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The Interactive Effects of Race and Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Perceptions of Recanted Confessions

Logan ewanation.

1 Department of Psychology, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

Evelyn M. Maeder

2 Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

Associated Data

The raw data supporting the conclusions of this article will be made available by the authors, without undue reservation.

We examined the effect of defendant race and expert testimony on jurors’ perceptions of recanted confessions. Participants (591 jury-eligible community members) read a first-degree murder trial transcript in which defendant race (Black/White) and expert testimony (present/absent) were manipulated. They provided verdicts and answered questions regarding the confession and expert testimony. When examining the full sample, we observed no significant main effects or interactions of defendant race or expert testimony. When exclusively examining White participants, we observed a significant interaction between expert testimony and defendant race on verdicts. When the defendant was White, there was no significant effect of expert testimony, but when the defendant was Black, jurors were significantly more likely to acquit when given expert testimony. These findings support the watchdog hypothesis, such that White jurors are more receptive to legally relevant evidence when the defendant is Black.

Introduction

Empirical research indicates that suspects falsely confess to crimes for a variety of reasons ( Kassin and Kiechel, 1996 ; King and Snook, 2009 ). According to the Innocence Project (2021) , false confessions 1 were involved in approximately a quarter of the cases that have been exonerated through DNA evidence. However, confessions remain one of the most influential forms of evidence in the courtroom ( Kassin and Neumann, 1997 ; Lieberman et al., 2008 ). Although expert witnesses are sometimes used to safeguard against issues with confession evidence, the effect of expert testimony on jurors’ perceptions of recanted confessions is unclear ( Moffa and Platania, 2007 ; Blandon-Gitlin et al., 2011 ). Further, jurors’ perceptions of recanted confessions may depend upon the suspect’s race, as jurors perceive confessions as more voluntary when the defendant belongs to a racial minority ( Pickel et al., 2013 ).

Most research focusing on the interaction between juror and defendant race has found that jurors are more lenient toward same-race defendants (see Devine and Caughlin, 2014 ). However, Sargent and Bradfield (2004) found that White mock jurors were more sensitive to legally relevant evidence in a trial transcript when the defendant was Black as compared to White. These authors argued that White jurors may attend to evidence more closely when the defendant is Black in an effort to serve as “watchdogs” against racism (termed the watchdog hypothesis). In a case in which a defendant has recanted their confession, the watchdog hypothesis would suggest that jurors may be more receptive to expert testimony (regarding factors that increase the likelihood of false confessions) when the defendant is Black, resulting in fewer guilty verdicts. The current study examines the interactive effects of defendant race and expert testimony on jurors’ perceptions of recanted confessions.

Confession Evidence

Empirical research has demonstrated that individuals may falsely confess to crimes that they did not commit (e.g., Kassin and Kiechel, 1996 ; Redlich et al., 2010 ) for a variety of reasons, including coercive interrogation tactics ( Kassin et al., 2003 ; King and Snook, 2009 ). However, in a criminal trial, a defendant’s confession is one of the most influential forms of evidence that the prosecution can present ( Kassin and Neumann, 1997 ; Lieberman et al., 2008 ; Schweitzer and Nuñez, 2018 ). For instance, Lieberman et al. (2008) demonstrated that among several types of evidence, the only type that participants perceived as more persuasive than a suspect’s confession was DNA analysis. Even then, there are plenty of anecdotal instances in which law enforcement officials have ignored exculpatory DNA evidence in investigations when the suspect has confessed (e.g., the Central Park jogger case, Juan Rivera, the Norfolk Four; Duru, 2003 ; Leo and Davis, 2010 ). Furthermore, Appleby and Kassin (2016) conducted a series of jury studies involving conflicting DNA and confession evidence. Although participants were overall more likely to render a verdict in line with the DNA evidence, the authors also observed that perceptions of culpability and the proportion of guilty verdicts rose significantly when the prosecution presented a theory to explain the contradicting exculpatory DNA evidence (e.g., the DNA evidence only indicated that the defendant had not ejaculated).

Unfortunately, the phenomenon of false confessions is by no means a rare occurrence. Depending on particular definitions and methodology 2 , scholars estimate that false confessions contribute to 12–26% of wrongful convictions ( Gudjonsson, 2003 ; Innocence Project, 2021 ; National Registry of Exonerations, 2020 ). Further research suggests that 73–81% of individuals who falsely confess are eventually convicted of the crime ( Leo and Ofshe, 1998 ; Drizin and Leo, 2004 ). This type of evidence may be so problematic partly because jurors are unable to distinguish between true and false confessions ( Kassin et al., 2005 ; Levine et al., 2010 ) and are unreceptive to the idea that an innocent person would ever falsely admit to a crime ( Leo and Davis, 2010 ; Blandon-Gitlin et al., 2011 ). In an attempt to safeguard against the serious implications of a false confession, some states have allowed expert witnesses to testify about the science concerning this type of evidence ( Kassin, 2008 ; Fulero, 2010 ).

Expert Testimony

A small number of studies have investigated the effect that expert testimony has on jurors’ perceptions of recanted confessions. Jurors themselves report that such testimony would assist in their evaluation of this form of evidence (e.g., Chojnacki et al., 2008 ; Costanzo et al., 2010 ). However, findings concerning expert testimony’s actual influence on verdicts in confession trials are mixed ( Blandon-Gitlin et al., 2011 ; Gomes et al., 2016 ; Henderson and Levett, 2016 ). For instance, a number of studies have observed no differences in verdicts between jurors who have and have not been presented with expert testimony in mock homicide trials ( Moffa and Platania, 2007 ; Henderson and Levett, 2016 , Study 2; Jones and Penrod, 2016 ). In comparison, Blandon-Gitlin et al. (2011) found that participants who read a trial transcript involving a recanted confession were less likely to render a guilty verdict after being exposed to expert testimony.

If working as intended, expert testimony should sensitize jurors to the quality of the confession ( Cutler et al., 1989 ; Levett and Kovera, 2008 ), thus leading to fewer convictions when the confession is low quality (e.g., when several interrogation tactics known to elicit false confession have been used). However, rather than sensitizing jurors to variations in the quality of confession evidence, expert testimony may instead induce a general skepticism concerning confessions. For example, Woody and Forrest (2009) found that jurors presented with expert testimony concerning false confessions were significantly less likely to convict the defendant, regardless of whether a false evidence ploy was used in the interrogation. In a similar study involving mock jurors, Woestehoff and Meissner(2016 , Study 3) manipulated the pressure and number of coercive interrogation tactics used in a defendant’s confession, as well as the presence of expert testimony. Overall, jurors were less likely to convict the defendant when exposed to expert testimony. This effect held regardless of how much pressure was involved in the defendant’s interrogation. Interestingly, Woestehoff and Meissner (2016) observed an effect of interrogation pressure independent of the expert witness; jurors given the high and medium-pressure conditions were significantly less likely to convict as compared to jurors who read about a low-pressure confession. These participants therefore appeared to be sensitive to variations in the confession evidence’s strength without the help of expert testimony.

Overall, there are conflicting findings regarding the effectiveness of expert testimony in cases involving a recanted confession. One factor that may explain these contradictory results is the race of the defendant. As described below, previous research has suggested that defendant race may influence jurors’ perceptions of the confession itself ( Ratcliff et al., 2010 ; Pickel et al., 2013 ).

Race in the Criminal Courtroom

An abundance of research examining the influence of defendant race has found that jurors often discriminate against defendants belonging to a racial minority (e.g., ForsterLee et al., 2006 ; Struckman-Johnson et al., 2008 ; Pickel et al., 2013 ). Specifically, jurors’ perceptions of confession evidence appear to depend upon the defendant’s race ( Ratcliff et al., 2010 ; Pickel et al., 2013 ). Pickel et al. (2013) presented mock jurors with a confession video wherein the defendant’s race was ambiguous. Jurors who were told the defendant was Arab American rated the confession as more voluntary and were more likely to convict than those who believed the defendant was White. In similar research, Ratcliff et al. (2010) found that participants shown a video of a confession believed that the confession was more voluntary, and that the suspect was more likely to be guilty, if the suspect was Asian or Black, as opposed to White.

Several studies have further observed the existence of an overall similarity-leniency bias within the courtroom, such that jurors perceive defendants of the same race more favorably than other-race defendants (see Mitchell et al., 2005 ; Devine and Caughlin, 2014 for meta-analyses). This similarity-leniency bias may be explained by social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel and Turner, 1986 ), which argues that people have a motivation to favor and prefer individuals belonging to their groups (rather than those outside of their groups) as a method of promoting a positive self-concept. In a criminal trial, social identity theory would therefore predict that jurors are more likely to acquit a defendant of the same race (and more likely to convict a defendant of a different race).

However, the watchdog hypothesis ( Sargent and Bradfield, 2004 ) suggests that White jurors are motivated to protect against discrimination and thus pay more attention to legally relevant information when the defendant is Black. Using simulated vignettes describing a robbery trial, Sargent and Bradfield (2004) manipulated alibi evidence strength (Study 1), cross-examination effectiveness (Study 2), and defendant race, in two samples of White mock jurors. They found that White jurors were more sensitive to manipulations of alibi strength and cross-examination effectiveness when the defendant was Black as opposed to White. The authors argued that White jurors may have attended to this information more closely in an effort to be “watchdogs” against racism. In trials involving recanted confessions, jurors may therefore be more receptive to expert testimony (concerning the phenomenon of false confessions) when the defendant is Black as compared to White.

Current Study

Previous research has observed conflicting findings concerning the effect of expert testimony in trials involving recanted confessions. Furthermore, although research examining juror and defendant race has demonstrated a similarity-leniency bias (see Devine and Caughlin, 2014 ), Sargent and Bradfield (2004) suggest that White jurors may pay more attention to legally relevant evidence when the defendant is Black. The current study therefore aimed to examine the interactive effects of defendant race and expert testimony on jurors’ perceptions of recanted confessions. Drawing upon previous research, we developed two hypotheses.

  • Hypothesis 1: Based on previous literature suggesting that jurors perceive confessions to be less voluntary for White defendants (e.g., Ratcliff et al., 2010 ), and other research demonstrating an outgroup bias in verdict decisions (e.g., Devine and Caughlin, 2014 ), we predicted a main effect for defendant race such that [predominantly White ( United States Census Bureau, 2019 )] participants would be more likely to convict the Black defendant than his White counterpart.
  • Hypothesis 2: However, in accordance with the watchdog hypothesis ( Sargent and Bradfield, 2004 ), we predicted an interaction between defendant race and expert testimony for White participants. Specifically, White participants would render fewer convictions in conditions with expert testimony as compared to conditions with no expert testimony for the Black defendant (with no such effect for the White defendant), as this testimony is legally relevant information to which they could attend to be “watchdogs” against racism.

