organizational crisis management research paper

Crisis management process for project-based organizations

International Journal of Managing Projects in Business

ISSN : 1753-8378

Article publication date: 30 May 2023

Issue publication date: 18 December 2023

The purpose of this paper is to study the crisis management process for project-based organizations (PBOs) by developing a comprehensive model and propositions.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper is based on a conceptual study. A literature review is considered a primary source for studying contemporary research, including 171 publications in total, which embody qualitative, quantitative, conceptual and theoretical studies. For data analysis, content analysis is used, which is comprised of descriptive and thematic analysis.

This study identifies five imperative elements of crisis management for PBOs which include (1) sense-making (information gathering and crisis interpretation), (2) decision-making (accurate and timely decision), (3) response (reactive response), (4) outcome (success/failure) and (5) learning. Based on these findings, this study proposes an integrative model of the interplay between sense-making, decision-making, response, outcome and learning. Furthermore, the findings lead to propositions for each of the elements. The paper contributes to the literature on dynamic capability theory.

Originality/value

This paper explores the crisis management process for PBOs. The proposed model deepens the understanding of the practices and processes of project-based crisis management.

• Crisis management

Sense-making

Decision-making, project-based organizations.

Iftikhar, R. , Majeed, M. and Drouin, N. (2023), "Crisis management process for project-based organizations", International Journal of Managing Projects in Business , Vol. 16 No. 8, pp. 100-125. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMPB-10-2020-0306

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2023, Rehab Iftikhar, Mehwish Majeed and Nathalie Drouin

Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode

Introduction

The research on crises started to develop in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in the fields of psychology, sociology and disaster response ( Jaques, 2009 ). It is generally accepted that a crisis is an unexpected event for which there are no contingency plans in place ( Hermann, 1963 ). Some of the major characteristics of a crisis are that it is an unforeseen, immeasurable, unknown and unplanned event ( Seeger, 2002 ; Oh et al. , 2013 ). A crisis is considered as “a low-probability, high impact event” ( Pearson and Clair, 1998 , as cited in Wilding and Paraskevas, 2006 ; Oh et al. , 2013 ; Iftikhar and Müller, 2019 ). Typically, a crisis is seen as a negative phenomenon, an event that threatens the organization ( Valackiene, 2011 ). In addition, crises can degrade organizational performance ( Scott, 1987 ); project-based organizations (PBOs) are no exception to this. Any organization, including PBOs in both the private and public sectors, does not want to fail and cannot afford poor performance ( Zeyanalian et al. , 2013 ). Despite the significance of crises for PBOs, surprisingly little research has been carried out so far ( Loosemore, 2000 ; Loosemore and Teo, 2000 ). Given the lack of research and the importance of the topic ( Hällgren and Wilson, 2008 ), it is clearly important to study how PBOs manage crises.

As mentioned above, crises in project settings are rarely discussed ( Hällgren and Wilson, 2011 ). A more neutral term of risk is used interchangeably with crisis ( Meyer et al. , 2002 ; Geraldi et al. , 2010 ; Iftikhar and Müller, 2019 ). Risk is “identifiable” ( Sicotte and Bourgault, 2008 , p. 468), involving foreseen and known events, which can be managed, but no one knows when they will occur ( Knight, 1921 ; Meyer et al. , 2002 ). Risk contains the property of the known-unknown, which means it is identifiable, but it is not possible to find out if exactly it will occur. Risk is measurable, predictable and manageable ( Knight, 1921 ). However, a crisis is an unforeseen, unmeasurable and unpredictable event ( Seeger, 2002 ). Crisis is commonly described as an unanticipated, surprising and ambiguous event posing a significant threat, leaving only a short decision time ( Hermann, 1963 ; Pearson and Clair, 1998 ). According to Iftikhar and Müller (2019) , risk is a potential future event, characterized by a certain probability of occurrence and, if it occurs, leading to negative consequences. Unlike crises, contingencies can be planned for risks, whereas a crisis is a threat with a high level of uncertainty with no contingency plan. This difference places emphasis on crisis management as crisis contains an element of surprise and required prompt decision-making.

Crisis management is a systematic process (step-wise approach) by which an organization attempts to effectively identify potential crises that an organization may encounter and plan how to manage them in such a way as to minimize the effects of the crisis ( Pearson and Clair, 1998 ; Gonzalez-Herrero and Smith, 2010 ; Ulmer et al. , 2017 ). The objective of crisis management is to avoid or minimize the negative impact of a crisis on an organization and its objectives ( Gonzalez-Herrero and Smith, 2010 ). It is an attempt to avoid or manage crisis events ( Pearson and Clair, 1998 ) that disturb the entire organization and concern the survival and durability of an organization. There are different crisis management approaches involved in the process, such as preparing, identifying and planning to respond to and resolve the crisis ( Ponis and Koronis, 2012 ). Coombs (1999) suggests a crisis management model which is based on prevention (detecting warning signals and taking action to mitigate the crisis), preparation (developing a crisis plan), response (trying to return to normal routines) and revision (determining what was done right). However, the common attributes of crisis management are the identification of crisis types and sources; responses to crises; and recovery from damage ( Ponis and Koronis, 2012 ). Researchers are of the view that the crisis management process should be divided into different stages. For instance, Mitroff et al. (1987) , Pearson and Mitroff (1993) and Mitroff (1994) proposed five phases of crisis management: signal detection (detecting early warning signals and then preparing for the crisis), preparation (trying to reduce the potential harm of a known crisis including developing crisis teams, training and exercises), damage containment (intended to limit the effects of the crisis, restraining parts of the organization or environment), recovery (fixing the damage caused by the crisis, trying to go back to normal business operation as soon as possible), followed by learning (the organization should examine what happened before, during and after the crisis and then identify the lessons that have been learned).

Although the research on crisis management is gaining popularity, it is, however, limited to traditional organizations ( Valackiene, 2011 ) by particularly focusing on exogenous phenomena, such as antecedents, management and consequences of crisis ( Simard and Laberge, 2018 ; Wang and Pitsis, 2020 ) while ignoring PBOs. The need for crisis management in PBOs is more substantial than in traditional organizations, and PBOs are an especially interesting context for crises given that most of their undertakings are unique and difficult to plan in advance ( Loosemore, 2000 ; Geraldi et al. , 2010 ). PBOs are different from conventional organizations since they are temporarily formed to perform unique and complex tasks ( Sydow et al. , 2004 ; Turner, 2006 ). According to Lundin and Söderholm (1995) , there are four attributes that make temporary organizations different from permanent ones: (1) time (temporary organizations have a built-in time dimension that contains the starting and ending time periods); (2) task (the reason for establishing of the temporary organization; the task is unique and complex, so the task seems to be more relevant to project team despite being members of permanent organizations); (3) team (temporary organizations rely on teams in which interdependent sets of people work together, and these teams are groups of individual, not organizational entities); and (4) transition (temporary organizations consider transition something important and useful, e.g. to overcome inertia, which is inherent in most of the permanent organizations). Permanent organizations have more naturally defined goals (rather than tasks), survival (rather than time), a working organization (rather than teams) and production processes, and continual development (rather than transition) ( Lundin and Söderholm, 1995 ). PBOs are temporary organizations and coexist with permanent organizations ( Kutsch and Hall, 2005 ).

Several studies have highlighted the dire need to investigate crisis management in the context of PBOs ( Pourbabaei et al. , 2015 ; Simard and Laberge, 2018 ), but the field of crisis management is very vast and still in its infancy because there is not a standardized process for crisis management ( Shrivastava, 1994 ; Hussain, 2019 ). Moreover, PBOs are different from permanent organizations. So far, little is known about crisis management in PBOs. It is necessary to develop a core framework which directs the crisis management process in PBOs. As a result, there is a need to further study crisis management in the context of PBOs. Keeping in view the scarcity of research, this conceptual study bridges the aforementioned gaps by developing a comprehensive model of the crisis management process and propositions for PBOs, which will advance the knowledge of crisis management in the project management field. In doing so we make several contributions. First, we clarify the process of crisis management for PBOs. Despite an increase in scholarly attention (e.g. Pearson and Clair, 1998 ; Ponis and Koronis, 2012 ), there is not generally accepted theoretical or conceptual delineation of crisis management for PBOs. We felt our contribution could be the development of a framework that could help researchers and practitioners in different fields to reflect on their research and to provide guidance from the developed crisis management model. Second, scholars and practitioners have a clear understanding of the factors that contribute to crisis management for PBOs, this will enhance their understanding of crisis and prepare them for crisis management. Third, we explore processes such as sense-making and decision-making, response and learning through which crisis is managed. Finally, we extend dynamic capability theory, in which we considered crisis management as a capability to perform a task. The organization uses its crisis management capabilities to identify crises and to minimize their impact on performance as well as learn from the outcome, i.e. the success or failure of the crisis management process which will refine and enhance further the crisis management process.

Literature review

PBOs have received increasing attention as an emerging organizational form ( Hobday, 2000 ). PBOs first became famous in the late 1990s. PBOs are found in a wide range of industries ( Thiry and Deguire, 2007 ). These include consulting and professional services (e.g. accounting, advertising, architectural design, law, management consulting and public relations), cultural industries (e.g. fashion, theatre, film-making, video games, advertisement and publishing), high technology (e.g. software, computer hardware, multimedia, aerospace, ICT and IT) and complex products and systems (e.g. construction, shipbuilding, transportation, telecommunications, oil and gas, defense, infrastructure, pharmaceutical, biotech, semi-conductors, automotive and electric equipment) ( Midler, 1995 ; Hobday, 2000 ; Berggren et al. , 2001 ; Ebers and Powell, 2007 ). Organizations that work predominantly or entirely performed in projects are commonly referred to as PBOs ( DeFillipi and Arthur, 1998 ).

A project is “a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product or service” ( PMI, 2004 , p. 4). A comprehensive definition of the project is a temporary organization in which human, material and financial resources are organized in a novel way to undertake a unique and transient endeavor to achieve an objective conforming to specific requirements (have defined start and end dates and funding limits), managing the inherent uncertainty and need for integration in order to deliver beneficial objectives of change ( Toor and Ogunlana, 2010 ; Yang et al. , 2011 ). Generally, projects as temporary systems refer to groups comprising a mix of different specialist competences, which have to achieve a certain goal or carry out a specific task within limits set as to costs and time ( Sydow et al. , 2004 ).

There are several definitions of crisis, but we choose the most widely cited and well-recognized definition, proposed by Pearson and Clair, which is also cited by other contemporary researchers (such as Wilding and Paraskevas, 2006 ; Oh et al. , 2013 ; Iftikhar and Müller, 2019 ). Pearson and Clair view crisis as “a low-probability, high impact event that threatens the viability of the organization [in our case, it is a project-based organization] and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly” (1998, p. 60). The most recent study ( Williams et al. , 2017) defines a crisis as a low-probability, unanticipated, high-impact event that, which is aligned with Pearson and Clair's perspective of crisis.

The definition highlights crisis as (1) a major, unpredictable event that is likely to interfere with normal business operations and has the potential to threaten survival, (2) a rare event which includes an element of surprise and (3) being characterized by time pressures, requiring a quick decision and response to minimize its impact ( Bonn and Rundle-Thiele, 2007 ; Yang et al. , 2022 ). Examining the above definition, there are a few characteristics. First, a crisis is an unplanned event that has the potential of dismantling the internal and external structure of an organization. A crisis may affect not only the employees and other members internal to the organization but also key stakeholders external to the organization. Second, a crisis may occur in any organization (small, medium or large and national or international) and in any industry ( Coleman, 2004 ; Keeffe and Darling, 2008 ). Finally, a crisis may affect the legitimacy of an organization ( Ray, 1999 ).

Several studies have found that crises may have positive as well as negative consequences ( Darling, 1994 ; Veil, 2011 ). In that respect, crises can present critical challenges to organizations, both externally and internally, and there is no guarantee that high-performing organizations will continue to perform well in times of crisis ( Lin et al. , 2006 ; Hällgren and Wilson, 2008 ). According to Wang and Pitsis (2020) , crisis is an unexpected event that threatens the security of PBOs, which makes it an especially interesting context of crises as the PBOs undertakings are unique and difficult to plan in advance ( Loosemore, 2000 ; Geraldi et al. , 2010 ). At the same time, prior research indicates that crisis management is crucial to the operations of any PBO, and that these organizations must develop capabilities to maintain a steady state of operations as well as the ability to respond to crises ( Söderlund and Tell, 2009 ). Effective crisis management requires knowing the particular nature of each crisis and what caused it, how to make prompt decisions and respond to it ( Najafbagy, 2011 ). However, different researchers have come up with different strategies to minimize the negative consequences of the crisis. For instance, Alkharabsheh et al. (2014) suggest the development of an “early warning system” that can help project managers in surviving a crisis with minimal loss. Patil et al. (2016) emphasized on transparent communication and reporting during a crisis and recommended team members to develop and strictly follow rules for minimizing the crisis.

Despite, the abundance of crisis management strategies, there is limited literature available on the crisis management framework. The existing studies on crisis management have devised strategies which can only be implemented to megaprojects ( Wang and Pitsis, 2020 ; Iftikhar et al. , 2021 ; Wang, 2022 ) and specific industries, such as housing projects ( Patil et al. , 2016 ), infrastructure project ( Van Os et al. , 2015 ) and software projects ( Sangaiah et al. , 2018 ). Moreover, contemporary research gives importance to crisis, but we find that the integrated crisis management process model is not developed for PBOs which can provide guidance to PBOs in crisis situations. There is a need to develop an integrated framework for crisis management that can be applied to project-based settings ( Bundy et al. , 2017 ; Williams et al. , 2017 ). Keeping in view these important research gaps, the current study aims to develop a comprehensive conceptual crisis management framework that can be used by PBOs to manage the crisis.

Dynamic capability theory

This paper considers the theoretical lens of dynamic capability theory. Dynamic capabilities theory examines how organizations integrate, build and reconfigure their internal and external organization-specific competencies into new competencies that match their turbulent environment, which enables organizations to effectively respond to changes in dynamic environments ( Teece et al. , 1997 ). Davies et al. (2016) study that to achieve organizational dynamic capabilities, flexibility and adaptability are required to handle crises. According to Killen and Hunt (2010) , dynamic capability consists of people, structures and processes that are continually monitored and adjusted to meet the changing requirements of the dynamic environment. Although, studies on crisis management have recently adopted insights from dynamic capability theory ( Mayr et al. , 2022 ; Sahebalzamani et al. , 2023 ); however, research on crisis management in PBO's under the lens of dynamic capability theory is still lacking. Since PBO's are different from traditional organizations, the nature of the crisis, its sources and solutions may also vary for PBOs. Relying on dynamic capability theory, this study aims to explore the crisis management process for PBO's. The PBO uses its crisis management capabilities to identify crisis and minimize their impact on performance ( Helfat et al. , 2007 ). In the suggested crisis management process model, we considered crisis as a turbulent environment containing external and internal crises and PBOs integrate, build and reconfigure their sense-making, decision-making, response and learning competencies, particularly for crisis management.

A systematic literature review synthesizes the existing body of knowledge and creates new knowledge ( Tranfield et al. , 2003 ). We implement a systematic literature review in three steps, as illustrated in Figure 1 .

The first step includes searching for articles using electronic databases (EBSCO Business Source Complete, Google Scholar and ISI Web of Science). The search rule employed in the title/abstract/keyword (T/A/K) field of the selected databases was (“crisis, “crisis management,” “project,” and “project-based organizations”) and (“sense-making”, “information gathering”, “crisis interpretation”, “decision-making”, “response” and “learning”). We also deployed a snowball approach by tracing the references in the articles found to incorporate the most imperative research work. This revealed 365 articles, all published between 1963 and 2022. Manual screening of each article's publication source and abstract was then conducted according to the following predefined inclusion criteria: articles must be (1) written in English; (2) published in peer-reviewed journals, books or book chapters and conference papers; and (3) published in high-ranking journals. Book reviews and editorials were eliminated, and only peer-reviewed papers were considered in this research. This led to the inclusion of articles published in journals such as the Academy of Management Journal ( AMJ ), Academy of Management Executive (AME), Academy of Management Review ( AMR ), Administrative Science Quarterly ( ASQ ), Journal of Management Studies ( JMS ), Management Learning (ML), Organization Science ( OS ), Business Ethics Quarterly , the International Journal of Project Management (IJPM), Project Management Journal (PMJ) , International Journal of Managing Projects in Business and Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management. To these, we added two of the leading practitioner-oriented journals, namely, the California Management Review ( CMR ) and Harvard Business Review ( HBR ).

The literature was selected for review based on its relevance to the topic under study. So far that reason in the next step, we excluded irrelevant papers by reading their titles, abstracts and keywords. The abstract was read if the title did not explicitly exclude the relevancy of the article. However, the abstract did not always provide enough information to decide whether the article included relevant information or not. In that case, the first author decides whether an article was useful by going through the introduction section. To avoid unnecessarily excluding other relevant studies published in lower ranking journals, the abstract was reviewed, and if it met the required standards, these articles were also considered for review. This stage yielded a total of 171 publications. We incorporated both empirical (qualitative and quantitative), conceptual and theoretical studies in the review. Moreover, the literature review also includes textbooks/reports relevant to our study.

The next step is to analyze those publications, the technique of content analysis is employed to “classify large amounts of text into an efficient number of categories that represent similar meanings” ( Hsieh and Shannon, 2005 , p. 1278). This content analysis comprises two parts: descriptive and thematic. The descriptive analysis was achieved by providing a description of the studies gathered in the data extraction form. The thematic analysis was done by analyzing the studies and defining the different themes presented in each study. As discussed by Tranfield et al. (2003) , it is essential to connect themes across the diverse core contributions and highlight any connections. The process creates an overview of the main findings and generates a solid basis to identify research gaps ( Tranfield et al. , 2003 ). The following sections detail and analyze each of the identified themes.

Findings: conceptual framework: crisis management process model – a multidimensional perspective

In Figure 2 , we provide a comprehensive model of the crisis management process for PBOs. We begin our presentation of the model by discussing the importance of sense-making, followed by decision-making, response, outcome and learning. Sense-making is about developing an understanding of crisis ( Weick et al. , 2005 ). This is considered the first step in our model as once a crisis strike, it is of utmost important to understand the crisis. Once an understanding of crisis is developed through sense-making, the next crucial step is to make decisions. A crisis needs rapid and right decision-making in order to minimize its impact as described by Pearson and Clair (1998) . Decision-making is a process of selecting the best option ( Anderson, 1983 ). The next step is to apply the decision by taking appropriate actions. According to Brunsson (1982) , actions are supposed to be initiated by rational decision procedures. The response is actually an implementation of the best option derived from decision-making process. It leads to outcome which could be success and failure ( Bundy and Pfarrer, 2015 ). The outcome which could be either success or failure, leads to organizational learning ( Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002 ; Baum and Dahlin, 2007 ).

Prior studies have considered how sense-making unfolds in a crisis in a wide range of contexts, including the Bhopal accident ( Weick, 2010 ), the Mann Gulch fire ( Weick, 1993 ), etc., which are illustrations of life-threatening events ( Iftikhar et al. , 2021 ). It does not take fire or a life-threatening event to precipitate a crisis, but it also includes normal accidents ( Kornberger et al ., 2019 ), which is the focus of this study. Much of the work examines sense-making in a single high-reliability organization (such as firefighting and aircraft carrier flight decks) ( Maitlis, 2005 ; Rudolph et al. , 2009 ; Clark and Geppert, 2011 ; Cornelissen, 2012 ; Monin et al. , 2013 ). In addition, prior research considered decisions as a result of a sense-making process ( Weick, 1995 ; Musca et al. , 2014 ). Decision-making is integral to the management of projects ( Stingl and Geraldi, 2017 ) and at time of crisis, it is extremely important.

We explored the role of response for crises; a response is an action which could alter the environment under consideration ( Porac et al. , 1989 ). The literature talks about proactive and reactive responses to abrupt events ( Barber and Warn, 2005 ). In addition, following the response, the outcome is either success or failure. There is a learning process whereby an organization acquires new information ( Miner and Robinson, 1994 ), and this helps to improve its prospects in environments ( Cyert and March, 1963 ; Sommer et al. , 2016 ).

The term “sense-making” is introduced by Karl Weick and simply means “the making of sense.” It refers to how we structure the unknown to be able to act in it ( Weick, 1995 , p. 4). Sense-making is the process through which people work to understand issues or events that are novel, ambiguous, confusing or in some other way violate expectations. Sense-making is triggered by cues such as issues, events or situations, for which the meaning is ambiguous and the outcome is uncertain ( Meyer, 1982 ), and where events, issues and actions are somehow surprising and confusing ( Weick, 1993 , 1995 ; Maitlis, 2005 ). According to Cornelissen (2012 , p. 118), “Sense-making refers to processes of meaning construction whereby people interpret events and issues within and outside of their organizations that are somehow surprising, complex, or confusing to them”.

Sense-making involves a few steps. The foremost step is sensing the problem. A problem is perceived when a discrepancy or gap occurs between the existing state (perceived reality, initial state) and the desired state (goal, standard of how things should be in the terminal state). Sensing a discrepancy between the existing and desired state is the first step in the process. When a situation feels “different,” it is experienced as a situation of discrepancy ( Orlikowski and Gash, 1994 ), breakdown ( Patriotta, 2003 ), surprise ( Louis, 1980 ), disconfirmation ( Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001 ), opportunity ( Dutton, 1993 ) or interruption ( Mandler, 1984 ). There are three main “sense-making moves” or key processes: scanning/information seeking, interpreting/creating interpretations and responding/taking action. These are all important aspects of the more general notion of sense-making ( Daft and Weick, 1984 ; Milliken, 1990 ; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991 ; Weber and Glynn, 2006 ; Rudolph et al. , 2009 ). According to Weick et al. (2005) , sense-making is about how something comes to be an event for organizational members. Second, sense-making is about the question: What does an event mean? In the context of everyday life, when people confront something unintelligible and ask, “What's the story here?” they then ask, “Now what should I do?” ( Weick et al. , 2005 ). We believe that information seeking, and the interpretation of the situation are the two pillars of the sense-making process; however, response is a separate dimension.

