ethics in criminology essay

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The ethics and politics of narrative for critical research practice, whose harm tellable categories in criminology, whose story the implications of our knowing, so what the politics of our telling, acknowledgements.

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Critical Narratives Or Crime Stories? The Ethics And Politics Of Narrative Research In Criminology

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Rebecca Bunn, Critical Narratives Or Crime Stories? The Ethics And Politics Of Narrative Research In Criminology, The British Journal of Criminology , Volume 63, Issue 6, November 2023, Pages 1557–1573, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azac101

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Amid growing criminological interest in narrative, there is hope that the mainstreaming of ‘narrative criminology’ will yield a more critical disposition within the discipline. This article contends that critical practice does not simply entail attending to issues of harm, power and resistance or researcher reflexivity, but grappling with the complex ethics and politics of our research practices. Focusing on the field of ‘narrative criminology’, this article explores issues of voyeurism, empathy, listening and bearing witness and poses some questions to guide ethical narrative practice within criminology. It calls for criminologists to consider how we may use narrative more responsibly within our discipline.

There has long been fruitful discussion about what the use of narrative offers sociological enquiry, including within the discipline of criminology. In particular, the field of ‘narrative criminology’ has developed as a scholarly movement committed to centring the place of narratives in criminological research. It adopts a constitutive understanding of narrative, centred around the belief that narratives shape experience and action, helping individuals attribute meaning to their lives ( Presser and Sandberg 2015 ). Prominent narrative criminologists Lois Presser and Sveinung Sandberg (2019) have recently argued that their narrative frameworks are especially fitting for critical criminological research because they seek to foreground harm, oppression and resistance, and reflexivity in the study of crime. Maruna and Liem (2021 : 139) have likewise asserted that narrative criminology represents ‘a fairly radical break with mainstream criminology and its core assumptions’, and have called for the field to be ‘mainstreamed’ to counter the discipline’s positivist tendencies. These contributions bring important attention to the question of what narrative might do for criminologists, and I wish to take their assertions as a valuable point of departure to instigate a broader discussion on what it might mean to practice narrative research ethically, within the discipline of criminology.

In particular, I wish to challenge the assumption that the use of narrative in criminology is fundamentally a critical endeavour—a claim that I argue represents a conflation of the essence of narrative with its potential practices ( Shuman 2010 ). Whilst I share the enthusiasm for narrative practice within criminological scholarship as espoused by narrative criminologists and their supporters, I humbly question the assumption that narrative criminology represents a ‘radical break’ with mainstream, positivist criminology ( Maruna and Liem 2021 : 139). In fact, I suggest that such a position may rather be indicative of criminologists’ ‘persistent drive to supersede the conditions of their operations from settler colonial logic’ ( Tuck and Yang 2014 : 229), than a revolutionary moment for the discipline. It assumes that there is something inherent within the field of narrative criminology that imbues critical praxis, or that a narrative framework necessarily makes research more critical in nature. Given its location within a discipline with a well-earned reputation as a ‘science of oppression’ ( Lynch 2000 ), the danger of this approach is that it glosses over the potential for narrative criminological research to cause harm, and discourages critical attention to how we might use narrative better. Ironically, this may ultimately come to serve the positivist imperatives of mainstream criminology, rather than change them. As Tauri (2018 : 5) reminds us, criminologists are often complicit in the same oppressive structures they research ‘through the very act of doing criminology’.

This article thus critiques the claim that narrative criminology is an ‘apt and powerful framework for research in critical criminology’ ( Presser and Sandberg 2019 : 1) and challenges the assumption advanced by some narrative criminologists that by virtue of the constructionist bent of the field and its increasing attention to issues of social justice, narrative criminology is ‘intrinsically critical’ ( Fleetwood et al . 2019 : 13). I contend that to engage in critical practice is not simply a matter of formulaically attending to issues of harm, power and resistance or individual researcher reflexivity. It is also about grappling with the ethics and politics of our own research practices; a process that is far more iterative, and which often requires a learning to sit with ambiguity and tension. While the explication of a comprehensive critical praxis framework for narrative research in criminology is beyond the scope of this article, I seek to use questions of ethics and politics as lenses through which to critique the field of narrative criminology, to contribute to a broader discussion of what such a critical praxis might entail. The article thus begins with a discussion about the importance of ethics and politics in narrative research, exploring issues of voyeurism, empathy, listening and bearing witness. Informed by Amy Shuman’s (2010) critique of empathy in narrative, and Michelle Brown’s (2013) notion of penal spectatorship, the article then poses three questions to guide ethical narrative practice within criminology.

Pioneers of narrative criminology, Presser and Sandberg (2019) , recently made a compelling case for what narrative criminology can offer critical criminological scholarship: narrative criminology shifts criminology’s narrow focus on law-breaking to wider notions of harm, accounts for both structure and agency, highlights both oppression and resistance and encourages researcher reflexivity. Likewise, Fleetwood et al . (2019) call for narrative criminologists to consider how their research may develop a more critical approach to the study of narratives. ‘Studying how stories travel’, they assert, ‘would move our narrative perspective, even further away from a traditional focus on individuals … to an emphasis on stories as points of interest’ ( Fleetwood et al . 2019 : 15). Over a number of publications, these leading narrative criminologists have described how narrative criminology ‘hews to a critical perspective’ ( Presser and Sandberg 2015 : 1), ‘questions established truths’ and ‘reveals power structures and hegemonies of consensus’ ( Fleetwood et al . 2019 : 13). These developments within narrative criminology offer considerable promise for a more critical approach to narratives as they circulate within criminology. Building on these developments, I suggest that criminologists must also consider the ethical and political consequences that may arise when stories become ‘points of interest’ in and of themselves. That is: what is at stake, and what is ultimately achieved, when narratives become points of criminological interest?

Scholars have long interrogated the ethical questions that arise from the politics of storytelling. For Amy Shuman (2010) , these questions are fundamentally linked to questions of empathy and entitlement. Specifically, when stories are told by those who have ‘suffered the experience’, there is a more obvious and usually unquestioned entitlement to interpret that experience ( Shuman 2010 : 18). However, when stories ‘travel’, and are retold by a distant or objective knower, that knower may rely on empathy as a form of authority to share the experience. In other words, empathy may be used to bridge differences between individuals, or to make broader claims to shared human experiences, through narrative. The problem, according to Shuman (2010 : 18), is that ‘empathy is a weak claim to entitlement’ and raises as many problems as it does promises. With respect to narrative ethics:

…the problem is not the accuracy of representations but the relationships between listeners and tellers produced by those representations… The critique of empathy is a place to begin to see narrative as a relationship between tellers and listeners and their cultural, political, and historical contexts (25).

Butterwick (2012) also cautions that where an emotional response such as empathy is all that eventuates from a person’s storytelling, power relations between research participants, and later, the audience, remain unaddressed. This, therefore, requires a shift in focus from the telling of stories, to how stories are listened and responded to; a shift from the ‘politics of expression’ to a ‘politics of listening’ ( Dreher and Mondal 2018 ), where the process of listening is recognized as a political act ( Fleetwood 2015 ; Tamboukou 2020 ). Many scholars, including criminologists, have similarly considered the process of ‘bearing witness’—an act of testifying to a lived experience, and having that testimony recognized by others ( Anderson 2016 ; Spivakovsky 2018 ). As Anderson (2016 : 413) notes, ‘bearing witness is to try – sincerely – to understand the person’s perspective and to attend to what it is that the story is really telling’. It draws attention to the responsibility of the audience, as much as the narrator, to hold and respond to the experience recounted. While there are still ethical difficulties to be navigated in both the acts of listening and bearing witness, they are important alternatives to a more common sense of voyeurism that plagues much social science research, particularly criminology. According to Tuck and Yang (2014 : 227), the frequent sharing of pain narratives and ‘damage-centred’ social science research is a form of voyeurism indicative of a settler-colonial drive towards the acquisition of knowledge, to conquer and govern the subaltern. Regardless of intent, such voyeurism ultimately serves to ‘preserve, rather than subvert, oppressive situations’ ( Shuman 2010 : 5).

So how might we, as scholars, navigate such a path? The solution is not (always) to stay silent, or to avoid the sharing of narratives altogether—a practice which itself ‘can reflect a position of privilege’ ( Butterwick 2012 : 64). As a guide, Shuman (2010 : 162) proposes some questions for those seeking to share the narratives of others. Specifically, she asks: ‘whose story is it (the question of entitlement), what is it being used for (what is the allegory), what does it promise (empathy, redemption, meaning), and at whose expense?’ In the sections that follow, I pose a similar series of questions, informed by Shuman’s (2010) analysis, to criminologists interested in engaging with narrative. In considering these questions, I draw examples from the field of narrative criminology, where the use of narrative for criminological research has been the most explicit. I do so to explore some key ethical and political quandaries that will inevitably arise if narrative research is to be ‘mainstreamed’ within the discipline of criminology more broadly ( Maruna and Liem 2021 ). I acknowledge and recognize that the use of narrative across criminology has been varied, and rich. Narrative criminologists, in particular, have made invaluable contributions to our understanding of the relationship between narrative and individual, interpersonal and social harm. At the same time, I believe it is imperative— critical, in every sense of the word—for us to consider how our own criminological research practices, including those that use narrative, can be harmful. Like all scholarly fields, narrative criminology consists of research with the potential to both subvert and reinforce unequal power relations. Drawing on Shuman’s (2010) critique of empathy in narrative, and Michelle Brown’s (2013) notion of penal spectatorship, I contend that a particular corpus of narrative criminological research is driven by a desire to know the ‘Other’. This seeking to know others may represent an expression of empathy, with many important and positive benefits; however, in the context of criminology it is also an expression of power, and thus brings certain ethical and political considerations if we wish to practise it critically. My critique of some examples from the field of narrative criminology is thus not intended as criticism of individual authors, but as an invitation to the scholarly community more broadly to reflect upon how we might use narrative practices more consciously and responsibly within our discipline. In understanding how narrative criminological research can be a vehicle for both emancipation and oppression, we can engage with the promises of narrative in a more nuanced way: one in which we do not assume a particular method or conceptual framework is inherently critical, but reflect upon how our use of particular approaches for scientific inquiry can both serve, and curtail, critical aims.

It is important here to acknowledge that it may appear I am expecting narrative criminology to solve problems that are inherent to the discipline of criminology more broadly, rather than to narrative criminology in particular. This is a fair point, yet I would suggest it is an expectation established by the field itself. Claims that narrative criminology is ‘intrinsically critical’ ( Fleetwood et al . 2019 : 13) and represents a ‘radical break’ ( Maruna and Liem 2021 : 139) from the wider discipline are significant, and require interrogation. Indeed, if narrative criminology wishes to be paradigm-shifting for criminology more broadly, then it must, as a matter of course, address some of the deeply ethical and political problems that criminological research presents. Whether research is conducted on individuals, groups, systems or other phenomena, the way in which research is conducted is crucial; and I suggest that many individual-oriented studies within narrative criminology—like criminology more broadly—tend to be extractive. This is not to paint all narrative criminological research with the same brush, or to imply that it only conducts research on individuals—an assertion which would be incorrect. At the same time, narrative criminologists have been explicit about the supposed ‘criminogenic’ nature of narratives ( Presser and Sandberg 2015 ; 2019 ) and the opportunities for exploiting people’s narratives for predicting future harm doing ( Presser 2009 ; Presser and Sandberg 2015 ). I suggest we must take seriously the ethical and political implications that such assertions raise for a commitment to critical practice.

