why competition is good essay

Essays About Competition: Top 6 Examples and 10 Prompts

As you write about competition, discover our examples of essays about competition and writing prompts to unlock your competitive self.

We live in a highly competitive time, and one might easily say that competition makes the world go round. Indeed, doing your best to get ahead of others has perks, such as fame, money, promotion in the workplace, or esteem from your parents if you’re a student.

Beyond these immediate rewards, competition can help develop self-confidence, discipline, and tenacity, which help people survive and thrive. So unleash your competitive side by writing a thrilling essay about competition, and read our examples to inspire you.

6 Helpful Essay Examples

1. is lack of competition strangling the u.s. economy by david wessel, 2. why competition is good for kids (and how to keep it that way) by devan mcguinness, 3.  how great power competition has changed by shivshankar menon, 4. how life became an endless, terrible competition by daniel markovits, 5. how to create a successful partnership with your competition by norma watenpaugh , 6. the importance of positive coaching in competition by oscar ponteri, 10 exciting writing prompts on essays about competition, 1. how schools can encourage healthy competition, 2. how competition builds self-esteem, 3. importance of competition laws, 4. business competition in the digital age, 5. competition vs. cooperation, 6. dealing with sibling competition, 7. preparing for a competition, 8. competition in mother-daughter relationships, 9. love is not a competition, 10. competition in the animal kingdom.

“If we’re slow to take action to bolster competition — perhaps because incumbents successfully wield their power or because of a distaste for regulation of any sort — we risk diluting the dynamism of the economy and restricting the flow of innovations and new ideas, darkening the prospects for our children and grandchildren.”

The essay looks at the decline of competition in various US industries. In particular, it investigates factors — profits, investment, business dynamism, and prices — that can indicate the robustness of competition in a country. Falling competition is worrisome in economies as it enables incumbent firms to abuse their power and block new entrants, restricting consumers’ options for more affordable and better quality goods and services.

“Besides setting them up for wins and losses later in life—hey, they won’t always land that big promotion—competitive activities help them develop important skills they’ll use well into adulthood, like taking turns, developing empathy, and tenacity.”

Well-meaning parents might disapprove of competition to shield children from getting disheartened at losing. But child development experts say that competition has lifelong benefits for children, reinforcing the value of hard work, thinking positively, and being a good team player. However, parents should be careful in delineating healthy competition from unhealthy ones.

“Competition among great powers has extended to the sea lanes that carry the world’s energy and trade and is visible in the naval buildup by all the major powers that we see today—a buildup over the last ten years which is unmatched in scale in history.”

With the influence among global superpowers now spread more evenly, coupled with the fact that their interventions in conflict areas have only yielded prolonged battles, global superpowers are now more focused on their geopolitical reach. But some factors, such as their dependence on other superpowers for economic growth, also compel them to go beyond their horizons. 

“Outrage at nepotism and other disgraceful forms of elite advantage-taking implicitly valorizes meritocratic ideals. Yet meritocracy itself is the bigger problem, and it is crippling the American dream. Meritocracy has created a competition that, even when everyone plays by the rules, only the rich can win.

Instead of intensely engaging in competition, why not just stop competing? This essay laments how meritocracy destroyed people’s relationships at home, all for advancing in the workplace. While throwing competition out of the window seems like an ambitious proposal, the author offers a glint of hope using the case of a policy framework created during the Great Depression. 

“In my experience, working with your competition is not an intuitive thing for most people. It takes a strong value proposition to make the risks and effort worthwhile.”

When cooperating with your competition becomes a key to your goals, you resort to a strategy called “co-opetition,” short for cooperative competition. This essay fleshes out the situations where such alliances work and provides tips on making the most out of these relationships while avoiding risks.

“I have learned that competition holds incredible power… It’s all about how you utilize it. How our youth coaches frame competition will dictate the way we compete beyond athletics for our entire life.”

A high-school student shares his profound thoughts on the essence of positive coaching in the life of athletes even beyond the field. His beliefs stem from his experiences with a cold-hearted coach that turned around his love for sports. 

To start, cite the numerous benefits of competition in developing well-rounded students. Make sure to back these up with research. Then, write about how you think schools can create an atmosphere conducive to healthy competition. Provide tips, for example, calling on teachers to encourage students to participate and motivate them to do their best instead of keeping their eyes on the trophy. You may also share how your school is promoting healthy competition.

Competition can drive you to improve and build the foundations for your self-esteem. For this essay, research the scientific links between healthy competition and self-confidence. Look also into how competition can promote a mindset that goes for growth and not just the gold medal. Some who lose may see themselves as a failure and give up rather than seeing their loss as an opportunity to learn and do better. 

Competition or antitrust laws aim to ensure robust market competition by banning anti-competitive acts and behaviors. First, briefly explain your country’s competition law and enumerate acts that are prohibited under this law. Then, to help readers understand more clearly, cite a recent case, for example, a merger and acquisition, where your antitrust office had to intervene to protect the interest of consumers. 

The borderless digital world has made the competition very cutthroat, with the demands for innovation at a neck-breaking pace. But one advantage is how it has somewhat leveled the playing field between big and small businesses. Enumerate the pros and cons of the digital age to business competition and cite what emerging trends businesses should watch out for.

Should we be more competitive or cooperative? Or should we stop pitting one against the other and begin balancing both? Provide a well-researched answer and write an argumentative essay where you take a position and, with research backing, explain why you take this position. To effectively execute this writing style and its techniques, see our ultimate guide on argumentative essays .

Competition among siblings goes as old as the story of Abel and Cain. It can disrupt family peace and become a vicious, toxic cycle that can last into their adult years if unresolved. What are the other negative impacts of sibling competition on the family and the well-being of siblings in the long term? Identify these and research what experts have to say on managing sibling rivalry. 

How do you prepare your mind and body for a competition? If you regularly participate in competitions, this is the right topic prompt for you. So, share tips that have worked to your advantage and find science-backed recommendations on how one can be ready on competition day both psychologically and physically. For example, studies have shown that visualizing your performance as a success can increase motivation, confidence, and self-efficacy.

Describe the factors that trigger competition between mothers and daughters. You can cite aspects of the gender theory identity developed by psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud . Then, differentiate the nature of the competition and its different stages as the daughter grows. Finally, help mothers navigate this confusing period and deal with strength and enormous understanding.

This quote is best for couples who fight like cats and dogs. For this writing prompt, explain how seeing your partner as a competition can destroy a romantic relationship. Then, offer tips on how your readers can make amends with their partners, reconnect with them and see them as allies. After all, relationships need intensive teamwork.

Write an informational essay about competition in the animal kingdom. For example, you might have to differentiate interspecific competition from the intraspecific competition. You might also have to flesh out the differences between competition and predation. Then cite the factors that trigger competition and its effects on biodiversity.

Before publishing, make sure your essay is error-free by using the best grammar checkers, including the top-rated Grammarly.  Find out why Grammarly is highly recommended in this Grammarly review .

Yna Lim is a communications specialist currently focused on policy advocacy. In her eight years of writing, she has been exposed to a variety of topics, including cryptocurrency, web hosting, agriculture, marketing, intellectual property, data privacy and international trade. A former journalist in one of the top business papers in the Philippines, Yna is currently pursuing her master's degree in economics and business.

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The Importance of Competition for the American   Economy

By Heather Boushey and Helen Knudsen

Healthy market competition is fundamental to a well-functioning U.S. economy. Basic economic theory demonstrates that when firms have to compete for customers, it leads to lower prices, higher quality goods and services, greater variety, and more innovation. [1] Competition is critical not only in product markets, but also in labor markets. [2] When firms compete to attract workers, they must increase compensation and improve working conditions.

There is evidence that in the United States, markets have become more concentrated and perhaps less competitive across a wide array of industries: four beef packers now control over 80 percent of their market, domestic air travel is now dominated by four airlines, and many Americans have only one choice of reliable broadband provider. There are a number of reasons for these trends towards greater concentration, including technological change, the increasing importance of “winner take all” markets, and more lenient government oversight over the last 40 years. [3]

When there is insufficient competition, dominant firms can use their market power to charge higher prices, offer decreased quality, and block potential competitors from entering the market—meaning entrepreneurs and small businesses cannot participate on a level playing field and new ideas cannot become new goods and services. Research has also connected market power to inequality . In an economy without adequate competition, prices and corporate profits rise, while workers’ wages decrease. This means large corporations and their shareholders gain wealth, while consumers and workers pay the cost. The pandemic has further underscored the dangers of an economy that depends on a few companies for essentials, exemplified by the supply chain problems we face when a small handful of corporations creates bottlenecks for a critical product.

This is why today, President Biden will sign an Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy. It launches a whole-of-government effort to combat growing market power in the U.S. economy by seeking to ensure that markets are competitive. Because of the scale and scope of the market power problem, the President’s Executive Order makes the promotion of competition central to the government’s mission by dedicating the entire government to reversing these trends.

Signals that indicate greater market power

Even though competition is fundamental to a thriving and fair economy, there is growing evidence that, over time, markets across the United States have become less competitive and that market power is expanding. There are two kinds of evidence that indicate that there are widespread concentration problems in the U.S. economy. First, there is evidence that market concentration, as well as profits and markups, are rising across industries. Second, market-specific studies show that consolidation has led to harmful price increases, providing one of the clearest indicators of enhanced market power.

Alongside the rise in prices, which is both an indication of a market power problem and an important consequence for consumers, economists have identified two other important consequences of rising concentration: first, there is growing evidence that it is hampering innovation; and, second, research shows that it is leading to substantial concentration in the U.S. labor market—not just markets for goods and services, which has the effect of suppressing wages.

Evidence of rising economic concentration

There are numerous studies that show increased concentration across a large number of industries in the economy. In fact, concentration has increased in over 75 percent of U.S. industries since the late 1990s. These studies show that the largest companies in the economy have grown at the expense of smaller firms. While it could be that, in some cases, concentration has grown because firms with a high market share are more efficient or more innovative than their competitors, the prevalence across so many industries and the trendlines are cause for concern.

This is underscored by a set of studies that show that the profits and markups of the largest firms—indicators that many economists point to as aggregate measures of market power across the economy—have grown over the last 30 to 40 years. In a free and open market, we would expect new companies to enter the market and compete down these profits. However, these increases in the profits of large, dominant firms coincide with a decrease in business dynamism in the U.S. economy—with fewer startups launching and less labor market fluidity.

Consequences of increased concentration

While informative, national-level, industry-wide studies give little insight into whether increased concentration and markups are a result of decreased competition; that is, they cannot tell us whether or not the concentration is problematic for the U.S. economy. As mentioned above, on the one hand, industry-wide concentration can increase when a firm becomes more efficient or more innovative or when a national firm increases its footprint. [4] Similarly, increased markups can be the result of improved technology driving down marginal costs. On the other hand, increased concentration can also be the result of anti-competitive mergers or increased barriers to entry, which could also increase markups.

In order to figure out whether the patterns of increased concentration and markups are problematic, economists must look more closely at individual markets, since market-specific studies allow a more detailed understanding of the competitive mechanisms that are leading to these patterns. To better understand these markets, economists have done deep dives into an array of industries—ranging from concrete to health care . These studies tend to focus on what happens after two (or more) firms merge. Studying mergers is especially important because a merger changes market structure in a way that is not caused by a firm improving its product or becoming more efficient. Rising consumer prices following a merger indicate that a firm has gained market power, which gives them increased price-setting capabilities and suggests that the merger harmed consumers.

There is evidence from an array of market-specific studies looking before and after mergers that strongly suggests that consolidation has led to less competition and greater market power. These studies show that as market conditions changed, prices rose, indicating that firms had the capacity to charge more since they had—in these cases—merged with their competitors:

• One review of this literature shows that of 49 such studies, 36 found merger-induced price increases. Another review finds that the average price effect in mergers studied was 7.2 percent.
• A review of hospital merger studies finds that most of the mergers led to price increases of at least 20 percent.
• A study of a large health insurer merger shows that it led to a 7 percent average premium increase.
• A study of airline mergers in the 1980s finds that prices increased between 7.2 and 29.4 percent in markets where the merging airlines competed directly.
• A study of the MillerCoors joint venture finds that it resulted in tacit coordination with Anheuser-Busch, leading to a 6 to 8 percent increase in retail beer prices.

Looking across these kinds of studies, the conclusion is that consolidation does indicate a market power problem with the consequence that consumers are facing higher prices than they would if the market was more competitive.

Other negative consequences of market concentration

There is also growing evidence that market power negatively affects innovation. There have long been questions about whether market concentration fostered or inhibited innovation. Even decades ago, Kenneth Arrow argued that concentration hindered invention: “pre-invention monopoly power acts as a strong disincentive to further innovation.” [5] Emerging evidence points to this being the case today: one study shows that firms with monopoly power are less likely to advance technological changes; another paper focuses on the channel through which less innovation occurs in the presence of market power; and another study finds that while price markups increased after a merger, there was no corresponding increase in productivity.

There are emerging concerns that this effect on innovation may be affecting the economy more generally. In his book, The Great Reversal, Thomas Philippon documents that the increase in concentration across the economy is reducing economy-wide investment. Similarly, scholars are finding that greater market power is a factor in low interest rates and high firm financial wealth, but relatively little investment. If concentration is allowed to continue, this may dampen U.S. productivity and growth, limiting the future competitiveness of the U.S. economy.

Decreased competition in labor markets

As firms become more concentrated, they are able to push wages down, exemplifying another instance where we see the growing consequences of market power. With greater market power, employers have less competition for the best workers since there are fewer other firms. Such power in the labor market can be deployed in several ways; we discuss two below.

First, consolidation in output markets not only affects consumer prices, but also wages and working conditions as the number of employers in an industry decreases. For example, as hospitals have merged, not only have consumers faced decreased choices in where to get their medical care, but nurses, doctors, and other health care employees have had less of a choice of employer. In fact, a study found that large hospital mergers led to lower wage growth for nurses, pharmacy workers, and hospital administrators.

Firms can also exert market power by limiting their employee’s ability to change jobs through noncompete agreements . These agreements prevent employees from quitting and—within a certain time period—taking a job with a different employer who may benefit from the employee’s industry-specific skills. This translates into lower pay , as the employee has limited ability to deploy their skills elsewhere. 

In all, these uncompetitive labor market conditions are quite common —with 60 percent of labor markets being highly concentrated. Importantly, researchers have documented that uncompetitive labor markets are associated with lower wages relative to what a truly competitive market would provide. A meta-analysis of labor market studies finds that firms pay their workers less than they would in a competitive labor market, with the median estimate showing that firms pay workers 58 percent of their value. New work has also found that more than one in ten U.S. workers are in labor markets where pay is reduced by at least 2 percent due to employer concentration.

Signs that policy change is necessary

There is strong evidence that one of the reasons for the current rise in market power is a shift in policy. Antitrust enforcement has become more lenient over the last 40 years, and regulators have not had sufficient resources to enforce the laws on the books.

Antitrust laws are traditionally enforced by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). They challenge anticompetitive mergers and other anticompetitive behavior by firms, such as exclusionary practices. The DOJ also prosecutes the criminal antitrust laws that bar collusive behavior, such as price-fixing.

To enforce the law, the DOJ and the FTC publish merger guidelines that lay out when a merger is likely to be challenged. Since the guidelines were first published in 1968, enforcement practice has become increasingly lenient.  

In 1968, in a highly concentrated market (four firms having 75 percent of market share), even the merger of two small firms (each with 4 percent market share) would be challenged routinely. Today, such mergers are almost never challenged; indeed, based on guidelines released in 2010, mergers are unlikely to be challenged even if they leave only four substantial competitors in place. The increase in these thresholds reflects, in part, the agencies giving more credit to efficiencies that might arise from mergers. At the same time that these guideline thresholds have increased, the level of purchase price that requires companies to give notice of their mergers to the agencies has risen, leading to a larger number of mergers going unreviewed—even as firms strategically acquire competitors.

In part because of these changes and because of real-term reductions in funding, Federal agencies have been bringing fewer antitrust cases. In fact, the number of criminal antitrust cases brought by the DOJ from FY2018-2021 has declined to an average of 22 a year, down from an average of over 60 cases a year across the previous six years. On the civil side, from 2010 to 2019 only about 3 percent of mergers that met the filing threshold have received “second requests,” which are a more thorough review by the agencies. When mergers are challenged, they are at the extreme, where four or fewer competitors are remaining.

Government suits enforcing the laws against anticompetitive conduct have also been rare. The DOJ’s lawsuit against Google and the FTC’s lawsuit against Facebook , both filed in 2020, are the first major Federal monopolization cases since the Microsoft case in 1998. [6] As the economy evolves with technology and “winner take all” markets become more important, it will be crucial to guard against anticompetitive conduct as well. These shifts have come at the same time that judicial precedent has moved in the direction of skepticism towards antitrust enforcement.

The Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy launches an effort to solve these problems

The President’s Executive Order establishes a whole-of-government approach to push back on decades of decline in competition. The Order not only calls on the traditional antitrust agencies—the DOJ and the FTC—to enforce existing laws vigorously and to consider updating their merger guidelines, it also directs all agencies and departments to use their detailed knowledge and expertise to ensure that their work clearly supports competition in the markets they regulate—including paying close attention to labor markets. This whole-of-government approach is necessary because the antitrust agencies are limited both by resources and the current judicial interpretation of the antitrust laws. It also relies on the fact that Congress has delegated authority to police anticompetitive conduct and oversee mergers to many agencies—not just the DOJ and the FTC.

The Order therefore directs or encourages roughly a dozen agencies to engage in more than 70 specific actions that will remove barriers to entry and encourage more competition. For example, the Order encourages the Department of Health and Human Services to work with states developing drug importation programs and to consider finalizing rules allowing hearing aids to be sold over the counter at a fraction of their current price. It requires all agencies to use their procurement and spending powers to avoid entrenching monopolists and to create new business opportunities for small firms. It encourages the FTC to issue rules curtailing noncompete agreements which inhibit labor mobility, preventing workers from switching to jobs that offer better pay and benefits. And, it directs the Department of Agriculture to consider strengthening its enforcement of laws designed to prevent large meat-processing companies from taking advantage of farmers.

The U.S. economy faces a serious market power problem which results in increasing wage inequality and wealth concentration, high prices, and stagnating wages. The President’s Executive Order relies on the full range of powers granted by Congress to address it, ensuring that the economy works for all Americans.

[1] When only a single firm sells a product or service for which there is no substitute, the firm is a monopoly.

[2] When only a single firm buys a product or service, the firm is a monopsony. A monopsony can exist in labor markets, when there is only one employer in a market.

[3] “Winner take all” markets are those where a single firm tends to dominate, even if the dominant firm’s product is only slightly better than the other products, and the market may have originally been competitive.  The market becomes more concentrated when the best performers are able to capture a large share of the market, often through technological advances. Walmart is an example in that it has been able to drive many smaller firms out of the market by harnessing advances in transportation and information technology in order to lower prices. This can also happen when the market has network externalities such that a firm’s technology is more valuable when there are more users of the technology; social media platforms or search engines are examples of such markets.

[4] There are some studies that show local concentration has been declining. This can be explained by large national companies entering local markets. These studies still look at broad industries rather than product specific markets.

[5] Kenneth Arrow, “Economic Welfare and The Allocation of Resources for Invention,” in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors , A Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research, 609-26 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 620.

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Pros and Cons of Competition Among Kids and Teens

Drawbacks and benefits.

• What Is Healthy Competition?
• How to Talk About It
• Coping With Competition Stress

Whether it is a presidential race, a cross-country race, or the race to be the school valedictorian, competition is everywhere. But is it really a good thing? Is it something we should be instilling in our children?

There are mixed reviews when it comes to teaching kids about competitiveness. Some people feel exposing kids to competition teaches them real-life lessons about winning and losing. Others feel competition does more harm than good. Either way, there are pros and cons to both approaches.

Prepares kids for future real-life situations

Develops important life skills, like empathy

Expands comfort zone

Helps kids learn from failure

Too much unnecessary pressure

Leads to negative feelings

Destructive to self-esteem

Those who are against instilling competitiveness in kids, or even exposing them to competitions in general, believe that competition is destructive and toxic. Their fear is that it places too much pressure on kids to be the best, whether it is in a spelling bee or a soccer match. They also argue that it can cause unnecessary stress and anxiety.

Those opposed to competition believe that when children are placed in competitive settings, they are often left feeling disappointed, defeated, and bad about themselves. Worse yet, competition can be destructive to self-esteem , especially if kids feel like they do not measure up or that they are not being recognized for their efforts.

To ward off these negative experiences, many parents remove the competitive aspect of every activity and declare everyone a winner. In other words, it’s the "everyone-gets-a-trophy" mentality.

The work of Thurston Domina , professor of education policy and sociology at the University of North Carolina, indicates that turning low-stakes activities into competitions is bad for kids.

Domina's research has found that competitions do little to motivate kids. His research team observed two California high schools that gave out gold or platinum ID cards to kids who scored well on standardized tests. What they found was that the program not only had little motivation for lower-achieving students, it also increased inequality and division among students.

Positives of Competition

Those who embrace competition as a fact of life believe that a little healthy competition might actually be good for kids.

Aside from preparing them for wins and losses later in their adult life, competitive activities help kids develop important skills like resilience, perseverance, and tenacity. They also learn how to take turns, encourage others, and develop empathy.

What's more, many coaches may feel that parenting is not just about safety and security, but also about expanding a child's comfort zone. In other words, it's important for kids to get used to the frustration that comes from competition . And, more importantly, it helps them circumvent the desire to quit or give up when things get tough.

Although it is important for a child to know they are safe, it is also important to allow a child to experience the instability and uncertainty that comes from competitive situations.

One of the biggest mistakes some parents make is protecting their kids from failure. Failure is not a bad thing. It might feel uncomfortable but it is a wonderful opportunity to learn. In fact, learning from failures not only motivates kids to work harder and improve a skill, but it also can help them become more capable adults that do not crumble the first time things get tough. Kids can learn how to lose and still feel good about their efforts.

All in all, healthy competition can teach kids that it’s not always the best that are successful, but rather those who work hard and stick it out that are the real winners in the end. The key is to find healthy ways for your kids to compete.

What Does Healthy Competition Look Like?

Keep in mind that competitiveness by itself is generally not a bad thing—it's how people approach competitions that can make them unhealthy. In other words, if the only goal is to win and not learn anything in the process, kids are going to feel discouraged when they lose. But, if parents, coaches, and fans learn how to look at losing constructively, then kids will learn a lot more from the competitions they participate in.

According to Carol Dweck, Stanford psychologist and author of Mindset: The New Psychology of Success , it is important the competition fosters a growth mindset instead of a fixed mindset.

For instance, when kids believe that the qualities they have cannot be changed, such as being bad at math, then they have a fixed mindset. Consequently, when kids have this mindset, they believe that change is not possible and they are stuck with what they are given, such as basketball ability, intelligence, artistic talent, and so on, and that they cannot change or suddenly develop soccer skills, musical talent, or a propensity for math.

What's more, according to Dweck, kids with a fixed mindset often feel the need to prove themselves over and over again and often evaluate themselves in an all-or-nothing kind of way.

Meanwhile, the opposite of a fixed mindset is the growth mindset. Kids who have a growth mindset recognize their current skills and abilities, but believe that they can change, improve, or add new skills with time and effort. As a result, when kids have a growth mindset, they are more likely to approach competition understanding that if they do not do well, it is not the end of the world. They know that they can learn and improve. And, more importantly, they are willing to try.

How to Talk to Your Child About Competition

As a parent, you have the power to help your kids think positively about competition.

For starters, healthy competition helps kids see that competition isn’t just about winning and losing. Make sure your kids know that competition is really about setting a goal and then accomplishing that goal.

In other words, instead of focusing on winning, focus on what your child has control over, such as the number of shots they take in a basketball game or the amount of time they invest in practicing for a solo and ensemble competition. At the end of the competition, the overall outcome matters less than instead whether or not they accomplish what they set out to do. 

It's important for parents to be there to support their kids through the challenges. You also need to regularly reinforce the message that it is okay to lose as long as they are working hard, putting in their best effort, and learning from the experience.

In fact, some coaches will indicate that the biggest lesson kids will learn from competition is that the biggest competitor is themselves. In other words, kids not only need to learn to believe in themselves and their abilities, but also discover that their identity is not tied to winning or losing but to their character in either scenario.

Recognize Different Types of Goals

Clearly, there are some competitive situations where the primary goal is to win. While this is fine in some situations, there is also a loser. If winning is the only goal that a child is focused on, it is bound to create an unhealthy environment.

Remember, no one has control over the outcome of a game. As a result, it is better for kids to have other goals besides winning such as a goal based on personal performance. Maybe they will still lose the game, but they will see their skill level improve in some way.

Promote Personal Traits Rather Than Outcome

Whether they are playing a sport , entering a dance competition, or participating in the science olympiad, there will be times in a child's life where they must compete with others. In these situations, take the focus off of winning and instead focus on the things they can control, like their effort.   Then, regardless of the outcome, help your kids see what they did well.

For instance, were they extremely focused? Did they show a lot of gritty behavior ? Did they manage their time well? It's important for kids to see that success is not about winning. Then, in the future, when they do not get into the college of their choice or they do not land the job they wanted, they will be able to step back and reflect on what they did well as well as where they might try to improve. 

Remember That Failure Is Part of Success

As odd as it might sound at first, allowing a child to fail is one of the most important aspects of competition.

When a child is allowed to fail, they discover that they can recover from it, learn from it, and move on from it. Failing, or losing a competition, does not have to define them.

Unfortunately, though, many children today are afraid of failure.   Maybe they are afraid others will bully them or make fun of them, or perhaps they are afraid of disappointing their parents. Whatever the reason, fear can prevent kids from trying things that are hard. When this happens, this can reduce their opportunities to grow as well as the opportunities for success.

One thing parents can do is share their experiences with failure and what they learned from it. The goal is to allow kids a chance to experience failure before they get to college. This way, when they experience challenges or failure, they will simply see it as a way of life and be able to move on in a healthy way. 

Give Your Approval Freely

Some parents will withhold love and approval when their child does not perform up to their standards or win a competition. When this happens, the child can become panicked inside because they do not feel loved or secure. What's more, they start to believe they are not enough or that they are lacking in some way and that the parent will never value them if they do not win.

More often than not, when this happens kids start working their tail off trying to make their parents happy. But trying to impress their parents is a dangerous course and can be detrimental to their mental well-being. Instead, children benefit when parents give them love and approval freely and without condition. Children should always feel like they are loved unconditionally, even when they lose.

