorism topic ideas & essay examples, 🥇 most interesting terrorism topics to write about, ⚡ shocking terrorism essay topics, 📌 simple & easy terrorism essay titles, 👍 good essay topics on terrorism, 💡 interesting topics to write about terrorism, ❓ terrorism essay questions.

Current-day problems, from global warming to human rights, continue to be a topical subject, urging students to address acute issues.

However, this relatability means that you, as an essay writer, may find yourself faced with conflicting facts and circumstances, which your inherent bias may affect.

Thus, a terrorism essay becomes not merely an academic endeavor, but an attempt to immerse yourself in contemporary issues with a multitude of opinions.

• Research and outline your subject beforehand. This process will not only save your time but also help you structure your thoughts and arguments coherently.
• Use tools, such as topic sentences and brainstorming techniques, in the prewriting phase of your paper. Doing so will help you understand how you would like to develop your central theme.
• Start compiling a bibliography early on. When many different viewpoints exist, creating a structured argument in favor of a particular approach may require a wide array of supporting book and journal titles.
• Give a historical overview of your issue. For example, if you are writing about global terrorism, then it is apparent that a worldwide network of violent radicals did not come into existence overnight. Acknowledge and explain the origins of your assigned issue.
• Read other’s sample essays. This action will help you gain a better understanding of what works and what does not in terrorism essay topics.
• Use terrorism essay quotations. Since this is a contemporary issue, then there are bound to be many people involved in activities to counter terrorism, survivors of attacks, and general onlookers. Utilize their perspectives and memories to give your essay a unique touch.
• Remain respectful throughout your paper. Recognize the gravity of your essay and understand the privilege you have when writing about ideas that you may not have experienced.
• Write your essay with no references. Despite watching TV coverages, listening to critics, and reading tabloids, none of us are experts on war or terrorism. Always cite the sources of your information to uphold the integrity of your work.
• Plagiarize from the work of others. While you may read essays written by your peers or those that are available online, directly copying from them is an academic offense.
• Go off point. If you are writing about the history of Al Qaeda, do not disintegrate your work into a how to stop terrorism essay. However, you may give some points in your conclusion on how the overall situation may be amended.
• Write controversial terrorism essay titles. While your title should be catchy and grab your readers’ attention, you should not resort to cheap tactics to make your headings memorable by shock value. Remember that your audience may perceive this tactic as making light of your subject, thus destroying your hard-earned credibility.
• Try to advocate for a pro-terrorist approach. While it is a sound idea to subvert some essay topics, this is not the case in such papers and your work should always be against terrorism.
• Integrate examples from unreliable sources. While readers are often less informed than the essay’s writer is, the opposite may also occur. Therefore, always check the facts, which you include in your work, to avoid embarrassment.
• Draw out your essay to stress the seriousness of the subject. Use your instructor’s specified word count as a measure for how much you should write. Your readers will not appreciate a long-winded paper, as they are hoping instead to get a quick and concise introduction to an important problem.

Want to get more inspiration on terrorism essay topics? Head over to IvyPanda!

