biological warfare short essay

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About the Author

Dominik Juling studies conflict studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science and environmental science at Yale University. Previously, he graduated from the Technical University of Munich in political science with a focus on technology. He has work experience with the German Armed Forces, NATO, and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. His academic interests are diverse but mainly focus on the interaction of climate change and conflict.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Marine Corps University, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government.

Future Bioterror and Biowarfare Threats for NATO's Armed Forces until 2030

Dominik juling​ https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20231401005.

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Abstract: The article argues that advances in biotechnology and other transformations of the threat environment will increase the risk for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces of being confronted with a biological, particularly a genetically modified, weapon by 2030.

Keywords: bioweapon; biowarfare; bioterrorism; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear; CBRN, future warfare

Introduction

A t the beginning of the COVID-19 (coronavirus disease) pandemic, caused by the virus SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2), the dangers posed by biological attacks or the strategic effects of pandemics were discussed in national security debates. Now, one catastrophe follows the next, and the Russian war of aggression dominates the security agenda. In the foreseeable future, however, we will not be able to erase new, natural biological threats from the agenda. For example, the 2022 monkeypox outbreak, with a first outbreak cluster in the United Kingdom, reminds us that smaller outbreaks of transmissible diseases are a constant companion of humanity. Nevertheless, the security dimension of pathogens has fundamentally changed in the twenty-first century. It will change even more in the future. 

This article explores the next generation of warfare in terms of biological threats by the year 2030. Because of few precedents in the area of biological warfare or biological terror and the partial look into the future, the article, and especially its target audience and substantive focus, is broad. Because biological threats often involve difficult-to-control spread of germs, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces were chosen as the major threatened group for this article, rather than focusing on the U.S. Marine Corps alone. Consistent with the U.S. Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 and the NATO 2030 initiative, the time horizon of 2030 was chosen. The former is a comprehensive modernization and restructuring program for the U.S. Marine Corps within the 2030 time horizon. Key points of the program include modernizing equipment, improving cooperation with the U.S. Navy, adapting tactics and strategy to modern weapons, threats and surveillance technology, and better internal talent management. While the Force Design 2030 report talks a lot about emerging military technologies and hostile area denial, it does not talk about the possibility of biological methods of area denial and their countermeasures. This article is intended to draw attention to potential threats that must also be considered in the restructuring of the U.S. Marine Corps. 1

Within the framework of the NATO 2030 initiative, an innovation and reorientation plan comprising nine proposals, it states that NATO also wants to defend its technological lead in the field of biotechnology. In addition, NATO’s new Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Policy, which has been in place since 2022, provides a comprehensive overview of NATO’s policy on biological threats, but it often remains comparatively vague. This article will help to provide examples and further information on threats. 2  

The threats studied may stem from state actors, nonstate actors, unknown origins, or accidents. Consequently, the research question is: “What are possible future bioterror and biowarfare threats for NATO’s Armed Forces by 2030?” While past and current events and examples are used throughout the article, the goal is to identify and broadly assess potential future threats. The hypothesis for the article thus assumes that advances in biotechnology and other transformations of the threat environment will increase the risk for NATO forces of being confronted with a biological, particularly a genetically modified, weapon by 2030. The article will show how and why the author comes to this conclusion. In doing so, the article will attempt to demonstrate that future biological threats by 2030 pose a serious but underestimated threat to NATO.

To provide an entry point and broad overview of the topic, the article provides a short history of biowarfare and bioterrorism and discusses the future biological threat environment, influential megatrends, emerging and disruptive technologies, possible biological threats by 2030, current and future means of delivery, and possible actors. It is argued that the threat from deliberately deployed biological agents will increase and change in nature by 2030. Unlike, for example, chemical weapons, biological weapons have not been tactically or strategically usable against humans because of their potentially uncontrolled spread, even to unprotected friendly forces, coupled with their highly complex production and stabilization outside of laboratory conditions. However, advances in biotechnology in modifying existing pathogens and creating entirely new ones now make it possible to circumvent these previous barriers and produce limited biological weapons for the first time. At the same time, it has already become cheaper, easier, and safer to produce dangerous agents, even more so by 2030. New technologies are also helping to deliver biological agents more effectively. In dual-use terms, by 2030 numerous civilian biotechnological successes will create a vast array of possibly ill-intentioned weapons that will provide NATO’s hostile actors with a wide range of methods. 

History of Events and Developments  Involving Potential Biological Weapons until 2022

As early as 1932, Japan engaged in a massive biological weapons program that resulted in the deaths of at least 10,000 prisoners of war by 1945. It is estimated that more than 200,000 additional civilians and soldiers were killed by Japanese biological weapons during military field operations. Various pathogens and means of delivery were systematically studied. After the end of the Second World War, further nonlethal experiments with biological weapons were conducted by the United States. 3 Particularly noteworthy are the results of a series of ethically highly controversial experiments on unknowing civilians in America. At that time, about 800,000 people in San Francisco were infected with a harmless bacterium. A ship was used to disperse the organisms in the air, but a dispatch with airplanes is also known. In secret tests in the New York City subway, there were even more estimated infections with the harmless bacteria noted. Light bulbs filled with microbes were thrown onto the tracks to distribute the bacteria. At least 239 known tests were conducted between 1949 and 1969, demonstrating the potentially massive spread of deliberately released bacteria. 4 The Soviet Union had a similarly comprehensive biological weapons program. In 1979, four years after the Biological Weapons Convention came into force, there was a very serious accident involving anthrax spores in a laboratory in what is known today as Yekaterinburg, Russia. Due to a missing filter, the area around the laboratory was contaminated and at least 66 people died. 5 Based on testimony from high-level former employees of the Soviet Biopreparat Research Agency, it can be inferred that the Soviet Union worked intensively to develop, mass produce, and test delivery methods of highly lethal biological weapons. Strains were repeatedly modified and improved. The goal was to create weapons that avoided precautionary measures or aftertreatment and were effective quickly and lethally. 6

The first significant attack in modern history using bioweapons and defined as terroristic occurred in 1984, when followers of cult leader Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh infected 751 citizens of The Dalles, Oregon, with salmonella. Forty-five people were hospitalized. The precipitator was the sect’s intention to gain seats in the local county circuit court. 7 In 1990, another cult began more comprehensive attempts to use biological weapons. Professor Barry Kellman reports on Aum Shinrikyo: 

In April 1990, Aum attempted to attack the Japanese parliament with botulinum toxin aerosol. In 1992, Aum sent a mission to Zaire to assist in the treatment of the Ebola virus disease victims in order to find a sample of the Ebola strain to take back to Japan for culturing purposes. In June 1993, the cult tried to release poison at the wedding of the Japanese crown prince. Later that month, Aum attempted to spray anthrax spores from the roof of a building in Tokyo. All these attacks were unsuccessful and resulted in no casualties. 8

Even though the cult’s chemical weapons program proved to be deadlier, a well-equipped laboratory was found with various biological substances that were used to successfully cultivate bacteria and viruses. 9

Since the World Health Organization (WHO) announced the eradication of smallpox in 1980, there has been a debate about whether the last remaining virus strains in laboratories should be destroyed. There has also been much discussion of the possibility of terrorist use, as humanity has become very vulnerable following the suspension of vaccination. 10 At present, the United States and Russia still have small stocks of smallpox strains, which are kept in highly secure laboratories. According to the WHO, no other laboratory has official access to the virus. 11 However, since the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), the general debate on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons has been broadened again to include other pathogens. This was also strongly reinforced by the anthrax letters sent only a week after the devastating al-Qaeda attacks. Of the 22 infected, 5 died. The perpetrator was, according to an FBI investigation, a professional Army biological researcher with access to all the essential materials. 12 Also in 2001, the book Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War was published only a few weeks after 9/11 and remained at number one on the New York Times bestseller list for more than two weeks. It contained a number of investigative novelties about the United States’ biodefense projects.

After 2001, it became known that al-Qaeda had already been pursuing a practical bioweapons program since the beginning of 1998. In 1999, the terrorist group recruited a Pakistani biologist to develop biological weapons in a laboratory in Kandahar. In 2001, a biochemist from the al-Qaeda network may have been able to isolate a lethal anthrax strain. 13 The actual progress of al-Qaeda’s anthrax research was more advanced than global leaders suspected, but the group was never able to produce a viable bioweapon. 14

In 2003, there was the first case of letters filled with ricin toxin in the United States. The perpetrator is unknown still today. Ricin toxin is a plant material, so there is no infection and reproduction as with microbes. Al-Qaeda terror cells in Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Sweden, and Germany were also planning attacks with ricin toxin in 2003. Suspects were arrested in Great Britain, Spain, Italy, and France. 15 In 2004, ricin toxin contamination was detected in a building in Washington, DC. Until 2009, this was the last major incident involving material that could be used as a biological weapon, with a potential terrorist background.

Since then, there have been a number of incidents up to 2021 due to the relatively easy production of ricin toxin. Most of the recorded cases have occurred in the United States. The lethality of ricin toxin is illustrated by the example of Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov, who was killed in an assassination in London in 1989 by only 0.2 milligram of the agent. 16 Significant incidents since 2009 include ricin letters sent to American politicians in 2013, ricin toxin in the hands of a right-wing militia in the United States, attempted orders via the darknet, and possession of ricin toxin in 2018 and ricin-powder-filled letters again in 2020. 17 The darknet is a variety of networks that are shielded or hidden from public access. The attempt by a jihadist living in Germany in 2018 to carry out an attack with ricin toxin stands out, as he was believed to have had contact with members of Islamic State and managed to produce potentially lethal ricin toxin on his own. He followed internet tutorials on how to make explosives and extract ricin toxin with rudimentary resources. 18 But also, in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State tried to obtain functioning biological weapons. A laptop discovered in Syria in 2014 contained many different instructions for the construction, storage, and delivery of weapons of mass destruction. 19 However, the Islamic State’s focus seemed to be on chemical weapons, especially after 2014.

A study by the U.S. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism that was examining 74 nonstate actor incidents involving biological agents from 1990–2011 concludes that use of an agent, possession of a nonweaponized agent, and attempted acquisition are the most common events. Other categories not recorded as often include plot, interest, possession of a weapon, threat with possession, and attempted use of an agent. The most common types of perpetrators involved in attacks during the period studied are cults and lone actors. 20

As in many other areas, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is also a turning point in the field of bioweapons. Since 2020, there have been a number of different scientific papers examining the link between COVID-19 and terrorism. Experts at University College London’s Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science found evidence as early as May 2020 that extremist groups were calling for the virus to be deliberately spread and to infect religious or ethnic groups particularly deemed adverse. Likewise, conspiracy theory narratives that SARS-CoV-2 was designed as a biological weapon became established. 21 The deliberate spread of SARS-CoV-2 was particularly discussed by parts of the American neo-Nazi scene, who set their sights on a violent collapse of the current system to establish a White ethno-state afterward. In right-wing Telegram channels, for example, the door handles of non-Whites, Jews, or FBI facilities were indicated as targets for the application of infectious saliva. Initially, the approach was also discussed in jihadist circles, as the Western states were most affected toward the beginning of the pandemic. In April 2020, an alleged Islamist was arrested in Tunisia for planning to deliberately spread SARS-CoV-2 among local security forces. In addition, many experts agree that COVID-19 has served as a great inspiration for various groups of different orientations that have already considered researching or acquiring biological weapons. 22 Various religious groups of different faiths see COVID-19 as a kind of revenge of God, without actively wanting to contribute to its spread. 23

In summary, it can be said that, as with chemical weapons, the procurement or attempted procurement of dual-use equipment, which could potentially be used for biological weapons production, has increasingly shifted to the internet since 2009. Here too, in addition to the regular online shops, the so-called darknet is once again playing a prominent role. As a relatively easy-to-obtain toxin, ricin toxin has played an increasingly important role since 2009, and the motivations of nonstate actors have generally been diversified. However, ricin is more suitable for attacking individuals or small groups, since a large-scale attack in the open is logistically difficult and would not be very effective. A major attack with biological weapons predicted by some analysts before 2010 was not realized until the end of 2022. Effective weaponization of SARS-CoV-2 has been partially attempted, but it has not been measurably successful, as all attempts were under primitive conditions.