Whose harm is ultimately narrated, or is left un-narrated, in narrative criminology? Put simply, which narratives get told, and which do not? Narrative criminologists have certainly paid attention to the ‘stories unsaid’ in accounts of their research participants ( Laws 2020 : 11), but less concern has arguably been shown for what goes unsaid in the field of narrative criminology, or the discipline of criminology more broadly ( Presser 2019 ). Questions of what is narrated or left un-narrated—indeed, what tends to be considered narratable or unnarratable—ultimately speak to the closely related issues of narrativity and tellability ( Williams 2010 ). Narrativity refers to ‘the quality of being narrative’: the features that make something recognizable as a narrative; whereas tellability has more to do with questions of value : what we believe makes a narrative worthy of being told ( Prince 2010 ). However, the very features we ascribe to narrative are themselves informed by what we value, thus holding the potential to both expand or foreclose what we consider narrative to be , as well as what appears possible, or worthy, of narrating. Shuman (2010 : 14) describes how ‘categories of experience’ used in narrative practice tend to ‘shape different stories and suggest interest in different “facts”’ That is, the facts that we come to be interested in, as well as the facts we discard, are ultimately informed by the categories we employ to shape our inquiries. Thus, as well as focusing on how ‘[narratives] give stories to categories’ ( Sandberg et al . 2015 : 3), we may also consider how particular categories construct certain ‘facts’ about crime and harm, ultimately determining which narratives are found to be ripe for analysis in criminological research.

Firstly, greater awareness is required around how the choice of language used within narrative criminology may help to reify harmful categorizations of identity and subjectivity. For example, we see ubiquitous use within the field of labels such as ‘offenders’, ‘criminals’, ‘addicts’, ‘victims’, ‘moral deviants’ and the like—despite a very long history within other critical disciplines of advocating for person-centred language ( Cox 2020 ). The constitutive view of narrative espoused by many narrative criminologists ironically identifies language as pivotal in the construction of meaning ( Presser 2009 ). However, such regard for the power of language seems mostly to concern narrative criminologists when considering the ‘linguistic devices for minimizing agency’ by those who commit harm, and less when labelling those same research participants as ‘crack dealers’ ( Presser 2009 : 185), ‘violent offenders’ ( Brookman 2015 ) and ‘drug users’ ( Miller et al . 2015 ), for example. Categories and labels such as these are powerful, power-laden, and constitutive. Too often, narratives told by narrative criminologists—about criminalized people in particular—tend to belong to familiar, stigmatizing, categories of experience: ones that conceptualize criminalised people as pathologically deviant, cognitively deficient or individually responsible for their criminalization ( Lean and Kilroy 2020 ), echoing Wendy Brown’s (2018) conception of the responsibilized neoliberal subject. Indeed, I contend that it is precisely because of their association with dominant criminological frameworks that such categories may appear so tellable to narrative criminologists in the first place. Ultimately, the use of such language constitutes a kind of discursive violence on research participants, and is incompatible with a critical approach. It follows that any attempt to mainstream narrative practice within criminology first requires an interrogation of the criminological categories to which it will be put to use.

Narrative criminology has ventured into a range of interesting areas of inquiry. Recent edited volumes have probed the utility and complexity of narrative practice for criminology, and engaged with issues such as institutional harm, counter-narratives and researcher reflexivity ( Fleetwood et al . 2019 ; Althoff et al. 2020 ). Presser (2019) , for example, recently explored the ‘textual absences’ in criminological theories driving penal harm in the US criminal justice system, and conceded that narrative criminologists ‘should probe much more than the stories of apprehended offenders and their violations of law’ (421). Nevertheless, owing in large part to her own seminal article on ‘The narratives of offenders’ ( Presser 2009 ) and subsequent foundational publications (such as Sandberg 2009 ; 2010 ; Sandberg et al . 2015 ; Presser and Sandberg 2015 ), the interrogation of criminalized people’s narratives has for the most part represented the ‘ sine qua non of narrative criminology’ ( Ugelvik 2016 : 216). Like mainstream criminology, a considerable amount of research within narrative criminology has been, and continues to be, concerned with individual people who commit harm, or who are claimed to provide us with insights into so-called ‘deviant’ or street-based sub-cultures ( Sandberg 2009 ). This is despite the fact—well established within critical criminology—that the vast majority of social harm arises from entrenched structural violence ( Lynch 2016 ). For example, narrative criminologists have tended to focus on the accounts of ‘serious violent offenders’ or people who have committed mass murder ( Presser 2012 ; Brookman 2015 ), despite such groups constituting a relatively small proportion of our prison populations. A further example is that narrative criminologists have tended to focus on the lives of people who use drugs, or who engage in drug dealing ( Sandberg et al . 2015 ; Copes 2016 ), rather than on the global regime of drug prohibition and ‘War on Drugs’ policy frameworks, well-known for their racist objectives and devastating consequences for poor communities worldwide. I contend that the choice to focus overwhelmingly on individuals who engage in drug-taking or serious violence helps to reinforce the idea that criminalized people are dangerous or ‘deviant’ and need to be incapacitated, whilst focus is diverted away from the blight of criminal justice systems around the world that churn through disadvantaged and marginalized groups—including racialized, disabled and socio-economically disenfranchised people. Whilst outlining the promising potential of a decolonial, intersectional approach to narrative criminology, Boonzaier (2019 : 471) warns about the need for narrative criminologists to consider the implications of research agendas that ‘frame oppressed groups as damaged and dysfunctional’, and implores us ‘to think carefully about how the narratives we produce as researchers may be taken up to advance particular anti-transformative agendas’. As Tuck and Yang (2014 : 244) have similarly argued:

As long as the objects of research are presumably damaged communities in need of intervention, the metanarrative of social science research…justifies a host of interventions into communities, and treats communities as frontiers to civilize.

Another growing sub-discipline of criminology touted as a potential ‘sister’ of narrative criminology is narrative victimology ( Pemberton et al . 2019 ). The linkages between these two fields have been insightfully explored ( Pemberton et al . 2019 ; Cook et al . 2019 ), and, as Fleetwood et al . (2019) point out, interest in the perspectives of people identified as victim/survivors within narrative criminology has grown in parallel. Less developed within narrative criminology, however, is the interrogation of the very ‘victim/offender’ binary, which Cook et al . (2019 : 242) remind us ‘has long been challenged within criminology more generally’. This would not simply entail accounting for how criminalized people often experience difficult lives, but how the very imperative to explain ‘harm’—particularly when defined in terms of a single event, implicating individual actors—constructs the very distinction between categories of ‘offender’ and ‘victim’, which then becomes reified through the research process. This is reflected in the supposedly binary concerns of narrative criminology and narrative victimology—the former framed as being concerned with ‘ why we harm’ and the latter with ‘ what it is to be harmed’ ( Cook et al . 2019 : 240). My concern here is not to deny that there are individuals who experience harm, but to suggest that narrative criminology must be careful not to take the categories of ‘offender’ and ‘victim’ for granted. It is to shift our focus, based on decades of research that makes it abundantly clear that some social groups are much more likely to become criminalized and victimized than others. Across the Western world, large swathes of our prison populations and community-based surveillance programs are drawn overwhelmingly from economically disadvantaged, racially marginalized, over-policed and oppressed communities ( Lynch 2016 ; Goddard and Myers 2017 ). Indeed this—along with criminology’s complicity—is a core focus of much critical criminological scholarship ( Lynch 2000 ). What does it mean then, for narrative criminology to focus overwhelmingly on the nature of individual harm, rather than the (social, political, economic, historical) forces that have contributed to so many people’s criminalization and victimization? Furthermore, how does the very way in which ‘harm’ is understood work to construct and/or reinforce particular kinds of ‘offender’ and ‘victim’ subjectivities within criminology more broadly? I contend that such questions are imperative for a critical research ethic, to which narrative criminology aspires.

Shuman (2010 : 4) describes empathy as an ‘act of understanding others across time, space, or any difference in experience.’ We use empathy in our narrative research practices when we seek to understand the narratives of those who have suffered different experiences to our own. Where empathy is successful, it holds potential for one to bear witness to the suffering of others. However, because empathy ultimately relies on a separation between the listener and the teller, this distance can just as easily ‘create voyeurs rather than witnesses and can foreclose meaning rather than open lines of inquiry and understanding’ ( Shuman 2010 : 5; Tuck and Yang 2014 ). Likewise, Michelle Brown (2013 : 113) refers to the notion of penal spectatorship to describe the tendency of those of us without direct experience of penal systems to engage in what she calls a ‘discursive fascination’ with the experiences of criminalized people. Specifically, Brown (2013) understands penal spectatorship as a form of subjectivity that most of us engage in at some point. Like Shuman (2010) , Brown (2013 : 113) notes how this subjectivity relies on the ‘privilege of distance’ to both normalize the spectacle and pain of punishment, and foreclose the possibility of imagining penal and legal systems otherwise.

Following these scholars, I suggest that where the narratives of criminalized people are ‘exploited for the sake of understanding criminal behavior’ ( Presser and Sandberg 2015 : 1), we situate ourselves as voyeurs to narratives of suffering, rather than as witnesses. This ultimately serves to objectify the experiences of criminalized or marginalized people, mainly for the benefit of scholars committed to the criminological project of knowing ( Foucault 1971 ). This ‘knowing’ is not a knowing in the sense of truly ‘liv[ing]-in-the-world-with-others’ ( Tamboukou 2020 : 1), but a colonizing form of knowledge that seeks to make the ‘Other’ transparent to the researcher ( Tuck and Yang 2014 ). We can see such dangers most obviously manifested in situations where people’s narratives are appropriated for purposes for which they did not consent, or co-opted for causes with which they do not agree ( Costa et al . 2012 ). Yet they are also visible in situations where people’s narratives—usually narratives of suffering—are used for the benefit of others, such as researchers, who seek to make broader claims about the allegorical nature of experience ( Shuman 2010 ). Such benefits include, for example, greater understanding or insight about a particular issue that has been identified as a ‘problem’—such as ‘violent offending’, ‘recidivism’, ‘addiction’ or indeed ‘crime’. These concerns are equally relevant for research that seeks to interrogate the experiences of people who identify as victims/survivors, whether they are criminalized or not: how might appeals to empathy for those who have suffered harm serve as the basis for the exploitation of their narratives (intentional or otherwise)? As Pemberton et al . (2019 : 397) note, people ‘experiencing traumatic memories feel they are reliving the trauma again and again, and are unable to experience the time that separates them from the actual event.’ If victimization is not simply something experienced as being in the past, but is something often lived continuously in the present moment, what are the ethical implications of eliciting such narratives through narrative interviewing? Of course, we must not assume a person who has experienced harm lacks agency or will not derive some benefit from sharing their story ( Cook et al . 2019 ). Rather, I suggest we must return to questions of relationship between listener and teller ( Shuman 2010 ), and interrogate how our distance from the people or phenomena we research may be more conducive to voyeurism than practices of bearing witness.

Within the field of narrative criminology, Fleetwood et al . (2019 : 16) rightly call for more scholarly attention to the ‘narrative environment’, including ‘which speakers are empowered to speak’ and the kinds of realities that are made available to us, as researchers, over others. Indeed, we can trace a progression within the field of narrative criminology over the past decade to consider broader notions of harm, including harm exercised within institutions, and by criminal justice professionals ( Presser 2013 ; Kurtz and Upton 2017 ; Petintseva 2019 ). At the same time, much narrative criminological work also tends to be directed toward knowing, understanding and explaining individual ‘criminality’ or ‘deviancy’, or critiquing the practices of penal and treatment institutions so that they may more effectively manage, rehabilitate or treat the individuals within their control. That is, many narrative criminological studies de-politicize the contexts in which they research; and as such, the very existence of the institutions they study tends to remain unquestioned. Such propensities are not unique to narrative criminology; however, they raise important questions about how a desire to interrogate narratives as ‘points of interest’ ( Fleetwood et al . 2019 : 15)—that is, as stories that make ‘criminologically relevant things happen’ ( Presser 2016 : 140)—might allow such de-politicization to occur. As Wood (2020 : 175) recently reminded us: it is important to keep in mind those who create narratives, the aims they are pursuing, and what elements their stories leave out. ’ This applies not only to the narratives of our research participants, but also to our own narrative research practices.

