dissertation on ontological argument

A Level Philosophy & Religious Studies

The Ontological Argument

Introduction.

“it is easier to feel convinced that [the Ontological Argument] must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies.” – Bertrand Russell

Ontological arguments are a priori. They are based on an analysis of the concept of God. They essentially argue that if you think carefully about what God is, you’ll understand that God must exist.

Ontological arguments are deductive. The truth of the premises logically entails the truth of the conclusion.

St Anselm’s Ontological argument

P1. God is the greatest conceivable being (by definition) P2. It is greater to exist in reality than the mind alone P3. God exists in the mind C1. Therefore, God exists in reality

Anselm uses the illustration of a painter who has an idea of what they will paint in their mind before painting it in reality. This shows that ideas can exist in the mind.

Anselm points to Psalm 14:1 “the fool says in his heart, ‘there is no God’.”

An atheist says they do not believe in God, but they must therefore have an idea of God in their mind.

The force of Anselm’s argument is then that it would be incoherent to think that God exists in the mind alone, since then we could conceive of something greater, i.e., God also existing in reality. Yet, God is the greatest being, so conceiving of anything greater is incoherent. So, our idea of God must therefore be of a being that exists in reality. To say that God does not exist in reality is to say that the greatest being is not the greatest being. It is self-contradictory.

“that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater. Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and reality.” – Anselm.

Whether God is within our understanding

A strength of the ontological argument its definition of God

Anselm uses a theologically and philosophically convincing definition of God, carefully designed to avoid the problem of defining something that is beyond our understanding. Anselm presents an analogy. We can’t fully look at the sun but can still see daylight. Similarly, we can’t fully know God, but can at least understand that he is the greatest conceivable being.

“If you say that what is not entirely understood is not understood and is not in the understanding: say, then, that since someone is not able to gaze upon the purest light of the sun does not see light that is nothing but sunlight.”  – Anselm

Weakness: God is not ‘in’ the mind/understanding

Gaunilo raises an objection to P3; the premise that the greatest conceivable being exists in the mind/understanding. Gaunilo draws on the traditional Christian premise that God is beyond our understanding to argue that God therefore cannot be in the understanding.

Anselm cannot then proceed to reason about whether it would be greater also in reality. The ontological argument seems to fail because it relies on our ability to understand and reason about things that are beyond our ability to understand or reason about.

Aquinas also made this argument against Anselm – that God’s nature, such as the ‘eternal law’ is beyond our understanding and that people have different understandings of God.

“Perhaps not everyone who hears this word “God” understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought” – Aquinas.

Gaunilo even doubts that we can understand this idea of the greatest conceivable being:  

“of God, or a being greater than all others, I could not conceive at all” – Gaunilo.

“So much for the assertion that this supreme nature already is in my understanding.” – Gaunilo.

Evaluation defending the ontological argument

However, Gaunilo’s argument is unsuccessful because a full understanding of the greatest conceivable being or of God’s nature is not required for the ontological argument to work.

Peter van Inwagen explains that Anselm would not accept that we either understand God fully or not at all. Our limited understanding of God is enough to justify attributing the name “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” to God.

God has traits but infinitely, i.e., omnipotence, omniscience etc. It is impossible to conceive of anything greater. So, we can understand enough of that idea. We may not be able to conceive of the ‘being’ itself, as Gaunilo says, but that seems to commit a straw man fallacy. Anselm doesn’t rely on conceiving the being itself. We can grasp the concept of a being greater than which none may be conceived. We can then follow Anselm’s reasoning that since it is greater to exist, that being must exist.

Evaluation criticizing the ontological argument

Gaunilo has a point. When we think about the concept of a being greater than anything we could possibly imagine, the idea of that actual being is not in our understanding.

Furthermore, the insights of Apophatic theology show that reasoning about God is impossible. Pseudo-Dionysius argues that if we are true to God’s transcendent unknowability, we would recognize that God is simply beyond any human concepts that we can understand. God therefore cannot be grasped by the understanding and so cannot be ‘in’ the understanding.

Pseudo-Dionysius explicitly says that God is ‘beyond assertion and denial’. So although the atheist is indeed wrong to deny God, proponents of the ontological argument are also wrong to assert God. God is beyond all these philosophical terms, even beyond truth and falsity itself.

Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ response to Anselm

Deductive arguments are strong because the only way to attack them is to deny the truth of the premises (soundness). This is stronger than inductive arguments because they can also be attacked by arguing that the conclusion is false even if the premises are true.

Weakness: Gaunilo denies that the ontological argument is actually a valid deductive argument, attacking the inference from the premises to the conclusion of God existing in reality

“I have in my understanding all manner of unreal objects” – Gaunilo.

“I should not admit that this being is in my understanding and concept even in the way in which many objects whose real existence is uncertain and doubtful, are in my understanding and concept. For it should be proved first that this being itself really exists somewhere; and then, from the fact that it is greater than all, we shall not hesitate to infer that it also subsists in itself.” – Gaunilo.

Anselm’s argument could succeed in showing that if God exists, then God is the greatest being and even that it subsists in itself, i.e., has necessary existence. However, this is not enough to show that God does exist necessarily.

“he who says that this being exists, because otherwise the being which is greater than all will not be greater than all, does not attend strictly enough to what he is saying. – Gaunilo.

Gaunilo then illustrates this with the case of a perfect lost island, which is an illustration of a thing whose real existence is ‘uncertain and doubtful’ yet is in his understanding as a concept.

Applying the logic of Anselm’s argument to this island has an absurd result (reductio ad absurdum). It is greater for this island to exist in reality, so it must exist. This would work not just for an island. The greatest or supremely perfect member of every category must exist. This is sometimes called the ‘overload’ objection because it suggests that reality would be overloaded with greatest/perfect things.

In response to Gaunilo, Anselm strengthened his argument into a 2 nd form.

Something is greater if it doesn’t depend on anything for its existence. An Island by definition is land enclosed by water, so part of the concept of an Island involves a dependence on things such as an ocean or a planet to exist. So, the greatest possible Island will still be contingent, which means by definition it could either exist or not.

This is why a priori analysis of its definition cannot prove its existence. The existence of contingent beings cannot be proven a priori since their existence is not a matter of definition. Their existence is a matter of whether what they depend on exists.

There is nothing in the concept of the greatest being that involves dependence, making it a necessary being. So, Anselm can now argue that this is why the argument works for God but is absurd when applied to anything contingent.

Anselm’s 2 nd form of his argument successfully refutes the relevance of the perfect island. A priori arguments cannot prove the existence of contingent things like islands since their existence is not a matter of definition. However, the greatest being is necessary, so its existence can be prove a priori.

However, Anselm arguably failed to respond to Gaunilo’s central contention.

Even if Anselm is right that we cannot conceive of God without existence, that only proves that God is a necessary being, such that if God existed it would be in a special way where God could not cease to exist. This is not the same as proving that this necessary being actually does exist. Anselm doesn’t deal with this point.

Descartes & Anselm vs Kant’s development of Gaunilo

Descartes’ Ontological argument

Descartes aims to strengthen the ontological argument with his rationalist epistemology. This claims that we can gain certain knowledge of some truths a priori, through rational intuition. This involves our mind’s ability to simply know certain truths. We can simply think about the concept of God as the supremely perfect being. We then rationally appreciate that God contains the perfection of existence. This is similar to how a rational understanding of a triangle reveals that it contains three sides.

“t he idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And my understanding that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property belongs to its nature” – Descartes

Descartes’ ontological argument functions through intuition rather than argument. Nonetheless he did put it into the form of a deductive argument:

P1 – I have an idea of a supremely perfect being which contains all perfections P2 – Existence is a perfection C3 – God exists

Descartes argument is notable for its simplicity. We know mathematical truths about triangles by simply thinking about our clear and distinct concept of a triangle. Similarly, we can know God exists by thinking about our clear and distinct concept of a supremely perfect being.

The argument is deliberately short, highlighting that its main point is that God’s existence can be known intuitively, not requiring a process of reasoning.

Weakness: Kant’s 1st objection: A priori reasoning cannot establish existence

Gaunilo tried to show that Anselm only succeeds in showing that if God exists, then God exists necessarily. The ontological argument has not shown that God-the-necessary-being does exist. Kant developed this type of objection.

Kant argues that Anselm and Descartes treat ‘existence’ as a predicate, as a description of God. Descartes implies that perfection is an ‘attribute’ of God. Anselm argues God must exist in order to be God. They try to show that you cannot think of God without existence, because it is a defining quality of God. The idea of ‘God’ and the idea of ‘existence’ are necessarily connected.

Kant objects that existence being a predicate of God does not establish God’s existence in reality. He Descartes example of a triangle. It is necessary that ‘having three sides’ is part of the concept of a triangle. This shows that if a triangle exists, it must have three sides.

Similarly, we could grant that the ontological argument shows that ‘necessary existence’ is part of the concept of God. Kant’s objection is that this only shows that if God exists, then God exists necessarily. It doesn’t show that God-the-necessary-being does exist.

Existence necessarily being part of the definition of God only shows that God is the idea of a necessary being. We can still deny that this necessary being or being greater than which cannot be conceived or maximally great or unlimited being actually exists.

Like Gaunilo, Kant is drawing a distinction between judgement and reality. A priori reasoning showing that existence is necessary to the definition of God in our minds is not the same as showing that necessary being actually exists in reality.

“The unconditioned necessity of judgements is not the same as an absolute necessity of things” – Kant.

“the illusion of this logical necessity has proved so powerful that when one has made a concept a priori of a thing that was set up so that its existence was comprehended within the range of its meaning, one believed one could infer with certainty that because existence necessarily pertains to the object of this concept, i.e., under the condition that I posit this thing as given (existing), its existence can also be posited necessarily” – Kant.

Kant’s first critique is unsuccessful because it is self-contradictory.

