research report 2022

Digital 2022: Global Overview Report

12½ trillion hours spent online, a new milestone in internet adoption, and new records for social media use…

If you expected digital to return to “business as usual” in 2022, you may want to reset those expectations.

Our new Digital 2022 Global Overview Report – published in partnership with We Are Social and Hootsuite – reveals that most of the connected world continues to grow faster than it did before the pandemic.

Big stories in this year’s report include:

Double-digit growth in social media users

Big gains for YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok

New insights into the world’s social media preferences

The rise of social commerce

Significant increases in the cost of social media ads

Some uncomfortable truths about advertising

We’ve also got a look back at the first ten years of the Global Digital Reports series.

At almost 8,000 words, this article’s a bit of a beast, so get yourself comfortable, and prepare for a full-on feast of facts and figures.

Best-in-class data

As always, I’d like to start by saying a very big thank you to the world-class data partners who’ve made this year’s reports possible, especially:

GSMA Intelligence

Important notes

Just before we get into the numbers, I’d like to encourage all readers to review our detailed notes on data , to understand how changes in data sources and methodologies may impact this year’s numbers. 

Alerts to highlight include:

Internet users: delays in reporting due to COVID-19 may mean that figures for “year-on-year change” represent change over periods of more than one year.

Social media users: big changes in platform reporting mean that various numbers included in this year’s reports are not directly comparable with figures for the same data points featured in our previous reports. Where we’ve been able to calculate representative growth figures, we’ve included those growth figures within this year’s reports, but where we haven’t included growth figures, it’s likely that any comparisons with historical data will deliver incorrect values . As a result, please avoid comparing social media users and advertising audience figures in this year’s reports with figures published in our previous reports.

But without further ado, let’s dive into the data…

Top 10 takeaways

I’d recommend starting with this video, which offers a handy summary of this year’s essential headlines and trends.

Once you’ve finished watching that, read on below for the full report.

Full report

You’ll find our Digital 2022 Global Overview Report in the SlideShare embed below ( click here if that’s not working for you), but read on below for my complete analysis of this year’s top findings.

Essential headlines

Global Digital Overview January 2022 DataReportal

Here are the key figures you need to understand the ‘state of digital’ today:

Global population: The world’s population stands at 7.91 billion in January 2022, with the annual growth rate of 1.0 percent suggesting that this figure will reach 8 billion sometime in mid-2023. Well over half (57.0 percent) of the world’s population now lives in urban areas.

Global mobile users: More than two-thirds (67.1 percent) of the world’s population now uses a mobile phone, with unique users reaching 5.31 billion by the start of 2022. The global total has grown by 1.8 percent over the past year, with 95 million new mobile users since this time last year.

Global internet users: Global internet users have climbed to 4.95 billion at the start of 2022, with internet penetration now standing at 62.5 percent of the world’s total population. Data show that internet users have grown by 192 million (+4.0 percent) over the past year, but ongoing restrictions to research and reporting due to COVID-19 mean that actual growth trends may be considerably higher than these figures suggest.

Global social media users: There are 4.62 billion social media users around the world in January 2022. This figure is equal to 58.4 percent of the world’s total population, although it’s worth noting that social media “users” may not represent unique individuals ( learn why ). Global social media users have grown by more than 10 percent over the past 12 months, with 424 million new users starting their social media journey during 2021.

These numbers provide valuable context for digital adoption and growth, but in order to make sense of what people are actually doing online, we need to dig deeper into the numbers.

And the good news is that we’ve got lots of numbers to dig into…

Global Digital Growth January 2022 DataReportal

A decade of digital growth

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the first global report in our Global Digital Reports series, so we can now look back over a full decade of digital data.

If you’d like to indulge in a bit of nostalgia, you can find our first Global Overview Report here , while all subsequent reports in the series are also available in our free library . 

You can also find my comprehensive analysis of key trends over the past decade in this in-depth article . 

Note that considerably more data is available today than it was at the time we produced many of our earlier reports though, so some of the figures I’ll cover below may not match those that we published in previous reports.

Internet user growth

Kepios analysis reveals that internet users have more than doubled over the past 10 years, climbing from 2.18 billion at the start of 2012 to 4.95 billion at the start of 2022.

That results in a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8.6 percent for the past decade as a whole, but – as you can see in the chart below – annual growth rates have fluctuated meaningfully from one year to another.

Global Internet Users Over Time January 2022 DataReportal

The latest data suggest that internet users grew by 192 million over the past 12 months, resulting in annual growth of just 4.0 percent in 2021.

However, we strongly suspect that this lower growth figure is more likely the consequence of challenges associated with collecting and reporting data during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, and that these numbers don’t reflect the actual growth in internet users over the past year.

As a result, there’s a very good chance that we’ll report higher numbers for growth between 2021 and 2022 once newer data becomes available.

Global Internet Overview January 2022 DataReportal

Social media user growth

Meanwhile, social media users have seen even faster growth than internet users over the past decade. 

Today’s total of 4.62 billion social media users is 3.1 times higher than the 1.48 billion figure we published in 2012, and means that social media users have grown at a CAGR of 12 percent over the past decade.

Global Social Media Users Over Time January 2022 DataReportal

Social media user growth has continued at a double-digit rate of 10.1 percent over the past 12 months too, but I confess I’m surprised that the growth rate between 2021 and 2022 has remained above pre-pandemic levels.

For context, the latest data indicate that 424 million users started their social media journey over the past year, equating to an average of more than 1 million new users per day, or roughly 13½ new users every single second .

Global Social Media Overview January 2022 DataReportal

However, anyone who had been wavering about joining social media before the pandemic struck would have been most likely to join during the early days of lockdown in 2020, so I’m hesitant to attribute any meaningful share of growth over the most recent 12 months to some kind of “COVID effect”.

Moreover, with social media users now equating to 58.4 percent of the world’s total population, we should expect to see growth rates start to decelerate over the next few years, and this may well be the last time that we report double-digit annual growth in social media users.

The good news is that we should see social media users reach the equivalent of 60 percent of the global population sometime in 2022 though, so even if growth rates do subside, the overall reach potential of social media should still offer plenty to get excited about.

Dig deeper: click here to learn more about what future digital growth rates might look like.

Ever fewer offline, but big challenges remain

Data reveal that the number of people who remain “unconnected” to the internet has now dropped below 3 billion for the first time.

This marks a significant milestone in the world’s journey towards equal digital access, and has particular relevance as the role of connected devices has moved from luxury to lifeline , especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.

However, the latest data also reveal that there’s plenty more work to do.

More than 1 billion people remain offline across Southern Asia, while almost 840 million people are yet to come online across Africa.

Meanwhile, despite accounting for roughly 1 in 5 of the world’s connected population, China is still home to more than 400 million of the world’s “unconnected”.

Unconnected Populations January 2022 DataReportal

For context, the median age of the population plays an important role in shaping adoption levels across many parts of Africa, with more than half of the populations of several countries in the region still below the age of 20.

However, basic infrastructure challenges remain an important consideration too.

For example, in the Central African Republic – where internet adoption remains stubbornly low – barely 1 in 7 people currently has access to electricity, and the vast majority of people still don’t have access to basic sanitation either.

Low Levels of Internet Adoption in Context January 2022 DataReportal

Furthermore, the excellent State of Mobile Internet Connectivity 2021 report from GSMA Intelligence reveals that 1 in 4 people across lower- and middle-income countries is still unaware of the existence of mobile internet.

In other words, hundreds of millions of people around the world may still not even know that the internet exists.

So, while the UN may have designated internet access a “basic human right”, there’s still a long way to go to ensure that everyone has equal access to what is arguably the most important innovation of our age.

Related: click here to learn more about the world’s top motivations for going online.

Social media favourites

When it comes to the world’s “favourite” social media platforms, GWI ’s latest data reveals that Instagram has now overtaken Facebook to claim second place in the worldwide rankings. 

It’s still a close call though: 14.8 percent of global internet users identify Instagram as their favourite platform, compared with 14.5 percent for Facebook.

However, yet another Meta platform – WhatsApp – tops the global rankings, with 15.7 percent of working-age internet users choosing the messenger app as their favourite social platform.

The World's Favourite Social Media Platforms January 2022 DataReportal

Interestingly, WeChat gains enough votes to rank fourth at a global level, despite a whopping 99 percent of the platform’s votes coming from users within Mainland China.

China is home to roughly 20 percent of the world’s total internet users though, so it’s perhaps unsurprising that the country’s social media users have such a big impact on these global rankings.

However, you may be more surprised to see TikTok gain just 4.3 percent of the total vote.

That doesn’t quite match the excitement TikTok generates in the media, but it’s worth noting that the number of people choosing TikTok as their favourite social platform has jumped by 71 percent in the past 90 days, and TikTok’s overall share of the vote has increased by 180 basis points in just 3 months.

Furthermore, App Annie reports that TikTok was the most-downloaded mobile app in 2021, and the platform continues to enjoy strong growth in ad reach too (more on that below).

World's Most Downloaded Mobile Apps in 2021 January 2022 DataReportal

As a result, we might expect to see TikTok make even bigger gains in these rankings over the coming months, so be sure to follow our quarterly Statshot reports in 2022 to keep track of its progress.

Dig deeper: take a closer look at how social media favourites vary by age and gender in this article .

Time spent using connected tech continues to rise

One of the top stories at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic was how much more the world came to depend on the internet, especially as countries entered lockdown.

However, despite fluctuations in movement restrictions over the past two years, the latest data show that people are in fact spending more time than ever using connected tech.

Internet time

Research from GWI reveals that the “typical” global internet user now spends almost 7 hours per day using the internet across all devices.

Change in Daily Time Spent Using the Internet January 2022 DataReportal

For context, if we assume that the average person sleeps for roughly 7 to 8 hours per day, the typical internet user now spends more than 40 percent of their waking life online.

The amount of time we spend online continues to climb too, with the daily average increasing by 4 minutes per day (+1.0 percent) over the past year. 

That may not sound like a big increase, but added up across all of the world’s internet users, those 4 extra minutes per day will equate to more than 5 billion additional days of internet use in 2022.

In total, the latest numbers suggest that the world will spend more than 12½ trillion hours online in 2022 alone.

As with most data points in our Global Digital Reports, however, there are considerable differences in time spent by geography.

South Africans now spend the greatest amount of time online each day, with the country’s working-age internet users saying that they spend an average of 10 hours and 46 minutes using connected tech every day.

Filipinos, Brazilians, and Colombians aren’t far behind, with the average internet user in those countries each spending more than 10 hours per day online.

At the other end of the scale, Japanese users spend the least amount of time online each day, with the national average still below 4½ hours per day.

It’s also interesting to note that China sits quite far down these rankings, with the country’s internet users saying they spend an average of 5 hours and 15 minutes per day online.

Daily Time Spent Using the Internet by Country January 2022 DataReportal

Social media time

At an average of 2 hours and 27 minutes per day, social media accounts for the largest single share of our connected media time, at 35 percent of the total.

The time we spend using social media has grown again over the past year too, up by 2 minutes per day (+1.4 percent).

Change in Daily Time Spent Using Social Media January 2022 DataReportal

However, social media’s share of overall internet time has actually fallen slightly since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Our analysis suggests that this is largely because people have embraced a variety of new online activities over the past two years, so – relatively – social media now accounts for a smaller share of total online time than it did when people did fewer things online.

Daily Time Spent With Social Media as a Share of Total Internet Time January 2022 DataReportal

However, with the world set to spend more than 4 trillion hours using social media in 2022, there’s little doubt that social media still plays a central role in our everyday lives.

Dig deeper: click here to see how social media time compares with time spent watching TV.

Social media time by platform

But how does that social media time break down by platform?

Well, the good news is that the wonderful folks at App Annie have shared some great data with us this year that reveals how much time people spend using the Android apps of several top social platforms.

For context, handsets running Android account for roughly 7 in 10 smartphones in use around the world today, so – while these figures may not include all social media users – they still provide rich insights into how the world actually uses social media platforms.

Overall, App Annie’s data shows that YouTube accounts for the greatest total time spent using social media apps on Android phones, and it also clocks the highest average time per user.

App Annie’s research indicates that the typical YouTube user now spends almost a full day – 23.7 hours – per month using YouTube’s mobile app, but remember that the platform likely also sees meaningful activity on its website, as well as via embeds on third-party websites.

Time Spent with Social Media Platforms January 2022 DataReportal

Facebook comes second in terms of total, cumulative time spent using social media apps, with Android users averaging 19.6 hours in the platform’s app each month.

TikTok users also clock in an average of 19.6 hours per month using the TikTok Android app, but because the platform has fewer overall users, TikTok only comes fifth in these rankings by cumulative time spent across all users.

WhatsApp comes third in terms of total time spent, with users spending an average of 18.6 hours per month using the messenger app on Android phones.

Instagram ranks fourth, but users spend considerably less time using the app each month compared with the rest of the top 5, at just 11.2 hours per month.

At 11.6 hours per month, LINE also sees impressive average use rates, but with considerably fewer users overall, it only places ninth in the global rankings by total time spent. 

For context, average monthly time per user has remained relatively stable across Facebook, YouTube, and WhatsApp over the past year.

Meanwhile, the time spent using Instagram has increased by 10 percent year on year, equating to almost 1 additional hour of use per month.

However, TikTok has seen the biggest gains across the top 5 over the past 12 months.

TikTok’s users now clock in an extra 6 hours and 20 minutes per month using the platform’s Android app compared with this time last year, equating to a year-on-year increase of 48 percent.

It’s important to stress that these figures vary considerably by geography though, and local rankings can look quite different to this global picture.

Dig deeper: Explore local data for time spent across the top 5 platforms in the full Digital 2022 report.

Time Spent Using TikTok by Country January 2022 DataReportal

Facebook is still the most-used social platform

Insights into people’s “favourite” platforms and the time they spend using each one are perhaps the most representative data points for marketers preparing a social media plan.

However, active user numbers still provide valuable benchmarks, especially when it comes to understanding a platform’s momentum.

Data published in Meta’s Q3 2021 investor earnings announcement confirms that Facebook is still the world’s most-used social media platform, with 2.91 billion users as of October 2021 (the latest “official” figure at the time of writing).

Facebook’s monthly active user base grew by a solid 6.2 percent (+170 million users) over the past year, despite already reaching more than half of its total potential audience by age and accessibility (note that Facebook is still blocked in China).

YouTube has closed the gap with Facebook over the past year though, with the platform’s audience growing almost twice as fast as Facebook’s.

YouTube now has at least 2.56 billion active users, which equates to roughly 88 percent of the latest Facebook total.

World's Most-Used Social Media Platforms January 2022 DataReportal

However, note that the figures we publish for YouTube are based on the platform’s ad audience, whereas the figures for Facebook represent total monthly active users.

Meta hasn’t published any official updates to global WhatsApp user numbers in the past year, but it’s likely that the platform still ranks third, with at least 2 billion active users per month.

Instagram ranks fourth at a global level, and has seen some of the fastest growth of any platform in the past year (you’ll find more detailed analysis of Instagram’s growth later in this article).

WeChat closes out the top five, with China’s favourite social media platform now claiming 1.26 billion monthly active users.

However, all eyes will doubtless be on TikTok, which currently sits in sixth place in these active user rankings.

Bytedance announced that the platform had passed 1 billion monthly active users back in September 2021, but the company has been characteristically tight-lipped since then, so that figure remains the latest “official” number.

However, it’s worth noting that TikTok’s active user base roughly doubled between December 2019 and September 2021, and with the platform still claiming top spot in the global app download charts, it’s almost certain that TikTok’s monthly active users continue to grow (more on that below).

Meanwhile, Meta hasn’t published an “official” monthly active user (MAU) number for Messenger since September 2017, so we’ve decided to use the platform’s latest ad audience reach figure in these rankings, instead of that older MAU headline.

Note that LinkedIn doesn’t publish active user numbers, which is why we’re unable to include it in this list. 

Dig deeper: stay up to date with all the latest social media stats via our dedicated platform pages .

Instagram keeps growing

The latest data published in Meta’s advertising resources shows that Instagram’s ad reach has jumped by an impressive 21 percent over the past year, despite important changes in how the company reports its ad audience numbers.

Meta’s own data suggests that more than a quarter of a billion new users joined Instagram during 2021, pushing the platform’s global ad reach to almost 1.5 billion users by the start of 2022.

Global Instagram Overview January 2022 DataReportal

What’s more, Instagram’s audience grew by more than 6 percent (+85 million users) in just the past 90 days, which suggests that its growth rates continue to accelerate

Instagram has been posting impressive quarterly growth rates for some time now, and our analysis of the company’s ad reach numbers indicates growth of almost 60 percent over the past 2 years.

Instagram's Global Advertising Audience Over Time January 2022 DataReportal

Our Digital 2022 Global Overview Report also includes data for some of Instagram’s individual ‘environments’, which will be particularly useful for marketers exploring opportunities such as short video formats and social search.

For context, ads in Instagram’s “home feed” reach almost all (96.6 percent) of Instagram’s active user base each month, so these placements remain the surest way to reach the largest Instagram audience.

However, ads in Instagram Stories now reach more than 1 billion users each month, and – with the format’s additional functionality and creative options – the Stories environment represents an ever more compelling opportunity.

Instagram Stories Overview January 2022 DataReportal

Meanwhile, slightly less than 800 million users also see ads in Instagram’s Explore tab each month. 

This finding may have added relevance for marketers launching new brands and products, because users browsing the Explore tab are more likely to be looking for new content, ideas, and inspiration.

Reels haven’t quite gained the same momentum as Stories yet, but data reveals that 675 million Instagram users still see ads in the platform’s dedicated video tab each month.

Instagram Reels Overview January 2022 DataReportal

We’ll take a closer look at Instagram Shop in the social commerce section later in this article.

Dig deeper: click here to explore the demographics of Instagram’s various ad audiences.

TikTok’s rapid rise continues

TikTok’s ad audience also continues to grow at an eye-watering pace. 

The latest figures published in Bytedance’s advertising resources indicate that TikTok’s ad reach increased by 60 million users (+7.3 percent) in just the past 90 days, taking worldwide ad reach to roughly 885 million by the start of 2022.

However, it’s important to stress that this figure doesn’t include users below the age of 18, who likely make up a sizeable share of the platform’s total active user base [ note: due to what the company describes as “data security requirements”, Bytedance’s tools only show ad reach data for audiences aged 18 and above, although marketers can still target ads to users aged 13 and above ].

The latest data suggest that TikTok has been adding an average of more than 650,000 new users every day over the past 3 months, which equates to almost 8 new users every second .

Global TikTok Overview January 2022 DataReportal

And what’s more, despite stereotypes, TikTok isn’t just popular with younger users. 

Ad audience data for TikTok users aged 18 and above indicates that more than three-quarters of all adults in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait already use the platform.

Meanwhile, TikTok users aged 18 and above in the United States now equate to more than half (50.3 percent) of all American adults.

TikTok Advertising Reach Rate Ranking January 2022 DataReportal

As with all social media audience data in our Global Digital Reports, “users” may not represent unique individuals, but either way, it’s clear that TikTok has already made a huge impression around the world, and is also an increasingly popular choice. 

Dig deeper: read more about TikTok’s rise and audience profile by clicking here .

YouTube’s ad reach passes 2.5 billion

Our latest analysis reveals that ads on YouTube now reach more than 2½ billion users, with that figure increasing by a hefty 11.9 percent (+271 million users) over the past 12 months.

What’s more, these figures only account for users in around 75 of the world’s larger economies, so there’s a very good chance that the total reach of YouTube ads is considerably higher than these published figures suggest.

Global YouTube Overview January 2022 DataReportal

The available data indicate that YouTube ads now reach roughly 1 in 3 people on Earth, with that figure rising to 37.7 percent of adults aged 18 and above.

However, if we focus only on those countries for which data are available, a far more impressive story emerges.

YouTube ads now reach more than three-quarters of adults aged 18 and above across most of the Western world, and more than 90 percent of all adults in a total of 14 countries.

YouTube Advertising Reach by Country January 2022 DataReportal

Beyond impressive reach numbers, marketers may also be interested to learn that music is increasingly important for YouTube’s global audiences, with 11 of the platform’s top 20 search terms over the past year relating directly to music.

This trend is also evident in our ranking of the platform’s most-subscribed channels, as well as our updated ranking of the platform’s all-time most viewed videos – both of which you’ll find in the full report.

Top 20 YouTube Search Queries in 2021 January 2022 DataReportal

Dig deeper: discover what YouTube users have been watching in our more granular analysis .

Related: click here to learn more about how the world’s online video and music habits are changing.

Social media for work

GWI’s latest numbers show that almost 1 in 4 internet users aged 16 to 64 now uses social media for work-related activities. 

However, this figure is considerably higher across many developing economies.

At the top of the scale, more than 4 in 10 working-age internet users in Kenya (41.5 percent) say that they use social media for work-related research.

Filipinos and South Africans are also considerably more likely to use social media for work than the global average, with more than one-third of internet users aged 16 to 64 in both countries saying that social media plays a role in their professional activities.

Use of Social Media for Work Activities January 2022 DataReportal

The median age of the overall population appears to play an important role in shaping how likely people in a particular country are to use social media for work, although it’s also worth noting that Greece seems to buck this trend.

Median Age of the Population by Country January 2022 DataReportal

While we’re on the subject of professional social media, it’s also worth noting that LinkedIn has had another impressive year.

Our analysis of data published in the platform’s advertising resources reveals that LinkedIn’s registered member base has increased by 11 percent over the 12 months (+81 million members), taking the global total to more than 808 million by the start of 2022.

Global LinkedIn Overview January 2022 DataReportal

Dig deeper: we’ll be taking a closer look at how people use connected tech at work in our upcoming Digital 2022 April Global Statshot report, so look out for that towards the end of April.

Big rise in social media ad spend

Various data points in this year’s reports reveal that spending on social media ads has jumped significantly over the past 12 months. 

For example, data from Statista shows that global social media ad spend exceeded USD $150 billion in 2021, with social media ads accounting for roughly one-third (33.1 percent) of total digital spend.

Global Social Media Ad Spend in 2021 January 2022 DataReportal

Meanwhile, the latest analysis from Skai shows that advertisers spent 14 percent more on social media ads in Q4 2021 than they did in the same quarter of 2020.

Change in Global Social Media Ad Spend Over Time January 2022 DataReportal

In line with this increase in overall spend, Q4 social media CPMs jumped by 21.7 percent year on year, with advertisers around the world paying an average of USD $9.13 for 1,000 social media ad impressions across the last 3 months of 2021.

Global Social Media Ad CPMs Over Time January 2022 DataReportal

Crucially though, because of the higher average cost per impression, social media advertisers actually delivered fewer total impressions in Q4 2021 compared with the same period in 2020, despite spending more overall.

Related: click here to learn which social media platforms drive the greatest share of web traffic.

Change in the Number of Social Media Ad Impressions Served Over Time January 2022 DataReportal

Social media’s role in the marketing mix

Despite those rising ad costs, marketers will be reassured to learn that new research confirms the effectiveness of social media advertising.

GWI’s latest data reveals that more than 1 in 4 internet users aged 16 to 64 (27.6 percent) discover new brands, products, and services via social media ads, which is only slightly less than the figure for TV ads (31.1 percent).

Search engines are still the top source of new brand discovery for the world’s internet users though, with 31.7 percent of GWI’s sample saying that they’ve learned about new brands via an online search.

Meanwhile, word-of-mouth recommendations also rank highly for brand discovery, so marketers may want to re-examine how easy it is for audiences to share their brand and its various online presences via messenger apps like WhatsApp and Telegram.

Sources of Brand Discovery January 2022 DataReportal

In addition to paid placements, it’s also worth noting that just under 1 in 4 working-age internet users (23.2 percent) actively likes or follows a brand on social media every month, while nearly 1 in 8 (12.2 percent) says that they (re)share brands’ social media posts at least once per month.

Online Interactions with Brands Each Month January 2022 DataReportal

GWI’s research shows that brands’ social media activities play an important role at other stages in the purchase cycle too.

For example, more than 4 in 10 working-age internet users say that they visit social networks specifically to research brands and products that they’re thinking of buying, with this figure rising to half of all internet users aged 16 to 24.

Use of Social Networks to Research Brands January 2022 DataReportal

But alongside all of these positive findings, there are also some more worrying trends in this year’s data.

For example, the latest data from Locowise indicates that Facebook pages can now expect an average engagement rate of just 0.07 percent.

That means that – on average – just 7 fans in every 10,000 will react to, comment on, or share any given post.

And even more disturbingly, that average falls to just 0.05 percent for pages with more than 100,000 fans.

Related: explore insights into social media marketing effectiveness in Hootsuite’s Social Media Trends 2022 report.

Global Facebook Post Engagement Benchmarks January 2022 DataReportal

The representativeness of advertising

Another troubling finding in this year’s data is that barely 1 in 6 working-age internet users (17.3 percent) says that they feel represented in the ads that they see, regardless of the advertising medium.

Representativeness of Advertising by Country January 2022 DataReportal

At the better end of the scale, GWI reports that people in China are the most likely to say that they feel represented in ads, with just over 1 in 4 (26.8 percent) answering in the affirmative. 

However, just 1 in 9 Americans has a similar perspective, and the figure drops to just 1 in 11 for people in the UK. 