Information gathering

Dealing with uncertainty requires information from the environment ( Braybrooke, 1964 ). Information gathering is defined as the process of monitoring the environment and providing environmental data to managers ( Daft and Weick, 1984 ). Information can come from external or internal, and personal or impersonal sources ( Aguilar, 1967 ; Keegan, 1974 ). In external sources, managers have direct contact with information outside the organization and search the external environment to identify important events or issues ( Daft and Weick, 1984 ; Milliken, 1990 ). Internal sources pertain to information collected and provided to managers by other people in the organization through internal channels). Personal sources involve direct contact with other individuals, whereas impersonal sources are written documents such as newspapers and magazines or reports from the organization's information system ( Daft and Weick, 1984 ). As per Iftikhar et al . (2022a) , these information-gathering sources are equally relevant for PBOs. On the one hand, hazardous and rapidly unfolding situations are difficult to comprehend, so people want to gather more information to determine the most appropriate action. On the other hand, the demands of the situation often require them to take action with incomplete information, since in a crisis, there is pressure (and sometimes immense pressure) to make sense of the world quickly ( Maitlis, 2005 ) and the pressure built-ups in the temporary setting of PBOs. According to Ajmal et al. (2010) , PBOs suffer adversely when they do not have proper information systems in place, affecting their knowledge management activities.

Of course, all of the information received is not necessarily relevant. Accessing the right information at the right time can also be problematic. One of the problems with information gathering is information overload. Information overload means having more information than one can acquire, process, store or retrieve ( Brennan, 2011 ). In their comprehensive review of the literature on information overload, Eppler and Mengis (2004 , p. 326) offered the following description: “Information overload occurs when the supply exceeds the capacity, and a diminished decision quality are the result.” Overload often leads to stress, inefficiency and mistakes that can result in poor decisions, bad analysis and/or miscommunication ( Eppler and Mengis, 2004 ). Therefore, we need quality information, which means the right information at the right time in the right amount.

Rich information gathering (internal and external) will positively impact the accuracy of PBOs' decision-making.

Rich information gathering (internal and external) will negatively impact the timeliness of PBOs' decision-making.

Decision quality depends upon three factors: (a) the quality of information inputs into the decision process (it depends on the ability of the system to effectively absorb information flows, thus preventing overloads and reducing noise in communication channels. Noise depends upon the distance between units in the organization); (b) the fidelity of objective articulation and tradeoff evaluation (input: cognitive abilities and group think; output: quality decisions); and (c) the cognitive abilities of the decision group (the abilities of the decision unit to interpret information, generate options creatively, calculate and make choices between alternative courses of action) ( Smart and Vertinsky, 1977 ).

Crisis interpretation

Interpretation is the process of translating events and developing shared understanding, but it occurs before action ( Daft and Weick, 1984 ). We consider crisis as “a low-probability, high impact event” ( Pearson and Clair, 1998 , p. 60). Crisis interpretation defines where the crisis lies and what the sources and characteristics of the crisis are, meaning whether the crisis lies internally or externally, the reason for the crisis and whether the crisis is technical, economic or social in nature ( Iftikhar et al. , 2022a ). In this paper, we draw on the classic work of Mitroff et al. (1987 , 1988) and Shrivastava and Mitroff (1987) to develop a typology, where crises are categorized into four types relying on a framework consisting of two dimensions. First, the internal-external dimension determines the source of factors that result in a crisis, which can be the failure of an internal organization system or a failure in the organization's external environment. Second, the technical-social dimension involves the characteristics of factors that cause a crisis; these include technical and/or economic failures or issues associated with human, organizational or social concerns. Following Mitroff et al. 's (1987) and Shrivastava and Mitroff's (1987) typologies of crises, we derived Table 1 .

Cell 1 represents failures in internal social processes and systems. These crises are most often caused by operator or managerial errors, intentional harm by saboteurs, faulty control systems, unhealthy working conditions or the failure of decision-making systems. The miscommunication of vital safety information, unsafe decisions or deliberate harm may result from these failures ( Shrivastava and Mitroff, 1987 ). In 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded 74 s after takeoff, killing all six crew members and one civilian passenger. This tragedy was a crisis for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The explosion was caused by the failure of the solid rocket booster that powered the shuttle. The launch took place at an extremely low air temperature, which caused the seals of the booster to lose their elasticity and malfunction. The problem was in the design of booster seals ( Shrivastava et al. , 1988 ; Vaughan, 1996 ).

Cell 2 represents technical and economic failures in internal organizational systems. These are caused by failures in the core technology of firms. Crises in this cell are triggered by major industrial accidents, such as Bhopal, Three Mile Island or Chernobyl. Defects in plant equipment, design or supplies are the primary cause of these crises. For example, a reactor meltdown at a nuclear power plant in Chernobyl caused the deaths of about 30 people. Hundreds of thousands of those living in the vicinity of the plant were severely irradiated ( Shrivastava and Mitroff, 1987 ; Liberatore, 2013 ).

Cell 3 represents failures in the social environment of corporations. These crises occur when agents or institutions in the social environment react adversely to the corporation. Incidents of sabotage, terrorism or off-site product tampering or misuse are examples of such failures ( Shrivastava and Mitroff, 1987 ). For example, in 1982, dozens of Tylenol capsules were found to be contaminated with cyanide. Eight people who ingested these capsules died immediately. This created a nationwide public health scandal and a crisis for Johnson & Johnson, who had manufactured the capsules. The full cost of withdrawing products from shelves and switching from the production of capsules to other forms of medication exceeded $500 million ( Shrivastava and Mitroff, 1987 ; Mitroff et al. , 1988 ; Olaniran et al. , 2012 ).

Cell 4 displays crises primarily related to technological and economic failures in the firm's environment, which cause crises within the organization. Examples might include hostile takeover attempts prompted by the restructuring of industries, drastic currency rate changes and other macroeconomic occurrences or attacks by corporate raiders. In 1985, for instance, cheese contaminated with poisonous bacteria was sold in California, which killed 84 people, creating a major public health crisis that affected the entire state. The victims' relatives sued the manufacturer for billions of dollars, forcing it into a hostile takeover ( Shrivastava and Mitroff, 1987 ).

Crises are characterized by low probability/high consequence events that threaten the most fundamental goals of an organization. Because of their low probability, these events defy interpretations and impose severe demands on sense-making. It is crucial to give meaning to crises in order to make appropriate decisions. According to studies done on the causes of real-life crises that took place in PBOs such as defense and healthcare; in formal, the majority of the crises took place due to the misinterpretation of the whole situation ( Fisher et al. , 2003 ); in the latter, a misinterpretation of information led to the death of a patient ( Albrecht et al. , 2004 ). Both these studies highlight the serious consequences of poor interpretations of crises. A crisis is an unknown situation that brings with it a lot of questions with no obvious answers, thus, creating the challenge of interpreting the situation properly ( Williams et al. , 2017 ). Those organizations which fail to interpret crises end up facing serious losses ( Li et al. , 2018 ). People who fail to interpret a crisis efficiently and effectively end up indulging in irrational decision-making ( Leung and Law, 2016 ). Decision-making is shaped by the quality of information sharing and information processing during and after a crisis ( Uitdewilligen and Waller, 2018 ).

Crisis interpretation is likely to lead to accurate and timely PBOs' decision-making.

During a crisis, decision-making is critical to make accurate and timely decisions ( Loosemore, 1998 ). The consequences of a crisis are high, as it is a low-probability, high-severity event; however, its impact can be reduced by rapid and accurate decision-making ( Mallak and Kurstedt, 1997 ; Kahn et al. , 2013 ). Good decisions must be made quickly, despite the uncertainty, time pressure and high stakes associated with a crisis ( Pearson and Clair, 1998 ). As Sawle (1991) said of the importance of decisions in a crisis, “the worst decision is no decision, and the second worst decision is a late one”. It is critical to integrate crises in decision-making process. The objective is to make the right decisions and execute them effectively. Decision-making is complex and at times of crisis, it is more complicated ( Wilson, 2013 ), as a crisis is an unexpected, unusual and abnormal event ( Lacombe, 2002 ). The core elements that define a crisis – ambiguity, urgency and high stakes – are also severe constraints on the ability of individuals to make decisions effectively ( Pearson and Clair, 1998 ).

Decision-making in crises is characterized by a high level of uncertainty, urgency to act, a narrowing of options and high-stakes implications for organizational survival. At the time of crisis, the challenge for any organization is to make decisions quickly and accurately ( Bonn and Rundle-Thiele, 2007 ) as individuals make decisions based on their perceptions ( Wang and Pitsis, 2020 ). In a crisis, one must secure a high-quality decision-making process. A decision process consists of the articulation of objectives, the generation of alternate courses of action, an appraisal of their feasibility, an evaluation of the consequences of the given alternatives, and a choice of the alternative which contributes most to the attainment of organizational objectives ( Smart and Vertinsky, 1977 ). In conventional terms, the task of making a decision can be decomposed into five subtasks: (1) identifying the relevant goals; (2) searching for alternative courses of action; (3) predicting the consequences of following each alternative; (4) evaluating each alternative in terms of its consequences for goal achievement; and (5) selecting the best alternative for achieving the goal ( Anderson, 1983 ).

Timely and accurate PBOs' decisions will lead to an appropriate crisis response.

Response is a capacity where people feel they can do something about the crisis ( Weick, 1988 ). Organizations increasingly face crises, yet little is known about how they develop their responses to unexpected events that enable their work to continue. According to Wang and Pitsis (2020) , the agreement of key stakeholders on response strategies is critical to resolving a crisis. One of the characteristics of a crisis is that it contains an element of surprise. A surprise is a break in expectations that arises from situations that are not anticipated or do not proceed as planned ( Cunha et al. , 2006 ) and encompasses any element within an organization that is unexpected and draws attention away from the standard progression of the work. Crises can occur in various ways. They can be generated by events and by processes. It is impossible for people to know in advance the form a crisis will take, what its source will be or which members it might involve.

Crises are turning points in organizations. The crisis situation will determine the appropriate action. People often do not know what the “appropriate action” is until they take some action and see what happens. Thus, actions determine the situation. Once a person becomes committed to an action, he/she then builds an explanation that justifies that action ( Weick, 1988 ). There are two ways to respond to the crisis, namely, firefighting and fire lighting. Fire fighter style is reactive behavior, where the focus is on tackling immediate problems. Fire lighter style is proactive behavior, able to explain the big picture, anticipate events and even prevent problems ( Barber and Warn, 2005 ). It is almost impossible for people to know in advance the form a crisis might take, what its source will be or which stakeholders it might involve. Since a crisis is a low probability and high-impact event, it is not possible to plan contingencies for it, hence only a reactive response can be taken.

A reactive response will lead either to success or failure outcomes for PBOs and for their projects.

It is important to determine the appropriate action. It is our contention that actions play a central role in the genesis of crises and therefore need to be understood if we are to manage crises ( Weick, 1988 ).

Outcomes (success/failure)

According to Pearson and Clair (1998) , any crisis process results in relative degrees of success and failure. The novelty, magnitude and frequency of decisions, actions and interactions demanded by a crisis suggest that no organization will respond in a manner that is completely effective or completely ineffective. Much of the literature treats organizational consequences in the event of a crisis as though alternative outcomes were dichotomous: the organization either failed ( Turner, 1976 ; Vaughan, 1990 ; Weick, 1993 ) or succeeded (e.g.  Roberts, 1989 ) in managing any particular crisis incident. Pearson and Clair (1998) proposed that “an organizational crisis will lead to both success and failure outcomes for the organization and its stakeholders” (1998, p. 68). However, it is not the crisis itself but its management which will lead to success or failure as an outcome for the organization. If a crisis is efficiently managed it will lead to success; in contrast, if the crisis is poorly managed, it will lead to failure. Researchers of organizational crises have examined a variety of factors that contribute to crisis management successes and failures. However, we suggest a subprocess for the crisis management process.

Crisis management outcomes (success/ failure) will lead to PBOs' learning.

Organizational learning is not simply the sum of individual learning ( Hedberg, 1981 ); rather, it is the process whereby knowledge is created, distributed across the organization, communicated among organization members and integrated into the strategy and management of the organization ( Duncan and Weiss, 1978 ). Organizational learning occurs when an organization institutionalizes new routines or acquires new information ( Miner and Robinson, 1994 ). Organizational learning helps organizations to enhance their practices and to improve their prospects in dynamic and competitive environments ( Cyert and March, 1963 ; Argote, 2011 ).

Learning can occur at several different levels (such as at the individual, project, firm or industry levels) and often as an unintended by-product of the project activity ( DeFillipi and Arthur, 2002 ). Project-based learning practices are a subset of organizational learning practices ( Keegan and Turner, 2001 ). Learning in PBOs most commonly refers to the process of making newly created project-level learning available to the organization as a whole by sharing, transferring, retaining and using it ( DeFillipi and Arthur, 1998 ; Prencipe and Tell, 2001 ; Scarbrough et al. , 2004 ; Argote and Ophir, 2005 ). However, previous research has emphasized the difficulties that organizations face when they attempt to capture the learning gained through projects and transfer it to their wider organizations (e.g. Middleton, 1967 ; Keegan and Turner, 2001 ). There is a risk that the experience gained is lost when the project finishes, the team dissolves and its members move on to other projects or are reabsorbed into the organization. Unless lessons learned are communicated, and experience gained on one project is transmitted to subsequent projects, there is also a risk that the same mistakes are repeated ( Middleton, 1967 ; Iftikhar and Wiewiora, 2022 ). “Lessons learned” is a popular term; however, it is often only lip service paid to the idea of learning from experience ( Smith and Elliot, 2007 ). As Williams et al. (2012) have stated, there are many lessons identified, but not very many learned.

To date, the study of crisis management has focused on crisis causality, prevention, response and turnaround, with limited consideration given to organizational learning from crisis ( Elliott and Smith, 2006 ). Organizations tend to engage in major changes mainly after they have been confronted with crises ( Miller and Friesen, 1984 ; Tushman and Anderson, 1986 ). Learning from crises involves understanding the causes of the crises, as well as identifying ways of preventing similar rare events from recurring and understanding what took place in the right or wrong direction ( Rerup, 2009 ; Locatelli and Mancini, 2010 ). Learning must focus on the ability to create resilience to cope with unforeseen high-impact events. It only becomes meaningful when lessons are put into practice; they have to be translated and used to make sense of new situations and enacted in order to manage an unfolding scenario ( Elliott and Macpherson, 2010 ). Project members can learn from their own crisis management experiences as well as others involved in the process. Moreover, learning from crises can improve future projects and future stages of current projects ( Iftikhar et al. , 2022b ).

Learning from crisis management outcomes (success/ failure) alleviate PBOs and their projects.

Despite an increase in the frequency of crises, the research on crisis management, particularly in the context of PBOs, is still in its initial stages. More specifically, there is a lack of a comprehensive crisis management model that can be applied to PBOs. Keeping in view this research gap, the current study presented a crisis management framework with special attention to PBOs. The novel insights this study has brought by proposing a crisis management framework which identified the importance and association of sense-making, timely decision-making and quick responses to crises and interplay among each other for the effectiveness of crisis management.

Theoretical implications

The current study adds to the literature on crisis management, particularly in the context of PBOs. This study has conceptualized a framework for crisis management, which consists of all those important factors that are underexplored. This study advances research on crisis management by proposing a comprehensive model for crisis management. The paper considers the theoretical lens of dynamic capability theory. The dynamic capability theory focuses on the processes used in organizations to integrate, build and reconfigure their internal and external resources and competencies to compete in dynamic environments ( Teece et al. , 1997 ; Killen and Hunt, 2010 ). An organization has dynamic capabilities when it can integrate, build and reconfigure its internal and external organization-specific capabilities in response to its changing environment. In our study, we considered sense-making, decision-making, response and learning as PBOs capabilities for handling changing environment of crisis. This study validates the dynamic capability theory in the context of crisis management and PBOs.

Practical implications

This study helps scholars and practitioners to develop a clear understanding of the factors that contribute to crisis management for PBOs. For academics, this contributes to a better understanding of the crisis and its management, which allows for more precise and focused investigations in the future. The results of the study not only add value to the scarce literature on crisis management in PBOs but also offer valuable insights to project managers who can take help from this study. Practitioners such as senior management, project managers and project team members benefit from being in a position to better describe the status of their organization or project and to identify actions appropriate for their particular situation. This includes taking managerial actions to make sense, decisions and responses for intra-organizational projects to manage the crisis. Practitioners' crisis awareness is an invisible force behind the crisis management process that affects their subsequent actions to handle the crisis. Another takeaway from this study is the revelation that crises, despite all their negativity, promote learning in organizations, improving the crisis management process in the future. The conceptual framework proposed in the study acts as a guideline for all those project managers who are either currently facing a crisis or are expected to come across a crisis. The steps proposed in the framework must be used by the project managers as standard operating procedures to minimize the financial and non-financial impact of the crisis. The project managers should be trained to enhance their sense-making and decision-making skills. They should also be taught about the importance of taking a reactive response. Another important insight from this study is the identification of crisis triggers. The project managers should keep an eye on all the factors that can trigger a crisis, so they have the necessary information during a crisis. This study also highlights the importance of learning in crisis. Managers should be bound to submit a report in which they should list down all the lessons they learned from the crisis. They should also be asked to share their opinion regarding the most suitable course of action in a similar situation. This report should be shared with all the employees and made accessible so that managers can take help from it if they face any similar situation in the future.

Limitations and future research

The first limitation of this study is that it is a conceptual study, presenting the crisis management process model and propositions. Although this model allows the identification of crisis and crisis management relationship with sense-making, decision-making, response and learning. This model will improve the field of crisis management. However, it is important to understand whether it works as we suggested, as it has not been tested empirically. Future researchers might test the model by studying it empirically. Another limitation of this study is that it has only highlighted the role of crisis triggers. Future studies might also discuss different factors that might trigger a crisis.

Moreover, this study has not mentioned the decision-making styles needed for crisis management. Future studies may also shed light on the most suitable decision-making style during a crisis. The current study has developed a standardized model that can be applied to PBOs in different industries, which strengthens the study due to generalizability. However, a more customized crisis management model which is specific to a particular industry might prove to be useful as the nature of crisis varies from one industry to the other. Future researchers might propose crisis management models that can be applied to a particular industry.

Stepwise approach for systematic literature review

Crisis management process model for project-based organizations

Different typology of crisis

Source(s): Created by Iftikhar (2023)

Aguilar , F. ( 1967 ), Scanning the Business Environment , Macmillan , New York .

Ajmal , M. , Helo , P. and Kekäle , T. ( 2010 ), “ Critical factors for knowledge management in project business ”, Journal of Knowledge Management , Vol.  14 No.  1 , pp.  156 - 168 .

Albrecht , B. , Bender , B. , Katz , R. , Pirani , J.A. and Salaway , G. ( 2004 ), “ Information technology alignment in higher education ”, available at: https://library.educause.edu/resources/2004/6/information-technology-alignment-in-higher-education ( accessed 7 October 2020 ).

Alkharabsheh , A. , Ahmad , Z.A. and Kharabsheh , A. ( 2014 ), “ Characteristics of crisis and decision making styles: the mediating role of leadership styles ”, Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences , Vol.  129 , pp.  282 - 288 .

Almeida , M.V. and Soares , A.L. ( 2014 ), “ Knowledge sharing in project-based organizations: overcoming the informational limbo ”, International Journal of Information Management , Vol.  34 No.  6 , pp.  770 - 779 .

Alonso-Almeida , M.D.M. , Bremser , K. and Llach , J. ( 2015 ), “ Proactive and reactive strategies deployed by restaurants in times of crisis: effects on capabilities, organization and competitive advantage ”, International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management , Vol.  27 No.  7 , pp.  1641 - 1661 .

Anderson , P.A. ( 1983 ), “ Decision making by objection and the Cuban missile crisis ”, Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol.  28 No.  2 , pp.  201 - 222 .

Argote , L. ( 2011 ), “ Organizational learning research: past, present, and future ”, Management Learning , Vol.  42 No.  4 , pp.  439 - 446 .

Argote , L. and Ophir , R. ( 2005 ), “ Intraorganizational learning ”, in Baum , J.A.C. (Ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Organizations , Blackwell , Oxford , pp.  181 - 207 .

Barber , E. and Warn , J. ( 2005 ), “ Leadership in project management: from firefighter to firelighter ”, Management Decision , Vol.  43 Nos 7/8 , pp.  1032 - 1039 .

Baum , J.A.C. and Dahlin , K.B. ( 2007 ), “ Aspiration performance and railroads' patterns of learning from train wrecks and crashes ”, Organization Science , Vol.  18 No.  3 , pp.  368 - 385 .

Bechky , B.A. and Okhuysen , G.A. ( 2011 ), “ Expecting the unexpected? How swat officers and film crew handle surprises ”, Academy of Management Journal , Vol.  54 No.  2 , pp.  239 - 261 .

Berggren , C. , Söderlund , J. and Anderson , C. ( 2001 ), “ Clients, contractors, and consultants: the consequences of organizational fragmentation in contemporary project environments ”, Project Management Journal , Vol.  32 No.  3 , pp.  39 - 48 .

Bertels , S. , Cody , M. and Pek , S. ( 2014 ), “ A responsive approach to organizational misconduct: rehabilitation, reintegration, and the reduction of reoffense ”, Business Ethics Quarterly , Vol.  24 No.  3 , pp.  343 - 370 .

Bonn , I. and Rundle-Thiele , S. ( 2007 ), “ Do or die – strategic decision-making following a shock event ”, Tourism Management , Vol.  28 No.  2 , pp.  615 - 620 .

Braybrooke , D. ( 1964 ), “ The mystery of executive success re-examined ”, Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol.  8 No.  4 , pp.  533 - 560 .

