what is economic equality essay

• Share full article

Advertisement

Supported by

Is Economic Inequality Really a Problem?

Yes, but the answer is less obvious than you might think.

By Samuel Scheffler

Dr. Scheffler is a professor of philosophy.

It is impossible to ignore the stark disparities of income and wealth that prevail in this country, and a great many of us are troubled by this state of affairs.

But is economic inequality really what bothers us? An influential essay published in 1987 by the philosopher Harry Frankfurt suggests that we have misidentified the problem. Professor Frankfurt argued that it does not matter whether some people have less than others. What matters is that some people do not have enough. They lack adequate income, have little or no wealth and do not enjoy decent housing, health care or education. If even the worst-off people had enough resources to lead good and fulfilling lives, then the fact that others had still greater resources would not be troubling.

When some people don’t have enough and others have vastly more than they need, it is easy to conclude that the problem is one of inequality. But this, according to Professor Frankfurt, is a mistake. The problem isn’t inequality as such. It’s the poverty and deprivation suffered by those who have least.

Professor Frankfurt’s essay didn’t persuade all his fellow philosophers, many of whom remained egalitarians. But his challenge continued to resonate and, in 2015, even as concerns about economic inequality were growing in many corners of society, he published a short book in which he reaffirmed his position.

And Professor Frankfurt, it seems, has a point. Those in the top 10 percent of America’s economic distribution are in a very comfortable position. Those in the top 1 percent are in an even more comfortable position than those in the other 9 percent. But few people find this kind of inequality troubling. Inequality bothers us most, it seems, only when some are very rich and others are very poor.

Even when the worst-off people are very poor, moreover, it wouldn’t be an improvement to reduce everyone else to their level. Equality would then prevail, but equal misery is hardly an ideal worth striving for.

So perhaps we shouldn’t object to economic inequality as such. Instead, we should just try to improve the position of those who have least. We should work to eliminate poverty, hunger, bad schools, substandard housing and inadequate medical care. But we shouldn’t make the elimination of inequality our aim.

Is this the correct conclusion? I think not. Economic inequality matters a great deal whether or not it matters “as such.”

Start by considering two points that Professor Frankfurt himself would accept. First, to succeed in eliminating poverty and securing decent conditions of life for all Americans would require raising taxes on the rich significantly. Although the ultimate purpose would not be to reduce inequality, the indirect effect would be to do just that. So even if inequality as such is not the problem, reducing inequality is almost certainly part of the solution.

Second, even if economic inequality is not a problem in and of itself, it can still have bad effects. Great disparities of income and wealth, of the kind we see in the United States today, can have damaging effects even when nobody is badly off in absolute terms. For example, the wealthiest may be able to exert a disproportionate share of political influence and to shape society in conformity with their interests. They may be able to make the law work for them rather than for everyone, and so undermine the rule of law. Enough economic inequality can transform a democracy into a plutocracy, a society ruled by the rich.

Large inequalities of inherited wealth can be particularly damaging, creating, in effect, an economic caste system that inhibits social mobility and undercuts equality of opportunity.

Extreme inequality can also have subtler and more insidious effects, which are especially pronounced when those who have the least are also poor and lack adequate resources, but which may persist even if everyone has enough. The rich may persuade themselves that they fully deserve their enormous wealth and develop attitudes of entitlement and privilege. Those who have less may develop feelings of inferiority and deference, on the one hand, and hostility and resentment on the other. In this way, extreme inequality can distort people’s view of themselves and compromise their relations with one another.

This brings us to a more fundamental point. The great political philosopher John Rawls thought that a liberal society should conceive of itself as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal people. Often, it seems, we do like to think of ourselves that way. We know that our society has always been blighted by grave injustices, beginning with the great moral catastrophe of slavery, but we aspire to create a society of equals, and we are proud of the steps we have taken toward that ideal.

But extreme inequality makes a mockery of our aspiration. In a society marked by the spectacular inequalities of income and wealth that have emerged in the United States in the past few decades, there is no meaningful sense in which all citizens, rich and poor alike, can nevertheless relate to one another on an equal footing. Even if poverty were eliminated and everyone had enough resources to lead a decent life, that would not by itself transform American citizenship into a relationship among equals. There is a limit to the degree of economic inequality that is compatible with the ideal of a society of equals and, although there is room for disagreement about where exactly the limit lies, it is clear that we have long since exceeded it.

If extreme economic inequality undermines the ideal of a society of equals, then is that merely one of its bad effects, like its corrupting influence on the political process? Or, instead, is that simply what it is for economic inequality to matter as such?

For practical purposes, it doesn’t make much difference which answer we give. In either case, the imperative that Professor Frankfurt identified — the imperative to ensure that all citizens have enough resources to lead decent lives — is of the utmost importance. It is appalling that so many people in a society as wealthy as ours continue to lack adequate housing, nutrition, medical care and education, and do not enjoy the full benefits of the rule of law. But addressing Professor Frankfurt’s imperative is not enough. Extreme economic inequality, whether it matters as such or “merely” for its effects, is pernicious. It threatens to transform us from a democracy into a plutocracy, and it makes a mockery of the ideal of equal citizenship.

If, as they say, every crisis is an opportunity, then America today is truly the land of opportunity. Of the many opportunities with which our current crises have presented us, one of the most basic is the opportunity to rethink our conception of ourselves as a society. Going forward, we must decide whether we wish to constitute ourselves as a genuine society of equals or, alternatively, whether we are content to have our relations with one another structured by an increasingly stark and unforgiving economic and social hierarchy.

Samuel Scheffler is a professor of philosophy and law at New York University and the author, most recently, of “Why Worry About Future Generations?”

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook , Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram .

To Fight Inequality, America Needs to Rethink Its Economic Model

F or decades, economic policy in most liberal democracies has been premised on two core beliefs: that free markets would maximize economic growth, and that we could address inequality through redistribution.

The recent revival of industrial policy, championed by President Biden, is a clear repudiation of the first of these beliefs. It reflects a growing recognition among economists that state intervention to shape markets and steer investment is crucial for fostering innovation, protecting strategically important sectors like semi-conductors, and tackling the climate emergency.

But we must also reassess the second belief—that taxes and transfers alone can address the vast inequalities that have brought American democracy to such a perilous juncture. Doing so will lead us towards a more fundamental rethink of our economic institutions, and the values that guide them.

This is partly a pragmatic response to economic reality. The massive increase in inequality since the 1980s in America was mostly driven not by a reduction in redistribution, but by the growing gap in earnings between low skill workers, whose wages have suffered an unprecedented period of stagnation, and college-educated professionals whose salaries have continued to soar. And while inequality has increased in most advanced economies, that it is so much higher in the U.S. compared to Europe is mostly the result of bigger gaps in earnings than lower levels of redistribution. In other words, even if America were to increase the generosity of the welfare state to European levels it would still be much more unequal.

But the need to look beyond redistribution is about more than economics, it is about resisting the narrow focus on money that dominates most debates about inequality, and the tendency to reduce our interests as citizens to those of consumers. While government transfers are essential for making sure that everyone can meet their basic needs, simply topping up people’s incomes fails to recognize the importance of work as a source of independence, identity, and community, and does nothing to address the insecurity faced by gig-economy workers, or the constant surveillance of employees in Amazon warehouses.

This is not purely a moral issue. According to a recent paper by economists at Columbia and Princeton, the Democratic Party’s shift towards a “compensate the losers ” strategy in the 1970s and 1980s—taxing high earners to fund welfare payments to the poor—played a key role in driving away less educated voters, who disproportionately support “pre-redistributive” policies like higher minimum wages and stronger unions.

Things are moving in the right direction. President Biden has put “good jobs” at the centre of his economic agenda, claiming that “a job is about [a] lot more than a pay cheque. It’s about your dignity. It’s about respect.” Leading economists such as Dani Rodrik at Harvard and Daron Acemoglu at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s have started to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy that such jobs are an inevitable by-product of a well-functioning market economy. This shift of focus towards the production or supply side of the economy has been variously termed “ productivism ”, “ modern supply-side economics ” and “ supply-side progressivism .”

Read More: Why Joe Biden is Running on the Economy

And yet, to grasp the full potential of these ideas we must look beyond economics to philosophy. Contemporary thinkers such as Michael Sandel and Elizabeth Anderson have done much to put questions about work back on the agenda. But for a systematic vision of a just society that recognizes the fundamental importance of work we should revisit the ideas of arguably the 20th-century’s greatest political philosopher, John Rawls—an early advocate for what we would now call “pre-distribution,” who argued that every citizen should have access to good jobs, a fair share of society’s wealth, and a say over how work is organized.

The publication of Rawls’s magnum opus A Theory of Justice in 1971 marks a watershed moment in the history of political thought, drawing favourable comparisons to the likes of John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, even Plato. Rawls’s most famous idea is a thought experiment called the “original position.” If we want to know what a fair society would look like, he argued, we should imagine how we would choose to organize it if we didn’t know what our individual position would be—rich or poor, Black or white, Christian of Muslim— as if behind a “veil of ignorance.”

Our first priority would be to secure a set of “basic liberties,” such as free speech and the right to vote, that are the basis for individual freedom and civic equality.

When it comes to the economy, we would want “fair equality of opportunity,” and we would tolerate a degree of inequality so that people have incentives to work hard and innovate, making society richer overall. But rather than assuming that the benefits would trickle down to those at the bottom, Rawls argued that we would want to organize our economy so that the least well-off would be better off than under any alternative system—a concept he called the “difference principle.”

This principle has often been interpreted as justifying a fairly conventional strategy of taxing the rich and redistributing to the poor. But Rawls explicitly rejected “welfare state capitalism” in favour of what he called a “property-owning democracy.” Rather than simply topping up the incomes of the least well off, society should “put in the hands of citizens generally, and not only of a few, sufficient productive means for them to be fully cooperating members of society.”

Doing so is essential for individual dignity and self-respect, he argued, warning that “Lacking a sense of long-term security and the opportunity for meaningful work and occupation is not only destructive of citizens’ self-respect but of their sense that they are members of society and not simply caught in it. This leads to self-hatred, bitterness, and resentment” – feelings that could threaten the stability of liberal democracy itself. A focus on work is also necessary for maintaining a sense of reciprocity since every able citizen would be expected to contribute to society in return for a fair reward.

Rawls’s philosophy offers the kind of big picture vision that has been missing on the center-left for a generation—a unifying alternative to ‘identity politics’ grounded in the best of America’s political traditions. It also points towards a genuinely transformative economic programme that would address the concerns of long-neglected lower-income voters, not simply for higher incomes but for a chance to contribute to society and to be treated with respect.

At the heart of this vision is the idea that productive resources—both human capital (skills) and ownership of physical capital (like stocks and shares)—should be widely shared. People’s incomes would still depend on their individual effort and good fortune, but wages and profits would be more equal, and there would be less need for redistribution.

How might we bring this about?

First, we would need to ensure equal access to education, irrespective of family background. Sadly, the reality in America today is that children from the richest fifth of households are fivetimes more likely to get a college degree than those from the poorest fifth. Achieving true equality of opportunity is a generational challenge, but the direction should be towards universal early years education, school funding based on need rather than local wealth, and a higher education system where tuition subsidies and publicly-funded income-contingent loans guarantee access to all.

We also need to shift focus towards the more than half of the population who don’t get a four-year college degree. Our obsession with academic higher education—justified in part on the basis that this will generate growth, which in turn will benefit non-graduates—is simply the educational equivalent of trickle-down economics. At the very least, public subsidies should be made available on equal terms for those who want to follow a vocational route, as the U.K. is doing through the introduction of a Lifelong Learning Entitlement from 2025, providing every individual with financial support for four years of post-18 education, covering both long and short courses, and vocational and academic subjects.

Second, we must address the vastly unequal distribution of wealth . Thewealthiest 10 % of Americans have around 70 % of all personal wealth compared to roughly 2% the entire bottom half. Sensible policies like guaranteed minimum interest rates for small savers and tax breaks to encourage employee share ownership would encourage middle-class savings. But to shift the dial on wealth inequality we should be open to something more radical, like a universal minimum inheritance paid to each citizen at the age of eighteen, funded through progressive taxes on inheritance and wealth. If developments in AI push more income towards the owners of capital, something like this will become necessary.

Finally, we need to give workers real power to shape how companies are run. The idea that owners, or shareholders, should make these decisions is often treated as an immutable fact of economic life. But this “shareholder primacy” is neither natural nor inevitable about, and in most European countries employees have the right to elect representatives to company boards and to ‘works councils’ with a say over working conditions. This system of ‘co-management’ allows owners and worker to strike a balance between pursuing profit and all the other things we want from work – security, dignity, a sense of achievement, community – in a way that makes sense for a particular firm. The benefits of co-management appear to come at little or no cost in terms of profits or competitiveness, are popular with managers, and may even increase  business investment and productivity.

Critics will no doubt denounce these ideas as “socialism.” But as we have seen, they have impeccable liberal credentials, and are perfectly compatible with the dynamic market economy that is so vital both for individual freedom and economic prosperity. Neither are they somehow “un-American.” As Elizabeth Anderson has reminded us , America was the great hope of free market egalitarians from Adam Smith through to Abraham Lincoln, whose dreams of a society of small-scale independent producers were dashed by the industrial revolution, and would have been horrified by the hierarchy and subservience of contemporary capitalism. Rawls’s ideal of property-owning democracy can help us revive this vision for the 21 st century.

Still, even sympathetic readers might wonder whether there is any point talking about a new economic paradigm when the U.S. has failed even to raise the Federal minimum wage since 2009. But this would be to ignore the lessons of history. As the neoliberal era comes to an end, we should learn from its leading architects Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, who were nothing if not bold, and saw their ideas go from heresy to orthodoxy in a single generation. As Friedman put it “Only a crisis — actual or perceived — produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around."

It often takes a generation or two before the ideas of truly great thinkers start to shape real politics. Now, for the first time since the publication of  A Theory of Justice  just over half a century ago, there is an urgent need and appetite for systematic political thinking on a scale that only a philosopher like Rawls can provide. In the face of widespread cynicism, even despair about the American project, his ideas offer a hopeful vision of the future whose time has come.

More Must-Reads From TIME

• Putin’s Enemies Are Struggling to Unite
• Women Say They Were Pressured Into Long-Term Birth Control
• What Student Photojournalists Saw at the Campus Protests
• Scientists Are Finding Out Just How Toxic Your Stuff Is
• Boredom Makes Us Human
• John Mulaney Has What Late Night Needs
• The 100 Most Influential People of 2024
• Want Weekly Recs on What to Watch, Read, and More? Sign Up for Worth Your Time

Contact us at [email protected]

The economic gains from equity

• Final Paper by Buckman et al
• Comment by Fortin
• Comment by Hurst
• General Discussion
• Data & Programs

Subscribe to the Economic Studies Bulletin

Shelby r. buckman , shelby r. buckman graduate student - stanford university laura y. choi , laura y. choi vice president, community development - federal reserve bank of san francisco mary c. daly , and mary c. daly president and chief executive officer - federal reserve bank of san francisco lily m. seitelman lily m. seitelman graduate student - boston university discussants: nicole fortin and nicole fortin professor - university of british columbia erik hurst erik hurst frank p. and marianne r. diassi distinguished service professor of economics - booth school of business, university of chicago, deputy director - becker friedman institute @erikhurst.

September 8, 2021

The paper summarized here is part of the Fall 2021 edition of the  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA) , the leading conference series and journal in economics for timely, cutting-edge research about real-world policy issues. The conference draft of the paper was presented on September 9, 2021 at the  Fall 2021 BPEA conference . The final version was published in the Fall 2021 edition by Brookings Institution Press on June 7, 2022.  Read all papers published in this edition here»   Submit a proposal to present at a future BPEA conference here»

Longstanding racial and ethnic disparities in the United States have hurt not only the people who experience the disparities but have hurt all Americans by depressing U.S. economic output by trillions of dollars over the past 30 years, suggests a paper discussed at the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA) conference on September 9.

The authors— Shelby R. Buckman, Laura Y. Choi, Mary C. Daly¸ and Lily M. Seitelman, all of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco—considered differences from 1990 to 2019 among white, Black, and Hispanic men and women, ages 25-64. They looked at disparities using five metrics: employment (the percentage of people with jobs); hours worked; educational attainment (the level of education completed); educational utilization (the extent to which people are in jobs that fully use their education); and earnings gaps not explained by those factors.

Then, in The economic gains from equity , they conducted a thought experiment, asking: “How much larger would the U.S. economic pie be if opportunities and outcomes were more equally distributed by race and ethnicity?” Their answer is $22.9 trillion over the 30-year period.

“The persistence of systemic disparities is costly, and eliminating them has the potential to produce large economic gains,” the authors write. Standard economic models often assume markets work efficiently and thus suggest explanations—such as unmeasured differences in productivity or cultural differences—that would support the existence and persistence of racial and ethnic gaps. The authors instead assume talent and job and educational preferences are distributed evenly across race and ethnicity. They then show the economic effects of disparities that hold people back from fully realizing their potential.

The persistence of systemic disparities is costly, and eliminating them has the potential to produce large economic gains

“The opportunity to participate in the economy and to succeed based on ability and effort is at the foundation of our nation and our economy,” they write. “Unfortunately, structural barriers have persistently disrupted this narrative for many Americans, leaving the talents of millions of people underutilized or on the sidelines. The result is lower prosperity, not just for those affected, but for everyone.”

“With considerable pressures weighing on U.S. economic potential in coming decades, the time seems right to take a new perspective and imagine what’s possible if equity is achieved,” the authors conclude.

The authors note in the paper that they built on the work of others and cite in particular the work, dating to 1985, of four African-American economists: William A. Darity, Patrick L. Mason, William E. Spriggs, and the late Rhonda M. Williams.

Acknowledgments

David Skidmore authored the summary language for this paper.

Buckman, Shelby R., Laura Y. Choi, Mary C. Daly¸ and Lily M. Seitelman. 2021. “The Economic Gains from Equity.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity , Fall. 71-111.

Fortin, Nicole. 2021. “Comment on ‘The Economic Gains from Equity’.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity , Fall. 112-130.

Hurst, Erik. 2021. “Comment on ‘The Economic Gains from Equity’.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity , Fall. 130-135.

Conflict of Interest Disclosure

Shelby R. Buckman is a graduate student in economics at Stanford University and a past employee at FRBSF during which time she did the majority of her contribution to this paper; Laura Y. Choi is vice president of community development at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; Mary C. Daly is president and chief executive officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, CRIW member, and IZA research fellow; Lily M. Seitelman is a graduate student in economics at Boston University and a past employee at FRBSF during which time she did the majority of her contribution to this paper. Beyond these affiliations, the authors did not receive financial support from any firm or person for this paper or from any firm or person with a financial or political interest in this paper. They are currently not officers, directors, or board members of any organization with an interest in this paper. No outside party had the right to review this paper before circulation. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Any opinion, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship under Grant No. DGE-1840990 and Grant No. DGE-1840990.

hIstory of bpea

Discussants

Economic Studies

Brookings Papers on Economic Activity

Simon Hodson

May 8, 2024

William A. Galston

May 1, 2024

Online only

2:00 pm - 3:15 pm EST

5 Essays to Learn More About Equality

“Equality” is one of those words that seems simple, but is more complicated upon closer inspection. At its core, equality can be defined as “the state of being equal.” When societies value equality, their goals include racial, economic, and gender equality . Do we really know what equality looks like in practice? Does it mean equal opportunities, equal outcomes, or both? To learn more about this concept, here are five essays focusing on equality:

“The Equality Effect” (2017) – Danny Dorling

In this essay, professor Danny Dorling lays out why equality is so beneficial to the world. What is equality? It’s living in a society where everyone gets the same freedoms, dignity, and rights. When equality is realized, a flood of benefits follows. Dorling describes the effect of equality as “magical.” Benefits include happier and healthier citizens, less crime, more productivity, and so on. Dorling believes the benefits of “economically equitable” living are so clear, change around the world is inevitable. Despite the obvious conclusion that equality creates a better world, progress has been slow. We’ve become numb to inequality. Raising awareness of equality’s benefits is essential.

Danny Dorling is the Halford Mackinder Professor of Geography at the University of Oxford. He has co-authored and authored a handful of books, including Slowdown: The End of the Great Acceleration—and Why It’s Good for the Planet, the Economy, and Our Lives . “The Equality Effect” is excerpted from this book. Dorling’s work focuses on issues like health, education, wealth, poverty, and employment.

“The Equality Conundrum” (2020) – Joshua Rothman

Originally published as “Same Difference” in the New Yorker’s print edition, this essay opens with a story. A couple plans on dividing their money equally among their children. However, they realize that to ensure equal success for their children, they might need to start with unequal amounts. This essay digs into the complexity of “equality.” While inequality is a major concern for people, most struggle to truly define it. Citing lectures, studies, philosophy, religion, and more, Rothman sheds light on the fact that equality is not a simple – or easy – concept.

Joshua Rothman has worked as a writer and editor of The New Yorker since 2012. He is the ideas editor of newyorker.com.

“Why Understanding Equity vs Equality in Schools Can Help You Create an Inclusive Classroom” (2019) – Waterford.org

Equality in education is critical to society. Students that receive excellent education are more likely to succeed than students who don’t. This essay focuses on the importance of equity, which means giving support to students dealing with issues like poverty, discrimination and economic injustice. What is the difference between equality and equity? What are some strategies that can address barriers? This essay is a great introduction to the equity issues teachers face and why equity is so important.

Waterford.org is a nonprofit organization dedicated to improving equity and education in the United States. It believes that the educational experiences children receive are crucial for their future. Waterford.org was founded by Dr. Dustin Heuston.

“What does equality mean to me?” (2020) – Gabriela Vivacqua and Saddal Diab

While it seems simple, the concept of equality is complex. In this piece posted by WFP_Africa on the WFP’s Insight page, the authors ask women from South Sudan what equality means to them. Half of South Sudan’s population consists of women and girls. Unequal access to essentials like healthcare, education, and work opportunities hold them back. Complete with photographs, this short text gives readers a glimpse into interpretations of equality and what organizations like the World Food Programme are doing to tackle gender inequality.

As part of the UN, the World Food Programme is the world’s largest humanitarian organization focusing on hunger and food security . It provides food assistance to over 80 countries each year.

“Here’s How Gender Equality is Measured” (2020) – Catherine Caruso

Gender inequality is one of the most discussed areas of inequality. Sobering stats reveal that while progress has been made, the world is still far from realizing true gender equality. How is gender equality measured? This essay refers to the Global Gender Gap report ’s factors. This report is released each year by the World Economic Forum. The four factors are political empowerment, health and survival, economic participation and opportunity, and education. The author provides a brief explanation of each factor.

Catherine Caruso is the Editorial Intern at Global Citizen, a movement committed to ending extreme poverty by 2030. Previously, Caruso worked as a writer for Inquisitr. Her English degree is from Syracuse University. She writes stories on health, the environment, and citizenship.

You may also like

16 Inspiring Civil Rights Leaders You Should Know

15 Trusted Charities Fighting for Housing Rights

15 Examples of Gender Inequality in Everyday Life

11 Approaches to Alleviate World Hunger 

15 Facts About Malala Yousafzai

12 Ways Poverty Affects Society

15 Great Charities to Donate to in 2024

15 Quotes Exposing Injustice in Society

14 Trusted Charities Helping Civilians in Palestine

The Great Migration: History, Causes and Facts

Social Change 101: Meaning, Examples, Learning Opportunities

Rosa Parks: Biography, Quotes, Impact

About the author, emmaline soken-huberty.

Emmaline Soken-Huberty is a freelance writer based in Portland, Oregon. She started to become interested in human rights while attending college, eventually getting a concentration in human rights and humanitarianism. LGBTQ+ rights, women’s rights, and climate change are of special concern to her. In her spare time, she can be found reading or enjoying Oregon’s natural beauty with her husband and dog.

How We Understand Economic Inequality and Why It Matters

Economic Mobility Fellow Efraín García Sánchez and colleagues find in new research that beliefs and attitudes about inequality shape how we feel about ourselves, perceive others, and justify inequality. They found:  

• Perceiving higher levels of economic inequality reduces people’s satisfaction with their lives and status in society
• Believing that economic inequality is unfair leads to more extreme feelings, whether positive or negative, toward politicians and partisans 
• Supporting values that foster individual achievement and self-interest make people more tolerant of inequality 

Learn More 

• Perceived Economic Inequality Is Negatively Associated with Subjective Well-being through Status Anxiety and Social Trust | Social Indicators Research  
• Economic Threats, Political and National Identification Predict Affective Polarization: Longitudinal Evidence From Spain | International Review of Social Psychology
• Individual Values Predict Desiring More Economic Inequality: The Moderator Role of Social Mobility | International Journal of Psychology  

Eberhardt's Landmark Research Featured in The New York Times

How University Commitments to Diversity Can Lead to Progress Toward Equality

Eberhardt to Speak in American Academy of Arts and Sciences Webinar

Why Money Flows Uphill

Power brokers choose economic efficiency over equality—in contrast to average Americans—economist Ray Fisman finds in study

Many scholars view global wealth disparities and income inequality as the defining moral, economic, and political issue of our time. Income inequality has been rising in the US for several decades, and the majority of Americans tell pollsters they think the level is too high.

Why, then, has the response from policymakers been so tepid—even under two popular two-term Democratic presidents? That is the question Boston University economist Ray Fisman and a lot of other economists have been asking. One possible contributing factor, Fisman and his colleagues found in a recent study , is that that the elites who make and influence policy care a lot less about economic equality—and more about economic efficiency—than do average Americans.

“Ours is an argument that pushes back, at least in part, against the claim that politics has been captured by economic elites,” says Fisman, who is the first Slater Family Professor in Behavioral Economics, in BU’s College of Arts & Sciences. “We provide a less insidious—but still problematic—explanation for limited redistribution. Politicians are acting on their principles, but these principles—which emphasize efficiency at the expense of equality—diverge from those of everyday Americans.”

Fisman’s study, which was published in Science in September 2015, notes that economic redistribution policies that benefit the middle class and poor almost always involve a cost in terms of lost, or wasted, resources—known as the “leaky bucket,” the term coined by economist Arthur M. Okun in his famous 1975 book, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff . Fisman’s co-authors are Pamela Jakiela , an assistant economics professor at the University of Maryland at College Park; Shachar Kariv , an economics professor at the University of California at Berkeley, and Daniel Markovits , a political philosopher and professor of law at Yale Law School.

The study, “The distributional preferences of an elite,” examines people’s attitudes toward two tradeoffs that shape social and economic policy: efficiency vs. equality and selfishness vs. fair-mindedness. “The tradeoff between selfishness and fair-mindedness informs the willingness of the haves to make sacrifices in order to aid the have-nots,” Fisman says. “And the tradeoff between efficiency and equality goes to the familiar conundrum of whether economic policy should concentrate on growing the economic pie or on promoting the pie’s even distribution.”

Elites in the study were more likely to be classified as selfish (and hence less likely to be classified as fair-minded) than average Americans. More importantly, Fisman says, the study found that elites were much less willing to sacrifice efficiency for equality than were average Americans. (That is, elites care more about growing the size of the economic pie than ensuring everyone gets the same-sized slice.) The more elite they were—in terms of education and income—the more the study subjects favored efficiency over equality. The “extreme” elite—a group made up of 208 Yale Law School (YLS) students—held these attitudes, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of YLS students self-identify as progressive Democrats. The Democratic Party has been traditionally thought of as the party of economic equality.

For the study, the researchers asked YLS students and hundreds of other Americans to play a variation of what economists call a dictator game, in which subjects were asked to distribute a pot of real money between themselves and an anonymous other person. Subjects could keep or give away as much of the money as they liked. The twist was that the price of giving—or redistribution—varied. In some cases, giving was expensive: For every dollar a subject paid out, the other person might only get a dime. In other cases, giving was cheap: For every dollar given, the other person might get as much as ten dollars. Most choices fell somewhere between these two extremes.

Three different classes of subjects played the game:

• Average Americans, who came from the American Life Panel (ALP), an Internet-based pool of Americans from across the economic and social spectrum that is assembled by the RAND Corporation.
• Intermediate elites, made up of undergraduates at the University of California at Berkeley, which is one of the most selective schools in the country, and ALP subjects who hold graduate degrees and have annual household incomes of over $100,000.
• Extreme elites, composed of three cohorts of students from Yale Law School, the country’s most selective law school. As the study points out, graduates of elite law schools typically receive salary offers of $160,000 (often augmented by signing bonuses) on graduation. Two of the past three US presidents and all nine sitting Supreme Court justices graduated from either Yale or Harvard Law schools.