Japan sits at the bottom of the rankings, with just 1 in 24 respondents in the country saying that they feel represented in the ads that they see – and this despite Japanese brands spending more than USD $47 billion on advertising in 2021.

However, this poor result may in part be due to Japan’s high median age.

Indeed, GWI’s data highlight the fact that – all over the world – older people feel particularly detached from advertising, with just 1 in 9 global internet users aged 55 to 64 (10.8 percent) saying that they recognise themselves in the advertising that they see.

Representativeness of Advertising by Age and Gender January 2022 DataReportal

But therein lies one of the many challenges in interpreting and acting on this data.

Should advertising actually reflect the audience that it’s aimed at, or should it offer an alternative perspective (e.g. a more “aspirational” lifestyle)?

This is one of the more contentious questions in marketing, and – sadly – there are no simple answers.

The best advice I can offer is to invest both time and resources in understanding not only what your specific audience’s life looks like, but also in understanding people’s hopes, dreams, and fears.

Conventional research will be an invaluable tool here, and many of the data partners featured in this year’s reports will be able to help.

Similarly, while social listening may not make the media headlines it used to, I firmly believe that regular social listening can provide some of the most powerful insights into what people actually care about.

So, as you put the finishing touches to those 2022 plans, be sure to put aside some time and money for active exploration of what matters to your audiences, and what “ad representativeness” might look like on their terms.

Related: learn about the latest cultural themes shaping advertising effectiveness in We Are Social’s Think Forward 2022 report. 

Ecommerce trends

As we predicted in our Digital 2021 reports, the increases in ecommerce adoption that we’ve seen since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic show no signs of abating, even as movement restrictions come and go. 

Data from GWI shows that nearly 6 in 10 working-age internet users (58.4 percent) now buy something online every week , with that figure continuing to rise throughout 2021.

Weekly Online Purchases by Country January 2022 DataReportal

Many of our lockdown-inspired behaviours have also endured, even as people venture back out into the world.

For example, almost 3 in 10 of us (28.3 percent) now buy groceries online every week, with the absolute number of online grocery shoppers increasing by 10 percent in just the past 6 months.

Weekly Online Grocery Purchases by Country January 2022 DataReportal

Meanwhile, spending in the grocery category has grown even faster than user numbers have.

Figures in Statista’s Digital Market Outlook show that online spend in the the Food and Beverages categories grew by more than 35 percent during 2021, with total annual revenue across these two categories reaching $588 billion.

Global Spend on Online Consumer Goods Purchases by Product Category January 2022 DataReportal

Overall, global revenues associated with online purchases of “consumer goods” – which include groceries, fashion, electronics, and other household items – increased by more than half a trillion US dollars during 2021 (+18 percent), reaching a total of USD $3.85 trillion for the year as a whole. 

Overview of the Global Consumer Goods Ecommerce Market January 2022 DataReportal

Statista’s data also reveals that the world’s ecommerce shoppers now spend an average of more than USD $1,000 per person, per year on online consumer goods purchases.

However, once again, the story varies considerably by geography.

Average revenue per user (ARPU) for online consumer goods purchases now exceeds USD $3,000 per year in Hong Kong and the United States, but remains below USD $100 in Nigeria.

Average Annual Spend on Online Consumer Goods Purchases per Shopper in 2021 January 2022 DataReportal

There’s some more optimistic news for travel brands in this year’s data, too.

Online travel revenues remain considerably lower than they were in 2019, but consumer spending has increased steadily over the past 12 months.

Statista’s Mobility Market Outlook reports that global online spend on flights grew by USD $11 billion (+6.8 percent) in 2021, reaching a total of USD $173 billion for the year.

The value of online hotel bookings has increased even faster though, with global revenues up by 45 percent compared with last year.

The world spent $142 billion on online hotel bookings in 2021, with annual revenues increasing by USD $44 billion compared with the overall total for 2020.

Overview of Global Online Travel Spend in 2021 January 2022 DataReportal

But the latest data also reveal that ecommerce isn’t just about getting “the latest and greatest”. 

Research from GWI reveals that ‘recommerce’ is also an increasingly popular choice, with 1 in 7 internet users aged 16 to 64 (14.4 percent) buying a used or second-hand item online each week.

Additional data: for a comprehensive look at the latest ecommerce stats and trends, check out Shopify’s excellent new Future of Commerce reports, which our Global Digital Reports team also contributed to.

Social commerce takes off

New additions to this year’s reports include figures for ad reach on Facebook Marketplace and Instagram Shop.

These figures only represent the number of users that marketers can reach with ads in these environments, and they may not represent the full extent of each environment’s total active user base.

Indeed, Meta reports that more than 1 billion Facebook users access Marketplace each month, so there seems to be quite a big gap between total Marketplace users, and the share of those users that sees ads within Facebook’s commerce environment.

However, this gap exists across other Meta products too, and our analysis suggests that Facebook’s overall ad reach only equates to about 72 percent of the platform’s total monthly active user figure [ find some potential explanations here ]. 

What’s more, these Marketplace and Instagram Shop figures still tell a compelling story, and further demonstrate that social commerce has already gained rapid momentum. 

For example, ads in Facebook Marketplace now reach more than 560 million users each month, equating to more than a quarter of the platform’s total ad reach.

Global Facebook Marketplace Audience Overview January 2022 DataReportal

In line with overall platform demographics, Facebook Marketplace attracts a larger male audience, with men accounting for 55 percent of the Marketplace audience.

However, the more interesting finding is that the Marketplace audience tends to be considerably older than the Facebook audience as a whole.

Users over the age of 35 account for more than half (50.9 percent) of Marketplace’s global ad audience, yet they account for just 40.9 percent of Facebook’s overall ad audience.

Note that Facebook limits use of Marketplace to users aged 18 and above, which explains why figures in the lowest age bracket are so low.

Global Facebook Marketplace Advertising Audience Profile January 2022 DataReportal

Instagram Shop has also started to gain momentum, with Meta’s tools reporting that advertisers can now reach more than 187 million users with ads in the Shop tab each month.

However, in contrast to the findings for Marketplace above, the data indicate that women account for a much greater share of Instagram Shop’s global ad audience.

Related: could social commerce help Meta build an alternative to its ad-funded model? Learn more in our detailed analysis .

Global Instagram Shop Overview January 2022 DataReportal

Mobile apps are a serious business

App Annie’s new State of Mobile 2022 report reveals that the typical mobile user now spends an average of 4 hours and 48 minutes per user, per day using their phone. 

That means that the world’s 5.3 billion mobile users will spend more than 1 billion years of combined human time using mobile phones in 2022.

Average Time Spent Using Mobile January 2022 DataReportal

And all that time adds up to serious money, too. 

In addition to the handset revenues that helped to propel Apple Inc. to a USD $3 trillion market cap earlier this month, the world’s smartphone users spent a combined total of USD $170 billion on mobile apps and in-app purchases in 2021.

Based on Ericsson’s latest figures for the number of handsets in use around the world, that equates to an average of more than USD $27 per handset.

Global Mobile App Market Overview January 2022 DataReportal

That may not sound like a huge amount, but to put those figures in context, worldwide consumer spend on mobile apps now equates to roughly 0.2 percent of total global GDP.

What’s more, these revenue figures only include transactions made directly through app stores, and don’t include things like ecommerce purchases made via mobile apps, or mobile ad revenues.

Consumer spending on apps continues to increase too, with 2021 revenue increasing by almost 19 percent compared with the total for 2020.

Additional data: find more great mobile insights in App Annie’s excellent State of Mobile 2022 report.

Mobile connections accelerate

And in more good news for the mobile economy, cellular data connection speeds also continue to accelerate.

Analysis from Ookla reveals that the median worldwide download speed via mobile connections increased by roughly a third over the past year, and more than half of the world’s mobile internet users now enjoy data connection speeds in excess of 29 megabits per second (Mbps).

For context, 29 Mbps is more than fast enough to stream a 4K video without any buffering.

Overview of Global Internet Connection Speeds January 2022 DataReportal

Note that Ookla recently changed its focus from mean speeds to median speeds though ( click here to understand the difference), so these latest numbers aren’t directly comparable to the figures we featured in previous reports.

However, this change in metrics doesn’t detract from the overall story: mobile connections are getting much faster, much more quickly.

This trend will be of particular interest to futurists, because faster mobile data speeds may also help to accelerate developers’ ability to deliver engaging AR, VR, and broader metaverse experiences via mobile connections.

Median Mobile Internet Connection Speeds by Country January 2022 DataReportal

Dig deeper: read our complete analysis of mobile and fixed connections speeds by clicking here .

Related: make sense of today’s mobile internet landscape with the help of GSMA Intelligence’s State of Mobile Internet Connectivity report .

Cryptocurrencies catch on

The number of people who own cryptocurrencies has jumped by more than a third (+37.8 percent) since this time last year. 

GWI reports that more than 1 in 10 working-age internet users now owns some form of cryptocurrency, with that figure rising to more than 2 in 10 in Thailand. 

Cryptocurrency Ownership by Country January 2022 DataReportal

Cryptocurrencies are particularly popular across developing economies, especially in countries where conventional currencies are more prone to big fluctuations in exchange rates.

For example, in Turkey – where the local lira has lost roughly half of its value versus the US dollar over the past year – ownership of cryptocurrencies has almost doubled (+86 percent) in the past twelve months, from 10 percent to 18.6 percent.

However, “crypto” ownership is still heavily male skewed, and older audiences are also underrepresented. 

Fewer than 1 in 20 internet users aged 55 to 64 owns any cryptocurrency today, and this finding may have important implications for policy makers exploring the potential for digital currencies.

Dig deeper: learn more about cryptocurrency trends in GWI’s excellent Connecting the Dots report .

Ownership of Cryptocurrency by Age and Gender January 2022 DataReportal

Most people pay for digital content

Contrary to stereotypes, the world’s internet users are not averse to paying for digital content. 

GWI finds that more than 7 in 10 working-age internet users (71.5 percent) now pay for some form of digital content each month, with that figure rising to almost 8 in 10 amongst younger Millennials.

Paying for Digital Content by Country January 2022 DataReportal

Perhaps unsurprisingly given the rapid rise of platforms like Netflix and Spotify, TV and music streaming subscriptions are the most popular forms of paid digital content.

However, people still pay for downloads too, with more than 1 in 5 internet users saying that they’ve paid to download music within the past 30 days. 

Global Digital Content Purchases by Content Type January 2022 DataReportal

In total, Statista reports that the world’s internet users spent almost USD $300 billion on digital content in 2021.

Interestingly though, despite the popularity of video and music streaming platforms, spend on video games accounted for more than half of that global total, highlighting just how valuable the gaming audience remains.

Related: explore the rise of cross-cultural content in our in-depth analysis .

Global Digital Media Spend by Format January 2022 DataReportal

Looking ahead: digital in 2022

That’s almost all for my analysis of this year’s Global Overview Report, but here are a few things to look out for over the coming months:

We should pass the momentous 5 billion internet user milestone in time for our next quarterly Statshot report. To celebrate, we’ll offer a bumper collection of insights into how the internet impacts daily lives around the world, so be sure to check back for that analysis in late April.

We may see some turbulence in the world of decentralised finance (DeFi) over the next few months, with the value of cryptocurrencies continuing their wild swings. Moreover, with ever more people investing in these “alternative” financial instruments, we can expect calls for greater regulation, more stringent government oversight, and – almost inevitably – new forms of taxation.

At the same time, while the underlying tech is undoubtedly here to stay, people will come to realise that NFTs are nothing more than certificates of digital ownership, and – ultimately – it’s the assets they represent that determine their actual value. As a result, I hope we’ll see the NFT conversation shift away from irrational speculation, and put greater emphasis on helping the world’s creators derive enduring value from their hard work. If that shift doesn’t happen soon, I fear NFTs will go the same way as ICOs .

Following the success of Squid Game, Money Heist, and Lupin, expect the unexpected when it comes to digitally distributed culture. Streaming platforms make it easier than ever for great content to travel around the world in an instant, fuelled by the social media water-cooler and ever more accurate algorithms. As a result, tomorrow’s big hits are just as likely to come from Hanoi and Harare as they are to come from Hollywood.

We’ll start to see greater convergence across digital activities, with formats like Live Commerce blending the best of social media, entertainment, and online shopping. Similarly, as faster mobile connections and more powerful mobile devices become ever more accessible, we can expect more immersive content experiences. In particular, I’m expecting to see AR find its way into rich music ‘experiences’ (well beyond music videos), while a handful of brands will also move beyond hype and hot air to deliver some truly compelling experiences in online virtual worlds.

Hopefully that’s given you more than enough to think about, but just in case you’re already craving your next fix of facts and figures, you might like to know that I’ll be back in a couple of weeks with the first of our Digital 2022 local country reports, which we’ll start publishing in mid-February.

And finally…

I suspect you’ve only made it this far because you’re anxious to find the latest updates in one of our most thought-provoking datasets, so I won’t leave you disappointed.

Regular readers will be pleased to hear that the battle for the internet continues, but – for the third year in a row – data suggests that dogs may once again have had the upper hand paw in 2021. 

To date, users have published more than 330 million posts to Instagram tagged with #dog, compared with just 257 million posts tagged with #cat. 

These figures reveal that Instagram has seen an impressive 38 million new #dog posts since our 2021 report , but just 27 million new posts for #cat.

However, canines’ dogged success over the past year isn’t just down to the #dogsofinstagram .

A similar pattern has played out on TikTok, where #dog posts now exceed 205 million, compared to just 137 million for #cat posts.

In a more encouraging finding for the felines, Twitter users appear to have become a little less extreme in their animal views over the past year, but dog lovers still outnumber cat lovers on the platform by a factor of almost 4 to 1. 

Dogs are clearly more salient in the zeitgeist too, with Google Trends data revealing that the world’s internet users searched for dogs twice as often as they searched for cats during 2021.

However, despite these valiant canine capers, cats still rule the web: Google returns more than 2.83 billion pages for “cat” today, compared with just 2.4 billion for “dog”.

Don’t hate the messenger.

The Battle for the Internet Continues January 2022 DataReportal

Microsoft New Future of Work Report 2022

• Jaime Teevan ,
• Nancy Baym ,
• Jenna Butler ,
• Brent Hecht ,
• Sonia Jaffe ,
• Kate Nowak ,
• Abigail Sellen ,
• Longqi Yang ,
• Marcus Ash ,
• Kagonya Awori ,
• Mia Bruch ,
• Piali Choudhury ,
• Adam Coleman ,
• Scott Counts ,
• Shiraz Cupala ,
• Mary Czerwinski ,
• Elizabeth Fetterolf ,
• Mar Gonzalez Franco ,
• Kunal Gupta ,
• Aaron L Halfaker ,
• Constance Hadley ,
• Brian Houck ,
• Kori Inkpen ,
• Shamsi Iqbal ,
• Eric Knudsen ,
• Stacey Levine ,
• Siân Lindley ,
• Jennifer Neville ,
• Jacki O'Neill ,
• Rick Pollak ,
• Victor Poznanski ,
• Sean Rintel ,
• Neha Parikh Shah ,
• Siddharth Suri ,
• Adam D. Troy ,
• Mengting Wan

MSR-TR-2022-3 | May 2022

Published by Microsoft

Due to the “Great Remote Work Experiment” that began in March 2020 when workplaces around the world rapidly shut down, work is changing faster than it has in a generation. As many people now return to the workplace and begin to experiment with hybrid work, a range of different outcomes is possible. Thankfully, researchers at Microsoft and from around the world have been investigating evolving hybrid work practices and developing technologies that will address the biggest new challenges while taking advantage of the biggest new opportunities.​

This Microsoft New Future of Work Report 2022 summarizes important recent research developments related to hybrid work. It highlights themes that have emerged in the findings of the past year and brings to the fore older research that has become newly relevant. Our hope is that the report will facilitate knowledge sharing across the research community and among those who track research related to work and productivity. This research area is unfolding as rapidly as work is changing, and the purpose of this report is to help the community build on what has been learned this past year.​

Never before has there been such an opportunity to actively shape the future of work. With research and careful study, we can create a new future of work that is meaningful, productive, and equitable.

Microsoft New Future of Work Report 2022: AI-powered social platforms

The New Future of Work Report summarizes important research and developments that can help us understand and improve the future of work. This report is organized by changes in work practices at four different “scales”: individuals, teams, organizations, and society. Throughout, researchers at Microsoft are using methods such as the latest advances in AI, causal inference, surveys and interviews, and prototype-building to uncover challenges and opportunities facing workers. But this report does not only feature research done at Microsoft: there is amazing research shaping the future of work done by researchers around the world. The report includes this work as well and forecasts from some of these experts. About this video: AI-curated online communities can break down workplace siloes and improve knowledge sharing—leading to happier…

Microsoft New Future of Work Report 2022: Hybrid workspaces

The New Future of Work Report summarizes important research and developments that can help us understand and improve the future of work. This report is organized by changes in work practices at four different “scales”: individuals, teams, organizations, and society. Throughout, researchers at Microsoft are using methods such as the latest advances in AI, causal inference, surveys and interviews, and prototype-building to uncover challenges and opportunities facing workers. But this report does not only feature research done at Microsoft: there is amazing research shaping the future of work done by researchers around the world. The report includes this work as well and forecasts from some of these experts. About this video: By one rule of thumb, workspace expenses equal 10% of wage costs, which means…

Microsoft New Future of Work Report 2022: Asynchronous collaboration

The New Future of Work Report summarizes important research and developments that can help us understand and improve the future of work. This report is organized by changes in work practices at four different “scales”: individuals, teams, organizations, and society. Throughout, researchers at Microsoft are using methods such as the latest advances in AI, causal inference, surveys and interviews, and prototype-building to uncover challenges and opportunities facing workers. But this report does not only feature research done at Microsoft: there is amazing research shaping the future of work done by researchers around the world. The report includes this work as well and forecasts from some of these experts. About this video: People spend 250% more time in meetings than before the remote work transition. Discover…

Microsoft New Future of Work Report 2022: Individual productivity and well-being

The New Future of Work Report summarizes important research and developments that can help us understand and improve the future of work. This report is organized by changes in work practices at four different “scales”: individuals, teams, organizations, and society. Throughout, researchers at Microsoft are using methods such as the latest advances in AI, causal inference, surveys and interviews, and prototype-building to uncover challenges and opportunities facing workers. But this report does not only feature research done at Microsoft: there is amazing research shaping the future of work done by researchers around the world. The report includes this work as well and forecasts from some of these experts. About this video: Many people feel more productive working remotely, but nearly as many prefer working onsite.…

Microsoft New Future of Work Report 2022: Team Collaboration

The New Future of Work Report summarizes important research and developments that can help us understand and improve the future of work. This report is organized by changes in work practices at four different “scales”: individuals, teams, organizations, and society. Throughout, researchers at Microsoft are using methods such as the latest advances in AI, causal inference, surveys and interviews, and prototype-building to uncover challenges and opportunities facing workers. But this report does not only feature research done at Microsoft: there is amazing research shaping the future of work done by researchers around the world. The report includes this work as well and forecasts from some of these experts. About this video: Great collaboration requires thoughtful choices that improve (or eliminate) meetings. Discover how we can…

Microsoft New Future of Work Report 2022: Organizational wellbeing

The Future of Work Report summarizes the most important research and developments that can help us understand and improve the future of work. This report is organized by changes in work practices at four different “scales”: individual, team, organization, and societal. Throughout, researchers at Microsoft are using methods like the latest advances in AI, causal inference, surveys and interviews, and prototype-building to uncover challenges and opportunities facing workers. But this report does not only feature research done at Microsoft: there is amazing research creating the future of work done at universities around the world. The report also includes this work as well, with pointers about how to find out more. About this video: People who feel valued at work are less likely to suffer burnout…

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HBR’s Most-Read Research Articles of 2022

• Dagny Dukach

Insights on equity, leadership, and becoming your best self.

The new year is a great time to set ambitious goals. But alongside our plans for the future, it’s also helpful to acknowledge all the challenges we’ve faced — and the progress we’ve made — in the last 12 months. In this end-of-year roundup, we share key insights and trends from HBR’s most-read research articles of 2022, exploring topics from embracing a new identity to fostering equity in the workplace and beyond.

For many of us, the arrival of a new year can be equal parts inspiring and daunting. While the promise of a fresh start is often welcome, it’s also a reminder of all the challenges we faced in the last 12 months — and all those still awaiting us, that we have yet to overcome.

• Dagny Dukach is a former associate editor at Harvard Business Review.

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Global Risks Report 2022

• ESOMAR Publishes the 2022 Global Market Research Report

ESOMAR released the 2022 edition of the Global Market Research Report (GMR). Based on a global survey of more than 105 countries and regions representing over 83% of the insights sector worldwide, the report covers critical topics such as industry growth predictions, the changing client landscape, evolution of data types and methodologies, and the significant expansion of the industry’s technology-enabled sector. 

“The theme this year is ‘Towards Clarity’, as the insights, data and research industry as a whole emerges - stronger than ever - from a period of uncertainty, ”says Dr Parves Khan, CEO and Director General at ESOMAR. “In the report, we closely examine the industry by region, as well as by sector, and look at the factors that are driving growth among the most successful players in the space. We dive into trends like DIY, new methodologies that are gaining momentum, and exactly how client needs are shifting. It is a must-read for anyone in this space.”

The 2022 GMR notes that the output of the industry will exceed USD $130 Billion by 2023 after an expected growth rate of 5% in 2022. This expansion comes on the heels of a record 2021, which saw the global industry expand 15% from USD $102 Billion to almost USD $119 Billion. The report includes detailed information on the growth and evolution of specific vertical sectors, both on the client and vendor sides of the industry, plus an in-depth look at regional performance, study design, emerging methodologies, and more.

Xabier Palacio, Senior Manager Intelligence Unit adds: “This year, the GMR report is projecting a K-shaped market recovery. Performance data shows countries are recovering at different rates and times. The tech-enabled sector is the fastest-growing one of the global insights industry in absolute terms, at +18.9%. At a global level, the established sector represents 39% of the total industry, the tech-enabled sector climbs up to 37%, while the reporting sector remains relatively flat at 23% compared to last year.”

The findings published in the report are based on data collected by national research associations, leading companies, independent analysts, and ESOMAR representatives, and is complemented with ESOMAR’s own independent size estimations.

Members of ESOMAR can download the report free of charge. Grab your copy here.

Gabriela Kusters

Gabriela Kusters is responsible for expanding the reach and performance of key marketing initiatives, boosting digital marketing effectiveness and growing organizational awareness around the world. She will apply her skills in all aspects of marketing to create strategies for positive growth.

With her experience, Gaby has the perfect blend in the digital marketing space and isn’t afraid to think outside the box - all while understanding the nuances of working in different regions around the world. Together with her team, Gaby conducts foundational work across all ESOMAR’s digital properties to ensure that outreach efforts are effective, optimized and aligned with organizational goals, values and culture.

Prior to joining ESOMAR in August 2022, Gaby managed marketing for high-tech telecommunications company, and led EMEA marketing programs for the global Mobile Marketing Association (MMA). Gaby holds a Master of Science in Marketing from Brunel University London and received her Bachelor of Science in Communications and Media Studies from HU University of Applied Sciences Utrecht, the Netherlands.

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World Economic Outlook Report October 2022

COUNTERING THE COST-OF-LIVING CRISIS

OCTOBER 2022

Projections Table

Chapters in the report, statistical appendix, inflation and uncertainty.

Global economic activity is experiencing a broad-based and sharper-than-expected slowdown, with inflation higher than seen in several decades. The cost-of-living crisis, tightening financial conditions in most regions, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the lingering COVID-19 pandemic all weigh heavily on the outlook. Global growth is forecast to slow from 6.0 percent in 2021 to 3.2 percent in 2022 and 2.7 percent in 2023. This is the weakest growth profile since 2001 except for the global financial crisis and the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Global inflation is forecast to rise from 4.7 percent in 2021 to 8.8 percent in 2022 but to decline to 6.5 percent in 2023 and to 4.1 percent by 2024. Monetary policy should stay the course to restore price stability, and fiscal policy should aim to alleviate the cost-of-living pressures while maintaining a sufficiently tight stance aligned with monetary policy. Structural reforms can further support the fight against inflation by improving productivity and easing supply constraints, while multilateral cooperation is necessary for fast-tracking the green energy transition and preventing fragmentation.

Global Prospects and Policies

The slowdown in global economic activity is broad-based and sharper-than-expected, with inflation higher than seen in decades. The economic outlook depends on a successful calibration of monetary and fiscal policies, the course of the war in Ukraine, and growth prospects in China. Risks remain unusually large: monetary policy could miscalculate the right stance to reduce inflation; diverging policy paths in the largest economies could exacerbate the US dollar’s appreciation; tightening global financing could trigger emerging market debt distress; and a worsening of China’s property sector crisis could undermine growth. Policymakers should focus on restoring price stability and alleviating cost-of-living pressures. Multilateral cooperation remains necessary to fast-track the green energy transition and prevent fragmentation.

Wage Dynamics Post–COVID-19 and Wage-Price Spiral Risks

Inflation has reached a 40-year high in some economies. Although wage growth has generally stayed below inflation so far, some observers warn that prices and wages could start feeding off each other, with wage and price inflation ratcheting up in a sustained wage-price spiral. This chapter examines past and recent wage dynamics and sheds light on prospects. Similar historical episodes were not followed by wage-price spirals on average. Analysis highlights that more backward-looking expectations require stronger and more frontloaded monetary tightening to reduce risks of inflation de-anchoring. Risks of a sustained wage-price spiral appear limited since underlying inflation shocks come from outside the labor market and monetary policy is tightening aggressively.