Materials and Methods

Participants.

Research has demonstrated that crowd sourced samples can be more heterogenous as compared to traditional undergraduate college samples ( Paolacci et al., 2010 ; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014 ; Baker et al., 2016 ). We therefore recruited participants using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). We compensated participants with $3 for successfully completing the study. Although we had 1133 responses to our task, one participant did not give informed consent, 248 participants failed manipulation/attention checks 3 , 235 participants were ineligible for jury duty in the United States, and 58 participants quit the survey prior to completion. Our final sample therefore consisted of 591 jury-eligible community members (i.e., citizens of the United States who were at least 18 years old with no unpardoned felony conviction). Three-hundred and thirty-one (55.4%) of the participants were women, 263 (44.1%) were men, and three (0.5%) identified as another gender. Participants’ ages ranged from 19 to 69 years old ( M = 36). Four-hundred and eighty-seven (81.6%) of the participants were White, 51 (8.5%) were Black, 27 (4.5%) were Hispanic, 21 (3.5%) were Asian, four (0.7%) were Native American, and seven (1.2%) identified as another race. Our participants’ racial demographics are similar to what other researchers have observed using MTurk (e.g., Burnham et al., 2018 ), and are comparable to the general United States population ( United States Census Bureau, 2019 ), although our sample contained a slightly lower percentage of individuals identifying as Black (8.5 vs. 13.4%).

Screening/Demographic Questionnaire

We used a demographic questionnaire in order to screen participants to ensure that they were jury-eligible. Participants were also asked to provide information regarding their race and gender.

Trial Transcript

We used a trial transcript adapted from previous research ( Kassin and Sommers, 1997 ; Sommers and Kassin, 2001 ; Henkel, 2008 ). The transcript involved a defendant charged with murdering his wife and neighbor. The prosecution argued that the defendant had arrived home to find his wife and neighbor together, and believing they were having an affair, he killed them in an act of jealousy. However, the defendant claimed that his wife and neighbor were already dead when he came home. The defendant had initially confessed to the crime, but later recanted the confession. Apart from this confession, the remaining evidence was circumstantial (e.g., a witness saw someone fleeing the crime scene who matched the general physical description of the defendant). The defendant testified that during his interrogation he was handcuffed to a desk in a small room for more than 5 h and claimed the interrogating officer had physically threatened him with his service weapon. The defendant also stated that he was experiencing an immense amount of stress and in a state of shock during the interrogation because he had learned of his wife’s death only hours before. Finally, the defendant testified that the interrogating officer had repeatedly told him that his actions (killing his cheating spouse and her lover) were understandable, and that no one would blame him for what he did (i.e., minimization, Kassin and McNall, 1991 ). In each transcript, we manipulated the defendant’s race (Black, White) and presence of expert testimony (present, not present). Defendant race was manipulated by including a color photograph [matched in a pilot study ( N = 30) on perceived age, likeability, and attractiveness] of the defendant, along with varying his name (Charles Smith for the White defendant and Jamaal Washington for the Black defendant) to strengthen our race manipulation. Previous research has used names to manipulate race (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004 ; Widner and Chicoine, 2011 ; Alhabash et al., 2014 ), as names can reinforce racial stereotypes and elicit biased judgments ( Bodenhausen and Wyer, 1985 ; Watson et al., 2011 ; Garcia and Abascal, 2016 ). In half of the transcripts, an expert witness specializing in confession research testified for the Defense. The expert primarily testified about two situational factors – minimization techniques and extended periods of time – that increase the likelihood of a false confession, both of which he noted were present in the defendant’s confession and interrogation. The expert also discussed independent knowledge of the crime (underscoring the fact that the defendant’s confession did not include details that only the true perpetrator of the crime would know), as well as the prevalence of wrongful convictions that involve a false confession.

Jury Instructions

Before and after the transcript, we provided participants with juror instructions adapted from the California Criminal Jury Instructions ( Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions, 2020 ). The instructions discussed the criteria for first-degree murder, as well as the lesser-included second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter charges, and also informed participants about the burden of proof and reasonable doubt.

Juror Questionnaire

In accordance with the legal instructions, we first asked participants to render a dichotomous verdict concerning the first-degree murder charge (guilty/not guilty). Participants who selected not guilty were then asked to render a dichotomous verdict concerning a second-degree murder charge (guilty/not guilty). Participants who still selected not guilty were then finally asked to render a dichotomous verdict concerning a voluntary manslaughter charge (guilty/not guilty). Logistically, we felt this method most appropriately reflected how jurors decide verdicts in California, as a juror who renders a guilty verdict for first-degree murder would not need to vote on the lesser-included offenses. We also asked participants to indicate on a scale from 1 ( not at all ) to 9 ( very much ) the degree to which they felt the defendant’s confession was voluntary (“How voluntary was the defendant’s confession?”).

The questionnaire also included a manipulation check, which asked participants to identify the race of the defendant from a list of options. In conditions with expert testimony, we asked participants to identify what the expert witness testified about (“What was a factor that the false confession expert, Dr. Turner, discussed?”) from a list of options to demonstrate that they had attended to this material. We embedded three other attention checks that required participants to select a specific response (e.g., “This is an attention check. Select Strongly Agree.”).

Participants were recruited from MTurk and completed the study online using Qualtrics survey software. Once participants had given informed consent, they were screened to ensure they met jury-eligibility requirements. We randomly assigned eligible participants to one of the four trial transcripts. Before and after reading the transcript, participants were provided with relevant legal instructions. After reading the transcript, participants responded to the juror questionnaire. Upon completion, participants were thanked, debriefed, and compensated. Participation in the study lasted approximately 30–45 min.

Tables 1–3 display a breakdown of verdicts by condition for the first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter charges, respectively. Table 4 summarizes the percentage of not guilty verdicts by verdict option for all participants as well as for White participants only. Prior to running the regression, we indicator coded our predictor variables (0 = no expert, 1 = expert present, and 0 = White defendant, 1 = Black defendant, respectively). We coded our ordinal outcome variable as 0 = not guilty, 1 = guilty of manslaughter, 2 = guilty of second-degree murder, and 3 = guilty of first-degree murder. To test our hypotheses, we conducted an ordinal regression with verdict being regressed on expert testimony, defendant race, and the interaction between expert testimony and defendant race. Results revealed no significant main effect of expert testimony, b = −0.04, OR = 0.96, 95% CI [0.64, 1.45], W 2 (1, N = 591) = 0.03, p = 0.861, or defendant race, b = −0.12, OR = 0.89, 95% CI [0.59, 1.34], W 2 (1, N = 591) = 0.33 p = 0.568. Additionally, the expert testimony by defendant race interaction was non-significant, b = 0.56, OR = 1.75, 95% CI [0.97, 3.15], W (1, N = 591) = 3.48, p = 0.062.

First-degree murder verdicts by defendant race and expert testimony.

Percentage of not guilty verdicts by charge.

Second-degree murder verdicts by defendant race and expert testimony.

Voluntary manslaughter verdicts by defendant race and expert testimony.

Because the watchdog hypothesis specifically involves White individuals ( Sargent and Bradfield, 2004 ), we re-ran our initial regression using only White participants ( N = 482). As before, we conducted an ordinal regression on verdict using expert testimony, defendant race, and the interaction as the predictor variables. Again, we observed no significant main effects of expert testimony, b = −0.26, OR = 0.77, 95% CI [0.49, 1.21], W 2 (1, N = 482) = 1.29, p = 0.257, or defendant race, b = −0.35, OR = 0.70, 95% CI [0.44, 1.11], W 2 (1, N = 482) = 2.26, p = 0.133. However, there was a significant interaction between expert testimony and defendant race, b = 0.93, OR = 2.56, 95% CI [1.33, 4.92], W 2 (1, N = 482) = 7.9, p = 0.005. We probed this interaction for White participants by running two separate ordinal regressions with expert testimony as the predictor, splitting the data file based on defendant race. Analyses indicated that for White jurors, there was no effect of expert testimony when the defendant was White, b = −0.26, OR = 0.77, 95% CI [0.49, 1.21], W 2 (1, N = 245) = 1.28, p = 0.258. In comparison, we observed a significant effect of expert testimony when the defendant was Black, b = 0.68, OR = 1.98, 95% CI [1.23, 3.17], W 2 (1, N = 237) = 8.04, p = 0.005. The odds of White jurors rendering a not guilty verdict (versus other verdict options) for the Black defendant were approximately twice as high when given expert testimony as compared to when no such testimony was presented.

Using the hmisc package ( Harrell, 2021 ) in R ( R Core Team, 2021 ), we conducted a post hoc sensitivity analysis to provide an estimate of the smallest effect size that we would have sufficient power (i.e., 80%) to detect. Analysis indicated that for an overall N of 590, our design had a power of.80 to detect an odds ratio of 1.52, which is equivalent to a “small” effect size under Cohen’s conventions (see Chen et al., 2010 ). Therefore, we appeared to be sufficiently powered to conduct our ordinal analyses.

Voluntariness of Confession

We conducted an exploratory analysis on participants’ perceptions of how voluntary the defendant’s confession was. We were interested in examining effects on voluntariness in particular because we felt this was a purer measure of jurors’ perceptions of the confession itself. In comparison, participants’ final verdicts could be influenced by a number of factors unrelated to the confession evidence (e.g., the circumstantial evidence presented at trial).

Overall, participants scored near the midpoint on their perceived voluntariness of the defendant’s confession ( M = 4.71, SD = 2.57). We ran a 2 × 2 ANOVA to test the degree to which defendant race and expert testimony influenced this rating. Results revealed a significant main effect for expert testimony [ F (1,586) = 4.76, p = 0.03, η 2 p = 0.008, w 2 p = 0.006]; participants who received expert testimony perceived the defendant’s confession to be less voluntary ( M = 4.48, SD = 2.50) than those who did not ( M = 4.94, SD = 2.62). The main effect for defendant race was not significant [ F (1,586) = 0.14, p = 0.71, partial η 2 = 0.001 w 2 p ≤ 0.001], nor was the interaction [ F (1,586) = 2.17, p = 0.14, η 2 p = 0.004, w 2 p = 0.002].

