virtue ethics essay example

15 Virtue Ethics Examples

virtue ethics explanation and concepts, explained below.

Virtue ethics is a moral philosophy and theory of normative ethics that emphasizes individuals’ character and personality traits instead of their actions.

Rather than asking whether an action is right or wrong, virtue ethics focuses on assessing the individual’s qualities and cultivating these noble characteristics to reach the best possible outcome.

For example, someone practicing virtue ethics might analyze an individual’s character traits, such as honesty, intelligence, and compassion, before deciding how best to respond in a given situation.

It may result in different decisions than one made by employing a consequentialist approach to evaluate the likely outcomes of specific actions.

So, virtue ethics emphasizes the importance of cultivating good character qualities rather than relying solely on assessing potential outcomes when making decisions. It requires individuals to take personal responsibility for their actions and strive for excellence in all aspects of life.

Definition of Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is a type of moral theory that focuses on the character of agents rather than their actions.

It holds that an individual’s ethical behavior should be measured by their trait-based characteristics such as honesty, courage , and wisdom, rather than by the consequences of their actions or the particular duties they are obliged to obey.

This approach emphasizes cultivating good virtues within individuals to attain desirable outcomes (Hu & Shen, 2018).

According to Sharma (2021),

“…virtue ethics is a broad term for theories that emphasize the role of character and virtue in moral philosophy rather than either doing one’s duty or acting in order to bring about good consequences” (p. 74).

Virtue ethics can be seen as a teleological ethical system that takes a goal-oriented approach toward morality. This goal is to develop desirable traits in individuals who will lead to a greater good for society as a whole (Duignan, 2011).

It also draws upon concepts from ancient philosophy, such as Aristotle’s conception of the golden mean, which states that virtue lies in moderation between two extremes.

Simply, virtue ethics is concerned with developing good character traits within individuals and helping them become the best versions of themselves.

15 Examples of Virtue Ethics

Loyalty : Being faithful, reliable, and dedicated to something or someone. It requires a commitment to helping others succeed and working together for common goals despite the difficulty.
Courage : The ability to act despite fear, adversity, or danger. It can include physical bravery but also moral courage, such as standing up for what one believes is right and just, even when it may be unpopular.
Honesty : Being truthful and sincere in all aspects of life. Honesty includes being open with others about disagreements or mistakes rather than attempting to cover them up.
Compassion : Having empathy for the plight of others and willingness to reach out with understanding and assistance. Compassion is often seen as the basis for altruistic behavior, such as charitable giving or volunteerism.
Patience : The capacity to endure hardships or unpleasant situations without losing one’s temper. Patience is often considered key to resolving conflicts peacefully or creating productive relationships with others.
Wisdom : The capacity to think deeply and use judgment based on experience. Wisdom involves understanding how the parts of a problem fit together rather than simply focusing on isolated details.
Kindness : Acting with generosity, gentleness, and concern for others. Kindness requires more than simply being nice but involves actively seeking opportunities to help those around you who may be struggling or need assistance.
Integrity : Living according to one’s principles no matter what the cost. Integrity involves taking responsibility for your actions, keeping promises, and having a consistent set of values regardless of circumstances or social pressure.
Humility : Acknowledging one’s own limitations while still recognizing personal strengths. Humility can involve admitting when we are wrong, praising another’s achievements rather than our own, and not placing oneself above other people.
Respect : Valuing the rights, beliefs, feelings, needs, preferences, and opinions of yourself and those around you. Respect requires treating everyone fairly regardless of background, race, gender identity, etc.
Gratitude: Appreciating the people, things, and experiences in one’s life and expressing thankfulness. Gratitude can lead to a greater sense of well-being and a more positive outlook on life.
Forgiveness: Letting go of anger or resentment towards someone who has wronged you. Forgiveness can help heal relationships and promote inner peace.
Creativity: Thinking outside the box and finding unique solutions to problems. Creativity involves taking risks and embracing failure as part of the learning process.
Justice: Upholding what is fair and equitable, and advocating for the rights of all individuals. Justice involves fighting against discrimination, inequality, and oppression.
Determination : Having the drive and persistence to achieve one’s goals despite obstacles or setbacks. Determination involves hard work , focus, and resilience in the face of challenges.

History of Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is rooted in ancient Greek and Roman philosophical thought, particularly the writings of Aristotle, Socrates, and Plato.

Aristotle proposed his theory of virtue ethics in the 4th century BC, suggesting that humans should be guided by their character rather than external rules or regulations (Armstrong, 2007).

He argued that cultivating certain habits and traits, known as virtues, was essential to living an ethical life and reaching a state of eudaimonia (human flourishing).

The writings of Socrates were influential in the development of Aristotelian virtue ethics.

He taught that being wise meant knowing oneself and what makes a person happy or sad. He focused on inner reflection rather than rule-following, a radical idea for his time (Van Hooft & Athanassoulis, 2014).

Plato also contributed to the development of virtue ethics in his writings. For example, he suggested that striving for justice and harmony within oneself was more important than following external rules or laws (Armstrong, 2007).

In the 1st century BC, Roman philosopher Marcus Aurelius wrote extensively about Stoicism, emphasizing virtuous behavior as opposed to rigid external rules.

He believed that all emotions should be suppressed in favor of reason and logic to achieve emotional balance (Van Hooft & Athanassoulis, 2014).

In recent times, Immanuel Kant proposed his version of virtue ethics, which emphasized self-discipline above all else.

His theory suggested that if people acted with harmonious wills, they could make ethical decisions without resorting to outside moral guidelines or codes (Hill, 2012).

Today, virtue ethics continues to influence ethical thinking. It has been incorporated into many modern philosophical theories, such as utilitarianism and deontology.