Warnings about antibiotic-resistant bacteria, vaccine resistant viruses, and the creation of completely new pathogens (chimeras) are also not new and were already voiced, for example, by the authors Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg in 1999. In their 1999 prediction, it will take about 20 years before genetic engineering can completely circumvent current biological countermeasures. 24

The World in 2030

Clearly, the environment for an analysis of biological threats will be different by the year 2030. The author does not attempt to draw a coherent picture of the security world of the future, but rather to identify some factors that are important for the future biological threat environment. One is the overall geopolitical evolution of NATO’s relationships with other state and nonstate actors. In a more cooperative world, the role of new treaties and their compliance in dual-use research and biological agents is an important variable of the future. In this context, the future monitoring and prevention of proliferation of pathogens for production and distribution is also an important factor. Another relevant factor is the political stability of countries with significant biotechnology research laboratories and stockpiles of potent pathogens. In the event of insufficient protection of the facilities or political unrest and upheaval, the hazardous materials could fall into the wrong hands. 

Other factors are additional natural pandemics through 2030 and the long-term effects of COVID-19 on future strategic considerations within NATO, its member states, and among potentially hostile actors. The consequences of Russia’s war of aggression, the following build-up of capabilities, shifts in foreign policy paradigms in some NATO countries, and a potentially more uncooperative international order will also play into the future of a biological threat environment. Add to this a huge number of potential black swan events, ranging from doomsday cults to false flag attacks to extortionist criminal groups. Equally unpredictable, of course, are future conflicts and their associated events. The next section discusses a number of megatrends that, unlike the variables identified in this article, have already begun in the past and will continue to have a relatively reliable impact through 2030 and beyond. 

Megatrends through 2030

Climate change as a megatrend through 2030 is having a significant impact on future biological threats. It has long been known that climate change will lead to a further geographic spread, as well as a net increase in transmissions of infectious diseases. 25 The Euro-Atlantic area in particular will be affected by new species emigrating from the south. The deliberate introduction of already found pathogens or vectors to new habitats farther north might be a terrorist method, made possible in part by climate change. At the same time, permafrost is thawing in many places, revealing frozen pathogens that might not be present today. For example, a child died in Siberia in 2016 from anthrax that was frozen in the permafrost, but smallpox and dangerous influenza strains can also potentially thaw in the Arctic region and be transmitted to humans. Similarly dangerous are much older and completely unknown pathogens that are buried several meters deep in the soil and could come to the surface by 2030. 26 Terrorist use is unlikely but not impossible. An additional factor, accelerated by climate change, is that in many cases natural disasters are followed by infectious disease outbreaks and epidemics. This is mainly due to displacement, which is mostly negatively connected to the availability of safe water and sanitation facilities, the degree of crowding, and the availability of health care services. 27 Another impact is that due to the decrease of global animal and plant biodiversity, large populations from one species potentially have advantages in dispersal in an imbalanced manner. Thus, insects and vectors used as bioweapons can more effectively attack plants, humans, and animals while transmitting and reproducing diseases.

Another set of megatrends such as population growth, migration, urbanization, and demographic change also interact with biological threats to NATO forces through 2030. Poor sanitary conditions in densely populated and rapidly growing megacities make the spread of pathogens more likely. NATO nations are experiencing steady demographic change that includes a rapidly growing older segment of society that is more vulnerable to many transmittable diseases.

Due to ongoing globalization and worldwide trade, especially online, it can be assumed that it will continue to be possible to order and deliver laboratory and medical equipment online through 2030. Similarly, pathogens can spread rapidly and potentially undetected in a short time due to the long-distance transport of people and animals.

The next megatrends identified by the author are inequality and poverty. However, meat consumption has often risen as a result of the greatly increased standard of living in China, for example. While total meat production in other parts of the world has increased only slightly since 1990, the amount in Asia has doubled. But individual consumption has also risen sharply in China and Brazil since 1990, while individual consumption in many NATO member states has declined slightly since around 2010. 28 It should be noted that there is a clear link between infectious diseases and meat production. 29 In particular, inadequate hygiene and safety measures, as well as factory farming, contribute to new zoonotic viruses and epidemics. 30 Due to various reasons, including high meat consumption, experts suspect that several and more severe pandemics will follow in the future. 31 However, a significant decrease in global meat consumption is not expected. In addition, more meat consumption significantly increases greenhouse gas emissions, which in turn increases biological hazards associated with climate change. Local poverty and inadequate government resources will continue to contribute to the inability to contain and prevent local outbreaks of infectious diseases in a timely manner through 2030, potentially posing a threat to nations far away.

The next megatrend through 2030 is briefly discussed in terms of digitalization and technological advances. As described in more detail in the next section, advances in biotechnology and medicine, as well as in the field of bioinformatics, are already contributing to major breakthroughs in the manipulation of bacteria, viruses, and animals. Bioinformatics is an interdisciplinary science that uses computer-assisted methods to try to generate new findings in the fields of biotechnology and medicine. This trend is very likely to continue by 2030 and further breakthroughs may be recorded. In addition, the advanced methods already known today for manipulating and producing pathogens are expected to become cheaper, easier to use, and possibly more widespread by 2030. This depends on whether there will be stronger regulations in this area in the future. However, it is very likely that civilian research and genome databases with potent pathogens that are freely available on the internet will be expanded by 2030 and could still be misused. The internet also facilitates recruitment and communication between nonstate actors hostile to NATO. Just as today, by 2030 the internet will likely make it possible to communicate encouragement and support for the development or terrorist deployment of bioweapons regardless of location.

The final megatrend cluster identified by the author is hybridization and asymmetric warfare. Both trends pose a certain threat in a world in 2030 in which limited-use biological weapons can wreak havoc on the enemy, but not on the enemy’s own forces. In addition, there is the possibility of concealing the origin of, for example, a local epidemic or the possibility of biological weapons that are not lethal to humans. In a hybrid conflict, an adversary actor could, for example, also want to cause economic damage or supply shortages and target livestock populations or agriculture. In a hybrid conflict, it would also be possible to use pathogens against NATO forces to incapacitate soldiers for a longer period of time without causing them permanent harm. In a possible future asymmetric conflict between now and 2030, it must be expected that the facilitated production and delivery of limited biological warfare agents will allow a heavily outnumbered actor to pretend that it has the ability to establish a certain balance against a perceived superior adversary.

Overall, for the complex 2030 threat environment, a broad set of important variables and longer-lasting megatrends suggest that there are several indications that by 2030 the threat of deployment may be higher and the impact more severe. In the next section, special attention is given to emerging and disruptive technologies through 2030 that are important for the design, production, and delivery of potential biological weapons.

Emerging and Disruptive Technologies until 2030

This section of the article will outline how new technologies are having a major impact on biological weapons by 2030. Before analyzing specific technologies in more detail, however, the author first wants to point out that biological weapons not only have a purely military use, but also, like other weapons of mass destruction, have a particular impact on politics and society. With a large number of digital devices connected to the internet, online media, and the peculiarities of social networks, actors could use the threat or deployment of biological weapons to spread panic and fear. Allison E. Betus, Michael K. Jablonski, and Anthony F. Lemieux examine the important role of media in our increasingly digitalized world as follows: 

Violent acts initiate media coverage, as well as word-of-mouth transmission, functioning as a gateway that draws attention to the terror group and its messages in a manner that increases the salience of the communication; then media provides additional information contextualizing the original act. Media coverage may make the group initiating the communication look more dangerous or powerful than is warranted. 32  

It is thus becoming increasingly clear that CBRN threats are not only reflected in new hardware, but also increasingly affect the virtual information and communication space, as well as the public perception of a real or perceived threat.

A research paper by the NATO Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism identifies a countervailing mechanism for the interaction of terrorism and technological progress. In general, military and civilian innovations influence each other with a reciprocal push and pull mechanism. This also benefits nonstate actors, who usually focus on adapting and refining existing and proven dual-use technology for their own purposes. 33 In addition to easy obtainable dual-use goods, high-tech equipment and material is mostly stolen from professional armed forces, bought on the black market, or supplied by state actors. In NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis: 2017 Report , one of six chapters is devoted exclusively to future technologies. The report describes, among other things, the rate of technological advances, the number of individuals with access to the internet, the potential of adversary non-state actors’ access to new technologies, the international interconnectedness, the amount of data collected, and an increase in the number of sensors in the world. At the same time, it is becoming more difficult for states, international organizations, or other frameworks to effectively regulate potentially dangerous technologies. This is due, among other things, to the rise of dual-use devices, effects of globalization, an increase in the power of the commercial sector, and the rapid pace of market maturity of new technologies, where democratic mechanisms can often be slow to react. 34  

The first tangible technologies under consideration are user friendly AI applications and web scrapers, which can already easily search large amounts of information about a certain online topic on the internet or in a database, for example about pathogens. AI can then theoretically analyze or even interpret the results. If no powerful computer hardware is available, capacity can be rented via cloud services. This intersection could well be classified as digital dual-use. The consequence is that gene combinations can be tested on the computer before they are cultivated. This saves time and resources and can be used to develop pathogens with specific properties. The process of producing a large number of molecules by combining and varying different chemical components using modern methods also exists in chemistry.

One of the most important future technologies described in this article are modern biological applications. These include genetic engineering, synthetic biology, and biochemistry. Again, this is an area of dual-use research. Genetic engineering is the direct genome manipulation of organisms, including clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) gene editing that is probably one of the most important scientific breakthroughs of recent times. Especially in the field of biological weapons and nonstate actors, this is a method that can be misused with serious consequences. The special advantage is that, compared to prior methods, it provides easier, cheaper, and more precise additions or removal of parts of the genome while the organism is alive. Thus, in the future, it will be reasonably easy to turn bacteria, viruses, fungi, plants, and humans into genetically modified organisms. 35 In general, this field is well researched and there are many publications available, as vaccines, for example, are also being developed using similar methods. For instance, a research paper on the synthesis of horsepox was published in 2017. Dr. Tom Inglesby, director of the Center for Health Security at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, sees this as increasing the risk of smallpox synthesis. 36 In the future, it is believed that despite often grave ethical concerns and attempted political regulation, research will continue to advance. It is often difficult to regulate and identify dual-use applications early enough. However, strategic considerations and scientific great-power competition also play into this technology, as China, in particular, has recently become known for advances in genetic engineering, which are often seen as ethically critical. 37  

One of the many different aims of synthetic biology is to produce synthetic cells (i.e., synthetic life). In 2019, a synthetic bacterium was created for the first time from an artificial sequence of genomes. 38 In this way, even very dangerous bacteria could theoretically be created as if from a construction kit. Research is currently being done on this with the aim of producing a synthetic drug delivery platform. 39 However, viruses can also be transported and distributed by synthetic bacteria. Advances in synthetic virology are particularly relevant to this study. In the future, it is expected that any virus whose DNA/RNA (deoxyribonucleic/ribonucleic acid) is available can potentially be reverse engineered, bringing viruses that have been eradicated back into circulation. Currently, the National Library of Medicine has a large database called the National Center for Biotechnology Information Virus (NCBI Virus), which contains the genetic data of nearly all known viruses, as well as other microorganisms and mammals. 40 There is an important report by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, commissioned by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2018, which describes three particularly dangerous scenarios of synthetic biology. In addition to the already described technique of reproducing viruses with genetic code from the internet, it also mentions the possibility of making bacteria resistant to antibiotics and the possibility of programming microbes in such a way that they slowly poison people through their metabolism. The last method could lead to death after a long time and thus disguise the crime. Much more difficult to implement, but theoretically possible, is a so-called gene drive that automatically spreads through the population, altering people’s DNA. 41

The field of biochemistry is also important, as research into, for example, metabolism processes in cells, signal molecules, or enzymes must also be considered in the effect of biological weapons. The exact impact of this area of research up to 2030 cannot be forecasted precisely, but it is certain that the impact will be significant.