For example, narrative criminologists have long drawn connections between their field and the field of desistance studies ( Maruna and Liem 2021 ). Many narratives told within narrative criminology are used to reinforce the need for desistance, which is ultimately presumed to be positive, necessary and desirable. Desistance narratives are usually described as evidence of formerly incarcerated people crafting new identities or achieving ‘redemption’ ( Maruna 2001 ; Stone 2016 ). Anderson (2016 : 1) has similarly explored how criminal justice practitioners can bear witness to desistance narratives as a powerful way to ‘endorse the humanity of those who have committed crimes’. Presser and Sandberg (2019) have also argued that when utilized to counter stigma experienced at the interpersonal level, desistance narratives can be tools of resistance. Whilst desistance research is often positioned in this way by its proponents as a positive alternative to the state project of rehabilitation, other scholars and criminalized people have identified the narrative of desistance as yet another tool that may facilitate the continued social control of criminalized people within the community, the ongoing individualization of crime and the silencing of dissent by the racist settler-colonial state ( Lean and Kilroy 2020 ; Russell and Carlton 2013 ). Indeed, Maruna and Liem (2021 : 133) have themselves conceded that in many instances, the coproduction of desistance narratives ‘can be more coercive, including pressures placed upon individuals to adopt self-blame narratives’ (see also Warr 2020 ). I suggest that it is here, in the taken-for-granted categories of criminological theorizing, that tokenistic notions of ‘studying up’ or ‘resistance’ can easily become depoliticized. Scholars of small-stories research have warned us about simplistic understandings of how resistance or counter narratives operate ( Shuman 2010 ). Shuman (2010 : 17), for example, reminds us that personal narratives do not necessarily ‘escape the categories and labels imposed on them by dominant narratives.’ As Fiander et al . (2016 : 4) have noted, ‘there is a significant difference between individual resistance and structural change’. Thus, we might instead ask: whose accounts of resistance are ultimately privileged in individual desistance narratives? Are they accounts, for example, which portray resistance against one dominant narrative (e.g. stigma against people who use drugs), through reifying another (e.g. the need for individual desistance and ‘offender supervision’)? Or, do they seek to challenge the ideological foundations of all dominant narratives that constrain the lives of criminalized people? I contend that in many narrative criminological studies concerned with desistance, we can witness how penal spectatorship ‘normalises what should be cause for concern across cultural life’ ( Brown 2013 : 113–4).

Another common example of how the criminological project of ‘knowing’ infuses narrative criminological research can be found in narrative studies of drug use and addiction ( Miller et al . 2015 ; Copes 2016 ). Whilst some narrative criminological studies have interrogated the broader politics of drug policy (see, e.g. Fleetwood 2015 ; Barrera 2019 ), many other studies within this body of work tend to be conducted with limited reference to the nuances and complexities of drug use highlighted within the critical addiction literature ( Fraser 2016 )—such as the political constitution of drug use and addiction as a ‘problem’ ( Lancaster et al. 2015 ), and critiques of abstinence-based and recovery-oriented drug treatment frameworks ( Moore and Fraser 2013 ). Infact in many narrative criminological studies we frequently witness the reification of addiction, the valorization of abstinence and ‘recovery’, and a depoliticization of contexts in which drug use occurs. For example, Presser and Sandberg (2019 : 4) point to a body of psychological research that they claim ‘follows narrative criminology’s fundamental decentering of criminal propensity, as narrative roles and not person-types align with offending’—research they assert ‘has implications for humane practice, such as in helping addicts achieve lasting recovery’. Yet as critical addiction scholars would argue, descriptions such as these simply serve to reinforce the category of ‘addict’ that is inevitably in need of ‘recovery’. The tendency to perceive such an approach as more humane than criminalizing a person labelled as having an addiction, has been comprehensively canvassed in the critical addiction literature and shown to be just as stigmatizing ( Fraser et al. 2017 ). In fact, rather than offering a more humane approach that decentres the notion of individual criminality, psychological models of addiction have been shown to smoothly integrate into criminal justice responses, and justify more punitive criminal sanctions on the basis that people experiencing addiction pose greater risks of reoffending ( Seear and Fraser 2014 ). This is possible precisely because medical and psychological understandings of addiction as a disease/disorder ultimately pathologize and depoliticize the concept ( Bunn 2019 )—rendering it a phenomenon to be measured and studied, in order to be controlled. The two bodies of research mentioned here thus raise important considerations for any attempt to mainstream narrative practice within criminology, in the hope that doing so will herald a radical turn for the discipline.

Shuman (2010 : 5) reminds us that we often use the narratives of others for seemingly noble purposes: ‘inspiration, redemption, emancipation, even subversion’; and, while this is not in itself problematic, it does suggest that we should be more attentive to the relationships that give rise to the sharing of those narratives. This is not simply a question of ethics, but also the related and inescapable reason that our very choice to use others’ narratives is driven by particular normative and political aims. For Shuman (2010) , this speaks to the issue of entitlement in narrative: what right do we have to tell other people’s stories? And—if we wish to engage in critical practice—should we always tell them? As has been explored in other sociological fields, criminologists should be wary of the risk of harm that can occur under the guise of giving ‘voice’ to research participants, without sharing power ( Costa et al . 2012 ). Many scholars note, for example, that the desire to ‘give voice’ to another person, ultimately relies on an uneven relationship between the listener and the teller ( Shuman 2010 ; Tuck and Yang 2014 ). As Tamboukou (2020 : 2) reminds us, ‘voice is inextricably related to politics’. In the context of narrative criminological research, our ability to research others and produce narratives about them is often contingent upon their criminalization, and sometimes their incarceration. In my view, simply being attentive to issues of ‘power’ and ‘resistance’ as they manifest in the lives of marginalized people does not suffice: it avoids the question of why they are not in a position to share those narratives themselves. It is for these reasons that Shuman (2010 : 8) contends empathy in narrative must be practiced in way that ‘requires critique’. In this final section, I suggest that criminologists must question what our narratives are ultimately being used for. That is— what are our intentions when we use narratives in criminological research? Is it to serve the collective enlightenment of criminologists and policy makers more broadly, as to why and how crime is committed or experienced? Or alternatively, how certain groups of people come to be criminalized or victimized? I further ask: do either of these aims, in and of themselves, justify their use? We may recall from narrative victimology that intent is a core component of the experience of victimization ( Pemberton et al . 2019 ). As Brown (2012 : 385) notes, ‘even in its most well-intentioned formations, empathy risks facilitating patronizing, even colonizing, benevolence’. Thus, while narrative criminology may be a broad church with diverse disciplinary imperatives, I suggest there are some common ethical intentions that should unite the field as a whole.

In narrative criminology, like mainstream criminology, we can observe the use of narratives both for extractive and emancipatory purposes. The first—our use of others’ narratives for the purposes of collective enlightenment—is one of the most apparent. In their most concerning iterations, such accounts exploit the narratives of people labelled as ‘criminals’ or ‘deviants’ to search for clues of some innate, pathological criminality. In other, more common examples, we see the use of criminalized people’s narratives to gain insight into so-called ‘offending pathways’, and processes of recidivism and desistance ( Maruna and Liem 2021 ). Of course, the idea that crime can be attributed to cognitive deficiencies, buttressed by an individual’s immersion in a deviant subculture or social disorganization, is not new to criminology; it mirrors criminological paradigms espoused within positivist and realist criminology and much of the evaluation literature committed to risk-based or ‘what works’ approaches. Traditional victimology has likewise been dominated by positivist research methods that have tended to objectify the experiences of people who have been harmed, whilst at times displaying a scepticism towards their veracity ( Pemberton et al . 2019 ). All such approaches are emblematic of the settler-colonial instinct of social science research that seeks out knowledge about ‘damaged’ and pain-ridden communities, to reinforce its own legitimacy ( Tuck and Yang 2014 ). Critical criminologists have long criticized such approaches for being steeped in racist, sexist, capitalist and ableist assumptions that uphold the political status quo and empower penal systems to more effectively manage and surveil marginalized populations under the guise of neutral scientific inquiry ( Goddard and Myers 2017 ).

However, I suggest that such propensities are also evident, albeit in much less overt ways, in a wider range of seemingly innocent narrative criminological work that seeks to explore the ‘here-and-now’ of crime ( Presser 2009 : 179). This includes, for example, studies which explore the sub-cultural narratives used by ‘deviant’ or ‘street’ based groups ( Sandberg 2009 ; Sandberg et al . 2015 ), or how so-called ‘prisoner’ and ‘drug addict’ notions of self are recounted in ‘telling moments’ ( O’Connor 2015 ). Similarly, Presser and Sandberg (2015 : 13) claim that ‘cultural criminology’s insistence on the seductions of crime is something narrativists can get behind,’ and others have noted the ‘important intertwined history’ that narrative criminology shares with the field of cultural criminology ( Laws 2020 : 4). Mills and Fleetwood (2020 : 33), drawing on ethnographic research with prepper communities in the United States, claim that cultural criminology’s notion of criminological verstehen is a useful complement to narrative research, such that both fields may more successfully ‘foster deep, empathetic understandings with their respondents’. Yet whether such deep, empathetic relationships can be authentically fostered in all contexts is questionable. As Michelle Brown (2012 : 384), writing on empathy and punishment from a US context, writes:

…efforts to regard the other/alter from within the frame of perpetration, in a society that imprisons more persons than any other on the planet or in history for the purposes of crime control, sets in motion a particular kind of reading – one premised in judgment. The ability to incite an open read of others, an empathy that is curious, engaged, authentic, committed, flexible, and moved is a fundamental problem in such a context.

Often missing from narrative criminologists’ engagement with cultural criminology is a consideration of some important criticisms of the latter, such as its failure to develop an adequate ‘grammar of critique’ sufficient for a critical criminological approach ( Spencer 2011 ). Moreover, I suggest that narrative criminologists have not adequately questioned how the relationship between narrative criminology and cultural criminology may ultimately strengthen the proclivities of both fields to engage in penal spectatorship, and further fetishize accounts of apparent ‘criminality’ ( Brown 2013 ). Here, we may observe that what ultimately drives research in both fields is a will to truth about crime ( Foucault 1971 ), and the promise of collective enlightenment about its causes. Yet, we must be cautious of where such curiosity about the ‘seductions of crime’ ( Presser and Sandberg 2015 : 13) can lead. For example, in Brookman’s (2015) analysis of the narratives of people labelled ‘violent offenders’, we see a number of disturbing recommendations for future research in narrative criminology. These include for the interviewee to ‘go back’ and ‘re-live’ the moment of violence as opposed to explaining their own interpretation of it; to have research participants perform their narratives in group settings rather than interviews, so that they might be less rehearsed; and to have participants be interviewed by multiple researchers, multiple times, using different approaches, to uncover the ‘authentically violent offender’ beneath the narratives they share ( Brookman 2015 : 226–7). Put simply, these suggestions demonstrate a lack of respect and dehumanization of the research subjects in question—as though they exist to be played with, to elicit the right kind of value for criminologists. Most scholars would no doubt share concerns about such methodological suggestions. However, rather than simply dismissing such suggestions as extreme, I suggest we take seriously what they reflect about the dangers of unquestionably adopting particular narrative practices—such as when the quest for narrative itself becomes more important than the wellbeing of, and respect for, the people sharing or co-producing those narratives. It highlights the serious ethical obligations that arise when we seek to extract the story from the individual, and ask it to ‘travel’ for our own research purposes ( Shuman 2010 ).

The second use of narratives—for emancipatory or subversive purposes—is also evident within narrative criminology, as well as its ‘sister’ field of narrative victimology. There are, for example, a growing number of studies that seek to explore the lives of stigmatized or victimized people, many of which point to the promising and emancipatory potential of narrative practice within criminology ( Fleetwood et al . 2019 ). For example, we learn how people in prison undertake immense ‘narrative labour’ ( Warr 2020 ) to counter stigma and survive the violence of the prison; as well as the ways in which people who have sexually offended navigate their highly stigmatized post-release lives ( Victor and Waldram 2015 ). Likewise, Boonzaier’s (2019 : 467) research with women who engage in sex work explores the violence of the multiple systems of oppression they experience. At the same time, a focus on oppression and stigma may not necessarily yield emancipatory research practice. As Tuck and Yang (2014 : 227) remind us, ‘much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice’. In my mind, following Shuman (2010) , two pertinent questions remain. First, for what purposes is such research conducted? And secondly, what exactly is emancipatory about it?