By developing strong virtues such as courage, kindness, humility, and respect, individuals can become better versions of themselves while positively influencing society.

Central Concepts in Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics, originating from Plato and Aristotle, consist of three main ideas: Aretê (excellence), Eudaimonia (“happiness” or “bliss”), and Phronêsis (practical wisdom). As a result of these core concepts, virtue ethics have been used for centuries to aid people in living their lives virtuously.

Here is a brief overview of these concepts:

1. Virtue (aretê)

This concept refers to genuine moral excellence of character. It is an internal quality that manifests itself in external actions and attitudes.

Examples of virtues include courage, kindness, honesty, justice, and temperance. A virtuous person embodies these qualities and acts with integrity even when faced with temptation or adversity (Green, 2016).

2. Eudaimonia (“happiness” or “human flourishing”)

This concept is based on the idea that humans should lead a life full of purpose and meaning. It involves being true to oneself while living according to one’s values and beliefs to reach a state of contentment.

Examples of eudaimonia-driven behavior would be taking care of your health by engaging in physical activities or pursuing meaningful relationships with friends and family that enhance our sense of belonging (Fowers, 2016).

3. Practical Wisdom (phronêsis)

This concept focuses on the importance of rational decision-making based on empirical evidence and logical reasoning.

It involves understanding the consequences of one’s actions and having good judgment when faced with moral dilemmas or conflicting interests (Kinsella & Pitman, 2012).

Examples include weighing the pros and cons before making a big decision or being able to think critically about different situations from multiple perspectives to find a just outcome.

Major Forms of Virtue Ethics

Contemporary researchers identify three major forms of virtue ethics, including ethics of care, agent-based theories, and the eudaimonism approach, all emphasizing different aspects of living an ethically upright life.

Here is a brief overview of each one:

1. Ethics of Care

This approach to ethical decision-making focuses on caring for others, particularly vulnerable individuals such as the sick, elderly, or disabled (Timpe & Boyd, 2015).

For example, when a doctor is tasked with treating a terminally ill patient, they should consider both the patient’s wishes and their own obligations to provide medically and ethically sound care.

In this example, the doctor’s moral decision might be influenced by their sense of empathy, compassion, and justice rather than simply following laws or regulations.

2. Agent-Based Theories

This type of virtue ethics emphasizes individual agents’ importance and societal roles. It questions traditional views on morality, focusing on large groups or abstract principles rather than individual actions (Timpe & Boyd, 2015).

An example would be an individual who chooses to pursue a career path based on their own values rather than what society expects them to do.

In doing so, they are taking responsibility for their own decisions and showing strength of character, an important aspect of virtue ethics.

3. Eudaimonist Approach

Eudaimonism is an ethical framework based on Ancient Greek philosophy. It postulates that individuals should strive for self-fulfillment by developing virtues such as courage, temperance, and wisdom to lead a good life (Fowers, 2016).

For example, if a person is faced with a difficult situation involving personal conflict between two people who are close to them, eudaimonism suggests that they should find a resolution that involves clear communication and mutual respect.

This approach puts less emphasis on punishment or retribution and more emphasis on finding a just outcome that allows everyone involved to flourish.

Critique of Virtue Ethics

While virtue ethics is quite a popular approach to ethical decision-making, it has some limitations, such as a lack of clear guidance for moral decision-making, high subjectivity, and lack of clear incentives for virtuous living.

Lack of Clear Guidance: First, critics argue that the approach does not provide clear guidance for moral decision-making because there are no universal virtues. Instead, each individual must decide which virtues they should pursue to lead a good life (Swanton, 2010). Such lack of specificity can make it difficult to determine the right course of action in any given situation, especially if conflicting values are at play.
Subjectivity : some consider this approach to be too subjective and open to interpretation (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2003). Since individual agents have the autonomy to prioritize their values over social norms or legal regulations, they may end up making decisions detrimental to their moral integrity or the well-being of others.
Lack of obvious rewards for virtuous behaviors: critics point out that virtue ethics does not provide enough incentive for individuals to act virtuously since there are no external rewards or punishments associated with this approach (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2003). Instead, people must have an intrinsic motivation to behave according to their moral codes.

Virtue ethics emphasizes cultivating good character traits within individuals rather than simply evaluating the consequences of their actions or adhering to a set of external rules or regulations.

This philosophy is rooted in ancient Greek and Roman thought and has influenced ethical thinking for centuries.

Virtue ethics involves developing virtues such as honesty, courage, compassion, and humility and using practical wisdom to make moral decisions.

Despite some limitations, virtue ethics is still a relevant and popular approach to ethical decision-making in many contexts.

Through careful reflection and practice, individuals can use this approach to cultivate strong moral character and lead meaningful lives.

Armstrong, A. E. (2007). The origins, development and tenets of virtue ethics. Nursing Ethics , 77–94. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230206458_5

Duignan, B. (2011). The history of Western ethics . Britannica Educational Pub.

Fowers, B. J. (2016). The deep psychology of eudaimonia and virtue: Belonging, loyalty and the anterior cingulate cortex. Varieties of Virtue Ethics , 199–216. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59177-7_12

Green, A. (2016). The virtue ethics of levi gersonides . New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hill, T. E. (2012). Virtue, rules, and justice: Kantian aspirations . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hu, J., & Shen, J. (2018). Virtue ethics: Reflection on and construction of moral education in colleges. Proceedings of the International Conference on Contemporary Education, Social Sciences and Ecological Studies (CESSES 2018) . https://doi.org/10.2991/cesses-18.2018.42

Kinsella, E. A., & Pitman, A. (2012). Phronesis as professional knowledge: Practical wisdom in the professions . London: Sensepublishers.