Brennan , L.L. ( 2011 ), “ The scientific management of information overload ”, Journal of Business and Management , Vol.  17 No.  1 , pp.  121 - 134 .

Brown , J.A. , Buchholtz , A.K. and Dunn , P. ( 2016 ), “ Moral salience and the role of goodwill in firm-stakeholder trust repair ”, Business Ethics Quarterly , Vol.  26 No.  2 , pp.  181 - 199 .

Brunsson , N. ( 1982 ), “ The irrationality of action and action rationality: decisions, ideologies and organizational actions ”, Journal of Management Studies , Vol.  19 No.  1 , pp.  29 - 44 .

Bundy , J. and Pfarrer , M.D. ( 2015 ), “ A burden of responsibility: the role of social approval at the onset of a crisis ”, Academy of Management Review , Vol.  40 No.  3 , pp.  345 - 369 .

Bundy , J. , Pfarrer , M.D. , Short , C.E. and Coombs , W.T. ( 2017 ), “ Crises and crisis management: integration, interpretation, and research development ”, Journal of Management , Vol.  43 No.  6 , pp.  1661 - 1692 .

Choi , S. , Cho , I. , Han , S.H. , Kwak , Y.H. and Chih , Y.Y. ( 2018 ), “ Dynamic capabilities of project-based organization in global operations ”, Journal of Management in Engineering , Vol.  34 No.  5 , 04018027 .

Christianson , M.K. , Farkas , M.T. , Sutcliffe , K.M. and Weick , K.E. ( 2009 ), “ Learning through rare events: significant interruptions at the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Museum ”, Organization Science , Vol.  20 No.  5 , pp.  846 - 860 .

Claeys , A.S. and Cauberghe , V. ( 2012 ), “ Crisis response and crisis timing strategies: two sides of the same coin ”, Public Relations Review , Vol.  38 No.  1 , pp.  83 - 88 .

Claeys , A.S. and Cauberghe , V. ( 2014 ), “ What makes crisis response strategies work? The impact of crisis involvement and message framing ”, Journal of Business Research , Vol.  67 No.  2 , pp.  182 - 189 .

Clark , E. and Geppert , M. ( 2011 ), “ Subsidiary integration as identity construction and institution building: a political sensemaking approach ”, Journal of Management Studies , Vol.  48 No.  2 , pp.  395 - 416 .

Coleman , L. ( 2004 ), “ The frequency and cost of corporate crises ”, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management , Vol.  12 No.  1 , pp.  2 - 13 .

Coombs , W.T. ( 1999 ), Ongoing Crisis Communication: Planning, Managing, and Responding , Sage Publications , London .

Cornelissen , J. ( 2012 ), “ Sensemaking under pressure: the influence of professional roles and social accountability on the creation of sense ”, Organization Science , Vol.  23 No.  1 , pp.  118 - 137 .

Cunha , M.P. , Clegg , S.R. and Kamoche , K. ( 2006 ), “ Surprises in management and organization: concept, sources, and a typology ”, British Journal of Management , Vol.  17 No.  4 , pp.  317 - 329 .

Cyert , R. and March , J.G. ( 1963 ), A Behavioral Theory of the Firm , Prentice-Hall , Englewood Cliffs, NJ .

Daft , R.L. and Weick , K.E. ( 1984 ), “ Toward a model of organizations as interpretation systems ”, Academy of Management Review , Vol.  9 No.  2 , pp.  284 - 295 .

Darling , J.R. ( 1994 ), “ Crisis management in international business: keys to effective decision making ”, Leadership and Organization Development Journal , Vol.  15 No.  8 , pp.  3 - 8 .

Davies , A. , Dodgson , M. and Gann , D. ( 2016 ), “ Dynamic capabilities in complex projects: the case of London Heathrow terminal 5 ”, Project Management Journal , Vol.  47 No.  2 , pp.  26 - 46 .

DeFillipi , R. and Arthur , M. ( 1998 ), “ Paradox in project-based enterprise: the case of film making ”, California Management Review , Vol.  40 No.  2 , pp.  125 - 139 .

DeFillipi , R. and Arthur , M. ( 2002 ), “ Project based learning: embedded learning contexts and the management of knowledge ”, Paper presented at the 3rd European Conference on Organization, Knowledge and Capabilities , Athens, Greece .

Duncan , R.B. and Weiss , A. ( 1978 ), “ Organizational learning: implications for organizational design ”, in Staw , B. (Ed.), Research in Organizational Behavior , pp.  75 - 123 .

Dutton , J.E. ( 1993 ), “ The making of organizational opportunities: an interpretive pathway to organizational change ”, in Cummings , L.L. and Staw , B.M. (Eds), Research in Organizational Behavior , JAI Press , Greenwich, CT , pp.  195 - 226 .

Ebers , M. and Powell , W. ( 2007 ), “ Biotechnology: its origins, organization, and outputs ”, Research Policy , Vol.  36 No.  4 , pp.  433 - 437 .

Edmunds , A. and Morris , A. ( 2000 ), “ The problem of information overload on business organisations: a review of literature ”, International Journal of Information Management , Vol.  20 No.  1 , pp.  17 - 28 .

Elliott , D. and Smith , D. ( 2006 ), “ Patterns of regulatory behavior in the UK football industry ”, Journal of Management Studies , Vol.  43 No.  2 , pp.  291 - 318 .

Elliott , D. and Macpherson , A. ( 2010 ), “ Policy and practice: recursive learning from crisis ”, Group and Organization Management , Vol.  35 No.  5 , pp.  572 - 605 .

Eppler , M.J. and Mengis , J. ( 2004 ), “ The concepts of information overload: a review of literature from organisation science, accounting, marketing, MIS and related disciplines ”, The Information Society , Vol.  20 No.  5 , pp.  325 - 344 .

Farhoomand , A.F. and Drury , D.H. ( 2002 ), “ Managerial information overload ”, Communications of the ACM , Vol.  45 No.  10 , pp.  127 - 131 .

Ferreira , J. , Coelho , A. and Moutinho , L. ( 2020 ), “ Dynamic capabilities, creativity and innovation capability and their impact on competitive advantage and firm performance: the moderating role of entrepreneurial orientation ”, Technovation , Vols 92-93 , 102061 .

Fisher , C.W. , Chengalur-Smith , I. and Ballou , D.P. ( 2003 ), “ The impact of experience and time on the use of data quality information in decision making ”, Information Systems Research , Vol.  14 No.  2 , pp.  170 - 188 .

Geraldi , J.G. , Lee-Kelley , L. and Kutsch , E. ( 2010 ), “ The Titanic sunk, so what? Project manager response to unexpected events ”, International Journal of Project Management , Vol.  28 No.  6 , pp.  547 - 558 .

Gillespie , N. and Dietz , G. ( 2009 ), “ Trust repair after an organization-level failure ”, Academy of Management Review , Vol.  34 No.  1 , pp.  127 - 145 .

Gillespie , N. , Dietz , G. and Lockey , S. ( 2014 ), “ Organizational reintegration and trust repair after an integrity violation: a case study ”, Business Ethics Quarterly , Vol.  24 No.  3 , pp.  371 - 410 .

Gioia , D.A. and Chittipeddi , K. ( 1991 ), “ Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change initiation ”, Strategic Management Journal , Vol.  12 No.  6 , pp.  433 - 448 .

Gonzalez-Herrero , A. and Smith , S. ( 2010 ), “ Crisis communications management 2.0: organizational principles to manage crisis in an online world ”, Organization Development Journal , Vol.  28 No.  1 , pp.  97 - 105 .

Graffin , S.D. , Haleblian , J. and Kiley , J.T. ( 2016 ), “ Ready, aim, acquire: impression offsetting and acquisitions ”, Academy of Management Journal , Vol.  59 No.  1 , pp.  232 - 252 .

Hällgren , M. and Wilson , T.L. ( 2008 ), “ The nature and management of crises in construction projects: projects as practice observations ”, International Journal of Project Management , Vol.  26 No.  8 , pp.  830 - 838 .

Hällgren , M. and Wilson , T.L. ( 2011 ), “ Opportunities for learning from crises in projects ”, International Journal of Managing Projects in Business , Vol.  4 No.  2 , pp.  196 - 217 .

Haunschild , P.R. and Sullivan , B.N. ( 2002 ), “ Learning from complexity: effects of prior accidents and incidents on airlines' learning ”, Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol.  47 No.  4 , pp.  609 - 643 .

Haunschild , P.R. , Polidoro , F. Jr. and Chandler , D. ( 2015 ), “ Organizational oscillation between learning and forgetting: the dual role of serious errors ”, Organization Science , Vol.  26 No.  6 , pp.  1682 - 1701 .

Hedberg , B. ( 1981 ), “ How organizations learn and unlearn ”, in Nystrom , P.C. and Starbuck , W.H. (Eds), Handbook of Organizational Design: Adapting Organizations to Their Environments , Oxford University Press , New York , pp.  3 - 26 .

Helfat , C.E. , Finkelstein , S. , Mitchell , W. , Peteraf , M. , Singh , H. , Teece , D. and Winter , S.G. ( 2007 ), Dynamic Capabilities: Understanding Strategic Change in Organizations , Blackwell , Oxford .

Hermann , C.F. ( 1963 ), “ Some consequences of crisis which limit the viability of organizations ”, Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol.  8 No.  1 , pp.  61 - 82 .

Himma , H.E. ( 2007 ), “ The concept of information overload: a preliminary step in understanding the nature of a harmful information-related condition ”, Ethics and Information Technology , Vol.  9 No.  4 , pp.  259 - 272 .

Hobday , M. ( 2000 ), “ The project-based organization: an ideal form for managing complex products and systems ”, Research Policy , Vol.  29 Nos 7-8 , pp.  871 - 893 .

Houhamdi , Z. and Athamena , B. ( 2015 ), “ Information quality framework ”, Global Business and Economics Anthology , Vol.  1 , pp.  182 - 191 .

Hsieh , H.-F. and Shannon , S.E. ( 2005 ), “ Three approaches to qualitative content analysis ”, Qualitative Health Research , Vol.  15 No.  9 , pp. 1277 - 1288 .

Hung , R.Y.Y. , Yang , B. , Lien , B.Y.H. , McLean , G.N. and Kuo , Y.M. ( 2010 ), “ Dynamic capability: impact of process alignment and organizational learning culture on performance ”, Journal of World Business , Vol.  45 No.  3 , pp.  285 - 294 .

Hussain , H.H. ( 2019 ), “ Evaluating the effectiveness of crisis management projects ”, Tikrit Journal of Administrative and Economic Sciences , Vol.  13 No.  37 , pp.  210 - 218 .

Iftikhar , R. and Müller , R. ( 2019 ), “ Taxonomy among triplets: opening the black box ”, International Journal of Management , Vol.  10 No.  2 , pp.  63 - 85 .

Iftikhar , R. , Müller , R. and Ahola , T. ( 2021 ), “ Crises and coping strategies in megaprojects: the case of the islamabad–rawalpindi metro bus project in Pakistan ”, Project Management Journal , Vol.  52 No.  4 , pp.  394 - 409 .

Iftikhar , R. , Momeni , K. and Ahola , T. ( 2022a ), “ Decision-making in crisis during megaprojects ”, The Journal of Modern Project Management , Vol.  9 No.  3 , pp.  33 - 49 .

Iftikhar , R. ( 2023 ), “ Crises and capabilities in project-based organizations: conceptual model and empirical evidence ”, International Journal of Managing Projects in Business , Vol.  16 No.  3 , pp. 543 - 570 .

Iftikhar , R. , Ahola , T. and Butt , A. ( 2022b ), “ Learning from interorganizational projects ”, International Journal of Managing Projects in Business , Vol.  15 No.  1 , pp.  102 - 120 .

Iftikhar , R. and Wiewiora , A. ( 2022 ), “ Learning processes and mechanisms for interorganizational projects: insights from the Islamabad–Rawalpindi metro bus project ”, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management , Vol.  69 No.  6 , pp. 3379 - 3391 .

Jaques , T. ( 2009 ), “ Issue management as a post-crisis discipline: identifying and responding to issue impacts beyond the crisis ”, Journal of Public Affairs , Vol.  9 No.  1 , pp.  35 - 44 .

Jiang , Y. , Ritchie , B.W. and Verreynne , M.L. ( 2019 ), “ Building tourism organizational resilience to crises and disasters: a dynamic capabilities view ”, International Journal of Tourism Research , Vol.  21 No.  6 , pp.  882 - 900 .

Kahn , W.A. , Barton , M.A. and Fellows , S. ( 2013 ), “ Organizational crises and the disturbance of relational systems ”, Academy of Management Review , Vol.  38 No.  3 , pp.  377 - 396 .

Kamoche , K. ( 2003 ), “ Riding the typhoon: the HR response to the economic crisis in Hong Kong ”, International Journal of Human Resource Management , Vol.  14 No.  2 , pp.  199 - 221 .

Keeffe , M.J. and Darling , J.R. ( 2008 ), “ Transformational crisis management of organization development: the case of talent loss at Microsoft ”, Organization Development Journal , Vol.  26 No.  4 , pp.  43 - 58 .

Keegan , W.J. ( 1974 ), “ Multinational scanning: a study of information sources utilized by headquarters executives in multinational companies ”, Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol.  19 No.  3 , pp. 411 - 421 .

Keegan , A. and Turner , J.R. ( 2001 ), “ Quantity versus quality in project based learning practices ”, Management Learning , Vol.  32 No.  1 , pp.  77 - 98 .

Killen , C.P. and Hunt , R.A. ( 2010 ), “ Dynamic capability through project portfolio management in service and manufacturing industries ”, International Journal of Managing Projects in Business , Vol.  3 No.  1 , pp.  157 - 169 .

Knight , F.H. ( 1921 ), Risk, Uncertainty and Profit , Hart, Schaffner & Marx; Houghton Mifflin , Boston, MA .

Kornberger , M. , Leixnering , S. and Meyer , R.E. ( 2019 ), “ The logic of tact: how decisions happen in situations of crisis ”, Organization Studies , Vol.  40 No.  2 , pp.  239 - 266 .

Kutsch , E. and Hall , M. ( 2005 ), “ Intervening conditions on the management of project risk: dealing with uncertainty in information technology projects ”, International Journal of Project Management , Vol.  23 No.  8 , pp.  591 - 599 .

Lacombe , P. ( 2002 ), “ Agronomic research and research into crisis situation ”, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management , Vol.  10 No.  4 , pp.  205 - 206 .

Lampel , J. , Shamsie , J. and Shapira , Z. ( 2009 ), “ Experiencing the improbable: rare events and organizational learning ”, Organization Science , Vol.  20 No.  5 , pp.  835 - 845 .

Lanham , R.A. ( 2006 ), The Economics of Attention: Style and Substance in the Age of Information , University of Chicago Press , Chicago .

Leung , L. and Law , N. ( 2016 ), “ Exploring the effectiveness of online role play simulations in tackling groupthink in crisis management training ”, International Journal of Gaming and Computer-Mediated Simulations , Vol.  8 No.  3 , pp.  1 - 18 .

Li , H. , Nair , A. , Song , M. , Tian , Y. and Singh , P.J. ( 2018 ), “ Uncovering the relationship between organizational crisis and innovation speed ”, Academy of Management Proceedings , Vol.  2018 No.  1 , 11413 .

Liberatore , A. ( 2013 ), The Management of Uncertainty: Learning from Chernobyl , Routledge , London .

Lin , Z. , Zhao , X. , Ismail , K.M. and Carley , K.M. ( 2006 ), “ Organizational design and restructuring in response to crises: lessons from computational modelling and real-world cases ”, Organization Science , Vol.  17 No.  5 , pp.  598 - 618 .

Locatelli , G. and Mancini , M. ( 2010 ), “ Risk management in a mega-project: the universal Expo 2015 case ”, International Journal of Project Organizations and Management , Vol.  2 No.  3 , pp.  236 - 253 .

Loosemore , M. ( 1998 ), “ The three ironies of crisis management in construction projects ”, International Journal of Project Management , Vol.  16 No.  3 , pp.  139 - 144 .

Loosemore , M. ( 2000 ), Crisis Management in Construction Projects , American Society of Civil Engineers , Reston .

Loosemore , M. and Teo , M. ( 2000 ), “ Crisis preparedness of construction companies ”, Journal of Management in Engineering , Vol.  16 No.  5 , pp.  60 - 65 .

Louis , M.R. ( 1980 ), “ Surprise and sensemaking: what newcomers experience in entering unfamiliar settings ”, Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol.  25 No.  2 , pp.  226 - 251 .

Lundin , R.A. and Söderholm , A. ( 1995 ), “ A theory of temporary organization ”, Scandinavian Journal of Management , Vol.  11 No.  4 , pp.  437 - 455 .

Madsen , P.M. ( 2009 ), “ These lives will not be lost in vain: organizational learning from disaster in U.S. coal mining ”, Organization Science , Vol.  20 No.  5 , pp.  861 - 875 .

Maitlis , S. ( 2005 ), “ The social processes of organizational sense making ”, Academy of Management Journal , Vol.  48 No.  1 , pp.  21 - 29 .

Mallak , L.A. and Kurstedt , H.S. Jr. ( 1997 ), “ Planning for crises in project management ”, Project Management Journal , Vol.  28 No.  2 , pp.  14 - 24 .

Mandler , G. ( 1984 ), Mind and Body , Free Press , New York .

Mansour , H.E. , Holmes , K. , Butler , B. and Ananthram , S. ( 2019 ), “ Developing dynamic capabilities to survive a crisis: tourism organizations' responses to continued turbulence in Libya ”, International Journal of Tourism Research , Vol.  21 No.  4 , pp.  493 - 503 .

Mayr , S. , Duller , C. and Königstorfer , M. ( 2022 ), “ How to manage a crisis: entrepreneurial and learning orientation in out-of-court reorganization ”, Journal of Small Business Strategy , Vol.  32 No.  2 , pp.  11 - 24 .

McAfee , A. and Brynjolfsson , E. ( 2012 ), “ Big data: the management revolution ”, Harvard Business Review , Vol.  90 No.  10 , pp.  60 - 68 .

Meyer , A.D. ( 1982 ), “ Adapting to environmental jolts ”, Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol.  27 No.  4 , pp.  515 - 537 .

Meyer , D.A. , Loch , H.C. and Pich , T.M. ( 2002 ), “ Managing project uncertainty: from variation to chaos ”, MIT Sloan Management Review , Vol.  43 No.  2 , pp.  60 - 67 .

Middleton , C.J. ( 1967 ), “ How to set up a project organization ”, Harvard Business Review , Vol.  45 No.  2 , pp.  73 - 82 .

Midler , C. ( 1995 ), “ Projectification of the firm: the Renault case ”, Scandinavian Journal of Management , Vol.  11 No.  4 , pp.  363 - 375 .

Miller , D. and Friesen , P.H. ( 1984 ), Organization: A Quantum View , Prentice-Hall , Englewood Cliffs, NJ .

Milliken , F.J. ( 1990 ), “ Perceiving and interpreting environmental change: an examination of college administrators' interpretation of changing demographics ”, Academy of Management Journal , Vol.  33 No.  1 , pp.  42 - 63 .

Miner , A. and Robinson , D. ( 1994 ), “ Organizational and population level learning as engines for career transitions ”, Journal of Organizational Behavior , Vol.  15 No.  4 , pp.  345 - 364 .

Mitroff , I.I. ( 1994 ), “ Crisis management and environmentalism: a natural fit ”, California Management Review , Vol.  36 No.  2 , pp.  101 - 113 .

Mitroff , I.I. , Shrivastava , P. and Udwadia , F.E. ( 1987 ), “ Effective crisis management ”, Academy of Management Executive , Vol.  1 No.  4 , pp.  283 - 292 .

Mitroff , I.I. , Pauchant , T.C. and Shrivastava , P. ( 1988 ), “ The structure of man-made organizational crises: conceptual and empirical issues in the development of a general theory of crisis management ”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change , Vol.  33 No.  2 , pp.  83 - 107 .

Monin , P. , Noorderhaven , N. , Vaara , E. and Kroon , D. ( 2013 ), “ Giving sense to and making sense of justice in postmerger integration ”, Academy of Management Journal , Vol.  56 No.  1 , pp.  256 - 284 .

Musca , G.N. , Mellet , C. , Simoni , G. , Sitri , F. and de Vogüé , S. ( 2014 ), “ Drop your boat!: the discursive co-construction of project renewal. the case of the Darwin mountaineering expedition in Patagonia ”, International Journal of Project Management , Vol.  32 No.  7 , pp.  1157 - 1169 .

Najafbagy , R. ( 2011 ), “ The crisis management capabilities and preparedness of organizations: a study of Iranian Hospital ”, International Journal of Management , Vol.  28 No.  2 , pp.  573 - 584 .

Oh , O. , Agrawal , M. and Rao , H.R. ( 2013 ), “ Community intelligence and social media services: a rumor theoretical analysis of tweets during social crisis ”, MIS Quarterly , Vol.  37 No.  2 , pp.  407 - 426 .

Olaniran , B.A. , Scholl , J.C. , Williams , D.E. and Boyer , L. ( 2012 ), “ Johnson and Johnson phantom recall: a fall from grace or a re-visit of the ghost of the past ”, Public Relations Review , Vol.  38 No.  1 , pp.  153 - 155 .

Orlikowski , W.J. and Gash , D.C. ( 1994 ), “ Technological frames: making sense of information technology in organizations ”, ACM Transactions Information Systems , Vol.  12 No.  2 , pp.  174 - 207 .

Patil , M.S.N. , Desai , D.B. and Gupta , A.K. ( 2016 ), “ An overview of crisis management in Housing project ”, Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research , Vol.  2 No.  7 , pp.  886 - 889 .

Patriotta , G. ( 2003 ), “ Sensemaking on the shop floor: narratives of knowledge in organizations ”, Journal Management Studies , Vol.  40 No.  2 , pp.  349 - 376 .

Pearce , J.A. and Michael , S.C. ( 2006 ), “ Strategies to prevent economic recessions from causing business failure ”, Business Horizons , Vol.  49 No.  3 , pp.  201 - 209 .