• “To Any Would-Be Terrorists” by Naomi Shihab Nye While trying to address the extremist audience, the writer resorted to the strong methods of personification to be able to talk straight to each reading the letter. Despite the character of the text, the writer […]
• Cause and Effect of Terrorism There are several effects of terrorism that are destructive in the nature. The effects are destruction of properties, loss of lives and decline in the economy of a country.
• Terror in “The Dumb Waiter” Play by Harold Pinter Pinter exemplifies the existential view of the absurd and the non-existence in The Dumb Waiter in the same manner as that employed in Waiting for Godot by Beckett.
• Analyzing the Concept of Terrorism It is worth noting that a clear definition of terrorism is mostly subjective and is rarely objective due to the fact that it is an act of political violence.
• What Makes Terrorism Different From Other Forms of Violence The purpose of this paper is to define terrorism and identify the crucial features that distinguish terrorism from different types of abuse.
• An Analysis of Terrorist Activities The main terrorist attack of al Qaeda was the 9/11 Bombing of the World Trade Centers, claiming the lives of thousands of people and leading to the beginning of the War on Terror.
• Bioterrorism: Impact of Science and Technology The bacteria of a disease can be obtained easily and grown in a fermentor- it is also easy to build and operate one.
• Human and Technical Intelligence in Countering Terrorism The application of technical intelligence for the public good has to prioritise on several factors including human welfare in assisting the authorities in detecting and combating terrorism.
• The Psychological Explanation of Terrorism Therefore, most psychologists argue that in the quest to underpin the possible causes of terrorist activities, there is the need to discriminate between the motivations for joining, being retained, and disserting terrorist factions.
• Eco-Defense and Kinds of Ecological Terrorism Two basic practices of tree spiking exist; spiking the tree at the bottom of the tree trunk, and spiking the tree way above the trunk, as high as one can reach.
• Domestic Terrorism and Homegrown Extremism in America To learn what kind of work has to be done to deal with domestic terrorism and homegrown extremism, the nature and the role of law enforcement agencies have to be considered.
• Terrorism, Human Trafficking, and International Response One of the key positive results of the global counter-terrorism efforts was the reduction of Al Qaeda’s presence both globally and in the Middle East, and the enhancement of travel safety.
• Analysis of a Domestic Terrorist Group and Homeland Security Policies The Boogaloo Movement is a severe menace, and the government must take all necessary measures to put a stop to it, it is concluded.
• Suspected Terrorist Interrogation and Use of Torture Regardless, torture is still popular across the globe, and it has elicited a new debate questioning whether it is immoral and unacceptable to use torture in the case of efforts to fight terror in the […]
• Terrorism, Corruption, and Climate Change as Threats Therefore, threats affecting countries around the globe include terrorism, corruption, and climate change that can be mitigated through integrated counter-terror mechanisms, severe punishment for dishonest practices, and creating awareness of safe practices.
• Problems the US Faced in the Prosecution of the International Terrorists Differentiating a potential extremist from the rest of the population has been challenging because most international criminals interact with civilians and become part of them.
• Terrorist Impact on Maritime Transportation Security Notably, the United States established the Transportation Security Administration under the Department of Transportation, which was soon transferred to the newly formed Homeland Security Department.
• International Terrorism: Waves and Countermeasures The concept of modern terrorism emerged in Russia, and after a decade, it spread to Western Europe, the Balkans, and Asia.
• The Nexus of Homeland Security and Terrorism The Department of Homeland Security is one of the several bureaucracies formed to tackle the issues of rising insecurity due to external powers and potential facilitators within the US.
• The Future and Change of Terrorism As a result, even if terrorists get their hands on these weapons, they might hesitate to use them on individuals because of the associated implications.
• The Terrorist Attack Recovery Process Terrorism response strategies and the recovery process vary according to the scope of damages and the implications of the methods used in the terror attacks.
• Preparing for a Potential Terrorist Attack The ultimate aim of preparedness is to limit exposure to adversities during and after a terrorist attack. Thus, a recommended approach to limiting the potential security hazard of terrorist attacks is assessing its attributes and […]
• Role of Terrorism in Russo-Ukrainian War Due to this factor, one of the most influential and widespread typologies of terrorism is the New Terrorism that emerged after the tragedy of 2001 in the USA.
• Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 Therefore, the current policies are a response to existing problems, and as the problem inside the country has become smaller, the reaction has also decreased.
• Role of Media in Terrorism and Its Force Multipliers The following passages describe the role of the media in terrorism, how terrorists use laws to their advantage, the concept of asymmetrical warfare, and force multiplier as they apply to terrorism.
• Anti-Terrorism Security Complex for Civil Aviation It is expected that the increase in the number of flights in the absence of a strengthened anti-terrorist culture should also lead to an increase in the number of unintended consequences of such flights – […]
• Terrorism: Goals and Strategies Their main purpose can range from changing the direction of the politics in the state to overthrowing the exciting government and establishing control over the population.
• Religious Terrorism: Ideologies and Methods of Al Qaeda and ISIS Strict adherence to the recorded practices and sayings of the Prophet in the letter of the Koran is emphasized. It endorses the rationalization of terrorism and violence in the efforts to fight against infidels.
• Principles of Leadership and Future of Terrorism At the present time, leadership is presented in various forms; however, the primary objectives of the model generally include the improvement of organizational performance and the enhancement of the relationships between the members.
• The 2012 Tel Aviv Bus Bombing and Crisis Management Musa was the manufacturer and detonator of the bomb, which he used Mafarji to deliver inside the Tel Aviv-based commuter bus.
• Terrorism: The Role of Social Media This paper will discuss the role of the internet in terrorist activities, with a focus on social media. In the electronic age, terrorists use social media for recruitment, training, public terror, and action.
• The Role of the Military in Domestic Terrorism Acts The video focuses on the issue of domestic terrorism in the U.S.in light of the January 6th attack on the Capitol.
• Addressing Challenges of Religious Terrorism The various methods used in religious terrorism are spiritual scriptures to justify the violent acts and the use of apocalyptic images of destruction to justify the actions.
• Terrorism and Changes in Police Management Firstly, the police and organizations related to the population’s safety prioritized the prevention of terrorism to minimize the damage. Organizing in the police station involves the creation of organizational structure, points of authority, and responsibilities.
• Terrorists’ Minds and Radicalization Processes Moreover, the models agree that radicalization is a stepwise process in which one stage or step leads to another and eventually reaches the act of terrorism.
• The Terrorism and Oil Industry Relationship Since terrorism is a source of political instability in the world, there is expected to be a positive correlation between oil prices and terrorist attacks. The purpose of this research was to examine the relationship […]
• Understanding the Definition of WMDs and the Constraints on Terrorist Acquisition The most known WMD a nuclear weapon is limited in numbers and difficult to create. The most probable WMD for terrorists to acquire are chemical weapons.
• Online Interventions Addressing Terrorism and Radicalization The study will also identify that the Sakinah campaign can be considered a suitable example of how it is possible to address Internet terrorism and radicalization.
• A Terrorism Attack in the Middle East Countries in the Middle East are prone to terrorist attacks rendering it one of the unsafest regions in the world. The importance of this study is to understand the purpose of terrorist attacks in the […]
• Behavioral Factors of Individual Terrorists The behavior of individual terrorists is dictated by the group dynamics, their mental health, and well-being, as well as the underlying incentives for joining a terrorist organization.
• The Ways Terrorists Raise and Move Money Moreover, the government has put into action the freezing orders and blocking of united states individuals who are presumed to have a hand in terrorist activities.
• Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime as Threats to Homeland Security The US is among the nations that have suffered some of the worst terrorist attacks worldwide and it is also a hub of international criminal activities due to its wealth of resources and powerful economic […]
• Planning for Terrorist Events: Case Study To review the response of France’s forces and evaluate its efficiency To provide several recommendations for the prevention of attacks during the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar Terrorist attacks that took place across Paris […]
• Global Impact of 9-11 Events on Terrorism Prevention Many people resorted to religion and faith, and the majority reported that they were praying more frequently. Moreover, it stimulated the intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan to fight terrorist groups.
• September 11, 2001 Attacks: What We Have Learned About Terrorism Since 9,11 The world has remembered one of the most tragic attacks in the USA in 2001, and the consequences of this event stay one of the most discussed.
• Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy One of the most serious problems of modern political society is the threat of terrorism, which, due to globalization, requires the unification of the international community.
• The Case of Saudi Arabia’s Soft Counter-Terrorism Strategy Therefore, this assessment is essential for government agencies, consulting organizations, and society in general, since innocent people suffer from the consequences of terrorism.
• Terrorism Prevention: Operation Geronimo Intelligence briefings had been vital in this operation, and there was sufficient evidence to show that the wanted terrorist was in the compound. In conclusion, the operation was a necessary undertaking in ensuring international peace […]
• Trump Tells Story About Killing Terrorists With Bullets Dipped in Pigs’ Blood The text reflects on Donald Trump’s recollection of the myth that terrorists were killed before the bullets used were dipped in pig blood.
• US Strategy From the Cold War to the Post-Global War on Terrorism Before the collapse of the United Soviet Socialist Republic in 1991, the United State’s strategy during the Cold War era had been one of deterrence to the potential threats of the USSR and its allies […]
• Analysis of the Terrorist Organizations: “Red Brigades” and “Boko Haram” The most famous action in the organization’s history is the abduction and murder of the former Prime Minister of Italy Aldo Moro in the spring of 1978.
• Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism in the US The very first section of this act is devoted to strengthening the internal security of the population of the States in the framework of countering terrorism.
• Countering Terrorism Through Innovative Approaches The vital issue of this meeting became the issue of the technological development of international terrorism, its rapid growth in the online world, and acquaintance with the most recent technologies.
• Iran’s Involvement in Sponsoring Global Terrorism Due to the particular features of the theocratic regimes, in the case of Iran, the inclination towards terrorism can be explained by two pillars of the Islamic doctrine underlining the constitution.
• Criminalistics: Forensic Science, Crime, and Terrorism These writings can be on the second, third, and so on pages, depending on the pressure on the writing subject, that is, a pen or pencil.
• Terrorism: the Victim of Terrorism and of Mechanisms to Combat It The Concept of Terrorism: Unlawful act Broad interpretations Threatening lives Generic term of terror Caused by forces opposed to the state Sociopolitical
• Countering Terrorism and Preventive Measures Considering the events of the past century, including the first and 9/11 bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001, United States Embassy in Beirut and Kuwait bombing, and many other attacks, the […]
• Why Terrorism Is Not a Serious Threat to International and National Security We accept the existence of this threat, but we are still sure terrorism narrative as an existential threat is doing more damage to a larger amount of people than local terroristic attacks.
• Biowarfare and Bioterrorism: History and Origin According to Edmond and William, the dawn of bioterrorism dates back to the nineteenth century, when Louis Pasteur and Robert Koech studied and understood the basics of microbiology. Moreover, another application of biological weapons is […]
• Response to a Hypothetical Terrorist Event Prior to explicit action, the first thing to do in such a situation is to assess the environment depending on the location of terrorists and the type of attack and to outline the civilians that […]
• Biological Warfare and Agro-Terrorism However, the most important thing from which those infected with botulism die is paralysis of the respiratory muscles and the respiratory failure that follows. The bacteria Bacillus Anthracis, which causes anthrax, is one of the […]
• Terrorism Impacts on Policing in Belgium Nevertheless, when studying the world experience of countries facing the threat of high extremist activity and falling victim to attacks by militant fanatics at the beginning of the 21st century, the Belgian government has strengthened […]
• Researching of Morals of Terrorists Terrorism attacks are a form of violence, and the moral implication is death in the form of revenge. Realism is a form of acceptance that everyone on the battlefield is a civilian with their families.
• The Structures, Motivations, and Qualities of Terrorist Groups This implies that the structures of terrorist groups are determined by the capacity and character of the government and society where they operate.
• The Functionalism Theory Assumptions of Terrorism The functionalism theory echoes the candid assumptions of terrorism and further resonates with the evolving terrorism threat. As Barkan outlines, the functionalism perspective postulates that terrorism creates social bonding and solidarity within societies at war.
• Terrorism: Cargo and Passenger Screening To avoid such events, security systems need to be improved by the management both in the field of technological equipment and in the training of professionals.
• The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism The objectives of this strategy are the prevention of radical manifestations in the fields of labor, law, politics, science and education, culture and sports, communication, and healthcare. In addition, it is characterized by legal information […]
• Motivations of Lone-Wolf Terrorists The phenomenon of lone-wolf terrorism is an interesting one because it challenges one to attempt to understand the motivation of a person to commit a violent criminal act knowing of the severe consequences.
• Public Policy Issue: Domestic Terrorism At the same time, proponents of the policy argue that the rise of domestic terrorism is due to the failure of holding accountable and confronting the perpetrators by the responsible authorities and not a case […]
• Radicalization and Terrorism in the United States The individuals or self-proclaimed bombers are one of the major threats that the USA will have to be on the lookout for most of the time.
• America: Racism, Terrorism, and Ethno-Culturalism The myth of the frontier is one of the strongest and long-lived myths of America that animates the imagination of the Americans even to this day.
• Domestic, Transnational, and Maritime Terrorism All types of terrorism are based on the forcible imposition of a worldview, ideology, morality, politics using violence, threats of murder or other forms as the primary means of achieving goals.
• “Terrorism” Is a Biased Term According to Bin Ladin, the bombing of the World Trade Center was an intimidation technique targeting the Americans due to the violence against the Islamic community.
• Terrorism and Data Mining Algorithms However, this is a necessary evil as the nation’s security has to be prioritized since these attacks lead to harm to a larger population compared to the infringements.
• Cyber-Terrorism and International Interventions Most of the cyber-attacks that have occurred involve the direction of the malware and attacks to specific critical systems and Information Technology infrastructures.
• Terrorism and Media Coverage In that regard, the issue of media coverage is specifically important to consider in situations involving hostages, as the media either covering a news report or responding to the terrorists’ demands is in a position […]
• Airfreight Security Breaches and Terrorism The majority of terrorist attacks happened after the 1990s, thereby indicating the deterioration of the security system and breaches in it.
• Terror and Religion One of the common religious terror activities has been on martyrdom, the practice of causing death to oneself on the basis of being a witness to ideological and theological perspectives and beliefs.
• Encryption, Stenography & Cyber Criminal Terrorist The internet and the ICT system as a whole are vulnerable to cyber attacks. This is the method of using to trademark to protect our images and copyright on our intellectual properties.
• Radicalization and Terrorism Phenomena A precursor to radicalization and terrorism is the lack of proper socio-political integration of certain communities in countries. Radicalization lies at the heart of terrorism and plays a central role in the propagation of ideas.
• Boko Haram Terrorist Organization: History and Facts Since the inception of the organization in 2002, the primary goal of Boko Haram has been to impose Islamic rule in Nigeria by promoting a version of the religion that forbids participation in any social […]
• Local Efforts to Counter the Terror Threat in New York City The program encompasses a series of both current and future policy efforts that are associated with the private sector security as well as counterterrorism in the state.
• Cyber-Terrorism and Healthcare Information Systems – Past, Present, and Future The cyber appliances in the health sector then again sustain correspondence amongst shareholders and service providers and as well support resources management.
• Bioterrorism Response by Healthcare Organizations Bioterrorism is a frequently used term that proves human responsibility on the development of its outcomes and effects on people and other living beings on Earth.
• Response to Terrorist Attacks: The Role of Military and Public Sector Entities Nevertheless, to understand the basis of such partnership, one has to understand the actions that the public sector takes and has taken to respond to terrorism in the United States and globally.
• Terrorism: What Is It and How to Counter It? Counterterrorism is one of the goals of international cooperation and is an activity aimed at preventing and combating terrorism. One of the most important areas of action is also to prevent the radicalization of both […]
• Emergency Operations in Case of Radiological Terrorism An excellent example of an explosion that profoundly affected the Americans is the 9/11 attack that led to the destruction of the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.
• Command Structure of Sharing the Information About Possible Acts of Terror Following the infamous events of 9/11, the government of the United States introduced new strategies and roles that have continued to reshape the roles and involvement of law enforcers in cases of terrorism.
• Bio-Terrorism: When Microbes Become a Threat to Human Existence In general, due to the cooperation of scientists, policymakers, and public agencies across the globe, the international community has recognized the potential of biological weapons and is prepared for the majority of threats.
• How Terrorism Impacts the Human Experience From the point of view of modern definitions or attempts to define these phenomena, the difference is most often established in the globality of the character, duration of the act, and the number of actors […]
• Annotated Bibliography About Terrorism This is a book review article written by Khanna on the book “Terrorism as a war” written by Walter Laqueur and published by Continuum Books.
• Cyberterrorism, Competing Factions, and Possible Course of Action Various aspects can be analyzed concerning cyberterrorism, competing factors, and possible course of actions in corporations to show that cyberterrorism is a legitimate option for the expression of grievances by terrorists.
• Importance of Emergency Response to Terrorist Attack According to the scenario presented, it makes sense to involve the DoD since the terrorists, supposedly AWOLs, pose an extreme threat to the lives of civilians and the military.
• National Response to Terrorism & Natural Disaster The National Response Framework governs the national security and crisis response to dynamic emergencies and natural disasters that occur in the community.
• Terrorism: Definitions, Features Shared by Terrorists However, since there is no agreed-upon definition of a terrorist attack, it is possible to state that some incidents were omitted from the statistics. Terrorism is difficult to combat and requires the input of international […]
• Alienation and Solidarity: The Logic of Suicide Terrorism Pape’s “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” discusses the growing prevalence of suicide attacks in the arsenal of terrorist movements from 1980 onward.
• Terrorists and Their Rights Under US Laws The key problems of the research are the ways in which Islamists are protected by the US legislation and society, where the threat comes from, and what the consequences might be.
• Anti-Terrorism Protocol and Counter-Terrorism Units The 1995 Tokyo sarin attack is a case in point because it proved the real possibility of such a scenario and was used as the reference for the L.A. First of all, as shown in […]
• Oklahoma City Bombing as Domestic Terrorist Act The federal building housed the offices of various government agencies, including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, which was directly involved in the Waco debacle. The attack allowed McVeigh to send a message to […]
• Foreign Fighters and Contemporary Terrorism Finally, recruiters have received access to the vulnerable groups directly, which is demonstrated in the book In the Skin of a Jihadist written by an investigative journalist Anne Erelle.
• Terrorist Attacks: Paul Hanson vs. Patrick Crusius He made some preparations in the form of stockpiling weapons and researching the locations in which they reside. Crusius was more discrete in his information gathering, though it was still the failure of the FBI […]
• Terrorism Liaison Officer’s Responsibilities The analyst was involved in the assessment of the case and contributed to false-positive reporting regarding the journalist and other civilians being terrorists.
• Domestic Security Agencies and Cyberterrorism Thus, it can be concluded that terrorism and cyberterrorism have become one of the many global challenges, and for this reason, they should be the object of close attention to the world community.
• Terrorism in the United States of America The group might disintegrate in the future because of its dwindling number of followers, leadership wrangles, and a lack of finances to fund its activities.
• Identifying Terrorism-Related Situations In the selected setting of Philadelphia, the general environment appears to be in control, yet further measures may need to be undertaken to prevent the instances of protests from reaching a state of havoc.
• Task Force and the Fusion Center: Terrorism Prevention Thus, it can be argued that the main task of JTTF in targeted violence prevention is crime investigation and intelligence generation.
• Fusion Centers: The Role in Terrorism Prevention Boston Globe reports that the information-sharing system currently in use is not efficient in preventing terrorism, highlighting the fact that the FBI and the CIA probes of Tamerlan Tsarnaev were unbeknown to Massachusetts counterterrorist units.
• DHS and Intelligence: Terrorism The organization of the fight against terrorism requires a comprehensive approach to the analysis of the sources and subjects of terrorist activity, a clear definition of the functions and areas of responsibility of each item […]
• The Molly Maguires as a Domestic Terrorism Group It is these origins of the Molly Maguires terrorist group that gave them their thirst for blood and led to the killing of a myriad of Irishmen until the group was exterminated in the proximities […]
• Australian Anti-Terrorism Laws In the quest to protect citizens, some governments have gone to the extend of inflicting torture on terror suspects in need to obtain some information from the suspect, which raises concern about the suspect’s civil […]
• Bioterrorism Preparedness and Public Health Response Therefore, the current state of the preparedness cannot be estimated as high or sufficient, and the approach needs to be elaborated.
• Aggressive Behavior Among the Al-Shabaab Terrorists The former are the underlying sources that propel susceptible individuals to radicalization, while the latter are the incentives that the terrorist groups offer to attract and retain recruits.
• War on Terrorism: Budget and Policy Discussion The discussion of the specific Acts and Policies directed at USA security is going to be considered with the purpose to follow the changes which occurred in the USA after 9/11 attacks.
• Criminology: Terrorism–Security Policy for Large Events This attack proved to the government the vulnerability of the state concerning external threats, especially because, prior to the attack, the customary means of attack had been the use of military force as evidenced in […]
• Causes of Terrorism Terrorism is defined as violent actions that are aimed at instilling fear to people as a means of coercing them to submit to ideologies of a certain group.
• Violent Resistance and Terrorism The following study is an attempt to establish the root causes of violent resistance, the challenges facing the world due to violent resistance, and possible remedies to the problem citing specific cases that are helpful […]
• Terror Groups – Abu Nidal Organization Abu Nidal is the Arabic meaning of ‘father of the struggle.’ The terror group was named after its leader and founder Sabri al-Banna who was born in Palestine to a land owning family. Among the […]
• Impacts of Terrorism on Police Mission in the U.S. The incidence of September 11 2001 has remarkably transformed the police force in the U.S. There is an increase in the level of monitoring of international travels and boundaries by the police force.
• Homeland Security: Digital Crime and Terrorism Activities However, the US law enforcement system is characterized by the activities of different agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Department of Homeland Security, Secret Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
• Understanding the Basics of Terrorism On the other side of the rail is another man lying flat on the ground with a sniper rifle in his hands ready to wreak havoc.
• “Policing Terrorism” by Waddington He is of the argument that case-specific policing is focused on the outcome of court verdicts. He points out an incident in which the palace security was breached, and the commissioner of police reacted to […]
• Definite Paths to Terrorism: Main Dimensions This assimilation is enforced by the use of violence to instil discipline and loyalty in the participants. In conclusion, there are other dimensions of the Islamic terrorism namely Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah.
• War on Terror: Propaganda and Freedom of the Press in the US There was the launching of the “Center for Media and Democracy”, CMD, in the year 1993 in order to create what was the only public interest at that period. There was expansive use of propaganda […]
• Terrorism and U.S. National Security Thomas Jefferson was the author of the Statute of Virginia for religious freedom in the year 1777 as well as the author of the famous United States Declaration of independence in the year 1776.
• Domestic Terrorism Trends: Challenges of the Coming Years Under the provisions of the US PATRIOT act, acts of domestic terrorism entail dangerous acts that pose a threat to human life and amount to a violation of various criminal laws of the US and/or […]
• Organizations Convincing to Become a Suicide Terrorist One of the underlying tenets taught to candidate suicide bombers is: “Islam is the answer and jihad is the way”. Pathological altruism refers to any behavior or personal tendency in which ‘the goal or motivation […]
• Bioterrorism: Term Review According to Meinhardt, “water supplies and water distribution systems represent potential target for terrorist activity in the United States because of the critical need for water in every sector of our industrialized society”.
• US & UK Human Rights While Countering Terrorism The threat of terror and the further legal reactions of the nations to the problem were considered as challenging, and it is necessary to examine differences and similarities associated with the promotion of human rights […]
• Organizational Change: Models Influencing American Terrorism This paper seeks to discuss the three models of terrorism, the effects of international terrorism locally, and the impacts of international terrorism on local cell groups.
• The Goal of a Terrorist Attack This objective is being accomplished by the mean of exposing people to the graphic accounts of terrorist acts-in-making, as was the case with the attacks of 9/11.
• Local Response to Terrorism Local response to terrorism involves using the resources and the law enforcement officers at the state and county level to detect and prevent acts of terror.
• Adjusting to Terrorism: The Issue of Detention Without Trial The country also needs to train more prosecutors and legal experts so that justice is disseminated to suspected terrorists who continue to be held at Guantanamo Bay without trial.
• Biological Terrorism: Dealing With the Threat It is therefore the responsibility of the recipient of this information to take action to secure his/her life against the potential lethality of the agent in question.
• The Maritime Terrorism Risk and Liability The research describes in detail aspects of maritime terrorism but does not clearly state the research question to be explored. However, in the summary part of the research paper there is several questions implied as […]
• Bioterrorism Preparedness in Healthcare Organizations It is also necessary to carry out a test on the public health emergencies for this would help the department to be aware of the strengths and weaknesses which are in the system.
• Adjusting to Terrorism In the US, the Department of Homeland Security is the primary body that deals with all matters of homeland security, including the prevention of terrorism. As such, the department needs to address it as a […]
• Impact of Terrorism on the Economy The premise of the essay is to evaluate the nature and the nature and the severity of the risks posed by terrorism on IFAD a United Nations specialized agency.
• A Criminal Justice Approach to Suppressing Terrorism The threat of terrorism substituted communism as the rationale which was used for justifying the state of emergency in America prior to 1990s.
• Comparison Between Organized Crime And Terrorism Organized crime refers to unlawful activities conducted by members of highly organized gangs and associations. Its defined by members and activities of a group.
• Boilover: Fire Aspects of the World Trade Center Terrorist Attacks Analysis These includes the intensity of the incident heat on the burning object, the composition of the burning fire, the ability of air that supports combustion to reach the burning fire, the mass of the burning […]
• Secure Transportation System Against Global Terror The good news is that cooperation, coordination, and new technology can be used to secure the global transportation system and halt the activities of terror groups.
• Sharing Terror Data: Criminal Analysis The FBI continuing investigation of the attacks to identify the hijackers and their sponsors, codenamed “PENTTBOM,” represents the largest investigation ever in the history of the agency.
• Torture and War Towards Terrorism An example of mental torture can be explained by the following; Y is a friend to X, they have been caught in the same crime act, Y is then taken to a separate room adjacent […]
• Women and Terrorism Relations The role of women in secular terrorist organizations has been more pronounced in history due to the conservative nature of religious terrorist movements, which often exclude women from their ranks.
• Investigation Methods: Terrorism and Cyber Crime The question on whether the investigations in these areas of cyber crime and terrorism to remain incident driven or to adopt strategic approach are still is of great concern to the security agencies and the […]
• Terrorism: Assessing the Past to Forecast the Future The terrorists groups all over the world, having the knowledge of lethargic weapons held by their enemies, are engaged in the discoveries of how the rapidly growing technology may improve the lethargy of their current […]
• Terrorism Response Strategy The preliminary assessment is performed on the basis that before implementing any rescue operations, the hazards that are contained in the area must be positively identified and the resources available or necessary to deal with […]
• Homeland Security and Terrorism The important root causes of terrorism are mainly two: a perceived sense of social & political injustice such that the group seeks to right the wrong and, the view that violence is the only way […]
• Terrorism Preparedness and Response The third and most important step to take is to switch off the available electrical gadgets to prevent the spread of fire. Of importance to prevent such catastrophes is cooperation from citizens, media, and the […]
• Terrorism Mitigation and Risk In order to avert the danger of possible portable nuclear attacks, it is important to assess the possibility and impact of attacks in the first place.
• Terrorism Risk Assessment: Threat of Al Shabaab and Hezbollah to the USA Attacks such as those that happened outside the US and more are likely to occur due to what Hezbollah perceives as the US posing a threat to its ties with Iran.
• Four Priorities of Action for Combating Terrorism on Our Shores There is therefore the need to employ new pragmatic foreign policy steps that promote the national interest within the broader values of international peace and security if any gains are to be realized in the […]
• The Cyber Terrorism Plan and Counter Strategy The news of hacking the website of the Pentagon will immediately get the attention of the media and this message will spread everywhere at the speed of light.
• The Potential for State Sponsored Terrorism Also, he mainly tries to bring all the enemies of the United States together and he believes that the United States is a devilish country.
• Bioterrorism and Biosecurity The epidemiology of the infection is spread in the world evenly though in some of the parts there is only one form of Anthrax, for instance in the United States of America and therefore our […]
• Bioterrorism and Biosecurity – Aum Shinrikyo The Aum Shinrikyo began their attacks in 1994 in Matsumoto where they used the refrigerator truck to release sarin near the homes of three judges who were overseeing a lawsuit that was predicted to go […]
• Terrorism: A Definition and Analysis The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as the perpetration of violence and force unlawfully against people or property with a sole aim of intimidating or coercing the government or the targeted population or any […]
• International Political Economy, Democratization, and Terrorism IPE describes the global power dynamics that control international trade and finance, fuel globalization, and wealth distribution across the globe. Sachs argues that globalization and the emergence of political economics have led to the increased […]
• Terrorism Definition at the National Level The development of a unified definition of terrorism at the global level is challenging because the domestic laws of several countries differ significantly.
• War and Terrorism in the Modern World They are used to frighten the public and pursue political goals, for example, to change the government in the country. For instance, acts of terrorism are meant to inflict fear and intimidation to put pressure […]
• Sociology. Terror and Violence Impacts
• US and Terrorism Relations Overview
• Agro-Terrorism: Definition and Impacts
• Terrorism and Trauma in American Literature
• War on Terror: The Battle Continues
• Terrorism Nowadays: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
• How Terrorism Affects Airline Security
• Terrorist Networks as a Threat to the United States Today
• Consequence Management and Terrorist Attacks Analysis
• Terrorist Groups’ Establishment: The Theory of Four-Wave Terroristic Groups
• Homeland Security: Terrorism Issue
• Domestic & Global Terrorism and Its legal Aspects
• Crime Myths and Domestic Terrorism
• Terrorist Attacks in Paris, 13th November 2015
• Hue Newton: A Terrorist and a Thinker
• Impact on Terrorist Activities of Regional Governments
• Regional Terrorism: The Bali Bombing, Australian and Indonesian Responses
• How to End Terrorism: Diplomacy or Military Action?
• Terrorism: Methods and Weapons
• Terrorism: Analysis of Definitions
• Screening for Terrorist for Aviation Security
• The Role of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Fight Against Terrorism
• Terrorist Event Countering: First Responders Risk
• Financing Terrorism: Challenges and Solutions
• Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Terrorism
• Domestic Terrorism: Burning Social Issue
• Al Shabaab: An Intriguing Example of Islamist Terror
• Causes and Motivations of Terrorism
• Ali Al-Timimi’s Case of Terrorism
• “The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians” by C. Carr
• Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Preparedness and Response
• Legislation Related to Bioterrorism
• Israel’s Response to Munich Terror Attack
• Bioterrorism and Its Harmful Consequences
• Domestic Terrorism in USA
• The Evolution of Terrorism on the World Stage
• Terrorism and Liberal Democracy: What We Should Know
• Michael Collins and His Terrorist Method
• Biological Weapon and Bioterrorism
• War and Terrorism in Algeria
• Is Terrorism Still the Most Important Security Issue for Australia?
• Primoratz’ Definition of Terrorism
• War on Terror and Its Effect on Individual Right
• Terrorism and Modern Society
• Terrorism: An Objective Definition
• Crimes Against the State: Terrorist Attacks and Death Penalty
• “Nuclear Terrorism: Risks, Consequences, and Response” by Jim Walsh: Stimulating Ideas, Logical Organization, Engaging Voice
• Origins of Terrorism and Solutions
• Terrorists R’ Us: Different Perspectives, the Real Meaning
• Middle-East and Africa Terrorist Movements
• Terrorism in Western Europe: Finland, Denmark and England
• Most Effective Anti-Terrorist Tactics, Organizations in the World
• The History of Ku Klux Klan: A Terrorist Organization Founded in the Southern States After the American Civil War
• The Use of Counter-Terrorism Attacks During the Algerian War of Independence From F.L.N.
• History and Financing of Terrorism: From Time Immemorial to Nowadays
• Comparison Between Secular and Religious Terror
• The Origins of Modern Terrorism
• Cultural Reaction of English Civilians Against Terrorist Situations in Their Country
• Political Violence and Terrorism. Crowd Behavior
• Domestic Terrorism: The Forgotten Threat
• Is Terrorism an Act of War?: Different Types of Terrorism
• Types of Terrorism: Centers Establishment
• Sociology of Terror: Contemporary Sense
• Anti-Terrorists Tactics and Organizations
• Understanding the War on Terror in the United States
• Foreign Policy Challenges Created by the War on Terror
• The Threat of International Terrorism in Modern World
• Middle-Eastern and African Terrorist Movements
• Terrorist Organizations and Funding
• Terrorist Recruitment Process: Who Joins and Why
• Should the U.S. Use Torture on Terror Suspects?
• Nigeria – Preventing Nuclear Terrorism
• Terrorism Impact on Global Business Environment
• Terrorism. Irish Republican Army
• Community Policing and War on Terror
• Biosecurity and Bioterrorism
• Terrorism Today and Its Definition
• Religious Violence. Terror in the Mind of God by Juergensmeyer
• Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy by P. R. Pillar
• Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Radical Terrorism
• Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance
• Pakistan’s Double Game in the War on Terror
• Eradicated Terrorism in the World
• The Interrelation Between Terrorism and Technology
• War on Terror & Violation of Constitutional Rights
• Media and the War on Global Terrorism
• Is the Geneva Convention Applicable to War on Terror?
• Adjusting to Terrorism in Modern World
• Death Sentence to Muslim Terrorists: Should We Murder People Who Had Done the Same Before?
• How the US is Dealing with Terrorism?
• Terrorism and Security Issues Review
• “Terrorism in Latin America” by Mark Sullivan
• How Terrorist Have Financial and Recruitment Growth Since 1980
• Effects of the September 11, 2001 Terror Attacks on Sino-American Relations
• Recent Developments in the History of Terrorism
• War on Terrorism: Role of Law Enforcement
• Current Issues in Iraq and Terrorism
• War on Terror. 42-Day Detention: An Equitable Solution?
• Early Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism
• Terrorism and the Affects on American Way of Living
• Counter Terrorism Measures in the UK
• The War on Terrorism in the United States
• United States & EU Efforts to Fight Terrorism
• Global Terrorism and State Security Measures
• American Governmnet Against the Threat of Terrorism
• Terrorism: 9/11 Conspiracy Theories
• Trends in Global Terrorism. Conflict Resolution and Iraq
• “Terrorism and Economic Security” by Robert L. Hutchings
• The War on Terror Cannot be Won
• Bioterrorism and Health Care Delivery
• Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Terrorism: Countering and Responding to the Treat
• Crimean Crisis and Russian State Terrorism
• Cyberterrorism as a Global Concern
• The United States and Terrorism
• Anti-Terrorist New York City Police Department Shield
• Terrorist Ideologies: Selecting a Target
• A Terrorist Attack on Atlanta, Georgia
• How Counselors Assist Survivors of Terrorism
• Fraud, Money Laundering, and Terrorism Financing
• Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures
• Terrorism and National Security
• Terrorism and Security Dilemma After 9/11
• International Law: Extradition of Terrorists
• The Functioning of Terrorist Groups
• Suicide Terrorism and Its Psychological Factors
• Terrorist Organization: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
• The Great Terror in the Factories, 1935–1938
• Workers During “The Great Terror” by R. Conquest
• “Terror and Democracy at the Age of Stalin” by Goldman
• Female Gender Role in “The Terrorist” Film
• Terrorism Studies and Framing Concept
• Terrorism as Spectacle: Extremist Propaganda
• Terror in the Mind of God by Mark Juergensmeyer
• Counter Terrorism and Public Awareness Plan
• Terrorist Organization Hezbollah: Tactics and Strategies
• The Hezbollah Terrorist Organization
• Terrorism, Social Activism and Political Violence
• “Faces of State Terrorism” by Laura Westra
• Organized Terrorism Against Government Leaders
• War on Terror and Its Victory Meaning
• Terrorism Definitions by the Global Community
• Islamic Terrorism in Ridley Scott’s “Body of Lies”
• Can Terrorism Only Be Defeated by Military Means?
• Terrorism Impact on Tourism Industry After 2015
• Terrorist Attack: Contemporary Social or Cultural Issues
• Poverty as a Factor of Terrorist Recruitment
• War on Drugs and Terror and American Promise
• Hazard Vulnerability Analysis and Terrorism
• Terrorist Participation and Its Motives
• The UAE Against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing
• Cyberterrorism as the Greatest Risk for the US
• Cultural Miscommunication and Hostility Against Muslims
• The Rise of Terrorist Organisations in Post-Invasion Iraq
• Factors That Motivate to Terrorism
• Domestic Terrorism in the United States of America
• State-Sponsored and Non-State Terrorism
• Internet Crimes and Digital Terrorism Prevention
• Vietnam War vs. War on Terror in the Middle East
• Immigration Services Against Crime and Terrorism
• Ideology and Terrorism: Rights from Wrongs?
• Islamic and Christian Religion and Terrorism
• American War on Terror and Operational Strategies
• Death Penalty for Murder by Terrorism
• Local Operational Planning for Potential Terrorist Threats
• Preventing Terrorism: Strategies and Challenges
• Terrorism, Hate Crimes and Racial Profiling
• Terrorism Preventive Measures in the United States
• Aum Shinrikyo Terrorist Group’s Activity
• Bioterrorism Attacks and Nursing Countermeasures
• Intelligence, Civil Law, and Terrorism Investigations
• Terrorism Prevention on the International Level
• Psychological Profiling in Terrorism Prevention
• Terrorism Definitions and Controversies
• Violent Extremism and Suicide Terrorist Attacks
• Al-Qaeda Emergence, Ideology, and New Terrorism
• Terror Attacks and Intelligence Community in the US
• Distressed Terrorism: Politics, Religion and Ideology
• Terrorism or Hate Crime: Similarities and Differences
• War on Terror: Critical Terrorism Studies’ Views
• Egyptian Tourism Industry and Terrorism Effects
• Terrorism and US Activities in the Middle East
• Islamic State Global Terror Threat Countermeasures
• War on Terror in Saudi Arabia and Arab Gulf States
• Saudi Arabian Lone Wolf Terrorism in 2011-2016
• Terrorist Groups: Critical Discourse Analysis
• War on Terror in Central Asia and the Caucasus
• US Intelligence to Prevent Terrorist Attacks
• Terrorism: Power of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Power
• Female Terrorism: Causes and Features
• Terrorism: the Evolution of ISIS
• Cyber Security’s and Counter Terrorism’ Intersection
• What Are the Global Impact of Terrorism in Business Domain?
• East African Community Counter-Terrorism Vision
• Terrorism and Torture: History and Arguments
• How Does Modern Terrorism Operate?
• Digital Media Usage to Recruit and Promote Terrorism
• Modern Terrorism and Globalization
• Stereotyping Terrorists and Mental Sanity
• Homeland Security Changes: Adjusting to Terrorism
• Propaganda: Terrorist, Government, State, Non-State
• Paternalist Terror in China in 1950-1953
• China in 1950-53: “Paternalist Terror” by J. Strauss
• Terrorist and Government Propaganda in Media
• Human Trafficking as a Terrorist Activity
• Coping with Terrorism in the USA
• Terrorism in the Middle East
• Contemporary Terrorism: The American Army Special Forces
• Conventions on Terrorism in the 21st Century
• Countering Terrorism: The US Intelligence Community
• Terrorism and Its Organisations: Al Qaeda and ISIL
• First Responders to Terrorist Attack
• Violence and Terror Definition Comparison
• The Westgate Terror Attack in Kenya
• Fighting Terrorism: “Iraqi Freedom” and “Enduring Freedom”
• Terrorist Organizations: Al-Qaeda and ETA
• Current Hurdles in Combating Terrorism
• Ethnic, Racial and Religious Profiling in Terrorism
• Halal Food and Terrorist Organizations in Australia
• Osama Bin Laden’s Role in Terror
• Hospitals Security Upgrade: Terrorist or Criminal Actions
• Homeland Security: Basque ETA Terrorist Organization
• International Counter Terrorism’ Elements
• Terrorism: Aspects, Approaches and Implications
• Use of Torture Against Terror Suspects
• Bioterrorism: Biological Agents as Weapons
• Different Methods Against Terrorism: Israel and Palestine
• Terrorism: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
• Terrorism: Post-9/11 Maritime Security Initiatives in the USA
• Bio-Terrorism Preparedness and Response
• Jonathan Moreno: Bioethics After the Terror
• What is the Best Way for Fighting Terrorism According to Mortenson?
• The Advanced Community Planning in Response to the Potential Threat of Terrorism
• The Impacts of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 on the National Intelligence Community
• War on Terrorism: How to Cope With the Global Threat?
• Terrorism and the Global Economies
• The Primary Causes of Terrorist Political Violence
• Terrorism as a Serious Threat
• Rumsfeld’s Memo & The War on Global Terrorism
• Terrorism Handling in Our Life
• Defense Imperatives: “Thwarting Terrorism & Bringing Terrorists to Justice”
• Understanding the Failure of the Global War on Terrorism and Suggestions for Future Strategies
• Counter-Terrorism and the Patriot Act
• Al-Qaeda as a Terrorist Organization
• Financial Markets After Terrorist Assault and The Enron Financial Outrage
• Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Intelligence
• Torture as a Counter-Terrorism Tool in 21st Century
• Lessons From the Mumbai Terrorist Attacks
• Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to Rogue States and International Terrorists
• Does Poverty Lead to Terrorism?
• Terrorism and Jihadist Movement
• US Exceptionalism in Constructing and Conceptualizing a Terrorist
• American Exceptionalism in Constructing and Conceptualizing a Terrorist
• History of Cyber Terrorism
• “Monsters, Inc.” and the War on Terror
• Economic Concerns in the Aftermath of Terrorism
• Terrorism in International Relations
• Terrorism in Israel and Palestine
• Local, State, and Federal Partnerships: Terrorism
• Hezbollah: A Terrorist Organisation?
• United States Domestic Terrorism
• Impacts of the ‘War on Terror’ on Human Rights
• International Terrorism: The Challenge to Global Security
• Salafist Takfiri Terrorism
• Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism
• Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Terrorist Threat
• Terrorists’ Usage of Chemical or Biological Agents
• Cyber Security Threat Posed by a Terrorist Group
• The Effect of Terrorism on Human Rights: The Clash Between the Human Rights Advocates and Victims of Terrorism
• Eliminating Terrorism at the Domestic Level
• Terrorism, Poverty and Financial Instability
• United States War on Terror Policy
• The Real Cause of Terrorism in Palestine
• Terrorism: Searching for a Definition
• Industrial Terrorism in Modern World
• Terrorist Cells and Groups Within the Northern Region of Africa
• Terrorism as a Communication Strategy
• How the U.S. Can Combat the Terrorist Threat in Africa?
• Hypothetical Scenario of a Terrorist Attack
• NYPD Counterterrorism Program
• Terrorism Before and After the September 11 Attacks
• U.S. War in Afghanistan: Pros and Cons
• Orientalist Constructions of Muslim Bodies and the Rhetoric of the «War on Terror»
• Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Group
• The U.S. Government Strategies Against the Terrorist Threats
• How Readily Terrorists Can Acquire Nuclear Weapons
• Post September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks
• Civil Liberties, Habeas Corpus and War on Terror
• Concept of Terrorism Phenomenon in Modern World
• Handling of Bio-Terrorist Threats
• The Spectacle of Terror
• Foreign Policy: United States and Fight with Terrorism
• Law Enforcement and Terrorism
• What New Demands on Policing Have Resulted From the International ‘War on Terror’?
• Leila Khaled: Freedom Fighter or Terrorist?
• Religious and Secular Terrorism: Analyzing Differences and Points of Intersection
• “Arabic Islamic Culture” and Terrorism: Inherent Concepts or Not?
• Terrorist Acts Prevention and Aftermaths Minimization
• Torture During the Algerian War and Its Relevance on the War on Terror
• The Definition of Terrorism
• International Terrorism: The Operations of the Hezbollah
• The Kurdish Conflict in the Middle East
• The US Anti-Terrorism Efforts Are Failing
• The Media and Terrorism
• Terrorist Groups in Turkey
• Terrorism: The United States’ Involvement
• Terrorism: Can Terrorism Ever Be Justified?
• America’s War on Terrorism
• Terrorism, Its Groups and Categories
• Terrorism in Political Protest
• Impact of Terrorism on Italian Economy
• “What Is the Definition of Terrorism? And Why Is the White House Afraid of Using the Term?” by Timothy Kelly
• Habeas Corpus and the War on Terror
• Civil Liberties, Habeas Corpus and the War on Terror
• Benefits of Preparing for Emergencies and Terrorism
• Preparing for Incidents of Terrorism at the Local Level
• Domestic Terrorism in the Post 9/11 Era
• Bush Doctrine, Explanation of the Administration and War on Terror
• Moral Convictions of Terrorists
• Why Terrorism is a Contested Concept
• Presidential Powers and the War on Terror
• Agro-Terrorism: The Lessons to Learn
• Terrorism: The War on Iraq
• Stereotyping Comparison: All Italians Are in a Mob, All Jamaicans Smoke Weed, All Muslims Are Terrorists
• The Al-Qaida Terrorist Group’s Recent Happenings
• The Fight Against Terrorism by Christian and Islam Leaders
• Is Terrorism Ever Justified?
• The War on Terrorism
• The Terrorist Attacks in the United States
• The Problems of Terrorism in Modern World
• Counter-Terrorism Plans Development
• Consequence Management After the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks
• Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act
• Terror and Terrorism
• September 11: Terror Attack and Huge Casualties
• The Concept of Terrorism
• Homeland Security: Collecting Information about Terrorism
• Terrorists and the Left and Right: Definitions & Examples
• Should the USA Use Drones to Combat Terrorism?
• How Are Terrorists Financing Their Acts of Terrorism?
• What Can History Teach Us About Terrorism?
• Why Do Americans Feel More Sympathy for Western Terrorism?
• How Can the United States of America Better Defend Itself Against Terrorism?
• Can the U.S. Prevent Future Acts of Domestic Terrorism?
• What Has Been the Effect of Globalization on Terrorism?
• How Can Businesses Cope With Terrorism?
• Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?
• Should the U.S. Government Be Scared of Cyber Terrorism?
• Why Does Western Europe Experience More Terrorism Than America?
• Are Terrorism and Globalization Linked to Politics?
• What Are the Causes of Terrorism, and How Can It Be Stopped?
• Are Muslim Communities Affected by Counter-Terrorism Legislation?
• Does American Foreign Policy Cause Terrorism?
• Does the Media Encourage Terrorism?
• Does the Terrorism Act Infringe Upon Our Human Rights?
• What Challenges Are Posed by International Terrorism to Democracy?
• How Can the Digital World Lead to a New Type of Terrorism?
• Whose Support Matters for the Occurrence of Terrorism?
• How America Prevents Terrorism?
• Does Higher Education Decrease Support for Terrorism?
• Can Foreign Aid Dampen the Threat of Terrorism to International Trade?
• Should Americans Fear Urban Terrorism?
• Can Illegal Immigration Lead to Terrorism?
• Does Distinguishing Domestic Terrorism From International Terrorism Help?
• Will the American Economy Benefit From the War Against Terrorism?
• Are Some Rights Negotiable When It Comes to Fighting Terrorism?
• Why Has Terrorism Become Such an Important Issue Over the Last 40 Years?
• Will Terrorism Lose Its Significance?
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