What to Do If Competition Stresses Your Kid Out

Sometimes kids are so resistant to competition that they may refuse to participate in any competitive activity. They also might fake an illness or show signs of anxiety.  

While it is normal for kids to feel a little anxious before a big competition, they should not be so worried that it is impacting other areas of their life.

Whether it is a big game, a standardized test, band competition, or the state spelling bee, if the fear of competition is impacting your child you may want to dig deeper to see what’s under the surface. There could be anxiety or depression at play. Or, it could be just an unhealthy view of competition.

Many people will often advise against allowing an anxious child to quit an activity . Before long, quitting could become a way of life for the child if they never learn how to manage their distress. However, there are some instances when it's OK to quit, such as being bored with a sport. Parents can always talk with their child about whether their skills could be better utilized elsewhere, and encourage them to try a new activity they might be more engaged with.

The next time performance anxiety rears its ugly head, try teaching your child some calming techniques to help them keep the butterflies at bay. It's also important to provide support and reassurance as much as possible. With each stressful competitive activity the child conquers, the more mental strength and stamina they will have for competitive situations in the future. Persevering through the anxiety and the challenges that competition provides is where the real growth happens.

​A Word From Verywell

Regardless of where you stand on competition, don't forget that there are many different types of competition. And, some of them are definitely more positive than others.

To teach your kids how to be competitive in a healthy way, look for activities that have attainable goals while encouraging teamwork. And of course, look for something that is fun for your kids and going to keep them engaged so they stick with it. 

Domina T, Penner AM, Penner EK. `Membership has its privileges': Status incentives and categorical inequality in education . Sociol Sci . 2016;3:264-295. doi:10.15195/v3.a13

Hammond DA. Grit: An important characteristic in learners . Curr Pharm Teach Learn . 2017;9(1):1-3. doi:10.1016/j.cptl.2016.08.048

Rutberg S, Nyberg L, Castelli D, Lindqvist AK. Grit as Perseverance in Physical Activity Participation . Int J Environ Res Public Health . 2020;17(3):807. doi:10.3390/ijerph17030807

Masten AS. Global perspectives on resilience in children and youth . Child Dev . 2014;85(1):6-20. doi:10.1111/cdev.12205

Dweck CS. Mindset: The New Psychology of Success . Random House.

Hagger MS, Hamilton K. Grit and self-discipline as predictors of effort and academic attainment . Br J Educ Psychol . 2019;89(2):324-342. doi:10.1111/bjep.12241

Gustafsson H, Sagar SS, Stenling A. Fear of failure, psychological stress, and burnout among adolescent athletes competing in high level sport . Scand J Med Sci Sports . 2017;27(12):2091-2102. doi:10.1111/sms.12797

Ford JL, Ildefonso K, Jones ML, Arvinen-Barrow M. Sport-related anxiety: current insights . Open Access J Sports Med . 2017;8:205-212. doi:10.2147/OAJSM.S125845

Anxiety and Depression Association of America. Childhood anxiety disorders .

By Sherri Gordon Sherri Gordon, CLC is a published author, certified professional life coach, and bullying prevention expert. 

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Article Contents

Introduction, the virtues of competition, competition sacrificed, the dark side of competition.

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Is competition always good?

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Maurice E. Stucke, Is competition always good?, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement , Volume 1, Issue 1, April 2013, Pages 162–197, https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jns008

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Competition is the backbone of US economic policy. Competition advocacy is also thriving internationally. Promoting competition is broadly accepted as the best available tool for promoting consumer well-being. Competition officials, who regularly try to protect the public from anticompetitive special interest legislation, are justifiably jaded about complaints of excess competition. Although the economic crisis has prompted some policymakers to reconsider basic assumptions, the virtues of competition are not among them. Nonetheless to effectively advocate competition, officials must understand when competition itself is the problem’s cause, not its cure. Market competition, while harming some participants, often benefits society. But does competition always benefit society? This is antitrust’s blind spot. After outlining the virtues of competition, and discussing some well-accepted exceptions to competition law, this article addresses four scenarios where competition yields suboptimal results.

Americans love to compete. More Americans strongly agreed than any other surveyed country’s residents that they like situations where they compete. 1 Praised in various contexts, 2 competition is the backbone of US economic policy. The US Supreme Court observed, ‘The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition.’ 3 The belief in competition is not only embodied in the antitrust laws. Every US executive agency, for example, is legally required to have an advocate for competition. 4

Competition advocacy is thriving internationally. 5 The past 20 years witnessed more countries with antitrust laws and the birth and growth of the International Competition Network (ICN), an international organization of governmental competition authorities, with over 100 member countries. 6 Although different constituencies accept to different degrees the benefits of competition and competition policy, the strongest competition advocates, in an ICN survey, were among the academic community, consumer associations, media, and nongovernmental organizations. 7 ‘Within OECD countries, competition is now broadly accepted as the best available mechanism for maximising the things that one can demand from an economic system in most circumstances.’ 8

The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conductive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition. 9

These days, it is unlikely that well-counseled firms will explicitly argue that they need to be saved from ‘ruinous’ or ‘cutthroat’ competition. But, under one name or another, this idea is likely to resurface. For example, two merging firms may well argue that ongoing competition will leave them with insufficient profits to make valuable and necessary investments to serve consumers. This is effectively a version of the ‘ruinous competition’ argument that should be treated skeptically. 12

Although the economic crisis has prompted some policymakers to reconsider basic assumptions, the virtues of competition are not among them. 13 Nonetheless to effectively advocate competition, officials must understand when competition itself is the cause, not the remedy, of the problem. Market competition, while harming some participants, often benefits society. 14 But does competition always benefit society? This is antitrust’s blind spot.

One could argue that the problem is not economic competition per se, but poor regulatory controls. This is a valid point. Part of competition’s appeal is that no consensus exists on its meaning. 15 Competition does not exist abstractly, but is influenced by the existing legal and informal institutions. 16 A chicken–egg dilemma follows: Is the problem with competition itself or the legal and informal institutions that yielded this type of competition? One’s view depends in part on one’s ideological reference point—namely the belief of competition existing outside a regulatory framework, necessitating governmental intervention in the marketplace versus the belief that regulatory forces help create and define competition in the market, necessitating improvements to the legal framework.

This article identifies the problem as competition itself, since under most theories of competition, markets characterized with low entry barriers (and recent entry) should not be prone to the market failures described herein. 17 Whatever the theory (failure of competition or regulations), society is worse off as a result.

The section ‘The virtues of competition’ outlines the virtues of competition. The section ‘Competition s acrificed’ discusses some well-accepted exceptions to competition policy. The section ‘The dark side of competition’ addresses four scenarios where competition yields a suboptimal result.

lower costs and prices for goods and services,

better quality,

more choices and variety,

more innovation,

greater efficiency and productivity,

economic development and growth,

greater wealth equality,

a stronger democracy by dispersing economic power, and

greater wellbeing by promoting individual initiative, liberty, and free association. 19

Competition’s virtues are so ingrained within the antitrust community that competition often takes a religious quality. The Ordoliberal, Austrian, Chicago, post-Chicago, Harvard, and Populist schools, for example, can disagree over how competition plays outs in markets, the proper antitrust goals, and the legal standards to effectuate the goals. But they unabashedly agree that competition itself is good. Antitrust policies and enforcement priorities can change with incoming administrations. But the DOJ and US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) steadfastly target horizontal restraints and erection of entry barriers via legislation. 20 Competition authorities from around the world may disagree over substantive and procedural issues, but they all advocate competition. 21 Indeed the labels ‘pro-competitive’ and ‘anticompetitive’ are synonymous with socially beneficial and detrimental conduct.

Some policies that ostensibly restrict competition are justified for promoting competition. Intellectual property rights, for example, can restrict competition along some dimensions (such as the use of a trade name). But the belief is that intellectual property and antitrust policies, rather than conflict, complement one another in promoting innovation and competition. 22 Likewise, contractual non-compete clauses are justified for their pro-competitive benefits. 23

Given their faith in competition’s healing powers, antitrust officials and courts typically distrust complaints about competition. 24 They are rightfully wary when industry groups or other government agencies decry competition as ruinous or destructive. First, consumers can pay more for poorer quality products or services, and have fewer choices. Second, governmental or private restraints can raise exit costs and inhibit innovation. Third, economic regulation can attract special interest groups to lobby for regulations that benefit them to society’s detriment. Competitors, challenged by new rivals or new forms of competition, may turn to regulators for help. Competitors may ask governmental agencies under the guise of consumer protection to prohibit or restrict certain pro-competitive activity, such as discounts to their clients. They may enlist the government to increase trade barriers or for other protectionist measures. Such ‘rent-seeking’ behavior benefits lobbyists and lawyers, but can substantially waste scarce resources. Finally, impeding competition can cause significant anti-democratic outcomes, like concentrated economic and political power, political instability, and corruption. 25

Accordingly, antitrust officials are justly suspicious when regulatory bodies decide that a company’s entry would ‘tend to a destructive competition in markets already adequately served and would not be in the public interest’. 26 Such decisions are best left to consumers, not regulators.

As the previous section discusses, competition, given its virtues, is the backbone of US economic policy. But competition, while often praised, is also criticized. 27 One economic reality, as this section outlines, is that competition and antitrust law do not permeate all social and economic activity.

Activity not subject to competition

Life would be more stressful if we competed for everything. Competition cannot always be preferred over cooperation. Cooperation is often more appealing and socially rewarding. 28 Society and competitors at times benefit when rivals cooperate in joint ventures and addressing societal needs (such as supporting education for specific trades). The divide between cooperation and competition is beyond this article’s scope. 29 But one important issue is when competition makes people less cooperative, promotes selfishness and free-riding, reduces contributions to public goods, and leaves society worse off. 30

Social and religious norms exclude or curtail competition in many daily settings. Commuting to work, in theory, is not a competitive sport. Parents should not foster competition among their children for their affection. 31 None of the pleasurable daily or weekly activities (ie intimate relations, socializing after work, relaxing, dinner, lunch, praying/worship) necessarily implicate competition. 32 Parishioners are discouraged from competing for better pews and parking spaces. Nor do the mainstream religions endorse a deity who wants people to compete for His love.

Antitrust norms do not translate easily in these social or religious settings. For example, if private companies agree to not cold call each other’s employees for employment opportunities, they face antitrust liability. 33 Some religions arguably compete for new members. 34 But it is doubtful that religious leaders are liable for agreeing not to proselytize each other’s members and to share information to enforce such agreements. 35

Some goods and services are not subject to market competition. 36 Although a market may otherwise form between willing buyers and sellers, the country’s laws and informal norms prevent these markets’ formation or curtail the economic competition therein. One example is human organs. Among the concerns economist Alvin Roth identifies are (i) ‘objectification’ — pricing a thing or service moves it into a class of impersonal objects to which it does not belong [eg payment for organs transforms a good deed (donating one’s organs) into a bad one (marketing and selling one’s organs that violates human dignity)]; (ii) ‘coercion’—giving money ‘might leave some people, particularly the poor, open to exploitation from which they deserve protection’; and (iii) the ‘slippery slope’—monetizing transactions ‘may cause society to slide down a slippery slope to genuinely repugnant transactions’ [eg lenders use organs as collateral for debts, and opens up sale of body parts generally (including eyes, arms, legs, etc.)]. 37

This is not fixed. Markets once considered repugnant (eg lending money for interest, life insurance for adults) are no longer. Markets that are repugnant today (eg slavery), once were not.

Antitrust immunities

Surely it cannot be said … that competition is of itself a national policy. To do so would disregard not only those areas of economic activity so long committed to government monopoly as no longer to be thought open to competition, such as the post office, cf., e.g., 17 Stat. 292 (criminal offense to establish unauthorized post office; provision since superseded), and those areas, loosely spoken of as natural monopolies or-more broadly-public utilities, in which active regulation has been found necessary to compensate for the inability of competition to provide adequate regulation. It would most strikingly disregard areas where policy has shifted from one of prohibiting restraints on competition to one of providing relief from the rigors of competition, as has been true of railroads. 38

Some or all economic activity in various industries is expressly immunized from antitrust liability. 39 Other significant areas of the economy are subject to implied antitrust immunity. The Court’s state action doctrine, for example, reflects the realities of state and local governments’ displacing competition for other aims. 40

Noncommercial activities intended to promote social causes

any reason for putting in temperance societies any more than churches or school-houses or any other kind of moral or educational associations that may be organized. Such an association is not in any sense a combination arrangement made to interfere with interstate commerce. 42

Thus, the Sherman Act’s ‘trade or commerce’ element applies to transactions one can characterize as ‘business’ or ‘commercial’. 43 Several courts have held that if universities agree on the eligibility criteria for their student athletes, their eligibility rules are not subject to antitrust scrutiny. 44 Rather than intending to provide the universities with a commercial advantage, these rules governing recruiting, improper inducements, and academic fraud primarily seek ‘to ensure fair competition in intercollegiate athletics’. 45

Unfair methods of competition

on ethical, religious and social sources, American law has developed a minimum level or standard of ‘fairness’ in competitive rivalry. The law of unfair competition has developed as a kind of Marquis of Queensbury code for competitive infighting. To pursue the analogy, it would be equally as unacceptable for the contestants in a prize-fight to agree privately to ‘throw the fight’ as it would be for one contestant to insert a horseshoe in his glove. 48

In reviewing the section ‘Competition s acrificed’, the antitrust community would not quibble about eliminating or limiting competition in noncommercial activities. The antitrust community would debate over what constitutes fair and unfair methods of competition, but agree that not all methods of competition are desirable. The community would likely tolerate price and service regulations in some industries (eg natural monopolies) where competition is not feasible. 49 As for antitrust immunities, the consensus within the antitrust community is that they reflect the victory of special interest groups and the collective action problem of citizens. 50 Antitrust immunity is rarely a good thing, is rarely justifiable on the grounds of improving societal wellbeing, often outlives its intended purpose, and should be read ‘narrowly, with beady eyes and green eyeshades’. 51

The Sherman Act, embodying as it does a preference for competition, has been since its enactment almost an economic constitution for our complex national economy. A fair approach in the accommodation between the seemingly disparate goals of regulation and competition should be to assume that competition, and thus antitrust law, does operate unless clearly displaced. 52

In condemning private and public anti-competitive restraints, competition officials and courts invariably prescribe competition as the cure. Increasing competition ‘improves a country’s performance, opens business opportunities to its citizens and reduces the cost of goods and services throughout the economy’. 53 Competition, officials recognize, does not cure every market failure (such as from negative externalities or public goods). 54 Fierce competition ultimately may yield oligopolies or monopolies. But that is a function of market conditions, not competition itself. Competition itself cannot cause market failures.

first, each individual is the best judge of what subserves his own interest, and the motive of self-interest leads him to secure the maximum of well-being for himself; and, secondly, since society is merely the sum of individuals, the effort of each to secure the maximum of well-being for himself has as its necessary effect to secure thereby also the maximum of well-being for society as a whole. 55

Using the recent advances in behavioral economics, subsections ‘Behavioral exploitation’ and ‘Competitive escalation paradigm’ examine Fisher’s first assumption. Surveying some recent empirical economic work, subsections ‘When individual and group interests diverge’ and ‘When competition among intermediaries reduces accuracy’ examine Fisher’s second assumption.

Behavioral exploitation

Competition policy typically assumes that market participants can best judge what subserves their interests. 56 Once we relax the assumption of market participants’ rationality and willpower, then competition at times leaves consumers and society worse off. Suboptimal competition can arise when firms compete in fostering and exploiting demand-driven biases or imperfect willpower.

using framing effects and changing the reference point, such that the price change is viewed as a discount, rather than a surcharge; 59

anchoring consumers to an artificially high suggested retail price, from which bounded rational consumers negotiate; 60

adding decoy options (such as restaurant’s adding higher priced wine) to steer consumers to higher margin goods and services; 61

using the sunk cost fallacy to remind consumers of the financial commitment they already made to induce them to continue paying installments on items, whose value is less than the remainder of payments;

using the availability heuristic 62 to drive purchases, such as an airline travel insurer using an emotionally salient death (from ‘terrorist acts’) rather than a death from ‘all possible causes’; 63

using the focusing illusion in advertisements (ie consumers predicting greater personal happiness from consumption of the advertised good and not accounting one’s adaptation to the new product); 64 and

giving the impression that their goods and services are of better quality because they are higher priced 65 or based on one advertised dimension. 66

The credit card industry provides one example. Some consumers do not understand the complex, opaque ways late fees and interest rates are calculated, and are overoptimistic on their ability and willpower to timely pay off the credit card purchases. 67 They underestimate the costs of their future borrowings and overestimate their likelihood of switching to lower interest credit. 68 The consumers choose credit cards with lower annual fees (but higher financing fees and penalties) over better-suited products (eg credit cards with higher annual fees but lower interest rates and late payment penalties). 69

Rational companies can exploit consumers’ biases. 70 One former CEO, for example, explained how his credit card company targeted low-income customers ‘by offering “free” credit cards that carried heavy hidden fees’. 71 The former CEO explained how these ads targeted consumers’ optimism: ‘When people make the buying decision, they don’t look at the penalty fees because they never believe they’ll be late. They never believe they’ll be over limit, right?’ 72

For other credit card competitors, exploiting consumer biases makes more sense than incurring the costs to debias. 73 If a credit card issuer invests in educating consumers of the likely total costs of using the credit card, their bounded willpower, and their overconfidence, other competitors can free ride on the company’s educational efforts and quickly offer similar credit cards with lower fees. Alternatively, the debiased consumers do not remain with the helpful credit card company. Instead they switch to the remaining exploiting credit card firms, where they, along with the other sophisticated customers, benefit from the exploitation (such as getting airline miles for their purchases, while not incurring any late fees). 74 Under either scenario, debiasing reduces the credit card company’s profits, without offering any lasting competitive advantage. Consequently, the industry profits more in exploiting consumers’ bounded rationality. Naïve consumers will not demand better-suited products. Firms have little financial incentive to help naïve consumers choose better products. 75 Market supply skews toward products and services that exploit or reinforce consumers’ bounded willpower and rationality.

The most striking result of the literature so far is that increasing competition through fostering entry of more firms may not on its own always improve outcomes for consumers. Indeed competition may not help when there are at least some consumers who do not search properly or have difficulties judging quality and prices … In the presence of such consumers it is no longer clear that firms necessarily have an incentive to compete by offering better deals. Rather, they can focus on exploiting biased consumers who are very likely to purchase from them regardless of price and quality. These effects can be made worse through firms' deliberate attempts to make price comparisons and search harder (through complex pricing, shrouding, etc) and obscure product quality. The incentives to engage in such activities become more intense when there are more competitors. 76

It is important to note that once we relax the assumptions of rationality and willpower, it does not follow that competition ‘always’ yields suboptimal outcomes. 79 This suboptimal competition depends first on firms’ ability to identify and exploit consumers whose biases, heuristics, and willpower make them particularly vulnerable. Second, after identifying these consumers, firms must be able to exploit them. 80 Third, the payoff from exploiting must exceed the likely payoff from debiasing consumers. 81 Firms lack an incentive to debias if sophisticated consumers, for example, support the exploiting firms as the myopic consumers subsidize their perks. 82 Finally, naïve consumers cannot otherwise quickly debias by being provided information or otherwise learning from their errors and adjusting. Thus, with enough naïve consumers to profitably exploit in these markets, firms will compete in devising better ways to exploit them.

Consequently, both antitrust and consumer protection law can complement each other in promoting the opportunity for consumers to choose among the firms’ helpful solutions for their problems, while foreclosing suboptimal competition, where companies exploit consumers’ biases and imperfect willpower to the consumers’ and society’s detriment.

Competitive escalation paradigm

The previous subsection describes suboptimal competition to exploit consumers’ biases and imperfect willpower. But firms, like consumers, are also susceptible to biases and heuristics. In competitive settings—such as auctions and bidding wars—overconfidence and passion may trump reason, leading participants to overpay for the purchased assets. 83 Unlike demand-driven biases (eg overconfident consumers demanding inappropriate financial products), competition should check supply-driven biases. Consumers, in competitive markets, presumably punish firms’ costly biases by taking their business elsewhere. If repeated biased decision-making is not punished, the problem is too little, rather than too much, competition.

One exception is the competitive escalation paradigm, when ‘two parties engage in an activity that is clearly irrational in terms of the expected outcomes to both sides, despite the fact that it is difficult to identify specific irrational actions by either party’. 84 To demonstrate this paradigm, Professors Max Bazerman and Don Moore auction a $20 bill. 85 The auction proceeds in dollar increments. The highest bidder wins the $20 bill; but the second highest bidder, as the loser, must pay the auctioneer his or her bid. (So if the highest bid is $4, the winner receives $16; if the second highest bid is $3, the loser must pay $3 to the auctioneer.)

Bidding over $20 for a $20 bill is illogical. Given the cost of losing, it is also illogical to enter a bidding war. But if everyone believes this, no one bids—also illogical. If only one person bids, that person gets a bargain. Once multiple bidders emerge, the second highest bidder fears having to pay and escalates the commitment. As a result, the bidding in experiments with undergraduate students, graduate students, and executives ‘typically ends between $20 and $70, but hits $100 with some regularity’. 86

Bazerman and Moore analogize their experiment to merger contests. Competitors A and B, in their example, fear being competitively disadvantaged if the other acquires cheaply Company C, a key supplier or buyer. 87 Company C, worth $1 billion as a standalone company, is worth $1.2 billion under either Firm A’s or B’s ownership. If Firm A acquires Company C, then Firm B, having lost its key supplier or buyer, would be significantly disadvantaged, at an estimated cost of $500 million. The same applies to Firm A if Firm B acquires Company C. Firms A and B may rationally decide to enter the bidding contest. Both are better off if the other cannot acquire Company C, nonetheless neither can afford the other to acquire the firm. Firms A and B, to avoid the $0.5 billion loss, could escalate the bidding to around $1.7 billion. 88 One example of this competitive escalation paradigm, argue Bazerman and Moore, is when Johnson & Johnson and Boston Scientific overbid for Guidant. 89

Here clear antitrust standards can benefit the competitors. If they both know they cannot acquire Company C under the antitrust laws, neither will bid. Antitrust, while not always preventing the competitive escalation paradigm, can prevent overbidding in highly concentrated industries where market forces cannot punish firms that overbid.

When individual and group interests diverge

Suppose the first assumption Fisher identifies is satisfied—people aptly judge what serves their interest, which leads them to maximize their well-being. One avoids the problem of behavioral exploitation and perhaps the competitive escalation paradigm. Nonetheless, as this subsection discusses, competition can be suboptimal if the second key assumption Fisher identifies is relaxed—namely the effort of each person to secure well-being has as its necessary effect to maximize society’s overall well-being.

As Darwin saw clearly, the fact that unfettered competition in nature often fails to promote the common good has nothing to do with monopoly exploitation. Rather, it’s a simple consequence of an often sharp divergence between individual and group interests. 91

One area of suboptimal competition is where advantages and disadvantages are relative. 92 Frank used the bull elk as an example. It is in each elk’s interest to have relatively larger antlers to defeat other bull elks. But the larger antlers compromise the elks’ mobility, handicapping the group overall. 93

Hockey players are another example. Hockey players prefer wearing helmets. But to secure a relative competitive advantage, one player chooses to play without a helmet. The other players follow. None now have a competitive advantage from playing helmetless. Collectively the hockey players are worse off. 94 Fisher’s example involves patrons competing to exit a theater on fire; it is in each individual’s interest to get ahead of others, but ‘the very intensity of such efforts in the aggregate defeat their own ends’. 95

A recent example is Wall Street traders who inject testosterone to obtain a competitive advantage. 96 One study found that traders’ daily testosterone ‘was significantly higher on days when traders made more than their 1-month daily average than on other days’; the ‘results suggest that high morning testosterone predicts greater profitability for the rest of that day’. 97 Higher testosterone levels, studies found, increased ‘search persistence, appetite for risk, and fearlessness in the face of novelty, qualities that would augment the performance of any trader who had a positive expected return’. 98 Male and female traders, weighing the benefits and risks, can rationally decide to increase their testosterone levels to gain a competitive advantage over other traders (or at least not be competitively disadvantaged against higher testosterone traders). 99 However, as other traders undertake hormone treatments, the traders no longer enjoy a competitive advantage. They and society are collectively worse off. 100

Below are five additional scenarios where competition for a relative advantage can leave the competitors collectively and society worse off.

How individual and group interests can diverge when firms lobby for a relative competitive advantage

Today corporations and trade groups spend billions of dollars lobbying the federal and state governments. 101 Microsoft, for example, historically did little lobbying. 102 That changed after the United States filed its antitrust lawsuit. Microsoft now spends millions of dollars annually on lobbying. 103 Not surprisingly, given the recent antitrust scrutiny, Google spends even more on lobbying—$9,680,000 alone in 2011. 104

In this transactional spirit, some corporations have affirmatively urged Congress to place limits on their electioneering communications. These corporations fear that officeholders will shake them down for supportive ads, that they will have to spend increasing sums on elections in an ever-escalating arms race with their competitors, and that public trust in business will be eroded. A system that effectively forces corporations to use their shareholders' money both to maintain access to, and to avoid retribution from, elected officials may ultimately prove more harmful than beneficial to many corporations. It can impose a kind of implicit tax. 106

The competitive pressure to lobby for a relative advantage (or prevent a relative disadvantage) harms the firms collectively as they ‘feel compelled to keep up with their competitors, particularly in the face of a shakedown by elected officials who write the laws and regulations that corporations must follow on a daily basis’. 107 This arms race also undermines a democracy. 108 Part of the current malaise, the Occupy Wall Street movement reflects, is the distrust in government given its capture to special interests. 109

How individual and group interests can diverge when firms behave unethically for a relative competitive advantage

When presented with a list of possibly questionable actions that may help the business survive, 47 per cent of CFOs felt one or more could be justified in an economic downturn. Worryingly, 15 per cent of CFOs surveyed would be willing to make cash payments to win or retain business and 4 per cent view misstating a company's financial performance as justifiable to help a business survive. While 46 per cent of total respondents agree that company management is likely to cut corners to meet targets, CFOs have an even more pessimistic view (52 per cent). 110

invest less in legal compliance and more likely violate the law, 112

pay kickbacks to secure business, 113

underreport profits to avoid taxes, 114 and

manipulate the ordering protocols on liver transplants. 115

The studies’ underlying theme is that as competition increases, and profit margins decrease, firms have greater incentive to engage in unethical behavior that improves their costs (relative to competitors). Other firms, given the cost disadvantage, face competitive pressure to follow; such competition collectively leaves the firms and society worse off. 116

Not surprisingly the business literature currently argues for a ‘more sophisticated form of capitalism, one imbued with a social purpose’. 117 In the past, the concepts of sustainability, fairness, and profitability generally were seen as conflicting. But under a shared value worldview, these concepts are reinforcing. 118 Profits can be attained, not through a competitive race to the bottom, but in better helping address societal needs.