Near-Term Macroeconomic Impact of Decarbonization Policies

Decades of procrastination have transformed what could have been a smooth transition to a more carbon-neutral society into what will likely be a more challenging one. By the end of the decade, the global economy needs to emit 25 percent less greenhouse gases than in 2022 to have a fighting chance to reach the goals set in Paris in 2015 and avert catastrophic climate disruptions. Using a new model developed at the IMF (GMMET), the chapter analyses the near-term macroeconomic impact of feasible decarbonization policies and potential challenges for monetary policy.

Statistical Appendix:

Data assumptions, conventions, and classifications

Statistical Appendix A:

Key Global Economic Indicators

Statistical Appendix B:

Supplemental Global Economic Indicators

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FY 2022 GDUFA Science and Research Report

FY 2022 GDUFA Science and Research Report  (PDF - 14 MB)

The FY 2022 GDUFA science and research report describes active research projects and outcomes organized in 13 scientific areas. In each area, we summarize the relevant research initiatives and highlight a research project that illustrates the types of scientific insights being developed. We also provide comprehensive lists of new, ongoing, and completed grants and contracts for research impacting each area, and of the research outcomes in that area generated during FY 2022. These outcomes include general guidances for industry and product-specific guidances (PSGs) published in FY 2022 that were supported by research in each area, as well as lists of scientific journal articles, posters, and presentations. 

Table of Contents

(Each link below will open a 14 MB PDF)

• Introduction
• Joint Directors' Message
• Ophthalmic Products
• Complex Mixtures and Peptide Products
• Long-Acting Injectable, Insertable or Implantable Products
• Complex Injectables, Formulations and Nanomaterials
• Inhalation and Nasal Products
• Topical Products
• Locally-Acting Physiologically Based Pharmacokinetic Modeling
• Quantitative Clinical Pharmacology
• Oral Absorption Models and Bioequivalence
• Patient Substitution of Generic Drugs
• Abuse-deterrent Opioid Drug Products
• Data Analytics
• Drug-Device Combination Products
• Acknowledgements

Directors of CDER’s Office of Generic Drugs and Office of Pharmaceutical Quality

Susan Rosencrance, Ph.D. Acting Director of CDER’s Office of Generic Drugs

Michael Kopcha, Ph.D., R.Ph. Director of CDER’s Office of Pharmaceutical Quality

The GDUFA science and research program is particularly important for certain pharmaceutical products, known as complex products, which are harder to develop as generics. Complex products often have few generics, or none at all. In the absence of market competition among generic alternatives, these medicines can be so expensive that patients who need them may not be able to afford them. The GDUFA science and research program supports the development of innovative methodologies and more efficient tools to help establish drug equivalence standards that facilitate the development of safe, effective, and high-quality generic products.

The outcomes from GDUFA-funded research expand our understanding of drug products, including complex products, and often contribute to the development of advanced methods to characterize product quality and performance. These methods may play a critical role in determining how FDA evaluates the quality and bioequivalence (BE) of complex generic products and can establish the scientific basis for novel and more efficient pathways by which to develop generic products. FDA’s recommendations related to BE issues and product quality are communicated to the generic industry through the continual publication of new and revised product-specific guidances (PSGs), as well as general guidances for industry.

We are deeply grateful to all of our collaborators within FDA and at institutions around the world, and to many throughout the global generic drug industry, for the success of the GDUFA science and research program. The continual advances and emerging issues in pharmaceutical science and manufacturing provide ongoing challenges for generic product development. We remain confident that our collaborative engagements to advance the GDUFA science and research program are the most effective way to address these scientific challenges for generics, and we look forward with optimism that the outcomes of this research program will continue to promote generic competition as a key part of FDA’s Drug Competition Action Plan and enhance patient access to high-quality, safe, and effective medicines. 

Read the full FY 2022 GDUFA Science and Research Report Joint Directors' Message he r e .

Home > AACR Cancer Progress Report > AACR Cancer Progress Report 2022: Contents > Cancer in 2022

Cancer in 2022

In this section, you will learn:

• In the United States, the age-adjusted overall cancer death rate has been steadily declining since the 1990s, with the reductions between 1991 and 2019 translating into nearly 3.5 million cancer deaths avoided.
• In the past three years, the number of cancer survivors living in the United States increased by more than a million, reaching greater than 18 million as of January 1, 2022.
• Certain U.S. populations have not benefited equally from the advances against cancer.
• The personal burden of cancer and its economic toll both on individuals and the U.S. health care system are expected to rise in the coming decades, highlighting the urgent need for more research to accelerate the pace of progress against cancer.

Research: Driving Progress Against Cancer

Cancer: an ongoing public health challenge in the united states and worldwide, variable progress among stages at diagnosis and types of cancer, disparities in progress for certain population groups, the growing burden of cancer, the global challenge of cancer, funding cancer research: a vital investment.

Medical research is the foundation of progress against the collection of many diseases we call cancer. Research improves survival and quality of life for people around the world because it is the driving force behind every advance in cancer science and medicine and every legislative action designed to improve public health. Each breakthrough against cancer is the culmination of a complex, multifaceted process that takes long-term commitment and years of effort by individuals from all segments of the medical research community (see sidebar on The Medical Research Community: Driving Progress Together ).

The remarkable progress being made against cancers—in particular, improvements in reducing smoking rates and developments in early detection and treatment—is resulting in cancer death rates falling steadily and in a rising number of people who survive a cancer diagnosis. In fact, the age-adjusted overall cancer death rate has declined by 32 percent between 1991 and 2019 in the United States, a reduction that translates into nearly 3.5 million cancer deaths avoided ( 1 ) Siegel RL, et al. Cancer statistics, 2022. CA Cancer J Clin 2022;72:7-33. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] . Among children and adolescents with cancer, overall death rates have declined by more than half between 1970 and 2019, largely due to advances in treatment ( 1 ) Siegel RL, et al. Cancer statistics, 2022. CA Cancer J Clin 2022;72:7-33. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] . In addition, in the past three years, the number of adults and children living in the United States with a history of cancer rose by more than a million, exceeding an estimated 18 million on January 1, 2022 ( 2 ) Miller KD, et al. Cancer Treatment and Survivorship Statistics, 2022. CA Cancer J Clin 2022;0:1-28. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] .

The steady decline in the overall cancer death rate can be attributed mainly to the unprecedented progress against lung, colorectal, breast, and prostate cancer, the four most common cancer types in the United States. In fact, during the past three decades, age-adjusted death rates from lung, female breast, and colorectal cancers have decreased by 44, 42, and 53 percent, respectively ( 3 ) Kratzer TB, et al. Progress against cancer mortality 50 years after passage of the National Cancer Act. JAMA Oncol 2022;8:156-9. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] . Furthermore, there have been significant developments against previously intractable cancers, such as melanoma, the deadliest form of skin cancer, fueled by a range of innovative new therapeutics that have moved rapidly from the bench to the clinic and received approval by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (see Figure 1 ). Collectively, these advances have led to the increase in five-year relative survival rate for all cancers combined from 49 percent in the mid-1970s to nearly 70 percent from 2011 to 2017, which are the most recent data available ( 1 ) Siegel RL, et al. Cancer statistics, 2022. CA Cancer J Clin 2022;72:7-33. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] .

Among the major advances made across the clinical cancer care continuum from August 1, 2021, to July 31, 2022, are the eight new anticancer therapeutics approved for use by FDA (see Table 4 ). During this period, FDA also approved two new imaging agents to help visualize cancerous cells, several artificial intelligence-based tools to improve detection and diagnosis of cancers, and new uses for 10 previously approved anticancer therapeutics.

The research that drives progress against cancer is made possible by investments from governments, philanthropic individuals and organizations, and the private sector. In the United States, government investments in medical research are administered mostly through the 27 institutes and centers of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The largest component of NIH is the National Cancer Institute (NCI), which is the federal government’s principal agency for cancer research and training. Medical research funded by the public sector contributes significantly to novel drug development, which is critical to saving and improving lives ( 6 ) Nayak RK, et al. Public-sector contributions to novel biologic drugs. JAMA Intern Med 2021;181:1522-5. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] ( 7 ) Galkina Cleary E, et al. Contribution of NIH funding to new drug approvals 2010-2016. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2018;115:2329-34. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] . Federal investments in government agencies conducting research, such as FDA and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), are also of particular importance.

Although we have made incredible progress against cancers, this group of devastating diseases continues to be an enormous public health challenge in the United States and around the world. In the United States alone, it is predicted that 1,918,030 new cases of cancer will be diagnosed in 2022 and that 609,360 people will die from the disease ( 1 ) Siegel RL, et al. Cancer statistics, 2022. CA Cancer J Clin 2022;72:7-33. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] (see Table 1 ). These estimates do not account for the consequences of COVID-19, which has proven to have an adverse impact across the spectrum of cancer research and patient care including significant declines in cancer screening and diagnosis ( 8 ) American Association for Cancer Research. AACR Report on the Impact of COVID-19 on Cancer Research and Patient Care. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. . In addition, data from the past two years have clearly shown the heightened risks of SARS-CoV-2 infection and severe COVID-19 among patients with cancer, albeit COVID-19-related mortality among this population has decreased over time ( 8 ) American Association for Cancer Research. AACR Report on the Impact of COVID-19 on Cancer Research and Patient Care. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. ( 9 ) Dieci MV, et al. Clinical profile and mortality of Sars-Cov-2 infection in cancer patients across two pandemic time periods (Feb 2020-Sep 2020; Sep 2020-May 2021) in the Veneto Oncology Network: The ROVID study. Eur J Cancer 2022;167:81-91. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] . Ongoing research will uncover the long-term effects of COVID-19 on cancer outcomes ( 10 ) National Cancer Institute. NCI COVID-19 in Cancer Patients Study (NCCAPS). Accessed: Nov 27, 2021.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. .

Progress against cancers has not been uniform for all stages of a given type of disease ( 5 ) National Cancer Institute. Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results program explorer. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. . This issue is illustrated by the fact that the five-year relative survival rates for U.S. patients vary widely depending on the stage at diagnosis ( 5 ) National Cancer Institute. Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results program explorer. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. . As one example, among women with breast cancer and people with colorectal cancer, those whose cancer is confined to the breast, or to the colon or rectum, have five-year relative survival rates of 99 percent and 92 percent, respectively, while those whose cancer has spread to a distant site have five-year relative survival rates of 30 percent and 16 percent, respectively ( 5 ) National Cancer Institute. Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results program explorer. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. .

An additional challenge that we face is the uneven progress against various cancer types ( 5 ) National Cancer Institute. Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results program explorer. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. . For example, the overall five-year relative survival rates of nearly 91 percent for women with breast cancer and 97 percent for men with prostate cancer stand in stark contrast to the overall five-year relative survival rates of 21 percent for people with liver cancer and less than 12 percent for those with pancreatic cancer ( 5 ) National Cancer Institute. Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results program explorer. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. . While some of these differences could be attributed to early detection of breast and prostate cancers through population level screening (see sidebar on Ways to Screen for Cancer ), disparities in five-year relative survival rates hold true for patients with these four cancer types even when their diseases are diagnosed at an advanced stage. The five-year relative survival rates of greater than 30 percent for advanced-stage female breast and male prostate cancers are significantly higher than the five-year relative survival rates of less than five percent for those with advanced-stage liver or pancreatic cancer ( 5 ) National Cancer Institute. Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results program explorer. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. .

Among children ages one to 14 years, cancer is the second-leading cause of death, and the most diagnosed cancers are leukemia and brain tumors ( 1 ) Siegel RL, et al. Cancer statistics, 2022. CA Cancer J Clin 2022;72:7-33. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] . Thanks to extraordinary advances in treatments for childhood leukemia, the age-adjusted mortality rate from the disease has almost halved in the past two decades. Unfortunately, mortality rates from childhood brain and other central nervous system tumors have essentially remained unchanged ( 5 ) National Cancer Institute. Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results program explorer. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. .

Developing new and effective tests for early detection of more types of cancer as well as better treatment options for all cancer types and for all stages of diagnosis could help address the challenges of variable progress against different types of cancer.

Cancer health disparities are one of the most pressing public health challenges in the United States. NCI defines cancer health disparities as adverse differences in cancer such as number of new cases, number of deaths, cancer-related health complications, survivorship and quality of life after cancer treatment, screening rates, and stage at diagnosis that exist among certain population groups ( 12 ) Cancer health disparities definitions and examples. Accessed: April 22, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. (see sidebar on Which U.S. Population Groups Experience Cancer Health Disparities? ).

As outlined in the AACR Cancer Disparities Progress Report 2022, racial and ethnic minorities and other medically underserved U.S. populations shoulder a disproportionately higher burden of cancer (see sidebar on Disparate Burden of Cancer in the U.S. ) ( 13 ) American Association for Cancer Research. AACR Cancer Disparities Progress Report 2022. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. . As one example, the U.S. Black population has long experienced cancer health disparities.

In 1990, the overall cancer death rates for Black people were 33 percent higher than for White people ( 5 ) National Cancer Institute. Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results program explorer. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. . There has been some progress in recent years as evidenced by the narrowing of the gap in cancer death rates between the Black and White populations to 13 percent in 2019, a 60 percent decline in the disparities since 1990 ( 5 ) National Cancer Institute. Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results program explorer. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. ( 14 ) Lawrence WR, et al. Trends in cancer mortality among black individuals in the US from 1999 to 2019. JAMA Oncol 2022. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] . However, even in 2019, overall cancer death rates were higher among Black men and women compared to all other U.S. racial and ethnic groups ( 14 ) Lawrence WR, et al. Trends in cancer mortality among black individuals in the US from 1999 to 2019. JAMA Oncol 2022. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] .

Sexual and gender minorities (SGM) are another U.S. population that experiences cancer health disparities. According to a new report, gay men are more likely than heterosexual men to report lifetime diagnoses of cancers, and gay men and lesbian women are more frequently unable to afford many types of health care services compared to heterosexual men and women ( 15 ) Heslin KC, et al. Sexual orientation differences in access to care and health status, behaviors, and beliefs: Findings from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, National Survey of Family Growth, and National Health Interview Survey. Natl Health Stat Report 2022:1-16. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] . Unfortunately, there are limited data on the epidemiology of cancer incidence and outcomes among SGM individuals making it difficult to evaluate the true burden of cancer in this underserved population. It is imperative that researchers collect disaggregated data by sexual orientation and gender identity, as well as within sexual minority groups (e.g., gay versus bisexual) and gender minority groups (e.g., transgender versus nonbinary) to accurately capture cancer epidemiology in these heterogeneous populations ( 13 ) American Association for Cancer Research. AACR Cancer Disparities Progress Report 2022. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. .

Research has identified complex and interrelated factors, often referred to as the social determinants of health, including socioeconomic, cultural, behavioral, environmental, and clinical factors that contribute to cancer health disparities. It is increasingly evident that structural racism and systemic injustices cause adverse differences in social determinants of health, creating conditions that perpetuate health inequities, including cancer health disparities (see sidebar on Why Do U.S. Cancer Health Disparities Exist? ).

One of the drivers of cancer health disparities is general health of a population group. For instance, individuals with underlying health conditions, such as diabetes, or those infected with certain pathogens, such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), experience a greater burden of cancer (see sidebar on Cancer Burden Among People Living with HIV ). It should be noted that individuals with intersectional identities often experience multilevel barriers to optimal health care that adversely impact cancer incidence and outcomes. As one example, among individuals living with HIV, those who are from racial and ethnical minority populations may experience worse cancer health disparities ( 20 ) Elizabeth Read-Connole, et al. Basic/Translational research on Health Disparities in HIV/AIDS and cancer (Clinical trial optional). 2022. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] . Understanding the biological drivers of cancer health disparities in marginalized populations with an underlying HIV/AIDS diagnosis is an area of active investigation ( 20 ) Elizabeth Read-Connole, et al. Basic/Translational research on Health Disparities in HIV/AIDS and cancer (Clinical trial optional). 2022. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] .

Considering that a significant proportion of the U.S. population is affected by cancer health disparities, it is important that public health experts intensify research efforts designed to improve our understanding and mitigating of these disparities. Only with new insights obtained through innovative research, including basic science using biospecimens from diverse populations, clinical trials involving participants from all sociodemographic backgrounds, and health care delivery research, will we develop and implement interventions that may eventually eliminate cancers for all populations.

The public health challenge posed by cancer is predicted to grow considerably in the coming decades unless we develop and implement more effective strategies for cancer prevention, early detection, and treatment ( 26 ) International Agency for Research on Cancer. Global Cancer Observatory. Accessed: July 15, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. . In the United States alone, the number of new cancer cases diagnosed each year is expected to reach nearly 2.3 million by 2040 ( 26 ) International Agency for Research on Cancer. Global Cancer Observatory. Accessed: July 15, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. . This is largely because cancer is primarily a disease of aging; 80 percent of U.S. cancer diagnoses occur among those who are 55 or older; 57 percent of diagnoses occur among those 65 and older ( 1 ) Siegel RL, et al. Cancer statistics, 2022. CA Cancer J Clin 2022;72:7-33. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] , and this segment of the U.S. population is expected to grow from 54.1 million in 2019 to nearly 81 million in 2040 ( 27 ) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Community Living. 2020 Profile of Older Americans. Accessed: Jul 6, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. . Also contributing to the projected increase in the number of U.S. cancer cases are high rates of obesity and physical inactivity, which are both linked to some common types of cancer, and the continued use of tobacco products among certain U.S. populations.

Progress has been made toward reducing cancer incidence in the United States; new cancer cases have declined 10 percent from their peak in 1992 to 2019, the year for which the most recent data are reported ( 5 ) National Cancer Institute. Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results program explorer. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. . However, overall cancer incidence has been rising among the U.S. adolescent and young adult (AYA) population (ages 15 to 39), which has seen nearly a 20 percent increase in cancer incidence from 2000 to 2019 ( 5 ) National Cancer Institute. Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results program explorer. Accessed: June 30, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. . In addition, the incidence of certain cancer types is steadily increasing, specifically among people younger than 50. As one example, many recent studies have reported an increase in the incidence of early-onset colorectal cancer among those age 49 and younger ( 28 ) Sinicrope FA. Increasing incidence of early-onset colorectal cancer. N Engl J Med 2022;386:1547-58. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] ( 29 ) Calip GS, et al. Colorectal cancer incidence among adults younger than 50 years-understanding findings from observational studies of lower gastrointestinal endoscopy. JAMA Oncol 2022;8:981-3. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] . The reasons behind rising cases of early-onset colorectal cancers are not completely understood but is presumed to be multifactorial, including contributions of modifiable lifestyle factors such as unhealthy diet and physical inactivity as well as factors that alter the gut microbiome such as use of antibiotics. To reduce the burden of early-onset colorectal cancer, many professional societies have modified their screening guidelines to recommend starting colorectal cancer screening at an earlier age. Additionally, researchers are evaluating new and improved strategies including genetic testing and others for prevention and early detection of colorectal cancer in the younger population ( 28 ) Sinicrope FA. Increasing incidence of early-onset colorectal cancer. N Engl J Med 2022;386:1547-58. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] .

Beyond the United States, cancer is an ongoing global challenge (see sidebar on Global Burden of Cancer ). According to a new analysis, there were an estimated 17.2 million new cancer cases (excluding nonmelanoma skin cancer) and 10 million cancer deaths globally, in 2019 ( 30 ) Kocarnik JM, et al. Cancer incidence, mortality, years of life lost, years lived with disability, and disability-adjusted life years for 29 cancer groups from 2010 to 2019: A systematic analysis for the global burden of disease study 2019. JAMA Oncol 2022;8:420-44. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] . The study evaluated cancer burden from 204 countries and territories as indicated by cancer-related deaths, as well as disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) and years of life lost (YLLs), which are two measures of cancer morbidity. Researchers found that among the 22 groups of diseases and injuries analyzed, cancer was second only to cardiovascular disease in the number of deaths, DALYs, and YLLs ( 30 ) Kocarnik JM, et al. Cancer incidence, mortality, years of life lost, years lived with disability, and disability-adjusted life years for 29 cancer groups from 2010 to 2019: A systematic analysis for the global burden of disease study 2019. JAMA Oncol 2022;8:420-44. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] . The five leading causes of cancer-related morbidity among men and women combined were lung cancer, colorectal cancer, stomach cancer, breast cancer, and liver cancer.

The study also indicated that, although there were increases in the absolute numbers of both global cancer deaths and new cases from 2010 to 2019, the age-standardized mortality and incidence rates decreased by six percent and one percent, respectively ( 30 ) Kocarnik JM, et al. Cancer incidence, mortality, years of life lost, years lived with disability, and disability-adjusted life years for 29 cancer groups from 2010 to 2019: A systematic analysis for the global burden of disease study 2019. JAMA Oncol 2022;8:420-44. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] . These trends, however, precede the setbacks in cancer care and outcomes that have been caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Global health experts are also concerned about the consequences of the ongoing wars that have displaced populations, further destroying health care systems, disrupting social services, and increasing risk of infectious disease transmission ( 31 ) The ASCO Post Staff. War is hell. It’s also a public health disaster, especially for people with cancer. Accessed: July 6, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. . Considering the devastating impact of these global crises on the entire continuum of cancer research and patient care as well as the growth of the global population age 65 and older ( 32 ) United Nations. Ageing. Accessed: July 6, 2022.[cited 2020 Jul 15]. , researchers caution that the burden of cancer worldwide may rise significantly in the coming decades.

Another concern among global public health experts is that, while age-standardized mortality and incidence rates are declining overall, the reduction in rates appears to be driven by countries with a higher sociodemographic index (SDI)—a composite measure of the social and economic development of a country that considers income per capita, average years of education, and total fertility rate for people younger than 25. The data indicate that age-standardized cancer incidence and mortality rates are increasing in countries with lower SDI ( 33 ) Pramesh CS, et al. Priorities for cancer research in low- and middle-income countries: a global perspective. Nat Med 2022;28:649-57. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] .

To ensure that progress against cancer is equitable worldwide, it is imperative that the global medical research community work together and share best practices to implement newer and more effective strategies that incorporate local needs and knowledge into tailored national cancer control plans. Public health experts have identified several priorities based on present and future needs of low resource countries, including reducing the burden of advanced cancers; improving access, affordability, and outcomes of treatment, utilizing value-based care; fostering implementation research; and leveraging technology to improve cancer control ( 33 ) Pramesh CS, et al. Priorities for cancer research in low- and middle-income countries: a global perspective. Nat Med 2022;28:649-57. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] .

Cancer exerts an immense toll because of the number of lives it affects each year and through its significant economic impact. The direct medical costs of cancer care are one measure of the financial impact of cancer, and in the United States alone, they were estimated to be $183 billion in 2015, the last year for which these data are currently available; this cost is projected to increase to $246 billion by 2030 ( 1 ) Siegel RL, et al. Cancer statistics, 2022. CA Cancer J Clin 2022;72:7-33. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] . These numbers do not include the indirect costs of lost productivity due to cancer-related morbidity and mortality, which are also extremely high. Notably, cancer patients in the United States shouldered an economic burden of $21 billion in 2019 from out-of-pocket costs and other related expenses, which is nearly 3.5 times the amount of approximately $6 billion in NCI funding for cancer research in the same year ( 38 ) Yabroff KR, et al. Annual Report to the Nation on the Status of Cancer, part 2: Patient economic burden associated with cancer care. J Natl Cancer Inst 2021;113:1670-82. [LINK NOT AVAILABLE] .

With the number of cancer cases projected to increase in the coming decades, we can be certain that both the direct and indirect costs will also escalate. The rising personal and economic burden of cancer underscores the urgent need for more research so that we can accelerate the pace of progress against cancer.

Recent advances in cancer prevention, detection, and treatment, many of which are highlighted in this report, were made as a direct result of the cumulative efforts of researchers from across the spectrum of cancer science and medicine. Much of their work, as well as that of FDA—the federal regulatory agency that assures the safety and efficacy of medical devices and therapeutic advances—is supported by funds from the federal government. The consecutive increases for the NIH budget in the last seven fiscal years have helped maintain the momentum of progress (see Investments in Research Fuel a Healthier Future ). To keep up with the pace of scientific and technological innovation, it is imperative, however, that Congress continue to provide sustained, robust, and predictable increases in investments in the federal agencies that are vital for fueling progress against cancer, in particular, NIH, NCI, FDA, and CDC, in the years ahead (see AACR Call to Action ).

• A Message from AACR
• Executive Summary
• A Snapshot of a Year in Progress
• Cancer in 2023
• Understanding the Path to Cancer Development
• Reducing the Risk of Cancer Development
• Screening for Early Detection
• Advancing the Frontiers of Cancer Science and Medicine
• Spotlight on Immunotherapy: Pushing the Frontier of Cancer Medicine
• Perspective: Looking to the Future of Immunology
• Supporting Cancer Patients and Survivors
• Envisioning the Future of Cancer Science and Medicine
• Advancing the Future of Cancer Research and Care Through Evidence-based Policies
• AACR Call to Action
• AACR President’s Vision: Future of Cancer Research and Care
• AACR Cancer Progress Report 2023: Steering Committee

Your donation to the American Association for Cancer Research helps our more than 58,000 members worldwide drive progress against cancer.