“ I think that Caterus, Kant, and numerous other philosophers have been mistaken in supposing that the proposition ‘God is a necessary being’ (or “God necessarily exists”) is equivalent to the conditional proposition ‘If God exists then He necessarily exists’ … Can anything be clearer than that the conjunction ‘God necessarily exists but it is possible that He does not exist’ is self-contradictory?” – Malcolm

Kant’s 1st objection seems to accept that the ontological argument shows that God is necessary. So, Kant must then accept that God is a being which contains its own reason for existence and is thus defined by the impossibility of non-existence.

It’s incoherent of Kant to grant God’s necessity while maintaining the possibility of God’s non-existence. So, the Ontological argument does show that God-the-necessary-being actually exists.

Malcolm tries to object that it’s incoherent to say God necessarily exists, but possibly doesn’t exist. However, that misunderstands Kant’s argument.

The issue is, Malcolm has only shown that God is a non-dependent being. In his ontological argument, Malcolm argued that if God exists, God exists necessarily because nothing could cause God to cease existing, as God is unlimited and non-dependent. This is what Malcolm established as God’s necessity. But this only establishes that God is necessary in the sense of being non-dependent, not in the sense of must exist. A being could be non-dependent and yet not exist. If it existed, then it would be necessary.

So, the necessity of God’s existence established by the ontological argument only relates to the manner of God’s existence if God exists. 

Ontological arguments cannot show that God actually exists, then.

The most famous modern defender on the ontological argument is Plantinga. Even he admits that this critique from Kant cannot really be solved and that at most the ontological argument can make religious belief rational – it cannot prove that God actually does exist, however. Very few people defend the ontological argument these days except for Plantinga, and even he doesn’t defend it as actually proving that God actually exists necessarily.

“reformulated versions of St. Anselm’s argument … cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion” – Plantinga.

Whether existence is a predicate

Strength: Anselm strengthens his argument in Proslogion chapter 3 to include necessary existence.

In chapter 2 Anselm spoke of existence being greater than non-existence. In chapter 3 he better justifies that premise. Existence is greater than non-existence because a being is greater if it cannot cease existing. A being whose nonexistence is impossible is greater than a being whose non-existence is possible.

If a being can cease to exist, that is because it depends on something else for its existence. Malcolm points out that dependence is a kind of limitation and in common language these concepts are linked to inferiority. A being which doesn’t depend on anything else (is necessary) is therefore unlimited and so is the greatest conceivable being.

This is Anselm’s argument in its strongest form. A being greater than which cannot be conceived must be one whose nonexistence is impossible.

Weakness: Kant’s 2 nd objection: existence is not a predicate.  

Anselm argues that if God didn’t exist, God wouldn’t be what God is; the greatest conceivable being. Descartes says that existence is part of what God is. Kant thinks they both assume that existence is a predicate, a description of a quality that God possesses.

Kant objects that existence is not a quality or attribute that defines a thing. To say something exists is not to describe that thing. If I say my cat exists, I do not describe a feature of the cat. I may be describing reality in a general sense, but I am not describing a defining quality of the cat. So existence isn’t a predicate.

Kant’s illustration is 100 thalers (coins). Imagine you have 100 thalers in your mind as a mere concept. Then imagine you also have 100 thalers in existence, not only in the mind. You have two cases of 100 thalers, one which exists in reality and the other which only exists in your mind.

If Anselm was correct that existence is part of the definition of the concept of a thing, then the thalers which exist should be conceptually different to the thalers that do not.

However, the concept 100 thalers is no different whether a mere concept in your mind or instantiated in reality. 100 thalers is just 100 thalers. It has the predicates of shininess, roundness and 100 etc. Being only in the mind doesn’t make the concept somehow less of a complete description of what 100 thalers is. So, existence is not part of the definition of a thing. It is not a predicate or property of the definition of a thing.

So, Anselm and Descartes are wrong when they claim it’s incoherent to think of God without existence.

Malcolm criticised Kant, arguing that Anselm’s second form had been right all along. Kant’s argument worked regarding contingent but not necessary existence. He made the same mistake Gaunilo’s lost island argument made, which was to think we could test the logic of the ontological argument through application to contingent things, such as islands or thalers.

Something is contingent if it is dependent on something else for its existence. The reason for the existence of a contingent thing is therefore external to it and so does not describe or define it. However, a necessary being doesn’t depend on anything else for its existence, so it contains the reason for its existence within itself. Since the reason for its existence is contained within itself, necessary existence must be a defining part of a thing in a way that contingent existence is not. So, necessary existence is a predicate. The ontological argument, which relies on necessary existence, is therefore defended from Kant’s critique.

Anselm and Malcolm seem correct that necessary existence is a predicate of God. Contingent existence of things like cats and coins is not a predicate, since their reason for existence is something else. However, necessary existence does define and describe a thing.

However, Kant’s first criticism might still succeed:

Even if necessary existence were a predicate of God, that only shows that if God exists, then God necessarily exists. It doesn’t show that God does exist.

Malcolm’s ontological argument

N. Malcolm’s created his own version of the ontological argument, referring to God as an unlimited being.

P1. God either exists or does not exist. P2. If God exists, God cannot go out of existence as that would require dependence on something else. So, if God exists, God’s existence is necessarily P3. If God does not exist, God cannot come into existence as that would make God dependent on whatever brought God into existence. So, if God does not exist, God’s existence is impossible. C1. So, God’s existence is either necessary or impossible P4. The concept of God is not self-contradictory (like a four-sided triangle), therefore God’s existence is not impossible. C2. Therefore, God exists necessarily.

In P4, Malcolm’s ontological argument most clearly shows how all versions of the argument rely on the concept of God being coherent. Nonetheless, there are numerous philosophical debates about that, including:

• The paradox of the stone
• The Euthyphro dilemma
• The incompatibility of free will and omniscience
• The logical problem of evil

Empiricist response: Hume on the impossibility of a necessary being

“there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori” – Hume.

A necessary being must exist – it cannot be the case that it does not exist. This means that we shouldn’t even be able to conceive of a necessary being not existing without contradiction. However, Hume claims that whatever we conceive of as existing, we can conceive of as not existing. It follows that there is no being that we cannot conceive to not exist, so no being can exist necessarily. Hume concludes:

“The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no meaning.”  

This argument references “Hume’s fork”:

A priori reasoning can only tell us about the relations between ideas , i.e. analytic knowledge (true by definition). E.g. “a bachelor is an unmarried man”.

A posteriori reasoning can only tell us about matters of fact , i.e. synthetic knowledge (true by the way the world is). E.g. “The sun will rise tomorrow”.

Matters of fact, such as whether a being exists, cannot be established a priori, according to this argument. Hume’s basis for the fork is that if a particular truth is a matter of logic/definition, then it will be true or false no matter the factual state of the universe. E.g., one plus one will always equal two, regardless of what happens to be factually true of the universe. This suggests there is a disconnect between logical truth and factual truth. The term “necessary existence” seem to ignore this disconnect. A being having necessary existence does not seem to be a matter of fact since it must exist, regardless of the factual state of the universe. Yet, what exists is a matter of fact, not relations of ideas. It’s invalid to claim that a being’s existence is logically necessary since a being’s existence cannot be established through logic. Since Hume’s fork has shown that logical truth is disconnected from factual truth, the idea that something could necessarily exist is incoherent.

The ontological argument therefore fails because it attempts to establish a matter of fact (God’s existence) through a priori reasoning.

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5 Meditation V: The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

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this chapter discusses Descartes's Ontological Argument—a thesis considering the existence of God, which was first developed by St. Anselm. Descartes's version refers to God as a “supremely perfect being,” whose perfection is defined by existence. Existence is perfection, therefore a perfect being that cannot exist is not perfect at all. There are many weaknesses in the Argument, however, as pointed out by the likes of Gaunilo, Kant, and Caterus. Unfortunately, the Ontological Argument remains implausible in light of their scholarship, however it may only compromise some of Descartes's discourse later on.

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Graham Oppy, editor: Ontological arguments

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018, x and 284 pp, $34.99 (paper)

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• Published: 27 June 2019
• Volume 86 , pages 91–96, ( 2019 )

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The Many - Faced Argument (ed. Hick and McGill, Macmillan 1967). A very large volume, edited by Miroslaw Szatkowski, appeared in 2013 ( Ontological Proofs Today, Ontos Verlag). That includes much advanced work, but is expensive and much less accessible than the volume under review.

See especially p. 57.

“The Ontological Argument as Cartesian Therapy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35(4), pp. 521–562.

“Ontological Arguments” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ; https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/ , accessed May 22, 2019.

Lewis, David, "Anselm and Actuality," Nous volume 4, number 2 (1970), pp. 175–188.

The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 221.

See his “Three Versions of the Ontological Argument” in Ontological Proofs Today, Miroslaw Szatkowski (editor), Ontos Verlag 2012, pp. 143–162.

NB: Descartes gives such a restriction, but this involves “clear and distinct perception” by the meditator.

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Harrelson, K.J. Graham Oppy, editor: Ontological arguments. Int J Philos Relig 86 , 91–96 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-019-09720-3

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The Ontological Argument from Descartes to Hegel

Kevin J. Harrelson, The Ontological Argument from Descartes to Hegel , Humanity Books, 2009, $39.98 (hbk), ISBN 9781591026396.