A new development that could potentially have an impact on chemical and biological weapons is microreactors in the form of a continuous flow reactor. Fundamentally, the idea is to allow chemical reactions to take place in a very small device. Advantages compared to large reactors include scalability, on-site and on-demand production, as well as a high reaction yield. 42 The small reactors can be scaled up to almost any size, and expensive, large, and complicated synthesis facilities in batch reactor design are no longer necessary, as the cult Aum Shinrikyo once built them. A 2013 study, however, stresses that the use of microreactors for the production of chemical weapons is limited. Nevertheless, future technological advances may well enable a broader range of warfare agents. 43 Advances in micro-enzymatic reactors are also expected in the field of biology. 44 This could help future terrorists or state actors to produce small quantities of toxic agents in almost any place in the world without significantly putting themselves at risk during production. Although the implications are not yet well understood, the cultivation of pathogens could also benefit from the technology.

Current and future often dual-use developments in nanoscience also offer many overlaps with biological weapons and means of delivery. But not only potentially lethal applications are being developed; nanoscience also supports modern material sciences, engineering, and production. For some years now, several armed forces have been researching machines frequently called nanobots. However, this often refers to insect-size unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which does not correspond to the “nano” definition. Nevertheless, these bionic insects, which are often only 2–3 mm in size and are capable of flying, can, for example, deliver a highly potent poison unnoticed to many locations. 45 In a swarm, technical systems could be manipulated, disrupted, or destroyed. However, real nanobots (i.e., nano-size synthetic drug carriers) are also not unlikely in the future. For example, a group of Chinese researchers undertook the first successful tests for targeted tumor treatment in 2018. 46 On the other hand, such carriers could also be used for the targeted transport of viruses and toxins. Bacteria have been used as drug carriers for similar applications for some time now. Theoretically, however, it is also possible to manipulate unmodified or transgenic insects with the help of nanotechnology, for example to increase the effect of distributed biological warfare agents. 47

Other applications of nanotechnologies are very small computers, which will be important for small means of delivery and monitoring of production of biological and chemical warfare agents. 48 In general, by 2030, nano-size technologies are expected to make the dual-use laboratory equipment needed for biological weapon production, among other things, cheaper, more effective, smaller, and more flexible. 49 In addition, future attacks with nanotubes may offer entirely new possibilities for disguising origin and lethality. A researcher at American University explains: “For example, nanotubes could be used to deliver only the lethal parts of the anthrax virus—without the signature protein that is recognizable to the immune system.” The researcher identifies three main dangers in linking nanoscience and potential biological weapons. First, rudimentary nanotechnology labs are already available on the internet for under $500 USD. Second, the technology makes it easier and cheaper to produce, disguise, and transport biological warfare agents. And third, the technology is not sufficiently regulated, which could lead to an asymmetric arms race that threatens the overall strategic security of major countries. 50

The dual-use problem in the CBRN sector, which has already been mentioned several times in this article, has been recognized for some time. For this reason, the informal multilateral export control regime known as the “Australia Group” has been in existence since 1985. It deals with dual-use technologies, which can be misused for the production of chemical and biological weapons, among other applications. The NATO countries and the European Commission are members, but Russia and China, for example, are not, which makes international control much more difficult. Nevertheless, the group offers expertise in identifying potential dual-use applications. Additionally, after 11 September 2001, there were great efforts to provide weaponizable research with guidelines and, in some cases, regulations. For example, after a research report on the synthetic production of a polio virus was published in 2002, the U.S. government set up a high-level advisory body to draw up guidelines against the terrorist use of biological research. 51 Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism , a comprehensive work on the state of the art at that time, was published in 2004. 52 In 2012, the book Innovation, Dual Use, and Security was published, in which, in addition to the biological risks, attention was also drawn to the potential chemical risks. It contains a 300-page in-depth overview of many intersecting issues. 53 In 2016, a case came to light in which a Chinese company exported a synthetic opioid called carfentanil unregulated to countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. However, this chemical is so potent that it has already killed several unknowing drug users. Terrorist use could not be ruled out. 54 This incident is exemplary for several substances and devices. Furthermore, on the Chinese state level, there have been concerns from some NATO member states in recent years. The country is pursuing civil-military integration in many scientific fields, often resulting in dual-use goods. 55 In 2021, the United States accused China of not clearly distancing itself from weaponizable research in the biological field: 

China continues to develop its biotechnology infrastructure and pursue scientific cooperation with countries of concern. Available information on studies from researchers at Chinese military medical institutions often identifies biological activities of a possibly anomalous nature since presentations discuss identifying, characterizing and testing numerous toxins with potential Dual Use applications. 56

Other countries that the United States accuses of a possible dual-use biological weapons program are North Korea and Iran. Russia is accused of not having properly destroyed “BW items specified under Article 1 of its past BW program.” 57 An increase in civil-military dual-use research in the CBRN field poses the risk of openly available knowledge being misused for malicious purposes. The next section will take a closer look at the actual level of research in 2023 and what developments are possible by 2030.

Possible Biological Threats by 2030

Without question, the biological threats of the future are increasingly severe. The individual threats are often incomprehensible for nonexperts, as biological warfare can be carried out by using viruses, bacteria, fungi, insects, or plants. Almost all animals are possible vectors, and in the far future, even mechanical products or highly manipulated organisms could also be possible vectors. In addition, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and DNA manipulation open up a whole new range of possibilities for modifying or even completely rebuilding or recreating viruses and bacteria. The latter are called designer pathogens. These technological advances were foreseeable for some time, and yet they only came to public attention because of the global pandemic. But as complex and diverse as the possible types of biological weapons are, so are the techniques to enhance the efficacy of biological weapons through biological engineering. A 2013 report in the Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science lists the possible techniques for weaponizing biological materials. These include the manipulation of bacteria; the aforementioned designer pathogens; the destruction or replacement of individual genes in the context of misused gene therapy; stealth viruses that only unfold their effect in the body after external or internal activation; host swapping diseases that, for example, specifically jump from domestic cats to humans; designer diseases that, for example, cause artificial cancer; and personalized biological weapons. The latter spread approximately asymptomatically in the population and only have an effect on certain genetic characteristics of a person or group of people. 58

In his 2002 contribution to The Counterproliferation Papers of the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center at Air University, Michael J. Ainscough describes the threats that could become reality by 2030. Based on findings of the JASON Defense Advisory Panel in 1997, Ainscough describes six future threats. First, he talks about binary biological weapons that can be used for extortion or safe handling. For this, a harmless host bacterium and a virulent plasmid would be isolated separately and threatened with the release of the associated second component, which would then interact to produce its effect. As far as designer genes are concerned, the researcher concludes that these have long been state of the art with simple modifications at the time of the study. Future designer pathogens will have far more complex capabilities and will be able to exhibit a whole range of modified characteristics. Regarding gene therapy, he writes: 

There are two general classes of gene therapy: germ-cell line (reproductive) and somatic cell line (therapeutic). Changes in DNA in germ cells would be inherited by future generations. Changes in DNA of somatic cells would affect only the individual and could not be passed on to descendants. Manipulation of somatic cells is subject to less ethical scrutiny than manipulation of germ cells. 59

Already 25 years ago, viruses were used as vectors to insert genes into mammalian cells. This genetically engineered virus was successfully used to prevent rabies in wildlife. Likewise, viruses were successfully used as vectors for mousepox viruses 25 years ago. This allowed vaccination of mice to be circumvented, which died shortly afterwards. The concept of stealth viruses is not new in nature. In this case, an initially unnoticed virus could enter human cells and wait for an external or internal signal. One related example are oncogenes, which are mutated genes that cause cancer as soon as they are activated. Some viruses have segments of DNA that mimic oncogenes. Other substances, bioregulators, physical processes, or external influences such as ultraviolet light could thus activate the virus. Ainscough also writes about host-swapping diseases and designer diseases. In the future of 2030, it could be possible to create the suitable pathogens for a certain disease pattern. This would make it possible, for example, to temporarily shut down the immune system or induce cell death in certain cells. 60 Twenty years later, Ainscough’s prognoses are all proving to be increasingly technically feasible. Except for complex designer pathogens and diseases, all predictions are applicable in the year 2023.

Although some of the possible applications mentioned have not yet been achieved in practice, thanks to the aforementioned CRISPR-Cas9 gene-editing technology and the general progress in the field, it is only a matter of time before the biological weapons mentioned are successfully tested within military or civil dual-use research. Another extremely problematic aspect is that CRISPR is not a high-tech technology that is only available in secure laboratories. At the current rate, it is foreseeable that in the world of 2030, manipulated and synthetic biological substances could take on an almost everyday character. But how difficult is it really for future actors to actually develop and deploy one of these methods themselves? 

Based on the state of the art in 2015, researcher Zian Liu of the University of California, Berkeley, concludes that there are five potential barriers that could prevent nonstate actors without access to professional laboratories from creating novel biological weapons. First, it is not easy to create a properly protective research environment that will secure the actor adequately. Secondly, although it is possible to order all the necessary materials on the internet, very specialized equipment for very dangerous substances and many test runs cost up to $30,000 USD. If an already dangerous bacteria or virus strain are used as an initial substance, a screening of the person placing the order is usually requested. However, there are sometimes great differences in this respect worldwide. Nevertheless, there are already mechanisms that automatically subject the online ordering of several suspicious materials to a closer examination. An example is the code of conduct for gene synthesis published by the International Association of Synthetic Biology in 2009. Fourth, it is often standard practice to modify existing research for one’s own purposes. However, specific research on modern biological weapons is of course top secret. But it is still possible to gather information from civilian dual-use literature, but this requires a higher degree of specialist expertise. Fifth, the actor would have to undertake potentially extensive testing and adjustments prior to deployment. Such tests can easily arouse suspicion in various ways. The author also describes that there is already an established community of so-called biohackers in many countries around the world. Determined nonstate actors might join such an often anonymous internet hobby community to act more effectively. 61

At the same time, of course, it is also possible that such a biohacker could lose control of a potentially dangerous agent as a result of an accident, since generally weaker standards of safety are observed in amateur labs. Liu’s six-year-old remarks must also be seen in the light of the fact that more advanced technologies are already available on the internet now. In the future, it will probably be even easier to circumvent the barriers as, for example, the aforementioned small flow reactors and CRISPR-Cas9 applications become widely marketable. 

All in all, synthetic or DNA-engineered biological weapons can potentially cause enormous damage, but a closer look reveals that, at least for nonstate actors, production is currently not as easy as it might seem. By 2030, however, some of the current barriers are expected to be significantly lower. Although it is possible to learn the fundamentals via internet courses, in most cases a solid academic education is needed to gain practical experience with the laboratory equipment. Compared to genetically modified agents, existing natural pathogens may pose an even greater danger, as slightly less experience is required to weaponize them. There is also more publicly available research and potential natural source sites for such pathogens. In 2014, for example, a Tunisian jihadist did not even attempt to produce complicated pathogens, but instead records were found on their laptop of how the causative pathogen of plague ( Yersinia pestis ) can be isolated from infected animals and subsequently weaponized. The chemist and physicist would presumably have had the theoretical prerequisites for creating his own strain, but it seems the costs were too high compared to the benefits. 62 He was caught without carrying out an attack.

