hypothesis on poverty and crime

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27 Poverty and Crime

Patrick Sharkey, Associate Professor of Sociology, New York University.

Max Besbris, PhD Student in Sociology, New York University.

Michael Friedson, Postdoctoral Fellow, New York University.

• Published: 05 April 2017
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This article examines theory and evidence on the association between poverty and crime at both the individual and community levels. It begins with a review of the literature on individual- or family-level poverty and crime, followed by a discussion at the level of the neighborhood or community. The research under consideration focuses on criminal activity and violent behavior, using self-reports or official records of violent offenses (homicide, assault, rape), property crime (burglary, theft, vandalism), and in some cases delinquency or victimization. The article concludes by highlighting three shifts of thinking about the relationship between poverty and crime, including a shift away from a focus on individual motivations and toward a focus on situations that make crime more or less likely.

The relationship between poverty and crime is complex. There is substantial evidence indicating that poverty is associated with criminal activity, but it is less clear that this relationship is causal or that higher levels of poverty in a neighborhood, a city, or a nation necessarily translate into higher levels of crime. Perhaps the most powerful illustration of this empirical reality comes from the simple observation made by Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson several decades ago in introducing their “routine activities theory” of crime. During the 1960s, when poverty and racial inequality were declining in American cities, the crime rate was rising ( Cohen and Felson 1979 ). The experience during the economic downturn from 2008–2012 provides a more recent example. Despite the rise in poverty and sustained unemployment over these years, crime has not risen in any remarkable way. The implication is that in order to understand the relationship between poverty and crime it is necessary to move beyond the assumption that more poor people translates directly into more crime.

One of the major shifts in criminological thinking, spurred in large part by Cohen and Felson’s ideas, is an expansion of focus beyond the characteristics or the motivations of potential offenders and toward a broader view of what makes an incident of crime more or less likely. This entails a shift from a focus on who is likely to commit a crime toward a focus on when, where, and why a crime is likely to occur ( Birkbeck and LaFree 1993 ; Katz 1988 ; Wikström and Loeber 2000 ). The basic insight of routine activities theory is that the likelihood of a crime occurring depends on the presence of a motivated offender, a vulnerable victim, and the absence of a capable guardian ( Sampson and Wikström 2008 ). Whereas traditional approaches to understanding crime focus primarily on the first element of this equation, the offender, these approaches ignore the two other moving parts: the vulnerable victim, and the presence or absence of capable guardians ( Wikström et al. 2012 ).

The “situational” perspective on crime has important implications for understanding the complexities of the relationship between poverty and crime. It forces one to consider how poverty affects the motivations of offenders, how poverty affects the vulnerability and attractiveness of potential targets, and how poverty affects the presence of capable guardians. We will consider each of these issues throughout the chapter. The research that we review reinforces the point that crime cannot be understood primarily in terms of individual characteristics, incentives, or resources. It has to be understood in terms of situations, attachments, networks, and contexts. This insight is central to a wide range of research in the field, and it frames our approach to considering the relationship between poverty and crime.

In this chapter we review theory and evidence on the relationship between poverty and crime at the level of the individual and at the level of the community. We make no attempt to be comprehensive, but instead we focus on major patterns of findings in the literature and important theoretical and empirical advances and developments. The research that we review considers criminal activity and violent behavior, using self-reports or official records of violent offenses (homicide, assault, rape), property crime (burglary, theft, vandalism), and in some cases delinquency or victimization. This approach, which reflects the dominant focus of research in criminology and sociology, places less emphasis on (or ignores completely) other types of less visible, underreported or understudied criminal activity or deviant behavior, including crime or abuse committed by police or elected officials, domestic violence, crimes committed in prison, and many types of financial or “white-collar” crime. It is important to acknowledge that the disproportionate focus on what might be thought of as “street crime” is likely to lead to biased conclusions about the overall strength of the relationship between poverty and crime. This bias arises due to the dearth of research on crime occurring outside of low-income communities (most notably white-collar crime) and because of the use of official records to measure criminal activity. Official reports of arrests reflect some combination of criminal activity, enforcement, and reporting. These are potential sources of bias that are present in much of the criminological literature and thus are present in this review as well.

The chapter proceeds with a review of the literature on individual- or family-level poverty and crime. Although the literature demonstrates a consistent association between poverty and crime, there are multiple interpretations of this association that have been put forth in the literature. Poverty may lead directly to some types of criminal activity. However, the link between poverty and crime also may be spurious, or it may be mediated by other processes related to labor force attachment, family structure, or connections to institutions like the military or the labor market. We then move to the level of the neighborhood or community. Again, the literature shows a consistent positive association between community-level poverty and crime, although the functional form of this relationship is less settled. A prominent strand of research has argued that community-level social processes play a central role in mediating the association between poverty and crime, generating resurgent interest in the importance of social cohesion, informal social control, and other dimensions of community organization that help explain the link between poverty and crime.

Our review of the literature concludes by highlighting three shifts of thinking about the relationship between poverty and crime: (1) a shift away from the idea that criminal activity is located within the individual, and toward a perspective that locates the potential for criminal activity within networks of potential offenders, victims, and guardians; (2) a shift away from a focus on individual motivations and toward a focus on situations that make crime more or less likely; and (3) a shift away from a focus on aggregated deprivation as an explanation for concentrations of crime and toward a consideration of community social processes that make crime more or less likely.

Individual Poverty and Crime

Evidence for a positive association between individual or family poverty and criminal offending is generally strong. A review of 273 studies assessing the association between different dimensions of social and economic status (SES) and offending concludes that there is consistent evidence from multiple national settings that individuals with low income, occupational status, and education have higher rates of criminal offending ( Ellis and McDonald 2001 ). However, evidence based on self-reported data on delinquent behavior is less consistent ( Tittle and Meier 1990 ; Wright et al. 1999 ). A recent study based on comparable surveys conducted in Greece, Russia, and Ukraine showed no consistent association between social and economic status and various self-reported measures of delinquent or criminal behavior ( Antonaccio et al. 2010 ).

Given this conflicting evidence, it is important to clarify that the claims made in this section are based primarily on research that examines poverty or economic resources and that considers criminal offending as an outcome. Evidence for an association between economic resources and crime is more consistent across settings and is generally quite strong, particularly in the United States ( Bjerk 2007 ). As a whole, however, the studies reviewed do not appear to provide strong evidence that these relationships are causal, nor is the overall association between poverty and crime particularly surprising—this association is consistent with virtually all individual- and family-level theories of criminal behavior. Poverty is associated with self-control and cognitive skills ( Hirschi and Gottfredson 2001 ), with family structure and joblessness ( Matsueda and Heimer 1987 ; Sampson 1987 ), with children’s peer networks ( Haynie 2001 ; Haynie, Silver, and Teasdale 2006 ), and with the type of neighborhoods in which families reside and the types of schools that children attend ( Deming 2011 ; Wilson 1987 ). The association between individual poverty and criminal offending may reflect some combination of all of these pathways of influence.

Alternatively, poverty may have direct effects on crime if the inability to secure steady or sufficient financial resources leads individuals to turn to illicit activity to generate income or if relative poverty in the midst of a wealthy society generates psychological strain ( Merton 1938 ). The “economic model of crime,” put forth formally by economist Gary Becker (1974) and elaborated and refined by an array of criminologists ( Clarke and Felson 1993 ; Cornish and Clarke 1986 ; Piliavin et al. 1986 ), suggests that crime can be explained as the product of a rational decision-making process in which potential offenders weigh the benefits and probable costs/risks of committing a crime or otherwise becoming involved in criminal activities ( Becker 1974 ). Much of the research assessing the economic model of crime has focused on deterrence, or the question of whether raising the costs of criminal behavior reduces crime. However, the theory also has direct implications for the study of poverty and crime, as it suggests that individuals lacking economic resources should have greater incentives to commit crime. Despite the abundance of evidence for an association between economic resources and criminal offending, there is little convincing research demonstrating a direct causal effect. For instance, the experimental programs that are most frequently cited for evidence on the effect of income on various social outcomes—such as the income maintenance experiments of the 1970s or the state-level welfare reform experiments of the 1990s—did not assess impacts on crime ( Blank 2002 ; Munnell 1987 ).

There are, however, a small number of studies that provide persuasive, if not definitive, evidence supporting a direct causal relationship between individual economic resources and crime. One example is a recent study that exploits differences in cities’ public assistance payment schedules in order to assess whether crime rises at periods of the month when public assistance benefits are likely to be depleted. As predicted by the economic model, crimes that lead to economic gain tend to rise as the time since public assistance payments grows, while other types of crime not involving economic gain do not increase ( Foley 2011 ). Another example comes from a set of experimental studies in which returning offenders from Georgia and Texas were randomly assigned to receive different levels of unemployment benefits immediately upon leaving prison, while members of the control group received job-placement counseling but no cash benefits ( Berk, Lenihan, and Rossi 1980 ; see also Rossi, Berk, and Lenihan 1980 ). Although the results are generalizable only to returning offenders, they show that modest supplements of income reduce subsequent recidivism.

A larger base of evidence suggests that unemployment (and underemployment or low wages) is causally related to criminal offending, with a stronger relationship between unemployment and property crime as compared with violent crime ( Chiricos 1987 ; Fagan and Freeman 1999 ; Grogger 1998 ; Levitt 2001 ; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001 ). This finding from the quantitative literature finds support in ethnographic studies arguing that the absence of stable employment and income are important factors leading to participation in informal and illicit profit-seeking activity, ranging from drug distribution and burglary to participating in informal or underground economic markets ( Bourgois 1995 ; Venkatesh 2006 ; Wright and Decker 1994 ).

The evidence linking unemployment with criminal behavior can be interpreted in multiple ways. Economists studying this relationship tend to view criminal activity as a substitute for employment in the formal labor market. From this perspective, individuals who cannot find work or whose wages are low, relative to opportunities in the informal or illicit labor market, are likely to choose criminal activity as an alternative (or supplemental) source of income ( Fagan and Freeman 1999 ; Grogger 1998 ). Criminological and sociological perspectives acknowledge the importance of income as a mechanism underlying the relationship between joblessness and crime but view employment as one of many social bonds that connect individuals to other individuals and to institutions in ways that reduce the likelihood that they will become involved in criminal activity. In their life-course model of deviance and desistance, Robert Sampson and John Laub describe the set of attachments that individuals form at different stages in the life course, including college attendance, military service, and entrance into marriage ( Sampson and Laub 1993 , 1996; Laub and Sampson 2003 ). The formation and maintenance of individuals’ bonds to romantic partners and family, to employers and institutions, and the informal social controls that arise from these social bonds do not only reduce the probability of criminal activity but also help explain patterns of desistance over time. Marriage and employment, for example, can alter the offending trajectory of individuals by serving as turning points from the past to the present, by increasing supervision and responsibilities, and by transforming roles and identities ( Laub and Sampson 2003 ).

The implication is that the relationship between poverty and crime may not be direct and causal; it is plausible that this relationship may be indirect or even spurious. Unemployment is only one characteristic that may confound the relationship between poverty and crime, but there are many others. Growing up in a single-parent household or in a community dominated by single-parent households is strongly related to criminal activity and also is associated with poverty ( Sampson 1987 ; Sampson and Wilson 1995 ). Association with delinquent peers is another potential confounder, as are cognitive skills, work ethic, and exposure to environmental toxins like lead or environmental stressors like violence ( Anderson 1999 ; Matsueda 1982 , 1988 ; Nevin 2007 ; Reyes 2007 ; Stretesky and Lynch 2001 ).

This discussion leaves us with three possible models of the relationship between individual or family poverty and crime. The first model posits that this relationship is direct and causal. In this model, which is reflected in the economic model of crime, poverty and the inability to secure stable and well-paid employment in the formal labor market provide greater incentives for individuals to commit crimes in order to generate income and associated benefits. The second model posits that the relationship between poverty and crime is mediated by other processes, such as the formation of social attachments to romantic partners, jobs, or institutions like the military. The third model posits that the association between poverty and crime is spurious and is the result of bias due to confounding factors. This model would suggest that poverty is linked with crime because it is associated with other criminogenic characteristics of the family or the individual.

The evidence available provides the strongest support for the first two models. Poverty is likely to be linked to crime both because the poor have greater incentives to commit crime and because poverty affects individuals’ environments, their relationships, their developmental trajectories, and their opportunities as they move through different stages of the life course. The strongest evidence in support of this conclusion comes from the literature on unemployment, wages, and crime. However, there is very little convincing evidence that focuses purely on the direct effect of poverty on crime. We consider this to be an important gap in the literature.

Community Poverty and Crime

Despite the myriad ways that individual poverty may be linked with individual criminal activity, the aggregation of individuals who have greater incentives or propensity to commit crime does not necessarily lead to more crime in the aggregate. One simplistic illustration of why this is the case emerges when we return to the situational framework of offenders, victims, and guardians with which we began the chapter. Focusing in particular on the presence of attractive and vulnerable victims, one might conclude that in areas where poverty is concentrated there are likely to be fewer attractive victims vulnerable to potential offenders ( Hannon 2002 ). If one were to consider only the second dimension of the crime equation, one might arrive at the hypothesis that in periods where poverty is rising or in places where poverty is concentrated there should be fewer crimes committed. Just as with theories that focus only on the prevalence of motivated offenders, this hypothesis is simplistic and incomplete.

Theories that focus exclusively on the number of potential offenders or the number of potential victims within a community are equally deficient because they do not consider the ecological context in which criminal activity takes place. Moving beyond the individual-level analysis of crime requires a consideration of social organization within the community; the enforcement of common norms of behavior by community residents, leaders, and police; the structure and strength of social networks within a community; and the relationships between residents, local organizations, and institutions within and outside the community ( Sampson 2012 ; Sampson and Wikström 2008 ).

An illustrative example comes from the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program, a social experiment that randomly offered vouchers to public housing residents in five cities that allowed them to move to low-poverty neighborhoods. The most common reason that families gave for volunteering for the program was that they wanted their children to be able to avoid the risks from crime, violence, and drugs in their origin neighborhoods ( Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007 ). However, when data on criminal activity were analyzed years later, the results showed that youth in families who had moved to neighborhoods with lower poverty were no less likely to report having been victimized or “jumped,” seeing someone shot or stabbed, or taking part in violent activities themselves ( Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007 ; Kling, Ludwig, and Katz 2005 ). A complicated set of findings emerged, with very different patterns for girls and boys. Whereas girls reported feeling more safe in their new communities, boys in families that moved to low-poverty neighborhoods were less likely to have been arrested for violent crimes but more likely to be arrested for property crimes, to have a friend who used drugs, and to engage in risky behaviors themselves ( Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2006 ; see also Sharkey and Sampson 2010 ).

The results from Moving to Opportunity reveal the complex ways in which individuals and aspects of their social environments interact to make crime more or less likely. Boys in families that moved to new environments may have changed their behavior with new opportunities for property crime available to them, but they may also have been subject to greater scrutiny from their new neighbors and from law enforcement. Girls in the same families were likely to be seen in a different light by neighbors and police, leading to different behavioral and social responses ( Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2006 ). The interaction between the characteristics of youths themselves; the types of potential targets that existed in their new communities; and the level of supervision, suspicion, and policing in the new communities created an unexpected pattern of behavior within the new environment.

This example highlights the complexity of community-level models of poverty and crime. In an attempt to synthesize some of the core ideas that have been put forth in the criminological literature on community-level crime, we focus on three stylized facts that guide our discussion of the community-level relationship between poverty and crime. First, crime is clustered in space to a remarkable degree ( Sampson 2012 ). This empirical observation has been made repeatedly by scholars in different settings and in different times, but the study of space and crime has been refined considerably in recent years. Crime is not only spatially clustered at the level of the neighborhood or community, but it is concentrated in a smaller number of “hot spots” within communities ( Block and Block 1995 ; Sherman 1995 ; Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger 1989 ). The spatial dimension of crime leads to questions about the underlying mechanisms that might explain why certain spaces or areas appear to be criminogenic. Over the past few decades, the concentration of poverty has emerged as a primary explanatory mechanism.

This leads to our second stylized fact: the level of poverty in a community is strongly associated with the level of crime in the community ( Patterson 1991 ; Krivo and Peterson 1996 ). This relationship is found not only in the United States but also in nations such as the Netherlands and Sweden, where the levels of concentrated poverty and violent crime are substantially lower (e.g., Sampson and Wikström 2008 ; Weijters, Scheepers, and Gerris 2009 ). Despite the robustness of this relationship across contexts, there is conflicting evidence on the functional form of this relationship. One of the central arguments in William Julius Wilson’s classic book The Truly Disadvantaged (1987) was that urban poverty in the United States transformed in the post–civil rights period, and the new type of concentrated neighborhood poverty that emerged during this period led to the intensification of an array of social problems including a sharp rise in violent crime. Sampson and Wilson (1995) argue that areas of concentrated poverty provide a niche where role models for youth are absent and residents are less fervent in enforcing common norms of behavior, leading to elevated levels of crime. This argument has served as a primary explanation for the rise and concentration of urban crime from the 1960s through the 1990s, but it has been challenged recently by research investigating the form of the relationship between neighborhood poverty and crime. Analyzing data on neighborhood crime from 25 cities in 2000, Hipp and Yates (2011) find no evidence that crime rises sharply in extreme-poverty neighborhoods. All types of crime rise with the level of poverty in the neighborhood, but for most types this relationship levels off as the neighborhood poverty rate reaches 30 percent or higher. As the most rigorous study conducted to date on the form of the relationship between neighborhood poverty and crime, we believe the findings from this article should provoke further theoretical and empirical investigations into this important issue.

Discussions about the functional form of the relationship between community poverty and crime lead directly into a broader discussion about the mechanisms underlying this relationship. An extensive ethnographic literature demonstrates how the threat of violence can come to structure interpersonal interactions and outlooks in areas of extreme poverty, creating the need for individuals to take strategic steps to avoid violence ( Anderson 1999 ; Harding 2010 ). The emergence of patterned responses to community-level poverty and violence involving the adoption of unique frames and repertoires of action becomes visible in this research, with consequences that can affect individual behavior and reinforce the atmosphere of threat, further weakening informal social controls and trust within the community ( Anderson 1999 ; Small, Harding, and Lamont 2010 ).

The importance of community trust, social cohesion, and informal social controls has been theorized and analyzed in a resurgent literature on community social processes and crime and violence. The third stylized fact about communities and crime is that social processes at the level of the community appear to play a central role in mediating the association between poverty and crime. In their classic work on the organization of communities and rates of juvenile delinquency, Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that community organization is lower and crime and delinquency are higher in neighborhoods with low social and economic status, high levels of ethnic heterogeneity, and high levels of residential mobility. In the last few decades these ideas have served as the basis for a resurgent interest in the role that structural characteristics of communities play in facilitating informal social controls, in strengthening or weakening community organization, and in increasing or reducing crime ( Sampson and Groves 1989 ; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997 ).

The research of Robert Sampson and several colleagues lies at the heart of this resurgence. With the concept of collective efficacy, Sampson builds on the ideas of Shaw and McKay but puts forth a more refined theory of the role of community-level social processes in influencing patterns of crime and violence. In addition to the three dimensions of communities on which Shaw and McKay focused, this research analyzes the importance of family structure and rates of family disruption as central factors influencing the capacity of a community to supervise and monitor teenage peer groups and to establish intergenerational lines of communication, social cohesion, and informal social controls. The “social process turn” ( Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002 ) in research on neighborhoods and crime leads to a new understanding of the link between neighborhood poverty and crime. According to this perspective, neighborhood poverty is associated with criminal activity not because of the aggregation of motivated offenders, but rather because of community-level dynamics that create an environment in which informal social controls over activity in public space are weakened. Community-level poverty is linked with family structure, residential mobility, the density of housing, labor force detachment, physical disorder, legal cynicism, civic and political participation, and community organization, all of which are associated with crime ( Hagan and Peterson 1995 ; Krivo and Peterson 1996 ; Sampson 2012 ; Sampson and Lauritsen 1994 ).

Comparative research is beginning to assess whether the focus on community social processes is applicable in different national settings. Some research using the same methods developed to study collective efficacy in Chicago suggests that the basic relationships are similar in very different places. For instance, in comparable studies conducted in Chicago and Stockholm, neighborhood collective efficacy was found to have a remarkably similar, inverse association with violent crime ( Sampson and Wikström 2008 ). However, such similarities do not suggest that models of poverty, collective efficacy, and community violence can be blindly transferred across national contexts. In a study of Belo Horizonte, Brazil, Villarreal and Silva (2006) find that neighborhood social cohesion is not predictive of crime rates. In a context in which national policies have led to a retrenchment of public sector employment and the welfare state ( Portes and Hoffman 2003 ), the authors argue that informal networks of reciprocity and exchange are central to community sustainability but also have led to a proliferation of informal labor market activity and have emerged at a time of rising crime and violence. This study provides an example of how the relationships among neighborhood social cohesion, neighborhood poverty, and crime may vary across different local or national contexts.

Summary of the Evidence and Three Shifts of Thinking

The evidence we have reviewed suggests a set of core findings that characterize the relationship between poverty and crime at the level of the individual and the community. First, poverty is strongly associated with crime at both levels of analysis. In the rational choice, or economic model, of crime, the individual-level relationship between poverty and criminal behavior is assumed to be direct and causal, but most theoretical models do not make this assumption. We have uncovered very little empirical research that provides convincing evidence for a direct causal relationship between individual poverty and criminal activity. Some suggestive research is consistent with a causal relationship, but most research does not assess it directly. Instead, most theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that poverty is linked with criminal behavior through individual characteristics and conditions associated with poverty, such as joblessness, family structure, peer networks, psychological strain, or exposure to intensely violent environments.

At the level of the community, there is again a strong relationship between poverty and aggregated rates of crime. However, the most prominent theoretical and empirical work on the topic suggests that this relationship is mediated by community-level social processes that facilitate social cohesion and trust and that act to limit criminal activity in the community. Poverty is thus viewed as one of several characteristics of communities that lead to the breakdown of community organization, in turn leading to higher rates of crime.

These findings lead us to identify three interrelated shifts of thinking that are central to understanding the relationship between poverty and crime. These shifts of thinking reflect the insights of criminologists that have been developed over the past several decades, but they may be less familiar to poverty researchers. The first is a shift away from thinking of the potential for crime as lying within the individual offender and instead thinking of the potential for crime as lying within networks of potential offenders, victims, and guardians situated within a diverse group of contexts and settings ( Papachristos 2011 ; Wikström et al. 2012 ). The field of criminology has a long history of locating the source of criminal activity within the individual. Without denying the importance of individual characteristics in affecting the propensity for criminal activity, and without denying the agency of individual offenders, we argue that the traditionally dominant focus on the offender has stifled progress in understanding variation in crime across places and over time.

This point reflects a second shift of thinking, which involves moving from a focus on individual motivations to a focus on situations ( Wikström et al. 2012 ). Applied to the study of poverty and crime, this shift moves away from the idea that crime is driven primarily by economic calculations. While economic benefit is one important motivation for potential offenders, even the rational choice paradigm has been extended to consider other types of noneconomic rewards arising from criminal offending (e.g., Cornish and Clarke 1986 ). The situational approach to crime, by contrast, expands beyond the motivations of individuals to consider the interactions of offenders, victims, and guardians. The role of poverty as a predictor of criminal offending is much more complex in the situational approach to crime. Poverty may produce more motivated offenders, fewer potential victims (for at least some types of crime), and less effective community guardians. Considered together, one would still expect an association between poverty and crime, but the mechanisms underlying this association are more complex than the economic model suggests.