As above, we re-ran this analysis with only White participants. This test again revealed a small, significant main effect for expert testimony [ F (1,477) = 4.00, p = 0.046, η 2 p = 0.008, w 2 p = 0.006], qualified by a significant interaction between defendant race and expert testimony [ F (1,477) = 4.20, p = 0.041, η 2 p = 0.009, w 2 p = 0.007]; the main effect for defendant race was not significant [ F (1,477) = 0.46, p = 0.50, partial η 2 = 0.001, w 2 p ≤ 0.001]. To probe the interaction, we first compared the effects of expert testimony on voluntariness ratings by defendant race. Simple effects tests demonstrated that for those who read about a White defendant, voluntariness ratings did not differ significantly in the presence ( M = 4.61, SD = 2.45) or absence ( M = 4.60, SD = 2.66) of expert testimony, t (242) = −0.04, p = 0.98, d = 0.01, 95% CI [−0.25,0.24]. However, participants who read about a Black defendant were significantly less likely to perceive his confession as voluntary when they received expert testimony ( M = 4.29, SD = 2.52) as compared to when they did not ( M = 5.23, SD = 2.63), t (235) = 2.83, p = 0.005, d = 0.37, 95% CI [0.11,0.63]. See Figure 1 for a visual display of this relationship. When probing the interaction the other way, we did not find significant effects for defendant race in either the expert testimony present { t (240) = 1.01, p = 0.315, d = 0.13, 95% CI [−0.12,0.38]} or absent { t (237) = −1.86, p = 0.064, d = 0.24, 95% CI [−0.50,0.01]} conditions.

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Ratings of voluntariness of confession by defendant race and expert testimony for White participants.

The aim of this study was to explore the combined effects of defendant race and expert testimony on jurors’ decision-making in trials involving a recanted confession. In line with the watchdog hypothesis ( Sargent and Bradfield, 2004 ), when the defendant was Black, White jurors were significantly more likely to render a not guilty verdict when given expert testimony. In comparison, White jurors’ verdicts were not significantly influenced by expert testimony in conditions involving White defendants. This same pattern was found for perceptions of the confession’s voluntariness, although findings relating to the voluntariness measure require further confirmatory testing from future research.

Our results may demonstrate evidence of a sensitivity effect in situations involving a Black defendant and a confession. Given that jurors in the Black defendant condition convicted less often and perceived the confession as less voluntary, these jurors likely attended more to the expert testimony than did those in the White defendant condition. Doing so may have allowed the testimony to sensitize jurors to the issues related to the disputed confession (e.g., long period of time, minimization and maximization techniques employed, lack of independent knowledge of the crime, etc.). However, because we did not manipulate the strength of the confession, it is unclear whether the expert testimony truly sensitized jurors in these conditions. Instead, they may have simply become skeptical of all confession evidence. Given that earlier findings regarding expert testimony and confession evidence suggest that the mere presence of expert testimony (regardless of the presence of coercive interrogation tactics) could reduce reliance on confessions ( Woody and Forrest, 2009 ), this was an important first step in establishing the presence of a watchdog effect. Future research should extend the current study’s design with the inclusion of a confession quality (i.e., lower vs. higher number of coercive tactics present in the interrogation) manipulation. Doing so would allow for a better understanding of whether sensitivity or skepticism is occurring in these situations.

Because our sample was predominantly White, we predicted an overall similarity-leniency bias such that Black defendants would be more likely to be convicted than defendants who were White ( Devine and Caughlin, 2014 ). Contrary to predictions, there was no significant main effect of defendant race on jurors’ verdicts. Although this finding conflicts with research supporting the similarity-leniency hypothesis (e.g., Ugwuegbu, 1978 ; Sommers and Ellsworth, 2000 ; Devine and Caughlin, 2014 ), other research has also demonstrated null effects relating to defendant race (e.g., Braden-Maguire et al., 2005 ; Maeder et al., 2012 ; Yamamoto and Maeder, 2017 ).

There are a number of potential explanations for why we observed no significant overall effect of defendant race. According to the aversive racism framework ( Schweitzer and Nuñez, 2018 ), the influence of racial bias is greatest in ambiguous situations ( Dovidio and Gaertner , 1996 , 2000 , 2004 ). In the current study, the legal instructions likely removed some of the ambiguity concerning participants’ verdict decision, lessening the effect defendant race may have had ( Pfeifer and Ogloff, 1991 ). Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis observed out-group bias in studies involving property crimes or adult sexual assaults, but much smaller (or non-existent) effects in studies using violent cases ( Devine and Caughlin, 2014 ). Because our trial transcript involved a murder, future research should consider replicating the current study using other crimes, such as burglary.

Finally, our data were collected between June and December 2018. During this time, the police’s unjust treatment of Black individuals became a salient topic in the media (e.g., Carney, 2016 ; Lopez, 2018 ; Scott, 2018 ). Our participants may therefore have been cognizant of the potential for such discrimination, particularly because the defendant claimed that he was threatened and coerced by police during his interrogation. Previous research has found that White jurors’ bias against BIPOC defendants is minimized when racial issues are made salient during the trial (e.g., Cohn et al., 2009 ; Bucolo and Cohn, 2010 ). It is a strong possibility that cases involving alleged police misconduct are inherently race salient, leading jurors to correct for racial bias and resulting in a null effect of defendant race ( Sommers and Ellsworth, 2000 , 2001 ). It is important to note that following the death of George Floyd in May 2020, the topic of racial discrimination in the United States’ justice system received unprecedented attention and media coverage. We encourage researchers to replicate and extend these findings to see what effect these recent events may have had in this context.

Similar to our results concerning defendant race, we observed no significant main effect of expert testimony on jurors’ verdicts. This complements the work of Jones and Penrod (2016) , as well as Moffa and Platania (2007) , but contradicts a number of other studies that did observe an effect of expert testimony in trials involving recanted confessions ( Woody and Forrest, 2009 ; Blandon-Gitlin et al., 2011 ; Woestehoff and Meissner, 2016 ). Related research concerning jurors’ perceptions of secondary confessions has also observed no significant effect of expert testimony on verdicts ( Neuschatz et al., 2012 ; Maeder and Pica, 2014 ).

In comparison to our results concerning expert testimony and verdict, there was a significant main effect of expert testimony on perceived voluntariness of the confession. One explanation for this pattern may be that although expert testimony lowered jurors’ perceived voluntariness of the confession, they still viewed the confession itself as indicative of guilt. Researchers have used the fundamental attribution error to explain jurors’ reluctance to discount disputed confession (e.g., Kassin and Sukel, 1997 ; Kassin and Gudjonsson, 2005 ). In our study, jurors may indeed have perceived the confession as less voluntary following expert testimony, but they still may have believed that overall, the defendant confessed because he was guilty (rather than because of the situational factors present). In similar research, Kassin and Wrightsman (1981) found instructions on the unreliability of coerced confessions significantly decreased participants’ perceived voluntariness of the confession, but did not influence verdicts.

In their work, Sargent and Bradfield (2004) manipulated the strength of the defendant’s alibi as well as the strength of the prosecutor’s cross-examination 4 ; future research should continue to examine the watchdog hypothesis by manipulating other types of evidence and/or expert testimony (such as expert testimony concerning police use of force or eyewitness identifications). Because the watchdog effect has now been demonstrated using both direct evidence (i.e., defendant’s alibi) as well as trial-level phenomena (i.e., cross-examination and expert testimony), we tentatively predict that our observed effects would likely generalize to these other forms of evidence. Further, our results underscore the notion that there is a complex effect of race in the courtroom that goes beyond a simple similarity-leniency effect; we found White jurors to be more lenient to the racial outgroup when given expert testimony. As discussed above, it may be the case that, due to the increased public attention regarding racial discrimination in the legal system, the similarity-leniency effect is minimized (or outright reduced) in trials involving potential police misconduct. More work examining this issue, particularly sampling from BIPOC jurors, is needed to better understand these complexities. Based on these preliminary results, White jurors appear to either interpret or apply evidence differently depending upon the defendant’s race, ultimately leading to different verdict decisions. Specifically, our findings suggest that attorneys should particularly consider the use of expert testimony in trials involving a BIPOC defendant and a recanted confession.

Finally, although we found evidence to suggest a watchdog effect, there are other possible explanations for our findings. In our study, White participants may have been more likely to use expert testimony in their verdict decisions when the defendant is Black as opposed to White not because they are paying more attention to legally relevant factors (as per the watchdog hypothesis), but because they are looking for a reason to acquit the Black defendant. This may be in an attempt to establish non-racist credentials (e.g., Effron and Conway, 2015 ) – when evaluating a Black defendant, White participants may feel as though their moral standing is uncertain, and so make greater use of the expert testimony and subsequently acquit in order to demonstrate their egalitarianism. Future research could implement a detailed measure of comprehension of the expert’s testimony. This would reveal whether participants comprehend the information better when the defendant is Black, or whether they simply use the expert testimony as a reason to acquit the Black defendant.

Limitations

Our study’s methodology had a number of limitations. To begin, we used a written trial transcript, which limited ecological validity ( Wenger and Bornstein, 2006 ). However, existing literature suggests that presentation mode does not significantly affect mock jurors’ verdict decisions ( Bornstein, 1999 ; Pezdek et al., 2010 ). Furthermore, our participants were likely aware that their responses had no true consequences, which may have influenced our findings ( Bornstein and McCabe, 2005 ; Bornstein et al., 2017 ). Studying real jury trials would help to overcome this problem of consequentiality and may have led to different results. However, such a methodology would also introduce a host of additional issues regarding feasibility and internal validity. Like most jury research, we also only used a single trial transcript that had specific evidence and charges. Replications using additional cases would increase the generalizability of our results.

An additional ecological limitation of the current study is the lack of a deliberation component. Although research has demonstrated that the jury’s final verdict is often predicted from individual verdicts ( Kalven and Zeisel, 1966 ; Devine et al., 2007 ), other literature suggests that deliberation can influence jurors’ bias ( London and Nunez, 2000 ) and also affect jurors’ cognitive processes when trying to reach a decision ( Salerno and Diamond, 2010 ; Salerno et al., 2017 ). Sommers (2006) has further demonstrated that the racial composition of a jury can influence how jurors talk about race, which may be relevant to our results as our study involved a Black defendant in half of the conditions. Therefore, future research examining the watchdog hypothesis should likely involve a deliberation component.

