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Can a 50-year-old treaty still keep the world safe from the changing threat of bioweapons?

How geopolitics and technological advances are making this a riskier world for bioweapons.

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GENEVA — Venomous Agent X is a deadly nerve agent , though you likely know it by another name: VX. It’s an amber, oil-like liquid that targets the body’s nervous system. A single drop on the skin can kill within minutes. In 2017, North Korea is believed to have used VX to assassinate Kim Jong Un’s estranged half-brother in a Malaysian airport. Kim Jong Nam suffered severe paralysis , dead in about 20 minutes from a weapon of mass destruction.

Sean Ekins and his team thought of the toxin for a possible experiment, one he needed to meet a last-minute deadline for a presentation at the Spiez Laboratory in Switzerland, at a conference examining how developments in science and technology might affect chemical and biological weapons regimes. Ekins is a scientist and CEO of Collaborations Pharmaceuticals, a lab that uses machine-learning platforms to seek therapeutic treatments for rare and neglected diseases. He and his colleague Fabio Urbina wanted to see if they could flip their AI software, MegaSyn. Instead of steering the software away from toxicity, they wanted to see if they could guide the model toward it.

The scientists trained the software with some 2 million molecules from a public database , and then modeled for specific, toxic traits.

In just six hours , the AI generated some 40,000 molecules that met the scientists’ criteria, meaning that, based on their molecular structure, they all looked quite a lot like toxic chemical agents. The AI designed VX. It designed other known toxic agents. It even designed entirely new molecules that the scientists hadn’t programmed for, creating a sketch for potentially lethal and novel chemical compounds.

The experiment was computational — a digital recipe for molecules like VX, not a physical creation of it or any other substance. But Ekins and his team used open source, publicly available data. The AI they used was also largely open source as well; they just tweaked the models a little bit.

Ekins was horrified. What he and his colleague had thought was a banal experiment ended up creating a cookbook for chemical agents. “If we could do this,” Ekins said, “what’s to stop anyone else doing it?”

VX, after all, is a banned substance under the Chemical Weapons Convention. A lab can’t just produce or go out and order up VX; countries face inspections to make sure they don’t have the stuff, or something like it, hanging around. VX doesn’t exist in nature, and it has no dual uses; that is, it has no therapeutic value or positive benefit. The only reason to have VX is to kill.

That isn’t the case for many things found in nature, like a virus or, well, your own DNA. Which is why this experiment got so much attention, not just among chemical warfare experts but among those who worry, specifically, about biological weapons. It showed just how simple it might be to apply it to the things that exist all around us, that can’t be tightly controlled, and that very likely have dual uses. Machine learning could be used to find ways to tweak a virus to make it less virulent, or more treatable. Or it could be used to make that virus more difficult to detect, or more deadly. And, if you or a nation-state are so inclined, wield it as a biological weapon.

Biological weapons, of course, are outlawed, too. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the production, use, development, stockpiling, or transfer of biological toxins or disease-causing organisms against humans, animals, or plants. More than 180 countries are party to the pact, which came into force in 1975 as the first multilateral treaty to ban an entire class of weapon. And in the years since, the taboo against state use of biological weapons has largely held.

Yet a volatile geopolitical environment, combined with the rapid advance and increased access in the ability to edit and engineer pathogens, is straining and testing the nearly 50-year-old BWC as never before.

“It’s like a race between the technology being developed really quickly and the biosecurity community racing to put the safeguards around it,” said Jaime Yassif, vice president of global biological policy and programs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

No treaty is perfect, but from the BWC’s beginnings, critics have said it lacked vital elements, like a verification mechanism to make sure everyone is following it. Global tensions, scientific advances, and the ever-expanding repertoire of what is possible with both biology and chemistry are making those flaws and cracks ever more visible.

Late last year, at the Ninth Review Conference for the Biological Weapons Convention at United Nations Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, countries broadly agreed that they needed to find ways to strengthen the pact, to make it fit for purpose in a more chaotic, unpredictable world.

As is often the case in arms control, agreement is one thing, action another. The same forces buffeting the treaty are also making it nearly impossible to update it for a different age, or even agree on what it means now. The longer the BWC stands still, the faster barriers against a deliberate biological attack begin to fall away. That makes the world more vulnerable than ever to a threat the international community tried to eradicate 50 years ago.

Illness, weaponized

Biological weapons are the “poor man’s atom bomb,” said Yong-Bee Lim, the deputy director of the Converging Risks Lab and Biosecurity Projects Manager at the Council on Strategic Risks. They are weapons that can often be built on the cheap, using materials found in nature. Even before the world understood what caused disease, countries used things against their enemies they knew carried contagion: catapulting plague-infested corpses over fortified walls , or giving or selling clothes or blankets from smallpox patients.

But biological weapons were always held in a separate category in warfare. They are inherently risky: Contagions are hard to control and contain, and the same pathogens that can infect your target can also sicken you and your population. This is also why they tend to be used as a stealth agent of war; humanity has a general repugnance toward disease and poison that doesn’t extend to other armaments. “It has always been seen as an ungentlemanly weapon,” said Filippa Lentzos, a biosecurity expert and associate professor at King’s College London. “It’s never an element of your arsenal that you are proud to display. It’s always an underhand thing.”

Those factors helped bolster a taboo against biological weapons, which the international community first tried to prohibit with the 1925 Geneva Protocol against chemical and biological methods of warfare. That pact didn’t stop many countries from building biological weapons programs through World War II, with germs used most notoriously by Japan in China . Well into the Cold War, the United States had a program of its own housed outside Washington, DC, at Fort Detrick , along with a chemical and biological weapons testing base in Utah.

The US wasn’t alone. The Soviet Union also had an offensive biological weapons project, as the two superpowers raced to match each other in armaments. But in the late 1960s, some high-profile mishaps linked to the US chemical and biological weapons programs — including a toxic cloud from a test of VX that killed or injured 6,000 sheep — along with public anger over the use of herbicides like Agent Orange during the Vietnam War, prompted Congress to pressure the Nixon administration to review the biological and chemical weapons programs. “Biological weapons have massive, unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable consequences,” President Richard Nixon said in 1969 after the release of the review, which essentially concluded that these kinds of offensive programs weren’t worth the risks.

The US would ultimately renounce the use of biological warfare, instead focusing its research on defense and safety measures. The American decision, which came after other allies turned away from their biological weapons programs , seeded the conditions for the creation of the BWC.

States have not engaged in known biological weapons attacks since — which is not the same thing as saying the treaty hasn’t been violated. The Soviet Union continued to build a big and sophisticated biological weapons program in the decades after it signed the BWC. That became clear after the fall of the USSR in 1991 . Other signatories have been suspected of maintaining offensive weapons programs at different points post-1975, including South Africa and Iraq . Today, US intelligence assesses that Russia and North Korea maintain active offensive programs, both in violation of the BWC.

The good and the bad of the BWC

The BWC calls the deliberate use of biological weapons “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” The document itself is short , just 15 articles, with the first explicitly banning the development, production, stockpile, and transfer of microbial or biological agents or toxins, “whatever their origin or method of production.”

It is broad and not particularly specific, but given the dual-purpose and rapidly changing nature of biological research, that is also its strength: “It does make the convention quite future-proof,” said Daniel Feakes, chief of the BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), the main body overseeing the convention.

The BWC is designed to be adaptable, but that also comes with a problem: It makes it difficult to ensure everyone who says they are following the BWC really is. Or, in arms control treaty-speak: It has no legally binding verification regime.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is arguably narrower, banning specific agents. It also has an enforcement body that carries out inspections. Nuclear treaties between the US and Russia, though they’re almost all but officially dead , included robust data-sharing and inspection. “Verification is a pretty standard element of most disarmament conventions, and that’s why people keep on coming back to the issue in the BWC,” Feakes said.

The BWC has none of that. Some of it has to do with the unique nature of biological weapons, which are distinct from things like chemical agents or nukes. But that has left the BWC with a huge gap since its inception.

“The holy grail that we’ve struggled with with the Biological Weapons Convention is how do you verify that the countries that have signed up to the treaty are not making biological weapons?” said Kenneth Ward, US special representative to the Biological Weapons Convention.

The closest thing that BWC has to a verification are Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), essentially a book report on a country’s bio activities. Not every country participates, or makes the documents public, and there is no way to fact-check what any country says.

And even if there were, the BWC is currently ill-equipped for such a task. The annual budget for the BWC is currently about $1.8 million , which in the past has come out to less than most McDonald’s franchise restaurants, according to one estimate in a 2020 book . About two-thirds of countries pay less than $1,000 into the BWC, including about 50 that pay around $100 . That is considerably less than the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which has an estimated 2023 budget of more than $80 million to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) that oversees the BWC just had its staff grow by a quarter — from three to four people. Compare that, again, to the OPCW, which has about 500 staff members . According to Feakes, what resources the ISU has mostly end up going toward the organizing and managing big meetings, like the Ninth Annual Review Conference. Even then, it’s barely enough: By the Friday morning session of the first week of the Review Conference in Geneva last year, the UN Web TV broadcast of the BWC negotiations had to be cut off because of cost concerns . If you can’t keep the live feed running, good luck preventing the potential proliferation of biological weapons.

That means the actual implementation of the BWC looks something akin to matchmaking, where a state may ask for technical or assistance or training, and the ISU seeks out another country or partner that might have the ability to actually do it, because the ISU definitely doesn’t.

But trying to fit BWC into the mold of other disarmament treaties is a lot trickier than you might think, largely because of the dual-use nature of biology. A nuclear warhead or VX gas has one purpose: warfare. But something like anthrax can and has been used as a biological weapon, and a legitimate lab may need to have anthrax on hand to make a vaccine. The same equipment you might use to try to find a cure to a virus or disease is much the same equipment you’d need to replicate or manipulate a virus for a biological attack. Germs are self-replicating which means countries don’t have to keep huge stockpiles of dangerous viruses.

Life science itself is far more decentralized than nuclear research, for example. Labs are spread out, and with materials fairly accessible. You can buy DNA online , and with technologies like benchtop DNA synthesis , you can print DNA in your lab with a tool that’s about the size of a microwave. There are far more people with expertise in the biological sciences, from geneticists to lab techs, around the world than there are nuclear scientists. A terror group getting ahold of weapons of mass destruction is always a risk, but the diffusion of biology means it’s probably easier to weaponize a virus — and certainly harder to detect — than it is to make a nuke. And, of course, the BWC only deals with nation-states anyway.

“You don’t want to create false confidence in a verification regime,” Ward, of the US State Department, said. “You have to be clear: What can we verify? What can we not verify? And we’re never going to be able to verify on a daily basis, is every biological facility in the world doing good things instead of bad things? It’s impossible to know.”

It’s also not like anyone hasn’t tried, either. Across decades, countries have attempted to figure out some way to create a verification mechanism. Perhaps the closest the BWC came was in 2001, but US opposition effectively sidelined efforts to create a more formal and transparent mechanism for verification for 20 years.

A lot has happened in those 20 years, including dramatic advances in life sciences — the mapping of the human genome, CRISPR gene-editing technology, mRNA vaccines, and more — which means the nature of biological threats is changing, too. Some verification is better than nothing, and almost certainly better than an absolute free-for-all — as the pandemic itself showed.

What is a bioweapon today — and tomorrow?

In a city, in one corner of the world, people start showing up to the hospital. They have some sort of respiratory illness, but it’s not clear what. The cases range in their severity: It is often fatal in older or immunocompromised people; for others, a mild to severe illness. Others still are asymptomatic, a virus in their bodies, spreading without any outward sign.

From there, the virus spreads, and spreads, and spreads. It shuts down economies, upends politics. Millions die; millions more get sick . A vaccine is developed quickly, so are treatments, but none are a perfect shield, especially as the virus, now out in the world, changes.

This is not a bioweapon but the Covid-19 pandemic. (Which, it’s worth emphasizing, is not a bioweapon , even if debates on its origins continue.) But what Covid-19 did do was show just how disruptive an entirely unintentional biological event can be. A deliberate one, or even the accidental release of a virus from a legitimate lab, could be far worse. (A 2018 pandemic tabletop exercise by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security modeled for a release of an engineered bioweapon and ended with 150 million people dead .) It’s still not easy to create such a deadly bioweapon, “but barriers are coming down, and risks are increasing,” Lentzos said.

Barriers are coming down because of the expansion and advancement in the life sciences. There is gene editing, which has been made easier and more powerful with tools like CRISPR . A bad actor could use it to make a virus more transmissible, or more fatal, or more resistant to treatment. There is synthetic biology, which enables scientists to manipulate or even design entirely new organisms — maybe tailor-made to infect livestock, or a country’s wheat supply, or even a specific person . Then there are the computational tools, like the artificial intelligence used by Ekins where huge databases and the power of computing let scientists rapidly sift through potential pathogens much faster , or find new combinations of molecules to create entirely novel viruses.

Scientists also better understand how the body works; what regulates our hormones, immune systems, and neurotransmitters. Many experts I spoke to talked about bioregulators — systems that regulate our normal bodily functions — as a possible tool of manipulation. This knowledge has plenty of benign applications, and potentially revolutionary ones, but could also be applied for military or political manipulation : speeding up someone’s heart rate, or causing organ failure, or even altering moods, so all of a sudden an even-keeled president is an erratic one.

There isn’t really a question as to whether such an attack would fit under the BWC. Even though we were decades away from decoding the human genome when the convention was signed, its Article 1 prohibition against any deliberate use of biological material or a toxin fits under the definition.