The third shift of thinking moves beyond a focus on aggregated deprivation as an explanation for concentrations of crime and toward a consideration of community social processes ( Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002 ). Concentrated poverty is one of several characteristics of communities, along with others such as high levels of residential mobility, that tend to disrupt processes of informal social control and social cohesion within communities, or collective efficacy ( Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997 ). The breakdown of collective efficacy provides the context for the emergence of crime and violence within the community, as informal controls over public space are less effective and violations of collective norms of behavior become common.

These three shifts of thinking reflect the findings from a complex theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between poverty and crime. In the most simplistic model of this relationship, individual poverty causes individuals to commit more crime and the aggregation of poor individuals in a community, a city, or a nation translates directly into more crime. The experience of the United States over the last 50 years demonstrates that this model is not adequate. When poverty is high, crime does not necessarily rise with it. In critiquing the direct, linear, causal model of poverty and crime, we acknowledge that we do not have an equally simple model to replace it. Instead, we argue that the relationship is complex, that it is driven by a number of different mediating mechanisms, and that these mechanisms vary depending on the level of analysis (e.g., individuals, neighborhoods, nations, etc.). While this may not be a particularly satisfying conclusion, the evidence available suggests that it is the most realistic.

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• Published: 21 January 2021

Why do inequality and deprivation produce high crime and low trust?

• Benoît De Courson 1 , 2 &
• Daniel Nettle 2  

Scientific Reports volume  11 , Article number:  1937 ( 2021 ) Cite this article

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• Human behaviour

Humans sometimes cooperate to mutual advantage, and sometimes exploit one another. In industrialised societies, the prevalence of exploitation, in the form of crime, is related to the distribution of economic resources: more unequal societies tend to have higher crime, as well as lower social trust. We created a model of cooperation and exploitation to explore why this should be. Distinctively, our model features a desperation threshold, a level of resources below which it is extremely damaging to fall. Agents do not belong to fixed types, but condition their behaviour on their current resource level and the behaviour in the population around them. We show that the optimal action for individuals who are close to the desperation threshold is to exploit others. This remains true even in the presence of severe and probable punishment for exploitation, since successful exploitation is the quickest route out of desperation, whereas being punished does not make already desperate states much worse. Simulated populations with a sufficiently unequal distribution of resources rapidly evolve an equilibrium of low trust and zero cooperation: desperate individuals try to exploit, and non-desperate individuals avoid interaction altogether. Making the distribution of resources more equal or increasing social mobility is generally effective in producing a high cooperation, high trust equilibrium; increasing punishment severity is not.

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Introduction.

Humans are often described as an unusually cooperative or ‘ultrasocial’ species 1 . The truth is more complex: humans from the same society can cooperate for mutual benefit; or they can simply co-exist; or they can actively exploit one another, as in, for example, crime. A theory of human sociality should ideally predict what mix of these alternatives will emerge under which circumstances. Comparing across industrialised societies, higher inequality—greater dispersion in the distribution of economic resources across individuals—is associated with higher crime and lower social trust 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 . These associations appear empirically robust, and meet epidemiological criteria for being considered causal 8 . However, the nature of the causal mechanisms is still debated. The effects of inequality are macroscopic phenomena, seen most clearly by comparing aggregates such as countries or states. It is their micro-foundations in individual psychology and behaviour that still require clarification.

There are, broadly, two classes of explanation for how inequality, a population-level phenomenon, could influence individual-level outcomes like crime or trust. The first class of explanation is compositional: in more unequal societies, the least fortunate individuals are absolutely worse off than in more equal societies of the same average wealth, exactly because the dispersion either side of the average is greater. Some individuals are also better off too, at the other end of the distribution, but if there is any non-linearity in the function relating individual resources to outcomes—if for example the poor becoming absolutely poorer has a larger effect on their propensity to offend than the rich becoming absolutely richer has on theirs—this can still change outcome prevalence in the population 9 , 10 , 11 . In line with compositional explanations, across US counties, the association between inequality and rate of property crime is fully mediated by the prevalence of poverty, which is higher in more unequal counties 2 . Moreover, changes in rates over time track changes in the economic prospects of people at the bottom end of the socioeconomic distribution 12 , 13 . The second class of explanation is psychosocial: individuals perceive the magnitude of social differentials in the society around them, and this affects their state of mind, increasing competitiveness, anxiety and self-serving individualism 8 , 14 . In this paper, we develop an explanatory model for why greater inequality should produce higher crime and lower social trust. Our model provides a bridge between compositional and psychosocial explanations. Its explanation for the inequality-crime association is compositional: individuals offend when their own absolute level of resources is desperately low, and the effect of increasing inequality is to make such desperation more prevalent. On the other hand, the model’s explanation for the inequality-trust association is more psychosocial: all individuals in high-inequality populations end up trusting less, regardless of their personal resource levels.

To provide a micro-foundation in individual behaviour for the macro-level effects of inequality on crime, we must start from explanations for why individuals commit crimes. Economic 15 , 16 and behavioural-ecological 17 approaches see offending as a strategic response to specific patterns of incentive. Economic models predict that offending should be more attractive when the payoffs from legitimate activity are low. This principle successfully explains variation in offending behaviour both within and between societies 12 , 16 . It can also explain the relationship between crime levels and inequality, in compositional manner, because unequal societies produce poorer legitimate opportunities for people at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum 2 . However, these models are generally taken to predict that making punishments for crime more severe should reduce the prevalence of offending, because harsher punishment should reduce the expected utility associated with the criminal option. Empirical evidence, though, does not clearly support the hypothesis that increasing punishment severity reduces offending 18 , 19 . There is more evidence for a deterrent effect of increased probability of punishment, though even this effect may be modest 18 , 19 .

Becker 15 pointed out that the puzzle of the weak deterrent effect of punishment severity would be solved if offenders were risk-preferring. The decision to offend is risky in that it has either a large positive payoff (if not caught) or a large negative one (if caught and punished). An individual who prefers risk might thus choose to offend even if the expected utility of offending is negative due to a possible severe punishment. Thus, the question becomes: why would some people—those who commit crime—prefer risk, when people are usually averse to it? To address this question, our model incorporates features of classic risk-sensitive foraging theory from behavioural ecology 20 (for a review in the context of human behaviour, see Ref. 21 ). Risk-sensitive foraging models incorporate a desperation threshold: a level of resources below which it is disastrous to fall, in the foraging case because of starvation. The models show that individuals in sufficient imminent danger of falling below this threshold ought to become risk-preferring. If a risky option is successful, it will allow them to leap back over the threshold; and if not, their prospects will be no more dire than they were anyway. Our model is novel in explicitly incorporating a desperation threshold into decisions about whether to cooperate (analogous in our model to participating in legitimate economic activity) or exploit others (analogous to committing an acquisitive crime).

The desperation threshold is the major theoretical innovation of our model. We justify its inclusion on multiple grounds. First, the ultimate currency in our model is fitness, a quantity with a natural biological interpretation that must necessarily be zero if the individual lacks the minimal resources to subsist and function socially. Thus, it is reasonable that expected fitness should be related to resource levels, but not linearly: there should be a point where, as resources deplete, expected fitness rapidly declines to zero. Our threshold assumption produces exactly this type of function (see Supplementary Sect.  2.1 , Supplementary Fig. S1 ). Second, in experimental games where gaining a payoff is subject to a threshold, people do switch to risk-proneness when in danger of falling below the threshold, as risk-sensitive foraging theory predicts 22 . Although this does not show that such thresholds are widespread or important in real life, it does show that people intuitively understand their implications when they are faced with them, and respond accordingly. Third, there are ethnographic descriptions of ‘disaster levels’, ‘crisis levels’, or ‘edges’ that affect the risk attitudes of people facing poverty 23 , 24 . For example, writing on Southeast Asia, Scott 23 describes the spectre of a “subsistence crisis level—perhaps a ‘danger zone’ rather than a ‘level’ would be more accurate…a threshold below which the qualitative deterioration in subsistence, security and status is massive and painful” (p. 17), as an ever-present factor in people’s decisions. Thus, including a desperation threshold is a simple but potentially powerful innovation into models of cooperation and exploitation, with potential to generate new insights.

In our model, agents repeatedly decide between three actions: foraging alone, foraging cooperatively, or exploiting a cooperative group. Foraging cooperatively is analogous to legitimate economic activity, and exploitation is analgous to acquisitive crime. Agents have variable levels of resources, and their behaviour is state-dependent. That is, rather than having a fixed strategy of always cooperating or always exploiting, each agent, at each interaction, selects a behaviour based on their current level of resources, the behaviour of others in the surrounding population, and background parameters such as the probability and severity of punishment, and the likelihood of resources improving through other means. Agents seek to maximize fitness. We assume that fitness is positively related to resource levels, but that there is a threshold, a critically low level of resources below which there is an immediate fitness penalty for falling. Our investigation of the model has two stages. We first compute the optimal action policy an individual should follow; that is, the optimal action to select for every possible combination of the situational variables. Second, we simulate populations of individuals all following the optimal action policies, to predict population-level outcomes for different initial resource distributions.

To explain the model in more detail, at each time point t in an indefinitely long sequence of time steps (where one time step is one economic interaction), agents have a current level of resources s. They can take one of three actions. Foraging alone costs x units of resources and is also guaranteed to return x. Thus, foraging alone is sufficient to maintain the agent but creates no increase in resources. It is also safe from exploitation, as we conceptualise it as involving minimal interaction with others. Alternatively, agents can team up with n-1 others to cooperate . As long as no other group member exploits, cooperation is mutually beneficial, costing x units but producing a payoff of \(\alpha x \left( {\alpha > 1} \right)\) to each group member. Finally, agents can exploit : join a cooperating group and try to selfishly divert the resources produced therein. If this exploitation is successful, they obtain a large reward β, but if they fail, they receive a punishment π. The probability of being punished is γ. The punishment is not administered by peers: we assume that there is a central punitive institution in place, and both the size and probability of punishment are exogenous. In our default case, the expected payoff for exploitation is zero (i.e. \(\left( {1 - \gamma } \right)\beta = \gamma \pi\) ), making exploitation no better than foraging alone on average, and worse than cooperating. However, the reward for a successful exploitation, β, is the largest payoff available to the agent in any single time step.

At every time step, each agent’s resource level is updated according to the outcomes of their action. In addition, resource levels change by a disturbance term controlled by a parameter r , such that the mean and variance of population resources are unchanged, but the temporal autocorrelation of agents’ resource levels is only 1 −  r . If r is high, individuals whose current resources are low can expect they will be higher in the future and vice versa, because of regression to the mean. If \(r = 0\) , resources will never change other than by the agent’s actions. We consider r a measure of social mobility due to causes other than choice of actions.

In the first stage, we use stochastic dynamic programming 25 , 26 to compute the optimal action policy. Fitness is a positive linear function of expected resource level s in the future. However, in computing the fitness payoffs of each action, we also penalize, by a fixed amount, any action that leaves the agent below a desperation threshold in the next time step (arbitrarily, we set this threshold at s  = 0). The optimal action policy identifies which one of the three actions is favoured for every possible combination of the factors that impinge on the agent. These include both their own current resource state s , and features of their social world, such as the severity of punishment π, the probability of punishment γ, and the level of social mobility r. A critical variable that enters into the computation of the optimal action is the probability that any cooperating group in the population will contain someone who exploits. We denote this probability p . We can think of 1 −  p as an index of the trustworthiness of the surrounding population. Computing the optimal policy effectively allows us to ask: under what circumstances should an individual forage alone, cooperate, or exploit?

In the second stage, we simulate populations of agents all following the optimal policies computed in the first stage. We can vary the starting distributions of resources (their mean and dispersion), as well as other parameters such as social mobility and the probability and severity of punishment. During the simulation stage, each agent forms an estimate of 1 −  p , the trustworthiness of others, through observing the behaviour of a randomly-selected subset of other individuals. We refer to these estimates as the agents’ social trust, since social trust is defined as the generalized expectation that others will behave well 27 . Social trust updates at the end of each time step. Agents’ social trust values are unbiased estimates of the current trustworthiness of the surrounding population, but they are not precise, because they are based on only a finite sample of other population members. The simulation stage, allows us to ask: what are the predicted temporal dynamics of behaviour, and of social trust, in populations with different starting distributions of resources, different levels of social mobility, and different punishments for exploitation?

Each of the three actions is optimal in a different region of the space formed by current resources s and the trustworthiness of others 1 −  p (Fig.  1 a). Below a critical value of s , agents should always exploit, regardless of trustworthiness . In the default case, this critical value is in the vicinity of the desperation threshold, though it can be lower or higher depending on the value of other parameters. With our default values, exploitation will not, on average, make the agent’s resource state any better in subsequent time steps. However, there is a large advantage to getting above the threshold in the next time step, and there is a region of the resource continuum where exploitation is the only action that can achieve this in one go (intuitively, it is the quickest way to ‘get one’s head above water’). Where s is above the critical value, cooperation is optimal as long as the trustworthiness of the surrounding population is sufficiently high. However, if trustworthiness is too low, the likelihood of getting exploited makes cooperation worse than foraging alone. The shape of the frontier between cooperation and foraging alone is complex when resources are close to the desperation threshold. This is because cooperation and foraging alone also differ in riskiness; foraging alone is risk-free, but cooperation carries a risk of being exploited that depends on trustworthiness. Just above the exploitation zone, there is a small region where cooperation is favoured even at low trustworthiness, since one successful cooperation would be enough to hurdle back over the threshold, but foraging alone would not. Just above this is a zone where foraging alone is favoured even at high trustworthiness; here the agent will be above the threshold in the next time period unless they are a victim of exploitation, which makes them averse to taking the risk of cooperating.

Optimal actions as a function of the individual’s current resources s and the trustworthiness of the surrounding population, 1 −  p . ( A ) All parameters at their default values. This includes: α = 1.2, r = 0.1, π = 10, and γ = 1/3 (see Table 1 for a full list). ( B ) Effect of altering the efficiency of cooperation α to be either lower (1.05) or higher (1.30) than ( A ). Other parameter values are as for ( A ). ( C ) Effects of varying social mobility, to be either high (r = 0.8), or complete (r = 1.0; i.e. resource levels in this time period have no continuity at all into the next). Other parameter values are as for ( A ). ( D ) Effect of increasing the severity of punishment for exploiters to π = 15 and π = 20. Other parameter values are as for ( A ). ( E ). Effects of altering the probability of punishment for exploiters to γ = 2/3 and γ = 9/10. Other parameter values are as for ( A ).

We explored the sensitivity of the optimal policy to changes in parameter values. Increasing the profitability of cooperation (α) decreases the level of trustworthiness that is required for cooperation to be worthwhile (Fig.  1 B; analytically, the cooperation/foraging alone frontier for \(s \gg 0\) is at \(\left( {1 - p} \right) = 1/\alpha\) ; see Supplementary Sect.  2.2 ). A very high level of social mobility r moves the critical value for exploitation far to the left (i.e. individuals have to be in an even more dire state before they start to exploit; Fig.  1 C). This is because with high social mobility, badly-off individuals can expect that their level of resources will regress towards the mean over time anyway, lessening the need for risky action when faced with a small immediate shortfall.

The optimality of exploitation below the critical level of resources is generally insensitive to increasing the severity of punishment, π (Fig.  1 D), even where the expected value of exploitation is thereby rendered negative. This is because a desperate agent will be below the threshold in the next time step anyway if they forage alone, cooperate, or receive a punishment of any size. They are so badly off that it is relatively unimportant how much worse things get, but important to take any small chance of ‘jumping over’ the threshold. The exploitation boundary is slightly more sensitive to the probability of punishment, γ, though even this sensitivity is modest (Fig.  1 E). When γ is very high, it is optimal for agents very close to the boundary of desperation to take a gamble on cooperating, even where trustworthiness is rather low. Although this is risky, it offers a better chance of getting back above the threshold than exploitation that is almost bound to fail. Nonetheless, it is striking that even where exploitation is almost bound to fail and attracts a heavy penalty, it is still the best option for an individual whose current resource level is desperately low.

We also explored the effect of setting either the probability γ or the severity π of punishment so low that the expected payoff from exploitation is positive. This produces a pattern where exploitation is optimal if an agent’s resources are either desperately low, or comfortably high (see Supplementary Fig. S2 ). Only in the middle—currently above the threshold, but not by far enough that a punishment would not pull them down below it–should agents cooperate or forage alone.

We simulated populations of N  = 500 individuals each following the optimal policy, with the distribution of initial resources s drawn from a distribution with mean μ and standard deviation σ. Populations fall into one of two absorbing equilibria. In the first, the poverty trap (Fig.  2 A), there is no cooperation after the first few time periods. Instead, there is a balance of attempted exploitation and foraging alone, with the proportions of these determined by the initial resource distribution and the values of π and γ. The way this equilibrium develops is as follows: there is a sufficiently high frequency of exploitation in the first round (about 10% of the population or more is required) that subsequent social trust estimates are mostly very low. With trust low, those with the higher resource levels switch to foraging alone, whilst those whose resources are desperately low continue to try to exploit. Since foraging alone produces no surplus, the population mean resources never increases, and both exploiters and lone foragers are stuck where they were.

The two equilibria in simulated populations. ( A ) The poverty trap. There is sufficient exploitation in the first time step ( A1 ) that social trust is low ( A2 ). Consequently, potential cooperators switch to lone foraging, resources never increase ( A3 ), and a subgroup of the population is left below the threshold seeking to exploit. Simulation initialised with μ = 5.5, σ = 4 and all other parameters at their default values. ( B ) The virtuous circle. Exploitation is sufficiently rare from the outset ( B1 ) that trust is high ( B2 ) and individuals switch from lone foraging to cooperation. This drives an increase in resources, eventually lifting almost all individuals above the threshold. Simulation initialised with μ = 5.5, σ = 3 and all other parameters at their default values.

In the second equilibrium, the virtuous circle (Fig.  2 B), the frequency of exploitation is lower at the outset. Individuals whose resources are high form high assessments of social trust, and hence choose cooperation over foraging alone. Since cooperation creates a surplus, the mean level of resources in the population increases. This benefits the few exploiters, both through the upward drift of social mobility, and because they sometimes exploit successfully. This resolves the problem of exploitation, since in so doing they move above the critical value to the point where it is no longer in their interests to exploit, and since they are in such a high-trust population, they then start to cooperate. Thus, over time, trust becomes universally high, resources grow, and cooperation becomes almost universal.

Each of the two equilibria has a basin of attraction in the space of initial population characteristics. The poverty trap is reached if the fraction of individuals whose resource levels fall below the level that triggers exploitation is sufficiently large at any point. With the desperation threshold at s = 0, his fraction is affected by both the mean resources μ, and inequality σ. For a given μ, increasing σ (i.e. greater inequality) makes it more likely that the poverty trap will result, because, by broadening the resource distribution, the tail that protrudes into the desperation zone is necessarily made larger.

The boundaries of the basin of attraction of the poverty trap are also affected by severity of punishment, probability of punishment, and the level of social mobility (Fig.  3 ). If the severity of punishment π is close to zero, there is no disincentive to exploit, and the poverty trap always results. As long as a minimum size of punishment is met, further increases in punishment severity have no benefit in preventing the poverty trap (Fig.  3 A). Indeed, there are circumstances where more severe punishment can make things worse. When the population has a degree of initial inequality that puts it close to the boundary between the two equilibria, very severe punishment (π = 20 or π = 25) pushes it into the poverty trap. This is because any individual that once tries exploitation because they are close to threshold (and is unsuccessful) is pushed so far down in resources by the punishment that they must then continue to exploit forever. Increasing the probability of punishment γ does not have this negative effect (Fig.  3 B). Instead, a very high probability of punishment can forestall the poverty trap at levels of inequality where it would otherwise occur, because it causes some of the worst-off individuals to try cooperating instead, as shown in Fig.  1 E. Finally, very high levels of social mobility r can rescue populations from the poverty trap even at high levels of inequality (Fig.  3 C). This is because of its dramatic effect on the critical value at which individuals start to exploit, as shown in Fig.  1 C.

Equilibrium population states by starting parameters. ( A ) Varying the initial inequality in resources σ and the severity of punishment π, whilst holding constant the probability of punishment γ at 1/3 and social mobility r at 0.1. ( B ) Varying the initial inequality in resources σ and the probability of punishment γ whilst holding the severity of punishment constant at π = 10 and social mobility r at 0.1. ( C ) Varying the initial inequality in resources σ and the level of social mobility r whilst holding constant the probability of punishment γ at 1/3 and the severity of punishment π at 10.

Though the equilibria are self-perpetuating without exogenous forces, the system is highly responsive to shocks. For example, exogenously changing the level of inequality in the population (via imposing a reduction in σ after 16 time steps) produces a phase transition from the poverty trap to the virtuous circle (Supplementary Fig. S3 ). This change is not instantaneous. First, a few individuals cross the threshold and change from exploitation to foraging alone; this produces a consequent change in social trust; which then leads to a mass switch to cooperation, and growth in mean wealth.

Results so far are all based on cooperation occurring in groups of size n  = 5. Reducing n enlarges the basin of attraction of the virtuous circle (Supplementary Sect.  2.5 , Supplementary Fig. S4 ). This is because, for any given population prevalence of exploitation, there is more likely to be at least one exploiter in a group of five than a group of three. Reducing the interaction group size changes the trustworthiness boundary between the region where it is optimal to cooperate and the region where it is better to forage alone. Thus, there are parameter values in our model where populations would succumb to the poverty trap by attempting to mount large cooperation groups, but avoid it by restricting cooperation groups to a smaller size.

In our model, exploiting others can be an individual’s optimal strategy under certain circumstances, namely when their resource levels are very low, and cannot be expected to spontaneously improve. We extend previous models by showing that it can be optimal to exploit even when the punishment for doing so and being caught is large enough to make the expected utility of exploitation negative. Two conditions combine to make this the case. First, exploitation produces a large variance in payoffs: it is costly to exploit and be caught, but there is a chance of securing a large positive payoff. Second, there is a threshold of desperation below which it is extremely costly to fall. It is precisely when at risk of falling below this threshold that exploitation becomes worthwhile: if it succeeds, one hurdles the threshold, and if it fails, one is scarcely worse off than one would have been anyway. In effect, due to the threshold, there is a point where agents have little left to lose, and this makes them risk-preferring. Thus, our model results connect classic economic models of crime 15 , 16 to risk-sensitive foraging theory from behavioural ecology 20 . In the process, it provides a simple answer to the question that has puzzled a number of authors 18 , 19 : why aren’t increases in the severity of punishments as deterrent as simple expected utility considerations imply they ought to be? Our model suggests that, beyond a minimum required level of punishment, not only might increasing severity be ineffective at reducing exploitation. It could under some circumstances make exploitation worse, by pushing punishees into such a low resource state that they have no reasonable option but to continue exploiting. Our findings also have implications for the literature on the evolution of cooperation. This has shown that punishment can be an effective mechanism for stabilising cooperation 28 , 29 , but have not considered that the deterrent effects of punishment may be different for different individuals, due to variation in their states. Our findings could be relevant to understanding why some level of exploitation persists in practice even when punishment is deterrent overall.

Within criminology, our prediction of risky exploitative behaviour when in danger of falling below a threshold of desperation is reminiscent of Merton’s strain theory of deviance 30 , 31 . Under this theory, deviance results when individuals have a goal (remaining constantly above the threshold of participation in society), but the available legitimate means are insufficient to get them there (neither foraging alone nor cooperation has a large enough one-time payoff). They thus turn to risky alternatives, despite the drawbacks of these (see also Ref. 32 for similar arguments). This explanation is not reducible to desperation making individuals discount the future more steeply, which is often invoked as an explanation for criminality 33 . Agents in our model do not face choices between smaller-sooner and larger-later rewards; the payoff for exploitation is immediate, whether successful or unsuccessful. Also note the philosophical differences between our approach and ‘self-control’ styles of explanation 34 . Those approaches see offending as deficient decision-making: it would be in people’s interests not to offend, but some can’t manage it (see Ref. 35 for a critical review). Like economic 15 , 16 and behavioural-ecological 17 theories of crime more generally, ours assumes instead that there are certain situations or states where offending is the best of a bad set of available options.