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Before the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the subject of terrorism did not loom large in philosophical discussion. Philosophical literature in English amounted to a few monographs and a single collection of papers devoted solely, or largely, to questions to do with terrorism. Articles on the subject in philosophy journals were few and far between; neither of the two major philosophy encyclopedias had an entry. The attacks of September 11 and their aftermath put terrorism on the philosophical agenda: it is now the topic of numerous books, journal articles, special journal issues, and conferences.

While social sciences study the causes, main varieties, and consequences of terrorism and history traces and attempts to explain the way terrorism has evolved over time, philosophy focuses on two fundamental—and related—questions. The first is conceptual: What is terrorism? The second is moral: Can terrorism ever be morally justified?

Philosophers have offered a range of positions on both questions. With regard to the problem of defining terrorism, the dominant approach seeks to acknowledge the core meaning “terrorism” has in common use. Terrorism is understood as a type of violence. Many definitions highlight the experience of terror or fear as the proximate aim of that violence. Neither violence nor terror is inflicted for its own sake, but rather for the sake of a further aim such as coercion, or some more specific political objective. But there are also definitions that sever the conceptual connection of terrorism with violence or with terror. With regard to the moral standing of terrorism, philosophers differ both on how that is to be determined and what the determination is. Consequentialists propose to judge terrorism, like everything else, in light of its consequences. Nonconsequentialists argue that its moral status is not simply a matter of what consequences, on balance, terrorism has, but is rather determined, whether solely or largely, by what it is. Positions on the morality of terrorism range from justification when its consequences on balance are good, or when some deontological moral requirements are satisfied, to its absolute, or almost absolute, rejection.

Philosophers working in applied philosophy have also sought to complement the discussions of terrorism in general with case studies—studies of the role and rights and wrongs of terrorism in particular conflicts, such as “the Troubles” in Northern Ireland (George 2000; Simpson 2004; Shanahan 2009), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Ashmore 1997; Gordon and Lopez 2000; Primoratz 2006; Kapitan 2008; Law (ed.) 2008), and the bombing of German cities in World War II (Grayling 2006; Primoratz 2010).

1.1.1 The reign of terror

1.1.2 propaganda by the deed, 1.1.3 the state as terrorist, 1.1.4 terrorists and freedom fighters, 1.2.1 violence and terror, 1.2.2 wide and narrow definitions, 1.2.3 some idiosyncratic definitions, 2.1 complicity of the victims, 2.2.1 terrorism justified, 2.2.2 terrorism unjustified, 2.3.1 basic human rights and distributive justice, 2.3.2 supreme emergency and moral disaster, 2.3.3 terrorism absolutely wrong, books, book chapters, and articles, special journal issues, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the conceptual issue.

The history of terrorism is probably coextensive with the history of political violence. The term “terrorism”, however, is relatively recent: it has been in use since late 18th century. Its use has repeatedly shifted in some significant respects. Moreover, in contemporary political discourse the word is often employed as a polemical term whose strong emotional charge occludes its somewhat vague descriptive meaning. All this tends to get in the way of sustained rational discussion of the nature and moral standing of terrorism and the best ways of coping with it.

1.1 “Terrorism” from the French Revolution to the early 21st century

When it first entered public discourse in the West, the word “terrorism” meant the reign of terror the Jacobins imposed in France from the fall of 1793 to the summer of 1794. Its ultimate aim was the reshaping of both society and human nature. That was to be achieved by destroying the old regime, suppressing all enemies of the revolutionary government, and inculcating and enforcing civic virtue. A central role in attaining these objectives was accorded to revolutionary tribunals which had wide authority, were constrained by very few rules of procedure, and saw their task as carrying out revolutionary policy rather than meting out legal justice of the more conventional sort. They went after “enemies of the people”, actual or potential, proven or suspected; the law on the basis of which they were operating “enumerated just who the enemies of the people might be in terms so ambiguous as to exclude no one” (Carter 1989: 142). The standard punishment was death. Trials and executions were meant to strike terror in the hearts of all who lacked civic virtue; the Jacobins believed that was a necessary means of consolidating the new regime. This necessity provided both the rationale of the reign of terror and its moral justification. As Robespierre put it, terror was but “an emanation of virtue”; without it, virtue remained impotent. Accordingly, the Jacobins applied the term to their own actions and policies quite unabashedly, without any negative connotations.

Yet the term “terrorism” and its cognates soon took on very strong negative connotations. Critics of the excesses of the French Revolution had watched its reign with horror from the start. Terrorism came to be associated with drastic abuse of power and related to the notion of tyranny as rule based on fear, a recurring theme in political philosophy.

In the second half of the 19th century, there was a shift in both descriptive and evaluative meaning of the term. Disillusioned with other methods of political struggle, some anarchist and other revolutionary organizations, and subsequently some nationalist groups too, took to political violence. They had come to the conclusion that words were not enough, and what was called for were deeds: extreme, dramatic deeds that would strike at the heart of the unjust, oppressive social and political order, generate fear and despair among its supporters, demonstrate its vulnerability to the oppressed, and ultimately force political and social change. This was “propaganda by the deed”, and the deed was for the most part assassination of royalty or highly placed government officials. Unlike the Jacobins’ reign of terror, which operated in a virtually indiscriminate way, this type of terrorism—as both advocates and critics called it—was largely employed in a highly discriminate manner. This was especially true of Russian revolutionary organizations such as People’s Will or Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR): they held that it was morally justified to assassinate a government official only if his complicity in the oppressive regime was significant enough for him to deserve to die, and the assassination would make an important contribution to the struggle. Their violence steered clear of other, uninvolved or insufficiently involved persons. Some instances of “propaganda by the deed” carried out by French and Spanish anarchists in the 1880s and 1890s were indiscriminate killings of common citizens; but that was an exception, rather than the rule. The perpetrators and some of those sympathetic to their cause claimed those acts were nevertheless morally legitimate, whether as retribution (exacted on the assumption that no member of the ruling class was innocent) or as a means necessary for the overthrow of the unjust order. Accordingly, in their parlance, too, the term “terrorism” implied no censure. When used by others, it conveyed a strong condemnation of the practice.

The terrorism employed by both sides in the Russian Revolution and Civil War was in important respects a throwback to that of the Jacobins. The government set up in Russia by the victorious Bolsheviks was totalitarian. So was the Nazi rule in Germany. Both sought to impose total political control on society. Such a radical aim could only be pursued by a similarly radical method: by terrorism directed by an extremely powerful political police at an atomized and defenseless population. Its success was due largely to its arbitrary character—to the unpredictability of its choice of victims. In both countries, the regime first suppressed all opposition; when it no longer had any opposition to speak of, political police took to persecuting “potential” and “objective opponents”. In the Soviet Union, it was eventually unleashed on victims chosen at random. Totalitarian terrorism is the most extreme and sustained type of state terrorism. As Hannah Arendt put it, “terror is the essence of totalitarian domination”, and the concentration camp is “the true central institution of totalitarian organizational power” (Arendt 1958: 464, 438). While students of totalitarianism talked of terrorism as its method of rule, representatives of totalitarian regimes, sensitive to the pejorative connotation of the word, portrayed the practice as defense of the state from internal enemies.

However, state terrorism is not the preserve of totalitarian regimes. Some non-totalitarian states have resorted to terrorism against enemy civilians as a method of warfare, most notably when the RAF and USAAF bombed German and Japanese cities in World War II (see Lackey 2004). Those who designed and oversaw these campaigns never publicly described them as “terror bombing”, but that was how they often referred to them in internal communications.