How individual and group interests can diverge when financial institutions undertake additional risk for a relative competitive advantage

First, the opacity and the long maturity of banks' assets make it easier to cover any misallocation of resources, at least in the short run. Second, the wide dispersion of bank debt among small, uninformed (and often fully insured) investors prevents any effective discipline on banks from the side of depositors. Thus, because banks can behave less prudently without being easily detected or being forced to pay additional funding costs, they have stronger incentives to take risk than firms in other industries. Examples of fraud and excessive risk are numerous in the history of financial systems as the current crisis has also shown. 119

An overleveraged financial institution can ignore the small probability that its risky conduct in conjunction with its competitors’ risky conduct may bring down the entire economy. 120 To gain additional profits and a competitive advantage, each firm will incur greater leverage. Even for rational-choice theorists like Richard Posner, the government must be a countervailing force to such self-interested rational private behavior by better regulating financial institutions. 121 Otherwise competition among rational self-interested ‘law-abiding financiers and consumers can precipitate an economic disaster’. 122

One may ask if competition is the problem, then is monopoly the cure. The remedy is neither monopoly nor overregulation (which besides impeding competition, stifles innovation and renders the financial system inefficient or unprofitable). But the remedy is not simply more competition, which can increase the financial system’s instability, as banks increase leverage and risk. 123 Instead, the financial industry must be ‘competitive enough to provide a range of services at a reasonable price for consumers, but [is] not prone to periods of excess competition, where risk is under priced (for example, to gain market share) and competitors fail as a result with systemic consequences’. 124

How individual and group interests can diverge when firms demand Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clauses for a relative competitive advantage

MFN clauses, the subject of two recent DOJ enforcement actions, are topical. 125 Some courts have embraced MFNs as pro-competitive. MFN clauses, Posner wrote, ‘are standard devices by which buyers try to bargain for low prices, by getting the seller to agree to treat them as favorably as any of their other customers’. 126 This ‘is the sort of conduct that the antitrust laws seek to encourage’. 127 Likewise, another court found that the MFN’s ‘insisting on a supplier's lowest price—assuming that the price is not “predatory” or below the supplier's incremental cost—tends to further competition on the merits’. 128 It seemed ‘silly’ to the court ‘to argue that a policy to pay the same amount for the same service is anticompetitive, even on the part of one who has market power. This, it would seem, is what competition should be all about’. 129

An individual customer may rationally wish to have advance notice of price increases, uniform delivered pricing, or most favored nation clauses available in connection with the purchase of antiknock compounds. However, individual purchasers are often unable to perceive or to measure the overall effect of all sellers pursuing the same practices with many buyers, and do not understand or appreciate the benefit of prohibiting the practices to improve the competitive environment … .a most favored nation clause is perceived by individual buyers to guarantee low prices; whereas widespread use of the clauses has the opposite effect of keeping prices high and uniform. In short, marketing practices that are preferred by both sellers and buyers may still have an anticompetitive effect. 131

What the appellate court failed to grasp is that MFNs—while individually rational—can be collectively irrational. 134 MFNs assure buyers that others during a specific time period will not pay a lower price. If the buyers fiercely compete, MFNs seemingly provide a relative cost advantage. The buyer need not expend time and expense to negotiate a lower price; it can free ride on other buyers’ efforts. It is in each buyer’s individual interest to secure this cost advantage; thus buyers may demand, and sellers may offer, MFN protection. 135 Competition drives buyers to demand MFN protection to lower their transaction costs; the number of buyers willing to invest in procuring a discount shrink. (Why should they uniquely incur the cost, when the benefits accrue to their rivals?) Accordingly, ‘buyer competition to obtain most-favored-customer protection, in the end, can cost buyers as a group’. 136

How individual and group interests can diverge when consumers compete for status

Status competition epitomizes competition for relative position among consumers with interdependent preferences. 137 The ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, 138 early Christian theologians, 139 and economists Adam Smith 140 and Thorstein Veblen 141 described how status competition is never won. Either people adapt to their fancier lifestyle, and envy those on the higher rung. 142 Or others catch up in their consumption (eg similarly large homes, extravagant parties), increasing the demand for conspicuous consumption or leisure that provide a relative advantage.

Despite status competition’s durability and prevalence, few praise it. C. S. Lewis, for example, observed that pride generally is the ‘essential vice’ and ‘complete anti-God state of mind’. 143 Pride is competition awry: ‘Pride is essentially competitive—is competitive by its very nature—while the other vices are competitive only, so to speak, by accident.’ 144 Pride, Lewis also wrote, ‘has been the chief cause of misery in every nation and every family since the world began’. 145

Status competition not only taxes individuals but society overall. 146 As economists that study subjective well-being conclude, ‘[h]igher-income aspirations reduce people’s satisfaction with life.’ 147 Wealthier people impose a negative externality on poorer people. 148 Antitrust norms, such as a per se prohibition of resale price maintenance for status goods, 149 are also difficult to reconcile with status competition where individual and collective interests can diverge to consumers’ and society’s detriment. 150

Status competition has confounded consumers and economists for centuries. John Maynard Keynes, for example, assumed that with greater productivity and higher living standards, people in developed economies would work only fifteen hours per week. 151 He identified two classes of needs—‘those needs which are absolute in the sense that we feel them whatever the situation of our fellow human beings may be, and those which are relative in the sense that we feel them only if their satisfaction lifts us above, makes us feel superior to, our fellows.’ 152 As its economy developed, Keynes predicted, society would deemphasize the importance of relative needs. 153

Much has been said of late about the importance of living the simple life, but so far as I know there has been no analysis to show why it is not lived. This analysis would reveal that the failure to live it is due to a kind of unconscious cut-throat competition in fashionable society. 155

Status competition is often, but not always, detrimental. On the bright side, people voluntarily compete and use Internet peer pressure to change their energy consumption, driving, and exercise habits. 156 But status competition is often suboptimal. One interesting empirical study sought to understand why academics cheated by inflating the number of times their papers were downloaded on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN). 157 SSRN ranks authors, their papers, and their academic institutions by the number of times the papers are downloaded. 158 Some authors repeatedly downloaded their own papers to inflate the publicly recorded download count. Why the deception? Status competition, the study found, was a key contributor. 159

a collective action problem, 160

a race to the bottom or regulatory arbitrage—where states compete away environmental, safety, and labor protections to obtain a relative advantage, 161 or

rational irrationality, whereby the ‘application of rational self-interest in the marketplace leads to an inferior and socially irrational outcome’. 162

Some may argue that these scenarios simply involve competitors’ imposing negative externalities on one another. Negative externalities typically involve ‘situations when the effect of production or consumption of goods and services imposes costs or benefits on others which are not reflected in the prices charged for the goods and services being provided’. 163 Even if one viewed competition itself as a negative externality that a competitor imposes on rivals, an important distinction exists. Firms—independent of any competitive pressure—at times impose a negative externality to maximize profits. For example, electric power utilities, whether or not a monopoly, will seek to maximize profits by polluting cheaply and having the community bear the environmental and health costs. In contrast, as this subsection discusses, competition induces the firm to impose a negative externality, which absent competitive pressure, the firm would ‘not’ otherwise impose. The utility monopoly, for example, may lobby to keep abay pesky environmentalists, but it would not expend resources on lobbying to secure a relative competitive advantage when its market power is otherwise secure.

When competition among intermediaries reduces accuracy

The previous subsection identifies five scenarios where competition for a relative advantage leaves the competitors and society worse off. This subsection discusses another race to the bottom, namely when consumers pressure an intermediary to shade its findings to the consumers’ liking, but society’s overall detriment. As competition increases in the intermediary’s market, more will be willing to distort their findings and reduce accuracy, which may appeal to the individual customers, but harms society overall.

Underlying democracies is the belief that competition fosters the marketplace of ideas: truth prevails in the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources. 164 Competition should, and often does, improve accuracy. 165

But competition can decrease accuracy when intermediaries, who monitor or report market participants’ businesses, property, goods, services, or behavior, also compete for the market participants’ business. One cannot characterize this simply as an incentives problem, whereby the intermediary shades its findings to the customers’ liking because the customer pays for the service. For if the problem were attributable primarily to misaligned incentives, then the problem would arise in duopolies, and be unaffected by entry and increased competition. Here, misaligned incentives play an important role, but so do increased entry and competition. 166 The concern is that competition increases the pressure on intermediaries to engage in unethical behavior.

This subsection discusses two industries, where, as recent economic studies found, greater competition yielded more unethical conduct among intermediaries. But this problem can arise in other markets as well. Home appraisers, pressured by threats of losing business to competitors, inflate their valuations to the benefit of real estate brokers (who gain higher commissions) and lenders (who make bigger loans and earn greater returns when selling them to investors). 167 Facing competitive pressure, lawyers can also adopt ‘a stronger adversarial and client-centered approach in the hope that this stance will be rewarded by clients' preferences’; more complaints about lawyer misconduct ensue. 168 Thus markets where intermediaries can manipulate information and test results can enjoy greater efficiency with less competition.

Ratings industry

(i) to measure the credit risk of an obligor and help to resolve the fundamental information asymmetry between issuers and investors, (ii) to provide a means of comparison of embedded credit risk across issuers, instruments, countries and over time; and (iii) to provide market participants with a common standard or language to use in referring to credit risk. 169

The growth and development of the market in structured finance and associated increase in securitisation activity occurred at a time when Fitch Ratings was becoming a viable competitor to Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, in effect, breaking up the duopoly the two [rating agencies] had previously enjoyed. The increased competition resulted in significant ratings grade inflation as the agencies competed for market share. Importantly, the ratings inflation was attributable not to the valuation models used by the agencies, but rather to systematic departures from those models, as the agencies made discretionary upward adjustments in ratings in efforts to retain or capture business, a direct consequence of the issuer-pays business model and increased concentration among investment banks. Issuers could credibly threaten to take their business elsewhere. 175

unveiled a new credit-rating model that Wall Street banks used to sow the seeds of their own demise. The formula allowed securities firms to sell more top-rated, subprime mortgage-backed bonds than ever before. A week later, Standard & Poor's moved to revise its own methods. An S&P executive urged colleagues to adjust rating requirements for securities backed by commercial properties because of the ‘threat of losing deals’. The world's two largest bond-analysis providers repeatedly eased their standards as they pursued profits from structured investment pools sold by their clients, according to company documents, e-mails and interviews with more than 50 Wall Street professionals. It amounted to a ‘market-share war where criteria were relaxed,’ says former S&P Managing Director Richard Gugliada. 177

In 2006 alone, Moody’s put its triple-A stamp of approval on 30 mortgage-related securities every working day. The results were disastrous: 83% of the mortgage securities rated triple-A that year ultimately were downgraded. 182

Even in the staid world of corporate bonds, increased competition among the ratings agencies led to a worse outcome. One empirical economic study looked at corporate bond and issuer ratings between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s. During this period, Fitch Ratings shook up the S&P/Moody’s duopoly by substantially increasing its share of corporate bond ratings. 183 It was Moody’s and S&P’s policy to rate essentially all taxable corporate bonds publicly issued in the USA. So Moody’s and S&P, under their policy, should have had little incentive to inflate their ratings for corporate bonds: ‘even if an issuer refuses to pay for a rating, the raters publish it anyway as an unsolicited rating and thereby compromise any potential advantage of ratings shopping’. 184 But even here, as competition intensified, ratings quality for corporate bonds and issuers deteriorated with more AAA ratings by S&P and Moody’s, and greater inability of the ratings to explain bond yields and predict defaults. 185

Consequently, increased competition among the ratings agencies, rather than improve ratings quality, reduced quality to society’s detriment. It is now the subject of lawsuits—with allegations that the financial institutions, by ‘play[ing] the [rating] agencies off one another’ and choosing the agency offering the highest percentage of AAA certificates with the least amount of credit enhancements, ‘engender[ed] a race to the bottom in terms of rating quality’. 186 The authors of the ratings study concluded that ‘competition most likely weakens reputational incentives for providing quality in the ratings industry and, thereby, undermines quality. The reputational mechanism appears to work best at modest levels of competition.’ 187

Automotive emissions testing centers

Another recent economic study empirically tested whether more competition among New York’s vehicle emissions testing centers led to a worse outcome—namely testing centers improperly passing vehicles ‘to garner more consumer loyalty for delivering to consumers what they want: a passing Smog Check result’. 188

In New York, like other states, automobile owners must have their vehicles periodically tested for pollution control. Owners can choose which private testing center to check their auto’s compliance with the environmental emission standards. In this market, the government fixed the price of emission testing. So the testing centers competed along non-price dimensions (such as quick testing and passing vehicles that otherwise should flunk). 189 Car owners could retest any failing car at another facility. Moreover, car owners received a one-year waiver if they spent $450 and the vehicle continued to fail. ‘With these limitations, the short-term benefit of failing a vehicle pales in comparison to the long-term benefit of retaining the customer’s service and repair business.’ 190

Under such pressure, firms that strictly follow legal rules may lose considerable market share as customers flee to more lax firms. When competition increases the threat of customer loss, firms are more likely to respond by matching their rivals’ behavior and crossing legal boundaries. 194

Antitrust typically treats entrants as superheroes in deterring or defeating the exercise of market power. Here entrants, the study found, were likelier the villains. New vehicle testing entrants with limited customer bases were ‘more likely than incumbents to be lenient in the face of competition’. 195 Entrants, rather than remedy market failure, contributed to it. 196

Policy makers must consider whether competition is the ideal market structure when corruption, fraud, or other unethical behaviors yield competitive advantages. If customers indeed demand illicit dimensions of quality, firms may feel compelled to cross ethical and legal boundaries simply to survive, often in response to the unethical behavior of just a few of their rivals. In markets with such potential, concentration with abnormally high prices and rents may be preferable, given the reduced prevalence of corruption. 197

The Supreme Court recognized that competition could increase vice. But equating ‘competition with deception, like the similar equation with safety hazards’, was for the Court ‘simply too broad’. 198 The Court was willing to assume that competition was ‘not entirely conducive to ethical behavior’ but that was ‘not a reason, cognizable under the Sherman Act, for doing away with competition’. 199 The Court was unwilling to support ‘a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable’. 200

This article agrees that a ‘suboptimal competition’ defense is premature. This article simply examines the initial issue of whether competition in a market economy is always good. If, as this article explores, the answer is no, a separate institutional issue is whether we should allow private parties to deal with these types of failures or whether legislation is required. Once antitrust officials recognize that market competition produces at times suboptimal results, the debate shifts to whether the problem of suboptimal competition can be better resolved privately (by perhaps relaxing antitrust scrutiny to private restraints) or with additional governmental regulations (which in turn raises issues over the form of the regulation and who should regulate). Even if one concludes that private restraints were the solution, the economic literature has not developed sufficiently an analytical framework for courts and agencies to apply, consistent with the rule of law, a suboptimal competition defense. Nor is it necessarily superior that independent agencies or courts (rather than elected officials) determine which industries receive a suboptimal competition defense, when, and under what circumstances. Society may prefer that the more publicly accountable elected officials, despite the risk of rent-seeking, should decide when competition is suboptimal.

Accordingly, antitrust officials should continue to advocate competition and challenge private and public anti-competitive restraints. But competition in a market economy, while often good, is not always good. The economic literature draws into question the competition official’s traditional remedy of more competition. The literature should prompt officials to inquire when competition promotes behavioral exploitation, unethical behavior, and misery.

Some may fear this weakens competition advocacy, as rent-seekers will use the exceptions described herein to restrict socially beneficial competition. But to effectively advocate competition, officials must understand when more competition is the problem, not the cure. In better understanding these instances when competition does more harm than good, antitrust officials can more effectively debunk claims of suboptimal competition. By undertaking this inquiry, antitrust officials become smarter and better advocates.

I wish to thank for their helpful comments the participants at Oxford University and George Washington University’s Antitrust Enforcement Symposium and the Midwest Law and Economics Association’s Annual Meeting, Luca Arnaudo, Caron Beaton-Wells, Kenneth Davidson, John Davies, Harry First, Franklin Fisher, Thomas Horton, Max Huffman, Christopher Leslie, Stephen Martin, Jochen Meulman, Anne-Lise Sibony, Randy Stutz, Henry Su, and Spencer Weber Waller. I also thank the University of Tennessee College of Law for the summer research grant.

1 Flash Eurobarometer, Entrepreneurship in the EU and beyond, Flash EB Series #283 (May 2010) 11 [American respondents ‘were more likely than EU citizens and Chinese respondents to say they were risk-takers and liked competition (77%-82%); in comparison, the proportions for EU citizens were 55%-65% and for Chinese respondents, 65%-69%’], 88 [‘Respondents in the US most frequently agreed that they liked situations in which they competed with others (77%, in total, agreed and 41% “‘strongly agreed”) ’].

2 See, eg George S Patton (‘Battle is the most magnificent competition in which a human being can indulge. It brings out all that is best; it removes all that is base.’) < http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/g/georgespa143694.html > accessed 7 January 2013.

3 Standard Oil Co v FTC 340 US 231, 248 (1951); see also Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations (April 2007) 2 < http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/toc.htm > accessed 7 January 2013 (‘free-market competition is, and has long been, the fundamental economic policy of the United States’); Report to the President and the Attorney General of the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures (1979) 177 [hereinafter 1979 Antitrust Report ]; The Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955) 1 (‘Most Americans have long recognized that opportunity for free market access and fostering of market rivalry are basic tenets of our faith in competition as a form of economic organization.’) [hereinafter 1955 Antitrust Report ]; see also European Commission, Competition, in Glossary of Terms Used in EU Competition Policy: Antitrust and Control of Concentrations (July 2002) (describing ‘[f]air and undistorted competition’ as ‘a cornerstone of a market economy’).

4 The agency’s advocate for competition for each procuring activity is responsible for, inter alia, ‘challenging barriers to, and promoting full and open competition in, the procurement of property and services by the executive agency’ and identifying ‘opportunities and actions taken to achieve full and open competition in the procurement activities of the executive agency’. 41 USC s 1705.

5 World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets (2002) 133; Paul Crampton, Head, Outreach Unit, Competition Division, OECD, ‘Competition and Efficiency as Organising Principles for All Economic and Regulatory Policymaking’, Prepared for the First Meeting of the Latin American Competition Forum (7–8 April 2003) 2 (advocating ‘competition and efficiency [as the] policy “glue” that links and binds all economic and regulatory decision-making into a coherent framework’).

6 China viewed, until the late 1970s, the term competition pejoratively as a ‘capitalist monster.’ Xiaoye Wang, ‘The New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: A Survey of a Work in Progress’ (2009) 54 Antitrust Bull 579, 580. Now China, Russia, and India have competition laws.

7 International Competition Network, Advocacy and Competition Policy—Report prepared by the Advocacy Working Group, for the ICN’s Conference Naples, Italy, 2002 (2002) xi.

8 Crampton (n 3) 3.

9 N Pac Ry Co v US 356 US 1, 4 (1958).

10 Advocacy Working Group, Int’l Competition Network, ‘Advocacy Toolkit Part I: Advocacy Process and Tools’, presented at the 10th Annual Conference of the ICN, The Hague (May 2011) 5 < http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/working-groups/current/advocacy.aspx > accessed 7 January 2013 (‘When they engage in competition advocacy, competition agencies may aim to [1] persuade other public authorities not to adopt unnecessarily anticompetitive measures and help them clearly to delineate the boundaries of economic regulation [2] increase awareness of the benefits of competition, and of the role competition law and policy can play in promoting and protecting welfare enhancing competition wherever possible, among economic agents, public authorities, the judicial system and the public at large.’).

11 Stamatakis Indus, Inc v King 965 F 2d 469, 471 (7th Cir 1992), citing Edward A Snyder and Thomas E Kauper, ‘Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff’ (1991) 90 Mich L Rev 551.

12 Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, US Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div, Competition Policy in Distressed Industries, Remarks Prepared for ABA Antitrust Symposium: Competition as Public Policy (13 May 2009) 9, < http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245857.htm > accessed 7 January 2013; see also Joaquín Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy, ‘Competition Policy as a Pan-European Effort’ (2 October 2012) SPEECH/12/672, < http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/672 > accessed 7 January 2013.

13 Shapiro (ibid) 2: ‘The current crisis provides no basis for wavering from this core principle, which has enjoyed bipartisan support since the Sherman Act was passed in 1890.’

14 Composite Marine Propellers, Inc v Van Der Woude 962 F 2d 1263, 1268 (7th Cir 1992) (‘Competition is ruthless, unprincipled, uncharitable, unforgiving-and a boon to society, Adam Smith reminds us, precisely because of these qualities that make it a bane to other producers.’).

15 Maurice E Stucke, ‘What is Competition?’ in Daniel Zimmer (ed), The Goals Of Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012); Maurice E Stucke, ‘Reconsidering Competition’ (2011) 81 Mississippi LJ 107.

16 Douglass C North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton University Press 2005) 52; RH Coase, ‘The Institutional Structure of Production’ (1992) 82 Am Econ Rev 713, 717–18; FA Hayek in Bruce Caldwell (ed), The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents – The Definitive Edition (University of Chicago Press 2007) 87: Competition ‘depends, above all, on the existence of an appropriate legal system, a legal system designed both to preserve competition and to make sure it operates as beneficially as possible.’

17 High entry barriers, as John Davies illustrated to me with the example below, are also consistent with suboptimal competition. In most markets, one assumes that if a merger reduces choice in a way that damages consumer welfare, that creates an opportunity for a choice-restoring entrant. However, at times, the degree of choice does not evolve in a market, but is imposed. Suppose there are two types of grocery chains–high quality/high price gourmet supermarkets and every-day-low-price/low-service supermarkets. Suppose a town has two supermarkets: A (gourmet) and B (discounter). Suppose C (a chain of discount supermarkets) buys Chain A, and finds it more profitable to change A’s product offering to C’s private label in all the Chain A supermarkets. Now the town has two deep-discount supermarkets: Chains B and C. In some countries, like the UK, the available space (under the land planning system) for supermarkets is limited. Entry will not correct the local worsening of the choice available to consumers, and reduction in aggregate consumer welfare. A competition agency, however, would unlikely challenge the supermarket merger, as competition will likely increase, not decrease, post-merger. Indeed, instead of the weak competition between the highly differentiated high-end Supermarket A and low-end offerings of Supermarket B, the town now enjoys head-to-head competition in the same discount segment. But there is a loss of choice. Some consumers preferred A’s high-end offering. Many—probably most—will have shopped at both stores, for different items. All of those people have lost some welfare. As Davies observed, this scenario may be unique to industries like retail chain mergers, when the new owners change the products on sale immediately to match its house brands, which may not hold true of other types of goods and services. But Davies raises an interesting example where competition increases but consumer welfare decreases. Another example is competition among producers of harmful goods. See, eg Daniel A Crane, ‘Harmful Output in the Antitrust Domain: Lessons from the Tobacco Industry’ (2005) 39 Ga L Rev 321, 409.

18 Nat'l Soc of Prof'l Engineers v US 435 US 679, 695 (1978).

19 AMC Report (n 3) 2–3; World Bank (n 5) 133; David J Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (OUP 1998) 242–45; 1979 Antitrust Report (n 3) 178–79; 1955 Antitrust Report (n 3) 1–2, 317–18; William J Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, US Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div, ‘The Role of Competition in Promoting Dynamic Markets and Economic Growth’ (12 November 2002), 2002 WL 34170825 (DOJ) (‘The competition for capital and other resources by firms throughout the economy leads to money and resources flowing away from weak, uncompetitive sectors and firms and towards the strongest, most competitive sectors, and to the strongest and most competitive firms within those sectors. In these ways, the very operation of the competitive process makes decisions on restructuring clear, and leads to the strongest and most competitive economy possible.’).

20 James C Cooper and others, ‘Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the FTC’ (2005) 72 Antitrust LJ 1091, 1093 n6 (charting the shifts in FTC advocacy filings between 1980 and 2004).

21 Advocacy Working Group, Int’l Competition Network, ‘Advocacy and Competition Policy Report’ (2002) 25 < http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc358.pdf > accessed 7 January 2013 (‘Competition advocacy refers to those activities conducted by the competition authority related to the promotion of a competitive environment for economic activities by means of non-enforcement mechanisms, mainly through its relationship with other governmental entities and by increasing public awareness of the benefits of competition’).

22 US Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, ‘Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition’ (2007) 1, 2, < www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.htm > accessed 7 January 2013 (‘intellectual property law's grant of exclusivity was seen as creating monopolies that were in tension with antitrust law's attack on monopoly power. Such generalizations are relegated to the past. Modern understanding of these two disciplines is that intellectual property and antitrust laws work in tandem to bring new and better technologies, products, and services to consumers at lower prices. . . . Both spur competition among rivals to be the first to enter the marketplace with a desirable technology, product, or service.’); Christopher R Leslie, ‘Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy’ (2009) 34 J Corp Law 1259 (discussing how antitrust and IP law are ‘neither always in tension nor always complementary’ but intertwined components of an overall innovation policy that maximizes both static and dynamic competition).

23 Lektro-Vend Corp v Vendo Co 660 F 2d 255, 265 (7th Cir 1981) (‘The recognized benefits of reasonably enforced noncompetition covenants are by now beyond question.’); US v Addyston Pipe & Steel Co 85 F 271, 281-82 (6th Cir 1898), aff'd as modified, 175 US 211 (1899).

24 See, eg US v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co 310 US 150, 220–21 (1940) (‘Ruinous competition, financial disaster, evils of price cutting and the like appear throughout our history as ostensible justifications for price-fixing.’); Addyston Pipe & Steel , 175 US at 213–14 (defendants defending their bid rigging ‘for the purpose of avoiding the great losses they would otherwise sustain, due to ruinous competition’). But in Appalachian Coals, Inc v United States , the Court held that the competitors’ proposed price-fixing did not violate the Sherman Act if the horizontal restraints were not detrimental to the Court’s conception of ‘fair competition’. 288 US 344, 373 (1933). The coal producers were confronted with the oversupply of coal, exacerbated in part by certain ‘destructive’ trade practices, such as buyers dumping ‘distressed’ coal (due in part to lack of storage facilities) onto the market. In response to industry conditions, coal producers proposed an exclusive selling agent to enable the former competing producers to fix the coal prices.