As well as a large class of circumstances where only individuals in a poor resource state will choose to exploit, we also identify some—where the expected payoff for exploitation is positive—where individuals with both very low and very high resources exploit, whilst those in the middle avoid doing so. Such cases have been anticipated in theories of human risk-sensitivity 21 . These distinguish risk-preference through need (e.g. to get back above the threshold immediately) from risk-preference through ability (e.g. to absorb a punishment with no ill effects), predicting that both can occur under some circumstances 32 . This dual form of risk-taking is best analogised to a situation where punishments take the form of fines: those who are desperate have to run the risk of incurring them, even though they can ill afford it; whilst those who are extremely well off can simply afford to pay them if caught. When we simulate populations of agents all following the optimal strategies identified by the model, population-level characteristics (inequality of resources, level of social mobility) affect the prevalence of exploitation and the level of trust. Specifically, holding constant the average level of resources, greater inequality makes frequent exploitation and low trust a more likely outcome. Thus, we capture the widely-observed associations between inequality, trust and crime levels that were our starting point 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 . Note that our explanation for the inequality-crime nexus is basically compositional rather than psychosocial. Decisions to offend are based primarily on agents’ own levels of resources; these are just more likely to be desperately low in more unequal populations. Turning these simulation findings into empirical predictions, we would expect the association between inequality and crime rates to be driven by more unequal societies producing worse prospects for people at the bottom end of the resources distribution, who would be the ones who turn to property crime. Inequality effects at the aggregate level should be largely mediated by individual-level poverty. There is evidence compatible with these claims for property crime 2 , 12 , 13 . This is the type of crime most similar to our modelled situation. Non-acquisitive crimes of violence, though related to inequality, do not appear so strongly mediated by individual-level poverty, and may thus require different but related explanations 2 , 36 .

However, the other major result of our population simulations—that more unequal populations are more likely to produce low trust—is not compositional. In our unequal simulated populations, every agent has low trust, not just the ones at the bottom of the resource distribution. This is compatible with empirical evidence: the association between inequality and social trust survives controlling for individual poverty 6 . Thus, our model generates a genuinely ecological effect of inequality on social relationships that fits the available evidence and links it to the psychosocial tradition of explanation 37 . Indeed, the model suggests a reason why psychosocial effects should arise. For agents above the threshold, the optimal decision between cooperation and foraging alone depends on inferences about whether anyone else in the population will exploit. To know that, you have to attend to the behaviour of everyone else, not just your own state. Thus, the model naturally generates a reason for agents to be sensitive to the distribution of others’ states in the population (or at the very least their behaviour), and to condition their social engagement with others on it.

In as much as our model provides a compositional explanation for the inequality-crime relationship, it might seem to imply that high levels of inequality would not lead to high crime as long as the mean wealth of the population was sufficiently high. This is because, with high mean wealth, even those in the bottom tail of the distribution would have sufficient levels of resources to be above the threshold of desperation. However, this implication would only follow if the location of the desperation threshold is considered exogenous and fixed. If, instead, the location of the desperation threshold moves upwards with mean wealth of the population, then more inequality will always produce more acquisitive crime, regardless of the mean level of population wealth. Assuming that the threshold moves in this way is a reasonable move: definitions of poverty for developed countries are expressed in terms of the resources required to live a life seen as acceptable or normal within that society, not an absolute dollar value (see Ref. 36 , pp. 64–6). Moreover, there is clear evidence that people compare themselves to relevant others in assessing the adequacy of their resources 38 . Thus, we would expect inequality to remain important for crime regardless of overall economic growth.

In addition to the results concerning inequality, we found that social mobility should, other things being equal, reduce the prevalence of exploitation, although social mobility has to be very high for the effect to be substantial. The pattern can again be interpreted as consistent with Merton’s strain theory of deviance 31 : very high levels of social mobility provide legitimate routes for those whose state is poor to improve it, thus reducing the zone where deviance is required. Economists have noted that those places within the USA with higher levels of intergenerational social mobility also have lower crime rates 39 , 40 . Their account of the causality in this association is the reverse of ours: the presence of crime, particularly violent crime, inhibits upward mobility 39 . However, it is possible that social mobility and crime are mutually causative.

Like any model, ours simplifies social situations to very bare elements. Interaction groups are drawn randomly at every time step from the whole population. Thus, there are no ongoing personal relationships, no reputation, no social networks, no kinship, no segregation or assortment of sub-groups. The model best captures social groups with frequent new interactions between strangers, which is appropriate since the phenomena under investigated are documented for commercial and industrial societies. A problem in mapping our findings onto empirical reality is that our population simulations generate two discrete equilibria: zero trust, economic stagnation and zero cooperation, or almost perfect trust, unlimited economic growth and zero exploitation. Although we show that the distribution of resources determines which equilibrium is reached, our model as presented here does generate the continuous relationships between inequality, crime, and trust (or indeed inequality and economic growth 41 ) that have been observed in reality. Even the most unequal real society features some social cooperation, and even the most equal features some property crime; the effects of inequality are graded. We make two points to try to bridge the disconnect between the black and white world of the simulations and the shades of grey seen in reality. First, our model does predict a continuous relationship between the level of inequality and the maximum size of cooperating groups. A highly unequal population, containing many individuals with an incentive to exploit, might only be able to sustain collective actions at the level of a few individuals, whereas a more equal population where almost no-one has an incentive to exploit could sustain far larger ones. Second, we appeal to all the richness of real social processes that our model excludes. In unequal countries, although social trust is relatively low, people can draw more heavily on their established social networks and reputational information; more homogenous sub-groups can segregate themselves; people can use defensive security measures, to keep cooperative relationships ongoing and protected; and so forth. Investment in these kinds of measures may vary proportionately with inequality and trust, thus maintaining outcomes intermediate between the stark equilibria of our simulations. Our key findings also depend entirely on accepting the notion that there is a threshold of desperation, a substantial non-linearity in the value of having resources. As we outlined in the Introduction, we believe there are good grounds for exploring the implications of such an assumption. However, that is very different from claiming that the widespread existence of such thresholds has been demonstrated. We hope our findings might generate empirical investigation into both the objective reality and psychological appraisal of such thresholds for people in poverty.

Limitations and simplifications duly noted, our model does have some clear implications. Large population-scale reductions in crime and exploitation should not be expected to follow from increasing the severity of punishments, and these could conceivably be counterproductive. Addressing basic distributional issues that leave large numbers of people in desperate circumstances and without legitimate means to improve them will have a much greater effect. Natural-experimental evidence supports this. The Eastern Cherokee, a Native American group with a high rate of poverty, distributed casino royalties through an unconditional income scheme. Rates of minor offending amongst young people in recipient households decline markedly, with no changes to the judicial regime 42 . Improving the distribution of resources would also be expected to increase social trust, and with it, the quality of human relationships; and this, for everyone, not just those in desperate circumstances.

The model was written in Python and implemented via a Jupyter notebook. For a fuller description of the model, see Supplementary Sect.  1 and Supplementary Table S1 .

Computing optimal policies

We used a stochastic dynamic programming algorithm 25 , 26 . Agents choose among a set of possible actions, defined by (probabilistic) consequences for the agent’s level of resources s . We seek, for every possible value of s and of p the agent might face, and given the values of other parameters, the action that maximises expected fitness. Maximization is achieved through backward induction: we begin with a ‘last time step’ ( T ) where terminal fitness is defined, as an increasing linear function of resource level s . Then in the period T  − 1 we compute for each combination of state variables and action the expected fitness at T , and thus choose for the optimal action for every combination of states. This allows us define expected fitness for every value of the state variables at T  − 1, repeat the maximization for time step T  − 2, and so on iteratively. The desperation threshold is implemented as a fixed fitness penalty ω that is applied whenever the individual’s resources are below the threshold level s  = 0. As the calculation moves backwards away from T , the resulting mapping of state variables to optimal actions converges to a long term optimal policy.

Actions and payoffs

Agents choose among three actions:

Cooperate The agent invests x units of resource and is rewarded α · x with probability 1 −  p ( p is the probability of cooperation being exploited, and 1 −  p is therefore the trustworthiness of the surrounding population), and 0 with probability p . The net payoff is therefore x · ( α  − 1) if there is no exploitation and −  x if there is. We assume that α  > 1 (by default α  = 1 . 2), which means that cooperation is more efficient than foraging alone. For the computation of optimal policies, we treat p as an exogenous variable. In the population simulations, it becomes endogenous.

Exploit An agent joins a cooperating group, but does not invest x, and instead tries to steal their partners’ investments, leading to a reward of β if the exploitation succeeds and a cost π if it fails. The probability of exploitation failing (i.e. being punished) is γ .

Forage alone The agent forages alone, investing x units of resource, receiving x in return, and suffering no risk of exploitation.

Payoffs are also affected by a random perturbation, so the above-mentioned payoffs are just the expected values. A simple form such as the addition of \(\varepsilon \sim N\left( {0, \sigma^{2} } \right)\) would be unsuitable when used in population simulations. As the variance of independent random variables is additive, it would lead to an ever increasing dispersion of resource levels in the population. To avoid this issue, we adopted a perturbation in the form of a first-order autoregressive process that does not change either the mean or the variance of resources in the population 43 :

Here, µ is the current mean resources in the population and σ 2 the population variance. The term \(\left( {1 - r} \right) \in \left[ {0, 1} \right]\) represents the desired correlation between an agent’s current and subsequent resources, which leads to us describing r as the ‘social mobility’ of the population. The perturbation can be seen as a ‘shuffle’. Each agent’s resource level is attracted to µ with a strength depending on r , but this regression to the mean is exactly offset at the population level by the variance added by the perturbation, so that the overall distribution of resources is roughly unchanged. If r  = 1, current resources are not informative about future resources.

The dynamic programming equation

Let I be the set of actions ( cooperate , exploit and alone ), which we shorten as I  = { C,H,A }. For i   ∈   I , we denote as \(\phi_{t}^{i} \left( {s, .} \right)\) the probability density of resources in in time step t if, in time step t  − 1, the resource level is s and the chosen action i . The expressions of these functions were obtained through the law of total probability, conditioning on the possible outcomes of the actions (e.g. success or failure of exploitation and cooperation), and with the Gaussian density of the random variable.

We can now write the dynamic programming equation, which gives the backward recurrence relation to compute the payoff values (and the decisions) at the period t from the ones at the period t  + 1.

Here, \(E_{i}\) is the conditional expectation if action i is played. The optimal action for the time step t is \({\text{argmax}}_{i \in I} E_{i} (f_{t} )\) . The resource variable s was bounded in the interval [− 50, 50], and discretized with 1001 steps of size 0 . 1.

For any given set of parameters (summarised in Table 1 ), we can therefore compute the optimal decision rule. Note that we can distinguish two types of parameters:

‘Structural parameters’, i.e. those defining the ‘rules’ of the game (the payoffs for the actions and the level of social mobility r , for example). In the subsequent simulation phase, these parameters will be fixed for any run of the simulations.

‘Input parameters’, such as p and s . In the simulation phase, these will evolve endogenously.

Optimal policies rapidly stabilize as the computation moves away from T . We report optimal actions at t  = 1 as the globally optimal actions.

Population simulations

We begin each simulation by initializing a population of N  = 500 individuals, whose resource levels are randomly drawn from a Gaussian distribution with a given mean µ and variance σ 2 . At each time step, interaction groups of n  = 5 individuals are formed at random, and re-formed at each time step to avoid effects of assortment. There is no spatial structure in the populations. Each individual always follows the optimal policy for its resources s and its estimate of p (see below). Varying N has no effect as long as N  >  n and 500 is simply chosen for computational convenience.

To deal with the case where several members of the same interaction group choose to exploit, we choose one at random that exploits, and the others are deemed to forage alone (in effect, there is nothing left for them to take). Also, when there is no cooperator in the group, all exploiters are deemed to forage alone.

Rather than providing each individual with perfect knowledge of the trustworthiness of the rest of the population 1 −  p , we allow individuals to form an estimate (their social trust ) from their experience. Social trust is derived in the following way. Each agent observes the decision of a sample of K individuals in the population, counts the number k of exploiters and infers an (unbiased) estimate of the prevalence of exploiters in the population: \(k^{\prime} = \frac{k}{K}N\) (rounded). The size of the sample can be varied to alter the precision with which agents can estimate trustworthiness. Unless otherwise stated we used K  = 50. Since p is the probability that there will be at least one exploiter in an interaction group, it is one minus the probability that there will be zero exploiters. Each agent computes this from their k’ by combinatorics.

An intentional consequence of social trust being estimated through sampling is that there is some population heterogeneity in social trust, and therefore in decisions about which action to take, even for agents with the same resources s . Note also that agents infer trustworthiness not from observing the particular individuals in their current interaction group, but rather, from a cross-section of the entire population. Thus, the estimate is genuinely social trust (the perception that people in society generally do or do not behave well).

Code availability

The Jupyter notebook for running the model is available at: https://github.com/regicid/Deprivation-antisociality . This repository also contains R code and datafiles used to make the figures in the paper.

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Acknowledgements

This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant agreement No AdG 666669, COMSTAR). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript. The authors thank Melissa Bateson, Juliette Dronne, Ulysse Klatzmann, Daniel Krupp, Kate Pickett, and Rebecca Saxe for their input.

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A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Income Inequality and Crime in Europe: Do Places Matter?

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While previous synthesis research studies have found income inequality to be the most consistent predictor of crime at the cross-national level, recent comparative research studies in Europe have implied that the magnitudes of income inequality-crime association might be different in cross-national studies depending on sample composition. Employing a systematic review and meta-analysis, this study aimed to systematically estimate the strength and variability of income inequality-crime association in Europe across multiple published articles and to investigate the intervening role of regions in this relationship. Additional analyses were conducted to detect the regional differences within Europe using the official secondary data of 36 European countries. Income inequality in Europe had a small impact on crime (Mr = .171, k  = 10), indicating that income inequality accounts for only 3% of the variance in crime outcomes. While the income inequality-crime association was significant in Eastern/Northern Europe, income inequality had little or no effect on crime in Western/Southern Europe. The small association between income inequality and crime in Europe may be due to the well-developed welfare system, which helps to buffer the adverse effects of being poor. This study’s findings highlight the importance of incorporating geographic characteristics into cross-national research using purposive sampling techniques.

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Kim, B., Seo, C. & Hong, YO. A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Income Inequality and Crime in Europe: Do Places Matter?. Eur J Crim Policy Res 28 , 573–596 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-020-09450-7

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Dynamic linkages between poverty, inequality, crime, and social expenditures in a panel of 16 countries: two-step GMM estimates

• Muhammad Khalid Anser 1 ,
• Zahid Yousaf 2 ,
• Abdelmohsen A. Nassani 3 ,
• Saad M. Alotaibi 3 ,
• Ahmad Kabbani 4 &
• Khalid Zaman 5  

Journal of Economic Structures volume  9 , Article number:  43 ( 2020 ) Cite this article

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The study examines the relationship between growth–inequality–poverty (GIP) triangle and crime rate under the premises of inverted U-shaped Kuznets curve and pro-poor growth scenario in a panel of 16 diversified countries, over a period of 1990–2014. The study employed panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator for robust inferences. The results show that there is (i) no/flat relationship between per capita income and crime rate; (ii) U-shaped relationship between poverty headcount and per capita income and (iii) inverted U-shaped relationship between income inequality and economic growth in a panel of selected countries. Income inequality and unemployment rate increases crime rate while trade openness supports to decrease crime rate. Crime rate substantially increases income inequality while health expenditures decrease poverty headcount ratio. Per capita income is influenced by high poverty incidence, whereas health expenditures and trade factor both amplify per capita income across countries. The results of pro-poor growth analysis show that though the crime rate decreases in the years 2000–2004 and 2010–2014, while the growth phase was anti-poor due to unequal distribution of income. Pro-poor education and health trickle down to the lower income strata group for the years 2010–2014, as education and health reforms considerably reduce crime rate during the time period.

1 Introduction

The study evaluated different United Nation sustainable development goals (SDGs), i.e., goals 1 and 2 (poverty reduction and hunger), goals 3 and 4 (promotion of health and education), goal 10 (reduced inequalities), and goal 16 (reduction of violence, peace and justice) to access pro-poor growth and crime reduction in a panel of 16 heterogeneous countries. The discussion of crime rate in pro-poor growth (PPG) agenda remains absent in the economic development literature, though Bourguignon ( 2000 ) stressed to reduce crime and violence by judicious income distribution; however, a very limited literature is available to emphasize the need of social safety nets for vulnerable peoples that should be included in the pro-growth policy agenda for broad-based economic growth. Kelly ( 2000 ) investigated the relationship between income inequality (INC_INEQ) and urban crime, and found that INC_INEQ is the strong predictor to influence violent crime rather than property crime, while poverty (POV) and economic growth (EG) significantly affect on property crime rather than violent crime. The policies should be developed for equitable income and sound EG for reducing POV and crime across the globe. Drèze and Khera ( 2000 ) examined the inter-district variations of intentional homicides rate (IHR) in India for the period of 1981 and found that there is no significant relationship between urbanization/poverty and murder rates, while literacy rate has a strong impact to reduce criminal violence in India. The results further indicate the lower murder rate in those districts where female to male ratio is comparatively high. The study emphasized the need to reduce crime, violence and homicides by significant growth policies for sustained EG in India. Neumayer ( 2003 ) investigated the long-run relationship between political governance, economic policies and IHR using the panel of 117 selected countries for the period of 1980–1997 and concluded that IHR can be reduce by good economic and political policies. The results specified that higher income level, good civic sense, sound EG, and higher level of democracy all are connected with the lower homicides rate in a panel of countries. The study emphasized the need to improve governance indicators in order to lowering the IHR across the globe. Jacobs and Richardson ( 2008 ) examined the interrelationship between INC_INEQ and IHR in a panel of 14 developed democracies nation and found that intentional homicides is the mounting concerns in those nations where the inequitable income distribution exists, while results further provoke the presence of young males associated with the higher murder rates in a region. The policies should be formulated caution with care while devising for judicious income distribution with demographic variables in the pro-growth agenda. Sachsida et al. ( 2010 ) found inertial effect on criminality and confirmed the positive relationship between INC_INEQ, urbanization and IHR. The study emphasized the importance of public security spending to reduce IHR in Brazil. Pridemore ( 2011 ) re-assessed the relationship between POV, INC_INEQ and IHR in a cross-national panel of US states and found POV-homicides’ linkages rather than inequality-homicides’ association. The study argued that there is substantially desire to re-assess the inequality-homicides’ linkages as it might be the misspecification of the model. Ulriksen ( 2012 ) examined the relationship between PPG, POV reduction and social security policies in the context of Botswana and found that broad-based social security policies have a significant impact to reduce POV, thus there is a strong need to include social security protections in the pro-poor growth (PPG) agenda for lowering the POV rates across the globe. Ouimet ( 2012 ) investigated the impact of socio-economic factors on IHR in a panel of 165 countries for the period 2010 and found that GIP triangle are strongly connected with the IHR for all countries, while for sub-samples, the results only support the inequality-homicides association rather than POV and EG induced IHR. The results highlighted the importance of GIP triangle to reduce IHR in a panel of selected countries.

Liu et al. ( 2013 ) investigated the relationship between national scale indicators of socio-economic and demographic factors and crime rates in 32 Mexican states and found that EG, wages and unemployment negatively affect crime rates, while increase federal police force that is helpful to reduce crime rates; however, on the other way around, higher public security expenditures are linked with the higher crime rates in Mexican states. Chu and Tusalem ( 2013 ) investigated the role of state to reduce IHR in a panel of 183 nations and found that political instability increases IHR, while anocracies is the strong predictor to influence IHR in a panel of countries. The study concluded that IHR increases in those countries where there is high level of political instability and death penalty, while the amalgamation of democratic and autocratic features lead to increased IHR. The policies should be drawn to strengthen political governance across the globe. Adeleye ( 2014 ) evaluated the different determinants of INC_INEQ in a large panel of 137 countries using the time series data from 2000 to 2012 and found that per capita income (PCI), secondary education, rule of law index and unemployment rate are the strong predictors for INC_INEQ and IHR, while INC_INEQ considerably affected IHR rate in a region. Dalberis ( 2015 ) investigated the relationship between INC_INEQ, POV and crime rates in Latin American countries and found that INC_INEQ has no significant association with the crime rate in Colombia, Brazil, Uruguay and Salvador, while poverty is the strong predictor to influence crime in Brazil, Uruguay and Salvador. The results highlighted the need for pro-poorness of growth reforms that would be helpful to lowering the crime rates in Latin American countries. Harris and Vermaak ( 2015 ) considered the relationship between expenditures’ inequality and IHRe across 52 districts of South Africa and found that while keeping other district features constant, inequality does appear as a strong dominant player to induce IHR. The rational income distribution along with broad-based EG may play a vital role to reduce IHR in South Africa. Stamatel ( 2016 ) investigated the relationship between democratic cultural values and IHR in a panel of 33 democratic countries for the period 2010 and found that democratic cultural values have a positive and negative impact of IHR in the presence of strong democratic institutions and practices. Ahmed et al. ( 2016 ) identified the different predictors of economic and natural resources in the context of Iran using the time series data from 1965–2011 and found that labor productivity, exports, capital stock and natural resources are the main predictors of EG, which altogether are important for sustained long-term growth of the country. Enamorado et al. ( 2016 ) interlinked crime rates with higher INC_INEQ using a 20-year dataset of more than 2000 Mexican municipalities and confirmed the causal relationships between the two stated factors. The results confined that drug-related crime rates largely increase up to 36% if there is one-point increment in the INC_INEQ during the specified time period. The study concludes with the fact that drug-related violent crime rates are more severe due to high proliferation of large dispersion in the labor market in terms of negative job opportunities in illegal sector. Thus, the sound policies are imperative to seize drug trafficking organizations by force for pro-equality growth. Ling et al. ( 2017 ) analyzed the role of trade openness in Malaysian life expectancy using the data from 1960 to 2014. The results show that continued EG and trade openness substantially increase life expectancy during the study time period. Further, the results established the feedback relationship between income and life expectancy in a country. The study concludes that life expectancy may increase through imported healthcare goods, which improves the quality of life of the people, thus trade liberalization policies are imperative for healthy and wealthy wellbeing.