It would also be relatively easy for nonstate actors to take advantage of a natural outbreak to infect themselves and then infect as many other people as possible. Breaking an imposed quarantine during a disease outbreak for political reasons could also be classified as terrorism, as people could be killed indirectly. Such intentions, as well as acting as a so-called superspreader, are entirely possible, as already described in the section on SARS-CoV-2. However, it is relatively difficult to deliberately infect oneself with a naturally occurring virus as the first carrier. Another comparatively simple biological weapon that could be used for attacks in the future is the mass breeding of insects. This can lead to effective attacks on crops, but as soon as the insects are to be used as vectors for diseases against humans, a greater effort might be required, although it might still be much less than that of producing a synthetic pathogen. The use of insectoid vectors proved to be very effective in the operations carried out by the Japanese during the Second World War. Other biological agents already used in the past, such as anthrax and ricin toxin, might also potentially be used in the future again. Currently, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention lists more than 20 dangerous bioterrorism agents, which they subdivided into three categories. 63

In addition, there is the danger of developments by state actors that could be misused for terrorist purposes by employees, fall into the hands of nonstate actors, be released as a result of an accident, and could be used intentionally or as part of a covert operation. The unconfirmed efforts of the People’s Republic of China operating a disguised dual-use bioweapons program are a cause for concern. 64 It is also very problematic that various states have not ratified international agreements and, in some cases, do not adhere to international standards, which could facilitate proliferation to potentially adversarial nonstate actors. The internet, and its global expansion, will continue to play a fundamental role in the future through legal and illegal orders, educational courses, and specialized biohacking communities, as well as the latest research and publicly accessible DNA/RNA databases.

With a prospective application in mind, a distinction must be made between how demanding it is to produce or obtain a specific biological weapon. As with chemical weapons, greater effectiveness goes mostly hand in hand with more difficult acquisition and are thus less likely to be used. This rough prediction may be obsolete by 2030, as technological advances lower the threshold for acquisition while increasing lethality. As emphasized in the introduction, it is important to note that various current and future biotechnological developments have the potential to limit and thus to a certain degree control transmissible biological weapons.

Current and Future Means  of Delivery for Biological Material

Due to the often-unstable nature of biological pathogens outside the laboratory, methods of dissemination are also important. In the following, current and conceivable methods by 2030 are examined in more detail. A whole range of bombs, including cluster bombs and balloon bombs, were developed for use with biological weapons at the beginning of the Cold War. Many of these developments were aimed at destroying enemy crops with plant pathogens. In the Second World War, Japan used, among other things, ceramic bombs filled with pathogens. While most chemical weapons can be stored for longer periods of time in their means of delivery and can be used relatively effectively by many methods, biological weapons usually require a much more cumbersome procedure. Due to the high impact energy of nonbraked bombs and missiles, successful dissemination of a biological agent is not likely. Parachuted bombs with a large-scale dispersal mechanism are more likely to succeed. However, anthrax spores are nevertheless known to survive dispersal by low-yield explosion, as found for example in the American E61, E120 or M143 cluster bomb submunitions developed in the 1960s. 65 However, a careful explosive delivery system for sophisticated bioweapons is very difficult for nonstate actors to achieve on their own. A civilian aircraft could be bought or rented for the drop of a bomb or cannister, but the overall cost of such a venture is very high compared to the possible outcome. 

Easy to control, maneuverable, low-cost UAVs with a comparatively high payload designed for the civilian market have become quite popular in the last decade and see regular combat operation, for example in the Ukraine war of 2022. In addition, camera technology is becoming smaller and smaller, batteries come with improved storage capacity, and small and lightweight flight controllers, accelerometers, and GPS (Global Positioning Systems) are becoming increasingly widespread. Thanks to mass production, mostly in the People’s Republic of China, models are now available in many price ranges and payload sizes. In the meantime, a large market has also established itself with do-it-yourself components with which mission-oriented UAVs can be built relatively easily. This can be done both as a fixed-wing aircraft and as a multicopter or helicopter. In recent years, a growing market has also emerged that specializes in professional applications and offers more expensive, but still affordable, products. In the United States alone, almost 750,000 commercial and recreational drones are currently registered. 66 At the same time, effective defense against these commercial UAVs remains a major challenge. In practice, it is also difficult to distinguish between registered and legal drone flights and potential attacks.

At an event organized by the Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies in 2011, some interesting points were made in relation to UAVs. For example, a simulation was mentioned in which 900g of weapons-grade anthrax would be released 100 meters above a large city. With appropriate winds, about 1.5 million people would be infected and tens of thousands would die despite strong containment measures. At the same event, the TAM-5 model aircraft was mentioned, which flew automatically for 39 hours in 2003 and traveled more than 3,000 km over the Atlantic. 67 Since 2009, more and more UAVs have been configured as multicopters. These models usually cannot fly as far or as long as fixed-wing aircraft, but they are more maneuverable and usually easier to operate. Modern remote-controlled aircraft can fly far faster than 500 km/h; modern quadrocopters far faster than 200 km/h. For professional applications, there are now drones with a payload of more than 100 kg. 68 In 2016, British prime minister David Cameron warned that UAVs could disperse radioactive material in massive quantities over cities. He is probably alluding to the wide availability of automated crop duster UAVs, which are in fact a low-effort, high-impact means of delivery for terrorists, especially when many people are crowded together in the open. Instead of radioactive material, however, chemical or biological material could be effectively disseminated. 69 State actors with access to professional technologies have resources to develop further technical solutions tailored to the agent. Manned aircraft for the deployment of CBRN material have been little considered by nonstate actors. In the past, Aum Shinrikyo tried to modify a Mil Mi-17 helicopter to spray toxic gas over Tokyo. 70 In 2001, an al-Qaeda terrorist traveled to the United States to possibly prepare an attack with a crop duster plane. 71

In addition to aerial deployment, CBRN material can also be deployed from the ground. The direct application of pathogens, as in the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, can be considered a ground-based attack. The same applies to attempts to deliberately transmit SARS-CoV-2 or other viruses to, e.g., door handles or from person to person. This category also includes assassinations with biological warfare agents.

A subcategory of biological warfare is entomological warfare. There are two fields of application, because insects can be used to act directly as weapons or to spread pathogens. But noninsectoid animals can also be used to deliberately spread pathogens. This type of warfare was first systematically studied and applied during the Second World War. Japan was particularly involved; the empire infected Chinese populations with plague-infected fleas and cholera-spreading flies. This mode of transmission proved catastrophically effective. Yellow rats were also bred in large numbers for use as vectors. 72 After the war, the Soviet Union, among others, researched ticks as vectors. According to their own statement, an automatic insect breeding facility was developed. 73 Such a facility was also planned in the United States, where mosquitoes and fleas were successfully tested as vectors and were dropped from airplanes. 74 But nonstate actors have also recognized the advantages of insects as biological weapons. For example, in 1989, after a letter from a group called “the Breeders” was found, “peculiar patterns of Mediterranean fruit fly infestation in southern California that year” were detected. 75 More recent cases have not been detected. In principle, it is easier to use insects as weapons than to successfully infect vectors with deadly diseases without endangering oneself. Major financial damage or famine due to crop shortfalls can be a consequence that is not directly fatal to humans.

As already indicated, the biological field is probably the most significant for the future. The possibilities of releasing and spreading a fully developed pathogen are very diverse and almost impossible to prevent. In jihadist circles, for example, one of the terrorists could be the first carrier, while other types of terrorists might want to harm a specific person or group of people. From poisoned water to public salad buffets, there are many methods. In the future, however, genetically manipulated or even synthetic bacteria, insects, or other animals will be particularly useful as vectors. Such animals can be bred or designed according to the requirements at hand (e.g., to reproduce and spread particularly quickly or to deliver the pathogen particularly effectively). Similarly, in the future it will often be difficult to distinguish manipulated animals from nonmanipulated animals. Thus, the origin of the outbreak can be concealed, which presents potential for a state attack disguised as a terrorist attack, or vice versa. 

Biological means of delivery of pathogens can already be prepared with the help of artificial hatcheries or programmed to reproduce themselves as quickly as possible. The latter might be a logistically more effective solution, although manual incubation requires less expertise in the field of molecular biology. In the future, modified organisms may be able to identify and attack certain people or groups of people on the basis of certain characteristics or infect them specifically with the transported pathogen. Similarly, carrier animals could be manipulated to feel comfortable in other climates or environments and attack the local population or displace native species. Climate change would accelerate such intentions. It is also possible that by 2030, technologies will exist that can artificially control insects or small animals, turning them into covert weapons. Currently, this already works with beetles. In this way, CBRN materials could be delivered unnoticed to a specific target without attracting attention. A pathogen that has a deliberately long delay to disease onset or death built in can be used to spread unobtrusively in humans or animals before it is detected. 

In addition to the ways of delivering biological material already discussed, there are other ways that can be used to contaminate soil, water, or plants. The perpetrator can either use one of the previously explained systems, such as an agricultural UAV. A simpler way is to distribute the agent personally in unguarded places. Biological agents such as anthrax are likely to contaminate soil permanently. The two best-known examples are Gruinard Island in Scotland and Vozrozhdeniya Island in what is now Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Both were partially contaminated by tests with Bacillus anthracis , the cause of anthrax; studies proved the extreme persistence of the biological weapon in soil during initial decontamination attempts. 76 To alert the public to the dangerous situation on the island, unknown perpetrators sent two packages of soil samples from Gruinard Island almost 40 years after the initial release of anthrax agent. One of the packages actually contained anthrax spores. 77 The island was then thoroughly decontaminated. The former Soviet biological weapons test site in the Aral Sea was also decontaminated in 2002 with funds from the United States, because many anthrax cultures were not sufficiently destroyed by the Soviets. Nevertheless, it is likely that live spores could still be found in unknown locations on the island. Yersinia pestis , known as plague, and smallpox virus have also been experimented with on the Soviet testing area but are not likely to have survived until today. 78

The deliberate poisoning of water, mostly of human drinking water, has been discussed many times in the past. In such a case, it is known as a point source. In fact, in 1972, two teenagers tried to poison Chicago’s drinking water with biological agents, but they did not come close to achieving their goal. 79

The deliberate poisoning of plants or livestock with biological agents is a very broad field of application that has been studied and partially applied since before the Second World War. In the past, Germany, France, Japan, Iraq, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union pursued such programs, sometimes on a large scale. 80 The means of delivery are either vectors or insects themselves, but the use of anticrop fungi and other transmissible plant diseases has also been successfully tested. Once applied to a plant, it then serves as both the means of delivery and the target of the weapon. As with soil contamination, there are theoretically multiple motivations for terrorists to engage in agro-terrorism. Agro-terrorism can often be closely linked to entomological warfare methods. For more information, see the section on animals as a means of delivery. Jonathan Ban of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute lists some motivations: 

Some actors may be motivated for the same reasons as other terrorist actions—to attract attention to a cause, incite fear, disrupt society, or demonstrate a capability with the intent of exacting political concessions. Other actors may be prompted by different motives—economic interest, sabotage, or revenge. 81  

He lists several cases in which crop poisoning was threatened or carried out. In the described cases, chemicals like mercury or cyanide were used for poisoning, but not self-transmitting biological weapons. Also, the alleged medfly attacks in California in 1989 had food production, in this case mass-produced fruits, as a target. 82 The Federation of American Scientists provides information on further incidents of biowarfare against agriculture: “In 1985 and 1988, Iraq conducted field tests of wheat cover smut to demonstrate its effectiveness as an anti-crop agent. Iraq also produced canisters designed to disperse the fungal agent over Iranian wheat fields. In Sri Lanka in the early 1980s, a group of Tamil separatists threatened to spread non-endemic plant diseases among rubber and tea plantations in a scheme to undermine the government.” 83

In the section on emerging technologies, the potential and current areas of application of nanotechnology in the CBRN sector have already been outlined. There is also a future field of application in the area of means of delivery. Future systems can use the bionic advantages of real living beings and combine them with the advantages of technical applications. Since only a few grams of various toxins or pathogens are often needed to have a lethal effect or to start an epidemic compared to current nuclear weapons, for example, nanorobots are also suitable for delivering the material. Also, camouflage as, for example, a mechanical rat or bird is possible to outsmart security measures of military premises or essential personnel. It is unlikely that nonstate actors will be able to build and operate such complex military high-tech means of delivery, but a dual-use application of such technologies is not impossible by 2030.