25 Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (Crown Business 2012) 3–4; World Bank (n 5) 135.

26 Farmland Dairies v Comm’r of New York State Dept of Agric & Markets 650 F Supp 939, 943 (EDNY 1987) [quoting Commissioner’s Determination, State of New York Department of Agriculture and Markets 21 (11 December 1986)].

27 See, eg Blankenship v Lewis County Fiscal Court Civ Act No 06-147-EBA, 2007 WL 4404165 (ED Ky 17 December 2007) (county government denying plaintiff permit to collect and haul away residents’ waste ‘on the grounds that permitting additional waste hauling businesses to operate in Lewis County would create too much competition for the existing seven businesses providing that service to the community’).

28 Jean Decety and others, ‘The Neural Bases of Cooperation and Competition: an fMRI Investigation’ (2004) 23 NeuroImage 744, 749 (finding that while cooperation and competition activated the frontoparietal network and anterior insula, ‘distinct regions were found to be selectively associated with cooperation and competition, notably the orbitofrontal cortex in the former and the inferior parietal and medial prefrontal cortices in the latter.’).

29 Saul Levmore, ‘Competition and Cooperation’ (1998) 97 Michigan L Rev 216.

30 Stefania Ottone and Ferruccio Ponzano, ‘Competition and Cooperation in Markets: The Experimental Case of a Winner-take-all Setting’ (2010) 39 J of Socio-Economics 163, 169–70 (finding that in winner-take-all scenario where subjects with homogeneous skills meet more than once stimulates greater cooperation than subjects in a perfect competition scenario); Claudia Canegallo and others, ‘Competition Versus Cooperation: Some Experimental Evidence’ (2008) 37 J of Socio-Economics 18, 24–25 (finding ‘the presence and the degree of competition in the economic environment significantly affect the willingness of individuals to cooperate, in a negative relation’).

31 The American Academy of Pediatrics, Caring for Your School-Age Child: Ages 5 to 12 (Bantam 1999) 367–72.

32 Daniel Kahneman and Alan B Krueger, ‘Development in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being’ (2006) 20 J of Economic Perspectives 3, 13.

33 Compl , US v Adobe Systems, Inc , Civ Act No 1:10-cv-01629 (DDC filed 24 September 2010) < http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f262600/262650.htm > accessed 7 January 2013.

34 Daniel M Hungerman, ‘Rethinking the Study of Religious Markets’ in Rachel McCleary (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Religion (OUP 2010) 257–75.

35 Joint International Commission for the Theological Dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church VIIth Plenary Session, Balamand School of Theology (Lebanon) (17–24 June 1993) < http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/ch_orthodox_docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_19930624_lebanon_en.html > accessed 7 January 2013 (‘Pastoral activity in the Catholic Church, Latin as well as Oriental, no longer aims at having the faithful of one Church pass over to the other; that is to say, it no longer aims at proselytizing among the Orthodox. It aims at answering the spiritual needs of its own faithful and it has no desire for expansion at the expense of the Orthodox Church. Within these perspectives, so that there will be no longer place for mistrust and suspicion, it is necessary that there be reciprocal exchanges of information about various pastoral projects and that thus cooperation between bishops and all those with responsibilities in our Churches, can be set in motion and develop.’), but see Barak D Richman, ‘Saving the First Amendment from Itself: Relief from the Sherman Act Against the Rabbinic Cartels’ (21 April 2012) Pepperdine L Rev, Forthcoming < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1808005 > accessed 7 January 2013 (discussing antitrust challenge of the Conservative Judaism movement’s rules governing the rabbi hiring process).

36 Alvin E Roth, ‘Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets’ (2007) 21 J of Economic Perspectives 37–58; Michael J Sandel, ‘What Isn’t for Sale’ The Atlantic (April 2002) < http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/04/what-isnt-for-sale/308902/ > accessed 7 January 2013.

37 Roth (ibid) 44–45; Dan Bilefsky, ‘European Crisis Bolsters Illegal Sales of Body Parts’ N Y Times (1 June 2012) < http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/europe/european-crisis-bolsters-illegal-sales-of-body-parts.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 > accessed 7 January 2013; French Civil Code Art 16-1 (‘Everyone has the right to respect for his body. The human body is inviolable. The human body, its elements and its products may not form the subject of a patrimonial right.’) and Art 16-5 (‘Agreements that have the effect of bestowing a patrimonial value to the human body, its elements or products are void.’).

38 FCC v RCA Communications 346 US 86, 92 (1953).

39 Maurice E Stucke and Allen P Grunes, ‘Why More Antitrust Immunity for the Media is a Bad Idea’ (2011) 105 Northwestern U L Rev 1399, 1401–2 (citing US statutory antitrust exemptions for newspapers, agriculture, export activities, insurance, labor, fishing, defense preparedness, professional sports, small business joint ventures, and local governments).

40 City of Lafayette, La v Louisiana Power & Light Co 435 US 389, 413 (1978) (‘ Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service.’); State Corporation Commission, Commonwealth of Virginia, Application of Beneficial Finance Corp, Case No 20095 (24 August 1979), 1979 SCC Ann Rept 399 (Va Corp Com), 1979 WL 4763 (Va Corp Com) 4 (noting how Virginia amended its small loan licensing statute with a ‘convenience and advantage’ clause to limit entry ‘so that the aims of the state's small loan acts might not be subverted by the supposed harmful consequences of having too many lenders and too much competition.’).

41 Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc v Hamilton College 128 F 3d 59, 63 (2nd Cir 1997).

42 21 Cong Rec 2658–59 (1890); see also Harry First, ‘Private Interest and Public Control: Government Action, The First Amendment, and the Sherman Act’ (1975) 1975 Utah L Rev 9, 13 n38; State of Mo v Nat'l Org for Women, Inc 620 F2d 1301, 1309 (8th Cir 1980) (‘it was the competitors in commerce that Senator Sherman had in mind as the concern of his bill, not noncompetitors motivated socially or politically in connection with legislation’).

43 See, eg Bassett v NCAA No 06-5795, 2008 US App LEXIS 12248, 2008 WL 2329755 (6th Cir 9 June 2008); United States v Brown Univ 5 F 3d 658, 665 (3d Cir 1993) (finding it ‘axiomatic that section one of the Sherman Act regulates only transactions that are commercial in nature’); Donnelly v Boston Coll 558 F2d 634, 635 (1st Cir 1977) (defendants' law school activities do not have ‘commercial objectives’).

44 See, eg Smith v NCAA 139 F 3d 180, 185 (3rd Cir 1998). Smith also included a Title IX claim, which the Third Circuit allowed to proceed. Smith sought certiorari to review the dismissal of her Sherman Act claim, and the NCAA sought certiorari to review the Third Circuit’s treatment of the Title IX claim. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Third Circuit’s analysis under Title IX. NCAA v Smith 525 US 459 (1999). However, the Court denied certiorari on the Sherman Act claim, allowing that decision by the Third Circuit to stand. ibid 464 n2.

45 Bassett v NCAA 528 F 3d 426, 433 (6th Cir 2008) [quoting Smith v NCAA 139 F 3d 180, 185 (3rd Cir 1998)]. Other courts, however, have applied the Sherman Act to regulations designed to preserve amateurism and fair competition in university athletics, but upheld them under the rule of reason. See, eg Justice v Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n 577 F Supp 356, 382 (D Ariz 1983).

In trying to drape themselves in the mantle of free competition, defendants are disingenuous. Their decision to simulate plaintiffs' trade dress yields society no benefits. . . . Above-board competition directed at factors such as quality and price is in society's interests. Obtaining sales by facilitating passing off is not. The effect of defendants' copying of [Plaintiffs’ trade dress] is that sales earned by plaintiffs through hard work are lost to pharmacist greed. The Lanham Act and New Jersey common law embody society's belief that that form of ‘competition’ is socially undesirable, and may be restrained.

47 See, eg Federal Trade Commission Act s 5, as amended, 15 USCA s 45; TianRui Group Co Ltd v Int'l Trade Comm'n 661 F 3d 1322, 1323–24 (Fed Cir 2011) (concluding that the International Trade Commission has statutory authority to investigate and grant relief based in part on extraterritorial conduct insofar as it is necessary to protect domestic industries from injuries arising out of unfair competition in the domestic marketplace); Dee Pridgen and Richard M Alderman, Consumer Protection and the Law (West 2011) vol 1; Hazel Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts (OUP 2001); Tony Weir, Economic Torts (OUP 1997) 3 (‘the requirement that the means (as opposed to the end) be wrongful (as opposed to generally deplorable) is entirely correct, sensible and practical’).

48 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (4th edn, West 2012) vol 1, s 1:23.

49 See, eg Lancaster Cmty Hosp v Antelope Valley Hosp Dist 940 F 2d 397, 402 n9 (9th Cir 1991) (‘This court, in considering whether a state has intended to displace competition with regulation, seems to have considered whether competition is generally thought to be a viable alternative to regulation in the relevant sphere of economic activity. In cases involving paradigmatic natural monopolies, we have more readily found that the legislature has intended to displace competition with regulation.’); Almeda Mall, Inc v Houston Lighting & Power Co 615 F 2d 343, 355 (5th Cir 1980) (‘These industries are regulated precisely because it has been determined that competition either cannot or should not prevail there. Thus, the regulatory scheme not only seeks to act as a surrogate for competition, but may, for public interest reasons, affirmatively seek to exclude competition from the marketplace.’) [quoting Watson and Brunner, ‘Monopolization by Regulated ‘Monopolies’: The Search for Substantive Standards’ (1977) 22 Antitrust Bull 559, 566–69].

50 James C Cooper and William E Kovacic, ‘U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition’ (2010) 90 BU L Rev 1555, 1582.

51 Chi Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v Nat’l Basketball Ass’n 961 F 2d 667, 671−72 (7th Cir 1992); Stucke and Grunes (n 39) 1401–4.

52 Essential Communications Sys, Inc v Am Tel & Tel Co 610 F 2d 1114, 1117 (3d Cir 1979).

53 OECD, ‘Competition Assessment Toolkit version 2.0, Principles’ (2011) 3.

54 Shapiro (n 12) (‘In terms of the classic categories of market failure from the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, most regulations – including environmental regulations, health and safety regulations, and consumer protection regulations – primarily address problems of externalities, public goods, and imperfect information. Competition policy primarily addresses the problem of market power.’).

55 Irving Fisher, ‘Why Has the Doctrine of Laissez Faire Been Abandoned?’ Science (4 January 1907) 19.

56 Amanda P Reeves and Maurice E Stucke, ‘Behavioral Antitrust’ (2011) 86 Indiana LJ 1527, 1545–53.

57 See SCFC ILC, Inc v Visa USA, Inc 36 F 3d 958, 965 (10th Cir 1994) {‘If the structure of the market is such that there is little potential for consumers to be harmed, we need not be especially concerned with how firms behave because the presence of effective competition will provide a powerful antidote to any effort to exploit consumers.’ [quoting George A Hay, ‘Market Power in Antitrust’ (1992) 60 Antitrust LJ 807, 808]}.

58 See, eg Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Servs, Inc 504 US 451, 474 n21 (1992) (noting that ‘in an equipment market with relatively few sellers, competitors may find it more profitable to adopt Kodak’s service and parts policy than to inform the consumers’); FTC v RF Keppel & Bro, Inc 291 US 304, 308, 313 (1934) (finding that while competitors ‘reluctantly yielded’ to the challenged practice to avoid loss of trade to their competitors, a ‘trader may not, by pursuing a dishonest practice, force his competitors to choose between its adoption or the loss of their trade’); Ford Motor Co v FTC 120 F 2d 175, 179 (6th Cir 1941) (Ford following industry leader General Motors in advertising a deceptive 6 per cent financing plan); Matthew Bennett and others, ‘What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Competition Policy?’ (2010) 6 Competition Pol’y Int’l 111, 118; Eliana Garcés - Tolon, ‘The Impact of Behavioral Economics on Consumer and Competition Policies’ (2010) 6 Competition Pol’y Int’l 145, 150; Max Huffman, ‘Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust’ (2012) 78 Antitrust LJ 105, 134 (‘consciously parallel behavioral exploitation is the nearly industry-wide policy of unbundling charges for checked bags in airline travel’).

59 Steffen Huck and others, ‘Consumer Behavioural Biases in Competition: A Survey, Final Report for the OFT’ (May 2011) para 2.5 [hereinafter OFT Report], < www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/research/OFT1324.pdf > accessed 7 January 2013 .

60 In one experiment, MBA students put down the last two digits of their social security number (SSN) (eg 14). Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (HarperCollins 2008) 25–28. The students, then participants, monetized it (eg $14), and then answered for each bidded item ‘Yes or No’ if they would pay that amount for the item. The students then stated the maximum amount they were willing to pay for each auctioned product. Students with the highest ending SSN (80–99) bid 216 to 346 per cent higher than students with low-end SSNs (1–20), who bid the lowest; see also Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011) 119–28 (discussing anchoring effects generally).

61 Similarly, people ‘rarely choose things in absolute terms’, but instead based on their relative advantage to other things. Ariely (ibid) 2–6. By adding a third more expensive choice, for example, the marketer can steer consumers to a more expensive second choice. MIT students, in one experiment, were offered three choices for the Economist magazine: (i) Internet-only subscription for $59 (16 students); (ii) print-only subscriptions for $125 (no students); and (iii) print-and-Internet subscriptions for $125 (84 students). When the ‘decoy’ second choice (print-only subscriptions) was removed and only the first and third options were presented, the students did not react similarly. Instead 68 students opted for Internet-only subscriptions for $59 (up from 16 students) and only 32 students chose print-and-Internet subscriptions for $125 (down from 84 students).

62 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ Science (27 September 1974) 1127 (noting situations where people assess the ‘frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind’).

63 See generally Eric J Johnson and others, ‘Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions’ (1993) 7 J Risk & Uncertainty 35.

64 Kahneman (n 60) 402–7.

65 Ariely conducted several experiments that revealed the power of higher prices. Ariely (n 60) 181–86. In one experiment, nearly all the participants reported less pain after taking a placebo priced at $2.50 per dose; when the placebo was discounted to $0.10 per dose, only half of the participants experienced less pain. Similarly, MIT students who paid regular price for the ‘SoBe Adrenaline Rush’ beverage reported less fatigue than the students who paid one-third of regular price for the same drink. SoBe Adrenaline Rush beverage was next promoted as energy for the students’ mind, and students after drinking the placebo, had to solve as many word puzzles as possible within thirty minutes. Students who paid regular price for the drink got on average nine correct responses, versus students who paid a discounted price for the same drink got on average 6.5 questions right.

66 OFT Report (n 59) para 3.130.

67 Stefano DellaVigna, ‘Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field’ (2009) 47 J of Econ Lit 315, 342; Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, ‘Making Credit Safer’ (2008) 157 U Pa L Rev 1, 49, 47–52; Samuel Issacharoff and Erin F Delaney, ‘Credit Card Accountability’ (2006) 73 U Chi L Rev 157, 162–63; for a summary of the recent impact regulatory impact on late fees, see Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CARD Act Factsheet (February 2011) < http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/credit-card-act/feb2011-factsheet/ > accessed 7 January 2013.

68 Bar-Gill and Warren (ibid) 51; DellaVigna (ibid) 321.

69 Bar-Gill and Warren (n 67) 46.

70 OFT Report (n 59) paras 3.31, 3.37, 3.43.

71 FRONTLINE: The Card Game (24 November 2009) < http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/creditcards/view/ > accessed 7 January 2013 (interview with former Providian CEO Shailesh Mehta).

73 For elegant economic models, see Paul Heidhues, Botond Köszegi and Takeshi Murooka, ‘Deception and Consumer Protection in Competitive Markets’ in Pros and Cons of Consumer Protection (Konkurrensverket Swedish Competition Authority 2011) 44; Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson, ‘Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets’ (2006) 121 QJ Econ 505, 517–20.

74 Gabaix and Laibson (n 73) 517–20.

75 See eg US Dep’t of Justice & Fed Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (19 August 2010) s 7.2 < http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html > accessed 7 January 2013 (noting how the market is more vulnerable to coordinated conduct if a firm that first offers a lower price or improved product to customers will retain relatively few customers after its rivals respond).

76 OFT Report (n 59) s 6.2; see also Heidhues and others (n 73) 68 (modeling how ‘in socially wasteful industries—independent of the number of competitors—firms will keep deceiving consumers even when educating them would be costless’ and ‘have strong incentives to engage in (non-appropriable) exploitative contract innovations—that is in finding new ways of charging consumers unexpected fees—while they have no incentives to engage in (non-appropriable) contract innovations that benefit consumers’).

77 2010 Merger Guidelines (n 75) s 7.

79 OFT Report (n 59) para 6.3 (noting how ‘competition tends to work as standard intuition suggests if biases simply distort consumers’ demand without affecting their desire to search for the best deals in light of their demand’); Huffman (n 58) 133; Max Huffman, ‘Bridging the Divide? Theories for Integrating Competition Law and Consumer Protection’ (2010) 6 Eur Competition J 7.

80 Financial markets, unlike prediction markets, lack a defined end-point. A rational investor could ‘short’ a company’s stock to profit when the stock price declines. But rational traders do not know when the speculative bubble will burst. Rational traders, due to investor pressure, can be subject to short-term horizons, and follow the herd for short-term gains. Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, ‘The Limits of Arbitrage’ (2007) 52 J Fin 35. Alternatively, consumers, recognizing their bounded rationality, can turn for some decisions to more rational advisors or consumer advocates (such as Which? and Consumers Union). Moreover, the window for exploitation can be short-lived. Consumers can make better decisions when they gain experience, quickly receive feedback on their earlier errors, discover their biases and heuristics in their earlier decisions, and take steps to debias. John A List, ‘Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?’ (2003) 118 QJ Econ 41, 41. Rational traders may make more money by creating products that encourage, rather than deter, speculation. Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance (OUP 2000) 172 (citing several examples, including future contracts on tulips during the Tulipmania of the 1630s).

81 Gabaix and Laibson (n 73) 509, 511.

82 OFT Report (n 59) paras 3.47–3.52, 4.19 (noting that whenever sophisticated consumers benefit from the exploitation of naïve consumers, firms will have no incentive to debias); Gabaix and Laibson (n 59) 507–9, 517–20 (discussing and modeling the ‘curse of debiasing’).

83 Richard H Thaler, The Winner’s Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life (Princeton University Press 1992) 50–62; DellaVigna (n 67) 342. In one experiment, neuroscientists and economists combined brain imaging techniques and behavioral economics research to better understand why individuals overbid. Mauricio R Delgado and others, ‘Understanding Overbidding: Using the Neural Circuitry of Reward to Design Economic Auctions’ (2008) 321 Science 1849, 1849. Specifically, they examined whether the fear of losing the social competition inherent in an auction game causes people to overpay. Members in the ‘loss-frame’ group were given 15 dollars at the beginning of each auction round. If they won the auction for that round, they would get to keep the 15 dollars and the payoff from the auction. If they lost, they would have to return the 15 dollars. Members in the ‘bonus-frame’ group, on the other hand, were told that if they won that auction round they would get a 15-dollar bonus at the end of the round. Whether one gets 15 dollars at the beginning or end of the auction round should not affect a rational player: the winner of each round gets 15 extra dollars, the loser gets nothing. Nonetheless, the loss-frame group members outbid the bonus-frame group members, although both outbid the baseline group.

84 Max H Bazerman and Don A Moore, Judgment in Management Decision Making (7th edn, Wiley 2009) 111. The business literature also discusses the competitive irrationality of firms sacrificing profits and consumer welfare to obtain a relative advantage over a rival. See Lorenz Graf and others, ‘Debiasing Competitive Irrationality: How Managers Can Be Prevented from Trading Off Absolute for Relative Profit’ (2012) 30 European Management J 386; Dennis B Arnett and Shelby D Hunt, ‘Competitive Irrationality: The Influence of Moral Philosophy’ (2002) 12 Business Ethics Q 279.

85 Bazerman and Moore (n 84) 105.

86 ibid 106.

87 ibid 105.

89 ibid 107–8; Deepak Malhotra, Gillian Ku and J Keith Murnighan, ‘When Winning Is Everything’ Harv ard Bus iness Rev iew (May 2008).

90 Fisher (n 55) 22 (‘even when the act of an individual is actually for his own benefit, it may not be for the benefit of society’).

91 Robert H Frank, The Darwin Economy: Liberty, Competition, and the Common Good (Princeton UP 2011) 16, 138.

92 Fisher (n 55) 24 (‘A general increase in relative advantage is a contradiction in terms, so that in the end the racers as a whole have only their labor for their pains.’).

93 Frank (n 91) 21.

94 ibid 8–9 [citing Thomas C Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (WW Norton & Co 1978)].

95 Fisher (n 55) 22.

96 Charles Wallace, ‘Keep Taking the Testosterone’ Financial Times (10 February 2012) 10; Cindy Perman, ‘Wall Streeters Buying Testosterone for an Edge’ CNBC (12 July 2012) < http://finance.yahoo.com/news/beefy-wall-streeters-traders-rub-185904441.html > accessed 7 January 2013.

97 JM Coates and J Herbert, ‘Endogenous Steroids and Financial Risk Taking on a London Trading Floor’ (22 April 2008) 105 PNAS 6167, 6178.

98 ibid 6170.

99 See also Reasoned Decision of the United States Anti-Doping Agency on Disqualification and Ineligibility in United States Anti-Doping Agency v Lance Armstrong (10 October 2012) 7 (‘Twenty of the twenty-one podium finishers in the Tour de France from 1999 through 2005 have been directly tied to likely doping through admissions, sanctions, public investigations or exceeding the UCI hematocrit threshold. Of the forty-five (45) podium finishes during the time period between 1996 and 2010, thirty-six (36) were by riders similarly tainted by doping.’).

100 Coates and Herbert (n 97) 6170 (noting studies that ‘if testosterone continued to rise or became chronically elevated, it could begin to have the opposite effect on P&L and survival, because testosterone has also been found to lead to impulsivity and sensation seeking, to harmful risk taking, and, among users of anabolic steroids, to euphoria and mania’).

101 < http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ > accessed 7 January 2013. Simon Johnson and James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown (Pantheon 2010) 90–92, 179, 192 (‘As of October 2009, 1,537 lobbyists representing financial institutions, other businesses, and industry groups had registered to work on financial regulation proposals before Congress—outnumbering by twenty-five to one the lobbyists representing consumer groups, unions, and other supporters of stronger regulation.’); Maurice E Stucke, ‘Crony Capitalism and Antitrust’ CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Oct 2011 (2) < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1942045 > accessed 7 January 2013.

102 Jeffrey H Birnbaum, ‘Learning From Microsoft’s Error, Google Builds a Lobbying Engine’ Washington Post (20 June 2007) D1 (‘For a couple of embarrassing years in the mid-1990s, Microsoft’s primary lobbying presence was “Jack and his Jeep”—Jack Krumholz, the software giant’s lone in-house lobbyist, who drove a Jeep Grand Cherokee to lobbying visits.’). Lobbyists have sought to influence antitrust decisions for years. Maurice E Stucke, ‘Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?’ (2009) 42 UC Davis L Rev 1375, 1446–56. If anything is new (starting with Microsoft ), observed Bert Foer, it is probably the fairly standard retention in large antitrust cases of public relation firms and media strategists, who have an easier time in the absence of a dedicated and expert antitrust media.

103 Center for Responsive Politics, Heavy Hitters, Microsoft Corp < http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?cycle=A&type=P&id=D000000115 > accessed 29 September 2011 (‘Between 2000 and 2010, Microsoft spent at least $6 million each year on federal lobbying efforts.’). Microsoft spent $7,335,000 in 2011 < http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000115 > accessed 7 January 2013.

104 < http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000022008&year=2011 > accessed 7 January 2013; Michael Liedtke, ‘Google’s Lobbying Bill Tops Previous Record’ Associated Press (21 July 2011) < http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/21/googles-lobbying-bill-q2-2011_n_906149.html > accessed 7 January 2013.

105 Citizens United v Fed Election Comm’n 130 S Ct 876, 910, 175 L Ed 2d 753 (2010).

No group can afford to drop out of the contest for government handouts; members of a group that did would pay the same taxes but receiver fewer benefits, thus redistributing income to the remaining contestants. As in the ‘prisoner's dilemma’ game, however, the result of this individually rational behavior is that everyone is worse off. This creates a kind of ‘race to the bottom,’ in which pork-barrel politics displaces pursuit of the public interest—a situation individuals may deplore even as they find themselves compelled to participate. Even if everybody belonged to a special interest group, so that special interest politics did not affect the distribution of wealth, interest groups still would direct resources to socially unproductive programs.

107 Brief of the Center for Political Accountability and the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research at the Wharton School as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee on Supplemental Question, Citizens United v Federal Election Commission , 2009 WL 2349016 (US) 4.

108 Albert R Hunt, ‘Letter From Washington: Super PACs Fuel a Race to the Bottom’ N Y Times (4 March 2012) < http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/us/05iht-letter05.html?pagewanted=all > accessed 7 January 2013.

109 Maurice E Stucke, ‘Occupy Wall Street and Antitrust’ (2012) 85 Southern California L Rev Postscript 33.

110 Ernst & Young, 12th Global Fraud Survey Growing Beyond: a place for integrity, CFOs in the spotlight < http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Assurance/Fraud-Investigation—Dispute-Services/Global-Fraud-Survey—a-place-for-integrity > accessed 7 January 2013.

111 Andrei Shleifer, ‘Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?’ (2004) 94 Am Econ Rev 414, 414–16 (discussing how competition can help spread child labor, corruption and bribery of government officials to reduce the amount the companies owe in tariffs and taxes, excessive executive pay, manipulated earnings to lower corporation’s cost of capital, and the involvement of universities in commercial activities).

112 Fernando Branco and J Miguel Villas-Boas, ‘Competitive Vices’ (May 2012) < http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1921617 > accessed 7 January 2013; Brian W Kulik and others, ‘Do Competitive Environments Lead to the Rise and Spread of Unethical Behavior? Parallels from Enron’ (2008) 83 J of Business Ethics 703.