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2022 M&A in Review: Regaining Momentum

With 17 announced transactions, the fourth quarter of 2022 was one of the most active quarters we have seen since the COVID-19 pandemic began near the end of Q1 2020. Four of the 17 announced transactions met our definition of “mega merger,” in which the smaller party has annual revenues in excess of $1 billion, and a fifth had a smaller party with revenues in the $500 million to $1 billion range. This was the third consecutive quarter in 2022 in which the average size of the smaller party across all announced transactions exceeded $800 million. As a result, the average smaller party size for the entire year reached an historic high of $852 million, well above 2021’s then-record size of $619 million.

Figure 1: Q4 2022 at a Glance

Source: Kaufman, Hall & Associates, LLC

The Year in Numbers

Figure 2: 2022 Hospital and Health System Transactions by the Numbers

Total Announced Transactions ...................................................    53

Number of Announced Transactions in Q4 2022 ..................     17

Breakdown by Smaller Party Size in Revenue (as % of Total Transactions)

• Revenue < $100M....................................................................    27%
• Revenues Between $100M and $500M...............................    42%
• Revenues Between $500M and $1B.....................................    15%
• Revenues > $1B........................................................................    15%

Not-for-Profit/For-Profit Deals

• Not-for-Profit Acquiring Not-for-Profit..................................    66%
• Not-for-Profit Acquiring For-Profit.........................................    19%
• For-Profit Acquiring Not-for-Profit...........................................    6%
• For-Profit Acquiring For-Profit..................................................    9%

Transactions Involving

• Religiously Affiliated Seller........................................................    4%
• Governmental Seller..................................................................    6%
• Rural or Urban/Rural Seller.....................................................    30%
• Financially Distressed Seller....................................................    15%

Highlights of announced transactions in 2022 include the following:

• The 53 total announced transactions for 2022 moved up from 2021’s recent historic low of 49 announced transactions (Figure 3).
• The average profile of the smaller party in announced transactions remained strong. Smaller party annual revenues exceeded $1 billion in more than 15% of the transactions (Figure 4), just below last year’s historic high of 16.3%. More than 15% of smaller parties had a credit rating of A- or higher, consistent with a trend toward stronger credit ratings noted in 2020 and 2021 and significantly surpassing those historically high watermarks (Figure 5).
• The high percentage of mega mergers and other significant transactions over the course of 2022 resulted in an historically high average smaller party size by annual revenue of $852 million (Figure 6), more than $200 million higher than last year’s historic high of $619 million. The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of the average smaller party size over the past 10 years approached 12%, up from 8% in 2021.
• While the number of announced transactions increased year over year, it remained below pre-pandemic activity levels. Nonetheless, the combined revenues of the parties in this year’s announced transactions resulted in more than $45 billion in total transacted revenue for the year, surpassing 2017’s recent historic high of $44 billion (Figure 7) despite recording less than half of the total transaction volume.
• Despite the financial difficulties that many hospitals and health systems encountered in 2022, the percentage of financially distressed sellers, at 15%, was slightly below the 16% level observed in 2020 and 2021.
• Activity by not-for-profit hospitals and health systems as both acquirers and sellers continued to increase, growing from 81% of total transactions in 2020 to 87% in 2021 to 91% in 2022.

Figure 3: Number of Announced Transactions, 2012 – 2022

Figure 4: Percentage of Announced Transactions in Which Smaller Party’s Annual Revenue Exceeded $1B, 2017 – 2022

Figure 5: Percentage of Announced Transactions in Which Smaller Party Had Credit Rating of A- or Higher, 2017 – 2022

Figure 6: Average Smaller Party Size by Annual Revenue, 2012 – 2022

Figure 7: Total Transacted Revenue, 2017 – 2022 ($s in Billions)

Trends in 2022 Transactions

Transformative mergers.

With the exception of Q1 2022, mega mergers had a significant impact on the metrics reported in our quarterly reports, with average size of the smaller party reaching historic highs in Q2 ($1.5 billion), Q3 ($834 million), and Q4 ($855 million). In addition, there were a significant number of transactions in which the smaller party had annual revenues between $500 million and $1 billion.

Kaufman Hall has long observed an increased emphasis from leading industry participants on the importance of expanding operations, markets, and expertise to complete the transformation of healthcare services. Mounting new pressures on legacy hospitals and health systems during and after the pandemic have highlighted the importance of investing in new capabilities, supporting resources, and business intelligence models. Hospitals and health systems are facing competition from highly capitalized (albeit specialized) tech companies, national health plans, and retail giants. A clear and present challenge to all in the industry is the scarcity (and resulting supply/demand realities) of human resources. Operational and financial challenges have kept operating margins depressed throughout 2022, making the search for economies of scale even more critical to organizations’ long-term sustainability. And as we have noted before, the pandemic demonstrated the resiliency of certain large systems, in which operational risk was distributed across multiple markets and resources could be moved to where they were needed most.

These transactions transcend the simplicity of raw scale, and instead more often exhibit a desire to transform healthcare for the communities that will be served by the combined system is an explicit goal of the transaction:

• Advocate Health—the organization formed in 2022 through the merger of Advocate Aurora Health and Atrium Health— cites among its goals an intent to address root causes of health inequities and increase the speed with which medical innovations reach patients.
• University of Michigan Health has committed $800 million to accelerate expansion of services and integrate leading edge technology as part of its planned combination with Sparrow Health.
• Essentia Health and Marshfield Clinic Health Systems—based in northern Minnesota and central Wisconsin— will use their combined resources “to ensure sustainable and thriving rural health care.”
• Sanford Health and Fairview Health—based in the Dakotas and Minnesota— plan to deploy their complementary experiences in serving rural and urban populations to drive innovations that “benefit rural, urban and indigenous communities across the Midwest.”

Cross-Market Transactions

All four of the announced transactions featured above—Advocate-Aurora Health/Atrium Health, University of Michigan Health/Sparrow Health, Essentia Health/Marshfield Clinic Health Systems, and Sanford Health/Fairview Health—are representative of cross-market transactions, another significant trend in 2022. These transactions connect health systems located in different geographies, with little or no overlap between their markets. As we have continued to report, the movement to capability-based scale is much more prominent than adjacent market-based scale.

A key element of these mergers is geographic diversity, spreading the combined organization’s operating risks across multiple markets and different market types (e.g., urban vs. rural). But other strategies can come into play: expanding access to an academic medical center’s specialty services to new markets, for example, or creating a mixture of diverse market “laboratories” in which new innovations can be tested against different demographics.

A benefit of cross-market mergers is that they do not actually change the competitive structure of the markets involved in the merger—there is no increase in the concentration of local hospitals or health systems, an increasingly important feature considering the current regulatory landscape.

A noteworthy element of many of this year’s cross-market mergers is that the systems have a common focus (e.g., rural health), complementary skillsets (academic medicine and community health), or a shared desire to improve health outcomes.

An Academic Focus on Community Hospital Networks

Academic medical centers (AMCs) demonstrated a renewed focus on extending their community hospital networks in announced transactions that included:

• Thomas Health’s integration into the WVU Health System in West Virginia
• UChicago Medicine’s acquisition of a controlling interest in AdventHealth’s Great Lakes Region, which includes four suburban Chicago hospitals
• Olathe Health’s partnership with the University of Kansas Health System
• Sparrow Health’s combination with University of Michigan Health

Community hospital networks can support multiple strategic goals for both the AMC and its community hospitals partners. [1] They can:

• Improve access to the AMC’s services , extending the AMC’s clinicians and brand into expanded markets and, to the extent lower-acuity cases can be treated by community hospital partners, improving capacity at the AMC’s main campus for the higher-acuity care
• Enhance quality and breadth of care at community hospital partner locations by providing care design protocols and other clinical best practices to its community hospital partners
• Reduce the AMC’s total cost of care by treating lower-acuity patients in a lower-cost community hospital setting
• Enhance the AMC’s research and academic stature by providing access to a broader patient population for clinical trials
• Provide a natural talent pipeline for residency programs and physician recruitment in community hospital settings
• Expand access to capital and credit markets for community hospital partners

These partnerships will also align with an AMC’s growth strategy, creating an expanded population basis able to support the growth or addition of specialty service lines.

Looking Forward: Regaining Momentum

While the total number of transactions remained below pre-pandemic levels in 2022, there were clear signs that M&A activity was beginning to regain momentum, and we expect that momentum to continue into 2023. This expectation is informed by several factors.

The need to transform healthcare . As our colleague and firm chair Ken Kaufman noted in a recent blog , “this is a transformative period in American healthcare, when hospital organizations are faced with the need to fundamentally reinvent themselves both financially and clinically.” The high level of transformative transactions that we witnessed in 2022, culminating in Q4, is evidence that health systems are recognizing and responding to this need.

Severe financial pressures . As detailed throughout 2022 in our National Hospital Flash Reports, the past year was extremely challenging for many hospitals and health systems across the U.S. Organizations that were able to amass strong balance sheets have had some cushion against these financial pressures, although that cushion is getting thinner as resources are used to offset operating losses and financial markets exhibit continued challenges. Smaller organizations and organizations that did not have balance sheet strength may soon have to look for alternatives, including stronger partners that can help them stabilize financially.

Moving past the pandemic . COVID-19 is still with us, but the worst strains of the pandemic seem to be moving behind us. Strategic discussions that were put on “pause” during the height of the pandemic are occurring, including conversations on how to find the next level of intellectual and capital capabilities required to remain competitive in a rapidly evolving healthcare marketplace.

Some market forces present challenging headwinds to transaction activity, including a higher interest rate environment that is raising the cost of capital as well as heightened regulatory scrutiny of M&A activity across multiple industries, including healthcare. We believe, however, that these tactical factors are overshadowed by an increasingly important strategic rationale for providers to form partnerships. In our conversations with clients, one of the questions we hear most frequently is “What are our strategic options going forward?” For many organizations, the answer to at least part of that question will be a partnership or transaction that provides the resources needed to pursue their post-pandemic strategies.

Select 2022 Announced Transactions in Which Kaufman Hall Served as an Advisor

Hospital and health system transactions.

• Exeter Health Resources announced its plan to join Beth Israel Lahey Health
• Vandalia Health acquired Greenbrier Valley Medical Center from Community Hospital Services
• Sparrow Health announced its intention to combine with University of Michigan Health

Other Transactions

• Tryko Partners acquired two skilled nursing facilities from Virtua Health
• DermCare, a Hildred Capital portfolio company, acquired Berman Skin Institute
• Rezolut, a SRM portfolio company, acquired CNY Diagnostic Imaging
• Summa Health sold its outreach lab business to Quest Diagnostics
• Northshore-Edward-Elmhurst Health formed a joint venture with Residential Healthcare Group to offer home and hospice care

*Bold text denotes the party for which Kaufman Hall served as advisor.

Co-contributors:

• Anu Singh , Managing Director and Leader of the Partnerships, Mergers & Acquisitions Practice, [email protected]
• David Cyganowski , Managing Director,  [email protected]
• Kris Blohm , Managing Director, [email protected]
• Nora Kelly , Managing Director, [email protected]
• Courtney Midanek , Managing Director, [email protected]
• Chris Peltola , Assistant Vice President, [email protected]
• Blake Dorris , Assistant Vice President, [email protected]
• Matthew Santulli , Senior Associate, [email protected]

For media inquiries, please contact Haydn Bush at [email protected] .

[1] These strategic goals are discussed in greater depth in Dawn Samaris, “Why Strategic Networks Make Sense for Academic Medical Centers,” originally published in The Governance Institute’s August 2020 Academic Health Focus newsletter and available on the Kaufman Hall website .

To request a pdf of this report, email us at [email protected] . 

Managing Director, Practice Leader, M&A

Contact Expert

Gist Weekly: April 26, 2024

Gist Weekly: April 19, 2024

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SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS

Publications output: u.s. trends and international comparisons.

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Executive Summary

Key takeaways:

• The United States remains a highly influential nation in science and engineering (S&E) research, as measured by the volume of peer-reviewed scholarly publications and the rate of citations to those publications.
• In 2022, China remained the largest producer of publications, followed by the United States, then by India. China’s top scientific field in terms of number of articles produced was engineering (25% of all publications), whereas the top field in the United States was health sciences (37%), and India’s top field was computer and information sciences (21%).
• Analysis of funding acknowledgments shows that from 2018 to 2022, the scientific fields most frequently acknowledging federal funding are chemistry, biological and biomedical sciences, astronomy and astrophysics, and physics.
• The United States, the European Union (EU-27), and China currently produce a high number of highly cited articles, relative to their overall production.
• Open access (OA) has become an increasingly important feature of the publication landscape, in terms of output and impact, as shown by the growth of fully OA articles.
• International collaborations with U.S. authors of S&E publications have increased over the last 15 years, and China is the most frequent U.S. partner.
• International collaboration in the fast-growing field of artificial intelligence helps show an important research network and the most important collaborations in terms of absolute and relative size.

The primary method of disseminating research findings is through publication of peer-reviewed journal articles and conference proceedings (i.e., publication output ). Data on publication output indicate a continued increase in global research activity, a growth in the proliferation and impact of some categories of OA research, and an internationally connected research ecosystem.

Global publication output reached 3.3 million articles in 2022, based on data from the Scopus database of S&E publications. The regions, countries, or economies with the largest volume of S&E publications in 2022 were China, with 27% of global output, and the United States, with 14%. From 2012 to 2022, the global yearly publication total grew by 59%. In terms of growth for these two largest producers, China and the United States had noticeably different expansion in their levels of overall production (growing by 173% and 6%, respectively).

Beyond differences at the level of region, country, or economy, the number of OA publications has increased dramatically in the last 10 years. In 2022, nearly 1.6 million articles were OA (classified in one of four OA categories), compared with about 1.5 million traditional closed-access journal articles. Just 10 years prior, OA articles accounted for around a third of all articles with a known access status. This growth is also clear with respect to impact, where OA research as a whole has a higher proportion of highly cited articles relative to the size of OA scholarship.

When an article is cited by a high number of subsequent articles by other authors, it is deemed to have exceptional scientific impact. Analyzing the distribution of highly cited articles based on the authors’ locations, the United States has a long-standing record of producing a disproportionate share of such articles, although its share has decreased in recent years. China’s share of those articles grew consistently over the past 20 years, and its scientific impact is on par with that of the EU-27. That impact varies by scientific discipline. In 2020, publications by authors in the United States in materials science, geosciences, and physics had relatively higher scientific impact than those in other fields. For publications by authors in China for the same year, those in the social sciences tended to have higher scientific impact than those in any other field.

International collaborations continue to grow in their share of global scientific publications. From 2012 to 2022, the share of articles from authors affiliated with institutions in multiple regions, countries, or economies increased by 19%. In 2022, the United States was involved in a high number of international collaborations (40% of U.S. articles produced included an international coauthor). Other top producers like China (19%), India (24%), and the United Kingdom (67%) varied in the concentration of international collaborations among their respective total outputs.

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2022 Year in Review Active

This has been another outstanding year for the CRU Program, and I am pleased to provide you with our 2022 Year in Review report. Highlights of this past year include the creation of our 42nd unit at Michigan State University and the completion of hiring activities for 37 new unit scientists in 31 States. In this report, you will learn more about the spectacular accomplishments of our students, research staff, and scientists over the past year. We are pleased to report that we continue to see increases in the number of students enrolled in the program, number of active projects, and number of publications and trainings offered to our partners and collaborators. Our dedicated Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Committee continues its valuable work to ensure that all members of our CRU family feel welcomed and included. We continue to grow our partnerships with key external collaborators such as WMI, The Wildlife Society, and USFWS. Our university and State cooperators remain steadfast in their commitment of involvement and have embraced the growth of the program, as we fill some long-standing vacancies and add additional units. 

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Methodology: 2023 focus groups of Asian Americans

Methodology: 2022-23 survey of asian americans, table of contents.

• About the focus groups
• Participant recruitment procedures
• Moderator and interpreter qualification
• Data analysis
• Sample design
• Data collection
• Weighting and variance estimation
• Analysis of Asians living in poverty
• Acknowledgments

The survey analysis is drawn from a national cross-sectional survey conducted for Pew Research Center by Westat. The sampling design of the survey was an address-based sampling (ABS) approach, supplemented by list samples, to reach a nationally representative group of respondents. The survey was fielded July 5, 2022, through Jan. 27, 2023. Self-administered screening interviews were conducted with a total of 36,469 U.S. adults either online or by mail, resulting in 7,006 interviews with Asian American adults. It is these 7,006 Asian Americans who are the focus of this report. After accounting for the complex sample design and loss of precision due to weighting, the margin of sampling error for these respondents is plus or minus 2.1 percentage points at the 95% level of confidence.

The survey was administered in two stages. In the first stage, a short screening survey was administered to a national sample of U.S. adults to collect basic demographics and determine a respondent’s eligibility for the extended survey of Asian Americans. Screener respondents were considered eligible for the extended survey if they self-identified as Asian (alone or in combination with any other race or ethnicity). Note that all individuals who self-identified as Asian were asked to complete the extended survey.

To maintain consistency with the Census Bureau’s definition of “Asian,” individuals responding as Asian but who self-identified with origins that did not meet the bureau’s official standards prior to the 2020 decennial census were considered ineligible and were not asked to complete the extended survey or were removed from the final sample. Those excluded were people solely of Southwest Asian descent (e.g., Lebanese, Saudi), those with Central Asian origins (e.g., Afghan, Uzbek) as well as various other non-Asian origins. The impact of excluding these groups is small, as together they represent about 1%-2% of the national U.S. Asian population, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of the 2021 American Community Survey.

Eligible survey respondents were asked in the extended survey how they identified ethnically (for example: Chinese, Filipino, Indian, Korean, Vietnamese, or some other ethnicity with a write-in option). Note that survey respondents were asked about their ethnicity rather than nationality. For example, those classified as Chinese in the survey are those self-identifying as of Chinese ethnicity, rather than necessarily being a citizen or former citizen of the People’s Republic of China. Since this is an ethnicity, classification of survey respondents as Chinese also includes those who are Taiwanese.

The research plan for this project was submitted to Westat’s institutional review board (IRB), which is an independent committee of experts that specializes in helping to protect the rights of research participants. Due to the minimal risks associated with this questionnaire content and the population of interest, this research underwent an expedited review and received approval (approval #FWA 00005551).

Throughout this methodology statement, the terms “extended survey” and “extended questionnaire” refer to the extended survey of Asian Americans that is the focus of this report, and “eligible adults” and “eligible respondents” refer to those individuals who met its eligibility criteria, unless otherwise noted.

The survey had a complex sample design constructed to maximize efficiency in reaching Asian American adults while also supporting reliable, national estimates for the population as a whole and for the five largest ethnic groups (Chinese, Filipino, Indian, Korean and Vietnamese). Asian American adults include those who self-identify as Asian, either alone or in combination with other races or Hispanic identity.

The main sample frame of the 2022-2023 Asian American Survey is an address-based sample (ABS). The ABS frame of addresses was derived from the USPS Computerized Delivery Sequence file. It is maintained by Marketing Systems Group (MSG) and is updated monthly. MSG geocodes their entire ABS frame, so block, block group, and census tract characteristics from the decennial census and the American Community Survey (ACS) could be appended to addresses and used for sampling and data collection.

All addresses on the ABS frame were geocoded to a census tract. Census tracts were then grouped into three strata based on the density of Asian American adults, defined as the proportion of Asian American adults among all adults in the tract. The three strata were defined as:

• High density: Tracts with an Asian American adult density of 10% or higher
• Medium density: Tracts with a density 3% to less than 10%
• Low density: Tracts with a density less than 3%

Mailing addresses in census tracts from the lowest density stratum, strata 3, were excluded from the sampling frame. As a result, the frame excluded 54.1% of the 2020 census tracts, 49.1% of the U.S. adult population, including 9.1% of adults who self-identified as Asian alone or in combination with other races or Hispanic ethnicity. For the largest five Asian ethnic subgroups, Filipinos had the largest percentage of excluded adults, with 6.8%, while Indians had the lowest with 4.2% of the adults. Addresses were then sampled from the two remaining strata. This stratification and the assignment of differential sampling rates to the strata were critical design components because of the rareness of the Asian American adult population.

Despite oversampling of the high- and medium-density Asian American strata in the ABS sample, the ABS sample was not expected to efficiently yield the required number of completed interviews for some ethnic subgroups. Therefore, the ABS sample was supplemented with samples from the specialized surname list frames maintained by the MSG. These list frames identify households using commercial databases linked to addresses and telephone numbers. The individuals’ surnames in these lists could be classified by likely ethnic origin. Westat requested MSG to produce five list frames: Chinese, Filipino, Indian, Korean and Vietnamese. The lists were subset to include only cases with a mailing address. Addresses sampled from the lists, unlike those sampled from the ABS frame, were not limited to high- and medium-density census tracts.

Once an address was sampled from either the ABS frame or the surname lists, an invitation was mailed to the address. The invitation requested that the adult in the household with the next birthday complete the survey.

To maximize response, the survey used a sequential mixed-mode protocol in which sampled households were first directed to respond online and later mailed a paper version of the questionnaire if they did not respond online.

The first mailing was a letter introducing the survey and providing the information necessary (URL and unique PIN) for online response. A pre-incentive of $2 was included in the mailing. This and remaining screener recruitment letters focused on the screener survey, without mentioning the possibility of eligibility for a longer survey and associated promised incentive, since most people would only be asked to complete the short screening survey. It was important for all households to complete the screening survey, not just those who identify as Asian American. As such, the invitation did not mention that the extended survey would focus on topics surrounding the Asian American experience. The invitation was generic to minimize the risk of nonresponse bias due to topic salience bias.

After one week, Westat sent a postcard reminder to all sampled individuals, followed three weeks later by a reminder letter to nonrespondents. Approximately 8.5 weeks after the initial mailing, Westat sent nonrespondents a paper version screening survey, which was a four-page booklet (one folded 11×17 paper) and a postage-paid return envelope in addition to the cover letter. If no response was obtained from those four mailings, no further contact was made.

Eligible adults who completed the screening interview on the web were immediately asked to continue with the extended questionnaire. If an eligible adult completed the screener online but did not complete the extended interview, Westat sent them a reminder letter. This was performed on a rolling basis when it had been at least one week since the web breakoff. Names were not collected until the end of the web survey, so these letters were addressed to “Recent Participant.”

If an eligible respondent completed a paper screener, Westat mailed them the extended survey and a postage-paid return envelope. This was sent weekly as completed paper screeners arrived. Westat followed these paper mailings with a reminder postcard. Later, Westat sent a final paper version via FedEx to eligible adults who had not completed the extended interview online or by paper.

A pre-incentive of $2 (in the form of two $1 bills) was sent to all sampled addresses with the first letter, which provided information about how to complete the survey online. This and subsequent screener invitations only referred to the pre-incentive without reference to the possibility of later promised incentives.

Respondents who completed the screening survey and were found eligible were offered a promised incentive of $10 to go on and complete the extended survey. All participants who completed the extended web survey were offered their choice of a $10 Amazon.com gift code instantly or $10 cash mailed. All participants who completed the survey via paper were mailed a $10 cash incentive.

In December 2022 a mailing was added for eligible respondents who had completed a screener questionnaire, either by web or paper but who had not yet completed the extended survey. It was sent to those who had received their last mailing in the standard sequence at least four weeks earlier. It included a cover letter, a paper copy of the extended survey, and a business reply envelope, and was assembled in a 9×12 envelope with a $1 bill made visible through the envelope window.

In the last month of data collection, an additional mailing was added to boost the number of Vietnamese respondents. A random sample of 4,000 addresses from the Vietnamese surname list and 2,000 addresses from the ABS frame who were flagged as likely Vietnamese were sent another copy of the first invitation letter, which contained web login credentials but no paper copy of the screener. This was sent in a No. 10 envelope with a wide window and was assembled with a $1 bill visible through the envelope window.

The mail and web screening and extended surveys were developed in English and translated into Chinese (Simplified and Traditional), Hindi, Korean, Tagalog and Vietnamese. For web, the landing page was displayed in English initially but included banners at the top and bottom of the page that allowed respondents to change the displayed language. Once in the survey, a dropdown button at the top of each page was available to respondents to toggle between languages.

The paper surveys were also formatted into all six languages. Recipients thought to be more likely to use a specific language option, based on supplemental information in the sampling frame or their address location, were sent a paper screener in that language in addition to an English screener questionnaire. Those receiving a paper extended instrument were sent the extended survey in the language in which the screener was completed. For web, respondents continued in their selected language from the screener.

Household-level weighting

The first step in weighting was creating a base weight for each sampled mailing address to account for its probability of selection into the sample. The base weight for mailing address k is called BW k and is defined as the inverse of its probability of selection. The ABS sample addresses had a probability of selection based on the stratum from which they were sampled. The supplemental samples (i.e., Chinese, Filipino, Indian, Korean and Vietnamese surname lists) also had a probability of selection from the list frames. Because all of the addresses in the list frames are also included in the ABS frame, these addresses had multiple opportunities for these addresses to be selected, and the base weights include an adjustment to account for their higher probability of selection.

Each sampled mailing address was assigned to one of four categories according to its final screener disposition. The categories were 1) household with a completed screener interview, 2) household with an incomplete screener interview, 3) ineligible (i.e., not a household, which were primarily postmaster returns), and 4) addresses for which status was unknown (i.e., addresses that were not identified as undeliverable by the USPS but from which no survey response was received).