Pearson , C.M. and Clair , J.A. ( 1998 ), “ Reframing crisis management ”, Academy of Management Review , Vol.  23 No.  1 , pp.  59 - 76 .

Pearson , C.M. and Mitroff , I.I. ( 1993 ), “ From crisis prone to crisis prepared: a framework for crisis management ”, Academy of Management Executive , Vol.  7 No.  1 , pp.  48 - 59 .

PMI ( 2004 ), A Guide to Project Management Body of Knowledge , 3rd ed. , Project Management Institute , Newtown Square .

Ponis , S.T. and Koronis , E. ( 2012 ), “ A knowledge management process-based approach to support corporate crisis management ”, Knowledge and Process Management , Vol.  19 No.  3 , pp.  148 - 159 .

Pourbabaei , H. , Tabatabaei , M. , Jalalian , Z. and Afrazeh , A. ( 2015 ), “ Crisis management through creating and transferring knowledge in project-based organizations ”, Journal of Applied Environmental and Biological Science , Vol.  5 No.  5S , pp.  204 - 210 .

Porac , J. , Thomas , H. and Baden-Fuller , C. ( 1989 ), “ Competitive groups as cognitive communities: the case of Scottish knitwear manufacturers ”, Journal of Management Studies , Vol.  26 No.  4 , pp.  397 - 416 .

Prencipe , A. and Tell , F. ( 2001 ), “ Inter-project learning: processes and outcomes of knowledge codification in project-based firms ”, Research Policy , Vol.  30 No.  9 , pp.  1373 - 1394 .

Pun , K.F. ( 2005 ), “ An empirical investigation of strategy determinants and choices in manufacturing enterprises ”, Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management , Vol.  16 No.  3 , pp.  282 - 301 .

Ray , S.J. ( 1999 ), Strategic Communication in Crisis Management: Lessons from the Airline Industry , Quorum Books , London .

Rerup , C. ( 2009 ), “ Attentional triangulation: learning from unexpected rare crisis ”, Organization Science , Vol.  20 No.  5 , pp.  876 - 893 .

Roberts , K. ( 1989 ), “ New challenges in organizational research: high reliability organizations ”, Industrial Crisis Quarterly , Vol.  3 No.  2 , pp.  111 - 125 .

Roberts , K.H. ( 1990 ), “ Some characteristics of one type of high reliability organization ”, Organization Science , Vol.  1 No.  2 , pp.  160 - 176 .

Rudolph , J.W. , Morrison , J.B. and Carroll , J.S. ( 2009 ), “ The dynamics of action-oriented problem solving: linking interpretation and choice ”, Academy of Management Review , Vol.  34 No.  4 , pp.  733 - 756 .

Sahebalzamani , S. , Jørgensen , E.J.B. , Bertella , G. and Nilsen , E.R. ( 2023 ), “ A dynamic capabilities approach to business model innovation in times of crisis ”, Tourism Planning and Development , Vol.  20 No.  2 , pp. 138 - 161 .

Sangaiah , A.K. , Samuel , O.W. , Li , X. , Abdel-Basset , M. and Wang , H. ( 2018 ), “ Towards an efficient risk assessment in software projects–fuzzy reinforcement paradigm ”, Computers and Electrical Engineering , Vol.  71 , pp.  833 - 846 .

Sawle , C. ( 1991 ), “ Concerns of project managers: crisis project management ”, PM Network , Vol.  5 No.  1 , pp.  25 - 29 .

Scarbrough , H. , Swan , J. , Stephance , L. , Bresnen , M. , Edelman , L. and Newell , S. ( 2004 ), “ Project-based learning and the role of learning boundaries ”, Organization Studies , Vol.  25 No.  9 , pp.  1579 - 1600 .

Scott , W.R. ( 1987 ), Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems , Prentice Hall , Englewood Cliffs, NJ .

Seeger , M.W. ( 2002 ), “ Chaos and crisis: proposition for general theory of crisis communication ”, Public Relations Review , Vol.  28 No.  4 , pp.  329 - 337 .

Shamim , S. , Zeng , J. , Shariq , S.M. and Khan , Z. ( 2019 ), “ Role of big data management in enhancing big data decision-making capability and quality among Chinese firms: a dynamic capabilities view ”, Information and Management , Vol.  56 No.  6 , 103135 .

Shrivastava , P. ( 1994 ), “ The evolution of crisis research ”, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management , Vol.  2 No.  1 , pp.  10 - 20 .

Shrivastava , P. and Mitroff , I.I. ( 1987 ), “ Strategic management of corporate crises ”, Columbia Journal of World Business , Vol.  22 No.  1 , pp.  5 - 11 .

Shrivastava , P. , Mitroff , I.I. and Miglani , A. ( 1988 ), “ Understanding industrial crises ”, Journal of Management Studies , Vol.  24 No.  4 , pp.  285 - 303 .

Sicotte , H. and Bourgault , M. ( 2008 ), “ Dimensions of uncertainty and their moderating effect on new product development project performance ”, R&D Management , Vol.  38 No.  5 , pp.  468 - 479 .

Simard , M. and Laberge , D. ( 2018 ), “ Development of a crisis in a project: a process perspective ”, International Journal of Managing Projects in Business , Vol.  11 No.  3 , pp.  806 - 826 .

Smart , C. and Vertinsky , I. ( 1977 ), “ Designs for crisis decision units ”, Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol.  22 No.  4 , pp.  640 - 657 .

Smith , D. and Elliot , D. ( 2007 ), “ Exploring the barriers to learning from crisis: organizational learning and crisis ”, Management Learning , Vol.  38 No.  5 , pp.  519 - 538 .

Söderlund , J. and Tell , F. ( 2009 ), “ The P-Form organization and the dynamics of project competence: project epochs in Asea/ABB, 1950-2000 ”, International Journal of Project Management , Vol.  27 No.  2 , pp.  101 - 112 .

Sommer , S.A. , Howell , J.M. and Hadley , C.N. ( 2016 ), “ Keeping positive and building strength: the role of affect and team leadership in developing resilience during an organizational crisis ”, Group and Organization Management , Vol.  41 No.  2 , pp.  172 - 202 .

Stingl , V. and Geraldi , J. ( 2017 ), “ Errors, lies and misunderstandings: systematic review on behavioural decision making in projects ”, International Journal of Project Management , Vol.  35 No.  2 , pp.  121 - 135 .

Sydow , J. , Lindkvist , L. and DeFillippi , R. ( 2004 ), “ Project-based organizations, embeddedness and repositories of knowledge ”, Organization Studies , Vol.  25 No.  9 , pp.  1475 - 1489 .

Taylor , M.S. and Enz , C.A. ( 2002 ), “ Voices from the field: GM's responses to the events of September 11, 2001 ”, Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly , Vol.  1 No.  1 , pp.  7 - 20 .

Teece , D.J. ( 2014 ), “ The foundations of enterprise performance: dynamic and ordinary capabilities in an (economic) theory of firms ”, Academy of Management Perspectives , Vol.  28 No.  4 , pp.  328 - 352 .

Teece , D.J. , Pisano , G. and Shuen , A. ( 1997 ), “ Dynamic capabilities and strategic management ”, Strategic Management Journal , Vol.  18 No.  7 , pp.  509 - 533 .

Thiry , M. and Deguire , M. ( 2007 ), “ Recent developments in project-based organisations ”, International Journal of Project Management , Vol.  25 No.  7 , pp.  649 - 658 .

Tjosvold , D. ( 1984 ), “ Effects of crisis orientation on managers' approach to controversy in decision making ”, Academy of Management Journal , Vol.  27 No.  1 , pp.  130 - 138 .

Toor , S.-U.-R. and Ogunlana , S.O. ( 2010 ), “ Beyond the iron triangle: stakeholder perception of key performance indicators (KPIs) for large-scale public sector development projects ”, International Journal of Project Management , Vol.  28 No.  3 , pp.  228 - 236 .

Torres , R. , Sidorova , A. and Jones , M.C. ( 2018 ), “ Enabling firm performance through business intelligence and analytics: a dynamic capabilities perspective ”, Information and Management , Vol.  55 No.  7 , pp.  822 - 839 .

Tranfield , D. , Denyer , D. and Smart , P. ( 2003 ), “ Towards a methodology for developing evidence-informed management knowledge by means of systematic review ”, British Journal of Management , Vol.  14 No.  3 , pp.  207 - 222 .

Turner , B.A. ( 1976 ), “ The organizational and interorganizational development of disasters ”, Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol.  21 No.  3 , pp.  378 - 397 .

Turner , J.R. ( 2006 ), “ Towards a theory of project management: the nature of the functions of project management ”, International Journal of Project Management , Vol.  24 No.  4 , pp.  277 - 279 .

Tushman , M.L. and Anderson , P. ( 1986 ), “ Technological discontinuities and organizational environment ”, Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol.  31 No.  3 , pp.  439 - 465 .

Uitdewilligen , S. and Waller , M.J. ( 2018 ), “ Information sharing and decision‐making in multidisciplinary crisis management teams ”, Journal of Organizational Behavior , Vol.  39 No.  6 , pp.  731 - 748 .

Ulmer , R.R. , Sellnow , T.L. and Seeger , M.W. ( 2017 ), Effective Crisis Communication: Moving from Crisis to Opportunity , Sage Publication , Thousand Oaks, California .

Valackiene , A. ( 2011 ), “ Theoretical substation of the mode for crisis management in organization ”, Engineering Economics , Vol.  21 No.  2 , pp.  78 - 90 .

Van Os , A. , Van Berkel , F. , De Gilder , D. , Van Dyck , C. and Groenewegen , P. ( 2015 ), “ Project risk as identity threat: explaining the development and consequences of risk discourse in an infrastructure project ”, International Journal of Project Management , Vol.  33 No.  4 , pp.  877 - 888 .

Vaughan , D. ( 1990 ), “ Autonomy, interdependence and social control: NASA and the space shuttle Challenger ”, Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol.  35 No.  2 , pp.  225 - 257 .

Vaughan , D. ( 1996 ), The Challenger Launch Decision , University of Chicago Press , Chicago .

Veil , S.R. ( 2011 ), “ Mindful learning in crisis management ”, Journal of Business Communication , Vol.  48 No.  2 , pp.  116 - 147 .

Wang , A. ( 2022 ), “ An investigation of key precursors of megaproject crises ”, International Journal of Managing Projects in Business , Vol.  15 No.  6 , pp. 938 - 959 .

Wang , A. and Pitsis , T.S. ( 2020 ), “ Identifying the antecedents of megaproject crises in China ”, International Journal of Project Management , Vol.  38 No.  6 , pp.  327 - 339 .

Weber , K. and Glynn , M.A. ( 2006 ), “ Making sense with institutions: context, thought and action in Karl Weick's theory ”, Organization Studies , Vol.  27 No.  11 , pp.  1639 - 1660 .

Weick , K.E. ( 1988 ), “ Enacted sensemaking in crisis situations ”, Journal of Management Studies , Vol.  25 No.  4 , pp.  305 - 317 .

Weick , K.E. ( 1993 ), “ The collapse of sensemaking: the Mann Gulch disaster ”, Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol.  38 No.  4 , pp.  628 - 652 .

Weick , K.E. ( 1995 ), Sensemaking in Organizations , Sage Publications , Thousand Oaks, CA .

Weick , K.E. ( 2010 ), “ Reflections on enacted sensemaking in the Bhopal disaster ”, Journal of Management Studies , Vol.  47 No.  3 , pp.  537 - 550 .

Weick , K.E. and Sutcliffe , K.M. ( 2001 ), Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an Age of Complexity , Jossey-Bass , San Francisco, CA .

Weick , K.E. , Sutcliffe , K.M. and Obstfeld , D. ( 2005 ), “ Organizing and the process of sense making and organizing ”, Organization Science , Vol.  16 No.  4 , pp.  409 - 421 .

Wendra , W. , Sule , E.T. , Joeliaty , J. and Azis , Y. ( 2019 ), “ Exploring dynamic capabilities, intellectual capital and innovation performance relationship: evidence from the garment manufacturing ”, Business: Theory and Practice , Vol.  20 , pp.  123 - 136 .

Wilding , R. and Paraskevas , A. ( 2006 ), “ Crisis management or crisis response system? A complexity science approach to organizational crises ”, Management Decision , Vol.  44 No.  7 , pp.  892 - 907 .

Williams , T. , Klakegg , O.J. , Walker , D.H.T. , Andersen , B. and Magnussen , O.M. ( 2012 ), “ Identifying and acting on early warning signs in complex projects ”, Project Management Journal , Vol.  43 No.  2 , pp.  37 - 53 .

Williams , T.A. , Gruber , D.A. , Sutcliffe , K.M. , Shepherd , D.A. and Zhao , E.Y. ( 2017 ), “ Organizational response to adversity: fusing crisis management and resilience research streams ”, Academy of Management Annals , Vol.  11 No.  2 , pp.  733 - 769 .

Wilson , T.C. ( 2013 ), “ Risk management lessons learned from the financial crisis: one CRO's view ”, Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions , Vol.  6 No.  2 , pp.  167 - 177 .

Wohlgemuth , V. , Wenzel , M. , Berger , E.S. and Eisend , M. ( 2019 ), “ Dynamic capabilities and employee participation: the role of trust and informal control ”, European Management Journal , Vol.  37 No.  6 , pp.  760 - 771 .

Woods , D.D. , Patterson , E.S. and Roth , E.M. ( 2002 ), “ Can we ever escape from data overload? A cognitive systems diagnosis ”, Cognition, Technology and Work , Vol.  4 No.  1 , pp.  22 - 36 .

Yang , J. , Shen , G.Q. , Ho , M. , Drew , D.S. and Xue , X. ( 2011 ), “ Stakeholder management in construction: an empirical study to address research gaps in previous studies ”, International Journal of Project Management , Vol.  29 No.  7 , pp.  900 - 910 .

Yang , X. , Wang , L. , Zhu , F. and Müller , R. ( 2022 ), “ Prior and governed stakeholder relationships: the key to resilience of inter-organizational projects ”, International Journal of Project Management , Vol.  40 No.  1 , pp.  64 - 75 .

Zahra , S.A. and George , G. ( 2002 ), “ Absorptive capacity: a review, reconceptualization, and extension ”, Academy of Management Review , Vol.  27 No.  2 , pp.  185 - 203 .

Zeyanalian , M. , Trigunarsyah , B. and Ronagh , H.R. ( 2013 ), “ Modification of advanced programmatic risk analysis and management model for the whole project life cycle's risks ”, Journal of Construction Engineering and Management , Vol.  139 No.  1 , pp.  51 - 59 .

Corresponding author

Related articles, we’re listening — tell us what you think, something didn’t work….

Report bugs here

All feedback is valuable

Please share your general feedback

Join us on our journey

Platform update page.

Visit emeraldpublishing.com/platformupdate to discover the latest news and updates

Questions & More Information

Answers to the most commonly asked questions here

Crisis Management: The Perspective of Organizational Learning

• Conference paper
• First Online: 02 March 2021
• Cite this conference paper

• Jarema Batorski 7  

Part of the book series: Eurasian Studies in Business and Economics ((EBES,volume 16/2))

565 Accesses

2 Citations

The purpose of this paper is to propose instruments to improve crisis management in an organization from the perspective of organizational learning. The assumption on which the research was based is the claim that the success of crisis management depends both on the effectiveness of the learning processes that enable overcoming a crisis and the ability to learn a lesson from a crisis. Organizational crises may be conducive to the process of intensive organizational knowledge acquisition. Actions undertaken in terms of crisis management often constitute the means for organizational learning, which is related to issues of the adaptation, survival, and competitiveness of enterprises in conditions of discrete changes in the environment. A crisis is a chance for revitalizing changes that would otherwise be impossible to implement. Increasing the ability to manage crises can be considered as a favorable condition for long-term economic and social development. Real help for managers confronted with organizational crises depends on the awareness of the importance of anti-crisis management and, above all, the problems they must face. In shaping the ability to learn valuable lessons from a crisis, the following factors are crucial: normalization mechanisms, the organization’s double-loop learning ability and the managers’ awareness of its importance in learning from a crisis, and the organization’s single-loop learning ability. Improving organizational learning should lead to the reconstruction of the organization’s abilities to cope in the crisis.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

• Available as PDF
• Read on any device
• Instant download
• Own it forever
• Available as EPUB and PDF
• Compact, lightweight edition
• Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
• Free shipping worldwide - see info
• Durable hardcover edition

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Argyris, C. (1989). Strategy implementation: An experience in learning. Organizational Dynamics, 2 (18), 5–15.

Article   Google Scholar  

Argyris, C., & Schön, D. A. (1978). Organizational learning: A theory of action perspective . Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Google Scholar  

Argyris, C., & Schön, D. A. (1996). Organizational learning II: Theory, method and practice . Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Batorski, J. (2002). Organizacja efektywnie ucząca się [An effectively learning organization] . Dąbrowa Górnicza, Poland: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Biznesu w Dąbrowie Górniczej.

Batorski, J. (2011). Fragmentation of crisis management in an enterprise. Serbian Journal of Management, 6 (2), 283–286.

Batorski, J. (2013). Instrumenty zarządzania kryzysowego w przedsiębiorstwie turystycznym: perspektywa organizacyjnego uczenia się [Instruments of crisis management in a tourist enterprise: the perspective of organizational learning] . Kraków, Poland: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.

Bednarczyk, M. (2006). Przedsiębiorczość w turystyce szansą rozwoju lokalnego w Polsce [Entrepreneurship in tourism as an opportunity for local development in Poland]. In G. Gołembski (Ed.), Turystyka w ujęciu podmiotowym i przestrzennym: człowiek—przestrzeń—przedsiębiorstwo [Tourism in the subjective and spatial approach: human—space—enterprise] (pp. 127–142). Poznań, Poland: Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej w Poznaniu.

Bensimon, E. M. (2005). Closing the achievement gap in higher education: An organizational learning perspective. New Directions for Higher Education, 131 , 99–111.

Booth, S. A. (1993). Crisis management strategy: Competition and changes in modern enterprises . London: Routledge.

Bratnicki, M. (1982). Organizacyjne uczenie się w warunkach kryzysu [Organizational learning in crisis conditions]. Problemy Postępu Technicznego, 102 (6), 14–19.

Bratnicki, M. (1993). Doskonalenie procesu zarządzania w przedsiębiorstwie: podejście zintegrowane [Improving the management process in an enterprise: an integrated approach] . Katowice, Poland: Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej w Katowicach.

Bratnicki, M., Kryś, R., & Stachowicz, J. (1988). Kultura organizacyjna przedsiębiorstwa: Studium kształtowania procesu zmian zarządzania [The organizational culture of companies: Study shaping the process of change management] . Wrocław, Poland: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.

Brooks, M. L., & Shapiro, M. B. (2014). Protection through corporate marketing in professional sports. In L. M. Johnston (Ed.), Sports, peacebuilding and ethics (pp. 125–167). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Burnett, J. J. (1998). A strategic approach to managing crises. Public Relations Review, 24 (4), 475–488.

Coombs, W. T. (2014). Crisis management and communications . [online] Institute for Public Relations. Retrieved May 12, 2019, from https://instituteforpr.org/crisis-management-communications/ .

Crichton, M. T., Ramsay, C. G., & Kelly, T. (2009). Enhancing organizational resilience through emergency planning: Learnings from cross-sectoral lessons. Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management, 17 (1), 24–37.

Dawson, P. (1994). Organizational change: A processual approach . London, England: Paul Chapman Publishing.

Deverell, E. (2010). Crisis-induced learning in public sector organizations . Stockholm, Sweden: Elanders Sverige.

Elliott, D., & Smith, D. (2007). Voices from the terraces: From ‘mock bureaucracy’ to learning from crisis within the UK’s football industry. In C. M. Pearson, C. Roux-Dufort, & J. A. Clair (Eds.), International handbook of organizational crisis management (pp. 271–295). Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.

Chapter   Google Scholar  

Elliott, D., Smith, D., & McGuinnes, M. (2000). Exploring the failure to learn: Crises and the barriers to learning. Review of Business, 21 (3–4), 17–24.

Glaesser, D. (2006). Crisis management in the tourism industry (2nd ed.). Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Book   Google Scholar  

Hajduk, G. (2017). Specyfika kryzysów wizerunkowych w mediach społecznościowych [Image crises in social media]. Studia Medioznawcze, 70 (3), 101–113.

Henderson, J. C. (2007). Tourism crises: Causes, consequences and management . Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Horchani, S. C., & Zouaoui, M. (2019). From entrepreneurial orientation to innovation: The mediating role of information system—Case of Tunisian SMEs. In M. Bilgin, H. Danis, E. Demir, & U. Can (Eds.), Eurasian business perspectives. Eurasian studies in business and economics (Vol. 10/1, pp. 3–17). Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Hough, M., & Spillan, J. (2004). Applying knowledge management principles to crisis management efforts. International Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Change Management, 4 , 1531–1538.

Hough, M. G., & Spillan, J. E. (2005). Crisis planning: Increasing effectiveness, decreasing discomfort. Journal of Business and Economics Research, 3 (4), 19–24.

Jacques, J. M., Roux-Dufort, C., & Gatot, L. (1999). From post-crisis to preventive learning: Some empirical evidence for a preventive crisis learning management tool. Proceedings of the Academy of Management Annual Meeting , Chicago, IL, August 6–11.

Jaques, T. (2007). Issue management and crisis management: An integrated, non-linear, relational construct. Public Relations Review, 33 (2), 147–157.

Jaques, T. (2010). Reshaping crisis management: The challenge for organizational design. Organization Development Journal, 28 (1), 9–17.

Kovoor-Misra, S., & Nathan, M. (2000). Timing is everything: The optimal time to learn from crises. Review of Business, 21 (3–4), 31–36.

Krzakiewicz, K. (2008). Zarządzanie antykryzysowe w organizacji [Crisis management in an organization] . Poznań, Poland: Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej w Poznaniu.