Regarding the first question, many studies ultimately interrogate the lived experience of oppression or stigma for the purpose of strengthening understanding about marginalized groups. Victor and Waldram (2015 : 119), for example, argue that studying experiences of stigma ‘allows us to better understand how offenders engage with treatment’, while Wesley (2018 : 227) states that ‘we must continue to investigate issues that recall us to ourselves, our privilege and disadvantage… because this reveals more nuanced understandings about disadvantaged and disenfranchised groups ’. The implication in such studies is that we are best serving and representing our research participants’ interests by getting to know more about them, and how they navigate, cope with, or attempt to resist, the many layers of oppression in their lives. Yet the ways in which we may also be implicated in their disadvantage or oppression, tend to remain addressed. This ultimately leads us to the second question: what is emancipatory about such narrative criminological research? As both Shuman (2010) and Brown (2013) attest, the reason empathy can so easily lead to voyeurism is because it does not fundamentally change the conditions of those in the research encounter. Often the researcher remains in their position of privilege, armed with more apparent knowledge of the ‘Other’, while the research subject returns, more often than not, to their existing circumstances. They may feel a sense of having contributed to knowledge of a larger issue, but their own lives are usually no different. Often, their experiences go on to be interpreted in ways they may find troubling, perhaps de-humanizing, or re-traumatizing ( Tuck and Yang 2014 ). Wesley (2018) , for example, insightfully demonstrates how researchers may co-constitute the narratives produced in such encounters—yet her research also reveals some of the ethical dilemmas that may arise during this process. In her interviews with criminalized women, she describes how she made claims to particular forms of professional knowledge in the form of bids to an ‘ Authority identity’, which her interviewees variously rejected or negotiated. In her interview with ‘Fatima’, she states:

While talking about all the ways the Advocate Program helped her, Fatima segued into asking me, ‘So, you’re on the Board of Directors, right?’ When I responded that I was, she said, ‘Maybe now you could tell them, like, seriously, you talked to somebody firsthand, by the examples I gave you, how much these programs help people.’…I did not overtly accept this, and instead of offering affirmations… I shifted the topic to talk more about her and less about my authority. I interpreted this version of authority as one rooted in perceptions of my power and privilege – in this context, the power to influence the availability of services rendered for her daily well-being, if not survival. On some level, this seemed counterproductive to my efforts to minimize perceptions of difference between us. ’ ( Wesley 2018 : 221—my emphasis).

This excerpt offers invaluable insight into the often-tenuous ethics of our research practices, even when we acknowledge issues such as power and resistance in the lives of research participants. Wesley (2018) writes impressively about the power dynamics within the research encounter, but when presented with an opportunity to make a material difference in the life of one of her research participants, feels limited by dominant narratives about professionalism. Tellingly, her desire in this exchange to avoid discomfort and redirect the narrative focus away from her power and privilege, is at odds with her earlier lack of discomfort when expressing authority over how research participants might understand themselves. Furthermore, it suggests that the desire to ‘minimize differences and to establish rapport’ ( Wesley 2018 : 226) for the comfort of the researcher is more important than using one’s privilege to potentially improve the well-being and survival of the research participant—in this case, actions arguably within the researcher’s control as a member of the Board of Directors. Sandberg (2010 : 448) has likewise described his attempts at reducing social distance and ‘establishing a bond’ with his research subjects—in his case, for the purpose of demonstrating ‘the fruitfulness of a narrative approach for studies of offenders’. However, a number of scholars have critiqued this desire to minimize differences within the research encounter, noting that it presumes a need for sameness as a prerequisite for recognition and responsiveness ( Dreher and Mondal 2018 ; Tamboukou 2020 ). Instead, they suggest that we must understand difference as ‘central to democratic dialogue’ ( Butterwick 2012 : 62), which should invoke discomfort if it is to result in any meaningful change ( Dreher and Mondal 2018 ). Whilst I recognize that many researchers would be wary of taking such an ‘activist position’ ( Presser and Sandberg 2019 ), I contend that these examples speak volumes about the gap that exists between what we claim narrative practice promises criminology, and what it often delivers ( Shuman 2010 ). In our search for the narratives of our research participants and their apparent power to transform future action, we are often blind to the power of narrative in the present moment to stand in solidarity with, or make a material difference in, the lives of those we encounter through our research.

Some existing contributions in the field of narrative criminology do make important progress towards this goal. Boonzaier’s (2019 : 467) research, noted above, demonstrates how Black feminist approaches can ‘speak back to the ways in which those on the margins … continue to be (mis)represented in the knowledge-making machinery’. Kurtz and Upton (2017 : 555) interrogate how law enforcement narratives have the power to ‘represent alternative versions of reality’ that supress the narratives of more marginalized groups; Petintseva (2019) describes how she challenged discriminatory attitudes of youth justice practitioners through the research encounter; Walklate et al . (2019) analyse how one high profile victim/survivor’s story impacted widescale policy change in Australia; and Fiander et al . (2016 : 16) demonstrate how penal history museums can both enable penal spectatorship and ‘undermine the legitimacy of incarceration’. Reflecting upon such examples, and others ( Fleetwood 2015 ; Ugelvik 2016 ; Presser 2019 ), I suggest that the power of narrative to progress a more critical research agenda may originate less from criminologists’ routine reflections upon their own positionalities, or the adoption of a wholesale research framework such as ‘narrative criminology’, but from a deeper commitment to an ethics and politics of listening that is open to challenging what we take for granted in research ( Boonzaier 2019 ; Tamboukou, 2020 ). It would also depend on a commitment to bearing witness to the complex, co-constitutive nature of structure and agency, and power and resistance, in our research participants’ lives; an attentiveness to the ethical relationships that arise between narrators and listeners in our research; and a willingness to confront and sit with the tension produced by the power dynamics arising from our research practices, without attempting to minimize or erase those differences. Finally, it would require a conscious commitment not to co-opt the lived experiences of our research participants to contribute to mainstream criminal justice system ‘knowledge’ about criminalized people ( Boonzaier 2019 ; Lean and Kilroy 2020 ). In some ways, this would be an exercise in refusal ( Tuck and Yang 2014 ) against the positivist imperative that presents ‘stories [as] only of interest…if they can be shown to do something’ ( Maruna and Liem 2021 : 139)—in the case of criminologists’ narratives, that something , or course, most often done in service to the State. Thus, criminologists who seek to use narrative for its emancipatory potential would do well to ensure their research not only attends to questions of power and privilege, but also stands in solidarity with marginalized people, centres the locus and imperative for change on those in power, and questions the very legitimacy of their institutions ( Tauri 2018 ). This should also include using the research process ‘to turn back upon itself’ as a colonizing project and question our very reliance on research frameworks that situate themselves as ‘universal, liberal or neutral knowledge without horizon’ ( Tuck and Yang 2014 : 243).

The narratives of harm we so frequently share in criminology are often narratives of suffering and oppression, as well as survival and resistance and this carries a greater weight and responsibility than is often acknowledged. It has consequences for the methodological choices we make in our research, and the relationships and obligations we have to our research participants. Our desire to understand how narratives become interesting may be a worthwhile scientific endeavour in its own right, but we must also always ask: to whom are such narratives engaging and interesting, and why ? I contend that when pursued without adequate consideration as to history, context, ethics and politics, criminological interest in narratives can too easily result in engagement with notions of crime and punishment as ‘pure spectacle’ ( Brown 2013 : 115). Criminologists may rightly seek out the narratives of others for the purposes of contributing to knowledge, or making some sort of difference in our communities. However, this cannot be achieved by sensationalizing or making spectacles of the behaviour of victimized or criminalized people, or dissecting and exploiting their stories to find evidence of some underlying pathological deviancy. Despite its critical potential, there are many ways in which the field of narrative criminology has acted in service to the criminal justice machine, as opposed to challenging the more sinister power dynamics that plague our broader social and economic relations. Narrative may offer criminologists another tool to conduct rich, critical research; but like any tool, narrative may also be used to reinforce unequal power relations, and as such, the field of narrative criminology cannot in and of itself be understood as a critical project. To engage in critique is a practice that must be constantly actioned. It is not in any particular research framework such as narrative criminology where criminologists will find the tools of liberation for oppressed and marginalized communities; but in a commitment to ethical and political praxis that cuts across methodologies and scholarly fields: an ongoing ‘politically aware and ethically reflective stance’ ( Boonzaier 2019 : 471).

Finally, I suggest that a critical narrative practice within criminology must resist the temptation to fill in the gaps of the narratives we co-produce through our research ( Shuman 2010 ) and embrace a form of critique that ‘open[s] up a set of questions that it cannot (and does not) close off’ ( Brown 2013 : 116). We must become more comfortable with activist research ( Presser and Sandberg 2019 ), and widen our collective gaze to consider the categories of experience that have thus far remained relatively unaddressed within mainstream criminology. This might involve engaging more deeply in a ‘politics of listening’ ( Butterwick 2012 ); and conducting research that is led and guided by the communities in which we are embedded, rather than the interests of criminologists and the criminal justice systems that so often benefit from our research. It might also involve a practice of ‘refusal’ as a ‘generative orientation’ ( Tuck and Yang 2014 : 238)—that is, as a practice that recognizes the necessity of limits for criminological research, and which ‘understands the wisdom in a story, as well as the wisdom in not passing that story on’ (244). In these processes of bearing witness, listening, and refusal, we may find that the most widespread and pressing injustices our communities face relate not to the actions of pathologically ‘criminal’ people, but a raft of systemic and structural harms that produce, reproduce and co-constitute interpersonal violence and suffering. For narrative criminologists, this may open up new possibilities to explore issues as wide-ranging and inter-dependent as settler-colonialism and structural racism, the criminalization of the poor, violence against people with disabilities, state crime and drug prohibition; as well as alternative solutions to violence in our communities, such as decolonization, penal abolition, transformative justice and anti-carceral feminism—to name just a few. Likewise, it would strengthen critical criminologists’ exploration of such issues by contributing important narrative tools to the interrogation of power, without accepting the inevitability or universality of such tools, or resorting to ‘damage-centred’ research that simply reinforces the structural dominance of the academy ( Tuck and Yang 2014 : 227). Across the discipline, it ultimately calls for us to consider the ethics and politics of engagement in our research, the kinds of harm we choose to foreground and the implications of our sharing the narratives we share—an opportunity, perhaps, to confront the harms that criminology has caused, and to reimagine the discipline itself.

I thank the anonymous reviewers, as well as Dr. Claire Spivakovsky and Dr. Diana Johns for their considered feedback.

This research is supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP) Scholarship.

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In This Article Expand or collapse the "in this article" section Criminal Justice Ethics

Introduction, general overviews.

Reference Resources
Overviews of the Ethical Territory
Police Ethics Textbooks
Specific Studies on Police Ethics
Specific Studies on Prosecutorial and Adjudicatory Ethics
Overviews of Correctional Ethics
Specific Studies on Correctional Ethics

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Forthcoming articles expand or collapse the "forthcoming articles" section.