Yale Law students favored efficiency over equality by a factor of four to one. ALP subjects split about evenly between focusing on efficiency and equality. Intermediate elites favored efficiency over equality by a factor of roughly three to two.

The study also found that Yale law students’ attitudes toward efficiency vs. equality tradeoffs predicted their career choices. Equality-minded subjects were more likely to work for nonprofit organizations, with a focus on the equality-related rights and interests of the disenfranchised. Efficiency-minded subjects chose the corporate sector.

BU Research sat down with Fisman recently to discuss what his research tells us about the disconnect between Washington and average Americans when it comes to economic inequality.

BU Research : What is the significance of this study?

Fisman: There are two aspects of it that I think are important. Our study focuses on the attitudes of elite Americans toward redistribution. Studying an elite population is a novelty in itself, since it’s so hard to access elites as survey subjects, yet so very important because of their outsized effect on policy. Second, I think our findings that elites are more concerned with economic efficiency than equality has implications for how we think about confronting the problem of growing inequality in America.

Can you explain how you define efficiency in this study? Are you using it as a proxy for the trickle-down concepts made popular by Ronald Reagan—that if the rich get richer then wealth will trickle down to everyone else?

We are most certainly not invoking supply-side economics, which is essentially a “have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too” theory of income taxation. The trickle-down theory holds that if you cut taxes on the able and productive, they work even harder and get even richer, and by virtue of their efforts, the entire country becomes so much wealthier that the crumbs that trickle down to the rest of the population are so big that even the poor are better off than if we’d taxed them at a higher rate. That is, under supply-side economics, everyone is better off.

We measure efficiency by the extent to which the size of the pie—money available in the experiment, in our case—is maximized. It says nothing about how this pie is distributed amongst individuals. You can think of lots of economic policies that increase or decrease GDP growth. Very, very often, they have implications for equality of income distribution. Taxation is indeed the most obvious example. If we raise taxes, able and productive individuals may choose to work less—why bother if the government taxes 99 cents on the dollar, the reasoning goes—and the country’s economic pie grows more slowly or, some say, may shrink. But we can use those tax proceeds to distribute income or improve educational opportunities or otherwise help the poor in ways that lead to a more equitable income distribution. In this case, we need to decide how much efficiency we’re willing to trade off for greater equality.

How do subjects trade off efficiency vs. equality when they play the game, and what has that got to do with inequality?

Participants in the experiment confront this tradeoff when they face different “prices” of giving. You can think about this price as capturing how much societal wealth is lost when a more productive member of society redistributes to a less able—and hence, initially poorer—individual.

For example, in some decisions, subjects may be able to give $10 for each dollar of their own income they give up. Giving in this case is cheap. At the other extreme, subjects may only be able to pass on 10 cents for each dollar they give up, so giving is expensive. An efficiency-minded individual will always keep everything when giving is expensive—rather than “waste” a dollar only to produce 10 cents in giving—while giving up everything when it is cheap to do so. Why keep the dollar when you can make someone else $10 richer? But this creates extreme inequality—one person ends up with everything and the other with nothing. An equality-minded person will always ensure that both parties end up with the same amount. And many subjects will do so even when it leads to a much, much smaller pie.

It seems like you’re making a distinction between political and economic elites. But aren’t some so-called political elites also part of the economic elite and couldn’t it be that they may express progressive ideas generally, but still be influenced by their inherent class bias?

I’m actually not sure we draw such a sharp distinction. In fact, one can very reasonably argue that they’re drawn from similar pools—like graduates of Yale Law School. YLS graduates are likely to join the ranks of the economic elite—as when they run white shoe law partnerships or Fortune 500 companies—or the political elite, serving as lawmakers and judges.

You found that elite subjects were twice as likely to be selfish as their compatriots in general—what are some numbers from your study that show that?

One example is Figure 2 of the online Science article, which shows that more than 30 percent of YLS students kept “nearly” the entire pie in every pie-splitting decision they made. Only around 15+ percent of our subjects drawn from a pool of diverse Americans did so. We get similar rates of selfishness to the YLS sample in our pool of Berkeley undergraduates.

You say that Yale Law students’ commitment to efficiency over equality is astonishing, given that they self-identified as Democrats rather than Republicans—and thus sided with the party of economic equality—by a factor of over nine to one. What about the difference between the rhetorical ideals of a political party and what it does in practice? Some people believe there isn’t much of a difference between Democrats and Republicans; people look at the Clinton administration, which cut welfare, among other regressive acts, as a deeply unprogressive administration. Is it possible these Yale students are a perfect example of modern, elite Democrats?

Here’s why we find it more astonishing: In other work , Shachar, Pam, and I find that political affiliation is, for Americans overall, a strong predictor of efficiency orientation. So self-identified Democrats—who lean toward equality orientation—do, in fact, act in a manner that is in keeping with the rhetorical ideals of their party, relative to Republicans, who tend to emphasize efficiency.

Given this result for the population overall, we find it to be very striking that Yale Law School students—more than 90 percent of whom say they’re Democrats—nonetheless are more efficiency-focused than the Republicans in our broader sample of Americans.

And yes, we’re arguing precisely your point—that this could contribute to the apparent divergence between the preferences of Americans for greater equality and the efficiency-focused technocratic choices of America’s leaders.

Are you suggesting that Yale Law School students acquire their attitudes about economic justice at Yale?

Definitely not. We’re not saying anything about where their attitudes come from. It’s not so much that they’re selfish as that they have this view of society that puts more weight on efficiency than equality and that would lead them to redistribute less than many Americans might prefer.

Is it possible for some of us non-economists to read your study as an excuse for elites—and that what you really found is that elites just don’t care about equality for the middle class and poor?

That’s a totally reasonable and relevant point. Given the current framing of our results, we do run the risk of being seen as apologists for inaction by elites. But I don’t see things that way. What I take away from our study is that policymakers on both sides of the aisle might be more reluctant to implement redistributive tax policies that aim to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor, even if that’s something their constituents want or need. The study’s findings signal this disconnect between the preferences of the electorate and the elected. It is, in some sense, a corruption of democracy, if you want to be a bit histrionic about it.

That is, we’re arguing that a mismatch between voter preferences and policies, owing to personal preferences of elites or otherwise, is a subversion of democracy. I think that’s a balanced assessment, and one that doesn’t let anyone off the hook.

We live in a so-called representative democracy. We can vote out people who don’t represent our interests. Why do you think this isn’t happening? Why do people who care about income inequality vote for people who don’t enact policies to remedy it?

This is so far above my pay grade. Why does Congress pass the Farm Bill every five years? Why can’t we pass gun control legislation? There are many mysteries to American politics, and probably more explanations for why things are the way they are. Our study doesn’t speak to this, and if I’ve got any sense at all, I won’t try to either.

Explore Related Topics:

• Government & Law
• Public Policy
• Share this story
• 3 Comments Add

Senior Contributing Editor

Sara Rimer A journalist for more than three decades, Sara Rimer worked at the Miami Herald , Washington Post and, for 26 years, the New York Times , where she was the New England bureau chief, and a national reporter covering education, aging, immigration, and other social justice issues. Her stories on the death penalty’s inequities were nominated for a Pulitzer Prize and cited in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision outlawing the execution of people with intellectual disabilities. Her journalism honors include Columbia University’s Meyer Berger award for in-depth human interest reporting. She holds a BA degree in American Studies from the University of Michigan. Profile

She can be reached at [email protected] .

Comments & Discussion

Boston University moderates comments to facilitate an informed, substantive, civil conversation. Abusive, profane, self-promotional, misleading, incoherent or off-topic comments will be rejected. Moderators are staffed during regular business hours (EST) and can only accept comments written in English. Statistics or facts must include a citation or a link to the citation.

There are 3 comments on Why Money Flows Uphill

An interesting study but I think Dr. Fisman might have focused more on economic opportunities (vs economic inequality) and income redistribution. There will always be economic and income inequality in America (and elsewhere) as proven throughout history. We are lucky to be living in a country that had enlightened Founders that saw the difference and structured a Constitution and laws that provided certain liberties and freedoms that enabled Americans the means for economic opportunities.

“Kill everyone better than you are, then everyone will be equal. All equally dead.” T.H. White, The Book of Merlin. No one aspires to have their child have an equally bad meal as a child living on the streets of Buenos Aires. Equality is a false objective that many want to impose on others, but they won’t accept for themselves.

I think we’ve run up against a weakness in testing here, though perhaps just a weakness of extremely weak testing.

The question asked here was “Are you willing to give up your space in the lifeboat with no assurance that anybody else will be saved in your place, and given that nobody else is giving up theirs?” Unsurprisingly, not a lot of thoughtful people went for the proposition.

The whole point of policy, as opposed to individual posing, is that it affects the whole polis. The policy question here was “Are you in favor of overall policies in which the lifeboats go to women and children first?” The phrasing of that question here was “Are you a Democrat or a Republican?” and Democrats, the egalitarian policy position, won.

No contradiction here. Different questions got different answers.

The wider question, for the economic profession and for the Trustees of Boston University, is whether the “academics” who couldn’t keep these differences straight shall be punished for their ignorance, carelessness, and consequent deception inflicted on the public?

My guess is the answer will be no.

Post a comment. Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Latest from The Brink

Explain this how do planets form, bu’s innovator of the year has pioneered devices to advance astronomy, microscopy, eye exams, bu study shows a correlation between social media use and desire for cosmetic procedures, covid-19 photo contest winners capture moments of joy, sorrow, meaning in crisis, how high-level lawsuits are disrupting climate change policies, the h5n1 bird flu is a growing threat for farm animals and humans—how serious is it, why is a bu researcher so fascinated with the diets of dung beetles, we are underestimating the health harms of climate disasters, three bu researchers elected aaas fellows, should people be fined for sleeping outside, secrets of ancient egyptian nile valley settlements found in forgotten treasure, not having job flexibility or security can leave workers feeling depressed, anxious, and hopeless, bu electrical engineer vivek goyal named a 2024 guggenheim fellow, can the bias in algorithms help us see our own, do immigrants and immigration help the economy, how do people carry such heavy loads on their heads, do alcohol ads promote underage drinking, how worried should we be about us measles outbreaks, stunning new image shows black hole’s immensely powerful magnetic field, it’s not just a pharmacy—walgreens and cvs closures can exacerbate health inequities.

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

This article is concerned with social and political equality. In its prescriptive usage, ‘equality’ is a highly contested concept. Its normally positive connotation gives it a rhetorical power suitable for use in political slogans (Westen 1990). At least since the French Revolution, equality has served as one of the leading ideals of the body politic; in this respect, it is at present probably the most controversial of the great social ideals. There is controversy concerning the precise notion of equality, the relation of justice and equality (the principles of equality), the material requirements and measure of the ideal of equality (equality of what?), the extension of equality (equality among whom?), and its status within a comprehensive (liberal) theory of justice (the value of equality). This article will discuss each of these issues in turn.

1. Defining the Concept

2.1 formal equality, 2.2 proportional equality, 2.3 moral equality, 2.4 presumption of equality, 3.1 simple equality and objections to equality in general, 3.2 libertarianism, 3.3 utilitarianism, 3.4 equality of welfare, 3.5 equality of resources, 3.6 responsibility and luck-egalitarianism, 3.7 equality of opportunity for welfare or advantage, 3.8 capabilities approaches, 4. relational equality, 5. equality among whom, 6.1. kinds of egalitarianism, 6.2 equality vs. priority or sufficiency, other internet resources, related entries.

‘Equality’ is a contested concept: “People who praise it or disparage it disagree about what they are praising or disparaging” (Dworkin 2000, p. 2). Our first task is therefore to provide a clear definition of equality in the face of widespread misconceptions about its meaning as a political idea. The terms ‘equality’ (Greek: isotes ; Latin: aequitas , aequalitas ; French: égalité ; German Gleichheit ), ‘equal’, and ‘equally’ signify a qualitative relationship. ‘Equality’ (or ‘equal’) signifies correspondence between a group of different objects, persons, processes or circumstances that have the same qualities in at least one respect, but not all respects, i.e., regarding one specific feature, with differences in other features. ‘Equality’ must then be distinguished from ‘identity’, which refers to one and the same object corresponding to itself in all its features. For the same reason, it needs to be distinguished from ‘similarity’ – the concept of merely approximate correspondence (Dann 1975, p. 997; Menne 1962, p. 44 ff.; Westen 1990, pp. 39, 120). Thus, to say that men are equal, for example, is not to say that they are identical. Equality implies similarity rather than ‘sameness’.

Judgements of equality presume a difference between the things compared. According to this definition, the notion of ‘complete’ or ‘absolute’ equality may be seen as problematic because it would violate the presumption of a difference. Two non-identical objects are never completely equal; they are different at least in their spatiotemporal location. If things do not differ they should not be called ‘equal’, but rather, more precisely, ‘identical’, such as the morning and the evening star. Here usage might vary. Some authors do consider absolute qualitative equality admissible as a borderline concept (Tugendhat & Wolf 1983, p. 170).

‘Equality’ can be used in the very same sense both to describe and prescribe, as with ‘thin’: “you are thin” and “you are too thin”. The approach taken to defining the standard of comparison for both descriptive and prescriptive assertions of equality is very important (Oppenheim 1970). In the descriptive case, the common standard is itself descriptive, for example when two people are said to have the same weight. In the prescriptive use, the standard prescribes a norm or rule, for example when it is said people ought to be equal before the law. The standards grounding prescriptive assertions of equality contain at least two components. On the one hand, there is a descriptive component, since the assertions need to contain descriptive criteria, in order to identify those people to which the rule or norm applies. The question of this identification – who belongs to which category? – may itself be normative, as when we ask to whom the U.S. laws apply. On the other hand, the comparative standards contain something normative – a moral or legal rule, such as the U.S. laws – specifying how those falling under the norm are to be treated. Such a rule constitutes the prescriptive component (Westen 1990, chap. 3). Sociological and economic analyses of (in-)equality mainly pose the questions of how inequalities can be determined and measured and what their causes and effects are. In contrast, social and political philosophy is in general concerned mainly with the following questions: what kind of equality, if any, should obtain, and with respect to whom and when ? Such is the case in this article as well.

‘Equality’ and ‘equal’ are incomplete predicates that necessarily generate one question: equal in what respect? (Rae 1980,p. 132 f.) Equality essentially consists of a tripartite relation between two (or several) objects or persons and one (or several) qualities. Two objects A and B are equal in a certain respect if, in that respect, they fall under the same general term. ‘Equality’ denotes the relation between the objects compared. Every comparison presumes a tertium comparationis , a concrete attribute defining the respect in which the equality applies – equality thus referring to a common sharing of this comparison-determining attribute. This relevant comparative standard represents a ‘variable’ (or ‘index’) of the concept of equality that needs to be specified in each particular case (Westen 1990, p. 10); differing conceptions of equality here emerge from one or another descriptive or normative moral standard. There is another source of diversity as well: As Temkin (1986, 1993, 2009) argues, various different standards might be used to measure inequality, with the respect in which people are compared remaining constant. The difference between a general concept and different specific conceptions (Rawls 1971, p. 21 f.) of equality may explain why some people claim ‘equality’ has no unified meaning – or is even devoid of meaning. (Rae 1981, p. 127 f., 132 f.)

For this reason, it helps to think of the idea of equality or inequality, in the context of social justice, not as a single principle, but as a complex group of principles forming the basic core of today’s egalitarianism. Different principles yield different answers. Both equality and inequality are complex and multifaceted concepts (Temkin 1993, chap. 2). In any real historical context, it is clear that no single notion of equality can sweep the field (Rae 1981, p. 132). Many egalitarians concede that much of our discussion of the concept is vague, but they believe there is also a common underlying strain of important moral concerns implicit in it (Williams 1973). Above all, it serves to remind us of our common humanity, despite various differences (cf. 2.3. below). In this sense, egalitarianism is often thought of as a single, coherent normative doctrine that embraces a variety of principles. Following the introduction of different principles and theories of equality, the discussion will return in the last section to the question how best to define egalitarianism and its core value.

2. Principles of Equality and Justice

Equality in its prescriptive usage is closely linked to morality and justice, and distributive justice in particular. Since antiquity equality has been considered a constitutive feature of justice. (On the history of the concept, cf. Albernethy 1959, Benn 1967, Brown 1988, Dann 1975, Thomson 1949.) People and movements throughout history have used the language of justice to contest inequalities. But what kind of role does equality play in a theory of justice? Philosophers have sought to clarify this by defending a variety of principles and conceptions of equality. This section introduces four such principles, ranging from the highly general and uncontroversial to the more specific and controversial. The next section reviews various conceptions of the ‘currency’ of equality. Different interpretations of the role of equality in a theory of justice emerge according to which of the four principles and metrics have been adopted. The first three principles of equality hold generally and primarily for all actions upon others and affecting others, and for their resulting circumstances. From the fourth principle onward, i.e., starting with the presumption of equality, the focus will be mainly on distributive justice and the evaluation of distribution.

When two persons have equal status in at least one normatively relevant respect, they must be treated equally with regard in this respect. This is the generally accepted formal equality principle that Aristotle articulated in reference to Plato: “treat like cases as like” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , V.3. 1131a10–b15; Politics , III.9.1280 a8–15, III. 12. 1282b18–23). The crucial question is which respects are normatively relevant and which are not. Some authors see this formal principle of equality as a specific application of a rule of rationality: it is irrational, because inconsistent, to treat equal cases unequally without sufficient reasons (Berlin 1955–56). But others claim that what is at stake here is a moral principle of justice, one reflecting the impartial and universalizable nature of moral judgments. On this view, the postulate of formal equality demands more than consistency with one’s subjective preferences: the equal or unequal treatment in question must be justifiable to the relevantly affected parties, and this on the sole basis of a situation’s objective features.

According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of equality, numerical and proportional (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , 1130b–1132b; cf. Plato, Laws , VI.757b–c). A way of treating others, or a distribution arising from it, is equal numerically when it treats all persons as indistinguishable, thus treating them identically or granting them the same quantity of a good per capita. That is not always just. In contrast, a way of treating others or a distribution is proportional or relatively equal when it treats all relevant persons in relation to their due. Just numerical equality is a special case of proportional equality. Numerical equality is only just under special circumstances, namely when persons are equal in the relevant respects so that the relevant proportions are equal. Proportional equality further specifies formal equality; it is the more precise and comprehensive formulation of formal equality. It indicates what produces an adequate equality.

Proportional equality in the treatment and distribution of goods to persons involves at least the following concepts or variables: Two or more persons \((P_1, P_2)\) and two or more allocations of goods to persons \((G)\) and \(X\) and \(Y\) as the quantity in which individuals have the relevant normative quality \(E\). This can be represented as an equation with fractions or as a ratio. If \(P1\) has \(E\) in the amount of \(X\) and if \(P_2\) has \(E\) in the amount \(Y\), then \(P_1\) is due \(G\) in the amount of \(X'\) and \(P_2\) is due \(G\) in the amount of \(Y'\), so that the ratio \(X/Y = X'/Y'\) is valid. (For the formula to be usable, the potentially large variety of factors involved have to be both quantifiable in principle and commensurable, i.e., capable of synthesis into an aggregate value.)

When factors speak for unequal treatment or distribution, because the persons are unequal in relevant respects, the treatment or distribution proportional to these factors is just. Unequal claims to treatment or distribution must be considered proportionally: that is the prerequisite for persons being considered equally.

This principle can also be incorporated into hierarchical, inegalitarian theories. It indicates that equal output is demanded with equal input. Aristocrats, perfectionists, and meritocrats all believe that persons should be assessed according to their differing deserts, understood in the broad sense of fulfillment of some relevant criterion. Reward and punishment, benefits and burdens, should be proportional to such deserts. Since this definition leaves open who is due what, there can be great inequality when it comes to presumed fundamental (natural) rights, deserts, and worth -– this is apparent in both Plato and Aristotle.

Aristotle’s idea of justice as proportional equality contains a fundamental insight. The idea offers a framework for a rational argument between egalitarian and non-egalitarian ideas of justice, its focal point being the question of the basis for an adequate equality (Hinsch 2003). Both sides accept justice as proportional equality. Aristotle’s analysis makes clear that the argument involves those features that decide whether two persons are to be considered equal or unequal in a distributive context.

On the formal level of pure conceptual explication, justice and equality are linked through these formal and proportional principles. Justice cannot be explained without these equality principles, which themselves only receive their normative significance in their role as principles of justice.

Formal and proportional equality is simply a conceptual schema. It needs to be made precise – i.e., its open variables need to be filled out. The formal postulate remains empty as long as it is unclear when, or through what features, two or more persons or cases should be considered equal. All debates over the proper conception of justice – over who is due what – can be understood as controversies over the question of which cases are equal and which unequal (Aristotle, Politics , 1282b 22). For this reason, equality theorists are correct in stressing that the claim that persons are owed equality becomes informative only when one is told what kind of equality they are owed (Nagel 1979; Rae 1981; Sen 1992, p. 13). Every normative theory implies a certain notion of equality. In order to outline their position, egalitarians must thus take account of a specific (egalitarian) conception of equality. To do so, they need to identify substantive principles of equality, which are discussed below.

Until the eighteenth century, it was assumed that human beings are unequal by nature. This postulate collapsed with the advent of the idea of natural right, which assumed a natural order in which all human beings were equal. Against Plato and Aristotle, the classical formula for justice according to which an action is just when it offers each individual his or her due took on a substantively egalitarian meaning in the course of time: everyone deserved the same dignity and respect. This is now the widely held conception of substantive, universal, moral equality. It developed among the Stoics, who emphasized the natural equality of all rational beings, and in early New Testament Christianity, which envisioned that all humans were equal before God, although this principle was not always adhered to in the later history of the church. This important idea was also taken up both in the Talmud and in Islam, where it was grounded in both Greek and Hebraic elements. In the modern period, starting in the seventeenth century, the dominant idea was of natural equality in the tradition of natural law and social contract theory. Hobbes (1651) postulated that in their natural condition, individuals possess equal rights, because over time they have the same capacity to do each other harm. Locke (1690) argued that all human beings have the same natural right to both (self-)ownership and freedom. Rousseau (1755) declared social inequality to be the result of a decline from the natural equality that characterized our harmonious state of nature, a decline catalyzed by the human urge for perfection, property and possessions (Dahrendorf 1962). For Rousseau (1755, 1762), the resulting inequality and rule of violence can only be overcome by binding individual subjectivity to a common civil existence and popular sovereignty. In Kant’s moral philosophy (1785), the categorical imperative formulates the equality postulate of universal human worth. His transcendental and philosophical reflections on autonomy and self-legislation lead to a recognition of the same freedom for all rational beings as the sole principle of human rights (Kant 1797, p. 230). Such Enlightenment ideas stimulated the great modern social movements and revolutions, and were taken up in modern constitutions and declarations of human rights. During the French Revolution, equality, along with freedom and fraternity, became a basis of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen of 1789.

The principle that holds that human beings, despite their differences, are to be regarded as one another’s equals, is often also called ‘human equality’ or ‘basic equality’ or ‘equal worth’ or ‘human dignity’ (William 1962, Vlastos 1962, Kateb 2014, Waldron 2017, Rosen 2018). Whether these terms are synonyms is a matter of interpretation, but “they cluster together to form a powerful body of principle” (Waldron 2017, p. 3).

This fundamental idea of equal respect for all persons and of the equal worth or equal dignity of all human beings (Vlastos 1962) is widely accepted (Carter 2011, but see also Steinhoff 2015). In a period in which there is not agreement across the members of a complex society to any one metaphysical, religious, or traditional view (Habermas 1983, p. 53, 1992, pp. 39–44), it appears impossible to peacefully reach a general agreement on common political aims without accepting that persons must be treated as equals. As a result, moral equality constitutes the ‘egalitarian plateau’ for all contemporary political theories (Kymlicka 1990, p. 5).

Fundamental equality means that persons are alike in important relevant and specified respects alone, and not that they are all generally the same or can be treated in the same way (Nagel 1991). In a now commonly posed distinction, stemming from Dworkin (1977, p. 227), moral equality can be understood as prescribing treatment of persons as equals, i.e., with equal concern and respect, and not the often implausible principle of providing all persons with equal treatment. Recognizing that human beings are all equally individual does not mean treating them uniformly in any respects other than those in which they clearly have a moral claim to be treated alike.

Disputes arise, of course, concerning what these claims amount to and how they should be resolved. Philosophical debates are concerned with the kind of equal treatment normatively required when we mutually consider ourselves persons with equal dignity. The principle of moral equality is too abstract and needs to be made concrete if we are to arrive at a clear moral standard. Nevertheless, no conception of just equality can be deduced from the notion of moral equality. Rather, we find competing philosophical conceptions of equal treatment serving as interpretations of moral equality. These need to be assessed according to their degree of fidelity to the deeper ideal of moral equality (Kymlicka 1990, p. 44).

Many conceptions of equality operate along procedural lines involving a presumption of equality . More materially concrete, ethical approaches, as described in the next section below, are concerned with distributive criteria – the presumption of equality, in contrast, is a formal, procedural principle of construction located on a higher formal and argumentative level. What is at stake here is the question of the principle with which a material conception of justice should be constructed, particularly once the approaches described above prove inadequate. The presumption of equality is a prima facie principle of equal distribution for all goods politically suited for the process of public distribution. In the domain of political justice, all members of a given community, taken together as a collective body, have to decide centrally on the fair distribution of social goods, as well as on the distribution’s fair realization. Any claim to a particular distribution, including any existing distributive scheme, has to be impartially justified, i.e., no ownership should be recognized without justification. Applied to this political domain, the presumption of equality requires that everyone should get an equal share in the distribution unless certain types of differences are relevant and justify, through universally acceptable reasons, unequal shares. (With different terms and arguments, this principle is conceived as a presumption by Benn & Peters (1959, 111) and by Bedau (1967, 19); as a relevant reasons approach by Williams (1973); as a conception of symmetry by Tugendhat (1993, 374; 1997, chap. 3); as default option by Hinsch (2002, chap. 5); for criticism of the presumption of equality, cf. Westen (1990, chap. 10).) This presumption results in a principle of prima facie equal distribution for all distributable goods. A strict principle of equal distribution is not required, but it is morally necessary to justify impartially any unequal distribution. The burden of proof lies on the side of those who favor any form of unequal distribution. (For a justification of the presumption in favor of equality s. Gosepath 2004, II.8.; Gosepath 2015.)

The presumption of equality provides an elegant procedure for constructing a theory of distributive justice (Gosepath 2004). One has only to analyze what can justify unequal treatment or unequal distribution in different spheres. To put it briefly, the following postulates of equality are at present generally considered morally required.

Strict equality is called for in the legal sphere of civil freedoms, since – putting aside limitation on freedom as punishment – there is no justification for any exceptions. As follows from the principle of formal equality, all citizens must have equal general rights and duties, which are grounded in general laws that apply to all. This is the postulate of legal equality. In addition, the postulate of equal freedom is equally valid: every person should have the same freedom to structure his or her life, and this in the most far-reaching manner possible in a peaceful and appropriate social order.

In the political sphere, the possibilities for political participation should be equally distributed. All citizens have the same claim to participation in forming public opinion, and in the distribution, control, and exercise of political power. This is the postulate – requiring equal opportunity – of equal political power sharing. To ensure equal opportunity, social institutions have to be designed in such a way that persons who are disadvantaged, e.g. have a stutter or a low income, have an equal chance to make their views known and to participate fully in the democratic process.

In the social sphere, equally gifted and motivated citizens must have approximately the same chances to obtain offices and positions, independent of their economic or social class and native endowments. This is the postulate of fair equality of social opportunity. Any unequal outcome must nevertheless result from equality of opportunity, i.e., qualifications alone should be the determining factor, not social background or influences of milieu.

The equality required in the economic sphere is complex, taking account of several positions that – each according to the presumption of equality – justify a turn away from equality. A salient problem here is what constitutes justified exceptions to equal distribution of goods, the main subfield in the debate over adequate conceptions of distributive equality and its currency. The following factors are usually considered eligible for justified unequal treatment: (a) need or differing natural disadvantages (e.g. disabilities); (b) existing rights or claims (e.g. private property); (c) differences in the performance of special services (e.g. desert, efforts, or sacrifices); (d) efficiency; and (e) compensation for direct and indirect or structural discrimination (e.g. affirmative action).

These factors play an essential, albeit varied, role in the following alternative egalitarian theories of distributive justice. These offer different accounts of what should be equalized in the economic sphere. Most can be understood as applications of the presumption of equality (whether they explicitly acknowledge it or not); only a few (like strict equality, libertarianism, and sufficiency) are alternatives to the presumption.