Li, Z., & Wang, H. (2009). Research on the enterprise crisis management system basic on knowledge demand. Proceedings of the 2009 International Symposium on Web Information Systems and Applications (WISA’09) , Nanchang, China, May 22–24.

Lin, Z., & Carley, K. M. (2002). Organizational design and adaptation in response to crises: Theory and practice . [online] Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems. Retrieved May 12, 2019, from http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/publications/papers/OrgCrisisResponse.pdf .

Nogalski, B., & Marcinkiewicz, H. (2004). Zarządzanie antykryzysowe przedsiębiorstwem: pokonać kryzys i wygrać [Enterprise anti-crisis management: To overcome the crisis and win] . Warszawa, Poland: Difin.

Pearson, C. M., & Clair, J. A. (2008). Reframing crisis management. In A. Boin (Ed.), Crisis management (Vol. 2, pp. 1–24). Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.

Pearson, C. M., & Mitroff, I. I. (1993). From crisis prone to crisis prepared: A framework for crisis management. Academy of Management Executive, 7 (1), 48–59.

Perechuda, K. (2005). Dyfuzja wiedzy w przedsiębiorstwie sieciowym: Wizualizacja i kompozycja [Knowledge diffusion in a networking company: Visualization and composition] . Wrocław, Poland: Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej we Wrocławiu.

Roberts, K. H., Madsen, P., & Desai, V. (2007). Organizational sensemaking during crisis. In C. M. Pearson, C. Roux-Dufort, & J. A. Clair (Eds.), International handbook of organizational crisis management (pp. 107–122). Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.

Romanowska, M. (2009). Strategie przedsiębiorstw w okresie kryzysu gospodarczego [strategies of enterprises during the economic crisis]. In R. Krupski (Ed.), Zarządzanie strategiczne: Problemy, kierunki badań [Strategic management: Problems, directions of research] (pp. 73–82). Wałbrzych, Poland: Wałbrzyska Wyższa Szkoła Zarządzania i Przedsiębiorczości.

Roux-Dufort, C. (2000). Why organizations don’t learn from crises: The perverse power of normalization. Review of Business, 21 (3–4), 25–30.

Schein, E. H. (1985). Organizational culture and leadership . San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Seymour, M., & Moore, S. (2000). Effective crisis management: Worldwide principles and practice . London: Cassell.

Sikorski, C. (1998). Ludzie nowej organizacji: Wzory kultury organizacyjnej wysokiej tolerancji niepewności [People of a new organization. Patterns of organizational culture of high uncertainty tolerance] . Łódź, Poland: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.

Stacey, R. D. (2013). The chaos frontier: Creative strategic control for business . Oxford, England: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Stern, E. (1997). Crisis and learning: A conceptual balance sheet. Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management, 5 (2), 69–86.

Download references

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Institute of Entrepreneurship, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland

Jarema Batorski

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jarema Batorski .

Editor information

Editors and affiliations.

Faculty of Political Sciences, Istanbul Medeniyet University, Istanbul, Turkey

Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin

MUFG Union Bank, San Francisco, CA, USA

Hakan Danis

Faculty of Tourism, Istanbul Medeniyet University, Istanbul, Turkey

Ender Demir

Department of Economics, ISCTE-IUL Iscte – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Cite this paper.

Batorski, J. (2021). Crisis Management: The Perspective of Organizational Learning. In: Bilgin, M.H., Danis, H., Demir, E., Vale, S. (eds) Eurasian Business Perspectives. Eurasian Studies in Business and Economics, vol 16/2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65085-8_4

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65085-8_4

Published : 02 March 2021

Publisher Name : Springer, Cham

Print ISBN : 978-3-030-65084-1

Online ISBN : 978-3-030-65085-8

eBook Packages : Business and Management Business and Management (R0)

Share this paper

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

• Publications
• Account settings

Preview improvements coming to the PMC website in October 2024. Learn More or Try it out now .

• Advanced Search
• Journal List
• Front Psychol

Employees Perception of Organizational Crises and Their Reactions to Them – A Norwegian Organizational Case Study

Jarle løwe sørensen.

1 Department of Business, History and Social Sciences, USN School of Business, University of South-Eastern Norway, Kongsberg, Norway

Jamie Ranse

2 School of Nursing and Midwifery, Griffith University, Gold Coast, QLD, Australia

3 Department of Emergency Medicine, Gold Coast Health, Gold Coast, QLD, Australia

Lesley Gray

4 Department of Primary Health Care and General Practice, University of Otago, Wellington, New Zealand

5 Joint Centre for Disaster Research, Massey University, Wellington, New Zealand

Amir Khorram-Manesh

6 Department of Surgery, Institute of Clinical Sciences, Sahlgrenska Academy, Gothenburg University, Gothenburg, Sweden

7 Gothenburg Emergency Medicine Research Group (GEMREG), Sahlgrenska Academy, Gothenburg University, Gothenburg, Sweden

Krzysztof Goniewicz

8 Department of Security, Polish Air Force University, Dęblin, Poland

Attila J. Hertelendy

9 Department of Emergency Medicine, Fellowship in Disaster Medicine, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, United States

10 Department of Emergency Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, United States

11 Department of Information Systems and Business Analytics, College of Business, Florida International University, Miami, FL, United States

Associated Data

The raw data supporting the conclusions of this article will be made available by the authors, without undue reservation. The data is in Norwegian language only.

Organizational sensemaking is crucial for resource planning and crisis management since facing complex strategic problems that exceed their capacity and ability, such as crises, forces organizations to engage in inter-organizational collaboration, which leads to obtaining individual and diverse perspectives to comprehend the issues and find solutions. This online qualitative survey study examines how Norwegian Sea Rescue Society employees perceived the concept of an organizational crisis and how they sensed their co-workers react to it. The scope was the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, a global event affecting all countries and organizations and responding similarly globally. Data were collected during the Fall of 2020. The instrument of choice was the Internal Crisis Management and Crisis Communication survey (ICMCC). The results showed that the overall sample strongly believed in their organization’s overall resilience level. However, a somewhat vague understanding of roles and responsibilities in a crisis where detected, together with some signs of informal communication, rumor spreading, misunderstanding, frustration, and insecurity. This study contributes to the academic field of organizational research, hence crisis management and sensemaking, and could be valuable to managers and decision-makers across sectors. Increased knowledge about how employees react to a crisis may help optimize internal crisis management planning and utilize robust mitigation and response strategies.

Introduction

On March 12, 2020, the Norwegian Institute of Public Health (2020) reported that 621 individuals had tested positive for the SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) coronavirus disease. In response, the Norwegian Government introduced the most substantial and intrusive control measures in Norway since World War 2. Kindergartens, schools, and higher education institutions were closed, cultural, sports events and organized activities were prohibited, and health professionals who work in patient care were forbidden to leave the country. Additionally, entry quarantine to Norway and a ban on staying on one’s leisure property were introduced ( Norwegian Government, 2020 ). One year later, COVID-19 has taken its toll on both societies and individuals. The virus has also brought several unexpected variables for organizations, which many people had not planned for or were equipped to handle. Against this backdrop, we extend Bailey and Breslin's (2021) argument that an organization’s ability to mitigate and respond to major crises like the COVID-19 pandemic is closely linked with the concept of resilience. Here, organizational resilience relates to an organization’s capacity to learn and reflect from past incidents, show flexibility, adapt to new situations, and take advantage of- and utilize existing resources ( Steen and Morsut, 2020 ). Considering that nations have always struggled with and fought against infectious diseases, it could be assumed that the ability to mitigate from- and respond to pandemics has continuously increased, but as Klein (2021) pointed out, more knowledge alone has not always shown enough. Imposed measures must also be explained and put in the proper social perspective. The ongoing pandemic has taught us that a crisis may affect an organization’s external and internal life. Therefore, it is in an organization essential to build and join together both inner and outer resilience in crisis management. A paucity of literature reviews the dynamics of internal crisis management ( Frandsen and Johansen, 2011 ; Heide and Simonsson, 2015 ; Adamu and Mohamad, 2019 ).

Organizational sensemaking is crucial for resource planning and crisis management. Previous publications indicate that when organizations face complex strategic problems which exceed their capacity and ability, such as diverse crises, they search for inter-organizational collaboration, which enables the accumulation of staff individual and diverse perspectives, in the hope of understanding the depth and nature of the issues to find proper solutions ( Seidl and Werle, 2018 ; Tan et al., 2020 ). This online qualitative survey study examines how Norwegian Sea Rescue Society employees perceived the concept of an organizational crisis and how they sensed their co-workers react to it. The scope was the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, a global event affecting all countries and organizations and responding similarly globally. As a contribution to organizational research, this online-survey-based case study, from a sensemaking perspective, aimed to examine how Norwegian Sea Rescue Society employees perceived the concept of an organizational crisis (the COVID-19 pandemic) and how they sense their co-workers reacted to it. Karl Weick’s theory on sensemaking ( Weick, 1995 , 2010 , 2012 , 2015 ) was deemed most appropriate as it focuses on crises and situations where organizational sensemaking is challenged or breaks down ( Johansen et al., 2012 ).

As the sensemaking concept, today can be described more as a general notion than a unified term; we see the need to narrow down the scope in this study and have chosen Maitlis and Christianson's (2014) four recurring sensemaking themes as the starting point for our discussion. The COVID-19 pandemic was proven to affect all nations and organizations which responded to its progression and impacts somewhat similarly and globally ( Khorram-Manesh et al., 2020 ). We thus consider this study to have relevant transfer value across sectors. Increased knowledge about how individuals make sense of- and react to organizational crises would contribute to organizational research and sensemaking. This online qualitative survey study showed that the overall sample strongly believed in their organization’s overall resilience level. However, a somewhat vague understanding of roles and responsibilities in a crisis where detected, together with some signs of informal communication, rumor spreading, misunderstanding, frustration, and insecurity. Our research is based on the frameworks of an earlier Danish study on internal crisis management and communication. Internal response, also known as an organizational response or business continuity management, focuses on an organization’s inner dynamics to a crisis, hence its overall approach and strategic instruments ( Johansen et al., 2012 ). We consider addressing the internal perspective especially relevant as last decade, CM and CC research have, in large, focused on the external dimensions of the crisis, hence, how to restore from a possible reputation or image damage. Thus, research on the internal life in crisis from a sensemaking perspective is to be considered limited ( Frandsen and Johansen, 2011 ).

A crisis can be described as an overwhelming situation that overstrains available capacities and resources ( Van Wart and Kapucu, 2011 ; Sriharan et al., 2022 ). A crisis is more transboundary than everyday emergencies and often exceeds natural or manmade geographical, organizational or administrative borders ( Ansell et al., 2010 ). Despite growing attention to the crisis, it has been proven difficult to establish a consensus about a unified crisis definition ( Wolbers et al., 2021 ). Bundy et al. (2017) point out that research on crises and their management remains fragmented. The organizational crisis literature is somewhat cofounded by several and sometimes conflicting explanations and definitions ( Kovoor-Misra et al., 2001 ), and there are still many theoretical, practical, and conceptual challenges that need resolving ( Lalonde and Roux-Dufort, 2013 ). According to Roux-Dufort and Lalonde (2013) , the diversity of conceptualizations indicates that we are faced with a wandering phenomenon. Upon examining the development of- and knowledge gaps in business and management research on organizational resilience, Linnenluecke (2017) found in her review that the research on resilience has developed into five main streams: “(1) organizational responses to external threats, (2) organizational reliability, (3) employee strengths, (4) the adaptability of business models or (5) design principles that reduce supply chain vulnerabilities and disruptions” (p. 4). The review concluded that many organizations, as a result, will face unpreparedness when a crisis strike if they do not increase their overall capacities and their knowledge about the discussion-making process and resilience planning.

One type of crisis, organizational crisis, an area of interest in this study, is defined as a low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the organization’s sustainability ( Pearson and Clair, 1998 ; Kim, 2018 ). It can be caused by natural and manmade hazards and pose internal and external challenges ( Winston, 2019 ). Other earlier sources, such as Nystrom and Starbuck (2015) , viewed crises as a threat to organizational development, while Milburn et al. (1983) saw them both as a threat and an opportunity. While Weick (1988) argued that a crisis was a low probability event, others like Smart and Vertinsky (1984) reasoned that it could be high and low. Whereas Pearson and Mitroff (1993) claimed that the element of surprise was a hallmark in crisis, Kerchner and Schuster (1982) , on the contrary, argued that they were somewhat predictable. Relevant to this study, and as pointed out by Boin and t Hart (2022) , a crisis could also be seen as a “ catalyst for change ” (p. 13). The justification argument stems from what Barton (1970) referred to as “collective stress,” which, summarized by Boin and t Hart, helps relieve and wash away existing and often tradition-based institutional myths and patterns. New thinking may be beneficial but also challenging for organizations that have a markedly mechanistic ( Burns and Stalker, 1961 ) approach to crisis management, where the action logic is focused on a linear, rigid, and fixed hierarchical system.

From an organizational viewpoint, mitigating and preparing for crises has become increasingly tricky as 21st-century organizations face ever-changing technological, communicative and cultural challenges ( Aljuhmani and Emeagwali, 2017 ). Crisis survival is thus much dependent on the organization’s overall level of resilience ( Teo et al., 2017 ). Resilience is the ability to react ( Williams et al., 2017 ) and recover from damaging events or blows ( Longstaff, 2005 ). Hwang and Lichtenthal (2000) argued that organizations could be subject to two main types of crisis; abrupt or cumulative, where the abrupt is a one-time event that occurs suddenly and challenges the state of normal, while the cumulative builds up gradually over time. Following the latter, an organizational crisis may be viewed as a three-stage multi-disciplinary process consisting of pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis ( Johansen and Frandsen, 2007 ). The organization identifies and takes strategical and tactical mitigation measures during this process, responds to the crises, and restores a normal state ( Coombs and Holladay, 2014 ; Zamoum and Gorpe, 2018 ). While such a multi-disciplinary approach to organizational crisis handling is embraced by several scholars ( Smart and Vertinsky, 1984 ; Weick, 1988 ; Kovoor-Misra et al., 2001 ), it has also been criticized for nurturing up under and contributing to lacking unification within the field of organizational crisis research ( Pearson and Clair, 1998 ).

Managing Crisis

Compared to managing routine-based daily operations, a crisis (also known as a disaster) can be quite challenging and stressful ( Peyravi et al., 2021 ). Stated reasons include that crisis occurs with less regularity and often is more disorganized and resource-overwhelming ( Ansell et al., 2010 ; Sørensen, 2017 ). It also presents stakeholders with higher uncertainty levels ( Mitroff et al., 1987 ), combined with pressure to make quick and effective decisions within short time frames, often based on little or poorly validated information ( Lu and Xue, 2016 ). Lastly, as Van Wart and Kapucu (2011) pointed out, there is an additional inconsistency and notable difference in how the crisis concept is viewed across public and private sectors. While public organizations tend to associate the main task of managing a crisis with facilitating and allocating resources to mitigate, prepare, and respond to expected and unexpected manmade or natural hazards, the NGO sector includes all untoward events and uses the crisis term more broadly. On that note, successful organizational crisis handling depends not just on effective management, structured planning and rapid decision-making. An organization’s success relies just as much on its nature ( Gilpin and Murphy, 2008 ) and its relationship with its employees ( Frandsen and Johansen, 2011 ).

Since the 1960s, extensive organizational hierarchies and excessive bureaucracies have been considered ineffective ( Downs, 1967 ). Such ways of organizing are especially true in crises. Findings show that organizations that have implemented long vertical structures often are challenged, as the vertical structure may hinder effective decision-making and often needed information flow ( Berlin and Carlström, 2013 ). As employees can positively or negatively impact the outcome of a crisis, they should always be considered an essential resource ( Frandsen and Johansen, 2011 ).

Everyday users of systems and procedures are often the ones that are in an immediate position to notice early warning crisis signs and detect discrepancies. Therefore, it is an essential management task to ensure that employees develop their crisis perspective and awareness to contribute to their organization’s overall crisis management ( Heide and Simonsson, 2015 ). As argued by Weick and Ashford (2001) , employees who are empowered are, in crises, not only able to act through established and rehearsed procedures; they are also capable of improvising and implementing alternative solutions. To be able to improvise and implement, there first needs to be an effort to understand connections. Such ability to turn unclear and often unexpected incidents into explicit and comprehensive situations is called sensemaking ( Weick et al., 2005 ).

Making Sense

In organizations, sensemaking serves as a plausible image and rationale for behavior. When stakeholders encounter ambiguous or uncertain situations, they will seek to “make sense” of them and act by examining and using existing organizational and environmental cues ( Weick, 1995 ; Weick and Ashford, 2001 ; Weick et al., 2005 ; Maitlis and Christianson, 2014 ). Sensemaking is thus more about situational interpretation and action interplay than an assessment of choice ( Laroche, 1995 ).

According to a 2014 review study by Maitlis and Christianson (2014) , the “sensemaking language” was introduced in the literature at the beginning of the twentieth century in works by, e.g., Dewey (1922) and James (1890) , but it was first when Karl Weick introduced the concept of organizational sensemaking in his 1969 book “The Social Psychology of Organizing” sensemaking became a critical topic within organizational research ( Weick, 1969 ). At the time, the book contributed to an ongoing debate on whether ecological changes in an organization’s environment, among others, create modifications that engage the attention of relevant actors, resulting in recursive selections and retentions. Later, Weick (1995) described how he viewed sensemaking as a process that is “is (i) grounded in identity construction, (ii) retrospective, (iii) enactive of sensible environments, (iv) social, (v) ongoing, (vi) focused on and extracted cues and (vii) driven by plausibility rather than accuracy” ( Magnussen et al., 2018 , p. 247). Then, in 2001, he provided a further holistic understanding of the phenomenon by explaining the four opinion capture process stages: (1) action, (2) interaction, (3) social commitment, and (4) committed interpretation ( Magnussen et al., 2018 ).

The notion of sensemaking may be viewed from several different perspectives. Individual sensemaking processes occur when individuals engage in retrospective and prospective thinking to construct an interpretation of reality ( Sonenshein, 2010 ). For example, when faced with an unfolding personal crisis, a person may engage in sensemaking about their future when a situation shatters their existing personal and worldly assumptions ( Keesee et al., 2008 ; Park, 2010 ). Such processes are also relevant in the study of working environments and professional interplay, examples being Weick’s known studies of the Bhopal ( Weick, 2010 ), Mann Gulch ( Weick, 1993 ) and Tenerife ( Weick, 1990 ) disasters, which later have been regarded as pioneer studies within the crisis sensemaking field ( Johansen et al., 2012 ).

The way individuals first construct meaning is influenced by several factors and levels, including their internal environment, culture, background, and identity ( Prior et al., 2018 ). Weick (1988) argued that when people act, they initially bring constructs into existence that they set into action. In an attempt to make sense, people, through mental modeling processes, notice and bracket down the environment to identify new cues that they again contemporaneously validate ( Weick et al., 2005 ). Cristofaro (2020) argued in his proposed Affective-Cognitive Theory of management decisions that when sense makers feel a positive, negative or even mixed affective state, they are driven to search for explanatory cues. However, the cues themselves are not a final solution to the sensemaking process but rather pieces of information, which the sensemaker uses to form a schema already shaped and influenced by existing “elicited affective states” (p. 9).

In later work-life studies, Christianson et al. (2009) , which studied the 2003 collapse of the roof of the Baltimore & Ohio (B&O) Railroad Museum Roundhouse, found, for example, that employees’ sensemaking was triggered upon trying to understand and cope with the future of their museum and whether the collapse and destruction were to be understood as a permanent, temporary setback. In a Norwegian study on whether sensemaking processes may influence emergency call center dispatchers’ decision-making when dealing with maritime crises, Magnussen et al. (2018) found that the dispatchers` past professional experiences influenced the sensemaking processes that took place before the actual decision-making, and thus did not always result in optimal outcomes. In sum, knowledge about sensemaking enables organizations to mitigate and act when faced with a crisis ( Weick et al., 2005 ). It provides stakeholders with a structured process of dealing with uncertainty ( Weick, 1995 ) and explains mental reality models ( Namvar et al., 2018 ), contributing to informed decision-making. On that note, traditional sensemaking models have been criticized for not fully considering the role of emotions in individuals and organizations ( Maitlis et al., 2013 ).

Today, sensemaking can be viewed more as a general notion than a unified term. According to Maitlis and Christianson (2014) , the many different definitions expose the many ontological assumptions ( Louis, 1980 ; Starbuck and Milliken, 1988 ; Gephart, 1993 ; Weick, 1995 ) that contribute to defining and further developing sensemaking theory. However, according to the authors, it can still be argued that there are four recurring themes, which will serve as the starting point for our further discussion. First, sensemaking should be viewed as a dynamic process where the focus is on transience over constancy ( Hernes and Maitlis, 2012 ). Second, sensemaking seems to be triggered, especially when stakeholders face unanticipated events ( Maitlis, 2005 ). Third, despite being a general notion, sensemaking should be viewed as a social construct, as organizations and individuals make sense based on their existing thoughts and feelings, thus already being affected by the “actual, imagined, or implied presence of others “( Allport and James, 1985 , p. 3, cited in Weick, 1995 , p. 39 and in Maitlis and Christianson, 2014 , p. 66). Finally, a fourth critical element is the fact that when people take action to make sense of a situation, it, in turn, affects the very environment they want to understand, thus creating “rational accounts of the world that enable action” ( Maitlis, 2005 , p. 21, cited in Maitlis and Christianson, 2014 , p. 66).

Materials and Methods

This research is a simple quantitative design, using an online survey of employees of the Norwegian Sea Rescue Society (RS).

Population and Sample - The Case of the Norwegian Sea Rescue Society

The population for this research included the 1,600 permanent and volunteer rescue workers of The Norwegian Sea Rescue Society (Redningsselskapet, RS.) Founded in 1891, the RS is Norway’s most prominent humanitarian maritime search and rescue (SAR) organization. The Redningsselskapet organizes 52 rescue vessels, four ambulance vessels and other support vessels. In addition to national duties, the organization participates in several international projects and partnerships ( Redningsselskapet, 2020 ). RS was deemed a relevant study sample based on its long-standing SAR traditions, organizational size, and international commitment.