But the larger question is whether the spread and development of these technologies incentivizes their malign use. That depends a lot on the political environment — on why a country would take the risk of breaking international law and norms. In a world where other disarmament treaties are falling away, great power competition is rising, and hybrid threats from cyber to information warfare offer the plausible deniability some governments seek, countries may start to see it as a risk worth taking.

Russia’s war in Ukraine is an example of how these dynamics are playing out. Moscow has very deliberately spread misinformation — amplified by everyone from the Chinese government to right-wingers in the US — alleging that the US has been funding bioweapons labs in Ukraine, including claiming that Washington and Kyiv have collaborated on an infection that is targeting certain groups, delivered by bats and birds. The claims have been disproven, and rejected by the United Nations Security Council , but some experts and officials fear it could serve as the basis for a false flag attack.

Biological attacks can also be difficult to verify because pathogens are naturally occurring, and even if scientists detect a new one, it’s difficult — if not impossible — to know if it’s something that has been deliberately created or something that emerged accidentally from nature or a lab. And given what Covid-19 demonstrated about the cracks in our defense against biological threats — and how little has been done to fix them over the past few years — a future bioweapon might “prey upon those existing vulnerabilities that haven’t been addressed,” said Saskia Popescu, a biodefense expert at George Mason University.

Decentralization further complicates matters, especially as the bioeconomy and biomanufacturing expands. The BWC is focused on nation-states, but this diffusion and access — again, you can buy DNA online and have it shipped to your lab — opens up opportunities for bad actors. “It’s easier for more and more people with less and less skills coming in the door to either make a pathogen from scratch or tinker with it to make it more dangerous,” said Yassif. “And that’s not contained within a few high-level labs, in a world-class lab with lots of resources. It’s increasingly democratized and distributed.”

Together, this creates a dangerous dynamic: The international bioweapons regime is basically standing still, as technology and geopolitics race ahead of it.

Can the BWC keep up?

All of this tumult spilled over at the Palais des Nations, United Nations headquarters in Geneva, this past December. There, states-parties to the Biological Weapons Convention gathered for the Ninth Annual Review Conference, or “RevCon,” as it’s known. These happen every five years, although the Covid-19 pandemic had delayed the scheduled meeting. It would ultimately complicate this one as well, as diplomats and delegates started testing positive. By week’s end, the officials presiding over the conference did so in KN95 masks — an outcome that felt a little too on-the-nose for a conference designed to shore up protections against biological threats.

In the Palais des Nations, a strange combination existed of low expectations and high hopes. The low expectations were mainly a hangover from the ghosts of BWC RevCon past, where states struggled to reach consensus. The war in Ukraine had also increased tensions, with Russia, in particular, playing spoiler because no one would give credence to their Ukraine bioweapons claims.

Yet many officials and experts hoped the disruptive power of Covid-19 would focus minds, providing a reminder of the threat of any kind of biological risks. New initiatives buzzed about, including ethical guidelines for scientists working in technologies that could be manipulated or misused. The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists included 10 principles for those practicing in the life sciences, an effort to raise awareness and accountability to mitigate biorisks. China, in particular, had championed these guidelines , which lots of other countries supported, too, including the United States. There were also discussions about creating a scientific or technical body, one that could review and advise on the latest biological and life science developments.

And, at long last, the United States cracked open the door to verification discussions. Ward said it was partly an acknowledgment from the Biden administration of the disruptive nature of Covid-19, but it was also an effort to move past two decades of ill will.

But that is always a tough task within international forums. The reality within the Palais was both slightly more boring and slightly more complicated. Politics played a big role in this. Russia, and some other familiar faces, including Iran used the forum to air their particular grievances — Moscow on Ukraine, Tehran on sanctions. The BWC is built on consensus — all the states-parties have to agree — so just one country can spoil the mood, and the progress.

Most of the intense discussions happened behind closed doors; out in the brightly lit conference room, the delegations discussed, line by line, exactly what should be in the RevCon text, in the most passive-aggressive public edit of all time. Countries went back and forth on word selection, striking this or seeking to add that — respectively, of course — until slowly all the add-ons and enhancements to the BWC fell away.

But, in the end, there was some progress, or as the line went: “ modest success .” The hopes for adopting those ethical guidelines for scientists or even bare-bones verification measures failed. But the states-parties at the BWC agreed to establish a working group — meeting for about two weeks or so — to examine a long list of priorities, like advances in science and technology, and a possible road map for bioweapons verification.

“Issues like verification, it’s now formally in the agenda or the work plan of the intersessional program, the first time in two decades,” said Izumi Nakamitsu, the United Nations high representative for disarmament affairs.

This is what counts for progress in the world of bioweapons governance: no substantive changes yet, but at least everyone is talking. The group will meet this August for the first time, after setting its agenda last month, with the goal of transforming the BWC by the time of the next RevCon about five years from now. Which is better than nothing when it comes to weapons of mass destruction.

In the meantime, the threats to the BWC are accelerating. The world is a more dangerous and tense place. Disinformation around bioweapons is also eroding the taboo against the use. This includes Russia’s playbook of continued accusations about bioweapons in Ukraine and elsewhere. But a top Republican recently claimed, with zero evidence, that the Chinese spy balloon shot down over the Atlantic Ocean in February was equipped with bioweapons .

And maybe it doesn’t sound so crazy, as science speeds ahead. ChatGPT has amplified concerns around artificial intelligence and what it is capable of. Ekins’s software designed VX and thousands of other molecules in six hours, after all. “We’re just a small piece of the pie,” Ekins said, of the VX experiment. “But what else is happening out there?”

This reporting was made possible by a grant from Founders Pledge .

Correction, May 1, 11:11am: This story originally misidentified the affiliation for Saskia Popescu. She is affiliated with George Mason University.

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Biological warfare and bioterrorism: a historical review

Stefan riedel.

1 From the Department of Pathology, Baylor University Medical Center, Dallas, Texas.

Because of the increased threat of terrorism, the risk posed by various microorganisms as biological weapons needs to be evaluated and the historical development and use of biological agents better understood. Biological warfare agents may be more potent than conventional and chemical weapons. During the past century, the progress made in biotechnology and biochemistry has simplified the development and production of such weapons. In addition, genetic engineering holds perhaps the most dangerous potential. Ease of production and the broad availability of biological agents and technical know how have led to a further spread of biological weapons and an increased desire among developing countries to have them. This article explains the concepts of biological warfare and its states of development, its utilization, and the attempts to control its proliferation throughout history. The threat of bioterrorism is real and significant; it is neither in the realm of science fiction nor confined to our nation.

EARLY USE OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Infectious diseases were recognized for their potential impact on people and armies as early as 600 BC ( 1 ). The crude use of filth and cadavers, animal carcasses, and contagion had devastating effects and weakened the enemy ( 2 ). Polluting wells and other sources of water of the opposing army was a common strategy that continued to be used through the many European wars, during the American Civil War, and even into the 20th century.

Military leaders in the Middle Ages recognized that victims of infectious diseases could become weapons themselves ( 1 ). During the siege of Caffa, a well-fortified Genoese-controlled seaport (now Feodosia, Ukraine), in 1346, the attacking Tartar force experienced an epidemic of plague ( 3 ). The Tartars, however, converted their misfortune into an opportunity by hurling the cadavers of their deceased into the city, thus initiating a plague epidemic in the city. The outbreak of plague followed, forcing a retreat of the Genoese forces. The plague pandemic, also known as the Black Death, swept through Europe, the Near East, and North Africa in the 14th century and was probably the most devastating public health disaster in recorded history. The ultimate origin of the plague remains uncertain: several countries in the Far East, China, Mongolia, India, and central Asia have been suggested ( 5 , 5 ).

The Caffa incident was described in 1348 or 1349 by Gabriel de Mussis, a notary born in Piacenza north of Genoa ( 6 ). De Mussis made two important claims: plague was transmitted to the citizens of Caffa by the hurling of diseased cadavers into the besieged city, and Italians fleeing from Caffa brought the plague into the Mediterranean seaports ( 4 ). In fact, ships carrying plague-infected refugees (and possibly rats) sailed to Constantinople, Genoa, Venice, and other Mediterranean seaports and are thought to have contributed to the second plague pandemic. However, given the complex ecology and epidemiology of plague, it may be an oversimplification to assume that a single biological attack was the sole cause of the plague epidemic in Caffa and even the 14th-century plague pandemic in Europe ( 3 ). Nonetheless, the account of a biological warfare attack in Caffa is plausible and consistent with the technology of that time, and despite its historical unimportance, the siege of Caffa is a powerful reminder of the terrible consequences when diseases are used as weapons.

During the same 14th-century plague pandemic, which killed more than 25 million Europeans in the 14th and 15th centuries, many other incidents indicate the various uses of disease and poisons during war. For example, bodies of dead soldiers were catapulted into the ranks of the enemy in Karolstein in 1422. A similar strategy using cadavers of plague victims was utilized in 1710 during the battle between Russian troops and Swedish forces in Reval. On numerous occasions during the past 2000 years, the use of biological agents in the form of disease, filth, and animal and human cadavers has been mentioned in historical recordings (Table ​ (Table1 1 ).

Examples of biological and chemical warfare use during the past 2000 years

Another disease has been used as an effective biological weapon in the New World: smallpox. Pizarro is said to have presented South American natives with variola-contaminated clothing in the 15th century ( 1 , 2 , 7 ). In addition, during the French-Indian War (1754–1767), Sir Jeffrey Amherst, the commander of the British forces in North America, suggested the deliberate use of smallpox to diminish the native Indian population hostile to the British ( 7 , 8 ). An outbreak of smallpox in Fort Pitt led to a significant generation of fomites and provided Amherst with the means to execute his plan. On June 24, 1763, Captain Ecuyer, one of Amherst's subordinate officers, provided the Native Americans with smallpox-laden blankets from the smallpox hospital. He recorded in his journal: “I hope it will have the desired effect” ( 2 , 9 ). As a result, a large outbreak of smallpox occurred among the Indian tribes in the Ohio River Valley. Again, it has to be recognized that several other contacts between European colonists and Native Americans contributed to such epidemics, which had been occurring for over 200 years. In addition, the transmission of smallpox by fomites was inefficient compared with respiratory droplet transmission.

The description of these historical attempts of using diseases in biological warfare illustrates the difficulty of differentiating between a naturally occurring epidemic and an alleged or attempted biological warfare attack—a problem that has continued into present times.

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES

The use of biological warfare became more sophisticated during the 19th century. The conception of Koch's postulates and the development of modern microbiology during the 19th century made possible the isolation and production of stocks of specific pathogens ( 2 ).

World War I

Substantial evidence suggests the existence of an ambitious biological warfare program in Germany during World War I. This program allegedly featured covert operations. During World War I, reports circulated of attempts by Germans to ship horses and cattle inoculated with disease-producing bacteria, such as Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) and Pseudomonas pseudomallei (glanders), to the USA and other countries ( 10 , 11 ). The same agents were used to infect Romanian sheep that were designated for export to Russia. Other allegations of attempts by Germany to spread cholera in Italy and plague in St. Petersburg in Russia followed ( 10 , 11 ). Germany denied all these allegations, including the accusation that biological bombs were dropped over British positions.

In 1924, a subcommittee of the Temporary Mixed Commission of the League of Nations, in support of Germany, found no hard evidence that the bacteriological arm of warfare had been employed in war ( 11 ). However, the document indicated evidence of use of the chemical arm of warfare. In response to the horror of chemical warfare during World War I, international diplomatic efforts were directed toward limiting the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, i.e., biological and chemical weapons ( 12 , 13 ). On June 17, 1925, the “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,” commonly called the Geneva Protocol of 1925, was signed. Because viruses were not differentiated from bacteria at that time, they were not specifically mentioned in the protocol. A total of 108 nations, including eventually the 5 permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, Im signed the agreement. However, the Geneva Protocol did not address verification or compliance, making it a “toothless” and less meaningful document ( 13 ). Several countries that were parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 began to develop biological weapons soon after its ratification. These countries included Belgium, Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Japan, and the Soviet Union. The USA did not ratify the Geneva Protocol until 1975 ( 13 ).

World War II

During World War II, some of the mentioned countries began a rather ambitious biological warfare research program (Table ​ (Table2 2 ). Various allegations and countercharges clouded the events during and after World War II. Japan conducted biological weapons research from approximately 1932 until the end of World War II ( 1 , 7 , 12 ). The program was under the direction of Shiro Ishii (1932–1942) and Kitano Misaji (1942–1945). Several military units existed for research and development of biological warfare. The center of the Japanese biowarfare program was known as “Unit 731” and was located in Manchuria near the town of Pingfan ( 1 ). The Japanese program consisted of more than 150 buildings in Pingfan, 5 satellite camps, and a staff of more than 3000 scientists. Organisms and diseases of interest to the Japanese program were B. anthracis, Neisseria meningitidis, Vibrio cholerae, Shigella spp, and Yersiniapestis ( 1 , 14 ). More than 10,000 prisoners are believed to have died as a result of experimental infection during the Japanese program between 1932 and 1945. At least 3000 of these victims were prisoners of war, including Korean, Chinese, Mongolian, Soviet, American, British, and Australian soldiers ( 14 ). Many of these prisoners died as a direct effect of experimental inoculation of agents causing gas gangrene, anthrax, meningococcal infection, cholera, dysentery, or plague. In addition, experiments with terodotoxin (an extremely poisonous fungal toxin) were conducted. In later years, Japanese officials considered these experiments as “most regrettable from the view point of humanity” ( 14 ).