Reviewed by Charles Taliaferro, St. Olaf College

In 1945, Bertrand Russell announced in his famous The History of Western Philosophy (a brilliant but sometimes eccentric and flawed book) that the ontological argument has been proved to be invalid, despite the fact that the soundness of the argument would be very good news indeed for philosophy:

The real question is: Is there anything we can think of which, by the mere fact that we can think of it, is shown to exist outside our thoughts. Every philosopher would like to say yes, because a philosopher’s job is to find out things about the world by thinking rather than observing. 1

While Russell pronounced the argument dead (albeit with regret), perhaps Anthony Kenny was wiser in his four volume New History of Western Philosophy when he ended the fourth volume with a warning to those who think the argument has been refuted:

Plantinga’s reinstatement of the [ontological] argument, using logical techniques more modern than any available to Russell, serves as a salutary warning of the danger that awaits any historian of logic who declares a philosophical issue definitively closed. 2

Kevin J. Harrelson has written a welcome historical and critical analysis of the ontological argument in early modern European philosophy. In the Introduction, he writes:

In the following chapters I argue that the strategy for proving a priori the existence of God that remains in place during this period, from Descartes’ initial argument in the Discourse on the Method (1637) to Hegel’s final lectures in Berlin (1831), is both internally consistent and free of any easily identifiable error. More importantly, I try to show that the most common objections to the modern ontological proof, raised by the likes of Gassendi, Hobbes, Hume, and Kant, fail to identify any conclusive and universal fallacy. (p. 18)

His book is not, however, “an outright defense of the ontological argument”, for Harrelson is convinced most versions of the ontological argument face serious obstacles and are not persuasive to those not already committed to what he finds philosophically problematic. The book is rich with historical references and nuanced readings of canonical texts, and is packed with arguments and counter-arguments.

The book opens with a compact overview of the ontological arguments found in Anselm, the scholastics, Descartes, and Leibniz. Some of the arguments’ exposition is a bit hard to follow. In discussing the relationship between perfection and necessary existence (which Anselmians usually seek to secure on the grounds that existing necessarily is a perfection or great-making attribute), Harrelson writes: “If God is indeed identical to his own existence, then it could only represent a shortcoming of human reason to distinguish the notion of a ‘perfect being’ from that of ‘necessary existence’” (p. 25). Why is this a problem? Can’t a case for the ontological argument begin with a consideration of great-making properties and an inquirer come to reason that necessary existence plus theistic attributes would be (or is) more excellent than theistic attributes and contingent existence? If one does not realize this prior to entertaining the argument, perhaps that is a “shortcoming”, but no worse than if someone did not realize 6 is the smallest perfect number before she reasoned that 6 is equivalent to 3 + 2+ 1.

In the same chapter, and on the same page as the claim just considered, Harrelson writes, “the peculiar identification of ‘God’ and ‘necessary existence’ renders misleading all theological statements about the existence of the deity” (p. 25). It is not clear, however, which philosopher (if any) claims that what we mean by “perfection” is “necessary existence” (as in “grandmother” is “a female whose child has a child”). Harrelson writes:

In early modern philosophy we find rather that theological propositions are understood to be akin to identical statements, and the philosophers in question fall just short of claiming that “perfect being” and “necessary existence” have the same meaning. “Necessary existence,” like God’s other predicates, is identical with God’s whole nature. This identity of subject and predicate would seem to exempt theological statements from the rules governing normal attributive statements. (p. 25)

Why, however, would a defender of the ontological argument claim that “necessary existence” means the same as “perfect being”, or claim that necessary existence “is identical with God’s whole nature”, rather than claim that necessary existence (or existing necessarily) is a mode of being distinct from being contingent (or having the property being contingent) ? Presumably, for an Anselmian theist, claiming that God exists necessarily involves claiming that there necessarily exists a being of unsurpassable excellence or perfection. I do not yet see how linking necessity and perfection is a theological disaster. At the least, some clarification of how the thesis of divine simplicity comes into play on this issue would have been desirable.

In the same chapter, Harrelson has an interesting treatment of Descartes’ analogy about the idea of a triangle in discussing the idea of God. The format Harrelson employs in clarifying the points at issue is complex.

The following is a short list of those objections, other than the possibility and Thomistic, that are prevalent in the modern period. After each objection I give a caricature of the kind of reply that is frequently found among proponents of the modern argument. I also give a brief explanation of the debate, in which I try to indicate, very roughly, the historical contexts in which the respective objections and replies appear and reappear. (p. 29)

The deliberate use of caricature made the reasoning less easy to follow (for me, anyway).

Thus, the problem with the argument is that it involves the existence of God (!), experience and/or intuition (perhaps especially theological intuition), and insight. One difficulty readers will have so far is that it is not easy to see “the downfall” of the argument without seeing more of “the rise”.

First, from the fact that our perception is incorporated in the premise of the argument it follows that the conclusion is not true for everyone. In other words, whoever does not actually perceive the connection between “a supremely perfect being” and “necessary existence” cannot assent to the claim in the minor premise, in which case the conclusion remains undemonstrated. It is not the case that these individuals fail to grasp a premise that is objectively true; rather, their perceiving a certain “truth” is itself part of the premise. The premise is in fact false in any instance in which the perception is lacking. The ontological argument is thus unsound in those cases. Regardless of whether the ontological argument is ever sound, then, it will sometimes be unsound. The objections will always be, in some sense, in the right, despite their inability to discover an internal flaw in the argument. (p. 67)

This strikes me as odd. Any argument in philosophy might well be considered unsound if not everyone grasps its entailment relations. Even a simple entailment like “if all humans are mortal, no immortal being is a human” might sometimes be unsound because someone, somewhere does not accept the entailment.

In “Refutation of Atheism”, there is a welcome discussion of Cambridge Platonist treatments of the ontological argument. Harrelson has some sympathy with Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, even if he thinks both present arguments with fatal flaws or fail to persuade. As before, I find Harrelson’s autopsy of the argument neither obvious or clear. Here is an analysis of More:

Like Descartes, [More] assents to the following maxim: "we are first to have a settled notion of what God is , before we go about to demonstrate that he is." The various subsidiary arguments to the minor premise (the proof of innateness, the deduction of necessary existence from the idea of God, etc.) serve this end, comprising a preliminary examination of the essence or notion of God. The inference to God’s actual existence appears only at the end of this discussion. This last fact, however, represents the fatal consequence of the systematic presentation of the ontological argument: in order to clarify the various steps in the argument, it was necessary to distinguish the essence of God (i.e., “what God is”) from his existence (“that he is”). The systematic presentation of the ontological argument thereby contradicts the basic presupposition of that same argument, viz., that the essence and existence of God are inseparable. (pp. 87-88)

I do not quite see the problem. More does not think God’s essence and existence can be metaphysically separated, but he thinks one can epistemically consider God’s essence and then come to see that it (together with the thesis that God exists either necessarily or God’s existence is impossible , plus the premise that God’s existence is possible ) entails that God exists.

Harrelson offers a helpful exposition of the work of Ralph Cudworth and Samuel Clark. He is probably correct that Locke’s attack on innate ideas undermined the popularity of the ontological argument, though there are many versions of the argument that do not require or presuppose the existence of innate ideas.

In the chapter “Being and Intuition”, Harrelson takes up the work of Malebranche. There is a useful examination of how Malebranche advances the ontological argument beyond Descartes. At least one of Harrelson’s objections to Malebranche seems strained: “the revised form of the argument is indefensible against the nominalist’s objection that ‘being’ is a mere concept” (p. 115). It is indefensible, unless of course nominalism turns out to be deeply problematic and then the objection carries no weight.

Chapter four contains a helpful analysis of Spinoza’s work, showing how his version of the ontological argument is closely tied in with the whole of Spinoza’s philosophy: "No one can accept [Spinoza’s] argument without accepting his other doctrines in toto , or at least without offering alternative versions of them." (p. 135)

Chapter five offers a detailed exploration of the ontological argument in pre-Kantian German philosophy. Arguments by Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, and Crusius are addressed.

Chapter six on Kant is excellent. Harrelson places Kant’s famous criticism of the ontological argument in perspective and shows why it is not decisive. Harrelson thinks Kant was effective in challenging the authority of the ontological argument largely because of Kant’s general case about the limits of human thought:

The ontological argument, in 1785, is still not the object of any directly successful critique. Its temporary disappearance is a product only of the belief that humans are incapable of obtaining any genuine cognition beyond the field of “experience,” as this term is defined in the opening chapters of the Critique of Pure Reason . (p. 191)

The final chapter on Hegel provides a good context for Harrelson’s thesis that the ontological argument might work for some people. If one can (in Hegel’s terms) “elevate” one’s mind to God, the argument succeeds:

Whoever “grasps” or comprehends that “being is the concept,” i.e., whoever gazes from the summit of absolute knowledge and thereby understands the inferences of Hegelian logic, also perceives the existence of God via participation in God’s self-knowledge. (p. 220)

In Harrelson’s view, while (to echo Russell) every philosopher would like to have such elevation, few of us succeed and so Hegel’s ontological argument (like Descartes’) fails in its ambition as a demonstration or proof.

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Ontological Arguments

Ontological arguments are arguments, for the conclusion that God exists, from premises which are supposed to derive from some source other than observation of the world—e.g., from reason alone. In other words, ontological arguments are arguments from nothing but analytic, a priori and necessary premises to the conclusion that God exists.

The first, and best-known, ontological argument was proposed by St. Anselm of Canterbury in the 11th. century C.E. In his Proslogion , St. Anselm claims to derive the existence of God from the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived . St. Anselm reasoned that, if such a being fails to exist, then a greater being—namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived, and which exists —can be conceived. But this would be absurd: nothing can be greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived. So a being than which no greater can be conceived—i.e., God—exists.

In the seventeenth century, René Descartes defended a family of similar arguments. For instance, in the Fifth Meditation , Descartes claims to provide a proof demonstrating the existence of God from the idea of a supremely perfect being. Descartes argues that there is no less contradiction in conceiving a supremely perfect being who lacks existence than there is in conceiving a triangle whose interior angles do not sum to 180 degrees. Hence, he supposes, since we do conceive a supremely perfect being—we do have the idea of a supremely perfect being—we must conclude that a supremely perfect being exists.

In the early eighteenth century, Gottfried Leibniz attempted to fill what he took to be a shortcoming in Descartes’ view. According to Leibniz, Descartes’ arguments fail unless one first shows that the idea of a supremely perfect being is coherent, or that it is possible for there to be a supremely perfect being. Leibniz argued that, since perfections are unanalysable, it is impossible to demonstrate that perfections are incompatible—and he concluded from this that all perfections can co-exist together in a single entity.