Sharma, M. (2021). Assam public service commission (APSC) main exam: General studies 4 & general studies 3 study package . New York: Maniram Sharma.

Swanton, C. (2010). Virtue ethics and the problem of moral disagreement. Philosophical Topics , 38 (2), 157–180. Doi: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43154586

Timpe, K., & Boyd, C. A. (2015). Virtues and their vices . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Van Hooft, S., & Athanassoulis, N. (2014). The handbook of virtue ethics . New York: Acumen Publishing Limited.

Viktoriya Sus (MA)

Viktoriya Sus is an academic writer specializing mainly in economics and business from Ukraine. She holds a Master’s degree in International Business from Lviv National University and has more than 6 years of experience writing for different clients. Viktoriya is passionate about researching the latest trends in economics and business. However, she also loves to explore different topics such as psychology, philosophy, and more.

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Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent.

This is not to say that only virtue ethicists attend to virtues, any more than it is to say that only consequentialists attend to consequences or only deontologists to rules. Each of the above-mentioned approaches can make room for virtues, consequences, and rules. Indeed, any plausible normative ethical theory will have something to say about all three. What distinguishes virtue ethics from consequentialism or deontology is the centrality of virtue within the theory (Watson 1990; Kawall 2009). Whereas consequentialists will define virtues as traits that yield good consequences and deontologists will define them as traits possessed by those who reliably fulfil their duties, virtue ethicists will resist the attempt to define virtues in terms of some other concept that is taken to be more fundamental. Rather, virtues and vices will be foundational for virtue ethical theories and other normative notions will be grounded in them.

We begin by discussing two concepts that are central to all forms of virtue ethics, namely, virtue and practical wisdom. Then we note some of the features that distinguish different virtue ethical theories from one another before turning to objections that have been raised against virtue ethics and responses offered on its behalf. We conclude with a look at some of the directions in which future research might develop.

1.2 Practical Wisdom

2.1 eudaimonist virtue ethics, 2.2 agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, 2.3 target-centered virtue ethics, 2.4 platonistic virtue ethics, 3. objections to virtue ethics, 4. future directions, other internet resources, related entries, 1. preliminaries.

In the West, virtue ethics’ founding fathers are Plato and Aristotle, and in the East it can be traced back to Mencius and Confucius. It persisted as the dominant approach in Western moral philosophy until at least the Enlightenment, suffered a momentary eclipse during the nineteenth century, but re-emerged in Anglo-American philosophy in the late 1950s. It was heralded by Anscombe’s famous article “Modern Moral Philosophy” (Anscombe 1958) which crystallized an increasing dissatisfaction with the forms of deontology and utilitarianism then prevailing. Neither of them, at that time, paid attention to a number of topics that had always figured in the virtue ethics tradition—virtues and vices, motives and moral character, moral education, moral wisdom or discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of happiness, the role of the emotions in our moral life and the fundamentally important questions of what sorts of persons we should be and how we should live.

Its re-emergence had an invigorating effect on the other two approaches, many of whose proponents then began to address these topics in the terms of their favoured theory. (One consequence of this has been that it is now necessary to distinguish “virtue ethics” (the third approach) from “virtue theory”, a term which includes accounts of virtue within the other approaches.) Interest in Kant’s virtue theory has redirected philosophers’ attention to Kant’s long neglected Doctrine of Virtue , and utilitarians have developed consequentialist virtue theories (Driver 2001; Hurka 2001). It has also generated virtue ethical readings of philosophers other than Plato and Aristotle, such as Martineau, Hume and Nietzsche, and thereby different forms of virtue ethics have developed (Slote 2001; Swanton 2003, 2011a).

Although modern virtue ethics does not have to take a “neo-Aristotelian” or eudaimonist form (see section 2), almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it. These are arête (excellence or virtue), phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) and eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or flourishing). (See Annas 2011 for a short, clear, and authoritative account of all three.) We discuss the first two in the remainder of this section. Eudaimonia is discussed in connection with eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics in the next.

A virtue is an excellent trait of character. It is a disposition, well entrenched in its possessor—something that, as we say, goes all the way down, unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker—to notice, expect, value, feel, desire, choose, act, and react in certain characteristic ways. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. A significant aspect of this mindset is the wholehearted acceptance of a distinctive range of considerations as reasons for action. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, practices honest dealing and does not cheat. If such actions are done merely because the agent thinks that honesty is the best policy, or because they fear being caught out, rather than through recognising “To do otherwise would be dishonest” as the relevant reason, they are not the actions of an honest person. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, tells the truth because it is the truth, for one can have the virtue of honesty without being tactless or indiscreet. The honest person recognises “That would be a lie” as a strong (though perhaps not overriding) reason for not making certain statements in certain circumstances, and gives due, but not overriding, weight to “That would be the truth” as a reason for making them.

An honest person’s reasons and choices with respect to honest and dishonest actions reflect her views about honesty, truth, and deception—but of course such views manifest themselves with respect to other actions, and to emotional reactions as well. Valuing honesty as she does, she chooses, where possible to work with honest people, to have honest friends, to bring up her children to be honest. She disapproves of, dislikes, deplores dishonesty, is not amused by certain tales of chicanery, despises or pities those who succeed through deception rather than thinking they have been clever, is unsurprised, or pleased (as appropriate) when honesty triumphs, is shocked or distressed when those near and dear to her do what is dishonest and so on. Given that a virtue is such a multi-track disposition, it would obviously be reckless to attribute one to an agent on the basis of a single observed action or even a series of similar actions, especially if you don’t know the agent’s reasons for doing as she did (Sreenivasan 2002).

Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree. To possess such a disposition fully is to possess full or perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways of falling short of this ideal (Athanassoulis 2000). Most people who can truly be described as fairly virtuous, and certainly markedly better than those who can truly be described as dishonest, self-centred and greedy, still have their blind spots—little areas where they do not act for the reasons one would expect. So someone honest or kind in most situations, and notably so in demanding ones, may nevertheless be trivially tainted by snobbery, inclined to be disingenuous about their forebears and less than kind to strangers with the wrong accent.

Further, it is not easy to get one’s emotions in harmony with one’s rational recognition of certain reasons for action. I may be honest enough to recognise that I must own up to a mistake because it would be dishonest not to do so without my acceptance being so wholehearted that I can own up easily, with no inner conflict. Following (and adapting) Aristotle, virtue ethicists draw a distinction between full or perfect virtue and “continence”, or strength of will. The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise.

Describing the continent as “falling short” of perfect virtue appears to go against the intuition that there is something particularly admirable about people who manage to act well when it is especially hard for them to do so, but the plausibility of this depends on exactly what “makes it hard” (Foot 1978: 11–14). If it is the circumstances in which the agent acts—say that she is very poor when she sees someone drop a full purse or that she is in deep grief when someone visits seeking help—then indeed it is particularly admirable of her to restore the purse or give the help when it is hard for her to do so. But if what makes it hard is an imperfection in her character—the temptation to keep what is not hers, or a callous indifference to the suffering of others—then it is not.

Another way in which one can easily fall short of full virtue is through lacking phronesis —moral or practical wisdom.

The concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor good: a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent or admirable person who acts and feels as she should. These are commonly accepted truisms. But it is equally common, in relation to particular (putative) examples of virtues to give these truisms up. We may say of someone that he is generous or honest “to a fault”. It is commonly asserted that someone’s compassion might lead them to act wrongly, to tell a lie they should not have told, for example, in their desire to prevent someone else’s hurt feelings. It is also said that courage, in a desperado, enables him to do far more wicked things than he would have been able to do if he were timid. So it would appear that generosity, honesty, compassion and courage despite being virtues, are sometimes faults. Someone who is generous, honest, compassionate, and courageous might not be a morally good person—or, if it is still held to be a truism that they are, then morally good people may be led by what makes them morally good to act wrongly! How have we arrived at such an odd conclusion?

The answer lies in too ready an acceptance of ordinary usage, which permits a fairly wide-ranging application of many of the virtue terms, combined, perhaps, with a modern readiness to suppose that the virtuous agent is motivated by emotion or inclination, not by rational choice. If one thinks of generosity or honesty as the disposition to be moved to action by generous or honest impulses such as the desire to give or to speak the truth, if one thinks of compassion as the disposition to be moved by the sufferings of others and to act on that emotion, if one thinks of courage as mere fearlessness or the willingness to face danger, then it will indeed seem obvious that these are all dispositions that can lead to their possessor’s acting wrongly. But it is also obvious, as soon as it is stated, that these are dispositions that can be possessed by children, and although children thus endowed (bar the “courageous” disposition) would undoubtedly be very nice children, we would not say that they were morally virtuous or admirable people. The ordinary usage, or the reliance on motivation by inclination, gives us what Aristotle calls “natural virtue”—a proto version of full virtue awaiting perfection by phronesis or practical wisdom.

Aristotle makes a number of specific remarks about phronesis that are the subject of much scholarly debate, but the (related) modern concept is best understood by thinking of what the virtuous morally mature adult has that nice children, including nice adolescents, lack. Both the virtuous adult and the nice child have good intentions, but the child is much more prone to mess things up because he is ignorant of what he needs to know in order to do what he intends. A virtuous adult is not, of course, infallible and may also, on occasion, fail to do what she intended to do through lack of knowledge, but only on those occasions on which the lack of knowledge is not culpable. So, for example, children and adolescents often harm those they intend to benefit either because they do not know how to set about securing the benefit or because their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is limited and often mistaken. Such ignorance in small children is rarely, if ever culpable. Adults, on the other hand, are culpable if they mess things up by being thoughtless, insensitive, reckless, impulsive, shortsighted, and by assuming that what suits them will suit everyone instead of taking a more objective viewpoint. They are also culpable if their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is mistaken. It is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him.

Quite generally, given that good intentions are intentions to act well or “do the right thing”, we may say that practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that enables its possessor, unlike the nice adolescents, to do just that, in any given situation. The detailed specification of what is involved in such knowledge or understanding has not yet appeared in the literature, but some aspects of it are becoming well known. Even many deontologists now stress the point that their action-guiding rules cannot, reliably, be applied without practical wisdom, because correct application requires situational appreciation—the capacity to recognise, in any particular situation, those features of it that are morally salient. This brings out two aspects of practical wisdom.

One is that it characteristically comes only with experience of life. Amongst the morally relevant features of a situation may be the likely consequences, for the people involved, of a certain action, and this is something that adolescents are notoriously clueless about precisely because they are inexperienced. It is part of practical wisdom to be wise about human beings and human life. (It should go without saying that the virtuous are mindful of the consequences of possible actions. How could they fail to be reckless, thoughtless and short-sighted if they were not?)

The second is the practically wise agent’s capacity to recognise some features of a situation as more important than others, or indeed, in that situation, as the only relevant ones. The wise do not see things in the same way as the nice adolescents who, with their under-developed virtues, still tend to see the personally disadvantageous nature of a certain action as competing in importance with its honesty or benevolence or justice.

These aspects coalesce in the description of the practically wise as those who understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly advantageous in life, who know, in short, how to live well.