Zaman ( 2018 ) extensively surveyed the large weighted sample of intellectuals about crime–poverty nexus and explored the number of socio-economic factors that concerned with high crime rate and POV incidence in Pakistan, including INC_INEQ, injustice, unemployment, low spending on education and health, price hikes, etc. There is a high need to increase social spending on education and health infrastructure in order to combat POV and crime rates in a given country. Imran et al. ( 2018 ) considered a time series data of US for a period of 1965–2016 and concluded that incidence of POV increases the intensity of property crime in a given country, while other controlling factors including country’s PCI and unemployment rate are not significantly associated with property crime in a country. The study concludes that property crime should be restricted by strong legislative and regulatory measures, judicious income distribution, and increasing minimum wage rate, which altogether would be helpful for the poor to reap economic benefits from PPG reforms in a country. Zaman et al. ( 2019 ) evaluated the role of education in crime reduction in a panel of 21 countries for a period of 1990–2015 and found a parabola relationship between PCI and crime rates in the presence of quality education and equitable justice across countries. The study further confirmed few other causal conceptions among the variables for making sound policy implications in the context of criminal justice. Piatkowska ( 2020 ) examined the social cost of POV in terms of increasing suicides rates, crime rates, and total violent rates in the United States and across 15 European nations during the period of 1993–2000. The results show that suicides–crime–violent rates are substantially increasing due to increase in relative POV and infant mortality rates across countries. The study argued that relative POV is the strong predictor to increase social cost of nation that needs efficient economic policies to reduce crime rates. Mukherjee ( 2019 ) discussed the role of social sustainability in achieving economic sustainability by reducing different forms of violent/crime rates through state intervention in the context of Indian economy by utilizing the data for a period of 2005–2016. The results further highlighted the need of socio-economic infrastructure development that would be helpful to provide safety nets to the poor in order to reduce crime rates in a country. Duque and McKnight ( 2019 ) presented the channel through which crime rates and legal system provide a pathway to increase INC_INEQ and POV across countries. The study further discussed and highlighted the socio-economic vulnerability that escalates through unequal distribution of income and high POV incidence, which need effective legal system to reduce crime rates. Khan et al. ( 2019a ) surveyed the Bolivian economy to assess pro-poor environmental reforms that could improve the quality of life of the poor through judicious income distribution and sustainable environmental reforms. The results conclude that services’ sector and healthcare infrastructure would be helpful to reduce POV rate and achieve PPG process at country wide. Zaman et al. ( 2020 ) surveyed the large panel of countries (i.e., 124 countries) for a period of 2010–2013 to analyze the role of INC_INEQ and EG on POV incidence across countries. The results generally favor the strong linkages among the three stated factors to support GIP triangle, which forms PPG process. The study emphasized the need to adopt some re-corrective measures in order to provide social safety nets and income distribution in order to make a growth process more pro-poor. Kousar et al. ( 2019 ) confined its finding in favor of POV reduction through managing international remittances’ receipts and financial development that would be helpful to improve the mechanism of income distribution in a country like Pakistan. The study concluded that international remittances may play a vital role to reduce POV via the mediation of financial development in a country.

The real problem is how to make EG more equitable, which is helpful to reduce POV and crime rates, and make a growth more pro-poor. The SDGs largely provoked the need to sustained economic activities, which helpful to make growth policies more poor friendly. The previous studies are widely discussed crime rates and POV reduction (see Zaman 2018 ; Khan et al. 2015 ; Heinemann and Verner 2006 ; etc.); however, a very few studies interlinked POV–crime nexus under PPG and Kuznets curve (KC) hypothesis (see Saasa 2018 ; Berens and Gelepithis 2018 , etc.). Based on the interconnections between crime, POV, and PPG, the study formulated the following research questions, i.e.,

Does crime rate negatively influenced GIP triangle, which sabotages the process of PPG?

The recent study of Khan et al. ( 2019b ) provoked the need of PPG policies to ensure sustainability agenda by including socio-economic and environmental factors in policy formulation, which gives favor to the poor as compared to the non-poor. In the similar lines, the social spending on education and healthcare infrastructure, and reforms needed to reduce labor market uncertainty in the form of lessen unemployment rate is considered the viable option for crime and POV reduction across countries (Khan et al. 2017 ). Thus, the study evaluated the question, i.e.,

To what extent social spending on education, health, and labor market are helpful to reduce crime rate, poverty, and income inequality across countries?

This question would be equally benefited to the developmental economists and policy makers to devise a healthy and wealthy policy by increasing spending on social infrastructure for pro-equality growth (Wang 2017 ). The last question is based upon non-linear formulation of crime–POV nexus where it is evaluated as a second-order coefficient to check the parabola relationship between them, i.e.,

Does crime and poverty exhibit a parabola relationship between them?

The question is all about the second-order condition, which confirmed one out of three conditions, i.e., either it is accepted an inverted U-shaped or U-shaped or flat relationship between them. The second-order condition assessed the probability to reduce crime rates and incidence of POV in policy formulation.

In the light of SDGs, the study explored the impact of GIP triangle and crime rates on pro-growth and PPG policies, which is imperative for sustainable development across countries. The study added social expenditures in PPG dynamics to promote healthy and wealthy economic activities, which improves quality of life of the poor and helpful to reduce crime incidence across countries. The study is first in nature, as authors’ knowledge, which included GIP triangle and crime rate in PPG framework, while controlling different socio-economic factors, including education and health expenditures, unemployment rate, and trade openness. Further, an empirical contribution of the study is to include second-order coefficient of PCI for evaluating crime- and inequality-induced KC, while the study proceed to analyze forecast relationship between the crime and POV incidence over a next 10-year time period. Finally, the study estimated PPG index while including crime rate as a main predictor factor in GIP triangle for robust policy inferences. Thus, these objectives are achieved by different statistical techniques for robust analysis.

2 Data source and methodological framework

The study used number of promising socio-economic variables to determine the dynamic relationship between PPG factors and crime rate under the framework of an inverted U-shaped KC in a panel of 16 diversified countries, using system GMM estimator for the period of 1990–2014. The study used the following variables, i.e., crime rate (proxy by intentional homicides rate per 100,000 population), GINI index measures income inequality, poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of total population), national estimates of unemployment in % of total labor force, education expenditures as % of GDP, per capita health expenditure in current US$, per capita income in constant 2005 US$, and trade openness as % of GDP. The samples of countries are presented in Table  7 in Appendix for ready reference. The data for the study are obtained from World Development Indicators published by World Bank ( 2015 ).

These countries are selected because of the devastating crime rate during the study time period. The recorded figures for Argentina crime rates about to 245% increase between the period of 1991 and 2007, while 2002 is considered the highest committed crime data recorded when the POV and INC_INEQ reached at their peak levels (Bouzat 2010 ). Brazil economy is working out for reduction of crime by focusing on three-point agenda, i.e., reduction in income disparity, to increase spending on education via an increase in enrollment of school dropout children, and to improve labor market conditionings. These three policies design to deter the crime rates in a given country (World Bank 2013 ). The robbery complaints largely increase since last two decades in Chile, which is being planned by controlling two action strategies, i.e., plan cuadrante and country security plan. Both the plan designed to restructured police force to reduce robbery and violence in a country (Vergara 2012 ). The rural China is suffered by high INC_INEQ that leads to higher crime rate (South China Monitoring Report 2015 ) while POV and INC_INEQ lead to crime and violent factor in Colombia (Gordon 2016 ). The socio-economic factors including low provision of education, health, high POV, and food challenges lead to increase crime in Indonesia (Pane 2017 ), while generating employment opportunities and increasing wage rate in Malaysia may be beneficial to reduce crime–POV nexus in a given country (Mulok et al. 2017 ). Mexican economy is suffered with high rate of homicides that negatively affect labor market outcomes, while country inhibits by increasing strict laws to diminish violence (Kato Vidal 2015 ). The safety situation in Morocco is cumbersome, as one of the country reports shows that an increased rate in crime is about to increase up to 23% in 2016 (OSAC 2017 ). The number of other factors remains visible in selected sample of panel of countries, including rural POV and social exclusion that is considered the main factor of socio-economic crisis in Poland (European Commission 2008 ); POV, unemployment, and INC_INEQ chiefly attributed to crime rate in South Africa (Bhorat et al. 2017 ); politics, democracy, and INC_INEQ arise conflicts in Thailand (Hewison 2014 ); corruption and high unemployment are the major conflicts in Tunisia (Saleh 2011 ); and Uruguay economy needs policy actions to reduce POV by investment in children education, modernizing rural sector, and balancing the gender gap (Thamma 2017 ). Thus, these facts about crime and POV in different countries put a focus to study crime–POV nexus under PPG framework in this study for robust evaluation. Figure  2 in Appendix shows the plots of the studied variables at level.

The study used the following non-linear equations to determine the dynamic relationship between PPG factors and crime rate in a panel of countries, i.e.,

where GDPPC indicates per capita GDP, GDPPC 2 indicates square of per capita GDP, GINI indicates Gini coefficient—income inequality, EDUEXP indicates education expenditures, HEXP indicates health expenditures, POVHCR indicates poverty headcount ratio, TOP indicates trade openness, UNEMP indicates unemployment, and CRIME indicates crime rate.

Equations ( 1 ) to ( 3 ) assessed the possible inverted U-shaped relationships between crime rate and PCI, between POVHCR and PCI, and between GINI and PCI, while Eq. ( 4 ) reviewed the PPG reforms across countries. Arellano and Bond ( 1991 ) developed the differenced GMM estimator, whom argued that the GMM estimator eliminates country effects and controls the possible endogeneity of explanatory variables using the appropriate instrumental list that evaluated by Sargan–Hansen test. The process further involves two-step GMM iterations with the time updated weights and adopted the weighting matrix by White period. The tests for autocorrelations by AR(1) and AR(2) and the Sargan test by Sargan–Hansen of over-identifying restrictions are presented for statistical reliability of the given models. The differenced GMM is superior to the 2SLS and system GMM, i.e., 2SLS regression estimator is used when the known endogeneity exists between the variables, which are handled by including the list of instrumental variables at their first lagged. Thus, the possible endogeneity problem is resolved accordingly. The system GMM further be used instead of 2SLS as if there are more than one endogenous issues exist in the model, which is unable to resolve through 2SLS estimator. Finally, the differenced GMM estimator is used as its estimated AR(1) and AR(2) bound values that would be helpful to encounter the issues of serial correlation and endogeneity problem accordingly.

Using the GMM estimator, the study verified different possibilities of KC, i.e., if the signs and magnitudes of \(\beta_{1} > 0\) and \(\beta_{2} < 0\) , than we may confirm the crime-induced KC, poverty-induced KC, and inequality-induced KC. The inverted U-shaped relationship between crime rate and PCI verified ‘crime-induced KC’, between POVHCR and PCI verified ‘POV-induced KC’, and inverted U-shaped relationship between GINI and PCI verified ‘inequality-induced KC’. On the other way around, if \(\beta_{1} < 0\) and \(\beta_{2} > 0\) , then we consider the U-shaped KC between crime rate and PCI, between POV and PCI, and between GINI and PCI, respectively. There are three other situations we may observe with the sign and magnitude of \(\beta_{1}\) and \(\beta_{2}\) , i.e., (i) \(\beta_{1} < 0\) and \(\beta_{2} = 0\) , (ii) \(\beta_{1} > 0\) and \(\beta_{2} = 0\) , and (iii) \(\beta_{1} = 0\) and \(\beta_{2} = 0\) , referred the monotonically decreasing function, monotonically increasing function, and flat/no relationship with the crime-PCI, poverty-PCI, and inequality-PCI in a panel of cross-sectional countries. The study further employed social accounting matrix by impulse response function (IRF) and variance decomposition analysis (VDA) in an inter-temporal relationship between the studied variables for a next 10-year period starting from 2015 to 2024. As it name implies, VDA explains the proportional variance in one variable caused by the proportional variance by the other variables in a vector autoregressive (VAR) system, while IRF traces the dynamic responses of a variable to innovations in other variables in the system. Both the techniques use the moving average representation of the original VAR system. Figure  1 shows the theoretical framework of the study to clearly outline the possible relationship between the stated variables.

Source: authors’ extraction

Research framework of the study.

Figure  1 shows the possible relationship between POV and crime rates in mediation of inequality, unemployment, and EG across countries. It is likelihood that POV increases inequality that leads to decrease in EG. The low-income growth further leads to increased unemployment, which causes high crime rates. This nexus is still rotated through crime rates that increase POV incidence across countries. The PPG process still works under the stated factors that need judicious income distribution to reduce crime rates.

The study further proceeds to evaluate the PPG reforms in a panel of selected countries. Kakwani and Pernia ( 2000 ) proposed an index of PPG called ‘PPG index’, which is evaluated by the growth elasticity and inequality elasticity with respect to POV. The same methodology is adopted in this study to assess the PPG and/or pro-rich growth reforms to assess the changes in the crime rate in a panel of countries. PPG defined as a state in which where the growth trickles down to the poor as compared to the non-poor. Poverty is largely affected by two main factors, i.e., higher growth rate may reduce the POV rates, while higher INC_INEQ reduces the impact of EG to reduce POV; therefore, the PPG index included the following mathematical illustrations, i.e.,

The study further assessed the pro-poorness of social expenditures and evaluates its impact to observe changes in IHR. The study shows the following mathematical illustrations that is extended from the scholarly work of Zaman and Khilji ( 2014 ); Kakwani and Pernia ( 2000 ) and Kakwani and Son ( 2004 ) i.e.,

where \(\alpha =\) 0, 1 and 2 indicate POVHCR, poverty gap and squared poverty gap, respectively, ‘P’ indicates FGT poverty measures, and ‘SOCIALEXP’ indicates social expenditures. Differentiating \(\eta_{\alpha }\) in Eq. ( 9 ) with respect to social expenditures gives more elaborated form of GEP, i.e.,

The elasticity of entire class of poverty measures \(P_{\alpha }\) with respect to Gini index is given by

which will be always positive only when \(S{\text{OCIALEXPE}} > z\) .Equations ( 10 ) and ( 11 ) are combined together to form TPE for all FGT poverty measures, i.e.,

or \(\delta_{\alpha } = \eta_{\alpha } + \xi_{\alpha }\) . Finally, pro-poorness of social expenditures estimated based on the following equation, i.e.,

Kakwani and Son ( 2004 ) presented the following bench mark applications to assess the pro-poor and/or anti-poor policies, i.e., the following value judgments regarding the PPG index ( \(\varphi\) ) are as follows, i.e.,

\(\varphi\)  < 0, growth is pro-rich or anti-poor,

0 <  \(\varphi\) \(\le\) 0.33, the process of PPG is considerable low,

0.33 <  \(\theta\) \(\le\) 0.66, the process of PPG is moderate,

0.66 <  \(\varphi\)  < 1.0, the process of EG considered as pro-poor, and

\(\varphi \ge\) 1.0, the process of EG is highly pro-poor.

The study utilized the PPG model for ready reference in this study.

This section presented the descriptive statistics in Table  1 , correlation matrix in Table  2 , dynamic system GMM estimates in Table  3 , IRF estimates in Table  4 , VDA estimates in Table  5 , while finally Table  6 shows the estimates for PPG in a panel of selected countries. Table  1 shows that GDPPC has a minimum value of US$ 199.350 and the maximum value of US$ 11257.600, with a mean and standard deviation (STD) value of US$ 4340.777 and US$ 2490.554, respectively. GINI has a minimum value of 25% and the maximum value of 64.790%, having an STD value of 8.580% with an average value of 45.095%. The minimum value of EDUEXP is about 0.998% of GDP and the maximum value of 7.657% of GDP, with an average value of 4.051% of GDP. The average value of HEXP per capita is about US$ 321.249 and a maximum value of US$ 1431.154, with an STD value of US$ 292.802. The maximum value of POVHCR is about 69% at US$1.90 a day with an average value of 12.394% at US$1.90 a day. The minimum value of trade is 13.753% of GDP and the maximum value of 220.407% of GDP, with an average value of 62.391% of GDP. The mean value for UNEMP is about 8.890% of total labor force with STD value of 6.010%. Finally, the minimum value of crime rate is about 0.439 per 100,000 inhabitants and the maximum value of 71.786 per 100,000 inhabitants, with an average value of 11.664 per 100,000 peoples. This exercise would be helpful to understand the basic descriptions of the studied variables in a panel of countries.

Figure  3 in Appendix shows the plots of the studied variables and found the stationary movement in the variables at their first difference. Table  2 presents the estimates of correlation matrix and found that GINI (i.e., r  = 0.264), EDUEXP ( r  = 0.243), HEXP ( r  = 0.730), TOP ( r  = 0.061), UNEMP (0.152) and CRIME ( r  = 0.031) have a positive correlation with the GDPPC, while POVHCR ( r  = − 0.599) significantly decreases GDPPC.

The results further reveal that GINI is affected by EDUEXP, HEXP, UNEMP and CRIME, while it considerably decreases by trade liberalization policies. EDUEXP, HEXP, PCI, TOP and UNEMP significantly decrease POVHCR, while crime rate has a positive correlation with the POVHCR. Finally, GINI have a greater magnitude, i.e., r  = 0.671, to influence CRIME, followed by UNEMP ( r  = 0.417), EDUEXP ( r  = 0.188), and POVHCR ( r  = 0.164) while trade liberalization policies support to decrease crime rates in a panel of countries. The study now proceeds to estimate the two-step system GMM for analyzing the functional relationship between socio-economic factors and crime rate. The results are presented in Table  3 .

The results of panel GMM show that GINI and UNEMP both have a significant and direct relationship with the CRIME, while TOP have an indirect relationship with CRIME in a panel of countries. The results imply that GINI and UNEMP are the main factors that increase CRIME, while trade liberalization policies have a supportive role to decrease crime rates across countries. Thorbecke and Charumilind ( 2002 ) evaluated the impact of income inequality on health, education, political conflict, and crime, and surveyed the different casual mechanism in between income inequality and its socio-economic impact across the globe. The policies have devised while reaching the conclusive relationships between them. Kennedy et al. ( 1998 ) concluded that social capital and income inequality are the powerful predictors of intentional homicides rate and violent crime in the US states. Altindag ( 2012 ) explored the long-run relationship between unemployment and crime rates in a country-specific panel dataset of Europe and found that unemployment significantly increases crime rates, while unemployment has a power predictor of exchange rate movements and industrial accident across the Europe. Menezes et al. ( 2013 ) confirmed the positive association between income inequality and criminality, as rational income distribution tends to decrease neighborhood homicides rate while it implies an increase in the intentional homicides rate in the surrounding neighborhoods.

In a second regression panel, the results confirmed the U-shaped relationship between POVHCR and GDPPC, as at initial level of EG, POV significantly declines, while at the later stages, this result is evaporated, as EG subsequently increases POVHCR that shows pro-rich federal policies across countries. The HEXP, however, significantly decreases POVHCR during the study time period. Dercon et al. ( 2012 ) investigated the relationship between chronic POV and rural EG in Ethiopia and argued that chronic POV is associated with the lack of education, physical assets and remoteness, while EG in terms of provide better roads and extension services may trickle down to the poor in a same way that the non-chronically poor benefited. Solinger and Hu ( 2012 ) examined the relationship between health, wealth and POV in urban China and found that wealthier cities prefer to allocate their considerable portion of savings for social assistance funds, while poorer places save the city money and work outside in a hope that the peoples would be better able to support themselves. Fosu ( 2015 ) examined the relationship between GIP triangle in sub-Saharan African countries and found that as a whole, South African countries lag behind the BICR (Brazil, India, China and Russia) group of countries; however, many of them in sub-Saharan African countries have outperformed India. The results further specified that PCI is the main predictor to reduce POV in sub-Saharan African countries; however, rational income distribution is a crucial challenge to reduce POV reduction through substantial growth reforms in a region. Kalichman et al. ( 2015 ) concluded that food poverty is associated with the multifaceted problems of health-related outcomes across the globe.

In a third regression panel, the results confirm an inverted U-shaped relationship between GDPPC and GINI that verified an inequality-induced KC in a panel of countries. The results imply that at initial level of economic development, GINI first increases and then decreases with the increased GDPPC across countries. CRIME, however, it is associated with the higher GINI during the studied time period. Kuznets ( 1955 ), Ahluwalia ( 1976 ), Deininger and Squire ( 1998 ), and others confirmed an inverted U-shaped relationship between INC_INEQ and PCI in different economic settings. Mo ( 2000 ) suggested different channelss to examine the possible impact of INC_INEQ on EG and found that ‘transfer channel’ exert the most important channel, while ‘human capital’ is the least important channel that negatively affects the rate of EG via INC_INEQ. Popa ( 2012 ) argued that health and education both are important predictors for EG, while POV and unemployment negatively correlated with the EG in Romania. Herzer and Vollmer ( 2012 ) confirmed the negative relationship between INC_INEQ and EG within the sample of developing countries, developed countries, democracies, non-democracies, and sample as a whole. In a similar line, Malinen ( 2012 ) confirmed the long-run equilibrium relationship between PCI and INC_INEQ and found that income inequality negatively affected the growth of developed countries.

The final regression shows that HEXP and TOP both significantly increase GDPPC, while POVHCR decreases the pace of EG, which merely be shown pro-rich federal policies in a panel of countries. Ranis et al. ( 2000 ) found that both the health and education expenditures lead to increased EG, while investment improves human development in a cross-country regression. Bloom et al. ( 2004 ) confirmed the positive connection between health and EG across the globe. Gyimah-Brempong and Wilson ( 2004 ) examined the possible effect of healthy human capital on PCI of sub-Saharan African and OECD countries and found the positive association between them in a panel of countries.

The statistical tests of the system GMM estimator confirmed the stability of the model by F-statistics, as empirically model is stable at 1% level of confidence interval. Sargan–Hansen test confirmed the instrumental validity at conventional levels for all cases estimated. Autocorrelations tests imply that except POVHCR model, the remaining three models including CRIME, GINI and GDPPC model confirmed the absence of first- and second-order serial correlation, and as a consequence, we verified our instruments are valid. As far as POVHCR model, we believed the results of Sargan–Hansen test of over identifying restrictions and AR(1) that is insignificant at 5% level, and confirmed the validity of instruments and absence of autocorrelation at first-order serial correlation. Table  4 shows the estimate of IRF for the next 10-year period starting from a year of 2015 to 2024.

The results show that the socio-economic factors have a mix result with the rate of crime, as POVHCR slightly increases with decreasing rate with the crime data, i.e., in the next coming years from 2016, 2018, 2019, and 2022, POVHCR exhibits a negative sign, while in the remaining years in between from 2015 to 2024, POVHCR increases crime rate. GINI will considerably increase crime rate from 2022 to 2024. UNEMP has a mixed result to either increase crime rate in one period while in the very next upcoming periods, it declines crime rate. Similar types of results been found with EDUEXP, HEXP and with the TOP; however, GDPPC will constantly increase the rate of crime in a panel of countries. In an inter-temporal relationship between POVHCR and other predictors, the results show that GDPPC would significantly decrease POVHCR for the next 10-year period; however, UNEMP, HEXP, and crime rate would considerably increase POVHCR. EDUEXP and TOP would support to reduce GINI for the next upcoming years, while remaining variables including crime rate, POV, UNEMP, HEXP, and GDPPC associated with an increased GINI across countries. The GDPPC will be influenced by crime rate, POVHCR, GINI, UNEMP, HEXP, and EDUEXP, while TOP would considerably to support GDPPC for the next 10-year time period. Figure  4 in Appendix shows the IRF estimates for the ready reference.

Table  5 shows the estimates of VDA and found that POVHCR will exert the largest share to influence crime rates, followed by GDPPC, TOP, HEXP, EDUEXP, GINI, and UNEMP. POVHCR would be affected by crime rate (i.e., 4.450%), UNEMP (1.751%), GDPPC (1.120%), GINI (1.043%), HEXP (0.639%), and EDUEXP (0.512%), and TOP (0.299%), respectively.

The results further reveal that GINI will affected by POVHCR, as it is explained by 7.680% variations to influence GINI for the next 10-year period. UNEMP, EDUEXP, and crime rate will subsequently influenced GDPPC about to 1.107%, 0.965%, and 0.312% respectively. The largest variance to explain UNEMP will be TOP, while the lowest variance to influence UNEMP will be GINI for the next 10-year period. Finally, GDPPC would largely influenced by HEXP, followed by UNEMP, CRIME, POVHCR, EDUEXP, TOP, and GINI for the period of 2015 to 2024. Figure  5 in Appendix shows the plots of the VDA for ready reference.