3. Conceptions of Distributive Equality: Equality of What?

Every effort to interpret the concept of equality and to apply the principles of equality mentioned above demands a precise measure of the parameters of equality. We need to know the dimensions within which the striving for equality is morally relevant. What follows is a brief review of the seven most prominent conceptions of distributive equality, each offering a different answer to one question: in the field of distributive justice, what should be equalized, or what should be the parameter or “currency” of equality?

Simple equality, meaning everyone being furnished with the same material level of goods and services, represents a strict position as far as distributive justice is concerned. It is generally rejected as untenable.

Hence, with the possible exception of Babeuf (1796) and Shaw (1928), no prominent author or movement has demanded strict equality. Since egalitarianism has come to be widely associated with the demand for economic equality, and this in turn with communistic or socialistic ideas, it is important to stress that neither communism nor socialism – despite their protest against poverty and exploitation and their demand for social security for all citizens – calls for absolute economic equality. The orthodox Marxist view of economic equality was expounded in the Critique of the Gotha Program (1875). Marx here rejects the idea of legal equality, on three grounds. First, he indicates, equality draws on a limited number of morally relevant perspectives and neglects others, thus having unequal effects. In Marx’s view, the economic structure is the most fundamental basis for the historical development of society, and is thus the point of reference for explaining its features. Second, theories of justice have concentrated excessively on distribution instead of the basic questions of production. Third, a future communist society needs no law and no justice, since social conflicts will have vanished.

As an idea, simple equality fails because of problems that are raised in regards to equality in general. It is useful to review these problems, as they require resolution in any plausible approach to equality.

(i) We need adequate indices for the measurement of the equality of the goods to be distributed. Through what concepts should equality and inequality be understood? It is thus clear that equality of material goods can lead to unequal satisfaction. Money constitutes a typical, though inadequate, index; at the very least, equal opportunity has to be conceived in other terms.

(ii) The time span needs to be indicated for realizing the desired model of equal distribution (McKerlie 1989, Sikora 1989). Should we seek to equalize the goods in question over complete individual lifetimes, or should we seek to ensure that various life segments are as equally provisioned as possible?

(iii) Equality distorts incentives promoting achievement in the economic field, and the administrative costs of redistribution produce wasteful inefficiencies (Okun 1975). Equality and efficiency need to be balanced. Often, Pareto-optimality is demanded in this respect, usually by economists. A social condition is Pareto-optimal or Pareto-efficient when it is not possible to shift to another condition judged better by at least one person and worse by none (Sen 1970, chap. 2, 2*). A widely discussed alternative to the Pareto principle is the Kaldor-Hicks welfare criterion. This stipulates that a rise in social welfare is always present when the benefits accruing through the distribution of value in a society exceed the corresponding costs. A change thus becomes desirable when the winners in such a change could compensate the losers for their losses, and still retain a substantial profit. In contrast to the Pareto-criterion, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion contains a compensation rule (Kaldor 1939). For purposes of economic analysis, such theoretical models of optimal efficiency make a great deal of sense. However, the analysis is always made relative to a starting situation that can itself be unjust and unequal. A society can thus be (close to) Pareto-optimality – i.e., no one can increase his or her material goods or freedoms without diminishing those of someone else – while also displaying enormous inequalities in the distribution of the same goods and freedoms. For this reason, egalitarians claim that it may be necessary to reduce Pareto-optimality for the sake of justice, if there is no more egalitarian distribution that is also Pareto-optimal. In the eyes of their critics, equality of whatever kind should not lead to some people having to make do with less, when this equalizing down does not benefit any of those who are in a worse position.

(iv) Moral objections : A strict and mechanical equal distribution between all individuals does not sufficiently take into account the differences among individuals and their situations. In essence, since individuals desire different things, why should everyone receive the same goods? Intuitively, for example, we can recognize that a sick person has other claims than a healthy person, and furnishing each with the same goods would be mistaken. With simple equality, personal freedoms are unacceptably limited and distinctive individual qualities insufficiently acknowledged; in this way they are in fact unequally regarded. Furthermore, persons not only have a moral right to their own needs being considered, but a right and a duty to take responsibility for their own decisions and the resulting consequences.

Working against the identification of distributive justice with simple equality, a basic postulate of many present-day egalitarians is as follows: human beings are themselves responsible for certain inequalities resulting from their free decisions; aside from minimum aid in emergencies, they deserve no recompense for such inequalities (but cf. relational egalatarians, discussed in Section 4 ). On the other hand, they are due compensation for inequalities that are not the result of self-chosen options. For egalitarians, the world is morally better when equality of life conditions prevail. This is an amorphous ideal demanding further clarification. Why is such equality an ideal, and what precise currency of equality does it involve?

By the same token, most egalitarians do not advocate an equality of outcome, but different kinds of equality of opportunity, due to their emphasis on a pair of morally central points: that individuals are responsible for their decisions, and that the only things to be considered objects of equality are those which serve the real interests of individuals. The opportunities to be equalized between people can be opportunities for well-being (i.e. objective welfare), or for preference satisfaction (i.e., subjective welfare), or for resources. It is not equality of objective or subjective well-being or resources themselves that should be equalized, but an equal opportunity to gain the well-being or resources one aspires to. Such equality depends on their being a realm of options for each individual equal to the options enjoyed by all other persons, in the sense of the same prospects for fulfillment of preferences or the possession of resources. The opportunity must consist of possibilities one can really take advantage of. Equal opportunity prevails when human beings effectively enjoy equal realms of possibility.

(v) Simple equality is very often associated with equality of results (although these are two distinct concepts). However, to strive only for equality of results is problematic. To illustrate the point, let us briefly limit the discussion to a single action and the event or state of affairs resulting from it. Arguably, actions should not be judged solely by the moral quality of their results, as important as this may be. One must also consider the way in which the events or circumstances to be evaluated have come about. Generally speaking, a moral judgement requires not only the assessment of the results of the action in question (the consequentialist aspect) but, first and foremost, the assessment of the intention of the actor (the deontological aspect). The source and its moral quality influence the moral judgement of the results (Pogge 1999, sect. V). For example, if you strike me, your blow will hurt me; the pain I feel may be considered bad in itself, but the moral status of your blow will also depend on whether you were (morally) allowed such a gesture (perhaps through parental status, although that is controversial) or even obliged to execute it (e.g. as a police officer preventing me from doing harm to others), or whether it was in fact prohibited but not prevented. What is true of individual actions (or their omission) has to be true mutatis mutandis of social institutions and circumstances like distributions resulting from collective social actions (or their omission). Social institutions should therefore be assessed not only on the basis of information about how they affect individual quality of life. A society in which people starve on the streets is certainly marked by inequality; nevertheless, its moral quality, i.e., whether the society is just or unjust with regard to this problem, also depends on the suffering’s causes. Does the society allow starvation as an unintended but tolerable side effect of what its members see as a just distributive scheme? Indeed, does it even defend the suffering as a necessary means, as with forms of Social Darwinism? Or has the society taken measures against starvation which have turned out to be insufficient? In the latter case, whether the society has taken such steps for reasons of political morality or efficiency again makes a moral difference. Hence even for egalitarians, equality of results is too narrow and one-sided a focus.

(vi) Finally, there is a danger of (strict) equality leading to uniformity, rather than to a respect for pluralism and democracy (Cohen 1989; Arneson 1993). In the contemporary debate, this complaint has been mainly articulated in feminist and multiculturalist theory. A central tenet of feminist theory is that gender has been and remains a historically variable and internally differentiated relation of domination. The same holds for so-called racial and ethnic differences, which are often still conceived of as marking different values. The different groups involved here rightly object to their discrimination, marginalization, and domination, and an appeal to equality of status thus seems a solution. However, as feminists and multiculturalists have pointed out, equality, as usually understood and practiced, is constituted in part by a denial and ranking of differences; as a result it seems less useful as an antidote to relations of domination. “Equality” can often mean the assimilation to a pre-existing and problematic ‘male’ or ‘white’ or ‘middle class’ norm. In short, domination and a fortiori inequality often arises out of an inability to appreciate and nurture differences, not out of a failure to see everyone as the same. To recognize these differences should however not lead to an essentialism grounded in sexual or cultural characteristics. There is a crucial debate between those who insist that sexual, racial, and ethnic differences should become irrelevant, on the one hand, and those believing that such differences, even though culturally relevant, should not furnish a basis for inequality: that one should rather find mechanisms for securing equality, despite valued differences. Neither of these strategies involves rejecting equality. The dispute is about how equality is to be attained (McKinnon 1989, Taylor 1992).

Proposing a connection between equality and pluralism, Michael Walzer’s theory (1983) aims at what he calls “complex equality”. According to Walzer, relevant reasons can only speak in favor of distributing specific types of goods in specific spheres, not in several or all spheres. Against a theory of simple equality promoting equal distribution of dominant goods, which underestimates the complexity of the criteria at work in each given sphere, the dominance of particular goods needs to be ended. For instance, purchasing power in the political sphere through means derived from the economic sphere (i.e., money) must be prevented. Walzer’s theory of complex equality is not actually aimed at equality per se, but at the separation of spheres of justice; the theory’s designation is misleading. Any theory of equality should, however, as per Walzer, avoid monistic conceptions and recognize instead the complexity of life and the plurality of criteria for justice.

The preceding considerations yield the following desideratum: instead of simple equality, a more complex equality needs to be conceptualized. That concept should resolve the problems discussed above through a distinction of various classes of goods, a separation of spheres, and a differentiation of relevant criteria.

Libertarianism and economic liberalism represent minimalist positions in relation to distributive justice. Citing Locke, they both postulate an original right to freedom and property, thus arguing against redistribution and social rights and for the free market (Nozick 1974; Hayek 1960). They assert an opposition between equality and freedom: the individual (natural) right to freedom can be limited only for the sake of foreign and domestic peace. For this reason, libertarians consider maintaining public order the state’s only legitimate duty. They assert a natural right to self-ownership (the philosophical term for “ownership of oneself” – i.e., one’s will, body, work, etc.) that entitles everybody to hitherto unowned bits of the external world by means of mixing their labor with it. All individuals can thus claim property if “enough and as good” is left over for others (Locke’s proviso). Correspondingly, they defend market freedoms and oppose the use of redistributive taxation schemes for the sake of egalitarian social justice. A principal objection to libertarian theory is that its interpretation of the Lockean proviso – nobody’s situation should be worsened through an initial acquisition of property – leads to an excessively weak requirement and is thus unacceptable (Kymlicka 1990, pp.108–117). However, with a broader and more adequate interpretation of what it means for one a situation to be worse than another, it is much more difficult to justify private appropriation and, a fortiori , all further ownership rights. If the proviso recognizes the full range of interests and alternatives that self-owners have, then it will not generate unrestricted rights over unequal amounts of resources. Another objection is that precisely if one’s own free accomplishment is what is meant to count, as the libertarians argue, success should not depend strictly on luck, extraordinary natural gifts, inherited property, and status. In other words, equal opportunity also needs to at least be present as a counterbalance, ensuring that the fate of human beings is determined by their decisions and not by unavoidable social circumstances. Equal opportunity thus seems to be the frequently vague minimal formula at work in every egalitarian conception of distributive justice. Many egalitarians, however, wish for more – namely, an equality of (at least basic) life conditions .

In any event, with a shift away from a strictly negative idea of freedom, economic liberalism can indeed itself point the way to more social and economic equality. For with such a shift, what is at stake is not only assuring an equal right to self-defense, but also furnishing everyone more or less the same chance to actually make use of the right to freedom (e.g. Van Parijs 1995, Steiner 1994, Otsuka 2005). In other words, certain basic goods need to be furnished to assure the equitable or “fair value of the basic liberties” (Rawls 1993, pp. 356–63).

It is possible to interpret utilitarianism as concretizing moral equality – and this in a way meant to offer the same consideration to the interests of all human beings (Kymlicka 1990, pp. 31f., Hare 1981, p. 26, Sen 1992, pp. 13f.). From the utilitarian perspective, since everyone counts as one and no one as more than one (Bentham), the interests of all should be treated equally without consideration of contents of interest or an individual’s material situation. For utilitarianism, this means that all enlightened personal interests have to be fairly aggregated. The morally proper action is the one that maximizes utility (Hare 1984). This conception of equal treatment has been criticized as inadequate by many opponents of utilitarianism. At least in utilitarianism’s classical form – so the critique reads – the hoped for moral equality is flawed, because all desires are taken up by the utilitarian calculation, including “selfish” and “external” preferences (Dworkin 1977, p. 234) that are meant to all have equal weight, even when they diminish the ‘rights’ and intentions of others. This conflicts with our everyday understanding of equal treatment. What is here at play is an argument involving “offensive” and “expensive” taste: a person cannot expect others to sustain his or her desires at the expense of their own (Kymlicka 1990, p. 40 f.). Rather, according to generally shared conviction, equal treatment consistently requires a basis of equal rights and resources that cannot be taken away from one person, whatever the desire of others. In line with Rawls (1971, pp. 31, 564, cf. 450), many hold that justice entails according no value to interests insofar as they conflict with justice. According to this view, unjustified preferences will not distort the mutual claims people have on each other. Equal treatment has to consist of everyone being able to claim a fair portion, and not in all interests having the same weight in disposal over my portion. Utilitarians cannot admit any restrictions on interests based on morals or justice. As long as utilitarian theory lacks a concept of justice and fair allocation, it must fail in its goal of treating everyone as equals. As Rawls (1971, pp. 27) also famously argues, utilitarianism that involves neglecting the separateness of persons does not contain a proper interpretation of moral equality as equal respect for each individual.

The concept of welfare equality is motivated by an intuition that when it comes to political ethics, what is at stake is individual well-being. The central criterion for justice must consequently be equalizing the level of welfare. But taking welfare as what is to be equalized leads to difficulties resembling those of utilitarianism. If one contentiously identifies subjective welfare with preference satisfaction, it seems implausible to count all individual preferences as equal, some – such as the desire to do others wrong – being inadmissible on grounds of justice (the offensive taste argument). Any welfare-centered concept of equality grants people with refined and expensive taste more resources – something distinctly at odds with our moral intuitions (the expensive taste argument) (Dworkin 1981a). However, satisfaction in the fulfillment of desires cannot serve as a standard, since we wish for more than a simple feeling of happiness. A more viable standard for welfare comparisons would seem to be success in the fulfillment of preferences. A fair evaluation of such success cannot be purely subjective, but requires a standard of what should or could have been achieved. This itself involves an assumption regarding just distribution, so it cannot stand as an independent criterion for justice. Another serious problem with any welfare-centered concept of equality is that it cannot take account of either desert (Feinberg 1970) or personal responsibility for one’s own well-being, to the extent this is possible and reasonable.

Represented above all by both Rawls and Dworkin, resource equality avoids such problems (Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1981b). It holds individuals responsible for their decisions and actions, but not for circumstances beyond their control, such as race, sex, skin-color, intelligence, and social position, thus excluding these as distributive criteria. Equal opportunity is insufficient because it does not compensate for unequal innate gifts. What applies for social circumstances should also apply for such gifts, as both are purely arbitrary from a moral point of view.

According to Rawls, human beings should have the same initial expectations of “basic goods,” i.e., all-purpose goods; this in no way precludes ending up with different quantities of such goods or resources, as a result of personal economic decisions and actions. When prime importance is accorded an assurance of equal basic freedoms and rights, inequalities are just when they fulfill two provisos: on the one hand, they have to be linked to offices and positions open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; on the other hand, they have to reflect the famous ‘difference principle’ in offering the greatest possible advantage to the least advantaged members of society (Rawls 1993, p. 5 f.; 1971, § 13). Otherwise, the economic order requires revision. Due to the argument of the moral arbitrariness of talents, the commonly accepted criteria for merit (like productivity, working hours, effort) are clearly relativized. The difference principle only allows the talented to earn more to the extent this raises the lowest incomes. According to Rawls, with regard to the basic structure of society, the difference principle should be opted for under a self-chosen “veil of ignorance” regarding personal and historical circumstances and similar factors: the principle offers a general assurance of not totally succumbing to the hazards of a free market situation; and everyone does better than with inevitably inefficient total equal distribution, whose level of well-being is below that of those worst off under the difference principle.

Since Rawls’ Theory of Justice is the classical focal point of present-day political philosophy, it is worth noting the different ways his theory claims to be egalitarian. First, Rawls upholds a natural basis for equal human worth: a minimal capacity for having a conception of the good and a sense of justice. Second, through the device of the “veil of ignorance,” people are conceived as equals in the “original position.” Third, the idea of sharing this “original position” presupposes the parties having political equality, as equal participants in the process of choosing the principles by which they would be governed. Fourth, Rawls proposes fair equality of opportunity. Fifth, he maintains that all desert must be institutionally defined, depending on the goals of the society. No one deserves his or her talents or circumstances, which are products of the natural lottery. Finally, the difference principle tends toward equalizing holdings. However, it is important to keep in mind, as Scheffler (2003) has pointed out, that the main focus of Rawls’ theory is justice as such; it is only secondarily about an egalitarian conception of justice. In addition, since the primary subject is the basic structure, pure procedural justice has priority over distributive or allocative justice Equality is not the only or single value for Rawls.

Dworkin’s equality of resources (1981b), on the other hand, is concerned with equality as such. His theory stakes a claim to being even more ‘ambition- and endowment-insensitive’ than Rawls’ theory. Unequal distribution of resources is considered fair only when it results from the decisions and intentional actions of those concerned. Dworkin proposes a hypothetical auction in which everyone can accumulate bundles of resources through equal means of payment, so that in the end no one is jealous of another’s bundle (the envy test). The auction-procedure also offers a way to precisely measure equality of resources: the measure of resources devoted to a person’s life is defined by the importance of the resources to others (Dworkin 1981b, p. 290). In the free market, how the distribution then develops depends on an individual’s ambitions. The inequalities that thus emerge are justified, since one has to take responsibility for how one’s choices turn out (i.e., one’s “option luck”) in the realm of personal responsibility. In contrast, unjustified inequalities based on different innate provisions and gifts, as well as on brute luck, should be compensated for through a fictive differentiated insurance system: its premiums are established behind Dworkin’s own “veil of ignorance,” in order to then be distributed in real life to everyone and collected in taxes. For Dworkin, this is the key to the natural lottery being balanced fairly, preventing a “slavery of the talented” through excessive redistribution.

Only some egalitarians hold inequality to be bad per se. Most of today’s egalitarians are pluralistic, recognizing other values besides equality. So called luck-egalitarians regard the moral significance of choice and responsibility as one of the most important values besides equality (for an overview over the debate see Lippert-Rasmussen 2015). They hold that it is bad – unjust or unfair – for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own (Temkin 1993, 13) and therefore strive to eliminate involuntary disadvantages, for which the sufferer cannot be held responsible (Cohen 1989, 916).

The principle of responsibility provides a central normative vantage point for deciding on which grounds one might justify which inequality. The positive formulation of the responsibility principle requires an assumption of personal responsibility and holds that inequalities which are the result of self-chosen options are just. (See above all Dworkin, 1981b, p. 311; contra: Anderson, 1999.) Unequal portions of social goods are thus fair when they result from the decisions and intentional actions of those concerned. Individuals must accept responsibility for the costs of their decisions. Persons are themselves responsible for certain inequalities that result from their voluntary decisions, and they deserve no compensation for such inequalities, aside from minimal provisions in cases of dire need (see below). In its negative formulation , the responsibility principle holds that inequalities which are not the result of self-chosen options are to be rejected as unjust; persons disadvantaged in this way deserve compensation. That which one can do nothing about, or for which one is not responsible, cannot constitute a relevant criterion. Still, the initial assumption remains an ascription of responsibility, and each individual case requires close scrutiny: one is responsible and accountable unless there is an adequate reason for being considered otherwise (but cf. Stemplowska 2013 for a different interpretation)..

If advantages or disadvantages that are due to arbitrary and unearned differences are unfair, this holds for social circumstances as well as natural endowments. The reasons favoring an exclusion of features like skin-color, size, sex, and place of origin as primarily discriminative apply equally to other natural human qualities, like intelligence, appearance, physical strength, and so forth. The kind and the extent of one’s natural abilities are due to a lottery of nature; considered from a moral standpoint, their distribution is purely arbitrary (Rawls, 1971, § 48). To sum up: natural and social endowment must not count, and personal intentions and voluntary decisions should count. Thus, a given social order is just when it equalizes as much as possible, and in a normatively tenable way, all personal disadvantages for which an individual is not responsible, and accords individuals the capacity to bear the consequences of their decisions and actions, as befits their capacity for autonomy.

Objections to all versions of “brute-luck egalitarianism” come from two sides. Some authors criticize its in their view unjustified or excessively radical rejection of merit: The luck-egalitarian thesis of desert only being justifiably acknowledged if it involves desert “all the way down” (Nozick 1974, p. 225) not only destroys the classical, everyday principle of desert, since everything has a basis that we ourselves have not created. In the eyes of such critics, along with the merit-principle this argument also destroys our personal identity, since we can no longer accredit ourselves with our own capacities and accomplishments. (Cf. the texts in Pojman & McLeod 1998, Olsaretti 2003.) Other authors consider the criterion for responsibility to be too strong, indeed inhuman (or “harsh”) in its consequences, since human beings responsible for their own misery would (supposedly) be left alone with their misery (Anderson 1999, also MacLeod 1998, Scheffler 2003, Wolff 1998, Fleurbaey 1995, Voigt 2007, Eyal 2017, Olsaretti 2009, Stemplowska 2009). However, pluralistic egalitarians should be able to argue that there are special cases, in which people are so badly off that they should be helped, even if they got into the miserable situation through their own fault. But even when people are in terrible situations, which did not arise through their own fault (‘bad brute luck’) – for instance, when they are disabled from birth – and egalitarians therefore have reasons to help them, these reasons are supposedly stigmatizing, since in these cases the principles of distribution would be based on pity. In these cases, political institutions have to take certain decisions – for example, in which category a particular case of distress should be placed – and gather relevant information on their citizens. Against such a procedure, one could object that it subjects the citizens to the tutelage of the state and harms their private sphere (Anderson 1999, also Hayek 1960: 85–102).

Approaches based on equality of opportunity can be read as revisions of both welfarism and resourcism. Ranged against welfarism and designed to avoid its pitfalls, they incorporate the powerful ideas of choice and responsibility into various, improved forms of egalitarianism. Such approaches are meant to equalize outcomes resulting from causes beyond a person’s control (i.e., beyond circumstances or endowment), but to allow differential outcomes that result from autonomous choice or ambition. But the approaches are also aimed at maintaining the insight that individual preferences have to count, as the sole basis for a necessary linkage back to the individual perspective: otherwise, there is an overlooking of the person’s value. In Arneson’s (1989, 1990) concept of equal opportunity for welfare , the preferences determining the measure of individual well-being are meant to be conceived hypothetically – i.e., a person would decide on them after a process of ideal reflection. In order to correspond to the morally central vantage of personal responsibility, what should be equalized are not enlightened preferences themselves, but rather real opportunities to achieve or receive a good, to the extent that it is aspired to. G.A. Cohen’s (1989, p. 916 f.) broader conception of equality of access to advantage attempts to integrate the perspectives of welfare equality and resource equality through the overriding concept of advantage. For Cohen, there are two grounds for egalitarian compensation. Egalitarians will be moved to furnish a paralyzed person with a compensatory wheelchair independently of the person’s welfare level. This egalitarian response to disability overrides equality of (opportunity to) welfare. Egalitarians also favor compensation for phenomena such as pain, independent of any loss of capacity – for instance by paying for expensive medicine. But, Cohen claims, any justification for such compensation has to invoke the idea of equality of opportunity to welfare. He thus views both aspects, resources and welfare, as necessary and irreducible. Much of Roemer’s (1998) more technical argument is devoted to constructing the scale to calibrate the extent to which something is the result of circumstances. An incurred adverse consequence is the result of circumstances, not choice, precisely to the extent that it is a consequence that persons of one or another specific type can be expected to incur.

Theories that limit themselves to the equal distribution of basic means, in the hope of doing justice to the different goals of all human beings, are often criticized as fetishistic, because they focus on means as opposed to what individuals gain with these means (Sen 1980). The value that goods have for someone depends on objective possibilities, the natural environment, and individual capacities. Hence, in contrast to the resourcist approach, Amartya Sen proposes orientating distribution around “capabilities to achieve functionings,” i.e., the various things that a person manages to do orbe in leading a life (Sen 1992). In other words, evaluating individual well-being has to be tied to a capability for achieving and maintaining various precious conditions and “functionings” constitutive of a person’s being, such as adequate nourishment, good health, the ability to move about freely or to appear in public without shame. The real freedom to acquire well-being is also important here, a freedom represented in the capability to oneself choose forms of achievement and the combination of “functionings.” For Sen, capabilities are thus the measure of an equality of capabilities human beings enjoy to lead their lives. A problem consistently raised with capability approaches is the ability to weigh capabilities in order to arrive at a metric for equality. The problem is intensified by the fact that various moral perspectives are blended in the concept of capability (Cohen 1993, p. 17–26, Williams 1987). Martha Nussbaum (1992, 2000) has linked the capability approach to an Aristotelian, essentialistic, “thick” theory of the good – a theory meant to be, as she puts it, “vague,” incomplete, and open-ended enough to leave place for individual and cultural variation. On the basis of such a “thick” conception of necessary and universal elements of a good life, certain capabilities and functionings can be designated as foundational. In this manner, Nussbaum can endow the capability approach with a precision that furnishes an index of interpersonal comparison, but at the risk of not being neutral enough regarding the plurality of personal conceptions of the good, a neutrality normally required by most liberals (most importantly Rawls 1993; but see Robeyns 2009 for a different take on the comparison with Rawls). For further discussion, see the entry on the capability approach .

Since the late 1990s, social relations egalitarianism has appeared in philosophical discourse as an increasingly important competitor to distribuitivist accounts of justice, especially its luck egalitarian versions (cf. Lippert-Rassmussen 2018). Proponents of social relations egalitarianism include Anderson (1999), Miller (1997), Scanlon (1996, 2018), Scheffler (2003, 2005, 2015), Wolff (1998, 2010) and Young (1990). Negatively, they are united in a rejection of the view that justice is a matter of eliminating differential luck. Positively, they claim that society is just if, and only if, individuals within it relate to one another as equals. Accordingly, the site of justice (i.e. that to which principles of justice apply) is society, not distributions. Relational Egalitarianism has a certain overlap with many theories of recognition and non-domination. Certain status differences are at the core of their objections, like those stigmatizing differences in status, whereby the badly off are caused to experience themselves as inferior, and are treated as inferiors, or when inequalities create objectionable relations of power(Honneth/Fraser 2003) and domination (Pettit 2001).

What does it mean that (and when do) individuals within a society relate to one another as equals? Racial discrimination, for example, is a paradigmatic instance of this condition?s violation. But once we move beyond a handful of such examples things become much less clear.

These claims to social and political equality exclude all unequal, hierarchical forms of social relationships, in which some people dominate, exploit, marginalize, demean, and inflict violence upon others:

As a social ideal, it holds that a human society must be conceived of as a cooperative arrangement among equals, each of whom enjoys the same social standing. As a political ideal, it highlights the claims that citizens are entitled to make on one another by virtue of their status as citizens, without any need for a moralized accounting of the details of their particular circumstances. (Scheffler 2003, p. 22)

However, forms of differentiation that do not violate moral equality (see above) are not per se excluded from social equality, if they are compatible with the recognition of the equal social status of concerned parties, as with differences relating to merit, need, and, if appropriate, race, gender, and social background (as in cases of affirmative action or fair punishment).

Where there is social equality, people feel that each member of the community enjoys an equal standing with all the rest that overrides their unequal ratings along particular dimensions. (Miller, 1997, p. 232)

Thus the question has to be answered whether – and if so, why – other dimensions, such as a person’s natural talents, creativity, intelligence, innovative skills or entrepreneurial ability, can be the basis for legitimate inequalities.

Relational egalitarians need a certain conception of what an equal standing in society amounts to and implies in terms of rights and goods. One way to offer such an account would be to rely (like Anderson 1999) on the capabilities approach (§3.8) and sufficitarianism (§6.2.): In a democratic community that preserves the free and equal status of persons, at least three sets of conditions have to be fulfilled.

First, certain political conditions are necessary to allow citizens to participate as equals in democratic deliberation. These include, among others, the capabilities to vote, hold office, assemble, petition the government, speak freely, and move about freely (Rawls 1999, p.53). The principle of democratic equality (as asked for by Anderson 1999) requires us to eliminate social hierarchies that prevent a democratically organized society, a society in which we cooperate and decide upon state action as equals. Persons morally owe each other the capabilities and conditions to live as equals in a democratic community (Christiano 2008, Kolodny 2014). Democracy can be interpreted as realizing public equality in collective decision-making.