Biological warfare programs during World War II

In addition to the experiments conducted on prisoners in the camps of Unit 731, the Japanese military developed plague as a biological weapon by allowing laboratory fleas to feed on plague infected rats ( 14 ). On several occasions, the fleas were released from aircraft over Chinese cities to initiate plague epidemics. However, the Japanese had not adequately prepared, trained, or equipped their own military personnel for the hazards of biological weapons. An attack on the city of Changteh in 1941 reportedly led to approximately 10,000 casualties due to biological weapons. During this incident 1700 deaths were reported among Japanese troops. Thus, “field trials” were terminated in 1942.

In December 1949, a Soviet military tribunal in Khabarovsk tried 12 Japanese prisoners of war for preparing and using biological weapons ( 15 ). Major General Kawashima, former head of Unit 731's First, Third, and Fourth Sections, testified in this trial that no fewer than 600 prisoners were killed yearly at Unit 731. The Japanese government, in turn, accused the Soviet Union of experimentation with biological weapons, referring to examples of B. anthracis, Shigella , and V. cholerae organisms recovered from Russian spies.

Although German medical researchers infected prisoners with disease-producing organisms such as Rickettsia prowazekii , hepatitis A virus, and malaria, no charges were pressed against Germany regarding experimentation with agents of biological warfare ( 1 , 7 ). Allegedly Hitler issued orders prohibiting the development of biological weapons, referring to his own devastating experience with the effects of chemical agents used during World War I. However, with the support of other high-ranking Nazi officials, German scientists began biological weapons research ( 16 ). Despite these efforts, which clearly lagged behind those of other countries, a German offensive biological weapons program never materialized.

On the other hand, German officials accused the Allies of using biological weapons: Joseph Goebbels accused the British of attempting to introduce yellow fever into India by importing infected mosquitoes from West Africa ( 1 ). This was in fact believable by many, because the British were actually experimenting with at least one organism of biological warfare: B. anthracis. Bomb experiments of weaponized spores of B. anthracis were conducted on Gruinard Island near the coast of Scotland ( 17 ). These experiments lead to heavy contamination of the island with persistence of viable spores. In 1986, the island was finally decontaminated by using formaldehyde and seawater.

In the USA, an offensive biological warfare program was begun in 1942 under the direction of a civilian agency, the War Reserve Service ( 1 ). The program included a research and development facility at Camp Detrick, Maryland (renamed Fort Detrick in 1956 and known today as the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases [USAMRIID]), testing sites in Mississippi and Utah, and a production facility in Terra Haute, Indiana.

Initially, organisms of interest were B. anthracis and Brucella suis. Although about 5000 bombs filled with B. anthracis spores were produced at Camp Detrick, the production facility lacked adequate engineering safety measures, precluding a large-scale production of biological weapons during World War II ( 2 , 7 ).

BIOWARFARE PROGRAMS AFTER WORLD WAR II

During the years immediately after World War II, newspapers were filled with articles about disease outbreaks caused by foreign agents armed with biological weapons ( 2 , 18 ). During the Korean War, the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea accused the USA of using agents of biological warfare against North Korea ( 1 , 18 ). In later years the USA admitted that it had the capability of producing such weapons, although it denied having used them. However, the credibility of the USA was undermined by its failure to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925, by public acknowledgment of its own offensive biological warfare program, and by suspicions of collaboration with former Unit 731 scientists ( 1 , 18 ).

In fact, the US program expanded during the Korean War (1950–1953) with the establishment of a new production facility in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. In addition, a defensive program was launched in 1953 with the objective of developing countermeasures, including vaccines, antisera, and therapeutic agents, to protect troops from possible biological attacks. By the late 1960s, the US military had developed a biological arsenal that included numerous biological pathogens, toxins, and fungal plant pathogens that could be directed against crops to induce crop failure and famine ( 1 ).

At Fort Detrick, biological munitions were detonated inside a hollow 1-million-liter, metallic, spherical aerosolization chamber known as the “eight ball” ( 7 ). Volunteers inside this chamber were exposed to Francisella tularensis and Coxiella burnetii. The studies were conducted to determine the vulnerability of humans to certain aerosolized pathogens. Further testing was done to evaluate the efficacy of vaccines, prophylaxis, and therapy. During the offensive biological program (1942–1969), 456 cases of occupational infections acquired at Fort Detrick were reported at a rate of < 10 infections per 1 million hours worked ( 7 , 19 ). This rate of infection was well within the contemporary standards of the National Safety Council and below the rate reported from other laboratories. Three fatalities due to acquired infections were reported from Fort Detrick during this period: 2 cases of anthrax occurred in 1951 and 1958, and 1 case of viral encephalitis was reported in 1964. In addition, 48 occupational infections were reported from the other testing and production sites, but no other fatalities occurred.

Between 1951 and 1954, several studies were conducted to demonstrate the vulnerability of US cities ( 20 ). Cities on both coasts were surreptitiously used as laboratories to test aerosolization and dispersal methods when simulants were released during covert experiments in New York City, San Francisco, and other sites. Aspergillus fumigatus, Bacillus subtilis var globigii , and Serratia marcescens were selected for these experiments ( 7 , 20 ). Organisms were released over large geographic areas to study the effects of solar irradiation and climatic conditions on the viability of organisms. Concerns regarding potential public health hazards were raised after outbreaks of urinary tract infections caused by nosocomial S. marcescens at Stanford University Hospital between September 1950 and February 1951. The outbreak followed covert experiments using S. marcescens as a simulant in San Francisco.

In addition to these efforts in the USA, many other countries continued their biological weapons research, including Canada, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. In the United Kingdom, the Microbiological Research Department was established in 1947 and expanded in 1951 ( 2 , 21 ). Plans for pilot biological warfare were made, and research continued on the development of new biological agents and weapons design. Britain conducted several trials with biological warfare agents in the Bahamas, in the Isles of Lewis, and in Scottish waters to refine these weapons. However, in 1957, the British government decided to abandon the offensive biological warfare research and to destroy stockpiles. At that time, a new emphasis was put on further development of biological defensive research ( 21 ). At the same time, the Soviet Union increased its efforts in both offensive and defensive biological warfare research and development ( 1 ). Reports regarding offensive research repeatedly occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, although officially the Soviet Union claimed not to possess any biological or chemical weapons.

Other allegations occurred during the post—World War II period ( 11 ):

• The Eastern European press stated that Great Britain had used biological weapons in Oman in 1957.
• The Chinese alleged that the USA caused a cholera epidemic in Hong Kong in 1961.
• In July 1964, the Soviet newspaper Pravda asserted that the US Military Commission in Columbia and Colombian troops had used biological agents against peasants in Colombia and Bolivia.
• In 1969, Egypt accused the “imperialistic aggressors” of using biological weapons in the Middle East, specifically causing an epidemic of cholera in Iraq in 1966.

THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

During the late 1960s, public and expert concerns were raised internationally regarding the indiscriminate nature of, unpredictability of, epidemiologic risks of, and lack of epidemiologic control measures for biological weapons ( 11 , 13 ). In addition, more information on various nationsbiological weapons programs became evident, and it was obvious that the 1925 Geneva Protocol was ineffective in controlling the proliferation of biological weapons. In July 1969, Great Britain submitted a proposal to the UN Committee on Disarmament outlining the need to prohibit the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons ( 22 ). Furthermore, the proposal provided for measures for control and inspections, as well as procedures to be followed in case of violation. Shortly after submission of the British proposal, in September 1969, the Warsaw Pact nations under the lead of the Soviet Union submitted a similar proposal to the UN. However, this proposal lacked provisions for inspections. Two months later, in November 1969, the World Health Organization issued a report regarding the possible consequences of the use of biological warfare agents (Table ​ (Table3 3 ).

Estimates of casualties produced by a hypothetical biological attack *

*Release of 50 kg of agent (aerosolized) by aircraft along a 2-km line upwind of a population center of 500,000 ( 23 ).

Subsequently, the 1972 “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,” known as the BWC, was developed. This treaty prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of pathogens or toxins in “quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” ( 22 ). Under the BWC, the development of delivery systems and the transfer of biological warfare technology or expertise to other countries are also prohibited. It further required the parties to the BWC to destroy stockpiles, delivery systems, and production equipment within 9 months of ratifying the treaty. This agreement was reached among 103 cosigning nations, and the treaty was ratified in April 1972. The BWC went into effect in March 1975 ( 1 ). Signatories that have not yet ratified the BWC are obliged to refrain from activities that would defeat the purpose of the treaty until they specifically communicate to the UN their intention not to ratify the treaty. Review conferences to the BWC were held in 1981, 1986, 1991, and 1996. Signatories to the BWC are required to submit the following information to the UN on an annual basis: facilities where biological defense research is being conducted, scientific conferences that are held at specified facilities, exchange of scientists or information, and disease outbreaks ( 1 , 24 ).

However, like the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the BWC does not provide firm guidelines for inspections and control of disarmament and adherence to the protocol. In addition, there are no guidelines on enforcement and how to deal with violations. Furthermore, there are unresolved controversies about the definition of “defensive research” and the quantities of pathogens necessary for benevolent research ( 24 , 25 ). Alleged violations of the BWC were to be reported to the UN Security Council, which may in turn initiate inspections of accused parties, as well as modalities of correction. The right of permanent members of the Security Council to veto proposed inspections, however, undermines this provision. More recent events in 2003 and 2004 again illustrated the complexity and the enormous difficulties the UN faces in enforcing the statutes of the BWC.

In the USA, the offensive biological weapons program was terminated by President Nixon by executive orders in 1969 and 1970 ( 7 ). The USA adopted a policy to never use biological weapons, including toxins, under any circumstances. National Security Decisions 35 and 44, issued in November 1969 (microorganisms) and February 1970 (toxins), mandated the cessation of offensive biological weapons research and production and the destruction of the biological weapons arsenal. However, research efforts continued to be allowed for the purpose of developing countermeasures, including vaccines and antisera. The entire arsenal of biological weapons was destroyed between May 1971 and February 1973 under the auspices of the US Department of Agriculture, the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Departments of Nature Resources of Arkansas, Colorado, and Maryland. After the termination of the offensive program, USAMRIID was established to continue research for development of medical defense for the US military against a potential attack with biological weapons. The USAMRIID is an open research institution, and none of the research is classified.

THE TIME AFTER THE BWC

Despite the agreement reached in 1972, several of the signatory nations of the BWC participated in activities outlawed by the convention ( 1 ). These events clearly demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the convention as the exclusive approach for eradicating biological weapons and preventing further proliferation. The number and identity of countries that have engaged in offensive biological weapons research is largely still classified information. However, it can be accurately stated that the number of state sponsored programs of this type has increased significantly during the past 30 years. In addition, several assassination attempts and attacks, as well as non—state-sponsored terrorist attacks, have been documented.

During the 1970s, biological weapons were used for covert assassinations. In 1978 a Bulgarian exile named Georgi Markov was attacked and killed in London, England. This assassination later became known as the “umbrella killing,” because the weapon used was a device disguised as an umbrella ( 26 ). This weapon discharged a tiny pellet into the subcutaneous tissue of Markov's leg while he was waiting at a bus stop in London. The following day, he became severely ill, and he died only 3 days after the attack. On autopsy, the pellet, cross-drilled as if it was designed to contain another material, was retrieved. As it was revealed in later years, this assassination was carried out by the communist Bulgarian secret service, and the technology to commit the crime was supplied to the Bulgarians by the Soviet Union ( 1 , 26 ). Only 10 days before the assassination of Markov, an attempt to kill another Bulgarian exile, Vladimir Kostov, had occurred in Paris, France. Kostov said that one day when he was leaving a metro stop in Paris, he had felt a sharp pain in his back. When he turned around, he saw a man with an umbrella running away.

Two weeks later, after he had learned of Markov's death, Kostov was examined by French doctors. They removed a similar pellet, which was made from an exotic alloy of iridium and platinum and contained the toxin ricin.

In the late 1970s, allegations were made that planes and helicopters delivering aerosols of different colors may have attacked the inhabitants of Laos and Kampuchea ( 1 , 7 ). People who were exposed became disoriented and ill. These attacks were commonly described as “yellow rain.” In fact it was highly controversial whether these clouds truly represented biological warfare agents. Some of these clouds were believed to comprise trichothecene toxins (e.g., T-2 mycotoxin). Some scientists believed that the yellow rains were most likely the fecal matter of wild honeybees dropped during their “cleansing flights.” The controversy over the yellow rain incidents remains unresolved.

During April 1979, an epidemic of anthrax occurred among the citizens of Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinburg), Russia. The epidemic occurred among people who lived and worked near a Soviet military microbiology facility (Compound 19) in Sverdlovsk. In addition, many livestock died of anthrax in the same area, out to a distance of 50 km ( 27 ). European and US intelligence suspected that this facility conducted biological warfare research and attributed the epidemic to an accidental release of anthrax spores. Early in February 1980, the widely distributed German newspaper Bild Zeitung carried a story about an accident in a Soviet military settlement in Sverdlovsk in which an anthrax cloud had resulted ( 28 ). When this story was published, other major Western newspapers and magazines began to take an interest in the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk, a city of 1.2 million people, 1400 km east of Moscow. Later that year several articles occurred in Soviet medical, veterinary, and legal journals reporting an anthrax outbreak among livestock. Human cases of anthrax were attributed to the ingestion of contaminated meat.