113 W Harvey Hegarty and Henry P Sims, ‘Some Determinants of Unethical Decision Behavior: An Experiment’ (1978) 63 J of Applied Psychology 451, 455–56.

114 Hongbin Cai and Qiao Liu, ‘Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence From Chinese Industrial Firms’ (2009) 119 Economic J 764, 765–66.

115 Jason Snyder, ‘Gaming the Liver Transplant Market’ J L Econ Organization (Advance Access Published 1 April 2010). Using the policy changes in ranking kidney transplant candidates, the study examined changes in hospitals’ behavior in admitting kidney transplant candidates into the intensive care unit (which under the former policy increased the candidates’ ranking). After the policy change, the use of the ICU decreased more in markets with more transplant centers and the percentage of relatively healthy people in the ICU decreased most in the areas with more firms. ‘It appears that each competing center used the ICU to move their sickest patients to the top of the list and had a negligible overall impact on the rank ordering of patients waiting for a liver.’ ibid 3.

116 Kent Greenfield, ‘Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms)’ (2001) 87 Va L Rev 1279, 1349–51 (‘Without such a term, the pressure on corporate managers to make money for the firm would force managers to compete to their collective detriment through illegality.’).

117 Michael E Porter and Mark R Kramer, ‘Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth’ Harv ard Bus iness Rev iew (January–February 2011) 62, 77; see also Dominic Barton, ‘Capitalism for the Long Term’ Harv ard Bus iness Rev iew (March 2011); Rosabeth Moss Kanter, ‘How Great Companies Think Differently’ Harv ard Bus iness Rev iew (November 2011) 66; ‘Symposium on Conscious Capitalism’ (2011) 53 California Management Rev 60 ff.

118 Porter and Kramer (ibid) 64, 66 (Shared value ‘involves creating economic value . . . for society by addressing its needs and challenges’ and ‘enhanc[ing] the competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions in the communities in which it operates.’).

119 OECD, Bank Competition and Financial Stability (OECD Publishing 27 October 2011) 24.

the Officer Defendants were deliberately reckless in their public statements regarding loan quality and underwriting. First, the confidential witness statements describe a staggering race-to-the-bottom of loan quality and underwriting standards as part of an effort to originate more loans for sale through secondary market transactions. The witnesses catalogue an explosive increase in risky loan products, including interest-only loans, stated income loans, and adjustable-rate loans, and a serious decline in loan quality and underwriting. . . . Several witnesses portray an underwriting system driven by volume and riddled with exceptions. They state that the goal was to ‘push more loans through,’ that ‘there was always someone to sign off on any loan,’ that nearly any loan was approved to meet its sales projections, and that exceptions were commonly made for the otherwise unqualified. There are specific instances of loose standards, as when an employee recommended denial of a loan application but higher-level managers repeatedly approved those loans, or when underwriters allowed rejected loans, usually because borrowers' incomes were too low, a second chance and approved the formerly rejected loans. There is testimony that instructions, according to managers, came from the corporate officers, and that officers had access to information on the effects of these practices, including the rising defaults. There are also indications that the compensation for sales reinforced the disregard for standards and quality as volume was linked to reward.

In re New Century 588 F Supp 2d 1206, 1229 (CD Cal 2008) (citations to complaint omitted).

121 Richard A Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ‘08 and the Descent Into Depression (Harvard UP 2009) xii, 242–43; see also OECD (n 119) 28–29 (‘Regulation should help to reduce the potential for any detrimental effects of competition on financial stability, in particular, by making banks less inclined to take on excessive risks.’).

122 Posner (n 121) 107; see also ibid 111–12.

123 US v Philadelphia Nat Bank 374 US 321, 380 (1963) (noting how ‘[u]nrestricted bank competition was thought to have been a major cause of the panic of 1907 and of the bank failures of the 1930's, and was regarded as a highly undesirable condition to impose on banks in the future’).

124 OECD (n 119) 9.

125 Compl para 65, US v Apple, Inc , Civ Action No 1:12-cv-02826-UA (SDNY filed 11 April 2012) < http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/applebooks.html > accessed 7 January 2013 (challenging, inter alia, ‘unusual’ MFN whereby the book publishers agreed to lower the retail price of their e-books on Apple’s iBookstore to the lowest price by any other retailer); Compl, US v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich. , Civ Action No 2:10-cv-15155 (ED Mich filed 18 October 2010) < http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f263200/263235.pdf > accessed 7 January 2013.

126 Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v Marshfield Clinic 65 F 3d 1406, 1415 (7th Cir 1995).

127 Marshfield Clinic (ibid). The DOJ and FTC supported a rehearing en banc in part because of the court’s permissive language on MFNs. Brief for the USA and FTC as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing, Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v Marshfield Clinic 65 F 3d 1406 (7th Cir filed 2 October 1995) < http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f0400/0421.htm#N_2_ > accessed 7 January 2013.

128 Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island 883 F 2d 1101, 1110 (1st Cir 1989).

130 Jonathan B Baker, ‘Vertical Restraints With Horizontal Consequences: Competitive Effects of ‘Most-Favored-Customer’ Clauses’ (1996) 64 Antitrust LJ 517; Arnold Celnicker, ‘A Competitive Analysis of Most Favored Nations Clauses in Contracts Between Health Care Providers and Insurers’ (1991) 69 NC L Rev 863, 883–91.

131 Matter of Ethyl Corp, 101 FTC 425 (1983), vacated by EI du Pont de Nemours & Co v FTC 729 F 2d 128 (2d Cir 1984); see also Fiona Scott-Morton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, US Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Contracts that Reference Rivals, Presented at Georgetown University Law Center Antitrust Seminar (5 April 2012) < www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/281965.pdf > accessed 7 January 2013 (making similar point, stating ‘Indeed, the idea that the buyer requests the MFN, and that the MFN will deliver a lower price to the buyer, is a common intuition for why MFNs should be procompetitive.’).

132 du Pont (ibid) 729 F 2d at 134.

134 Baker (n 130) 533 (‘when buyers desire something individually, one cannot assume, as these courts have done, that it is in the buyers' interest collectively to obtain it’). The appellate court may have ruled otherwise if the sellers ‘adopted or continued to use the most favored nation clause for the purpose of influencing the price discounting policies of other producers or of facilitating their adoption of or adherence to uniform prices.’ du Pont 729 F 2d at 134. Whether MFNs are demand-driven (customers seeking to maximize their self-interest) or supply-driven (sellers marketing MFNs), once MFNs are widespread in the industry, the anticompetitive outcome is the same—higher equilibrium prices. Perhaps the appellate court believed that sellers are more blameworthy if they actively promote MFNs for an ulterior anticompetitive purpose rather than responding to consumer demand.

135 Scott-Morton (n 131).

136 Baker (n 130) 533.

137 Angela Chao and Juliet B Schor, ‘Empirical Tests of Status Competition: Evidence from Women’s Cosmetics’ (1998) 19 J of Economic Psychology 107, 108–9.

138 Seneca, ‘Letter CXXIII’ in Letters from a Stoic (Robin Campbell trs, Penguin Books 1969) 227 (observing how some gadgets are purchased not because of their inherent utility, but ‘because others have bought them or they’re in most people’s houses’); Plutarch, ‘On Contentment’ in Ian Kidd (ed) and Robin H Waterfield (trans), Essays (Penguin Books 1992) 222 (observing how prisoners ‘envy those who have been freed, who envy those with citizen status, who in turn envy rich people, who envy province commanders, who envy kings, who—because they almost aspire to making thunder and lightning—envy the gods’).

139 Saint Augustine, Confessions (Penguin Books 1961) 33 (acknowledging ‘man’s insatiable desire for the poverty he calls wealth’); Saint Thomas Aquinas, Compendium Theologiae , reprinted in Aquinas’s Shorter Summa (2002) 353–56.

140 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (A. Millar. 1790. Library of Economics and Liberty [Online] < http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS4.html >; accessed 26 September 2012) IV.I.8, 183 (trinkets’ real purpose is to ‘more effectually gratify that love of distinction so natural to man’).

141 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (Penguin Books 1994) (1899) 26, 103–4 (observing that the predominant motive for conspicuous consumption is the ‘invidious distinction attaching to wealth’). The accumulation of goods and services forms the conventional basis of esteem. Veblen observed the hedonic treadmill: ‘[T]he present pecuniary standard [marks] the point of departure for a fresh increase in wealth; and this in turn gives rise to a new standard of sufficiency and a new pecuniary classification of one’s self as compared with one’s neighbors.’ ibid 31.

142 Alois Stutzer and Bruno S Frey, ‘Recent Advances in the Economics of Individual Subjective Well-Being’ (Summer 2010) 77 Social Research 679, 690; Seneca, ‘Letter CIV’ in Letters from a Stoic ( n 138) 186 (‘However much you possess there’s someone else who has more, and you’ll be fancying yourself to be short of things you need to the exact extent to which you lag behind him.’).

143 CS Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952) (HarperCollins 2000) 121–22.

144 ibid 122.

145 ibid 123–24; see also Veblen (n 141) 31 (chronically dissatisfied with his present lot, man will strain to place ‘a wider and ever-widening pecuniary interval between himself and the average standard’); Smith (n 140) 184.

146 Fisher (n 55) 25; Frank (n 91) 76–81 (discussing a progressive consumption tax).

147 Stutzer and Frey (n 142) 691; Richard Layard ‘Happiness & Public Policy: A Challenge to the Profession’ (2006) 116 The Economic J C24–33.

148 Stutzer and Frey (n 142) 690; Bruno S Frey, Happiness: A Revolution in Economics (MIT Press 2008) 31.

149 Each purchaser’s individual interest is to purchase the status good at a discount, while others pay the full retail price to preserve the product’s symbol of conspicuous consumption. Maurice E Stucke, ‘Money, Is That What I Want? Competition Policy & the Role of Behavioral Economics’ (2010) 50 Santa Clara L Rev 893; Barak Y Orbach, ‘Antitrust Vertical Myopia: The Allure of High Prices’ (2008) 50 Ariz L Rev 261, 286. Likewise, each retailer’s individual interest is to offer a discount while its competitors charge the full price. Absent RPM, a race to the bottom, here the discount bin, ensues. As retailers discount, more consumers can afford the status good. But the good’s status value decreases. Early adopters disapprove of the brand’s commoditization, and switch to other status symbols. As more consumers disapprove of the brand as cheap and vulgar, the manufacturer and retailers lower price to maintain demand levels (primarily among consumers who previously could not afford the item). Arguably banning RPM could reduce status competition. Far-sighted consumers can see the natural cycle of early adoption, emulation, and rejection. Why purchase the $100 polo shirt that in several years retails for $30? But this proves too much. Far-sighted consumers would recognize the tax and misery imposed by status competition, and forego status competition whether RPM was legal or illegal.

150 Group boycotts and agreements to restrict purchases are per se illegal. But suppose consumers collectively agreed to disarm the birthday party arms-race by boycotting expensive toys, gift bags, and birthday entertainers. William Doherty, ‘Beyond the Consulting Room—Therapists as Catalysts of Social Change’ < http://www.psychotherapynetworker.org/symposium-2011/326-522-after-the-affair- > accessed 7 January 2013; see also < http://www.cehd.umn.edu/fsos/projects/birthdays/parents.asp#gifts > accessed 7 January 2013. To curb this social competition, neighborhood parents undertake a Green Birthday Pledge, where they collectively agree to ‘a “no-gift” or “giving party” or a “swap party” to cut back on unwanted toys and excess packaging and wrapping’ and skipping ‘the goody bag loaded with cheap plastic toys and candy’. < http://www.enviromom.com/host-a-green-birthday-par.html > accessed 7 January 2013. Only an overzealous antitrust official would prosecute their group boycott.

151 John Maynard Keynes, ‘Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren’ in Essays In Persuasion (1932) 358, 369 (‘For three hours a day is quite enough to satisfy the old Adam in most of us!’).

152 ibid 365.

153 ibid 369–70.

154 Jonathan Guthrie, ‘Anything to Distract Us from the Arts of Life’ Fin ancial Times (30 April 2009) 11 (quoting Professor Alan Manning).

155 Fisher (n 55) 25.

156 Tim Bradshaw, ‘Peer Groups that Harness an Online Community Spirit’ Fin ancial Times (6 August 2009) 12.

157 Benjamin G Edelman and Ian Larkin, ‘Demographics, Career Concerns or Social Comparison: Who Games SSRN Download Counts?’ Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No 09-096 (19 February 2009) < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346397 > accessed 7 January 2013.

158 < http://www.ssrn.com/ > accessed 7 January 2013.

159 Edelman and Larkin (n 157) 4, 17 (finding ‘strong evidence that envy and social comparisons play a strong role in predicting deceptive downloads. Higher levels of reported downloads for three separate peer groups—an author’s institution, other [peers] within an SSRN e-journal, and [peers] within an e-journal publishing papers on SSRN at about the same time as the author in question—are associated with 12% to 30% more invalid downloads.’).

160 Frank (n 91) 9.

161 H Geoffrey Moulton, Jr, ‘Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics’ (1997) 82 Minn L Rev 73, 136–41 (‘Most often employed in the contexts of environmental and corporate regulation, the “race to the bottom” argument for national intervention posits that state competition for jobs, industry, and investment will lead states to adopt lower-than-optimal regulatory standards. . . . In other words, a state government acting strategically may rationally conclude that lax regulatory standards will increase its constituents' welfare (by increasing investment and employment) by an amount greater than any (in-state) costs resulting from the lower standards. Other states, however, will naturally relax their own standards in response, in order to get ahead themselves or not be left behind, “triggering a downward regulatory spiral and nonoptimal results.”’ ); Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining 452 US 264, 268, 281–82 (1981) (noting Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act responds to congressional concern that ‘nationwide ‘surface mining and reclamation standards are essential in order to insure that competition in interstate commerce … will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States to improve and maintain adequate standards,’’ and holding that ‘[t]he prevention of this sort of destructive interstate competition is a traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause’); Louis K Liggett Co v Lee 288 US 517, 557–60 (1933) (Brandeis, J, dissenting in part) (noting how the leading industrial state governments relaxed the legal limits upon business corporations’ size and powers not because they believed that these restrictions were undesirable, but to compete with the lesser states, which eager for the revenue, removed these legal safeguards: ‘The race was one not of diligence but of laxity.’).

162 John Cassidy, How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2009) 142.

163 ‘Externalities’ in Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law , compiled by RS Khemani & DM Shapiro, commissioned by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, 1993; McCloud v Testa 97 F 3d 1536, 1561 n21 (6th Cir 1996) (negative externalities arise ‘when the private costs of some activity are less than the total costs to society of that activity’, so that ‘society produces more of the activity than is optimal because private parties engaging in that activity essentially shift some of their costs onto society as a whole’).

164 Maurice E Stucke and Allen P Grunes, ‘Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas’ (2001) 69 Antitrust LJ 249.

165 Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M Shapiro, ‘Competition & Truth in the Market for News’ (2008) 22 J of Economic Perspectives 133; Stefano DellaVigna and Ethan Kaplan, ‘The Political Impact of Media Bias’ in Roumeen Islam (ed), Information and Public Choice: From Media Markets to Policy Making (World Bank 2008).

166 Indeed entry may make everyone worse off. An empirical study found that higher housing prices attracted more real-estate brokers into that market. Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti, ‘Can Free Entry Be Inefficient? Fixed Commissions and Social Waste in the Real Estate Industry’ (2003) J of Political Economy 1076. The brokers did not benefit. Their productivity (houses sold per hours worked) on average declined and their real wages remained the same. Consumers did not benefit. They paid higher brokerage fees, which were fixed on a percentage of the increasing home values. Accordingly, the study concluded that ‘[i]ncreases in housing prices translate into pure economic losses since brokers are not made better off but consumers are made worse off.’ ibid 1118. Another study of real-estate agents in the greater Boston, Massachusetts area found that new entrants likelier take listings from bottom tier incumbents and ‘no evidence that consumers benefit from enhanced competition associated with entry either on sales probability or time to sale’. Panle Jia Barwick and Parag A Pathak, ‘The Costs of Free Entry: An Empirical Study of Real Estate Agents in Greater Boston’ (September 2012) Working Paper 32 < http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/pjia/working > accessed 7 January 2013.

167 Vikas Bajaj, ‘New York Says Appraiser Inflated Value of Homes’ N Y Times (2 November 2007) < http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/business/02appraise.html > accessed 7 January 2013; Les Christie, ‘Taming Inflated Home Appraisals: New Guidelines Aim to Reduce the Pressure that Real Estate Appraisers Feel to Boost Home Values’ CNNMoney (14 January 2009) < http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/14/real_estate/appraisal_reform/index.htm > accessed 7 January 2013; Kenneth R Harney, ‘Appraisers Say Pressure on Them to Fudge Values is Up Sharply’ RealtyTimes (5 February 2007) < http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20070205_appraisers.htm > accessed 7 January 2013 (90 per cent of 1200 surveyed real estate appraisers said mortgage brokers, realty agents, lenders and individual home sellers pressured them to raise property valuations, a huge increase over the 2003 survey results, and 75 per cent of appraisers reported ‘negative ramifications’ when they declined requests for inflated valuations); Julie Haviv, ‘Some US Appraisers Feel Pressure To Inflate Home Values’ Wall Street Journal (9 February 2004) (citing 2003 October Research survey of 500 fee appraisers across the country, with at least five years of experience in the residential real estate appraisal business, that 55 per cent said they have felt pressure to inflate the values of properties, with 25 per cent of those respondents saying it happens nearly half the time) < http://www.octoberresearch.com/about-news-releases-details.cfm?ID=4 > accessed 7 January 2013.

168 Neta Ziv, ‘Regulation of Israeli Lawyers: From Professional Autonomy to Multi-Institutional Regulation’ (2009) 77 Fordham L Rev 1763, 1794 & n54 (discussing concerns within Israel about greater lawyer misconduct from increased competition); see also Robin Wellford Slocum, ‘The Dilemma of the Vengeful Client: A Prescriptive Framework for Cooling the Flames of Anger’ (2009) 92 Marq L Rev 481, 486 (‘Within the legal profession itself, an excessive focus on the economic outcomes of legal matters, to the exclusion of psychological and emotional costs, has contributed to an environment of brutal competition and unethical behavior—an environment where everyone is a potential adversary and trust is a mirage on the horizon.’) (internal quotation omitted).

169 OECD (n 119) 25.

170 US Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div, Press Release, DOJ Urges SEC to Increase Competition for Securities Ratings Agencies (6 March 1998) < http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1998/212587.htm > accessed 7 January 2013.

172 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee Competition and Financial Markets, Note by the United States, DAF/COMP/WD(2009)11 (30 January 2009) 10–11.

173 Issuers, whose securities the agencies rate, pay the fees.

174 OECD (n 119) 25.

175 ibid 26; see also Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (US GPO 2011) 210.

176 Bo Becker and Todd Milbourn, ‘How Did Increased Competition Affect Credit Ratings?’ (2011) 101 J of Fin Econ 493, 494–95.

177 Elliot Blair Smith, ‘‘Race to Bottom’ at Moody's, S&P Secured Subprime's Boom, Bust’ Bloomberg (25 September 2008) < http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ax3vfya_Vtdo > accessed 7 January 2013.

178 FCIC Report (n 175) 210.

180 ibid xxv.

183 Becker and Milbourn (n 176) 494 (‘In the median industry, Fitch issued less than one in ten ratings in 1997, but approximately a third of ratings by 2007.’).

184 ibid 498.

185 ibid 496, 513 (‘A one standard deviation increase in Fitch’s market share is predicted to increase the average firm and bond rating by between a tenth and half of a step (and increases it significantly more for more highly levered firms). Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of our competition measure reduces the conditional correlation between ratings and bond yields by about a third and reduces the conditional predictive power for default events at a three-year horizon by two-thirds.’).

186 In re Lehman Bros Mortgage-Backed Sec Litig 650 F 3d 167, 172 (2d Cir 2011); see also In re Bear Stearns Mortg Pass-Through Certificates Litig 08 CIV. 8093 LTS KNF, 2012 WL 1076216 (SDNY Mar 30, 2012) (complaint alleging that ‘[c]ompounding the problem, banks such as Bear Stearns shopped for Rating Agencies willing to assign their securities top credit ratings, pitting the Agencies against each other and provoking a race to the bottom in rating quality’).

187 Becker and Milbourn (n 176) 499.

188 Victor Manuel Bennett and others, ‘Customer-Driven Misconduct: How Competition Corrupts Business Practices’ (2013) Management Science. In press, draft available at < www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/12-071.pdf > 3, accessed 7 January 2013.

189 ibid 9.

190 ibid 8.

191 ibid 2.

192 ibid 3.

194 ibid 5.

195 ibid 3, 15 (finding ‘that, while incumbents’ pass rates increase in the face of competition (b = 0.073, p < 0.05), entrants’ pass rates respond even more strongly (b = 0.220, p < 0.01). While an entrant’s pass rate is 0.96 percentage points lower than other facilities when entering a market without an incumbent, it rises dramatically as the number of proximate facilities increases. These results suggest that while new entrants may on average be more reluctant to provide illicit quality to customers, their willingness increases when trying to win new customers in more competitive markets.’).

196 ibid 3.

197 ibid 19.

198 Nat'l Soc of Prof'l Engineers v US 435 US 679, 696 (1978).

200 ibid 696, 695 (‘Even assuming occasional exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition, the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad’).

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“I Think Competition is Better Than You Do: Does It Make Me Happier?” Evidence from the World Value Surveys

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• Volume 16 , pages 599–618, ( 2015 )

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Drawing on individual data from the World Values Surveys, this paper estimates the relation between individual feelings about competition and self-reported happiness. People who think competition is good are associated to the same (high) level of happiness as do people who think competition is harmful. This finding is different than and complements previous research which shows a positive or negative relation between competition and well-being. The paper improves over previous research in that it approximates competitive environment by using individual-level measures. The paper also considers how gender and cultural traits affect the relation between competition and happiness. A significant effect of culture is found.

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In this paper, I use the terms well-being and happiness interchangeably.

In assessing the wellbeing effects of economic choices, economists have been traditionally led by the principle of revealed preference, by which if one observes that an individual chooses consumption bundle A over consumption bundle B, one assumes that the individual does so because he prefers bundle A over bundle B and in choosing bundle A over bundle B, presumably, the individual will maximize his wellbeing. But this is a logical conclusion derived from appropriate assumptions and it is by no means clear if it constitutes a measure of individual wellbeing.

The game is played by two players in the Non-Competitive environment and by three players in the Competitive environment. In the latter, one party has to choose with who of the other two players she will play, thus creating a competitive condition. Games are repeated over 30 rounds.

Subjective well-being is measured by computing self-reported hedonic states experienced by the participants, while disposition towards others is measured using a variant of a social value orientation test (Liebrand 1984 ).

Since the experiments were run at the University of Amsterdam, the sample may well consist of university students.

The surveys cover more than 60 countries and collect information on some 80,000 individuals.

Economic or bargaining power is measured by the absolute self-reported income level of each individual.

Since Fischer ( 2008 ) is interested in the effect of an individual bargaining position on happiness inequality, she interacts her self-reported satisfaction with self-reported (absolute) income level, also from the WVS.

Nevertheless, since the KOF index may be correlated with economic growth or income inequality, Fischer ( 2008 ) uses the predicted residuals of a regression of the KOF index on GDP..

Their pairwise correlation is low. 0.475.

I have used Instrumental variables to gauge into the potential causal relation stemming from competition to happiness. The analysis is available from the author upon request. .

First, one may argue that happier individuals may regard competition as a good thing but also argue that more intense competition may make individuals happier, as most economists do. Second, data collected from the World Value Surveys ( 2013 ) are subjective and may not represent actual behavior.

These strategies may include deceiving costumers through advertising, for example. Some critics of corporate global capitalism have also argued that multinationals foster environmentally unsustainable growth strategies, which harm us all.

Note that increasing values of both categorical variables, happiness and feelings about competition indicate lower happiness and less appreciation for competition, respectively.

For a lucid review of both views, see Blaug ( 2001 ).

In fact, Smith’s view of competition may be closer to Darwin’s than Frank suggests (see Blaug 2001 ).

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Barrios, J.J. “I Think Competition is Better Than You Do: Does It Make Me Happier?” Evidence from the World Value Surveys. J Happiness Stud 16 , 599–618 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-014-9524-5

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• PTE Sample Essay 9 – Competition: Good or Bad for Children’s Development

Some people say that competition is good for children’s development while others believe it is bad. Discuss both views and give your opinion.

One of the highly controversial debates today relates to whether the competition among young people is beneficial or not. In this essay, I am going to delve into the question from both points of view through presenting its merits and demerits and then give my own perspective on the matter.

On one side of the argument, there are people who content that the competition is helpful for children’s improvement. It is generally a well-known fact that competition leads to boosting versatile-development of children. It motivates and stimulates them in order to be more superior than others. For example, a student who is weak in school studies will study harder to achieve better scores than his peers in a test if there is a guaranteed prize for those who accomplish high marks. As a result, the child would end up gaining more knowledge and improving skills for his studies through hard-working.

On the other hand, a competition could result in putting a lot of stress on children. In the course of competing moment, some of them can be left out due to a failure to catch up and getting behind other students. They would lose their self-esteem compared to those whose achievements are by far better and such stress they would suffer would give deteriorated impact on themselves.

In conclusion, a competition can improve children’s all-round development while it can give exceeding pressure on them more than they can deal with. However, in my opinion, I tend to believe that the benefits of competition outweigh its disadvantages.

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Is Competition in U.S. Elections Desirable?

Electoral competition can be argued to be a key component of a flourishing democracy.  Only through competition it is possible to ensure the government’s responsiveness to the wishes and aspirations of citizens (Brunell, 2008: 5). However, when it comes to presidential and congressional elections in the U.S., there is another side to this argument. The need for competitive general elections is offset by primary elections, where party candidates compete among each other (Brunell, 2008: 113). Candidates’ awareness of the constituents’ wishes is ensured during these elections, thus guaranteeing the candidate’s accountability and responsiveness. The more competition there is in subsequent elections, the closer the outcome is; consequently, there are more dissatisfied voters. As argued by Brunell and Buchler (2009: 450): ‘if the purpose of democracy is to create a government that the public likes and trusts, then non-competitive elections are paradoxically healthy for democracy.’