After the heyday of totalitarian terrorism in the 1930s and 1940s, internal state terrorism continued to be practiced by military dictatorships in many parts of the world, albeit in a less sustained and pervasive way. But the type of terrorism that came to the fore in the second half of the 20th century and in early 21st century is that employed by insurgent organizations. Many movements for national liberation from colonial rule resorted to it, either as the main method of struggle or as a tactic complementing guerrilla warfare. So did some separatist movements. Some organizations driven by extreme ideologies, in particular on the left, took to terrorism as the way of trying to destroy what they considered an unjust, oppressive economic, social and political system. This type of terrorism is, by and large, indiscriminate in its choice of target: it attacks men and women of whatever political (or apolitical) views, social class, and walk of life; young and old, adults and children. It shoots at people, or blows them up by planting bombs, in office buildings, markets, cafes, cinemas, places of religious worship, on buses or planes, or in other vulnerable public places. It also takes people hostage, by hijacking planes and in other ways.

As “terrorism” has by now acquired a very strong pejorative meaning, no-one applies the word to their own actions or to actions and campaigns of those they sympathize with. Insurgents practicing terrorism portray their actions as struggle for liberation and seek to be considered and treated as soldiers rather than terrorists or criminals. They often depict their enemy—the alien government, or the agencies of the social, political and economic system—as the “true terrorists”. For them, the test of terrorism is not what is done , but rather what the ultimate aim of doing it is. If the ultimate aim is liberation or justice, the violence used in order to attain it is not terrorism, whereas the violence aiming at maintaining oppression or injustice, or some of the “structural violence” embodying it, is. On the other hand, governments tend to paint all insurgent violence with the brush of “terrorism”. Government spokespersons and pro-government media typically assume that terrorism is by definition something done by non-state agents, and that a state can never be guilty of terrorism (although it can sponsor terrorist organizations). For them, the test of terrorism is not what is done , but who does it. When a state agency uses violence, it is an act of war, or reprisal, or defense of the security of the state and its citizens; when an insurgent group does the same, it is terrorism. Under these circumstances, one person’s terrorist is indeed another’s freedom fighter, and public debate about terrorism is largely conducted at cross purposes and to little effect. Attempts of the United Nations to propose a definition of “terrorism” that could be accepted by all states and embedded in international law so far have been frustrated by the same sort of relativism. Islamic countries would accept no definition that allowed national liberation movements in the Middle East and Kashmir to be portrayed as terrorist, whereas Western countries would accept no definition that allowed for state agencies to be guilty of terrorism.

1.2 Two core traits of terrorism and two types of definition

The evaluative meaning of “terrorism” has shifted considerably more than once. So has its descriptive meaning, but to a lesser degree. Whatever else the word may have meant, its ordinary use over more than two centuries has typically indicated two things: violence and intimidation (the causing of great fear or terror, terrorizing). The dominant approach to the conceptual question in philosophical literature reflects this. Terrorism is usually understood as a type of violence. This violence is not blind or sadistic, but rather aims at intimidation and at some further political, social, or religious goal or, more broadly, at coercion.

That is how (political) “terrorism” is defined by Per Bauhn in the first philosophical book-length study in English:

The performance of violent acts, directed against one or more persons, intended by the performing agent to intimidate one or more persons and thereby to bring about one or more of the agent’s political goals (Bauhn 1989: 28).

Another good example of a mainstream definition is provided in C.A.J. Coady’s article on terrorism in the Encyclopedia of Ethics :

The tactic of intentionally targeting non-combatants [or non-combatant property, when significantly related to life and security] with lethal or severe violence … meant to produce political results via the creation of fear (Coady 2001: 1697).

Yet another example is the definition proposed by Igor Primoratz:

The deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating some other people into a course of action they otherwise would not take (Primoratz 2013: 24).

These definitions put aside both the question of who the actor is and the question of what their ultimate objectives are, and focus on what is done and what the proximate aim of doing it is. They present terrorism as a way of acting that could be adopted by different agents and serve various ultimate objectives (most, but perhaps not all of them, political). It can be employed by states or by non-state agents, and may promote national liberation or oppression, revolutionary or conservative causes (and possibly pursue some nonpolitical aims as well). One can be a terrorist and a freedom fighter; terrorism is not the monopoly of enemies of freedom. One can hold high government or military office and design or implement a terrorist campaign; terrorism is not the preserve of insurgents. In this way much of the relativism concerning who is and who is not a terrorist that has plagued contemporary public debate (see 1.1.4 above) can be overcome.

Beyond concurring that violence and intimidation constitute the core of terrorism, the definitions quoted above differ in several respects. Does only actual violence count, or do threats of violence also qualify? Must terrorist violence be directed against life and limb, or does violence against (some) property also count? Does terrorism always seek to attain some political goal, or can there be non-political (e.g. criminal) terrorism? All these points are minor. There is also one major difference: while Coady and Primoratz define terrorism as violence against non-combatants or innocent people, respectively, Bauhn’s definition includes no such restriction. Definitions of the former type can be termed “narrow”, and those of the latter sort “wide”. Philosophical literature on terrorism abounds in instances of both types.

Should we adopt a wide or a narrow definition? A wide definition encompasses the entire history of “terrorism” from the Jacobins to the present, and is more in accord with current ordinary use. A narrow definition departs from much ordinary use by restricting terrorist violence to that directed at non-combatants or innocent persons. Thus it leaves out most of 19th century “propaganda by the deed” and political violence perpetrated by Russian revolutionaries which they themselves and the public called terrorist.

For these reasons, historians of terrorism normally work with a wide definition, and social scientists do so much of the time. But philosophers may well prefer a narrow definition. They focus on the moral standing of terrorism and need a definition that is particularly helpful in moral discourse. Morally speaking, surely there is a difference—for some, a world of difference—between planting a bomb in a government building and killing a number of highly placed officials of (what one considers) an unjust and oppressive government, and planting a bomb in a tea shop and killing a random collection of common citizens, including children. While both acts raise serious moral issues, these issues are not identical, and running them together under the same heading of “terrorism” will likely hamper, rather than help, discerning moral assessment.

Narrow definitions are revisionary, but (unlike those discussed in the next section) not implausibly so. They focus on the traits of terrorism that cause most of us to view the practice with deep moral repugnance: (i) violence (ii) against non-combatants (or, alternatively, against innocent people) for the sake of (iii) intimidation (and, on some definitions, (iv) coercion). In highlighting (ii), they relate the issue of terrorism to the ethics of war and one of the fundamental principles of just war theory, that of non-combatant immunity. They help distinguish terrorism from acts of war proper and political assassination, which do not target non-combatants or common citizens. It does not matter very much whether the victims of terrorism are described as “non-combatants” or “innocent people”, as each term is used in a technical sense, and both refer to those who have not lost their immunity against lethal or other extreme violence by being directly involved in, or highly responsible for, (what terrorists consider) insufferable injustice or oppression. In war, these are innocent civilians; in a violent conflict that falls short of war, these are common citizens.

Talk of involvement of individuals and groups in injustice or oppression raises the question: is the injustice or oppression at issue, and thus the standing of those implicated in it, to be determined by some objective criteria, or from the point of view of those who resort to violence? Coady chooses the former option. He approaches terrorism from the standpoint of just war theory and its principle of noncombatant immunity. “Combatants” is a technical term designating agents of aggression or, more broadly, “dangerous wrongdoers” or “agents of harm”; they are legitimate targets of potentially lethal violence. All others are noncombatants, and enjoy immunity from such violence (Coady 2004). This approach may not be difficult to apply in war, where the wrong or harm at issue is either aggression that needs to be repelled, or systematic and large-scale violations of human rights that provide the ground for humanitarian intervention. Issues of injustice or oppression that arise in an internal conflict that falls short of war, however, tend to be highly contentious: what some consider an imperfect, but basically morally legitimate political and social order, others may see as the epitome of injustice and oppression that must be overthrown, if need be by violence. Under such circumstances, when a highly placed political official is killed by insurgents, that may be characterized (and condemned) by many as an act of terrorism, while the insurgents and those sympathetic to their struggle may reject this characterization and portray (and justify) the killing as political assassination.

In order to avoid this kind of relativism, Primoratz puts forward a view that in one important respect takes on board the standpoint of the terrorist. The direct victims of terrorism are innocent in the sense of not being responsible, on any credible understanding of responsibility and liability, for the injustice or oppression the terrorists fight against—not responsible at all, or at least not responsible to the degree that makes them liable to be killed or maimed on that account. The injustice or oppression at issue need not be real; it may be merely alleged (by the terrorists). Being responsible for a merely alleged great injustice or oppression is enough for losing one’s immunity against violence, as far as the type of immunity and innocence relevant to defining terrorism is concerned. According to the traditional version of just war theory one does not lose immunity against acts of war only by fighting in an unjust war, but by fighting in any war. Similarly, one does not lose immunity against political violence only by holding office in or implementing policies of a gravely unjust government, but by holding office in or implementing policies of any government: as King Umberto I of Italy said after surviving an assassination attempt, such risk comes with the job. Members of these two classes are not considered innocent and morally protected against violence by those attacking them; the latter view their acts as acts of war proper or of political assassination, respectively. If the terrorists subscribe to a credible view of responsibility and liability, then, when they attack common citizens, they attack people innocent from their own point of view, i.e., innocent even if we grant the terrorists their assessment of the policies at issue. (This is not to say that those who consider a government to be gravely unjust have a moral license to kill its officials, but only that if they do so, that will not be terrorism, but rather political assassination. We can still condemn their actions if we reject their judgment of the policies at issue, or if we accept that judgment, but believe that they should have opposed those policies by nonviolent means. But we will not be condemning their actions qua terrorism.)

On this account, not only real, but also merely alleged injustice or oppression counts in determining the innocence of the victims and deciding which acts are acts of terrorism; thus such decisions are not hostage to endless debates about the moral status of contested policies. Nevertheless, a residue of relativity remains. The account presupposes a certain understanding of responsibility and liability: a person is responsible for a state of affairs only by virtue of that person’s voluntary, i.e., informed and free, act or omission that has a sufficiently strong connection with that state of affairs, and thereby becomes liable to some proportionately unfavorable response. Provided the terrorists accept some such understanding of responsibility and liability, they kill and maim people they themselves must admit to be innocent. To be sure, some militant organizations resort to violence which we perceive as terrorist, yet object to the label. They profess a view of responsibility and liability based on extremely far-fetched connections between states of affairs and human choices and actions, and argue that entire social classes or nations are responsible for certain policies and practices and all their members are liable to be attacked by deadly violence (for more on this, see 2.1 below). Such arguments can only be regarded as preposterous. We should insist on viewing their actions as terrorist, although they reject this description. It is not clear how this residue of relativity could be removed (Primoratz 2013: 16–21).

Some object to defining “terrorism” as violence against non-combatants or innocent persons. They argue that doing so runs together the question of the nature of terrorism and that of its moral status, and begs the moral issue by making terrorism unjustified by definition. We should rather keep these questions separate, and take care not to prejudge the latter by giving a wrong answer to the former. What is needed is a morally neutral definition of terrorism, and that means a wide one (Corlett 2003: 114–20, 134–35; Young 2004: 57). But it is doubtful that “terrorism” can be defined in some morally untainted way. The wide definitions these philosophers adopt contain the word “violence”, which is itself morally loaded. A narrow definition is not completely morally neutral, as violence against the innocent is clearly morally wrong. But what is clear is that such violence is prima facie wrong. The definition implies a general presumption against terrorism, not its sweeping moral condemnation in each and every instance, whatever the circumstances and whatever the consequences of desisting from it. The definition does not rule out that in certain circumstances it might not be wrong, all things considered. Ethical investigation is not preempted: a particular case of terrorism still needs to be judged on its merits.

Another way of settling the issue of wide vs. narrow definition is offered by Georg Meggle. He adopts a wide definition of terrorism, and goes on to distinguish two different types: terrorism in the strong sense, which deliberately, recklessly, or negligently harms innocent people, and terrorism in the weak sense, which does not. Obviously, the moral assessment of the two types of terrorism is going to be significantly different (Meggle 2005).

The vast majority of cases almost anyone without an ax to grind would want to classify as “terrorism” exhibit the two traits implied in ordinary use and highlighted by mainstream philosophical definitions such as those quoted above: violence and intimidation. But philosophical literature also offers definitions that leave out one or the other core component.

Some seek to sever the connection between terrorism and violence. Carl Wellman defines terrorism as “the use or attempted use of terror as a means of coercion”. Terrorism is often associated with violence, but that is because violence is a very effective means of intimidation. Yet “violence is not essential to terrorism and, in fact, most acts of terrorism are nonviolent” (Wellman 1979: 250–51). The last claim seems false on any non-circular interpretation. There may be many acts generally considered terrorist that do not involve actual violence, but are meant to intimidate by threatening it; but that is not enough to support the notion of “non-violent terrorism”, which seems odd. So does Wellman’s example of “classroom terrorism”: a professor threatens to fail students who submit their essays after the due date, causes panic in class, and thereby engages in terrorism.

Robert E. Goodin offers a similar account, emphasizing the political role of terrorism: terrorism is “a political tactic, involving the deliberate frightening of people for political advantage” (Goodin 2006: 49). This, he claims, is the distinctive wrong terrorists commit. Whereas on Wellman’s account one can commit an act of terrorism without either engaging in or threatening violence, merely by making a threat in order to intimidate, on Goodin’s account one need not even make a threat: one acts as a terrorist by merely issuing a warning about the acts of others that is meant to intimidate. This, too, seems arbitrary, although it makes sense as a step in an argument meant to show that “ if (or insofar as ) Western political leaders are intending to frighten people for their own political advantage, then (to that extent ) they are committing the same core wrong that is distinctively associated with terrorism” (Goodin 2006: 2).

It has also been suggested that terrorism need not be understood as inducing terror or fear. According to Ted Honderich, terrorism is best defined as “violence, short of war, political, illegal and prima facie wrong” (Honderich 2006: 88). This definition might be thought problematic on several counts, but the idea of “terrorism” without “terror” seems especially odd. The two are connected etymologically and historically, and this connection is deeply entrenched in current ordinary use. Intimidation is not the morally salient trait of terrorism ( pace Goodin), but it is one of its core traits that cause most of us to condemn the practice. We might consider severing the connection if Honderich offered a good reason for doing so. But he supports his highly revisionary definition by the puzzling claim that to define terrorism as violence meant to intimidate is to imply that terrorism is particularly abhorrent and thereby “in effect … invite a kind of prima facie approval or tolerance of war” (Honderich 2006: 93).

2. The moral issue

Can terrorism be morally justified? There is no single answer to this question, as there is no single conception of what terrorism is. If we put aside definitions that depart too much, and for no compelling reason, from the core meaning of “terrorism” (such as those cited in 1.2.3), we still need to decide whether the question assumes a wide or a narrow understanding of terrorism. A narrow conception of terrorism seems to be better suited to ethical investigation (1.2.2). Moreover, philosophers who work with a wide definition typically hold that terrorism that targets non-combatants or innocent persons is much more difficult to justify than “selective” terrorism which attacks only those who cannot plausibly claim innocence of the injustice or oppression at issue (and which accordingly does not count as “terrorism” on a narrow definition of the term). The present discussion therefore focuses on terrorism understood as violence against innocent civilians or common citizens, intended to intimidate and thereby to achieve some further (political) objective or, more broadly, to coerce.

One might try to justify some acts or campaigns of violence of this kind in two ways. One could argue that the victims may be non-combatants or common citizens, but nevertheless are not innocent of the wrongs the terrorists are fighting against. Alternatively, one could concede the innocence of the victims and argue that attacks on them are nevertheless justified, either by their consequences on balance, or by some deontological considerations.

If the former line of argument is successful, will it prove too much? In showing that an instance of violence was justified because those targeted were not really innocent, we will have shown that the act or campaign of violence at issue was actually not a case of terrorism. This may be merely a matter of semantics. There is a much more damaging objection. A terrorist act is characteristically the killing or injuring of a random collection of people who happen to be in a certain place at a certain time. Arguments to the effect that those people are not innocent of the wrongs the terrorist fights against will therefore have a very wide reach, and accordingly will be based on some simplistic conception of collective responsibility. These arguments will be of the sort offered, for example, by the 19th century anarchist Emile Henry. He planted a bomb at the office of a mining company which, if it had exploded, would have killed or injured a number of people who did not work for the company, but lived in the same building. He also planted a bomb in a café that did go off, injuring twenty people, one of whom later died of his injuries. At his trial, Henry explained: “What about the innocent victims? […] The building where the Carmeaux Company had its offices was inhabited only by the bourgeois; hence there would be no innocent victims. The whole of the bourgeoisie lives by the exploitation of the unfortunate, and should expiate its crimes together” (Henry 1977: 193). When commenting on the second attack, he said:

Those good bourgeois who hold no office but who reap their dividends and live idly on the profits of the workers’ toil, they also must take their share in the reprisals. And not only they, but all those who are satisfied with the existing order, who applaud the acts of the government and so become its accomplices … in other words, the daily clientele of Terminus and other great cafés! (Henry 1977: 195)

This is an utterly implausible view of responsibility and liability. It claims that all members of a social class—men and women, young and old, adults and children—are liable to be killed or maimed: some for operating the system of exploitation, others for supporting it, and still others for benefiting from it. Even if, for the sake of argument, we grant the anarchist’s harsh moral condemnation of capitalist society, not every type and degree of involvement with it can justify the use of extreme violence. Giving the system political support, or benefiting from it, may be morally objectionable, but is surely not enough to make one liable to be blown to pieces.

Another, more recent example, is provided by Osama Bin Laden. In an interview in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001 he said:

The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their government and that they voted for their president. Their government makes weapons and provides them to Israel, which they use to kill Palestinian Muslims. Given that the American Congress is a committee that represents the people, the fact that it agrees with the actions of the American government proves that America in its entirety is responsible for the atrocities that it is committing against Muslims (Bin Laden 2005: 140–141).

This, too, is a preposterous understanding of responsibility and liability. For it claims that all Americans are eligible to be killed or maimed: some for devising and implementing America’s policies, others for participating in the political process, still others for paying taxes. Even if, for the sake of argument, we grant Bin Laden’s severe condemnation of those policies, not every type and degree of involvement with them can justify the use of lethal violence. Surely voting in elections or paying taxes is not enough to make one fair game.

Attempts at justification of terrorism that concede that its victims are innocent seem more promising. They fall into two groups, depending on the type of ethical theory on which they are based.

2.2 Consequentialism

Adherents of consequentialism judge terrorism, like every other practice, solely by its consequences. Terrorism is not considered wrong in itself, but only if it has bad consequences on balance. The innocence of the victims does not change that. This is an instance of a general trait of consequentialism often highlighted by its critics, for example in the debate about the moral justification of legal punishment. A standard objection to the consequentialist approach to punishment has been that it implies that punishment of the innocent is justified, when its consequences are good on balance. This objection can only get off the ground because consequentialism denies that in such matters a person’s innocence is morally significant in itself.

Those who consider terrorism from a consequentialist point of view differ in their assessment of its morality. Their judgment on terrorism depends on their view of the good to be promoted by its use and on their assessment of the utility of terrorism as a means of promoting it. There is room for disagreement on both issues.