Because the study was conducted online on MTurk, there was a lack of general control over the environment in which participants responded, which may have produced environmental confounds. However, we implemented manipulation and attention checks to ascertain data quality (e.g., Peer et al., 2014 ). Using MTurk also allowed for recruitment from a nationwide community sample (rather than relying on an undergraduate sample from a single university), which likely increased the generalizability of our results ( Baker et al., 2016 ). Regardless, we still had a fairly racially homogenous sample, as response rates from BIPOC participants were low. We were therefore unable to do any proper comparisons based on juror race. Although the watchdog hypothesis focuses specifically on White jurors, future research needs to be conducted that explicitly examines BIPOC jurors’ perceptions in the courtroom.

Our study examined the role of defendant race and the influence of expert testimony in the context of trials involving recanted confessions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the interactive effects of these variables. For White jurors, we observed an interaction between defendant race and the presence of expert testimony. There was no significant effect of expert testimony on verdict when the defendant was White, but White jurors were significantly less likely to find the Black defendant guilty (and perceive his confession as voluntary) when presented with expert testimony concerning false confessions. These findings support the existence of the watchdog hypothesis ( Sargent and Bradfield, 2004 ), such that White jurors are more receptive to legally relevant evidence when the defendant is Black. To gain a stronger understanding of when this effect is elicited, future research should replicate the current study using other types of evidence and expert testimony.

Data Availability Statement

Ethics statement.

The studies involving human participants were reviewed and approved by the Carleton University Research Ethics Board-B (CUREB-B) Carleton University. The patients/participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study.

Author Contributions

LE and EM contributed to the conception and design of the study and conducted the data analysis. LE organized the data collection and wrote the first draft of the manuscript. EM wrote the sections of the manuscript. Both authors contributed to manuscript revision, read, and approved the submitted version.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Publisher’s Note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

Funding. This research received funding from the American-Psychology Law Society’s Diversity Research Award.

1 The Innocence Project includes false admissions and other forms of self-incrimination in their definition of false confessions.

2 The National Registry of Exonerations defines a false confession as “a statement made to law enforcement at any point during the proceedings which was interpreted or presented by law enforcement as an admission of participation in or presence at the crime, even if the statement was not presented at trial. A statement is not a confession if it was made to someone other than law enforcement. A statement that is not at odds with the defense is not a confession. A guilty plea is not a confession.” In comparison, the Innocence Project’s definition includes false admissions and other forms of self-incrimination in their definition of false confessions.

3 Sixty-two participants failed the manipulation check concerning defendant race, while 184 participants failed the manipulation check concerning the content of the expert’s testimony. For attention checks, participants were instructed to select a particular response. Twenty-six participants failed the first attention check, 29 participants failed the second attention check, and 33 failed the third attention check.

4 In the “weak” cross-examination condition, participants read a case summary where the court reporters indicated the prosecution had presented ineffective cross-examinations of the defense witnesses. In the “strong” condition, the case summary described the prosecution as presenting an effective cross-examination that diminished the defense witnesses’ credibility.

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Similarity Hypothesis

The basic idea, theory, meet practice.

TDL is an applied research consultancy. In our work, we leverage the insights of diverse fields—from psychology and economics to machine learning and behavioral data science—to sculpt targeted solutions to nuanced problems.

Consider the closest friends you meet while backpacking abroad. You likely share many similarities; perhaps a thrill for spontaneity, hobbies, appreciation for culture, music preferences, or food choices. During the trip, you find yourself effortlessly interacting with other backpackers: sharing a relatively-unknown scenic route, a local exhibition to visit, or the best bed and breakfast in town. We often relate and empathize easily with similar individuals – this is a result of the similarity hypothesis.

The  similarity hypothesis  suggests that we tend to be drawn towards those who are similar to ourselves. Similarities can refer to shared attitudes and values, as well as political opinions, cultural background, or even minute details like posture. 1

The experience of interacting with similar individuals jumpstarts cognitive processing, like learning, memory, attention, and reasoning. An aspiring musician might remember all the lyrics to their favorite band’s albums. An employee might pick up skills more quickly when assisted by a mentor they admire or identify with. Even when it comes to making comparisons with others, we tend to look for individuals who share similar attitudes and beliefs because it can be difficult to make accurate comparisons when others are too different from us. 2

Why do we tend to be drawn towards individuals who share similar attitudes and values?

Similarity Hypothesis:  A hypothesis which states that we tend to be attracted towards individuals who share similar important traits, such as attitudes and values.

Cognitive Processing:  A general term to describe any mental function involved in acquiring, storing, interpreting and manipulating information. These functions can be conscious or unconscious, such as attention, memory storage, learning, and reasoning.

Empathy:  Understanding an individual from their point of view and experiencing that individual’s feelings, thoughts and perceptions.

In 1954, Leon Festinger proposed in his social comparison theory: when individuals are uncertain of their abilities and opinions, they tend to make comparisons with other similar individuals to assess the accuracy of their own opinion. Festinger’s influential social comparison theory introduced the similarity hypothesis. Since its introduction in  A Theory of Social Comparison Processes , a large amount of evidence has supported the hypothesis. 3

Festinger’s hypothesis has been used to explain phenomena in a diverse array of fields, from political science to marketing. For instance, in the 1971  The Attraction Paradigm , psychologist Donn Byrne introduced the similarity-attraction theory. Byrne’s theory was based on the similarity hypothesis. He suggested that individuals who share similar “important attitudes” (opinions on family and values) are generally more likely to be attracted to each other, compared to individuals who share similar “less important” attitudes (opinions on a specific type of sink). 4  This holds for friendships as well as romantic partners. Byrne further outlined that individuals associate with those who have similar personality characteristics, such as self-esteem, optimism, and conscientiousness.

According to Byrne, personality similarity has a key role to play in the longevity and happiness of a marriage. 5  Byrne’s similarity-attraction theory stated that individuals are generally romantically attracted to others who share similar physical characteristics and levels of physical attractiveness. Byrne’s work on similarity-attraction was so influential that further research has supported his theory, with individuals’ preference for similarity being demonstrated in various other aspects such as social habits and socioeconomic status. 5

The similarity hypothesis then made its way into the field of economics and decision-making in Amos Tversky’s 1972 book,  Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice . 6  Tversky influenced choice theory in economics by applying the similarity hypothesis to decision-making, changing the way modern economists approached the field. Based on the hypothesis, he suggested that when a new product enters a market, it will take more demand from the share of a similar product than a dissimilar one. This has important implications for brands: when creating a new line of products, they should make it as dissimilar as possible from their current offering to prevent market cannibalization. Tversky’s work influenced marketing managers, who started adopting his use of the similarity hypothesis to help make marketing entry decisions. 7

Leon Festinger

An influential American social psychologist, most renowned for his work on social comparison theory in his 1954 book,  A Theory of Social Comparison Processes . Festinger introduced the similarity hypothesis in this book, which has been followed by an enormous amount of data which has provided evidence to support the hypothesis. Several of Festinger’s theories and research also renounced previously dominant behaviorist views of social psychology.

An American psychologist and  influential contributor of foundational theory in interpersonal attraction. His work on similarity-attraction theory, based on the similarity hypothesis, was groundbreaking for exploring the relationship between similar attitudes and attraction. Byrne was also an early contributor on the psychology of human sexuality. 8

Amos Tversky

One of the founders of behavioral science who helped revolutionize the field of economics and decision-making. Tversky was an influential psychologist who applied the similarity hypothesis to decision-making and choice theory in economics. Along with  Daniel Kahneman , Tversky was also a pioneer in  loss aversion  and  prospect theory .

Consequences

When it comes to attraction, Byrne’s similarity-attraction theory remains relevant today as it provides reassurance that an individual is not alone in their belief. Being attracted to individuals with similar attitudes also enables one to more accurately predict the other’s behaviors in different scenarios, providing an insight into the other’s predilections and “pet peeves” based on similarity. 5

Similarly, when we empathize with a target, such as a novel, our enhanced cognitive processing enables us to facilitate reading comprehension. Our reading accelerates and our memory increases. Likewise, when we fail to empathize with a target, such as a film, we evoke a perception of dissimilarity. This creates the opposite effect, and our cognitive processing is inhibited: we lose focus easily, finding it difficult to recall the plot of the film. 1

Our enhanced cognitive processing is a result of empathy, which arises from our perception of similarity. This affects the way we interact with other individuals, as the perception of similarity can implicitly evoke empathy between two individuals. The perception of similarity is the reason why an employee may be able to learn new techniques more quickly when assisted by a mentor they empathize with.

Understanding the similarity hypothesis can allow us to better design inclusive educational curricula, particularly in scenarios where it is important to understand individuals or experiences which are not necessarily similar to most learners. This can be especially useful in cross-cultural education, history, minority education, and special-needs classes. 1  Applying the similarity hypothesis in these fields of education can help overcome the effort involved in understanding experiences or individuals which are dissimilar.

Controversies

Despite the repeated evidence upholding the similarity hypothesis, one criticism is that individuals frequently seek novelty and difference, with such experiences providing just as much certainty when it comes to self-evaluation. 3

Scholars who disagree with the similarity-attraction theory tend to adopt the complementarity view of attraction. This view states that individuals are more likely to prefer partners who have attributes that are complementary, rather than those who possess replicating attributes. This can be seen when an individual with a certain perceived negative attribute, such as impatience, is more attracted to someone who does not possess that same attribute. The complementarity view of attraction suggests that individuals prefer not to be reminded of their faults by being with someone similar, and therefore they are more attracted to those who will complement and bring out the best in them. 5

Emerging studies are also starting to define more clearly that it is perceived similarity, rather than actual similarity, that influences attraction. A 2012 study by American psychologists at Texas A&M and Northwestern University found that, unlike previous findings, actual similarity did not predict romantic attraction as effectively as previously thought. 9

There are alternative views when addressing how the similarity hypothesis influences opinion comparisons between individuals. Some argue that comparisons with other similar individuals depend on the type of opinion being evaluated. A study in 2000 by Jerry Suls, René Martin, and Ladd Wheeler highlights results which suggest that we prefer comparing with other similar individuals when it comes to the evaluation of preferences. Think about how you are more likely to care about what your best friend thinks of your outfit, compared to the Lyft driver who dropped you off this morning. In contrast, other studies have suggested that we prefer to compare ourselves with dissimilar individuals when it comes to belief assessment, 3  such as evaluating whether a certain statement or proposition is true.

The effects of the similarity hypothesis on memory retrieval.