2. Forms of Virtue Ethics

While all forms of virtue ethics agree that virtue is central and practical wisdom required, they differ in how they combine these and other concepts to illuminate what we should do in particular contexts and how we should live our lives as a whole. In what follows we sketch four distinct forms taken by contemporary virtue ethics, namely, a) eudaimonist virtue ethics, b) agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, c) target-centered virtue ethics, and d) Platonistic virtue ethics.

The distinctive feature of eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics is that they define virtues in terms of their relationship to eudaimonia . A virtue is a trait that contributes to or is a constituent of eudaimonia and we ought to develop virtues, the eudaimonist claims, precisely because they contribute to eudaimonia .

The concept of eudaimonia , a key term in ancient Greek moral philosophy, is standardly translated as “happiness” or “flourishing” and occasionally as “well-being.” Each translation has its disadvantages. The trouble with “flourishing” is that animals and even plants can flourish but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings. The trouble with “happiness” is that in ordinary conversation it connotes something subjectively determined. It is for me, not for you, to pronounce on whether I am happy. If I think I am happy then I am—it is not something I can be wrong about (barring advanced cases of self-deception). Contrast my being healthy or flourishing. Here we have no difficulty in recognizing that I might think I was healthy, either physically or psychologically, or think that I was flourishing but be wrong. In this respect, “flourishing” is a better translation than “happiness”. It is all too easy to be mistaken about whether one’s life is eudaimon (the adjective from eudaimonia ) not simply because it is easy to deceive oneself, but because it is easy to have a mistaken conception of eudaimonia , or of what it is to live well as a human being, believing it to consist largely in physical pleasure or luxury for example.

Eudaimonia is, avowedly, a moralized or value-laden concept of happiness, something like “true” or “real” happiness or “the sort of happiness worth seeking or having.” It is thereby the sort of concept about which there can be substantial disagreement between people with different views about human life that cannot be resolved by appeal to some external standard on which, despite their different views, the parties to the disagreement concur (Hursthouse 1999: 188–189).

Most versions of virtue ethics agree that living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for eudaimonia. This supreme good is not conceived of as an independently defined state (made up of, say, a list of non-moral goods that does not include virtuous activity) which exercise of the virtues might be thought to promote. It is, within virtue ethics, already conceived of as something of which virtuous activity is at least partially constitutive (Kraut 1989). Thereby virtue ethicists claim that a human life devoted to physical pleasure or the acquisition of wealth is not eudaimon , but a wasted life.

But although all standard versions of virtue ethics insist on that conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia , further links are matters of dispute and generate different versions. For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient—what is also needed are external goods which are a matter of luck. For Plato and the Stoics, virtue is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia (Annas 1993).

According to eudaimonist virtue ethics, the good life is the eudaimon life, and the virtues are what enable a human being to be eudaimon because the virtues just are those character traits that benefit their possessor in that way, barring bad luck. So there is a link between eudaimonia and what confers virtue status on a character trait. (For a discussion of the differences between eudaimonists see Baril 2014. For recent defenses of eudaimonism see Annas 2011; LeBar 2013b; Badhwar 2014; and Bloomfield 2014.)

Rather than deriving the normativity of virtue from the value of eudaimonia , agent-based virtue ethicists argue that other forms of normativity—including the value of eudaimonia —are traced back to and ultimately explained in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents.

It is unclear how many other forms of normativity must be explained in terms of the qualities of agents in order for a theory to count as agent-based. The two best-known agent-based theorists, Michael Slote and Linda Zagzebski, trace a wide range of normative qualities back to the qualities of agents. For example, Slote defines rightness and wrongness in terms of agents’ motivations: “[A]gent-based virtue ethics … understands rightness in terms of good motivations and wrongness in terms of the having of bad (or insufficiently good) motives” (2001: 14). Similarly, he explains the goodness of an action, the value of eudaimonia , the justice of a law or social institution, and the normativity of practical rationality in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents (2001: 99–100, 154, 2000). Zagzebski likewise defines right and wrong actions by reference to the emotions, motives, and dispositions of virtuous and vicious agents. For example, “A wrong act = an act that the phronimos characteristically would not do, and he would feel guilty if he did = an act such that it is not the case that he might do it = an act that expresses a vice = an act that is against a requirement of virtue (the virtuous self)” (Zagzebski 2004: 160). Her definitions of duties, good and bad ends, and good and bad states of affairs are similarly grounded in the motivational and dispositional states of exemplary agents (1998, 2004, 2010).

However, there could also be less ambitious agent-based approaches to virtue ethics (see Slote 1997). At the very least, an agent-based approach must be committed to explaining what one should do by reference to the motivational and dispositional states of agents. But this is not yet a sufficient condition for counting as an agent-based approach, since the same condition will be met by every virtue ethical account. For a theory to count as an agent-based form of virtue ethics it must also be the case that the normative properties of motivations and dispositions cannot be explained in terms of the normative properties of something else (such as eudaimonia or states of affairs) which is taken to be more fundamental.

Beyond this basic commitment, there is room for agent-based theories to be developed in a number of different directions. The most important distinguishing factor has to do with how motivations and dispositions are taken to matter for the purposes of explaining other normative qualities. For Slote what matters are this particular agent’s actual motives and dispositions . The goodness of action A, for example, is derived from the agent’s motives when she performs A. If those motives are good then the action is good, if not then not. On Zagzebski’s account, by contrast, a good or bad, right or wrong action is defined not by this agent’s actual motives but rather by whether this is the sort of action a virtuously motivated agent would perform (Zagzebski 2004: 160). Appeal to the virtuous agent’s hypothetical motives and dispositions enables Zagzebski to distinguish between performing the right action and doing so for the right reasons (a distinction that, as Brady (2004) observes, Slote has trouble drawing).