In more recent times, Kurt Gödel, Charles Hartshorne, Norman Malcolm and Alvin Plantinga have all presented much-discussed ontological arguments which bear interesting connections to the earlier arguments of St. Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz. Of these, the most interesting are those of Gödel and Plantinga; in these cases, however, it is unclear whether we should really say that these authors claim that the arguments are proofs of the existence of God.

Critiques of ontological arguments begin with Gaunilo, a contemporary of St. Anselm. Perhaps the best known criticisms of ontological arguments are due to Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason . Most famously, Kant claims that ontological arguments are vitiated by their reliance upon the implicit assumption that “existence” is a predicate. However, as Bertrand Russell observed, it is much easier to be persuaded that ontological arguments are no good than it is to say exactly what is wrong with them. This helps to explain why ontological arguments have fascinated philosophers for almost a thousand years.

In various ways, the account provided to this point is rough, and susceptible of improvement. Sections 1–5 in what follows provide some of the requisite embellishments, though—as is usually the case in philosophy—there are many issues taken up here which could be pursued at much greater length. Sections 6–8 take up some of the central questions at a slightly more sophisticated level of discussion. Section 9 is a quick overview of very recent work on ontological arguments:

1. History of Ontological Arguments

2. taxonomy of ontological arguments, 3. characterisation of ontological arguments, 4. objections to ontological arguments, 5. parodies of ontological arguments, 6. gödel’s ontological argument, 7. a victorious ontological argument, 8. st. anselm’s ontological argument, 9. ontological arguments in the 21st century, primary texts, other texts, other internet resources, related entries.

For a useful discussion of the history of ontological arguments in the modern period, see Harrelson 2009.

According to a modification of the taxonomy of Oppy 1995, there are eight major kinds of ontological arguments, viz:

• definitional ontological arguments;
• conceptual (or hyperintensional) ontological arguments;
• modal ontological arguments;
• Meinongian ontological arguments;
• experiential ontological arguments;
• mereological ontological arguments;
• higher-order ontological arguments; and
• ‘Hegelian’ ontological arguments;

Examples of all but the last follow. These are mostly toy examples. But they serve to highlight the deficiencies which more complex examples also share.

Note: I provide no example of a ‘Hegelian’ ontological argument because I know of no formulation of such an argument. Many people assert that Hegel provided an ontological argument; but, when pressed for a list of the premises of the argument, Hegel’s friends fail to deliver. (For a defense of Hegel against these charges—but not for a supply of the premises of ‘the Hegelian ontological argument’—see Redding and Bubbio 2014.)

God is a being which has every perfection. (This is true as a matter of definition.) Existence is a perfection. Hence God exists.

I conceive of a being than which no greater can be conceived. If a being than which no greater can be conceived does not exist, then I can conceive of a being greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived—namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived that exists. I cannot conceive of a being greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived. Hence, a being than which no greater can be conceived exists.

It is possible that that God exists. God is not a contingent being, i.e., either it is not possible that God exists, or it is necessary that God exists. Hence, it is necessary that God exists. Hence, God exists. (See Malcolm 1960, Hartshorne 1965, and Plantinga 1974 for closely related arguments.)

[It is analytic, necessary and a priori that] Each instance of the schema “The F G is F ” expresses a truth. Hence the sentence “The existent perfect being is existent” expresses a truth. Hence, the existent perfect being is existent. Hence, God is existent, i.e. God exists. (The last step is justified by the observation that, as a matter of definition, if there is exactly one existent perfect being, then that being is God.)

The word ‘God’ has a meaning that is revealed in religious experience. The word ‘God’ has a meaning only if God exists. Hence, God exists. (See Rescher 1959 for a live version of this argument.)

I exist. Therefore something exists. Whenever a bunch of things exist, their mereological sum also exists. Therefore the sum of all things exists. Therefore God—the sum of all things—exists.

Say that a God-property is a property that is possessed by God in all and only those worlds in which God exists. Not all properties are God properties. Any property entailed by a collection of God-properties is itself a God-property. The God-properties include necessary existence, necessary omnipotence, necessary omniscience, and necessary perfect goodness. Hence, there is a necessarily existent, necessarily omnipotent, necessarily omniscient, and necessarily perfectly good being (namely, God).

Of course, this taxonomy is not exclusive: an argument can belong to several categories at once. Moreover, an argument can be ambiguous between a range of readings, each of which belongs to different categories. This latter fact may help to explain part of the curious fascination of ontological arguments. Finally, the taxonomy can be further specialised: there are, for example, at least four importantly different kinds of modal ontological arguments which should be distinguished. (See, e.g., Ross 1969 for a rather different kind of modal ontological argument.)

It is not easy to give a good characterisation of ontological arguments. The traditional characterisation involves the use of problematic notions—analyticity, necessity, and a priority —and also fails to apply to many arguments to which defenders have affixed the label “ontological”. (Consider, for example, the claim that I conceive of a being than which no greater can be conceived. This claim is clearly not analytic (its truth doesn’t follow immediately from the meanings of the words used to express it), nor necessary (I might never have entertained the concept), nor a priori (except perhaps in my own case, though even this is unclear—perhaps even I don’t know independently of experience that I have this concept.)) However, it is unclear how that traditional characterisation should be improved upon.

Perhaps one might resolve to use the label “ontological argument” for any argument which gets classified as “an ontological argument” by its proponent(s). This procedure would make good sense if one thought that there is a natural kind—ontological arguments—which our practice carves out, but for which is hard to specify defining conditions. Moreover, this procedure can be adapted as a pro tem stop gap: when there is a better definition to hand, that definition will be adopted instead. On the other hand, it seems worthwhile to attempt a more informative definition.

Focus on the case of ontological arguments for the conclusion that God exists. One characteristic feature of these arguments is the use which they make of “referential vocabulary”—names, definite descriptions, indefinite descriptions, quantified noun phrases, etc.—whose ontological commitments—for occurrences of this vocabulary in “referential position”—non-theists do not accept.

Theists and non-theists alike (can) agree that there is spatio-temporal, or causal, or nomic, or modal structure to the world (the basis for cosmological arguments); and that there are certain kinds of complexity of organisation, structure and function in the world (the basis for teleological arguments); and so on. But theists and non-theists are in dispute about whether there are perfect beings, or beings than which no greater can be conceived, or … ; thus, theists and non-theists are in dispute about the indirect subject matter of the premises of ontological arguments.

Of course, the premises of ontological arguments often do not deal directly with perfect beings, beings than which no greater can be conceived, etc.; rather, they deal with descriptions of, or ideas of, or concepts of, or the possibility of the existence of, these things. However, the basic point remains: ontological arguments require the use of vocabulary which non-theists should certainly find problematic when it is used in ontologically committing contexts (i.e not inside the scope of prophylactic operators—such as “according to the story” or “by the lights of theists” or “by the definition”—which can be taken to afford protection against unwanted commitments).

Note that this characterisation does not beg the question against the possibility of the construction of a successful ontological argument—i.e., it does not lead immediately to the conclusion that all ontological arguments are question-begging (in virtue of the ontologically committing vocabulary which they employ). For it may be that the vocabulary in question only gets used in premises under the protection of prophylactic operators (which ward off the unwanted commitments.) Of course, there will then be questions about whether the resulting arguments can possibly be valid—how could the commitments turn up in the conclusion if they are not there in the premises?—but those are further questions, which would remain to be addressed.

Objections to ontological arguments take many forms. Some objections are intended to apply only to particular ontological arguments, or particular forms of ontological arguments; other objections are intended to apply to all ontological arguments. It is a controversial question whether there are any successful general objections to ontological arguments.

One general criticism of ontological arguments which have appeared hitherto is this: none of them is persuasive , i.e., none of them provides those who do not already accept the conclusion that God exists—and who are reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc.—with either a pro tanto reason or an all-things-considered reason to accept that conclusion. Any reading of any ontological argument which has been produced so far which is sufficiently clearly stated to admit of evaluation yields a result which is invalid, or possesses a set of premises which it is clear in advance that no reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc. non-theists will accept, or has a benign conclusion which has no religious significance, or else falls prey to more than one of the above failings.

For each of the families of arguments introduced in the earlier taxonomy, we can give general reasons why arguments of that family fall under the general criticism. In what follows, we shall apply these general considerations to the exemplar arguments introduced in section 2.

(1) Definitional arguments: These are arguments in which ontologically committing vocabulary is introduced solely via a definition. An obvious problem is that claims involving that vocabulary cannot then be non-question-beggingly detached from the scope of that definition. (The inference from ‘By definition, God is an existent being’ to ‘God exists’ is patently invalid; while the inference to ‘By definition, God exists’ is valid, but uninteresting. In the example given earlier, the premises licence the claim that, as a matter of definition, God possesses the perfection of existence. But, as just noted, there is no valid inference from this claim to the further claim that God exists.)

(2) Conceptual arguments: These are arguments in which ontologically committing vocabulary is introduced solely within the scope of hyperintensional operators (e.g. ‘believes that’, ‘conceives of’, etc.). Often, these operators have two readings, one of which can cancel ontological commitment, and the other of which cannot. On the reading which can give cancellation (as in the most likely reading of ‘John believes in Santa Claus’), the inference to a conclusion in which the ontological commitment is not cancelled will be invalid. On the reading which cannot cancel ontological commitment (as in that reading of ‘John thinks about God’ which can only be true if there is a God to think about), the premises are question-begging: they incur ontological commitments which non-theists reject. In our sample argument, the claim, that I conceive of an existent being than which no greater being can be conceived, admits of the two kinds of readings just distinguished. On the one hand, on the reading which gives cancellation, the inference to the conclusion that there is a being than which no greater can be conceived is plainly invalid. On the other hand, on the reading in which there is no cancellation, it is clear that this claim is one which no reasonable, etc. non-theist will accept: if you doubt that there is a being than which no greater can be conceived, then, of course, you doubt whether you can have thoughts about such a being.