In 2015, Hidetsugu Komeda conducted a study to observe memory retrieval in typically developing (TD) individuals and individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). The similarity hypothesis predicts that individuals with ASD will be able to easily retrieve other individuals with ASD from their memory. Participants were carefully selected and read 24 stories, before completing a recognition task. The results showed that ASD individuals demonstrated the same level of accuracy as TD individuals, but memory-retrieval patterns between the two groups were different. 1

Individuals with ASD were able to retrieve ASD-consistent stories more easily than ASD-inconsistent stories. TD individuals were also able to retrieve TD-consistent stories more easily than ASD-protagonist stories. These results are consistent with the similarity hypothesis, suggesting that individuals with ASD characteristics are able to help other ASD individuals due to empathy arising from their similarities. 1

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Defendant-juror similarity and mock joror judgments

  • Published: December 1995
  • Volume 19 , pages 545–567, ( 1995 )

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similarity leniency hypothesis definition quizlet

  • Norbert L. Kerr 1 ,
  • Robert W. Hymes 2 ,
  • Alonzo B. Anderson 3 &
  • James E. Weathers  

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It was hypothesized that joror-defendant similarity would lead to greater leniency toward a criminal defendant when the evidence against that defendant was weak or inconclusive; but when evidence was strong, it was expected that this relationship would be reversed. In Study 1, religious similarity was found to be simply and positively related to evaluation of the defendant and leniency, a relationship unaffected by the strength of evidence. This pattern of results was attributed to (a) insufficiently strong evidence against the defendant and (b) the lack of anticipated jury deliberation, problems addressed in Study 2. In that study, when evidence was strong against the defendant, juror-defendant racial similarity did increase the likelihood of conviction, but only when jurors anticipated being in the racial minority in their jury. Implications of the findings for psychological theory and for voir dire were discussed.

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The authors wish to thank Howard Klein and Jane Stanfel for their assistance in data collection and analysis in Experiment 2, and the Editor and two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions on an earlier draft.

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Kerr, N.L., Hymes, R.W., Anderson, A.B. et al. Defendant-juror similarity and mock joror judgments. Law Hum Behav 19 , 545–567 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01499374

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Leniency Bias in Performance Ratings: The Big-Five Correlates

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  • 1 Innushuk ConsultSydney, NSW, Australia.
  • 2 Department of Psychology, University of Hong KongHong Kong, Hong Kong.
  • 3 CU Denver Business School, University of Colorado at DenverDenver, CO, USA.
  • PMID: 28443043
  • PMCID: PMC5385382
  • DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00521

Some researchers assume that employees' personality characteristics affect leniency in rating others and themselves. However, little research has investigated these two tendencies at the same time. In the present study we developed one index for other-rating leniency and another one for self-rating leniency. Based on a review of the literature, we hypothesized that a generous assessment of peers would more likely be made by those who are extroverted and agreeable than by those who are not. Furthermore, a generous assessment of oneself would more likely be made by people who are conscientious and emotionally stable, than by people who are not. We also investigated if the leniency in rating others and the leniency in rating oneself are part of a more general leniency tendency. Data collected from a sample of real estate dealers provided support for the above hypotheses. Limitations and implications for future research are discussed.

Keywords: Agreeableness; Big Five personality traits; extroversion; others rating; personality; rating leniency; self-rating; work performance.

ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

The interactive effects of race and expert testimony on jurors’ perceptions of recanted confessions.

\r\nLogan Ewanation*

  • 1 Department of Psychology, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada
  • 2 Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

We examined the effect of defendant race and expert testimony on jurors’ perceptions of recanted confessions. Participants (591 jury-eligible community members) read a first-degree murder trial transcript in which defendant race (Black/White) and expert testimony (present/absent) were manipulated. They provided verdicts and answered questions regarding the confession and expert testimony. When examining the full sample, we observed no significant main effects or interactions of defendant race or expert testimony. When exclusively examining White participants, we observed a significant interaction between expert testimony and defendant race on verdicts. When the defendant was White, there was no significant effect of expert testimony, but when the defendant was Black, jurors were significantly more likely to acquit when given expert testimony. These findings support the watchdog hypothesis, such that White jurors are more receptive to legally relevant evidence when the defendant is Black.

Introduction

Empirical research indicates that suspects falsely confess to crimes for a variety of reasons ( Kassin and Kiechel, 1996 ; King and Snook, 2009 ). According to the Innocence Project (2021) , false confessions 1 were involved in approximately a quarter of the cases that have been exonerated through DNA evidence. However, confessions remain one of the most influential forms of evidence in the courtroom ( Kassin and Neumann, 1997 ; Lieberman et al., 2008 ). Although expert witnesses are sometimes used to safeguard against issues with confession evidence, the effect of expert testimony on jurors’ perceptions of recanted confessions is unclear ( Moffa and Platania, 2007 ; Blandon-Gitlin et al., 2011 ). Further, jurors’ perceptions of recanted confessions may depend upon the suspect’s race, as jurors perceive confessions as more voluntary when the defendant belongs to a racial minority ( Pickel et al., 2013 ).

Most research focusing on the interaction between juror and defendant race has found that jurors are more lenient toward same-race defendants (see Devine and Caughlin, 2014 ). However, Sargent and Bradfield (2004) found that White mock jurors were more sensitive to legally relevant evidence in a trial transcript when the defendant was Black as compared to White. These authors argued that White jurors may attend to evidence more closely when the defendant is Black in an effort to serve as “watchdogs” against racism (termed the watchdog hypothesis). In a case in which a defendant has recanted their confession, the watchdog hypothesis would suggest that jurors may be more receptive to expert testimony (regarding factors that increase the likelihood of false confessions) when the defendant is Black, resulting in fewer guilty verdicts. The current study examines the interactive effects of defendant race and expert testimony on jurors’ perceptions of recanted confessions.

Confession Evidence

Empirical research has demonstrated that individuals may falsely confess to crimes that they did not commit (e.g., Kassin and Kiechel, 1996 ; Redlich et al., 2010 ) for a variety of reasons, including coercive interrogation tactics ( Kassin et al., 2003 ; King and Snook, 2009 ). However, in a criminal trial, a defendant’s confession is one of the most influential forms of evidence that the prosecution can present ( Kassin and Neumann, 1997 ; Lieberman et al., 2008 ; Schweitzer and Nuñez, 2018 ). For instance, Lieberman et al. (2008) demonstrated that among several types of evidence, the only type that participants perceived as more persuasive than a suspect’s confession was DNA analysis. Even then, there are plenty of anecdotal instances in which law enforcement officials have ignored exculpatory DNA evidence in investigations when the suspect has confessed (e.g., the Central Park jogger case, Juan Rivera, the Norfolk Four; Duru, 2003 ; Leo and Davis, 2010 ). Furthermore, Appleby and Kassin (2016) conducted a series of jury studies involving conflicting DNA and confession evidence. Although participants were overall more likely to render a verdict in line with the DNA evidence, the authors also observed that perceptions of culpability and the proportion of guilty verdicts rose significantly when the prosecution presented a theory to explain the contradicting exculpatory DNA evidence (e.g., the DNA evidence only indicated that the defendant had not ejaculated).

Unfortunately, the phenomenon of false confessions is by no means a rare occurrence. Depending on particular definitions and methodology 2 , scholars estimate that false confessions contribute to 12–26% of wrongful convictions ( Gudjonsson, 2003 ; Innocence Project, 2021 ; National Registry of Exonerations, 2020 ). Further research suggests that 73–81% of individuals who falsely confess are eventually convicted of the crime ( Leo and Ofshe, 1998 ; Drizin and Leo, 2004 ). This type of evidence may be so problematic partly because jurors are unable to distinguish between true and false confessions ( Kassin et al., 2005 ; Levine et al., 2010 ) and are unreceptive to the idea that an innocent person would ever falsely admit to a crime ( Leo and Davis, 2010 ; Blandon-Gitlin et al., 2011 ). In an attempt to safeguard against the serious implications of a false confession, some states have allowed expert witnesses to testify about the science concerning this type of evidence ( Kassin, 2008 ; Fulero, 2010 ).

Expert Testimony

A small number of studies have investigated the effect that expert testimony has on jurors’ perceptions of recanted confessions. Jurors themselves report that such testimony would assist in their evaluation of this form of evidence (e.g., Chojnacki et al., 2008 ; Costanzo et al., 2010 ). However, findings concerning expert testimony’s actual influence on verdicts in confession trials are mixed ( Blandon-Gitlin et al., 2011 ; Gomes et al., 2016 ; Henderson and Levett, 2016 ). For instance, a number of studies have observed no differences in verdicts between jurors who have and have not been presented with expert testimony in mock homicide trials ( Moffa and Platania, 2007 ; Henderson and Levett, 2016 , Study 2; Jones and Penrod, 2016 ). In comparison, Blandon-Gitlin et al. (2011) found that participants who read a trial transcript involving a recanted confession were less likely to render a guilty verdict after being exposed to expert testimony.

If working as intended, expert testimony should sensitize jurors to the quality of the confession ( Cutler et al., 1989 ; Levett and Kovera, 2008 ), thus leading to fewer convictions when the confession is low quality (e.g., when several interrogation tactics known to elicit false confession have been used). However, rather than sensitizing jurors to variations in the quality of confession evidence, expert testimony may instead induce a general skepticism concerning confessions. For example, Woody and Forrest (2009) found that jurors presented with expert testimony concerning false confessions were significantly less likely to convict the defendant, regardless of whether a false evidence ploy was used in the interrogation. In a similar study involving mock jurors, Woestehoff and Meissner(2016 , Study 3) manipulated the pressure and number of coercive interrogation tactics used in a defendant’s confession, as well as the presence of expert testimony. Overall, jurors were less likely to convict the defendant when exposed to expert testimony. This effect held regardless of how much pressure was involved in the defendant’s interrogation. Interestingly, Woestehoff and Meissner (2016) observed an effect of interrogation pressure independent of the expert witness; jurors given the high and medium-pressure conditions were significantly less likely to convict as compared to jurors who read about a low-pressure confession. These participants therefore appeared to be sensitive to variations in the confession evidence’s strength without the help of expert testimony.

Overall, there are conflicting findings regarding the effectiveness of expert testimony in cases involving a recanted confession. One factor that may explain these contradictory results is the race of the defendant. As described below, previous research has suggested that defendant race may influence jurors’ perceptions of the confession itself ( Ratcliff et al., 2010 ; Pickel et al., 2013 ).