Further, the organization’s response to the COVID-19 Coronavirus was considered relevant as a case study since operational insecurity, infection control requirements, and human resource challenges did pose administrative and managerial challenges to the organization. A sample size calculation was undertaken using G*Power, a free-to-use statistical software package ( Faul et al., 2009 ). The sample size calculation was set with a statistical power of 0.80 with an alpha significance level of 0.05, and an effect size of 0.3 ( Cohen, 2013 ). The appropriate sample size was calculated to be 82.

Data Collection

Instead of 82 participants, 365 possible participants were sent an e-mail invitation to complete an online survey via the RS Human Resource department. The invitation described the study, its purpose and a hyperlink to the survey. Furthermore, contact information for the researchers, along with RS’s approval, was enclosed. One e-mail reminder was sent to potential participants, and data collection closed 16 days after the initial e-mail.

The survey was based on the Danish-developed Internal Crisis Management and Crisis Communication survey (ICMCC). This survey was designed to measure organizational participants’ perceived internal crisis management and communication levels. The ICMCC survey was developed as part of the Danish research project “Internal Crisis Management and Crisis Communication in Danish Organizations” (2011–2014), which was financed by the Danish Council for Independent Research/Social Sciences ( Johansen et al., 2012 ). The theoretical framework of the ICMCC was built around crisis management, sensemaking and internal stakeholder theory, thus relevant to this study. The ICMCC’s homogeneity had earlier been tested by calculating Chronbach’s alpha. The test calculated an alpha value of 0.76, which was considered satisfactory according to Altman (1990) .

The survey included two sections. Demographic information was collected, including the participant’s age, gender, highest educational level, years of working experience, whether they have crisis management/communication as part of their job description, and whether they had received crisis management/communication training collected. Secondly, participants were asked to pick one or more crisis definitions from a list of four predetermined from the original ICMCC survey. Then, participants were asked to rank how they perceived other employees react to crises against 18 different reaction types, using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 = ‘strongly agree.’

Data Analysis

After data collection, data were cleaned and imported to Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 25.0. Armonk, NY: IBM Corp). First, demographical data were analyzed using frequencies and means of central tendency for descriptive purposes. Second, the sample’s crisis perception and reactions to the crises outlined in the ICMCC survey were analyzed. Again, frequencies and central tendency were used to indicate observation averages and identify the dataset’s dispersion ( Barde and Barde, 2012 ).

Protection of Human Participants

To ensure that the study was performed in accordance with ethical research standards, ethical approval was obtained from the Norwegian Center for Research Data (NSD) before data collection (reference number 672295). Additionally, permission was obtained from the RS to conduct this research. Participant volunteerism was emphasized in the initial invitation to participants and during the survey. To ensure further voluntary participation, the participants answered an “I wish to participate in this study” question with a yes/no alternative as the first survey question. Additionally, to ensure anonymity, age and years of working experience, answer options were presented in predefined groupings.

Demographics

A total of 73 ( N  = 73) persons agreed to participate in this study. The response rate was 20%. That gave an overall statistical power of 0.75. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents were males, and 23% were females. Most participants belonged to the 50–59 age group (33.5%) or the 40–49 (33.0%). Further, 19% belonged to the 30–39 group, 5.5% to the 20–29, and 11.0% to the 60–69 age group. Over half (57.8%) stated four years of higher education as their highest level, while 18.3% listed a high-school level. Twenty-two percent had more than four years of higher education, while one individual listed a doctoral educational level. Years of RS working experience varied from under one to 15+. The distributions were as followed: 0–1 (10.7%), 1–5 (25.3%), 6–10 (36.0%), 11–15 (13.3%), and 15+ (14.7%). Close to half (48.5%) either strongly or somewhat agreed that they had crisis management as part of their function. Thirty-four point 5% either strongly or somewhat disagreed. Over half (55.4%) strongly disagreed that they had received crisis management/communication training, while 9.5% somewhat disagreed. Thirty-one point 1% either strongly or somewhat agreed ( Table 1 ).

Demographics.

N = 73.

Employee’s Pattern Perception of Crisis

Of the four crisis pattern descriptions provided ( Table 2 ), over half (63.6%) supported the claim that a crisis is an incident involving damage to stakeholders (customers, members, employees, volunteers, etc.). Fifty-four point 5% supported the assertion that an incident put parts of the organization out of operation within a short period. Fewer of the sample population perceived that a crisis threatens the entire organization’s existing foundation (22.1%) or is poorly handled by the organization’s management (10.4%).

Employee’s pattern perception of crisis (from high to low).

Perceived Co-worker’s Reaction to Crises

Upon being asked how the participants perceived that their co-workers react to crises ( Table 3 ), most perceived they would out a need for more information ( M  = 4 0.32, SD = 0.92). Next followed a sense that several would produce more informal communication ( M  = 2.90, SD = 1.16), feel insecure ( M  = 2.89, SD = 1.20), and frustrated ( M  = 2.86, SD = 1.23). On the other side, as seen in the table, few perceived that their co-workers would become passive ( M  = 1.70, SD = 0.99) or panic ( M  = 1.44. SD = 0.77). Further, the findings showed that only a minory perceived that their colleagues would lose motivation ( M  = 1.83, SD = 1.08), leave the organization ( M  = 1.80, SD = 1.01), lose confidence ( M  = 1.79, SD = 1.06), or feel ashamed ( M  = 1.73, SD = 0.95).

Perceived reactions to crises.

First, by taking as a starting point that sensemaking involves a dynamic process where the focus is on transience over constancy ( Hernes and Maitlis, 2012 ), it flows nicely together with the notion that a crisis, here the COVID-19 pandemic, in its nature, is a rare, overwhelming and abnormal occurrence. Most participants perceived the pandemic as an incident involving damage to stakeholders (customers, members, employees, volunteers, etc.). That over half also defined the ongoing corona crisis as an incident that within a short time put parts of the organization out of operation; it also aligned well with Pearson and Clair's (1998) definition of an organizational crisis, thus being a low-probability, high-impact event. Based on the assumption that the sample responded to the survey questions built on how they perceived the Norwegian Sea Rescue Society had responded to the COVID-19 outbreak during the first three quarters of 2020, only 10.4% reported that they associated a crisis with an incident that was poorly handled by the management. Despite that managing crisis can be quite challenging and stressful compared to standard routine procedures, the findings indicate strong confidence in RS’s ability to handle a crisis. Combined, it indicates trust in management and widespread belief in organizational resilience, that RS is an organization that internally can handle both abrupt and cumulative incidents ( Hwang and Lichtenthal, 2000 ), which both are represented in the ongoing pandemic. Such findings are positive in light of Gilpin and Murphy's (2008) earlier discussed argument of how an organization’s success relies on its nature and its relationship to its workers ( Frandsen and Johansen, 2011 ). Findings signal a highly empowered employee group with a high degree of crisis awareness ( Weick and Ashford, 2001 ), who can turn unclear and often unexpected incidents into understandable and tangible situations ( Weick et al., 2005 ).

Second, results align with the assumption that sensemaking seems to be triggered, especially when stakeholders face unanticipated events ( Maitlis, 2005 ). That the top three found perceived reaction patterns in this study were to (1) seek out more information, (2) engage in more informal communication, and (3) experience a feeling of insecurity supports the assumptions of, among others ( Weick, 1995 ; Weick et al., 2005 ) and Maitlis and Christianson (2014) , which argued that when stakeholders encounter ambiguous or uncertain situations, they will seek to “make sense” of them through the use of existing organizational knowledge, networks and experiences. However, the search for explanatory cues is not always the final solution to the sensemaking process but rather pieces of information, which the sensemaker uses to form a schema that is often already shaped and influenced by existing states. Therefore, as argued by Cristofaro (2020) , it is necessary to focus more on the role of affective states in determining possible cognition errors. That said, making sense of a crisis is not always easy as such an incident presents stakeholders with higher uncertainty levels ( Mitroff et al., 1987 ) and limited information flow, often based upon less validated materials ( Lu and Xue, 2016 ). Therefore, traditional information networks may not always prove sufficient, resulting in that co-workers seeking out information elsewhere.

While informal communication networks may have several benefits, there is an imminent danger that employees may fall victim to an illicit or little nuanced information flow. Combined with a higher degree of uncertainty, such information may negatively affect employees’ sensemaking processes about their current and future ( Keesee et al., 2008 ; Park, 2010 ). Signs of such negative ongoing processes are also identifiable in this study, as co-workers are, by their peers, perceived to show somewhat signs of misunderstanding, frustration, and insecurity, and some are also, to a degree, perceived to feel sorrow and fear. On a positive note, few perceived that their co-workers encountered a loss of motivation or wanted to leave the organization in a crisis. This may suggest that the Norwegian Sea Rescue Society (RS) is a resilient organization with the ability to counteract and adjust to triggering events. Emotional response findings also support the notion of organizational robustness. Few perceived that their co-workers reacted with a feeling of shame or betrayal when their organization experienced a crisis. On the contrary, the results indicate that RS employees consider their co-workers to handle crises well, as few perceived that typical crisis reaction patterns involved high degrees of passivity, silence, panic or loss of confidence.

Third, despite being a general notion, sensemaking can be viewed as a social construct, as organizations and individuals make sense based on their existing thoughts and feelings, thus already being affected by the “actual, imagined, or implied presence of others” ( Allport and James, 1985 , p. 3, cited in Weick, 1995 , p. 39 and in Maitlis and Christianson, 2014 , p. 66). As seen here, employees can positively or negatively impact the outcome of a crisis ( Frandsen and Johansen, 2011 ) through their actions and behavior. Therefore, as Heide and Simonsson (2015) discussed, it is an essential management task to ensure that employees develop relevant crisis understanding, perspective, and awareness. An interesting observation in this study was that close to half of the sample, or more specifically, 35 individuals, while not belonging to the top management, perceived that they had crisis management and communication as part of their formal function. On the one hand, such high numbers may indicate an organization with unclear internally communicated roles and responsibilities. Conversely, the finding may reflect a relatively flat and transparent organizational structure, where top management trusts their employees and the employees take active ownership and contribute to their organization’s overall crisis management.

Finally, a fourth critical element is that when people take action to make sense of a situation, it, in turn, affects the very environment they want to understand, thus creating “rational accounts of the world that enable action” ( Maitlis, 2005 , p. 21, cited in Maitlis and Christianson, 2014 , p. 66). That well over half of the sample population had been with the organization for 6 years indicates That the Norwegian Sea Rescue Society (RS) has a stable employee pool. While a stable pool can be a strength both in everyday operations and in crisis, it can also result in extensive hierarchies, ingrained cultures and traditions that get in the way of effective crisis response ( Downs, 1967 ; Berlin and Carlström, 2013 ). As employees often are the ones that are in the immediate position to notice early warning crisis signs and detect discrepancies, it is an essential management task to ensure that the employees develop and keeps up to date on their crisis sensemaking and awareness skills. As argued by Weick and Ashford (2001) , employees who are empowered are, in crises, not only able to act through established and rehearsed procedures; they are also capable of improvising and implementing alternative solutions.

Conclusion, Recommendations and Limitations

Findings showed that a majority perceived a crisis as an incident involving damage to stakeholders and that it was an incident that put parts of the organization out of operation within a short period. Fewer perceived that a crisis threatens the entire organization’s existing foundation or is poorly handled by the organization’s management. The results indicated that most of the sampled population strongly believed in their organization’s overall resilience level, thus its ability to react and recover from damaging events or blows. However, the results also indicated a somewhat vague understanding of internal roles and responsibilities. Their need for more information became evident in co-workers’ reaction patterns. The sample perceived that their co-workers engaged in informal communication and rumor spreading. Signs of ongoing negative processes were also identifiable in this study, as co-workers were by their peers perceived to show somewhat signs of misunderstanding, frustration, and insecurity. Crisis perception, knowledge of own organization, limitations and capabilities, roles, and responsibilities are important factors in crisis management that should be enhanced through communication and information sharing to prevent spreading rumors and functional disruption in an organization during a crisis. This paper deals with Norwegian employees. However, these findings’ implications are global and include necessary educational initiatives and research focusing on employees’ perceptions of- and reactions to an organizational crisis. More research, preferably with the same approach, is recommended to gain further knowledge on how employees perceive and react to organizational crises. We recommend that future studies examine the relationships between variables using renowned statistical methods.

This study has several limitations. First, this study was limited in scope as data was collected from a limited sample population and a relatively short period. However, the response rate with associated achieved statistical power of 0.75 is close to the desired target of 0.80, hence giving a good indication of the current perceived understanding of crises and their responses. Second, the sample was presented only with predefined options, thus not providing individual options to define the different terms. Third, the sample had to interpret terms like crises, panic, and insecurity individually, which may cause lower term validity. Fourth, since the study was done during an ongoing pandemic, there is a bias in terms of the amount of information that existed at the time data was collected. Fifth, as this study focuses on individual perceptions only, there will always be a risk of bias or other barriers to perceptual accuracy. Finally, it should be noted that the original study was conducted on the organizational level among the 367 largest private companies and 98 public municipalities in Denmark ( Johansen et al., 2012 ), while in this study, the same survey was used on a single organization and applied on the individual level. We still deem using the same instrument relevant, as it measures the participant’s individual perceptions in both studies.

Data Availability Statement

Ethics statement.

The studies involving human participants were reviewed and approved by NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data. The patients/participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study.

Author Contributions

JS: conceptualization, methodology, formal analysis, visualization, and project administration. JS, JR, LG, AK-M, KG, and AH: writing—original draft preparation and writing—review and editing. All authors contributed to the article and approved the submitted version.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Publisher’s Note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

Acknowledgments

Reported data were collected as part of Master-thesis work of Fagerland (2020) . The reported data in this article was not used as part of the thesis work and has never been reported on or published. The authors extend their appreciation to the Norwegian Sea Rescue Society for positively supporting and facilitating this study.

• Adamu A. A., Mohamad B. (2019). Developing a strategic model of internal crisis communication: empirical evidence from Nigeria . Int. J. Strateg. Commun. 13 , 233–254. doi: 10.1080/1553118X.2019.1629935 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Aljuhmani H. Y., Emeagwali O. L. (2017). The roles of strategic planning in organizational crisis management: The case of Jordanian banking sector . Int. Rev. Manag. Mark. 7 , 50–60. [ Google Scholar ]
• Allport G., James W. (1985). Psychology: The Briefer Course . University of Notre Dame Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Altman D. G. (1990). Practical Statistics for Medical Research . Florida: CRC press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Ansell C., Boin A., Keller A. (2010). Managing transboundary crises: identifying the building blocks of an effective response system . J. Conting. Crisis Manag. 18 , 195–207. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5973.2010.00620.x [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bailey K., Breslin D. (2021). The COVID-19 pandemic: what can we learn from past research in organizations and management? Int. J. Manag. Rev. 23 , 3–6. doi: 10.1111/ijmr.12237 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Barde M. P., Barde P. J. (2012). What to use to express the variability of data: standard deviation or standard error of mean? Perspect. Clin. Res. 3 , 113–116. doi: 10.4103/2229-3485.100662, PMID: [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Barton A. H. (1970). Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations . Ward Lock Educational.
• Berlin J. M., Carlström E. D. (2013). The dominance of mechanistic behaviour: a critical study of emergency exercises . Int. J. Emerg. Manag. 9 , 327–350. doi: 10.1504/IJEM.2013.059878 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Boin A., t Hart P. (2022). From Crisis to reform? Exploring three post-COVID pathways . Pol. Soc. 41 , 13–24. doi: 10.1093/polsoc/puab007 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bundy J., Pfarrer M. D., Short C. E., Coombs W. T. (2017). Crises and crisis management: integration, interpretation, and research development . J. Manag. 43 , 1661–1692. doi: 10.1177/0149206316680030 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Burns T., Stalker G.M. (1961). The Management of Innovation . London: Tavistock. [ Google Scholar ]
• Christianson M. K., Farkas M. T., Sutcliffe K. M., Weick K. E. (2009). Learning through rare events: significant interruptions at the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Museum . Organ. Sci. 20 , 846–860. doi: 10.1287/orsc.1080.0389 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Cohen J. (2013). Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences . London: Academic press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Coombs W. T., Holladay S. J. (2014). How publics react to crisis communication efforts: comparing crisis response reactions across sub-arenas . J. Commun. Manag. 18 , 40–57. doi: 10.1108/JCOM-03-2013-0015 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Cristofaro M. (2020). "I feel and think, therefore I am": An affect-cognitive theory of management decisions . Eur. Manag. J. 38 , 344–355. doi: 10.1016/j.emj.2019.09.003 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Dewey J. (1922). Human Nature and Conduct . Mineola, NY: Dover. [ Google Scholar ]
• Downs A. (1967). Inside Bureaucracy . New York: Little Brown. [ Google Scholar ]
• Fagerland O. M. B. (2020). Internal Crisis Communication: Case of The Norwegian Sea Rescue Society (Master’s thesis, University of South-Eastern Norway).
• Faul F., Erdfelder E., Buchner A., Lang A.-G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using G* power 3.1: tests for correlation and regression analyses . Behav. Res. Methods 41 , 1149–1160. doi: 10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149, PMID: [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Frandsen F., Johansen W. (2011). The Study of Internal Crisis Communication: Towards an Integrative Framework . Corporate Communications: An International Journal. [ Google Scholar ]
• Gephart R. P. (1993). The textual approach: risk and blame in disaster sensemaking . Acad. Manag. J. 36 , 1465–1514. doi: 10.5465/256819 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gilpin D. R., Murphy P. J. (2008). Crisis Management in a Complex World . London: Oxford University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Heide M., Simonsson C. (2015). Struggling with internal crisis communication: a balancing act between paradoxical tensions . Pub. Relat. Inq. 4 , 223–255. doi: 10.1177/2046147X15570108 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hernes T., Maitlis S. (2012). Process, Sensemaking, and Organizing . London: Oxford University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Hwang P., Lichtenthal J. D. (2000). Anatomy of organizational crises . J. Conting. Crisis Manag. 8 , 129–140. doi: 10.1111/1468-5973.00132 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• James W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology . New York: Dover. [ Google Scholar ]
• Johansen W., Aggerholm H. K., Frandsen F. (2012). Entering new territory: a study of internal crisis management and crisis communication in organizations . Public Relat. Rev. 38 , 270–279. doi: 10.1016/j.pubrev.2011.11.008 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Johansen W., Frandsen F. (2007). Crisis Communication: When the Corporate Image and Reputation Is Threatened [English Trans.] . Frederiksberg, Denmark: Samfundslitteratur. [ Google Scholar ]
• Keesee N. J., Currier J. M., Neimeyer R. A. (2008). Predictors of grief following the death of one's child: The contribution of finding meaning . J. Clin. Psychol. 64 , 1145–1163. doi: 10.1002/jclp.20502, PMID: [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kerchner C. T., Schuster J. H. (1982). The uses of crisis: taking the tide at the flood . Rev. High. Educ. 5 , 121–141. doi: 10.1353/rhe.1982.0011 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Khorram-Manesh A., Carlström E., Hertelendy A., Goniewicz K., Casady C., Burkle F. (2020). Does the prosperity of a country play a role in COVID-19 outcomes? Disaster Med. Public Health Prep. 16 , 177–186. doi: 10.1017/dmp.2020.304, PMID: [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kim Y. (2018). Enhancing employee communication behaviors for sensemaking and sensegiving in crisis situations: strategic management approach for effective internal crisis communication . J. Commun. Manag. 22 , 451–475. doi: 10.1108/JCOM-03-2018-0025 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Klein J. (2021). “Infectious disease, pandemics, and education: From miasms to COVID-19,” in Meeting the Challenges of Existential Threats Through Educational Innovation . ed. H. Saeverot (Routledge), 85–97.
• Kovoor-Misra S., Clair J. A., Bettenhausen K. L. (2001). Clarifying the attributes of organizational crises . Technol. Forecast. Soc. Chang. 67 , 77–91. doi: 10.1016/S0040-1625(99)00081-5 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lalonde C., Roux-Dufort C. (2013). Challenges in teaching crisis management: connecting theories, skills, and reflexivity . J. Manag. Educ. 37 , 21–50. doi: 10.1177/1052562912456144 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Laroche H. (1995). From decision to action in organizations: decision-making as a social representation . Organ. Sci. 6 , 62–75. doi: 10.1287/orsc.6.1.62 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Linnenluecke M. K. (2017). Resilience in business and management research: A review of influential publications and a research agenda . Int. J. Manag. Rev. 19 , 4–30. doi: 10.1111/ijmr.12076 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Longstaff P. H. (2005). Security, Resilience, and Communication in Unpredictable Environments Such as Terrorism, Natural Disasters, and Complex Technology . England: Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University. [ Google Scholar ]
• Louis M. R. (1980). Surprise and sensemaking: what newcomers experience in entering unfamiliar settings . Adm. Sci. Q. 25 , 226–251. doi: 10.2307/2392453, PMID: [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lu X., Xue L. (2016). Managing the unexpected: sense-making in the Chinese emergency management system . Public Adm. 94 , 414–429. doi: 10.1111/padm.12261 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Magnussen L. I., Carlstrøm E., Berge A.-K., Wegger F., Sørensen J. L. (2018). Help we are sinking! Stories from Norwegian dispatch centers on decision-making in unfamiliar and ambiguous situations . J. Emerg. manag. 16 , 245–254. doi: 10.5055/jem.2018.0373 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Maitlis S. (2005). The social processes of organizational sensemaking . Acad. Manag. J. 48 , 21–49. doi: 10.5465/amj.2005.15993111 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Maitlis S., Christianson M. (2014). Sensemaking in organizations: taking stock and moving forward . Acad. Manag. Ann. 8 , 57–125. doi: 10.5465/19416520.2014.873177 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Maitlis S., Vogus T. J., Lawrence T. B. (2013). Sensemaking and emotion in organizations . Organ. Psychol. Rev. 3 , 222–247. doi: 10.1177/2041386613489062 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Milburn T. W., Schuler R. S., Watman K. H. (1983). Organizational crisis. Part I: definition and conceptualization . Hum. Relat. 36 , 1141–1160. doi: 10.1177/001872678303601205 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Mitroff I. I., Shrivastava P., Udwadia F. E. (1987). Effective crisis management . Acad. Manag. Perspect. 1 , 283–292. doi: 10.5465/ame.1987.4275639 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Namvar M., Cybulski J., Phang C., Wee C.-Y., Tan K. Y. (2018). Simplifying sensemaking: concept, process, strengths, shortcomings, and ways forward for information systems in contemporary business environments . Australas. J. Inf. Syst. 22 :1645. doi: 10.3127/ajis.v22i0.1654 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Norwegian Government (2020). Omfattende tiltak for å bekjempe koronaviruset. Available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/nye-tiltak/id2693327/ (Accessed November 11, 2020).
• Norwegian Institute of Public Health (2020). Status koronavirus 12. mars 2020. Available at: https://www.fhi.no/nyheter/2020/status-koronavirus-12.-mars-2020/ (Accessed November 11, 2020).
• Nystrom P., Starbuck W. H. (2015). To Avoid Organizational Crises, Unlearn. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2708289 [ Google Scholar ]
• Park C. L. (2010). Making sense of the meaning literature: an integrative review of meaning making and its effects on adjustment to stressful life events . Psychol. Bull. 136 , 257–301. doi: 10.1037/a0018301, PMID: [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pearson C. M., Clair J. A. (1998). Reframing crisis management . Acad. Manag. Rev. 23 , 59–76. doi: 10.2307/259099 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pearson C. M., Mitroff I. I. (1993). From crisis prone to crisis prepared: a framework for crisis management . Acad. Manag. Perspect. 7 , 48–59. doi: 10.5465/ame.1993.9409142058 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Peyravi M., Marzaleh M. A., Khorram-Manesh A. (2021). “ A disaster: Genral principles and management ,” in Handbook of Disaster and Emergency Management . 2nd Edn. eds. Khorram-Manesh A., Goniewicz K., Hertelendy A., Dulebenets M. (Göteborg: Kompendiet; ). [ Google Scholar ]
• Prior D. D., Keränen J., Koskela S. (2018). Sensemaking, sensegiving and absorptive capacity in complex procurements . J. Bus. Res. 88 , 79–90. doi: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.03.009 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Redningsselskapet (2020). Welcome to the Norwegian sea rescue society. Available at: https://www.redningsselskapet.no/english/ (Accessed November 11, 2020).
• Roux-Dufort C., Lalonde C. (2013). Exploring the Theoretical Foundations of Crisis Management . J. Conting. Crisis Manag. 21 , 1–3. [ Google Scholar ]
• Seidl D., Werle F. (2018). Inter-organizational sensemaking in the face of strategic meta-problems: requisite variety and dynamics of participation . Strateg. Manag. J. 39 , 830–858. doi: 10.1002/smj.2723 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Smart C., Vertinsky I. (1984). Strategy and the environment: A study of corporate responses to crises . Strateg. Manag. J. 5 , 199–213. doi: 10.1002/smj.4250050302 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sonenshein S. (2010). We're changing—Or are we? Untangling the role of progressive, regressive, and stability narratives during strategic change implementation . Acad. Manag. J. 53 , 477–512. doi: 10.5465/amj.2010.51467638 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sørensen J. L. (2017). Norwegian maritime crisis collaboration exercises: are they useful? Doctoral dissertation, Northcentral University.
• Sriharan A., Hertelendy A. J., Banaszak-Holl J., Fleig-Palmer M. M., Mitchell C., Nigam A., et al.. (2022). Public health and health sector crisis leadership during pandemics: a review of the medical and business literature . Med. Care Res. Rev. 79 , 475–486. doi: 10.1177/10775587211039201 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Starbuck W. H., Milliken F. J. (1988). “ Executives' perceptual filters: what they notice and how they make sense ,” in The Executive Effect: Concepts and Methods for Studying Top Managers . ed. Hambrick D. C. (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press; ), 35–65. [ Google Scholar ]
• Steen R., Morsut C. (2020). Resilience in crisis management at the municipal level: The synne storm in Norway . Risk, Hazards Crisis Pub. Pol. 11 , 35–60. doi: 10.1002/rhc3.12178 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Tan B., Pan S. L., Chen W., Huang L. (2020). Organizational Sensemaking in ERP implementation: The influence of Sensemaking structure . MIS Q. 44 , 1773–1809. doi: 10.25300/MISQ/2020/11872 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Teo W. L., Lee M., Lim W. S. (2017). The relational activation of resilience model: how leadership activates resilience in an organizational crisis . J. Conting. Crisis Manag. 25 , 136–147. doi: 10.1111/1468-5973.12179 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Van Wart M., Kapucu N. (2011). Crisis management competencies: The case of emergency managers in the USA . Public Manag. Rev. 13 , 489–511. doi: 10.1080/14719037.2010.525034 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Weick K. E. (1969). The Social Psychology of Organizing . Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. [ Google Scholar ]
• Weick K. E. (1988). Enacted sensemaking in crisis situations [1] . J. Manag. Stud. 25 , 305–317. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6486.1988.tb00039.x [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Weick K. E. (1990). The vulnerable system: an analysis of the Tenerife air disaster . J. Manag. 16 , 571–593. doi: 10.1177/014920639001600304 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Weick K. E. (1993). The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann gulch disaster . Adm. Sci. Q. 38 , 628–652. doi: 10.2307/2393339 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Weick K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in Organizations . United States: Sage. [ Google Scholar ]
• Weick K. E. (2010). Reflections on enacted sensemaking in the Bhopal disaster . J. Manag. Stud. 47 , 537–550. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00900.x [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Weick K. E. (2012). Making Sense of the Organization, Volume 2: The Impermanent Organization . New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. [ Google Scholar ]
• Weick K. E. (2015). The social psychology of organizing . Management 18 :189. [ Google Scholar ]
• Weick K. E., Ashford S. J. (2001). Learning in organizations . New Handbook of Organ. Commun. Adv. Theor. Res. Methods 704 :731. [ Google Scholar ]
• Weick K. E., Sutcliffe K., Obstfeld D. (2005). Organizing and the process of sensemaking . Organ. Sci. 16 , 409–421. doi: 10.1287/orsc.1050.0133 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Williams T. A., Gruber D. A., Sutcliffe K. M., Shepherd D. A., Zhao E. Y. (2017). Organizational response to adversity: fusing crisis management and resilience research streams . Acad. Manag. Ann. 11 , 733–769. doi: 10.5465/annals.2015.0134 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Winston B. E. (ed.) (2019). “ Leadership growth through crisis: an investigation of leader development during tumultuous circumstances ,” in Communicating Through Crisis . Switzerland: Palgrave. [ Google Scholar ]
• Wolbers J., Kuipers S., Boin A. (2021). A systematic review of 20 years of crisis and disaster research: trends and progress . Risk, Hazards Crisis Pub. Pol. 12 , 374–392. doi: 10.1002/rhc3.12244 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Zamoum K., Gorpe T. S. (2018). “ Crisis management: a historical and conceptual approach for a better understanding of today's crises ,” in Crisis Management-Theory and Practice . eds. Holla, K., Titko M., Ristvej J. (United Kingdom: IntechOpen; ). [ Google Scholar ]