Education Programs in Prison
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Criminal Justice Ethics by John Kleinig LAST REVIEWED: 09 July 2015 LAST MODIFIED: 30 November 2015 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396607-0080

The scope of criminal justice ethics is usually construed narrowly to encompass a range of concrete and mid-level ethical problems encountered within the primary institutions of criminal justice—police, courts, and corrections—including, for example, use-of-force policies, judicial corruption, and the rights of prisoners. Within that narrower framework, criminal justice ethics may focus on problems generated by the institutions themselves, such as the place of police discretion, the independence of the judiciary, or prison overcrowding, as well as on problems encountered by criminal justice practitioners— problems of professional ethics, such as conscientious objection to particular police strategies, the use of ad hominem legal defense tactics, and forming friendships with prison inmates. More broadly, however, criminal justice ethics may encompass ethical problems that arise in connection with the foundations of the criminal justice system, the moral limits of criminal law, ethical problems that emerge in reflections on the nature and origins of criminality, as well as more general ethical problems that have important particularized expressions within the framework of criminal justice—for example, those concerning human rights, loyalty, impartiality, ends and means, and punishment. To the extent that criminal justice ethics is construed narrowly, as it often is in courses and texts designed for those who are or aspire to be criminal justice practitioners, the curriculum should also encompass ways in which broader frameworks and issues impinge on the narrower discussions. Consider, for example, how a discussion about the judicial treatment of drug offenders should be responsive to larger questions about the social context of and appropriate responses to drug use, the justification for imprisonment, as well as a general consideration of the justification and purposes of punishment. What some of these larger questions also show is the extent to which ethical problems within criminal justice may be based on quasi-empirical data that are shifting and contentious—whether, for example, a “war on drugs” is inherently discriminatory and likely to be won. Although there has always been a level of ethical reflection on criminal justice issues, the development of criminal justice ethics as an identifiable academic focus is relatively recent, and, to some extent, it is predated by some of the more particularized studies in legal and police ethics. Given the vast criminal-justice-related literature, it may be appropriate to indicate the principles used here to determine inclusion/exclusion, especially given that some of the items included are not directed primarily to ethical issues, while some of those that have been excluded are directed to ethical issues. First of all, ethical issues concern the basic normative conditions for people’s relations and interactions, whether these are construed interpersonally, communally, or institutionally. They differ from moral issues only insofar as they operate through personal and institutional roles rather than at the level of basic humanity. Whereas we talk about the morality of killing, we speak of the ethics of the police use of deadly force. Much of what is encompassed by the ethics of role relations is also incorporated within the idea of professionalism. Where available, the best of such materials have been included here. As is always the case with applied ethics, and particularly so in the case of criminal justice ethics, ethical determinations require a close understanding of the social roles involved, and of the social circumstances in which those roles operate. In selecting materials for inclusion, the author has therefore been concerned to select a range of materials that will not only address what might be called the exclusively ethical dimensions of issues, but that will also point to relevant empirical resources for embodying an informed ethical focus. On some occasions, a choice has been made between “classical” contributions to the criminal justice field and those with which the author may have been more ideologically or even academically sympathetic. For the most part, the author has opted for the classical contributions, expecting that this would integrate the ethical material more adequately into “mainstream” criminal justice discussions.

There are relatively few comprehensive overviews of criminal justice ethics, narrowly construed, that have not been written with a student audience in mind. The scope is too broad. Zedner 2004 comes closest to an ethically sensitive scholarly overview, and Braithwaite and Pettit 1990 sketches an ethical framework for a general theory of criminal justice institutions. Most philosophers who write in the area have avoided the “institutional” turn and have focused instead on much broader questions, such as the moral limits of criminal law or the justification of punishment. Feinberg 1984–1988 , Husak 2008 , and Simester and von Hirsch 2011 provide major general discussions of the former, and Hart 1968 , Duff 1986 , Duff 2001 , and Primoratz 1999 give sophisticated but accessible overviews of the latter.

Braithwaite, John, and Philip Pettit. 1990. Not just deserts: A republican theory of criminal justice . Oxford: Clarendon.

A readable attempt to develop a republican theory of criminal justice around the idea of individual “dominion.”

Duff, R. A. 1986. Trials and punishments . Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.

The first of two major contributions to the theory of punishment by one of the foremost contemporary British philosophers of criminal law. Punishment is construed as a communicative attempt to bring the wrongdoer to an acknowledgment of wrongdoing.

Duff, R. A. 2001. Punishment, communication, and community . Studies in Crime and Public Policy. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

Not so much a revision as a development of communitarian ideas only latent in the author’s first book ( Duff 1986 ). Both are well written and suitable for graduate classes on punishment theory.

Feinberg, Joel. 1984–1988. The moral limits of the criminal law . 4 vols. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

Magisterial defense of a revised Millian understanding of criminalization. Although not written for a student audience, it is beautifully clear and accessible. Vol. 1, Harm to Others (1984); Vol. 2, Offense to Others (1985); Vol. 3, Harm to Self (1986); Vol. 4, Harmless Wrongdoing (1988).

Hart, H. L. A. 1968. Punishment and responsibility: Essays in the philosophy of law . Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

A collection of articles by one of the 20th century’s most influential contributors to analytic philosophy of law, including the title essay, in which a hybrid theory of punishment is developed. Individual essays suitable for graduate classes.

Husak, Douglas. 2008. Overcriminalization: The limits of the criminal law . New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

Offers an alternative schema to Feinberg 1984–1988 , though written within the same general tradition. Focuses on internal and external constraints on criminal law.

Primoratz, Igor. 1999. Justifying legal punishment . 2d ed. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Clearly written overview, defending, ultimately, a communicative retributivism. Could be used as a text.

Simester, A. P., and Andreeas von Hirsch. 2011. Crimes, harms, and wrongs: On the principles of criminalisation . Oxford: Hart.

Two well-known theorists of criminalization combine efforts to produce a comprehensive theory of criminalization. A partial critique of Feinberg 1984–1988 .

Zedner, Lucia. 2004. Criminal justice . Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

Primarily focused on criminal justice in a British context, this book is packed with a wide range of materials. Could be used in a graduate course.

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Research Ethics in Criminology

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Criminology Skills (3rd edn)

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Introduction
1. What is criminology?
2. Books, journals, and articles
3. Statistics and official publications
4. Media and web sources
5. Criminal law
6. Study skills
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8. Referencing and avoiding plagiarism
9. Essay writing
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p. 241 12. Research ethics

Emily Finch
and Stefan Fafinski
https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198799818.003.0012
Published in print: 30 August 2019
Published online: September 2019

This chapter discusses the importance of research ethics in criminology, with emphasis on ethical issues arising from research using human participants. It first considers the value of ethical approaches to research and moves on to address the particular issues raised by criminological research. It draws on the British Society of Criminology Statement of Ethics to explore the core ethical principles of confidentiality, anonymity, consent, and the avoidance of harm. The final section offers guidance on identifying and addressing ethical issues raised by one’s own research, along with suggestions on points to consider when formulating an application for approval for a Research Ethics Committee.

ethical research
British Society of Criminology Code of Ethics
Statement of Ethics
ethical approval
Research Ethics Committee
participant consent

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Statement of Ethics

For a printable version of the Statement of Ethics please click here

Statement of Ethics for Researchers in the Field of Criminology

The British Society of Criminology’s Code of Ethics for Researchers (now the British Society of Criminology Statement of Ethics) has been revised to reflect the changing landscape and emerging codes of practice (ESRC[1], Concordat, 2012 and so on) which cut across geographical and disciplinary boundaries. The British Society of Criminology as a professional body recognises the importance of continuing the discussion around issues such as ‘research integrity’, ‘research misconduct’ within the discipline and wider afield (such as The UK Research Integrity Office (UKRIO)).

The British Society of Criminology’s Statement of Ethics does not seek to impose a single model of ethical practice, but is a frame of reference to encourage and support reflective and responsible ethical practice in criminological research and, in keeping with the aims of the Society, challenge questionable practice, publishing or otherwise to promote principles, values and standards to ensure that ethical standards in criminological research are maintained. The Statement of Ethics is intended to make members aware of the ethical issues that may arise throughout the research process and to encourage members to take responsibility for their own ethical approaches by promoting and supporting good practice. This Statement of Ethics is intended as an aid to promote responsible and informed decision making, it is not a substitute for this. It is thus an aspirational code, not a prescriptive one.

The Statement of Ethics serves to provide a framework of principles to assist the choices and decisions which have to be made to reflect the principles, values and interests of all those involved in a particular situation. It is not to create new requirements or restrictions on the conduct of research, but to protect researchers from misconduct and to raise awareness of ethical issues. Overall, the guidance seeks to provide a critical appreciation of ethical practice in relation to research within the broader field of criminology.

Members should read the Statement of Ethics in the light of any other Professional Ethical Guidelines or Codes of Practice to which they are subject, including those issued by individual academic institutions, funding bodies, the ESRC and AcSS[2].

Membership of the British Society of Criminology is taken to imply acceptance of these general principles and the need to be aware of ethical issues and issues regarding professional conduct that may arise throughout the research process.

The British Society of Criminology’s general principle is that researchers should ensure that research is undertaken to the highest possible methodological standard and the highest quality in order that maximum possible knowledge and benefits accrue to society.

1. General Responsibilities

Researchers in the field of criminology should endeavour to:

i) Advance knowledge about criminological issues;

ii) Identify and seek to ameliorate factors which restrict the development of their professional competence, governance and integrity;

iii) Seek appropriate experience or training to improve their professional knowledge, skills and attributes, and identify and deal with any factors which threaten to restrict their professional integrity;

iv) Refrain from laying claim, directly or indirectly, to expertise in areas of criminology that they do not have;

v) Take all reasonable steps to ensure their qualifications, capabilities or views are not misrepresented by others;

vi) Take all reasonable steps to correct any misrepresentations and adopt the highest standards in all their professional relationships with institutions and colleagues whatever their status;

vii) Respect their various responsibilities as outlined in the remainder of this document;

viii) Keep up to date with ethical and methodological issues in the field, for example by reading reports on ethics, research monographs and by participating in training events;

ix) Check the reliability of their sources of information, in particular when using the Internet and new social media;

x) Comply where appropriate with the relevant national and international legislation (e.g. the 1998 Data Protection Act, the 1998 Human Rights Act, copyright laws and so on).

2. Responsibilities of Researchers Towards the Discipline of Criminology

Researchers have a duty to promote the advancement and dissemination of knowledge, to protect intellectual and professional freedom, and therefore to promote a working environment and professional relationships conducive to these. More specifically, researchers should promote free and independent inquiry into criminological matters and unrestricted dissemination of criminological knowledge. As part of this, researchers should endeavour to avoid contractual conditions that limit or compromise research integrity (See UKRIO[3] for further information). Researchers should endeavour to ensure that the methodology employed and the research findings are open for discussion and peer review.

3. Researchers’ Responsibilities to Colleagues

Researchers should:

i) Recognise fully the contribution to the research of early career colleagues and avoid exploitation of them. For example, reports and publications emanating from research should follow the convention of listing contributors in alphabetical order unless one has contributed more than the other(s). For further discussion of roles and expectations concerning authorship, go to the Singapore Statement[4]/Vancouver Protocol[5] or COPE[6] as examples of guidelines and codes of conduct regarding research integrity (see Street et al, 2010);

ii) Actively promote and encourage the professional development of research staff by ensuring that staff receive appropriate training and support and protection in research environments which may jeopardise their physical and/or emotional well-being;

iii) Not claim the work of others as their own;

iv) Ensure that the use of others’ ideas and research materials should be cited at all times, whatever their status and regardless of the status of the ideas or materials (even if in draft form);

v) Promote equal opportunity in all aspects of their professional work and actively seek to avoid discriminatory behaviour. This includes a moral obligation to challenge stereotypes and negative attitudes based on prejudice. It also includes an obligation to avoid over-generalising on the basis of limited data, and to beware of the dangers of failing to reflect the experience of certain groups, or contributing to the over-researching of certain groups within the population.

4. Researchers’ Responsibilities towards Research Participants

The list below regarding responsibilities towards research participants are neither exhaustive nor in order of priority.

1. Recognise that they have a responsibility to minimise personal harm to research participants by ensuring that the potential physical, psychological, discomfort or stress to individuals participating in research is minimised by participation in the research. No list of harms can be exhaustive but harms may include:

· physical harms: including injury, illness, pain;

· psychological harms: including feelings of worthlessness, distress, guilt, anger or fear-related, for example, the disclosure of sensitive or embarrassing information, or learning about a genetic possibility of developing an untreatable disease;

· devaluation of personal worth: including being humiliated, manipulated or in other ways treated disrespectfully or unjustly.

This may not be applied to all situations, for example, where researchers are uncovering corruption, violence or pollution. Researchers need not work to minimise harm to the corporate or institutional entities responsible for the damage.

2. Design research in a way such that the dignity and autonomy of research participants is protected and respected at all times.

3. Strive to protect the rights of those they study, their interests, sensitivities and privacy. Researchers should consider carefully the possibility that the research experience may be a disturbing one, particularly for those who are vulnerable by virtue of factors such as: age, social status, or powerlessness and should seek to minimise such disturbances. Researchers should also consider whether it is appropriate to offer information about support services (e.g. leaflets or contact details of relevant self-help groups).

4. Minimise risks to researchers.

5. Be sympathetic to the constraints on organisations participating in research and not inhibit their functioning by imposing any unnecessary burdens. There may be particular difficulties where the commissioners of research require the delivery of certain information within a specified time period and so researchers sometimes have to tread a fine line between satisfying commissioners/funders of research and respecting the constraints of participating organisations. See the section on Researchers’ Relationships with Sponsors and/or Funders below.