Race in the Criminal Courtroom

An abundance of research examining the influence of defendant race has found that jurors often discriminate against defendants belonging to a racial minority (e.g., ForsterLee et al., 2006 ; Struckman-Johnson et al., 2008 ; Pickel et al., 2013 ). Specifically, jurors’ perceptions of confession evidence appear to depend upon the defendant’s race ( Ratcliff et al., 2010 ; Pickel et al., 2013 ). Pickel et al. (2013) presented mock jurors with a confession video wherein the defendant’s race was ambiguous. Jurors who were told the defendant was Arab American rated the confession as more voluntary and were more likely to convict than those who believed the defendant was White. In similar research, Ratcliff et al. (2010) found that participants shown a video of a confession believed that the confession was more voluntary, and that the suspect was more likely to be guilty, if the suspect was Asian or Black, as opposed to White.

Several studies have further observed the existence of an overall similarity-leniency bias within the courtroom, such that jurors perceive defendants of the same race more favorably than other-race defendants (see Mitchell et al., 2005 ; Devine and Caughlin, 2014 for meta-analyses). This similarity-leniency bias may be explained by social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel and Turner, 1986 ), which argues that people have a motivation to favor and prefer individuals belonging to their groups (rather than those outside of their groups) as a method of promoting a positive self-concept. In a criminal trial, social identity theory would therefore predict that jurors are more likely to acquit a defendant of the same race (and more likely to convict a defendant of a different race).

However, the watchdog hypothesis ( Sargent and Bradfield, 2004 ) suggests that White jurors are motivated to protect against discrimination and thus pay more attention to legally relevant information when the defendant is Black. Using simulated vignettes describing a robbery trial, Sargent and Bradfield (2004) manipulated alibi evidence strength (Study 1), cross-examination effectiveness (Study 2), and defendant race, in two samples of White mock jurors. They found that White jurors were more sensitive to manipulations of alibi strength and cross-examination effectiveness when the defendant was Black as opposed to White. The authors argued that White jurors may have attended to this information more closely in an effort to be “watchdogs” against racism. In trials involving recanted confessions, jurors may therefore be more receptive to expert testimony (concerning the phenomenon of false confessions) when the defendant is Black as compared to White.

Current Study

Previous research has observed conflicting findings concerning the effect of expert testimony in trials involving recanted confessions. Furthermore, although research examining juror and defendant race has demonstrated a similarity-leniency bias (see Devine and Caughlin, 2014 ), Sargent and Bradfield (2004) suggest that White jurors may pay more attention to legally relevant evidence when the defendant is Black. The current study therefore aimed to examine the interactive effects of defendant race and expert testimony on jurors’ perceptions of recanted confessions. Drawing upon previous research, we developed two hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Based on previous literature suggesting that jurors perceive confessions to be less voluntary for White defendants (e.g., Ratcliff et al., 2010 ), and other research demonstrating an outgroup bias in verdict decisions (e.g., Devine and Caughlin, 2014 ), we predicted a main effect for defendant race such that [predominantly White ( United States Census Bureau, 2019 )] participants would be more likely to convict the Black defendant than his White counterpart.

Hypothesis 2: However, in accordance with the watchdog hypothesis ( Sargent and Bradfield, 2004 ), we predicted an interaction between defendant race and expert testimony for White participants. Specifically, White participants would render fewer convictions in conditions with expert testimony as compared to conditions with no expert testimony for the Black defendant (with no such effect for the White defendant), as this testimony is legally relevant information to which they could attend to be “watchdogs” against racism.

Materials and Methods

Participants.

Research has demonstrated that crowd sourced samples can be more heterogenous as compared to traditional undergraduate college samples ( Paolacci et al., 2010 ; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014 ; Baker et al., 2016 ). We therefore recruited participants using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). We compensated participants with $3 for successfully completing the study. Although we had 1133 responses to our task, one participant did not give informed consent, 248 participants failed manipulation/attention checks 3 , 235 participants were ineligible for jury duty in the United States, and 58 participants quit the survey prior to completion. Our final sample therefore consisted of 591 jury-eligible community members (i.e., citizens of the United States who were at least 18 years old with no unpardoned felony conviction). Three-hundred and thirty-one (55.4%) of the participants were women, 263 (44.1%) were men, and three (0.5%) identified as another gender. Participants’ ages ranged from 19 to 69 years old ( M = 36). Four-hundred and eighty-seven (81.6%) of the participants were White, 51 (8.5%) were Black, 27 (4.5%) were Hispanic, 21 (3.5%) were Asian, four (0.7%) were Native American, and seven (1.2%) identified as another race. Our participants’ racial demographics are similar to what other researchers have observed using MTurk (e.g., Burnham et al., 2018 ), and are comparable to the general United States population ( United States Census Bureau, 2019 ), although our sample contained a slightly lower percentage of individuals identifying as Black (8.5 vs. 13.4%).

Screening/Demographic Questionnaire

We used a demographic questionnaire in order to screen participants to ensure that they were jury-eligible. Participants were also asked to provide information regarding their race and gender.

Trial Transcript

We used a trial transcript adapted from previous research ( Kassin and Sommers, 1997 ; Sommers and Kassin, 2001 ; Henkel, 2008 ). The transcript involved a defendant charged with murdering his wife and neighbor. The prosecution argued that the defendant had arrived home to find his wife and neighbor together, and believing they were having an affair, he killed them in an act of jealousy. However, the defendant claimed that his wife and neighbor were already dead when he came home. The defendant had initially confessed to the crime, but later recanted the confession. Apart from this confession, the remaining evidence was circumstantial (e.g., a witness saw someone fleeing the crime scene who matched the general physical description of the defendant). The defendant testified that during his interrogation he was handcuffed to a desk in a small room for more than 5 h and claimed the interrogating officer had physically threatened him with his service weapon. The defendant also stated that he was experiencing an immense amount of stress and in a state of shock during the interrogation because he had learned of his wife’s death only hours before. Finally, the defendant testified that the interrogating officer had repeatedly told him that his actions (killing his cheating spouse and her lover) were understandable, and that no one would blame him for what he did (i.e., minimization, Kassin and McNall, 1991 ). In each transcript, we manipulated the defendant’s race (Black, White) and presence of expert testimony (present, not present). Defendant race was manipulated by including a color photograph [matched in a pilot study ( N = 30) on perceived age, likeability, and attractiveness] of the defendant, along with varying his name (Charles Smith for the White defendant and Jamaal Washington for the Black defendant) to strengthen our race manipulation. Previous research has used names to manipulate race (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004 ; Widner and Chicoine, 2011 ; Alhabash et al., 2014 ), as names can reinforce racial stereotypes and elicit biased judgments ( Bodenhausen and Wyer, 1985 ; Watson et al., 2011 ; Garcia and Abascal, 2016 ). In half of the transcripts, an expert witness specializing in confession research testified for the Defense. The expert primarily testified about two situational factors – minimization techniques and extended periods of time – that increase the likelihood of a false confession, both of which he noted were present in the defendant’s confession and interrogation. The expert also discussed independent knowledge of the crime (underscoring the fact that the defendant’s confession did not include details that only the true perpetrator of the crime would know), as well as the prevalence of wrongful convictions that involve a false confession.

Jury Instructions

Before and after the transcript, we provided participants with juror instructions adapted from the California Criminal Jury Instructions ( Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions, 2020 ). The instructions discussed the criteria for first-degree murder, as well as the lesser-included second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter charges, and also informed participants about the burden of proof and reasonable doubt.

Juror Questionnaire

In accordance with the legal instructions, we first asked participants to render a dichotomous verdict concerning the first-degree murder charge (guilty/not guilty). Participants who selected not guilty were then asked to render a dichotomous verdict concerning a second-degree murder charge (guilty/not guilty). Participants who still selected not guilty were then finally asked to render a dichotomous verdict concerning a voluntary manslaughter charge (guilty/not guilty). Logistically, we felt this method most appropriately reflected how jurors decide verdicts in California, as a juror who renders a guilty verdict for first-degree murder would not need to vote on the lesser-included offenses. We also asked participants to indicate on a scale from 1 ( not at all ) to 9 ( very much ) the degree to which they felt the defendant’s confession was voluntary (“How voluntary was the defendant’s confession?”).

The questionnaire also included a manipulation check, which asked participants to identify the race of the defendant from a list of options. In conditions with expert testimony, we asked participants to identify what the expert witness testified about (“What was a factor that the false confession expert, Dr. Turner, discussed?”) from a list of options to demonstrate that they had attended to this material. We embedded three other attention checks that required participants to select a specific response (e.g., “This is an attention check. Select Strongly Agree.”).

Participants were recruited from MTurk and completed the study online using Qualtrics survey software. Once participants had given informed consent, they were screened to ensure they met jury-eligibility requirements. We randomly assigned eligible participants to one of the four trial transcripts. Before and after reading the transcript, participants were provided with relevant legal instructions. After reading the transcript, participants responded to the juror questionnaire. Upon completion, participants were thanked, debriefed, and compensated. Participation in the study lasted approximately 30–45 min.

Tables 1–3 display a breakdown of verdicts by condition for the first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter charges, respectively. Table 4 summarizes the percentage of not guilty verdicts by verdict option for all participants as well as for White participants only. Prior to running the regression, we indicator coded our predictor variables (0 = no expert, 1 = expert present, and 0 = White defendant, 1 = Black defendant, respectively). We coded our ordinal outcome variable as 0 = not guilty, 1 = guilty of manslaughter, 2 = guilty of second-degree murder, and 3 = guilty of first-degree murder. To test our hypotheses, we conducted an ordinal regression with verdict being regressed on expert testimony, defendant race, and the interaction between expert testimony and defendant race. Results revealed no significant main effect of expert testimony, b = −0.04, OR = 0.96, 95% CI [0.64, 1.45], W 2 (1, N = 591) = 0.03, p = 0.861, or defendant race, b = −0.12, OR = 0.89, 95% CI [0.59, 1.34], W 2 (1, N = 591) = 0.33 p = 0.568. Additionally, the expert testimony by defendant race interaction was non-significant, b = 0.56, OR = 1.75, 95% CI [0.97, 3.15], W (1, N = 591) = 3.48, p = 0.062.

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Table 1. First-degree murder verdicts by defendant race and expert testimony.

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Table 2. Second-degree murder verdicts by defendant race and expert testimony.

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Table 3. Voluntary manslaughter verdicts by defendant race and expert testimony.