This essay will therefore argue that competition in congressional and presidential elections is generally undesirable; however, to some extent, still needed. The argument will first be supported by determining the nature of competition in presidential and congressional elections. Then, reasons for less competition will be determined in terms of winner and loser satisfaction with elected officials. Finally, the change of patterns of competitiveness in the U.S. elections will be analyzed, opposing Brunell’s (2008) argument for redistricting, and determining the reasons of decline in competition in recent years.

The electoral system is one of the major factors determining the nature of electoral competition in a country. In the case of U.S., it is the Single Member District (SMD) electoral system, otherwise called First-Past-The-Post (FPTP). Contrary to proportional representation (PR) systems, constituents vote directly for their desired candidate instead of party lists, and only one candidate gets elected in a district. Thus, the FPTP is a winner-takes-all system. Consequently, there exist only two major parties, as is in most other countries that use FPTP.  Whilst the U.S. has been reluctant to change electoral systems and has never intended to switch to PR, there have been quite a few changes in electoral law. However, these changes have ultimately only reinforced two-partyism, for example, by preventing easy ballot access to third parties. Blais (2008: 94) argues that ‘new party entrants to the system have largely been kept out of politics by the dominance of the two main parties’, meaning that third parties in the U.S. are weak and work better as interest groups rather than serious challengers of main parties. The U.S. has never seen, and is unlikely to see, a phenomenon such as the sudden rise of Liberal Democrats in the UK in 2010. As party identification with Democrats or Republicans is deeply entrenched within the electorate, there is very little space for candidates of third parties to be elected.

Frymer’s (2010: 30) statement that ‘[party] goal is both not to alienate important swing voters and to maintain their hold on their electoral base’ basically summarizes the nature of electoral competition in congressional elections, and makes further explanation fairly simple. Over time, politicians have become more ideologically polarized (Gelman et al, 2008: 113). A perfect example of this is the gap in support for the war in Iraq by Democrats and Republicans (a gap which has significantly widened despite already having been quite large when the war began) in comparison with common support by both parties for the Vietnam War in the 1960s’ (Gelman et al, 2008: 114-116). Liberal-Conservative polarization is also evident in many social issues, such as abortion and taxation. Similarly, voter polarization has also increased. It is well illustrated by the ‘increase in partisan voting: voting in House elections is now much more consistent with voting in presidential elections’ (Abramowitz et al, 2006: 88). In addition, split-ticket voting has decreased from more than 25% in the 1980s’ to less than 15% now (Gelman et al, 2008: 125-126). Voters are likewise polarized on social issues depending on their partisanship. Consequently, the existence of the so-called ‘Red’ and ‘Blue’ states, which have respective tendencies to vote Republican and Democrat, cannot be denied. It can therefore be concluded that party and voter polarization, as well as winner-takes-all elections, explain the nature of competition in both congressional and presidential elections.

Whether competition in elections is desirable or undesirable ultimately raises the question whether competition actually exists. It can be argued that during the last two decades, competition at the federal level has been high as House and Senate elections have generally been close. In the period 1995-2007, the biggest difference between the majority and minority parties was 31 seats out of 435 in the House of Representatives, and 11 seats out of 100 in the Senate (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). This shows that the electorate is fairly evenly polarized. However, the fact that Representative incumbents during the same period of time have maintained at least a 94% rate of re-election, whereas Senators maintain at least only 79%, shows that at the state level, there was very little competition (Center for Responsive Politics, 2012). The House election of 1998 saw even more shocking numbers: only 6 of 401 candidates who sought re-election did not succeed. These two contradictory arguments require some further elaboration. The lack of state level competition in congressional elections leads to a realization that it is counterbalanced in primaries. During congressional primaries, candidates of the same party compete for the support of the public, and only one of each party in a district can afterwards compete for a seat in Congress. Thus, states, either Red or Blue, elect the candidate most suitable to their needs long before actual elections. Consequently, Abramowitz (2006: 78) argues that ‘despite the appearance of national competitiveness, however, the number of competitive House contests has fallen since 1994’. The same explanation basically applies to presidential elections, which Beaumont (October 2012) sums up concisely:

‘The presidential battleground map is as compact as it’s been in decades, with just nine states seeing the bulk of candidate visits, campaign ads and get-out-the-vote efforts in the hunt for the 270 Electoral College votes needed for victory. That means just a fraction of Americans will determine the outcome of the race for the White House.’

Due to the existence of swing states (and districts) and a more or less equal polarization of the electorate, the winner-takes-all nature of FPTP competition results in large numbers of voters who lose elections. Brunell (2008: 11) argues that, ‘the cry for more competition in House elections is so prevalent that we rarely reflect upon the costs associated with competitive elections nor do we question the link between competition and responsiveness.’

Countries using PR do not face such difficulties, as there is much less polarization in multi-party systems where parliaments often consist of a wider range of politicians in terms of ideological position. In the U.S., on the other hand, ideological stance has a significant effect on polarization and competition. Wrighton & Squire (1997: 457-459) give two good reasons why competition has fluctuated in the past. First, partisan realignment in 1932 lead to the introduction of New Deal policies turning around US politics and, in a sense, inverted parties ideologically.  This provided incentive for, in this case, the Democrats to challenge hitherto uncontested seats. Second, from 1960s’ onwards, an increase of incumbency advantage has been evident. Cox & Katz (1996: 494) argue that, ‘not only were incumbents by definition experienced themselves but also their presence could scare off experienced challengers from the other party.’

For example, although president incumbents have not always been re-elected, when they do, they are likely to win by a greater margin than new challengers, whereas when they lose, the margin is usually smaller (Prakash, 2012). Taking into account the latter two reasons, it can now be argued whether competition in congressional and presidential elections is desirable or not.

Voters want their chosen candidate to win, and this is a fact. Therefore, electoral competition is undesirable. Winning elections tends to have a positive outcome on the satisfaction with elected officials, electoral institutions, and the government as a whole (Brunell, 2008: 32).  However, more competition in elections results in a higher number of losing voters. This is not to say that competition in general is bad. Without competition, there could be no democracy, legitimacy, and responsiveness. Yet, to some extent, lesser competition benefits both voters and parties. Brunell (2008: 35) states that ‘losers have a significant number of negative responses and far fewer positive things to say than winners’ about their representative. This is in fact a natural consequence of events. Losing voters cannot be as satisfied with election outcomes, as their wishes are less likely to be regarded.  Consequently, they tend to express discontent. Also, Brunell and Buchler (2009: 453) argue that ‘non-competitive elections yield Representatives who are in more ideological agreement with their constituents.’ If a particular district has a significantly larger proportion of citizens identifying with one party than the other, there consequently is more coherence between the electorate and the Representative in terms of ideological views and opinions on specific issues. Furthermore, higher competition in elections does not necessarily improve accountability. Primary elections are argued to be serving the purpose of maximizing responsiveness to citizen wishes; thus it can be concluded that ‘the utility of competitive general elections is quite low’, and therefore, undesirable (Brunell, 2008: 113).

A study by Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning (2006) has shown that electoral competition in House election in 2002 was the lowest since the 1970s. The number of safe districts for both Democrats and Republicans has reached its highest point thus far, whereas the number of marginal districts is at its all-time low (Abramowitz et al, 2006: 76). Even though at federal level there seems to be a fairly high degree of competition; given that majorities in the House have been smaller than they used to be throughout the 20 th century, it is debatable whether there is a need for less competition. Ansolabehere et al (2006: 22) suggest that, ‘today, only about 25 percent of statewide candidates face serious primary opposition, and less than 8 percent win after competitive primaries but uncompetitive general elections.’

Therefore, the argument by Brunell (2008) and Brunell and Buchler (2009) that competitiveness in congressional and presidential elections should be reduced through redistricting seems to be lacking evidence. Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning (2006) did not find evidence that redistricting particularly affects the decline of electoral competition. On the contrary, their study found that ‘a shift in the partisan composition of House districts’ occurred only between redistricting cycles, whereas ‘a decline in the ability of challengers to compete financially with incumbents’ was another major reason for decline in competition (2006: 86). Campaign spending is argued by Gierzynski (2000: 64) to be more important for the non-incumbent candidates to seriously challenge incumbents. However, he provides evidence that in most cases, incumbents raise significantly higher amounts of money, which then gives them a much higher chance of re-election. Even though this essay has agreed with Brunell’s argument for less competition, it does not agree with the notion of redistricting to reduce competition. Competition in both congressional and presidential elections at the state level is already low, in spite of marginal results that add up at the federal level. Redistricting could reduce competition at the state level even further, but in the end results would basically be the same.

This essay argued that competition in the U.S. congressional and presidential elections is generally not desirable. In order to support this argument, this essay first of all looked into the nature of competition in elections, emphasizing the importance of the FPTP electoral system and voter polarization. Then, the extent of competition in the U.S. was examined at state and federal levels, with the conclusion that whereas competition has significantly decreased overall at the state level, with very few competitive districts remaining; close results of recent elections at the federal level were the result of high voter polarization and a handful of swing states. Next, the positive effects of less competition on winning and losing voters were examined, leading to a conclusion that competition is not desirable. Finally, the implications of decline in competition were discussed, emphasizing the advantage of incumbency, as well as the role of money in campaigns; finishing with opposition to Brunell’s (2008) argument that competition should be reduced by redistricting.

Bibliography

Abramowitz, A. I., Alexander, B. & Gunning, M., 2006. Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections [online]. In: Journal of Politics , Vol. 68, No. 1 (February, 2006), pp. 75–88. Available from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00371.x/pdf [Accessed 14th November, 2012]

Ansolabehere, S., Hansen, J. M., Hirano, S., & Snyder Jr, J. M., 2006. The Decline of Competition in US Primary Elections, 1908-2004 [online]. In: The Marketplace of Democracy: Electoral Competition and American Politics , pp. 74-101. Available from http://www.columbia.edu/~sh145/papers/primary_competition.pdf [Accessed 14th November, 2012]

Beaumont, T., 2012. Presidential race contested in far fewer states than in past [online]. Available from http://m.startribune.com/politics/?id=173331131 [Accessed 13th November, 2012]

Blais, A., 2008. Election Reform and (the Lack of) Electoral System Change in the USA. In: Blais, A. (ed.), 2008. To Keep or To Change First Past The Post? The Politics of Electoral Reform [online]. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2008. Available from http://0-www.oxfordscholarship.com.lib.exeter.ac.uk/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539390.001.0001/acprof-9780199539390-chapter-4 [Accessed 13th November, 2012]

Brunell, T. L. &Buchler, J., 2009. Ideological Representation and Competitive Congressional Elections [online]. In: Electoral Studies , Vol. 28, No. 3 (September, 2009), pp. 448–457. Available from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/[Accessed 13th November, 2012]

Brunell, T. L., 2008. Redistricting and Representation: Why Competitive Elections are Bad for America . New York : London : Routledge

Center for Responsive Politics, 2012. Reelection Rates Over the Years [online]. Available from http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.php [Accessed 13th November, 2012]

Cox, G. W. & Katz, J. N., 1996. Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections Grow? [online] In: American Journal of Political Science , Vol. 40, No. 2 (May, 1996), pp. 478-497. Available from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111633 [Accessed 12th November, 2012]

Frymer, P., 2010. Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America (New in Paper) [online]. Princeton : Princeton University Press. Available from http://books.google.co.uk/bookshl=en&lr=&id=bX0XtVhbnOkC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=electoral+competition+in+america&ots=iHgkjwRv_Y&sig=l3nIquyS8U02ojMazJr7p8UPWQ4#v=onepage&q=electoral%20competition%20in%20america&f=false[Accessed 12th November, 2012]

Gelman, A. et al., 2008. Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do . Princeton : Princeton University Press.

Gierzynski, A., 2000. Money Rules: Financing Elections in America. Boulder, CO ; Oxford : Westview Press

Prakash, S., 2012. Limit Use of Presidential Perks? Yeah, Right [online]. In: New York Times, 21 September, 2012. Available from http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/09/20/when-the-white-house-speaks-on-the-campaign-trail/limit-use-of-presidential-perks-yeah-right [Accessed 14th November, 2012]

U.S. Census Bureau, 2012. Table 411. Composition of Congress by Political Party: 1975 to 2011 [online]. In: Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012 , p. 279. Available from www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0411.pdf [Accessed 13th November, 2012]

Wrighton, J. M. & Squire, P., 1997. Uncontested Seats and Electoral Competition For the U.S. House of Representatives Over Time [online]. In: The Journal of Politics , Vol. 59, No. 2 (1997), pp. 452-468. Available from http://ir.uiowa.edu/polisci_pubs/97/[Accessed 13th November, 2012]

Written by: Vilius Semenas Written at: University of Exeter Written for: Malcolm Shaw Date written: November 2013

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Sport and Competition

How competitions are good for kids, beyond sports, a variety of competitions can help your child develop..

Posted July 13, 2022 | Reviewed by Vanessa Lancaster

• Researchers found that kids involved in team sports were less likely to have signs of anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or social problems.
• Team players may have had less difficulty socially because they had practiced cognitive empathy: understanding how others think.
• Organized competitions can promote a growth mindset and resilience.

There are pros and cons to putting young people in competitive situations like sports. In this story, we’ll cover the main plusses.

Help your child learn to collaborate.

In team-based competitions, children need to communicate and work together. The fact that they will face another team competitively can make them better collaborators. A good deal of evidence supports the benefits of team sports, in particular.

In a new study with more than 11,200 U.S. kids aged nine to 13, researchers found that kids involved in team sports like basketball and soccer were less likely to have signs of anxiety , depression , withdrawal, social problems, and attention problems. Compared to children who didn’t play a team sport, the team players had 17 percent less difficulty socially in measures based on parents’ responses.

Help your child learn that other people think differently.

The team players may have had less difficulty socially because they had practiced cognitive empathy: understanding how others think. Many competitive activities require young people to anticipate what others may do in response to their actions. The first step is putting themselves in the other person’s shoes.

Help your child see their strengths and weaknesses.

To compete well over time, you need to recognize your strengths and weaknesses and those of your teammates or rivals.

Young people compare themselves to others to judge their strengths and find self-esteem outside the home. Social status becomes paramount. They may be influenced by their most socially successful peers—but it is helpful if they evaluate performance and have heroes in other areas. Competitions are a way to direct your child to admire skills, talent, and expertise.

Help your child find role models.

Again, think about sports. To quote the Institute of Competition Sciences,

We know that Lebron James is an expert at basketball because of his ridiculously high numbers of shots, rebounds, blocks, and ultimately wins. Without the competition to showcase his skills, would our students still be able to recognize him as a hero they aspire to?

In the same way, competitions can direct students to admire their peers who work hard and have measurable success, rather than students who experiment with drugs or drive fast.

Help your child celebrate success at all stages.

Parents and teachers may be concerned that competitions make some students feel like losers and crush their ambition. But it depends upon how the competition is designed. A well-designed competition includes recognition and celebrations of achievements along the way. Simply making it to the final round becomes a big achievement.

Teach your child to seek growth.

Seeing mistakes or failures as an opportunity to learn and improve is a valuable skill in many areas of life. Competitions make this concrete. They provide benchmarks. If you lose one game, you come back to play another round differently.

Along the way, your child ideally will learn that it’s okay to ask for help and take advice. It becomes clear that other people can help you to do better next time or stretch to the next level.

Teach your child resilience and self-discipline.

A growth mindset feeds resilience. Stress is inevitable—and we all need practice at getting back on task when it’s hard. You don’t want your child to feel the stress of competition for the first time in a workplace.

Teach your child independence.

It’s important that the competitive situations your child enters foster independent action. Your child needs to listen to the coach and play an assigned role—but also come up with her own plans. A competitive situation will give her benchmarks and feedback. Ideally, if your child is a follower by nature, teachers and coaches will push her to try something new she’s thought of herself.

Boys, in particular, sometimes have trouble in school because they are physically restless, competitive, or want to do their own thing. A competition can get them engaged.

Teach your child to face fear .

We also need to learn how to keep our cool and perform when things get intense. If your child is always worried about failure, he won’t grow. In competitions, students can learn to recognize the physical signs of anxiety as positive—excitement rather than fear--and then take risks as they compete. The post-fear high is exhilarating and pushes them to experiment with new challenges.

In Psyched Up , a book based on interviews with athletes, soldiers, entertainers, and others, journalist Daniel McGinn reveals some of their techniques for peak performance —for example, finding meaningless rituals that will prime you more reliably than a last-minute rehearsal. Competitions give your children a forum to learn the techniques that work best for them.

Teach your child good judgment.

Much of life is frightening, but if we learn to evaluate risk, we can decide if the prize is worth it. May competitions require students to calculate when to take a chance—and when not to. This is an invaluable lesson in the teenage years when many kids are drawn to the excitement of risk and lack judgment. They need to learn that calculated risk-taking can be a good thing—but taking dumb risks isn’t. A huge risk like driving too fast on a dark rainy highway isn’t worth the very temporary prize of impressing a date or getting home sooner.

Help your child develop lifelong interests.

Competitions can help your child learn what areas motivate him most. There are competitions to promote skills in math and science , problem-solving , design , entrepreneurship , and more.

Help your child redirect natural competitiveness.

Unstructured competition can have harmful results. Many boys and girls now spend big parts of every day on electronic media playing violent games and seeking social attention, both competitive activities.

There is plenty of evidence that social media affects the self-esteem of teen girls, especially Your anxious daughter may worry about her body because she is, perhaps without fully understanding her motives, competing for attention from boys or seeking membership in a group of socially successful girls.

Similarly, boys can be nasty to each other during team gaming, and there’s evidence that lots of gaming lead to more impulsive behavior, including violence. One study found that male video game players who lost their games became especially nasty to the female players.

Those observations aren’t arguments against the competition in itself. But competitiveness needs to be channeled towards useful skills and pro-social behavior. The formal competition gives adults a way to guide and structure young people to compete in positive ways.

A version of this story appears at Your Care Everywhere.

Temma Ehrenfeld is a New York-based science writer, and former assistant editor at Newsweek .

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6 Benefits of Essay Writing Competitions

30 Jan, 2024 | Blog Articles , Get the Edge

5. They don’t require any funding or background knowledge

Most essay competitions are free to enter, and a good essay can be written based on your own ideas and public resources. They can be completed at any time and place, and panels will often accept entries from around the world.

Most can be found online if you look around – a quick Google search usually turns up the most reputable ones. If you’re keen to develop in the STEM field, the Oxford Scientist’s Schools Competition might take your fancy (2). Was the Scholastica Law summer school program (3) right up your alley? Trinity College Cambridge has competitions in many areas, including Law (4).

These, and many other, opportunities are open to anyone, even if you don’t have prior experience.

6. Now is the best time to enter!

Essay competitions are usually based around deadlines. While this may seem scary and overwhelming, it’s the number one reason to start now. With tight time frames, you won’t be able to procrastinate.

Similarly, many are only open to certain year groups or age ranges – so it’s best to seize any opportunity when it arises. That shows proactivity, and gives you more knowledge and skills to build on later. You can apply these new skills to another competition, a job, summer course or your degree.

Read more about how to write the perfect essay

Next steps for passionate writers

• Read some top tips on academic writing in English .
• Oxford University have a list of essay and creative writing competitions for students covering a range of subjects
• Keen to try out UK university life? Sign up to one of our Oxford Scholastica summer schools today!

References and Further Reading:

1) https://www.oxfordscholastica.com/oxford-summer-courses/

2) https://oxsci.org/schools/

3) https://www.oxfordscholastica.com/oxford-summer-courses/#law

4) https://www.trin.cam.ac.uk/undergraduate/essay-prizes/

Looking to boost your university applications?

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4 Competitive Essays on Advantages & Disadvantages of Competition

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This essay talks on Competition, Meaning & Concept, Advantages of Competition & Disadvantages of Competition in our Life. This essay is written in Simple English For Children & Students.

List of Topics

Essay on advantages & Disadvantages of Competition For Students

Competition is a situation in which two or more people or groups strive to achieve something that they want. Its is basic instinct of societal progress and development.

Competition: Meaning & Concept:

The term ‘competition’ is derived from the Latin word ‘competere’ which means “to strive together.” The dictionary meaning of competition is “the act of competing, as for profit or a prize; rivalry.” Competition may be defined as the process in which two or more parties strive to achieve the same goal. In other words, it is a situation in which each party tries to outdo the others.

Nowadays, competition has become an integral part of our lives. We can see competition everywhere around us. For example, we come across competition in our daily life while playing games, studying in school or college, or even while going for a job interview. In fact, competition is present in every sphere of our life.

>>>>> Read Also:   ”  Essay on Self Reliance  “

Advantages of Competition

There are many advantages of competition which have been discussed below:

1. It brings out the best in people: Competition brings out the best in people as it encourages them to do their best. When people are competing with each other, they try to outperform their rivals and this leads to the development of new skills and abilities.

2. It motivates people: Competition is a great motivator as it encourages people to give their best performance. When people know that they are being evaluated against others, they try to do their best in order to achieve the desired goal.

3. It promotes innovation: Competition promotes innovation as people try to develop new and better products or services in order to gain an edge over their rivals. This leads to the development of new and improved products which are beneficial for both consumers and businesses.

4. It improves the quality of products and services: Competition among businesses leads to the improvement in the quality of products and services as businesses try to offer better quality products and services in order to attract more customers.

5. It reduces prices: Competition among businesses also leads to reduction in prices as businesses try to offer their products or services at lower prices in order to attract more customers. This is beneficial for consumers as they get access to better quality products and services at lower prices.

Disadvantages of Competition:

Despite the many advantages of competition, there are some disadvantages also which have been discussed below:

1. It can lead to cut-throat competition: In some cases, competition can lead to cut-throat competition among businesses which can adversely affect their profitability.

2. It can lead to unethical practices: In order to gain an edge over their rivals, some businesses may resort to unethical practices such as false advertising or unfair trade practices. This can have a negative impact on both businesses and consumers.

3. It can lead to stress and anxiety: Competition can also lead to stress and anxiety among people as they try to do their best in order to achieve the desired goal. This can have a negative impact on their health and well-being.

4. It can create a sense of rivalry: In some cases, competition can create a sense of rivalry and hostility among people. This can adversely affect relationships and lead to social disharmony.

5. It can lead to waste: In some cases, competition can lead to waste as businesses may produce more products than what is actually required. This can lead to resources being wasted and also cause pollution and environmental damage.

Despite the disadvantages, competition is an important part of our lives as it has many advantages which outweigh the disadvantages. It is important to have healthy competition in order to encourage people to do their best and also to promote innovation and development.

Competition is an important part of our lives and it has many advantages which outweigh the disadvantages. It is important to have healthy competition in order to encourage people to do their best and also to promote innovation and development. What are your thoughts on competition? Do you think it is a good or bad thing?

Why Competition is Good For Students:

There are many reasons why competition is beneficial for students. One of the main reasons is that it encourages students to push themselves and strive for excellence. When students know that they are competing against others, they are motivated to work harder and achieve better results.

Competition also teaches important life skills such as time management, teamwork, and leadership. In order to be successful in a competitive environment, students must learn how to manage their time effectively, work well with others, and take on leadership roles when necessary.

Participating in competitions also helps students develop resilience and perseverance. They learn how to handle both success and failure graciously, and how to bounce back from setbacks or losses. These are essential skills that will benefit them not only academically but also in their personal and professional lives.

Moreover, competition exposes students to different perspectives and ideas. By competing against others, they are exposed to new ways of thinking and problem-solving strategies. This helps them become more open-minded individuals who are able to adapt to different situations.

Competition can also be a great way for students to discover their strengths and weaknesses. By challenging themselves in various competitions, they can identify areas where they excel and areas where they need improvement. This self-awareness is crucial for personal growth and development.

In addition, participating in competitions can enhance a student’s resume or college application. It shows that the student is proactive, dedicated, and has a drive to succeed. Many universities and employers look for these qualities in potential candidates.

Overall, competition promotes a healthy and positive learning environment for students. It encourages them to strive for their personal best while also fostering important life skills that will benefit them in the long run. So instead of viewing competition as a negative aspect, we should embrace it and utilize its benefits to help our students grow and succeed both academically and personally.

Why Competition is Bad for Students:

There are a number of reasons why competition can be detrimental for students, especially in the educational setting. Here are some additional points to consider:

• Unhealthy Comparison: When students are constantly competing against each other, it creates an environment of constant comparison and pressure to outperform others. This can lead to feelings of inadequacy and low self-esteem, which can negatively impact mental health.
• Limited Focus on Learning: In highly competitive environments, the focus shifts from learning and personal growth to winning at all costs. Students may become more concerned with getting better grades or beating their peers than actually understanding the subject matter and developing critical thinking skills.
• Fear of Failure: With competition comes the fear of failure, as students feel that anything less than first place is not good enough. This fear can be paralyzing and prevent students from taking risks and trying new things, which are essential for learning and personal growth.
• Negative Impact on Collaboration: In a competitive environment, collaboration becomes less important as everyone is focused on their individual success. However, in the real world, success often comes from working together with others and building upon each other’s strengths.
• Uneven Playing Field: Competition assumes that all students start at the same level and have equal opportunities. However, this is often not the case as students come from different backgrounds, have varying levels of support at home, and may struggle with different challenges that affect their academic performance.
• Skewed Definition of Success: Competition typically defines success as being better than others. However, this narrow definition ignores individual strengths and differences, and can lead to a one-size-fits-all approach to education which may not work for all students.
• Added Stress: Competition can add unnecessary stress and pressure on students, leading to burnout and anxiety. This stress can also spill over into other areas of their lives, affecting their overall well-being.

Overall, it’s important to recognize that while competition may have some benefits in certain contexts, it is not always the best approach in the educational setting. We should prioritize creating an environment that promotes collaboration, growth, and individual success rather than pitting students against each other in a constant race towards achievement.

Essay on Good and Bad Effects of Competition:

Competition is the driving force behind the progress and growth in every aspect of life. It pushes individuals, companies, and even countries to strive for excellence and achieve their full potential. However, like any other force, competition has both positive and negative effects on people and society as a whole.

Positive Effects of Competition

Competition fosters innovation and creativity by encouraging individuals or groups to come up with new ideas or improve upon existing ones in order to gain an edge over their competitors. This leads to advancements in technology, science, medicine, arts, etc.

Moreover, competition promotes efficiency through cost-cutting measures such as streamlining processes or finding better methods of production. This not only benefits the competing parties but also the consumers who can enjoy better quality products or services at lower prices.

Competition also drives economic growth and development by creating job opportunities, increasing consumer spending, and boosting overall productivity. It encourages businesses to expand into new markets and invest in research and development, leading to a stronger economy.