Second, to participate as an equal in civil society, certain civil conditions must obtain. These include the conditions that make it robustly likely that injustices such as marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism (Anderson 1999 with reference to Young 1990), or domination (Pettit 2001) can be to avoided. Third, certain social conditions and personal capabilities have to obtain that enable people to enjoy equal standing in society. Citizens need, in this regard, adequate nutrition, shelter, clothing, education, and medical care. This last point leads into the debate over whether a relational egalitarian conception of social justice yields intrinsic and instrumental reasons of justice to care about distributive inequality in socially produced goods, despite its emphasis on just social relationships and not the distribution of goods per se (Schemmel 2011, Elford 2017).

Justice is primarily related to individual actions. Individual persons are the primary bearers of responsibility (the key principle of ethical individualism). This raises two controversial issues in the contemporary debate.

One could regard the norms of distributive equality as applying to groups rather than individuals. It is often groups that rightfully raise the issue of an inequality between themselves and the rest of society, as with women and racial and ethnic groups. The question arises of whether inequality among such groups should be considered morally objectionable in itself, or whether even in the case of groups, the underlying concern should be how individuals (as members of such groups) fare in comparative terms. If there is a worry about inequalities between groups of individuals, why does this not translate into a worry about inequalities between members of the group?

A further question concerns whether the norms of distributive equality (whatever they are) apply to all individuals, regardless of where (and when) they live. Or rather, do they only hold for members of communities within states and nations? Most theories of equality deal exclusively with distributive equality among people in a single society. There does not, however, seem to be any rationale for that limitation. Can the group of the entitled be restricted prior to the examination of concrete claims? Many theories seem to imply this, especially when they connect distributive justice or the goods to be distributed with social cooperation or production. For those who contribute nothing to cooperation, such as the disabled, children, or future generations, would have to be denied a claim to a fair share. The circle of persons who are to be the recipients of distribution would thus be restricted from the outset. Other theories are less restrictive, insofar as they do not link distribution to actual social collaboration, yet nonetheless do restrict it, insofar as they bind it to the status of citizenship. In this view, distributive justice is limited to the individuals within a society. Those outside the community have no entitlement to social justice. Unequal distribution among states and the social situations of people outside the particular society could not, in this view, be a problem of social distributive justice (Nagel 2005). Yet here too, the universal morality of equal respect and the principle of equal distribution demand that all persons consider one another as prima facie equally entitled to the goods, unless reasons for an unequal distribution can be advanced. It may be that in the process of justification, reasons will emerge for privileging those who were particularly involved in the production of a good, but there is no prima facie reason to exclude from the outset other persons, such as those from other countries, from the process of distribution and justification (Pogge 2002). That may seem most intuitively plausible in the case of natural resources (e.g. oil) that someone discovers by chance on or beneath the surface of his or her property. Why should such resources belong to the person who discovers them, or on whose property they are located? Nevertheless, in the eyes of many if not most people, global justice, i.e., extending egalitarian distributive justice globally, demands too much from individuals and their states (Miller 1998; but cf. Caney 2005). Alternatively, one might argue that there are other ‘special relations’ between members of one society that do not exist between members of different societies. Nationalism is an example for such a (controversial) thesis that may provide a case for a kind of local equality (Miller 1995). For further discussion, see the entry on global justice.

Another issue is the relationship between generations. Does the present generation have an egalitarian obligation towards future generations regarding equal living conditions? One argument in favor of this conclusion might be that people should not end up unequally well off as a result of morally arbitrary factors. However, the issue of justice between generation is notoriously complex (Temkin 1992). For further discussion, see the entry on intergenerational justice .

6. The Value of Equality: Why Equality?

Does equality play a major role in a theory of justice, and if so, what is this role? A conception of justice is egalitarian when it views equality as a fundamental goal of justice. Temkin has put it as follows:

… an egalitarian is any person who attaches some value to equality itself (that is, any person that cares at all about equality, over and above the extent it promotes other ideals). So, equality needn’t be the only value, or even the ideal she values most… . Egalitarians have the deep and (for them) compelling view that it is a bad thing – unjust and unfair – for some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own. (Temkin 1986, p. 100, cf. 1993, p. 7)

In general, the focus of the modern egalitarian effort to realize equality is on the possibility of a good life, i.e., on an equality of life prospects and life circumstances – interpreted in various ways according to various positions in the “equality of what” debate (see above).

It is apparent that there are three sorts of egalitarianism: intrinsic, instrumental and constitutive. (For a twofold distinction cf. Parfit 1997, Temkin 1993, p. 11, McKerlie, 1996, p. 275.)

Intrinsic egalitarians view equality as a good in itself. As pure egalitarians, they are concerned solely with equality, most of them with equality of social circumstances, according to which it is intrinsically bad if some people are worse off than others through no fault of their own. But it is in fact the case that people do not always consider inequality a moral evil. Intrinsic egalitarians regarde quality as desirable even when the equalization would be of no use to any of the affected parties, such as when equality can only be produced through depressing the level of well being of everyone’s life. But something can only have an intrinsic value when it is good for at least one person, when it makes one life better in some way or another.

The following “ leveling-down ” objection indicates that doing away within equality in fact ought to produce better circumstances; it is otherwise unclear why equality should be desired. (For such an objection, cf. Nozick 1974, p. 229, Raz 1986, chap. 9, p. 227, 235, Temkin 1993, pp. 247–8.) Sometimes inequality can only be ended by depriving those who are better off of their resources, rendering them as poorly off as everyone else. (For anyone looking for a drastic literary example, Kurt Vonnegut’s 1950 science-fiction story Harrison Bergeron is recommended.) This would have to be an acceptable approach according to the intrinsic conception. But would it be morally good if, in a group consisting of both blind and sighted persons, those with sight were rendered blind because the blind could not be offered sight? That would be morally perverse. Doing away with inequality by bringing everyone down contains – so the objection goes – nothing good. Such leveling-down objections would of course only be valid if there were indeed no better and equally egalitarian alternatives available, but there are nearly always such alternatives: e.g. those who can see should have to help the blind, financially or otherwise. When there are no alternatives, in order to avoid such objections, intrinsic egalitarianism cannot be strict, but needs to be pluralistic . Then intrinsic egalitarians could say there is something good about the change, namely greater equality, although they would concede that much is bad about it. Pluralistic egalitarians do not have equality as their only goal; they also admit other values and principles, above all the principle of welfare, according to which it is better when people are doing better. In addition, pluralistic egalitarianism should be moderate enough to not always grant equality victory in the case of conflict between equality and welfare. Instead, they must accept reductions in equality for the sake of a higher quality of life for all (as with Rawls’ difference principle).

At present, many egalitarians are ready to concede that equality in the sense of equality of life circumstances has no compelling value in itself, but that, in a framework of liberal concepts of justice, its meaning emerges in pursuit of other ideals, like universal freedom, the full development of human capacities and the human personality, the mitigation of suffering and defeat of domination and stigmatization, the stable coherence of modern and freely constituted societies, and so forth (Scanlon 1996, 2018). For those who are worse off, unequal circumstances often mean considerable (relative) disadvantages and many (absolute) evils; as a rule, these (relative) disadvantages and (absolute) evils are the source of our moral condemnation of unequal circumstances. But this does not mean that inequality as such is an evil. Hence, the argument goes, fundamental moral ideals other than equality stand behind our aspiring for equality. To reject inequality on such grounds is to favor equality either as a byproduct or as a means, and not as a goal or intrinsic value. In its treatment of equality as a derived virtue, the sort of egalitarianism – if the term is actually suitable – here at play is instrumental .

As indicated, there is also a third, more suitable approach to the equality ideal: a constitutive egalitarianism. According to this approach, to the aspiration to equality is rooted in other moral grounds, namely because certain inequalities are unjust. Equality has value, but this is an extrinsic value, since it derives from another, higher moral principle of equal dignity and respect. But it is not instrumental for this reason, i.e., it is not only valued on account of moral equality, but also on its own account. (For the distinction between the origin of a value and the kind of value it is, cf. Korsgaard 1996.) Equality stands in relation to justice as does a part to a whole. The requirement of justification is based on moral equality, and in certain contexts, successful justification leads to the above-named principles of equality, i.e., formal, proportional equality and the presumption of equality. Thus, according to constitutive egalitarianism, these principles and the resulting equality are required by justice, and by the same token constitute social justice.

It is important to further distinguish two levels of egalitarianism and non-egalitarianism, respectively. On a first level, a constitutive egalitarian presumes that every explication of the moral standpoint is incomplete without terms such as ‘equal,’ ‘similarly,’ etc. In contrast, a non-egalitarianism operating on the same level considers such terms misplaced or redundant. On a second level, when it comes to concretizing and specifying conceptions of justice, a constitutive egalitarian gives equality substantive weight. On this level, more and less egalitarian positions can be found, according to the chosen currency of equality (the criteria by which just equality is measured) and according to the reasons for unequal distributions (exemptions of the presumption of equality) that the respective theories regard as well grounded. Egalitarianism on the second level thus relates to the kind, quality and quantity of things to be equalized. Because of such variables, a clear-cut definition of second level egalitarianism cannot be formulated. In contrast, non-egalitarians on this second level advocate a non-relational entitlement theory of justice.

Alongside the often-raised objections against equality mentioned in the section on “simple equality” (3.1. above) there is a different and more fundamental critique formulated by first level non-egalitarians: that equality does not have a foundational role in the grounding of claims to justice. While the older version of a critique of egalitarianism comes mainly from the conservative end of the political spectrum, thus arguing in general against “patterned principles of justice” (Nozick 1974, esp. pp. 156–157), the critique’s newer version also often can be heard in progressive circles (Walzer 1983, Raz 1986, chap. 9, Frankfurt 1987, 1997, Parfit 1997, Anderson 1999). This first-level critique of equality poses the basic question of why justice should in fact be conceived relationally and (what is here the same) comparatively. Referring back to Joel Feinberg’s (1974) distinction between comparative and non-comparative justice, non-egalitarians object to the moral requirement to treat people as equals, and the many demands for justice emerging from it. They argue that neither the postulate nor these demands involve comparative principles, let alone any equality principles. They reproach first-level egalitarians for a confusion between “equality” and “universals.” As the non-egalitarians see things, within many principles of justice – at least the especially important ones – the equality-terminology is redundant. Equality is thus merely a byproduct of the general fulfillment of actually non-comparative standards of justice: something obscured through the unnecessary insertion of an expression of equality (Raz 1986, p. 227f.). At least the central standards of dignified human life are not relational but “absolute.” As Harry Frankfurt puts it: “It is whether people have good lives, and not how their lives compare with the lives of others” (Frankfurt 1997, p. 6). And again: “The fundamental error of egalitarianism lies in supposing that it is morally important whether one person has less than another regardless of how much either of them has” (Frankfurt 1987, p. 34).

From the non-egalitarian perspective, what is really at stake in helping those worse off and improving their lot is humanitarian concern , a desire to alleviate suffering. Such concern is not understood as egalitarian, as it is not focused on the difference between the better off and the worse off as such (whatever the applied standard), but on improving the situation of the latter. Their distress constitutes the actual moral foundation. The wealth of those better off only furnishes a means that has to be transferred for the sake of mitigating the distress, as long as other, morally negative consequences do not emerge in the process. The strength of the impetus for more equality lies in the urgency of the claims of those worse off, not in the extent of the inequality. For this reason, instead of equality the non-egalitarian critics favor one or another entitlement theory of justice , such as Nozick’s (1974) libertarianism (cf. 3.2. above) and Frankfurt’s (1987) doctrine of sufficiency , according to which “What is important from the moral point of view is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough. If everyone had enough , it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than others” (Frankfurt 1987, p. 21).

Parfit’s (1997) priority view accordingly calls for a focus on improving the situation of society’s weaker and poorer members, and indeed all the more urgently the worse off they are, even if they can be less helped than others in the process. Parfit (1995) distinguishes between egalitarianism and prioritarianism. According to prioritarians, benefiting people is more important the worse off those people are. This prioritising will often increase equality, but they are two distinct values, since in an important respect equality is a relational value while priority is not. However, egalitarians and prioritarians share an important feature, in that both hold that the best possible distribution of a fixed sum of goods is an equal one. It is thus a matter of debate whether prioritarianism is a sort of egalitarianism or a (decent) inegalitarianism. In any case, entitlement-based non-egalitarian arguments can practically result in an equality of outcome as far-reaching as egalitarian theories. Hence the fulfillment of an absolute or non-comparative standard for everyone (e.g. to the effect that nobody should starve) frequently results in a certain equality of outcome, where such a standard comprises not only a decent but a good life. Consequently, the debate here centers on the basis – is it equality or something else? – and not so much on the outcome – are persons or groups more or less equal, according to a chosen metric? Possibly, the difference lies even deeper, in their respective conceptions of morality in general.

Egalitarians can respond to the anti-egalitarian critique by conceding that it is the nature of some (however certainly far from all) essential norms of morality and justice to be concerned primarily with the adequate fulfillment of the separate claims of individuals. However, whether a claim can itself be considered suitable can be ascertained only by asking whether it can be agreed on by all those affected in hypothetical conditions of freedom and equality. (See, e.g., Casal 2007 for a deeper discussion and critique of the doctrine of sufficiency.) This justificatory procedure is more necessary if it is less evident that what is at stake is actually suffering, distress, or an objective need. In the view of the constitutive egalitarians, all the judgments of distributive justice should be approached relationally, by asking which distributive scheme all concerned parties can universally and reciprocally agree to. As described at some length in the pertinent section above, many egalitarians argue that a presumption in favor of equality follows from this justification requirement. In the eyes of such egalitarians, this is all one needs for the justification and determination of the constitutive value of equality.

Secondly, even if – for the sake of argument – the question is left open as to whether demands for distribution according to objective needs (e.g. alleviating hunger) involve non-comparative entitlement-claims, it is nonetheless always necessary to resolve the question of what needy individuals are owed. And this is tied in a basic way to the question of what persons owe one another in comparable or worse situations, and how scarce resources (money, goods, time, energy) must be invested in light of the sum total of our obligations. While the claim on our aid may well appear non-relational, determining the kind and extent of the aid must always be relational, at least in circumstances of scarcity (and resources are always scarce). Claims are either “satiable” (Raz 1986, p. 235) – i.e., an upper limit or sufficiency level can be indicated, after which each person’s claim to X has been fulfilled – or they are not. For insatiable claims, to stipulate any level at which one is or ought to be sufficiently satisfied is arbitrary. If the standards of sufficiency are defined as a bare minimum, why should persons be content with that minimum? Why should the manner in which welfare and resources are distributed above the poverty level not also be a question of justice? If, by contrast, we are concerned solely with claims that are in principle “satiable,” such claims having a reasonable definition of sufficiency, then these standards of sufficiency will most likely be very high. In Frankfurt’s definition, for example, sufficiency is reached only when persons are satisfied and no longer actively strive for more. Since people find themselves ourselves operating, in practice, in circumstances far beneath such a high sufficiency level, they (of course) live under conditions of (moderate) scarcity. Then the above mentioned argument holds as well – namely, that in order to determine to what extent it is to be fulfilled, each claim has to be judged in relation to the claims of all others and all available resources. In addition, the moral urgency of lifting people above dire poverty cannot be invoked to demonstrate the moral urgency of everyone having enough. In both forms of scarcity – i.e., with satiable and insatiable claims – the social right or claim to goods cannot be conceived as something absolute or non-comparative. Egalitarians may thus conclude that distributive justice is always comparative. This would suggest that distributive equality, especially equality of life-conditions, should play a fundamental role in any adequate theory of justice in particular, and of morality in general.

• Albernethy, Georg L. (ed.), 1959, The Idea of Equality , Richmond: John Knox.
• Anderson, Elizabeth, 1999, “What Is the Point of Equality?,” Ethics , 109: 287–337.
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Aristotle, Politics , in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Arneson, Richard, 1989, “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,” Philosophical Studies , 56: 77–93; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford:Oxford University Press, pp. 229–241.
• –––, 1990, “Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 19: 158–194.
• –––, 1993, “Equality,” in R. Goodin & P. Pettit (eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy , Oxford:Blackwell, pp. 489–507.
• Babeuf, Gracchus, 1796, “Manifeste des Égaux,” in Histoire de G. Babeuf et du Babouvisme , Paris 1884, Engl. trans. in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 49–52.
• Baker, John, Kathleen Lynch, Sara Cantillon, Judy Walsh, 2004, Equality. From Theory to Action , Houndsmill/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Bedau, Hugo Adam, 1967, “Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality,” in J. R. Pennock, J. Chapman (eds.), Equality , New York: Atherton, pp. 3–27.
• Benn, Stanley, 1967, “Equality, Moral and Social,” in P. Edwards(ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Vol 3, New York: Macmillan, pp. 38–42.
• Benn, Stanley I. and Richard S. Peters, 1959, Social Principles and the Democratic State , London: Allen & Unwin.
• Berlin, Isaiah, 1955–56, “Equality,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LVI , pp. 301–326.
• Brown, Henry Phelps, 1988, Egalitarianism and the Generation of Inequality , Oxford: Clarendon.
• Callinicos, Alex, 2000, Equality , Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Caney, Simon, 2005, Justice Beyond Borders , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Carter, Ian, 2011, “Respect and the Basis of Equality”, Ethics , 121(3): 538–571.
• Casal, Paula, 2007, “Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough”, Ethics , 117(2): 296–326.
• Cavanagh, Matt, 2002, Against Equality of Opportunity , Oxford: Clarendon.
• Christiano, Thomas, 2008, The constitution of equality: democratic authority and its limits , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Cohen, Gerald A., 1989, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics , 99: 906–944.
• –––, 1993, “Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities,” in M. Nussbaum & A. Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 9–29.
• –––, 2000, If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re so Rich? , Harvard: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 2007, Rescuing Justice and Equality , manuscript.
• Dahrendorf, Ralf, 1962, “On the Origin of Social Inequality,” in P. Laslett & W. G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics, and Society , 2nd Series, Oxford: Blackwell.
• Daniels, Norman, 2003, “Democratic equality: Rawls’s complex egalitarianism,” in S. Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 241–276.
• Dann, Otto, 1975, “Gleichheit,” in V. O. Brunner, W. Conze, R. Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe , pp. 995–1046.
• Dworkin, Ronald, 1977, Taking Rights Seriously , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 1981a, “What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare”, Philosophy and Public Affairs , 10: 185–246; reprinted in R. Dworkin, 2000, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality , Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp.11–64.
• –––, 1981b, “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 10: 283–345; reprinted in R. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality , Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2000, pp. 65–119.
• –––, 2000, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Elford, Gideon, 2017, “Relational Equality and Distribution,” Journal of Political Philosophy , 25: 80–99.
• Eyal, Nir, 2017, “Luck Egalitarianism, Harshness, and the Rule of Rescue”, in S.M. Liao and C. O’Neil (eds.), Current Controversies in Bioethics , pp. 160–176, New York: Routledge.
• Feinberg, Joel, 1970, “Justice and Personal Desert,” in J. Feinberg, Doing and Deserving , Princeton; reprinted in L. P. Pojman & O. McLeod (eds.), 1998, What Do We Deserve? A Reader on Justice and Desert , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 70–83.
• –––, 1974, “Non-Comparative Justice,” Philosophical Review , 83: 297–358.
• Fleurbaey, Marc, 2008, Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Frankfurt, Harry, 1987, “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” Ethics , 98: 21–42; reprinted in H. Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About , Cambridge University Press, pp. 134–168; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 261–273.
• –––, 1997, “Equality and Respect,” Social Research , 64: 3–15.
• Gosepath, Stefan, 2004, Gleiche Gerechtigkeit. Grundlagen eines liberalen Egalitarismus , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
• –––, 2015, “The Principles and the Presumption of Equality,” in C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, I. Wallimann-Helmer (eds.), Social equality: on what it means to be equals , Oxford University Press, pp. 167–185.
• Habermas, Jürgen, 1983, “Diskursethik – Notizen zu einem Begründungsprogramm,” in J. Habermas, Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, pp. 53–126; English translation, “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification,” in J. Habermas, 1990, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action , tr. C. Lenhardt and S. Weber Nicholsen, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 43–115.
• –––, 1992, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp; Engl. Trans.: Habermas, Jürgen, 1996, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy , tr. W. Rehg, Cambridge: MIT Press.
• Hajdin, Mane (ed.), 2000, The Notion of Equality , Aldershot: Ashgate.
• Hare, Richard M., 1981, Moral Thinking. Its Levels, Method and Point , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 1984, “Rights, Utility and Universalization: Reply to J. L. Mackie,” in R. G. Frey (ed.), Utilities and Rights, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press; reprinted Oxford: Blackwell 1985.
• Hayek, Friedrich A., 1960, The Constitution of Liberty , London: Routledge.
• Hinsch, Wilfried, 2002, Gerechtfertigte Ungleichheiten , Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.
• –––, 2003, “Angemessene Gleichheit,” in R. Geiger, J. C. Merle, N. Scarano (eds.), Modelle politischer Philosophie , Paderborn: Mentis, pp. 260–271.
• Hobbes, Thomas, 1651, in E. Curley (ed.), 1994, Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668 , Indianapolis: Hackett.
• Holtug, Nils and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), 2006, Egalitarianism. New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Honneth, Axel and Nancy Fraser, 2003, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange , New York: Verso.
• Kaldor, Nicholas, 1939, “Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-Personal Comparison of Utility,” The Economic Journal , 49: 549–552.
• Kant, Imanuel, 1785, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten , in Kants Gesammelte Schriften , ed. by Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1902ff., vol. IV.
• –––, 1797, Metaphysik der Sitten , in Kants Gesammelte Schriften , ed. by Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1902ff., vol. VI.
• Kateb, George, 2014, Human Dignity , Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
• Kersting, Wolfgang, 2002, Kritik der Gleichheit. Über die Grenzen der Gerechtigkeit und der Moral , Weilerswist: Velbrück.
• Kolodny, Nico, 2014, “Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs , 42 (4):287–336.
• Korsgaard, Christine, 1996, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” in C. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 249–253.
• Kymlicka, Will, 1990, Contemporary Political Philosophy , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Lakoff, Sandford A., 1964, Equality in Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper, 2015, Luck Egalitarianism , London: Bloomsbury Academic.
• –––, 2018, Relational Egalitarianism: Living as Equals , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Locke, John, 1690, in C. B. MacPerson (ed.), 1980, The Second Treatise of Government , Indianapolis: Hackett.
• MacKinnon, Catherine, 1989, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• MacLeod, Colin M., 1998, Liberalism, Justice, and Markets , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Marshall, Thomas Humphrey, 1950, “Citizenship and Social Class,” in T. Marshall, 1950, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–75; reprinted London: Pluto 1981, 1992.
• Marx, Karl, 1875, Critique of the Gotha Program ; reprinted in Marx-Engels-Werke (MEW) vol. 19, Berlin 1978; and in Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (MEGA-B), Berlin 1975 ff., vol. I 25.
• McKerlie, Dennis, 1989, “Equality and Time,” Ethics , 99: 274–296; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 65–75.
• –––, 1996, “Equality,” Ethics , 106: 274–296.
• Menke, Christoph, 2000, Spiegelungen der Gleichheit , Berlin: Akademie 2000; reprinted Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 2004.
• Menne, Alfred, 1962, “Identität, Gleichheit, Ähnlichkeit,” Ratio , 4: 44ff.
• Miller, David, 1995, On Nationality , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 1997, “Equality and Justice,” Ratio , 10: 222–237.
• –––, 1998, “The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice,” in D. R. Mapel & T. Nardin (eds.), International Society. Diverse Ethical Perspectives , Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.164–181.
• Murphy, Liam and Thomas Nagel, 2002, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice , Oxford University Press.
• Nagel, Thomas, 1979, “Equality,” in T. Nagel, Mortal Questions , Cambridge University Press, pp. 106–127.
• –––, 1991, Equality and Partiality , Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2005, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 33 (2): 113–147.
• Nozick, Robert, 1974, Anarchy, State, and Utopia , New York: Basic Books.
• Nussbaum, Martha, 1992, “Human Functioning and Social Justice. In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism,” Political Theory , 20: 202–246.
• –––, 2000, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Okun, Arthur M., 1975, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff , Washington: The Brookings Institution.
• Olsaretti, Serena (ed.), 2003, Desert and Justice , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 2009, “Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice,”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , CIX(2): 165–188.
• Oppenheim, Felix, 1970, “Egalitarianism as a Descriptive Concept,” American Philosophical Quarterly , 7: 143–152; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 55–65.
• Otsuka, Michael, 2005, Libertarianism without Inequality , NewYork: Oxford University Press.
• Parfit, Derek, 1995, Equality or Priority? , The Lindley Lectures, Lawrence, KA: The University of Kansas.
• –––, 1997, “Equality and Priority,” Ratio , 10: 202–221.
• Plato, Republic , in J. M. Cooper & D.S. Hutchinson (eds.), 1997, Plato: Complete Works , Indianapolis: Hackett, pp. 971–1223.
• Plato, Laws , in J. M. Cooper & D.S. Hutchinson (eds.), 1997, Plato: Complete Works , Indianapolis: Hackett, pp. 1318–1616.
• Pettit, Philip, 2001, A Theory of Freedom , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Pogge, Thomas W., 1999, “Human Flourishing and Universal Justice,” Social Philosophy and Policy , 16 (1): 333–361, and in E. Frankel Paulet al. (eds.), 1999, Human Flourishing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 333–361.
• –––, 2002, World Poverty and Human Rights. Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms , Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Pojman, Louis P. and Owen McLeod (eds.), 1998, What Do We Deserve? A Reader on Justice and Desert , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Pojman, Louis P. and Robert Westmoreland (eds.), 1996, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Rae, Douglas et al. (eds.), 1981, Equalities , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice , Cambridge: Harvard University Press, rev. ed. 1999.
• –––, 1993, Political Liberalism , New York: Columbia University Press.
• Raz, Joseph, 1986, The Morality of Freedom , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Robeyns, Ingrid, 2009, “Justice as fairness and the capability approach”, in: Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur (eds.), Arguments for a Better World. Essays for Amartya Sen’s 75 th Birthday , Oxford University Press, pp. 397–413.
• –––, 2017, Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice: The Capability Approach Re-Examined , Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.
• Roemer, John E., 1998, Equality of Opportunity , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Rosen, Gideon, 2018, Dignity: Its History and Meaning , Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
• Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 1755, in M. Cranston (ed.), 1984, A Discourse on Inequality , London: Penguin; partly reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 36–45.
• –––, 1762, in M. Cranston (ed.), 1987, The Social Contract , Harmondsworth: Penguin.
• Scanlon, Thomas, 1996, The Diversity of Objections to Inequality , The Lindley Lectures, Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas; reprinted in T. Scanlon, 2003, The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 202–218.
• –––, 2018, Why Does Inequality Matter? , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Scheffler, Samuel, 2003, “What is Egalitarianism?,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 31: 5–39; reprinted in Equality and Tradition , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 175–207.
• –––, 2005, “Choice, Circumstances and the value of Equality,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics , 4: 5–28.
• –––, 2015, “The Practice of Equality,” in C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, and I. Wallimann-Helmer (eds.), Social Equality: Essays on What it Means to be Equals , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 21–44.
• Schemmel, Christian, 2011, “Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care About Distibutions,” Social Theory and Practice , 37: 365–390.
• Sen, Amartya, 1970, Collective Choice and Social Welfare , San Fransisco: Holden-Day; reprinted Amsterdam 1979.
• –––, 1980, “Equality of What?,” in S. M. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values , I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 197–220; reprinted in A. Sen, 1982, Choice, Welfare and Measurement , Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 353–372, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1997; also in S. Darwall (ed.), 1995, Equal Freedom , Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
• –––, 1992, Inequality Reexamined , Oxford: Clarendon Press, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Shaw, George Bernard, 1928, The Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism and Capitalism , New York: Brentano’s Publishers.
• Sikora, R.I., 1989, “Six Viewpoints for Assessing Egalitarian Distribution Schemes,” Ethics , 99: 492–502.
• Steinhoff, Uwe (ed.), 2015, Do All Persons Have Equal Moral Worth? For and Against “Basic Equality” and the Principle of Equal Respect and Concern , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Steiner, Hillel, 1994, An Essay on Rights , Oxford: Blackwell.
• Stemplowska, Zofia, 2009, “Making Justice Sensitive to Responsibility,” Political Studies , 57: 237–259.
• –––, 2013, “Rescuing Luck Egalitarianism,”, Journal of Social Philosophy , 44(4): 402–419.
• Sypnowich, Christine (ed.), 2006, The Egalitarian Conscience. Essays in Honour of G. A. Cohen , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Tawney, R. H., 1931, Equality , London: Allen & Unwin.
• Taylor, Charles, 1992, Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Temkin, Larry, 1986, “Inequality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 15: 99–121; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 75–88.
• –––, 1992, “Intergenerational Inequality,” in Laslett, P. & J.S. Fishkin (eds.), Justice Between Age Groups and Generations , New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 169–205.
• –––, 1993, Inequality , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2009, “Illuminating Egalitarianism,” in T. Christiano & J. Christman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy , Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, pp. 155–178.
• Thomson, David, 1949, Equality , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Tugendhat, Ernst and Ursula Wolf, 1983, Logisch-Semantische Propädeutik , Stuttgart: Reclam.
• Tugendhat, Ernst, 1993, Vorlesungen über Ethik , Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
• –––, 1997, Dialog in Letitia , Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp.
• Van Parijs, Philippe, 1995, Real Freedom For All. What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Vlastos, Gregory, 1962, “Justice and Equality,” in R. Brandt (ed.), Social Justice , Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall; reprinted in J. Waldron (ed.), 1984, Theories of Rights , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 41–76; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 120–133.
• Voigt, Kristin, 2007, “Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities,” Ethics , 112(3): 529–57.
• Vonnegut, Kurt, 1950, “Harrison Bergeron,” in K. Vonnegut, 1950, Welcome to the Monkey House , New York: Delacorte Press, pp. 7–13; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 315–311.
• Waldron, Jeremy, 2017, One another’s equals: the basis of human equality , Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
• Walzer, Michael, 1983, Spheres of Justice. A Defence of Pluralism and Equality , New York/London: Basic Books.
• Westen, Peter, 1990, Speaking Equality , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• White, Stuart, 2006, Equality , Oxford: Blackwell.
• Williams, Bernard, 1973, “The Idea of Equality”, in B. Williams, Problems of the Self , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 230–249, reprinted in: L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 91–102.
• –––, 1987, “The Standard of Living: Interests and Capabilities,” in A. Sen, The Standard of Living , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 94–102.
• Wolff, Jonathan, 1998, “Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos,” Philosophy & Public Affairs , 27: 97–122.
• –––, 2010, “Fairness, respect and the egalitarian ethos revisited,” Journal of Ethics , 14 (3–4): 335–350.
• Young, Iris Marion, 1990, Justice and the Politics of Difference , Princeton: Princeton University Press.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

[Please contact the author with suggestions.]