In 1986, Matthew Meselson (Department of Molecular and Cellular Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts) renewed previously unsuccessful requests to Soviet officials to bring independent scientists to Sverdlovsk to investigate the incident ( 1 , 28 ). This request finally resulted in the invitation to come to Moscow to discuss the incident with 4 Soviet physicians who had gone to Sverdlovsk to deal with the outbreak. The impression after these meetings was that a plausible case had been made, and further investigation of the epidemiologic and pathoanatomical data was needed. The Soviet Union maintained that the anthrax outbreak was caused by consumption of contaminated meat that was purchased on the black market ( 28 ). However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin, then the president of Russia, directed his counselor for ecology and health to determine the origin of the epidemic in Sverdlovsk. In May 1992, Yeltsin admitted that the facility had been part of an offensive biological weapons program and that the epidemic was caused by an accidental release of anthrax spores. He was quoted as saying, “The KGB admitted that our military developments were the cause.” Meselson and his team returned to Russia to aid in these further investigations ( 1 , 28 ). Among the evidence reviewed were a private pathologist's notes from 42 autopsies that resulted in the diagnosis of anthrax ( 29 ). Demographic, ecologic, and atmospheric data were also reviewed. The conclusion was that the pattern of these 42 cases of fatal anthrax bacteremia and toxemia were typical of inhalational anthrax as seen in experimentally infected nonhuman primates. In summary, the narrow zone of human and animal anthrax cases extending downwind from Compound 19 indicated that the outbreak resulted from an aerosol that originated there ( 27 , 29 ).

A 1995 report stated that the Russian program continued to exist after the 1979 incident and had temporarily increased during the 1980s. In 1995, the program was still in existence and employed 25,000 to 30,000 people ( 1 ). At the same time, several high-ranking officials in the former Soviet military and Biopreparat had defected to Western countries. The information provided by these former employees gave further insight into the biological weapons program of the former Soviet Union. After the anthrax incident in Sverdlovsk, the research was continued at a remote military facility in the isolated city of Stepnogorsk in Kazakhstan, producing an even more virulent strain of anthrax ( 1 , 28 ). In 1980, the former Soviet Union expanded its bioweapons research program and was eventually able to weaponize smallpox. This research was conducted at remote facilities in Siberia, and very little information is available about the extent and outcome of this research and where it was conducted ( 1 ).

During Operation Desert Shield, the build-up phase of the Persian Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) after Iraq had invaded and occupied Kuwait in the fall and winter of 1990, the USA and the coalition of allied countries faced the threat of biological and chemical warfare ( 2 , 30 ). The experience gained from observations during the first Persian Gulf War in the late 1980s supported the information on biological and chemical weapons available to the Western intelligence community. In fact, Iraq had used chemical warfare against its own people on many occasions in the 1980s ( 1 ). Intelligence reports from that time suggested that the Iraqi regime had sponsored a very ambitious biological and chemical warfare program.

Coalition forces prepared in 1990–1991 for potential biological and chemical warfare by training in protective masks and equipment, exercising decontamination procedures, receiving extensive education on possible detection procedures, and immunizing troops against potential biological warfare threats. Approximately 150,000 US troops received a Food and Drug Administration—licensed toxoid vaccine against anthrax, and 8000 received a new botulinum toxoid vaccine ( 7 ). For further protection against anthrax spores, 30 million 500-mg oral doses of ciprofloxacin were stockpiled to provide a 1-month course of chemoprophylaxis for the 500,000 US troops that were involved in the operation.

At the end of the Persian Gulf War in August 1991, the first UN inspection of Iraq's biological warfare capabilities was carried out. Representatives of the Iraqi government announced to representatives from the UN Special Commissions Team 7 that Iraq had conducted research into the offensive use of B. anthracis , botulinum toxins, and Clostridium perfringens ( 30 ). Iraq had extensive and redundant research facilities at Salman Pak, Al Hakam, and other sites, only some of which were destroyed during the war ( 1 , 30 ). Despite these elaborate efforts by the UN, the struggle with enforcement of the BWC continued throughout the late 1990s and into the 21st century. As the recent developments in Iraq have shown, development of biological and chemical weapons is a real threat, and efforts to control its proliferation are limited by logistical and political problems. As long as there are no concrete provisions for enforcement, the BWC will remain a toothless instrument in the hands of the UN Security Council.

In addition to these state-sponsored and military-related biowarfare programs, private and civilian groups have attempted to develop, distribute, and use biological and chemical weapons. One incident was the intentional contamination of salad bars in restaurants in Oregon by the Rajneeshee cult during late September 1984 ( 7 , 28 ). A total of 751 cases of severe enteritis were reported, and Salmonella typhimurium was identified as the causative organism. Forty-five victims were hospitalized during this outbreak. Although the Rajneeshees were suspected, the extensive research and investigation conducted by the Oregon Health Department and the Centers for Disease Control could not conclusively identify the origin of the epidemic. However, in 1985, a member of the cult confirmed the attack and identified the epidemic as a deliberate biological attack ( 28 ).

Unfortunately, recent examples of the intentional use of biological weapons are not difficult to find. In the mid 1990s, large amounts of botulinum toxin were found in a laboratory in a safe house of the Red Army Faction in Paris, France. Apparently, the toxin was never used ( 28 ). The bioterrorism threat resurfaced then on March 18, 1995, after the Aum Shinrikyo attacked the Tokyo subway system with sarin gas. The investigations after this incident disclosed evidence of a rudimentary biological weapons program. Allegedly before March 1995, the cult had attempted 3 unsuccessful biological attacks in Japan using anthrax and botulinum toxin. In addition, cult members had attempted to acquire Ebola virus in Zaire during 1992 ( 7 , 28 ). However, only a small portion of the entire program was discovered by Japanese police and intelligence, and only fragments of evidence have been made available to the public. Until the present time, the full extent of the biological weapons program by the Aum Shinrikyo, as well as its present condition, remains unknown.

CONCLUSIONS

Biological weapons are unique in their invisibility and their delayed effects. These factors allow those who use them to inculcate fear and cause confusion among their victims and to escape undetected. A biowarfare attack would not only cause sickness and death in a large number of victims but would also aim to create fear, panic, and paralyzing uncertainty. Its goal is disruption of social and economic activity, the breakdown of government authority, and the impairment of military responses. As demonstrated by the “anthrax letters” in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attack in September 2001, the occurrence of only a small number of infections can create an enormous psychological impact-everyone feels threatened and nobody knows what will happen next.

The choice of the biowarfare agent depends on the economic, technical, and financial capabilities of the state or organization. Smallpox, Ebola, and Marburg virus might be chosen because they have a reputation for causing a more horrifying illness. Images on the nightly news of doctors, nurses, and law enforcement personnel in full protective gear could cause widespread public distraction and anxiety.

Biowarfare attacks are now a possibility. The medical community as well as the public should become familiar with epidemiology and control measures to increase the likelihood of a calm and reasoned response if an outbreak should occur. In fact, the principles that help clinicians develop strategies against diseases are relevant as the medical community considers the problem of biological weapons proliferation. For the medical community, further education focusing on recognition of this threat is both timely and necessary.

Primary prevention rests on creating a strong global norm that rejects development of such weapons. Secondary prevention implies early detection and prompt treatment of disease. The medical community plays an important role in secondary prevention by participating in disease surveillance and reporting and thus providing the first indication of biological weapons use. In addition, continued research to improve surveillance and the search for improved diagnostic capabilities, therapeutic agents, and effective response plans will further strengthen secondary prevention measures. Finally, the role of tertiary prevention, which limits the disability from disease, shall not be forgotten. Unfortunately, the tools of primary and secondary prevention are imperfect. While the BWC is prepared to assist those nations that have been targets of biological weapons, the medical community must be prepared to face the sequelae should the unthinkable happen.

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About the Author

Dominik Juling studies conflict studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science and environmental science at Yale University. Previously, he graduated from the Technical University of Munich in political science with a focus on technology. He has work experience with the German Armed Forces, NATO, and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. His academic interests are diverse but mainly focus on the interaction of climate change and conflict.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Marine Corps University, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government.

Future Bioterror and Biowarfare Threats for NATO's Armed Forces until 2030

Dominik juling​ https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20231401005.

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Abstract: The article argues that advances in biotechnology and other transformations of the threat environment will increase the risk for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces of being confronted with a biological, particularly a genetically modified, weapon by 2030.

Keywords: bioweapon; biowarfare; bioterrorism; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear; CBRN, future warfare

Introduction

A t the beginning of the COVID-19 (coronavirus disease) pandemic, caused by the virus SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2), the dangers posed by biological attacks or the strategic effects of pandemics were discussed in national security debates. Now, one catastrophe follows the next, and the Russian war of aggression dominates the security agenda. In the foreseeable future, however, we will not be able to erase new, natural biological threats from the agenda. For example, the 2022 monkeypox outbreak, with a first outbreak cluster in the United Kingdom, reminds us that smaller outbreaks of transmissible diseases are a constant companion of humanity. Nevertheless, the security dimension of pathogens has fundamentally changed in the twenty-first century. It will change even more in the future. 

This article explores the next generation of warfare in terms of biological threats by the year 2030. Because of few precedents in the area of biological warfare or biological terror and the partial look into the future, the article, and especially its target audience and substantive focus, is broad. Because biological threats often involve difficult-to-control spread of germs, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces were chosen as the major threatened group for this article, rather than focusing on the U.S. Marine Corps alone. Consistent with the U.S. Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 and the NATO 2030 initiative, the time horizon of 2030 was chosen. The former is a comprehensive modernization and restructuring program for the U.S. Marine Corps within the 2030 time horizon. Key points of the program include modernizing equipment, improving cooperation with the U.S. Navy, adapting tactics and strategy to modern weapons, threats and surveillance technology, and better internal talent management. While the Force Design 2030 report talks a lot about emerging military technologies and hostile area denial, it does not talk about the possibility of biological methods of area denial and their countermeasures. This article is intended to draw attention to potential threats that must also be considered in the restructuring of the U.S. Marine Corps. 1

Within the framework of the NATO 2030 initiative, an innovation and reorientation plan comprising nine proposals, it states that NATO also wants to defend its technological lead in the field of biotechnology. In addition, NATO’s new Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Policy, which has been in place since 2022, provides a comprehensive overview of NATO’s policy on biological threats, but it often remains comparatively vague. This article will help to provide examples and further information on threats. 2  

The threats studied may stem from state actors, nonstate actors, unknown origins, or accidents. Consequently, the research question is: “What are possible future bioterror and biowarfare threats for NATO’s Armed Forces by 2030?” While past and current events and examples are used throughout the article, the goal is to identify and broadly assess potential future threats. The hypothesis for the article thus assumes that advances in biotechnology and other transformations of the threat environment will increase the risk for NATO forces of being confronted with a biological, particularly a genetically modified, weapon by 2030. The article will show how and why the author comes to this conclusion. In doing so, the article will attempt to demonstrate that future biological threats by 2030 pose a serious but underestimated threat to NATO.

To provide an entry point and broad overview of the topic, the article provides a short history of biowarfare and bioterrorism and discusses the future biological threat environment, influential megatrends, emerging and disruptive technologies, possible biological threats by 2030, current and future means of delivery, and possible actors. It is argued that the threat from deliberately deployed biological agents will increase and change in nature by 2030. Unlike, for example, chemical weapons, biological weapons have not been tactically or strategically usable against humans because of their potentially uncontrolled spread, even to unprotected friendly forces, coupled with their highly complex production and stabilization outside of laboratory conditions. However, advances in biotechnology in modifying existing pathogens and creating entirely new ones now make it possible to circumvent these previous barriers and produce limited biological weapons for the first time. At the same time, it has already become cheaper, easier, and safer to produce dangerous agents, even more so by 2030. New technologies are also helping to deliver biological agents more effectively. In dual-use terms, by 2030 numerous civilian biotechnological successes will create a vast array of possibly ill-intentioned weapons that will provide NATO’s hostile actors with a wide range of methods. 

History of Events and Developments  Involving Potential Biological Weapons until 2022

As early as 1932, Japan engaged in a massive biological weapons program that resulted in the deaths of at least 10,000 prisoners of war by 1945. It is estimated that more than 200,000 additional civilians and soldiers were killed by Japanese biological weapons during military field operations. Various pathogens and means of delivery were systematically studied. After the end of the Second World War, further nonlethal experiments with biological weapons were conducted by the United States. 3 Particularly noteworthy are the results of a series of ethically highly controversial experiments on unknowing civilians in America. At that time, about 800,000 people in San Francisco were infected with a harmless bacterium. A ship was used to disperse the organisms in the air, but a dispatch with airplanes is also known. In secret tests in the New York City subway, there were even more estimated infections with the harmless bacteria noted. Light bulbs filled with microbes were thrown onto the tracks to distribute the bacteria. At least 239 known tests were conducted between 1949 and 1969, demonstrating the potentially massive spread of deliberately released bacteria. 4 The Soviet Union had a similarly comprehensive biological weapons program. In 1979, four years after the Biological Weapons Convention came into force, there was a very serious accident involving anthrax spores in a laboratory in what is known today as Yekaterinburg, Russia. Due to a missing filter, the area around the laboratory was contaminated and at least 66 people died. 5 Based on testimony from high-level former employees of the Soviet Biopreparat Research Agency, it can be inferred that the Soviet Union worked intensively to develop, mass produce, and test delivery methods of highly lethal biological weapons. Strains were repeatedly modified and improved. The goal was to create weapons that avoided precautionary measures or aftertreatment and were effective quickly and lethally. 6

The first significant attack in modern history using bioweapons and defined as terroristic occurred in 1984, when followers of cult leader Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh infected 751 citizens of The Dalles, Oregon, with salmonella. Forty-five people were hospitalized. The precipitator was the sect’s intention to gain seats in the local county circuit court. 7 In 1990, another cult began more comprehensive attempts to use biological weapons. Professor Barry Kellman reports on Aum Shinrikyo: 

In April 1990, Aum attempted to attack the Japanese parliament with botulinum toxin aerosol. In 1992, Aum sent a mission to Zaire to assist in the treatment of the Ebola virus disease victims in order to find a sample of the Ebola strain to take back to Japan for culturing purposes. In June 1993, the cult tried to release poison at the wedding of the Japanese crown prince. Later that month, Aum attempted to spray anthrax spores from the roof of a building in Tokyo. All these attacks were unsuccessful and resulted in no casualties. 8

Even though the cult’s chemical weapons program proved to be deadlier, a well-equipped laboratory was found with various biological substances that were used to successfully cultivate bacteria and viruses. 9

Since the World Health Organization (WHO) announced the eradication of smallpox in 1980, there has been a debate about whether the last remaining virus strains in laboratories should be destroyed. There has also been much discussion of the possibility of terrorist use, as humanity has become very vulnerable following the suspension of vaccination. 10 At present, the United States and Russia still have small stocks of smallpox strains, which are kept in highly secure laboratories. According to the WHO, no other laboratory has official access to the virus. 11 However, since the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), the general debate on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons has been broadened again to include other pathogens. This was also strongly reinforced by the anthrax letters sent only a week after the devastating al-Qaeda attacks. Of the 22 infected, 5 died. The perpetrator was, according to an FBI investigation, a professional Army biological researcher with access to all the essential materials. 12 Also in 2001, the book Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War was published only a few weeks after 9/11 and remained at number one on the New York Times bestseller list for more than two weeks. It contained a number of investigative novelties about the United States’ biodefense projects.