Organizational Crisis Management Research Paper

View sample Organizational Crisis Management Research Paper. Browse research paper examples for more inspiration. If you need a management research paper written according to all the academic standards, you can always turn to our experienced writers for help. This is how your paper can get an A! Feel free to contact our writing service for professional assistance. We offer high-quality assignments for reasonable rates.

The financial scandals of the new millennium, as well as stories of how businesses suffered in the devastating aftermaths of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the Gulf Coast hurricanes, have created a renewed interest in organizational crises and their management. Images of the crooked “E” sign being removed from Enron’s headquarters in Houston, Jimmy Dunne’s determined face on CNBC when he announced that Sandler O’Neill and Partners would remain in business despite the World Trade Center attacks, and the flooded businesses in the French Quarter of New Orleans have become poignant reminders that powerful events can overwhelm the resources of today’s organizations. They can cause loss of life, loss of physical assets, loss of employment, loss of revenues, and loss of shareholder equity.

Academic Writing, Editing, Proofreading, And Problem Solving Services

Get 10% off with 24start discount code.

In a survey of 114 Fortune 1,000 companies, Ian Mitroff, Terry Pauchant, and Paul Shrivastava (1989) estimated that large U.S. corporations face 10 crises a year. The frequency of crises is increasing because organizations operating in domestic and international markets have become interconnected so that negative events affecting one company can have a domino effect on its suppliers, creditors, and distributors; business environments are becoming more and more turbulent; and complex, high-risk technologies that can be potentially harmful, are being used. The capabilities of organizations to effectively handle a crisis, unfortunately, have not kept up with the new realities. In a longitudinal study by the Center for Crisis Management at the University of Southern California, Ian Mitroff and Murat Alpaslan (2003) revealed that three out of four Fortune 500 corporations are prepared to handle only the types of calamities that they have encountered in the past.

The purpose of this research-paper is to survey the literature on organizational crisis and crisis management. It offers a definition of organizational crisis, reviews conceptual models of organizational crisis, and describes different types of crises affecting businesses. It summarizes several approaches to crisis management and suggests that managers in the future may be best served by new strategies which require broad, abstract thinking as well as specialized, technical knowledge; continual assessment of external threats and internal vulnerabilities; the creation of a crisis center; mobilization of experts with multiple and diverse perspectives from inside and outside the organization; and joint problem solving with community leaders and government officials.

A Definition Of Organizational Crisis

Organizational crisis is a difficult concept to define. Consensus among researchers on a definition has been illusive for a number of reasons. First, contributions to crisis theory have been made by researchers coming from multiple disciplines. In psychology, for example, a crisis is defined as “an acute disruption of psychological homeostasis in which one’s usual coping mechanisms fail and there exists evidence of distress and functional impairment” (Yeager & Roberts, 2003, p. 6). In political science, a crisis consists of a “breakpoint along the peace/war continuum of a state’s relations with any other international actor” (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 1982, pp. 382-383). In health care, a crisis is conceived of as a “transition for better or worse in the course of a disease, usually indicated by a marked change in the intensity of signs and symptoms” (Anderson, Anderson, & Glanze, 1998, p. 2371). Each researcher approaches the topic with his or her own units of analysis, lenses, tools, and biases.

Examples of Recent Organizational Crises

Organization: Tulane University

Precipitating Event: Hurricane Katrina hit the New Orleans area on August 27, 2005. The hurricane killed 1,323 individuals and displaced over 400,000 people. It shut down 71,000 businesses, with some of them never to reopen. Property damages reached $25 billion.

Impact: Tulane University incurred structural damage of $250 million and operating losses of $100 million. Two thirds of its campus was flooded. It cancelled its Fall 2005 semester and deployed its students to 595 different campuses across the country. Moody’s Investors Services predicted that the university could run out of cash by April 2006, if students did not return.

Predisaster preparations: Tulane had an emergency plan that had been tested several times. It called for a campus wide evacuation in the event of a category 3, 4, or 5 storm. The plan did not, however, consider the possibility of catastrophic dam-age or the shutting down of facilities for an extended period of time. The plan called for several senior administrators to stay on campus to ride out the storm. This turned out to be a mistake. Administrators were stranded for four days without food, utilities, or means of communication. immediate crisis

Responses: Students, who had just arrived on campus to start a new semester, were evacuated ahead of time by buses and cars to a gym at Jackson State University in Mississippi. When power failed at the gym, they traveled to airports in Dallas and Atlanta. A recovery team of administrators was soon assembled in Houston. The team set up an emergency Web site to communicate with students and faculty. David Pilo, an alumnus and cofounder of Yahoo, donated manpower and Web-hosting resources. With the help of police officers, employees retrieved IT files from a downtown New Orleans building. Other universities agreed to accept Tulane students for one semester. Tulane kept their first semester tuition. A $150 million loan was obtained to hire a firm to repair the damaged campus.

Intermediate crisis responses: Fund-raising activities began with the goal of $25 million by June 2006. A cruise ship was rented for use as a dormitory. $1.5 million was spent to charter a local school for the children of Tulane faculty. 243 full-time staff members were laid off.

Long-Term Strategic changes: Tulane’s president, Scott Cowen, assembled a planning board which included the president of John Hopkins University and consultants from PriceWaterhouseCoopers. The medical school was downsized (clinical work was discontinued; faculty and staff were cut by 40%). A decision was made to focus on undergraduate education (PhD programs in English, Law, Economics, and Social Work were eliminated). Several undergraduate Engineering majors (including civil and environmental engineering) were dropped. Eight of 16 athletic programs (including men’s track, women’s swimming, and men’s cross-country) were cut.

Sources: Cowen (2006) and Reingold (2006).”

Organization: Sandler O’Neill & Partners

Precipitating event: The September 11 terrorist attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center resulted in the death of 2,749 people; the destruction of the offices of over 430 businesses from 26 countries; and the demolition of 75 stores, restaurants, and service outlets in the underground mall. Total losses were expected to reach as much as $90 billion.

Impact: Sandler O’Neill’s headquarters were located on the 104th floor of the South Tower of the World Trade Center. It lost 66 out of its 171 employees including its cofounder and senior managing partner, Herman Sandler and investmentbanking head, Chris Quackenbush. All of the firm’s bond traders were killed (buying and selling bonds generated 40% of total revenues). Twenty out of 24 employees who worked on the equity desk were killed. The two employees who ran the syndicate desk were killed.

At the time of the attack, most employees felt that they would be safer remaining inside the building than trying to leave. They learned from a prior experience. Those who fled after the 1993 basement bombing of the World Trade Center were either engulfed in smoke in the staircases or stranded on the roof in the cold for hours.

Immediate crisis responses: Recovery efforts became the responsibility of James Dunne, the firm’s sole surviving senior partner, who had been playing golf the day of the attacks. His first concern was with the families of the victims. He made sure that at least one of Sandler’s 22 partners would attend each of the 66 funerals. He sent every family a check to cover the rest of the year’s salary of the deceased employee. He set up a charity fund, hired grief counselors and extended the health care benefits for the families for five years. He arranged for year end bonuses to be paid to the victims’ relatives.

Dunne created a new executive team through reappointments. The head of the bond desk became a managing partner responsible for day-to-day operations and the co-head of research became the new chief operating officer. He formed an outside advisory committee comprised of golfing friends who were also high-level investment bankers. Employees moved into temporary midtown office space donated by Bank of America. Although all records were destroyed, employees were able to get in touch with their clients because one staff member had all their telephone numbers memorized. Employees continued to close deals. Competitors offered their help. They provided employees with daily market information, taught them how to run a syndicate desk, and gave them commissions for joining them in deals.

Intermediate crisis responses: The firm began to hire new employees, adding 77 by September 2002. It was able to attract highly qualified individuals that other Wall Street firms had laid off. It rebuilt its information technology infrastructure. It moved into its own office space on a low floor at 919 Third Avenue in midtown Manhattan. In 2002, Sandler O’Neill rose to 8th place from 16th place in 2001 in a ranking of financial institutions.

Long-Term Strategic changes: Sandler O’Neill continued to grow. It moved into new areas of research (foreign banking and the broker-dealer sector). It created a Community Reinvestment Act advisory division. It became more active in merger and acquisition advising.

Sources: Brooker (2002) and Etzel (2002).

Organization: Enron Corporation

Precipitating Events: Enron was a Houston-based natural gas and electricity company which was admired for its innovative use of the Internet to trade energy contracts. In 2000, it reported revenues of $100 billion and it ranked number 7 in Fortune Magazine’s Fortune 500. It was later revealed that for a period of at least five years, high-ranking Enron executives engaged in unethical accounting practices and the mismanagement of the firm’s investments in water, telecommunications, and other utilities. Its accounting (in which it booked revenue upfront from long-term deals instead of spreading them over several years) and its off-balance sheet partnerships (in which it created special purpose entities which bought out partner stakes in joint ventures so that it could keep debt off its books) caused its profits to be overstated and its debts understated. On August 14, 2001, Jeffrey Skilling, CEO, resigned for personal reasons. Kenneth Lay, chairman, replaced Skilling as CEO. On October 16, 2001, Enron announced a quarterly loss of $638 million. Andrew Fastow, CFO, was fired. On November 8, 2001, Enron restated its financial results for the past four years (earnings declined by $591 million; debt for 2000 increased by $658 million). Its stock fell below $1 per share. On December 2, 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy.

Impact: In the aftermath of Enron’s collapse, 2,400 other related business entities had to be closed; its workforce of 32,000 employees was dispersed; and $1 billion in retirement funds held in Enron stock was lost. Arthur Anderson, a respected accounting and consulting firm, went out of business because of the role its accountants played in the shredding of Enron documents. Banks, including Citibank and JP Morgan Chase, paid fines and settled lawsuits for their role in helping Enron finance deals. Lay, Skilling, Fastow, and other executives were convicted of fraud.

Attempts to Save the Company: The day after Skilling resigned as CEO, Sherron Watkins, an accountant and vice president, wrote a memo to Lay expressing her concerns that the company was about to implode because of its accounting practices. She advised him to hire independent legal and accounting experts to review the partnerships. Lay hired attorneys from Vinson & Elkins who had prepared the legal documents for the partnerships. Lay instructed them not to look too closely into the accounting. The lawyers concluded that the accounting was aggressive but not inappropriate. Negotiations began with Enron’s competitor, Dynergy, who initially agreed to acquire Enron for $8.9 billion. Dynergy backed out of the deal after its executives reviewed Enron’s financial statements. Lay and other executives called high-ranking government officials, including Treasury secretary, Paul O’Neill, to see if they could convince banks to extend credit to them. They refused. Thousands of Enron employees were laid off. Enron sold its trading business to UBS Warburg.

Divestiture of Enron Businesses: In January 2002, Lay resigned as CEO under pressure from creditors. Enron hired Stephen Cooper, a turnaround specialist, as interim CEO. By looking at Enron’s organization, businesses, customer base, and liquidity, Cooper felt it was a good restructuring candidate. Almost all of Enron’s businesses were sold, including Mariner Energy Incorporated, Portland General Electric Company, its North American pipeline, and Prisma Energy, until a staff of 300 employees remained. Enron would become a shell company to handle litigation until it dissolved.

Sources: Fox (2003), Healy & Palepu (2003), and Lawrence (2003).

Second, researchers are divided on whether a crisis is an objective or subjective phenomenon. Some argue that crises have objective properties. It is possible to identify the onslaught and start of a crisis; the chaotic midway phase in which employees suffer from shock, denial, and panic; and the resolution period when the crisis subsides and the organization recovers. A crisis also involves a tangible threat (e.g., a major food poisoning outbreak in a hotel chain; a steep drop in world coffee prices and its impact on small coffee-bean growers; a powerful hurricane which destroys the headquarters of a specialty insurance company). Other researchers argue that crises exist predominantly in the minds of key decision makers. Leaders may create crises when they are nonexistent in order to further their own political agendas. When employees in an organization become complacent, managers try to create a sense or urgency by pointing to a threatening move of a competitor or by publicizing the results of an unfavorable customer-satisfaction survey. The underlying motive is to stimulate creative thinking and action. Managers may sometimes call a crisis a “minor blip” resulting from a “slight miscalculation” in order to avoid blame and to stay in power for as long as possible. Dawn Stover (2004), for example, reported that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) labeled the breakup of the Space Shuttle Columbia a “mishap” because the term is blame-neutral, suggesting bad luck rather than human error.

Third, a few researchers have argued that the search for a common definition of organizational crisis is not only futile but also wrong. Ian Mitroff, Murat Alpaslan, and Sandy Green (2004) contended that crises are ill-structured problems and that any attempt to develop common terms violates the ambiguous and complex nature of such problems. Crises,

in other words, defy definition. The best managers can do is to use a systems model of scientific inquiry which involves threat sensing, crisis assessment, crisis capabilities, and damage containment. Once these activities have been completed, managers return to the threat sensing step to determine if the danger has passed. If not, the cycle is repeated.

Progress on a definition of crisis in the management literature was made in 1998. Christine Pearson and Judith Clair (1998) proposed that “an organizational crisis is a low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly” (p. 59). It is a traumatic event which creates stress for members of the organization. Employees become defensive, deny the severity of the situation, and begin to question deeply held beliefs. Their ability to make sound decisions is impaired by cognitive biases. The crisis also leads to a breakdown of cultural norms and a lack of faith in leadership. The potential for a crisis is increased if an organization employs “high-risk” technologies (e.g., nuclear power). If one or two of the components fail, they interact in unexpected ways and cause the entire system to collapse. The result is a large-scale organizational disaster accompanied by the loss of life (e.g., Union Carbide’s chemical leak in Bhopal, India).

The advantage of Pearson and Clair’s (1998) work is that three of the most important perspectives on organizational crisis—the psychological approach, the sociopolitical approach, and the technological-structural approach—are integrated into one definition. A crisis has both an objective reality (i.e., it is a low-probability, high-impact event) and perceptual qualities (leaders must recognize that a crisis exists if they are to make any effort to respond). Many crises are preceded by warning signals that are ignored, minimized, or misread by decision makers. The lack of an appropriate response from senior managers only makes the impact of the crisis worse. The business will continue to lose customers and its financial performance will deteriorate even further.

The disadvantages associated with Pearson and Clair’s (1998) definition is that crises are occurring more and more frequently in the new millennium; therefore, the notion that a crisis is a “low-probability” event may be heading toward obsolescence. It is also important to clearly define “high-impact.” The appearance of anthrax-tainted mail in the United States in 2001 and the sniper attacks in the Washington, DC area in 2002 fortunately did not result in the loss of thousands of lives. They did, however, cause widespread panic and the disruption of daily routines. Finally, Pearson and Clair’s definition does not acknowledge that some crises are favorable for an organization. The Chinese symbol for crisis means danger and opportunity. A crisis, therefore, represents a significant turning point in an organization’s history. Some organizations will emerge successfully from the crisis while others will fail. The events that lead up to crises can come from the organization’s internal environment (e.g., human error, lax security, equipment failures, unethical behaviors, power struggles) or from the organization’s external environment (e.g., natural disasters, stock market crashes, nationalization, terrorism). Table 1 shows the relationship between crisis and other similar terms.