Negative Effects of Competition

On the other hand, competition can have detrimental effects on individuals’ mental health. The constant pressure to outperform others can lead to anxiety, stress, and burnout. This is especially true in highly competitive industries such as finance, law, or sports.

Moreover, competition often brings out negative traits such as aggression and selfishness. In pursuit of winning at all costs, competitors may resort to unethical practices like cheating or sabotage. This not only harms the individual’s reputation but also damages the integrity of the competition.

In addition, competition can create inequality and social divisions. Those who lack resources or opportunities to compete may feel left behind and marginalized, leading to feelings of resentment and discontent.

Striking a Balance

It is important to strike a balance between healthy and unhealthy competition. Competition should be encouraged as long as it promotes growth, innovation, and fair play. At the same time, measures must be taken to prevent excessive pressure on individuals and promote cooperation over cut-throat competition.

Educational systems should focus on instilling values like teamwork, empathy, and sportsmanship rather than solely emphasizing on academic excellence or winning competitions. Companies can provide support for their employees’ well-being through stress management programs and promoting work-life balance.

>>>>> Read Also:   ”    Essay on WhatsApp   “

In conclusion, competition has its good and bad effects, but it is ultimately up to us to manage it wisely. By recognizing the positive impact of healthy competition and taking steps to mitigate its negative consequences, we can create a society that thrives on progress rather than unhealthy rivalry.

• Advantages: Encourages improvement, fosters innovation, motivates individuals to excel, enhances skills, and can lead to better products and services.
• Disadvantages: May create stress and anxiety, promote unethical behavior, lead to inequality, and result in a win-lose mentality.

Disadvantages of competition include increased stress, potential for cheating or unethical behavior, unequal opportunities, and a focus on winning at all costs rather than personal growth.

Advantages of competition include driving individuals and businesses to improve, fostering innovation, motivating people to work harder, leading to the development of better products and services, and promoting overall growth.

Competition among students can encourage academic excellence, develop critical thinking and problem-solving skills, improve time management, and prepare them for real-world challenges. It can also foster a sense of achievement and motivation to excel.

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Essay on Is Competition Really Good

All of us are different from each other, but our motive is the same. All of us want to become successful and also want to acquire knowledge. To analyze how much, we have learned it is very necessary to compete with others and take part in different competitions. I have discussed some positive aspects of the competition below and hope it will be helpful for you.

Short and Long Essays on Is Competition Really Good

Essay on Is Competition Really Good for students of class 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and class 12 in English in 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 500 words.

Essay 1 (250 Words) – Is Competition Really Good?

Introduction

All of us have some dream but the problem is the population growing day by day and the positions are less nowadays. It means not everyone can be a singer or a doctor. So, if you want to become something or you have some ability, you have to compete with others and prove yourself. This process is named as a competition. In simple words, it is a process through which you can show how you are superior to others.

Why Competition is Important

• There are many benefits of a competition and if someone fails it does not mean they are unable, it shows they are not ready and should work hard for the next time.
• I can say that competition helps us to improve and analyze our progress.
• If you are one of those who work hard, then competition can really be helpful for you and will bring success for you.
• Competition is important because it helps us to know our abilities and helps us to learn more. It also encourages people to become skilled.

Types of Competition

• There are different types of competitions and some of them are organized whereas some of them are internal.
• Sometimes we break our own records; we compete with ourselves and bring out the best of us. This is an internal competition.
• When we compete with people to prove ourselves then it a worldly competition.
• It can be organized in schools, different institutions, for filling various posts, in the employment sectors, etc.

There should be a motive for our life and we should know it and work accordingly. All of us have different abilities and to earn we can use our ability as our strongest factor. It is interesting when we are able and we compete. So, in my opinion, competition is a very good thing and it should be performed everywhere.

Essay 2 (400 Words) – Competition and its Importance

All of us want to be successful and achieve our aims. But only those are called successful who win or reach the top position. We compete to reach the top and it also helps us to improve and learn. Competition is something that helps us in many ways and should be performed in every field. We should encourage people to take part in a competition and know their abilities.

What does Competition Mean?

When a group of people, come together to win a certain post or position but it can be won by a single person, then it is called competition. It can be of any type and related to any field. There are different competitions organized in the entire world. Sometimes we win whereas sometimes we lose. Losing does not mean we are unable in fact it inspires us to work hard and try again.

Competition should always be taken in a good sense because sometimes people take it wrongly which can make them suffer. Competing in a good way will help us to progress; whereas if we compete to satisfy our envy then it is not good for us.

It can be of various types depending upon your place. It can be conducted in a school in terms of education, sports, cultural activities, etc. In-office for promotion or appraisal. In life to succeed and achieve more. Where ever we go we face competition is it is quite a good way to prove yourself.

Importance of Competition

• It helps us to achieve success because in today’s generation we have to compete for everything and competition is the best way to prove ourselves.
• A competition also develops confidence, suppose a child sings well and he gave a small audition conducted in his city and he won; now this will develop his confidence and now he can even face big stage easily.
• Competition helps us to polish our skills which help us to progress. We can’t stay in the same position for a long time and competition helps us to grow.
• All of us have certain dreams and it can be achieved only after competing with others. Therefore, we can say that it motivates us to perform well.

There are multiple benefits of competition and healthy competition will not only bring success for you but will also help you to progress and learn. Life is all about learning and competitions are the speed breakers that interrupt you to analyze how much have learned. Those who know how to handle these speed breakers will never get affected by them and will always succeed.

Essay 3 (500 – 600 Words) – How to Win a Competition

The world is full of competition, either it is in terms of education or carrier settlement. All of us prefer the best and want to be successful. You are successful only when someone fails. So, it is everywhere and is an essential part of today’s generation. Competition is something pokes us to learn because all of us want to win and we try hard. We progress when we compete and it is a good sign.

How to Win a competition

One should definitely have some strategies and plan to prepare for a competition. I have mentioned some of the best strategies which will definitely help you.

• Analyze your ability and make correct strategy : Basically, there are two things one is ‘what you know’ and the second is ‘things you don’t know’ about a certain thing. There are some people who have lots of stamina and also confidence which helps them to learn things quickly and perform well.

First of all, you should make a list of things you know and then also make another list of topics you don’t know and then analyze yourself. Now analyze either you can complete an unknown portion within the time provided? If you can then you should definitely start preparing for it, and if can’t then should focus on what you already know and make it clearer. This is called the correct strategy.

• Don’t take it as a competition : When you think about winning it will not allow you to learn, you will just remember things you need. Whereas once you will start learning it will increase your knowledge and, in this way, no one can stop you from winning.
• Have proper study material : Nowadays we prefer the internet for our studies but one should also keep in mind that how much they have to read. Because the internet is like an ocean and the more you will search the more you will get confused. So, make sure the topics which you have to search for. This will save you time as well as effort.

Positive Aspects of Competition

Competition can be of any type, depending upon the situation. Sometimes we compete to look better whereas sometimes we compete to get good marks. But when the competition is healthy then it is good, otherwise, it can harm us. I have bought some positive effects of healthy competition;

• Develops Focus : When we work hard to achieve something or to win a competition; we become more focused. Focus is something that helps us to perform well and also increases our ability to learn.
• Helps you to Progress: When you compete with someone or want to break your own records; you work hard and when you work hard, you will automatically progress.
• It Inspires : When we compete with someone it always inspires us; we always want to show our best and we try hard to win. It automatically motivates us.

Competition is a good thing and it does not matter in which field you are; you should always take part in different competitions to analyze yourself. They are the medium to analyze your learning and knowledge. If you want to be a Police officer, then you have to compete with others like you who also want to become a Police officer. And you have to prove yourself through a common exam. It is helpful in many ways and also helps us to learn more. In my opinion, it is a very good thing and all of us should take part in different competitions in which we can perform well.

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25 Best Writing Competitions for High School Students – 2024

April 12, 2024

Over the past several years, the number of college applicants has been steadily rising. [i] As college admissions become more competitive, there are many steps a student can take to achieve high school success and become an outstanding candidate for college admissions: earning high SAT scores, securing strong letters of recommendation , and participating in various competitions will all boost your admissions prospects. [ii] In particular, writing competitions for high school students are a popular way to win scholarships and prize money, receive feedback on writing, build a portfolio of public work, and add to college application credentials!

Below, we’ve selected twenty-five writing competitions for high school students and sorted them by three general topics: 1) language, literature and arts, 2) STEM, environment and sustainability, and 3) politics, history and philosophy. It’s never too soon to begin thinking about your future college prospects, and even if you are a freshman, many of these writing competitions for high schoolers will be open to you! [iii]

Writing Competitions for High School Students in Language, Literature, and Arts

1) adroit prizes for poetry and prose.

This prestigious creative writing award offers high school students the opportunity to showcase their work in Adroit Journal . Judges are acclaimed writers in their respective genres.

• Eligibility: All high school students (including international students) are eligible to apply. Poetry contestants may submit up to five poems. Prose contestants may submit up to three pieces of fiction or nonfiction writing (for a combined total of 3,500 words – excerpts accepted).
• Prize: Winners will receive $200 and their writing will be published in Adroit Journal . All submitted entries will be considered for publication!
• Deadline: May 1st (specific deadline may vary by year).

2)  Atlas Shrugged Essay Contest

This unique essay competition allows writers the chance to explore and respond to Ayn Rand’s fascinating and polemic 1957 novel Atlas Shrugged . Specific essay topics are posted every three months; prizes are granted seasonally with a grand prize winner announced every year.

• Prize: Annual grand prize is $25,000.
• Deadline: Deadlines occur every season, for each seasonal prompt.
• Eligibility: Essays must be written in English and be 800-1,600 words in length.

Writing Competitions for High School Students (Continued)

3)  the bennington young writers awards.

Through Bennington College, this high school writing competition offers three prizes in three different genre categories: poetry, fiction, and nonfiction. Winners and finalists who decide to attend Bennington College will ultimately receive a substantial scholarship prize.

• Eligibility: U.S. and international students in grades 9 through 12 may apply.
• Prize: First place winners receive $1,000; second place wins $500; third place winners receive $250. YWA winners who apply, are admitted, and enroll at Bennington receive a $15,000 scholarship per year (for a total of $60,000). YWA finalists who apply, are admitted, and enroll at Bennington will receive a $10,000 scholarship per year (for a total of $40,000).
• Deadline: The competition runs annually from September 1st to November 1st.

4)  Jane Austen Society of North America (JASNA) Student Essay Contest

Do you love Jane Austen? If so, this is the high school writing competition for you! With the JASNA Student Essay Contest, high school students have the opportunity to write a six to eight-page essay about Jane Austen’s works, focused on a specific, designated topic for the competition year.

• Eligibility: Any high school student (homeschooled students also eligible) enrolled during the contest year may submit an essay.
• Prize: First place winner receives a $1,000 scholarship and two nights’ lodging for the upcoming annual JASNA meeting. Second place wins a $500 scholarship and third place wins a $250 scholarship. All winners will additionally receive a year membership in JASNA, the online publication of their article, and a set of Norton Critical Editions of Jane Austen’s novels.
• Deadline: Submission accepted from February-June 1st (specific dates may vary by year).

5)  The Kennedy Center VSA Playwright Discovery Program

Young aspiring writers with disabilities are encouraged to apply to this unique program. Students are asked to submit a ten-minute play script that explores any topic, including the student’s own disability experience.

• Eligibility: U.S. and international high school students with disabilities ages 14-19 may apply.
• Prize: Multiple winners will receive exclusive access to professional development and networking opportunities at The Kennedy Center.
• Deadline: January (specific deadline date may vary by year).

6)  Leonard M. Milburg ’53 High School Poetry Prize

Through Princeton’s Lewis Center for the Arts, this prestigious writing competition for high school students recognizes outstanding poetry writing and is judged by creative writing faculty at Princeton University.

• Eligibility: U.S. or international students in the eleventh grade may apply. Applicants may submit up to three poems.
• Prize: First place wins $1,500; second place wins $750; third place wins $500.
• Deadline: November (specific deadline date may vary by year).

7)  Nancy Thorp Poetry Contest

Nancy Thorp was a student at Hollins University who showed great promise as a poet. After her death, her family established this scholarship to support budding young poets.

• Eligibility: Female high school sophomores and juniors are eligible to apply. Applicants must be U.S. citizens.
• Prize: First place wins $350 and publication in Cargoes literary magazine, along with a $5,000 renewable scholarship (up to $20,000 over four years) if the student enrolls in Hollins University, and free tuition and housing for Hollins University’s summer creative writing program (grades 9-12). Second place wins publication in Cargoes, along with a $1,000 renewable scholarship ($4,000 over four years) if the student enrolls at Hollins and $500 to apply toward Hollins’ summer creative writing program.
• Deadline: October (specific deadline date may vary by year).

8)  National Council of Teachers of English Achievement Awards in Writing

Students may be nominated by their English teachers to win this prestigious writing award. Winners “exhibit the power to inform and move an audience through language” and prompts and genres may vary by competition year.

• Prize: A certificate will be awarded to students who are judged to have exceptional writing skills. Student names will be displayed on the NCTE website.
• Eligibility: U.S. high school sophomores and juniors are eligible for nomination.
• Deadline: February (specific dates may vary by year). Contest prompts released in August.

9)  National Scholastic Art and Writing Awards

At Scholastic Art and Writing Awards, numerous opportunities for scholarships and awards await those who submit writing in various genres: literary criticism, drama, poetry, and fiction. In all, there are 28 generic categories of art and writing to choose from!

• Eligibility: Teens in grades 7-12 (ages 13 and up) may apply.
• Prize: Various types of recognition and scholarships (up to $12,500) are offered for these award winners.
• Deadline: Scholastic Awards opens for entries in September; deadlines range from December to January.

10)  National Society of High School Scholars Creative Writing Scholarship

In this creative writing competition for high schoolers, students have the opportunity to submit a piece poetry or fiction (or both – one in each category!) for the opportunity to be published on the NSHSS website and win a monetary prize.

• Eligibility: Rising high school students graduating in 2024, 2025, 2026 and 2027 may apply.
• Prize: There will be three $2,000 awards for the fiction category and three $2,000 awards for the poetry category.
• Deadline: Submissions Accepted from May to October (specific dates may vary by year).

11)  National Writing Award: The Humanities and a Freer Tomorrow

This writing competition allows high school students the chance to be nominated by a teacher for a piece of writing in response to Ruth J. Simmons’ “Facing History to Find a Better Future.” Specific prompt topics may vary by year.

• Eligibility: Nominating teachers can submit work from 11th and 12th graders in one category (fiction, poetry, prose, or essay).
• Prize: One top prize of $1,000. Four additional prizes of $500 each. Winners will have the opportunity to have their work published by NCTE.
• Deadline: Applications are open September to October (specific dates may vary by year).

12)  New York Public Library Young Lions Fiction Award

Although this prestigious award isn’t exclusively for high schoolers (anyone younger than 35 may submit a work of fiction), if you’ve written a collection of short stories or even a novel, you should certainly consider applying!

• Eligibility: Any writer below the age of 35 may submit a novel or collection of short stories to participate in this competition.
• Prize: $10,000 award.
• Deadline: September (specific date may vary by year).

13)  Princeton University Ten-Minute Play Contest

This writing competition for high school students awards three annual top prizes for the best ten-minute play. Play submissions are judged each year by an acclaimed guest playwright.

• Eligibility: U.S. or international students in the eleventh grade may apply. Students may submit one play entry; entries must be ten pages or less. Plays must be written in English.
• Prize: First place prize is $500; second place is $250; third place is $100.
• Deadline: Varies by year. However, students are recommended to submit before the deadline date – the submission portal will close when a maximum of 250 applicants have applied.

14)  YouthPLAYS New Voices One-Act Competition for Young Playwrights

In this exciting writing competition, students have the chance to submit an original play script for a play of around 10-40 minutes in length. An excellent competition choice for any student considering a future in the theatre!

• Eligibility: Prospective authors ages 19 and under may submit a script for consideration in the competition. See specific writing guidelines here .
• Prize: First prize wins $250 and publication with YouthPLAYS; second prize wins $100.
• Deadline: Submissions run from January 1st to May 1st.

STEM, Environment, and Sustainability High School Writing Competitions

15)  engineergirl essay contest.

This wonderful essay contest invites students to explore topics related to engineering and science. Each year a new, specific prompt will be chosen for young writers who wish to compete.

• Eligibility: High school students are eligible to apply. Previous winners and close family members of employees of the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine are not eligible.
• Prize: First place winners receive $1,000; second place receives $750; third place receives $500.
• Deadline: Competition opens in September and submissions are due February 1st of the following year. Winners are announced in the summer.

16)  Ocean Awareness Contest

The Ocean Awareness Contest is an opportunity for students to create written and artistic projects that explore sustainability, environmentalism, and positive change. High school freshmen (up to age 14) may apply to the Junior Division. Students ages 15-18 may enter the Senior Division.

• Eligibility: Students ages 11-18 may apply (international students included).
• Prize: Monetary prizes ranging from $100-$1000 will be awarded each year. Additionally, $500 will be awarded to ten students who identify as Black, Indigenous, or Latino via the We All Rise Prize program.
• Deadline: June 10, 2024 (specific deadline may vary by year).

17)  Rachel Carson Intergenerational Sense of Wonder / Sense of Wild Contest

If you are interested in issues of sustainability, environment, biology and the natural world, this is one of the high school writing competitions that is just for you! Essay prompts explore the natural world and our place within it and may include poetry, essays, and photography.

• Eligibility: Students must pair with an adult from a different generation (e.g. parent, grandparent or teacher – contestants need not be related). Entries must be submitted as a team.
• Prize: Winners will receive a certificate from RCLA; their first names, ages, and entry titles will be posted on the RCLA website.
• Deadline: November 16th, 2024 (specific deadline may vary by year).

18)  River of Words Competition

This writing competition for high school students is another top choice for those thinking of pursuing majors or careers in biology, environment, and sustainability; this specific contest hopes to promote positive education in sustainability by “promoting environmental literacy through the arts and cultural exchange.”

• Eligibility: Any U.S. or international student from kindergarten through 12th grade may apply.
• Prize: Winners will be published in the River of Words
• Deadline: January (specific deadline may vary by year).

Writing Competitions for High School Students in Politics, History and Philosophy

19)  american foreign service association essay contest.

With this writing competition for high school students, entrants may submit essays ranging from 1,000-1,500 words about diplomacy, history, and international politics (specific prompts vary by year).

• Eligibility: Students in grades nine through twelve may apply. Students whose parents are in the Foreign Service Association are not eligible.
• Prize: The first-place winner will receive $2,500, an all-expense paid trip to Washington, D.C. for the winner and the winner’s parents, and an all-expense paid voyage via Semester at Sea. The second-place winner receives $1,250 and full tuition for a summer session at the National Student Leadership Conference’s International Diplomacy program.
• Deadline: Early spring (specific deadline may vary by year).

20)  Bill of Rights Institute We the Students Essay Contest

In this writing competition for high school students, civic-minded U.S. high schoolers may explore the principles and virtues of the Bill of Rights Institute. Interested applicants should review the specific submission guidelines .

• Eligibility: Any high school student aged 13 to 19 may apply.
• Prize: Prizes range from $1,500 to $10,000.
• Deadline: Submissions for 2024 due May 19th (specific deadline may vary by year).

21)  JFK Presidential Library and Museum Profile in Courage Essay Contest

For students interested in history and political science, this competition offers the chance to write about U.S. elected officials who have demonstrated political courage.

• Eligibility: U.S. high school students from grades 9-12 may apply.
• Prize: First prize is $10,000; second prize receives $3,000; five finalists receive $1,000 each; ten semifinalists receive $100 each; eight students receive honorable mention.
• Deadline: Submissions accepted from September to January (specific deadline may vary by year).
• Sample Essays: 2000-2023 Contest Winner Essays

22)  John Locke Institute Essay Competition

This essay competition is for students who would like to write about and cultivate “independent thought, depth of knowledge, clear reasoning, critical analysis and persuasive style” from one of seven intellectual categories: philosophy, politics, economics, history, psychology, theology or law.

• Eligibility: Students from any country may submit an essay.
• Prize: $2,000 for each subject category winner toward a John Locke Institute program; winning essays will be published on the Institute’s website.
• Deadline: Registration must be completed by May 31st, 2024; essay submission due June 30th, 2024 (specific deadline may vary by year).

23)  Society of Professional Journalists and the Journalism Education Association Essay Contest

This exciting writing competition for high schoolers allows students to explore topics related to journalism, democracy and media literacy. Specific prompts will be provided for contestants each year.

• Eligibility: All U.S. students from grades 9-12 may submit original writing to participate in this contest.
• Prize: First-place winners will receive $1,000; second place is awarded $500; third place receives $300.
• Deadline: February (specific deadline may vary by year).

24)  Veterans of Foreign Wars Voice of Democracy Youth Scholarship Essay

This audio essay allows high school students the opportunity to “express themselves in regards to a democratic and patriot-themed recorded essay.” One winner will be granted a $35,000 scholarship to be paid toward their university, college, or vocational school of choice. Smaller prizes range from $1,000-$21,000, and the first-place winner in each VFW state wins $1,000.

• Prize: College scholarships range from $1,000-$35,000
• Eligibility: U.S. students in grades 9-12 may submit a 3-5-minute audio essay.
• Deadline: October 31st
• Sample Written Essay: 2023-2024 Prize-winning essay by Sophia Lin

25)  World Historian Student Essay Competition

The World Historian Student Essay Competition recognizes young scholars who explore world historical events and how they relate to the student scholar personally. Ultimately the student writer must describe “the experience of being changed by a better understanding of world history.”

• Eligibility: Internationally, students ages K-12 may submit an entry. See specific prompt and submission guidelines for writing instructions.
• Prize: $500

Writing Competitions for High School Students – Sources

[i] Institute for Education Sciences: National Center for Education Statistics. “Number of applications for admission from first-time, degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students were received by postsecondary institutions in the fall.” https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/TrendGenerator/app/answer/10/101

[ii] Jaschik, Scott. “Record Applications, Record Rejections.” Inside Higher Ed . 3 April 2022. https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/2022/04/04/most-competitive-colleges-get-more-competitive

[iii] Wood, Sarah. “College Applications are on the Rise: What to Know.” U.S. News & World Report. 21 June 2022. https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/college-applications-are-on-the-rise-what-to-know

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Jamie Smith

For the past decade, Jamie has taught writing and English literature at several universities, including Boston College, the University of Pittsburgh, and Carnegie Mellon University. She earned a Ph.D. in English from Carnegie Mellon, where she currently teaches courses and conducts research on composition, public writing, and British literature.

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UK has real concerns about AI risks, says competition regulator

Concentration of power among just six big tech companies ‘could lead to winner takes all dynamics’

Just six major technology companies are at the heart of the AI sector through an “interconnected web” of more than 90 investments and partnerships links, the UK’s competition regulator has warned, sparking increased concern about the anti-competitive nature of the technology.

Sarah Cardell, the chief executive of the Competition and Markets Authority , said AI foundation models – general-purpose AI systems such as OpenAI’s GPT-4 and Google’s Gemini, on which consumer and business products are frequently built – were a potential “paradigm shift” for society.

Speaking in Washington, she added that the immense concentration of power they represented would give a small number of companies “the ability and incentives to shape these markets in their own interests”.

“When we started this work, we were curious. Now, with a deeper understanding and having watched developments very closely, we have real concerns,” Cardell said.

“The essential challenge we face is how to harness this immensely exciting technology for the benefit of all, while safeguarding against potential exploitation of market power and unintended consequences. We’re committed to applying the principles we have developed, and to using all legal powers at our disposal, now and in the future, to ensure that this transformational and structurally critical technology delivers on its promise.”

The six identified by the CMA are Google, Microsoft , Meta, Amazon, Apple and Nvidia, the leading supplier of chips for training and using AI. Their involvement in more than 90 partnerships and investments, the CMA said, could limit diversity and choice in the market.

The “winner takes all” dynamics of digital markets led to the dominance of a few powerful platforms, Cardell said, and she was “determined to apply the lessons of history” to prevent the same thing from happening again.

Highlighting three “interlinked” risks, Cardell said that competition in the AI sector could be harmed by companies that control critical inputs, from data to chips, restricting access to shield themselves from competition; companies using their market power to distort choice in AI services; and partnerships between key players exacerbating concentrations of market power.

The CMA first announced its plans to investigate the market in AI foundation models in May 2023 . The initial review, published in September , found that people should not expect the technology to have a positive outcome in the world at large.

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“We can’t take a positive future for granted,” Cardell said at the time. “There remains a real risk that the use of AI develops in a way that undermines consumer trust or is dominated by a few players who exert market power that prevents the full benefits being felt across the economy.”

The news came as AI regulators around the world prepare for a mini-summit in Korea, to build on the AI safety summit held in the UK in November 2023 and prepare for the full second session in Paris, expected later this year.

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The New Idea of India

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Spring 2024 Issue

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Narendra Modi’s reign is producing a less liberal but more assured nation.

• Foreign & Public Diplomacy
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• Ravi Agrawal

This article appears in the Spring 2024 print issue of FP. Read more from the issue.

This article appears in the Spring 2024 issue of Foreign Policy. Subscribe now to read every story from the issue.

From the middle of April until early June, staggered over the course of several weeks, the world’s biggest election will take place. More than 960 million Indians—out of a population of 1.4 billion—are eligible to vote in parliamentary elections that polls strongly suggest will return Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power for a third consecutive term.

Modi is probably the world’s most popular leader. According to a recent Morning Consult poll , 78 percent of Indians approve of his leadership. (The next three highest-ranked leaders, from Mexico, Argentina, and Switzerland, generate approval ratings of 63, 62, and 56 percent, respectively.) It is not hard to see why Modi is admired. He is a charismatic leader, a masterful orator in Hindi, and widely perceived as hard-working and committed to the country’s success. He is regarded as unlikely to turn to nepotism or corruption, often attributed to the fact that he is a 73-year-old man without a partner or children. Modi has few genuine competitors. His power within his party is absolute, and his opponents are fractured, weak, and dynastic—a quality usually equated with graft. Whether it is through maximizing his opportunity to host the G-20 or through his high-profile visits abroad, Modi has expanded India’s presence on the world stage and, with it, his own popularity. New Delhi is also becoming more assertive in its foreign policy, prioritizing self-interest over ideology and morality—another choice that is not without considerable domestic appeal.