After 2001, it became known that al-Qaeda had already been pursuing a practical bioweapons program since the beginning of 1998. In 1999, the terrorist group recruited a Pakistani biologist to develop biological weapons in a laboratory in Kandahar. In 2001, a biochemist from the al-Qaeda network may have been able to isolate a lethal anthrax strain. 13 The actual progress of al-Qaeda’s anthrax research was more advanced than global leaders suspected, but the group was never able to produce a viable bioweapon. 14

In 2003, there was the first case of letters filled with ricin toxin in the United States. The perpetrator is unknown still today. Ricin toxin is a plant material, so there is no infection and reproduction as with microbes. Al-Qaeda terror cells in Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Sweden, and Germany were also planning attacks with ricin toxin in 2003. Suspects were arrested in Great Britain, Spain, Italy, and France. 15 In 2004, ricin toxin contamination was detected in a building in Washington, DC. Until 2009, this was the last major incident involving material that could be used as a biological weapon, with a potential terrorist background.

Since then, there have been a number of incidents up to 2021 due to the relatively easy production of ricin toxin. Most of the recorded cases have occurred in the United States. The lethality of ricin toxin is illustrated by the example of Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov, who was killed in an assassination in London in 1989 by only 0.2 milligram of the agent. 16 Significant incidents since 2009 include ricin letters sent to American politicians in 2013, ricin toxin in the hands of a right-wing militia in the United States, attempted orders via the darknet, and possession of ricin toxin in 2018 and ricin-powder-filled letters again in 2020. 17 The darknet is a variety of networks that are shielded or hidden from public access. The attempt by a jihadist living in Germany in 2018 to carry out an attack with ricin toxin stands out, as he was believed to have had contact with members of Islamic State and managed to produce potentially lethal ricin toxin on his own. He followed internet tutorials on how to make explosives and extract ricin toxin with rudimentary resources. 18 But also, in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State tried to obtain functioning biological weapons. A laptop discovered in Syria in 2014 contained many different instructions for the construction, storage, and delivery of weapons of mass destruction. 19 However, the Islamic State’s focus seemed to be on chemical weapons, especially after 2014.

A study by the U.S. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism that was examining 74 nonstate actor incidents involving biological agents from 1990–2011 concludes that use of an agent, possession of a nonweaponized agent, and attempted acquisition are the most common events. Other categories not recorded as often include plot, interest, possession of a weapon, threat with possession, and attempted use of an agent. The most common types of perpetrators involved in attacks during the period studied are cults and lone actors. 20

As in many other areas, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is also a turning point in the field of bioweapons. Since 2020, there have been a number of different scientific papers examining the link between COVID-19 and terrorism. Experts at University College London’s Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science found evidence as early as May 2020 that extremist groups were calling for the virus to be deliberately spread and to infect religious or ethnic groups particularly deemed adverse. Likewise, conspiracy theory narratives that SARS-CoV-2 was designed as a biological weapon became established. 21 The deliberate spread of SARS-CoV-2 was particularly discussed by parts of the American neo-Nazi scene, who set their sights on a violent collapse of the current system to establish a White ethno-state afterward. In right-wing Telegram channels, for example, the door handles of non-Whites, Jews, or FBI facilities were indicated as targets for the application of infectious saliva. Initially, the approach was also discussed in jihadist circles, as the Western states were most affected toward the beginning of the pandemic. In April 2020, an alleged Islamist was arrested in Tunisia for planning to deliberately spread SARS-CoV-2 among local security forces. In addition, many experts agree that COVID-19 has served as a great inspiration for various groups of different orientations that have already considered researching or acquiring biological weapons. 22 Various religious groups of different faiths see COVID-19 as a kind of revenge of God, without actively wanting to contribute to its spread. 23

In summary, it can be said that, as with chemical weapons, the procurement or attempted procurement of dual-use equipment, which could potentially be used for biological weapons production, has increasingly shifted to the internet since 2009. Here too, in addition to the regular online shops, the so-called darknet is once again playing a prominent role. As a relatively easy-to-obtain toxin, ricin toxin has played an increasingly important role since 2009, and the motivations of nonstate actors have generally been diversified. However, ricin is more suitable for attacking individuals or small groups, since a large-scale attack in the open is logistically difficult and would not be very effective. A major attack with biological weapons predicted by some analysts before 2010 was not realized until the end of 2022. Effective weaponization of SARS-CoV-2 has been partially attempted, but it has not been measurably successful, as all attempts were under primitive conditions.

Warnings about antibiotic-resistant bacteria, vaccine resistant viruses, and the creation of completely new pathogens (chimeras) are also not new and were already voiced, for example, by the authors Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg in 1999. In their 1999 prediction, it will take about 20 years before genetic engineering can completely circumvent current biological countermeasures. 24

The World in 2030

Clearly, the environment for an analysis of biological threats will be different by the year 2030. The author does not attempt to draw a coherent picture of the security world of the future, but rather to identify some factors that are important for the future biological threat environment. One is the overall geopolitical evolution of NATO’s relationships with other state and nonstate actors. In a more cooperative world, the role of new treaties and their compliance in dual-use research and biological agents is an important variable of the future. In this context, the future monitoring and prevention of proliferation of pathogens for production and distribution is also an important factor. Another relevant factor is the political stability of countries with significant biotechnology research laboratories and stockpiles of potent pathogens. In the event of insufficient protection of the facilities or political unrest and upheaval, the hazardous materials could fall into the wrong hands. 

Other factors are additional natural pandemics through 2030 and the long-term effects of COVID-19 on future strategic considerations within NATO, its member states, and among potentially hostile actors. The consequences of Russia’s war of aggression, the following build-up of capabilities, shifts in foreign policy paradigms in some NATO countries, and a potentially more uncooperative international order will also play into the future of a biological threat environment. Add to this a huge number of potential black swan events, ranging from doomsday cults to false flag attacks to extortionist criminal groups. Equally unpredictable, of course, are future conflicts and their associated events. The next section discusses a number of megatrends that, unlike the variables identified in this article, have already begun in the past and will continue to have a relatively reliable impact through 2030 and beyond. 

Megatrends through 2030

Climate change as a megatrend through 2030 is having a significant impact on future biological threats. It has long been known that climate change will lead to a further geographic spread, as well as a net increase in transmissions of infectious diseases. 25 The Euro-Atlantic area in particular will be affected by new species emigrating from the south. The deliberate introduction of already found pathogens or vectors to new habitats farther north might be a terrorist method, made possible in part by climate change. At the same time, permafrost is thawing in many places, revealing frozen pathogens that might not be present today. For example, a child died in Siberia in 2016 from anthrax that was frozen in the permafrost, but smallpox and dangerous influenza strains can also potentially thaw in the Arctic region and be transmitted to humans. Similarly dangerous are much older and completely unknown pathogens that are buried several meters deep in the soil and could come to the surface by 2030. 26 Terrorist use is unlikely but not impossible. An additional factor, accelerated by climate change, is that in many cases natural disasters are followed by infectious disease outbreaks and epidemics. This is mainly due to displacement, which is mostly negatively connected to the availability of safe water and sanitation facilities, the degree of crowding, and the availability of health care services. 27 Another impact is that due to the decrease of global animal and plant biodiversity, large populations from one species potentially have advantages in dispersal in an imbalanced manner. Thus, insects and vectors used as bioweapons can more effectively attack plants, humans, and animals while transmitting and reproducing diseases.

Another set of megatrends such as population growth, migration, urbanization, and demographic change also interact with biological threats to NATO forces through 2030. Poor sanitary conditions in densely populated and rapidly growing megacities make the spread of pathogens more likely. NATO nations are experiencing steady demographic change that includes a rapidly growing older segment of society that is more vulnerable to many transmittable diseases.

Due to ongoing globalization and worldwide trade, especially online, it can be assumed that it will continue to be possible to order and deliver laboratory and medical equipment online through 2030. Similarly, pathogens can spread rapidly and potentially undetected in a short time due to the long-distance transport of people and animals.

The next megatrends identified by the author are inequality and poverty. However, meat consumption has often risen as a result of the greatly increased standard of living in China, for example. While total meat production in other parts of the world has increased only slightly since 1990, the amount in Asia has doubled. But individual consumption has also risen sharply in China and Brazil since 1990, while individual consumption in many NATO member states has declined slightly since around 2010. 28 It should be noted that there is a clear link between infectious diseases and meat production. 29 In particular, inadequate hygiene and safety measures, as well as factory farming, contribute to new zoonotic viruses and epidemics. 30 Due to various reasons, including high meat consumption, experts suspect that several and more severe pandemics will follow in the future. 31 However, a significant decrease in global meat consumption is not expected. In addition, more meat consumption significantly increases greenhouse gas emissions, which in turn increases biological hazards associated with climate change. Local poverty and inadequate government resources will continue to contribute to the inability to contain and prevent local outbreaks of infectious diseases in a timely manner through 2030, potentially posing a threat to nations far away.

The next megatrend through 2030 is briefly discussed in terms of digitalization and technological advances. As described in more detail in the next section, advances in biotechnology and medicine, as well as in the field of bioinformatics, are already contributing to major breakthroughs in the manipulation of bacteria, viruses, and animals. Bioinformatics is an interdisciplinary science that uses computer-assisted methods to try to generate new findings in the fields of biotechnology and medicine. This trend is very likely to continue by 2030 and further breakthroughs may be recorded. In addition, the advanced methods already known today for manipulating and producing pathogens are expected to become cheaper, easier to use, and possibly more widespread by 2030. This depends on whether there will be stronger regulations in this area in the future. However, it is very likely that civilian research and genome databases with potent pathogens that are freely available on the internet will be expanded by 2030 and could still be misused. The internet also facilitates recruitment and communication between nonstate actors hostile to NATO. Just as today, by 2030 the internet will likely make it possible to communicate encouragement and support for the development or terrorist deployment of bioweapons regardless of location.

The final megatrend cluster identified by the author is hybridization and asymmetric warfare. Both trends pose a certain threat in a world in 2030 in which limited-use biological weapons can wreak havoc on the enemy, but not on the enemy’s own forces. In addition, there is the possibility of concealing the origin of, for example, a local epidemic or the possibility of biological weapons that are not lethal to humans. In a hybrid conflict, an adversary actor could, for example, also want to cause economic damage or supply shortages and target livestock populations or agriculture. In a hybrid conflict, it would also be possible to use pathogens against NATO forces to incapacitate soldiers for a longer period of time without causing them permanent harm. In a possible future asymmetric conflict between now and 2030, it must be expected that the facilitated production and delivery of limited biological warfare agents will allow a heavily outnumbered actor to pretend that it has the ability to establish a certain balance against a perceived superior adversary.

Overall, for the complex 2030 threat environment, a broad set of important variables and longer-lasting megatrends suggest that there are several indications that by 2030 the threat of deployment may be higher and the impact more severe. In the next section, special attention is given to emerging and disruptive technologies through 2030 that are important for the design, production, and delivery of potential biological weapons.

Emerging and Disruptive Technologies until 2030

This section of the article will outline how new technologies are having a major impact on biological weapons by 2030. Before analyzing specific technologies in more detail, however, the author first wants to point out that biological weapons not only have a purely military use, but also, like other weapons of mass destruction, have a particular impact on politics and society. With a large number of digital devices connected to the internet, online media, and the peculiarities of social networks, actors could use the threat or deployment of biological weapons to spread panic and fear. Allison E. Betus, Michael K. Jablonski, and Anthony F. Lemieux examine the important role of media in our increasingly digitalized world as follows: 

Violent acts initiate media coverage, as well as word-of-mouth transmission, functioning as a gateway that draws attention to the terror group and its messages in a manner that increases the salience of the communication; then media provides additional information contextualizing the original act. Media coverage may make the group initiating the communication look more dangerous or powerful than is warranted. 32  

It is thus becoming increasingly clear that CBRN threats are not only reflected in new hardware, but also increasingly affect the virtual information and communication space, as well as the public perception of a real or perceived threat.