The second step in the weighting process was adjusting the base weight to account for occupied households among those with unknown eligibility (category 4). Previous ABS studies have found that about 13% of all addresses in the ABS frame were either vacant or not home to anyone in the civilian, non-institutionalized adult population. For this survey, it was assumed that 87% of all sampled addresses from the ABS frame were eligible households. However, this value was not appropriate for the addresses sampled from the list frames, which were expected to have a higher proportion of households as these were maintained lists. For the list samples, the occupied household rate was computed as the proportion of list cases in category 3 compared to all resolved list cases (i.e., the sum of categories 1 through 3). The base weights for the share of category 4 addresses (unknown eligibility) assumed to be eligible were then allocated to cases in categories 1 and 2 (known households) so that the sum of the combined category 1 and 2 base weights equaled the number of addresses assumed to be eligible in each frame. The category 3 ineligible addresses were given a weight of zero.

The next step was adjusting for nonresponse for households without a completed screener interview to create a final household weight. This adjustment allocated the weights of nonrespondents (category 2) to those of respondents (category 1) within classes defined by the cross-classification of sampling strata, census region, and sample type (e.g., ABS and list supplemental samples). Those classes with fewer than 50 sampled addresses or large adjustment factors were collapsed with nearby cells within the sample type. Given the large variance in the household weights among the medium density ABS stratum, final household weights for addresses within this stratum were capped at 300.

Weighting of extended survey respondents

The extended interview nonresponse adjustment began by assigning each case that completed the screener interview to one of three dispositions: 1) eligible adult completed the extended interview; 2) eligible adult did not complete the extended interview; and 3) not eligible for the extended interview.

An initial adult base weight was calculated for the cases with a completed extended interview as the product of the truncated number of adults in the household (max value of 3) and the household weight. This adjustment accounted for selecting one adult in each household.

The final step in the adult weighting was calibrating the adult weights for those who completed the extended interview so that the calibrated weights (i.e., the estimated number of adults) aligned with benchmarks for non-institutionalized Asian adults from the 2016-2020 American Community Surveys Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). Specifically, raking was used to calibrate the weights on the following dimensions:

• Ethnic group (Chinese, Filipino, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, other single Asian ethnicities, and multiple Asian ethnicities)
• Collapsed ethnic group (Chinese, Filipino, Indian, Korean, Vietnamese, all other single and multiple Asian ethnicities) by age group
• Collapsed ethnic group by sex
• Collapsed ethnic group by census region
• Collapsed ethnic group by education
• Collapsed ethnic group by housing tenure
• Collapsed ethnic group by nativity
• Income group by number of persons in the household

The control totals used in raking were based on the entire population of Asian American adults (including those who live in the excluded stratum) to correct for both extended interview nonresponse and undercoverage from excluding the low-density stratum in the ABS frame.

Variance estimation

Because the modeled estimates used in the weighting are themselves subject to sampling error, variance estimation and tests of statistical significance were performed using the grouped jackknife estimator ( JK 2). One hundred sets of replicates were created by deleting a group of cases within each stratum from each replicate and doubling the weights for a corresponding set of cases in the same stratum. The entire weighting and modeling process was performed on the full sample and then separately repeated for each replicate. The result is a total of 101 separate weights for each respondent that have incorporated the variability from the complex sample design. 1

Response rates

Westat assigned all sampled cases a result code for their participation in the screener, and then they assigned a result for the extended questionnaire for those who were eligible for the survey of Asian Americans. Two of the dispositions warrant some discussion. One is the category “4.313 No such address.” This category is for addresses that were returned by the U.S. Postal Service as not being deliverable. This status indicates the address, which was on the USPS Delivery Sequence File at the time of sampling, currently is not occupied or no longer exists. The second category is “4.90 Other.” This category contains 588 addresses that were never mailed because they had a drop count of greater than four. Drop points are addresses with multiple households that share the same address. The information available in the ABS frame on drop points is limited to the number of drop points at the address, without information on the type of households at the drop point, or how they should be labeled for mailing purposes. In this survey, all drop points were eligible for sampling, but only those with drop point counts of four or fewer were mailed. Westat treated drop point counts of five or more as out of scope, and no mailing was done for those addresses.

Westat used the disposition results to compute response rates consistent with AAPOR definitions. The response rates are weighted by the base weight to account for the differential sampling in this survey. The AAPOR RR3 response rate to the screening interview was 17.0%. 2  The RR1 response rate to the extended Asian American interview (77.9%) is the number of eligible adults completing the questionnaire over the total sampled for that extended questionnaire. The overall response rate is the product of the screener response rate and the conditional response rate for the extended questionnaire. The overall response rate for the Asian American sample in the Pew Research Center survey was 13.3% (17.0% x 77.9%).

Survey analysis of Asian adults living in poverty is based on 561 respondents of the 2022-23 survey of Asian Americans whose approximate family income falls at or below the 2022 federal poverty line published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

The survey asked respondents to choose their family income brackets in the 12 months prior to the survey. These income brackets were converted into dollars in the following ways:

• For those reporting a family income of less than $12,500, $12,499 was used as a proxy for their family income.
• For respondents reporting income brackets that are between $12,500 and $149,999, the midpoint of the selected income bracket was used as a proxy. For example, if they chose “$12,500 to $14,999,” $13,750 was used.
• For respondents reporting a family income of $150,000 or more, $150,000 was used.

The survey also asked respondents how many adults ages 18 or older live in their household including themselves, from one to 10 adults. Additionally, the survey asked how many children under 18 live in their household, from zero to 10 children. These responses were used to calculate their total family (household) size. Asian adults were categorized as “living near or below the poverty line” if their approximate family income, after being adjusted for family size, falls at or below 100% of the 2022 federal poverty line. Respondents with a household size of four were categorized as “living near or below the poverty line” if their approximate family income is $27,750 or less. 3 All Asian adults whose approximate family income is $12,499 were categorized as “living near or below” the poverty line regardless of family size, since those respondents have an income under the 2022 federal poverty line for a family of one. All Asian adults who meet the criteria above are used for the analysis of Asians in poverty, irrespective of their status as students or not.

A number of sensitivity checks were performed to test the robustness of the findings, and the main conclusions were consistently upheld. These sensitivity checks included using the poverty thresholds published by the Census Bureau instead of the poverty line published by HHS to define Asians in poverty, and excluding full-time students from the analysis even if their family income falls at or below the poverty line.

• For additional details on jackknife replication, refer to Rust, K.F., and J.N.K. Rao. 1996. “ Variance estimation for complex surveys using replication techniques .” Statistical Methods in Medical Research. ↩
• The weighted share of unscreened households assumed to be eligible for the screener interview (occupied “e”) was 87%. ↩
• The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has separate poverty guidelines for the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii. For all respondents in the 2022-23 survey of Asian Americans, poverty status was determined by applying the federal poverty line for the 48 contiguous states and D.C., regardless of respondents’ state of residence. ↩

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Trends in electric cars

• Executive summary

Electric car sales

Electric car availability and affordability.

• Electric two- and three-wheelers
• Electric light commercial vehicles
• Electric truck and bus sales
• Electric heavy-duty vehicle model availability
• Charging for electric light-duty vehicles
• Charging for electric heavy-duty vehicles
• Battery supply and demand
• Battery prices
• Electric vehicle company strategy and market competition
• Electric vehicle and battery start-ups
• Vehicle outlook by mode
• Vehicle outlook by region
• The industry outlook
• Light-duty vehicle charging
• Heavy-duty vehicle charging
• Battery demand
• Electricity demand
• Oil displacement
• Well-to-wheel greenhouse gas emissions
• Lifecycle impacts of electric cars

Cite report

IEA (2024), Global EV Outlook 2024 , IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2024, Licence: CC BY 4.0

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Nearly one in five cars sold in 2023 was electric.

Electric car sales neared 14 million in 2023, 95% of which were in China, Europe and the United States

Almost 14 million new electric cars 1 were registered globally in 2023, bringing their total number on the roads to 40 million, closely tracking the sales forecast from the 2023 edition of the Global EV Outlook (GEVO-2023). Electric car sales in 2023 were 3.5 million higher than in 2022, a 35% year-on-year increase. This is more than six times higher than in 2018, just 5 years earlier. In 2023, there were over 250 000 new registrations per week, which is more than the annual total in 2013, ten years earlier. Electric cars accounted for around 18% of all cars sold in 2023, up from 14% in 2022 and only 2% 5 years earlier, in 2018. These trends indicate that growth remains robust as electric car markets mature. Battery electric cars accounted for 70% of the electric car stock in 2023.

Global electric car stock, 2013-2023

While sales of electric cars are increasing globally, they remain significantly concentrated in just a few major markets. In 2023, just under 60% of new electric car registrations were in the People’s Republic of China (hereafter ‘China’), just under 25% in Europe, 2 and 10% in the United States – corresponding to nearly 95% of global electric car sales combined. In these countries, electric cars account for a large share of local car markets: more than one in three new car registrations in China was electric in 2023, over one in five in Europe, and one in ten in the United States. However, sales remain limited elsewhere, even in countries with developed car markets such as Japan and India. As a result of sales concentration, the global electric car stock is also increasingly concentrated. Nevertheless, China, Europe and the United States also represent around two-thirds of total car sales and stocks, meaning that the EV transition in these markets has major repercussions in terms of global trends.

In China, the number of new electric car registrations reached 8.1 million in 2023, increasing by 35% relative to 2022. Increasing electric car sales were the main reason for growth in the overall car market, which contracted by 8% for conventional (internal combustion engine) cars but grew by 5% in total, indicating that electric car sales are continuing to perform as the market matures. The year 2023 was the first in which China’s New Energy Vehicle (NEV) 3 industry ran without support from national subsidies for EV purchases, which have facilitated expansion of the market for more than a decade. Tax exemption for EV purchases and non-financial support remain in place, after an extension , as the automotive industry is seen as one of the key drivers of economic growth. Some province-led support and investment also remains in place and plays an important role in China’s EV landscape. As the market matures, the industry is entering a phase marked by increased price competition and consolidation. In addition, China exported over 4 million cars in 2023, making it the largest auto exporter in the world, among which 1.2 million were EVs. This is markedly more than the previous year – car exports were almost 65% higher than in 2022, and electric car exports were 80% higher. The main export markets for these vehicles were Europe and countries in the Asia Pacific region, such as Thailand and Australia.

In the United States, new electric car registrations totalled 1.4 million in 2023, increasing by more than 40% compared to 2022. While relative annual growth in 2023 was slower than in the preceding two years, demand for electric cars and absolute growth remained strong. The revised qualifications for the Clean Vehicle Tax Credit, alongside electric car price cuts, meant that some popular EV models became eligible for credit in 2023. Sales of the Tesla Model Y, for example, increased 50% compared to 2022 after it became eligible for the full USD 7 500 tax credit. Overall, the new criteria established by the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) appear to have supported sales in 2023, despite earlier concerns that tighter domestic content requirements for EV and battery manufacturing could create immediate bottlenecks or delays, such as for the Ford F-150 Lightning . As of 2024, new guidance for the tax credits means the number of eligible models has fallen to less than 30 from about 45, 4 including several trim levels of the Tesla Model 3 becoming ineligible. However, in 2023 and 2024, leasing business models enable electric cars to qualify for the tax credits even if they do not fully meet the requirements, as leased cars can qualify for a less strict commercial vehicle tax credit and these tax credit savings can be passed to lease-holders. Such strategies have also contributed to sustained electric car roll-out.

In Europe, new electric car registrations reached nearly 3.2 million in 2023, increasing by almost 20% relative to 2022. In the European Union, sales amounted to 2.4 million, with similar growth rates. As in China, the high rates of electric car sales seen in Europe suggest that growth remains robust as markets mature, and several European countries reached important milestones in 2023. Germany, for example, became the third country after China and the United States to record half a million new battery electric car registrations in a single year, with 18% of car sales being battery electric (and another 6% plug-in hybrid).

However, the phase-out of several purchase subsidies in Germany slowed overall EV sales growth. At the start of 2023, PHEV subsidies were phased out, resulting in lower PHEV sales compared to 2022, and in December 2023, all EV subsidies ended after a ruling on the Climate and Transformation Fund. In Germany, the sales share for electric cars fell from 30% in 2022 to 25% in 2023. This had an impact on the overall electric car sales share in the region. In the rest of Europe, however, electric car sales and their sales share increased. Around 25% of all cars sold in France and the United Kingdom were electric, 30% in the Netherlands, and 60% in Sweden. In Norway, sales shares increased slightly despite the overall market contracting, and its sales share remains the highest in Europe, at almost 95%.

Electric car registrations and sales share in China, United States and Europe, 2018-2023

Sales in emerging markets are increasing, albeit from a low base, led by southeast asia and brazil.

Electric car sales continued to increase in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) outside China in 2023, but they remained low overall. In many cases, personal cars are not the most common means of passenger transport, especially compared with shared vans and minibuses, or two- and three-wheelers (2/3Ws), which are more prevalent and more often electrified, given their relative accessibility and affordability. The electrification of 2/3Ws and public or shared mobility will be key to achieve emissions reductions in such cases (see later sections in this report). While switching from internal combustion engine (ICE) to electric cars is important, the effect on overall emissions differs depending on the mode of transport that is displaced. Replacing 2/3Ws, public and shared mobility or more active forms of transport with personal cars may not be desirable in all cases.

In India, electric car registrations were up 70% year-on-year to 80 000, compared to a growth rate of under 10% for total car sales. Around 2% of all cars sold were electric. Purchase incentives under the Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric Vehicles (FAME II) scheme, supply-side incentives under the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme, tax benefits and the Go Electric campaign have all contributed to fostering demand in recent years. A number of new models also became popular in 2023, such as Mahindra’s XUV400, MG’s Comet, Citroën’s e-C3, BYD’s Yuan Plus, and Hyundai’s Ioniq 5, driving up growth compared to 2022. However, if the forthcoming FAME III scheme includes a subsidy reduction, as has been speculated in line with lower subsidy levels in the 2024 budget, future growth could be affected. Local carmakers have thus far maintained a strong foothold in the market, supported by advantageous import tariffs , and account for 80% of electric car sales in cumulative terms since 2010, led by Tata (70%) and Mahindra (10%).

In Thailand, electric car registrations more than quadrupled year-on-year to nearly 90 000, reaching a notable 10% sales share – comparable to the share in the United States. This is all the more impressive given that overall car sales in the country decreased from 2022 to 2023. New subsidies, including for domestic battery manufacturing, and lower import and excise taxes, combined with the growing presence of Chinese carmakers , have contributed to rapidly increasing sales. Chinese companies account for over half the sales to date, and they could become even more prominent given that BYD plans to start operating EV production facilities in Thailand in 2024, with an annual production capacity of 150 000 vehicles for an investment of just under USD 500 million . Thailand aims to become a major EV manufacturing hub for domestic and export markets, and is aiming to attract USD 28 billion in foreign investment within 4 years, backed by specific incentives to foster investment.

In Viet Nam, after an exceptional 2022 for the overall car market, car sales contracted by 25% in 2023, but electric car sales still recorded unprecedented growth: from under 100 in 2021, to 7 000 in 2022, and over 30 000 in 2023, reaching a 15% sales share. Domestic front-runner VinFast, established in 2017, accounted for nearly all domestic sales. VinFast also started selling electric sports utility vehicles (SUVs) in North America in 2023, as well as developing manufacturing facilities in order to unlock domestic content-linked subsidies under the US IRA. VinFast is investing around USD 2 billion and targets an annual production of 150 000 vehicles in the United States by 2025. The company went public in 2023, far exceeding expectations with a debut market valuation of around USD 85 billion, well beyond General Motors (GM) (USD 46 billion), Ford (USD 48 billion) or BMW (USD 68 billion), before it settled back down around USD 20 billion by the end of the year. VinFast also looks to enter regional markets, such as India and the Philippines .

In Malaysia, electric car registrations more than tripled to 10 000, supported by tax breaks and import duty exemptions, as well as an acceleration in charging infrastructure roll-out. In 2023, Mercedes-Benz marketed the first domestically assembled EV, and both BYD and Tesla also entered the market.

In Latin America, electric car sales reached almost 90 000 in 2023, with markets in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico leading the region. In Brazil, electric car registrations nearly tripled year-on-year to more than 50 000, a market share of 3%. Growth in Brazil was underpinned by the entry of Chinese carmakers, such as BYD with its Song and Dolphin models, Great Wall with its H6, and Chery with its Tiggo 8, which immediately ranked among the best-selling models in 2023. Road transport electrification in Brazil could bring significant climate benefits given the largely low-emissions power mix, as well as reducing local air pollution. However, EV adoption has been slow thus far, given the national prioritisation of ethanol-based fuels since the late 1970s as a strategy to maintain energy security in the face of oil shocks. Today, biofuels are important alternative fuels available at competitive cost and aligned with the existing refuelling infrastructure. Brazil remains the world’s largest producer of sugar cane, and its agribusiness represents about one-fourth of GDP. At the end of 2023, Brazil launched the Green Mobility and Innovation Programme , which provides tax incentives for companies to develop and manufacture low-emissions road transport technology, aggregating to more than BRA 19 billion (Brazilian reals) (USD 3.8 billion) over the 2024-2028 period. Several major carmakers already in Brazil are developing hybrid ethanol-electric models as a result. China’s BYD and Great Wall are also planning to start domestic manufacturing, counting on local battery metal deposits, and plan to sell both fully electric and hybrid ethanol-electric models. BYD is investing over USD 600 million in its electric car plant in Brazil – its first outside Asia – for an annual capacity of 150 000 vehicles. BYD also partnered with Raízen to develop charging infrastructure in eight Brazilian cities starting in 2024. GM, on the other hand, plans to stop producing ICE (including ethanol) models and go fully electric, notably to produce for export markets. In 2024, Hyundai announced investments of USD 1.1 billion to 2032 to start local manufacturing of electric, hybrid and hydrogen cars.

In Mexico, electric car registrations were up 80% year-on-year to 15 000, a market share just above 1%. Given its proximity to the United States, Mexico’s automotive market is already well integrated with North American partners, and benefits from advantageous trade agreements, large existing manufacturing capacity, and eligibility for subsidies under the IRA. As a result, local EV supply chains are developing quickly, with expectations that this will spill over into domestic markets. Tesla, Ford, Stellantis, BMW, GM, Volkswagen (VW) and Audi have all either started manufacturing or announced plans to manufacture EVs in Mexico. Chinese carmakers such as BYD, Chery and SAIC are also considering expanding to Mexico. Elsewhere in the region, Colombia and Costa Rica are seeing increasing electric car sales, with around 6 000 and 5 000 in 2023, respectively, but sales remain limited in other Central and South American countries.

Throughout Africa, Eurasia and the Middle East, electric cars are still rare, accounting for less than 1% of total car sales. However, as Chinese carmakers look for opportunities abroad, new models – including those produced domestically – could boost EV sales. For example, in Uzbekistan , BYD set up a joint venture with UzAuto Motors in 2023 to produce 50 000 electric cars annually, and Chery International established a partnership with ADM Jizzakh. This partnership has already led to a steep increase in electric car sales in Uzbekistan, reaching around 10 000 in 2023. In the Middle East, Jordan boasts the highest electric car sales share, at more than 45%, supported by much lower import duties relative to ICE cars, followed by the United Arab Emirates, with 13%.

Strong electric car sales in the first quarter of 2024 surpass the annual total from just four years ago

Electric car sales remained strong in the first quarter of 2024, surpassing those of the same period in 2023 by around 25% to reach more than 3 million. This growth rate was similar to the increase observed for the same period in 2023 compared to 2022. The majority of the additional sales came from China, which sold about half a million more electric cars than over the same period in 2023. In relative terms, the most substantial growth was observed outside of the major EV markets, where sales increased by over 50%, suggesting that the transition to electromobility is picking up in an increasing number of countries worldwide.

Quarterly electric car sales by region, 2021-2024

From January to March of this year, nearly 1.9 million electric cars were sold in China, marking an almost 35% increase compared to sales in the first quarter of 2023. In March, NEV sales in China surpassed a share of 40% in overall car sales for the first time, according to retail sales reported by the China Passenger Car Association. As witnessed in 2023, sales of plug-in hybrid electric cars are growing faster than sales of pure battery electric cars. Plug-in hybrid electric car sales in the first quarter increased by around 75% year-on-year in China, compared to just 15% for battery electric car sales, though the former started from a lower base.

In Europe, the first quarter of 2024 saw year-on-year growth of over 5%, slightly above the growth in overall car sales and thereby stabilising the EV sales share at a similar level as last year. Electric car sales growth was particularly high in Belgium, where around 60 000 electric cars were sold, almost 35% more than the year before. However, Belgium represents less than 5% of total European car sales. In the major European markets – France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom (together representing about 60% of European car sales) – growth in electric car sales was lower. In France, overall EV sales in the first quarter grew by about 15%, with BEV sales growth being higher than for PHEVs. While this is less than half the rate as over the same period last year, total sales were nonetheless higher and led to a slight increase in the share of EVs in total car sales. The United Kingdom saw similar year-on-year growth (over 15%) in EV sales as France, about the same rate as over the same period last year. In Germany, where battery electric car subsidies ended in 2023, sales of electric cars fell by almost 5% in the first quarter of 2024, mainly as a result of a 20% year-on-year decrease in March. The share of EVs in total car sales was therefore slightly lower than last year. As in China, PHEV sales in both Germany and the United Kingdom were stronger than BEV sales. In Italy, sales of electric cars in the first three months of 2024 were more than 20% lower than over the same period in 2023, with the majority of the decrease taking place in the PHEV segment. However, this trend could be reversed based on the introduction of a new incentive scheme , and if Chinese automaker Chery succeeds in appealing to Italian consumers when it enters the market later this year.

In the United States, first-quarter sales reached around 350 000, almost 15% higher than over the same period the year before. As in other major markets, the sales growth of PHEVs was even higher, at 50%. While the BEV sales share in the United States appears to have fallen somewhat over the past few months, the sales share of PHEVs has grown.

In smaller EV markets, sales growth in the first months of 2024 was much higher, albeit from a low base. In January and February, electric car sales almost quadrupled in Brazil and increased more than sevenfold in Viet Nam. In India, sales increased more than 50% in the first quarter of 2024. These figures suggest that EVs are gaining momentum across diverse markets worldwide.

Since 2021, first-quarter electric car sales have typically accounted for 15-20% of the total global annual sales. Based on this observed trend, coupled with policy momentum and the seasonality that EV sales typically experience, we estimate that electric car sales could reach around 17 million in 2024. This indicates robust growth for a maturing market, with 2024 sales to surpass those of 2023 by more than 20% and EVs to reach a share in total car sales of more than one-fifth.

Electric car sales, 2012-2024

The majority of the additional 3 million electric car sales projected for 2024 relative to 2023 are from China. Despite the phase-out of NEV purchase subsidies last year, sales in China have remained robust, indicating that the market is maturing. With strong competition and relatively low-cost electric cars, sales are to grow by almost 25% in 2024 compared to last year, reaching around 10 million. If confirmed, this figure will come close to the total global electric car sales in 2022. As a result, electric car sales could represent around 45% of total car sales in China over 2024.

In 2024, electric car sales in the United States are projected to rise by 20% compared to the previous year, translating to almost half a million more sales, relative to 2023. Despite reporting of a rocky end to 2023 for electric cars in the United States, sales shares are projected to remain robust in 2024. Over the entire year, around one in nine cars sold are expected to be electric.

Based on recent trends, and considering that tightening CO 2 targets are due to come in only in 2025, the growth in electric car sales in Europe is expected to be the lowest of the three largest markets. Sales are projected to reach around 3.5 million units in 2024, reflecting modest growth of less than 10% compared to the previous year. In the context of a generally weak outlook for passenger car sales, electric cars would still represent about one in four cars sold in Europe.

Outside of the major EV markets, electric car sales are anticipated to reach the milestone of over 1 million units in 2024, marking a significant increase of over 40% compared to 2023. Recent trends showing the success of both homegrown and Chinese electric carmakers in Southeast Asia underscore that the region is set to make a strong contribution to the sales of emerging EV markets (see the section on Trends in the electric vehicle industry). Despite some uncertainty surrounding whether India’s forthcoming FAME III scheme will include subsidies for electric cars, we expect sales in India to remain robust, and to experience around 50% growth compared to 2023. Across all regions outside the three major EV markets, electric car sales are expected to represent around 5% of total car sales in 2024, which – considering the high growth rates seen in recent years – could indicate that a tipping point towards global mass adoption is getting closer.

There are of course downside risks to the 2024 outlook for electric car sales. Factors such as high interest rates and economic uncertainty could potentially reduce the growth of global electric car sales in 2024. Other challenges may come from the IRA restrictions on US electric car tax incentives, and the tightening of technical requirements for EVs to qualify for the purchase tax exemption in China. However, there are also upside potentials to consider. New markets may open up more rapidly than anticipated, as automakers expand their EV operations and new entrants compete for market share. This could lead to accelerated growth in electric car sales globally, surpassing the initial estimations.