Kai Nielsen approaches questions to do with political violence in general and terrorism in particular as a consequentialist in ethics and a socialist in politics. The use of neither can be ruled out categorically; it all depends on their utility as a method for attaining morally and politically worthwhile objectives such as “a truly socialist society” or liberation from colonial rule. “When and where [either] should be employed is a tactical question that must be decided … on a case-by-case basis … like the choice of weapon in a war” (Nielsen 1981: 435). Nielsen has a wide definition of terrorism, but his examples show that the innocence of the victims of terrorism makes no difference to its justification—that is, that his conclusions apply to terrorism in both the wide and narrow sense. In his view,

terrorist acts must be justified by their political effects and their moral consequences. They are justified (1) when they are politically effective weapons in the revolutionary struggle and (2) when, everything considered, there are sound reasons for believing that, by the use of that type of violence rather than no violence at all or violence of some other type, there will be less injustice, suffering and degradation in the world than would otherwise have been the case (Nielsen 1981: 446).

Historical experience, in Nielsen’s view, tells us that terrorism on a small scale, used as the sole method of struggle in order to provoke the masses into revolutionary action, is ineffective and often counterproductive. On the other hand, terrorism employed in conjunction with guerrilla warfare in a protracted war of liberation may well prove useful and therefore also justified, as it did in Algeria and South Vietnam. (For an earlier statement of the same view, see Trotsky 1961: 48–59, 62–65.)

Nicholas Fotion also uses a wide definition of terrorism. He, too, is a consequentialist (although some of his remarks concerning the innocence of many victims of terrorism might be more at home in nonconsequentialist ethics). But he finds standard consequentialist assessments of terrorism such as Nielsen’s too permissive. If some types of terrorism are justifiable under certain circumstances, such circumstances will be extremely rare. Terrorists and their apologists do not perform the requisite calculations properly. One problem is the “higher good” to be promoted by terrorism: more often than not, it is defined in ideological terms, rather than derived from settled preferences or interests of actual people. But for the most part Fotion discusses the issue of means. If a terrorist act or campaign is to be justified instrumentally, it must be shown (1) that the end sought is good enough to justify the means, (2) that the end will indeed be achieved by means of terrorism, and (3) that the end cannot be achieved in any other way that is morally and otherwise less costly. Terrorists not only, as a matter of fact, fail to discharge this burden; Fotion argues that, with regard to terrorism that victimizes innocent people, it cannot be discharged. All direct victims of terrorism are treated as objects to be used—indeed, used up—by the terrorist. But

in being treated as an object, the innocent victim is worse off than the (alleged) guilty victim. Insofar as the latter is judged to have done a wrong, he is thought of as a human. […] For the terrorist the innocent victim is neither a human in this judgmental sense nor a human in the sense of simply having value as a human being. Of course the terrorist needs to pick a human being as a victim … because [that] brings about more terror … But this does not involve treating them as humans. Rather, they are victimized and thereby treated as objects because they are humans (Fotion 1981: 464).

In reply, terrorists can claim that they advisedly sacrifice valued human beings for a higher good. But for this claim to carry any conviction, they would have to show that they have no alternative. Yet, Fotion argues, they always have the alternative of taking on the opponent’s military establishment, and often also have the option of going after government officials responsible for the wrongs they object to, instead of attacking innocent persons. That kind of terrorism may sometimes be justified, whereas terrorism that targets innocent people never is.

2.3 Nonconsequentialism

Within a nonconsequentialist approach to morality, terrorism is considered wrong in itself, because of what it is, rather than only because (and insofar as) its consequences are bad on balance. But this is not to say that this approach leaves no room whatever for morally justifying certain acts or campaigns of terrorism. Indeed, nonconsequentialist discussions of terrorism also present a range of positions and arguments.

A nonconsequentialist might try to justify an act or campaign of terrorism in one of two ways. One might invoke some deontological considerations, such as justice or rights, in favor of resorting to terrorism under certain circumstances. Alternatively, one might argue that the obvious, and obviously very weighty, considerations of rights (of the victims of terrorism) and justice (which demands respect for those rights) may sometimes be overridden by extremely weighty considerations of consequences—an extremely high price that would be paid for not resorting to terrorism. For the rejection of consequentialism is of course not tantamount to denying that consequences of our actions, policies, and practices matter in their moral assessment; what is denied is the consequentialists’ claim that only consequences matter.

Virginia Held operates with a broad notion of terrorism, but her justification of terrorism is meant to apply to terrorism that targets common citizens. Her discussion of the subject focuses on the issue of rights. When rights of a person or group are not respected, what may we do in order to ensure that they are? On one view, known as consequentialism of rights, if the only way to ensure respect of a certain right of A and B is to infringe the same right of C , we shall be justified in doing so. Held does not hold that such trade-offs in rights with the aim of maximizing their respect in a society are appropriate. Yet rights sometimes come into conflict, whether directly or indirectly (as in the above example). When that happens, there is no way we can avoid comparing the rights involved as more or less stringent and making certain choices between them. That applies to the case of terrorism too. Terrorism obviously violates some human rights of its victims. But its advocates claim that in some circumstances a limited use of terrorism is the only way of bringing about a society where human rights of all will be respected.

Even when this claim is true, that is not enough to make resort to terrorism justified. But it will be justified if an additional condition is met: that of distributive justice. If there is a society where the human rights of a part of the population are respected, while the same rights of another part of the population are being violated; if the only way of changing that and ensuring that human rights of all are respected is a limited use of terrorism; finally, if terrorism is directed against members of the first group, which up to now has been privileged as far as respect of human rights is concerned—then terrorism will be morally justified. This is a justification in terms of distributive justice, applied to the problem of violations of human rights. It is more just to equalize the violations of human rights in a stage of transition to a society where the rights of all are respected, than to allow that the group which has already suffered large-scale violations of human rights suffer even more such violations (assuming that in both cases we are dealing with violations of the same, or equally stringent, human rights). The human rights of many are going to be violated in any case; it is more just, and therefore morally preferable, that their violations should be distributed in a more equitable way (Held 2008).

It might be objected that in calling for sacrificing such basic human rights as the right to life and to bodily security of individual victims of terrorism for the sake of a more just distribution of violations of the same rights within a group in the course of transition to a stage where these rights will be respected throughout that group, Held offends against the principles of separateness of persons and respect for persons (Primoratz 1997: 230–31). In response, Held argues that

to fail to achieve a more just distribution of violations of rights (through the use of terrorism if that is the only means available) is to fail to recognize that those whose rights are already not fairly respected are individuals in their own right, not merely members of a group … whose rights can be ignored.

An argument for achieving a just distribution of rights violations is not necessarily about groups; it can be an argument about the rights of individuals to fairness (Held 2008: 89–90). (For further objections to Held’s argument, see Steinhoff 2007: 125–30; Brooks 2010; Nath 2011.)

In Held’s justification of terrorism, it is justice that requires that inescapable violations of human rights be more evenly distributed. There is a different way of allowing for the use of terrorism under certain circumstances within a nonconsequentialist approach to the ethics of violence. It could be argued that, as far as justice and rights are concerned, terrorism (or, in Held’s terminology, the kind of terrorism that targets the innocent) is never justified. Furthermore, considerations of justice and rights carry much greater weight than considerations of good and bad consequences, and therefore normally trump the latter in cases of conflict. However, in exceptional circumstances considerations concerning consequences—the price of not resorting to terrorism—may be so extremely weighty as to override those of justice and rights.

Michael Walzer offers an argument along these lines in his discussion of “terror bombing” of German cities in World War II. In early 1942, it seemed that Britain would be defeated by Germany and that its military could not prevail while fighting in accordance with the rules of war. Britain was the only remaining obstacle to the subjugation of most of Europe by the Nazis. That was “an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an ideology and a practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were literally beyond calculation, immeasurably awful” (Walzer 2000: 253). Thus Britain was facing a “supreme emergency”: an (a) imminent threat of (b) something utterly unthinkable from a moral point of view. In such an emergency—a case of the “dirty hands” predicament that so often plagues political action (see Walzer 1973)—one may breach a basic and weighty moral principle such as civilian immunity, if that is the only hope of fending off the threat. So for more than three years, the RAF, later joined by the USAAF, deliberately devastated many German cities, killed about 600,000 civilians and seriously injured another 800,000 in an attempt to terrorize the German people into forcing their leadership to halt the war and surrender unconditionally. By early 1943 it was clear that Germany was not going to win the war, and all subsequent terror bombing lacked moral justification. But in its first year, in Walzer’s view, the terror bombing of Germany was morally justified as a response to the supreme emergency Britain was facing. Walzer then expands the notion of supreme emergency to apply to a single political community facing the threat of extermination or enslavement, and eventually to a single political community whose “survival and freedom” are at stake. For “the survival and freedom of political communities—whose members share a way of life, developed by their ancestors, to be passed on to their children—are the highest values of international society” (Walzer 2000: 254).

Here we have two different conceptions of supreme emergency. The threat is imminent in both, but the nature of the threat differs: it is one thing to suffer the fate the Nazis had in store for peoples they considered racially inferior, and another to have one’s polity dismantled. By moving back and forth between these two types of supreme emergency under the ambiguous heading of threat to “the survival and freedom of a political community”, Walzer seeks to extend to the latter the moral response that might be appropriate to the former. Yet whereas genocide, expulsion, or enslavement of an entire people might be thought a moral disaster that may be fended off by any means, its loss of political independence is, at most, a political disaster. If a polity to be dismantled lacks moral legitimacy, its demise may well be a moral improvement. But even if a polity does have moral legitimacy, a threat to its “survival and freedom” falls short of “an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives”. If so, its military cannot be justified in waging war on enemy civilians in order to defend it. (On supreme emergencies see, for instance, Statman 2006; Kaplan 2011.)

There is another, less permissive position constructed along similar lines, but based on a more austere view of what counts as a moral disaster that might justify resort to terrorism. Contrary to what many fighters against social or economic oppression, colonial rule, or foreign occupation believe, evils of such magnitude that they can justify indiscriminate killing and maiming of innocent people are extremely rare. Not every case of oppression, foreign rule, or occupation, however morally indefensible, amounts to a moral disaster in the relevant sense. Nor does every imminent threat to “the survival and freedom of a political community” qualify, contrary to what Walzer has argued. However, if an entire people is subjected to extermination, or to an attempt at “ethnically cleansing” it from its land, then it is facing a true moral disaster and may properly consider terrorism as a method of struggle against such a fate. In view of their enormity and finality, extermination and “ethnic cleansing” of an entire people constitute a category apart. To be sure, resorting to terrorism in such a case will be morally justified only if there are very good grounds for believing that terrorism will succeed where nothing else will: in preventing imminent extermination or “ethnic cleansing”, or stopping it if it is already under way. Cases where both conditions are met will be extremely rare. Indeed, history may not offer a single example. But that does not mean that no act or campaign of terrorism could ever satisfy these conditions and thus turn out to be justified. Accordingly, terrorism is almost absolutely wrong (Primoratz 2013: chapter 6).

Both the “supreme emergency” and the “moral disaster” view will justify a resort to terrorism only when that is the only way to deal with the emergency, or to prevent the disaster, respectively. Just how certain must we be that terrorism will indeed achieve the goal, while no other method will? One might argue that when in extremis , we cannot apply stringent epistemic standards in deciding how to cope—indeed, if we cannot really know what will work, we must take our chances with what might. This is Walzer’s view: in such a predicament, we must “wager” the crime of terrorism against the evil that is otherwise in store for us. “There is no option; the risk otherwise is too great” (Walzer 2000: 259–260). It may be objected that this position highlights the enormity of the threat, while failing to give due weight to the enormity of the means proposed for fending off the threat—the enormity of terrorism, of deliberately killing and maiming innocent people. When that is taken into account, the conclusion may rather be that even in extremis , if terrorism is to be justified, the reasons for believing that it will work and that nothing else will must be very strong indeed.

Some hold that terrorism is absolutely wrong. This position, too, comes in different versions. Some philosophers work with a wide definition of terrorism, and argue that under certain circumstances “selective” terrorism that targets only those seriously implicated in the wrongs at issue may be justified (Corlett 2003, Young 2004). This seems to suggest that terrorism which is not selective in this way—that is, terrorism in the narrow sense—is never justified. Yet this does not follow: there is still room for arguing that terrorism of the latter type can be justified by further considerations, such as those of “supreme emergency” or “moral disaster”.

Per Bauhn does not leave it at that. He attempts to show that terrorism that targets non-combatants or common citizens can never be justified by deploying a slightly amended version of Alan Gewirth’s ethical theory. Freedom and safety are fundamental prerequisites of action and therefore must be accorded paramount weight. The need to protect them generates a range of rights; the right pertinent here is “an absolute right not to be made the intended victims of a homicidal project” all innocent persons have (Gewirth 1981: 16). When the absolute status of this right is challenged by invoking supreme emergency or moral disaster, Bauhn argues that there is a moral difference between what we are positively and directly causally responsible for, and what we are causally responsible for only indirectly, by failing to prevent other persons from intentionally bringing it about. We are morally responsible for the former, but (except in certain special circumstances) not for the latter. If we refuse to resort to terrorism in order not to target innocent persons, and thus fail to prevent some other persons from perpetrating atrocities, it is only the perpetrators who will be morally responsible for those atrocities. Therefore we must refuse (Bauhn 1989: chapter 5).

Some philosophers base their absolute rejection of terrorism on the slippery slope argument, and argue that “the appeal to supreme emergency is too dangerous to be allowed as a publicly available vindication for terrorism, no matter how rare the circumstances are meant to be” (Coady 2021: 143–44).

Stephen Nathanson seeks to ground the absolute immunity of civilians or common citizens and the absolute prohibition of terrorism which it entails in a rule-consequentialist ethical theory (Nathanson 2010: 191–208). Adopting civilian immunity, rather than adopting any other rule regulating the matter or having no rule at all, is the best way to reduce the killing and destruction in armed conflict. Moreover, the best consequences will be achieved by adopting it as an absolute rule, rather than as a rule allowing for exceptions in supreme emergencies. The idea of supreme emergency is vague. The criteria for proffering supreme emergency exemptions are liable to be applied in arbitrary and subjective ways. Finally, there is the slippery slope argument: “permitting [departures from the rule of civilian immunity, including terrorism] even under the direst circumstances will lower the bar for justifying such acts … broadcast the message that such behavior may sometimes be justified and … thus lend its weight to increasing the use of such methods” (Nathanson 2010: 207).

However, one can adopt rule-consequentialism as one’s ethical theory and yet view the immunity of civilians or common citizens and the attendant prohibition of terrorism as very stringent, but not absolute moral rules. Thus Richard B. Brandt and Brad Hooker do not view this immunity as absolute. They argue that a set of moral rules selected because of the good consequences of their adoption should include a rule that allows and indeed requires one to prevent disaster even if that means breaking some other moral rule. Even such a stringent moral rule as the prohibition of deliberate use of violence against innocent people may be overridden, if the disaster that cannot be prevented in any other way is grave enough. (See Brandt 1992: 87–88, 150–51, 156–57; Hooker 2000: 98–99, 127–36). There is thus some convergence at the level of practical conclusions between their understanding of the immunity of civilians or common citizens and the “moral disaster” position outlined above (2.3.2).

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Thanks to Andrew Alexandra, Tony Coady, and Thomas Pogge for helpful comments on a draft of this article.

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The Philippines’ anti-terror bill is poised to cause more terror

The government needs to accept that there are no shortcuts to peace and retract the bill.

As the world is plagued by COVID-19, an impending anti-terrorism bill is creating more fear in the Philippines.

Recently passed by Congress , the bill is set to be signed into law by President Rodrigo Duterte. If this happens, the bill will not only suppress the fundamental rights and freedoms of Filipinos, it will also terrorise the same conflict-affected communities it seeks to protect, as it undoes decades of peacebuilding work.

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Despite protests against the bill and mounting calls to provide more time for deliberations, Congress has quietly fast-tracked its passage while the rest of the country braced for the impact of COVID-19. The bill will allow for a lengthened period of warrantless detention and expanded surveillance of those law enforcement deems suspicious. It will also remove stiff penalties for wrongful detention.  

Most importantly, the bill carries a vague definition of “terrorism” that offers little distinction between organisations that commit acts of terror and revolutionary armed movements, which is important for those doing mediation among warring parties. The bill will provide law enforcers with broad powers to determine what constitutes a “terrorist”, shifting the burden of proof to suspected individuals and organisations. This is not only a threat to dissent and democracy, but also to peace.

Threat to peace in Mindanao

For more than half a century, the Philippine government has been trying to quell secessionist and communist armed movements in the country.

Bangsamoro, an autonomous region in the south of the Philippines, is currently in transition after decades of fighting between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. While much remains to be done, significant strides have been taken , with a transitional regional government installed last year and the decommissioning of combatants and arms under way. These gains have been made possible primarily by the peace talks and reconciliation processes.

The ill-advised and shortsighted fear of the ISIL (ISIS) armed group taking root in Mindanao, and the increased framing of the communist armed movements as “terrorist”, distract the government from seeing the gains of dialogue and peacebuilding.

The threat of terrorism is real, but it is not the main threat to peace.

In fact, militaristic approaches to counterterrorism have caused the most suffering and displacements, prompted  breakdowns in ongoing peace processes , and given birth to more aggressive splinter groups like the Abu Sayyaf, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, and Maute Group.

Insensitivity to the local context and the peace process in prioritising fighting terrorists in Mamasapano in 2015 and Marawi in 2017 delayed the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law and undermined reconciliation across communities in the country. These should not be forgotten, and should not be repeated.

Opening old wounds

Due to a long history of discrimination, the Moro and Muslim minorities in the Philippines are often most affected not only by terrorist attacks but by harassment and warrantless arrests packaged as “counterterrorism”.

This profiling of Muslims as violent “terrorists” continues to this day. In January, it was discovered that the Manila Police District was collating information about Muslim youth and students in the National Capital Region for its “ preventing violent extremism” initiatives .

Two months before, in November 2019, the police barged into the office of a long-established Mindanao-based peacebuilding organisation , without a warrant, checked the living quarters, and inspected the bags of young Moros from Marawi who were attending a psychosocial support training.

Being a woman while being both Moro and Muslim adds another layer of vulnerability, especially with the heightened visibility that comes with wearing a headscarf. Women widowed by war and children orphaned by conflict are also disproportionately affected by counterterrorism that narrowly sees them as vulnerable to being recruited into terrorism, instead of partners who can inform policies for change.

This bill will undermine efforts at reconciliation, as it will make it easier to target Muslims and open old wounds anew.

Ending or escalating the communist insurgency?

The military generals clearly see the impending anti-terrorism bill as a way to “end” the world’s oldest existing communist insurgency. But the bill is more likely to reignite war and bring further insecurity.

Following the termination of the peace negotiations between the government, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People’s Army (NPA) and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines in 2017, the government has since branded the CPP-NPA as “terrorist” and filed a petition seeking to declare them terrorist organisations under the Human Security Act, the current counterterrorism law. Following delayed progress through the courts, the government has taken a new tack: change the law directly. Thus, the Anti Terror Bill.

The argument about whether the CPP-NPA is a terrorist organisation or a revolutionary movement is fraught with a lot of biases, and a long, violent history between the communist armed movement and the military. What is clear is that the impending declaration of the CPP-NPA as terrorist organisations will impede any future peace talks, and escalate violence and displacement in communities.

As lessons have not been learned, the military should be reminded that the CPP-NPA was at its strongest under the martial law regime of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos. It is not activism that pushes communities towards violence. Rather, it is crackdowns on nonviolent civic action that will push communities to lose trust in government and take alternative routes for affecting change.