A research paper by the NATO Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism identifies a countervailing mechanism for the interaction of terrorism and technological progress. In general, military and civilian innovations influence each other with a reciprocal push and pull mechanism. This also benefits nonstate actors, who usually focus on adapting and refining existing and proven dual-use technology for their own purposes. 33 In addition to easy obtainable dual-use goods, high-tech equipment and material is mostly stolen from professional armed forces, bought on the black market, or supplied by state actors. In NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis: 2017 Report , one of six chapters is devoted exclusively to future technologies. The report describes, among other things, the rate of technological advances, the number of individuals with access to the internet, the potential of adversary non-state actors’ access to new technologies, the international interconnectedness, the amount of data collected, and an increase in the number of sensors in the world. At the same time, it is becoming more difficult for states, international organizations, or other frameworks to effectively regulate potentially dangerous technologies. This is due, among other things, to the rise of dual-use devices, effects of globalization, an increase in the power of the commercial sector, and the rapid pace of market maturity of new technologies, where democratic mechanisms can often be slow to react. 34  

The first tangible technologies under consideration are user friendly AI applications and web scrapers, which can already easily search large amounts of information about a certain online topic on the internet or in a database, for example about pathogens. AI can then theoretically analyze or even interpret the results. If no powerful computer hardware is available, capacity can be rented via cloud services. This intersection could well be classified as digital dual-use. The consequence is that gene combinations can be tested on the computer before they are cultivated. This saves time and resources and can be used to develop pathogens with specific properties. The process of producing a large number of molecules by combining and varying different chemical components using modern methods also exists in chemistry.

One of the most important future technologies described in this article are modern biological applications. These include genetic engineering, synthetic biology, and biochemistry. Again, this is an area of dual-use research. Genetic engineering is the direct genome manipulation of organisms, including clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) gene editing that is probably one of the most important scientific breakthroughs of recent times. Especially in the field of biological weapons and nonstate actors, this is a method that can be misused with serious consequences. The special advantage is that, compared to prior methods, it provides easier, cheaper, and more precise additions or removal of parts of the genome while the organism is alive. Thus, in the future, it will be reasonably easy to turn bacteria, viruses, fungi, plants, and humans into genetically modified organisms. 35 In general, this field is well researched and there are many publications available, as vaccines, for example, are also being developed using similar methods. For instance, a research paper on the synthesis of horsepox was published in 2017. Dr. Tom Inglesby, director of the Center for Health Security at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, sees this as increasing the risk of smallpox synthesis. 36 In the future, it is believed that despite often grave ethical concerns and attempted political regulation, research will continue to advance. It is often difficult to regulate and identify dual-use applications early enough. However, strategic considerations and scientific great-power competition also play into this technology, as China, in particular, has recently become known for advances in genetic engineering, which are often seen as ethically critical. 37  

One of the many different aims of synthetic biology is to produce synthetic cells (i.e., synthetic life). In 2019, a synthetic bacterium was created for the first time from an artificial sequence of genomes. 38 In this way, even very dangerous bacteria could theoretically be created as if from a construction kit. Research is currently being done on this with the aim of producing a synthetic drug delivery platform. 39 However, viruses can also be transported and distributed by synthetic bacteria. Advances in synthetic virology are particularly relevant to this study. In the future, it is expected that any virus whose DNA/RNA (deoxyribonucleic/ribonucleic acid) is available can potentially be reverse engineered, bringing viruses that have been eradicated back into circulation. Currently, the National Library of Medicine has a large database called the National Center for Biotechnology Information Virus (NCBI Virus), which contains the genetic data of nearly all known viruses, as well as other microorganisms and mammals. 40 There is an important report by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, commissioned by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2018, which describes three particularly dangerous scenarios of synthetic biology. In addition to the already described technique of reproducing viruses with genetic code from the internet, it also mentions the possibility of making bacteria resistant to antibiotics and the possibility of programming microbes in such a way that they slowly poison people through their metabolism. The last method could lead to death after a long time and thus disguise the crime. Much more difficult to implement, but theoretically possible, is a so-called gene drive that automatically spreads through the population, altering people’s DNA. 41

The field of biochemistry is also important, as research into, for example, metabolism processes in cells, signal molecules, or enzymes must also be considered in the effect of biological weapons. The exact impact of this area of research up to 2030 cannot be forecasted precisely, but it is certain that the impact will be significant.

A new development that could potentially have an impact on chemical and biological weapons is microreactors in the form of a continuous flow reactor. Fundamentally, the idea is to allow chemical reactions to take place in a very small device. Advantages compared to large reactors include scalability, on-site and on-demand production, as well as a high reaction yield. 42 The small reactors can be scaled up to almost any size, and expensive, large, and complicated synthesis facilities in batch reactor design are no longer necessary, as the cult Aum Shinrikyo once built them. A 2013 study, however, stresses that the use of microreactors for the production of chemical weapons is limited. Nevertheless, future technological advances may well enable a broader range of warfare agents. 43 Advances in micro-enzymatic reactors are also expected in the field of biology. 44 This could help future terrorists or state actors to produce small quantities of toxic agents in almost any place in the world without significantly putting themselves at risk during production. Although the implications are not yet well understood, the cultivation of pathogens could also benefit from the technology.

Current and future often dual-use developments in nanoscience also offer many overlaps with biological weapons and means of delivery. But not only potentially lethal applications are being developed; nanoscience also supports modern material sciences, engineering, and production. For some years now, several armed forces have been researching machines frequently called nanobots. However, this often refers to insect-size unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which does not correspond to the “nano” definition. Nevertheless, these bionic insects, which are often only 2–3 mm in size and are capable of flying, can, for example, deliver a highly potent poison unnoticed to many locations. 45 In a swarm, technical systems could be manipulated, disrupted, or destroyed. However, real nanobots (i.e., nano-size synthetic drug carriers) are also not unlikely in the future. For example, a group of Chinese researchers undertook the first successful tests for targeted tumor treatment in 2018. 46 On the other hand, such carriers could also be used for the targeted transport of viruses and toxins. Bacteria have been used as drug carriers for similar applications for some time now. Theoretically, however, it is also possible to manipulate unmodified or transgenic insects with the help of nanotechnology, for example to increase the effect of distributed biological warfare agents. 47

Other applications of nanotechnologies are very small computers, which will be important for small means of delivery and monitoring of production of biological and chemical warfare agents. 48 In general, by 2030, nano-size technologies are expected to make the dual-use laboratory equipment needed for biological weapon production, among other things, cheaper, more effective, smaller, and more flexible. 49 In addition, future attacks with nanotubes may offer entirely new possibilities for disguising origin and lethality. A researcher at American University explains: “For example, nanotubes could be used to deliver only the lethal parts of the anthrax virus—without the signature protein that is recognizable to the immune system.” The researcher identifies three main dangers in linking nanoscience and potential biological weapons. First, rudimentary nanotechnology labs are already available on the internet for under $500 USD. Second, the technology makes it easier and cheaper to produce, disguise, and transport biological warfare agents. And third, the technology is not sufficiently regulated, which could lead to an asymmetric arms race that threatens the overall strategic security of major countries. 50

The dual-use problem in the CBRN sector, which has already been mentioned several times in this article, has been recognized for some time. For this reason, the informal multilateral export control regime known as the “Australia Group” has been in existence since 1985. It deals with dual-use technologies, which can be misused for the production of chemical and biological weapons, among other applications. The NATO countries and the European Commission are members, but Russia and China, for example, are not, which makes international control much more difficult. Nevertheless, the group offers expertise in identifying potential dual-use applications. Additionally, after 11 September 2001, there were great efforts to provide weaponizable research with guidelines and, in some cases, regulations. For example, after a research report on the synthetic production of a polio virus was published in 2002, the U.S. government set up a high-level advisory body to draw up guidelines against the terrorist use of biological research. 51 Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism , a comprehensive work on the state of the art at that time, was published in 2004. 52 In 2012, the book Innovation, Dual Use, and Security was published, in which, in addition to the biological risks, attention was also drawn to the potential chemical risks. It contains a 300-page in-depth overview of many intersecting issues. 53 In 2016, a case came to light in which a Chinese company exported a synthetic opioid called carfentanil unregulated to countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. However, this chemical is so potent that it has already killed several unknowing drug users. Terrorist use could not be ruled out. 54 This incident is exemplary for several substances and devices. Furthermore, on the Chinese state level, there have been concerns from some NATO member states in recent years. The country is pursuing civil-military integration in many scientific fields, often resulting in dual-use goods. 55 In 2021, the United States accused China of not clearly distancing itself from weaponizable research in the biological field: 

China continues to develop its biotechnology infrastructure and pursue scientific cooperation with countries of concern. Available information on studies from researchers at Chinese military medical institutions often identifies biological activities of a possibly anomalous nature since presentations discuss identifying, characterizing and testing numerous toxins with potential Dual Use applications. 56

Other countries that the United States accuses of a possible dual-use biological weapons program are North Korea and Iran. Russia is accused of not having properly destroyed “BW items specified under Article 1 of its past BW program.” 57 An increase in civil-military dual-use research in the CBRN field poses the risk of openly available knowledge being misused for malicious purposes. The next section will take a closer look at the actual level of research in 2023 and what developments are possible by 2030.

Possible Biological Threats by 2030

Without question, the biological threats of the future are increasingly severe. The individual threats are often incomprehensible for nonexperts, as biological warfare can be carried out by using viruses, bacteria, fungi, insects, or plants. Almost all animals are possible vectors, and in the far future, even mechanical products or highly manipulated organisms could also be possible vectors. In addition, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and DNA manipulation open up a whole new range of possibilities for modifying or even completely rebuilding or recreating viruses and bacteria. The latter are called designer pathogens. These technological advances were foreseeable for some time, and yet they only came to public attention because of the global pandemic. But as complex and diverse as the possible types of biological weapons are, so are the techniques to enhance the efficacy of biological weapons through biological engineering. A 2013 report in the Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science lists the possible techniques for weaponizing biological materials. These include the manipulation of bacteria; the aforementioned designer pathogens; the destruction or replacement of individual genes in the context of misused gene therapy; stealth viruses that only unfold their effect in the body after external or internal activation; host swapping diseases that, for example, specifically jump from domestic cats to humans; designer diseases that, for example, cause artificial cancer; and personalized biological weapons. The latter spread approximately asymptomatically in the population and only have an effect on certain genetic characteristics of a person or group of people. 58

In his 2002 contribution to The Counterproliferation Papers of the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center at Air University, Michael J. Ainscough describes the threats that could become reality by 2030. Based on findings of the JASON Defense Advisory Panel in 1997, Ainscough describes six future threats. First, he talks about binary biological weapons that can be used for extortion or safe handling. For this, a harmless host bacterium and a virulent plasmid would be isolated separately and threatened with the release of the associated second component, which would then interact to produce its effect. As far as designer genes are concerned, the researcher concludes that these have long been state of the art with simple modifications at the time of the study. Future designer pathogens will have far more complex capabilities and will be able to exhibit a whole range of modified characteristics. Regarding gene therapy, he writes: 

There are two general classes of gene therapy: germ-cell line (reproductive) and somatic cell line (therapeutic). Changes in DNA in germ cells would be inherited by future generations. Changes in DNA of somatic cells would affect only the individual and could not be passed on to descendants. Manipulation of somatic cells is subject to less ethical scrutiny than manipulation of germ cells. 59

Already 25 years ago, viruses were used as vectors to insert genes into mammalian cells. This genetically engineered virus was successfully used to prevent rabies in wildlife. Likewise, viruses were successfully used as vectors for mousepox viruses 25 years ago. This allowed vaccination of mice to be circumvented, which died shortly afterwards. The concept of stealth viruses is not new in nature. In this case, an initially unnoticed virus could enter human cells and wait for an external or internal signal. One related example are oncogenes, which are mutated genes that cause cancer as soon as they are activated. Some viruses have segments of DNA that mimic oncogenes. Other substances, bioregulators, physical processes, or external influences such as ultraviolet light could thus activate the virus. Ainscough also writes about host-swapping diseases and designer diseases. In the future of 2030, it could be possible to create the suitable pathogens for a certain disease pattern. This would make it possible, for example, to temporarily shut down the immune system or induce cell death in certain cells. 60 Twenty years later, Ainscough’s prognoses are all proving to be increasingly technically feasible. Except for complex designer pathogens and diseases, all predictions are applicable in the year 2023.

Although some of the possible applications mentioned have not yet been achieved in practice, thanks to the aforementioned CRISPR-Cas9 gene-editing technology and the general progress in the field, it is only a matter of time before the biological weapons mentioned are successfully tested within military or civil dual-use research. Another extremely problematic aspect is that CRISPR is not a high-tech technology that is only available in secure laboratories. At the current rate, it is foreseeable that in the world of 2030, manipulated and synthetic biological substances could take on an almost everyday character. But how difficult is it really for future actors to actually develop and deploy one of these methods themselves? 

Based on the state of the art in 2015, researcher Zian Liu of the University of California, Berkeley, concludes that there are five potential barriers that could prevent nonstate actors without access to professional laboratories from creating novel biological weapons. First, it is not easy to create a properly protective research environment that will secure the actor adequately. Secondly, although it is possible to order all the necessary materials on the internet, very specialized equipment for very dangerous substances and many test runs cost up to $30,000 USD. If an already dangerous bacteria or virus strain are used as an initial substance, a screening of the person placing the order is usually requested. However, there are sometimes great differences in this respect worldwide. Nevertheless, there are already mechanisms that automatically subject the online ordering of several suspicious materials to a closer examination. An example is the code of conduct for gene synthesis published by the International Association of Synthetic Biology in 2009. Fourth, it is often standard practice to modify existing research for one’s own purposes. However, specific research on modern biological weapons is of course top secret. But it is still possible to gather information from civilian dual-use literature, but this requires a higher degree of specialist expertise. Fifth, the actor would have to undertake potentially extensive testing and adjustments prior to deployment. Such tests can easily arouse suspicion in various ways. The author also describes that there is already an established community of so-called biohackers in many countries around the world. Determined nonstate actors might join such an often anonymous internet hobby community to act more effectively. 61

At the same time, of course, it is also possible that such a biohacker could lose control of a potentially dangerous agent as a result of an accident, since generally weaker standards of safety are observed in amateur labs. Liu’s six-year-old remarks must also be seen in the light of the fact that more advanced technologies are already available on the internet now. In the future, it will probably be even easier to circumvent the barriers as, for example, the aforementioned small flow reactors and CRISPR-Cas9 applications become widely marketable. 