6. Take part in research voluntarily, free from any concern and be able to give freely informed consent in all but exceptional circumstances (exceptional in this context relates to exceptional importance of the topic rather than difficulty of gaining access). Covert research may be allowed where the ends might be thought to justify the means. Examples of this include research on the National Front and research that has exposed racism and other social harms. However recognition of this point should not be taken to mean that the BSC condones all covert research, it is simply to acknowledge that there are some circumstances where attempts to gain individual consent would be counterproductive. Advice must be sought from the research supervisor, local research managers, university ethics committees and/or funders. Of course, there are other circumstances where individual consent cannot be sought such as research on public behaviour, crowd behaviour, riots and other collective behaviour, and research which focuses on TV images, for example (see also, point 13 below).

7. Accept that informed consent implies a responsibility on the part of the researchers to explain as fully as possible, and in terms meaningful to participants, what the research is about, who is undertaking and financing it, why it is being undertaken, and how any research findings are to be disseminated. It is reasonable to expect that researchers should provide all participants with a full explanation of the study.

8. Ensure that participants’ consent should be given on the basis of sufficient information about the research ensuring that there is no explicit or implicit coercion. Researchers need to check that each participant is making a voluntary and informed decision to participate. Research participants should be informed about the limits to confidentiality and anonymity. Participants should be able to reject the use of data-gathering devices such as digital recorders. If the researcher feels that it is necessary to break confidentiality, the participant will normally be informed of what action is being taken by the researcher unless to do so would increase the risk to those concerned.

9. Pay special attention to these matters when participation is sought from children and young people, older people, those with a learning disability or cognitive impairment, or individuals in a dependent or unequal relationship, including consideration of the need for additional consent from an adult responsible for the child at the time participation is sought. Every effort should be made to secure free and informed consent from individual participants. Passive assent, including group assent (with consent given by a gatekeeper) should be avoided wherever possible, and every effort should be made to develop methods of seeking consent that are appropriate to the groups being studied. It is not considered appropriate to assume that penal and care institutions can give informed consent to research on young people’s behalf. The young people themselves must be consulted. Furthermore, researchers should give regard to issues of child protection and make provision for the disclosure of abuse.

10. Aim to ensure that all research involving those who lack capacity, or who during the research project come to lack capacity, must be approved by an ‘appropriate body’ operating under the Mental Capacity Act, 2005[7] (apart from a few exceptions). The key point is that valid consent can only be secured if the potential participant has capacity at the time consent is sought (for further information see https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9/contents). It is illegal to conduct such research without approval of the ‘appropriate body’. In most cases this is through the National Health Service National Research Ethics Service (NRES). Where research participants are recruited through the NHS or Social Care services, the proposal will be reviewed with the UK Health Departments’ Research Ethics Service[8].

11. Strive to ascertain that where proxy consent for research participants is necessary, the best interests of the vulnerable person must be of the highest importance.

12. Ensure that where there is a likelihood that identifiable data (including visual/vocal methods) may be shared with other researchers or third parties, the potential uses to which the data might be put should be discussed with research participants. Researchers should not breach the ‘duty of confidentiality’ and not pass on identifiable data to third parties without participants’ consent. Research participants should be informed if data is likely to be placed in archives, including electronic repositories and how they will be encrypted. Researchers should also note that they are subject to current legislation (UK Data Protection Act 1998), over such matters as intellectual property (including copyright, trademark, patents), privacy and confidentiality and ‘personal data processing’[9]. Offers of confidentiality may sometimes be overridden by law: researchers should therefore consider the circumstances in which they might be required to divulge information to legal or other authorities, and make such circumstances clear to participants when seeking their informed consent.

13. When conducting research via the Internet or via new e-technologies, be aware of the particular ethical dilemmas that may arise when engaging in these mediums. Information provided in e-social science, e-mails, web pages, social media sites, cyber-forums and various forms of ‘instant messaging’ that are intentionally public may be ‘in the public domain’, but the public nature of any communication or information on the Internet should always be critically examined and the identity of individuals protected unless it is a salient aspect of the research. Researchers should not only be aware of the relevant areas of law in the jurisdictions that they cover but they should also be aware of the rules of conduct of their Internet Service Provider (including JANET – Joint Academic Network). When conducting Internet research, the researcher should be aware of the boundaries between public and private domains, the legal and cultural differences across jurisdictions and data security when using cloud computing or commercial survey sites. Where research might prejudice the legitimate rights of respondents, researchers should obtain informed consent from them, honour assurances of confidentiality, and ensure the security of data transmission. They should exercise particular care and consideration when engaging with children and vulnerable people in Internet research.

14. Be cognisant of the differing legislative requirements, codes of practice and compliance with Data Protection legislation when undertaking comparative or cross-national research, involving different jurisdictions where codes of practice are likely to differ.

5. Researchers’ Relationships with Sponsors and/or Funders

i) Seek to clarify in advance the respective obligations of funders and researchers and their institutions and encourage written agreements wherever possible. They should recognise their obligations to funders whether contractually defined or only the subject of informal or unwritten agreements. They should attempt to complete research projects to the best of their ability within contractual or unwritten agreements. Researchers have a responsibility to notify the sponsor/funder of any proposed departure from the terms of reference.

ii) Seek to maintain good relationships with all funding and professional agencies in order to achieve the aim of advancing knowledge about criminological issues and to avoid bringing the wider criminological community into disrepute with these agencies. In particular, researchers should seek to avoid damaging confrontations with funding agencies and the participants of research, which may reduce research possibilities for other researchers.

iii) Seek to avoid contractual/financial arrangements which emphasise speed and economy at the expense of good quality research and they should seek to avoid restrictions on their freedom to disseminate research findings. In turn, it is hoped that funding bodies/sponsors will recognise that intellectual and professional freedom is of paramount importance and that they will seek to ensure that the dissemination of research findings is not unnecessarily delayed or obstructed because of considerations unrelated to the quality of the research.

6. Professional Codes of Ethics/Statements of Principle and Guidelines

This section details relevant Professional Association Research Ethics Guidelines or Codes.

Academy of Social Sciences website: https://www.acss.org.uk

Ethics policy link: https://www.respectproject.org/main/index.php

British Sociological Association website: https://www.britsoc.co.uk

The Association represents UK sociology on key bodies both nationally and internationally and works closely with allied organisations to influence policies affecting sociology within the wider social sciences remit. The BSA provides a network of communication to all who are concerned with the promotion and use of sociology and sociological research:

British Sociological Association (2004) Statement of Ethical Practice for the British Sociological Association, London: BSA:

https://www.britsoc.co.uk/media/27107/StatementofEthicalPractice.pdf

Economic and Social Research Council website: https://www.esrc.ac.uk ; Ethics policy link: https://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-esrc/information/research-ethics.aspx

The Market Research Society: https://www.mrs.org.uk

The Society is an international society whose members produce or use research for public policy or commercial use. Their code of conduct is widely recognised and has been in place for over 50 years:

Market Research Society (2012) Code of Conduct, London: Market Research Society

https://www.mrs.org.uk/standards/code_of_conduct

The Respect Project https://www.respectproject.org/main/aims.php funded by the European Commission’s Information Society Technologies (IST) Programme, set up common European standards and benchmarks and provides a Code of practice for socio-economic research. They offer particularly detailed advice on the legal context for intellectual property in Europe.

The Respect Project (2004) RESPECT Code of practice for socio-economic research, Brighton: Institute for Employment Studies. https://www.respectproject.org/code/respect_code.pdf

The Social Research Association https://the-sra.org.uk/ is a professional organisation for social researchers in the UK. They have branches in Scotland, Wales and Ireland. They offer an ethics consultation to members who can email their ethical dilemmas to the committee for discussion. The Social Research Association have also developed a code of practice for the safety of social researchers:

https://the-sra.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/safety_code_of_practice.pdf

Socio-Legal Studies Association https://www.slsa.ac.uk/ is the professional organisation for academics in socio-legal studies in the UK. Their guidelines are a short and accessibly written guide to the main ethical issues faced by socio-legal researchers:

Socio-Legal Studies Association (2009) Statement of Principles of Ethical Research Practice, https://www.slsa.ac.uk/index.php/ethics-statement

UK Research Integrity Office (UKRIO) website: https://www.ukrio.org

Ethics policy links: https://www.ukrio.org/our-work/the-concordat-to-support-research-integrity/

https://www.rcuk.ac.uk/documents/documents/AssuranceonResearchIntegrity.pdf

Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology website: https://www.anzsoc.org; Ethics policy link: https://www.anzsoc.org/cms-the-society/code-of-ethics.phps

7. Relevant Legislation in the UK

The Data Protection Act (which covers all of the UK) requires organisations processing personal data to adhere to principles regarding collecting and storing data. This legislation covers researchers in public institutions and has implications for collecting and storing personal data.

https://www.ethicsguidebook.ac.uk/Data-Protection-Act-111

https://www.ico.org.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/the_guide

Confidentiality

Researchers in the UK have no special legal protection that requires them to uphold confidentiality (as medical staff and lawyers do). Researchers and their data can be subject to subpoena where they may have evidence relating to a case. This legal situation should be taken into account by researchers when they offer confidentiality. Rather than absolute confidentiality, researchers may consider making the limits of confidentiality clear to respondents.

In general in the UK people who witness crimes or hear about them before or afterwards are not legally obliged to report them to the police. Researchers are under no additional legal obligations. There exists a legal obligation to report information about three types of crime to the relevant authorities:

i) Where a person has information relation to an act of terrorism, or suspected financial offences related to terrorism (Terrorism Act 2000).

ii) Where a person has information about suspected instances of money laundering (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002). Although this legislation is aimed at those working in the regulatory sector, this legislation could potentially cover researchers. This is a complex area and researchers are advised to seek legal advice.

iii) Where the researcher has information about the neglect or abuse of a child, there is a long-standing convention that researchers have responsibility to act. There is no legal obligation to do so, however Section 115 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 gives power for individuals to disclose information to specific relevant authorities (engaged in crime prevention) for the purposes of the Act.

Researchers employed by institutions such as universities or criminal justice agencies will be subject to institutional research ethical governance. Legal advice is often available to researchers employed in universities through research services departments. Of particular significance is the ESRC Framework for Research Ethics: https://www.esrc.ac.uk/_images/Framework-for-Research-Ethics_tcm8-4586.pdf . In brief, this framework sets out procedures for research ethics governance that are a condition of receiving ESRC funding.

8. Case Studies and Frequently Asked Questions

We welcome new case studies which illustrate the ethical dilemmas of research. If you or your research team would like to share ethical issues and how you overcame them, please e-mail the Chair of the Ethics Committee at: [email protected] (We would expect such case studies to be suitably anonymised).

Note: these FAQs are intended to provoke thought and debate: the answers given are not to be taken as definitive. Q1: “One of my interviewees in prison has told me about getting away with various offences. He told me he is in prison for three burglaries, but there are several other offences that the police don’t know about. What should I do?”

A1: It should have been made clear to participants in the research at the outset the limits of confidentiality for those involved in the study. Research in sensitive settings such as prisons is particularly likely to raise issues of this kind.

Q2: “I’ve been doing some focus group discussions with school children about their views on crime and punishment. In a small group of ten year olds one day, they started talking about a man called John who gives them sweets at the gate of the school. There was a lot of hushing and shushing and exchanged glances at this point, and it became clear that I was being told something I wasn’t meant to hear because of their parents. What should I do?”

A2: The welfare of vulnerable participants in research, such as children, overrides other concerns. Research with children should only be undertaken by people who have been cleared for the purpose by the Disclosure and Barring Service (previously CRB). If research uncovers suspected child abuse, this must be disclosed to the proper authorities for investigation. In this case, the suspicion is vague but valid: the researcher should inform a senior staff member at the school about what was said.

Q3: “I’ve got piles of interview data for my PhD but nowhere to keep the material. I share an office with five others and have two drawers in a filing cabinet but the key has been lost. What am I meant to do with all the data, and does my department have an obligation to help me?”

A3: PhD students should receive proper training on data protection and university departments should make appropriate provision for confidential storage of data.