‘Activism is not terrorism’

The government assures the public that crackdowns on activists will not happen under the guise of counterterrorism, but in the same breath the Speaker of the House tells activists to “not allow terrorists to hide within [their] ranks.” This statement itself is telling of the government’s narrow and misinformed mindset about activism and terror – that those who are radicalised through activism will participate in armed rebellions and, therefore, to prevent “violent extremism” the state should stop “radicalisation” made possible through activism.  

Given this bias, and the weak intelligence capacity of law enforcers, the bill will crush progressive organisations and student activists who the state perceives are communist fronts; mediators who are perceived as communist sympathisers; and Indigenous people who are perceived as the main targets of recruitment by the NPA.  

These groups are already being “red-tagged” or wrongly targeted for alleged links with the CPP-NPA .  Even without the new law and under the martial law in place until last year, young Indigenous people who work on peacebuilding in Western Mindanao were reportedly wrongly included in the military’s “terrorist lists,” and asked to show themselves to law enforcers and prove they are not linked with the NPA. As the Senate president admitted, there is no need for martial law once this bill becomes law.

The looming anti-terror law will assume rather than fairly test the guilt of civilians, as law enforcers will have free reign to arrest and detain individuals based on mere suspicion. This is both unconstitutional and dangerous.

No shortcuts to peace

If implemented, the new anti-terrorism bill will not only impede our ability as peacebuilders and human rights defenders to bridge divides or raise the alarm when atrocities occur. It will also put our lives and limbs at risk. It will undo years of peacebuilding and further devastate the communities worst affected by terror. 

If it is sincere in its “ whole-of-nation approach” to peacebuilding , the government must retract the bill, re-open deliberations and listen to a wide range of voices across society, especially the voices of those who have borne the brunt of both terrorist violence and abusive counterterror laws.  It  must heed the lessons from community leaders and peacebuilders. We need a policy that addresses the underlying roots of terrorism, and that prevents further distrust, injustice and escalations in violence.  

Yet as I write this, trust in the government is also under threat. What is left of our democracy is under threat. Peace is under threat.

It is our collective duty to end violence against civilian communities. For this same reason, we cannot take shortcuts to peace.

This rushed and unrestrained anti-terror bill will cause terror – and it will come from the state.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

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[OPINION] Surviving and fighting the anti-terror law

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This is AI generated summarization, which may have errors. For context, always refer to the full article.

Just before day’s end on July 3, President Duterte signed into law what is now the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020, which repeals the 2007 Human Security Act .

Republic Act No. 11479 is an abomination of a law as it conflates terrorism with legitimate dissent and can be used to suppress criticism, protest, and opposition to the government.

It makes a general rule that dissent is terrorism and makes the exception that it is not terrorism when it is an exercise of constitutional rights. But the law then makes an exception to the exception – that it is terrorism if your exercise of constitutional rights leads to public disorder or violence, whether intended or not. That is very dangerously vague and justifies the advice of National Security Adviser Hermogenes Esperon, Jr to just keep quiet as well as his observation that the law’s critics are supporters of terrorism.

Indeed, while the act will be effective only 15 days after publication, many critics of the law have brought up the abuses of the police even prior to its signing, and which would potentially be exacerbated by the law’s passage.

The Piston 6 , Cebu 8 , Iligan 16 , and Pride 20 are just few among those who have been arrested the past few weeks without warrants and have been detained longer than is necessary. When asked, the police could not provide a violation to charge them with.

The anti-terrorism law is also unconstitutional because the Anti-Terrorism Council usurps judicial power by allowing it to order arrests up to 24 days without charges and for giving it proscription authority – to designate individuals and groups as terrorists. All of these can be done without due process.

Not a solution to terrorism

This law is based on the premise that the current law is inadequate. That is not true. The Human Security Act is already draconian. But it is ineffective not because of the law but because of implementation failures.

The law is a failure because of government failures in intelligence and prosecution and because of abuses by police, military, and security officials. A new law will not plug those failures. In fact, these failures will guarantee the failure of this new anti-terrorism law.

Terrorism is a real problem and we must defeat it. But this law will not do that. From targeting a universe of a few dozens or at most a few hundred terrorists, the law can be used against thousands, even tens of thousands of activists, critics, and dissidents.

For example, in Marawi, instead of going only after the Maute and Isis terrorists, all those angry at the government’s failures in rebuilding their beloved city can now be designated terrorists. Instead of going after the Abu Sayyaf in Sulo, military and police as well as prosecution efforts will be wasted against Lumad peoples fighting mining and other incursions against their ancestral domains.

Moving forward: what can we do now?

The first thing that people can do is to file cases or join already existing petitions challenging the constitutionality of the law. The Supreme Court, being the final arbiter of laws, has the power to ultimately decide if laws passed by the legislative are compliant with the constitution.

As of Monday, July 6, 4 petitions against the Anti-Terrorism Act has already been filed in the Supreme Court: Atty. Calleja and the De La Salle Brothers, Albay Rep. Edcel Lagman, FEU Law Dean Mel Sta. Maria, and the Makabayan lawmakers. Many other groups are also poised to file petitions, including the National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers (NUPL) and former Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio. It is believed that more petitions questioning the law will be filed in the next few days and weeks.

As of the end of this week, two more petitions have been filed, making a total of six: Atty. Rudolf  Jurado, the president’s former government corporate counsel, and constitutional framers Christian Monsod and Felicitas Arroyo joined by Ateneo and Xavier Law professors and the Ateneo Human Rights Center (AHRC).

The second is to continue protesting and speaking up against the law. Fear is understandable at this time, but it is important not to be paralyzed by it. In fact, it is important more than ever to speak up now and to encourage others to do the same.

Let’s assert and test Section 4 of the Anti-Terrorism law that states that terrorism shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights.

It is to be noted that on Friday, July 10, the House committee on legislative franchises voted 70-11 (with 2 inhibitions and 1 abstention) to deny the renewal of ABS-CBN’s franchise . We condemn this action by Congress to shut down a media giant at a time when information is much needed; and we urge people therefore to keep speaking up and expressing their dissent towards such a decision.

The third, however, is to be smart. While this proviso exists in the law, it is followed by the phrase “which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to create a serious risk to public safety.”

Therefore, the law enforcement officials and military personnel need only to allege any of these 3 for someone to be suspected of terrorism. Moreover, as already stated above, terrorism as defined in the law is overbroad, and so despite the proviso, it is easy to conflate legitimate dissent and terrorism. Hence, individuals and groups are advised to be more cautious now as they question the law. Of highest priority is to be vigilant against infiltrators who would hijack protest actions and endanger everyone.

Fourth, on a more practical level, with the spate of arrests happening now even before the law has become fully effective, it is recommended that individuals brush up on their rights particularly in preparation for the eventuality that they become apprehended by the police, and let loved ones know of their whereabouts especially if they are going to attend protests and other similar demonstrations. They should also have a list of lawyers to call if they are in fact arrested.

Fifth, we must all lobby Congress to repeal the recently signed act and enacting a better anti-terrorism law that improves on the Human Security Act in terms of respect for human rights.

Sixth, some might even want to participate in drafting the implementing rules and regulations to make the law less harmful. It would be tricky because it could be perceived as accepting the law, but we would still support colleagues who would do it.

A united front for human rights

A united front among all pro-democracy and pro-human rights Filipinos are a must at this time. Those who will be most vulnerable with the signing of the law are the marginalized – the indigenous peoples, those living beneath the poverty line, farmers, fisherfolk, and those who work with them, such as social workers and social activists. The youth are particularly vulnerable.

Let us not allow division within our ranks and instead come together to ensure the protection especially of the marginalized who will experience the brunt of this draconian law.

Besides, none of us are safe from the law, not even the retired Supreme Court Justices and law deans. If not them, their children and grandchildren are at risk with this law.

With the passage of the bill into law, many people are understandably left at a loss about how to proceed.

However, the most important thing to do right now is to remain vigilant and to continue to fight for the rights assured to us by the Constitution. Now, more than ever, we need to speak up for democracy, for our country, and for future generations. – Rappler.com

Joy Reyes is a collaborator of Professor La Viña. She graduated from the University of the Philippines College of Law and holds undergraduate degrees in Psychology and Political Science from the Ateneo de Manila University.

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France’s Justice System Is Cracking Down on Israel’s Critics

France insoumise election candidate rima hassan has received a police summons over possible “apology for terrorism” charges. she’s the latest of a string of pro-palestine activists to face inquiries, in a blatant judicial offensive against israel’s critics..

I t’s a major escalation in France’s clampdown on solidarity with Palestine — and the latest sign of the politicization of the country’s justice system. Two prominent left-wing figures will soon face questioning before state investigators for possible charges of “apology for terrorism.” It’s a controversial infraction under French law, which criminalizes forms of expression said to support acts of terrorism or paint them in a positive light.

On April 19, Rima Hassan received a summons for preliminary questioning in an investigation over her statements on the Israel-Palestine conflict. A prominent human rights activist and a France Insoumise candidate in June’s elections to the European Parliament, Hassan is scheduled to meet with investigators in Paris on April 30. Then the prosecutor’s office will decide to either pursue charges or drop a potential case against her.

The announcement of an investigation concluded what was already a turbulent week for the Franco-Palestinian jurist, whose criticism of Israeli colonization and its devastating war on Gaza have made her into a bête noire for both political opponents and France’s right-leaning media landscape. Under pressure from local and national figures, the president of the University of Lille cancelled Hassan’s scheduled appearance before students on April 18 alongside Jean-Luc Mélenchon. A rally was ultimately held in a public square in Lille after a substitute meeting was banned under orders of the local police prefecture .

After Hassan, it was Mathilde Panot who found herself in the crosshairs of what now appears to be a coordinated attack on France’s leading left-wing opposition force. Panot is president of the France Insoumise group in the National Assembly and therefore the ranking MP of the largest left-wing party in parliament. On April 23, her office released a statement announcing that she too had received a summons for an investigation into “apology for terrorism.” This is allegedly in response to the written declaration issued by the France Insoumise parliamentary group on October 7, in the immediate aftermath of the Hamas-led attack on Israel.

“There is a desire to silence voices that are denouncing the French state’s complicity in Israel’s war,” said Hassan. She highlighted that, just before she took Jacobin ’s call, a student group at the University of Paris-Dauphine alerted her that state officials were trying to force the withdrawal of an invitation for her to speak on May 6 . “The pressure on the French government and on Israel’s remaining allies is growing by the day.”

Hassan told Jacobin that she plans to respond to questions from investigators. But she has no qualms about decrying the maneuver as an attack taking place at the height of the European Parliament election campaign. It is aimed against a staunch critic of Israeli’s colonization of internationally recognized Palestinian territory, of Benjamin Netanyahu’s war, and of the acquiescence of Emmanuel Macron’s government.

“The Macronist regime will have transgressed every conceivable limit,” Panot declared in the April 23 press release following her own summons, warning of a “serious instrumentalization of the justice system, aimed at gagging political expression.”

“We will not be silent,” the statement continues. “No summons, no intimidation of any kind will prevent us from protesting against the ongoing genocide of the Palestinian people. I call on everyone to realize the extent of these alarming attacks on freedom of opinion and democracy.”

Since October 7, France Insoumise’s position on the Israel-Palestine conflict has turned it into the target of much of the French political class, including a pro-Israel faction on the center left, who have used the crisis to pursue the ostracization of the left-wing force founded by Jean-Luc Mélenchon. They’ve pointed to statements like France Insoumise’s October 7 communiqué as definitive proof of the “antisemitic,” “Islamo-leftist” extremism that supposedly runs rampant on the Left — making it into a threat on par with Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National, or perhaps an even more dangerous one.

The prosecutor’s office has yet to publicly explain its reasons for summoning Hassan or Panot. Panot’s press release, however, claims that the cause is indeed the party’s October 7 communiqué, a text which referred to the day’s attacks as an “armed offensive of Palestinian forces led by Hamas,” one coming in “the context of an intensification of Israel’s policy of colonization in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.”

“We mourn the lives of dead Israelis and Palestinians,” the October 7 statement continued, before calling for an immediate cease-fire and peace negotiations.

France Insoumise has sought to position itself as the political outlet for French people disgusted with their government’s support for the Israeli state and its refusal to bring pressure to bear on Netanyahu. In that regard, the possible targeting of two of its spokespeople is an extension of the French justice system’s growing recourse to “apology for terrorism” charges against critics of Israel, which have surged since October in response to the outpouring of protest provoked by the siege and invasion of Gaza.

In an October 10 policy circular issued to state prosecutors, justice minister Éric Dupond-Moretti called for a “rapid and firm penal response” against “public statements that praise the aforementioned attacks, presenting them as a legitimate resistance to Israel, or the public dissemination of messages inciting favorable judgement of Hamas or Islamic Jihad.” The circular likewise recalls that Hamas is on the European Union’s official list of terrorist groups.

Dupond-Moretti’s circular has provided the justice system and pro-Israel groups with a wide net for legal harassment and attacks against activists and critics of the war.

On April 18, Jean-Paul Delescaut, general secretary of a department-level branch of the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) union, was handed a one-year suspended prison sentence for “apology for terrorism.” The far-left New Anticapitalist Party has likewise been the target of an investigation and has faced threats of a possible dissolution. Anasse Kazib, a union organizer and former presidential candidate of the Trotskyist group Permanent Revolution, received a summons in early April for an October 7 tweet in which he evoked “apartheid” and referred to Israel as a “bloodthirsty state.” On April 18, prosecutors in Nanterre dropped charges against popular comedian Guillaume Meurice for “provocation of antisemitic violence” brought by the Organisation Juive Européene (OJE), a lobbying group that has been the instigator of many of the complaints filed since October. Meurice had called Netanyahu a “Nazi without a foreskin” in a sketch aired on the public radio network France Inter in late October.

Scores of others, further from the public eye, have also found themselves in the path of this judicial harassment campaign. According to Mediapart ’s count , as many as 385 tips were assessed by state prosecutors between October 7 and the end of the calendar year, leading in most cases to the opening of criminal investigations.

“Based on the information that I have of Rima Hassan’s statements, I don’t see the slightest shred of a criminal offense,” Vincent Brengarth, Hassan’s attorney, told Jacobin . “She has never incited any terrorist act whatsoever. And neither has she been an apologist for acts of terrorism.”

Hassan’s summons, consulted by Jacobin , states that she is being asked to respond for “facts committed between November 5 and December 1, 2023.” That period preceded the announcement of her candidacy for the European parliament. But by then, she had emerged as one of the leading opponents of the current war and of President Emmanuel Macron’s feet-dragging on demanding a cease-fire. The dates detailed in her summons likewise exclude the main scandal surrounding Hassan : the January 22 release by the website Le Crayon of a video that included a snippet in which she responded “true” to the question of whether Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel was “legitimate.”

Hassan has claimed that the interview was heavily edited , leading to a distorted version of her response and views. In line with France Insoumise ’s position, Hassan maintains that her “compass” is the United Nations’ appraisal of the Israel-Palestine conflict as a military occupation in an active colonial conflict, one in which war crimes and international law violations committed by any actor must be condemned.

Activist Lobbying

Many of the investigations into “apology for terrorism” have resulted from state-instigated pursuits arising from interior ministry tracking or tips submitted via its online platform, Pharos. The summons targeting Panot and Hassan appear to have officially originated, however, in complaints filed by the pro-Israel lobbying group Organisation Juive Européene. In its post to X following the announcement of Hassan’s summons, the OJE celebrated : “Good news, the complaints that we’ve filed since October 9 are being investigated and often result in convictions.”

“Pro-Israel lobbyists want to preserve the image of the Israeli state,” said Hassan of the OJE’s campaign against her. “Anyone who challenges the discourse and image of [the state of Israel] can be targeted.”

But the timing of these investigations has many legitimately wondering whether these charges are solely being leveled in response to the concerns of a third party. If organizations like the OJE have been pushing for criminal investigations against public critics of Israel, the decision to open these cases now was made by state officials. Moreover, it comes weeks before an election that many across France’s political spectrum hope will deliver a decisive blow to France Insoumise — the dominant party on the Left since the 2022 elections and the main force arguing for a shift in French policy on the Israel-Palestine conflict.

“We’re entering into an absolutely staggering phase of all-out repression,” said Brengarth. “It’s all the more staggering because it’s taking place in a very turbulent political context, one in which France’s position on the Israeli state’s actions in Gaze is not clear, as we waver between a form of condemnation and support, despite everything.”

For the attorney Raphaël Kempf, who has also defended individuals accused of “apology for terrorism,” the growing reliance on this infraction speaks to an instrumental use of the justice system in order to shut down an important political debate.

“What’s becoming punishable is the fact of proposing a politico-historical and a social understanding of what happened on October 7,” Kempf told Jacobin . “’Apology for terrorism’ criminalizes the work that historians could be doing in twenty, thirty, or forty years’ time — or the work that some are already doing! Any attempt to describe October 7 as anything other than the result of bloodthirsty, antisemitic barbarism is somehow considered apologism for it. We’re being deprived of the possibility of any attempt to provide a deeper explanation and analysis.”

Author of the 2022 essay Violences judiciaires and a specialist on the illiberal tendencies in French criminal law, Kempf suggests that the current moment marks a new chapter in the justice system’s use of “apology for terrorism.” The infraction can be traced to the late 1890s and the fear of far-left organizing and intellectual activity — viewed as responsible for a spate of attacks and assassinations that targeted leading political figures.

As the French public’s attention has turned towards the problem of Islamist terrorism, the infraction was given a boost thanks to a 2014 law that removed it from a special code reserved for press offenses. Following the 2015 and 2016 terrorist attacks, the use of the infraction exploded: at its peak, 421 guilty verdicts for “apology for terrorism” were handed down in 2016 alone, before dropping down to 171 by 2019, still far above the historical norm.

Against the backdrop of national crisis set off by a wave of terror attacks, the surge in the use of this charge in the mid-2010s targeted people largely on the margins of French society. This shift attracted little attention beyond activist circles, independent media and civil liberties organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International . But for Kempf, today’s developments point to something of a return to the origins of such laws.

“’Apology for terrorism’ is now being used against figures in the political opposition,” he said. “It’s almost as if we’re back in the same situation as in the late nineteenth century. The purpose of this offense was to target political opponents.”

Some even want to see the legal regime strengthened. A bill approved in late January by the Senate, controlled by the right-wing opposition, seeks to create a specific offense for the “possession” in private of material or documents providing an “apology for terrorism.” This would target, for example, content distributed in closed chat or messaging groups.

The National Assembly has yet to take up the proposed law — and the Constitutional Council blocked a similar push in 2020. But when it comes to the French state’s experiments in criminalizing dissent, it sometimes seems like the sky’s the limit.

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France’s Justice System Is Cracking Down on Israel’s Critics

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France Insoumise election candidate Rima Hassan has received a police summons over possible “apology for terrorism” charges. She’s the latest of a string of pro-Palestine activists to face inquiries, in a blatant judicial offensive against Israel’s critics.

A protester faces a French police officer in riot gear during a pro-Palestine demonstration in central Paris on October 28, 2023. (Geoffroy van der Hasselt / AFP via Getty Images)

It’s a major escalation in France’s clampdown on solidarity with Palestine — and the latest sign of the politicization of the country’s justice system. Two prominent left-wing figures will soon face questioning before state investigators for possible charges of “apology for terrorism.” It’s a controversial infraction under French law, which criminalizes forms of expression said to support acts of terrorism or paint them in a positive light.