(3) Modal arguments: These are arguments with premises which concern modal claims about God, i.e., claims about the possibility or necessity of God’s attributes and existence. Suppose that we agree to think about possibility and necessity in terms of possible worlds: a claim is possibly true just in case it is true in at least one possible world; a claim is necessarily true just in case it is true in every possible world; and a claim is contingent just in case it is true in some possible worlds and false in others. Some theists hold that God is a necessarily existent being, i.e., that God exists in every possible world; all non-theists reject the claim that God exists in the actual world. The sample argument consists, in effect, of two premises:

• God exists in at least one possible world.
• God exists in all possible worlds if God exists in any.

A minimally rational non-theist would not accept both of these premises – they entail that God exists in every possible world whereas a minimally rational non-theists would insist that there is at least one possible world in which God does not exist. Given that that a minimally rational non-theist accepts that there is at least one possible world in which God does not exist, such a non-theist could offer the following counterargument:

• God fails to exist in at least one possible world.

These premises entail that God exists in no possible world, and hence that God does not exist in the actual world. Considered together, the argument and the counterargument just mentioned plainly do not give anyone a reason to prefer theism to non-theism, and nor do they give anyone a reason to prefer non-theism to theism. So the sample argument is unsuccessful: it doesn’t supply an all-things-considered reason to prefer theism to non-theism (just as the counterargument doesn’t supply an all-things-considered reason to prefer non-theism to theism).

(4) Meinongian arguments: These are arguments which depend somehow or other on Meinongian theories of objects. Consider the schema ‘The F G is F ’. Naive Meinongians will suppose that if F is instantiated with any property, then the result is true (and, quite likely, necessary, analytic and a priori). So, for example, the round square is round; the bald current King of France is bald; and so on. However, more sophisticiated Meinongians will insist that there must be some restriction on the substitution instances for F, in order to allow one to draw the obvious and important ontological distinction between the following two groups: {Bill Clinton, the sun, the Eiffel Tower} and {Santa Claus, Mickey Mouse, the round square}. Choice of vocabulary here is controversial: Let us suppose (for the sake of example) that the right thing to say is that the former things exist and the latter do not. Under this supposition, ‘existent’ will not be a suitable substitution instance for F—obviously, since we all agree that there is no existent round square. Of course, nothing hangs on the choice of ‘existent’ as the crucial piece of vocabulary. The point is that non-theists are not prepared to include god(s) in the former group of objects—and hence will be unpersuaded by any argument which tries to use whatever vocabulary is used to discriminate between the two classes as the basis for an argument that god(s) belong to the former group. (Cognoscenti will recognise that the crucial point is that Meinongian ontological arguments fail to respect the distinction between nuclear (assumptible, characterising) properties and non-nuclear (non-assumptible, non-characterising) properties. It should, of course, be noted that neither Meinong, nor any of his well-known modern supporters—e.g. Terence Parsons, Richard Sylvan—ever endorses a Meinongian ontological argument; and it should also be noted that most motivate the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear properties in part by a need to avoid Meinongian ontological arguments. The reason for calling these arguments “Meinongian” is that they rely on quantification over—or reference to—non-existent objects; there is no perjorative intent in the use of this label.)

(5) Experiential arguments: These are arguments which try to make use of ‘externalist’ or ‘object-involving’ accounts of content. It should not be surprising that they fail. After all, those accounts of content need to have something to say about expressions which fail to refer (‘Santa Claus’, ‘phlogiston’, etc.). But, however the account goes, non-theists will insist that expressions which purport to refer to god(s) should be given exactly the same kind of treatment.

(6) Mereological arguments: Those who dislike mereology will not be impressed by these arguments. However, even those who accept principles of unrestricted composition—i.e., who accept principles which claim, e.g., that, whenever there are some things, there is something which is the sum or fusion of all of those things—need not be perturbed by them: for it is plausible to think that the conclusions of these arguments have no religious significance whatsoever—they are merely arguments for, e.g., the existence of the physical universe.

(7) Higher-Order arguments: The key to these arguments is the observation that any collection of properties, that (a) does not include all properties and (b) is closed under entailment, is possibly jointly instantiated. If it is impossible that God exists — as all who deny that God exists suppose, on the further assumption that, were God to exist, God would exist of necessity — then it cannot be true both that the God-properties are closed under entailment and that there are properties that are not God-properties. Those who take themselves to have good independent reason to deny that there are any gods will take themselves to have good independent reason to deny that there are God-properties that form a non-trivial collection that is closed under entailment.

Even if the forgoing analyses are correct, it is important to note that no argument has been given for the conclusion that no ontological argument can be successful. Even if all of the kinds of arguments produced to date are pretty clearly unsuccessful—i.e., not such as ought to give non-theists reason to accept the conclusion that God exists—it remains an open question whether there is some other kind of hitherto undiscovered ontological argument which does succeed. (Perhaps it is worth adding here that there is fairly widespread consensus, even amongst theists, that no known ontological arguments for the existence of God are persuasive. Most categories of ontological argument have some actual defenders; but none has a large following.)

Many other objections to (some) ontological arguments have been proposed. All of the following have been alleged to be the key to the explanation of the failure of (at least some) ontological arguments: (1) existence is not a predicate (see, e.g., Kant, Smart 1955, Alston 1960); (2) the concept of god is meaningless/incoherent/ inconsistent (see, e.g., Findlay 1949); (3) ontological arguments are ruled out by “the missing explanation argument” (see Johnston 1992; (4) ontological arguments all trade on mistaken uses of singular terms (see, e.g., Barnes 1972; (5) existence is not a perfection (see almost any textbook in philosophy of religion); (6) ontological arguments presuppose a Meinongian approach to ontology (see, e.g., Dummett 1993); and (7) ontological arguments are question-begging, i.e., presuppose what they set out to prove (see, e.g., Rowe 1989). There are many things to say about these objections: the most important point is that almost all of them require far more controversial assumptions than non-theists require in order to be able to reject ontological arguments with good conscience. Trying to support most of these claims merely in order to beat up on ontological arguments is like using a steamroller to crack a nut (in circumstances in which one is unsure that one can get the steamroller to move!).

Of course, all of the above discussion is directed merely to the claim that ontological arguments are not dialectically efficacious—i.e., they give reasonable non-theists no reason to change their views. It might be wondered whether there is some other use which ontological arguments have—e.g., as Plantinga claims, in establishing the reasonableness of theism. This seems unlikely. After all, at best these arguments show that certain sets of sentences (beliefs, etc.) are incompatible—one cannot reject the conclusions of these arguments while accepting their premises. But the arguments themselves say nothing about the reasonableness of accepting the premisses. So the arguments themselves say nothing about the (unconditional) reasonableness of accepting the conclusions of these arguments. Those who are disposed to think that theism is irrational need find nothing in ontological arguments to make them change their minds (and those who are disposed to think that theism is true should take no comfort from them either).

Positive ontological arguments—i.e., arguments FOR the existence of god(s)—invariably admit of various kinds of parodies, i.e., parallel arguments which seem at least equally acceptable to non-theists, but which establish absurd or contradictory conclusions. For many positive ontological arguments, there are parodies which purport to establish the non-existence of god(s); and for many positive ontological arguments there are lots (usually a large infinity!) of similar arguments which purport to establish the existence of lots (usally a large infinity) of distinct god-like beings. Here are some modest examples:

(1) By definition, God is a non-existent being who has every (other) perfection. Hence God does not exist.

(2) I conceive of a being than which no greater can be conceived except that it only ever creates n universes. If such a being does not exist, then we can conceive of a greater being—namely, one exactly like it which does exist. But I cannot conceive of a being which is greater in this way. Hence, a being than which no greater can be conceived except that it only ever creates n universes exists.

(3) It is possible that God does not exist. God is not a contingent being, i.e., either it is not possible that God exists, or it is necessary that God exists. Hence it is not possible that God exists. Hence God does not exist.

(4) It is analytic, necessary, and a priori that the F G is F . Hence, the existent perfect being who creates exactly n universes is existent. Hence the perfect being who creates exactly n universes exists.

There are many kinds of parodies on Ontological Arguments. The aim is to construct arguments which non-theists can reasonably claim to have no more reason to accept than the original Ontological Arguments themselves. Of course, theists may well be able to hold that the originals are sound, and the parodies not—but that is an entirely unrelated issue. (All theists—and no non-theists—should grant that the following argument is sound, given that the connectives are to be interpretted classically: “Either 2+2=5, or God exists. Not 2+2=5. Hence God exists.” It should be completely obvious that this argument is useless.)

There are many parodic discussions of Ontological Arguments in the literature. A particularly pretty one is due to Raymond Smullyan (1984), in which the argument is attributed to “the unknown Dutch theologian van Dollard”. A relatively recent addition to the genre is described in Grey 2000, though the date of its construction is uncertain. It is the work of Douglas Gasking, one-time Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne (with emendations by William Grey and Denis Robinson):

• The creation of the world is the most marvellous achievement imaginable.
• The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality, and (b) the ability of its creator.
• The greater the disability or handicap of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.
• The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non-existence.
• Therefore, if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator, we can conceive a greater being—namely, one who created everything while not existing.
• An existing God, therefore, would not be a being than which a greater cannot be conceived, because an even more formidable and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist.
• (Hence) God does not exist.