Conceptual Models Of Organizational Crisis

Organizational crises have been studied from a life cycle perspective. Organizations, like individuals, pass through several developmental phases, in which movement from one phase to the next is triggered by a crisis and its successful resolution. Crises involving organizational growth and development are fairly predictable (and therefore manageable). Since organizations pass through well-known stages and face common issues, managers are advised to follow a set of specific strategies to help their businesses move forward. In “birth,” managers should create an organizational vision, acquire needed resources, and hire talented employees; in “growth,” managers need to maintain stakeholder confidence, acquire additional resources, and build commitment; in “maturity,” managers must pursue organizational change and revitalization; in “decline,” managers must cut costs and arrange for an orderly closing of the firm.

Larry Greiner (1972) developed a classic model of organizational crisis within the organizational life cycle literature. He argued that as an organization grows in size and age, it encounters several crises. A “crisis of leadership” emerges when an organization has grown too large and complex for the managing capabilities of its entrepreneurial founder. Professional managers must be hired to “pull the organization together” through formal communication, accounting policies, incentive programs, and quality-control systems. A “crisis of autonomy” develops as lower level managers seek greater freedom and responsibility while top managers are reluctant to give up power. Eventually, lower level managers and plant managers are allowed to make day-to-day operating decisions. Conflicts between plant managers who now want complete discretion in running their operations and top managers who attempt to centralize decision making erupt in “a crisis of control.” The firm can only move forward when plant managers are given the responsibility to run decentralized field units while a general headquarters is created so that top managers can plan, control, and review the performance of line managers. Finally, a “crisis of red tape” occurs when rigid bureaucratic structures inhibit problem solving and innovation. By creating cross-departmental teams, managers can encourage spontaneity and conflict resolution.

Gilbert Probst and Sebastian Raisch (2005) provide an example of the continued interest in organizational crises that occur as companies pass through different life cycle stages. In their study of 100 large organizational crises, they found that companies suffering from a premature aging syndrome (i.e., they grew old before their time) or from a burnout syndrome (i.e., they experienced permanent stress due to system exhaustion) collapsed at the height of their success. They either grew too rapidly or too slowly, pursued either constant change or tentative change, had either overly powerful or extremely weak managers, and fostered either very competitive or very cooperative cultures. Success hinged on a company’s ability to maintain, over the long term, an appropriate balance in growth rates, change processes, leadership styles, and cultures.

Table 1 Organizational Crises and Similar Terms

Crises often result from pressures emanating from an organization’s external environment. Carolyne Smart, Walter Thompson, and Ilan Vertinsky (1978) segmented the external environment into those elements that are controllable by the actions or attributes of an organization (e.g., managers can conduct market research to learn how well products are being received and make product enhancements based on customer feedback) and those elements which cannot be controlled or influenced by the organization (e.g., political, legal, and social factors as well as competitor moves). A crisis occurs when there is a dramatic shift in the level or structure of the uncontrollable elements in a firm’s external environment. The firm’s ability to cope successfully with the crisis depends on its profile of organizational attributes. The profile includes (a) executive characteristics such as motives, leadership styles, cognitive abilities, and the propensity for risk taking; and (b) organizational characteristics, such as slack resources, and degrees of diversification, centralization, formalization, and routinization. In a follow-up study, Carolyne Smart and Ilan Vertinsky (1984) found that managers tended to defend the status quo and use standard operating procedures in response to a crisis in a routine environment. Managers used retrenchment strategies in response to crises in complex and turbulent environments because they felt they were unable to exert control over events. Managers adopted entrepreneurial strategies when faced with a crisis in a simple environment.

Irving Janis (1982) coined the phrase “groupthink” to refer to decision-making situations in which high-level government officials make low-quality and hasty foreign policy recommendations. They feel pressured to conform to the will of the leader and to maintain a sense of amiability and esprit de corps within their inner circle. Janis hypothesized that groups that are highly cohesive and insulate themselves from outside criticism tend to concur with the judgments of the leader and to support his or her plans. This leads to such symptoms as feelings of invulnerability, stereotyped views of the enemy, beliefs in the group’s morality, and illusions of unanimity. When decision makers face a crisis or a provocative situational context characterized by high stress, external threat, and short decision time, they use poor judgment. The result is a fiasco. President Kennedy’s 1963 decision to send 1,400 Cuban exiles to Cuba in an attempt to overthrow the Castro government was flawed because his advisory team failed to criticize the plan and miscalculated the strength and size of Castro’s forces. Groupthink has been used to explain everything from the demise of Enron to the loss of the Challenger Space Shuttle to NBC’s mistake in hiring Jay Leno to host The Tonight Show.

In a retrospective examination of his work, Charles Per-row (2004) discussed his finding that increasingly complex technologies, such as those in nuclear power plants and chemical refineries, are risky because their components can interact with one another in unanticipated ways and cause large-scale disasters. In order to understand a specific event, such as the failure of an operator to close a valve, it is necessary to examine the context of the failure, such as the mindset of the operator, which in turn is determined by training, experience, and corporate ideology. Crises are inevitable because a small problem can escalate quickly; in retrospect, no one knew that if component x failed, then component y would fail and together the two failures would start a fire and silence the alarm system. Perrow was so worried about advanced technologies that he advocated for the abandonment of nuclear power and nuclear weapons.

Paul Shrivastava, Ian Mitroff, Danny Miller, and Anil Miglani (1988) take Perrow’s ideas a step further. They agree that complex technological systems are unreliable and that human error and inadequate resource allocations for safety can contribute to industrial crises. Regulatory failures, which allowed the hazardous technologies to enter communities which are ill equipped to handle them, are to blame as well. The infrastructure needed to successfully contain the damage and evacuate civilians is lacking. A crisis, therefore, is not just a problem for a single organization; it affects both private and public organizations and requires a coordinated strategy involving multiple stakeholders.

Strategic And Tactical Responses To Crisis

There are many “dos” and “don’ts” of effective crisis management. In the short term, managers are warned not to ignore the early signs of the onset of a crisis, not to deceive or lie to employees or the public about major threats, and not to find scapegoats for the company’s problems. In the long term, managers are told to develop contingency plans, to create crisis-management teams, and to implement training programs so that others can learn to recognize the beginnings of a crisis. Managers can easily become overwhelmed by the abundance of advice and the number of items on crisis-preparation checklists. Managers should realize that both the type of crisis facing the organization and the stage in the evolution of the crisis require different strategic and tactical responses. Strategies are comprehensive and have a long-term perspective; tactics consist of short-term, operational maneuvers. The more predictable crises can be handled by rescue specialists and technical experts while the less predictable crises should be managed by an organization’s top executives since they require significant system wide changes.

From a strategic point of view, managers are encouraged to adopt a general crisis orientation. They must be able to tolerate ambiguity, stay calm during difficult times, and fully mobilize an organization’s resources. Managers must acknowledge that they will never have a detailed plan for every crisis that might occur. Their goal is to be prepared for a crisis and, when the time comes, to exhibit flexibility (i.e., to quickly recognize how an existing plan can be modified to meet a new threat) and resiliency (i.e., to evaluate the crisis, recover from initial shock, and utilize the organization’s strengths and resources).

Bertrand Robert and Chris Lajtha (2002) developed a 10-point mental action plan for successful crisis management:

• Instead of viewing crises as negative or threatening events, managers should treat them as unusual opportunities for change in which a company’s core values and management policies are tested and improved. Developing the skills and talents of employees to better handle crises via training can enhance their everyday performance and serve as a springboard for innovation and risk taking.
• A company’s chief executive and top managers must be actively engaged in crisis management and agree to undergo crisis-management training themselves.
• Rigid operating procedures and lengthy policy manuals are useless during a crisis. Managers must regard crisis management as a continual process that requires frequent revisions and updating. It should be an integral part of a company’s strategic management processes.
• Managers should assess the feasibility of setting up a crisis-management team or crisis-management center. It is unlikely that one manager will possess all the necessary leadership skills to handle a crisis.
• It is just as important to prepare for crises in advance and to learn from crises that have been successfully resolved as it is to help the organization through the acute phase of a crisis. Managers, however, are often unwilling to devote the necessary resources to the precrisis and postcrisis stages.
• During the precrisis stage, it is important to use lateral thinking and to pay attention to early warning signs no matter how marginal or peripheral they may seem.
• Crisis-management teams should not be afraid to violate organizational taboos. They should not be reprimanded for speaking freely, crossing hierarchical lines, or disagreeing with a culture value.
• Managers should rebuild lost confidence among customers, shareholders, suppliers, creditors, and employees. By acting competently, they can gain the respect and trust of key stakeholders and increase the likelihood that new decisions will be accepted and implemented.
• Employees need training to deal with the unexpected. Detailed simulations which incorporate the element of surprise are especially helpful.
• Organizations should be more open with one another and share information with the academic community (even regarding their weaknesses and mistakes) so that “best practices” in crisis management can be developed.

From a process point of view, crises have been analyzed according to several phases which have become associated with different strategies. Summarizing the literature, Sheldene Simola (2005) outlined the basic strategies that reduce the occurrence of and damage from organizational crises. In the precrisis stage, managers try to get a sense of what is going to happen so that they can prepare for a crisis in advance. Managers conduct an organizational risk assessment to identify areas of potential vulnerability and to take steps to reduce the risk. They create crisis-management teams and a crisis-management center equipped with emergency communications systems. A backup location is established in case the primary facility incurs damage. Managers write crisis plans, protect company data, hold practice drills, and simulate emergencies.

In the acute stage, a crisis has hit and some damage has occurred. Managers must work hard to control as much of the crisis as possible. They activate the crisis-management team; assess the causes and likely consequences of the crisis; contain the crisis physically (e.g., in the case of a chemical spill); send a message to the media that the situation is under control; and ensure the safety and health of employees, customers, and the general public.

The chronic crisis stage refers to cleanup, recovery, and healing. The crisis-resolution stage means that the organization is healthy again. Organizations must engage in learning and adopt flexible roles, cross-functional teams, open communications, and joint problem solving. Arjen Boin, Paul t’Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius (2005) believe that three different types of learning must occur. Experience-based learning means that past events and actions are remembered and studied; they provide guidelines regarding what will and what will not work in the future. Explanation-based learning requires the rational and scientific search for the causes of a crisis and its consequences; an extensive and meticulous audit will provide recommendations for the future. Competence/skill-based learning suggests that new talents, skills, and technologies are needed to deal effectively with a crisis.

From a practical point of view, not all crises are the same. Their origins, intensity, duration, and consequences are different. Crises resulting from natural disasters, industrial mishaps, malicious acts of violence, and internal ethical breakdowns are fundamentally different in nature and are best handled by different strategies. Securities fraud, white-collar crime, and accounting irregularities are associated with unethical behaviors which can be most damaging to a corporation’s reputation. Such organizations face the daunting task of creating an ethical culture, putting into place safeguards to prevent future incidents, and restoring credibility with the public. Recommended remedies range from such commonplace practices as the operating of anonymous hotlines for whistleblowers to more drastic measures such as the hiring of chief risk officers to monitor the corporation as a whole and not just one department, and the expanding of democratic participation in corporate governance by inviting employees, community representatives, and other stakeholders to sit on boards of directors.

Defective products, environmental spills, and plant explosions also receive negative publicity and the scorn of members of society. They often indicate a disregard for safety and inadequate quality control procedures that resulted from a firm’s cost-cutting efforts. These crises have significant consequences that can occur long after the triggering event. Crisis responses are initially aimed at technical damage control and rescue and relief of the injured. Later, victims need to be compensated; technological and organizational improvements need to be made. There is an increased focus on creating “high-reliability organizations” that demonstrate a commitment to safety, a culture of continuous learning and improvement, and redundancy in safety measures and personnel.

Powerful earthquakes and hurricanes are acts of nature that are best handled by operating early warning systems, fortifying infrastructures, implementing orderly evacuations, and rebuilding affected areas. Their patterns are somewhat predictable. Hurricanes, for example, usually occur during the summer months in the southern regions of the United States, tornadoes develop in the Midwest and South, and earthquakes affect California. They cause the most significant damage at the time and place of occurrence and their adverse effects diminish over time. One reason Hurricane Katrina was so devastating was because the model hurricane used to design the network of levees, floodwalls, storm gates, and pumps in New Orleans was too simplistic. Had a better hurricane-protection system been in place, the results would have been different—causing, perhaps, a case of “wet ankles” at the most (Schwartz, 2006).

Terrorism is an act of violence committed by individuals who seek to cause as much damage and loss of life as possible. The attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon highlighted the importance of information flow and interorganizational coordination before, during, and after a crisis (see Comfort, 2002). Different agencies had key pieces of information which in isolation from each other appeared insignificant. An FBI agent in Phoenix, Arizona, for example, expressed concerns about suspicious individuals taking flying lessons. The British government knew that Zacarias Moussaui, under arrest in the United States for an immigration violation, had trained at an Al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan. Communications between firemen and police officers on the scene broke down, resulting in a large number of fatalities among emergency and rescue personnel.

A major recommendation made by the architects of the 9/11 Commission Report was the need to share sensitive and time-critical information by creating trust between federal and nonfederal entities and by establishing secure communications mechanisms so that information did not fall into the wrong hands. Other tools are helpful in confronting terrorism. Sarah Murray (2004) discussed a matrix in which risks are assessed on the basis of the probability of an attack and an organization’s resilience, and Matt Crenson (2004) wrote about a branch of abstract mathematics that may be able to help intelligence officers determine the most efficient way to disable a terrorist network (work in both these areas is being conducted by professors at MIT). Dean Alexander (2004) reported that some companies are investing in telecommunications networks and virtual offices, operating duplicate facilities and managing multiple personnel, and even providing counterterrorism training for executives and bodyguards.

A new generation of crises may be on the way. Arjen Boin and Patrick Lagadec (2000) compiled a list of the characteristics of modern crises. They can affect large populations; produce high economic costs; endure for a long period; trigger a snowball effect on other individuals, groups, and institutions; involve a large number of actors and organizations who jump into action; create communication snafus; and cause extreme uncertainty. “Unthinkable” or “inconceivable” events have the potential to wreck havoc not just on today’s organizations but also on the social order in countries around the globe. Scenarios for radical weather changes, biological terrorism, and asteroid collisions have been developed by various agencies. Disaster checklists, evacuation policies, and media training are no longer sufficient. New forms of information sharing, problem solving, and cooperation among individuals, groups, organizations, and governments at all levels of society are warranted.

A Conference Board Report recently concluded that an avian flu pandemic would require global, holistic planning (Conference Board, 2006). Jeffrey Staples (2006) said that companies could experience absentee rates of between 15%-30% due to sickness, quarantines, travel restrictions, and fear of contagion. A good plan should focus on employee education, hygiene, evacuation, and minimization of supply chain disruptions. Scientists claim that an asteroid, 1950 DA, will travel dangerously close to the Earth and might crash into the Atlantic Ocean in the year 2880.

According to a report by Cynthia Wagner (2003), a simulation showed that it could cause a tsunami that might engulf the northeastern U.S. coast within two hours after impact. Improving the nation’s knowledge base and applying expertise acquired in other large-scale disasters might aid in the planning for such an event.

Only a few organizations have begun to prepare for such rare occurrences. The software company, SAS Institute Inc., for example, has set up a Pandemic Task Force, with executives from its travel, security, health care, and risk functions, to develop plans for human-to-human transmissions of avian flu. In case of an outbreak, employees would be encouraged to work at home; if the payroll system became inaccessible there would be an alternative so that employees could still get paid (Reingold, 2006). Sun Microsystems has built an information technology infrastructure that will give its employees and customers access to information on their own desktop computers no matter where they are. It plans to broadcast reports in different languages on the spread of an infectious disease on its intranet radio station (Caruso, 2006). As these examples illustrate, companies need good crisis management plans. In their article, “Preparing for Evil,” Ian Mitroff and Murat Alpaslan (2003) caution that it is no longer possible to fight “new wars with old strategies” (p. 109). The authors continue: “If they are to cope with abnormal crises, companies must see—as their enemies do—skyscrapers as vertical coffins and aircraft as flying bombs, ugly and horrifying though the prospect may be” (p. 11). It has become more important than ever to develop novel and comprehensive approaches to crisis management.

Bibliography:

• Alexander, D. C. (2004). Business confronts terrorism: Risks and responses. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
• Anderson, K. N., Anderson, L. E., & Glanze, W. D. (1998). Mosby’s medical, nursing, & allied health dictionary (5th ed.). St. Louis, MO: Mosby.
• Boin, A., & Lagadec, P. (2000). Preparing for the future: Critical challenges in crisis management. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 8(4), 185-191.
• Boin, A., t’Hart, P., Stern, E., & Sundelius, B. (2005). The politics of crisis management. New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Brecher, M., & Wilkenfeld, J. (1982). Crises in world politics. World Politics, 34(3), 380-417.
• Brooker, K. (2002). Starting over. Fortune, 145(2), 50-64. Caruso, D. (2006). Staying connected. Harvard Business Review, 84(5), 38.
• Churchman, C. W. (1967). Wicked problems. Management Science, 14(4), B141.
• Conference Board. (2006, July 2). Report suggests companies need a more global, holistic preparation for potential avian flu epidemic. Lab Business Week, p. 274.
• Comfort, L. K. (2002). Managing intergovernmental responses to terrorism and other extreme events. Publius, 32(4), 29-49.
• Conklin, E. J., & Weil, W. (1997). Wicked problems: Naming the pain in organizations. 3M meeting network. Retrieved September 8, 2007, from http://www.leanconstruction.org/ pdf/wicked.pdf
• Cowen, S. S. (2006). Be prepared. The chronicle of higher education, 52(33), 12.
• Crenson, M. (2004, October 17). Fighting terrorism with abstract math; Hamas succession predicted by lab. The Washington Post, p. A4.
• Etzel, B. (2002). Up from ground zero, Investment Dealer’s Digest, 68(34): 7-9.
• Fox, L. (2003). Enron: The rise and fall. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
• Greiner, L. E. (1972). Evolution and revolution as organizations grow. Harvard Business Review, 50(4), 37-46.
• Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2003). The fall of Enron. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(2), 3-12.
• Janis, I. (1982). Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
• Kreps, G. A. (1984). Sociological inquiry and disaster research. Annual Review of Sociology, 10, 309-330.
• Lawrence, A. (2003). The Collapse of Enron. NY: McGraw-Hill/ Irwin.
• Meyer, A. D. (1982). Adapting to environmental jolts. Administrative Science Quarterly, 27(4), 516-537.
• Mitroff, I. I., & Alpaslan, M. C. (2003). Preparing for evil. Harvard Business Review, 81(4), 109-115.
• Mitroff, I. I., Alpaslan, M. C., & Green, S. E. (2004). Crises as ill-structured messes. International Studies Review, 6(1), 165-194.
• Mitroff, I. I., Pauchant, T. C., & Shrivastava, P. (1989). Crisis, disaster, catastrophe: Are you ready? Security Management. 33(2), 101-108.
• Murray, S. (2004, June 2). Gambling on the life of a business, terrorism: Sarah Murray explains why each company needs to take a different approach to the chances of being attacked. Financial Times, p. 2.
• Pearson, C. M., & Clair, J. A. (1998). Reframing crisis management. Academy of Management Review, 23(1), 59-76.
• Perrow, C. (2004). A personal note on normal accidents. Organization & Environment, 17(1), 9-14.
• Porfiriev, B. N. (1996). Social aftermath and organizational response to a major disaster: The case of the 1995 Sakhalin earthquake in Russia. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 4(4), 218-227.
• Probst, G., & Raisch, S. (2005). Organizational crisis: The logic of failure. Academy of Management Executive, 19(1), 90105.
• Reingold, J. (2006). The storm after the storm. Fast Company, 104, 88-94.
• Reingold, J. (2006, July/August). Mastering disaster. Fast Company, 107, 38-39.
• Robert, B., & Lajtha, C. (2002). A new approach to crisis management. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 10(4), 181-191.
• Schwartz, J. (2006, May 30). An autopsy of Katrina: Four storms, not just one. The New York Times, p. F1.
• Shrivastava, P., Mitroff, I. I., Miller, D., & Miglani, A. (1988). Understanding industrial crises. Journal of Management Studies, 25(4), 285-303.
• Simola, S. K. (2005). Organizational crisis management: Overview and opportunities. Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research, 57(3), 180-192.
• Smart, C. F., Thompson, W. A., & Vertinsky, I. (1978). Diagnosing corporate effectiveness and susceptibility to crises. In C. F. Smart & W. T. Stanbury (Eds.), Studies on crisis management (pp. 57-95). Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Butterworth.
• Smart, C. & Vertinsky, I. (1984). Strategy and the environment: A study of corporate responses to crises. Strategic Management Journal, 5(3), 199-213.
• Staples, J. (2006). A new type of threat. Harvard Business Review. 84(5), 20-22.
• Stover, D. (2004). Anomaly = Disaster, and other handy NASA euphemisms. Popular Science, 264(2), 96.
• Wagner, C. G. (2003). Impact! Simulating an asteroid hit. Futurist, 37(5), 68.
• Watkins, M. D., & Bazerman, M. H. (2003). Predictable surprises: The disasters you should have seen coming. Harvard Business Review, 81(3), 72-85.
• Yeager, K. R., & Roberts, A. R. (2003). Differentiating among stress, acute stress disorder, crisis episodes, trauma and PTSD: Paradigm and treatment goals. Brief Treatment and Crisis Intervention, 3(1), 3-25.

ORDER HIGH QUALITY CUSTOM PAPER