More electric models are becoming available, but the trend is towards larger ones

The number of available electric car models nears 600, two-thirds of which are large vehicles and SUVs

In 2023, the number of available models for electric cars increased 15% year-on-year to nearly 590, as carmakers scaled up electrification plans, seeking to appeal to a growing consumer base. Meanwhile, the number of fully ICE models (i.e. excluding hybrids) declined for the fourth consecutive year, at an average of 2%. Based on recent original equipment manufacturer (OEM) announcements, the number of new electric car models could reach 1 000 by 2028. If all announced new electric models actually reach the market, and if the number of available ICE car models continues to decline by 2% annually, there could be as many electric as ICE car models before 2030.

As reported in GEVO-2023, the share of small and medium electric car models is decreasing among available electric models: in 2023, two-thirds of the battery-electric models on the market were SUVs, 5 pick-up trucks or large cars. Just 25% of battery electric car sales in the United States were for small and medium models, compared to 40% in Europe and 50% in China. Electric cars are following the same trend as conventional cars, and getting bigger on average. In 2023, SUVs, pick-up trucks and large models accounted for 65% of total ICE car sales worldwide, and more than 80% in the United States, 60% in China and 50% in Europe.

Several factors underpin the increase in the share of large models. Since the 2010s, conventional SUVs in the United States have benefited from less stringent tailpipe emissions rules than smaller models, creating an incentive for carmakers to market more vehicles in that segment. Similarly, in the European Union, CO 2 targets for passenger cars have included a compromise on weight, allowing CO 2 leeway for heavier vehicles in some cases. Larger vehicles also mean larger margins for carmakers. Given that incumbent carmakers are not yet making a profit on their EV offer in many cases, focusing on larger models enables them to increase their margins. Under the US IRA, electric SUVs can qualify for tax credits as long as they are priced under USD 80 000, whereas the limit stands at USD 55 000 for a sedan, creating an incentive to market SUVs if a greater margin can be gathered. On the demand side, there is now strong willingness to pay for SUVs or large models. Consumers are typically interested in longer-range and larger cars for their primary vehicles, even though small models are more suited to urban use. Higher marketing spend on SUVs compared to smaller models can also have an impact on consumer choices.

The progressive shift towards ICE SUVs has been dramatically limiting fuel savings. Over the 2010-2022 period, without the shift to SUVs, energy use per kilometre could have fallen at an average annual rate 30% higher than the actual rate. Switching to electric in the SUV and larger car segments can therefore achieve immediate and significant CO 2 emissions reductions, and electrification also brings considerable benefits in terms of reducing air pollution and non-tailpipe emissions, especially in urban settings. In 2023, if all ICE and HEV sales of SUVs had instead been BEV, around 770 Mt CO 2 could have been avoided globally over the cars’ lifetimes (see section 10 on lifecycle analysis). This is equivalent to the total road emissions of China in 2023.

Breakdown of battery electric car sales in selected countries and regions by segment, 2018-2023

Nevertheless, from a policy perspective, it is critical to mitigate the negative spillovers associated with an increase in larger electric cars in the fleet.

Larger electric car models have a significant impact on battery supply chains and critical mineral demand. In 2023, the sales-weighted average battery electric SUV in Europe had a battery almost twice as large as the one in the average small electric car, with a proportionate impact on critical mineral needs. Of course, the range of small cars is typically shorter than SUVs and large cars (see later section on ranges). However, when comparing electric SUVs and medium-sized electric cars, which in 2023 offered a similar range, the SUV battery was still 25% larger. This means that if all electric SUVs sold in 2023 had instead been medium-sized cars, around 60 GWh of battery equivalent could have been avoided globally, with limited impact on range. Accounting for the different chemistries used in China, Europe, and the United States, this would be equivalent to almost 6 000 tonnes of lithium, 30 000 tonnes of nickel, almost 7 000 tonnes of cobalt, and over 8 000 tonnes of manganese.

Larger batteries also require more power, or longer charging times. This can put pressure on electricity grids and charging infrastructure by increasing occupancy, which could create issues during peak utilisation, such as at highway charging points at high traffic times.

In addition, larger vehicles also require greater quantities of materials such as iron and steel, aluminium and plastics, with a higher environmental and carbon footprint for materials production, processing and assembly. Because they are heavier, larger models also have higher electricity consumption. The additional energy consumption resulting from the increased mass is mitigated by regenerative braking to some extent, but in 2022, the sales-weighted average electricity consumption of electric SUVs was 20% higher than that of other electric cars. 6

Major carmakers have announced launches of smaller and more affordable electric car models over the past few years. However, when all launch announcements are considered, far fewer smaller models are expected than SUVs, large models and pick-up trucks. Only 25% of the 400+ launches expected over the 2024-2028 period are small and medium models, which represents a smaller share of available models than in 2023. Even in China, where small and medium models have been popular, new launches are typically for larger cars.

Number of available car models in 2023 and expected new ones by powertrain, country or region and segment, 2024-2028

Several governments have responded by introducing policies to create incentives for smaller and lighter passenger cars. In Norway, for example, all cars are subject to a purchase tax based on weight, CO 2 and nitrogen oxides (NO x ) emissions, though electric cars were exempt from the weight-based tax prior to 2023. Any imported cars weighing more than 500 kg must also pay an entry fee for each additional kg. In France, a progressive weight-based tax applies to ICE and PHEV cars weighing above 1 600 kg, with a significant impact on price: weight tax for a Land Rover Defender 130 (2 550 kg) adds up to more than EUR 21 500, versus zero for a Renault Clio (1 100 kg). Battery electric cars have been exempted to date. In February 2024, a referendum held in Paris resulted in a tripling of city parking fees for visiting SUVs, applicable to ICE, hybrid and plug-in hybrid cars above 1 600 kg and battery electric ones above 2 000 kg, in an effort to limit the use of large and/or polluting vehicles. Other examples exist in Estonia, Finland, Switzerland and the Netherlands. A number of policy options may be used, such as caps and fleet averages for vehicle footprint, weight, and/or battery size; access to finance for smaller vehicles; and sustained support for public charging, enabling wider use of shorter-range cars.

Average range is increasing, but only moderately

Concerns about range compared to ICE vehicles, and about the availability of charging infrastructure for long-distance journeys, also contribute to increasing appetite for larger models with longer range.

With increasing battery size and improvements in battery technology and vehicle design, the sales-weighted average range of battery electric cars grew by nearly 75% between 2015 and 2023, although trends vary by segment. The average range of small cars in 2023 – around 150 km – is not much higher than it was in 2015, indicating that this range is already well suited for urban use (with the exception of taxis, which have much higher daily usage). Large, higher-end models already offered higher ranges than average in 2015, and their range has stagnated through 2023, averaging around 360-380 km. Meanwhile, significant improvements have been made for medium-sized cars and SUVs, the range of which now stands around 380 km, whereas it averaged around 150 km for medium cars and 270 km for SUVs in 2015. This is encouraging for consumers looking to purchase an electric car for longer journeys rather than urban use.

Since 2020, growth in the average range of vehicles has been slower than over the 2015-2020 period. This could result from a number of factors, including fluctuating battery prices, carmakers’ attempts to limit additional costs as competition intensifies, and technical constraints (e.g. energy density, battery size). It could also reflect that beyond a certain range at which most driving needs are met, consumers’ willingness to pay for a marginal increase in battery size and range is limited. Looking forward, however, the average range could start increasing again as novel battery technologies mature and prices fall.

More affordable electric cars are needed to reach a mass-market tipping point

An equitable and inclusive transition to electric mobility, both within countries and at the global level, hinges on the successful launch of affordable EVs (including but not limited to electric cars). In this section, we use historic sales and price data for electric and ICE models around the world to examine the total cost of owning an electric car, price trends over time, and the remaining electric premium, by country and vehicle size. 7 Specific models are used for illustration.

Total cost of ownership

Car purchase decisions typically involve consideration of retail price and available subsidies as well as lifetime operating costs, such as fuel costs, insurance, maintenance and depreciation, which together make up the total cost of ownership (TCO). Reaching TCO parity between electric and ICE cars creates important financial incentives to make the switch. This section examines the different components of the TCO, by region and car size.

In 2023, upfront retail prices for electric cars were generally higher than for their ICE equivalents, which increased their TCO in relative terms. On the upside, higher fuel efficiency and lower maintenance costs enable fuel cost savings for electric cars, lowering their TCO. This is especially true in periods when fuel prices are high, in places where electricity prices are not too closely correlated to fossil fuel prices. Depreciation is also a major factor in determining TCO: As a car ages, it loses value, and depreciation for electric cars tends to be faster than for ICE equivalents, further increasing their TCO. Accelerated depreciation could, however, prove beneficial for the development of second-hand markets.

However, the trend towards faster depreciation for electric vehicles might be reversed for multiple reasons. Firstly, consumers are gaining more confidence in electric battery lifetimes, thereby increasing the resale value of EVs. Secondly, strong demand and the positive brand image of some BEV models can mean they hold their value longer, as shown by Tesla models depreciating more slowly than the average petrol car in the United States. Finally, increasing fuel prices in some regions, the roll-out of low-emissions zones that restrict access for the most polluting vehicles, and taxes and parking fees specifically targeted at ICE vehicles could mean they experience faster depreciation rates than EVs in the future. In light of these two possible opposing depreciation trends, the same fixed annual depreciation rate for both BEVs and ICE vehicles has been applied in the following cost of ownership analysis.

Subsidies help lower the TCO of electric cars relative to ICE equivalents in multiple ways. A purchase subsidy lowers the original retail price, thereby lowering capital depreciation over time, and a lower retail price implies lower financing costs through cumulative interest. Subsidies can significantly reduce the number of years required to reach TCO parity between electric and ICE equivalents. As of 2022, we estimate that TCO parity could be reached in most cases in under 7 years in the three major EV markets, with significant variations across different car sizes. In comparison, for models purchased at 2018 prices, TCO parity was much harder to achieve.

In Germany, for example, we estimate that the sales-weighted average price of a medium-sized battery electric car in 2022 was 10-20% more expensive than its ICE equivalent, but 10-20% cheaper in cumulative costs of ownership after 5 years, thanks to fuel and maintenance costs savings. In the case of an electric SUV, we estimate that the average annual operating cost savings would amount to USD 1 800 when compared to the equivalent conventional SUV over a period of 10 years. In the United States, despite lower fuel prices with respect to electricity, the higher average annual mileage results in savings that are close to Germany at USD 1 600 per year. In China, lower annual distance driven reduces fuel cost savings potential, but the very low price of electricity enables savings of about USD 1 000 per year.

In EMDEs, some electric cars can also be cheaper than ICE equivalents over their lifetime. This is true in India , for example, although it depends on the financing instrument. Access to finance is typically much more challenging in EMDEs due to higher interest rates and the more limited availability of cheap capital. Passenger cars have also a significantly lower market penetration in the first place, and many car purchases are made in second-hand markets. Later sections of this report look at markets for used electric cars, as well as the TCO for electric and conventional 2/3Ws in EMDEs, where they are far more widespread than cars as a means of road transport.

Upfront retail price parity

Achieving price parity between electric and ICE cars will be an important tipping point. Even when the TCO for electric cars is advantageous, the upfront retail price plays a decisive role, and mass-market consumers are typically more sensitive to price premiums than wealthier buyers. This holds true not only in emerging and developing economies, which have comparatively high costs of capital and comparatively low household and business incomes, but also in advanced economies. In the United States, for example, surveys suggest affordability was the top concern for consumers considering EV adoption in 2023. Other estimates show that even among SUV and pick-up truck consumers, only 50% would be willing to purchase one above USD 50 000.

In this section, we examine historic price trends for electric and ICE cars over the 2018-2022 period, by country and car size, and for best-selling models in 2023.

Electric cars are generally getting cheaper as battery prices drop, competition intensifies, and carmakers achieve economies of scale. In most cases, however, they remain on average more expensive than ICE equivalents. In some cases, after adjusting for inflation, their price stagnated or even moderately increased between 2018 and 2022.

Larger batteries for longer ranges increase car prices, and so too do the additional options, equipment, digital technology and luxury features that are often marketed on top of the base model. A disproportionate focus on larger, premium models is pushing up the average price, which – added to the lack of available models in second-hand markets (see below) – limits potential to reach mass-market consumers. Importantly, geopolitical tension, trade and supply chain disruptions, increasing battery prices in 2022 relative to 2021, and rising inflation, have also significantly affected the potential for further cost declines.

Competition can also play an important role in bringing down electric car prices. Intensifying competition leads carmakers to cut prices to the minimum profit margin they can sustain, and – if needed – to do so more quickly than battery and production costs decline. For example, between mid-2022 and early-2024, Tesla cut the price of its Model Y from between USD 65 000 and USD 70 000 to between USD 45 000 and USD 55 000 in the United States. Battery prices for such a model dropped by only USD 3 000 over the same period in the United States, suggesting that a profit margin may still be made at a lower price. Similarly, in China, the price of the Base Model Y dropped from CNY 320 000 (Yuan renminbi) (USD 47 000) to CNY 250 000 (USD 38 000), while the corresponding battery price fell by only USD 1 000. Conversely, in cases where electric models remain niche or aimed at wealthier, less price-sensitive early adopters, their price may not fall as quickly as battery prices, if carmakers can sustain greater margins.

Price gap between the sales-weighted average price of conventional and electric cars in selected countries, before subsidy, by size, in 2018 and 2022

In China, where the sales share of electric cars has been high for several years, the sales-weighted average price of electric cars (before purchase subsidy) is already lower than that of ICE cars. This is true not only when looking at total sales, but also at the small cars segment, and is close for SUVs. After accounting for the EV exemption from the 10% vehicle purchase tax, electric SUVs were already on par with conventional ones in 2022, on average.

Electric car prices have dropped significantly since 2018. We estimate that around 55% of the electric cars sold in China in 2022 were cheaper than their average ICE equivalent, up from under 10% in 2018. Given the further price declines between 2022 and 2023, we estimate that this share increased to around 65% in 2023. These encouraging trends suggest that price parity between electric and ICE cars could also be reached in other countries in certain segments by 2030, if the sales share of electric cars continues to grow, and if supporting infrastructure – such as for charging – is sustained.

As reported in detail in GEVO-2023 , China remains a global exception in terms of available inexpensive electric models. Local carmakers already market nearly 50 small, affordable electric car models, many of which are priced under CNY 100 000 (USD 15 000). This is in the same range as best-selling small ICE cars in 2023, which cost from CNY 70 000 to CNY 100 000. In 2022, the best-selling electric car was SAIC’s small Wuling Hongguang Mini EV, which accounted for 10% of all BEV sales. It was priced around CNY 40 000, weighing under 700 kg for a 170-km range. In 2023, however, it was overtaken by Tesla models, among other larger models, as new consumers seek longer ranges and higher-end options and digital equipment.

United States

In the United States, the sales-weighted average price of electric cars decreased over the 2018-2022 period, primarily driven by a considerable drop in the price of Tesla cars, which account for a significant share of sales. The sales-weighted average retail price of electric SUVs fell slightly more quickly than the average SUV battery costs over the same period. The average price of small and medium models also decreased, albeit to a smaller extent.

Across all segments, electric models remained more expensive than conventional equivalents in 2022. However, the gap has since begun to close, as market size increases and competition leads carmakers to cut prices. For example, in 2023-2024, Tesla’s Model 3 could be found in the USD 39 000 to USD 42 000 range, which is comparable to the average price for new ICE cars, and a new Model Y priced under USD 50 000 was launched. Rivian is expecting to launch its R2 SUV in 2026 at USD 45 000, which is much less than previous vehicles. Average price parity between electric and conventional SUVs could be reached by 2030, but it may only be reached later for small and medium cars, given their lower availability and popularity.

Smaller, cheaper electric models have further to go to reach price parity in the United States. We estimate that in 2022, only about 5% of the electric cars sold in the United States were cheaper than their average ICE equivalent. In 2023, the cheapest electric cars were priced around USD 30 000 (e.g. Chevrolet Bolt, Nissan Leaf, Mini Cooper SE). To compare, best-selling small ICE options cost under USD 20 000 (e.g. Kia Rio, Mitsubishi Mirage), and many best-selling medium ICE options between USD 20 000 and USD 25 000 (e.g. Honda Civic, Toyota Corolla, Kia Forte, Hyundai Avante, Nissan Sentra).

Around 25 new all-electric car models are expected in 2024, but only 5 of them are expected below USD 50 000, and none under the USD 30 000 mark. Considering all the electric models expected to be available in 2024, about 75% are priced above USD 50 000, and fewer than 10 under USD 40 000, even after taking into account the USD 7 500 tax credit under the IRA for eligible cars as of February 2024. This means that despite the tax credit, few electric car models directly compete with small mass-market ICE models.

In December 2023, GM stopped production of its best-selling electric car, the Bolt, announcing it would introduce a new version in 2025. The Nissan Leaf (40 kWh) therefore remains the cheapest available electric car in 2024, at just under USD 30 000, but is not yet eligible for IRA tax credits. Ford announced in 2024 that it would move away from large and expensive electric cars as a way to convince more consumers to switch to electric, at the same time as increasing output of ICE models to help finance a transition to electric mobility. In 2024, Tesla announced it would start producing a next-generation, compact and affordable electric car in June 2025, but the company had already announced in 2020 that it would deliver a USD 25 000 model within 3 years. Some micro urban electric cars are already available between USD 5 000 and USD 20 000 (e.g. Arcimoto FUV, Nimbus One), but they are rare. In theory, such models could cover many use cases, since 80% of car journeys in the United States are under 10 miles .

Pricing trends differ across European countries, and typically vary by segment.

In Norway, after taking into account the EV sales tax exemption, electric cars are already cheaper than ICE equivalents across all segments. In 2022, we estimate that the electric premium stood around -15%, and even -30% for medium-sized cars. Five years earlier, in 2018, the overall electric premium was less advantageous, at around -5%. The progressive reintroduction of sales taxes on electric cars may change these estimates for 2023 onwards.

Germany’s electric premium ranks among the lowest in the European Union. Although the sales-weighted average electric premium increased slightly between 2018 and 2022, it stood at 15% in 2022. It is particularly low for medium-sized cars (10-15%) and SUVs (20%), but remains higher than 50% for small models. In the case of medium cars, the sales-weighted average electric premium was as low as EUR 5 000 in 2022. We estimate that in 2022, over 40% of the medium electric cars sold in Germany were cheaper than their average ICE equivalent. Looking at total sales, over 25% of the electric cars sold in 2022 were cheaper than their average ICE equivalent. In 2023, the cheapest models among the best-selling medium electric cars were priced between EUR 22 000 and EUR 35 000 (e.g. MG MG4, Dacia Spring, Renault Megane), far cheaper than the three front-runners priced above EUR 45 000 (VW ID.3, Cupra Born, and Tesla Model 3). To compare, best-selling ICE cars in the medium segment were also priced between EUR 30 000 and EUR 45 000 (e.g. VW Golf, VW Passat Santana, Skoda Octavia Laura, Audi A3, Audi A4). At the end of 2023, Germany phased out its subsidy for electric car purchases, but competition and falling model prices could compensate for this.

In France, the sales-weighted average electric premium stagnated between 2018 and 2022. The average price of ICE cars also increased over the same period, though more moderately than that of electric models. Despite a drop in the price of electric SUVs, which stood at a 30% premium over ICE equivalents in 2022, the former do not account for a high enough share of total electric car sales to drive down the overall average. The electric premium for small and medium cars remains around 40-50%.

These trends mirror those of some of the best-selling models. For example, when adjusting prices for inflation, the small Renault Zoe was sold at the same price on average in 2022-2023 as in 2018-2019, or EUR 30 000 (USD 32 000). It could be found for sale at as low as EUR 25 000 in 2015-2016. The earlier models, in 2015, had a battery size of around 20 kWh, which increased to around 40 kWh in 2018‑2019 and 50 kWh in newer models in 2022-2023. Yet European battery prices fell more quickly than the battery size increased over the same period, indicating that battery size alone does not explain car price dynamics.

In 2023, the cheapest electric cars in France were priced between EUR 22 000 and EUR 30 000 (e.g. Dacia Spring, Renault Twingo E-Tech, Smart EQ Fortwo), while best-selling small ICE models were available between EUR 10 000 and EUR 20 000 (e.g. Renault Clio, Peugeot 208, Citroën C3, Dacia Sandero, Opel Corsa, Skoda Fabia). Since mid-2024, subsidies of up to EUR 4 000 can be granted for electric cars priced under EUR 47 000, with an additional subsidy of up to EUR 3 000 for lower-income households.

In the United Kingdom, the sales-weighted average electric premium shrank between 2018 and 2022, thanks to a drop in prices for electric SUVs, as in the United States. Nonetheless, electric SUVs still stood at a 45% premium over ICE equivalents in 2022, which is similar to the premium for small models but far higher than for medium cars (20%).

In 2023, the cheapest electric cars in the United Kingdom were priced from GBP 27 000 to GBP 30 000 (USD 33 000 to 37 000) (e.g. MG MG4, Fiat 500, Nissan Leaf, Renault Zoe), with the exception of the Smart EQ Fortwo, priced at GBP 21 000. To compare, best-selling small ICE options could be found from GBP 10 000 to 17 000 (e.g. Peugeot 208, Fiat 500, Dacia Sandero) and medium options below GBP 25 000 (e.g. Ford Puma). Since July 2022, there has been no subsidy for the purchase of electric passenger cars.

Elsewhere in Europe, electric cars remain typically much more expensive than ICE equivalents. In Poland , for example, just a few electric car models could be found at prices competitive with ICE cars in 2023, under the PLN 150 000 (Polish zloty) (EUR 35 000) mark. Over 70% of electric car sales in 2023 were for SUVs, or large or more luxurious models, compared to less than 60% for ICE cars.

In 2023, there were several announcements by European OEMs for smaller models priced under EUR 25 000 in the near-term (e.g. Renault R5, Citroën e-C3, Fiat e-Panda, VW ID.2all). There is also some appetite for urban microcars (i.e. L6-L7 category), learning from the success of China’s Wuling. Miniature models bring important benefits if they displace conventional models, helping reduce battery and critical mineral demand. Their prices are often below USD 5 000 (e.g. Microlino, Fiat Topolino, Citroën Ami, Silence S04, Birò B2211).

In Europe and the United States, electric car prices are expected to come down as a result of falling battery prices, more efficient manufacturing, and competition. Independent analyses suggest that price parity between some electric and ICE car models in certain segments could be reached over the 2025-2028 period, for example for small electric cars in Europe in 2025 or soon after. However, many market variables could delay price parity, such as volatile commodity prices, supply chain bottlenecks, and the ability of carmakers to yield sufficient margins from cheaper electric models. The typical rule in which economies of scale bring down costs is being complicated by numerous other market forces. These include a dynamic regulatory context, geopolitical competition, domestic content incentives, and a continually evolving technology landscape, with competing battery chemistries that each have their own economies of scale and regional specificities.

Japan is a rare example of an advanced economy where small models – both for electric and ICE vehicles – appeal to a large consumer base, motivated by densely populated cities with limited parking space, and policy support. In 2023, about 60% of total ICE sales were for small models, and over half of total electric sales. Two electric cars from the smallest “Kei” category, the Nissan Sakura and Mitsubishi eK-X, accounted for nearly 50% of national electric car sales alone, and both are priced between JPY 2.3 million (Japanese yen) and JPY 3 million (USD 18 000 to USD 23 000). However, this is still more expensive than best-selling small ICE cars (e.g. Honda N Box, Daihatsu Hijet, Daihatsu Tanto, Suzuki Spacia, Daihatsu Move), priced between USD 13 000 and USD 18 000. In 2024, Nissan announced that it would aim to reach cost parity (of production, not retail price) between electric and ICE cars by 2030.

Emerging market and developing economies

In EMDEs, the absence of small and cheaper electric car models is a significant hindrance to wider market uptake. Many of the available car models are SUVs or large models, targeting consumers of high-end goods, and far too expensive for mass-market consumers, who often do not own a personal car in the first place (see later sections on second-hand car markets and 2/3Ws).

In India, while Tata’s small Tiago/Tigor models, which are priced between USD 10 000 and USD 15 000, accounted for about 20% of total electric car sales in 2023, the average best-selling small ICE car is priced around USD 7 000. Large models and SUVs accounted for over 65% of total electric car sales. While BYD announced in 2023 the goal of accounting for 40% of India’s EV market by 2030, all of its models available in India cost more than INR 3 million (Indian rupees) (USD 37 000), including the Seal, launched in 2024 for INR 4.1 million (USD 50 000).

Similarly, SUVs and large models accounted for the majority share of electric car sales in Thailand (60%), Indonesia (55%), Malaysia (over 85%) and Viet Nam (over 95%). In Indonesia, for example, Hyundai’s Ionic 5 was the most popular electric car in 2023, priced at around USD 50 000. Looking at launch announcements, most new models expected over the 2024-2028 period in EMDEs are SUVs or large models. However, more than 50 small and medium models could also be introduced, and the recent or forthcoming entry of Chinese carmakers suggests that cheaper models could hit the market in the coming years.

In 2022-2023, Chinese carmakers accounted for 40-75% of the electric car sales in Indonesia, Thailand and Brazil, with sales jumping as cheaper Chinese models were introduced. In Thailand, for example, Hozon launched its Neta V model in 2022 priced at THB 550 000 (Thai baht) (USD 15 600), which became a best-seller in 2023 given its relative affordability compared with the cheapest ICE equivalents at around USD 9 000. Similarly, in Indonesia, the market entry of Wuling’s Air EV in 2022-2023 was met with great success. In Colombia, the best-selling electric car in 2023 was the Chinese mini-car, Zhidou 2DS, which could be found at around USD 15 000, a competitive option relative to the country’s cheapest ICE car, the Kia Picanto, at USD 13 000.