• The Equality Studies Centre , University College/Dublin.

consequentialism | egalitarianism | equality: of opportunity | impartiality | justice: distributive | justification, political: public | libertarianism | luck: justice and bad luck

Copyright © 2021 by Stefan Gosepath < stefan . gosepath @ fu-berlin . de >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2023 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Cookie settings

These necessary cookies are required to activate the core functionality of the website. An opt-out from these technologies is not available.

In order to further improve our offer and our website, we collect anonymous data for statistics and analyses. With the help of these cookies we can, for example, determine the number of visitors and the effect of certain pages on our website and optimize our content.

Selecting your areas of interest helps us to better understand our audience.

What is economic inequality?

Economic inequality is the unequal distribution of income and opportunity between different groups in society. It is a concern in almost all countries around the world and often people are trapped in poverty with little chance to climb up the social ladder. But, being born into poverty does not automatically mean you stay poor. Education, at all levels, enhancing skills, and training policies can be used alongside social assistance programs to help people out of poverty and to reduce inequality. Several countries are also now exploring whether a universal basic income could be the answer.

The global coronavirus pandemic is likely to further inequalities as travel restrictions, nationwide lockdowns, and the virus itself affect people within and across nations in widely varying ways.

For commentary on the effects of the virus see Covid-19: Pandemics and the labor market .

See National responses to Covid-19 for content looking at the effects of the pandemic on individual countries or cities.

• Transition and emerging economies
• Demography, family, and gender

Female poverty and intrahousehold inequality in transition economies Updated

An unequal distribution of resources within the family is a special concern for female poverty, determinants of inequality in transition countries, market changes and limited redistribution contributed to high income and wealth inequality growth in eastern europe.

• Development

Measuring poverty within the household

Standard poverty measures may drastically understate the problem; the collective household model can help.

• Labor markets and institutions
• Education and human capital

Income inequality and social origins Updated

Promoting intergenerational mobility makes societies more egalitarian.

• Behavioral and personnel economics

Inequality and informality in transition and emerging countries Updated

A bidirectional relationship between informality and inequality exists; in transition and emerging countries, higher informality decreases inequality.

• Migration and ethnicity

Racial wage differentials in developed countries Updated

The variation of racial wage gaps across and within groups requires differing policy solutions, how do widespread shocks affect people’s desires to redistribute income, all in this together: inequality during covid-19, four mistaken theses about universal basic incomes, can we use trade policy to achieve gender equality, when is the right time to start tracking students, why does poverty persist across the generations, iza world of labor video on inequality and post transition in emerging economies, racial wage differentials in developed countries: simonetta longhi in discussion with dan hamermesh, slavery, racial inequality & education: graziella bertocchi in conversation with daniel s hamermesh, inequality and informality in transition and emerging countries: roberto dell'anno and dan hamermesh, income inequality and social origins: lorenzo cappellari in conversation with daniel s hamermesh, measuring income inequality: ija trapeznikova in conversation with daniel s hamermesh.

How can we improve IZA World of Labor? Click here to take our 5-minute survey and enter a prize draw.

An Introduction to Equality of Opportunity

Main navigation.

Freedom and equality are foundational values that we draw upon when envisioning a better society. Equality of opportunity is a social ideal that combines concern with freedom and equality, and this social ideal provides a vision of how we ought to live together.

At first glance, the value of equality can seem to demand uniformity that seems dystopian. For instance, if everyone were forced to wear the same clothes, pursue the same hobbies and have the same number of children, we would think this was intolerable. However, we should be careful not to reject equality entirely on this basis. Equality is still attractive if we limit its scope to some areas. For instance, equality before the law and equal rights to vote seem to be at the heart of our convictions about how we should live together. Inequality in these areas seems as intolerable as sameness in dress, family size or in our choice of recreational activities.

Freedom or opportunity may explain where and when equality seems most important. Our equal rights to a fair trial, to vote in elections, to association, speech and religion are each an equal right to a sphere of freedom. Part of what we value in this mixture is the protection from interference and having others dictate our lives to us and the other part of what we value is that we enjoy this protection on equal terms. In the sphere of religious worship, for example, individuals decide what religion they will worship. Unequal freedom, where some have freedom of religion and others do not, strikes us as wrong because it is unequal. Whereas Equal Unfreedom, where we are all slaves or lack basic rights, strikes us as wrong because it is unfree. A combination of freedom and equality, then, promises to describe a fitting social ideal for people who disagree about important, religious, moral and political questions, and yet want to live together in mutual respect.

Equality of Opportunity is one such combination and it has been a rich source of academic and political debate, a political slogan, and a widely held conviction about how human beings should live together. At its most basic, Equality of Opportunity requires that all human beings are equal in the sphere of opportunity. Equality of opportunity is usually opposed to slavery, hierarchy and caste society, where social positions, life prospects and individual freedoms are determined by membership of some group that you are born into, such as the aristocracy. Our acknowledgement of the importance of freedom and equality motivate the theory and practice of Equality of Opportunity. But before we go any further we should ask, “What is Equality of Opportunity?”

What is Equality of Opportunity?

When we ask what equality of opportunity is we could be asking two questions. First, we could be asking about the concept of equality of opportunity. If so, we are asking for the idea in its most general form. We are asking what kind of features must a statement have to count as a statement of equality of opportunity rather than a statement of something else. Second, we could be asking for the correct conception of equality of opportunity. The term 'conception' refers to a specific interpretation of a notion or idea. It is a particular way of understanding the kind of equality and the kinds of opportunities that are most valuable or more important. While there is only one concept of equality of opportunity, there are many different conceptions.

The concept of Equality of Opportunity has been examined by philosopher Peter Westen. Westen shows that an opportunity is a three-way relationship between a person, some obstacles, and a desired goal. However, a person only has an opportunity if she has a chance of achieving that goal. One cannot have an opportunity if one faces insurmountable obstacles that make it impossible to secure the goal. For instance, one cannot have an opportunity to become the president of the United States if one is not a natural born citizen. Many people, therefore, have no opportunity to become president of the United States. A person can have an opportunity even in the face of many, quite serious, obstacles. So, a natural born US citizen has the opportunity to become president, but she faces serious obstacles, such as accruing the relevant number and distribution of votes, as well as winning primaries. So, to have an opportunity means to face no insurmountable obstacles with respect to some important or desired goal, but what about having an equal opportunity?

In order for opportunities to be equal within a group, each member of that group must face the same relevant obstacles, none insurmountable, with respect to achieving the same desirable goal. In our example, all natural born citizens of the US have an equal opportunity when irrelevant goals, such as race, gender and religious affiliation are removed and when relevant obstacles, such as being democratically elected, remain.

Some critics have doubted the importance of mentioning equality when thinking about opportunities within a group. They argue that the only equality here is universalism, meaning that the opportunity is had by all. We can see why one might be drawn to the idea that equality plays little role in this ideal since we could say that everyone should have an opportunity to become president and this seems to do the job as well as saying that everyone should have an equal opportunity to become president. Equality appears to be doing no work, and this may lead us to question whether this expresses the value of equality.

However, this analysis misses something of significance, which is the fact that all people should have the same opportunity, and not merely an opportunity. While everyone could have an opportunity, and each face different irrelevant and relevant obstacles, equality of opportunity requires that no one face any irrelevant obstacles. If women were prohibited from becoming president, or if they had to win a greater proportion of the votes to be elected than men, then they would face an irrelevant obstacle that men do not. Thus, men and women would not enjoy equal opportunity with respect to the good of political representation in this society. This aspect of equality of opportunity is important for a social ideal because it expresses part of the moral value of equality.

At this point we do well to contrast equality of opportunity with equality of outcome. Equality of opportunity requires only that people be free from certain obstacles to pursue their own happiness and success. As such, Equality of Opportunity is not opposed to different outcomes of the conscientious, but fair pursuit of jobs, health, wealth, education and other goods that people value, so long as everyone faces the same obstacles. Sometimes this idea is known as the level-playing field because its main concern is that no one is unfairly advantaged before they even start out. It is in stark opposition to games that are rigged in favor of some over others. By contrast, Equality of Outcome insists that everyone do equally well with respect to some of the goods that individuals value, regardless of their effort, talents, and whether they wish to pursue it. This sort of equality can seem undesirable, but it can also be understood as one that is impossible to achieve because people are unequal in so many of the respects that affect outcomes, such as natural talent, health, their attitudes to hard work and in their interests and preferences. This can lead us to favor equal opportunities and to allow the inequality of outcomes. However, we should note that equal outcomes may still be very important indicators of inequality of opportunity, and that equal outcomes may be appropriate for children and others who lack responsible agency.

The bare concept of Equality of Opportunity as a relation between agents, obstacles and goals, leaves a lot to be filled out. There are many different ways in which we could all face the same obstacles with respect to the same goals. By varying the different goals and obstacles we vary the conception of Equality of Opportunity and different views will offer different guidance, and some will be more attractive than others. Different goals can make a difference in the following way. Opportunity for undesirable or irrelevant goals, such as opportunities to be mugged or to count grass, will not be included. Some goals may be trivial and it may not matter whether people have different opportunities with respect to those goals. For instance, opportunities to tie your shoe laces or grow a tree in your garden are less important than opportunities to find meaningful work or get a good education. We will have to think hard about exactly which ones do matter and which do not. In addition, we must think carefully about the kinds of obstacles that are morally relevant and the ones that are morally irrelevant with respect to the goal. For instance, we might think that race, religion and sexuality should not affect one’s opportunities to go to college, but that hard-work and ability to learn should. As such, ability to learn would be an obstacle that is relevant to the distribution of opportunity to go to college, but sexuality, religion and race would not. Which obstacles are morally relevant will depend on a more substantive account of what matters morally in each case. Different accounts of what are relevant and what goals matter are offered by rival conceptions of equality of opportunity.

Conceptions of Equality of Opportunity can be more or less demanding. The obstacles may be more or less difficult to overcome or the goals may be more or less difficult to achieve. For instance, if we think that obstacles such as social class, in addition to race, gender, sexuality and religious belief, are irrelevant to the goal that is desired, then we will have to try much harder to minimize differences in social class or minimize the effect social class has on the distribution of these goods. We could also specify the nature of the obstacle in different ways, such as formal or legal racial discrimination rather than explicit or implicit bias. The view can also be more or less demanding in terms of the goals we specify. So, for instance, we might think that everyone should have an equal opportunity to reach a basic standard of living or that everyone should have an equal opportunity to reach a high or equal standard of living. These views would support different policies and may require much more of our institutions, and greater individual effort, than others. They may also reflect the values of individual freedom and equal respect better or worse.

We will now briefly focus on two influential conceptions of Equality of Opportunity and show how they differ in their demandingness. We then go on to explain the special relationship that conceptions of Equality of Opportunity have with education and schooling.

Different Views of Equality of Opportunity

Formal Equality of Opportunity is arguably the least demanding conception of Equality of Opportunity. It focuses on the formal rules that stand in the way of achieving particular goals, such as employment and admission to schools.  Different types of formal equality of opportunity can focus on many or few goals. What unites these views is a focus on formal discriminatory rules as an irrelevant obstacle to some role. Policies that are related to this conception include requirements that advertisements for jobs do not specify racial, religious or gender characteristics. They must be perfectly general such that anyone can apply without violating the formal rule. This vision of a free and equal society can be satisfied merely by ensuring that formal rules are properly general. So long as there are no formal rules that stand in the way of some individuals’ achievement of some goal those individuals have equal opportunity. The view is therefore compatible with private discrimination, implicit bias, and unequal distributions of resources.

On the other hand, Equality of Opportunity for Welfare is perhaps the most demanding conception of Equality of Opportunity. It focuses on welfare, or how well a person’s life actually goes, and not minimal welfare but equal welfare. Individual choice is the only relevant obstacle. So, the only thing that should stand in the way of an individual’s achievement of equal welfare should be their own voluntary choices. In other words, a person should be no worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. If a person chooses to take risks or gambles, any resulting inequality would not be problematic, but if a person is a victim of bad luck, such as a natural disaster or disability, then any resulting inequality would need to be remedied for equality of opportunity to be fully realized.

This view is highly demanding and would require a radical redistribution of wealth to both those who are less naturally talented and to those who are otherwise disadvantaged through no fault of their own, for example, through upbringing, through natural bad luck as well as social class, racism, sexism and religious discrimination. Addressing these inequalities may require investing in schooling, sports facilities and social networks as well as healthcare and assistance for the disabled and heavily regulated jobs markets.

It should be noted that the more demanding the view the greater the encroachment on some putatively valuable forms of individual freedom. For instance, in order to ensure that wealth, social background and natural luck do not act as an obstacle for the poor it may be necessary to tax the earnings of the well-off. Some will claim that this violates the entitlements of the rich to their resources, and is therefore too high a price to pay. This may lead those people to accept a less demanding conception of Equality of Opportunity. Others will claim that taxing the wealthy is an acceptable price to pay to ensure that poor people have substantively equal opportunities to secure good jobs, adequate healthcare and education and to have means to support their families and live a decent life.

There are other conceptions of Equality of Opportunity that are only moderately demanding. The two extreme views above, however, help us to see and make sense of dominant ideologies on the left and the right, and therefore historical public political disagreements. We can characterize much of contemporary political argument as being about what the best conception of Equality of Opportunity is, which partly explains why it is such an important idea to understand.

Defenders of small government and individual responsibility on the right may be drawn to something resembling the conception of Formal Equality of Opportunity because going further requires interference with individual entitlements and a bigger state. They may go further than Formal Equality of Opportunity and instead favor the Meritocratic Conception of Equality of Opportunity, which requires redistribution to ensure that hard work and talent, and not discrimination and favoritism, determine hiring practices.  Those who believe in meritocracy may consider some taxation to be a price worth paying for fairer hiring practices.

Defenders of more substantive equal chances, who care about equalizing school quality and school funding, as well as providing for health care, will be drawn to more demanding ideals that more closely approximate Equality of Opportunity for Welfare. They may be put off by the demandingness of the conception of Equality of Opportunity for Welfare, and instead favor the conception of Fair Equality of Opportunity, which condemns inequalities in social background as obstacles to achieving valuable goals in life. Such a view will require redistribution to ensure that hard-working and talented individuals from the working class have the same chance of success as similarly hard-working and talented individuals from the middle and upper-classes. This kind of view may advocate increased per pupil funding for the working-class. Evaluating the appropriateness of these ideals will be determined both by how well they express our commitment to freedom and equality, and whether they lead to sacrifice of other values that we view as more or less important than that commitment.

These different conceptions of Equality of Opportunity offer us very different guidance and assessment of our societies. The contemporary USA undoubtedly satisfies some conceptions more than others. In this way, we can see that which view is the best conception of Equality of Opportunity will determine how much work we have to do to make progress and in which direction we need to go, whether that is breaking down formal barriers, eradicating nepotism and informal discrimination, or something more demanding like mitigating wealth inequality and the inequalities that follow from social class distinctions and natural disadvantages.

Applying the Ideas to Education

The focus of this project is on the application of conceptions of Equality of Opportunity to education. Though the types of policies and reforms that will be favored depend on the conception of Equality of Opportunity that is most defensible, we can say that educational institutions will have a central role to play in better realizing equality of opportunity. This is because education is valuable for a wide range of goals that we think are important, such as employment, health, wealth, welfare and citizenship. Moreover, almost all contemporary societies compel school attendance for all young children and so education can be offered to all and across many of the irrelevant obstacles, such as race, sexuality, religious affiliation, social class and natural talent. Of course, it may be that the highest gains could be had by focusing on pre-K education, or that non-educational levers would be most effective if politically feasible, but, to some extent, we have to think about what is best given the current institutional arrangements. As such, educational institutions are one lever that we can use to try to redress imbalances and inequalities and to help members of disadvantaged groups overcome those obstacles. Education, and schooling in particular, may be a much more politically feasible lever than pure redistribution or cash transfers and other more controversial public policies such as minimum wage legislation, affirmative action and further intervention in markets. Focusing on reform of educational policy, therefore, may be the best thing to focus on today. Nevertheless, reforming society through education can be an extremely difficult undertaking and background inequality and poverty can restrict even its efficacy. We should bear in mind, however, that some conceptions of equality of opportunity may be particularly inappropriate when applied to children. For instance, Equality of Opportunity for Welfare focuses on individual choices, because it emphasizes responsibility, but we don’t usually hold children responsible for the choices they make because their capacities are so under-developed. Also, Meritocratic Equality of Opportunity may seem to be ill-suited to educational institutions because educational institutions are supposed to cultivate merit. In applying conceptions of Equality of Opportunity to education, we must show an awareness of these and other concerns.

To illustrate more clearly some of the benefits and concerns of using education as a lever for achieving equality of opportunity, I want to explore one particular conception of equality of opportunity. Let’s assume that we accept the conception of Fair Equality of Opportunity as determining an important part of how we should live together and hold that social class should not affect who gets jobs, but that the most meritorious candidate should get the job. Failure to address this issue would be a failure to take into account that social class should not affect job prospects.

There are broadly two types of strategy we could adopt, each of which has its own pitfalls and each of which uses educational institutions. The first strategy is to focus resources on trying to correct inequalities by providing extra schooling to those who are disadvantaged by social class. This aims to address the inequality of opportunity that is caused by institutions other than educational ones. The second strategy is to focus on attempting to correct inequalities in the social background, which may include inequality in educational opportunity and access to good schools, as well as unemployment and poverty in general.

We know that family background can greatly affect the development of capabilities and skills, and ambitions to go to college and get high-status jobs. Knowing this, and being committed to fair equality of opportunity, we could attempt to redress the issues around unequal childhoods by offering extra schooling to children who come from disadvantaged backgrounds. This could either be achieved by targeting additional resources, tutoring, and extra classes at those who are poorer within the school, or it could be achieved by providing greater resources to those schools that educate a greater proportion of poorer children.

However, operating at this level treats the symptoms rather than the cause and, in the society that allows private schooling and tolerates huge wealth inequalities, additional investment in the education of poorer children can become an arms race that the government cannot win. Put simply, the better-off could always invest more and more into the education of their children and will do so because they want their children to secure places at the elite colleges and in the top professions. If rich parents invest more and more in their children’s education, the government must attempt to keep up if it is going to succeed in equalizing opportunity. As the government spends more and more to narrow the gap, education budgets, and taxation must increase, but it is very difficult to sustain ever-increasing budgets and taxation consistent with winning democratic elections. This threatens the political feasibility of such measures, though significant improvements may be made in the process.

An alternative strategy, which treats the causes of social class as an obstacle to equality of opportunity, is available. Looking to education we may wish to ensure that all schools are equally well-resourced. As we saw above, one way of doing this is to devote increasing resources to poorer schools. An alternative is to limit the resources that can be spent on private education, or to abolish elite private schooling all together, as it threatens equality of opportunity. However, such measures will likely be insufficient, even if feasible and effective. This is because parent-child interactions as innocent as reading bedtime stories can enhance child development unequally. Interfering in the family is both politically difficult to justify and may be morally suspect as it compromises the values that the family embodies and promotes.

A radical alternative is available, but it requires the eradication of social class and anything other than minimal wealth inequalities. In such a society, no one would be so much better off than others that they have more free time, resources, better housing and health care so that their children develop to a greater extent or more quickly than others. This would be to address the causes of inequality of opportunity, but it would likely be highly unpopular with the electorate and some will argue that an economy where workers are paid roughly equally for different work, will be painfully inefficient. Whether this is true cannot be proved here, but each of these strategies may be rejected on the grounds of being ineffective, infeasible or of compromising more important values, such as the value of the family or economic efficiency. Nevertheless, the first strategy appears to be the most promising and our commitment to equality of opportunity of some sort suggests that where we fall short of respecting freedom and equality in our society today, the educational institutions will be our first and most promising levers.

In addition, we need to think about the goal that we are trying to achieve within education, not only the goal that we care about for Equality of Opportunity in general, i.e. the conception that we think is correct. Disagreement about this concerns whether we should be concerned with equality of educational outcomes, equality of opportunities, or merely adequacy, and is partly motivated by the problems with meritocracy and responsibility noted above.

Different standards of education might be appropriate for different types of equality of opportunity goals. For instance, with respect to jobs, we might be very concerned that equally hard-working and naturally talented students achieve equal outcomes on standardized tests, since being the most qualified candidate usually gets you the job. However, being a good citizen perhaps is independent of how well informed you are relative to others, so long as you are well-informed about various candidates and about how to spot a bad argument. Moreover, with respect to young children, we might think that outcomes, not opportunities are best in some areas, such as basic reading skills. What we want, with respect to literacy, is not that children have equal opportunities to read, but that they actually learn to read, even if this comes at great cost. We should note that achieving equal outcomes will be differently costly for different individuals due to ranges of ability and the quickness with which children pick up certain skills. At the most extreme end of this spectrum are severe cognitive disabilities, which may render it very difficult or impossible to achieve equal outcomes. As such, a desirable view of equality of opportunity may have to answer special sorts of questions around the appropriate education for those who have severe disabilities. Whatever the correct answers, we can only make progress on these questions by thinking seriously about the issues many of which are presented here in a way that is widely accessible.

Our focus is on the application of conceptions of Equality of Opportunity to education, but there are many other goods that people value and should have equal opportunity to pursue. For instance, most people value healthcare as it is important no matter what their ambitions and life plans are. Access to good doctors and basic medical treatment could be evaluated in terms of equality of opportunity. So, if some people face greater obstacles than others in getting to see a good doctor. If basic healthcare is expensive, then poorer people will face greater obstacles than the rich. If few doctors are willing to work in rural areas, then those in rural areas will face greater obstacles than those in urban areas. These unequal obstacles may be condemnable, depending on the conception of Equality of Opportunity that is most desirable. Moreover, rather than focusing on particular goods, such as education and health, we may prefer to focus on happiness itself, since it seems to be the fundamental value that people care about. Such a focus would enable us to condemn obstacles that stand in the way of health or education only insofar as those goods affect the happiness of those individuals. This makes an important difference if people wish to pursue health or education to different extents. One person’s happiness may hinge on her access to education far more than another’s persons. We can say the same about health.

The intention of this brief introduction to equality of opportunity and education was to introduce beginners to the ideal of equality of opportunity, its place within contemporary political debates and its history. At this stage we might ask: why should anyone care about equality of opportunity? This takes us back to the start of the introduction. If you believe that all of us are equal in some important ways and if you think that freedom to pursue one’s plans without interference from others is important, then equality of opportunity is very important indeed.

Arguing about equality of opportunity is really an argument about how best to understand the kind of society we should be striving for, one where free and equal persons live together. Although other ideals may also be worth striving for, equality of opportunity offers important guidance and a standpoint for criticism of contemporary societies, their politicians and our own personal conduct. It enables us to judge some change as progress or backsliding. Educational institutions, in particular, are well situated to make those changes and failure to utilize them for this end can be judged to have been a further opportunity missed.

What can be found on this website is a summary of different academic debates about equality of opportunity and education and an annotated bibliography of some of the key books and articles on the topic. I start with a beginners reading list below, and go on to explain the crux of some key debates. The debates are divided into the following sections. The first section addresses the concept of equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. The second section considers different conceptions of equality of opportunity and debates about their relative merits. The third section covers debates about education and educational policy, including: school choice and the family, higher education, and whether adequacy or equality should be the principle for distributing educational resources and the aim of schooling.

Arneson, Richard. “Equality Of Opportunity”. Edited by Edward N Zalta. Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy, 2002. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/equal-opportunity/ . Google Scholar

Brighouse, Harry, and Kenneth Howe. Educational Equality. Continuum, 2010. Google Scholar

Gutmann, Amy. Democratic Education. Princeton University Press, 1998. Google Scholar

Jencks, Christopher. “Whom Must We Treat Equally For Educational Opportunity To Be Equal?”. Ethics, Ethics, 1988, 518-533. Google Scholar

Kittay, Eva Feder. “At The Margins Of Moral Personhood”. Ethics, Ethics, 116, no. 1 (2005): 100-131. Google Scholar

Kymlicka, Will. In Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2002. Google Scholar

McKinnon, Catriona. Issues In Political Theory. Oxford University Press, 2012. Google Scholar

Parfit, Derek. “Equality And Priority”. Ratio, Ratio, 10, no. 3 (1997): 202-221. Google Scholar

Swift, Adam. Political Philosophy: A Beginners' Guide For Students And Politicians. Polity, 2013. Google Scholar

Williams, Bernard. “The Idea Of Equality”. In Philosophy, Politics, And Society, 110-131. Philosophy, Politics, And Society. London: Basil Blackwell, 1962. Google Scholar

Section 1: Equality of Opportunity and Alternatives »

• Search Search Please fill out this field.

What Is Economic Justice?

Understanding economic justice, examples of ways to achieve economic justice, what is the goal of economic justice, what is the difference between social justice and economic justice, is economic justice achievable, economic justice: meaning, examples of how to achieve it.

Adam Hayes, Ph.D., CFA, is a financial writer with 15+ years Wall Street experience as a derivatives trader. Besides his extensive derivative trading expertise, Adam is an expert in economics and behavioral finance. Adam received his master's in economics from The New School for Social Research and his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in sociology. He is a CFA charterholder as well as holding FINRA Series 7, 55 & 63 licenses. He currently researches and teaches economic sociology and the social studies of finance at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

Economic justice is a component of social justice and welfare economics . It is a set of moral and ethical principles for building economic institutions, where the ultimate goal is to create an opportunity for each person to establish a sufficient material foundation upon which to have a dignified, productive, and creative life.

Key Takeaways

• Economic justice is the idea that the economy will be more successful if it is fairer, and that prosperity and justice go hand-in-hand rather than in opposition to one another.
• The goal is to create opportunities for all to thrive.
• Universal basic income, income equality by gender and race, equal opportunity for employment and credit, and allowing all to reach their full potential are key tenets of economic justice.

The concept of economic justice intersects with the idea of overall economic prosperity. There is a belief that creating more opportunities for all members of society to earn viable wages will contribute to sustained economic growth . When more citizens are able to provide for themselves and maintain stable discretionary income , they are more likely to spend their earnings on goods, which in turn drives demand in the economy.