This parody—at least in its current state—seems inferior to other parodies in the literature, including the early parodies of Gaunilo and Caterus. To mention but one difficulty, while we might suppose that it would be a greater achievement to create something if one did not exist than if one did exist, it doesn’t follow from this that a non-existent creator is greater ( qua being) than an existent creator. Perhaps it might be replied that this objection fails to take the first premise into account: if the creation of the world really is “the most marvellous achievement imaginable”, then surely there is some plausibility to the claim that the creator must have been non-existent (since that would make the achievement more marvellous than it would otherwise have been). But what reason is there to believe that the creation of the world is “the most marvellous achievement imaginable”, in the sense which is required for this argument? Surely it is quite easy to imagine even more marvellous achievements—e.g., the creation of many worlds at least as good as this one! (Of course, one might also want to say that, in fact, one cannot conceive of a non-existent being’s actually creating something: that is literally inconceivable. Etc.)

Chambers 2000 and Siegwart 2014 provide nice, recent discussions of Gaunilo’s parody of the Proslogion II argument.

There is a small, but steadily growing, literature on the ontological arguments which Gödel developed in his notebooks, but which did not appear in print until well after his death. These arguments have been discussed, annotated and amended by various leading logicians: the upshot is a family of arguments with impeccable logical credentials. (Interested readers are referred to Sobel 1987, Anderson 1990, Adams 1995b, and Hazen 1999 for the history of these arguments, and for the scholarly annotations and emendations.) Here, I shall give a brief presentation of the version of the argument which is developed by Anderson, and then make some comments on that version. This discussion follows the presentation and discussion in Oppy 1996, 2000.

Definition 1: x is God-like if and only if x has as essential properties those and only those properties which are positive Definition 2: A is an essence of x if and only if for every property B , x has B necessarily if and only if A entails B Definition 3: x necessarily exists if and only if every essence of x is necessarily exemplified Axiom 1: If a property is positive, then its negation is not positive. Axiom 2: Any property entailed by—i.e., strictly implied by—a positive property is positive Axiom 3: The property of being God-like is positive Axiom 4: If a property is positive, then it is necessarily positive Axiom 5: Necessary existence is positive Axiom 6: For any property P , if P is positive, then being necessarily P is positive. Theorem 1: If a property is positive, then it is consistent, i.e., possibly exemplified. Corollary 1: The property of being God-like is consistent. Theorem 2: If something is God-like, then the property of being God-like is an essence of that thing. Theorem 3: Necessarily, the property of being God-like is exemplified.

Given a sufficiently generous conception of properties, and granted the acceptability of the underlying modal logic, the listed theorems do follow from the axioms. (This point was argued in detail by Dana Scott, in lecture notes which circulated for many years and which were transcribed in Sobel 1987 and published in Sobel 2004. It is also made by Sobel, Anderson, and Adams.) So, criticisms of the argument are bound to focus on the axioms, or on the other assumptions which are required in order to construct the proof.

Some philosophers have denied the acceptability of the underlying modal logic. And some philosophers have rejected generous conceptions of properties in favour of sparse conceptions according to which only some predicates express properties. But suppose that we adopt neither of these avenues of potential criticism of the proof. What else might we say against it?

One important point to note is that no definition of the notion of “positive property” is supplied with the proof. At most, the various axioms which involve this concept can be taken to provide a partial implicit definition. If we suppose that the “positive properties” form a set, then the axioms provide us with the following information about this set:

• If a property belongs to the set, then its negation does not belong to the set.
• The set is closed under entailment.
• The property of having as essential properties just those properties which are in the set is itself a member of the set.
• The set has exactly the same members in all possible worlds.
• The property of necessary existence is in the set.
• If a property is in the set, then the property of having that property necessarily is also in the set.

On Gödel’s theoretical assumptions, we can show that any set which conforms to (1)–(6) is such that the property of having as essential properties just those properties which are in that set is exemplified. Gödel wants us to conclude that there is just one intuitive, theologically interesting set of properties which is such that the property of having as essential properties just the properties in that set is exemplified. But, on the one hand, what reason do we have to think that there is any theologically interesting set of properties which conforms to the Gödelian specification? And, on the other hand, what reason do we have to deny that, if there is one set of theologically interesting set of properties which conforms to the Gödelian specification, then there are many theologically threatening sets of properties which also conform to that specification?

In particular, there is some reason to think that the Gödelian ontological argument goes through just as well—or just as badly—with respect to other sets of properties (and in ways which are damaging to the original argument). Suppose that there is some set of independent properties { I , G 1 , G 2 , …} which can be used to generate the set of positive properties by closure under entailment and “necessitation”. (“Independence” means: no one of the properties in the set is entailed by all the rest. “Necessitation” means: if P is in the set, then so is necessarily having P . I is the property of having as essential properties just those properties which are in the set. G 1 , G 2 , … are further properties, of which we require at least two.) Consider any proper subset of the set { G 1 , G 2 , …}—{ H 1 , H 2 , …}, say—and define a new generating set { I *, H 1 , H 2 , …}, where I * is the property of having as essential properties just those properties which are in the newly generated set. A “proof” parallel to that offered by Gödel “establishes” that there is a being which has as essential properties just those properties in this new set. If there are as few as 7 independent properties in the original generating set, then we shall be able to establish the existence of 720 distinct“God-like” creatures by the kind of argument which Gödel offers. (The creatures are distinct because each has a different set of essential properties.)

Even if the above considerations are sufficient to cast doubt on the credentials of Gödel’s “proof”, they do not pinpoint where the “proof” goes wrong. If we accept that the role of Axioms 1, 2, 4, and 6 is really just to constrain the notion of “positive property” in the right way—or, in other words, if we suppose that Axioms 1, 2, 4, and 6 are “analytic truths” about “positive properties”—then there is good reason for opponents of the “proof” to be sceptical about Axioms 3 and 5. Kant would not have been happy with Axiom 5; and there is at least some reason to think that whether the property of being God-like is “positive” ought to depend upon whether or not there is a God-like being.

The “victorious” modal ontological argument of Plantinga 1974 goes roughly as follows: Say that an entity possesses “maximal excellence” if and only if it is omnipotent, omnscient, and morally perfect. Say, further, that an entity possesses “maximal greatness” if and only if it possesses maximal excellence in every possible world—that is, if and only if it is necessarily existent and necessarily maximally excellent. Then consider the following argument:

• There is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
• (Hence) There is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.

Under suitable assumptions about the nature of accessibility relations between possible worlds, this argument is valid: from it is possible that it is necessary that p , one can infer that it is necessary that p . Setting aside the possibility that one might challenge this widely accepted modal principle, it seems that opponents of the argument are bound to challenge the acceptability of the premise.

And, of course, they do. Let’s just run the argument in reverse.

• There is no entity which possesses maximal greatness.
• (Hence) There is no possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.

Plainly enough, if you do not already accept the claim that there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness, then you won’t agree that the first of these arguments is more acceptable than the second. So, as a proof of the existence of a being which posseses maximal greatness, Plantinga’s argument seems to be a non-starter.

Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Plantinga himself agrees: the “victorious” modal ontological argument is not a proof of the existence of a being which possesses maximal greatness. But how, then, is it “victorious”? Plantinga writes: “Our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm’s argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion” (Plantinga 1974, 221).

It is pretty clear that Plantinga’s argument does not show what he claims that it shows. Consider, again, the argument: “Either God exists, or 2+2=5. It is not the case that 2+2=5. So God exists.” It is just a mistake for a theist to say: “Since the premise is true (and the argument is valid), this argument shows that the conclusion of the argument is true ”. No-one thinks that that argument shows any such thing. Similarly, it is just a mistake for a theist to say: “Since it is rational to accept the premise (and the argument is valid), this argument shows that it is rational to accept the conclusion of the argument”. Again, no one thinks that that argument shows any such thing. But why don’t these arguments show the things in question? There is room for argument about this. But it is at least plausible to claim that, in each case, any even minimally rational person who has doubts about the claimed status of the conclusion of the argument will have exactly the same doubts about the claimed status of the premise. If, for example, I doubt that it is rational to accept the claim that God exists, then you can be quite sure that I will doubt that it is rational to accept the claim that either 2+2=5 or God exists. But, of course, the very same point can be made about Plantinga’s argument: anyone with even minimal rationality who understands the premise and the conclusion of the argument, and who has doubts about the claim that it is rationally permissible to believe that there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness, will have exactly the same doubts about the claim that it is rationally permissible to believe that there is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.

For further discussion of Plantinga’s argument, see—for example—Adams 1988, Chandler 1993, Oppy 1995 (70–78, 248–259), Tooley 1981, and van Inwagen 1977).

There is an enormous literature on the material in Proslogion II-III . Some commentators deny that St. Anselm tried to put forward any proofs of the existence of God. Even among commentators who agree that St. Anselm intended to prove the existence of God, there is disagreement about where the proof is located. Some commentators claim that the main proof is in Proslogion II , and that the rest of the work draws out corollaries of that proof (see, e.g., Charlesworth 1965). Other commentators claim that the main proof is in Prologion III , and that the proof in Proslogion II is merely an inferior first attempt (see, e.g., Malcolm 1960). Yet other commentators claim that there is a single proof which spans at least Proslogion II-III —see, e.g., Campbell 1976 and, perhaps, the entire work—see, e.g., La Croix 1972. I shall ignore this aspect of the controversy about the Proslogion . Instead, I shall just focus on the question of the analysis of the material in Proslogion II on the assumption that there is an independent argument for the existence of God which is given therein.

Here is one translation of the crucial part of Proslogion II (due to William Mann (1972, 260–1); alternative translations can be found in Barnes 1972, Campbell 1976, Charlesworth 1965, and elsewhere):

Thus even the fool is convinced that something than which nothing greater can be conceived is in the understanding, since when he hears this, he understands it; and whatever is understood is in the understanding. And certainly that than which a greater cannot be conceived cannot be in the understanding alone. For if it is even in the understanding alone, it can be conceived to exist in reality also, which is greater. Thus if that than which a greater cannot be conceived is in the understanding alone, then that than which a greater cannot be conceived is itself that than which a greater can be conceived. But surely this cannot be. Thus without doubt something than which a greater cannot be conceived exists, both in the understanding and in reality.