Fully autonomous vehicles are certainly part of the future of 2030. With autonomous UAVs, the damage of even low-quality CBRN weapons can be increased by automatically matching and selecting between multiple detected targets. Reprogramming requires IT skills, but these can also be obtained by terrorist groups. Deployed en masse, autonomous vehicles can carry out many different conceivable types of attacks and cause increased panic among the population, which is further exacerbated by the use of CBRN material. Autonomous drones can also target, for example, crowds of people with CBRN material, move on, and attack new identified targets. This saves CBRN material and makes the attack more effective, as even agricultural drones have a rather limited capacity when it comes to creating a deadly concentration of an agent in the air. 

Possible Actors

The last and final section provides an overview of possible actors up to the year 2030. Earlier in the article, China and its dual-use biotechnology activities were discussed in more detail. Of the potentially hostile state actors, however, North Korea must also be mentioned, whose possible bioweapons program is explained in two reports as well as the Russian Federation, about whose current bioweapons allegations there is also a detailed article. 84 In the case of both countries, however, there is no definitive evidence. On Iran and a possible bioweapons program, sources are comparatively sparse.

Starting with state actors that may have sophisticated and resource-i­ntensive capabilities to research, produce, and deploy biological weapons, it must never be forgotten that former state actors, like defectors or disloyal soldiers, may also get their hands on these biological weapons or sophisticated weapons get stolen or lost. In today’s world and the world of 2030, there are also pseudo-nonstate actors who ostensibly operate autonomously but are significantly supported by a state actor. In addition to economically, religiously, and politically motivated actors, there are also cults that stand out from other groups in the field of non-state actors, since their goal may well be the extermination of all human life without limitation. Other nonstate actor groups that could theoretically plan to use biological weapons by 2030 are ecoterrorists, extreme conspiracy theorists, cyberterrorists, internal staff, renegade scientists, or laboratory security personnel. The third major category is unintentional accidents in laboratories or accidents involving members of the biohacker community at home. For example, at least two accidents occurred in coronavirus laboratories in China in 2004, and the local outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the UK in 2007 was traced to a laboratory in Surrey. 85 The fourth category is incidents, outbreaks, and attacks of unknown origin, which is not unlikely in the context of possible hybrid warfare by 2030.

Conclusion and Overall Threat Potential

In conclusion, NATO forces will find themselves in an increasingly dangerous biological threat environment by 2030. Despite the diverse threat environment, the alliance must credibly ensure that it can continue to operate actively in the aftermath of biological weapons attacks. Despite the high potency of biological agents, the issue is often treated only half-heartedly in armed forces and often remains a secondary consideration in national security strategies, despite the COVID-19 pandemic as an illustrative example. This article shows that there are virtually no limits to future biological weapons. This type of weapon of mass destruction has the potential to fundamentally change the future of warfare. As Ainscough’s prognosis shows, this is not necessarily a new conclusion. The hypothesis is thus confirmed, although it is clear that forecasts for the future are always merely educated assumptions and that a large number of unknown factors play a decisive role in the real outcome.

It is very difficult to quantify the threat of future bioweapon attacks on a scientific basis. At the end of 2022, there is no concrete evidence that any actor is planning or threatening to use biological weapons in the near future. Nevertheless, the threat environment is evolving in a direction that fundamentally increases biological threats. Likewise, the progress of biotechnology will sooner or later lead to the development of limited transmissible bioweapons. So far, uncontrolled spread has deterred actors from using transmissible bioweapons. If, by 2030, it is possible to effectively limit biological weapons or make them nonlethal and endow pathogens with individual capabilities and attributes as designer pathogens, biowarfare could indeed establish itself as an alternative to traditional types of kinetic warfare in the future.

NATO forces must work closely together to develop effective counterstrategies and stay at the forefront of research to identify threats and develop effective countermeasures, as stated in the NATO 2030 agenda. Additionally, the U.S. Marine Corps should address biological threats more thoroughly. At the same time, the defensive nature and safe conduct of their own biological research must always be made clear at the international stage and a treaty structure adapted to the changed conditions of our time, in particular with the People’s Republic of China, must be sought diplomatically. It must be reliably ensured that, despite a lower barrier, the use of biological weapons will continue to elude the interest of any actors in the future.

For further research, the author recommends the development of effective counterstrategies to future biological weapons attacks and an outlook on what biotechnological advances potential adversaries could use to make their soldiers more capable and resilient in the future.

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• Published: 22 October 2001

Genomics and future biological weapons: the need for preventive action by the biomedical community

• Claire M. Fraser 1 &
• Malcolm R. Dando 2  

Nature Genetics volume  29 ,  pages 253–256 ( 2001 ) Cite this article

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There is an increasing concern within both the scientific and security communities that the ongoing revolution in biology has great potential to be misused in offensive biological weapons programs. In light of the 11 September tragedy, we can no longer afford to be complacent about the possibility of biological terrorism. Here we review the major relevant trends in genomics research and development, and discuss how these capabilities might be misused in the design of new bioweapons. We also discuss how the breakthroughs that have come from the genomics revolution may be used to enhance detection, protection and treatment so that biological warfare agents are never used.

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Biological Warfare and Prevention Methods Essay

Biological agents differ from nuclear, radiological, and chemical ones by the methods of influence on the human body and by the size of the expansion. Biological warfare, also called germ warfare, is one of the most known weapons of mass destruction. Germ warfare involves various toxins, bacteria, insects, or viruses and is used in order to kill humans or start a war. There are various ways of a biological attack, such as infecting people by the alimentary route or implementing infectious aerosols.

In my opinion, biological warfare is one of the most severe methods of starting a war or torturing enemies. Biological warfare is considered as one of the most demolishing weapons as it does not require any special skills to be used, is cost-effective, and difficult to disclose, but can target the entire population (Flora, 2019). From my point of view, the future perspectives or threats of using such an agent remain unpredictable. Military and scientific forces of no countries currently possess the needed knowledge, equipment, technologies to cultivate biological weapons that could harm the entire humanity or nation in short terms or produce the wanted impact. However, in the future, in the case of the development of such a weapon, the owner would be in a privileged position, and international conflicts would seem to become more brutal. Those weapons’ impact would still be unpredictable and could even lead to the extinction of humanity.

Nowadays, it is the era of microbiology, and countries possess huge amounts of scientific labs. Therefore, humans have the possibility to examine viruses, learn their impact on the body, and develop ways of protection. To my mind, none of us are ready to fight such biological agents, as seen in the current COVID-19 example. Therefore, new methods such as immunity-raising drugs, more qualified virologists, or high-reactionary systems require to be developed. However, people’s knowledge on that issue can be adapted to new situations as well.

Flora, S.J.S., Pachauri, V. (2019). Handbook on biological warfare preparedness . Academic Press.

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IvyPanda . 2022. "Biological Warfare and Prevention Methods." November 8, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/biological-warfare-and-prevention-methods/.

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Home — Essay Samples — Government & Politics — Weapons Of Mass Destruction — Chemical and Biological Warfare

Chemical and Biological Warfare

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• Miller Center. “George W. Bush - Administration.” Miller Center, 23 Feb. 2017
• History. “Bush Learns of Attack on World Trade Center.” History.com, A&E Television Networks, 16 Nov. 2009
• U.S. Department of Defense. “Bush: No Distinction Between Attackers and Those Who Harbor Them.” United States Department of Defense, 11 Sept. 2001
• Gallup. “Bush Job Approval Highest in Gallup History.” Gallup.com, 24 Sept. 2001
• Richelson, Jeffery. “Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 11 Feb. 2004
• The White House. “State of the Union Address 2002.” National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives and Records Administration, 29 Jan. 2002
• NY Times. “Timeline of Major Events in the Iraq War.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 31 Aug. 2010

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A Short History of Biological Warfare: From Pre-History to the 21st Century

By W. Seth Carus CSWMD Occasional Paper 12

Introduction

This is an overview, not a definitive history. Much about BW remains unknown, either because it is unknowable (due in some cases to the deliberate destruction of records) or because it is knowable only to some people (such as those who might have access to classified information) or because of the absence of academic research. 1 

This survey breaks the history of BW into three periods. The first section examines prehistory to 1900—the period before scientific advances proved that microorganisms were the cause of many diseases. Despite many claims to the contrary, resort to BW was exceedingly rare during this era. Readers interested only in BW’s modern history can skip this section. 

The second section looks at the years from 1900 through 1945. This period saw the emergence of state BW programs, the employment of biological weapons in both world wars, and the use of biological agents by nonstate actors, including criminals. This period witnessed the most significant resort to BW. It included the first organized state campaign to wage BW—sabotage operations organized by the German government during World War I. It also saw the most extensive use—the Japanese attacks in China. Almost all the known victims of BW were Chinese, mostly civilians, who were killed in these operations. This period also saw the initial efforts to control BW in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which essentially prohibited the first use of BW agents.

Finally, the third section, covering the period from 1945 to the present, focuses mostly on developments during the Cold War, including descriptions of state BW programs as well as known uses of biological agents by states, terrorists, and criminals. Despite the development of highly sophisticated techniques for dissemination of biological agents by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (the two countries with the largest and most advanced BW programs ever organized), most of the known programs were small and possessed only crude dissemination capabilities. The known uses were unsophisticated as well, essentially no more advanced than what the Germans did during World War I. This era also saw the negotiation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). 

This history focuses on those agents covered by the BWC, which prohibited weapons disseminating biological agents or toxins. Biological agents are replicating biological entities, such as bacteria. Toxins, poisons of biological origin, are similar to chemical warfare agents and also have been banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Definitional matters are discussed in more detail in appendix 2. 

Biological agents are referred to by their scientific name. Following scientific practice, the name is abbreviated after the first mention. Thus, Bacillus anthracis (commonly, but incorrectly, called anthrax), which causes several diseases (including cutaneous anthrax, inhalational anthrax, and gastrointestinal anthrax), is hereafter called B. anthracis . Those seeking additional information about specific diseases should refer to specialist works that describe them in more detail. 2  

Readers wishing more detailed information should look at the references cited in the notes. Appendix 1 also provides suggested readings.

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War, not a biological necessity

This particular essay, by the world reknown anthropologist, Margaret Mead, argues that warfare is not inevitable, nor systematically prevalent; that it is a human invention, not a biological imperative; and that it can one day disappear, just as trial by ordeal has disappeared, once these points become self-understood by society and once a better invention, sufficiently convincing and congruent to the point in time, is proposed to replace it.

Written in 1940, at the start of the second World War, it continues to this day to be discussed and argued in scientific journals and in universities.

This text had such influence that it led eminent scientists of different disciplines to draft in 1986, the Seville Statement on Violence , which concludes with the following statement, so close to Margaret Mead's message: "Just as 'wars begin in the minds of men', peace also begins in our minds. The same species who invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of us." [LINK]

This influence continued, with a growing movement to replace the culture of war with the culture of peace within the UN, and which resulted in the famous resolutions A/RES/53/25 and A/RES/53/243, voted by the United Nations respectively in Nov. 1998 and Oct. 1999, establishing a definition for " culture of peace ", a list of actions for member states and civil society, and the proclamation of the Decade for Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World (2001-2010).