Q4: “I’ve just interviewed someone who was very depressed, and I’m worried that they may harm themselves.”

A4: Where criminologists undertake research on sensitive topics, they may need to consider providing information about sources of appropriate support to research participants who may become distressed by the research encounter. However, whether it is appropriate to disclose information about potential self harm by research participants to third parties is a complex issue, and the decision will depend upon the circumstances of the case. It cannot be assumed that the person concerned would want their mental condition discussed with third parties.

Q5: “I’m a junior member of a large research group. I wrote the literature review for an article which the head of the group has submitted to a journal, but he has submitted it only under his own name. What can I do?”

A5. Discuss this directly with the senior researcher and enlist the support of others in doing so if necessary. If direct discussion is not effective, then explore other routes within the University department by consulting another senior member of staff for advice. What is at stake here is intellectual property.

Guide to Further Reading

Anonymous (2013) Ottawa criminologists go to court to protect research confidentiality. CAUT (Canadian Association of University Teachers) Bulletin, 60(1): 1.

Buchanan, E. (2011) Internet Research Ethics: Past, Present, Future, in C. Ess. and M. Consalvo, (Eds.) The Handbook of Internet Studies. Hoboken NJ: Wiley-Blackwell: 83-108.

Decker, S. E., Naugle, A.E., Carter-Visscher, R., Bell, K. and Seifert, A. (2011) ‘Ethical Issues in Research on Sensitive Topics: Participants’ Experiences of Distress and Benefit’, Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics, Vol. 6(3): 55-64.

Dingwall, R. (2012) How did we ever get into this mess? The rise of ethical regulation in the social sciences in K. Love. (Ed.) Ethics in Social Research. Bingley: Emerald, 3-26.

Geis, G., Mobley, A. and Schichor, D. (1999) Private prisons, criminological research, and conflict of interest: a case study, Crime and Delinquency 45: 372–388.

Hammersley, M. and Traianou, A. (2012) Ethics in Qualitative Research: Controversies and Contexts. London: Sage.

Israel, M. (2004) ‘Strictly confidential? Integrity and the disclosure of criminological and socio-legal research’, British Journal of Criminology 44(5): 715–740.

Israel, M. and Hay, I. (2012) Research Ethics in Criminology in D. Gadd, S. Karstedt and S. Messner, (Eds.) Sage Handbook of Criminological Research Methods. London: Sage.

Israel, M. (2014) Research Ethics and Integrity for Social Scientists: Beyond Regulatory Compliance. London: Sage.

Lee, R. (1995) Dangerous Fieldwork, London: Sage.

Mertens, D.M. and Ginsberg, P.E. (Eds.) (2009) Handbook of Social Research Ethics. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Punch, M. (1986) The Politics and Ethics of Fieldwork, London: Sage.

Social Research Association (n.d.) A Code of Practice for the Safety of Social Researchers. https://the-sra.org.uk/sra_resources/safety-code/

Spicker, P. (2011) ‘Ethical Covert Research’, Sociology, Vol. 45 (1): 118-133.

Street, J., Rogers, W., Israel, M. and Braunack-Mayer, A. (2010) Credit where Credit is Due? Regulation, research integrity and the attribution of authorship in the health sciences, Social Science and Medicine 70 (9): 1458-65.

The Concordat To Support Research Integrity (2012) London: Universities UK.

Van den Hoonaard W. and Hamilton, A. (Eds) (2014.) Ethics Rupture: Exploring Alternatives to Formal Research-Ethics Review. Toronto: Toronto University Press.

Winlow, S. and Hall, S. (2012) What is an ‘Ethics Committee’? Academic governance in an epoch of belief and incredulity. British Journal of Criminology, 52: 400–416.

The BSC’s Statement of Ethics was revised by Azrini Wahidin, Loraine Gelsthorpe, Terry Gillespie, Nic Groombridge and Jennifer Fleetwood in 2015. We also wish to acknowledge the help of Charlotte Harris, Mark Israel, Malcolm Cowburn and Robert Dingwall.

The Professional Affairs and Ethics Sub-Committee of the British Society of Criminology currently includes: Azrini Wahidin, Loraine Gelsthorpe, Terry Gillespie, Nic Groombridge and Jennifer Fleetwood. Members of the Committee offer an advisory service to all members of the BSC regarding ethical issues. Notwithstanding members’ commitments to any other professional and institutional codes of practice or statements of ethics for researchers, the Committee also serves to review and comment upon research proposals. We are particularly keen to assist postgraduate students in this regard.

Contact Details:

Professor Azrini Wahidin, The University of Warwick

[email protected]

[1] ESRC stands for Economic Social Research Council. Go to https://www.esrc.ac.uk

[2]Academy of Social Sciences. Go to https://acss.org.uk/ to access briefing papers on ethics and research integrity.

[3] UKRIO stands for UK Research Integrity Office. For further information go to: https://www.ukrio.org .

[4] The principles and responsibilities set out in the Singapore Statement on Research Integrity represent the first international effort to encourage the development of unified policies, guidelines and codes of conduct, with the long-range goal of fostering greater integrity in research worldwide. Go to: https://www.singaporestatement.org/statement.html

The Singapore Statement on Research Integrity (2010) provides a useful framework enabling researchers to think about their responsibilities. The Singapore Statement sets out four basic principles for responsible research:

Honesty: ‘Researchers are truthful in all aspects of research’

Accountability: ‘Researchers take responsibility for their actions as researchers’

Professional courtesy: ‘Researchers treat colleagues, staff and students fairly and with respect’

Good stewardship: ‘Researchers use and manage resources provided by others responsibly’

[5] The Vancouver Protocol on authorship relates to authorship. It is important to remember that each discipline has its own customs and practices for joint or multi-authorship. According to the Vancouver Protocol, the following are minimum requirements for authorship:

• Conception and design, analysis and interpretation of data; and

• Drafting the article or revising it critically for important intellectual content;

• Final approval of the version to be published.

[6] COPE aims to define best practice in the ethics of scholarly publishing and to assist editors, editorial board members, owners of journals and publishers to achieve this. One of the ways in which it fulfils this mission is by the publication of its Code of Conduct and Best Practice Guidelines for Journal Editors. For further details go to: https://publicationethics.org/resources/code-conduct .

[7] See Chapter 11: https://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/related/ukpacop_20050009_en.pdf .

[8] https://www.Dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_126474

[9] Researchers should be aware that the processing of any information relating to an identifiable living individual constitutes ‘personal data processing’ and is subject to the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 (See Section 33 of the Act relating to exemptions).

Criminology, Sociology and Policing at Hull

Student research journal, the ethical dilemma.

An essay for the MA Criminal Justice and Crime Control by Deborah Thompson, December 2018.

Essay Scenario

A police officer has been investigating a secret group of ‘far right’ activists. An informant, who is quite highly placed in this group, is giving useful information to the officer because the officer has evidence that could see him charged with a serious crime. The officer realises that he is obstructing justice by protecting the informant; however, he believes that the information received may stop a terrorist attack. The essay involves critically discussing the ethical issues raised in the scenario, applying relevant ethical theories, and to answer whether the officer should continue protecting the informant in exchange for information.

Introduction

Whilst there are many different theories this essay will consider deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics in relation to the scenario detailed.

As society needs a system of principles to guide it there are sometimes difficult decisions to make which need the law to be applied, in conjunction with personal values, emotion and instinct. The scenario given invokes a decision about what to do with regards to the three theories of ethics – whether to follow duty and to strictly apply it, whether to protect society from greater harm, or whether to uphold personal beliefs and values.

Ethical dilemmas mean that individuals have to consider reviewing all the facts and identifying potential values that may be relevant, alongside which ethical principles need to be applied and then what choice of action that may resolve the ethical dilemma.

Deontological Ethics

This theory equals the study of duty. People often have duties to perform certain actions irrespective of the consequences of those actions. If someone had to judge whether an act was moral the only important consideration would be the intent but not the consequence.

Immanuel Kant put forward that good will, or the intention to do what is right, is fundamental to morality. Applying his theory it would be that if someone applied good will, then even it if turned out badly it could be consider a moral action. If someone appeared to be acting out of good will but actually was only bothered about themselves then this would not be a moral action (Kant 1785:61/2).

Josef Seifert (online 1991) cites Kant by quoting: “It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will.”

He says that the categorical imperative tells us what we ought to do, for example ‘if you want to stay out of jail, you should not break the law’. This then commands you to follow and behave morally. Cyndi Banks cites Piers Benn by stating that motive is essential and that actions possess moral worth if they are performed with ‘categorical imperative’ (Banks 2004:209, Benn 1998:172).

Kant’s first formulation makes a case that for things to be moral it must be applied to anyone in similar circumstances and that you should ‘only do unto others as you would have done to you’, as cited by many of the world’s different religions (CUNY:2002 [online]).

His second formulation argues that you should act in a way that treats people with value and not as objects. A case to highlight this would be the way that Jewish people were persecuted during the holocaust, where the Nazi regime systematically dehumanised a race by tattooing a number on every person to take away their identity and by stripping them of hair, clothes and personal belongings. Perhaps this made it easier for the Nazis to carry out the atrocities that occurred? His third formulation puts forward that when you act morally you can choose your own moral decisions and that you should make your own choices. In deontological ethics if something is wrong it is wrong all the time, regardless of the good that may arise from the decision.

In the scenario the police officer has evidence to bring a charge of murder against the informant. This clearly indicates that informant has broken one of society’s strictest laws and the officer knows this. His professional role means that he has to follow the laws of the land and that he should bring the evidence forward so that the informant can be charged with the crime and be duly processed through the criminal justice system. The officer has conflicting thoughts as he will be considering the greater good of whether keeping the informant ‘out of jail’ and giving over information about a terrorist attack that may kill many more individuals is a better decision than making one person pay for their crime. The officer has a duty to perform his role to the best of his ability and by keeping the informant out of the police system he is compromising his employed role, as he has agreed to follow the College of Policing Code of Ethics (2014 online). He is breaching standards of professional behaviour sections 1 to 10, however in particular section 1 honesty and integrity, section 6 duties and responsibilities and section 9 his own conduct.

It could be argued that the officer firmly believes that what he is doing will save many people, compared with punishing one at this time. Although he may justify this to himself by being able to charge the informant at a later point when the danger has passed. This could lead the officer into a more dangerous situation, as the informant would argue that he was helping and should not be punished, thereby putting the officer in a precarious position with his employers.

This theory of ethics is an absolutist system and that means that the officer knows that what he is doing is wrong and that he needs to arrest/charge the individual with the crime committed regardless of what may happen in the future. However, is duty always the right thing to follow?

Consequentialism Ethics

A second theory of ethics is consequentialism – this theory considers that an act can be viewed as moral if it generates good consequences/results. If it produces bad consequences this can be considered morally wrong.

Jeremy Bentham, circa 1789, developed the modern theory of utilitarianism, campaigning for a more humane and just legal system. The Principle of Utility – the greatest happiness principle is where there is an ability to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure or to prevent mischief, pain or evil from happening.

Julia Driver (2007:42) cites Bentham as stating: “By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever; according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question…I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.”

When considering a dilemma the right action is one that will produce the greatest pleasure and least pain to those affected by it. In the given scenario, it could be argued that the greatest happiness would be the benefit to society if the terrorist attack is prevented, even if the informant does not get charged with murder against an individual. However, if it unfolded that the terrorist attack was never going to take place and society would not be affected then the officer should consider taking the informant into custody.

This kind of decision by an authority has recently been highlighted in the news with regards to an undercover police officer using whatever means necessary to infiltrate an animal rights group (The Guardian 2018 online). The furore surrounding whether his superiors were aware of his methods, and their approval, are currently being investigated. Does this mean that this theory is ok providing the public do not become aware of it? Does the end justify the means? If the pubic become aware of it do we then question the institutional morals/ethics?

John Stuart Mill developed Bentham’s ideas, by expressing that “his pleasures and pains are not regarded by me as any more important than yours when it comes to deciding what is right or wrong for me or anybody else to do.” (Brown University online) Linking this to the dilemma can a question be asked about whether the informant’s pain is greater or less because of being blackmailed for information. Will he be forever wondering if he will eventually be charged or the instance let go?