There have been many ingenious attempts to find an argument which can be expressed in modern logical formalism, which is logically valid, and which might plausibly be claimed to be the argument which is expressed in this passage. To take a few prime examples, Adams 1971, Barnes 1972 and Oppenheimer and Zalta 1991 have all produced formally valid analyses of the argument in this passage. We begin with a brief presentation of each of these analyses, preceded by a presentation of the formulation of the argument given by Plantinga 1967, and including a presentation of some of the formulations of Lewis 1970. (Chambers 2000 works with the analysis of Adams 1971.)

8.1 Formulation 1

God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (Assumption for reductio )

Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone. (Premise)

A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality can be conceived. (Premise)

A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality is greater than God. (From (1) and (2).)

A being greater than God can be conceived. (From (3) and (4).)

It is false that a being greater than God can be conceived. (From definition of “God”.)

Hence, it is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (From (1), (5), (6).)

God exists in the understanding. (Premise, to which even the Fool agrees.)

Hence God exists in reality. (From (7), (8).)

See Plantinga 1967.

8.2 Formulation 2

The Fool understands the expression “the being than which no greater can be conceived”. (Premise)

If a person understands an expression “ b ”, then b is in that person’s understanding. (Premise)

If a thing is in a person’s understanding, then the person can conceive of that thing’s existing in reality. (Premise)

Each thing which exists in reality is greater than any thing which exists only in the understanding. (Premise)

If a person can conceive of something, and that thing entails something else, then the person can also conceive of that other thing. (Premise)

If a person can conceive that a specified object has a given property, then that person can conceive that something or other has that property. (Premise)

Hence the being than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality. (From (1)-(6), by a complex series of steps here omitted.)

See Barnes 1972.

8.3 Formulation 3

There is a thing x , and a magnitude m , such that x exists in the understanding, m is the magnitude of x , and it it not possible that there is a thing y and a magnitude n such that n is the magnitude of y and n > m . (Premise)

For any thing x and magnitude m , if x exists in the understanding, m is the magnitude of x , and it is not possible that there is a thing y and magnitude n such that n is the magnitude of y and n > m , then it is possible that x exists in reality. (Premise)

For any thing x and magnitude m , if m is the magnitude of x , and it it not possible that there is a thing y and a magnitude n such that n is the magnitude of y and n > m , and x does not exist in reality, then it is not possible that if x exists in reality then there is a magnitude n such that n is greater than m and n is the magnitude of x . (Premise)

(Hence) There is a thing x and a magnitude m such that x exist in the understanding, and x exists in reality, and m is the magnitude of x , and it it not possible that there is a thing y and a magnitude n such that n is the magnitude of y and n > m . (From 1, 2, 3)

See Adams 1971.

8.4 Formulation 4

For any understandable being x , there is a world w such that x exists in w . (Premise)

For any understandable being x , and for any worlds w and v , if x exists in w , but x does not exist in v , then the greatness of x in w exceeds the greatness of x in v . (Premise)

There is an understandable being x such that for no world w and being y does the greatness of y in w exceed the greatness of x in the actual world. (Premise)

(Hence) There is a being x existing in the actual world such that for no world w and being y does the greatness of y in w exceed the greatness of x in the actual world. (From (1)-(3).)

See Lewis 1970.

Lewis also suggests an alternative to (3) which yields a valid argument:

(3′) There is an understandable being x such that for no worlds v and w and being y does the greatness of y in w exceed the greatness of x in v .

and two alternatives to (3)—not presented here—which yield invalid arguments. (Of course, there further two alternatives are crucial to Lewis’ overall analysis of the passage: essentially, Lewis suggests that Anselm equivocates between an invalid argument with plausible premises and a valid argument with question-begging premises. In this respect, Lewis’ analysis is quite different from the other analyses currently under discussion.)

8.5 Formulation 5

There is (in the understanding) something than which there is no greater. (Premise)

(Hence) There is (in the understanding) a unique thing than which there is no greater. (From (1), assuming that the “greater-than” relation is connected.)

(Hence) There is (in the understanding) something which is the thing than which there is no greater. (From (2), by a theorem about descriptions.)

(Hence) There is (in the understanding) nothing which is greater than the thing than which there is no greater. (From (3), by another theorem about descriptions.)

If that thing than which there is no greater does not exist (in reality), then there is (in the understanding) something which is greater than that thing than which there is no greater. (Premise)

(Hence) That thing than which there is no greater exists (in reality). (From (4) and (5).)

(Hence) God exists. (From (6).)

See Oppenheimer and Zalta 1991.

Oppenheimer and Zalta 2011 provides a “simplified” version of this argument, in which the number of controversial assumptions is reduced. Since they also provide a clear reason for thinking that this new version of the argument is not persuasive, I shall not consider it further here.

8.6 Critical Appraisal

Considered as interpretations of the argument presented in the Proslogion , these formulations are subject to various kinds of criticisms.

First , the modal interpretations of Lewis 1970 and Adams 1971 don’t square very well with the rest of the Proslogion : the claim that “being than which no greater can be conceived” should be read as “being than which no greater is possible” would have us render the claim of Proslogion 15 to be that God is a being greater than any which is possible. And that is surely a bad result.

Second , the Meinongian interpretations of Barnes 1972, Adams 1971 and Oppenheimer and Zalta 1991 produce arguments which, given the principles involved, could easily be much simplified, and which are obviously vulnerable to Gaunilo-type objections.

Consider, for example, the case of Oppenheimer and Zalta. They have Anselm committed to the claim that if anyone can understand the phrase “that than which F ”, then there is something in the understanding such that F (see their footnote 25); and they also have him committed to the claim that if there is something which is the F -thing, then it—i.e., the F -thing—has the property F (see page 7). Plainly though, if Anselm is really committed to these principles, then he could hardly fail to be committed to the more general principles: (1) if anyone can understand the phrase “an F ”, then there is at least one F -thing in the understanding; and (2) if there are some things which are the F -things, then they—i.e., the F -things—must have the property F . (It would surely be absurd to claim that Anselm is only committed to the less general principles: what could possibly have justified the restrictions to the special cases?)

But, then, mark the consequences. We all understand the expression “an existent perfect being”. So, by the first claim, there is at least one existent perfect being in the understanding. And, by the second claim, any existent perfect being is existent. So, from these two claims combined, there is—in reality—at least one existent perfect being.

This argument gives Anselm everything that he wants, and very much more briefly. (The Proslogion goes on and on, trying to establish the properties of that than which no greater can be conceived. How much easier if we can just explicitly build all of the properties which want to “derive” into the initial description.) So, if Anselm really were committed to the principles which Oppenheimer and Zalta appear to attribute to him, it is hard to understand why he didn’t give the simpler argument. And, of course, it is also hard to understand why he didn’t take Gaunilo’s criticism. After all, when it is set out in this way, it is obvious that the argument proves far too much.

Third , some of the arguments have Anselm committed to claims about greatness which do not seem to correspond with what he actually says. The natural reading of the text is that, if two beings are identical save that one exists only in the understanding and the other exists in reality as well, then the latter is greater than the former. But Barnes 1971, for example, has Anselm committed to the much stronger claim that any existing thing is greater than every non-existent thing.

Given these kinds of considerations, it is natural to wonder whether there are better interpretations of Proslogion II according to which the argument in question turns out NOT to be logically valid. Here is a modest attempt to provide such an analysis:

We start with the claim that the Fool understands the expression “being than which no greater can be conceived”, i.e., even the Fool can entertain the idea or possess the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived. Now, entertaining this idea or possessing this concept requires the entertainer or possessor to recognise certain relationships which hold between given properties and the idea or concept in question. For example, given that you possess the concept of, or entertain the idea of, a smallest really existent Martian, it follows that you must recognise some kind of connection between the properties of being a Martian, really existing, and being smaller than other really existing Martians, and the concept or idea in question.

Following Anselm, we might say that, since you understand the expression “smallest really existent Martian”, there is, in your understanding, at least one smallest really existent Martian. (Or, apparently following Descartes, one might say that real existence is “part of”—or “contained in”—the idea of a smallest really existent Martian.) However, in saying this, it must be understood that we are not actually predicating properties of anything: we aren’t supposing that there is something which possesses the properties of being a Martian, really existing, and being no larger than any other Martian. (After all, we can safely suppose, we don’t think that any Martians really exist.) In other words, we must be able to have the concept of, or entertain the idea of, a smallest really existing Martian without believing that there really are any smallest Martians. Indeed, more strongly, we must be able to entertain the concept of a smallest really existent Martian—and to recognise that the property of “really existing” is part of this concept—while nonetheless maintaining that there are no smallest existent Martians.

It will be useful to introduce vocabulary to mark the point which is being made here. We could, for instance, distinguish between the properties which are encoded in an idea or concept, and the properties which are attributed in positive atomic beliefs which have that idea or concept as an ingredient. The idea “really existent Santa Claus” encodes the property of real existence; but it is perfectly possible to entertain this idea without attributing real existence to Santa Claus, i.e., without believing that Santa Claus really exists.

We can then apply this distinction to Anselm’s argument. On the one hand, the idea “being than which no greater can be conceived” encodes the property of real existence—this is what the reductio argument establishes (if it establishes anything at all). On the other hand, it is perfectly possible to entertain the idea of a being than which no greater can be conceived—and to recognise that this idea encodes the property of real existence—without attributing real existence to a being than which no greater can be conceived, i.e., without believing that a being than which no greater can be conceived really exists.

Of course, the argument which Anselm actually presents pays no attention to this distinction between encoding and attributing—i.e., between entertaining an idea and holding a belief—and nor does it pay attention to various other niceties. We begin from the point that the Fool entertains the idea of that than which no greater can be conceived (because the Fool understands the words “that than which no greater can be conceived”). From this, we move quickly to the claim that even the Fool is “convinced”—i.e., believes—that that than which no greater can be conceived possesses the property of existing in the understanding. And then the reductio argument is produced to establish that that than which no greater can be conceived cannot exist only in the understanding but must also possess the property of existing in reality as well (and all mention of the Fool, and what it is that the Fool believes, disappears).