Another point on which agent-based forms of virtue ethics might differ concerns how one identifies virtuous motivations and dispositions. According to Zagzebski’s exemplarist account, “We do not have criteria for goodness in advance of identifying the exemplars of goodness” (Zagzebski 2004: 41). As we observe the people around us, we find ourselves wanting to be like some of them (in at least some respects) and not wanting to be like others. The former provide us with positive exemplars and the latter with negative ones. Our understanding of better and worse motivations and virtuous and vicious dispositions is grounded in these primitive responses to exemplars (2004: 53). This is not to say that every time we act we stop and ask ourselves what one of our exemplars would do in this situations. Our moral concepts become more refined over time as we encounter a wider variety of exemplars and begin to draw systematic connections between them, noting what they have in common, how they differ, and which of these commonalities and differences matter, morally speaking. Recognizable motivational profiles emerge and come to be labeled as virtues or vices, and these, in turn, shape our understanding of the obligations we have and the ends we should pursue. However, even though the systematising of moral thought can travel a long way from our starting point, according to the exemplarist it never reaches a stage where reference to exemplars is replaced by the recognition of something more fundamental. At the end of the day, according to the exemplarist, our moral system still rests on our basic propensity to take a liking (or disliking) to exemplars. Nevertheless, one could be an agent-based theorist without advancing the exemplarist’s account of the origins or reference conditions for judgments of good and bad, virtuous and vicious.

The touchstone for eudaimonist virtue ethicists is a flourishing human life. For agent-based virtue ethicists it is an exemplary agent’s motivations. The target-centered view developed by Christine Swanton (2003), by contrast, begins with our existing conceptions of the virtues. We already have a passable idea of which traits are virtues and what they involve. Of course, this untutored understanding can be clarified and improved, and it is one of the tasks of the virtue ethicist to help us do precisely that. But rather than stripping things back to something as basic as the motivations we want to imitate or building it up to something as elaborate as an entire flourishing life, the target-centered view begins where most ethics students find themselves, namely, with the idea that generosity, courage, self-discipline, compassion, and the like get a tick of approval. It then examines what these traits involve.

A complete account of virtue will map out 1) its field , 2) its mode of responsiveness, 3) its basis of moral acknowledgment, and 4) its target . Different virtues are concerned with different fields . Courage, for example, is concerned with what might harm us, whereas generosity is concerned with the sharing of time, talent, and property. The basis of acknowledgment of a virtue is the feature within the virtue’s field to which it responds. To continue with our previous examples, generosity is attentive to the benefits that others might enjoy through one’s agency, and courage responds to threats to value, status, or the bonds that exist between oneself and particular others, and the fear such threats might generate. A virtue’s mode has to do with how it responds to the bases of acknowledgment within its field. Generosity promotes a good, namely, another’s benefit, whereas courage defends a value, bond, or status. Finally, a virtue’s target is that at which it is aimed. Courage aims to control fear and handle danger, while generosity aims to share time, talents, or possessions with others in ways that benefit them.

A virtue , on a target-centered account, “is a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way” (Swanton 2003: 19). A virtuous act is an act that hits the target of a virtue, which is to say that it succeeds in responding to items in its field in the specified way (233). Providing a target-centered definition of a right action requires us to move beyond the analysis of a single virtue and the actions that follow from it. This is because a single action context may involve a number of different, overlapping fields. Determination might lead me to persist in trying to complete a difficult task even if doing so requires a singleness of purpose. But love for my family might make a different use of my time and attention. In order to define right action a target-centered view must explain how we handle different virtues’ conflicting claims on our resources. There are at least three different ways to address this challenge. A perfectionist target-centered account would stipulate, “An act is right if and only if it is overall virtuous, and that entails that it is the, or a, best action possible in the circumstances” (239–240). A more permissive target-centered account would not identify ‘right’ with ‘best’, but would allow an action to count as right provided “it is good enough even if not the (or a) best action” (240). A minimalist target-centered account would not even require an action to be good in order to be right. On such a view, “An act is right if and only if it is not overall vicious” (240). (For further discussion of target-centered virtue ethics see Van Zyl 2014; and Smith 2016).

The fourth form a virtue ethic might adopt takes its inspiration from Plato. The Socrates of Plato’s dialogues devotes a great deal of time to asking his fellow Athenians to explain the nature of virtues like justice, courage, piety, and wisdom. So it is clear that Plato counts as a virtue theorist. But it is a matter of some debate whether he should be read as a virtue ethicist (White 2015). What is not open to debate is whether Plato has had an important influence on the contemporary revival of interest in virtue ethics. A number of those who have contributed to the revival have done so as Plato scholars (e.g., Prior 1991; Kamtekar 1998; Annas 1999; and Reshotko 2006). However, often they have ended up championing a eudaimonist version of virtue ethics (see Prior 2001 and Annas 2011), rather than a version that would warrant a separate classification. Nevertheless, there are two variants that call for distinct treatment.