Finally, Table  6 presents the changes in crime rate by five different growth phases, i.e., phase 1: 1990–1994, phase 2: 1995–1999, phase 3: 2000–2004, phase 4: 2005–2009, and phase 5: 2010–2014. The results show that in the years 1990–1994, 1% increase in EG and INC_INEQ decrease POVHCR by − 0.023% and − 0.630%, which reduces TPE by − 0.629 percentage points. The PPG index surpassed the bench mark value of unity and confirmed the trickledown effect that facilitates the poor as compared to the non-poor. However, there is an overwhelming increase in the crime rate beside that the pro-poorness of EG, which indicate the need for substantial safety nets’ protection to the poor that escape out from this acute activities (Wang et al. 2017 ). In a second phase from 1995 to 1999, although EG decreases POVHCR by − 0.187; however, GINI has a greater share to increase POVHCR by 0.517% that ultimately increases TPE by 0.330%. This increase in the TPE turns to decrease PPG as 1.764, which shows anti-poor/pro-rich federal policies and low reforms for the poor that accompanied with the higher rates of crime in a panel of countries. The rest of the growth phases from 2000 to 2014 show anti-poor growth accompanied with the higher INC_INEQ and lower EG; however, crime rate decreases in the year 2000–2004 and 2010–2014 besides that the growth process is anti-poor across countries. The policies should be formulated in a way to aligned crime rate with the PPG reforms across countries (Vellala et al. 2018 ).

The results of PPE index confirmed an anti-poor growth from 1990 to 2004, while at the subsequent years from 2005 to 2014, education growth rate subsequently benefited the poor as compared to the non-poor, i.e., PPE index exceeds the bench mark value of unity. Crime rate is increasing from 1990 to 1999, and from 2005 to 2009, while it decreases the crime rate for the years 2000–2004 and 2010–2014. The good sign of recovery has been visible for the years 2010–2014 where the PPE growth supports to decrease crime rate in a panel of selected countries. Finally, the PPH index confirmed two PPG phases, i.e., from 1990 to 1994, and 2010 to 2014 in which crime rate increases for the former years and decreases in the later years. The remaining health phases from 1995 to 2009 show anti-poor health index, while crime rate is still increasing during the years from 1995 to 1999 and 2005 to 2009, and decreasing for the period 2000–2004. The results emphasized the need to integrate PPG index with the crime rate, as PPG reforms are helpful to reduce humans’ costs by increasing EG and social expenditures, and providing judicious income distribution to escape out from POV and vulnerability across the globe (Musavengane et al. 2019 ).

From the overall results, we come to the conclusion that social spending on education and health is imperative to reduce crime incidence, while it further translated a positive impact on POV and inequality reduction across countries (Hinton 2016 ). EG is a vital factor to reduce POV; however, it is not a sufficient condition under higher INC_INEQ (Dudzevičiūtė and Prakapienė 2018 ). INC_INEQ and unemployment rate both are negatively correlated with crime rates; however, it may be reduced by judicious income distribution and increases social spending across countries (Costantini et al. 2018 ). Trade liberalization policies reduce incidence of crime rates and improve country’s PCI, which enforce the need to capitalize domestic exports by expanding local industries. Thus, the United Nations SDGs would be achieved by its implication in the countries perspectives (Dix-Carneiro et al. 2018 ). The study achieved the research objectives by its theoretical and empirical contribution, which seems challenge for the developmental experts to devise policies toward more pro-growth and PPG.

4 Conclusions and policy recommendations

This study investigated the dynamic relationship between socio-economic factors and crime rate to assess PPG reforms for reducing crime rate in a panel of 16 diversified countries, using a time series data from 1990–2014. The study used PCI and square PCI in relation with crime rate, POVHCR, and GINI to evaluate crime-induced KC, poverty-induced KC and inequality-induced KC, while PPG index assesses the federal growth reforms regarding healthcare provision, education and wealth to escape out from POV and violence. The results show that GINI and UNEMP are the main predictors that have a devastating impact to increase crime rate. Trade liberalization policies are helpful to reduce crime rate and increase PCI. Healthcare expenditures decrease POVHCR and amplify EG. The EG is affected by POVHCR, which requires strong policy framework to devise PPG approach in a panel of selected countries. The study failed to establish crime-induced KC and poverty-induced KC, while the study confirmed an inequality-induced KC. The results of IRF reveal that PCI would considerably increase crime rate, while crime rate influenced GINI and PCI for the next 10-year period. The estimates of VDA show that POVHCR explained the greater share to influence crime rates, while reverse is true in case of POVHCR. The study divided the studied time period into five growth phases 1990–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2004, 2005–2009, and 2010–2014 to assess PPG, PPH, and PPE reforms and observe the changes in crime rates. The results show that there is an only period from 1990 to 1994 that shows PPG, while crime rate is still increasing in that period; however, in the years 2000–2004, and 2010–2014, crime rate decreases without favoring the growth to the poor. PPE and PPH assessment confirmed the reduction in the crime rates for the years 2010–2014. The overall results confirmed the strong correlation between socio-economic factors and crime rates to purse the pro-poorness of government policies across countries. The overall results emphasized the need of strong policy framework to aligned PPG policies with the reduction in crime rate across the globe. The study proposed the following policy recommendations, i.e.,

Education, health and wealth are the strong predictors of reducing crime rates and achieving PPG, thus it should be aligned with inclusive trade policies to reduce human cost in terms of decreasing chronic poverty and violence/crime.

The policies should be formulated to strengthen the pro-poorness of social expenditures that would be helpful to reduce an overwhelming impact of crime rate in a panel of countries.

GIP triangle is mostly viewed as a pro-poor package to reduce the vicious cycle of poverty; however, there is a strong need to include some other social factors including unemployment, violence, crime, etc., which is mostly charged due to increase in poverty and unequal distribution of income across the globe. The policies should devise to observe the positive change in lessen the crime rate by PPG reforms in a panel of selected countries.

The significant implication of the Kuznets’ work should be extended to the some other unexplored factors especially for crime rate that would be traced out by the pro-poor agenda and pro-growth reforms.

There is a need to align the positivity of judicious income distribution with the broad-based economic growth that would be helpful to reduce poverty and crime rate across countries.

The result although not supported the ‘parabola’ relationship between income and crime rates; however, it confirmed the U-shaped relationship between income and poverty. The economic implication is that income is not the sole contributor to increase crime rates while poverty exacerbates violent crimes across countries. There is a high need to develop a mechanism through which poverty incidence can be reduced, which would ultimately lead to decreased crime rates. The improvement in the labor market structure, judicious income distribution, and providing social safety nets are the desirable strategies to reduce crime rates and poverty incidence across countries, and

The results supported parabola relationship between economic growth and inequality, which gives a clear indication to improve income distribution channel for reducing poverty and crime rates at global scale.

These seven policies would give strong alignment to improve social infrastructure for managing crime through equitable justice and PPG process.

Availability of data and materials

The data are freely available on World Development Indicator, published by World Bank on given URL ID: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators .

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The authors are thankful for King Saud university research project number (RSP-2019/87) for funding the study. The authors are indebted to the editor and reviewers for constructive comments that have helped to improve the quality of the manuscript.

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Muhammad Khalid Anser

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Zahid Yousaf

Department of Management, College of Business Administration, King Saud University, P.O. Box 71115, Riyadh, 11587, Saudi Arabia

Abdelmohsen A. Nassani & Saad M. Alotaibi

Department of Management, Aleppo University, Aleppo, Syria

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See Table  7 , Figs.  2 , 3 , 4 and 5 .

Source: World Bank ( 2015 )

Data trend at level.

Source: World Bank ( 2015 ). ‘D’ indicates first difference

Data trend at first differenced

Source: authors’ estimation. Note: ‘D’ shows first difference, while ‘LOG’ represents natural logarithm

Plots of IRF.

VDA Estimates.

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Anser, M.K., Yousaf, Z., Nassani, A.A. et al. Dynamic linkages between poverty, inequality, crime, and social expenditures in a panel of 16 countries: two-step GMM estimates. Economic Structures 9 , 43 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40008-020-00220-6

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How Poverty Influences Crime Rates

In the 1993 science-fiction movie Demolition Man, a rebel named Edgar Friendly is leading a rebellion against a society that has discovered complete bliss. The only problem is that if you don’t fit in with that society, you don’t get to eat. So in a fine dining experience at the local Taco Bell, we see Friendly’s group stealing food to eat.

In today’s society, we see people in poverty often acting the same way. Stealing food from take-out counters, violating loitering laws, and influencing the crime rate in other ways is something that is directly linked to poverty. There will always be crime, but urban crime tends to always be located in high poverty areas.

How does poverty influence crime rates? The answers may actually surprise you.

Poverty Isn’t Just About Having a Lack of Resources

The effects that poverty has on crime can be explained in multiple ways. For starters, there is a higher rate of untreated mental illness that is in populations struggling with poverty compared to wealthier populations. Now most people who struggle with a mental illness will never commit a crime, but there are some types of severe mental illness which increase the risk of an individual committing a crime.

Untreated severe mental illnesses are particularly significant when looking at links between poverty and homicide. On the other end of the spectrum, those who are mentally ill are also victimized by violent crime at much higher levels than the general population.

Yet despite these facts, the number of beds at mental health hospitals and treatment facilities are lower in the United States today than they were in 1850.

But a mental illness isn’t the only link that there is between poverty and crime. Being in poverty often leads to high levels of stress. An overwhelming desire to meet certain basic needs becomes the highest priority. Over time, if those needs cannot be met, then some individuals will commit robberies, burglaries, and other forms of them. It can also lead to violent acts, though in the mind of the perpetrator, the actions are seen as a method of self-defense.

Poverty also creates fewer opportunities, some of which co-exist with mental illness and a lack of being able to meet basic needs. If an individual is struggling with an untreated mental illness, then it is difficult for them to hold down an employment opportunity. Without a job, it is difficult to find money to meet basic needs.

A lack of resources also creates inferior educational opportunities for households in poverty, some actual and some admittedly perceived. Yet the perception of a lack of education is enough for individuals in poverty to create self-fulfilling prophecies regarding their future. Because they believe there aren’t good quality schools out there, then there aren’t good quality jobs out there. People feel the need to fight for themselves.

This leads to the creation of gangs and gang affiliation. Then the cycle continues to perpetuate itself again and again. Crime is simply a means to an end. It’s a way to obtain what is needed without a legitimate means to do so because it seems like there isn’t a legitimate opportunity to avoid crime.

It’s a cycle that feeds upon itself. And often the prize of a successful crime outweighs the risk of being caught, which further increases the crime rate in areas of poverty.

Isn’t Poverty a Reflection of a Person’s Choices?

In a free-market society, a common belief regarding poverty is that each person is responsible for their own circumstances. It’s a stereotype that has fed more stereotypes, such as the idea that drug and alcohol use is more prevalent amongst households in poverty. It is true that one of the risk factors for drug use is poverty.

The same is true for alcoholism. Yet the stereotype is that the risk factor not only applies to everyone in poverty, but that everyone is struggling with some form of addiction. If they could only get a job, they would be fine.

And since drug use and public alcohol use is often illegal, these activities then contribute to the local crime rate.

In reality, the problem comes back to the stresses that occur when a household or individual is living in poverty. Not being able to have a basic need met, like knowing when your next meal will be or what it will be, can lead people to a breaking point. They seek out any relief that they can find. Many times, that relief ends up being in a bottle or a needle.

Stress relief also involves risky decisions to alleviate, if but for a moment, what poverty is placing upon an individual. It’s the reason why risky sexual encounters are accepted in poverty-stricken areas. That brief monetary reward is enough to purchase another fix that can help someone forget where they are. Then they repeat the behavior because the reward of forgetting is worth the risk of future health problems or getting caught.

Greater Socioeconomic Gaps Also Encourage Greater Crime

Setting all stereotypes aside, poverty influences crime rates because at its core, it highlights and reinforces the differences between the wealthy class and those who are poor. The greater the gap happens to be, then the greater the benefits are to a thief to use that wealth in some way to their own advantage.

This socioeconomic gap is seen in many different ways in our society today.

• Children who come from homes in poverty are more likely to be expelled from school or to have a police record than a child who makes the same choices as the poor child, but has more overall wealth.
• Societies that have age gaps are also prone to more crime when poverty is a factor in the community. This is because of the number of possessions that elderly households are perceived to have, along with the natural vulnerability which comes with age.
• Communities which have a higher percentage of inhabitants that are under the age of 25 may also lead to higher crime rates, especially if there are large socioeconomic gaps between different households of that age group.

It is these differences which also encourage a higher overall crime rate in minority populations in the United States. Many minority households live in urban areas and may have built-in struggles with poverty for multiple generations. In a 1995 survey of US metropolitan areas with unemployed rates of 12% or more, the population was composed of at least 30% minority households.

Yet socioeconomic gaps also create the potential for crime within communities that are struggling with poverty. These gaps are just not always associated with money. If someone is bigger and stronger than someone else, then they may choose to take a weaker person’s resources. Business owners may take advantage of the desperation of poverty and offer jobs with wages well below legal limits.

There are even precedents of having local law enforcement officials extorting money from those who are in poverty, which then creates a lack of functional restraint on the crime that exists in these areas.

A World Where Not All Crimes Are Created or Treated Equally

During a 20-year period of economic difficulty which started in Europe in 1975, there was a rise in unemployment in uneducated youth and a rise of theft and violence that rose at the same time. This led to an effort to create more educational opportunities, as multiple studies have shown that higher educational levels lead to lower overall violent crime.

Yet this doesn’t eliminate all crime. In fact, other forms of crime, such as corruption, are more likely in the wealthier classes. This means our focus on poverty tends to be on the amount of violent crime that is produced by low-income communities.

So why is there more violence in low-income areas? It is because there is less of a safety net that is present for those with few or no resources to rely upon. The fight-or-flight mechanism is initiated and when it comes to self-preservation, most people are going to fight for themselves and their loved ones.

If that means violence is required to secure needed resources, then so be it.

This Means There Are Two Key Issues Which Must Be Addressed

In order to solve the problem of poverty as it relates to crime, there are two key issues which must be addressed at the same time.

• Resources must be provided to those in poverty so that basic needs can be met, including any treatment that may be required for mental illness or addiction.
• Those in poverty must receive some level of consistent protection to make sure they do not have what little resources they have become stolen from them by others.

And, for the most part, society agrees with these two points. Where disagreement begins is how to address these issues. You’ll see this often in poverty-stricken areas when someone is asking for help and another person comes by and says, “Just go get a job.”

Unfortunately, it just isn’t that easy. Someone struggling with a lack of resources and an untreated illness may not even know how to begin looking for a job. For that reason, many societies have implemented programs to ease the stress that poverty creates.

To meet basic needs, many governments have created aid and assistance programs which offer enough food benefits, living assistance, and limited cash to reduce the stress of poverty. But, because there may be a 1-5% fraud rate within these programs, there are consistent calls to reduce eligibility for them, create greater restrictions to join them, or to cut them out of society completely.

We’ve also created changes to the individual treatment process in order to protect personal rights. This has stopped many of the involuntary inpatient commitments to mental hospitals that occurred in the past, yet the less-restrictive alternative of outpatient therapy has been found to be far from effective – even if a judge orders compliance with medication and therapy.

So what do we do from a criminal justice standpoint? We have to enforce laws to create a society that is safe and orderly. Yet we cannot ignore households in poverty when they become victims of a crime, even if it is labeled as “poor-on-poor” crime. The answer, it seems, may come from the State of Texas – which ironically houses about 10% of the US prisoner population.

Instead of Incarceration, a Focus on Treatment Creates a Reduction in Crime

In 2006, Texas was facing a population crisis within their criminal justice system. Hundreds of thousands of prisoner beds were already full due to the enforcement of drug crime in the past 15 years. By 2010, the prisoner population increase had risen 346% from 1990 levels. At the same time, US prison populations only doubled.

Texas couldn’t build prisons fast enough. Yet, when looking at a cost of $526 million to expand the prison population even more, the investment didn’t seem to make sense. So Texas decided to “go soft on crime” as a way to reduce prison population levels.

Instead of creating new prisoner beds, Texas focused on expanding beds in treatment programs. Should a prisoner violate their probation or a first-time offender commit a non-violent crime, instead of locking the person up, the goal became to shift away the stress that is caused by a lack of overall resources.

There were even slots put into the Texas criminal justice system which allowed for outpatient treatment programs to allow for sentences of probation instead of incarceration. Diversion programs were also setup within the court system to be able to treat individuals suffering from a mental illness. Instead of just prison and parole being an option for sentencing, judges were given a third option: treatment.

In the first 7 years of these reforms being in place, the number of inmates that were incarcerated in Texas dropped by nearly 10,000. And, for the first time in over 160 years, Texas decided to actually shut down a prison. The state is even seeing improvements in their recidivism rates with treatment as an option.

What Does This Mean for Poverty and Crime?

There will always be crime. That much is clear. What our goal must be as a society is to eliminate crime that is due to the stresses of poverty. Through reforms, treatment, and a removal of the stress that comes with living in poverty, it is clear that a lower crime rate will be the result. Texas has already proven this.

In order to make this happen, we must be willing to set aside our own personal stereotypes about poverty. Instead of someone being a “poor person,” we must view them as a person. We must treat children equally, no matter what their socioeconomic class might be. Then we must be consistent in providing opportunities to everyone, no matter what their living situation might be.

When there are zero opportunities, an individual will make their own opportunities and that will usually be through crime. It will be through violent crime if necessary. We may never completely eliminate poverty within our lifetime, but we can set the stage for people to find a different way than in previous generations.

Through education, treatment, and consistency, people will be given more opportunities. That will help them be able to get that job they need to provide themselves with legitimate resources. If not, then our future might just be a world where people feel like they need to steal food from Taco Bell in order to survive.

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How poverty leads to crime (with 5 theories from experts).

It's no secret that poverty and crime go hand in hand. But what exactly is the relationship between the two? What factors make people living in poverty more likely to commit crimes?

Poverty and crime have long been linked by both popular opinion and academic research. Various theories exist that attempt to explain this link, including social disorganization theory, strain theory, differential association theory, control theory, and relative deprivation theory.

Studies show a strong correlation between poverty, unemployment, and criminal activity. Areas of concentrated poverty are often hotbeds for different types of crime, such as property theft and violence. Without basic necessities like food, clean water, and education, it can be difficult to stay out of trouble.

• Social disorganization theory (developed by the Chicago School) suggests that people in poorer neighborhoods have fewer resources to modify their behavior (such as educational opportunities or access to good jobs). Additionally, the disadvantaged may be more susceptible to peer pressure and less able to resist criminal opportunities.
• Strain Theory (by Robert K. Merton, 47th President of the American Sociological Association) suggests that poverty can create conditions of deprivation that lead individuals to commit crimes as a way of financial gain or personal gain. When societies fail to provide citizens with basic needs like food and shelter, people may resort to “survival crimes” such as theft or other financial crimes in order to survive.
• Differential Association Theory (by Edwin Sutherland, elected President of the American Sociological Society) states that poverty leads individuals into environments in which they are constantly exposed to criminal ideas. This can lead them into situations where they learn how to commit criminal behavior from their peers who are likely engaged in illegal activities themselves.
• Self-Control Theory (by Michael R. Gottfredson, former President of the University of Oregon) proposes that economic hardship deprives individuals of the ability to postpone gratification–which is essential for self-control. Without self-control, individuals are more likely to engage in illegal behaviors due fulfill immediate needs.
• Relative Deprivation Theory (by Ted Gurr, a professor of political science) argues that the level of poverty within a given society can lead members of certain social groups to perceive their situation as worse than the perceived situation of others –making them more likely to engage in criminal activity out of frustration or anger toward those who seem successful or well-off compared them.

Poverty can lead to crime in many ways, from unstable home environments to psychiatric disorders. A lack of resources forces families into desperate situations where they must resort to illegal activities just to survive. By understanding how poverty contributes to crime we can help create solutions for those affected.

Crime is often seen as an inevitable consequence of inequality and poverty. Indeed, those with fewer financial resources and less access to education have been linked with poorer health outcomes, higher unemployment, and other negative indicators that could lead to criminality behaviors.

While it seems logical that poverty cause crimes, poverty might not be a cause of crime. Even with many theories, as with many hypotheses, correlation might not show causation too.   

- Poverty is like a prison. It limits opportunities, resources, and options for people to improve their lives, trapping them in an endless cycle of crime.

- Crime is like a trap door. People living in poverty can easily get caught up in criminal behavior and be sucked into a life of crime they can’t escape from.

Crime is a debatable indicator as it depends on the efforts of the police or government in enforcing crimes.

• Rich countries also have crime, just different types of crime. Criminals in rich countries will focus on higher-value crimes like fraud or embezzlement. Even children of rich parents will commit petty crimes like shoplifting. 
• There is no crime without law and a region that enforces law strictly might end up with more crime than a country with loosely enforced laws.

Through examining current research on poverty-induced crime, there are also interesting comparisons of income inequality (instead of poverty) with crimes (similar to the relative deprivation theory).

The gap between rich and poor is growing, and with it comes a problem that affects all of us: crime. But what is the connection between income inequality and crime?

It’s undeniable that there are real consequences to income inequality. Studies suggest that widely varied socioeconomic backgrounds create an environment where those with lesser access to resources are more likely to commit crimes in order to generate income.

Societal gaps have been studied by researchers for centuries, but the effects of income inequalities on crime are particularly troubling as we continue to live in a world of uneven economic power distribution. 

Also in the era of fake news, can we trust the media to tell us the truth? We also explored how to identify trustworthy sources of information as well as debunk some common myths about the media industry . 

No one should have to face religious discrimination. We also shared some tips on how to prevent religious discrimination at home, school, and work.

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What the data says about crime in the U.S.

A growing share of Americans say reducing crime should be a top priority for the president and Congress to address this year. Around six-in-ten U.S. adults (58%) hold that view today, up from 47% at the beginning of Joe Biden’s presidency in 2021.

We conducted this analysis to learn more about U.S. crime patterns and how those patterns have changed over time.

The analysis relies on statistics published by the FBI, which we accessed through the Crime Data Explorer , and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), which we accessed through the  National Crime Victimization Survey data analysis tool .

To measure public attitudes about crime in the U.S., we relied on survey data from Pew Research Center and Gallup.

Additional details about each data source, including survey methodologies, are available by following the links in the text of this analysis.

With the issue likely to come up in this year’s presidential election, here’s what we know about crime in the United States, based on the latest available data from the federal government and other sources.

How much crime is there in the U.S.?

It’s difficult to say for certain. The  two primary sources of government crime statistics  – the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) – paint an incomplete picture.

The FBI publishes  annual data  on crimes that have been reported to law enforcement, but not crimes that haven’t been reported. Historically, the FBI has also only published statistics about a handful of specific violent and property crimes, but not many other types of crime, such as drug crime. And while the FBI’s data is based on information from thousands of federal, state, county, city and other police departments, not all law enforcement agencies participate every year. In 2022, the most recent full year with available statistics, the FBI received data from 83% of participating agencies .

BJS, for its part, tracks crime by fielding a  large annual survey of Americans ages 12 and older and asking them whether they were the victim of certain types of crime in the past six months. One advantage of this approach is that it captures both reported and unreported crimes. But the BJS survey has limitations of its own. Like the FBI, it focuses mainly on a handful of violent and property crimes. And since the BJS data is based on after-the-fact interviews with crime victims, it cannot provide information about one especially high-profile type of offense: murder.