As it stands, this is deeply problematic. How are we supposed to regiment the references to the Fool in the argument? Is the reductio argument supposed to tell us something about what even the Fool believes, or ought to believe? Are the earlier references to the Fool supposed to be inessential and eliminable? How are we so much as to understand the claim that even the Fool believes that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in the understanding? And how do we get from the Fool’s understanding the words “that than which no greater can be conceived” to his believing that that than which no greater can be conceived possesses the property of existing in the understanding?

Following the earlier line of thought, it seems that the argument might go something like this:

(Even) the Fool has the concept of that than which no greater can be conceived.

(Hence) (Even) the Fool believes that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in the understanding.

No one who believes that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in the understanding can reasonably believe that that than which no greater can be conceived exists only in the understanding.

(Hence) (Even) the Fool cannot reasonably deny that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality

(Hence) That than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality.

While this is not a good argument, it could appear compelling to one who failed to attend to the distinction between entertaining ideas and holding beliefs and who was a bit hazy on the distinction between the vehicles of belief and their contents. When the Fool entertains the concept of that than which no greater can be conceived he recognises that he is entertaining this concept (i.e., he believes that he is entertaining the concept of that than which no greater can be conceived—or, as we might say, that the concept is in his understanding). Conflating the concept with its object, this gives us the belief that than which no greater can be conceived possesses the property of existing in the understanding. Now, suppose as hypothesis for reductio , that we can reasonably believe that that than which no greater can be conceived possesses the property of existing only in the understanding. Ignoring the distinction between entertaining ideas and holding beliefs, this means that we when we entertain the idea of that than which no greater can be conceived, we entertain the idea of a being which exists only in the understanding. But that is absurd: when we entertain the idea of that than which no greater can be conceived, our idea encodes the property of existing in reality. So there is a contradiction, and we can conclude that, in order to be reasonable, we must believe that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality. But if any reasonable person must believe that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality, then surely it is the case that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality. And so we are done.

No doubt this suggestion about the interpretation of Anselm’s argument is deficient in various ways. However, the point of including it is illustrative rather than dogmatic. In the literature, there has been great resistance to the idea that the argument which Anselm gives is one which modern logicians would not hesitate to pronounce invalid. But it is very hard to see why there should be this resistance. (Certainly, it is not something for which there is much argument in the literature.) The text of the Proslogion is so rough, and so much in need of polishing, that we should not be too quick to dismiss the suggestion that Anselm’s argument is rather more like the argument most recently sketched than it is like the logically valid demonstrations provided by commentators such as Barnes, Adams, and Oppenheimer and Zalta. (For a more complex analysis of Proslogion II that has it yielding a valid argument, see Hinst 2014.)

Many recent discussions of ontological arguments are in compendiums, companions, encylopedias, and the like. So, for example, there are review discussions of ontological arguments in: Leftow 2005, Matthews 2005, Lowe 2007, Oppy 2007, and Maydole 2009. While the ambitions of these review discussions vary, many of them are designed to introduce neophytes to the arguments and their history. Given the current explosion of enthusiasm for compendiums, companions, encylopedias, and the like, in philosophy of religion, it is likely that many more such discussions will appear in the immediate future.

Some recent discussions of ontological arguments have been placed in more synoptic treatments of arguments about the existence of God. So, for example, there are extended discussions of ontological arguments in Everitt 2004, Sobel 2004, and Oppy 2006. Sobel’s examination of ontological arguments is exemplary. He provides one chapter on ‘classical ontological arguments’: Anselm, Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant’s critique of ontological arguments; one chapter on ‘modern modal ontological arguments’: Hartshorne, Malcolm and Plantinga; and one chapter on Gödel’s ontological argument. His analyses are very careful, and make heavy use of the tools of modern philosophical logic.

There has been one recent monograph devoted exclusively to the analysis of ontological arguments: Dombrowski 2006. Dombrowski is a fan of Hartshorne: the aim of his book is to defend the claim that Hartshorne’s ontological argument is a success. While Dombrowski’s book is a useful addition to the literature because of the scope of its discussion of ontological arguments—for example, it contains a chapter on Rorty on ontological arguments, and another chapter on John Taylor on ontological arguments—even reviewers sympathetic to process theism have not been persuaded that it makes a strong case for its central thesis.

Swatkowski (2012) is the most recent collection of papers on ontological arguments. A significant proportion of papers in this collection take up technical questions about logics that support ontological derivations. (Those interested in technical questions may also be interested in the topic taken up in Oppenheimer and Zalta (2011) and Gorbacz (2012).)

Finally, there has been some activity in journals. The most significant of these pieces is Millican 2004, the first article on ontological arguments in recent memory to appear in Mind . Millican argues for a novel interpretation of Anselm’s argument, and for a new critique of ontological arguments deriving from this interpretation. Needless to say, both the interpretation and the critique are controversial, but they are also worthy of attention. Among other journal articles, perhaps the most interesting are Pruss 2010, which provides a novel defence of the key possibility premise in modal ontological arguments, and Pruss 2009, which kick-started recent discussion of higher-order ontological arguments. There is also a chain of papers in Analysis initiated by Matthews and Baker (2010)

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up this entry topic at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Kurt Gödel’s Ontological Argument (Christopher Small, University of Waterloo)
• Medieval Sourcebook: Philosophers’ Criticisms of Anslem’s Ontological Argument for the Being of God (Paul Halsell, Fordham University)
• Handout for a Talk on the Ontological Argument (J. R. Lucas, Oxford University)
• Ontological Argument Revisited by Two Ottoman Muslim Scholars (Umit Dericioglu)
• The Ontological Argument (Kenneth Himma, University of Washington)
• Anselm’s Ontological Argument (Gideon Rosen, Princeton University)
• Hegel and Kant on the Ontological Argument (Maria de Lourdes Borges, Federal University of Santa Catarina)
• Ontological Argument (links to papers on ontological arguments)
• “ Formalization, Mechanization and Automation of Gödel’s Proof of God’s Existence , unpublished manuscript.
• “ Automating Gödel’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence with Higher-order Automated Theorem Provers , published in ECAI 2014, T. Schaub et al . (eds.), IOS Press.

Anselm, Saint [Anselm of Bec, Anselm of Canterbury] | a priori justification and knowledge | Descartes, René | existence | God: concepts of | Gödel, Kurt | Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich | Kant, Immanuel | logic: informal | logic: modal | Meinong, Alexius

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Anselm, the Ontological Argument, Faith and Reason

The opposing theories that point to the existence of god., john stonestreet jared hayden.

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John Stonestreet

Jared Hayden

This month marks the 915 th anniversary of the death of Anselm of Canterbury, one of the most influential theologians and apologists of his millennium. As a theologian, Anselm is known for advancing the satisfaction theory of atonement, a precursor to the ideas about sin and salvation that would be later championed by the Protestant reformers. As an apologist, Anselm argued that faith and reason do not stand opposed but, rather, work together in the pursuit of truth. Reason is not an obstacle to faith, and faith is not an obstacle to reason. Knowledge is, he believed, “faith seeking understanding.”  

Anselm is perhaps best known for the “ontological argument” for the existence of God. Published in his 1078 work the Proslogion , Anselm set out to construct “a single argument which would require no other for its proof.” The argument can seem confusing, but at its heart, it’s simple: God, by definition, is the greatest possible being that humans can imagine, greater than which nothing else can be imagined. However, if God were only an idea in our minds, He would not be the greatest possible being imaginable because the greatest possible being would also exist in reality (and not just in our minds). Therefore, God exists.   

Since its publication, Anselm’s ontological argument has been the subject of much debate. After all, humans imagine all kinds of things. Must they exist also?   

No. Anselm’s key insight is that God is a necessary being. In other words, God does not depend on any other being for His existence. God exists independently of anything or anyone else, regardless of whether we believe in Him.    

Two centuries after Anselm, Thomas Aquinas argued that God’s existence is necessary for other things to exist. To use an analogy: God is necessary for the existence of all creation like the sun is necessary to sustain all life. Plants depend on sunlight to create the nutrients they need. Many animals depend on plants for their survival. Other animals depend on plant-eating animals for their survival. Therefore, if the sun did not exist, neither would any life on Earth. Because life exists, that suggests the sun must also exist.  

Like the sun, God is necessary for both the existence and continued existence of life. As twentieth century theologian Robert Capon put it, creation is not some   

self-perpetuating pool game which is contingent only at the start—which needs only the first push on the cue ball to keep it going forever. … The world is more unnecessary than that. It is unnecessary now ; it cries in this moment for a cause to hold it in being. … [I]f God wanted to get rid of the universe, He would not have to do anything; He would have to stop doing something.  

An insight that is also central for Anselm is the relationship of the mind to reality. For Anselm, the human ability to conceive of a being that is greater than any other being points to an actual reality of that being. C.S. Lewis applied similar logic in Mere Christianity when he wrote, “If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world.”   

And even more clearly here:  

If the whole universe has no meaning, we should never have found out that it has no meaning: just as, if there were no light in the universe and therefore no creatures with eyes, we should never know it was dark. Dark would be without meaning.  

Anselm believed that the fact that humans are the kind of creatures that even raise the question of deity suggests there is something about us and the world that makes the idea of God reasonable in the first place. The fact that we do live in that kind of a world and are that kind of creature must be explained. And, he believed, thinking that faith and reason are opposed to one another won’t help us. Rather, as Anselm taught, faith and reason go hand-in-hand.    

This Breakpoint was co-authored by Jared Hayden. For more resources to live like a Christian in this cultural moment, go to breakpoint.org.  

Anselm Apologetics Christian History ontological argument Theology Worldview

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Anselm, the Ontological Argument, Faith and Reason Breakpoint

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