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Table 4. Percentage of not guilty verdicts by charge.

Because the watchdog hypothesis specifically involves White individuals ( Sargent and Bradfield, 2004 ), we re-ran our initial regression using only White participants ( N = 482). As before, we conducted an ordinal regression on verdict using expert testimony, defendant race, and the interaction as the predictor variables. Again, we observed no significant main effects of expert testimony, b = −0.26, OR = 0.77, 95% CI [0.49, 1.21], W 2 (1, N = 482) = 1.29, p = 0.257, or defendant race, b = −0.35, OR = 0.70, 95% CI [0.44, 1.11], W 2 (1, N = 482) = 2.26, p = 0.133. However, there was a significant interaction between expert testimony and defendant race, b = 0.93, OR = 2.56, 95% CI [1.33, 4.92], W 2 (1, N = 482) = 7.9, p = 0.005. We probed this interaction for White participants by running two separate ordinal regressions with expert testimony as the predictor, splitting the data file based on defendant race. Analyses indicated that for White jurors, there was no effect of expert testimony when the defendant was White, b = −0.26, OR = 0.77, 95% CI [0.49, 1.21], W 2 (1, N = 245) = 1.28, p = 0.258. In comparison, we observed a significant effect of expert testimony when the defendant was Black, b = 0.68, OR = 1.98, 95% CI [1.23, 3.17], W 2 (1, N = 237) = 8.04, p = 0.005. The odds of White jurors rendering a not guilty verdict (versus other verdict options) for the Black defendant were approximately twice as high when given expert testimony as compared to when no such testimony was presented.

Using the hmisc package ( Harrell, 2021 ) in R ( R Core Team, 2021 ), we conducted a post hoc sensitivity analysis to provide an estimate of the smallest effect size that we would have sufficient power (i.e., 80%) to detect. Analysis indicated that for an overall N of 590, our design had a power of.80 to detect an odds ratio of 1.52, which is equivalent to a “small” effect size under Cohen’s conventions (see Chen et al., 2010 ). Therefore, we appeared to be sufficiently powered to conduct our ordinal analyses.

Voluntariness of Confession

We conducted an exploratory analysis on participants’ perceptions of how voluntary the defendant’s confession was. We were interested in examining effects on voluntariness in particular because we felt this was a purer measure of jurors’ perceptions of the confession itself. In comparison, participants’ final verdicts could be influenced by a number of factors unrelated to the confession evidence (e.g., the circumstantial evidence presented at trial).

Overall, participants scored near the midpoint on their perceived voluntariness of the defendant’s confession ( M = 4.71, SD = 2.57). We ran a 2 × 2 ANOVA to test the degree to which defendant race and expert testimony influenced this rating. Results revealed a significant main effect for expert testimony [ F (1,586) = 4.76, p = 0.03, η 2 p = 0.008, w 2 p = 0.006]; participants who received expert testimony perceived the defendant’s confession to be less voluntary ( M = 4.48, SD = 2.50) than those who did not ( M = 4.94, SD = 2.62). The main effect for defendant race was not significant [ F (1,586) = 0.14, p = 0.71, partial η 2 = 0.001 w 2 p ≤ 0.001], nor was the interaction [ F (1,586) = 2.17, p = 0.14, η 2 p = 0.004, w 2 p = 0.002].

As above, we re-ran this analysis with only White participants. This test again revealed a small, significant main effect for expert testimony [ F (1,477) = 4.00, p = 0.046, η 2 p = 0.008, w 2 p = 0.006], qualified by a significant interaction between defendant race and expert testimony [ F (1,477) = 4.20, p = 0.041, η 2 p = 0.009, w 2 p = 0.007]; the main effect for defendant race was not significant [ F (1,477) = 0.46, p = 0.50, partial η 2 = 0.001, w 2 p ≤ 0.001]. To probe the interaction, we first compared the effects of expert testimony on voluntariness ratings by defendant race. Simple effects tests demonstrated that for those who read about a White defendant, voluntariness ratings did not differ significantly in the presence ( M = 4.61, SD = 2.45) or absence ( M = 4.60, SD = 2.66) of expert testimony, t (242) = −0.04, p = 0.98, d = 0.01, 95% CI [−0.25,0.24]. However, participants who read about a Black defendant were significantly less likely to perceive his confession as voluntary when they received expert testimony ( M = 4.29, SD = 2.52) as compared to when they did not ( M = 5.23, SD = 2.63), t (235) = 2.83, p = 0.005, d = 0.37, 95% CI [0.11,0.63]. See Figure 1 for a visual display of this relationship. When probing the interaction the other way, we did not find significant effects for defendant race in either the expert testimony present { t (240) = 1.01, p = 0.315, d = 0.13, 95% CI [−0.12,0.38]} or absent { t (237) = −1.86, p = 0.064, d = 0.24, 95% CI [−0.50,0.01]} conditions.

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Figure 1. Ratings of voluntariness of confession by defendant race and expert testimony for White participants.

The aim of this study was to explore the combined effects of defendant race and expert testimony on jurors’ decision-making in trials involving a recanted confession. In line with the watchdog hypothesis ( Sargent and Bradfield, 2004 ), when the defendant was Black, White jurors were significantly more likely to render a not guilty verdict when given expert testimony. In comparison, White jurors’ verdicts were not significantly influenced by expert testimony in conditions involving White defendants. This same pattern was found for perceptions of the confession’s voluntariness, although findings relating to the voluntariness measure require further confirmatory testing from future research.

Our results may demonstrate evidence of a sensitivity effect in situations involving a Black defendant and a confession. Given that jurors in the Black defendant condition convicted less often and perceived the confession as less voluntary, these jurors likely attended more to the expert testimony than did those in the White defendant condition. Doing so may have allowed the testimony to sensitize jurors to the issues related to the disputed confession (e.g., long period of time, minimization and maximization techniques employed, lack of independent knowledge of the crime, etc.). However, because we did not manipulate the strength of the confession, it is unclear whether the expert testimony truly sensitized jurors in these conditions. Instead, they may have simply become skeptical of all confession evidence. Given that earlier findings regarding expert testimony and confession evidence suggest that the mere presence of expert testimony (regardless of the presence of coercive interrogation tactics) could reduce reliance on confessions ( Woody and Forrest, 2009 ), this was an important first step in establishing the presence of a watchdog effect. Future research should extend the current study’s design with the inclusion of a confession quality (i.e., lower vs. higher number of coercive tactics present in the interrogation) manipulation. Doing so would allow for a better understanding of whether sensitivity or skepticism is occurring in these situations.

Because our sample was predominantly White, we predicted an overall similarity-leniency bias such that Black defendants would be more likely to be convicted than defendants who were White ( Devine and Caughlin, 2014 ). Contrary to predictions, there was no significant main effect of defendant race on jurors’ verdicts. Although this finding conflicts with research supporting the similarity-leniency hypothesis (e.g., Ugwuegbu, 1978 ; Sommers and Ellsworth, 2000 ; Devine and Caughlin, 2014 ), other research has also demonstrated null effects relating to defendant race (e.g., Braden-Maguire et al., 2005 ; Maeder et al., 2012 ; Yamamoto and Maeder, 2017 ).

There are a number of potential explanations for why we observed no significant overall effect of defendant race. According to the aversive racism framework ( Schweitzer and Nuñez, 2018 ), the influence of racial bias is greatest in ambiguous situations ( Dovidio and Gaertner , 1996 2000 , 2004 ). In the current study, the legal instructions likely removed some of the ambiguity concerning participants’ verdict decision, lessening the effect defendant race may have had ( Pfeifer and Ogloff, 1991 ). Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis observed out-group bias in studies involving property crimes or adult sexual assaults, but much smaller (or non-existent) effects in studies using violent cases ( Devine and Caughlin, 2014 ). Because our trial transcript involved a murder, future research should consider replicating the current study using other crimes, such as burglary.

Finally, our data were collected between June and December 2018. During this time, the police’s unjust treatment of Black individuals became a salient topic in the media (e.g., Carney, 2016 ; Lopez, 2018 ; Scott, 2018 ). Our participants may therefore have been cognizant of the potential for such discrimination, particularly because the defendant claimed that he was threatened and coerced by police during his interrogation. Previous research has found that White jurors’ bias against BIPOC defendants is minimized when racial issues are made salient during the trial (e.g., Cohn et al., 2009 ; Bucolo and Cohn, 2010 ). It is a strong possibility that cases involving alleged police misconduct are inherently race salient, leading jurors to correct for racial bias and resulting in a null effect of defendant race ( Sommers and Ellsworth, 2000 , 2001 ). It is important to note that following the death of George Floyd in May 2020, the topic of racial discrimination in the United States’ justice system received unprecedented attention and media coverage. We encourage researchers to replicate and extend these findings to see what effect these recent events may have had in this context.

Similar to our results concerning defendant race, we observed no significant main effect of expert testimony on jurors’ verdicts. This complements the work of Jones and Penrod (2016) , as well as Moffa and Platania (2007) , but contradicts a number of other studies that did observe an effect of expert testimony in trials involving recanted confessions ( Woody and Forrest, 2009 ; Blandon-Gitlin et al., 2011 ; Woestehoff and Meissner, 2016 ). Related research concerning jurors’ perceptions of secondary confessions has also observed no significant effect of expert testimony on verdicts ( Neuschatz et al., 2012 ; Maeder and Pica, 2014 ).

In comparison to our results concerning expert testimony and verdict, there was a significant main effect of expert testimony on perceived voluntariness of the confession. One explanation for this pattern may be that although expert testimony lowered jurors’ perceived voluntariness of the confession, they still viewed the confession itself as indicative of guilt. Researchers have used the fundamental attribution error to explain jurors’ reluctance to discount disputed confession (e.g., Kassin and Sukel, 1997 ; Kassin and Gudjonsson, 2005 ). In our study, jurors may indeed have perceived the confession as less voluntary following expert testimony, but they still may have believed that overall, the defendant confessed because he was guilty (rather than because of the situational factors present). In similar research, Kassin and Wrightsman (1981) found instructions on the unreliability of coerced confessions significantly decreased participants’ perceived voluntariness of the confession, but did not influence verdicts.