Achieving economic justice can include addressing wage gaps and other deficiencies in individual earnings. For instance, there are members of the workforce employed in jobs that do not make full use of their skills. This typically leads to workers earning wages that do not reflect the full potential of their abilities. As a result, they do not have the highest income they are capable of earning.

Such loss of possible wages creates an inefficiency in the economy because those workers will not have the income to participate to their fullest in it. If this inefficiency reaches significant magnitude—wherein large portions of the population are not purchasing goods and services they might have otherwise spent their earnings on—it can slow the economy.

One attempt to achieve economic justice is a system of progressive taxation , wherein the tax percentage increases as the base income amount increases. The goal of progressive taxation is to remedy income inequality and provide funds for social services, public infrastructure , and education. The earned income tax credit (EITC) , affordable housing, and need-based federal financial aid for college students are other examples of economic justice institutions.

Actions that could serve economic justice also include efforts to end gender-driven wage gaps and provide more thorough career preparation and education to low-income and at-risk segments of the population. Elevating wages for workers who have been earning lower wages is another proposed method of serving economic justice.

Such a strategy can be seen as a counterpoint to the idea of paying greater salaries to business executives who are associated with generating the wealth that pays the wages of others. Note that this idea doesn't operate in reverse: When the economy experiences a downturn, it is those who are among the poorest who face the most severe detriments, compared with those who are more affluent.

Economic justice strives to eliminate the inequality created by capitalism by creating equal opportunities for all members of the economy. Proponents argue that giving everyone a chance to earn a decent, fair income is good for the economy, as putting more money in pockets leads to greater spending on goods and services.

Economic justice is about money and making sure everyone has an equal share. Social justice is concerned with equal rights in general for people of all social dimensions. The idea behind social justice is that all people should have equal access to wealth, health, well-being, justice, privileges, and opportunity—regardless of their legal, political, economic, or other circumstances.

Pure economic justice is a rarity. Many developed economies offer some form of welfare and implement a progressive taxation system to ensure that bigger earners contribute more to public finances. However, in most of these countries, inequality is still widespread. Loopholes that favor the wealthy undermine attempts to reduce inequality, and big businesses often threaten to relocate elsewhere if forced to share a greater portion of their earnings with employees.

• A History of Income Inequality in the United States 1 of 30
• How Education and Training Affect the Economy 2 of 30
• Education vs. Experience: Which One Gets the Job? 3 of 30
• Unemployment Rate by State 4 of 30
• Can a Family Survive on the U.S. Minimum Wage? 5 of 30
• The Economics of Labor Mobility 6 of 30
• Forced Retirement: What it is, How it Works, FAQ 7 of 30
• Predatory Lending: How to Avoid, Examples and Protections 8 of 30
• Unbanked: What It Means, Statistics, Solutions 9 of 30
• Underbanked: What It Is and Who They Are 10 of 30
• Underinsurance: What it is, How it Works, FAQ 11 of 30
• The History of Unions in the United States 12 of 30
• What Is Middle Class Income? Thresholds, Is It Shrinking 13 of 30
• What Is Poverty? Meaning, Causes, and How To Measure 14 of 30
• Gini Index Explained and Gini Coefficients Around the World 15 of 30
• Measuring Inequality: Forget Gini, Go with the Palma Ratio Instead 16 of 30
• Lorenz Curve 17 of 30
• What Is the Human Development Index (HDI)? 18 of 30
• What Are the Criticisms of the Human Development Index (HDI)? 19 of 30
• Poverty Trap: Definition, Causes, and Proposed Solutions 20 of 30
• Conflict Theory Definition, Founder, and Examples 21 of 30
• America's Middle Class Is Losing Ground Financially 22 of 30
• Hollowing Out: What It Means, How It Works 23 of 30
• Social Justice Meaning and Main Principles Explained 24 of 30
• Economic Justice: Meaning, Examples of How to Achieve It 25 of 30
• Welfare Economics Explained: Theory, Assumptions, and Criticism 26 of 30
• Egalitarianism: Definition, Ideas, and Types 27 of 30
• The Nordic Model: Pros and Cons 28 of 30
• Equity-Efficiency Tradeoff: Definition, Causes, and Examples 29 of 30
• The Economic Message Behind Martin Luther King Jr.'s 'Dream' Speech 30 of 30

• Terms of Service
• Editorial Policy
• Privacy Policy
• Your Privacy Choices

Numbers, Facts and Trends Shaping Your World

Read our research on:

Full Topic List

Regions & Countries

• Publications
• Our Methods
• Short Reads
• Tools & Resources

Read Our Research On:

6 facts about economic inequality in the U.S.

Rising economic inequality in the United States has become a central issue in the race for the Democratic presidential nomination, and discussions about policy interventions that might help address it are likely to remain at the forefront in the 2020 general election .

As these debates continue, here are some basic facts about how economic inequality has changed over time and how the U.S. compares globally.

How we did this

For this analysis, we gathered data from the U.S. Census Bureau, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Bank . We also used previously published data points from Pew Research Center surveys and analyses of outside data.

Over the past 50 years, the highest-earning 20% of U.S. households have steadily brought in a larger share of the country’s total income. In 2018, households in the top fifth of earners (with incomes of $130,001 or more that year) brought in 52% of all U.S. income, more than the lower four-fifths combined, according to Census Bureau data.

In 1968, by comparison, the top-earning 20% of households brought in 43% of the nation’s income, while those in the lower four income quintiles accounted for 56%.

Among the top 5% of households – those with incomes of at least $248,729 in 2018 – their share of all U.S. income rose from 16% in 1968 to 23% in 2018.

Income inequality in the U.S. is the highest of all the G7 nations , according to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development . To compare income inequality across countries, the OECD uses the Gini coefficient , a commonly used measure ranging from 0, or perfect equality, to 1, or complete inequality. In 2017, the U.S. had a Gini coefficient of 0.434. In the other G7 nations, the Gini ranged from 0.326 in France to 0.392 in the UK.

Globally, the Gini ranges from lows of about 0.25 in some Eastern European countries to highs of 0.5 to 0.6 in countries in southern Africa, according to World Bank estimates .

The black-white income gap in the U.S. has persisted over time. The difference in median household incomes between white and black Americans has grown from about $23,800 in 1970 to roughly $33,000 in 2018 (as measured in 2018 dollars). Median black household income was 61% of median white household income in 2018, up modestly from 56% in 1970 – but down slightly from 63% in 2007, before the Great Recession , according to Current Population Survey data.

Overall, 61% of Americans say there is too much economic inequality in the country today, but views differ by political party and household income level. Among Republicans and those who lean toward the GOP, 41% say there is too much inequality in the U.S., compared with 78% of Democrats and Democratic leaners, a Pew Research Center survey conducted in September 2019 found.

Across income groups, U.S. adults are about equally likely to say there is too much economic inequality. But upper- (27%) and middle-income Americans (26%) are more likely than those with lower incomes (17%) to say that there is about the right amount of economic inequality.

These views also vary by income within the two party coalitions. Lower-income Republicans are more likely than upper-income ones to say there’s too much inequality in the country today (48% vs. 34%). Among Democrats, the reverse is true: 93% at upper-income levels say there is too much inequality, compared with 65% of lower-income Democrats.

The wealth gap between America’s richest and poorer families more than doubled from 1989 to 2016, according to a recent analysis by the Center. Another way of measuring inequality is to look at household wealth, also known as net worth, or the value of assets owned by a family, such as a home or a savings account, minus outstanding debt, such as a mortgage or student loan.

In 1989, the richest 5% of families had 114 times as much wealth as families in the second quintile (one tier above the lowest), at the median $2.3 million compared with $20,300. By 2016, the top 5% held 248 times as much wealth at the median. (The median wealth of the poorest 20% is either zero or negative in most years we examined.)

The richest families are also the only ones whose wealth increased in the years after the start of the Great Recession. From 2007 to 2016, the median net worth of the top 20% increased 13%, to $1.2 million. For the top 5%, it increased by 4%, to $4.8 million. In contrast, the median net worth of families in lower tiers of wealth decreased by at least 20%. Families in the second-lowest fifth experienced a 39% loss (from $32,100 in 2007 to $19,500 in 2016).

Middle-class incomes have grown at a slower rate than upper-tier incomes over the past five decades, the same analysis found . From 1970 to 2018, the median middle-class income increased from $58,100 to $86,600, a gain of 49%. By comparison, the median income for upper-tier households grew 64% over that time, from $126,100 to $207,400.

The share of American adults who live in middle-income households has decreased from 61% in 1971 to 51% in 2019. During this time, the share of adults in the upper-income tier increased from 14% to 20%, and the share in the lower-income tier increased from 25% to 29%.

• Economic Inequality
• Economy & Work
• Income & Wages
• Income, Wealth & Poverty
• Personal Finances

Katherine Schaeffer is a research analyst at Pew Research Center .

1 in 10: Redefining the Asian American Dream (Short Film)

The hardships and dreams of asian americans living in poverty, a booming u.s. stock market doesn’t benefit all racial and ethnic groups equally, black americans’ views on success in the u.s., wealth surged in the pandemic, but debt endures for poorer black and hispanic families, most popular.

1615 L St. NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 USA (+1) 202-419-4300 | Main (+1) 202-857-8562 | Fax (+1) 202-419-4372 |  Media Inquiries

Research Topics

• Age & Generations
• Coronavirus (COVID-19)
• Family & Relationships
• Gender & LGBTQ
• Immigration & Migration
• International Affairs
• Internet & Technology
• Methodological Research
• News Habits & Media
• Non-U.S. Governments
• Other Topics
• Politics & Policy
• Race & Ethnicity
• Email Newsletters

ABOUT PEW RESEARCH CENTER  Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. Pew Research Center does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of  The Pew Charitable Trusts .

Copyright 2024 Pew Research Center

Economic Inequality: What It Is and How It Impacts You

There are steps Americans can take to fight economic inequality in their personal lives and communities.

What to Know About Economic Inequality

Getty Images

Wealth and income inequality have increased over the previous half-century.

It's nearly impossible to read the news these days without running across mentions of economic inequality.

In recent months, politicians have debated the merits of raising marginal tax rates on the wealthy, a move proponents say could reduce economic inequalities. Likewise, economic inequality takes center stage when columnists discuss the extreme riches of some of today's business owners, like Jeff Bezos, who could purchase every home in Austin, Texas, according to real estate brokerage Redfin . The concept of economic inequality was even discussed during the recent college admissions scandal in which celebrities and other wealthy parents allegedly paid bribes to secure college acceptance letters for their children.

So what is economic inequality, and how does it impact you? Here's what to know about this important social and financial concept.

What Is Economic Inequality?

Economic inequality is a broad term that encapsulates the gap between the income and wealth amassed by different groups in a society. Americans reference it when questioning why CEOs earn so much more than their employees or how historical and current policies have barred families of color from accumulating wealth. "Economic inequality is the more generic name and within that you could talk about income inequality and wealth inequality," says Jim Freeland, professor of business administration at Darden School of Business at the University of Virginia.

Understanding economic inequality can be complex, Freeland says. "It's not, by itself, bad," he says. "A lot of people would say, when you see (economic inequality), it's a measure that capitalism is working." But, he adds, "It's a question of: How unequal should it be? A lot of people are concerned we've gone beyond where it should be."

Indeed, wealth and income inequality have increased over the previous half-century. According to the Urban Institute , in 1963, a family in the 90th wealth percentile had about six times the wealth owned by the typical American family. This gap was relatively stable until about 1983, when it quickly widened. By 2016, a family at the 90th percentile had almost $1.2 million in wealth, more than 12 times the amount owned by the typical family.

(Courtesy of the Urban Institute)

Similarly, income inequality has risen over the past 50 years, according to the Urban Institute . The income for families near the top of the income spectrum increased by about 90 percent from 1963 to 2016. Meanwhile, the income of families at the bottom increased less than 10 percent.

While income inequality is worth considering, wealth inequality is a more revealing and comprehensive metric to understand, says Signe-Mary McKernan, co-director of the Opportunity and Ownership initiative and an economist at the Urban Institute. Income can have a powerful impact on a person's financial health and status, but the passing down of wealth through generations is a more powerful measure of opportunity and prosperity. "Wealth is important because it's where economic opportunity lies," McKernan says.

How Does Economic Inequality Impact You?

You may not be thinking about the wealth gap when buying your first home or applying for a credit card , but these economic structures have real-world impacts on your daily life.

"There's a strong correlation between economic inequality and opportunity inequality," Freeland says. An economic imbalance impacts people's abilities to climb the wealth ladder and to get ahead by working hard, he says. It can lead to geographic segregation, gaps in educational attainment and cycles of poverty. "If you can't move, it really makes you feel kind of helpless and you give up hope," he says.

Economic inequality can leave families financially vulnerable, unable to weather small financial setbacks or begin to build wealth. It can put families in financial jeopardy when a crisis such as a job loss arises, Freeland says. On a political level, he says, it can threaten democracy as a small group of elite amass political influence and control.

(Courtesy of Fabian T. Pfeffer (Inequality Lab, University of Michigan and Alexandra Killewald (Harvard University) )

How Can I Fight Back Against Economic Inequality?

It isn't easy, but there are individual and community-focused moves Americans can make to battle economic inequality in their lives and in their localities. "I think the thing that helps people do that is to reconcile that, yes, what we do personally matters, and we are within a larger construct," says Saundra Davis, a financial coach and financial behavior specialist at Sage Financial Solutions in San Francisco.

On the personal level, families at all income levels can take steps to shore up their financial stability and ability to survive financial setbacks, including taking advantage of employer-sponsored or public savings programs and safety nets.

Urban Institute's McKernan suggests funneling money into automatic savings vehicles, such as employee retirement accounts , IRAs or via automatic transfers from a checking to a savings account. "Low-income families with savings are more financially resilient than middle-income families without savings," she says.

Prioritizing access to health insurance, either through an employer or a government program, is another key way to avoid medical debt , which can be crippling for many families. While economic inequality is a broad topic, it can be helpful to tackle it head-on in your financial life. "Even if you are poor or low-income, research has shown you can build wealth," McKernan says. "It's not easy, but it's possible."

To combat economic inequality from a community-wide perspective, consider supporting policy ideas that tackle wealth inequality. Policies that improve schools, provide parenting resources and desegregate housing can combat economic inequality, Freeland says. Join programs that improve mobility and help people in need, such as tutoring disadvantaged students or coaching a community sports team. Business owners can close economic gaps when they offer support to their employees, such as paid sick leave , child care resources and paid time off, Freeland says.

McKernan points to recent policies in states such as New York and Oregon, where officials are working to launch automatic retirement plans for workers who don't have access to employer-sponsored 401(k)s. Another policy suggestion that addresses economic inequality: opportunity bonds. One proposal would give newborns a $1,000 savings account at birth, which could accrue additional deposits and interest until that child turns 18.

There may be other kinds of programs specific to your region that aim to close the wealth and income gap and limit economic inequality. Select what coincides with your values and the needs of your community. When it comes to solving economic inequality, "this is a complicated and difficult problem, so there's no one solution," Freeland says. "A whole bunch of people need to do a whole bunch of different things."

8 Ways to Tell If You're in the Middle Class

Tags: personal finance , personal budgets , wealth , inequality , money , The Racial Divide

The Best Financial Tools for You

Credit Cards

Find the Best Loan for You

Popular Stories

Family Finance

Personal Loans

Comparative assessments and other editorial opinions are those of U.S. News and have not been previously reviewed, approved or endorsed by any other entities, such as banks, credit card issuers or travel companies. The content on this page is accurate as of the posting date; however, some of our partner offers may have expired.

You May Also Like

How to be financially responsible.

Emily Sherman May 14, 2024

12 Ways to Build a Passive Income Stream

Geoff Williams May 8, 2024

12 Small Business Apps to Try This Year

Maryalene LaPonsie April 30, 2024

The 2 Months in 2024 for 3 Paychecks

Jessica Walrack April 29, 2024

TikTok's 6-to-1 Grocery Method

Erica Sandberg April 24, 2024

Personal Finance Ratios to Track

Jessica Walrack April 23, 2024

7 Tips for Starting a Side Hustle

Jessica Walrack April 18, 2024

Smart Ways to Gift Money to Children

Jessica Walrack April 8, 2024

How to File a Claim After a Disaster

Geoff Williams April 5, 2024

What Is a Personal Asset?

Erica Lamberg April 5, 2024

Am I Middle Class?

Jessica Walrack March 29, 2024

Ask a Pro: Do I Need an Estate Plan?

Brandon Renfro March 27, 2024

Boost Your Financial Literacy

Erica Sandberg March 14, 2024

March Madness Costs

Jessica Walrack March 14, 2024

Best Apps for Selling Used Stuff

Emily Sherman March 4, 2024

Legit Ways to Get Free Money 

Erica Sandberg Feb. 29, 2024

Start a Small Business 

Erica Sandberg Feb. 23, 2024

8 Business Books for Entrepreneurs

Jessica Walrack Feb. 22, 2024

Winning Strategies for Small Businesses

Erica Lamberg Feb. 22, 2024

National Issues That Impact Your Money

Erica Sandberg Feb. 21, 2024

Social Equality and Economic Growth Essay

Introduction, social equality and economic growth, works cited.

Social equality refers to a situation where all individuals in a particular society are of the same status. It is an ideal situation given that it is not practical to achieve perfect egalitarianism in any given community. The similarities in status can be regarded in terms of security, access to services offered, and equality before the law. Other aspects of this phenomenon include freedoms and property rights. Equality also means the absence of social classes. Also, it implies the absence of discrimination. All the individuals are provided with equal opportunities in life (Edsall par. 3). However, most people regard the concept is as a form of utopia. The reason is that, as already indicated, it is difficult to have such a society where all individuals have equal chances and rights.

Economic growth is closely related to social equality. It refers to a rise in market value for goods and services produced in a particular economy within a given period. In most cases, the growth is expressed as a percentage of the annual change in gross domestic product. To achieve this phenomenon, the economy must be productive. Individuals in the country must also be engaged in meaningful economic activities for growth to occur (Porter par. 9). It is for this reason that it is important for every individual to be given equal opportunities to participate in nation-building.

In this essay, I am going to analyze the relationship between social equality and economic growth. The analysis will be made in the context of an article published in the New York Times about this topic.

As already indicated, there is a close link between the two concepts. Social equality provides individuals with equal opportunities to contribute to the growth of the economy (Krugman par. 12). Such people have equal chances to be productive. Equality also ensures that the potential of the society is fully exploited to enhance the development of the entire community. However, in spite of the apparent relationship, economic growth has been cited as a major factor behind social inequalities. The rise in economic prosperity leads to the emergence of social classes, which makes it difficult to achieve equality. The reason is that the benefits of these economic developments are not accessed by all individuals equally. As a result, people have come up with divergent views concerning the link existing between the two phenomena. Two schools of thought with different views have emerged. One of the groups supports a positive relationship between the two. They feel that social equality stimulates economic growth. On their part, the other group is of the view that economic growth impedes the achievement of social equality.

Capitalism is one of the major problems that have contributed to social inequalities in society today. The concept refers to an economic system where industries, means of production, and trade are privately owned and controlled (Fung par. 22). The players involved are charged with the responsibility of setting the prices for goods, assets, and services. The practice exposes buyers to the risk of being exploited by these market players in their bid to maximize their gains. The major concern of these investors is profit margins. They are rarely concerned with the welfare of the consumers. It is noted that the group of market players is made up of a few wealthy individuals. As a result, the system is characterized by stiff competition between producers. There is also the unfettered accumulation of capital among the investors (Fung par. 22). Wealth is controlled by a few individuals who make decisions affecting millions of people. For this reason, there is a wide gap between the rich and the poor in most of the capitalist economies (Porter par. 9).

Most of the world’s economies, such as those in the United States of America and China, have adopted capitalism. The governments in such countries advocate for free trade. As a result, they have little or no control over property rights. They also lack control over the markets. To safeguard the interests of the citizens, there is a need for government to take a more proactive role in the economy. Failure to put in place control measures leaves the citizens vulnerable to economic abuse. Exploitation by capitalists may be in the form of hiked prices of goods and services and low wages for labor (Tritch par. 17).

One of the ways through which capitalism leads to the exploitation of citizens is by encouraging the emergence of monopolies (Olivo and Sullivan 31). The formation of monopolies grants the production rights to only a few individuals. Lack of competition gives these individuals the liberty to change the prices of their goods and services at will. Also, monopolies interfere with the distribution of wealth in society. Only a few individuals can accumulate assets and other forms of capital (Fung par. 22). Other potential producers are denied the opportunity to operate. As such, the economic system continues to hinder the achievement of social equality. It has led to the widening of the gap between the wealthy and the poor in society (Porter par. 9).

Factors that have aggravated the situation include the aforementioned increased inequalities between the wealthy and the poor. There is a need to provide all individuals with equal opportunities. Some economists think that promoting equality would enhance economic growth compared to a system where only a few individuals are in control of production rights (Fung par. 22). There is increasing pressure on governments to promote equality to increase social welfare (Grynbaum par. 22). It is not fair to have a few extremely wealthy individuals, while the majority of the citizens languish in poverty.

At times, the information highlighting the form of relationship between social egalitarianism and development is sketchy. Different economists view social equality from varying dimensions. Regardless of the divergent views, it is important to take into consideration what seems right and fair. Social fairness aims at redistributing wealth and resources among individuals in society (Krugman par. 12). Discrimination is significantly reduced since there would be no social classes. All individuals are accorded equal chances to contribute to the economy and benefit from the same. As a result, the per capita income for the poor is likely to rise, reducing levels of poverty.

The experts and analysts who think that equality would promote economic growth also feel that social inequality leads to wastage of human potential. For example, over 40 percent of the children living in the United States of America are from poor backgrounds (Krugman par. 12). The children are not given a chance to contribute to growth in society. On the other hand, those from affluent backgrounds receive preferential treatment. The situation means that only about 60 percent of the American children are adequately empowered to exploit the available opportunities and resources. The remaining 40 percent lack the means to produce. They often end up working for those from affluent backgrounds. Only a few of them are in a position to realize their potential after many years of struggle. As a result, these individuals are not as productive as they should be (Porter par. 9). In the process, economic growth is hindered.

Some economists think that measures to promote social equality would lead to reduced economic growth (Edsall par. 4). Such strategies include imposing taxes on the affluent in society. However, such a move is likely to hurt the economy. The reason is that individuals would make little or no returns from the services they offer and the goods they produce. As a result, wealthy individuals would lose more to taxation than they would be gaining from the economic growth expected to be brought about by social equality (Krugman par. 12). Such persons are mostly successful investors. Taxation and such other measures to address inequalities would scare away these investors, reducing the economy’s total productivity in the long run. The effects of such a move are more devastating than inequality itself.

To begin with, many individuals would lose their jobs as businesses begin to shut down. The rate of unemployment would increase, taking a toll on the economy since many individuals are rendered unproductive. Per capita income would also be considerably reduced.

I find it important to have an accurate picture of the real effects of inequalities on economic growth. As stated earlier, different economists have varying opinions concerning this issue (Edsall par. 3). The scholars have come up with brilliant explanations to support their arguments. However, the effects have not been determined quantitatively. As such, the real benefits of promoting equality are not well documented.

Different words have been used to describe and define the concept of egalitarianism. Such terms include, among others, redistribution. In such discourses, the term is used to describe the process of obtaining wealth from some individuals and indirectly giving it to the poor. However, such a strategy has its evils. The situation would mean taking from the wealthy and those from high social status what is rightfully theirs (Grynbaum par. 22). In light of this, the move is likely to encounter resistance from those persons who are considered to be of high social standing in the economy. The criterion to be used in the redistribution of wealth is also a major concern. Equality must be achieved through a specific set of standards for it to be viewed as fair and transparent. The process is also very demanding. Appropriate measures need to be put in place to ensure that the resources that have been obtained from the affluent in the society are given to deserving individuals.

I have learned that the problem of social inequality forms a cycle that is hard to break. Individuals who lack the opportunity to produce and become wealthy are not in a position to empower their children. For this reason, the issue of social inequality has become a recurrent problem. It is passed from one generation to the other. The situation means that the differences between the haves and have-nots continue to increase (Krugman par. 12). Governments and other stakeholders should address this issue with the urgency it deserves. If this does not happen, there is a likelihood that the different world economies would suffer from reduced growth due to failure to fully exploit human and other resources available. Many skills and abilities are unnoticed. As a result, they are not fully utilized. The economy has to seek for such skills from other areas, a process that increases the cost of production. In light of this, social equality would go a long way in stimulating economic growth.

Great care should be taken when promoting equality between members of the society (Edsall par. 34). The move should be implemented in such a way that it is viewed by all to be in good faith. It should be geared towards benefiting the entire society. Some may argue that equality should be in terms of opportunities and not outcomes. The statement seems realistic in terms of providing all members of society with equal opportunities. Such a strategy would not be seen to be undermining any particular group of people. In any case, it would stimulate healthy competition among individuals. Such competition is important as it spurs economic growth. It is expected that all persons would work hard for them to gain from equal opportunities availed to them.

However good the statement sounds, it is not realistic. For equality to be achieved through availing equal opportunities to all, a lot of time is required (Krugman par. 12). The approach can only be used in bringing social egalitarianism to future generations. For instance, it can be used to improve the future of 40 percent of American children brought up in poor homes. It is unrealistic to think that these individuals would have equal access to opportunities, such as education, health, and jobs, as children from rich families. The children from low-income families are also likely to drop out of school. They may not complete their college education. Individuals from both poor and wealthy backgrounds may probably be allowed to attend the same schools. However, those from low-income families may lack the capacity to settle the high charges associated with learning in such institutions.

For this reason, opportunities alone would not bring about social equality. People should be empowered to contribute to the economy and improve their living standards. Giving such people opportunities is not enough. Capital and resources are needed to exploit opportunities and ideas. The poor in society lack these important factors to enhance the quality of their life. That is one of the reasons why equality has not been achieved in society (Goltz par. 16).

Social equality would be achieved when people reap similar outcomes from the opportunities availed to them. For this reason, the statement that we should seek to achieve equality of opportunities, as opposed to fairness in outcomes, is not valid. Inequalities in outcomes are the major reasons why social egalitarianism has not been achieved in contemporary society. People cannot have equal opportunities if they are not in a position to benefit equally. As a result, there are disparities in the outcomes obtained from opportunities availed to different members of society. That is the reason why the gap between the poor and the rich continues to increase.

Edsall, Thomas 2014, Just Right Inequality . Web.

Fung, Brian 2014, Forget the 1 Percent. In the Bitcoin World, Half the Wealth Belongs to the 0.1 Percent . Web.

Goltz, Jay 2014, 10 Words Entrepreneurs should use with Caution . Web.

Grynbaum, Michael 2014, Litigant against Social Welfare Agency will be its Leader . Web.

Krugman, Paul 2014, Liberty, Equality, Efficiency . Web.

Olivo, Antonio, and Patricia Sullivan, 2014, Northern Va. Property Values, and Tax Bills, are Up- but Public Services Aren’t. Web.

Porter, Eduardo 2014, A Relentless Widening of Disparity in Wealth . Web.

Tritch, Teresa 2014, Yet more G.O.P. Hypocrisy on the Minimum Wage . Web.

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2020, May 13). Social Equality and Economic Growth. https://ivypanda.com/essays/social-equality-and-economic-growth/

"Social Equality and Economic Growth." IvyPanda , 13 May 2020, ivypanda.com/essays/social-equality-and-economic-growth/.

IvyPanda . (2020) 'Social Equality and Economic Growth'. 13 May.

IvyPanda . 2020. "Social Equality and Economic Growth." May 13, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/social-equality-and-economic-growth/.

1. IvyPanda . "Social Equality and Economic Growth." May 13, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/social-equality-and-economic-growth/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Social Equality and Economic Growth." May 13, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/social-equality-and-economic-growth/.