Modi’s success can confuse his detractors. After all, he has increasingly authoritarian tendencies: Modi only rarely attends press conferences, has stopped sitting down for interviews with the few remaining journalists who would ask him difficult questions, and has largely sidestepped parliamentary debate. He has centralized power and built a cult of personality while weakening India’s system of federalism. Under his leadership, the country’s Hindu majority has become dominant. This salience of one religion can have ugly impacts, harming minority groups and calling into question the country’s commitment to secularism. Key pillars of democracy, such as a free press and an independent judiciary, have been eroded.

Yet Modi wins—democratically. The political scientist Sunil Khilnani argued in his 1997 book, The Idea of India , that it was democracy, rather than culture or religion, that shaped what was then a 50-year-old country. The primary embodiment of this idea, according to Khilnani, was India’s first prime minister, the anglicized, University of Cambridge-educated Jawaharlal Nehru, who went by the nickname “Joe” into his 20s. Nehru believed in a vision of a liberal, secular country that would serve as a contrast to Pakistan, which was formed explicitly as a Muslim homeland. Modi is, in many ways, Nehru’s opposite. Born into a lower-caste, lower-middle-class family, the current prime minister’s formative education came from years of traveling around the country as a Hindu community organizer, sleeping in ordinary people’s homes and building an understanding of their collective frustrations and aspirations. Modi’s idea of India, while premised on electoral democracy and welfarism, is substantially different from Nehru’s. It centers culture and religion in the state’s affairs; it defines nationhood through Hinduism; and it believes a powerful chief executive is preferable to a liberal one, even if that means the curtailment of individual rights and civil liberties. This alternative vision—a form of illiberal democracy—is an increasingly winning proposition for Modi and his BJP.

Hindus represent 80 percent of India’s population. The BJP courts this mega-majority by making them feel proud of their religion and culture. Sometimes, it aids this project by stirring up resentment of the country’s 200 million Muslims, who form 14 percent of the population. The BJP also attempts to further a version of history that interprets Hindus as victimized by successive hordes of invaders. Hindus hardly comprise a monolith, divided as they are by caste and language, but the BJP requires only half their support to win national elections. In 2014, it secured 31 percent of the national vote to gain a majority of seats in Parliament—the first time in three decades a single party had done so. It did even better in 2019, with 37 percent of the vote.

An illiberal, Hindi-dominated, and Hindu-first nation is emerging, and it is challenging—even eclipsing—other ideas of India, including Jawaharlal Nehru’s.

At least some part of the BJP’s success can be attributed to Modi’s name recognition and tireless performances on the campaign trail. But focusing too much on one man can be a distraction from understanding India’s trajectory. Even though Modi has acquired a greater concentration of power than any Indian leader in a generation, his core religious agenda has long been telegraphed by his party, as well as by its ideological parent, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu social society and paramilitary group that counts more than 5 million members. While Modi has been the primary face of the BJP since 2014, the party itself has existed in its current form since 1980. (The RSS, to which Modi traces his true ideological roots, is even older. It will mark its 100th anniversary next year.) The BJP’s vision—its idea of India—is hardly new or hidden. It is clearly described in its election manifestos and, combined with Modi’s salesmanship, is increasingly successful at the ballot box.

Put another way, while India’s current political moment has much to do with supply—in the form of a once-in-a-generation leader and few convincing alternatives—it may also have something to do with shifting demand. The success of the BJP’s political project reveals a clearer picture of what India is becoming. Nearly half the country’s population is under the age of 25. Many of these young Indians are looking to assert a new cultural and social vision of nationhood. An illiberal, Hindi-dominated, and Hindu-first nation is emerging, and it is challenging—even eclipsing—other ideas of India, including Nehru’s. This has profound impacts for both domestic and foreign policy. The sooner India’s would-be partners and rivals realize this, the better they will be able to manage New Delhi’s growing global clout. “The Nehruvian idea of India is dead,” said Vinay Sitapati, the author of India Before Modi . “Something is definitely lost. But the question is whether that idea was alien to India in the first place.”

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Indians bristle at reports of how their country has fallen in recent years on key markers of the health of its civil society. It is nonetheless worth contending with those assessments. According to Reporters Without Borders, India ranked 161st out of 180 countries for press freedom in 2023, down from 80th out of 139 countries in 2002. Freedom House, which measures democracy around the world, marked India as only “partly free” in its 2024 report, with Indian-administered Kashmir receiving a “not free” designation. Only a handful of countries and territories, such as Russia and Hong Kong, experienced a greater decline in freedom over the last decade than India. The World Economic Forum’s 2023 Global Gender Gap Index ranks India 127th out of 146 countries. The World Justice Project ranks India 79th out of 142 countries for adherence to the rule of law, down from 59th in 2015. As one legal scholar wrote in Scroll.in , the judiciary has “placed its enormous arsenal at the government’s disposal in pursuit of its radical majoritarian agenda.” Consider, as well, access to the web: India has administered more internet shutdowns than any country in the last decade, even more than Iran and Myanmar.

The social indicator that worries observers of India the most is religious freedom. Troubles between Hindus and Muslims are not new. But in its decade in power, Modi’s BJP has been remarkably successful in furthering its Hindu-first agenda through legislation. It has done so by revoking the semi-autonomous status of majority-Muslim Kashmir in 2019 and later that year—an election year—passing an immigration law that fast-tracked citizenship for non-Muslims from three neighboring countries, each of which has a large Muslim majority. (The law, which makes it more difficult for Indian Muslims to prove their citizenship, was implemented in March. The timing of this announcement seemed to highlight its electoral benefits.)

Perhaps more damaging than these legislative maneuvers has been the Modi administration’s silence, and often its dog whistles of encouragement, amid an increasingly menacing climate for Indian Muslims. While Nehru’s emphasis on secularism once imposed implicit rules in the public sphere, Hindus can now question Muslims’ loyalty to India with relative impunity. Hindu supremacy has become the norm; critics are branded “anti-national.” This dominance culminated on Jan. 22, when Modi consecrated a giant temple to the Hindu god Ram in the northern Indian city of Ayodhya. The temple, which cost $250 million to build, was constructed on the site of a mosque that was demolished by a Hindu mob in 1992. When that happened three decades ago, top BJP leaders recoiled from the violence they had unleashed. Today, that embarrassment has morphed into an expression of national pride. “It is the beginning of a new era,” said Modi, adorned in a Hindu priest’s garb at the temple’s opening, in front of an audience of top Bollywood stars and the country’s business elite.

“The BJP’s dominance is primarily demand-driven,” Sitapati said. “Progressives are in denial about this.”

Modi’s vision of what it means to be Indian is at least partly borne out in public opinion. When the Pew Research Center conducted a major survey of religion in India between late 2019 and early 2020, it found that 64 percent of Hindus believed being Hindu was very important to being “truly Indian,” while 59 percent said speaking Hindi was similarly foundational in defining Indianness; 84 percent considered religion to be “very important” in their lives; and 59 percent prayed daily. “The BJP’s dominance is primarily demand-driven,” said Sitapati, who also teaches law and politics at Shiv Nadar University Chennai. “Progressives are in denial about this.”

Sitapati has critics on the left who claim his scholarship underplays the militant roots of the BJP and RSS, helping to rehabilitate their image. But on the question of demand and supply: The BJP’s dominance is limited to the country’s north, where most people speak Hindi. In the wealthier south, where tech firms are flourishing, literacy rates are higher, and most people speak languages such as Tamil, Telugu, and Malayalam, the BJP is decidedly less popular. Southern leaders harbor a growing resentment that their taxes are subsidizing the Hindi Belt in the north. This geographic cleavage could come to a head in 2026, when a national process of redistricting is expected to take place. Opposition leaders fear the BJP could redraw parliamentary constituencies to its advantage. If the BJP succeeds, it could continue winning at the polls long beyond Modi’s time.

Despite all this, Sitapati contends that the country remains democratic: “Political participation is higher than ever. Elections are free and fair. The BJP regularly loses state elections. If your definition of democracy is focused on the sanctity of elections and the substance of policies, then democracy is thriving.” In Indian society, he said, culture is not centered on liberalism and individual rights; Modi’s rise must be viewed within that context.

Liberal Indians who might disagree are vanishing from the public eye. One clear exception is the Booker Prize-winning novelist Arundhati Roy. Speaking in Lausanne, Switzerland, last September, she described an India descending into fascism . The ruling BJP’s “message of Hindu supremacism has relentlessly been disseminated to a population of 1.4 billion people,” Roy said. “Consequently, elections are a season of murder, lynching, and dog-whistling. … It is no longer just our leaders we must fear but a whole section of the population.”

Is the mobilization of more than a billion Hindus a form of tyranny of the majority? Not quite, says Pratap Bhanu Mehta, an Indian political scientist who teaches at Princeton University. “Hindu nationalists will say that theirs is a classic nation-building project,” he said, underscoring how independent India is still a young country. Populism, too, is an unsatisfying term for describing Modi’s politics. Even though he plays up his modest background, he is hardly anti-elitist and in fact frequently courts top Indian and global business leaders to invest in the country. Sometimes, they directly finance Modi’s success: A 2017 provision for electoral bonds brought in more than $600 million in anonymous donations to the BJP. The Supreme Court scrapped the scheme in March, calling it “unconstitutional,” but the ruling is likely too late to have prevented the influence of big donors in this year’s election.

Mukul Kesavan, a historian based in New Delhi, argues that it would be more accurate to describe the BJP’s agenda as majoritarianism. “Majoritarianism just needs a minority to mobilize against—a hatred of the internal other,” he said. “India is at the vanguard of this. There is no one else doing what we are doing. I am continually astonished that the West doesn’t see this.”

What the West also doesn’t always see is that Modi is substantially different from strongmen such as Donald Trump in the United States. While Trump propagated an ideology that eclipsed that of the Republican Party, Modi is fulfilling the RSS’s century-old movement to equate Indianness more closely with Hinduism. Surveys and elections both reveal this movement’s time has come.

“People aren’t blinkered. They’re willing to accept trade-offs,” said Mehta, explaining how growing numbers of Indians have accepted the BJP’s premise of a Hindu state, even if there are elements of that project that make them uncomfortable. “They don’t think the majoritarian agenda presents a deal-breaker.” For now, at least. A key question is what happens when majoritarianism provokes something that challenges public acceptance of this trade-off. The greatest risk here lies in a potential surge of communal violence, the likes of which have pockmarked Indian history. In 2002, for example, 58 Hindu pilgrims were killed in Godhra, in the western state of Gujarat, after a train that was returning from Ayodhya caught fire. Modi, then chief minister of Gujarat, declared the incident an act of terrorism. After rumors circulated that Muslims were responsible for the fire, a mob embarked on three days of violence in the state, killing more than a thousand people. An overwhelming majority of the dead were Muslim. Modi has never been convicted of any involvement, but the tragedy has followed him in ways both damaging and to his advantage. Liberal Indians were horrified that he didn’t do more to stop the violence, but the message for a substantial number of Hindus was that he would stop at nothing to protect them.

Twenty-two years later, Modi is a mainstream leader catering to a national constituency that is much more diverse than that of Gujarat. While the riots once loomed large in his biography, Indians now see them as just one part of a complicated career in the public eye. What is unknown is how they might react to another mass outbreak of communal violence and whether civil society retains the muscle to rein in the worst excesses of its people. Optimists will point out that India has been through tough moments and emerged stronger. When Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency in 1975, giving her the license to rule by decree, voters kicked her out of power the first chance they got. Modi, however, has a stronger grip on the country—and he continues to expand his powers while winning at the ballot box.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi greets a crowd in Varanasi, India, on March 4, 2022. Ritesh Shukla/Getty Images

Just as citizens can’t subsist purely on the ideals of secularism and liberalism, it’s the same with nationalism and majoritarianism. In the end, the state must deliver. Here, Modi’s record is mixed. “Modi sees Japan as a model—modern in an industrial sense without being Western in a cultural sense,” Sitapati said. “He has delivered on an ideological project that is Hindu revivalism mixed with industrialization.”

India is undertaking a vast national project of state-building under Modi. Since 2014, spending on transport has more than tripled as a share of GDP. India is currently building more than 6,000 miles of highways a year and has doubled the length of its rural road network since 2014. In 2022, capitalizing on a red-hot aviation market, New Delhi privatized its creaky national carrier, Air India. India has twice as many airports today than it did a decade ago, with domestic passengers more than doubling in quantity to top 200 million. Its middle classes are spending more money: Average monthly per capita consumption expenditure in urban areas rose by 146 percent in the last decade. Meanwhile, India is whittling down its infamous bureaucratic hurdles to become an easier place for industry. According to the World Bank’s annual Doing Business report, India rose from a rank of 134th in 2014 to 63rd in 2020. Investors seem bullish. The country’s main stock index, the BSE Sensex, has increased in value by 250 percent in the last decade.

Strongmen are usually more popular among men than women. It is a strange paradox, then, that the BJP won a record number of votes by women in the 2019 national election and is projected to do so again in 2024, as voter participation , and voting by women, continues to climb. Modi has targeted female voters through the canny deployment of services that make domestic life easier. Rural access to piped water, for example, has climbed to more than 75 percent from just 16.8 percent in 2019. Modi declared India free of open defecation in 2019 after a campaign to build more than 110 million toilets. And according to the International Energy Agency, 45 percent of India’s electricity transmission lines have been installed in the last decade.

The most transformative force in the country is the ongoing proliferation of the internet, as I wrote in my 2018 book, India Connected . Just as the invention of the car more than a century ago shaped modern America, with the corresponding building out of the interstate system and suburbia, cheap smartphones have enabled Indians to partake in a burgeoning digital ecosystem. Though it didn’t have much to do with the smartphone and internet boom, the government has capitalized on it. India’s Unified Payments Interface, a government-run instant payment system, now accounts for three-fourths of all non-cash retail transactions in the country. With the help of digital banking and a new national biometric identification system, New Delhi has been able to sidestep corruption by directly transferring subsidies to citizens, saving billions of dollars in wastage.

Modi is projecting an image of a more powerful, muscular, prideful nation—and Indians are in thrall to the self-portrait.

The private sector has been a willing participant in India’s new digital and physical economy. But it has also been strangely leery of investing more, as two leading economists describe in this issue (Page 42). Businesses remain concerned that Modi has a cabal of preferred partners in his plans for industrialization—for example, he is seen as too cozy with the country’s two richest men, Mukesh Ambani and Gautam Adani, both of whom hail from his native state of Gujarat. Fears abound that New Delhi’s history of retroactive taxation and protectionism could blow up the best laid corporate plans.

Because he has corralled great power, when Modi missteps, the consequences tend to be enormous. In 2016, he suddenly announced a process of demonetization, recalling high-value notes of currency as legal tender. While the move attempted to reduce corruption by outing people with large amounts of untaxed income, it was in fact a stunt that reduced India’s growth by nearly 2 percentage points. Similarly, panicked by the onset of COVID-19 in 2020, Modi announced a sudden national lockdown, leading to millions of migrant workers racing home—and likely spreading the virus. A year later, New Delhi largely stood by when the delta variant of COVID-19 surged through the country, killing untold thousands of Indians. No amount of nationalism or pride could cover up for the fact that, on that occasion, the state had let its people down.

Now, with a population hungry for good news, India is looking to take advantage of the best foreign-policy deals. There are plenty to be struck in a shifting global order. The United States’ power is in relative decline, China’s has risen, and a range of so-called middle powers are looking to benchmark their status. Modi is projecting an image of a more powerful, muscular, prideful nation—and Indians are in thrall to the self-portrait.

Modi is seen through a video camera as he speaks at the final session of the G-20 summit in New Delhi on Sept. 10, 2023. Dan Kitwood/Getty Images

One window into India’s newfound status on the world stage came last September, after Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made the stunning announcement that Ottawa was investigating “credible allegations” that Indian government agents had orchestrated the murder of a Sikh community leader in British Columbia. New Delhi flatly denied his accusations, calling them “absurd.” The person who was killed, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, had sought to establish a nation called Khalistan, carved out of territory in his native Punjab, a state in northwestern India. In 2020, New Delhi declared Nijjar a terrorist.

A Canadian leader publicly accusing India of a murder on Canadian soil could have been a major embarrassment for Modi. Instead, the incident galvanized his supporters. The national mood seemed to agree with the government line that New Delhi didn’t do it but with an important subtext: If it did, it did the right thing.

“It’s this idea that ‘We have arrived. Now we can talk on equal terms to the white man,’” Sitapati said. It’s not just revisionism to examine how colonial powers masterminded the plunder of India’s land and resources; even the word “loot” is stolen from Hindi, as the writer and parliamentarian Shashi Tharoor has pointed out. The BJP’s project of nation-building attempts to reinstill a sense of self-pride, often by painting Hindus as the victims of centuries of wrongs but who have now awoken to claim their true status. This is why the Jan. 22 opening of the Ram temple took on epic significance, reviving among Hindus a sense that they were rightfully claiming the primacy they once enjoyed.

The flashier the stage, the better. For much of 2023, India flaunted its hosting of the G-20, a rotating presidency that most other countries see as perfunctory. For Modi, it became a marketing machine, with giant billboards advertising New Delhi’s pride in playing host (always alongside a portrait of the prime minister). When the summit began in September, TV channels dutifully carried key parts live, showing Modi welcoming a series of top world leaders.

Weeks earlier, Indians united around another celebratory moment. The country landed two robots on the moon, making it only the fourth country to do so and the first to reach the moon’s southern polar region. As TV channels ran a live broadcast of the landing, Modi beamed into mission control at the key moment of touchdown, his face on a split screen with the landing. The self-promotion can seem garish, but it feeds into a sense of collective accomplishment and national identity.

Also popular is New Delhi’s stance on Moscow, thumbing its nose at Western countries seeking to sanction Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. While Russia exported less than 1 percent of its crude to India before 2022, it now sends more than half of its supplies there. China and India are together purchasing 80 percent of Russia’s seaborne oil exports—and they do so at below-market rates because of a price cap imposed by the West. There is little consideration for morality, in part because Indians, like many in the global south, now widely perceive the West as applying double standards to world affairs. As a result, there’s no moral benchmark. For India, an advantageous oil deal is just that: good economics and smart politics. (India and Russia also share a historic friendship, which both sides are keen to continue.)

New Delhi’s growing foreign-policy assertiveness stems from a knowledge that it is increasingly needed by other countries. Allies seem aware of this new dynamic. For the United States, even if India doesn’t come to its aid in a potential tussle with China in the Taiwan Strait, merely preventing New Delhi from growing closer to Beijing represents a geopolitical win that papers over other disagreements. For other countries, access to India’s growing market is paramount. Despite the BJP’s hostility to Muslims, Modi receives a red-carpet welcome when he visits countries in the Persian Gulf.

India’s embrace of its strategic interests—and its confidence in articulating that choice—is of a piece with broader changes in how the country views itself. Modi and his BJP have succeeded in furthering an idea of India that makes a virtue of sacrificing Western liberalism for a homegrown sense of self-interest. By appealing to young people’s economic aspirations and their desire for identity in an increasingly interconnected world, the BJP has found room to advance a religious and cultural agenda that would have been unimaginable a generation ago. This vision cannot be purely top-down; the will of a nation evolves over time. In the future, there will likely be further contests among other ideas of India. But if Modi’s BJP continues to win at the ballot box, history may show that the country’s liberal experiment wasn’t just interrupted—it may have been an aberration.

Ravi Agrawal is the editor in chief of Foreign Policy . Twitter:  @RaviReports

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J.D. Vance: The Math on Ukraine Doesn’t Add Up

By J. D. Vance

Mr. Vance, a Republican, is the junior senator from Ohio.

President Biden wants the world to believe that the biggest obstacle facing Ukraine is Republicans and our lack of commitment to the global community. This is wrong.

Ukraine’s challenge is not the G.O.P.; it’s math. Ukraine needs more soldiers than it can field, even with draconian conscription policies. And it needs more matériel than the United States can provide. This reality must inform any future Ukraine policy, from further congressional aid to the diplomatic course set by the president.

The Biden administration has applied increasing pressure on Republicans to pass a supplemental aid package of more than $60 billion to Ukraine. I voted against this package in the Senate and remain opposed to virtually any proposal for the United States to continue funding this war. Mr. Biden has failed to articulate even basic facts about what Ukraine needs and how this aid will change the reality on the ground.

The most fundamental question: How much does Ukraine need and how much can we actually provide? Mr. Biden suggests that a $60 billion supplemental means the difference between victory and defeat in a major war between Russia and Ukraine. That is also wrong. $60 billion is a fraction of what it would take to turn the tide in Ukraine’s favor. But this is not just a matter of dollars. Fundamentally, we lack the capacity to manufacture the amount of weapons Ukraine needs us to supply to win the war.

Consider our ability to produce 155-millimeter artillery shells. Last year, Ukraine’s then defense minister assessed that their base line requirement for these shells is over four million per year, but said they could fire up to seven million if that many were available. Since the start of the conflict, the United States has gone to great lengths to ramp up production of 155-millimeter shells. We’ve roughly doubled our capacity and can now produce 360,000 per year — less than a tenth of what Ukraine says it needs. The administration’s goal is to get this to 1.2 million — 30 percent of what’s needed — by the end of 2025. This would cost the American taxpayers dearly while yielding an unpleasantly familiar result: failure abroad.

Just this week, the top American military commander in Europe argued that absent further security assistance, Russia could soon have a 10-to-1 artillery advantage over Ukraine. What didn’t gather as many headlines is that Russia’s current advantage is at least 5 to 1, even after all the money we have poured into the conflict. Neither of these ratios plausibly lead to Ukrainian victory.

Proponents of American aid to Ukraine have argued that our approach has been a boon to our own economy, creating jobs here in the factories that manufacture weapons. But our national security interests can be — and often are — separate from our economic interests. The notion that we should prolong a bloody and gruesome war because it’s been good for American business is grotesque. We can and should rebuild our industrial base without shipping its products to a foreign conflict.

The story is the same when we look at other munitions. Take the Patriot missile system — our premier air defense weapon. It’s of such importance in this war that Ukraine’s foreign minister has specifically demanded them. That’s because in March alone, Russia reportedly launched over 3,000 guided aerial bombs, 600 drones and 400 missiles at Ukraine. To fend off these attacks, the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, and others have indicated they need thousands of Patriot interceptors per year. The problem is this: The United States only manufactures 550 every year. If we pass the supplemental aid package currently being considered in Congress, we could potentially increase annual production to 650, but that’s still less than a third of what Ukraine requires.

These weapons are not only needed by Ukraine. If China were to set its sights on Taiwan, the Patriot missile system would be critical to its defense. In fact, the United States has promised to send Taiwan nearly $900 million worth of Patriot missiles, but delivery of those weapons and other essential resources has been severely delayed, partly because of shortages caused by the war.

If that sounds bad, Ukraine’s manpower situation is even worse. Here are the basics: Russia has nearly four times the population of Ukraine. Ukraine needs upward of half a million new recruits, but hundreds of thousands of fighting-age men have already fled the country. The average Ukrainian soldier is roughly 43 years old , and many soldiers have already served two years at the front with few, if any, opportunities to stop fighting. After two years of conflict, there are some villages with almost no men left. The Ukrainian military has resorted to coercing men into service, and women have staged protests to demand the return of their husbands and fathers after long years of service at the front. This newspaper reported one instance in which the Ukrainian military attempted to conscript a man with diagnosed mental disability.

Many in Washington seem to think that hundreds of thousands of young Ukrainians have gone to war with a song in their heart and are happy to label any thought to the contrary Russian propaganda. But major newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic are reporting that the situation on the ground in Ukraine is grim.

These basic mathematical realities were true, but contestable, at the outset of the war. They were obvious and incontestable a year ago, when American leadership worked closely with Mr. Zelensky to undertake a disastrous counteroffensive. The bad news is that accepting brute reality would have been most useful last spring, before the Ukrainians launched that extremely costly and unsuccessful military campaign. The good news is that even now, a defensive strategy can work. Digging in with old-fashioned ditches, cement and land mines are what enabled Russia to weather Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive. Our allies in Europe could better support such a strategy, as well. While some European countries have provided considerable resources, the burden of military support has thus far fallen heaviest on the United States.

By committing to a defensive strategy, Ukraine can preserve its precious military manpower, stop the bleeding and provide time for negotiations to commence. But this would require both American and Ukrainian leadership to accept that Mr. Zelensky’s stated goals for the war — a return to 1991 boundaries — are fantastical.

The White House has said time and again that they can’t negotiate with President Vladimir Putin of Russia. This is absurd. The Biden administration has no viable plan for the Ukrainians to win this war. The sooner Americans confront this truth, the sooner we can fix this mess and broker for peace.

J.D. Vance ( @JDVance1 ), a Republican, is the junior senator from Ohio.

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An Arizona ginger beer made with 'good, clean ingredients' named the best in the US

Phoenix-based Big Marble Organics, founded by Dwayne Allen , brought home a Platinum Medal on April 8, for Organic Ginger Beer at 2024 L.A. Spirits Awards.

L.A. Spirits Awards started in 2019 as an effort to level the playing field for all the entrants. Each entry is judged blindly by a panel of three to four judges in the Principal Round. If the judges unanimously award it gold, it will receive a Platinum Medal. A Secondary Round allows the judges to review the entries they could not agree upon, or if an unusually large number of candidates are nominated in the Principal Round, to compete for Best in Show.

"We are ecstatic to receive the Platinum Medal for our Organic Ginger Beer at the 2024 L.A. SpiritsAwards," said Dwayne Allen, founder and "Chief Bubblemaker" at Big Marble Organics in a press release. "Getting that Platinum Medal is like a high-five from Mother Nature herself for making it with good, clean ingredients! Cheers to great taste and helping the planet, one sip at a time!"

This is the third consecutive year that Big Marble Organics has received national recognition. In 2023, it brought home two medals: a double gold for Ginger Beer and a silver for its extra dry tonic water at New Orleans Spirits Competition by Tales of the Cocktails.

Where to find Big Marble beverages

Big Marble Organics' Ginger Beer is highly carbonated with a spicy and strong ginger flavor. Big Marble Organics beverages are sold at AJ’s Fine Foods, Whole Foods Markets, Fry’s and Total Wine.

In addition, over 300 bars and restaurants around the Valley use Big Marble products. A complete list can be found on the website, but a few include Bitter & Twisted, Beckett's Table and Belly Kitchen and Bar.

Details: bigmarble.com .

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