In their work, Sargent and Bradfield (2004) manipulated the strength of the defendant’s alibi as well as the strength of the prosecutor’s cross-examination 4 ; future research should continue to examine the watchdog hypothesis by manipulating other types of evidence and/or expert testimony (such as expert testimony concerning police use of force or eyewitness identifications). Because the watchdog effect has now been demonstrated using both direct evidence (i.e., defendant’s alibi) as well as trial-level phenomena (i.e., cross-examination and expert testimony), we tentatively predict that our observed effects would likely generalize to these other forms of evidence. Further, our results underscore the notion that there is a complex effect of race in the courtroom that goes beyond a simple similarity-leniency effect; we found White jurors to be more lenient to the racial outgroup when given expert testimony. As discussed above, it may be the case that, due to the increased public attention regarding racial discrimination in the legal system, the similarity-leniency effect is minimized (or outright reduced) in trials involving potential police misconduct. More work examining this issue, particularly sampling from BIPOC jurors, is needed to better understand these complexities. Based on these preliminary results, White jurors appear to either interpret or apply evidence differently depending upon the defendant’s race, ultimately leading to different verdict decisions. Specifically, our findings suggest that attorneys should particularly consider the use of expert testimony in trials involving a BIPOC defendant and a recanted confession.

Finally, although we found evidence to suggest a watchdog effect, there are other possible explanations for our findings. In our study, White participants may have been more likely to use expert testimony in their verdict decisions when the defendant is Black as opposed to White not because they are paying more attention to legally relevant factors (as per the watchdog hypothesis), but because they are looking for a reason to acquit the Black defendant. This may be in an attempt to establish non-racist credentials (e.g., Effron and Conway, 2015 ) – when evaluating a Black defendant, White participants may feel as though their moral standing is uncertain, and so make greater use of the expert testimony and subsequently acquit in order to demonstrate their egalitarianism. Future research could implement a detailed measure of comprehension of the expert’s testimony. This would reveal whether participants comprehend the information better when the defendant is Black, or whether they simply use the expert testimony as a reason to acquit the Black defendant.

Limitations

Our study’s methodology had a number of limitations. To begin, we used a written trial transcript, which limited ecological validity ( Wenger and Bornstein, 2006 ). However, existing literature suggests that presentation mode does not significantly affect mock jurors’ verdict decisions ( Bornstein, 1999 ; Pezdek et al., 2010 ). Furthermore, our participants were likely aware that their responses had no true consequences, which may have influenced our findings ( Bornstein and McCabe, 2005 ; Bornstein et al., 2017 ). Studying real jury trials would help to overcome this problem of consequentiality and may have led to different results. However, such a methodology would also introduce a host of additional issues regarding feasibility and internal validity. Like most jury research, we also only used a single trial transcript that had specific evidence and charges. Replications using additional cases would increase the generalizability of our results.

An additional ecological limitation of the current study is the lack of a deliberation component. Although research has demonstrated that the jury’s final verdict is often predicted from individual verdicts ( Kalven and Zeisel, 1966 ; Devine et al., 2007 ), other literature suggests that deliberation can influence jurors’ bias ( London and Nunez, 2000 ) and also affect jurors’ cognitive processes when trying to reach a decision ( Salerno and Diamond, 2010 ; Salerno et al., 2017 ). Sommers (2006) has further demonstrated that the racial composition of a jury can influence how jurors talk about race, which may be relevant to our results as our study involved a Black defendant in half of the conditions. Therefore, future research examining the watchdog hypothesis should likely involve a deliberation component.

Because the study was conducted online on MTurk, there was a lack of general control over the environment in which participants responded, which may have produced environmental confounds. However, we implemented manipulation and attention checks to ascertain data quality (e.g., Peer et al., 2014 ). Using MTurk also allowed for recruitment from a nationwide community sample (rather than relying on an undergraduate sample from a single university), which likely increased the generalizability of our results ( Baker et al., 2016 ). Regardless, we still had a fairly racially homogenous sample, as response rates from BIPOC participants were low. We were therefore unable to do any proper comparisons based on juror race. Although the watchdog hypothesis focuses specifically on White jurors, future research needs to be conducted that explicitly examines BIPOC jurors’ perceptions in the courtroom.

Our study examined the role of defendant race and the influence of expert testimony in the context of trials involving recanted confessions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the interactive effects of these variables. For White jurors, we observed an interaction between defendant race and the presence of expert testimony. There was no significant effect of expert testimony on verdict when the defendant was White, but White jurors were significantly less likely to find the Black defendant guilty (and perceive his confession as voluntary) when presented with expert testimony concerning false confessions. These findings support the existence of the watchdog hypothesis ( Sargent and Bradfield, 2004 ), such that White jurors are more receptive to legally relevant evidence when the defendant is Black. To gain a stronger understanding of when this effect is elicited, future research should replicate the current study using other types of evidence and expert testimony.

Data Availability Statement

The raw data supporting the conclusions of this article will be made available by the authors, without undue reservation.

Ethics Statement

The studies involving human participants were reviewed and approved by the Carleton University Research Ethics Board-B (CUREB-B) Carleton University. The patients/participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study.

Author Contributions

LE and EM contributed to the conception and design of the study and conducted the data analysis. LE organized the data collection and wrote the first draft of the manuscript. EM wrote the sections of the manuscript. Both authors contributed to manuscript revision, read, and approved the submitted version.

This research received funding from the American-Psychology Law Society’s Diversity Research Award.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Publisher’s Note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

  • ^ The Innocence Project includes false admissions and other forms of self-incrimination in their definition of false confessions.
  • ^ The National Registry of Exonerations defines a false confession as “a statement made to law enforcement at any point during the proceedings which was interpreted or presented by law enforcement as an admission of participation in or presence at the crime, even if the statement was not presented at trial. A statement is not a confession if it was made to someone other than law enforcement. A statement that is not at odds with the defense is not a confession. A guilty plea is not a confession.” In comparison, the Innocence Project’s definition includes false admissions and other forms of self-incrimination in their definition of false confessions.
  • ^ Sixty-two participants failed the manipulation check concerning defendant race, while 184 participants failed the manipulation check concerning the content of the expert’s testimony. For attention checks, participants were instructed to select a particular response. Twenty-six participants failed the first attention check, 29 participants failed the second attention check, and 33 failed the third attention check.
  • ^ In the “weak” cross-examination condition, participants read a case summary where the court reporters indicated the prosecution had presented ineffective cross-examinations of the defense witnesses. In the “strong” condition, the case summary described the prosecution as presenting an effective cross-examination that diminished the defense witnesses’ credibility.

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Keywords : juror decision-making, recanted confessions, watchdog hypothesis, expert testimony, juries, confession evidence, defendant race

Citation: Ewanation L and Maeder EM (2021) The Interactive Effects of Race and Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Perceptions of Recanted Confessions. Front. Psychol. 12:699077. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.699077

Received: 22 April 2021; Accepted: 02 August 2021; Published: 03 September 2021.

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Copyright © 2021 Ewanation and Maeder. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Logan Ewanation, [email protected]

Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

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    Juror Bias in Noncapital Cases. Dozens of experimental studies have been conducted to examine the influence of defendant race and ethnicity, usually conceptualized as Black versus White, on noncapital juror decision making. Over the past decade, two meta-analyses have provided quantitative syntheses of this research.

  14. PDF Similarity Leniency in Mens Rea Determinations and The Mediating ...

    Similarity leniency is found when jurors of one race (e.g., White or Black) are more lenient when judging a defendant of the same race (e.g., White or Black, respectively), and ... race, but this hypothesis has yet to be tested empirically. Moreover, the mechanism driving this phenomenon remains unclear (Devine & Caughlin, 2014).

  15. PDF Defendant-juror similarity and mock joror judgments

    Defendant-Juror Simila nd Mock ity Juror Judgments*. Norbert L. Kerr,t Robert W.Hymes, Alonzo B. Anderson,w and James E.Weathers. Itwas hypothesized that juror-defendant similarity would ead to greater leniency toward a criminal defendant when the evidence against that defendant was weak orinconclusive; b when t evidence was strong, it was ...

  16. PDF An Examination of Jury Verdicts for Evidence of a Similarity-Leniency

    hypothesis incorporates SIT and a liking-leniency hypothesis proposed by Davis, Bray, and Holt (1977). The liking-leniency hypothesis stated that a well-liked defen-dant should receive more lenient treatment than one who is disliked. Kerr et al.'s similarity-leniency hypothesis suggested that jurors would be more lenient toward a

  17. Strength of Evidence, Extraevidentiary Influence, and the ...

    To examine relationships between strength of evidence (SOE) and extraevidentiary variables in the context of Kalven and Zeisel's (The American Jury, 1966) liberation hypothesis, post-trial questionnaire data were collected from judges, attorneys, and jurors associated with 179 criminal jury trials. SOE ratings were strongly correlated with jury verdicts on the three most serious charges ...

  18. Similarity Hypothesis

    Similarity Hypothesis: A hypothesis which states that we tend to be attracted towards individuals who share similar important traits, such as attitudes and values. Cognitive Processing: A general term to describe any mental function involved in acquiring, storing, interpreting and manipulating information. These functions can be conscious or ...

  19. Defendant-juror similarity and mock joror judgments

    It was hypothesized that joror-defendant similarity would lead to greater leniency toward a criminal defendant when the evidence against that defendant was weak or inconclusive; but when evidence was strong, it was expected that this relationship would be reversed. In Study 1, religious similarity was found to be simply and positively related to evaluation of the defendant and leniency, a ...

  20. Leniency Bias in Performance Ratings: The Big-Five Correlates

    DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00521. Keywords: Some researchers assume that employees' personality characteristics affect leniency in rating others and themselves. However, little research has investigated these two tendencies at the same time. In the present study we developed one index for other-rating leniency and another one for self-rating ….

  21. Solved The similarity-leniency hypothesis seems to generally

    The similarity - leniency hypothesis seems to generally apply when evidence is In such cases, jurors tend to give those defendants who are like them. weak or inconclusive; harsher sentences. meak or inconclusive; the benefit of the doubt. especially strong; harsher sentences. especially strong; the benefit of the doubt.

  22. Frontiers

    This similarity-leniency bias may be explained by social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel and Turner, 1986), which argues that people have a motivation to favor and prefer individuals belonging to their groups (rather than those outside of their groups) as a method of promoting a positive self-concept. In a criminal trial, social identity theory ...

  23. The similarity-lenience hypothesis seems to generally apply when

    The similarity-leniency hypothesis is a concept in legal psychology suggesting that jurors are often more lenient in their judgments towards defendants who share similarities with themselves, particularly when evidence is weak or ambiguous. Therefore, the correct answer is b) "Weak; lenient judgments." This means, when evidence is weak, jurors ...