• Governments in "From Egalitarianism to Kleptocracy" by Diamond
• Equality or Priority in the Ideal of Equality
• Shakespeare’s Universality: Here’s Fine Revolution
• Argument Against Monogamy
• Diana Mehta: "Rape Culture" at University of Ottawa
• Weddings, Marriage, and Money in the UAE
• Breaking Social Norms in United Arab Emirates
• Aristotle's Notion of Civic Relationships

• Search Menu
• Browse content in Arts and Humanities
• Browse content in Archaeology
• Anglo-Saxon and Medieval Archaeology
• Archaeological Methodology and Techniques
• Archaeology by Region
• Archaeology of Religion
• Archaeology of Trade and Exchange
• Biblical Archaeology
• Contemporary and Public Archaeology
• Environmental Archaeology
• Historical Archaeology
• History and Theory of Archaeology
• Industrial Archaeology
• Landscape Archaeology
• Mortuary Archaeology
• Prehistoric Archaeology
• Underwater Archaeology
• Urban Archaeology
• Zooarchaeology
• Browse content in Architecture
• Architectural Structure and Design
• History of Architecture
• Residential and Domestic Buildings
• Theory of Architecture
• Browse content in Art
• Art Subjects and Themes
• History of Art
• Industrial and Commercial Art
• Theory of Art
• Biographical Studies
• Byzantine Studies
• Browse content in Classical Studies
• Classical Literature
• Classical Reception
• Classical History
• Classical Philosophy
• Classical Mythology
• Classical Art and Architecture
• Classical Oratory and Rhetoric
• Greek and Roman Archaeology
• Greek and Roman Epigraphy
• Greek and Roman Law
• Greek and Roman Papyrology
• Late Antiquity
• Religion in the Ancient World
• Digital Humanities
• Browse content in History
• Colonialism and Imperialism
• Diplomatic History
• Environmental History
• Genealogy, Heraldry, Names, and Honours
• Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing
• Historical Geography
• History by Period
• History of Agriculture
• History of Education
• History of Emotions
• History of Gender and Sexuality
• Industrial History
• Intellectual History
• International History
• Labour History
• Legal and Constitutional History
• Local and Family History
• Maritime History
• Military History
• National Liberation and Post-Colonialism
• Oral History
• Political History
• Public History
• Regional and National History
• Revolutions and Rebellions
• Slavery and Abolition of Slavery
• Social and Cultural History
• Theory, Methods, and Historiography
• Urban History
• World History
• Browse content in Language Teaching and Learning
• Language Learning (Specific Skills)
• Language Teaching Theory and Methods
• Browse content in Linguistics
• Applied Linguistics
• Cognitive Linguistics
• Computational Linguistics
• Forensic Linguistics
• Grammar, Syntax and Morphology
• Historical and Diachronic Linguistics
• History of English
• Language Variation
• Language Families
• Language Acquisition
• Language Evolution
• Language Reference
• Lexicography
• Linguistic Theories
• Linguistic Typology
• Linguistic Anthropology
• Phonetics and Phonology
• Psycholinguistics
• Sociolinguistics
• Translation and Interpretation
• Writing Systems
• Browse content in Literature
• Bibliography
• Children's Literature Studies
• Literary Studies (Modernism)
• Literary Studies (Asian)
• Literary Studies (European)
• Literary Studies (Eco-criticism)
• Literary Studies (Romanticism)
• Literary Studies (American)
• Literary Studies - World
• Literary Studies (1500 to 1800)
• Literary Studies (19th Century)
• Literary Studies (20th Century onwards)
• Literary Studies (African American Literature)
• Literary Studies (British and Irish)
• Literary Studies (Early and Medieval)
• Literary Studies (Fiction, Novelists, and Prose Writers)
• Literary Studies (Gender Studies)
• Literary Studies (Graphic Novels)
• Literary Studies (History of the Book)
• Literary Studies (Plays and Playwrights)
• Literary Studies (Poetry and Poets)
• Literary Studies (Postcolonial Literature)
• Literary Studies (Queer Studies)
• Literary Studies (Science Fiction)
• Literary Studies (Travel Literature)
• Literary Studies (War Literature)
• Literary Studies (Women's Writing)
• Literary Theory and Cultural Studies
• Mythology and Folklore
• Shakespeare Studies and Criticism
• Browse content in Media Studies
• Browse content in Music
• Applied Music
• Dance and Music
• Ethics in Music
• Ethnomusicology
• Gender and Sexuality in Music
• Medicine and Music
• Music Cultures
• Music and Culture
• Music and Religion
• Music and Media
• Music Education and Pedagogy
• Music Theory and Analysis
• Musical Scores, Lyrics, and Libretti
• Musical Structures, Styles, and Techniques
• Musicology and Music History
• Performance Practice and Studies
• Race and Ethnicity in Music
• Sound Studies
• Browse content in Performing Arts
• Browse content in Philosophy
• Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
• Epistemology
• Feminist Philosophy
• History of Western Philosophy
• Metaphysics
• Moral Philosophy
• Non-Western Philosophy
• Philosophy of Action
• Philosophy of Law
• Philosophy of Religion
• Philosophy of Science
• Philosophy of Language
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Perception
• Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
• Practical Ethics
• Social and Political Philosophy
• Browse content in Religion
• Biblical Studies
• Christianity
• East Asian Religions
• History of Religion
• Judaism and Jewish Studies
• Qumran Studies
• Religion and Education
• Religion and Health
• Religion and Politics
• Religion and Science
• Religion and Law
• Religion and Art, Literature, and Music
• Religious Studies
• Browse content in Society and Culture
• Cookery, Food, and Drink
• Cultural Studies
• Customs and Traditions
• Ethical Issues and Debates
• Hobbies, Games, Arts and Crafts
• Lifestyle, Home, and Garden
• Natural world, Country Life, and Pets
• Popular Beliefs and Controversial Knowledge
• Sports and Outdoor Recreation
• Technology and Society
• Travel and Holiday
• Visual Culture
• Browse content in Law
• Arbitration
• Browse content in Company and Commercial Law
• Commercial Law
• Company Law
• Browse content in Comparative Law
• Systems of Law
• Competition Law
• Browse content in Constitutional and Administrative Law
• Government Powers
• Judicial Review
• Local Government Law
• Military and Defence Law
• Parliamentary and Legislative Practice
• Construction Law
• Contract Law
• Browse content in Criminal Law
• Criminal Procedure
• Criminal Evidence Law
• Sentencing and Punishment
• Employment and Labour Law
• Environment and Energy Law
• Browse content in Financial Law
• Banking Law
• Insolvency Law
• History of Law
• Human Rights and Immigration
• Intellectual Property Law
• Browse content in International Law
• Private International Law and Conflict of Laws
• Public International Law
• IT and Communications Law
• Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
• Law and Society
• Law and Politics
• Browse content in Legal System and Practice
• Courts and Procedure
• Legal Skills and Practice
• Primary Sources of Law
• Regulation of Legal Profession
• Medical and Healthcare Law
• Browse content in Policing
• Criminal Investigation and Detection
• Police and Security Services
• Police Procedure and Law
• Police Regional Planning
• Browse content in Property Law
• Personal Property Law
• Study and Revision
• Terrorism and National Security Law
• Browse content in Trusts Law
• Wills and Probate or Succession
• Browse content in Medicine and Health
• Browse content in Allied Health Professions
• Arts Therapies
• Clinical Science
• Dietetics and Nutrition
• Occupational Therapy
• Operating Department Practice
• Physiotherapy
• Radiography
• Speech and Language Therapy
• Browse content in Anaesthetics
• General Anaesthesia
• Neuroanaesthesia
• Browse content in Clinical Medicine
• Acute Medicine
• Cardiovascular Medicine
• Clinical Genetics
• Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics
• Dermatology
• Endocrinology and Diabetes
• Gastroenterology
• Genito-urinary Medicine
• Geriatric Medicine
• Infectious Diseases
• Medical Oncology
• Medical Toxicology
• Pain Medicine
• Palliative Medicine
• Rehabilitation Medicine
• Respiratory Medicine and Pulmonology
• Rheumatology
• Sleep Medicine
• Sports and Exercise Medicine
• Clinical Neuroscience
• Community Medical Services
• Critical Care
• Emergency Medicine
• Forensic Medicine
• Haematology
• History of Medicine
• Medical Ethics
• Browse content in Medical Dentistry
• Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery
• Paediatric Dentistry
• Restorative Dentistry and Orthodontics
• Surgical Dentistry
• Browse content in Medical Skills
• Clinical Skills
• Communication Skills
• Nursing Skills
• Surgical Skills
• Medical Statistics and Methodology
• Browse content in Neurology
• Clinical Neurophysiology
• Neuropathology
• Nursing Studies
• Browse content in Obstetrics and Gynaecology
• Gynaecology
• Occupational Medicine
• Ophthalmology
• Otolaryngology (ENT)
• Browse content in Paediatrics
• Neonatology
• Browse content in Pathology
• Chemical Pathology
• Clinical Cytogenetics and Molecular Genetics
• Histopathology
• Medical Microbiology and Virology
• Patient Education and Information
• Browse content in Pharmacology
• Psychopharmacology
• Browse content in Popular Health
• Caring for Others
• Complementary and Alternative Medicine
• Self-help and Personal Development
• Browse content in Preclinical Medicine
• Cell Biology
• Molecular Biology and Genetics
• Reproduction, Growth and Development
• Primary Care
• Professional Development in Medicine
• Browse content in Psychiatry
• Addiction Medicine
• Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
• Forensic Psychiatry
• Learning Disabilities
• Old Age Psychiatry
• Psychotherapy
• Browse content in Public Health and Epidemiology
• Epidemiology
• Public Health
• Browse content in Radiology
• Clinical Radiology
• Interventional Radiology
• Nuclear Medicine
• Radiation Oncology
• Reproductive Medicine
• Browse content in Surgery
• Cardiothoracic Surgery
• Gastro-intestinal and Colorectal Surgery
• General Surgery
• Neurosurgery
• Paediatric Surgery
• Peri-operative Care
• Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
• Surgical Oncology
• Transplant Surgery
• Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery
• Vascular Surgery
• Browse content in Science and Mathematics
• Browse content in Biological Sciences
• Aquatic Biology
• Biochemistry
• Bioinformatics and Computational Biology
• Developmental Biology
• Ecology and Conservation
• Evolutionary Biology
• Genetics and Genomics
• Microbiology
• Molecular and Cell Biology
• Natural History
• Plant Sciences and Forestry
• Research Methods in Life Sciences
• Structural Biology
• Systems Biology
• Zoology and Animal Sciences
• Browse content in Chemistry
• Analytical Chemistry
• Computational Chemistry
• Crystallography
• Environmental Chemistry
• Industrial Chemistry
• Inorganic Chemistry
• Materials Chemistry
• Medicinal Chemistry
• Mineralogy and Gems
• Organic Chemistry
• Physical Chemistry
• Polymer Chemistry
• Study and Communication Skills in Chemistry
• Theoretical Chemistry
• Browse content in Computer Science
• Artificial Intelligence
• Computer Architecture and Logic Design
• Game Studies
• Human-Computer Interaction
• Mathematical Theory of Computation
• Programming Languages
• Software Engineering
• Systems Analysis and Design
• Virtual Reality
• Browse content in Computing
• Business Applications
• Computer Games
• Computer Security
• Computer Networking and Communications
• Digital Lifestyle
• Graphical and Digital Media Applications
• Operating Systems
• Browse content in Earth Sciences and Geography
• Atmospheric Sciences
• Environmental Geography
• Geology and the Lithosphere
• Maps and Map-making
• Meteorology and Climatology
• Oceanography and Hydrology
• Palaeontology
• Physical Geography and Topography
• Regional Geography
• Soil Science
• Urban Geography
• Browse content in Engineering and Technology
• Agriculture and Farming
• Biological Engineering
• Civil Engineering, Surveying, and Building
• Electronics and Communications Engineering
• Energy Technology
• Engineering (General)
• Environmental Science, Engineering, and Technology
• History of Engineering and Technology
• Mechanical Engineering and Materials
• Technology of Industrial Chemistry
• Transport Technology and Trades
• Browse content in Environmental Science
• Applied Ecology (Environmental Science)
• Conservation of the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Environmental Sustainability
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Environmental Science)
• Management of Land and Natural Resources (Environmental Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environmental Science)
• Nuclear Issues (Environmental Science)
• Pollution and Threats to the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Environmental Science)
• History of Science and Technology
• Browse content in Materials Science
• Ceramics and Glasses
• Composite Materials
• Metals, Alloying, and Corrosion
• Nanotechnology
• Browse content in Mathematics
• Applied Mathematics
• Biomathematics and Statistics
• History of Mathematics
• Mathematical Education
• Mathematical Finance
• Mathematical Analysis
• Numerical and Computational Mathematics
• Probability and Statistics
• Pure Mathematics
• Browse content in Neuroscience
• Cognition and Behavioural Neuroscience
• Development of the Nervous System
• Disorders of the Nervous System
• History of Neuroscience
• Invertebrate Neurobiology
• Molecular and Cellular Systems
• Neuroendocrinology and Autonomic Nervous System
• Neuroscientific Techniques
• Sensory and Motor Systems
• Browse content in Physics
• Astronomy and Astrophysics
• Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
• Biological and Medical Physics
• Classical Mechanics
• Computational Physics
• Condensed Matter Physics
• Electromagnetism, Optics, and Acoustics
• History of Physics
• Mathematical and Statistical Physics
• Measurement Science
• Nuclear Physics
• Particles and Fields
• Plasma Physics
• Quantum Physics
• Relativity and Gravitation
• Semiconductor and Mesoscopic Physics
• Browse content in Psychology
• Affective Sciences
• Clinical Psychology
• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Cognitive Psychology
• Criminal and Forensic Psychology
• Developmental Psychology
• Educational Psychology
• Evolutionary Psychology
• Health Psychology
• History and Systems in Psychology
• Music Psychology
• Neuropsychology
• Organizational Psychology
• Psychological Assessment and Testing
• Psychology of Human-Technology Interaction
• Psychology Professional Development and Training
• Research Methods in Psychology
• Social Psychology
• Browse content in Social Sciences
• Browse content in Anthropology
• Anthropology of Religion
• Human Evolution
• Medical Anthropology
• Physical Anthropology
• Regional Anthropology
• Social and Cultural Anthropology
• Theory and Practice of Anthropology
• Browse content in Business and Management
• Business History
• Business Strategy
• Business Ethics
• Business and Government
• Business and Technology
• Business and the Environment
• Comparative Management
• Corporate Governance
• Corporate Social Responsibility
• Entrepreneurship
• Health Management
• Human Resource Management
• Industrial and Employment Relations
• Industry Studies
• Information and Communication Technologies
• International Business
• Knowledge Management
• Management and Management Techniques
• Operations Management
• Organizational Theory and Behaviour
• Pensions and Pension Management
• Public and Nonprofit Management
• Strategic Management
• Supply Chain Management
• Browse content in Criminology and Criminal Justice
• Criminal Justice
• Criminology
• Forms of Crime
• International and Comparative Criminology
• Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice
• Development Studies
• Browse content in Economics
• Agricultural, Environmental, and Natural Resource Economics
• Asian Economics
• Behavioural Finance
• Behavioural Economics and Neuroeconomics
• Econometrics and Mathematical Economics
• Economic Methodology
• Economic Systems
• Economic History
• Economic Development and Growth
• Financial Markets
• Financial Institutions and Services
• General Economics and Teaching
• Health, Education, and Welfare
• History of Economic Thought
• International Economics
• Labour and Demographic Economics
• Law and Economics
• Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
• Microeconomics
• Public Economics
• Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
• Welfare Economics
• Browse content in Education
• Adult Education and Continuous Learning
• Care and Counselling of Students
• Early Childhood and Elementary Education
• Educational Equipment and Technology
• Educational Strategies and Policy
• Higher and Further Education
• Organization and Management of Education
• Philosophy and Theory of Education
• Schools Studies
• Secondary Education
• Teaching of a Specific Subject
• Teaching of Specific Groups and Special Educational Needs
• Teaching Skills and Techniques
• Browse content in Environment
• Applied Ecology (Social Science)
• Climate Change
• Conservation of the Environment (Social Science)
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Social Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environment)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Social Science)
• Browse content in Human Geography
• Cultural Geography
• Economic Geography
• Political Geography
• Browse content in Interdisciplinary Studies
• Communication Studies
• Museums, Libraries, and Information Sciences
• Browse content in Politics
• African Politics
• Asian Politics
• Chinese Politics
• Comparative Politics
• Conflict Politics
• Elections and Electoral Studies
• Environmental Politics
• European Union
• Foreign Policy
• Gender and Politics
• Human Rights and Politics
• Indian Politics
• International Relations
• International Organization (Politics)
• International Political Economy
• Irish Politics
• Latin American Politics
• Middle Eastern Politics
• Political Theory
• Political Methodology
• Political Communication
• Political Philosophy
• Political Sociology
• Political Behaviour
• Political Economy
• Political Institutions
• Politics and Law
• Public Administration
• Public Policy
• Quantitative Political Methodology
• Regional Political Studies
• Russian Politics
• Security Studies
• State and Local Government
• UK Politics
• US Politics
• Browse content in Regional and Area Studies
• African Studies
• Asian Studies
• East Asian Studies
• Japanese Studies
• Latin American Studies
• Middle Eastern Studies
• Native American Studies
• Scottish Studies
• Browse content in Research and Information
• Research Methods
• Browse content in Social Work
• Addictions and Substance Misuse
• Adoption and Fostering
• Care of the Elderly
• Child and Adolescent Social Work
• Couple and Family Social Work
• Developmental and Physical Disabilities Social Work
• Direct Practice and Clinical Social Work
• Emergency Services
• Human Behaviour and the Social Environment
• International and Global Issues in Social Work
• Mental and Behavioural Health
• Social Justice and Human Rights
• Social Policy and Advocacy
• Social Work and Crime and Justice
• Social Work Macro Practice
• Social Work Practice Settings
• Social Work Research and Evidence-based Practice
• Welfare and Benefit Systems
• Browse content in Sociology
• Childhood Studies
• Community Development
• Comparative and Historical Sociology
• Economic Sociology
• Gender and Sexuality
• Gerontology and Ageing
• Health, Illness, and Medicine
• Marriage and the Family
• Migration Studies
• Occupations, Professions, and Work
• Organizations
• Population and Demography
• Race and Ethnicity
• Social Theory
• Social Movements and Social Change
• Social Research and Statistics
• Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
• Sociology of Religion
• Sociology of Education
• Sport and Leisure
• Urban and Rural Studies
• Browse content in Warfare and Defence
• Defence Strategy, Planning, and Research
• Land Forces and Warfare
• Military Administration
• Military Life and Institutions
• Naval Forces and Warfare
• Other Warfare and Defence Issues
• Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
• Weapons and Equipment

• < Previous chapter
• Next chapter >

5 Freedom and Equality

Elizabeth Anderson is Arthur F. Thurnau Professor and John Dewey Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

• Published: 05 October 2016
• Cite Icon Cite
• Permissions Icon Permissions

Freedom and equality are often viewed as conflicting values. But there are at least three conceptions of freedom-negative, positive, and republican-and three conceptions of equality-of standing, esteem, and authority. Libertarians argue that rights to negative liberty override claims to positive liberty. However, a freedom-based defense of private property rights must favor positive over negative freedom. Furthermore, a regime of full contractual alienability of rights-on the priority of negative over republican freedom-is an unstable basis for a free society. To sustain a free society over time, republican liberty must take priority over negative liberty, resulting in a kind of authority egalitarianism. Finally, the chapter discusses how the values of freedom and equality bear on the definition of property rights. The result is a qualified defense of some core features of social democratic orders.

Freedom and equality are typically presented as opposing values. In the quick version of the argument, economic liberty—the freedom to make contracts, acquire property, and exchange goods—upsets substantive economic equality ( Nozick, 2013 : 160–164). Suppose some people sail to an uninhabited island and divide its territory and the provisions they brought into shares of equal value. If they are free to produce, trade, and accumulate property, some would rapidly get richer than others due to good luck and good choices, while others would become poor due to bad luck and bad choices. Any attempt to enforce strict material equality across large populations under modern economic conditions would require a totalitarian state. Gracchus Babeuf, a radical of the French Revolution, and the first modern advocate of strict material equality under state communism, understood this perfectly. He saw that the only way to ensure strict material equality was for the state to run society like an army—to control all property and production, assign everyone to their jobs, and control everyone’s thoughts (lest some get the ideas that they deserve more than others, or that they should be free to choose their own way of life) ( Babeuf, 1967 ; Buonarroti, 1836 ). He thought such equality was worth the sacrifice of freedom. Few who have actually lived under communism agree.

While the quick argument is true and of great historical importance, it does not address moderate types of egalitarianism. Virtually no one today advocates strict material equality. Social democrats, particularly in northern Europe, embraced private property and extensive markets well before the collapse of communism. Friedrich Hayek (1944) argued that social democratic experiments would lead societies down the slippery slope to totalitarianism. His prediction failed: moderate egalitarianism of the social democratic type has proved compatible with democracy, extensive civil liberties, and substantial if constrained market freedoms.

To make progress on the question of normative trade-offs between freedom and equality within the range of options for political economy credibly on the table, we must clarify our concepts. There are at least three conceptions of freedom—negative, positive, and republican—and three conceptions of equality—of standing, esteem, and authority. Republican freedom requires extensive authority egalitarianism. To block arguments that freedom requires substantial material equality, libertarians typically argue that rights to negative liberty override or constrain claims to positive liberty. This chapter will argue that, to the extent that libertarians want to support private property rights in terms of the importance of freedom to individuals, this strategy fails, because the freedom-based defense of private property rights depends on giving priority to positive or republican over negative freedom. Next, it is argued that the core rationale for inalienable rights depends on considerations of republican freedom. A regime of full contractual alienability of rights—on the priority of negative over republican freedom—is an unstable basis for a free society. It tends to shrink the domains in which individuals interact as free and independent persons, and expand the domains in which they interact on terms of domination and subordination. To sustain a free society over time, we should accept the priority of republican over negative liberty. This is to endorse a kind of authority egalitarianism. The chapter concludes with some reflections on how the values of freedom and equality bear on the definition of property rights. The result will be a qualified defense of some core features of social democratic orders.

1. Conceptions of Freedom and Equality

Let us distinguish three conceptions of freedom: negative freedom (noninterference), positive freedom (opportunities), and republican freedom (nondomination). Sarah has negative freedom if no one interferes with her actions. She has positive freedom if she has a rich set of opportunities effectively accessible to her. She has republican freedom if she is not dominated by another person—not subject to another’s arbitrary and unaccountable will.

These three conceptions of freedom are logically distinct. They are also somewhat causally independent: one can enjoy high degrees of any two of these freedoms at substantial cost to the third. Lakshmi could have perfect negative and republican freedom on an island in which she is the only inhabitant. No one else would be interfering with her actions or dominating her. She would have little positive freedom, however, since most opportunities are generated in society with others. Maria could have high degrees of negative and positive freedom while lacking republican freedom. She could be the favorite of an indulgent king, who showers her with wealth and privileges, and permits her to say and do what she likes—but who could throw her in his dungeon at his whim. Finally, Sven could have high degrees of positive and republican freedom while being subject to many constraints on his negative liberty. He could reside in an advanced social democratic state such as Norway, where interpersonal authority is constrained by the rule of law (so he is not subject to anyone’s arbitrary will), and a rich set of opportunities is available to all, at the cost of substantial negative liberty constraints through high levels of taxation and economic regulation.

Traditionally, most discussions of freedom focused on the contrast between negative and positive freedom. The recent revival of the republican conception of freedom as nondomination adds an important dimension to thinking about the lived experience of unfreedom and the social conditions of freedom. Pettit (1997 : 22–25) stresses the contrast between negative and republican freedom in the case where a dominator could but chooses not to interfere with subordinates. He argues that such vulnerability to interference can make subordinates submissive, self-censoring, and sycophantic toward their superiors. It is also important to consider some differences between negative liberty constraints imposed by a dominating power and those imposed in accordance with the rule of law by a liberal democratic authority. Domination is often personal: think of the husband under the law of coverture or the violent husband today, the slaveholder, the bullying, micromanaging boss. Rule-of-law constraints are impersonal and of general applicability. This arm’s-length character of the rule of law often relieves people of the humiliation of submission to domination, since they know “it’s not about me.” Dominating interference can arrive unannounced. Rule-of-law constraints must be publicized in advance, giving people time to figure out how to pursue their projects in ways that avoid interference. Dominating interference does not have to justify itself. Rule-of-law constraints in a liberal democratic order must appeal to public reasons, which limits the constraints that can be imposed. Dominating interference is unaccountable. Applied rule-of-law constraints in a democracy are subject to appeal before an impartial adjudicator, and those who enact them can be removed from power by those to whom the constraints apply.

These remarks apply to ideal types only. Actually existing formally liberal democratic regimes have devised innumerable ways to exercise domination under the guise of the rule of law. It is possible to devise a set of impersonal, generally applicable, publicized laws that regulate conduct so minutely that almost anyone innocently going about their business could be found to have run afoul of one of them. Such is the case with traffic laws in the United States. If enforcement action on the trivial infringements were limited to mere warnings or token fines, as in police stops to warn drivers that their tail lights are broken, they could be a service to the drivers and others on the road. Often, however, such traffic stops are a mere pretext for police exercise of arbitrary power to harass, intimidate, invade privacy, and seize people’s property without due process of law. 1 In other cases, impersonal rule-of-law regulations impose constraints so out of touch with local conditions, with such draconian penalties for noncompliance, that enforcement amounts to domination. Such is the case with the high-stakes testing regime imposed by the federal government under No Child Left Behind, with uniform arbitrary progress goals foisted on local school districts without any empirical research demonstrating that these goals were feasible. In some cases, the NCLB regime has created a culture of intimidation and cheating ( Aviv, 2014 ). This is a centralized planning regime akin to the five-year plans of communist states. In both cases, the imposition of goals plucked out of thin air in combination with severe sanctions is premised on the assumption that lack of sufficient will is the primary obstacle to progress—an assumption that rationalizes domination of those required to meet the goals.

We should be skeptical of attempts to operationalize the conditions for nondomination in formal terms. Powerful agents are constantly devising ways to skirt around formal constraints to dominate others. Republican freedom is a sociologically complex condition not easily encapsulated in any simple set of necessary and sufficient conditions, nor easily realized through any particular set of laws.

Turn now to equality. In other work, I have argued that the conceptions of equality relevant for political purposes are relational: they characterize the types of social relations in which members of society stand to one another ( Anderson, 2012b ; Anderson, 2012a ). Relational equality is opposed to social hierarchy. Three types of hierarchy—of standing, esteem, and authority—are particularly important. In hierarchies of standing, agents (including the state) count the interests of superiors highly, and the interests of inferiors for little or nothing. In hierarchies of esteem, some groups monopolize esteem and stigmatize their inferiors. In hierarchies of authority, dominant agents issue arbitrary and unaccountable commands to subordinates, who must obey on pain of sanctions. Egalitarians oppose such hierarchies and aim to replace them with institutions in which persons relate to one another as equals. For example, they want members of society to be treated as equals by the state and in institutions of civil society (standing); to be recognized as bearing equal dignity and respect (esteem); to have equal votes and access to political participation in democratic states (authority). Each of these conceptions of relational equality is complex and implicates numerous features of the social setting.

These three types of hierarchy usually reinforce each other. Groups that exercise power over others tend to enjoy higher esteem, and often use their power to exact special solicitude for their interests from others. Sometimes they come apart. Upper-class married women under the law of coverture enjoyed high esteem and standing, but had little authority and were subordinate to their husbands and to men generally. Some ethnic minorities, such as Chinese Malaysians, enjoy high standing and authority through their ownership and control of most businesses in Malaysia, but are racially stigmatized in Malaysian society.

Given this array of distinct conceptions of freedom and equality, it is harder to argue that freedom and equality are structurally opposed. There is a deep affinity between republican freedom as nondomination and authority egalitarianism. These are not conceptually identical. Domination can be realized in an isolated, transient interpersonal case (consider a kidnapper and his victim). Authoritarian hierarchy is institutionalized, enduring, and group-based. Yet authority hierarchies cause the most important infringements of republican freedom. Historically, the radical republican tradition, from the Levellers to the radical wing of the Republican party through Reconstruction, saw the two causes of freedom and equality as united: to be free was to not be subject to the arbitrary will of others. This required elimination of the authoritarian powers of dominant classes, whether of the king, feudal landlords, or slaveholders. Republican freedom for all is incompatible with authoritarian hierarchy and hence requires some form of authority egalitarianism.

Authority egalitarianism so dominates public discourse in contemporary liberal democracies that few people openly reject it. However, conservatives have traditionally supported authority hierarchy, and continue to do so today, while often publicizing their views in other terms. For example, conservatives tend to defend expansive discretionary powers of police over suspects and employers over workers, as well as policies that reinforce race, class, and gender hierarchies, such as restrictions on voting, reproductive freedom, and access to the courts.