All in all, synthetic or DNA-engineered biological weapons can potentially cause enormous damage, but a closer look reveals that, at least for nonstate actors, production is currently not as easy as it might seem. By 2030, however, some of the current barriers are expected to be significantly lower. Although it is possible to learn the fundamentals via internet courses, in most cases a solid academic education is needed to gain practical experience with the laboratory equipment. Compared to genetically modified agents, existing natural pathogens may pose an even greater danger, as slightly less experience is required to weaponize them. There is also more publicly available research and potential natural source sites for such pathogens. In 2014, for example, a Tunisian jihadist did not even attempt to produce complicated pathogens, but instead records were found on their laptop of how the causative pathogen of plague ( Yersinia pestis ) can be isolated from infected animals and subsequently weaponized. The chemist and physicist would presumably have had the theoretical prerequisites for creating his own strain, but it seems the costs were too high compared to the benefits. 62 He was caught without carrying out an attack.

It would also be relatively easy for nonstate actors to take advantage of a natural outbreak to infect themselves and then infect as many other people as possible. Breaking an imposed quarantine during a disease outbreak for political reasons could also be classified as terrorism, as people could be killed indirectly. Such intentions, as well as acting as a so-called superspreader, are entirely possible, as already described in the section on SARS-CoV-2. However, it is relatively difficult to deliberately infect oneself with a naturally occurring virus as the first carrier. Another comparatively simple biological weapon that could be used for attacks in the future is the mass breeding of insects. This can lead to effective attacks on crops, but as soon as the insects are to be used as vectors for diseases against humans, a greater effort might be required, although it might still be much less than that of producing a synthetic pathogen. The use of insectoid vectors proved to be very effective in the operations carried out by the Japanese during the Second World War. Other biological agents already used in the past, such as anthrax and ricin toxin, might also potentially be used in the future again. Currently, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention lists more than 20 dangerous bioterrorism agents, which they subdivided into three categories. 63

In addition, there is the danger of developments by state actors that could be misused for terrorist purposes by employees, fall into the hands of nonstate actors, be released as a result of an accident, and could be used intentionally or as part of a covert operation. The unconfirmed efforts of the People’s Republic of China operating a disguised dual-use bioweapons program are a cause for concern. 64 It is also very problematic that various states have not ratified international agreements and, in some cases, do not adhere to international standards, which could facilitate proliferation to potentially adversarial nonstate actors. The internet, and its global expansion, will continue to play a fundamental role in the future through legal and illegal orders, educational courses, and specialized biohacking communities, as well as the latest research and publicly accessible DNA/RNA databases.

With a prospective application in mind, a distinction must be made between how demanding it is to produce or obtain a specific biological weapon. As with chemical weapons, greater effectiveness goes mostly hand in hand with more difficult acquisition and are thus less likely to be used. This rough prediction may be obsolete by 2030, as technological advances lower the threshold for acquisition while increasing lethality. As emphasized in the introduction, it is important to note that various current and future biotechnological developments have the potential to limit and thus to a certain degree control transmissible biological weapons.

Current and Future Means  of Delivery for Biological Material

Due to the often-unstable nature of biological pathogens outside the laboratory, methods of dissemination are also important. In the following, current and conceivable methods by 2030 are examined in more detail. A whole range of bombs, including cluster bombs and balloon bombs, were developed for use with biological weapons at the beginning of the Cold War. Many of these developments were aimed at destroying enemy crops with plant pathogens. In the Second World War, Japan used, among other things, ceramic bombs filled with pathogens. While most chemical weapons can be stored for longer periods of time in their means of delivery and can be used relatively effectively by many methods, biological weapons usually require a much more cumbersome procedure. Due to the high impact energy of nonbraked bombs and missiles, successful dissemination of a biological agent is not likely. Parachuted bombs with a large-scale dispersal mechanism are more likely to succeed. However, anthrax spores are nevertheless known to survive dispersal by low-yield explosion, as found for example in the American E61, E120 or M143 cluster bomb submunitions developed in the 1960s. 65 However, a careful explosive delivery system for sophisticated bioweapons is very difficult for nonstate actors to achieve on their own. A civilian aircraft could be bought or rented for the drop of a bomb or cannister, but the overall cost of such a venture is very high compared to the possible outcome. 

Easy to control, maneuverable, low-cost UAVs with a comparatively high payload designed for the civilian market have become quite popular in the last decade and see regular combat operation, for example in the Ukraine war of 2022. In addition, camera technology is becoming smaller and smaller, batteries come with improved storage capacity, and small and lightweight flight controllers, accelerometers, and GPS (Global Positioning Systems) are becoming increasingly widespread. Thanks to mass production, mostly in the People’s Republic of China, models are now available in many price ranges and payload sizes. In the meantime, a large market has also established itself with do-it-yourself components with which mission-oriented UAVs can be built relatively easily. This can be done both as a fixed-wing aircraft and as a multicopter or helicopter. In recent years, a growing market has also emerged that specializes in professional applications and offers more expensive, but still affordable, products. In the United States alone, almost 750,000 commercial and recreational drones are currently registered. 66 At the same time, effective defense against these commercial UAVs remains a major challenge. In practice, it is also difficult to distinguish between registered and legal drone flights and potential attacks.

At an event organized by the Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies in 2011, some interesting points were made in relation to UAVs. For example, a simulation was mentioned in which 900g of weapons-grade anthrax would be released 100 meters above a large city. With appropriate winds, about 1.5 million people would be infected and tens of thousands would die despite strong containment measures. At the same event, the TAM-5 model aircraft was mentioned, which flew automatically for 39 hours in 2003 and traveled more than 3,000 km over the Atlantic. 67 Since 2009, more and more UAVs have been configured as multicopters. These models usually cannot fly as far or as long as fixed-wing aircraft, but they are more maneuverable and usually easier to operate. Modern remote-controlled aircraft can fly far faster than 500 km/h; modern quadrocopters far faster than 200 km/h. For professional applications, there are now drones with a payload of more than 100 kg. 68 In 2016, British prime minister David Cameron warned that UAVs could disperse radioactive material in massive quantities over cities. He is probably alluding to the wide availability of automated crop duster UAVs, which are in fact a low-effort, high-impact means of delivery for terrorists, especially when many people are crowded together in the open. Instead of radioactive material, however, chemical or biological material could be effectively disseminated. 69 State actors with access to professional technologies have resources to develop further technical solutions tailored to the agent. Manned aircraft for the deployment of CBRN material have been little considered by nonstate actors. In the past, Aum Shinrikyo tried to modify a Mil Mi-17 helicopter to spray toxic gas over Tokyo. 70 In 2001, an al-Qaeda terrorist traveled to the United States to possibly prepare an attack with a crop duster plane. 71

In addition to aerial deployment, CBRN material can also be deployed from the ground. The direct application of pathogens, as in the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, can be considered a ground-based attack. The same applies to attempts to deliberately transmit SARS-CoV-2 or other viruses to, e.g., door handles or from person to person. This category also includes assassinations with biological warfare agents.

A subcategory of biological warfare is entomological warfare. There are two fields of application, because insects can be used to act directly as weapons or to spread pathogens. But noninsectoid animals can also be used to deliberately spread pathogens. This type of warfare was first systematically studied and applied during the Second World War. Japan was particularly involved; the empire infected Chinese populations with plague-infected fleas and cholera-spreading flies. This mode of transmission proved catastrophically effective. Yellow rats were also bred in large numbers for use as vectors. 72 After the war, the Soviet Union, among others, researched ticks as vectors. According to their own statement, an automatic insect breeding facility was developed. 73 Such a facility was also planned in the United States, where mosquitoes and fleas were successfully tested as vectors and were dropped from airplanes. 74 But nonstate actors have also recognized the advantages of insects as biological weapons. For example, in 1989, after a letter from a group called “the Breeders” was found, “peculiar patterns of Mediterranean fruit fly infestation in southern California that year” were detected. 75 More recent cases have not been detected. In principle, it is easier to use insects as weapons than to successfully infect vectors with deadly diseases without endangering oneself. Major financial damage or famine due to crop shortfalls can be a consequence that is not directly fatal to humans.

As already indicated, the biological field is probably the most significant for the future. The possibilities of releasing and spreading a fully developed pathogen are very diverse and almost impossible to prevent. In jihadist circles, for example, one of the terrorists could be the first carrier, while other types of terrorists might want to harm a specific person or group of people. From poisoned water to public salad buffets, there are many methods. In the future, however, genetically manipulated or even synthetic bacteria, insects, or other animals will be particularly useful as vectors. Such animals can be bred or designed according to the requirements at hand (e.g., to reproduce and spread particularly quickly or to deliver the pathogen particularly effectively). Similarly, in the future it will often be difficult to distinguish manipulated animals from nonmanipulated animals. Thus, the origin of the outbreak can be concealed, which presents potential for a state attack disguised as a terrorist attack, or vice versa. 

Biological means of delivery of pathogens can already be prepared with the help of artificial hatcheries or programmed to reproduce themselves as quickly as possible. The latter might be a logistically more effective solution, although manual incubation requires less expertise in the field of molecular biology. In the future, modified organisms may be able to identify and attack certain people or groups of people on the basis of certain characteristics or infect them specifically with the transported pathogen. Similarly, carrier animals could be manipulated to feel comfortable in other climates or environments and attack the local population or displace native species. Climate change would accelerate such intentions. It is also possible that by 2030, technologies will exist that can artificially control insects or small animals, turning them into covert weapons. Currently, this already works with beetles. In this way, CBRN materials could be delivered unnoticed to a specific target without attracting attention. A pathogen that has a deliberately long delay to disease onset or death built in can be used to spread unobtrusively in humans or animals before it is detected. 

In addition to the ways of delivering biological material already discussed, there are other ways that can be used to contaminate soil, water, or plants. The perpetrator can either use one of the previously explained systems, such as an agricultural UAV. A simpler way is to distribute the agent personally in unguarded places. Biological agents such as anthrax are likely to contaminate soil permanently. The two best-known examples are Gruinard Island in Scotland and Vozrozhdeniya Island in what is now Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Both were partially contaminated by tests with Bacillus anthracis , the cause of anthrax; studies proved the extreme persistence of the biological weapon in soil during initial decontamination attempts. 76 To alert the public to the dangerous situation on the island, unknown perpetrators sent two packages of soil samples from Gruinard Island almost 40 years after the initial release of anthrax agent. One of the packages actually contained anthrax spores. 77 The island was then thoroughly decontaminated. The former Soviet biological weapons test site in the Aral Sea was also decontaminated in 2002 with funds from the United States, because many anthrax cultures were not sufficiently destroyed by the Soviets. Nevertheless, it is likely that live spores could still be found in unknown locations on the island. Yersinia pestis , known as plague, and smallpox virus have also been experimented with on the Soviet testing area but are not likely to have survived until today. 78

The deliberate poisoning of water, mostly of human drinking water, has been discussed many times in the past. In such a case, it is known as a point source. In fact, in 1972, two teenagers tried to poison Chicago’s drinking water with biological agents, but they did not come close to achieving their goal. 79

The deliberate poisoning of plants or livestock with biological agents is a very broad field of application that has been studied and partially applied since before the Second World War. In the past, Germany, France, Japan, Iraq, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union pursued such programs, sometimes on a large scale. 80 The means of delivery are either vectors or insects themselves, but the use of anticrop fungi and other transmissible plant diseases has also been successfully tested. Once applied to a plant, it then serves as both the means of delivery and the target of the weapon. As with soil contamination, there are theoretically multiple motivations for terrorists to engage in agro-terrorism. Agro-terrorism can often be closely linked to entomological warfare methods. For more information, see the section on animals as a means of delivery. Jonathan Ban of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute lists some motivations: 

Some actors may be motivated for the same reasons as other terrorist actions—to attract attention to a cause, incite fear, disrupt society, or demonstrate a capability with the intent of exacting political concessions. Other actors may be prompted by different motives—economic interest, sabotage, or revenge. 81  

He lists several cases in which crop poisoning was threatened or carried out. In the described cases, chemicals like mercury or cyanide were used for poisoning, but not self-transmitting biological weapons. Also, the alleged medfly attacks in California in 1989 had food production, in this case mass-produced fruits, as a target. 82 The Federation of American Scientists provides information on further incidents of biowarfare against agriculture: “In 1985 and 1988, Iraq conducted field tests of wheat cover smut to demonstrate its effectiveness as an anti-crop agent. Iraq also produced canisters designed to disperse the fungal agent over Iranian wheat fields. In Sri Lanka in the early 1980s, a group of Tamil separatists threatened to spread non-endemic plant diseases among rubber and tea plantations in a scheme to undermine the government.” 83

In the section on emerging technologies, the potential and current areas of application of nanotechnology in the CBRN sector have already been outlined. There is also a future field of application in the area of means of delivery. Future systems can use the bionic advantages of real living beings and combine them with the advantages of technical applications. Since only a few grams of various toxins or pathogens are often needed to have a lethal effect or to start an epidemic compared to current nuclear weapons, for example, nanorobots are also suitable for delivering the material. Also, camouflage as, for example, a mechanical rat or bird is possible to outsmart security measures of military premises or essential personnel. It is unlikely that nonstate actors will be able to build and operate such complex military high-tech means of delivery, but a dual-use application of such technologies is not impossible by 2030.