On April 19, Rima Hassan received a summons for preliminary questioning in an investigation over her statements on the Israel-Palestine conflict. A prominent human rights activist and a France Insoumise candidate in June’s elections to the European Parliament, Hassan is scheduled to meet with investigators in Paris on April 30. Then the prosecutor’s office will decide to either pursue charges or drop a potential case against her.

The announcement of an investigation concluded what was already a turbulent week for the Franco-Palestinian jurist, whose criticism of Israeli colonization and its devastating war on Gaza have made her into a bête noire for both political opponents and France’s right-leaning media landscape. Under pressure from local and national figures, the president of the University of Lille cancelled Hassan’s scheduled appearance before students on April 18 alongside Jean-Luc Mélenchon. A rally was ultimately held in a public square in Lille after a substitute meeting was banned under orders of the local police prefecture .

After Hassan, it was Mathilde Panot who found herself in the crosshairs of what now appears to be a coordinated attack on France’s leading left-wing opposition force. Panot is president of the France Insoumise group in the National Assembly and therefore the ranking MP of the largest left-wing party in parliament. On April 23, her office released a statement announcing that she too had received a summons for an investigation into “apology for terrorism.” This is allegedly in response to the written declaration issued by the France Insoumise parliamentary group on October 7, in the immediate aftermath of the Hamas-led attack on Israel.

“There is a desire to silence voices that are denouncing the French state’s complicity in Israel’s war,” said Hassan. She highlighted that, just before she took Jacobin ’s call, a student group at the University of Paris-Dauphine alerted her that state officials were trying to force the withdrawal of an invitation for her to speak on May 6 . “The pressure on the French government and on Israel’s remaining allies is growing by the day.”

Hassan told Jacobin that she plans to respond to questions from investigators. But she has no qualms about decrying the maneuver as an attack taking place at the height of the European Parliament election campaign. It is aimed against a staunch critic of Israeli’s colonization of internationally recognized Palestinian territory, of Benjamin Netanyahu’s war, and of the acquiescence of Emmanuel Macron’s government.

“The Macronist regime will have transgressed every conceivable limit,” Panot declared in the April 23 press release following her own summons, warning of a “serious instrumentalization of the justice system, aimed at gagging political expression.”

“We will not be silent,” the statement continues. “No summons, no intimidation of any kind will prevent us from protesting against the ongoing genocide of the Palestinian people. I call on everyone to realize the extent of these alarming attacks on freedom of opinion and democracy.”

Since October 7, France Insoumise’s position on the Israel-Palestine conflict has turned it into the target of much of the French political class, including a pro-Israel faction on the center left, who have used the crisis to pursue the ostracization of the left-wing force founded by Jean-Luc Mélenchon. They’ve pointed to statements like France Insoumise’s October 7 communiqué as definitive proof of the “antisemitic,” “Islamo-leftist” extremism that supposedly runs rampant on the Left — making it into a threat on par with Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National, or perhaps an even more dangerous one.

The prosecutor’s office has yet to publicly explain its reasons for summoning Hassan or Panot. Panot’s press release, however, claims that the cause is indeed the party’s October 7 communiqué, a text which referred to the day’s attacks as an “armed offensive of Palestinian forces led by Hamas,” one coming in “the context of an intensification of Israel’s policy of colonization in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.”

“We mourn the lives of dead Israelis and Palestinians,” the October 7 statement continued, before calling for an immediate cease-fire and peace negotiations.

France Insoumise has sought to position itself as the political outlet for French people disgusted with their government’s support for the Israeli state and its refusal to bring pressure to bear on Netanyahu. In that regard, the possible targeting of two of its spokespeople is an extension of the French justice system’s growing recourse to “apology for terrorism” charges against critics of Israel, which have surged since October in response to the outpouring of protest provoked by the siege and invasion of Gaza.

In an October 10 policy circular issued to state prosecutors, justice minister Éric Dupond-Moretti called for a “rapid and firm penal response” against “public statements that praise the aforementioned attacks, presenting them as a legitimate resistance to Israel, or the public dissemination of messages inciting favorable judgement of Hamas or Islamic Jihad.” The circular likewise recalls that Hamas is on the European Union’s official list of terrorist groups.

Dupond-Moretti’s circular has provided the justice system and pro-Israel groups with a wide net for legal harassment and attacks against activists and critics of the war.

On April 18, Jean-Paul Delescaut, general secretary of a department-level branch of the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) union, was handed a one-year suspended prison sentence for “apology for terrorism.” The far-left New Anticapitalist Party has likewise been the target of an investigation and has faced threats of a possible dissolution. Anasse Kazib, a union organizer and former presidential candidate of the Trotskyist group Permanent Revolution, received a summons in early April for an October 7 tweet in which he evoked “apartheid” and referred to Israel as a “bloodthirsty state.” On April 18, prosecutors in Nanterre dropped charges against popular comedian Guillaume Meurice for “provocation of antisemitic violence” brought by the Organisation Juive Européene (OJE), a lobbying group that has been the instigator of many of the complaints filed since October. Meurice had called Netanyahu a “Nazi without a foreskin” in a sketch aired on the public radio network France Inter in late October.

Scores of others, further from the public eye, have also found themselves in the path of this judicial harassment campaign. According to Mediapart ’s count , as many as 385 tips were assessed by state prosecutors between October 7 and the end of the calendar year, leading in most cases to the opening of criminal investigations.

“Based on the information that I have of Rima Hassan’s statements, I don’t see the slightest shred of a criminal offense,” Vincent Brengarth, Hassan’s attorney, told Jacobin . “She has never incited any terrorist act whatsoever. And neither has she been an apologist for acts of terrorism.”

Hassan’s summons, consulted by Jacobin , states that she is being asked to respond for “facts committed between November 5 and December 1, 2023.” That period preceded the announcement of her candidacy for the European parliament. But by then, she had emerged as one of the leading opponents of the current war and of President Emmanuel Macron’s feet-dragging on demanding a cease-fire. The dates detailed in her summons likewise exclude the main scandal surrounding Hassan : the January 22 release by the website Le Crayon of a video that included a snippet in which she responded “true” to the question of whether Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel was “legitimate.”

Hassan has claimed that the interview was heavily edited , leading to a distorted version of her response and views. In line with France Insoumise ’s position, Hassan maintains that her “compass” is the United Nations’ appraisal of the Israel-Palestine conflict as a military occupation in an active colonial conflict, one in which war crimes and international law violations committed by any actor must be condemned.

Activist Lobbying

Many of the investigations into “apology for terrorism” have resulted from state-instigated pursuits arising from interior ministry tracking or tips submitted via its online platform, Pharos. The summons targeting Panot and Hassan appear to have officially originated, however, in complaints filed by the pro-Israel lobbying group Organisation Juive Européene. In its post to X following the announcement of Hassan’s summons, the OJE celebrated : “Good news, the complaints that we’ve filed since October 9 are being investigated and often result in convictions.”

“Pro-Israel lobbyists want to preserve the image of the Israeli state,” said Hassan of the OJE’s campaign against her. “Anyone who challenges the discourse and image of [the state of Israel] can be targeted.”

But the timing of these investigations has many legitimately wondering whether these charges are solely being leveled in response to the concerns of a third party. If organizations like the OJE have been pushing for criminal investigations against public critics of Israel, the decision to open these cases now was made by state officials. Moreover, it comes weeks before an election that many across France’s political spectrum hope will deliver a decisive blow to France Insoumise — the dominant party on the Left since the 2022 elections and the main force arguing for a shift in French policy on the Israel-Palestine conflict.

“We’re entering into an absolutely staggering phase of all-out repression,” said Brengarth. “It’s all the more staggering because it’s taking place in a very turbulent political context, one in which France’s position on the Israeli state’s actions in Gaze is not clear, as we waver between a form of condemnation and support, despite everything.”

For the attorney Raphaël Kempf, who has also defended individuals accused of “apology for terrorism,” the growing reliance on this infraction speaks to an instrumental use of the justice system in order to shut down an important political debate.

“What’s becoming punishable is the fact of proposing a politico-historical and a social understanding of what happened on October 7,” Kempf told Jacobin . “’Apology for terrorism’ criminalizes the work that historians could be doing in twenty, thirty, or forty years’ time — or the work that some are already doing! Any attempt to describe October 7 as anything other than the result of bloodthirsty, antisemitic barbarism is somehow considered apologism for it. We’re being deprived of the possibility of any attempt to provide a deeper explanation and analysis.”

Author of the 2022 essay Violences judiciaires and a specialist on the illiberal tendencies in French criminal law, Kempf suggests that the current moment marks a new chapter in the justice system’s use of “apology for terrorism.” The infraction can be traced to the late 1890s and the fear of far-left organizing and intellectual activity — viewed as responsible for a spate of attacks and assassinations that targeted leading political figures.

As the French public’s attention has turned towards the problem of Islamist terrorism, the infraction was given a boost thanks to a 2014 law that removed it from a special code reserved for press offenses. Following the 2015 and 2016 terrorist attacks, the use of the infraction exploded: at its peak, 421 guilty verdicts for “apology for terrorism” were handed down in 2016 alone, before dropping down to 171 by 2019, still far above the historical norm.

Against the backdrop of national crisis set off by a wave of terror attacks, the surge in the use of this charge in the mid-2010s targeted people largely on the margins of French society. This shift attracted little attention beyond activist circles, independent media and civil liberties organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International . But for Kempf, today’s developments point to something of a return to the origins of such laws.

“’Apology for terrorism’ is now being used against figures in the political opposition,” he said. “It’s almost as if we’re back in the same situation as in the late nineteenth century. The purpose of this offense was to target political opponents.”

Some even want to see the legal regime strengthened. A bill approved in late January by the Senate, controlled by the right-wing opposition, seeks to create a specific offense for the “possession” in private of material or documents providing an “apology for terrorism.” This would target, for example, content distributed in closed chat or messaging groups.

The National Assembly has yet to take up the proposed law — and the Constitutional Council blocked a similar push in 2020. But when it comes to the French state’s experiments in criminalizing dissent, it sometimes seems like the sky’s the limit.

Opinion We have a radical democracy. Will Trump voters destroy it?

For some time, it was possible to believe that many voters could not see the threat Donald Trump poses to America’s liberal democracy, and many still profess not to see it. But now, a little more than six months from Election Day, it’s hard to believe they don’t. The warning signs are clear enough. Trump himself offers a new reason for concern almost every day. People may choose to ignore the warnings or persuade themselves not to worry, but they can see what we all see, and that should be enough.

Adapted from “Rebellion: How Antiliberalism is Tearing America Apart — Again” by Robert Kagan. Copyright © 2024 by Robert Kagan. Reprinted by permission of Penguin Random House. All Rights Reserved.

How to explain their willingness to support Trump despite the risk he poses to our system of government? The answer is not rapidly changing technology, widening inequality, unsuccessful foreign policies or unrest on university campuses but something much deeper and more fundamental. It is what the Founders worried about and Abraham Lincoln warned about: a decline in what they called public virtue. They feared it would be hard to sustain popular support for the revolutionary liberal principles of the Declaration of Independence, and they worried that the virtuous love of liberty and equality would in time give way to narrow, selfish interest. Although James Madison and his colleagues hoped to establish a government on the solid foundation of self-interest, even Madison acknowledged that no government by the people could be sustained if the people themselves did not have sufficient dedication to the liberal ideals of the Declaration. The people had to love liberty, not just for themselves but as an abstract ideal for all humans.

Americans are going down this route today because too many no longer care enough whether the system the Founders created survives and are ceding the ground to those, led by Trump, who actively seek to overthrow what so many of them call “the regime.” This “regime” they are referring to is the unique political system established by the Founders based on the principles of universal equality and natural rights. That, plain and simple, is what this election is about. “A republic if you can keep it,” Benjamin Franklin allegedly said of the government created by the Constitutional Convention in 1787. This is the year we may choose not to keep it.

A healthy republic would not be debating whether Trump and his followers seek the overthrow of the Founders’ system of liberal democracy. What more do people need to see than his well-documented attempt to prevent the peaceful transfer of power with the storming of the U.S. Capitol, the elaborate scheme to create false electoral slates in key states, the clear evidence that he bullied officials in some states to “find” more votes, and to persuade Vice President Mike Pence not to certify the legitimate results? What more do they need to know than that Trump continues to insist he won that election and celebrates as heroes and “patriots” the people who invaded the U.S. Capitol and smashed policemen’s faces with the stated aim of forcing Congress to negate the election results? As one 56-year-old Michigan woman present at the Capitol on Jan. 6 , 2021, explained: “We weren’t there to steal things. We weren’t there to do damage. We were just there to overthrow the government .”

Trump not only acknowledges his goals, past and present; he promises to do it again if he loses this year. For the third straight election, he is claiming that if he loses, then the vote will have been fraudulent. He has warned of uprisings, of “bedlam” and a “bloodbath,” and he has made clear that he will again be the promoter of this violence, just as he was on Jan. 6. Trump explicitly warned in 2020 that he would not accept the election results if he lost, and he didn’t. This year he is saying it again. Were there no other charges against him, no other reason to be concerned about his return to the presidency, this alone would be sufficient to oppose him. He does not respect and has never pledged to abide by the democratic processes established by the Constitution. On the contrary, he has explicitly promised to violate the Constitution when he deems it necessary. That by itself makes him a unique candidate in American history and should be disqualifying.

This kind of open challenge to our democracy was never meant to be addressed by the courts. As the Founders well understood, you don’t serve a subpoena to a would-be tyrant and tell him to lawyer up. Nor was it meant to be addressed by the normal processes of democratic elections. They knew, and feared, that a demagogue could capture the allegiance of enough voters to overthrow the system. That was why they gave Congress, and particularly the Senate, supposedly more immune from popular pressures, the power to impeach and remove presidents and to deny them the opportunity to run again — and not simply because they violated some law but because they posed a clear and present danger to the republic. After Trump’s attempt to overthrow the government in 2020, Congress had a chance to use the method prescribed by the Founders in precisely the circumstances they envisioned. But Senate Republicans, out of a combination of ambition and cowardice, refused to play the vital role the Founders envisioned for them. The result is that the nightmare feared by the Founders is one election away from becoming reality.

The problem with Trump is not that he has some carefully thought-out plan for seizing power, much less an elaborate ideological justification for doing so. (Others do have such plans and such justifications, including many of those who will populate his administration — more on that in a moment.) With Trump, everything is about him and his immediate needs. He will run roughshod over the laws and Constitution simply to get what he wants for himself, his family and his business interests. Americans know that if he is elected, he would abuse the justice system to go after his opponents. They know this because he says so. “I am your retribution!” he declares, and by “your” he means “my.” Americans know he would use his power as president to try to solve his financial problems. He did it as president and is doing it now as a presidential candidate . They know he would not respect the results of fair elections if he loses, which is the very definition of a tyrant.

So, why will so many vote for him anyway? For a significant segment of the Republican electorate, the white-hot core of the Trump movement, it is because they want to see the system overthrown. This should not come as a shock, for it is not a new phenomenon. On the contrary, it is as old as the republic. Historians have written about the “liberal tradition” in America, but there has from the beginning also been an anti-liberal tradition: large numbers of Americans determined to preserve preliberal traditions, hierarchies and beliefs against the secular liberal principles of the Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights. The Founders based the republic on a radical set of principles and assertions about government: that all human beings were created equal in their possession of certain “natural rights” that government was bound to respect and to safeguard. These rights did not derive from religious belief but were “self-evident.” They were not granted by the Christian God, by the crown or even by the Constitution. They were inherent in what it meant to be human.

This is the central tenet of liberalism. Before the American Revolution no government had ever been founded on liberal principles, and the vast majority of human beings had never believed in these natural rights — certainly not the Christian church in either its Protestant or Roman Catholic versions nor Islam nor Judaism nor Hinduism nor Buddhism. People might be equal in the eyes of their god, but no government or religious institution had ever been based on the principle of equal rights. Not even the English system was based on this principle but rather on monarchy, a ruling aristocracy, and a contract between crown and subjects that was modified over the centuries but was not based on the principle of universal “natural” rights.

The Founders knew these ideas were radical, that they were inaugurating, in their own words, a novus ordo seclorum — a new order of the ages — that required a new way of thinking and acting. They knew, as well, that their own practices and those of 18th-century American society did not conform to their new revolutionary doctrines. They knew that slavery was contrary to the Declaration’s principles, though they permitted slavery to continue, hoping it would die a natural death. They knew that established churches were contrary to those principles because they impinged on that most important of rights, “freedom of conscience,” which was vital to the preservation of liberty, yet a number of states in the 18th and 19th centuries retained all kinds of religious tests for office. In short, they knew that a great many Americans did not in fact believe in the liberal principles of the Revolution. As Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, put it, “We have changed our forms of government, but it remains yet to effect a revolution in our principles, opinions and manners so as to accommodate them to the forms of government we have adopted.” They did not insist that citizens believe in those principles. One could be an American citizen whether one believed in the Declaration or not.

And a great many did not. Leaders of the slaveholding South called the Declaration “a most pernicious falsehood.” South Carolina’s John C. Calhoun called the very idea of equal rights a “false doctrine.” They believed in democracy, but only if it was an exclusively White democracy. When democracy turned against them in 1860, they rebelled and sought an exit from the system. That rebellion never ended. It has been weakened, suppressed — sometimes by force — and driven underground, but it has never gone away. Although the South was militarily defeated and deprived of its special advantages in the Constitution, its hostility to the Founders’ liberalism did not abate. As Southern writer W.J. Cash observed in 1941, if the war had “smashed the southern world,” it had nevertheless “left the essential southern mind and will … entirely unshaken” and Southerners themselves determined “to hold fast to their own, to maintain their divergences, to remain what they had been and were.” In 1956, almost a century after the Civil War, a fifth of Congress, almost all Democrats — signed the “Southern Manifesto” calling on states to refuse to obey the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision to end segregation in public schools. Nothing had changed. Are we so surprised that for many Americans, nothing has changed even today?

Nor has anti-liberalism only been about race. For more than a century after the Revolution, many if not most White Anglo-Saxon Protestants insisted that America was a Protestant nation. They did not believe Catholics possessed equal rights or should be treated as equals. The influential “second” Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s was anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish as well as anti-Black, which was why, unlike the original Klan, it flourished outside the South. Many regard today’s Christian nationalism as a fringe movement, but it has been a powerful and often dominant force throughout America’s history.

For two centuries, many White Americans have felt under siege by the Founders’ liberalism. They have been defeated in war and suppressed by threats of force, but more than that, they have been continually oppressed by a system designed by the Founders to preserve and strengthen liberalism against competing beliefs and hierarchies. Since World War II, the courts and the political system have pursued the Founders’ liberal goals with greater and greater fidelity, ending official segregation, driving religion from public schools, recognizing and defending the rights of women and minorities hitherto deprived of their “natural rights” because of religious, racial and ethnic discrimination. The hegemony of liberalism has expanded, just as Lincoln hoped it would, “constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of colors everywhere.” Anti-liberal political scientist Patrick Deneen calls it “liberal totalitarianism,” and, apart from the hyperbole, he is right that liberalism has been steadily deepening and expanding under presidents of both parties since the 1940s.