Electric car sales in selected countries, by origin of carmaker, 2021-2023

Second-hand markets for electric cars are on the rise.

As electric vehicle markets mature, the second-hand market will become more important

In the same way as for other technology products, second-hand markets for used electric cars are now emerging as newer generations of vehicles progressively become available and earlier adopters switch or upgrade. Second-hand markets are critical to foster mass-market adoption, especially if new electric cars remain expensive, and used ones become cheaper. Just as for ICE vehicles – for which buying second-hand is often the primary method of acquiring a car in both emerging and advanced economies – a similar pattern will emerge with electric vehicles. It is estimated that eight out of ten EU citizens buy their car second-hand, and this share is even higher – around 90% – among low- and middle-income groups. Similarly, in the United States, about seven out of ten vehicles sold are second-hand, and only 17% of lower-income households buy a new car.

As major electric car markets reach maturity, more and more used electric cars are becoming available for resale. Our estimates suggest that in 2023, the market size for used electric cars amounted to nearly 800 000 in China , 400 000 in the United States and more than 450 000 for France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom combined. Second-hand sales have not been included in the numbers presented in the previous section of this report, which focused on sales of new electric cars, but they are already significant. On aggregate, global second-hand electric car sales were roughly equal to new electric car sales in the United States in 2023. In the United States, used electric car sales are set to increase by 40% in 2024 relative to 2023. Of course, these volumes are dwarfed by second-hand ICE markets: 30 million in the European countries listed above combined, nearly 20 million in China, and 36 million in the United States . However, these markets have had decades to mature, indicating greater longer-term potential for used electric car markets.

Used car markets already provide more affordable electric options in China, Europe and the United States

Second-hand car markets are increasingly becoming a source of more affordable electric cars that can compete with used ICE equivalents. In the United States, for example, more than half of second-hand electric cars are already priced below USD 30 000. Moreover, the average price is expected to quickly fall towards USD 25 000, the price at which used electric cars become eligible for the federal used car rebate of USD 4 000, making them directly competitive with best-selling new and used ICE options. The price of a second-hand Tesla in the United States dropped from over USD 50 000 in early 2023 to just above USD 33 000 in early 2024, making it competitive with a second-hand SUV and many new models as well (either electric or conventional). In Europe , second-hand battery electric cars can be found between EUR 15 000 and EUR 25 000 (USD 16 000‑27 000), and second-hand plug-in hybrids around EUR 30 000 (USD 32 000). Some European countries also offer subsidies for second-hand electric cars, such as the Netherlands (EUR 2 000), where the subsidy for new cars has been steadily declining since 2020, while that for used cars remains constant, and France (EUR 1 000). In China , used electric cars were priced around CNY 75 000 on average in 2023 (USD 11 000).

In recent years, the resale value 8 of electric cars has been increasing. In Europe, the resale value of battery electric cars sold after 12 months has steadily increased over the 2017-2022 period, surpassing that of all other powertrains and standing at more than 70% in mid-2022. The resale value of battery electric cars sold after 36 months stood below 40% in 2017, but has since been closing the gap with other powertrains, reaching around 55% in mid-2022. This is the result of many factors, including higher prices of new electric cars, improving technology allowing vehicles and batteries to retain greater value over time, and increasing demand for second-hand electric cars. Similar trends have been observed in China.

High or low resale values have important implications for the development of second-hand electric car markets and their contributions to the transition to road transport electrification. High resale values primarily benefit consumers of new cars (who retain more of the value of their initial purchase), and carmakers, because many consumers are attracted by the possibility of reselling their car after a few years, thereby fostering demand for newer models. High resale values also benefit leasing companies, which seek to minimise depreciation and resell after a few years.

Leasing companies have a significant impact on second-hand markets because they own large volumes of vehicles for a shorter period (under three years, compared to 3 to 5 years for a private household). Their impact on markets for new cars can also be considerable: leasing companies accounted for over 20% of new cars sold in Europe in 2022.

Overall, a resale value for electric cars on par with or higher than that of ICE equivalents contributes to supporting demand for new electric cars. In the near term, however, a combination of high prices for new electric cars and high resale values could hinder widespread adoption of used EVs among mass-market consumers seeking affordable cars. In such cases, policy support can help bridge the gap with second-hand ICE prices.

International trade for used electric cars to emerging markets is expected to increase

As the EV stock ages in advanced markets, it is likely that more and more used EVs will be traded internationally, assuming that global standards enable technology compatibility (e.g. for charging infrastructure). Imported used vehicles present an opportunity for consumers in EMDEs, who may not have access to new models because they are either too expensive or not marketed in their countries.

Data on used car trade flows are scattered and often contradictory, but the history of ICE cars can be a useful guide to what may happen for electric cars. Many EMDEs have been importing used ICE vehicles for decades. UNEP estimates that Africa imports 40% of all used vehicles exported worldwide, with African countries typically becoming the ultimate destination for used imports. Typical trade flows include Western European Union member states to Eastern European Union member states and to African countries that drive on the right-hand side; Japan to Asia and to African countries that drive on the left-hand side; and the United States to the Middle East and Central America.

Used electric car exports from large EV markets have been growing in recent years. For China, this can be explained by the recent roll-back of a policy forbidding exports of used vehicles of any kind. Since 2019 , as part of a pilot project, the government has granted 27 cities and provinces the right to export second-hand cars. In 2022, China exported almost 70 000 used vehicles, a significant increase on 2021, when fewer than 20 000 vehicles were exported. About 70% of these were NEVs, of which over 45% were exported to the Middle East. In 2023, the Ministry of Commerce released a draft policy on second-hand vehicle export that, once approved, will allow the export of second-hand vehicles from all regions of China. Used car exports from China are expected to increase significantly as a result.

In the European Union, the number of used electric cars traded internationally is also increasing . In both 2021 and 2022, the market size grew by 70% year-on-year, reaching almost 120 000 electric cars in 2022. More than half of all trade takes place between EU member states, followed by trade with neighbouring countries such as Norway, the United Kingdom and Türkiye (accounting for 20% combined). The remainder of used EVs are exported to countries such as Mexico, Tunisia and the United States. As of 2023, the largest exporters are Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain.

Last year, just over 1% of all used cars leaving Japan were electric. However these exports are growing and increased by 30% in 2023 relative to 2022, reaching 20 000 cars. The major second-hand electric car markets for Japanese vehicles are traditionally Russia and New Zealand (over 60% combined). After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, second-hand trade of conventional cars from Japan to Russia jumped sharply following a halt in operations of local OEMs in Russia, but this trade was quickly restricted by the Japanese government, thereby bringing down the price of second-hand cars in Japan. New Zealand has very few local vehicle assembly or manufacturing facilities, and for this reason many cars entering New Zealand are used imports. In 2023, nearly 20% of all electric cars that entered New Zealand were used imports, compared to 50% for the overall car market.

In emerging economies, local policies play an important role in promoting or limiting trade flows for used cars. In the case of ICE vehicles, for example, some countries (e.g. Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Peru) limit the maximum age of used car imports to prevent the dumping of highly polluting cars. Other countries (e.g. Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, India, South Africa) have banned used car imports entirely to protect their domestic manufacturing industries.

Just as for ICE vehicles, policy measures can either help or hinder the import of used electric cars, such as by setting emission standards for imported used cars. Importing countries will also need to simultaneously support roll-out of charging infrastructure to avoid problems with access like those reported in Sri Lanka after an incentive scheme significantly increased imports of used EVs in 2018.

The median age of vehicle imports tends to increase as the GDP per capita of a country decreases. In some African countries, the median age of imports is over 15 years. Beyond this timeframe, electric cars may require specific servicing to extend their lifetime. To support the availability of second-hand markets for electric cars, it will be important to develop strategies, technical capacity, and business models to swap very old batteries from used vehicles. Today, many countries that import ICE vehicles, including EMDEs, already have servicing capacity in place to extend the lifetimes of used ICE vehicles, but not used EVs. On the other hand, there are typically fewer parts in electric powertrains than in ICE ones, and these parts can even be more durable. Battery recycling capacity will also be needed, given that the importing country is likely to be where the imported EV eventually reaches end-of-life. Including end-of-life considerations in policy making today can help mitigate the risk of longer-term environmental harm that could result from the accumulation of obsolete EVs and associated waste in EMDEs.

Policy choices in more mature markets also have an impact on possible trade flows. For example, the current policy framework in the European Union for the circularity of EV batteries may prevent EVs and EV batteries from leaving the European Union, which brings energy security advantages but might limit reuse. In this regard, advanced economies and EMDEs should strengthen co-operation to facilitate second-hand trade while ensuring adequate end-of-life strategies. For example, there could be incentives or allowances associated with extended vehicle lifetimes via use in second-hand markets internationally before recycling, as long as recycling in the destination market is guaranteed, or the EV battery is returned at end of life.

Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, “electric cars” refers to both battery electric and plug-in hybrid cars, and “electric vehicles” (EVs) refers to battery electric (BEV) and plug-in hybrid (PHEV) vehicles, excluding fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV). Unless otherwise specified, EVs include all modes of road transport.

Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, regional groupings refer to those described in the Annex.

In the Chinese context, the term New Energy Vehicles (NEVs) includes BEVs, PHEVs and FCEVs.

Based on model trim eligibility from the US government website as of 31 March 2024.

SUVs may be defined differently across regions, but broadly refer to vehicles that incorporate features commonly found in off-road vehicles (e.g. four-wheel drive, higher ground clearance, larger cargo area). In this report, small and large SUVs both count as SUVs. Crossovers are counted as SUVs if they feature an SUV body type; otherwise they are categorised as medium-sized vehicles.

Measured under the Worldwide Harmonised Light Vehicles Test Procedure using vehicle model sales data from IHS Markit.

Price data points collected from various data providers and ad-hoc sources cover 65-95% of both electric and ICE car sales globally. By “price”, we refer to the advertised price that the customer pays for the acquisition of the vehicle only, including legally required acquisition taxes (e.g. including Value-Added Tax and registration taxes but excluding consumer tax credits). Prices reflect not only the materials, components and manufacturing costs, but also the costs related to sales and marketing, administration, R&D and the profit margin. In the case of a small electric car in Europe, for example, these mark-up costs can account for around 40% of the final pre-tax price. They account for an even greater share of the final pre-tax price when consumers purchase additional options, or opt for larger models, for which margins can be higher. The price for the same model may differ across countries or regions (e.g. in 2023, a VW ID.3 could be purchased in China at half its price in Europe). Throughout the whole section, prices are adjusted for inflation and expressed in constant 2022 USD.

This metric of depreciation used in second-hand technology markets represents the value of the vehicle when being resold in relation to the value when originally purchased. A resale value of 70% means that a product purchased new will lose 30% of its original value, on average, and sell at such a discount relative to the original price.

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Global military spending surges amid war, rising tensions and insecurity

(Stockholm, 22 April 2024) Total global military expenditure reached $2443 billion in 2023, an increase of 6.8 per cent in real terms from 2022. This was the steepest year-on-year increase since 2009. The 10 largest spenders in 2023—led by the United States, China and Russia—all increased their military spending, according to new data on global military spending published today by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), available at  www.sipri.org . 

Read this press release in Catalan ( PDF ), French ( PDF ), Spanish ( PDF ) or Swedish ( PDF ).

Click here to download the SIPRI Fact Sheet.

Military expenditure increases in all regions

World military expenditure rose for the ninth consecutive year to an all-time high of $2443 billion. For the first time since 2009, military expenditure went up in all five of the geographical regions defined by SIPRI, with particularly large increases recorded in Europe, Asia and Oceania and the Middle East. 

‘ The unprecedented rise in military spending is a direct response to the global deterioration in peace and security,’ said Nan Tian, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘States are prioritizing military strength but they risk an action–reaction spiral in the increasingly volatile geopolitical and security landscape.’

Military aid to Ukraine narrows spending gap with Russia 

Russia ’s military spending increased by 24 per cent to an estimated $109 billion in 2023, marking a 57 per cent rise since 2014, the year that Russia annexed Crimea. In 2023 Russia’s military spending made up 16 per cent of total government spending and its military burden (military spending as a share of gross domestic product, GDP) was 5.9 per cent. 

Ukraine was the eighth largest spender in 2023, after a spending surge of 51 per cent to reach $64.8 billion. This gave Ukraine a military burden of 37 per cent and represented 58 per cent of total government spending.

Ukraine’s military spending in 2023 was 59 per cent the size of Russia’s. However, Ukraine also received at least $35 billion in military aid during the year, including $25.4 billion from the USA. Combined, this aid and Ukraine’s own military spending were equivalent to about 91 per cent of Russian spending.

USA remains NATO’s major spender but European members increase share

In 2023 the 31 NATO members accounted for $1341 billion, equal to 55 per cent of the world’s military expenditure. Military spending by the USA rose by 2.3 per cent to reach $916 billion in 2023, representing 68 per cent of total NATO military spending. In 2023 most European NATO members increased their military expenditure. Their combined share of the NATO total was 28 per cent, the highest in a decade. The remaining 4 per cent came from Canada and Türkiye .

‘For European NATO states, the past two years of war in Ukraine have fundamentally changed the security outlook,’ said  Lorenzo Scarazzato, Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.  ‘This shift in threat perceptions is reflected in growing shares of GDP being directed towards military spending, with the NATO target of 2 per cent increasingly being seen as a baseline rather than a threshold to reach.’

A decade after NATO members formally committed to a target of spending 2 per cent of GDP on the military, 11 out of 31 NATO members met or surpassed this level in 2023 —the highest number since the commitment was made.  Another target — of directing at least 20 per cent of military spending to ‘equipment spending’ — was met by 28 NATO members in 2023, up from 7 in 2014.

China’s rising military expenditure drives up spending by neighbours

China , the world’s second largest military spender, allocated an estimated $296 billion to the military in 2023, an increase of 6.0 per cent from 2022. This was the 29th consecutive year-on-year rise in China’s military expenditure. China accounted for half of total military spending across the Asia and Oceania region. Several of China’s neighbours have linked their own spending increases to China’s rising military expenditure. 

Japan allocated $50.2 billion to its military in 2023, which was 11 per cent more than in 2022.  Taiwan ’s military expenditure also grew by 11 per cent in 2023, reaching $16.6 billion.

‘China is directing much of its growing military budget to boost the combat readiness of the People’s Liberation Army,’ said Xiao Liang, Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘This has prompted the governments of Japan, Taiwan and others to significantly build up their military capabilities, a trend that will accelerate further in the coming years.’

War and tensions in the Middle East fuel biggest spending increase of past decade

Estimated military expenditure in the Middle East increased by 9.0 per cent to $200 billion in 2023. This was the highest annual growth rate in the region seen in the past decade. 

Israel ’s military spending—the second largest in the region after Saudi Arabia —grew by 24 per cent to reach $27.5 billion in 2023. The spending increase was mainly driven by Israel’s large-scale offensive in Gaza in response to the attack on southern Israel by Hamas in October 2023. 

‘The large increase in military spending in the Middle East in 2023 reflected the rapidly shifting situation in the region—from the warming of diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab countries in recent years to the outbreak of a major war in Gaza and fears of a region-wide conflict,’ said Diego Lopes da Silva, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. 

Military action against organized crime pushes up spending in Central America and the Caribbean

Military spending in Central America and the Caribbean in 2023 was 54 per cent higher than in 2014. Escalating crime levels have led to the increased use of military forces against criminal gangs in several countries in the subregion.

Military spending by the Dominican Republic  rose by 14 per cent in 2023 in response to worsening gang violence in neighbouring Haiti. The Dominican Republic’s military spending has risen steeply since 2021, when the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse threw Haiti into crisis.

In Mexico , military expenditure reached $11.8 billion in 2023, a 55 per cent increase from 2014 (but a 1.5 per cent decrease from 2022). Allocations to the Guardia Nacional (National Guard)—a militarized force used to curb criminal activity—rose from 0.7 per cent of Mexico’s total military expenditure in 2019, when the force was created, to 11 per cent in 2023.

‘The use of the military to suppress gang violence has been a growing trend in the region for years as governments are either unable to address the problem using conventional means or prefer immediate—often more violent—responses,’ said Diego Lopes da Silva, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.

Other notable developments

• India was the fourth largest military spender globally in 2023. At $83.6 billion, its military expenditure was 4.2 per cent higher than in 2022.
• The largest percentage increase in military spending by any country in 2023 was seen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (+105 per cent), where there has been protracted conflict between the government and non-state armed groups. South Sudan recorded the second largest percentage increase (+78 per cent) amid internal violence and spillover from the Sudanese civil war.
• Poland ’s military spending, the 14th highest in the world, was $31.6 billion after growing by 75 per cent between 2022 and 2023—by far the largest annual increase by any European country.
• In 2023 Brazil ’s military spending increased by 3.1 per cent to $22.9 billion. Citing the NATO spending guideline, members of Brazil’s Congress submitted a constitutional amendment to the Senate in 2023 that aims to increase Brazil’s military burden to an annual minimum of 2 per cent of GDP (up from 1.1 per cent in 2023).
• Algeria ’s military spending grew by 76 per cent to reach $18.3 billion. This was the highest level of expenditure ever recorded by Algeria and was largely due to a sharp rise in revenue from gas exports to countries in Europe as they moved away from Russian supplies.
• Iran was the fourth largest military spender in the Middle East in 2023 with $10.3 billion. According to available data, the share of military spending allocated to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps grew from 27 per cent to 37 per cent between 2019 and 2023.

For editors

SIPRI monitors developments in military expenditure worldwide and maintains the most comprehensive, consistent and extensive publicly available data source on military expenditure. The annual update of the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database is accessible from today at  www.sipri.org .

All percentage changes are expressed in real terms (constant 2022 prices). Military expenditure refers to all government spending on current military forces and activities, including salaries and benefits, operational expenses, arms and equipment purchases, military construction, research and development, and central administration, command and support. SIPRI therefore discourages the use of terms such as ‘arms spending’ when referring to military expenditure, as spending on armaments is usually only a minority of the total.

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For information or interview requests contact Mimmi Shen ( [email protected] , +46 766 286 133) or Stephanie Blenckner ( [email protected] , +46 8 655 97 47).

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Atlanta Real Estate Market Trends | Northeast Industrial Q1 2024

Vacancy Rate Continues to Rise in Northeast Atlanta

Key Northeast Industrial Atlanta Submarket Trends

• Slower demand persists as net absorption tallied its lowest total since Q4 2013
• 1.8 MSF of industrial space delivered during the quarter
• With 6.2 MSF under construction, the development pipeline further retreated from its peak of 15.2 MSF in Q2 2022
• New construction continues to drive rental rate growth as overall asking rents reached $9.91/SF

Northeast Atlanta Industrial Submarket Overview

Related Experts

Jonathan Koes

Research Manager

Jonathan leads the Research team in Colliers' Atlanta office.  He is responsible for gathering and synthesizing data to deliver market insights for the region.  Other responsibilities include preparing quarterly reports, delivering thought leadership, and providing brokerage support across all asset types. Prior to joining Colliers, Jonathan worked in Acquisitions for a national real estate investor and led the research team in Cushman & Wakefield's Virginia offices.

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March 2024 Rental Report: Median Asking Rents Continue To Decline

• March 2024 marks the eighth year-over-year rent decline in a row for 0-2 bedroom properties observed since trend data began in 2020. Asking rents dipped by $5, or 0.3%, year over year (Y/Y).
• The median asking rent in the 50 largest metros registered at $1,722, up by $14 from last month but down $36 from its August 2022 peak. 
• Median rent declined in all size categories: Studio: $1,435, down $21 (-1.4%) year over year; 1-bed: $1,602, down $2 (- 0.1%) year over year; 2-bed: $1,908, down $10 (-0.5%) year over year.
• Regionally, median asking rent in the West saw its first year-over-year growth after 13 months of declines while major Northeastern areas continued to see growth. Rents in the Midwest remained at the same level as last year (+0.0%), while rents in the South continued to drop year over year (-1.5%).

In March 2024, the U.S. median rent continued to decline year over year for the eighth month in a row, down -0.3% for 0-2 bedroom properties across the top 50 metros, a pace similar to the -0.4% seen in February 2024. The median asking rent was $1,722, up by $14 from last month following a typical seasonal trend.

Despite the eight months of decline, the U.S. median rent was just $36 (-2.0%) less than the peak in August 2022. Notably, it was still $313 (22.2%) higher than the same time in 2019 (before the COVID-19 pandemic).

Rising shelter costs have been a major driver of the overall rate of inflation. Stabilizing market rents could make it difficult to see further improvement in the overall rate of inflation , complicating the Fed’s policy decision and underscoring the need for additional housing construction to alleviate the supply shortage that is contributing to higher costs.

Figure 1: Rents Decline Again, but Nationwide Rent Is Just 2.0% Below 2022 Peak

All units saw rent declines

In March 2024, the median asking rent for two-bedroom units dropped -0.5%, a dip lower than the -0.8% seen last month, marking the eighth consecutive month of annual declines. The median rent for two bedrooms was $1,908 nationally, $46 (-2.4%) lower than the peak in August 2022. Nevertheless, larger unit rents had the highest growth rate over the past five years, up by $372 (24.2%).

The rent for one-bedroom units slipped -0.1% in March 2024 on a year-over-year basis, a relatively smaller decline compared with other types of units. In fact, many renters may use one-bedroom units as alternatives to both studios and two-bedroom units, given these properties are typically more spacious than a studio and are more affordable than two-bedroom units. In March 2024, the median rent of a one bedroom was $1,602. It was $31 lower than the peak observed last August, but still $290 (22.1%) higher than in March 2019. 

In March 2024, the median asking rent for studios fell by 1.4%, marking the seventh consecutive month of annual declines. The median rent of studios was $1,435 in March, down by $55 (-3.7%) from its peak in October 2022. Nevertheless, the median asking rent for studios was still $215 (17.6%) higher than five years ago. 

Figure 2: All Units Saw Rent Declines

Table 1: National Rents by Unit Size

Rents in western metros started to rebound, catching up with northeastern peers.

In March 2024, the median rent in the West was 0.4% higher than a year ago. It is the first year-over-year rent increase after 13 consecutive months of declines. San Diego, CA (2.9%), and Los Angeles, CA (1.6%), were among the markets that saw faster annual growth in March, while Phoenix, AZ (-3.2%), and Denver, CO (-1.9%), continued to see larger rent declines.

It is not surprising to see rents climb faster in expensive metros. With housing prices already unaffordable, coupled with the expectation of elevated mortgage rates in the short term, more first-time homebuyers from these expensive markets are likely to opt for longer stays in the rental market. This trend is expected to boost rental demand and exert upward pressure on rents in these crowded markets. 

Additionally, unemployment rates in the West surged from 3.9% to 4.7% between February 2023 and 2024. In the short term, the rising unemployment rate may force many people to postpone their purchasing plans, keeping them in the rental market for extended periods. Consequently, this could drive up demand and inflate prices. However, if the labor market deterioration persists, residents may opt to relocate from the region, diminishing demand and exerting downward pressure on prices.

In the meantime, expensive Northeastern metros such as New York, NY (3.8%), and Boston, MA (3.3%), continued to see faster rent growth compared with their Western counterparts.

On one hand, the relatively robust labor markets in the Northeast likely contribute to increased demand. Meanwhile, sluggish growth in supply fails to keep pace with demand, intensifying competition among renters and consequently driving up rents. Specifically, in March 2024, the seasonally adjusted annual rates for multifamily homes in the Northeast stood at 41,000 units, marking a 37.9% decrease from the previous year’s rate. 1 Meanwhile, in the West, rates for multifamily homes remained notably high at 161,000 units, though experiencing a 12.0% decline compared with the same period last year.

Rents in Midwest markets remain on par with last year

In March 2024, rents in Midwest metros registered a similar level as a year ago (+0.0%). Chicago, IL (4.3%), Kansas City, MO (3.4%), and Indianapolis, IN (3.3%), emerged as the top-performing markets with the fastest year-over-year growth in the Midwest.

As Midwest markets tend to have greater affordability , the stronger growth in these markets likely results from this benefit even as it may reduce existing affordability. While rent in Chicago ($1,846) was much higher than its Midwest peers, its median asking rent was over $1,000 less than big-city counterparts such as New York City ($2,876) and Los Angeles ($2,869). However, in February 2024, the unemployment rate in Chicago was 5.3%, whereas the rate was 4.5% a year ago. Meanwhile, the overall unemployment rate in the Midwest climbed from 3.6% to 4.0% over the past 12 months. If this trend continues, the softening labor market could exert downward pressure on rental prices, leading to slower growth or even declines. 

Rents in Southern markets declined

In March 2024, the median asking rent for 0-2 bedroom rental properties in the South was 1.5% lower than one year ago. Specifically, the top five metros experiencing the most significant year-over-year rent declines are Austin, TX (-4.7%), Memphis, TN (-4.4%), Atlanta, GA (-3.7%), Miami, FL (-3.6%), and Nashville, TN (-2.9%). Meanwhile, the unemployment rate in the South registered at 3.4% in February 2024, signaling a robust labor market and strong rental demand. While the demand remains vigorous, the supply side presents an even more influential picture with a substantial 71.7% growth in the seasonally adjusted, annual multifamily completion rates to 273,000 units between March 2023 and March 2024 . This heightened supply has contributed to a downward push on rent prices, resulting in an overall decline in rental costs, even as demand remains elevated.