The full text of this short essay is herewith:

IS WAR A BIOLOGICAL necessity, a sociological inevitability, or just a bad invention? Those who argue for the first view endow man with such pugnacious instincts that some outlet in aggressive behaviour is necessary if man is to reach full human stature. It was this point of view which lay brhind William James's famous essay, 'The Moral Equivalent of War', in which he tried to retain the warlike virtues and channel them in new directions. A similar point of view has lain behind the Soviet Union's attempt to make competition between groups rather than between individuals. A basic, competitive, aggressive, warring human nature is assumed, and those who wish to outlaw war or outlaw competitiveness merely try to find new and less socially destructive ways in which these biologically given aspects of man's nature can find expression. Then there are those who take the second view: warfare is the inevitable concomitant of the development of the state, the struggle for land and natural resources, of class societies springing not from the nature of man, but, from the nature of history. War is nevertheless inevitable unless we change our social system and outlaw classes, the struggle for power, and possessions; and in the event of our success warfare would disappear, as a symptom vanishes when the disease is cured One may hold a sort of compromise position between these two extremes; one may claim that all aggression springs from the frustration of man's biologically determined drives and that, since all forms of culture are frustrating, it is certain each new generation will be aggressive and the aggression will find its natural and inevitable expression in race war, class war, nationalistic war, and so on. All three of these positions are very popular today among those who think seriously about the problems of war and its possible prevention, but I wish to urge another point of view, less defeatist, perhaps, than the first and third and more accurate than the second: that is, that warfare, by which I mean recognised conflict between two groups as groups, in which each group puts an army (even if the army is only fifteen pygmies) into the field to fight and kill, if possible, some of the members of the army of the other group - that warfare of this sort is an invention like any other of the inventions in terms of which we order our lives, such as writing, marriage, cooking our food instead of eating it raw, trial by jury, or burial of the dead, and so on. Some of this list anyone will grant are inventions: trial by jury is confined to very limited portions of the globe; we know that there are tribes that do not bury their dead but instead expose or cremate them; and we know that only part of the human race has had the knowledge of writing as its cultural inheritance. But, whenever a way of doing things is found universally, such as the use of fire or the practice of some form of marriage, we tend to think at once that it is not an invention at all but an attribute of humanity itself. And yet even such universals as marriage and the use of fire are inventions like the rest, very basic ones, inventions which were, perhaps, necessary if human history was to take the turn that it has taken, but nevertheless inventions. At some point in his social development man was undoubtedly without the institution of marriage or the knowledge of the use of fire. THE CASE FOR warfare is much clearer because there are peoples even today who have no warfare. Of these the Eskimos are perhaps the most conspicuous examples, but the Lepchas of Sikkim described by Geoffrey Gorer in Himalayan Village are as good. Neither of these peoples understands war, not even defensive warfare. The idea of warfare is lacking, and this idea is as essential to really carrying on war as an alphabet or a syllabary is to writing. But, whereas the Lepchas are a gentle, unquarrelsome people, and the advocates of other points of view might argue that they are not full human beings or that they had never been frustrated and so had no aggression to expand in warfare, the Eskimo case gives no such possibility of interpretation. The Eskimos are not a mild and meek people; many of them are turbulent and troublesome. Fights, theft of wives, murder, cannibalism, occur among them--all outbursts of passionate men goaded by desire or intolerable circumstance. Here are men faced with hunger, men faced with loss of their wives, men faced with the threat of extermination by other men, and here are orphan children, growing up miserably with no one to care for them, mocked and neglected by those about them. The personality necessary for war, the circumstances necessary to goad men to desperation are present, but there is no war. When a travelling Eskimo entered a settlement, he might have to fight the strongest man in the settlement to establish his position among them, but this was a test of strength and bravery, not war. The idea of warfare, of one group organising against another group to maim and wound and kill them was absent. And, without that idea, passions might rage but there was no war. But, it may be argued, is not this because the Eskimos have such a low and undeveloped form of social organisation? They own no land, they move from place to place, camping, it is true, season after season on the same site, but this is not something to fight for as the modern nations of the world fight for land and raw materials. They have no permanent possessions that can be looted, no towns that can be burned. They have no social classes to produce stress and strains within the society which might force it to go to war outside. Does not the absence of war among the Eskimos, while disproving the biological necessity of war, just go to confirm the point that it is the state of development of the society which accounts for war and nothing else? We find the answer among the pygmy peoples of the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal. The Andamans also represent an exceedingly low level of society; they are a hunting and food-gathering people; they live in tiny hordes without any class stratification; their houses are simpler than the snow houses of the Eskimo. But they knew about warfare. The army might contain only fifteen determined pygmies marching in a straight line, but it was the real thing none the less. Tiny army met tiny army in open battle, blows were exchanged, casualties suffered, and the state of warfare could only be concluded by a peacemaking ceremony. Similarly, among the Australian aborigines, who built no permanent dwellings but wandered from water hole to water hole over their almost desert country, warfare - and rules of 'international law' - were highly developed. The student of social evolution will seek in vain for his obvious causes of war, struggle for lands, struggle for power of one group over another, expansion of population, need to divert the minds of a populace restive under tyranny, or even the ambition of a successful leader to enhance his own prestige. All are absent, but warfare as a practice remained, and men engaged in it and killed one another in the course of a war because killing is what is done in wars. From instances like these it becomes apparent that an inquiry into the causes of war misses the fundamental point as completely as does an insistence upon the biological necessity of war. If a people have an idea of going to war and the idea that war is the way in which certain situations, defined within their society, are to be handled, they will sometimes go to war. If they are a mild and unaggressive people, like the Pueblo Indians, they may limit themselves to defensive warfare, but they will be forced to think in terms of war because there are peoples near them who have warfare as a pattern, and offensive, raiding, pillaging warfare at that. When the pattern of warfare is known, people like the Pueblo Indians will defend themselves, taking advantage of their natural defences, the mesa village site, and people like the Lepchas, having no natural defences and no idea of warfare, will merely submit to the invader. But the essential point remains the same. There is a way of behaving which is known to a given people and labelled as an appropriate form of behaviour; a bold and warlike people like the Sioux or the Maori may label warfare as desirable as well as possible, a mild people like the Pueblo Indians may label warfare as undesirable, but to the minds of both peoples the possibility of warfare is present. Their thoughts, their hopes, their plans are oriented about this idea--that warfare may be selected as the way to meet some situation. SO SIMPLE peoples and civilised peoples, mild peoples and violent, assertive peoples, will all go to war if they have the invention, just as those peoples who have the custom of duelling will have duels and peoples who have the pattern of vendetta will indulge in vendetta. And, conversely, peoples who do not know of duelling will not fight duels, even though their wives are seduced and their daughters ravished; they may on occasion commit murder but they will not fight duels. Cultures which lack the idea of the vendetta will not meet every quarrel in this way. A people can use only the forms it has. So the Balinese have their special way of dealing with a quarrel between two individuals: if the two feel that the causes of quarrel are heavy, they may go and register their quarrel in the temple before the gods, and, making offerings, they may swear never to have anything to do with each other again.... But in other societies, although individuals might feel as full of animosity and as unwilling to have any further contact as do the Balinese, they cannot register their quarrel with the gods and go on quietly about their business because registering quarrels with the gods is not an invention of which they know. Yet, if it be granted that warfare is, after all, an invention, it may nevertheless be an invention that lends itself to certain types of personality, to the exigent needs of autocrats, to the expansionist desires of crowded peoples, to the desire for plunder and rape and loot which is engendered by a dull and frustrating life. What, then, can we say of this congruence between warfare and its uses? If it is a form which fits so well, is not this congruence the essential point? But even here the primitive material causes us to wonder, because there are tribes who go to war merely for glory, having no quarrel with the enemy, suffering from no tyrant within their boundaries, anxious neither for land nor loot nor women, but merely anxious to win prestige which within that tribe has been declared obtainable only by war and without which no young man can hope to win his sweetheart's smile of approval. But if, as was the case with the Bush Negroes of Dutch Guiana, it is artistic ability which is necessary to win a girl's approval, the same young man would have to be carving rather than going out on a war party. In many parts of the world, war is a game in which the individual can win counters - counters which bring him prestige in the eyes of his own sex or of the opposite sex; he plays for these counters as he might, in our society, strive for a tennis championship. Warfare is a frame for such prestige-seeking merely because it calls for the display of certain skills and certain virtues; all of these skills - riding straight, shooting straight, dodging the missiles of the enemy and sending one's own straight to the mark - can be equally well exercised in some other framework and, equally, the virtues endurance, bravery, loyalty, steadfastness - can be displayed in other contexts. The tie-up between proving oneself a man and proving this by a success in organised killing is due to a definition which many societies have made of manliness. And often, even in those societies which counted success in warfare a proof of human worth, strange turns were given to the idea, as when the plains Indians gave their highest awards to the man who touched a live enemy rather than to the man who brought in a scalp--from a dead enemy - because the latter was less risky. Warfare is just an invention known to the majority of human societies by which they permit their young men either to accumulate prestige or avenge their honour or acquire loot or wives or slaves or grab lands or cattle or appease the blood lust of their gods or the restless souls of the recently dead. It is just an invention, older and more widespread than the jury system, but none the less an invention But, once we have said this, have we said anything at all? Despite a few stances, dear to the instances of controversialist, of the loss of the useful arts, once an invention is made which proves congruent with human needs or social forms, it tends to persist. Grant that war is an invention, that it is not a biological necessity nor the outcome of certain special types of social forms, still once the invention is made, what are we to do about it? The Indian who had been subsisting on the buffalo for generations because with his primitive weapons he could slaughter only a limited number of buffalo did not return to his primitive weapons when he saw that the white man’s more efficient weapons were exterminating the buffalo. A desire for the white man’s cloth may mortgage the South Sea Islander to the white man’s plantation, but he does not return to making bark cloth, which would have left him free. Once an invention is known and accepted, men do not easily relinquish it. The skilled workers may smash the first steam looms which they feel are to be their undoing, but they accept them in the end, and no movement which has insisted upon the mere abandonment of usable inventions has ever had much success. Warfare is here, as part of our thought; the deeds of warriors are immortalised in the words of our poets, the toys of our children are modelled upon the weapons of the soldier, the frame of reference within which our statesmen and our diplomats work always contains war. If we know that it is not inevitable, that it is due to historical accident that warfare is one of the ways in which we think of behaving, are we given any hope by that? What hope is there of persuading nations to abandon war, nations so thoroughly imbued with the idea that resort to war is, if not actually desirable and noble, at least inevitable whenever certain defined circumstances arise? In answer to this question I think we might turn to the history of other social inventions, and inventions which must once have seemed as finally entrenched as warfare. Take the methods of trial which preceded the jury system: ordeal and trial by combat. Unfair, capricious, alien as they are to our feeling today, they were once the only methods open to individuals accused of some offense. The invention of trial by jury gradually replaced these methods until only witches, and finally not even witches, had to resort to the ordeal. And for a long time the jury system seemed the best and finest method of settling legal disputes, but today new inventions, trial before judges only or before commissions, are replacing the jury system. In each case the old method was replaced by a new social invention. The ordeal did not go out because people thought it unjust or wrong; it went out because a method more congruent with the institutions and feelings of the period was invented. And, if we despair over the way in which war seems such an ingrained habit of most of the human race, we can take comfort from the fact that a poor invention will usually give place to a better invention. For this, two conditions, at least, are necessary. The people must recognise the defects of the old invention, and someone must make a new one. Propaganda against warfare, documentation of its terrible cost in human suffering and social waste, these prepare the ground by teaching people to feel that warfare is a defective social institution. There is further needed a belief that social invention is possible and the invention of new methods which will render warfare as out of date as the tractor is making the plough, or the motor car the horse and buggy. A form of behaviour becomes out of date only when something else takes its place, and, in order to invent forms of behaviour which will make war obsolete, it is a first requirement to believe that an invention is possible. Reprinted from

Margaret Mead, ‘Warfare is only an invention - not a biological necessity’ ASIA, XL (1940).