Brown University (online) put forward that we should do ethical actions that produce the greatest good and the least harm for all who may be affected including governments, businesses, the community and the environment.

This is something that we are now seeing in today’s modern ethos – do the least harm and the greatest good for all stakeholders including protecting agriculture, animal and marine life, energy and chemical usage etc. The dilemma would really be debated by these considerations, as in what benefits society more? Is keeping the informant out of prison helping society more, as the societal good in this case would overrule the good for the person?

The question to be answered is whether to recommend unjust actions. Should there be a sacrifice of some kind in order to save the lives of others? The sacrifice of the officer’s duty, the sacrifice of the informant’s freedom of choice in order to stop the potential fatalities that could occur in a terrorist attack. (Driver 2007:122)

Virtue Ethics

In order to understand what virtue ethics means it is necessary to understand what a virtue is. Banks (2004:237) puts forward that a virtue is having “…personal qualities or traits of character, shown through habitual action, that makes us persons of excellent character.”

These qualities can include intelligence and strength and aspects covering temperament, patience, empathy and religious beliefs.

The BBC (2014 [online]) states that: “… Virtue ethics is person rather than action based: it looks at the virtue or moral character of the person carrying out an action, rather than at ethical duties and rules, or the consequences of particular actions…”

Some of the earliest theories arise from philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato, in terms of establishing what makes a ‘good character’ and ‘what kind of person do I want to be’?

This theory of ethics says that an action is right only if a virtuous person would typically follow the same action, if the same circumstances arose. This theory is concerned with moral character and that this takes a long time to develop through upbringing, education and habituation. It puts forward that a person’s moral character may take a whole life to develop, but once it is established then the person will apply it consistently, predictably and appropriately in a variety of situations. However our ‘friendships’ can be classified into three types according to Aristotle – one of utility, one of pleasure and one of virtue. (Driver 2007:143:144) Given this statement, how do we see the relationship between the informant and police officer? This seems to be more one of utility as this relationship would not be in existence if a ‘business’ transaction was not taking place.

As a police officer he has sworn to tell the truth and uphold the law and these values will cause him a dilemma in regards to whether to charge the informant or not. In this theory the police officer’s moral character should be firmly established and he will know what he should do and that would be to charge the informant with the crime of murder, as the accused also has rights and is currently being ‘blackmailed’. Has the police officer himself broken a law by doing what he has been doing? What would happen to the officer if this were to be made public? In terms of virtuous ethics what would another officer do in the same circumstances?

Banks (2004:257) argues that it is not enough to tell the truth sometimes or only when it is advantageous, a virtuous person would tell the truth no matter what the outcome – therefore the police officer should arrest the informant and charge him with crime he has committed.

To conclude this essay it can be said that all the theories have similarities as well as differences, that two theories would arrive at the same conclusion and one would be different.

Deontological Ethics are concerned with the rights of duty and doing what is believed to be right but not concerned with the consequence and where the police officer in this dilemma should choose duty and arrest the informant. If something is wrong it is always wrong irrespective of what may happen in the future. Consequentialism Ethics is more concerned with the results of an action i.e. does it generate good results. If it does then it can be viewed as morally right and if bad results morally wrong. This theory is more complicated as the situation is unclear and may go two ways. If there is a planned terrorist attack then the consequences would be good for society and the informant should be utilised to gain information. If there was no planned attack then the informant should be arrested and charged for their crime. The officer would be in a dilemma knowing that he has a duty to follow the law but also to protect society. Virtue Ethics is more concerned with the person’s character and would argue that to be a police officer you would need to have certain qualities and character traits that would allow you to do the right thing in whatever circumstance. This would indicate that the police officer, because of his chosen role, should be virtuous enough and to arrest the informant rather than blackmail him into providing evidence.

Reference List

Banks, C. (2004) CriminalJustice Ethics Theory and Practice . London: Sage Publications Ltd.

BBC (2014) VirtueEthics. [online] Availablefrom: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/introduction/virtue.shtml [Accessed 11th November 2018].

Benn, P. (1998) Ethics: Fundamentals of Philosophy . Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Brown University [n.d] A Framework for Making Ethical Decisions. [online] Available from: https://www.brown.edu/academics/science-and-technology-studies/framework-making-ethical-decisions [Accessed 11th November 2018].

College of Policing (2014) Code of Ethics A Code of Practicefor the Principles and Standards ofProfessional Behaviour for the Policing Profession of England and Wales . [online] Available from: http://www.college.police.uk/What-we-do/Ethics/Documents/Code_of_Ethics.pdf [Accessed 11th November 2018].

Driver, J. (2007) EthicsThe Fundamentals . Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Graham, G. (2004) EightTheories of Ethics. London: Routledge.

Hall, R. A. S., Dennis, C. B., Chipman, T. L. (1999) TheEthical Foundations of Criminal Justice. London: CRC Press.

Kant, I. (1785) Groundwork . [online] Available from: https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1785.pdf [Accessed 11th November 2018].

Seifert, J. (1991) Theoretical Ethics. [online] Available from: https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TEth/TEthSeif.htm [Accessed 11th November 2018].

The Guardian (2018) WomanTricked into Relationship with Police Spy Launches Legal Action. [online] Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/01/woman-tricked-relationship-police-spy-launches-legal-action-jim-boyling [Accessed 11th November 2018].

The City University of New York (CUNY) (2002) Ethics,Chapter 9 Kantian Theory: TheCategorical Imperative, Not the Golden Rule [online] Available from: http://www.qcc.cuny.edu/SocialSciences/ppecorino/ETHICS_TEXT/Chapter_8_Kantian_Theory/Not_Golden.htm [Accessed 13th November 2018].

Opinion What we have learned about the Supreme Court’s right-wingers

Supreme Court observers frequently refer to its right-wing majority of six as a single bloc. However, differences among those six have become more apparent over time. Justices Samuel A. Alito Jr.’s and Clarence Thomas’s extreme judicial activism, partisan screeds and ethics controversies put them in a category unto themselves. Meanwhile, Justice Amy Coney Barrett has demonstrated surprising independence.

Watch Justice Barrett.

Not all Republican-appointed judges are the same. In Trump v. Anderson (concerning disqualification under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment of four-times-indicted former president Donald Trump), for example, Barrett, along with Justices Elena Kagan, Ketanji Brown Jackson and Sonia Sotomayor, criticized the maximalist majority opinion, which held that not only could state courts not determine disqualification but that Congress had to act before any candidate could be disqualified from federal office.

Like the so-called liberal justices, Barrett was disinclined to address “the complicated question whether federal legislation is the exclusive vehicle through which Section 3 can be enforced.” The court decided too much, she agreed. Her complaint with the so-called liberal justices was primarily tonal. (“This is not the time to amplify disagreement with stridency.”)

Likewise, in United States v. Texas (considering the stay on enforcement of Texas’s S.B. 4 immigration law ), Barrett, along with Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh, offered the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit an opening to take up the case promptly, which it did, rather than wade into a procedural fight over a stay in a case concerning Texas’s constitutionally suspect law.

As Supreme Court expert Steve Vladeck put it , “The Barrett/Kavanaugh concurrence went out of its way to nudge the Fifth Circuit — noting not only that the Fifth Circuit should be able to rule on the stay pending appeal ‘promptly,’ but that, ‘If a decision does not issue soon, the applicants may return to this Court.’” In essence, Barrett said the Supreme Court would not meddle in a circuit’s administrative business. But if the 5th Circuit actually allowed this constitutional monstrosity to proceed, she would have a different view.

And in Moore v. Harper (the independent state legislature doctrine), Barrett joined in the chief justice’s majority opinion, along with the three Democratic-appointed justices, to bat down the radical notion that state courts have no role in determining alleged violations of state election laws (provided they did “not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review”).

Beyond her opinions in high-profile cases, Barrett also sought to repair the court’s reputation damaged by right-wing partisanship. She has started appearing alongside Sotomayor publicly to insist that the court’s ideological combatants are more collegial than they might appear. Perhaps she is.

Barrett is no Sandra Day O’Connor (a true swing justice). Barrett was just as extreme on Roe v. Wade as the other right-wingers. Nevertheless, her efforts to carve an independent niche on the court should not be ignored.

On the other hand, there is no limit to what Justices Alito and Thomas will do.

In contrast to Barrett, no right-wing theory or activist invitation is too wacky for Alito and Thomas to entertain.

During oral argument on Danco Laboratories v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine (considering the Food and Drug Administration’s approval of mifepristone), Alito and Thomas took up the right-wing infatuation with the Comstock Act , passed in 1873. Alito, alone among the justices, seemed anxious to speed past the very real “standing” issue to ruminate about a means of banning abortion nationwide.

The Comstock law, which has not been enforced in about a century, bans sending “every article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing which is advertised or described in a manner calculated to lead another to use or apply it for producing abortion .” (Also, certainly unconstitutionally, it bans a large category of vaguely defined pornography.) Thomas and Alito seem ready and willing to deploy the law in a way it has never been applied: namely, to states where abortion is otherwise legal, thereby threatening the availability of medical abortions nationwide.

The Post reported , “Some experts and Biden officials fear Alito and Thomas are planning to write a separate opinion focused solely on the Comstock Act, arguing that the law remains viable and providing legal cover to a future administration that seeks to invoke it.” Even if Alito and Thomas do not carry the day, the Hill reported , “access to abortion pills could still very much be at risk if Alito and Thomas succeed in soliciting a Comstock-focused challenge in the future,” abortion rights defenders fear. A future Republican administration might well start trying to employ the law to throw abortion providers in jail.

Fishing for a hook to extrapolate the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization ruling into a nationwide ban on medical abortions epitomizes these justices’ radical disregard for precedent and brazen judicial activism. Indeed, Alito and Thomas increasingly seem like stalking horses for the far-right agenda, be it on guns, abortion or voting.

The Supreme Court’s credibility

Numerous polls show the court’s approval has cratered , likely a function of its ethics scandals, partisan rhetoric and aggressive reversal of precedent. In other words, judicial imperialism and disdain for ethical rules that apply even to members of Congress are unpopular with voters.

Increasingly partisan Thomas and Alito no longer bother to conceal their contempt for ethical restrictions , congressional oversight or judicial temperament . They have repeatedly failed to disclose luxurious gifts (with no sign of remorse) and remain adamant that they will accept no outside oversight.

After a firestorm of protest over financial disclosure lapses, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. released ethical guidelines so weak that they lack an enforcement mechanism. Worse, the guidelines are so porous that they posed no barrier to Thomas sitting on cases involving attempts to overturn the 2020 election that his wife supported.

Unless the rest of the court decides to restrain Thomas and Alito, concerns about ethical lapses and misalignment with contemporary American values will deepen, heightening demands for congressional responses (e.g., mandatory ethics, term limits, court expansion). If that happens, Alito and Thomas will be largely responsible.

Opinion | A Trump dictatorship is increasingly inevitable. We should stop pretending. November 30, 2023 Opinion | A Trump dictatorship is increasingly inevitable. We should stop pretending. November 30, 2023
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Punishment and responsibility: Essays in the philosophy of law. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. A collection of articles by one of the 20th century's most influential contributors to analytic philosophy of law, including the title essay, in which a hybrid theory of punishment is developed. Individual essays suitable for graduate classes.
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The essays in the collection stand as thought provoking interventions in what is a challenging academic climate. Taken together, they are a 'must read' for students, researchers, and anyone else interested in the ethics and governance of social research." Dr Jaime Waters, Senior Lecturer in Criminology, Sheffield Hallam University, UK
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See Full PDFDownload PDF. 33 Research Ethics in Criminology Mark Israel, Iain Hay INTRODUCTION While few criminologists have written about or even taught research ethics (Rhineberger, 2006), there is an oral tradition as criminologists - like many other researchers - swap stories about their dealings with various research ethics and ...
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Joint Cmssn on Criminology and Criminal Justice Education and Standards. Box 4348, Chicago, IL 60680, United States. Sale Source. National Institute of Justice/. Box 6000, Dept F, Rockville, MD 20849, United States. Joint Cmssn on Criminology and Criminal Justice Education and Standards. Box 4348, Chicago, IL 60680, United States.
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