Appendix: Rental Data—50 Largest Metropolitan Areas—March 2024

Methodology.

Rental data as of March 2024 for studio, 1-bedroom, or 2-bedroom units advertised as for rent on Realtor.com®. Rental units include apartments as well as private rentals (condos, townhomes, single-family homes). We use rental sources that reliably report data each month within the 50 largest metropolitan areas. Realtor.com began publishing regular monthly rental trends reports in October 2020 with data history stretching back to March 2019.

With the release of its January 2024 rent report, Realtor.com incorporated a new and improved methodology for capturing and reporting more comprehensive rental listing trends and metrics. The new methodology is expected to yield a cleaner, more representative, and more consistent measurement of rental listings and trends at both the national and local levels. The methodology has been adjusted to better represent the true cost of primary housing for renters. Most areas across the country will see minor changes with a smaller handful of areas seeing larger updates. As a result of these changes, the rental data released since January 2024 will not be directly comparable with previous releases and Realtor.com economics blog posts. However, future data releases, including historical data, will consistently apply the new methodology.

• Data Source: Census New Residential Construction  

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Volume 30, Number 7—July 2024

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Domestic Dairy Cattle and Cats, United States, 2024

Suggested citation for this article

We report highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus in dairy cattle and cats in Kansas and Texas, United States, which reflects the continued spread of clade 2.3.4.4b viruses that entered the country in late 2021. Infected cattle experienced nonspecific illness, reduced feed intake and rumination, and an abrupt drop in milk production, but fatal systemic influenza infection developed in domestic cats fed raw (unpasteurized) colostrum and milk from affected cows. Cow-to-cow transmission appears to have occurred because infections were observed in cattle on Michigan, Idaho, and Ohio farms where avian influenza virus–infected cows were transported. Although the US Food and Drug Administration has indicated the commercial milk supply remains safe, the detection of influenza virus in unpasteurized bovine milk is a concern because of potential cross-species transmission. Continued surveillance of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in domestic production animals is needed to prevent cross-species and mammal-to-mammal transmission.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses pose a threat to wild birds and poultry globally, and HPAI H5N1 viruses are of even greater concern because of their frequent spillover into mammals. In late 2021, the Eurasian strain of H5N1 (clade 2.3.4.4b) was detected in North America ( 1 , 2 ) and initiated an outbreak that continued into 2024. Spillover detections and deaths from this clade have been reported in both terrestrial and marine mammals in the United States ( 3 , 4 ). The detection of HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus in severe cases of human disease in Ecuador ( 5 ) and Chile ( 6 ) raises further concerns regarding the pandemic potential of specific HPAI viruses.

In February 2024, veterinarians were alerted to a syndrome occurring in lactating dairy cattle in the panhandle region of northern Texas. Nonspecific illness accompanied by reduced feed intake and rumination and an abrupt drop in milk production developed in affected animals. The milk from most affected cows had a thickened, creamy yellow appearance similar to colostrum. On affected farms, incidence appeared to peak 4–6 days after the first animals were affected and then tapered off within 10–14 days; afterward, most animals were slowly returned to regular milking. Clinical signs were commonly reported in multiparous cows during middle to late lactation; ≈10%–15% illness and minimal death of cattle were observed on affected farms. Initial submissions of blood, urine, feces, milk, and nasal swab samples and postmortem tissues to regional diagnostic laboratories did not reveal a consistent, specific cause for reduced milk production. Milk cultures were often negative, and serum chemistry testing showed mildly increased aspartate aminotransferase, gamma-glutamyl transferase, creatinine kinase, and bilirubin values, whereas complete blood counts showed variable anemia and leukocytopenia.

In early March 2024, similar clinical cases were reported in dairy cattle in southwestern Kansas and northeastern New Mexico; deaths of wild birds and domestic cats were also observed within affected sites in the Texas panhandle. In > 1 dairy farms in Texas, deaths occurred in domestic cats fed raw colostrum and milk from sick cows that were in the hospital parlor. Antemortem clinical signs in affected cats were depressed mental state, stiff body movements, ataxia, blindness, circling, and copious oculonasal discharge. Neurologic exams of affected cats revealed the absence of menace reflexes and pupillary light responses with a weak blink response.

On March 21, 2024, milk, serum, and fresh and fixed tissue samples from cattle located in affected dairies in Texas and 2 deceased cats from an affected Texas dairy farm were received at the Iowa State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory (ISUVDL; Ames, IA, USA). The next day, similar sets of samples were received from cattle located in affected dairies in Kansas. Milk and tissue samples from cattle and tissue samples from the cats tested positive for influenza A virus (IAV) by screening PCR, which was confirmed and characterized as HPAI H5N1 virus by the US Department of Agriculture National Veterinary Services Laboratory. Detection led to an initial press release by the US Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service on March 25, 2024, confirming HPAI virus in dairy cattle ( 7 ). We report the characterizations performed at the ISUVDL for HPAI H5N1 viruses infecting cattle and cats in Kansas and Texas.

Materials and Methods

Milk samples (cases 2–5) and fresh and formalin-fixed tissues (cases 1, 3–5) from dairy cattle were received at the ISUVDL from Texas on March 21 and from Kansas on March 22, 2024. The cattle exhibited nonspecific illness and reduced lactation, as described previously. The tissue samples for diagnostic testing came from 3 cows that were euthanized and 3 that died naturally; all postmortem examinations were performed on the premises of affected farms.

The bodies of 2 adult domestic shorthaired cats from a north Texas dairy farm were received at the ISUVDL for a complete postmortem examination on March 21, 2024. The cats were found dead with no apparent signs of injury and were from a resident population of ≈24 domestic cats that had been fed milk from sick cows. Clinical disease in cows on that farm was first noted on March 16; the cats became sick on March 17, and several cats died in a cluster during March 19–20. In total, >50% of the cats at that dairy became ill and died. We collected cerebrum, cerebellum, eye, lung, heart, spleen, liver, lymph node, and kidney tissue samples from the cats and placed them in 10% neutral-buffered formalin for histopathology.

At ISUVDL, we trimmed, embedded in paraffin, and processed formalin-fixed tissues from affected cattle and cats for hematoxylin/eosin staining and histologic evaluation. For immunohistochemistry (IHC), we prepared 4-µm–thick sections from paraffin-embedded tissues, placed them on Superfrost Plus slides (VWR, https://www.vwr.com ), and dried them for 20 minutes at 60°C. We used a Ventana Discovery Ultra IHC/ISH research platform (Roche, https://www.roche.com ) for deparaffinization until and including counterstaining. We obtained all products except the primary antibody from Roche. Automated deparaffination was followed by enzymatic digestion with protease 1 for 8 minutes at 37°C and endogenous peroxidase blocking. We obtained the primary influenza A virus antibody from the hybridoma cell line H16-L10–4R5 (ATCC, https://www.atcc.org ) and diluted at 1:100 in Discovery PSS diluent; we incubated sections with antibody for 32 minutes at room temperature. Next, we incubated the sections with a hapten-labeled conjugate, Discovery anti-mouse HQ, for 16 minutes at 37°C followed by a 16-minute incubation with the horse radish peroxidase conjugate, Discovery anti-HQ HRP. We used a ChromoMap DAB kit for antigen visualization, followed by counterstaining with hematoxylin and then bluing. Positive controls were sections of IAV-positive swine lung. Negative controls were sections of brain, lung, and eyes from cats not infected with IAV.

We diluted milk samples 1:3 vol/vol in phosphate buffered saline, pH 7.4 (Gibco/Thermo Fisher Scientific, https://www.thermofisher.com ) by mixing 1 unit volume of milk and 3 unit volumes of phosphate buffered saline. We prepared 10% homogenates of mammary glands, brains, lungs, spleens, and lymph nodes in Earle’s balanced salt solution (Sigma-Aldrich, https://www.sigmaaldrich.com ). Processing was not necessary for ocular fluid, rumen content, or serum samples. After processing, we extracted samples according to a National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) protocol that had 2 NAHLN-approved deviations for ISUVDL consisting of the MagMax Viral RNA Isolation Kit for 100 µL sample volumes and a Kingfisher Flex instrument (both Thermo Fisher Scientific).

We performed real-time reverse transcription PCR (rRT-PCR) by using an NAHLN-approved assay with 1 deviation, which was the VetMAX-Gold SIV Detection kit (Thermo Fisher Scientific), to screen for the presence of IAV RNA. We tested samples along with the VetMAX XENO Internal Positive Control to monitor the possible presence of PCR inhibitors. Each rRT-PCR 96-well plate had 2 positive amplification controls, 2 negative amplification controls, 1 positive extraction control, and 1 negative extraction control. We ran the rRT-PCR on an ABI 7500 Fast thermocycler and analyzed data with Design and Analysis Software 2.7.0 (both Thermo Fisher Scientific). We considered samples with cycle threshold (Ct) values <40.0 to be positive for virus.

After the screening rRT-PCR, we analyzed IAV RNA–positive samples for the H5 subtype and H5 clade 2.3.4.4b by using the same RNA extraction and NAHLN-approved rRT-PCR protocols as described previously, according to standard operating procedures. We performed PCR on the ABI 7500 Fast thermocycler by using appropriate controls to detect H5-specific IAV. We considered samples with Ct values <40.0 to be positive for the IAV H5 subtype.

We conducted genomic sequencing of 2 milk samples from infected dairy cattle from Texas and 2 tissue samples (lung and brain) from cats that died at a different Texas dairy. We subjected the whole-genome sequencing data to bioinformatics analysis to assemble the 8 different IAV segment sequences according to previously described methods ( 8 ). We used the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) sequences for phylogenetic analysis. We obtained reference sequences for the HA and NA segments of IAV H5 clade 2.3.4.4 from publicly available databases, including GISAID ( https://www.gisaid.org ) and GenBank. We aligned the sequences by using MAFFT version 7.520 software ( https://mafft.cbrc.jp/alignment/server/index.html ) to create multiple sequence alignments for subsequent phylogenetic analysis. We used IQTree2 ( https://github.com/iqtree/iqtree2 ) to construct the phylogenetic tree from the aligned sequences. The software was configured to automatically identify the optimal substitution model by using the ModelFinder Plus option, ensuring the selection of the most suitable model for the dataset and, thereby, improving the accuracy of the reconstructed tree. We visualized the resulting phylogenetic tree by using iTOL ( https://itol.embl.de ), a web-based platform for interactive tree exploration and annotation.

Gross Lesions in Cows and Cats

All cows were in good body condition with adequate rumen fill and no external indications of disease. Postmortem examinations of the affected dairy cows revealed firm mammary glands typical of mastitis; however, mammary gland lesions were not consistent. Two cows that were acutely ill before postmortem examination had grossly normal milk and no abnormal mammary gland lesions. The gastrointestinal tract of some cows had small abomasal ulcers and shallow linear erosions of the intestines, but those observations were also not consistent in all animals. The colon contents were brown and sticky, suggesting moderate dehydration. The feces contained feed particles that appeared to have undergone minimal ruminal fermentation. The rumen contents had normal color and appearance but appeared to have undergone minimal fermentation.

The 2 adult cats (1 intact male, 1 intact female) received at the ISUVDL were in adequate body and postmortem condition. External examination was unremarkable. Mild hemorrhages were observed in the subcutaneous tissues over the dorsal skull, and multifocal meningeal hemorrhages were observed in the cerebrums of both cats. The gastrointestinal tracts were empty, and no other gross lesions were observed.

Microscopic Lesions in Cows and Cats

Figure 1 . Mammary gland lesions in cattle in study of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in domestic dairy cattle and cats, United States, 2024. A, B) Mammary gland...

The chief microscopic lesion observed in affected cows was moderate acute multifocal neutrophilic mastitis ( Figure 1 ); however, mammary glands were not received from every cow. Three cows had mild neutrophilic or lymphocytic hepatitis. Because they were adult cattle, other observed microscopic lesions (e.g., mild lymphoplasmacytic interstitial nephritis and mild to moderate lymphocytic abomasitis) were presumed to be nonspecific, age-related changes. We did not observe major lesions in the other evaluated tissues. We performed IHC for IAV antigen on all evaluated tissues; the only tissues with positive immunoreactivity were mastitic mammary glands from 2 cows that showed nuclear and cytoplasmic labeling of alveolar epithelial cells and cells within lumina ( Figure 1 ) and multifocal germinal centers within a lymph node from 1 cow ( Table 1 ).

Figure 2 . Lesions in cat tissues in study of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in domestic dairy cattle and cats, United States, 2024. Tissue sections were stained with...

Both cats had microscopic lesions consistent with severe systemic virus infection, including severe subacute multifocal necrotizing and lymphocytic meningoencephalitis with vasculitis and neuronal necrosis, moderate subacute multifocal necrotizing and lymphocytic interstitial pneumonia, moderate to severe subacute multifocal necrotizing and lymphohistiocytic myocarditis, and moderate subacute multifocal lymphoplasmacytic chorioretinitis with ganglion cell necrosis and attenuation of the internal plexiform and nuclear layers ( Table 2 ; Figure 2 ). We performed IHC for IAV antigen on multiple tissues (brain, eye, lung, heart, spleen, liver, and kidney). We detected positive IAV immunoreactivity in brain (intracytoplasmic, intranuclear, and axonal immunolabeling of neurons), lung, and heart, and multifocal and segmental immunoreactivity within all layers of the retina ( Figure 2 ).

PCR Data from Cows and Cats

We tested various samples from 8 clinically affected mature dairy cows by IAV screening and H5 subtype-specific PCR ( Table 3 ). Milk and mammary gland homogenates consistently showed low Ct values: 12.3–16.9 by IAV screening PCR, 17.6–23.1 by H5 subtype PCR, and 14.7–20.0 by H5 2.3.4.4 clade PCR (case 1, cow 1; case 2, cows 1 and 2; case 3, cow 1; and case 4, cow 1). We forwarded the samples to the National Veterinary Services Laboratory, which confirmed the virus was an HPAI H5N1 virus strain.

When available, we also tested tissue homogenates (e.g., lung, spleen, and lymph nodes), ocular fluid, and rumen contents from 6 cows by IAV and H5 subtype-specific PCR ( Table 3 ). However, the PCR findings were not consistent. For example, the tissue homogenates and ocular fluid tested positive in some but not all cows. In case 5, cow 1, the milk sample tested negative by IAV screening PCR, but the spleen homogenate tested positive by IAV screening, H5 subtype, and H5 2.3.4.4 PCR. For 2 cows (case 3, cow 1; and case 4, cow 1) that had both milk and rumen contents available, both samples tested positive for IAV. Nevertheless, all IAV-positive nonmammary gland tissue homogenates, ocular fluid, and rumen contents had markedly elevated Ct values in contrast to the low Ct values for milk and mammary gland homogenate samples.

We tested brain and lung samples from the 2 cats (case 6, cats 1 and 2) by IAV screening and H5 subtype-specific PCR ( Table 3 ). Both sample types were positive by IAV screening PCR; Ct values were 9.9–13.5 for brain and 17.4–24.4 for lung samples, indicating high amounts of virus nucleic acid in those samples. The H5 subtype and H5 2.3.4.4 PCR results were also positive for the brain and lung samples; Ct values were consistent with the IAV screening PCR ( Table 3 ).

Phylogenetic Analyses

We assembled the sequences of all 8 segments of the HPAI viruses from both cow milk and cat tissue samples. We used the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) sequences specifically for phylogenetic analysis to delineate the clade of the HA gene and subtype of the NA gene.

Figure 3 . Phylogenetic analysis of hemagglutinin gene sequences in study of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in domestic dairy cattle and cats, United States, 2024. Colors indicate different...

For HA gene analysis, both HA sequences derived from cow milk samples exhibited a high degree of similarity, sharing 99.88% nucleotide identity, whereas the 2 HA sequences from cat tissue samples showed complete identity at 100%. The HA sequences from the milk samples had 99.94% nucleotide identities with HA sequences from the cat tissues, resulting in a distinct subcluster comprising all 4 HA sequences, which clustered together with other H5N1 viruses belonging to clade 2.3.4.4b ( Figure 3 ). The HA sequences were deposited in GenBank (accession nos. PP599465 [case 2, cow 1], PP599473 [case 2, cow 2], PP692142 [case 6, cat 1], and PP692195 [case 6, cat 2]).

Figure 4 . Phylogenetic analysis of neuraminidase gene sequences in study of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in domestic dairy cattle and cats, United States, 2024. Colors indicate different...

For NA gene analysis, the 2 NA sequences obtained from cow milk samples showed 99.93% nucleotide identity. Moreover, the NA sequences derived from the milk samples exhibited complete nucleotide identities (100%) with those from the cat tissues. The 4 NA sequences were grouped within the N1 subtype of HPAI viruses ( Figure 4 ). The NA sequences were deposited in GenBank (accession nos. PP599467 [case 2, cow 1], PP599475 [case 2, cow 2], PP692144 [case 6, cat 1], and PP692197 [case 6, cat 2]).

This case series differs from most previous reports of IAV infection in bovids, which indicated cattle were inapparently infected or resistant to infection ( 9 ). We describe an H5N1 strain of IAV in dairy cattle that resulted in apparent systemic illness, reduced milk production, and abundant virus shedding in milk. The magnitude of this finding is further emphasized by the high death rate (≈50%) of cats on farm premises that were fed raw colostrum and milk from affected cows; clinical disease and lesions developed that were consistent with previous reports of H5N1 infection in cats presumably derived from consuming infected wild birds ( 10 – 12 ). Although exposure to and consumption of dead wild birds cannot be completely ruled out for the cats described in this report, the known consumption of unpasteurized milk and colostrum from infected cows and the high amount of virus nucleic acid within the milk make milk and colostrum consumption a likely route of exposure. Therefore, our findings suggest cross-species mammal-to-mammal transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus and raise new concerns regarding the potential for virus spread within mammal populations. Horizontal transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus has been previously demonstrated in experimentally infected cats ( 13 ) and ferrets ( 14 ) and is suspected to account for large dieoffs observed during natural outbreaks in mink ( 15 ) and sea lions ( 16 ). Future experimental studies of HPAI H5N1 virus in dairy cattle should seek to confirm cross-species transmission to cats and potentially other mammals.

Clinical IAV infection in cattle has been infrequently reported in the published literature. The first report occurred in Japan in 1949, where a short course of disease with pyrexia, anorexia, nasal discharge, pneumonia, and decreased lactation developed in cattle ( 17 ). In 1997, a similar condition occurred in dairy cows in southwest England leading to a sporadic drop in milk production ( 18 ), and IAV seroconversion was later associated with reduced milk yield and respiratory disease ( 19 – 21 ). Rising antibody titers against human-origin influenza A viruses (H1N1 and H3N2) were later again reported in dairy cattle in England, which led to an acute fall in milk production during October 2005–March 2006 ( 22 ). Limited reports of IAV isolation from cattle exist; most reports occurred during the 1960s and 1970s in Hungary and in the former Soviet Union, where H3N2 was recovered from cattle experiencing respiratory disease ( 9 , 23 ). Direct detection of IAV in milk and the potential transmission from cattle to cats through feeding of unpasteurized milk has not been previously reported.

An IAV-associated drop in milk production in dairy cattle appears to have occurred during > 4 distinct periods and within 3 widely separated geographic areas: 1949 in Japan ( 17 ), 1997–1998 and 2005–2006 in Europe ( 19 , 21 ), and 2024 in the United States (this report). The sporadic occurrence of clinical disease in dairy cattle worldwide might be the result of changes in subclinical infection rates and the presence or absence of sufficient baseline IAV antibodies in cattle to prevent infection. Milk IgG, lactoferrin, and conglutinin have also been suggested as host factors that might reduce susceptibility of bovids to IAV infection ( 9 ). Contemporary estimates of the seroprevalence of IAV antibodies in US cattle are not well described in the published literature. One retrospective serologic survey in the United States in the late 1990s showed 27% of serum samples had positive antibody titers and 31% had low-positive titers for IAV H1 subtype-specific antigen in cattle with no evidence of clinical infections ( 24 ). Antibody titers for H5 subtype-specific antigen have not been reported in US cattle.

The susceptibility of domestic cats to HPAI H5N1 is well-documented globally ( 10 – 12 , 25 – 28 ), and infection often results in neurologic signs in affected felids and other terrestrial mammals ( 4 ). Most cases in cats result from consuming infected wild birds or contaminated poultry products ( 12 , 27 ). The incubation period in cats is short; clinical disease is often observed 2–3 days after infection ( 28 ). Brain tissue has been suggested as the best diagnostic sample to confirm HPAI virus infection in cats ( 10 ), and our results support that finding. One unique finding in the cats from this report is the presence of blindness and microscopic lesions of chorioretinitis. Those results suggest that further investigation into potential ocular manifestations of HPAI H5N1 virus infection in cats might be warranted.

The genomic sequencing and subsequent analysis of clinical samples from both bovine and feline sources provided considerable insights. The HA and NA sequences derived from both bovine milk and cat tissue samples from different Texas farms had a notable degree of similarity. Those findings strongly suggest a shared origin for the viruses detected in the dairy cattle and cat tissues. Further research, case series investigations, and surveillance data are needed to better understand and inform measures to curtail the clinical effects, shedding, and spread of HPAI viruses among mammals. Although pasteurization of commercial milk mitigates risks for transmission to humans, a 2019 US consumer study showed that 4.4% of adults consumed raw milk > 1 time during the previous year ( 29 ), indicating a need for public awareness of the potential presence of HPAI H5N1 viruses in raw milk.

Ingestion of feed contaminated with feces from wild birds infected with HPAI virus is presumed to be the most likely initial source of infection in the dairy farms. Although the exact source of the virus is unknown, migratory birds (Anseriformes and Charadriiformes) are likely sources because the Texas panhandle region lies in the Central Flyway, and those birds are the main natural reservoir for avian influenza viruses ( 30 ). HPAI H5N1 viruses are well adapted to domestic ducks and geese, and ducks appear to be a major reservoir ( 31 ); however, terns have also emerged as an important source of virus spread ( 32 ). The mode of transmission among infected cattle is also unknown; however, horizontal transmission has been suggested because disease developed in resident cattle herds in Michigan, Idaho, and Ohio farms that received infected cattle from the affected regions, and those cattle tested positive for HPAI H5N1 ( 33 ). Experimental studies are needed to decipher the transmission routes and pathogenesis (e.g., replication sites and movement) of the virus within infected cattle.

In conclusion, we showed that dairy cattle are susceptible to infection with HPAI H5N1 virus and can shed virus in milk and, therefore, might potentially transmit infection to other mammals via unpasteurized milk. A reduction in milk production and vague systemic illness were the most commonly reported clinical signs in affected cows, but neurologic signs and death rapidly developed in affected domestic cats. HPAI virus infection should be considered in dairy cattle when an unexpected and unexplained abrupt drop in feed intake and milk production occurs and for cats when rapid onset of neurologic signs and blindness develop. The recurring nature of global HPAI H5N1 virus outbreaks and detection of spillover events in a broad host range is concerning and suggests increasing virus adaptation in mammals. Surveillance of HPAI viruses in domestic production animals, including cattle, is needed to elucidate influenza virus evolution and ecology and prevent cross-species transmission.

Dr. Burrough is a professor and diagnostic pathologist at the Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine and Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory. His research focuses on infectious diseases of livestock with an emphasis on swine.

Acknowledgment

We thank the faculty and staff at the ISUVDL who contributed to the processing and analysis of clinical samples in this investigation, the veterinarians involved with clinical assessments at affected dairies and various conference calls in the days before diagnostic submissions that ultimately led to the detection of HPAI virus in the cattle, and the US Department of Agriculture National Veterinary Services Laboratory and NAHLN for their roles and assistance in providing their expertise, confirmatory diagnostic support, and communications surrounding the HPAI virus cases impacting lactating dairy cattle.

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• Figure 1 . Mammary gland lesions in cattle in study of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in domestic dairy cattle and cats, United States, 2024. A, B) Mammary...
• Figure 2 . Lesions in cat tissues in study of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in domestic dairy cattle and cats, United States, 2024. Tissue sections were stained...
• Figure 3 . Phylogenetic analysis of hemagglutinin gene sequences in study of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in domestic dairy cattle and cats, United States, 2024. Colors indicate...
• Figure 4 . Phylogenetic analysis of neuraminidase gene sequences in study of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in domestic dairy cattle and cats, United States, 2024. Colors indicate...
• Table 1 . Microscopic lesions observed in cattle in study of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in domestic dairy cattle and cats, United States, 2024
• Table 2 . Microscopic lesions observed in cats in study of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in domestic dairy cattle and cats, United States, 2024
• Table 3 . PCR results from various specimens in study of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in domestic dairy cattle and cats, United States, 2024

Suggested citation for this article : Burrough ER, Magstadt DR, Petersen B, Timmermans SJ, Gauger PC, Zhang J, et al. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in domestic dairy cattle and cats, United States, 2024. Emerg Infect Dis. 2024 Jul [ date cited ]. https://doi.org/10.3201/eid3007.240508

DOI: 10.3201/eid3007.240508

Original Publication Date: April 29, 2024

Table of Contents – Volume 30, Number 7—July 2024

Please use the form below to submit correspondence to the authors or contact them at the following address:

Eric R. Burrough, Iowa State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory, 1937 Christensen Dr, Ames, IA 50011, USA

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