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Biological Warfare

Updated 13 July 2022

Subject Politics

Downloads 28

Category Culture ,  Government

Topic Bioterrorism ,  Policy ,  Society ,  Western Culture

Many people in western culture are terrified of the concept of biological weapons because it has the ability to wipe out whole populations. The biological agent used in this sense may be anything from a viable microorganism to a potent byproduct of the organism's metabolic processes. The ability of biological agents to harm vast populations and when used in small quantity demonstrates the lethality of biological warfare. For a long time, the world has been aware of its ability and has attempted to develop strategies that would safeguard the human race in the event of a biological weapons attack. However, I am of the opinion that the policies in place are not sufficient and the world would struggle to deal with any form of biological warfare. Infectious diseases have played a significant role in shaping the history of the world. Outbreaks of such diseases are a threat to people around the world. While most of the outbreaks referred to are natural, malicious individuals may interfere with nature and influence disease spread. This is the basis of using infectious agents as weapons against other human beings. Of particular concern, in this context, is the manipulation of infectious agents that are new or relatively unmown. This increases the lethal nature of biological warfare since immediate response would not be possible. The argument that the world is not ready to tackle biological warfare is based on a couple of factors surrounding the nature of biological weapons and government policy. If a part of the world were to be attacked, we would be virtually helpless. The first argument, in this case, is that there are not enough measures restricting the production of biological weapons and ensuring that the general public is protected from such threats. Hylton explains how a senior member of the US department of security was able to access the White House with a weaponized powder of an anthrax-like bacterium known as Bacillus globigii (n.p.). This happened weeks after the 9/11 attacks when everyone was on high alert. The author of the newspaper article argues that guards at the White House who performed a thorough check on the General were looking for the wrong things. This poses a serious problem in dealing with biological weapons since even a commonplace object such as a doorknob or even a handshake can transform into poison. Biological warfare is dependent on a variety of factors which include the agent used, the degree of weaponization, the amount realized, and the method of delivery (Hylton). An individual with the technical skills and a good laboratory can work around these variables and produce a potent weapon. Material threats with regards to biological agents include Ebola virus, anthrax, and plague. There is a growing threat that terrorists will resort to such weapons in the near future. According to a task-force report cited in the newspaper article, the United States cannot “rapidly recognize, respond, and recover from a biological attack.” This is a damning state of affairs especially considering the US is the world’s strongest nation. The second argument, with regard to biological warfare, is that global policies on the topic are weak thus limiting the world’s ability to deal with biological warfare. The “Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention” (BWTC) prohibited signatories from using biological weapons. The BWTC is binding to 170 countries which agreed to stop research in biological weapons. However, the BWTC lacks inspection mechanisms. A country can easily hide a biological weapons program within infrastructure dealing with biotechnology. The convention does not specify which biological agents are prohibited which leads to a level of ambiguity (Jansen, Breeveld, Stijnis, and Grobusch 489). The weaknesses of the convention mean that a country can research biological weapons under the radar which makes the world a less safe place with regard to biological warfare. The third argument concerning global readiness in the case of biological warfare is the dismal response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa a few years ago. The world has no system to deal with disease outbreaks and epidemics (Bill Gates). The fatalities due to the outbreak could have been much lower if there could have been a rapid response team of experts to mitigate the spread of the disease. Bill Gates argues that the fact that Ebola is not airborne limited its spread across the world. This wouldn’t be the case with a weaponized, airborne pathogen. If the 1918 Spanish Flu epidemic were to happen today, Gates argues that more than 30 million people would die. This illustrates how lethal a biological weapon using a potent airborne agent. If the world’s nations were to come together and form a team of experts to respond to such situations, we should be ready and prepared to deal with any biological attack. The three sources used in this paper approach the issue of biological warfare from different angles. While the newspaper article reviews developments in the United States, the journal article and Ted talk adopt a more global perspective. Besides the different levels of formality, all sources explain the state of affairs regarding biological warfare in the modern world. Bill Gates goes a step forward and proposes how government authorities around the world could be more prepared to deal with disease outbreaks and biological attacks. All sources agree that much has to be done to deal with biological warfare more comprehensively. It is, therefore, up to global leaders to prioritize biological welfare in their defense budgets to prevent any calamities in the future. Works CitedGates, Bill. “The Next Outbreak? We’re Not Ready.” TED 2015. [Video]. Hylton, Wil S. “How Ready Are We for Bioterrorism?” The New York Times Magazine. 26 Oct. 2011. Web. 9 Nov. 2017. Jansen, H.J., F.J. Breeveld, C. Stijnis, and M.P. Grobusch. “Biological Warfare, Bioterrorism, and Biocrime.” Clinical Microbiology and Infection, 20.6 (2014): 488-496.

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The biological weapons threats and coping strategies for health promotion

Seyyed-javad hosseini-shokouh.

Infectious Disease Research Center and Department of Infectious and Tropical Diseases, Faculty of Medicine, AJA University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran

Rahim Ali Sheikhi

1 Community-oriented Nursing Midwifery Research Center, Shahrekord University of Medical Sciences, Shahrekord, Iran

Seyed Mohammad Reza Hosseini

2 Department of Emergency Nursing, School of Nursing and Midwifery Birjand University of Medical Sciences, Birjand, Iran

Parisa Moradimajd

3 Department of Anesthesia, Faculty of Allied Medical Sciences, Iran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran

The biotechnology revolution and the emergence of new ways to change the genetic material of an organism have led to an increased risk of biological wars. Coping strategies against these threats is very important to improve the health of people. Therefore, due to the importance of this issue, this study is aimed to review the scope of using biotechnology and genetic engineering in wars and coping strategies in all over the world. In this review study, database includes of PubMed, Web of Science, Google Scholar, Scopus, and Science Direct were searched. The search was limited to reviewed articles in English published between 1990 and 2020. The primary search results generated 148 relevant references. After eliminating the duplicates and articles which were not related to the review of the abstract, 11 references were identified for inclusion in this review. Based on the results of these studies, the advances in genetic engineering can lead to the development of new weapons for other types of conflict and war scenarios, secret operations, and sabotage activities. Rapid developments in biotechnology and genetics have created environmental, ethical, political, and social challenges for many communities. Increasing awareness and sensitivity, monitoring, and building capacity for effective coping are essential. Biotechnology areas that will probably significantly contribute to countering biological weapons include recognizing the human genome, strengthening the immune system, identifying bacteria and viruses' genome, equipment for biological identification, new vaccines, new antibiotics, and anti-viral drugs must be monitored.

Introduction

Today, biological threats make a great problem in all over the world.[ 1 ] From I ancient times, many methods used to kill or disability the enemies, i.e., some soldiers poisoned their arrowheads and water wells with natural materials.[ 1 , 2 ] In recent years term of genetic engineering is frequently used. Genetic engineering is human involvement in the process of gene transfer between biological organisms.[ 3 , 4 ] In the context of biological wars or bio-terrorism, it aims to manipulate the gene to create new pathogenic properties such as increased survival, infection, pathogenicity, resistance to drugs, etc.[ 4 ]

Although with advances in biology and biotechnology, it is expected to change the lifestyle of societies in this century, in parallel, with the misuse of biotechnology knowledge, it can lead to the generation of biological weapons using genetic engineering and threats caused by it. Today, the simulation and design of genes become routine news topics, many articles about biological warfare and bioterrorism caused by genetic manipulations are written and published.[ 5 ] The reality is that the new generation of biological weapons will create unpredictable positions using genetic engineering and pathogens generated by genetic engineering may form the next generation of biological warfare agents.[ 6 ]

Based on available evidence, some countries are working on biological warfare factors through genetic engineering.[ 7 , 8 ] The development of modern biotechnology in medical and pharmaceutical research has led to the availability of knowledge and facilities all over the world.[ 9 , 10 ] Furthermore, classic biological factors can be produced even with the simplest genetic methods. The use of modern biotechnology has made it possible to create completely new and unknown biological weapons that, for technical or ethical reasons, may be used more than classic biological warfare agents.[ 11 , 12 ]

The spread of terrorist attacks and biological threats worldwide has made it necessary to recognize and prepare to face these events. Therefore, in this article, we have tried to investigate the new use of biological weapons made by genetic engineering and coping strategies to improve health of people.

Materials and Methods

In this systematic review article, we searched articles published in journals and available databases and libraries from 1990 to 2020 for this overview. Five selected popular databases that have more related articles such as PubMed, Web of Science, Google Scholar, Scopus, and Science Direct were searched with certain keywords include biological weapons, biological threats, biological disaster, biological emergencies, coping strategies, genetic engineering, and challenge. Included criteria were published with the English language on 1990–2020. Exclusion criteria were not available full text and not related to this topic. After conducting a comprehensive search for the relevant articles with our topic, the reference lists of the retrieved articles were searched for pinpointing the relevant documents. Finally, the EndNote software version X10 was used to manage the search library, screen duplications, and extract irrelevant articles. The searching strategy of PubMed was used as a model for searching other databases showed in Box 1 .

PubMed search strategy

The primary search generated 158 relevant references. After eliminating duplicates, 101 articles remained. Then, 71 references not meeting inclusion criteria were excluded after further review and 30 articles included to studies. However, at the end among the papers, 11 articles were included in the study [ Figure 1 ]. Based on the content analysis category and subcategory extract from selected articles. Selected references are mentioned in Table 1 .

Flow chart of manuscript selection process PRISMA 2009

Characteristics of selected studies

GEM=Genetic engineering microorganisms, TWC=Taylor woodrow construction, BTWC=Biologic taylor woodrow construction

Data extraction and analysis

A descriptive and content analysis was used for analyzing the data because quantitative meta-analysis was not possible due to the heterogeneity of the results and the number of repeated or nonindependent samples. The primary synthesis of the studies was conducted separately for each of the included article formats. Then, descriptive and thematic analysis was performed for the included articles and literature reviews. Extracted the data from the included studies were checked by two authors for improving accuracy. Finally, ten themes were extracted from the studies [ Figure 2 ].

Coping strategies against biological threats

Understanding the human genetic structure

The human genome identification project has a profound impact on the speed of molecular biology research and helps solve the most mysterious and complex life processes.[ 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 ] Advances in biotechnology with the analysis of events that occur after infection with a pathogenic agent or the absorption of a toxic molecule in human body cells can clarify the conditions that cause the person to develop infectious diseases.[ 13 , 24 , 25 ] At present, the function of nearly half of the human genes is unknown.[ 22 , 24 ] The genomic studies, with the clarification of our unknown genes, will design new strategies for the prevention and treatment of microbial diseases based on created of vaccines and antimicrobial drugs.[ 5 ] Although there are reports of using biological agents to target specific ethnic groups.[ 5 , 6 ] According to theoretical opinion, ethnic cleansing is possible. However, most experts are uncertain about this possibility.[ 13 , 14 , 24 , 25 ] For the definition of racial groups, recognizing the sequence of the human genome has not yet created a genetic map. Various studies have shown that genetic variation in human populations is low in comparison to other species. Furthermore, there is more diversity within groups than between ethnic groups.[ 26 , 27 ]

Identification of the genomes of viruses and bacteria

The identification of microorganism's genome will determine pathogen characteristics such as pathogenicity or resistance to antibiotics.[ 28 , 29 , 30 ] By identifying microorganisms such as bacteria genomes, can modified them to produce biocontrols against the pathogen.[ 21 ] For example, E-coli can be used to produce commercial amounts of interferon, a natural protein with antiviral activity. On the other hand, it can create a genetically engineered bacterium that produces anti-pathogenic bioregulator agents.[ 21 , 22 ] Despite many benefits after identification viruses' genome, there are concerns about the production of secret viruses that are located only on specific genes. These secret viruses then activated by a stimulus and create a pre-designed disease or cause the programmed cell death.[ 23 , 24 ]

Global rules about bioterrorism

In many declarations and international conventions, using of biological agents on the battlefields has been banned. However, the unwritten rule of war may not follow these threats.[ 16 , 31 , 32 ] For example, several countries of signers, the Biologic Weapons Convention, such as Iraq (1972), have participated in illegal activities announced by the Convention. These events indicate the ineffectiveness of this convention as the only way to eliminate biological weapons and prevent them from spreading.[ 15 , 31 , 32 , 33 ]

Today, access to highly hazardous agents is increasingly restricted. For instance, smallpox, which was eradicated >20 years ago, is officially stored only in two high-security laboratories in the United States and Russia and it's now impossible to obtain the virus.[ 17 , 18 , 34 , 35 ] However, the rapid development of molecular biology provides possible to synthesize new compounds of this virus in the laboratory. For example, a research team at New York State University conducted a chemical synthesis of synthetic poliovirus. They were able to rebuild a complete virus using a genetic sequence of the virus that available online.[ 18 , 35 ] In fact, this method can be used to produce similar viruses that have a short DNA sequence. However, it should be noted that this method is complicated and only a few trained experts are likely to be able to do this.[ 16 , 17 , 34 ]