The fury on the anti-liberal right against what is today called “wokeness” is nothing new. Anti-liberal movements in America, whether in defense of the White race or Christianity, and more often both together, have always claimed to be suffering under the expanding hegemony of liberalism. They have always claimed that a liberal government and society were depriving them of their “freedom” to live a life according to Christian teachings and were favoring various minority groups, especially Black people, at their expense. In the 1970s, influential theologian R.J. Rushdoony complained that the Christian in America had “no right to his identity” but was forced to recognize “all others and their ‘rights.’” And he was correct if a Christian’s “rights” included the right not only to lead a Christian life oneself but to impose that life on the entire society, or if a White person’s “freedom” included the freedom to preserve white primacy in society. In the 19th century, enslavers insisted they were deprived of their “freedom” to hold human beings as property; Southerners in the post-Reconstruction era insisted on their “freedom” to oppress Black citizens in their states.

Today, anti-liberals in American society are indeed deprived of their “freedom” to impose their religious and racial views on society, on public schools, on the public square and on the laws of the nation. What Christian nationalists call “liberal totalitarianism,” the Founders called “freedom of conscience.”

Six decades ago, people like Rushdoony were responding not to “woke” corporations or Black Lives Matter but to civil rights legislation. Today, anti-liberal conservatives complain about school curriculums that acknowledge the racism that has shaped America’s history, but even five decades ago, before the invention of “critical race theory,” anti-liberal White people such as Rushdoony insisted that the “white man” was being “systematically indoctrinated into believing he is guilty of enslaving and abusing the Negro.” Nor is it new that many White people feel that the demands of minority groups for both rights and respect have “gone too far” and it is they, the White people of America, who are suffering the worst discrimination. In the 1960s, surveys taken by the New York Times showed that majorities of White people believed even then that the civil rights movement had “gone too far,” that Blacks were receiving “everything on a silver platter” and the government was practicing “reverse discrimination” against White people. Liberalism is always going too far for many Americans — and certainly for anti-liberals. Anti-liberals these days complain about wokeness, therefore, but it is the liberal system of government bequeathed by the Founders, and the accompanying egalitarian spirit, that they are really objecting to, just as anti-liberals have since the founding of the nation. Many of Trump’s core supporters insist they are patriots, but whether they realize it or not, their allegiance is not to the Founders’ America but to an ethnoreligious definition of the nation that the Founders explicitly rejected.

Some do realize it. The smartest and most honest of them know that if people truly want a “Christian America,” it can only come through “regime change,” by which they mean the “regime” created by the Founders. The Founders’ legacy is a “dead end,” writes Glenn Ellmers, a scholar at the Claremont Institute. The Constitution is a “Potemkin village.” According to Deneen and Harvard Law School’s Adrian Vermeule, the system established by the Founders to protect individual rights needs to be replaced with an alternative form of government. What they have in mind is a Christian commonwealth: a “culture that preserves and encourages order and continuity, and support for religious belief and institutions,” with legislation to “promote public morality, and forbid its intentional corruption,” a “forthright acknowledgment and renewal of the Christian roots of our civilization,” “public opportunities for prayers,” and a “revitalization of our public spaces to reflect a deeper belief that we are called to erect imitations of the beauty that awaits us in another Kingdom.”

These anti-liberal conservatives know that bringing such a commonwealth into being means jettisoning the Founders’ obsession with individual rights. The influential advocate of “conservative nationalism,” Yoram Hazony, wants Americans to abandon the Declaration in favor of a nationhood built on Protestantism and the Bible. America is a “ revolutionary nation ,” Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) insists, not because of the principles of the Declaration and not even because of the American Revolution itself, but “because we are the heirs of the revolution of the Bible” that began with “the founding of the nation of Israel.” There could hardly be a statement more at odds with the American Founders’ liberal, ecumenical vision.

Expressing a belief in God is no threat to the Founders’ system, but reshaping society in accord with Christian teachings is. To build the nation Hawley and Hazony imagine would require jettisoning not only the Declaration but also the Constitution, which was designed to protect the Declaration’s principles. The Christian commonwealth would not and could not be a democracy because the majority of people can’t be trusted to choose correctly. According to the Claremont Institute’s Ellmers, “most people living in the United States today — certainly more than half — are not Americans in any meaningful sense of the term.” They are a “zombie” or “human rodent” who lives “a shadow-life of timid conformity.” Only “the 75 million people who voted in the last election” for Trump are true Americans. Instead of trying to compete with Democrats in elections that don’t reflect the will of the people, Ellmers writes, “Why not just cut to the chase and skip the empty, meaningless process?” The “only road forward” is “overturning the existing post-American order.”

For these intellectuals, Trump is an imperfect if essential vehicle for the counterrevolution. A “deeply flawed narcissist” suffering from a “bombastic vanity,” as Deneen and Ellmers note, he has “lacked the discipline to target his creative/destructive tendencies effectively.” But this can be remedied. If Trump failed to accomplish the desired overthrow in his first term, Deneen argues, it was because he lacked “a capable leadership class.” Things will be different in his next term. What is needed, according to Deneen, is a “self-conscious aristoi,” a class of thinkers who understand “both the disease afflicting the nation, and the revolutionary medicine required for the cure,” who know how to turn populist “resentments into sustained policy.” Members of Deneen’s would-be new elite will, like Vladimir Lenin, place themselves at the vanguard of a populist revolution, acting “on behalf of the broad working class” while raising the consciousness of the “untutored” masses. Indeed, according to Harvard’s Vermeule, it will be necessary to impose the common good even against the people’s “own perceptions of what is best for them” — a most Leninist concept indeed.

The Christian commonwealth, then, would require a powerful executive freed from the Constitution’s liberal and democratic constraints. The new state, Vermeule wrote, with its “robust executive,” would “sear the liberal faith with hot irons,” wielding the “authority to curb the social and economic pretensions of the urban-gentry liberals.” The whiff of violence and oppression in such statements is intentional. The anti-liberal intellectuals understand that changing the liberal system will require far more than an election and a few legislative reforms.

Deneen and Vermeule are often dismissed as mere intellectual provocateurs, but their writings stand out because they have the courage to acknowledge that what they seek is incompatible with the Founders’ liberal system. While others conceal their views under a phony fidelity to American liberal principles or claim that what they want accords with the Founders’ true intent, Deneen, Vermeule and other anti-liberals acknowledge that the country they want, a country subservient to the Christian God, a country whose laws are based on the Bible, cannot be created absent the overthrow of the Founders’ liberal and defiantly secular system. Even a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Neil M. Gorsuch, speaks of the “so-called separation of church and state.” Anti-liberalism at the Supreme Court is nothing new, either.

And the anti-liberals know as well that this year may be their last chance to effect their counterrevolution. The percentage of the population made up of White people (let alone White Protestants) is steadily shrinking. Just as the anti-liberal conservatives of the pre-World War II years closed the immigration gates too late and were overwhelmed by a tide of non-Nordic peoples from Southern and Eastern Europe, so the immigration wave of largely non-White people since 1965 has brought the nation to the cusp of a non-White majority. The anti-liberals thus face the task of engineering the revolution with only a minority of the electorate committed to “regime change.”

Trump’s takeover of the Republican Party makes this possible. Trump is not a unique figure in American history. In each generation, anti-liberal forces have turned to the same breed of demagogue, the flouter of norms, the boorish trampler of liberal nostrums. William Buckley noted that the very “uncouthness” of George Wallace seemed to “account for his general popularity.” James Burnham marveled at how Joseph McCarthy’s “inept acts and ignorant words” had a “charismatic” quality that well expressed the fears and angers of his devoted followers.

What their critics saw as boorishness and malevolence, however, their followers saw as strength and defiance against a liberal system stacked against them. They were rebellious opponents of the system, “wreckers,” unabashedly anti-liberal in both thought and manner, and that is precisely what made them popular among a broad swath of White Americans who felt themselves losing ground in the culture and society — to Black people, Catholics, Jews and immigrants from non-Nordic countries. Today, exactly a century after the most overtly racist immigration restriction in American history, Trump once again calls for more immigrants from “nice” European countries, such as Denmark, Switzerland and Norway.

Trump did not just stumble into leadership of this movement of White rebellion. He summoned it. He made his debut as presidential aspirant on an unabashed white supremacist platform, championing the birther conspiracy that America’s first Black president was not in fact an American. Riding that issue alone, he catapulted to the front of the Republican pack, according to polls in 2011, before bowing out to continue his hit show, “The Apprentice.” Whether his debut as a white supremacist was opportunism or sprang from conviction hardly matters — it certainly has not mattered to his followers. The fact is, white supremacy has been his calling card, and millions have responded to it to the point where white nationalists have become the core of his movement. Many Christian nationalists already see him as a suffering Christ, and in this bizarre sense it is true that the prosecutions have “helped” him: The more adversity he faces, the more court battles he must wage, the more allegations that are slung at him, the more devoted they are to him.

No other group can be counted on for such absolute loyalty. While some Republicans wobble when asked if they would support Trump if convicted of a crime, White Christian Evangelicals overwhelmingly say they will support him no matter what. Trump needs that unshakable loyalty because he is fighting for his life. The thought that he might end up in jail has given him every reason to hew as closely as possible to the people who will stick with him even if he is convicted. These are also the people he will need to back him unconditionally in challenging the results of the election should he lose. If he wins, he will need them in what are sure to be titanic fights with Democrats and the legal system and to keep the Republican Party in line.

This is one reason Trump has so far shown no inclination to reach out beyond his base, to Nikki Haley voters, to more moderate suburban Republicans, to those who are made uncomfortable by his statements and actions. He may show flexibility on the important issue of abortion to secure his own election, but since clinching the nomination, he has only hardened his Christian nationalist message. His “poisoning the blood” campaign, his “dictator-for-a-day” comments, his release of the Trump Bible, his claim that, upon taking office, he will create “a new federal task force” to fight “anti-Christian bias to be led by a fully reformed Department of Justice,” are all aimed directly at his white Christian nationalist base without much concern for how millions of other Republican voters feel about it. Christians are “under siege,” he claims in hawking his Bible. “We must make America pray again.”

Besides, his hard tack toward white supremacy and Christian nationalism has cost him little among the broader Republican electorate.

Why not? Why is there so little resistance to Trump even as he commits ever more deeply to a Christian nationalist program for undoing the Founders’ liberal project?

For many, the answer is simply narrow self-interest, either a positive interest in supporting him or a negative interest in not opposing him or being seen to oppose him. This seems to be the answer for corporate America. Having first followed marketing data to appeal to the broadest cross-section of Americans by embracing communities only recently enjoying more of the full panoply of rights, businesses learned the hard way that Trump and his movement will not tolerate this and have mostly retreated to silence and neutrality. But they have also gone further, making clear as much as possible that they will not be a problem for him — either before he is elected or after.

This was the message JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon sent, from Davos, Switzerland, of all places, early this year when he declared that Trump was “kind of right about NATO, kind of right about immigration,” that he “grew the economy quite well.” There is no reason to doubt that he spoke for many of the richest Americans and for other corporate leaders. There was no outcry among them that anyone could hear. The truth is, they have no financial reason to oppose Trump. They know that Trump’s White working-class followers don’t have to be paid off economically because most care chiefly about the culture wars. Trump can still cut taxes and reduce federal regulations and other obstacles to corporate profit. The rich and powerful will always have some purchase in a Trump administration if only because he needs and respects money and will want to make deals for himself and his family, as he did in a first term. Whatever moral or political qualms business leaders may have about Trump, the bottom line dictates that they get along with him, and if that means turning a blind eye to his unconstitutional actions — Dimon’s favorable recounting of Trump’s first term notably ignored his attempt to overthrow the government — then so be it.

We already know that little or no opposition will come from the Republican Party ecosystem. Among elected officials, the few willing to stand up to Trump have either been driven out of the party or are retiring so fast that they cannot even bear to finish out their terms. Those who remain have accepted Trump’s iron rule and therefore now have an interest in his success.

But what about the average Republican voter, the “normal” Republicans who happily voted for George W. Bush, John McCain and Mitt Romney? Do they not see the difference between those Republicans and Trump — or do they not care? They, too, may feel their narrow interests are served by a Trump victory, and although they may not be Christian nationalists themselves, their views as White Americans make them sympathetic to the complaints of the anti-liberals. They, too, may feel they — or their children — are at a disadvantage in a system dedicated to diversity and wokeness. Their annoyance with a liberalism that has “gone too far” makes them susceptible to Trump’s appeal, and, more importantly, unconcerned about the threat he poses. Left to their own devices, they would not be interested in overthrowing the regime. But neither are they inclined to stand in the way of those who are.

Are these voters and GOP power players right to believe that they, like Dimon, will be just fine in a system no longer faithful to the Founders’ liberal ideals? Perhaps so. They will not be the first to suffer from a shift back toward a 1920s America. White Americans tolerated the systematic oppression of Black people for a century after the Civil War. They tolerated violence in the South, injustice in the courtrooms, a Supreme Court that refused to recognize the equal rights of Black people, women and various minorities. Will they rise up against a second Trump term infused by Christian and white nationalism, or will they acquiesce in the gradual dismantling of the liberal gains of the past eight decades?

The shame is that many White people today seem to have conveniently forgotten how much they and their forebears have depended on the Founders’ liberalism to gain their present status as fully equal members of American society and to enjoy the freedoms that they take for granted.

Most White Republicans, after all, do not have the “legacy European” lineage that Tucker Carlson praises. They do not have ancestors who stepped off the Mayflower or fought in the Revolution. The ancestors of the great majority of “White” Americans today were not considered “White” when they first set foot on American shores. Irish Americans may no longer remember that the Thomas Nast cartoons of the late 19th century depicted the Irish as apelike creatures. Many Italian Americans may not recall that a riot made up of “New Orleans’ finest” lynched and murdered 11 Sicilian immigrants and were never charged.

Many Catholics seem to have forgotten that they were once the most despised group in America, such that one of the Founders, John Jay, wanted them excluded from citizenship altogether. Most White Americans were at one time members of despised immigrant groups. They were the victims of the very anti-liberalism they are now voting back into power. They climbed to equality using liberalism as their ladder, and now that they have reached their destination they would pull away the ladder and abandon liberalism. Having obtained their equality using the laws and institutions of liberalism, their passion for liberalism has faded.

The Founders understood, and feared, that the fervor for rights and liberalism that animated the Revolution might not last. Writing in 1781, two years before the end of the war, Thomas Jefferson predicted that once the war ended, “we shall be going down hill.” The people would return to their quotidian lives, forgetting their passionate concern for rights, intent only on “making money.” They might never again come together “to effect a due respect for their rights,” and so their government would stop being solicitous of their rights. Over a half-century later, Lincoln, in his famous Lyceum address, lamented that the original spirit of the Revolution had dissipated with time, leaving Americans with only the normal selfishness of human beings. The original “pillars of the temple of liberty” had “crumbled away.” A little over two decades later, the nation fell into civil war.

If the American system of government fails this year, it will not be because the institutions established by the Founders failed. It will not be because of new technologies or flaws in the Constitution. No system of government can protect against a determined tyrant. Only the people can. This year we will learn if they will.

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'Terrorism' : A world ensnared by a word

By John V. Whitbeck, International Herald Tribune

• Feb. 18, 2004

JIDDA— In his televised "Meet the Press" interview Feb. 8, President George W. Bush was never asked a question about "terrorism." Yet he used the word (or a variant) 22 times. The word explained, and justified, everything — past, present and future.

Few American politicians or commentators dare to question the conventional wisdom that "terrorism" is the greatest threat facing America and the world. If so, the real threat lies not in the behavior to which this word is applied but in the word itself.

It is no accident that there is no agreed definition of terrorism, since the word is so subjective as to be devoid of any inherent meaning. At the same time, the word is extremely dangerous, because people tend to believe that it does have meaning, and they use and abuse it by applying it to whatever they hate as a way of avoiding rational thought and discussion and, frequently, excusing their own illegal and immoral behavior.

There is no shortage of precise verbal formulations for the diverse acts to which the word "terrorism" is often applied. "Mass murder," "assassination," "arson" and "sabotage" are available (to all of which "politically motivated" can be added if appropriate), and such crimes are already on the statute books, rendering specific criminal legislation for "terrorism" unnecessary and undesirable.

However, such precise formulations do not carry the overwhelming, demonizing and thought-deadening impact of the word "terrorism," which is, of course, precisely the charm of the word for its more cynical and unprincipled users and abusers. If someone commits "politically motivated mass murder," people might be curious as to the cause or grievance which inspired such a crime, but no cause or grievance can justify (or even explain) "terrorism," which, all right-thinking people must agree, is an ultimate evil.

Most acts to which the word "terrorism" is applied (at least in the West) are tactics of the weak, usually (although not always) against the strong. Such acts are not a tactic of choice but of last resort.

The poor, the weak and the oppressed rarely complain about "terrorism." The rich, the strong and the oppressors constantly do. While most of mankind has more reason to fear the high-technology violence of the strong than the low-technology violence of the weak, the fundamental mind-trick employed by the abusers of the word "terrorism" is essentially this: The low-technology violence of the weak is such an abomination that there are no limits on the high-technology violence of the strong that can be deployed against it.

Not surprisingly, since Sept. 11, 2001, virtually every recognized state confronting an insurgency or separatist movement has eagerly jumped on the "war on terrorism" bandwagon, branding its domestic opponents — if it had not already done so — "terrorists."

Even while accepting that many people labeled "terrorists" are genuinely reprehensible, it should be recognized that neither respect for human rights nor the human condition is likely to be enhanced by this apparent carte blanche seized by the strong to crush the weak as they see fit.

Perhaps the only honest and globally workable definition of "terrorism" is an explicitly subjective one — "violence that I don't support." Anyone who reads both the Western and Arab press cannot help noticing that the Western press routinely characterizes as "terrorism" virtually all Palestinian violence against Israelis (even against Israeli occupation forces within Palestine), while the Arab press routinely characterizes as "terrorism" virtually all Israeli violence against Palestinians. Only such a formulation would accommodate both characterizations, as well as most others.

If everyone recognized that "terrorism" is fundamentally a term of abuse, with no intrinsic meaning, there would be no more reason to worry about the word now than before Sept. 11. But with the United States relying on the word to assert, apparently, a right to attack any country it dislikes, many people around the world understandably feel a genuine sense of terror (dictionary definition: "a state of intense fear") as to where the United States is taking the rest of the world.

If the world is to avoid a descent into anarchy, in which the only rule is "might makes right," the world — and particularly the United States — must recognize that "terrorism" is simply a word, a subjective epithet, not an objective reality and certainly not an excuse to suspend rules of international law and domestic civil liberties.

Every nation — and particularly the United States — must also recognize that in a world filled with injustice, violent outbursts by those hoping desperately for a better life — or simply seeking to strike a blow against injustice or their tormentors before they die — can never be eradicated.

At best, the frequency and gravity of such outbursts can be diminished by seeking to alleviate — rather than continuing to aggravate — the injustices and humiliations that give rise to them. A single-minded focus on increased military, "security" and "counter-terrorism" programs will almost certainly continue to prove counterproductive to its declared objective, diminishing both security and the quality of life for all mankind. Perfect security is, and will always be, an illusion, and "victory" in a "war on terrorism" is no more likely than in a "war on poverty," a "war on crime" or a "war on drugs."

It is long overdue, but not too late, for the American people to liberate themselves from the aggressive and self-destructive paranoia inflicted on them by unscrupulous abusers of an undefinable word.

Perhaps John Kerry will have the courage and genuine patriotism to question the wisdom of continuing to wage a perpetual "war" against a subjective epithet and, by doing so, to set us free, restoring some measure of sanity and more mature and constructive priorities both to American society and to America's relations with the world.

The writer is an international lawyer based in Saudi Arabia.

[Not to be reproduced without the permission of the author.]