All those caveats aside, looking at the FBI and BJS statistics side-by-side  does  give researchers a good picture of U.S. violent and property crime rates and how they have changed over time. In addition, the FBI is transitioning to a new data collection system – known as the National Incident-Based Reporting System – that eventually will provide national information on a much larger set of crimes , as well as details such as the time and place they occur and the types of weapons involved, if applicable.

Which kinds of crime are most and least common?

Property crime in the U.S. is much more common than violent crime. In 2022, the FBI reported a total of 1,954.4 property crimes per 100,000 people, compared with 380.7 violent crimes per 100,000 people.  

By far the most common form of property crime in 2022 was larceny/theft, followed by motor vehicle theft and burglary. Among violent crimes, aggravated assault was the most common offense, followed by robbery, rape, and murder/nonnegligent manslaughter.

BJS tracks a slightly different set of offenses from the FBI, but it finds the same overall patterns, with theft the most common form of property crime in 2022 and assault the most common form of violent crime.

How have crime rates in the U.S. changed over time?

Both the FBI and BJS data show dramatic declines in U.S. violent and property crime rates since the early 1990s, when crime spiked across much of the nation.

Using the FBI data, the violent crime rate fell 49% between 1993 and 2022, with large decreases in the rates of robbery (-74%), aggravated assault (-39%) and murder/nonnegligent manslaughter (-34%). It’s not possible to calculate the change in the rape rate during this period because the FBI  revised its definition of the offense in 2013 .

The FBI data also shows a 59% reduction in the U.S. property crime rate between 1993 and 2022, with big declines in the rates of burglary (-75%), larceny/theft (-54%) and motor vehicle theft (-53%).

Using the BJS statistics, the declines in the violent and property crime rates are even steeper than those captured in the FBI data. Per BJS, the U.S. violent and property crime rates each fell 71% between 1993 and 2022.

While crime rates have fallen sharply over the long term, the decline hasn’t always been steady. There have been notable increases in certain kinds of crime in some years, including recently.

In 2020, for example, the U.S. murder rate saw its largest single-year increase on record – and by 2022, it remained considerably higher than before the coronavirus pandemic. Preliminary data for 2023, however, suggests that the murder rate fell substantially last year .

How do Americans perceive crime in their country?

Americans tend to believe crime is up, even when official data shows it is down.

In 23 of 27 Gallup surveys conducted since 1993 , at least 60% of U.S. adults have said there is more crime nationally than there was the year before, despite the downward trend in crime rates during most of that period.

While perceptions of rising crime at the national level are common, fewer Americans believe crime is up in their own communities. In every Gallup crime survey since the 1990s, Americans have been much less likely to say crime is up in their area than to say the same about crime nationally.

Public attitudes about crime differ widely by Americans’ party affiliation, race and ethnicity, and other factors . For example, Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are much more likely than Democrats and Democratic leaners to say reducing crime should be a top priority for the president and Congress this year (68% vs. 47%), according to a recent Pew Research Center survey.

How does crime in the U.S. differ by demographic characteristics?

Some groups of Americans are more likely than others to be victims of crime. In the  2022 BJS survey , for example, younger people and those with lower incomes were far more likely to report being the victim of a violent crime than older and higher-income people.

There were no major differences in violent crime victimization rates between male and female respondents or between those who identified as White, Black or Hispanic. But the victimization rate among Asian Americans (a category that includes Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders) was substantially lower than among other racial and ethnic groups.

The same BJS survey asks victims about the demographic characteristics of the offenders in the incidents they experienced.

In 2022, those who are male, younger people and those who are Black accounted for considerably larger shares of perceived offenders in violent incidents than their respective shares of the U.S. population. Men, for instance, accounted for 79% of perceived offenders in violent incidents, compared with 49% of the nation’s 12-and-older population that year. Black Americans accounted for 25% of perceived offenders in violent incidents, about twice their share of the 12-and-older population (12%).

As with all surveys, however, there are several potential sources of error, including the possibility that crime victims’ perceptions about offenders are incorrect.

How does crime in the U.S. differ geographically?

There are big geographic differences in violent and property crime rates.

For example, in 2022, there were more than 700 violent crimes per 100,000 residents in New Mexico and Alaska. That compares with fewer than 200 per 100,000 people in Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Hampshire and Maine, according to the FBI.

The FBI notes that various factors might influence an area’s crime rate, including its population density and economic conditions.

What percentage of crimes are reported to police? What percentage are solved?

Most violent and property crimes in the U.S. are not reported to police, and most of the crimes that  are  reported are not solved.

In its annual survey, BJS asks crime victims whether they reported their crime to police. It found that in 2022, only 41.5% of violent crimes and 31.8% of household property crimes were reported to authorities. BJS notes that there are many reasons why crime might not be reported, including fear of reprisal or of “getting the offender in trouble,” a feeling that police “would not or could not do anything to help,” or a belief that the crime is “a personal issue or too trivial to report.”

Most of the crimes that are reported to police, meanwhile,  are not solved , at least based on an FBI measure known as the clearance rate . That’s the share of cases each year that are closed, or “cleared,” through the arrest, charging and referral of a suspect for prosecution, or due to “exceptional” circumstances such as the death of a suspect or a victim’s refusal to cooperate with a prosecution. In 2022, police nationwide cleared 36.7% of violent crimes that were reported to them and 12.1% of the property crimes that came to their attention.

Which crimes are most likely to be reported to police? Which are most likely to be solved?

Around eight-in-ten motor vehicle thefts (80.9%) were reported to police in 2022, making them by far the most commonly reported property crime tracked by BJS. Household burglaries and trespassing offenses were reported to police at much lower rates (44.9% and 41.2%, respectively), while personal theft/larceny and other types of theft were only reported around a quarter of the time.

Among violent crimes – excluding homicide, which BJS doesn’t track – robbery was the most likely to be reported to law enforcement in 2022 (64.0%). It was followed by aggravated assault (49.9%), simple assault (36.8%) and rape/sexual assault (21.4%).

The list of crimes  cleared  by police in 2022 looks different from the list of crimes reported. Law enforcement officers were generally much more likely to solve violent crimes than property crimes, according to the FBI.

The most frequently solved violent crime tends to be homicide. Police cleared around half of murders and nonnegligent manslaughters (52.3%) in 2022. The clearance rates were lower for aggravated assault (41.4%), rape (26.1%) and robbery (23.2%).

When it comes to property crime, law enforcement agencies cleared 13.0% of burglaries, 12.4% of larcenies/thefts and 9.3% of motor vehicle thefts in 2022.

Are police solving more or fewer crimes than they used to?

Nationwide clearance rates for both violent and property crime are at their lowest levels since at least 1993, the FBI data shows.

Police cleared a little over a third (36.7%) of the violent crimes that came to their attention in 2022, down from nearly half (48.1%) as recently as 2013. During the same period, there were decreases for each of the four types of violent crime the FBI tracks:

• Police cleared 52.3% of reported murders and nonnegligent homicides in 2022, down from 64.1% in 2013.
• They cleared 41.4% of aggravated assaults, down from 57.7%.
• They cleared 26.1% of rapes, down from 40.6%.
• They cleared 23.2% of robberies, down from 29.4%.

The pattern is less pronounced for property crime. Overall, law enforcement agencies cleared 12.1% of reported property crimes in 2022, down from 19.7% in 2013. The clearance rate for burglary didn’t change much, but it fell for larceny/theft (to 12.4% in 2022 from 22.4% in 2013) and motor vehicle theft (to 9.3% from 14.2%).

Note: This is an update of a post originally published on Nov. 20, 2020.

• Criminal Justice

John Gramlich is an associate director at Pew Research Center

8 facts about Black Lives Matter

#blacklivesmatter turns 10, support for the black lives matter movement has dropped considerably from its peak in 2020, fewer than 1% of federal criminal defendants were acquitted in 2022, before release of video showing tyre nichols’ beating, public views of police conduct had improved modestly, most popular.

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Attorneys deliver closing arguments in Mark Cooper retrial over inmate death

Deliberations were to start Wednesday morning. For a possible verdict, check www.mansfieldnewsjournal.com.

Attorneys on opposing sides of the Mark Cooper retrial didn't agree on much in their closing arguments.

They did agree, however, that the case would come down to cause of death and reasonable use of force.

Jurors sat through a grueling four hours of closing arguments Tuesday afternoon in Richland County Common Pleas Court. One older juror let out an audible sigh during the rebuttal argument toward the end of the session.

Cooper, 57, is charged with two counts of involuntary manslaughter , one a first-degree felony, the other a third-degree felony; and reckless homicide, a third-degree felony.

His charges are in connection with the death of Alexander Rios, 28, after the inmate rushed out of his holding cell, past several corrections officers on Sept. 19, 2019.

Denise Salerno, who is with the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office, is teaming with Drew Wood of the Ohio Attorney General's Office as special prosecutors for the state.

In her closing, Salerno attacked the defense theory that Rios was under the influence of methamphetamines during his struggle with corrections officers, leading to his heart stopping.

In the jail video, several of the corrections officers can be seen holding Rios down, stepping and kneeling on his back as they try to handcuff him.

State discounts defense theory that Rios was under influence of meth

According to previous testimony, Rios was a presumptive positive for amphetamines, but no confirmation test was done.

"Nobody saw or knew that Mr. Rios had taken methamphetamines," Salerno told the jury. "How far are we going? Inference upon inference upon inference."

During the autopsy, a ripped bag of plastic was recovered from Rios' stomach.

"What testimony did you hear that this contained a bag of methamphetamines?" Salerno said.

She urged jurors to watch the jail video, parts of which were played dozens of times in the first six days of the trial. Salerno said to note how Rios was doing when Cooper became involved and stood on the inmate.

"He goes from active to wheezing," she said. "Mr. Rios is having difficulty breathing. This is escalating.

"You can hear that last gasp. You stop seeing any movement from Mr. Rios, but you still see Mr. Cooper staying on him."

Former Lt. Jamaal O'Dell, who was the supervisor during the incident, said corrections officers are trained not to put their feet on inmates.

Salerno said the state did not have to prove that Cooper intended to kill Rios.

She played the entire video straight through before referring to a timeline of events. Cooper came from another part of the jail to join the altercation at the 1-minute 25-second mark.

Cooper can be seen placing one of his feet on Rios at the 1:53 mark.

"Nobody else is doing this," Salerno said of the other corrections officers involved.

Cooper can be seen standing on Rios with both feet

At the 2:55 mark, Cooper is seen standing on Rios with both feet. During the first trial, his weight at the time was listed at 250 pounds.

"Other officers are subduing him (Rios). Mr. Cooper could have simply stepped off," Salerno said. "... He did not have to engage."

Defense attorney James Mayer III delivered a 2-hour closing argument. He started by talking about cause of death and reasonable force.

"They are separate, but they are so interrelated," Mayer said.

Mayer focused on the state's focus on the 7 seconds Cooper stood on Rios with both feet. He said that would not kill a person.

He also talked about the official cause of death in 2019, excited delirium. It is characterized by agitation, aggression, acute distress and sudden death, often in the pre-hospital care setting and often involving drug use.

The term is no longer recognized by many organizations, including the National Association of Medical Examiners.

"Delirium is very real," Mayer countered. "The controversy is on how it kills somebody in a delirious state."

He pointed out that Dr. Lee Lehman, who oversaw the autopsy at the Montgomery County Coroner's Office, believes excited delirium was the cause of death.

Mayer said the state claims that his client crushed Rios to death.

Defense attorney points out there were no injuries to Rios

"What would you expect (if that were the case)? It would start with an injury of some sort, maybe some damage or trauma to the bone structure," Mayer said. "There were only a couple of scrapes and abrasions."

Mayer devoted part of his closing argument to attacking Dr. Roger Mitchell, the state's expert witness. He was paid $500 an hour for his services, plus $3,500 for his testimony.

Mitchell has written a book on instances of people dying in custody.

"This man is a hired gun. He is a champion for social change, good for him," Mayer said. "This man has bias, and he has an agenda, and it informs every opinion he makes."

Mitchell said Rios died from compression asphyxia.

"Dr. Mitchell ignores the weight of every other corrections officer (involved in the wrestling match)," Mayer said. "There is not point and time that you can see the green of his (Rios') smock."

Mayer agreed with Mitchell on at least one point, that methamphetamine is dangerous to the heart.

"Nobody is suggesting that because of Rios' actions, that he deserved the consequence of death," Mayer said.

In the video, Rios is seen standing on a half-wall in his holding cell, yelling at corrections officers.

"That looks like methamphetamine intoxication," Mayer said, noting signs include confused behavior, combatant and non-compliant. "The delirious state is still a thing. What's going on in his body that brings his heart to a stop?

"... What Rios is presenting is as a ticking time bomb of his own creation. It's going to go off, and when it does, his heart's going to stop."

Mayer says use of force was justified

As far as use of force, Mayer said it was justified in this case. He noted that O'Dell called the incident the most difficult restraint of his 20-year career.

"Let common sense be your guide," he told the jury.

Because the state has the burden of proof, Wood was able to give a rebuttal argument.

Wood discounted the idea that Cooper caused Rios' death in the 7 seconds he stood on him with both feet.

"Those are Mr. Mayer's words, not ours," Wood said. "That pressure started much earlier.

"Something killed Alexander Rios. He was alive when he was running around. He was dead after the restraint. Whatever drugs were in his system didn't kill him."

Wood said jurors had to decide the "case that exists, not the one that Mr. Mayer imagines."

He also attacked excited delirium, noting the term does not say how death is caused.

In closing, Wood praised Mitchell as an expert witness. He said the National Association of Medical Examiners commissioned his work on the topic of death in custody.

"The evidence in this case is Dr. Mitchell follows the truth," Wood said. "Dr. Lehman made a mistake."

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‘It’s a Very Winnable Case’: Three Writers Dissect the Trump Trial

By David French ,  Mary McCord and Ken White

Mr. French is a Times columnist. Ms. McCord and Mr. White are former federal prosecutors.

David French, a Times columnist, hosted a written online conversation with the former federal prosecutors Mary McCord and Ken White to discuss and debate the Trump criminal trial in Manhattan and how, or if, the outcome will matter to voters.

David French: Before we start, just a quick refresher on the case. Donald Trump is charged with falsifying business records to conceal hush money payments made to Stormy Daniels, a porn film actress, to cover up a sexual relationship that Daniels said she had with Trump in 2006.

Alvin Bragg, the Manhattan district attorney, claims that Trump falsely recorded reimbursements for the hush money payments as “legal expenses.” Falsifying business records is ordinarily only a misdemeanor, but the D.A. is claiming that Trump falsified records with the intent to commit other crimes or conceal other crimes, including state and federal campaign finance violations, state tax crimes and the falsification of other business records. If he falsified business records to aid in the commission of these other crimes, then Trump could be guilty of a felony.

When the case was filed, legal analysts from across the political spectrum voiced concern about the case, mainly on legal grounds. I have expressed my own doubts about the case. Now that the trial is underway, what’s your assessment of the case today?

Ken White: We know a lot more now about the D.A.’s theory of the case than we did before. There was a lot of speculation about whether the predicate crime — the one Trump was promoting by falsifying records — was going to be federal or state, and whether it was going to be campaign-finance related or election-interference related. Now the prosecutors have shown their hand, and their lead theory is going to be that Trump meant to interfere unlawfully with an election by concealing information that the voters might have considered. A case tends to look stronger after the prosecution picks a theory and commits to it. The evidence of deliberate falsification of records is going to be very strong.

Mary McCord: I agree, the falsification of business records seems rock-solid based on the documentary evidence.

The question for the jurors will be Trump’s knowledge and intent. I expect some of the evidence of Trump’s knowledge and intent will come from witnesses with varying degrees of credibility, but other evidence will come from emails and text messages, including those that will corroborate witnesses with credibility issues, like Michael Cohen, Trump’s former lawyer and “fixer.” The picture that the prosecutors will paint for the jury, based on the judge’s pretrial rulings, will give the jurors plenty of evidence of motive: to prevent information damaging to candidate Trump from becoming public just weeks before the 2016 election. It’s a very winnable case for the D.A.

French: Let’s stick with the legal analysis for a moment. The D.A. has to prove that Trump falsified business records in furtherance of committing (or concealing) another crime. But Trump hasn’t been charged with that other crime. Why hasn’t the D.A. charged additional crimes, and how could that affect the case?

McCord: Because, based on New York law, the D.A. was not required to seek indictment on the crimes that Trump is alleged to have intended to conceal by falsifying business records.

White: It’s not unusual to charge cases relying on an uncharged predicate crime. It’s usually a smart decision by the D.A. to make the charges narrower and simpler.

McCord: The jury will be instructed by Justice Juan Merchan about what they have to conclude about Trump’s intent and whether the government’s evidence has proved that intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

White: At the risk of getting all legal realist on you, jurors usually absorb case theories holistically — they decide if they accept the big picture and don’t get too bogged down with the details.

French: Thanks for bringing up the jury. You’ve both picked many juries in your career. Can you help readers understand what kind of juror each side is looking for (or worried about)?

McCord: Jury selection — “voir dire” in legal parlance — is intended to ensure that the jurors can be fair and impartial as they assess the evidence presented and apply the law to the facts as the judge instructs them. But realistically, the defense will be looking for jurors who they think will be skeptical of the government’s case and maybe who are skeptical of the government generally.

White: The defense wants someone who is independent and freethinking and willing to be the one holdout who hangs the jury — and, ideally, a secret Trump partisan.

McCord: Right, and so the government will be trying to weed out any potential juror they think could hang the jury. It likely will prefer well-read jurors, so long as those jurors are reading and listening to fact-based news. This is why one of the questions during jury selection asks potential jurors what media they visit, read or watch.

White: They’re both concerned about bias, but the government’s job is harder, since they need to convince all 12 jurors. TV and expensive consultants have encouraged us to think this is a scientific process that can be quantified. I think it remains a very subjective exercise.

French: You’ve both talked about intent as a key element in this case. As prosecutors, how do you go about proving intent in the face of either a defendant’s denial or the defendant’s silence?

White: Well, silence certainly isn’t the issue here. The best way to prove intent is with the defendant’s own words. And Trump runs his mouth a lot. As a prosecutor, you lay out the things the defendant did, and what they said about it, and ask the jury to draw inferences from that — why would he have done those things and said those things if he didn’t have this intent.

McCord: The government will be relying on witness testimony from those who spoke personally with Trump, like Michael Cohen and the former American Media chief David Pecker, but also on any corroborating evidence that doesn’t depend on credibility, like emails, text messages and other contemporaneous documentation.

White: It’s something lawyers view in a more complicated way than jurors do. Jurors tend to take things in a big-picture way. For years, legal pundits have been arguing that it’s hard to prove Trump’s intent because he’s so erratic and says so many contradictory things, so how can you draw inferences? But I don’t think a jury processes it that way.

McCord: This is also why it is important for the government to tell the whole story of the conspiracy to “catch and kill” allegations that would reflect poorly on Trump with voters and to elevate stories that would reflect poorly on his opponents. That broader scheme, dating back to 2015, suggests Trump’s intent not only to pay off Stormy Daniels to keep her quiet, but to conceal those payments through false business records. And the timing of the hush money payments just after the “Access Hollywood” story broke in October 2016 also provides clues about his intent given how close the election was.

French: How serious is this case for Trump, as a matter of legal jeopardy, especially given that he’d be a first-time nonviolent offender?

White: New York criminal practitioners seem fairly unanimous that a first-time offender convicted of something like this is extremely unlikely to do jail time. Add in his age and health, and it’s even more unlikely. The ridiculous truth is that to spend jail time in New York you’ve got to be a teenager accused of swiping a backpack or something.

McCord: I don’t think potential jail time is what is most important about this case. Being found guilty by a jury of a crime that was intended to influence a presidential election would be a huge deal, or at least it should be, especially if the person found guilty is running for president again.

French: Mary, I’m glad you said a conviction should be a huge deal. I absolutely agree. But would it be, truly? One side of me says that a felony conviction — especially following lurid evidence of the affair and coverup — could break through with at least some Americans. But then I remind myself that he has maintained his extraordinarily high floor of support through impeachments, indictments, a sexual abuse liability verdict and a pair of financially devastating civil judgments. Do you think a criminal trial has a unique chance to drive public opinion?

White: I’m afraid I’m a pessimist here. I think Trump has conditioned his base, perhaps 30 percent to 35 percent of the country, to see any conviction as unjust and illegitimate. The big question — on which the viability of the rule of law may hang — is what the people in the middle think. Will they care?

McCord: This is why the framing of the case is so important. Trump is not on trial for having an affair with a porn star. He is on trial for falsifying business records to give him an advantage in the election for president — and it was a close election. Today, Trump has used his claims of political persecution to solidify his base. But for those who don’t buy the persecution argument, conviction here might be enough to give them pause in November.

French: Let me ask a big-picture question. The rule of law is necessary for preserving our democracy, but I worry that it’s not sufficient. If enough people want Trump, can even a criminal conviction keep him at bay? Will the people get the Republic they want, law be damned?

White: The rule of law is not a deus ex machina that will save us from ignorance, prejudice and laziness. It’s not designed to, and is certainly inadequate to, fix our terrible politics. For that matter our political system might not be equipped to reject a populist like Trump. John Adams wrote : “Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.” He was probably talking about shared communal values rather than religious dogma. Without a shared set of values about what we expect from a leader, our system is probably not capable of defeating a tyrant.

McCord: Trump has exposed the weaknesses of a system that is based at least in part on the expectation that most people — both the governed and the governing — will seek to abide by the rule of law. But when someone like Trump comes along, we see that our system is slow and inefficient.

French: Rather than ending on a rather bleak note about American democracy, let’s conclude with a few lightning-round questions. First, which witness — aside from Michael Cohen — are you most interested in hearing from?

White: Trump himself. No sane defense attorney would want to put him on the stand. But will this be the case where he overrules his attorneys? It’s a ploy that’s very unlikely to get him a not-guilty verdict, but might be effective in reaching that lone holdout.

McCord: I’m also most interested in hearing from Trump.

French: This is pure speculation, but if the Stormy Daniels scandal emerged in October 2016, would Trump have won?

White: Yes. I think that sort of thing was already priced in. Nobody voted for him as a family man.

McCord: Coming on the heels of the “Access Hollywood” tape, this may have affected enough voters, particularly women voters, to make a difference.

French: Finally, what’s the best method for waking up a sleeping client ?

McCord: My client for most of my career was the United States, and the United States doesn’t fall asleep at the table.

White: Whisper how much you’re charging per hour.

David French is a Times columnist. Mary McCord, the executive director of the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection at Georgetown University Law Center, was the acting assistant attorney general for national security from 2016 to 2017, principal deputy assistant attorney general from 2014 to 2016 and a federal prosecutor for 20 years. Ken White, a former federal prosecutor, is a partner at Brown White & Osborn in Los Angeles.

Source photographs by Adam Gray and Angela Weiss, via Getty Images.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook , Instagram , TikTok , WhatsApp , X and Threads .

David French is an Opinion columnist, writing about law, culture, religion and armed conflict. He is a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom and a former constitutional litigator. His most recent book is “Divided We Fall: America’s Secession Threat and How to Restore Our Nation .” You can follow him on Threads ( @davidfrenchjag ).

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The Social Consequences of Poverty: An Empirical Test on Longitudinal Data

Carina mood.