Timothy Chappell takes the defining feature of Platonistic virtue ethics to be that “Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good” (2014). Chappell follows Iris Murdoch in arguing that “In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego” (Murdoch 1971: 51). Constantly attending to our needs, our desires, our passions, and our thoughts skews our perspective on what the world is actually like and blinds us to the goods around us. Contemplating the goodness of something we encounter—which is to say, carefully attending to it “for its own sake, in order to understand it” (Chappell 2014: 300)—breaks this natural tendency by drawing our attention away from ourselves. Contemplating such goodness with regularity makes room for new habits of thought that focus more readily and more honestly on things other than the self. It alters the quality of our consciousness. And “anything which alters consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity, and realism is to be connected with virtue” (Murdoch 1971: 82). The virtues get defined, then, in terms of qualities that help one “pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is” (91). And good agency is defined by the possession and exercise of such virtues. Within Chappell’s and Murdoch’s framework, then, not all normative properties get defined in terms of virtue. Goodness, in particular, is not so defined. But the kind of goodness which is possible for creatures like us is defined by virtue, and any answer to the question of what one should do or how one should live will appeal to the virtues.

Another Platonistic variant of virtue ethics is exemplified by Robert Merrihew Adams. Unlike Murdoch and Chappell, his starting point is not a set of claims about our consciousness of goodness. Rather, he begins with an account of the metaphysics of goodness. Like Murdoch and others influenced by Platonism, Adams’s account of goodness is built around a conception of a supremely perfect good. And like Augustine, Adams takes that perfect good to be God. God is both the exemplification and the source of all goodness. Other things are good, he suggests, to the extent that they resemble God (Adams 1999).

The resemblance requirement identifies a necessary condition for being good, but it does not yet give us a sufficient condition. This is because there are ways in which finite creatures might resemble God that would not be suitable to the type of creature they are. For example, if God were all-knowing, then the belief, “I am all-knowing,” would be a suitable belief for God to have. In God, such a belief—because true—would be part of God’s perfection. However, as neither you nor I are all-knowing, the belief, “I am all-knowing,” in one of us would not be good. To rule out such cases we need to introduce another factor. That factor is the fitting response to goodness, which Adams suggests is love. Adams uses love to weed out problematic resemblances: “being excellent in the way that a finite thing can be consists in resembling God in a way that could serve God as a reason for loving the thing” (Adams 1999: 36).

Virtues come into the account as one of the ways in which some things (namely, persons) could resemble God. “[M]ost of the excellences that are most important to us, and of whose value we are most confident, are excellences of persons or of qualities or actions or works or lives or stories of persons” (1999: 42). This is one of the reasons Adams offers for conceiving of the ideal of perfection as a personal God, rather than an impersonal form of the Good. Many of the excellences of persons of which we are most confident are virtues such as love, wisdom, justice, patience, and generosity. And within many theistic traditions, including Adams’s own Christian tradition, such virtues are commonly attributed to divine agents.

A Platonistic account like the one Adams puts forward in Finite and Infinite Goods clearly does not derive all other normative properties from the virtues (for a discussion of the relationship between this view and the one he puts forward in A Theory of Virtue (2006) see Pettigrove 2014). Goodness provides the normative foundation. Virtues are not built on that foundation; rather, as one of the varieties of goodness of whose value we are most confident, virtues form part of the foundation. Obligations, by contrast, come into the account at a different level. Moral obligations, Adams argues, are determined by the expectations and demands that “arise in a relationship or system of relationships that is good or valuable” (1999: 244). Other things being equal, the more virtuous the parties to the relationship, the more binding the obligation. Thus, within Adams’s account, the good (which includes virtue) is prior to the right. However, once good relationships have given rise to obligations, those obligations take on a life of their own. Their bindingness is not traced directly to considerations of goodness. Rather, they are determined by the expectations of the parties and the demands of the relationship.

A number of objections have been raised against virtue ethics, some of which bear more directly on one form of virtue ethics than on others. In this section we consider eight objections, namely, the a) application, b) adequacy, c) relativism, d) conflict, e) self-effacement, f) justification, g) egoism, and h) situationist problems.

a) In the early days of virtue ethics’ revival, the approach was associated with an “anti-codifiability” thesis about ethics, directed against the prevailing pretensions of normative theory. At the time, utilitarians and deontologists commonly (though not universally) held that the task of ethical theory was to come up with a code consisting of universal rules or principles (possibly only one, as in the case of act-utilitarianism) which would have two significant features: i) the rule(s) would amount to a decision procedure for determining what the right action was in any particular case; ii) the rule(s) would be stated in such terms that any non-virtuous person could understand and apply it (them) correctly.

Virtue ethicists maintained, contrary to these two claims, that it was quite unrealistic to imagine that there could be such a code (see, in particular, McDowell 1979). The results of attempts to produce and employ such a code, in the heady days of the 1960s and 1970s, when medical and then bioethics boomed and bloomed, tended to support the virtue ethicists’ claim. More and more utilitarians and deontologists found themselves agreed on their general rules but on opposite sides of the controversial moral issues in contemporary discussion. It came to be recognised that moral sensitivity, perception, imagination, and judgement informed by experience— phronesis in short—is needed to apply rules or principles correctly. Hence many (though by no means all) utilitarians and deontologists have explicitly abandoned (ii) and much less emphasis is placed on (i).

Nevertheless, the complaint that virtue ethics does not produce codifiable principles is still a commonly voiced criticism of the approach, expressed as the objection that it is, in principle, unable to provide action-guidance.

Initially, the objection was based on a misunderstanding. Blinkered by slogans that described virtue ethics as “concerned with Being rather than Doing,” as addressing “What sort of person should I be?” but not “What should I do?” as being “agent-centered rather than act-centered,” its critics maintained that it was unable to provide action-guidance. Hence, rather than being a normative rival to utilitarian and deontological ethics, it could claim to be no more than a valuable supplement to them. The rather odd idea was that all virtue ethics could offer was, “Identify a moral exemplar and do what he would do,” as though the university student trying to decide whether to study music (her preference) or engineering (her parents’ preference) was supposed to ask herself, “What would Socrates study if he were in my circumstances?”