Fully autonomous vehicles are certainly part of the future of 2030. With autonomous UAVs, the damage of even low-quality CBRN weapons can be increased by automatically matching and selecting between multiple detected targets. Reprogramming requires IT skills, but these can also be obtained by terrorist groups. Deployed en masse, autonomous vehicles can carry out many different conceivable types of attacks and cause increased panic among the population, which is further exacerbated by the use of CBRN material. Autonomous drones can also target, for example, crowds of people with CBRN material, move on, and attack new identified targets. This saves CBRN material and makes the attack more effective, as even agricultural drones have a rather limited capacity when it comes to creating a deadly concentration of an agent in the air. 

Possible Actors

The last and final section provides an overview of possible actors up to the year 2030. Earlier in the article, China and its dual-use biotechnology activities were discussed in more detail. Of the potentially hostile state actors, however, North Korea must also be mentioned, whose possible bioweapons program is explained in two reports as well as the Russian Federation, about whose current bioweapons allegations there is also a detailed article. 84 In the case of both countries, however, there is no definitive evidence. On Iran and a possible bioweapons program, sources are comparatively sparse.

Starting with state actors that may have sophisticated and resource-i­ntensive capabilities to research, produce, and deploy biological weapons, it must never be forgotten that former state actors, like defectors or disloyal soldiers, may also get their hands on these biological weapons or sophisticated weapons get stolen or lost. In today’s world and the world of 2030, there are also pseudo-nonstate actors who ostensibly operate autonomously but are significantly supported by a state actor. In addition to economically, religiously, and politically motivated actors, there are also cults that stand out from other groups in the field of non-state actors, since their goal may well be the extermination of all human life without limitation. Other nonstate actor groups that could theoretically plan to use biological weapons by 2030 are ecoterrorists, extreme conspiracy theorists, cyberterrorists, internal staff, renegade scientists, or laboratory security personnel. The third major category is unintentional accidents in laboratories or accidents involving members of the biohacker community at home. For example, at least two accidents occurred in coronavirus laboratories in China in 2004, and the local outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the UK in 2007 was traced to a laboratory in Surrey. 85 The fourth category is incidents, outbreaks, and attacks of unknown origin, which is not unlikely in the context of possible hybrid warfare by 2030.

Conclusion and Overall Threat Potential

In conclusion, NATO forces will find themselves in an increasingly dangerous biological threat environment by 2030. Despite the diverse threat environment, the alliance must credibly ensure that it can continue to operate actively in the aftermath of biological weapons attacks. Despite the high potency of biological agents, the issue is often treated only half-heartedly in armed forces and often remains a secondary consideration in national security strategies, despite the COVID-19 pandemic as an illustrative example. This article shows that there are virtually no limits to future biological weapons. This type of weapon of mass destruction has the potential to fundamentally change the future of warfare. As Ainscough’s prognosis shows, this is not necessarily a new conclusion. The hypothesis is thus confirmed, although it is clear that forecasts for the future are always merely educated assumptions and that a large number of unknown factors play a decisive role in the real outcome.

It is very difficult to quantify the threat of future bioweapon attacks on a scientific basis. At the end of 2022, there is no concrete evidence that any actor is planning or threatening to use biological weapons in the near future. Nevertheless, the threat environment is evolving in a direction that fundamentally increases biological threats. Likewise, the progress of biotechnology will sooner or later lead to the development of limited transmissible bioweapons. So far, uncontrolled spread has deterred actors from using transmissible bioweapons. If, by 2030, it is possible to effectively limit biological weapons or make them nonlethal and endow pathogens with individual capabilities and attributes as designer pathogens, biowarfare could indeed establish itself as an alternative to traditional types of kinetic warfare in the future.

NATO forces must work closely together to develop effective counterstrategies and stay at the forefront of research to identify threats and develop effective countermeasures, as stated in the NATO 2030 agenda. Additionally, the U.S. Marine Corps should address biological threats more thoroughly. At the same time, the defensive nature and safe conduct of their own biological research must always be made clear at the international stage and a treaty structure adapted to the changed conditions of our time, in particular with the People’s Republic of China, must be sought diplomatically. It must be reliably ensured that, despite a lower barrier, the use of biological weapons will continue to elude the interest of any actors in the future.

For further research, the author recommends the development of effective counterstrategies to future biological weapons attacks and an outlook on what biotechnological advances potential adversaries could use to make their soldiers more capable and resilient in the future.

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Ethical issues in military bioscience

• Published: 09 June 2023
• Volume 41 , pages 1–5, ( 2023 )

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• Rain Liivoja 1 &
• Ned Dobos 2  

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1 Introduction

Armed forces have a long and complicated relationship with bioscientific innovation. It may well be the case that military-sponsored research and development in the life sciences have yielded important benefits for the society at large, for example when it comes to public health (e.g. Dasey 1990 ). At the same time, the militaries’ penchant for secrecy and occasionally cavalier attitude towards risk (e.g. Moreno 2001 ) have made the notion of military bioscience rather eerie in the public imagination. So much so that botched military biomedical experiments have become a favoured trope of screenwriters looking for unnerving material.

Bioscientific knowledge and biotechnology have, of course, a wide range of military uses. They map onto an equally broad spectrum on ethical and legal implications. At one end are applications that are so clearly objectionable as to give rise to minimal ethical or legal debate. For example, the aversion to the use of biological warfare agents to harm the adversary has become entrenched. Interestingly, biological warfare has drawn more moral scorn than chemical warfare (e.g. Krickus 1965 ). Along with the practical difficulties of using biological warfare agents, this may have helped pave the way for the blanket ban on biological warfare in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), whereas the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons took another twenty years to achieve. Also, aside from the industrial scale violation of the BWC by the Soviet Union (and possibly Russia) (e.g. Leitenberg, Zilinskas, and Kuhn 2012 ), the prohibition of biological warfare agents has been rather well adhered to.

At the other end of the spectrum of military biotechnology and bioscience one finds some relatively uncontroversial practices, such as the use of biomaterials in military medicine. Similarly, attempting to improve the nutrition or training programs of military personnel by drawing on latest bioscientific insight does not appear to be problematic. This seems to be the case, at least, if service members are not subjected to experimental practices involuntarily or given an unfair advantage compared to the rest of the population.

In the middle of the spectrum, however, lie interventions that are not objectionable on their face but nevertheless create significant ethical conundrums. Some of these are precisely the focus of this symposium.

2 Human enhancement

Most of the following papers address, in one way or another, human enhancement in the military. Human enhancement broadly refers to biomedical interventions undertaken to make a person “better than well”, that is, to improve some aspect of their performance beyond what is regarded as “normal” (see generally Juengst and Moseley 2019 ). But matters quickly become contested: in particular, it is by no means obvious what “well” or “normal” mean. Also, the ability to distinguish in a principled manner between enhancement and treatment remains debatable (e.g. Erler 2017 ),

As Adam Henschke ( 2023 , Sect. 1) demonstrates, the matter is further complicated by enhancement and disenhancement being context-dependent notions. Thus, a particular change in a person’s cognitive or physical functioning may be unequivocally beneficial at a certain point in time or in some context but just as unequivocally detrimental at another time or in another context. Accordingly, what might amount to a desirable enhancement during military service could become an undesirable disenhancement in civilian life (ibid., Sect. 1), or otherwise complicate demobilisation and reintegration (Walsh and Van de Ven 2023 , Sect. 3).

Even though distinguishing between enhancement and therapy seems to be fraught with difficulty, the distinction does have significant practical implications for law and policy (e.g. McGee 2020 ). Adrian Walsh and Katina van de Ven (2023) suggest, however, that the ethical evaluation of enhancement depends on the context, and thus applying the enhancement-therapy distinction does not always have similar law and policy implications. In particular, they argue that the considerations that support prohibiting enhancement (“doping”) in professional sport are inapplicable to the conduct of warfare, such that the adoption by the Australian Defence Force of parts of the World Anti-Doping Code becomes difficult to defend on ethical grounds (ibid., Sects. 2–3).

3 Duty of care

Aside from problems with conceptual delimitation and overall acceptability, human enhancement in the military also raises questions about the associated duty of care. Clearly, military personnel have some rights vis-à-vis the armed forces, and/or the military has certain obligations towards the service members; some of these are relevant to enhancement (Henschke 2023 , Sect. 2; Walsh and Van de Ven 2023 , Sect. 4; see also Dobos 2023 ).

What complicates the exercise of the duty of care in this context is that it may pull in different directions. Henschke ( 2023 , Sect. 2) shows that an enhancement ( in casu , increased vigilance as a result of brain stimulation) may benefit the service member while on active duty, but amount to a debilitating anxiety disorder in civilian life. Likewise, Walsh and Van de Ven ( 2023 , Sect. 5) point out that service members who becomes accustomed to an enhancement (in their example, the use of anabolic-androgenic steroids to increase muscle mass and strength, and improve endurance) may find it difficult to reintegrate into civilian society where the use of this enhancement is illegal or frowned upon. Ned Dobos ( 2023 , Sect. 3) notes a risk related to moral injury: a pharmacological intervention that protects the service member against a debilitating sense of wrongdoing or guilt (i.e. moral trauma) may expose them to a corrosion of moral emotions and induce a sense of indifference (i.e. moral degradation).

As a consequence, a complicated balancing of the short- and long-term interests of service members must take place, all against the background of the broader military benefit arising from the use of the enhancement. Thus, even if we accept that the armed forces or the government owe a duty of care to military personnel, it is far from obvious what exactly that requires in practice when it comes to enhancements.

4 Accountability

Human enhancement may also make it more difficult to establish accountability for undesirable actions. Walsh and Van de Ven ( 2023 , Sect. 3) give the example of fighter pilots who, having ingested amphetamines as an approved fatigue countermeasure on a long mission, mistakenly fire on friendly forces. They query whether the use of such drugs might lessen the responsibility of the individuals involved, and thereby also cast doubt on the acceptability of the intervention in question from the perspective of the just war theory (ibid.). The same questions also arise under the rules and principles of international law that apply in armed conflicts (Liivoja 2022 , sec. IV(A); Harrison Dinniss and Kleffner 2016 , sec. VI(B)).

Sahar Latheef ( 2023 ) considers individual responsibility in the context of brain-to-brain interfaces (BBIs), which would allow direct communication between two or more human brains. She argues that an individual connected to a BBI ought not be held fully responsible for their actions due to the adverse impact this technology can have on their ability to act freely, coupled with a diminished sense of self-agency, and a lack of authenticity of thoughts and memories (ibid.). She notes, among other things, that the absence of language in communication erodes a sense of agency—a problem that also manifests itself in the legal context (e.g. Noll 2014 ).

5 Dual loyalties

Finally, human enhancement may increase the tension between military ethics and medical ethics, and exacerbate the problem of dual loyalties of persons who are simultaneously members of the medical profession and the profession of arms.

Michael Reade ( 2023 ) considers in detail how conflicting duties may arise out of these loyalties, and how a balance between the requirements of military and medical ethics could be maintained in practice. He explains how armed conflict accentuates the problem of dual loyalties, noting that the military medical practitioner may face a dilemma when, for example, asked to prescribe medications to enhance combat ability, in the knowledge that this might have an adverse effect on the individuals (ibid., Sect. 6). In this context, questions can also arise about the bounds of the activities that military medical personnel can carry out while retaining their special protection under international law (see Liivoja 2018 ).

6 By way of a conclusion

The papers in this special issue take distinctly different approaches to ethical issues in military bioscience. But, when read together, several common themes emerge. First, the papers highlight the ambiguities in the concept of human enhancement, and perhaps give us reason to be wary of that concept. Second, they implicitly suggest that biomedical interventions in the military cannot be evaluated based on purely civilian conceptions of bioethics or medical ethics but require an approach that factors in uniquely military considerations (cf. Mehlman and Corley 2014 ). Third, the papers identify challenges for accountability—both in terms of the way in which the service member’s individual responsibility may be eroded as a result of human enhancement, as well as the additional demands placed on the ethical compass of the military medical professional.

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Acknowledgements

We gratefully acknowledge that the workshop where the papers in this special issue were first presented and discussed was made possible by a Branco Weiss Fellowship, administered by ETH Zurich.

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Liivoja, R., Dobos, N. Ethical issues in military bioscience. Monash Bioeth. Rev. 41 , 1–5 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-023-00176-w

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• 08 March 2024

Could AI-designed proteins be weaponized? Scientists lay out safety guidelines

• Ewen Callaway

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Artificial-intelligence tools can design proteins to perform specific functions. Credit: Google DeepMind/EMBL-EBI (CC-BY-4.0)

Could proteins designed by artificial intelligence (AI) ever be used as bioweapons? In the hope of heading off this possibility — as well as the prospect of burdensome government regulation — researchers today launched an initiative calling for the safe and ethical use of protein design.

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Researchers, including Baker and his colleagues, have been trying to design and make new proteins for decades. But their capacity to do so has exploded in recent years thanks to advances in AI . Endeavours that once took years or were impossible — such as designing a protein that binds to a specified molecule — can now be achieved in minutes. Most of the AI tools that scientists have developed to enable this are freely available.

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