Institute for Futures Studies, Box 591, 101 31 Stockholm, Sweden

Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

Jan O. Jonsson

Nuffield College, OX1 1NF Oxford, England, UK

Poverty is commonly defined as a lack of economic resources that has negative social consequences, but surprisingly little is known about the importance of economic hardship for social outcomes. This article offers an empirical investigation into this issue. We apply panel data methods on longitudinal data from the Swedish Level-of-Living Survey 2000 and 2010 (n = 3089) to study whether poverty affects four social outcomes—close social relations (social support), other social relations (friends and relatives), political participation, and activity in organizations. We also compare these effects across five different poverty indicators. Our main conclusion is that poverty in general has negative effects on social life. It has more harmful effects for relations with friends and relatives than for social support; and more for political participation than organizational activity. The poverty indicator that shows the greatest impact is material deprivation (lack of cash margin), while the most prevalent poverty indicators—absolute income poverty, and especially relative income poverty—appear to have the least effect on social outcomes.

Introduction

According to the most influential definitions, poverty is seen as a lack of economic resources that have negative social consequences—this is in fact a view that dominates current theories of poverty (Townsend 1979 ; Sen 1983 ; UN 1995 ), and also has a long heritage (Smith 1776 /1976). The idea is that even when people have food, clothes, and shelter, economic problems lead to a deterioration of social relations and participation. Being poor is about not being able to partake in society on equal terms with others, and therefore in the long run being excluded by fellow citizens or withdrawing from social and civic life because of a lack of economic resources, typically in combination with the concomitant shame of not being able to live a life like them (e.g., Sen 1983 ). Economic hardship affects the standard of life, consumption patterns, and leisure time activities, and this is directly or indirectly related to the possibility of making or maintaining friends or acquaintances: poverty is revealed by not having appropriate clothes, or a car; by not being able to afford vacation trips, visits to the restaurant, or hosting dinner parties (e.g., Mack and Lansley 1985 ; Callan et al. 1993 )—in short, low incomes prevent the poor from living a life in “decency” (Galbraith 1958 ).

The relational nature of poverty is also central to the social exclusion literature, which puts poverty in a larger perspective of multiple disadvantages and their interrelationships (Hills et al. 2002 , Rodgers et al. 1995 ; Room 1995 ). While there are different definitions of the social exclusion concept, the literature is characterized by a move from distributional to relational concerns (Gore 1995 ) and by an emphasis on the importance of social integration and active participation in public life. The inability of living a decent or “ordinary” social life may in this perspective erode social networks, social relations, and social participation, potentially setting off a downward spiral of misfortune (Paugam 1995 ) reinforcing disadvantages in several domains of life. This perspective on poverty and social exclusion is essentially sociological: the playing field of the private economy is social. It is ultimately about individuals’ relations with other people—not only primary social relations, with kin and friends, but extending to secondary relations reflected by participation in the wider community, such as in organizations and in political life (UN 1995 ).

Despite the fact that the social consequences of limited economic resources are central to modern perspectives on poverty and marginalization, this relation is surprisingly seldom studied empirically. Qualitative research on the poor give interesting examples on how the negative effects of poverty works, and portray the way that economic problems are transformed into social ones (Ridge and Millar 2011 ; Attree 2006 ). Such studies, however, have too small sample sizes to generalize to the population, and they cannot tell us much about the range of the problem. The (relatively few) studies that have addressed the association between poverty and social outcomes on larger scale tend to verify that the poor have worse social relations (Böhnke 2008 ; Jonsson and Östberg 2004 ; Levitas 2006 ), but Barnes et al. ( 2002 ) did not find any noteworthy association between poverty (measured as relative income poverty, using the 60 %-limit) and social relations or social isolation. Dahl et al. ( 2008 ) found no relation between poverty and friendships, but report less participation in civic organizations among the poor. All these studies have however been limited to cross-sectional data or hampered by methodological shortcomings, and therefore have not been able to address the separation of selection effects from potentially causal ones.

Our aim in this study is to make good these omissions. We use longitudinal data from the Swedish Level of Living Surveys (LNU) 2000 and 2010 to study how falling into poverty, or rising from it, is associated with outcomes in terms of primary and secondary social relations, including participation in civil society. These panel data make it possible to generalize the results to the Swedish adult population (19–65 in 2000; 29–75 in 2010), to address the issue of causality, and to estimate how strong the relation between economic vulnerability and social outcomes is. Because the data provide us with the possibility of measuring poverty in several ways, we are also able to address the question using different—alternative or complementary—indicators. Poverty is measured as economic deprivation (lack of cash margin, self-reported economic problems), income poverty (absolute and relative), and long-term poverty, respectively. The primary, or core, social outcomes are indicated by having social support if needed, and by social relations with friends and relatives. We expand our analysis to secondary, or fringe, social outcomes in terms of participation in social life at large, such as in civil society: our indicators here include the participation in organizations and in political life.

Different Dimensions/Definitions of Poverty

In modern welfare states, the normal take on the issue of poverty is to regard it as the relative lack of economic resources, that is, to define the poor in relation to their fellow citizens in the same country at the same time. Three approaches dominate the scholarly literature today. The first takes as a point of departure the income deemed necessary for living a life on par with others, or that makes possible an “acceptable” living standard—defined as the goods and services judged necessary, often on the basis of consumer or household budget studies. This usage of a poverty threshold is often (somewhat confusingly) called absolute income poverty , and is most common in North America (cf. Corak 2006 for a review), although most countries have poverty lines defined for different kinds of social benefits. In Europe and in the OECD, the convention is instead to use versions of relative income poverty , defining as poor those whose incomes fall well behind the median income in the country in question (European Union using 60 % and OECD 50 % of the median as the threshold). As an alternative to using purchasing power (as in the “absolute” measure), this relative measure defines poverty by income inequality in the bottom half of the income distribution (Atkinson et al. 2002 ; OECD 2008 ).

The third approach argues that income measures are too indirect; poverty should instead be indicated directly by the lack of consumer products and services that are necessary for an acceptable living standard (Mack and Lansley 1985 ; Ringen 1988 ; Townsend 1979 ). This approach often involves listing a number of possessions and conditions, such as having a car, washing machine, modern kitchen; and being able to dine out sometimes, to have the home adequately heated and mended, to have sufficient insurances, and so on. An elaborate version includes information on what people in general see as necessities, what is often termed “consensual” poverty (e.g., Mack and Lansley 1985 ; Gordon et al. 2000 ; Halleröd 1995 ; van den Bosch 2001 ). Other direct indicators include the ability to cover unforeseen costs (cash margin) and subjective definitions of poverty (e.g., van den Bosch 2001 ). The direct approach to poverty has gained in popularity and measures of economic/material deprivation and consensual poverty are used in several recent and contemporary comparative surveys such as ECHP (Whelan et al. 2003 ) and EU-SILC (e.g., UNICEF 2012 ; Nolan and Whelan 2011 ).

It is often pointed out that, due to the often quite volatile income careers of households, the majority of poverty episodes are short term and the group that is identified as poor in the cross-section therefore tends to be rather diluted (Bane and Ellwood 1986 ; Duncan et al. 1993 ). Those who suffer most from the downsides of poverty are, it could be argued, instead the long-term, persistent, or chronically poor, and there is empirical evidence that those who experience more years in poverty also are more deprived of a “common lifestyle” (Whelan et al. 2003 ). Poverty persistence has been defined in several ways, such as having spent a given number of years below a poverty threshold, or having an average income over a number of years that falls under the poverty line (e.g., Duncan and Rodgers 1991 ; Rodgers and Rodgers 1993 ). The persistently poor can only be detected with any precision in longitudinal studies, and typically on the basis of low incomes, as data covering repeated measures of material deprivation are uncommon.

For the purposes of this study, it is not essential to nominate the best or most appropriate poverty measure. The measures outlined above, while each having some disadvantage, all provide plausible theoretical grounds for predicting negative social outcomes. Low incomes, either in “absolute” or relative terms, may inhibit social activities and participation because these are costly (e.g., having decent housing, needing a car, paying membership fees, entrance tickets, or new clothes). Economic deprivation, often indicated by items or habits that are directly relevant to social life, is also a valid representation of a lack of resources. Lastly, to be in long-term poverty is no doubt a worse condition than being in shorter-term poverty.

It is worth underlining that we see different measures of poverty as relevant indicators despite the fact that the overlap between them often is surprisingly small (Bradshaw and Finch 2003 ). The lack of overlap is not necessarily a problem, as different people may have different configurations of economic problems but share in common many of the experiences of poverty—experiences, we argue, that are (in theory at least) all likely to lead to adverse social outcomes. Whether this is the case or not is one of the questions that we address, but if previous studies on child poverty are of any guidance, different definitions of poverty may show surprisingly similar associations with a number of outcomes (Jonsson and Östberg 2004 ).

What are the Likely Social Consequences of Poverty?

We have concluded that poverty is, according to most influential poverty definitions, manifested in the social sphere. This connects with the idea of Veblen ( 1899 ) of the relation between consumption and social status. What you buy and consume—clothes, furniture, vacation trips—in part define who you are, which group you aspire to belong to, and what view others will have of you. Inclusion into and exclusion from status groups and social circles are, in this view, dependent on economic resources as reflected in consumption patterns. While Veblen was mostly concerned about the rich and their conspicuous consumption, it is not difficult to transfer these ideas to the less fortunate: the poor are under risk of exclusion, of losing their social status and identity, and perhaps also, therefore, their friends. It is however likely that this is a process that differs according to outcome, with an unknown time-lag.

If, as outlined above, we can speak of primary and secondary social consequences, the former should include socializing with friends, but also more intimate relations. Our conjecture is that the closer the relation, the less affected is it by poverty, simply because intimate social bonds are characterized by more unconditional personal relations, typically not requiring costs to uphold.

When it comes to the secondary social consequences, we move outside the realm of closer interpersonal relations to acquaintances and the wider social network, and to the (sometimes relatively anonymous) participation in civil or political life. This dimension of poverty lies at the heart of the social exclusion perspective, which strongly emphasizes the broader issues of societal participation and civic engagement, vital to democratic societies. It is also reflected in the United Nation’s definition, following the Copenhagen summit in 1995, where “overall poverty” in addition to lack of economic resources is said to be “…characterized by lack of participation in decision-making and in civil, social, and cultural life” (UN 1995 , p. 57). Poverty may bring about secondary social consequences because such participation is costly—as in the examples of travel, need for special equipment, or membership fees—but also because of psychological mechanisms, such as lowered self-esteem triggering disbelief in civic and political activities, and a general passivity leading to decreased organizational and social activities overall. If processes like these exist there is a risk of a “downward spiral of social exclusion” where unemployment leads to poverty and social isolation, which in turn reduce the chances of re-gaining a footing in the labour market (Paugam 1995 ).

What theories of poverty and social exclusion postulate is, in conclusion, that both what we have called primary and secondary social relations will be negatively affected by economic hardship—the latter supposedly more than the former. Our strategy in the following is to test this basic hypothesis by applying multivariate panel-data analyses on longitudinal data. In this way, we believe that we can come further than previous studies towards estimating causal effects, although, as is the case in social sciences, the causal relation must remain preliminary due to the nature of observational data.

Data and Definitions

We use the two most recent waves of the Swedish Level-of-living Survey, conducted in 2000 and 2010 on random (1/1000) samples of adult Swedes, aged 18–75. 1 The attrition rate is low, with 84 % of panel respondents remaining from 2000 to 2010. This is one of the few data sets from which we can get over-time measures of both poverty and social outcomes for a panel that is representative of the adult population (at the first time point, t 0 )—in addition, there is annual income information from register data between the waves. The panel feature obviously restricts the age-groups slightly (ages 19–65 in 2000; 29–75 in 2010), the final number of analyzed cases being between 2995 and 3144, depending on the number of missing cases on the respective poverty measure and social outcome variable. For ease of interpretation and comparison of effect sizes, we have constructed all social outcome variables and poverty variables to be dichotomous (0/1). 2

In constructing poverty variables, we must balance theoretical validity with the need to have group sizes large enough for statistical analysis. For example, we expand the absolute poverty measure to include those who received social assistance any time during the year. As social assistance recipients receive this benefit based on having an income below a poverty line that is similar to the one we use, this seems justifiable. In other cases, however, group sizes are small but we find no theoretically reasonable way of making the variables more inclusive, meaning that some analyses cannot be carried out in full detail.

Our income poverty measures are based on register data and are thus free from recall error or misreporting, but—as the proponents of deprivation measures point out—income poverty measures are indirect measures of hardship. The deprivation measure is more direct, but self-reporting always carries a risk of subjectivity in the assessment. To the extent that changes in one’s judgment of the economic situation depend on changes in non-economic factors that are also related to social relations, the deprivation measure will give upwardly biased estimates. 3 As there is no general agreement about whether income or deprivation definitions are superior, our use of several definitions is a strength because the results will give an overall picture that is not sensitive to potential limitations in any one measure. In addition, we are able to see whether results vary systematically across commonly used definitions.

Poverty Measures

• Cash margin whether the respondent can raise a given sum of money in a week, if necessary (in 2000, the sum was 12,000 SEK; in 2010, 14,000 SEK, the latter sum corresponding to approximately 1600 Euro, 2200 USD, or 1400 GBP in 2013 currency rates). For those who answer in the affirmative, there is a follow-up question of how this can be done: by (a) own/household resources, (b) borrowing.
• Economic crisis Those who claim that they have had problems meeting costs for rent, food, bills, etc. during the last 12 months (responded “yes” to a yes/no alternative).
• Absolute poverty is defined as either (a) having a disposable family income below a poverty threshold or (b) receiving social assistance, both assessed in 1999 (for the survey 2000) or 2009 (for the survey 2010). The poverty line varies by family type/composition according to a commonly used calculation of household necessities (Jansson 2000 ). This “basket” of goods and services is intended to define an acceptable living standard, and was originally constructed for calculating an income threshold for social assistance, with addition of estimated costs for housing and transport. The threshold is adjusted for changes in the Consumer Price Index, using 2010 as the base year. In order to get analyzable group sizes, we classify anyone with an income below 1.25 times this threshold as poor. Self-employed are excluded because their nominal incomes are often a poor indicator of their economic standard.
• Deprived and income poor A combination of the indicator of economic deprivation and the indicator of absolute poverty. The poor are defined as those who are economically deprived and in addition are either absolute income-poor or have had social assistance some time during the last calendar year.
• Long - term poor are defined as those interviewed in 2010 (2000) who had an equivalized disposable income that fell below the 1.25 absolute poverty threshold (excluding self-employed) or who received social assistance in 2009 (1999), and who were in this situation for at least two of the years 2000–2008 (1990–1998). The long-term poor (coded 1) are contrasted to the non-poor (coded 0), excluding the short-term poor (coded missing) in order to distinguish whether long-term poverty is particularly detrimental (as compared to absolute poverty in general).
• Relative poverty is defined, according to the EU standard, as having a disposable equivalized income that is lower than 60 % of the median income in Sweden the year in question (EU 2005). 4 As for absolute poverty, this variable is based on incomes the year prior to the survey year. Self-employed are excluded.

Social and Participation Outcomes

Primary (core) social relations.

• Social support The value 1 (has support) is given to those who have answered in the positive to three questions about whether one has a close friend who can help if one (a) gets sick, (b) needs someone to talk to about troubles, or (c) needs company. Those who lack support in at least one of these respects are coded 0 (lack of support).
• Frequent social relations This variable is based on four questions about how often one meets (a) relatives and (b) friends, either (i) at ones’ home or (ii) at the home of those one meets, with the response set being “yes, often”, “sometimes”, and “no, never”. Respondents are defined as having frequent relations (1) if they have at least one “often” of the four possible and no “never”, 5 and 0 otherwise.

Secondary (fringe) Social Relations/Participation

• Political participation : Coded 1 (yes) if one during the last 12 months actively participated (held an elected position or was at a meeting) in a trade union or a political party, and 0 (no) otherwise. 6
• Organizational activity : Coded 1 (yes) if one is a member of an organization and actively participate in its activities at least once in a year, and 0 (no) otherwise.

Control Variables

• Age (in years)
• Educational qualifications in 2010 (five levels according to a standard schema used by Statistics Sweden (1985), entered as dummy variables)
• Civil status distinguishes between single and cohabiting/married persons, and is used as a time-varying covariate (TVC) where we register any changes from couple to single and vice versa.
• Immigrant origin is coded 1 if both parents were born in any country outside Sweden, 0 otherwise.
• Labour market status is also used as a TVC, with four values indicating labour market participation (yes/no) in 2000 and 2010, respectively.
• Global self - rated health in 2000, with three response alternatives: Good, bad, or in between. 7

Table  1 shows descriptive statistics for the 2 years we study, 2000 and 2010 (percentages in the upper panel; averages, standard deviations, max and min values in the lower panel). Recall that the sample is longitudinal with the same respondents appearing in both years. This means, naturally, that the sample ages 10 years between the waves, the upper age limit being pushed up from 65 to 75. Both the change over years and the ageing of the sample have repercussions for their conditions: somewhat more have poor health, for example, fewer lack social support but more lack frequent social relations, and more are single in 2010 (where widows are a growing category). The group has however improved their economic conditions, with a sizeable reduction in poverty rates. Most of the changes are in fact period effects, and it is particularly obvious for the change in poverty—in 2000 people still suffered from the deep recession in Sweden that begun in 1991 and started to turn in 1996/97 (Jonsson et al. 2010 ), while the most recent international recession (starting in 2008/09) did not affect Sweden that much.

Table 1

Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables in the LNU panel

N for variables used as change variables pertains to non-missing observations in both 2000 and 2010

The overall decrease in poverty masks changes that our respondents experienced between 2000 and 2010: Table  2 reveals these for the measure of economic deprivation, showing the outflow (row) percentages and the total percentages (and the number of respondents in parentheses). It is evident that there was quite a lot of mobility out of poverty between the years (61 % left), but also a very strong relative risk of being found in poverty in 2010 among those who were poor in 2000 (39 vs. 5 % of those who were non-poor in 2000). Of all our respondents, the most common situation was to be non-poor both years (81 %), while few were poor on both occasions (6 %). Table  2 also demonstrates some small cell numbers: 13.3 % of the panel (9.4 % + 3.9 %), or a good 400 cases, changed poverty status, and these cases are crucial for identifying our models. As in many panel studies based on survey data, this will inevitably lead to some problems with large standard errors and difficulties in arriving at statistically significant and precise estimates; but to preview the findings, our results are surprisingly consistent all the same.

Table 2

Mobility in poverty (measured as economic deprivation) in Sweden between 2000 and 2010

Outflow percentage (row %), total percentage, and number of cases (in parentheses). LNU panel 2000–2010

We begin with showing descriptive results of how poverty is associated with our outcome variables, using the economic deprivation measure of poverty. 8 Figure  1 confirms that those who are poor have worse social relationships and participate less in political life and in organizations. Poverty is thus connected with both primary and secondary social relations.

The relation between poverty (measured as economic deprivation) and social relations/participation in Sweden, LNU 2010. N = 5271

The descriptive picture in Fig.  1 does not tell us anything about the causal nature of the relation between poverty and social outcomes, only that such a relation exists, and that it is in the predicted direction: poor people have weaker social relations, less support, and lower levels of political and civic participation. Our task now is to apply more stringent statistical models to test whether the relation we have uncovered is likely to be of a causal nature. This means that we must try to rid the association of both the risk for reverse causality—that, for example, a weaker social network leads to poverty—and the risk that there is a common underlying cause of both poverty and social outcomes, such as poor health or singlehood.

The Change Model

First, as we have panel data, we can study the difference in change across two time-points T (called t 0 and t 1 , respectively) in an outcome variable (e.g., social relations), between groups (i.e. those who changed poverty status versus those who did not). The respondents are assigned to either of these groups on the grounds of entering or leaving poverty; in the first case, one group is non-poor at t 0 but experiences poverty at t 1 , and the change in this group is compared to the group consisting of those who are non-poor both at t 0 and t 1 . The question in focus then is: Do social relations in the group entering poverty worsen in relation to the corresponding change in social relations in the group who remains non-poor? Because we have symmetric hypotheses of the effect of poverty on social outcomes—assuming leaving poverty has positive consequences similar to the negative consequences of entering poverty—we also study whether those who exit poverty improve their social outcomes as compared to those remaining poor. We ask, that is, not only what damage falling into poverty might have for social outcomes, but also what “social gains” could be expected for someone who climbs out of poverty.

Thus, in our analyses we use two different “change groups”, poverty leavers and poverty entrants , and two “comparison groups”, constantly poor and never poor , respectively. 9 The setup comparing the change in social outcomes for those who change poverty status and those who do not is analogous to a so-called difference-in-difference design, but as the allocation of respondents to comparison groups and change groups in our data cannot be assumed to be random (as with control groups and treatment groups in experimental designs), we take further measures to approach causal interpretations.

Accounting for the Starting Value of the Dependent Variable

An important indication of the non-randomness of the allocation to the change and comparison groups is that their average values of the social outcomes (i.e. the dependent variable) at t 0 differ systematically: Those who become poor between 2000 and 2010 have on average worse social outcomes already in 2000 than those who stay out of poverty. Similarly, those who stay in poverty both years have on average worse social outcomes than those who have exited poverty in 2010. In order to further reduce the impact of unobserved variables, we therefore make all comparisons of changes in social outcomes between t 0 and t 1 for fixed t 0 values of both social outcome and poverty status.

As we use dichotomous outcome variables, we get eight combinations of poverty and outcome states (2 × 2 × 2 = 8), and four direct strategic comparisons:

• Poverty leavers versus constantly poor, positive social outcome in 2000 , showing if those who exit poverty have a higher chance of maintaining the positive social outcome than those who stay in poverty
• Poverty leavers versus constantly poor, negative social outcome in 2000 , showing if those who exit poverty have a higher chance of improvement in the social outcome than those who stay in poverty
• Poverty entrants versus never poor, positive social outcome in 2000 , showing if those who enter poverty have a higher risk of deterioration in the social outcome than those who stay out of poverty, and
• Poverty entrants versus never poor, negative social outcome in 2000 , showing if those who enter poverty have a lower chance of improvement in the social outcome.

Thus, we hold the initial social situation and poverty status fixed, letting only the poverty in 2010 vary. 10 The analytical strategy is set out in Table  3 , showing estimates of the probability to have frequent social relations in 2010, for poverty defined (as in Table  2 and Fig.  1 above) as economic deprivation.

Table 3

Per cent with frequent social relations in “comparison” and “change” groups in 2000 and 2010, according to initial value on social relations in 2000 and poverty (measured as economic deprivation) in 2000 and 2010

LNU panel 2000–2010. N = 3083

The figures in Table  3 should be read like this: 0.59 in the upper left cell means that among those who were poor neither in 2000 nor in 2010 (“never poor”, or 0–0), and who had non-frequent social relations to begin with, 59 % had frequent social relations in 2010. Among those never poor who instead started out with more frequent social relations, 90 per cent had frequent social relations in 2010. This difference (59 vs. 90) tells us either that the initial conditions were important (weak social relations can be inherently difficult to improve) or that there is heterogeneity within the group of never poor people, such as some having (to us perhaps unobserved) characteristics that support relation building while others have not.

Because our strategy is to condition on the initial situation in order to minimize the impact of initial conditions and unobserved heterogeneity, we focus on the comparisons across columns. If we follow each column downwards, that is, for a given initial social outcome (weak or not weak social relations, respectively) it is apparent that the outcome is worse for the “poverty entrants” in comparison with the “never poor” (upper three lines). Comparing the change group [those who became poor (0–1)] with the comparison group [never poor (0–0)] for those who started out with weak social relations (left column), the estimated probability of frequent social relations in 2010 is 7 % points lower for those who became poor. Among those who started out with frequent relations, those who became poor have a 17 % points lower probability of frequent relations in 2010 than those who stayed out of poverty.