The connections between relational equality and conventional ideas of equality in terms of the distribution of income and wealth are mainly causal. Esteem egalitarians worry that great economic inequality will cause the poor to be stigmatized and the rich glorified simply for their wealth. Authority egalitarians worry that too much wealth inequality empowers the rich to turn the state into a plutocracy. This radical republican objection to wealth inequality is distinct from contemporary notions of distributive justice, which focus on the ideas that unequal distributions are unfair, and that redistribution can enhance the consumption opportunities of the less well off. 2 The latter notions are the concern of standing egalitarianism. Concern for distributive justice—specifically, how the rules that determine the fair division of gains from social cooperation should be designed—can be cast in terms of the question: what rules would free people of equal standing choose, with an eye to also sustaining their equal social relations? The concern to choose principles that sustain relations of equal standing is partly causal and partly constitutive. In a contractualist framework, principles of distributive justice for economic goods constrain the choice of regulative rules of property, contract, the system of money and banking, and so forth, and do not directly determine outcomes ( Rawls, 1999 : 47–49, 73–76). From this point of view, certain principles, such as equality of rights to own property and make contracts, are constitutive of equal standing.

Absent from this list of conceptions of equality is any notion of equality considered as a bare pattern in the distribution of goods, independent of how those goods were brought about, the social relations through which they came to be possessed, or the social relations they tend to cause. Some people think that it is a bad thing if one person is worse off than another due to sheer luck ( Arneson, 2000 ; Temkin, 2003 ). I do not share this intuition. Suppose a temperamentally happy baby is born, and then another is born that is even happier. The first is now worse off than the second, through sheer luck. This fact is no injustice and harms no one’s interests. Nor does it make the world a worse place. Even if it did, it would still be irrelevant in a liberal political order, as concern for the value of the world apart from any connection to human welfare, interests, or freedom fails even the most lax standard of liberal neutrality.

2. A Freedom-based Justification of Property Must Favor Positive or Republican over Negative Freedom

The conventional debate about freedom and distributive equality is cast in terms of the relative priority of negative and positive freedom. If negative liberty, as embodied in property rights, trumps positive freedom, then taxation for purposes of redistribution of income and wealth is unjust ( Nozick, 2013 : 30–34, 172–173; Mack, 2009 ).

One way to motivate the priority of negative freedom is to stress the normative difference between constraints against infringing others’ liberties, which do not require anyone to do anything (merely to refrain from acting in certain ways), and positive requirements to supply others with goods, which carry the taint of forced labor. This argument applies at most to taxation of labor income. Nozick (2013 : 169) tacitly acknowledged this point in claiming that “Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor” (emphasis added). People receive passive income (such as interest, mineral royalties, capital gains, land rents, and bequests) without lifting a finger, so taxation of or limitations on such income does not amount to forcing them to work for others. Such taxation is the traditional left-libertarian strategy for pursuing distributive equality consistent with negative liberty constraints. Land and natural resource taxes can be justified in Lockean terms, as respecting the property rights in the commons of those who lost access to privately appropriated land. Paine’s classic version of this argument (1796) claims that Lockean property rights should be unbundled: just appropriation entitles owners to use the land and exclude others, but not to 100 percent of the income from land rents. Citizens generally retain rights to part of that income stream. This grounds a moderate egalitarianism without resort to the extravagant premises needed to support a more demanding distributive equality in libertarian terms, as for instance in Otsuka (1998) .

Arguments for the priority of negative over positive freedom with respect to property rights run into more fundamental difficulties. A regime of perfect negative freedom with respect to property is one of Hohfeldian privileges only, not of rights. 3 A negative liberty is a privilege to act in some way without state interference or liability for damages to another for the way one acts. The correlate to A’s privilege is that others lack any right to demand state assistance in constraining A’s liberty to act in that way. There is nothing conceptually incoherent in a situation where multiple persons have a privilege with respect to the same rival good: consider the rules of basketball, which permit members of either team to compete for possession of the ball, and even to “steal” the ball from opponents. If the other team exercises its liberty to steal the ball, the original possessor cannot appeal to the referee to get it back.

No sound argument for a regime of property rights can rely on considerations of negative liberty alone. Rights entail that others have correlative duties. To have a property right to something is to have a claim against others, enforceable by the state, that they not act in particular ways with respect to that thing. Property rights, by definition, are massive constraints on negative liberty: to secure the right of a single individual owner to some property, the negative liberty of everyone else—billions of people—must be constrained. Judged by a metric of negative liberty alone, recognition of property rights inherently amounts to a massive net loss of total negative freedom. The argument applies equally well to rights in one’s person, showing again the inability of considerations of negative liberty alone to ground rights. “It is impossible to create rights, to impose obligations, to protect the person, life, reputation, property, subsistence, or liberty itself, but at the expense of liberty” ( Bentham, 1838–1843 : I.1, 301).

What could justify this gigantic net loss of negative liberty? If we want to defend this loss as a net gain in overall freedom, we must do so by appealing to one of the other conceptions of freedom—positive freedom, or republican freedom. Excellent arguments can be provided to defend private property rights in terms of positive freedom. Someone who has invested their labor in some external good with the aim of creating something worth more than the original raw materials has a vital interest in assurance that they will have effective access to this good in the future. Such assurance requires the state’s assistance in securing that good against others’ negative liberty interest in taking possession of it. To have a claim to the state’s assistance in securing effective access to a good, against others’ negative liberty interests in it, is to have a right to positive freedom .

Considerations of republican freedom also supply excellent arguments for private property. In a system of privileges alone, contests over possession of external objects would be settled in the interests of the stronger parties. Because individuals need access to external goods to survive, the stronger could then condition others’ access on their subjection to the possessors’ arbitrary will. Only a system of private property rights can protect the weaker from domination by the stronger. The republican argument for rights in one’s own body follows even more immediately from such considerations, since to be an object of others’ possession is per se to be dominated by them.

Thus, there are impeccable freedom-based arguments for individual property rights. But they depend on treating individuals’ interests in either positive or republican freedom as overriding others’ negative liberty interests. Against this, libertarians such as Nozick could argue that the proper conception of negative liberty is a moralized one, such that interference with others’ negative freedom does not count as an infringement of liberty unless it is unjust . Such a moralized view of liberty is implicit in Nozick’s moralized accounts of coercion and voluntariness (1969: 450; 2013: 262–263). Hence, no genuine sacrifice of others’ negative liberty is involved in establishing a just system of property rights.

In response, we must consider what could justify claims to negative liberty rights in property. The problem arises with special clarity once we consider the pervasiveness of prima facie conflicts of property rights, as in cases of externalities settled by tort law or land use regulation. Whenever prima facie negative liberty rights conflict, we must decide between them either by weighing their value in terms of non-liberty considerations, or in terms of some other conception of freedom—positive or republican. If we appeal to considerations other than freedom, we treat freedom as subordinate to other values. For example, desert-based arguments for property rights, which point to the fact that the individual created the object of property, or added value to it through their labor—treat freedom as subordinate to the social goal of rewarding people according to their just deserts. Similarly, Nozick’s resolution of conflicting claims in terms of a moralized notion of negative liberty covertly imports utilitarian considerations to do the needed normative work ( Fried, 2011 ). To base the justification of property rights on considerations of freedom itself, we must regard freedom as a value or interest and not immediately as a right. That is, we must regard freedom as a nonmoralized consideration. Otherwise we have no basis in freedom for justifying property rights or resolving property disputes when uses of property conflict.

A contractualist framework can offer a freedom-based justification of private property rights that departs from libertarian premises. In this picture, the principles of right are whatever principles persons would rationally choose (or could not reasonably reject) to govern their interpersonal claims, given that they are, and understand themselves to be, free and equal in relation to one another. If they chose a regime of privileges only, this would amount to anarchist communism, in which the world is an unregulated commons. Such a regime would lead to depleted commons—razed forests, extinct game, destroyed fisheries. It would also give everyone a greater incentive to take what others produced than to produce themselves. Few would invest their labor in external things, everyone would be poor, and meaningful opportunities would be rare. By contrast, adoption of an institutional scheme of extensive private property rights, including broad freedoms of exchange and contract, would create vastly richer opportunities for peaceful and cooperative production on terms of mutual freedom and equality. All have an overwhelming common interest in sustaining an institutional infrastructure of private property rights that generates more positive freedom —better opportunities—for all.

This argument justifies rights to negative freedom with respect to external property in terms of positive freedom. It does not suppose, as libertarian arguments do, that the liberty interests of the individual override the common interest. Rather, it claims that people have a common interest in sustaining a regime of individual rights to property. On this view, individual rights are not justified by the weight of the individual interest they protect, but by the fact that everyone has a common interest in relating to each other through a shared infrastructure of individual rights ( Raz, 1994 ). The infrastructure of private property rights is a public good, justified by its promotion of opportunities—of positive freedom—for all. A well-designed infrastructure provides a framework within which individuals can relate to one another as free and equal persons.

So far, the argument is one of evaluative priority only. It has been argued that if one wants to justify private property rights in terms of freedom, one must grant evaluative priority to positive or republican over negative freedom. Discussion of the implications of this argument for the content of a just scheme of private property rights—to whether a just scheme would look more libertarian, or more egalitarian—will be postponed to the last section of this chapter.

3. Republican Freedom and the Justification of Inalienable Rights

If negative freedom were the only conception of freedom, it would be difficult to offer a freedom-based justification of inalienable rights. If Sarah’s right is inalienable, then she is immune from anyone changing her right. This could look attractive, except that it entails that she is disabled from changing her own right—that she lacks the power to waive others’ correlative duties to respect that right ( Hohfeld, 1913–1914 : 44–45, 55). This is a constraint on her higher-order negative liberty. This liberty is higher-order because it concerns not the liberty to exercise the right, but the liberty over the right itself.

Inalienable rights might also leave the individual with an inferior set of positive freedoms than if her rights are alienable. Contracts involve an exchange of rights. There is a general presumption that voluntary and informed contracts produce gains for both sides. To make Sarah’s right inalienable prevents her from exchanging it for rights she values more, and thereby reduces her opportunities or positive freedom.

However, there are strategic contexts in which individuals can get much better opportunities if some of their rights are inalienable ( Dworkin, 1982 : 55–56). In urgent situations, when one party cannot hold out for better terms, the other can exploit that fact and offer terms that are much worse than what they would otherwise be willing to offer. Peter, seeing Michelle drowning, might condition his tossing her a life ring on her agreeing to become his slave, if her rights in herself were fully alienable. But if she had an inalienable right to self-ownership, Peter could not exploit her desperation to subject her to slavery, but would offer her better terms.

Such considerations leave libertarians torn between accepting and rejecting the validity of voluntary contracts into slavery. 4 Those tempted by the negative liberty case in favor of full alienability of rights should recall the antislavery arguments of the Republican Party before the Civil War. Republicans objected to slavery because it enabled slaveholders to subordinate even free men to their dominion. The Slave Power—politically organized proslavery interests—undermined the republican character of government. It suppressed the right to petition Congress (via the gag rule against hearing antislavery petitions), censored the mail (against antislavery literature), and forced free men, against their conscience, to join posses to hunt down alleged fugitive slaves. It violated equal citizenship by effectively granting additional representation to slaveowners for their property in slaves (via the three-fifths rule for apportioning representatives). By insisting on the right to hold slaves in the territories, the Slave Power threatened the prospects of free men to secure their independence by staking out individual homesteads. Slave plantations would acquire vast territories, crowding out opportunities for independent family farms. Chattel slavery of blacks threatened to reduce whites to wage slaves, subordinate to their employers for their entire working lives ( Foner, 1995 ).

The Republican antislavery argument is similar to the positive liberty argument above: it stresses how the constitution of a scheme of liberty rights provides the public infrastructure for a society of free and equal persons. The critical point is to institute a scheme of individual rights that can sustain relations of freedom and equality—understood as personal independence and nondomination—among persons. While the Republican Party limited its arguments to securing relations of nondomination among men, feminist abolitionists extended their arguments to married women, who, like slaves, lacked the rights to own property, make contracts, sue and be sued in court, keep their earned income, and move freely without getting permission from their masters (husbands) ( Sklar, 2000 ). Like the positive liberty argument for individual rights, it recognizes how individuals have a vital stake in other people’s liberty rights being secure against invasion or appropriation by others. The stability of this public infrastructure of freedom depends on individual rights being inalienable.

It is to no avail to reply that a libertarian scheme of fully alienable rights that permits voluntary slavery would reject the forced slavery of the antebellum South, along with the violations of free speech and republican government needed to secure the institution of slavery against state “interference.” For the Republicans’ antislavery argument was about the stability of certain rights configurations under realistic conditions. It was that a society that enforces rights to total domination of one person over another will not be able to sustain itself as a free society of equals over time. How the dominators acquired those rights, whether by force or contract, is irrelevant to this argument. Slaveholders, in the name of protection of their private property rights, used the immense economic power they gained from slavery to seize the state apparatus and crush republican liberties. This is a version of the classical republican antiplutocratic argument against extreme wealth inequality. But it was also directed toward the threat that slavery posed to economic independence of free men—to their prospects for self-employment, for freedom from subjection to an employer.

Debra Satz ( 2010 : 180, 232n40), citing Genicot (2002) , offers a similar argument against debt bondage, adapted to contemporary conditions. Two dynamics threaten the ability of workers to maintain their freedom if they have the power to alienate their right to quit to their creditor/employer. First, the availability of debt bondage may restrict opportunities to obtain credit without bondage. Bondage functions as a guarantee against destitute debtors’ default: they put up their own labor as collateral. However, the institution of debt bondage makes it more difficult to establish formalized credit and labor markets by which alternative methods of promoting loan repayment (such as credit ratings and garnishing wages) make credit available without bondage.

Second, living under conditions of bondage makes people servile, humble, and psychologically dependent—psychological dispositions that they are likely to transmit to their children. Servile people lack a vivid conception of themselves as rights-bearers and lack the assertiveness needed to vindicate their rights. Moreover, the poor are unlikely to hang on to their freedom for long, given their strategic vulnerability when others are already giving up their alienable rights under hard bargaining. A system of fully alienable libertarian rights is thus liable to degenerate into a society of lords and bondsmen, unable to reproduce the self-understandings that ground libertarian rights. A free society cannot be sustained by people trained to servility and locked into strategic games where some individuals’ alienation of their liberty rights puts others’ liberties at risk ( Satz, 2010 : 173–180).

This argument generalizes. Workers may have a permanent interest in retaining other rights besides the formal right to quit, so as to prevent the authority relations constitutive of employment from conversion into relations of domination. For example, they have a permanent interest against sexual and other forms of discriminatory harassment. Under U.S. law, workers have inalienable rights against such degrading treatment. In addition, since lower-level workers have minimal freedom at work, but spend their workdays following others’ orders, they have a vital interest in secure access to a limited length of the working day—in having some hours in which they act under their own direction. This is the purpose of maximum hours laws, which forbid employers from conditioning a job offer on having to work too many hours per week. The logic in both cases is strategic: once employers are free to make such unwelcome “offers” (or rather, threats), the decision of some to accept removes better offers from other workers’ choice sets, and thereby deprives them of both positive and republican freedom.

As in the case of contractual slavery, libertarians are divided over this type of argument. Mill (1965 : XI, §12) supported maximum hours laws as an exception to laissez faire, on strategic grounds. The early Nozick would probably have accepted laws against sexual harassment, because conditioning a job on putting up with a hostile atmosphere or compliance with the boss’s sexual demands makes workers worse off relative to a normative baseline of not being subject to unwelcome sexual affronts, and hence counts as coercive. 5 However, the Nozick of Anarchy, State, and Utopia would have rejected such laws as interfering with freedom of contract, given that he accepted contractual slavery. Eric Mack (1981) also upholds an absolute principle of freedom of contract, and so would be committed to the alienability of rights against sexual harassment and even assault in labor contracts.

Mack recognizes that it is disingenuous to claim that restraints on freedom of contract that improve workers’ choice sets violate their freedom of contract. Hence minimum wage laws, if they only raise wages and do not increase unemployment, do not violate workers’ rights. His complaint is that such restraints violate employers’ rights, coercing them into offering better terms to workers than they wanted to make. They treat employers as mere resources to be used by others in pursuit of goals the employer does not share ( Mack, 1981 : 6–8). This argument, if applied to laws against sexual harassment and similar forms of personal domination, is bizarre. One would have thought that employers who threaten their workers with job loss if they do not put up with sexual subordination are treating them as mere resources to be used by the employer in pursuit of goals the workers do not share.

Mack contrasts a morality of “social goals” with one of deontological side constraints, claiming that the former treats people as mere means and the latter treats people as ends in themselves. A deontology of complete alienability of rights in one’s person, however, leads to a society in which some are made others’ partial or total property, reduced to instruments of the others’ arbitrary wills, and deprived of all three kinds of freedom. That they entered such a state by choice does not undermine the conclusion. Rather, it proves that liberty does not only upset equality—it also upsets liberty. To be more precise: negative liberty upsets liberty.

Suppose our “social goal” is to sustain a society in which individuals relate to each other as free persons—which is to say, as equal and independent, not subject to the arbitrary will of others? That would seem to be not merely unobjectionable to a libertarian, but the very point of a libertarian view. The scheme of rights required to realize such a society cannot be devised without tending to the likely consequences of choices made within it. The infrastructure of rights needed to sustain a society in which individuals relate to each other as free persons requires that the rights most fundamental to the ability to exercise independent agency be inalienable, so that no one becomes subject to another’s domination. Thus, the fundamental freedom-based rationale for inalienable rights is based on considerations of republican freedom. It entails that a free society requires substantial authority egalitarianism.

4. Freedom, Equality, and the Definition of Property Rights

I conclude with some remarks on the definition of property rights. Much libertarian writing supposes that as soon as an argument is given to justify a right to private property in something, this justifies all the classical incidents of property—including rights to exclude, use, alter, and destroy it, to give, barter, or sell all or any parts of it or any rights to it, to rent, loan, or lease it for income, all with unlimited duration ( Honoré, 1961 ). Why is a separate argument not required for each of these incidents? Shouldn’t the nature and function of the property in question play a role in determining which rights are attached to it, and for how long? For example, while the right to destroy is easily granted to most chattels, the positive liberty of future generations provides compelling reasons to deny it to property in land and water resources. Such interests also justify limits on dividing property into parcels or rights bundles too small to use ( Heller, 1998 ). It is also questionable how any case for intellectual property rights can be grounded in considerations of negative liberty, given that a regime of universal privilege with respect to ideas does not interfere with the liberties of authors and inventors to create and use their works. A freedom-based case for intellectual property can only be made on positive liberty grounds, and then only justify limited terms for copyrights and patents, given the role of the intellectual commons in expanding cultural and technological opportunities.

A just system of legal rules of property, contract, banking, employment, and so forth constitutes a public infrastructure that can sustain a free society of equals over time. Since, in a well-ordered society, members sustain this infrastructure by paying taxes and complying with its rules, each member has a legitimate claim that the rules secure their access to opportunities generated by that infrastructure. The case is no different from the system of public roads. Fair distributions of access to opportunity matter here, too. A system of roads that accommodates only cars, with no pedestrian sidewalks, crosswalks, and stop lights, denies adequate opportunities for freedom of movement to those without cars. It would be absurd for drivers to object to pedestrian infrastructure because it interferes with their negative liberty. They have no claim that the publicly supported infrastructure be tailored to their interests alone.

Arguments over the rules defining private property rights are comparable. Since everyone needs effective access to private property to secure their liberty interests, property rules should ensure such access to all. Such distributive concerns might be partially secured, for example, by way of estate taxes, the revenues of which are distributed to all in the form of social insurance. As Paine (1796) argued, such taxes do not infringe private property rights, but rather constitute a partial unbundling of property rights to secure the legitimate property rights of others. That one of the incidents of property (protecting wealth interests) partially expires upon the death of the owner is no more a violation of property rights than the fact that patents expire after twenty years: such rules simply define the scope of the right in the first instance.

Three features of the public infrastructure of economic rights in social democratic orders promote, and arguably are needed to secure, decent opportunities for all to live on terms of republican freedom and hence authority egalitarianism with respect to everyone else. First, as argued above, individuals need a robust set of market inalienable rights, to avoid domination by their employers. Second, as Paine argued, they need a universal system of social insurance to secure their independence in cases of inability to work or to find work ( Anderson, 2008 ). Third, under modern conditions, they need free, universal education, to avoid domination by parents and others, and to secure a self-conception as someone with rights of personal independence. Each of these can be understood as individual property rights, secured via partial unbundling of classical private property rights. None require state ownership or management of productive enterprises, or bureaucratic administration of individuals’ lives. They merely constitute an alternative type of private property regime. It is superior to a libertarian one on grounds of freedom , because it better secures positive and republican freedom for all. Since any credible freedom-based argument for private property rights must already recognize the normative priority of positive and republican freedom over negative freedom, it is hard to run credible freedom-based arguments against these core institutions of social democracy at the level of abstraction at which these arguments proceed in political philosophy. Of course, the details of any particular implementation of these institutions may have many objectionable features, as is also true of private employment relations. Because the conditions of republican and positive freedom are sociologically complex, we cannot expect arguments at a high level of abstraction to settle disputes over the details of a property regime suitable for a free society of equals. The current chapter demonstrates that the ideal of a free society of equals is not an oxymoron: not only is relational equality not fundamentally opposed to freedom, in certain senses equality is needed for freedom. Inequality upsets liberty.

Ferguson, Missouri, the site of protests triggered by the police homicide of a black man stopped for jaywalking, illustrates this phenomenon. With a declining tax base, Ferguson turned to police to raise revenue by incessantly harassing mostly black citizens with traffic citations. They turned citations into the second-highest source of city revenue by issuing an average of three warrants and $321 in fines per household . Poor individuals who cannot pay the fines and fail to appear in court to explain why are often arrested and thrown into jail for weeks ( Tabarrok, 2014 ). By comparison to such gross violations of republican freedom, the negative liberty constraints of a regular tax raising the same total revenue are trivial.

Rawls clearly distinguished the republican concern that extreme wealth inequality leads to plutocracy from the egalitarian interest in the fair division of income and wealth as such. This is why he grounded progressive inheritance taxes in the principle of equal basic liberties (including the fair value of political liberties—an antiplutocratic principle), rather than the difference principle, which takes the fair distribution of income and wealth as its direct object ( Rawls, 1999 : 245, 70).

For the classic distinction between privileges and rights, see Hohfeld, 1913–1914 : 30–44.

For libertarians who oppose contractual slavery, see Mill (1859 : 184) and Rothbard (1998 : 40–41). For those who think slave contracts should be enforceable, see Nozick (2013 : 331), Alexander (2010) , and Block (2003) . Locke, an inspiration to libertarians, rejected contractual slavery; see Locke, 1824b : §23 and more aptly Locke, 1824a : §42. However, both his arguments rely on non-libertarian premises: in the Second Treatise , against a right to suicide; in the First Treatise , asserting a positive right to charity.

Nozick (1969) argues that a proposal can count as a threat, and hence be coercive, even if the proposer has a legal right to carry out the negative consequence for the recipient (452), and that such cases of coercion can include employer threats to fire workers if they fail to comply with the employer’s wishes (for example, by voting to be represented by a union) (453). Hence, in his early view, employers can coerce workers even if workers have exit rights and employers have the right to fire them at will. See also Flanigan (2012) , arguing that sexual harassment at work constitutes wrongful coercion if the empirical expectation for the job does not include sex work. This allows employers to get off the sexual harassment hook simply by listing sexual harassment in boilerplate contractual language for all employees, even for jobs such as cashier and carpenter that have nothing to do with performing sexual services. Still, it reflects some appreciation by a libertarian, however ambivalent, of the reality of workplace coercion.

Alexander, Larry , 2010. Voluntary enslavement. San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 10–042. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694662 .

Anderson, Elizabeth , 2008 . How should egalitarians cope with market risks? Theoretical Inquiries in Law , 9, pp.61–92.

Google Scholar

Anderson, Elizabeth , 2012 a. Equality. In: David Estlund , ed. The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy . New York: Oxford University Press. pp.40–57.

Google Preview

Anderson, Elizabeth , 2012 b. The fundamental disagreement between luck egalitarians and relational egalitarians.   Canadian Journal of Philosophy , S36, pp.1–23.

Arneson, Richard , 2000 . Luck egalitarianism and prioritarianism.   Ethics , 110, pp.339–349.

Aviv, Rachel , 2014 . Wrong answer.   The New Yorker , 21 July. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/07/21/wrong-answer .

Babeuf, Gracchus , 1967 . The defense of Gracchus Babeuf before the High Court of Vendôme . John Anthony Scott , ed. and trans. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Bentham, Jeremy , 1838–43. Principles of the civil code. In: John Bowring , ed. The works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the superintendence of his executor, John Bowring . Vol. 1. Edinburgh: William Tate. pp.297–364.

Block, Walter , 2003 . Toward a libertarian theory of inalienability: a critique of Rothbard, Barnett, Smith, Kinsella, Gordon, and Epstein.   Journal of Libertarian Studies , 17(2), pp.39–85.

Buonarroti, Philippe , 1836 . Buonarroti’s history of Babeuf’s conspiracy for equality . Bronterre [pseud.]. London: H. Hetherington.

Dworkin, Gerald , 1982 . Is more choice better than less? Midwest Studies in Philosophy , 7, pp.47–61.

Flanigan, Jessica , 2012. Workplace coercion. http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/03/workplace-coercion/ . Posted on 12 March 2012; Accessed on: 29 July 2014.

Foner, Eric , 1995 . Free soil, free labor, free men: the ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War . New York: Oxford University Press.

Fried, Barbara , 2011 . Does Nozick have a theory of property rights? In: Ralf Bader and John Meadowcraft , eds. The Cambridge companion to Nozick’s Anarchy, state and utopia. New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Http://ssrn.com/abstract=1782031 .

Genicot, Garance , 2002 . Bonded labor and serfdom: a paradox of voluntary choice.   Journal of Development Economics , 67(1), pp.101–127.

Hayek, Friedrich A. , 1944 . The road to serfdom . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Heller, Michael , 1998 . The tragedy of the anticommons: property in the transition from Marx to markets.   Harvard Law Review , 111, pp.621–688.

Hohfeld, Wesley , 1913– 1914 . Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning.   Yale Law Journal , 23, pp.16–59.

Honoré, Anthony , 1961 . Ownership. In: Anthony G. Guest , ed. Oxford essays in jurisprudence . Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp.107–147.

Locke, John , 1824 a. First treatise of government. In: The works of John Locke in nine volumes . vol. 4. 12th ed. London: Rivington. pp.212–337.

Locke, John , 1824 b. Second treatise of government. In: The works of John Locke in nine volumes , vol. 4. 12th ed. London: Rivington. pp.338–485.

Mack, Eric , 1981 . In defense of “unbridled” freedom of contract.   American Journal of Economics and Sociology , 40(1), pp.1–15.

Mack, Eric , 2009 . Individualism and libertarian rights. In: Thomas Christiano and John Christman , eds. Contemporary debates in political philosophy . Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp.119–136.

Mill, John Stuart , 1859 . On liberty . London: J. W. Parker and Son.

Mill, John Stuart , 1965 . Principles of political economy . Vol. 3 of Collected works of John Stuart Mill , edited by J. M. Robson . Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Nozick, Robert , 1969 . Coercion. In: Sydney Morganbesser , Patrick Suppes , and Morton White , eds. Philosophy, science, and method: essays in honor of Ernest Nagel . New York: St. Martin’s Press. pp.440–472.

Nozick, Robert , 2013 . Anarchy, state, and utopia . New York: Basic Books.

Otsuka, Michael , 1998 . Self-ownership and equality: a Lockean reconciliation.   Philosophy and Public Affairs , 27(1), pp.65–92.

Paine, Thomas , 1796. Agrarian justice. http://www.ssa.gov/history/paine4.html . Accessed on 27 July 2012.

Pettit, Philip , 1997 . Republicanism: a theory of freedom and government . New York: Oxford University Press.

Rawls, John , 1999 . A theory of justice . Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Raz, Joseph , 1994 . Rights and individual well-being. In: Ethics in the public domain . Oxford: Clarendon. pp.44–59.

Rothbard, Murray , 1998 . The ethics of liberty . Rev. ed. New York: New York University Press.

Satz, Debra , 2010 . Why some things should not be for sale: the moral limits of markets . Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Sklar, Kathryn Kish , 2000 . Women’s rights emerges within the anti-slavery movement, 1830–1870: a brief history with documents . Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s.

Tabarrok, Alex , 2014. Ferguson and the modern debtor’s prison. http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2014/08/ferguson-and-the-debtors-prison.html . Posted on 21 August 2014; Accessed on 22 August 2014.

Temkin, Larry , 2003 . Egalitarianism defended.   Ethics , 113, pp.764–782.

• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Institutional account management
• Rights and permissions
• Get help with access
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.