It seems that the most effective prevention of using such weapons is the fear of revenge and reciprocal use of similar methods. During the Gulf War, it is believed that Iraq was denied the use of chemicals in the war due to fear of retaliation.[ 15 , 31 , 32 , 33 ] However, this issue cannot always be honest, particularly nonstate terrorists cannot be easily prevented from committing these acts because biotechnology by using limited facilities create mass casualties.[ 30 ] However, the probability of terrorists with use biological agents made by genetic engineering is very low, but if an event occurs, its effects will be very obvious.[ 16 , 32 ]

Overview on biological threats and attacks

This despite the fact that molecular biology and genetic engineering are still at the beginning and more technical facilities will be created for military exploitation in the coming years.[ 5 , 6 ] Although the gene synthesis process was difficult and lengthy in the past, now, with the development of biotechnology, it is flourishing.[ 15 , 16 , 31 , 32 , 33 ] Today, quick and inexpensive methods have replaced the old.[ 17 , 18 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 ] The ability of attached specific viruses to the genome of specific populations at the desired time or to produce specific pathogens for specific groups clearly indicates the disturbing potential of the genetic engineering applied to the production of biological weapons.[ 5 , 6 ] There are also growing concerns about the incorrect use of biotechnology in agriculture and the misuse of genetic identity information of particular plant or human populations and manipulation of their safety systems. These processes can consider as bioterrorism attacks.[ 24 ] Genetic variation in human species is also a limited possibility to isolate small groups with exclusive genetic characteristics. In contrast, the genetic variation between plants and some animals can turn the food and agriculture industry into a simple and vulnerable target against biological attacks.[ 26 ]

Biological wars and bioterrorism are multifaceted problems that requiring hybrid solutions.[ 19 , 39 ] To solve bioterrorism problems that are constantly evolving, we must use the ideas of the best researchers and experts. Fortunately, similar advances in gene biotechnology that used to create biological weapons can be used to counter them. Probably, these areas of biotechnology will make a significant contribution.[ 20 , 39 ] However these weapons, in addition to will be really destructive, the possibility of their detection, prevention, and treatment have extraordinary challenges for many scientists.[ 23 ]

Preparedness for new biological agents

The genetic variation of classical pathogens is just a small fraction that new biomedical techniques have created. Based on military view, another very worrying problem is the creation of new types of biological weapons that there is no prior knowledge about them and as nonlethal instruments and not used in classical wars.[ 19 , 37 , 38 , 39 ] On the other hand, ignoring the global norms against biological weapons defined in Geneva today's technical facilities is creating a new challenge in this field that may lead to a new biological weapons race.[ 19 , 39 ]

One of the notable issues is using biotechnology to develop microorganisms that destroy substances. The idea is based on the fact that natural microorganisms are capable of breaking down any material, including plastics, rubber, metals, and chemicals.[ 20 , 39 ] This ability is now used to eliminate environmental contamination. Although this process is very slow and incomplete, it is possible to expand the performance of these organisms with genetic engineering to the degree that is sufficiently effective as biological weapons.[ 37 , 38 ] One of these genetically engineered germs can destroy military colors in 72 h and facilitate the destruction and degradation of aircraft by destroying their colors and coating.[ 19 , 20 , 39 ] Another similar study is the American effort to identify microorganisms that can destroy narcotics producer plants.[ 20 , 39 ]

Enhancing immunity system

The complete identification of the human genome sequence is an important issue for better identification and strengthening of the human body's immune system.[ 7 ] Furthermore, this process provides great potential and capability for coping with biological wars.[ 20 ] Based on the studies, research on mechanisms to strengthen the immune system has led to the identification of ways to protect humans against anthrax.[ 7 , 8 ]

Gene database: Advantage and disadvantage

In the past, limit access to pathogens was one of the ways to combat bioterrorism. But with the advance of DNA synthesis technology, just limiting access to dangerous pathogens does not lead to security.[ 28 , 29 , 30 ] Since the gene sequence is a plan, it can be synthesized without using the samples in the culture medium or stored DNA. Therefore, terrorists will not be able to build a genetic map without access to them.[ 27 ] It seems that limiting access to genomic databases can solve an important part of this problem. In fact, gene databases as one of the fundamental tools for researchers.[ 29 , 30 , 40 ]

The recent advances in gene sequencing are heavily protected and kept secret by governments in the gene databases.[ 15 , 31 , 33 , 40 ] However since medical science is widely published in the electronic and online database, gene sequencing data and DNA synthesis in some cases (such as smallpox, botulism, and anthrax) are published by and are available now in internet databases for free and unlimited.[ 27 , 28 ] This information can be used to simulate some microorganisms. For example, the Spanish influenza virus was spread in 1918, synthesized by a research team in 2000 and its genetic information has been published and easily accessible.[ 29 ]

Equipment and methods for the detection of biological agents

Regardless of whether microorganisms have been created through genetic engineering or not, scientists need to continuously advanced, rapid and automatic diagnostic tools for biologic agents.[ 5 , 6 , 7 ] According to comparing genomes with using DNA, which has already been possible, DNA microprocessors have been designed can identify the bacterial and viral genomes of the most important pathogens in humans.[ 6 , 41 ] This detector can identify genetic compositions of biological agents contain genes or plasmids such as antibiotic resistance or an artificial organism made from single genes.[ 41 ] Current detection methods can greatly reduce with using biosensors that have the ability to identify a biological factor in a quick and accurate manner.[ 6 ]

Be consider that today anyone with basic training can widely use ready-made and available kits to change the sequence of a gene or the displacement of genes in a microorganism. It can also spread viruses and microorganisms, providing small and disposable bioreactors.[ 29 ] The continuity of such progress equipment and methods for the detection of biological agents could reduce barriers to the development of biological weapons.

New vaccines

Vaccines stimulate the immune system to build antibodies against certain pathogens.[ 26 , 27 ] The availability of genetic sequences for many pathogens has led to the production of new vaccines against microorganisms.[ 28 , 29 , 30 ] Genetic engineering researchers are trying to create vaccines that stimulate the immune system against various diseases.[ 42 , 43 ] By using different antigens in a vaccine, a broad spectrum of immunity can be created. Although these methods have not yet been successful, recognition of antigens that are known base on the genetic sequence of pathogens is very valuable.[ 43 ]

Antibiotic and antiviral drugs based on genes' configuration and proteomic analysis

Progress in recognizing of the microbial genome has created great hope for the design of antimicrobial drugs.[ 4 , 5 ] Current antibiotics target three stages, such as replication, protein synthesis, and cell wall synthesis in germs.[ 4 ] The discovery of the codes of germ genes has made it possible to identify the viral proteins of the microbes and target them with broad-spectrum antimicrobial agents.[ 6 ] After the golden age of antibacterial drug production, decoding of viruses genome has now opened the way for the production of a new group of antiviral drugs by recognizing the pathogenicity and vulnerability of viral replication.[ 5 , 6 ]

Research on genes' configuration and proteomic analysis has led to the disclosure of a range of genes that are effective in pathogenesis and antibiotic resistance. Furthermore, it can speed up the misuse of genomic data. Some companies have developed methods in which break down genes into smaller pieces and create similar genes with new properties.[ 25 ] This technique will speed up the production of recombinant products up to twenty times faster. Although these methods are developed for industrial applications, they may be exploited.[ 13 , 25 ] Some scientists believe that the availability of human genetic sequencing will facilitate the development of biological weapons targeting specific ethnic groups. Although it seems very unlikely at the moment.[ 14 ] Although genetic predisposition to certain infectious diseases is a well-known issue, genetic coding is not the only determinant of susceptibility to the disease.[ 14 , 25 ]

Based on the results from the review 11 article, we understand that biological weapon threat is old but ignored with many countries. The new vaccine, gene database, enhancing the immunity system, and other coping strategy is improving, but they have not yet reached the desired level. The advances in biotechnology knowledge allow the manipulation of microorganisms and the production of microbial agents with new features such as antibiotic resistance, change their antigenic characteristics and transmission of pathogenicity of microorganisms between agents.[ 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ] Based on the results of some studies, manipulation of the classical elements of biological warfare makes it more difficult to isolate, identify, and cure factors and make them more suitable for military purposes.[ 5 , 6 ]

It is important to think about what will happen in the coming decades and when this revolution and genetic engineering development will spread globally. Today, concerning the creation of certain types of biological and mass murder weapons has been a global challenge.[ 22 ] Based on this review, concerns about biological threats and weapons are aggravated by the fact that the production of biological weapons is easy. Its raw materials, such as viral and bacterial plasmids, can easily be obtained from the scientists or their storage institutions. Then the release of genetic sequencing germs, makes it easy for the identification of genes that contribute to disease severity, adhesion to the host cell, immune response, and drug resistance.[ 11 , 12 ] Identifying the sequencing of pathogens genome can be a major contributor to the control and treatment of these diseases and can be exploited in the development of biological weapons.[ 11 , 12 ] We resulted from the initial search, that publication of genetic variation in human populations is low. Many countries in laboratories work on this variation for beneficial aim, but poor publication is accessible.[ 26 , 27 ]

At present, all military and civilian populations are exposed to biological weapons all over the world. Therefore, preparedness for responding to the biological agent's epidemic and genetic engineering is essential.[ 16 , 17 , 34 ] Nowadays, the use of genetic engineering in the future of biological weapons is not just a theoretical possibility.[ 31 ] On the contrary, it should be considered that any natural pathogens not appropriate for biological wars. Such factors include produced in large quantities, quick to operate, have good environmental compatibility, the resulting disease treated by the user and manufacturer of such weapons has a vaccine and the possibility of protecting insider soldiers.[ 32 ] These reasons explain why only a minority of natural pathogens are suitable for military purposes. In these cases, anthrax is the first choice to meet almost all of these factors. Based on specific characteristics of smallpox, such as very infectious and deadly and no effective treatment, this virus is an ideal biological weapon, especially for terrorist groups.[ 17 ]

Indeed, we can say that biological engineering and manipulation genomes have advantages and disadvantages. Advantage such as the production of antibiotics and antiviral drugs based on genes' configuration and proteomic analysis, new vaccines, and enhancing immunity system can create a great revolution in the promotion of human health.

Based on the results of Jefferson et al's study in 2014, scientists need to continuously advanced, rapid, and automatic diagnostic tools for biologic agents.[ 5 ] This progress is very useful for people, but such advanced equipment and methods could reduce barriers to the development of biological weapons. Therefore, close global monitoring on these actions, is a necessary need in all over the world.

In all over the words, the gene database is challenging issues in recent years. Miller and colleagues mentioned in your research that recent advances in gene sequencing are protected and kept secret by governments in the gene databases.[ 40 ] Gene database is almost a secret resource and dose not let public access to this information. On the other hand, the publication of gene sequencing can be used to simulate some microorganisms that maybe had advantages and disadvantages effects on human life.

According to our search, few studies have examined strategies to coping with biological threats. One of the strengths of this study is the comprehensive review of all materials published around the world. However, due to the security issue of biological threats and events, many countries and research institutes do not publish their information and experiences and do not share them with other people. Therefore, this issue can be considered as a limitation for this study. It is suggested to conduct quantitative and qualitative studies with a large sample size and a survey of experts in this field.

The biotechnology areas that will probably significantly contribute to countering biological weapons include recognizing the human genome, strengthening the immune system, identifying bacteria and viruses' genome, equipment for biological identification, new vaccines, new antibiotics, and anti-viral drugs must be monitored. Companies need to obtain special licenses and permissions to enter the synthetic genes market must adhere to ethics and safety. Furthermore, customers of this technology and its products should be monitored.

Financial support and sponsorship

Conflicts of interest.

There are no conflicts of interest.

Acknowledgment

This paper is a result of Joint work between AJA University of Medical Sciences, Shahrekord University of Medical Science and Iran University of Medical Science. The researchers hereby thank the three universities for supporting the study.