If we move down Table  3 , to the three bottom lines, the change and comparison groups are now different. The comparison group is the “constantly poor” (1–1), and the change group are “poverty leavers” (1–0). Again following the columns downwards, we can see that the change group improved their social relations in comparison with the constantly poor; and this is true whether they started out with weak social relations or not. In fact, the chance of improvement for those who started off with non-frequent social relations is the most noteworthy, being 33 % units higher for those who escaped poverty than for those who did not. In sum, Table  3 suggests that becoming poor appears to be bad for social relations whereas escaping poverty is beneficial.

Expanding the Model

The model exemplified in Table  3 is a panel model that studies change across time within the same individuals, conditioning on their initial state. It does away with time-constant effects of observed and unobserved respondent characteristics, and although this is far superior to a cross-sectional model (such as the one underlying Fig.  1 ) there are still threats to causal interpretations. It is possible (if probably unusual) that permanent characteristics may trigger a change over time in both the dependent and independent variables; or, put in another way, whether a person stays in or exits poverty may be partly caused by a variable that also predicts change in the outcome (what is sometimes referred to as a violation of the “common trend assumption”). In our case, we can for example imagine that health problems in 2000 can affect who becomes poor in 2010, at t 1 , and that the same health problems can lead to a deterioration of social relations between 2000 and 2010, so even conditioning on the social relations at t 0 will not be enough. This we handle by adding control variables, attempting to condition the comparison of poor and non-poor also on sex, age, highest level of education (in 2010), immigrant status, and health (in 2000). 11

Given the set-up of our data—with 10 years between the two data-points and with no information on the precise time ordering of poverty and social outcomes at t 1 , the model can be further improved by including change in some of the control variables. It is possible, for example, that a non-poor and married respondent in 2000 divorced before 2010, triggering both poverty and reduced social relations at the time of the interview in 2010. 12 There are two major events that in this way may bias our results, divorce/separation and unemployment (because each can lead to poverty, and possibly also affect social outcomes). We handle this by controlling for variables combining civil status and unemployment in 2000 as well as in 2010. To the extent that these factors are a consequence of becoming poor, there is a risk of biasing our estimates downwards (e.g., if becoming poor increases the risk of divorce). However, as there is no way to distinguish empirically whether control variables (divorce, unemployment) or poverty changed first we prefer to report conservative estimates. 13

Throughout, we use logistic regression to estimate our models (one model for each social outcome and poverty definition). We create a dummy variable for each of the combinations of poverty in 2000, poverty in 2010 and the social outcome in 2000, and alternate the reference category in order to get the four strategic comparisons described above. Coefficients do thus express the distance between the relevant change and comparison groups. The coefficients reported are average marginal effects (AME) for a one-unit change in the respective poverty variable (i.e. going from non-poor to poor and vice versa), which are straightforwardly interpretable as percentage unit differences and (unlike odds ratios or log odds ratios) comparable across models and outcomes (Mood 2010 ).

Regression Results

As detailed above, we use changes over time in poverty and social outcomes to estimate the effects of interest. The effect of poverty is allowed to be heterogeneous, and is assessed through four comparisons of the social outcome in 2010 (Y 1 ):

• Those entering poverty relative to those in constant non-poverty (P 01  = 0,1 vs. P 01  = 0,0) when both have favourable social outcomes at t 0 (Y 0  = 1)
• Those exiting poverty relative to those in constant poverty (P 01  = 1,0 vs. P 01  = 1,1) when both have favourable social outcomes at t 0 (Y 0  = 1)
• Those entering poverty relative to those in constant non-poverty (P 01  = 0,1 vs. P 01  = 0,0) when both have non-favourable social outcomes at t 0 (Y 0  = 0)
• Those exiting poverty relative to those in constant poverty (P 01  = 1,0 vs. P 01  = 1,1) when both have non-favourable social outcomes at t 0 (Y 0  = 0)

Poverty is a rare outcome, and as noted above it is particularly uncommon to enter poverty between 2000 and 2010 because of the improving macro-economic situation. Some of the social outcomes were also rare in 2000. This unfortunately means that in some comparisons we have cell frequencies that are prohibitively small, and we have chosen to exclude all comparisons involving cells where N < 20.

The regression results are displayed in Table  4 . To understand how the estimates come to be, consider the four in the upper left part of the Table (0.330, 0.138, −0.175 and −0.065), reflecting the effect of poverty, measured as economic deprivation, on the probability of having frequent social relations. Because these estimates are all derived from a regression without any controls, they are identical (apart from using three decimal places) to the percentage comparisons in Table  3 (0.33, 0.14, −0.17, −0.07), and can be straightforwardly interpreted as average differences in the probability of the outcome in question. From Table  4 it is clear that the three first differences are all statistically significant, whereas the estimate −0.07 is not (primarily because those who entered poverty in 2010 and had infrequent social relations in 2000 is a small group, N = 25).

Table 4

Average marginal effects (from logistic regression) of five types of poverty (1–5) on four social outcomes (A-D) comparing those with different poverty statuses in 2000 and 2010 and conditioning on the starting value of the social outcome (in 2000)

Right columns control for sex, education, age, immigrant status, health in 2000, civil status change between 2000 and 2010, and unemployment change between 2000 and 2010. P values in parentheses. Excluded estimates involve variable categories with N < 20. Shaded cells are in hypothesized direction, bold estimates are statistically significant ( P  < 0.05). N in regressions: 1A: 3075; 1B: 3073; 1C: 3075; 1D: 3069; 2A: 3144; 2B: 3137; 2C: 3144; 2D: 3130; 3A: 3074, 3B: 3072; 3C: 3074; 3D: 3068; 4A: 2995; 4B: 2988; 4C: 2995; 4D: 2981; 5A: 3128; 5B: 3121; 5C: 3128; 5D: 3114

In the column to the right, we can see what difference the controls make: the estimates are reduced, but not substantially so, and the three first differences are still statistically significant.

The estimates for each social outcome, reflecting the four comparisons described above, support the hypothesis of poverty affecting social relations negatively (note that the signs of the estimates should differ in order to do so, the upper two being positive as they reflect an effect of the exit from poverty, and the lower two being negative as they reflect an effect of entering poverty). We have indicated support for the hypothesis in Table  4 by shading the estimates and standard errors for estimates that go in the predicted direction.

Following the first two columns down, we can see that there is mostly support for the hypothesis of a negative effect of poverty, but when controlling for other variables, the effects on social support are not impressive. In fact, if we concentrate on each social outcome (i.e., row-wise), one conclusion is that, when controlling for confounders, there are rather small effects of poverty on the probability of having access to social support. The opposite is true for political participation, where the consistency in the estimated effects of poverty is striking.

If we instead follow the columns, we ask whether any of the definitions of poverty is a better predictor of social outcomes than the others. The measure of economic deprivation appears to be the most stable one, followed by absolute poverty and the combined deprivation/absolute poverty variable. 14 The relative poverty measure is less able to predict social outcomes: in many instances it even has the non-expected sign. Interestingly, long-term poverty (as measured here) does not appear to have more severe negative consequences than absolute poverty in general.

Because some of our comparison groups are small, it is difficult to get high precision in the estimates, efficiency being a concern particularly in view of the set of control variables in Table  4 . Only 14 out of 62 estimates in models with controls are significant and in the right direction. Nonetheless, with 52 out of 62 estimates in these models having the expected sign, we believe that the hypothesis of a negative effect of poverty on social outcomes receives quite strong support.

Although control variables are not shown in the table, one thing should be noted about them: The reduction of coefficients when including control variables is almost exclusively driven by changes in civil status. 15 The time constant characteristics that are included are cross-sectionally related to both poverty and social outcomes, but they have only minor impacts on the estimated effects of poverty. This suggests that the conditioning on prior values of the dependent and independent variables eliminates much time invariant heterogeneity, which increases the credibility of estimates.

Conclusions

We set out to test a fundamental, but rarely questioned assumption in dominating definitions of poverty: whether shortage of economic resources has negative consequences for social relations and participation. By using longitudinal data from the Swedish Level-of-living Surveys 2000 and 2010, including repeated measures of poverty (according to several commonly used definitions) and four social outcome variables, we are able to come further than previous studies in estimating the relation between poverty and social outcomes: Our main conclusion is that there appears to be a causal relation between them.

Panel models suggest that falling into poverty increases the risk of weakening social relations and decreasing (civic and political) participation. Climbing out of poverty tends to have the opposite effects, a result that strengthens the interpretation of causality. The sample is too small to estimate the effect sizes with any precision, yet they appear to be substantial, with statistically significant estimates ranging between 5 and 21 % units.

While these findings are disquieting insofar as poverty goes, our results also suggest two more positive results. First, the negative effects of poverty appear to be reversible: once the private economy recovers, social outcomes improve. Secondly, the negative consequences are less for the closest social relations, whether there is someone there in cases of need (sickness, personal problems, etc.). This is in line with an interpretation of such close relations being unconditional: our nearest and dearest tend to hang on to us also in times of financial troubles, which may bolster risks for social isolation and psychological ill-being,

Our finding of negative effects of poverty on civic and political participation relates to the fears of a “downward spiral of social exclusion”, as there is a risk that the loss of less intimate social relations shrinks social networks and decreases the available social capital in terms of contacts that can be important for outcomes such as finding a job (e.g., Lin 2001 ; Granovetter 1974 ). However, Gallie et al. ( 2003 ) found no evidence for any strong impact of social isolation on unemployment, suggesting that the negative effects on social outcomes that we observe are unlikely to lead to self-reinforcement of poverty. Nevertheless, social relations are of course important outcomes in their own right, so if they are negatively affected by poverty it matters regardless of whether social relations in turn are important for other outcomes. Effects on political and civic participation are also relevant in themselves beyond individuals’ wellbeing, as they suggest a potentially democratic problem where poor have less of a voice and less influence on society than others.

Our results show the merits of our approach, to study the relation between poverty and social outcomes longitudinally. The fact that the poor have worse social relations and lower participation is partly because of selection. This may be because the socially isolated, or those with a weaker social network, more easily fall into poverty; or it can be because of a common denominator, such as poor health or social problems. But once we have stripped the analysis of such selection effects, we also find what is likely to be a causal relation between poverty and social relations. However, this effect of poverty on social outcomes, in turn, varies between different definitions of poverty. Here it appears that economic deprivation, primarily indicated by the ability of raising money with short notice, is the strongest predictor of social outcomes. Income poverty, whether in absolute or (particularly) relative terms, are weaker predictors of social outcomes, which is interesting as they are the two most common indicators of poverty in existing research.

Even if we are fortunate to have panel data at our disposal, there are limitations in our analyses that render our conclusions tentative. One is that we do not have a random allocation to the comparison groups at t 0 ; another that there is a 10-year span between the waves that we analyze, and both poverty and social outcomes may vary across this time-span. We have been able to address these problems by conditioning on the outcome at t 0 and by controlling for confounders, but in order to perform more rigorous tests future research would benefit from data with a more detailed temporal structure, and preferably with an experimental or at least quasi-experimental design.

Finally, our analyses concern Sweden, and given the position as an active welfare state with a low degree of inequality and low poverty rates, one can ask whether the results are valid also for other comparable countries. While both the level of poverty and the pattern of social relations differ between countries (for policy or cultural reasons), we believe that the mechanisms linking poverty and social outcomes are of a quite general kind, especially as the “costs for social participation” can be expected to be relative to the general wealth of a country—however, until comparative longitudinal data become available, this must remain a hypothesis for future research.

1 http://www.sofi.su.se/english/2.17851/research/three-research-departments/lnu-level-of-living .

2 We have tested various alternative codings and the overall pattern of results in terms of e.g., direction of effects and differences across poverty definitions are similar, but more difficult to present in an accessible way.

3 Our deprivation questions are however designed to reduce the impact of subjectivity by asking, e.g., about getting a specified sum within a specified time (see below).

4 In the equivalence scale, the first adult gets a weight of one, the second of 0.6, and each child gets a weight of 0.5.

5 We have also tried using single indicators (either a/b or i/ii) without detecting any meaningful difference between them. One would perhaps have assumed that poverty would be more consequential for having others over to one’s own place, but the absence of support for this can perhaps be understood in light of the strong social norm of reciprocity in social relations.

6 We have refrained from using information on voting and membership in trade unions and political parties, because these indicators do not capture the active, social nature of civic engagement to the same extent as participation in meetings and the holding of positions.

7 We have also estimated models with a more extensive health variable, a s ymptom index , which sums responses to 47 questions about self-reported health symptoms. However, this variable has virtually zero effects once global self-rated health is controlled, and does not lead to any substantive differences in other estimates. Adding the global health measure and the symptom index as TVC had no effect either.

8 Using the other indicators of poverty yields very similar results, although for some of those the difference between poor and non-poor is smaller.

9 We call these comparison groups ”never poor” and ”constantly poor” for expository purposes, although their poverty status pertains only to the years 2000 and 2010, i.e., without information on the years in between.

10 With this design we allow different effects of poverty on improvement versus deterioration of the social outcome. We have also estimated models with a lagged dependent variable, which constrains the effects of poverty changes to be of the same size for deterioration as for improvement of the social outcome. Conclusions from that analysis are roughly a weighted average of the estimates for deterioration and improvement that we report. As our analyses suggest that effects of poverty differ in size depending on the value of the lagged dependent variable (the social outcome) our current specification gives a more adequate representation of the process.

11 We have also tested models with a wider range of controls for, e.g., economic and social background (i.e. characteristics of the respondent’s parents), geography, detailed family type and a more detailed health variable, but none of these had any impact on the estimated poverty effects.

12 It is also possible that we register reverse causality, namely if worsening social outcomes that occur after t 0 lead to poverty at t 1 . This situation is almost inevitable when using panel data with no clear temporal ordering of events occurring between waves. However, reverse causality strikes us, in this case, as theoretically implausible.

13 We have also estimated models controlling for changes in health, which did not change the results.

14 If respondents’ judgments of the deprivation questions (access to cash margin and ability to pay rent, food, bills etc.) change due to non-economic factors that are related to changes in social relations, the better predictive capacity of the deprivation measure may be caused by a larger bias in this measure than in the (register-based) income measures.

15 As mentioned above, this variable may to some extent be endogenous (i.e., a mediator of the poverty effect rather than a confounder), in which case we get a downward bias of estimates.

Contributor Information

Carina Mood, Phone: +44-8-402 12 22, Email: [email protected] .

Jan O. Jonsson, Phone: +44 1865 278513, Email: [email protected] .

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Mark Meadows, Rudy Giuliani and Arizona 'fake electors' charged with state crimes

A state grand jury in Arizona on Wednesday indicted Trump aide s including Rudy Giuliani, Mark Meadows and Boris Epshteyn, as well as s o-called "fake electors" who backed then-President Donald Trump in 2020, after a sprawling investigation into the alleged efforts to overturn Joe Biden’s win in the presidential election in the state.

One month after the 2020 election, 11 Trump supporters convened at the Arizona GOP’s headquarters in Phoenix to sign a certificate claiming to be Arizona’s 11 electors to the Electoral College, though Biden won the state by 10,457 votes and state officials certified his electors. The state Republican Party documented the signing of the certificate in a social media post and sent it to Congress and the National Archives.

Trump is described as “Unindicted Coconspirator 1” in the indictment, which includes charges of conspiracy, fraud and forgery. The document also describes people who have been charged in the case but have not yet been served and whose names are redacted: Meadows, Trump's former White House chief of staff; Giuliani, the former New York City mayor and Trump attorney; Epshteyn, a Trump campaign official and attorney; former Trump campaign and White House official Mike Roman; former Trump attorney Jenna Ellis; former Trump attorney Christina Bobb; and John Eastman, another attorney and Trump legal adviser in the aftermath of the 2020 election.

Epshteyn sat at the defense table with Trump when he was arraigned in his New York hush money case last year, though he has not appeared during the trial.

Ted Goodman, a spokesperson for Giuliani, said in a statement Wednesday that Giuliani “is proud to stand up for the countless Americans who raised legitimate concerns surrounding the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election.”

Also among those charged in Arizona is Kelli Ward, who served as chair of the Arizona GOP during the 2020 election and the immediate aftermath. She tweeted on Jan. 6, 2021, after the attack on the U.S. Capitol: “Congress is adjourned. Send the elector choice back to the legislatures.” Ward was a Trump elector and a consistent propagator of false claims that Arizona’s election results were rigged.

Others charged along with Ward as "fake electors" were: state legislators Anthony Kern and Jake Hoffman; Michael Ward, Kelli Ward’s husband; Tyler Bowyer, the Republican National Committee's Arizona committeeman and the chief operating officer of the Trump-aligned Turning Point USA; Greg Safsten, the former Arizona GOP executive director; former U.S. Senate candidate Jim Lamon; Robert Montgomery, the former head of the Cochise County GOP; and Republican Party activists Samuel Moorhead, Nancy Cottle and Loraine Pellegrino.

Another passage of the indictment appears to describe attorney Kenneth Chesebro, one of the planners of the alleged scheme, as an unindicted coconspirator. Chesebro pleaded guilty last year in Georgia to conspiracy charges brought against him, Trump and 17 other people in the state. He is also believed to be one of the unidentified co-conspirators special counsel Jack Smith described in his federal election interference indictment of Trump last year. 

Arizona Attorney General Kris Mayes, a Democrat, led the investigation. She won her election to be the state’s chief prosecutor in November 2022, replacing Republican Mark Brnovich, a onetime ally of Trump who later earned his scorn for not substantiating his claims of election fraud in the state.

"We conducted a thorough and professional investigation over the past 13 months into the fake electors scheme in our state," Mayes said in a video announcing the charges . "I understand for some of you today didn't come fast enough. And I know I'll be criticized by others for conducting this investigation at all. But as I've stated before, and we'll say here again, today, I will not allow American democracy to be undermined."

The Republican Party of Arizona said in statement posted to X that the indictments represented a “blatant and unprecedented abuse of prosecutorial power, aimed solely at distracting the public from the critical policy debates our country should be focusing on as we approach the 2024 election.”

“The timing of these charges-precisely four years after the 2020 election and as President Biden seeks re-election-is suspiciously convenient and politically motivated. This is not justice; it is pure election interference,” it said. “They do nothing but undermine the trust in our state’s legal processes and are clearly designed to silence dissent and weaponize the law against political opponents.”

The Arizona charges are the latest example of Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 election sprouting into legal cases during his 2024 bid to retake office.

Arizona was one of seven states where “alternate electors” signed paperwork falsely claiming Trump had won the states. Prosecutors have already charged “alternate electors” in Nevada , Georgia and Michigan .

Chesebro and others, including Eastman , argued in the months after the 2020 election that then-Vice President Mike Pence could use the existence of the alternate electors to name Trump the winner of the election as he presided over the electoral vote count in Congress on Jan. 6.

Eastman wrote in a memo: “At the end, he announces that because of the ongoing disputes in the 7 States, there are no electors that can be deemed validly appointed in those States. … There are at this point 232 votes for Trump, 222 votes for Biden. Pence then gavels President Trump as re-elected.”

Trump lost Arizona by just under 11,000 votes. As the Republican electors sent illegitimate certifications to Washington, Trump sought to put pressure on Maricopa County officials and other Arizona Republicans, including then-state House Speaker Rusty Bowers and then-Gov. Doug Ducey.

Trump placed a phone call directly to Ducey as the governor certified the state’s election results. Ducey muted the call.

Mayes’ term as Arizona attorney general has been marked by other election cases stemming from Trump’s false claims about fraud in the 2020 election and after.

Last fall, Mayes charged two local officials who delayed the certification of midterm election results in 2022 in Cochise County. The officials voted against certifying the county’s election results by the statutory deadline after they aired baseless accusations about the integrity of the election for months. The county certified its election results only after a court ordered it to do so.

Vaughn Hillyard is a correspondent for NBC News. 

Dareh Gregorian is a politics reporter for NBC News.

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Tributes paid to Frank Field, former Labour minister, who has died aged 81

Long-serving MP dedicated Westminster career to tackling social issues including child poverty and modern slavery

Tributes from across the political spectrum have been paid to the former Labour minister and welfare campaigner Frank Field , who has died at the age of 81.

Lord Field, who dedicated his career in Westminster to tackling social issues, including child poverty and modern slavery, served as an MP for 40 years.

Messages of support came from across the political divide, with praise for “a man of often uncomfortable principle” with an “unwavering moral compass”.

In 2021, he revealed he had been diagnosed with terminal cancer when his speech was read out in the House of Lords to support a change in the law on assisted dying.

Field was one of the longest-serving MPs in the Commons, only losing his seat in the 2019 general election after forming his own party.

Tony Blair, under whose government Field served as welfare reform minister, said: “Frank had integrity, intelligence and deep commitment to the causes he believed in. He was an independent thinker never constrained by conventional wisdom, but always pushing at the frontier of new ideas.

“Even when we disagreed, I had the utmost respect for him as a colleague and a character. Whether in his work on child poverty or in his time devoted to the reform of our welfare system, he stood up and stood out for the passion and insight he brought to any subject.”

The former home secretary Priti Patel wrote on X: “Frank was a kind and compassionate man and a great parliamentarian. His unwavering moral compass, commitment to working cross-party and unshakable principles defined him and will be greatly missed.”

Chris Bryant MP, the shadow minister for creative industries and digital, said Field was “a man of often uncomfortable principle [who] made our politics better”.

The Conservative MP Tracey Crouch wrote: “I am genuinely devastated to hear that Frank Field has died. He was one of parliament’s nicest people. Kind, softly spoken & generous in praise. He has been v poorly so there is comfort knowing he is now at peace but he will be hugely missed.”

The shadow health secretary, Wes Streeting, described Field as “a great parliamentarian, crusader for social justice and source of wise counsel”. He wrote: “What a blessing to have known him and benefited from his advice and kindness, even as his illness gripped him.”

The former justice secretary and Conservative MP Robert Buckland, wrote: “Very sad to hear of the death of Frank Field. He made a unique contribution to public life. His blend of compassion, thoughtfulness, decency, shot through with steel, will be greatly missed.”

A family statement, issued by his parliamentary office, said: “Frank Field (Rt Hon Lord Field of Birkenhead, CH) has died at the age of 81 following a period of illness.

“Frank was director of the Child Poverty Action Group between 1969 and 1979, and the member of parliament for Birkenhead between 1979 and 2019.

“During that time, he served as a minister for welfare reform and led the independent review on poverty and life chances. He also chaired the Commons work and pensions select committee (and its predecessor committee on social services and social security) as well as the joint committee on the draft modern slavery bill.

Field was first elected as the Labour MP for Birkenhead in Merseyside in 1979. He was made a cross-bench peer in 2020, where he became Lord Field of Birkenhead, and two years later was made a member of the order of the companions of honour.

He continued to serve on the boards of Cool Earth, Feeding Britain and the Frank Field Education Trust.

Field was welfare reform minister in Tony Blair’s first government in 1997 and went on to chair the work and pensions select committee.

He later resigned the Labour whip over antisemitism and “nastiness” in the party under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership. He stood in the 2019 general election for his newly formed Birkenhead Social Justice party but lost the seat to Mick Whitley for Labour.

Field died on Tuesday in a London care home. He gave his support to the assisted dying bill in 2021, which would make it legal for terminally ill adults in England and Wales to seek support to end their lives.

In a statement read by Molly Meacher, who had tabled the bill, Field said: “I’ve just spent a period in a hospice and I’m not well enough to participate in today’s debate. If I had been, I would have spoken strongly in favour of the second reading [of the bill].

“I changed my mind on assisted dying when an MP friend was dying of cancer and wanted to die early, before the full horror effects set in, but was denied this opportunity.”

His family said in their statement: “Frank is survived by two brothers. He will be mourned by admirers across politics but above all he will be greatly missed by those lucky enough to have enjoyed his laughter and friendship.”

• Frank Field
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