But the objection failed to take note of Anscombe’s hint that a great deal of specific action guidance could be found in rules employing the virtue and vice terms (“v-rules”) such as “Do what is honest/charitable; do not do what is dishonest/uncharitable” (Hursthouse 1999). (It is a noteworthy feature of our virtue and vice vocabulary that, although our list of generally recognised virtue terms is comparatively short, our list of vice terms is remarkably, and usefully, long, far exceeding anything that anyone who thinks in terms of standard deontological rules has ever come up with. Much invaluable action guidance comes from avoiding courses of action that would be irresponsible, feckless, lazy, inconsiderate, uncooperative, harsh, intolerant, selfish, mercenary, indiscreet, tactless, arrogant, unsympathetic, cold, incautious, unenterprising, pusillanimous, feeble, presumptuous, rude, hypocritical, self-indulgent, materialistic, grasping, short-sighted, vindictive, calculating, ungrateful, grudging, brutal, profligate, disloyal, and on and on.)

(b) A closely related objection has to do with whether virtue ethics can provide an adequate account of right action. This worry can take two forms. (i) One might think a virtue ethical account of right action is extensionally inadequate. It is possible to perform a right action without being virtuous and a virtuous person can occasionally perform the wrong action without that calling her virtue into question. If virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for right action, one might wonder whether the relationship between rightness/wrongness and virtue/vice is close enough for the former to be identified in terms of the latter. (ii) Alternatively, even if one thought it possible to produce a virtue ethical account that picked out all (and only) right actions, one might still think that at least in some cases virtue is not what explains rightness (Adams 2006:6–8).

Some virtue ethicists respond to the adequacy objection by rejecting the assumption that virtue ethics ought to be in the business of providing an account of right action in the first place. Following in the footsteps of Anscombe (1958) and MacIntyre (1985), Talbot Brewer (2009) argues that to work with the categories of rightness and wrongness is already to get off on the wrong foot. Contemporary conceptions of right and wrong action, built as they are around a notion of moral duty that presupposes a framework of divine (or moral) law or around a conception of obligation that is defined in contrast to self-interest, carry baggage the virtue ethicist is better off without. Virtue ethics can address the questions of how one should live, what kind of person one should become, and even what one should do without that committing it to providing an account of ‘right action’. One might choose, instead, to work with aretaic concepts (defined in terms of virtues and vices) and axiological concepts (defined in terms of good and bad, better and worse) and leave out deontic notions (like right/wrong action, duty, and obligation) altogether.

Other virtue ethicists wish to retain the concept of right action but note that in the current philosophical discussion a number of distinct qualities march under that banner. In some contexts, ‘right action’ identifies the best action an agent might perform in the circumstances. In others, it designates an action that is commendable (even if not the best possible). In still others, it picks out actions that are not blameworthy (even if not commendable). A virtue ethicist might choose to define one of these—for example, the best action—in terms of virtues and vices, but appeal to other normative concepts—such as legitimate expectations—when defining other conceptions of right action.

As we observed in section 2, a virtue ethical account need not attempt to reduce all other normative concepts to virtues and vices. What is required is simply (i) that virtue is not reduced to some other normative concept that is taken to be more fundamental and (ii) that some other normative concepts are explained in terms of virtue and vice. This takes the sting out of the adequacy objection, which is most compelling against versions of virtue ethics that attempt to define all of the senses of ‘right action’ in terms of virtues. Appealing to virtues and vices makes it much easier to achieve extensional adequacy. Making room for normative concepts that are not taken to be reducible to virtue and vice concepts makes it even easier to generate a theory that is both extensionally and explanatorily adequate. Whether one needs other concepts and, if so, how many, is still a matter of debate among virtue ethicists, as is the question of whether virtue ethics even ought to be offering an account of right action. Either way virtue ethicists have resources available to them to address the adequacy objection.

Insofar as the different versions of virtue ethics all retain an emphasis on the virtues, they are open to the familiar problem of (c) the charge of cultural relativity. Is it not the case that different cultures embody different virtues, (MacIntyre 1985) and hence that the v-rules will pick out actions as right or wrong only relative to a particular culture? Different replies have been made to this charge. One—the tu quoque , or “partners in crime” response—exhibits a quite familiar pattern in virtue ethicists’ defensive strategy (Solomon 1988). They admit that, for them, cultural relativism is a challenge, but point out that it is just as much a problem for the other two approaches. The (putative) cultural variation in character traits regarded as virtues is no greater—indeed markedly less—than the cultural variation in rules of conduct, and different cultures have different ideas about what constitutes happiness or welfare. That cultural relativity should be a problem common to all three approaches is hardly surprising. It is related, after all, to the “justification problem” ( see below ) the quite general metaethical problem of justifying one’s moral beliefs to those who disagree, whether they be moral sceptics, pluralists or from another culture.

A bolder strategy involves claiming that virtue ethics has less difficulty with cultural relativity than the other two approaches. Much cultural disagreement arises, it may be claimed, from local understandings of the virtues, but the virtues themselves are not relative to culture (Nussbaum 1993).

Another objection to which the tu quoque response is partially appropriate is (d) “the conflict problem.” What does virtue ethics have to say about dilemmas—cases in which, apparently, the requirements of different virtues conflict because they point in opposed directions? Charity prompts me to kill the person who would be better off dead, but justice forbids it. Honesty points to telling the hurtful truth, kindness and compassion to remaining silent or even lying. What shall I do? Of course, the same sorts of dilemmas are generated by conflicts between deontological rules. Deontology and virtue ethics share the conflict problem (and are happy to take it on board rather than follow some of the utilitarians in their consequentialist resolutions of such dilemmas) and in fact their strategies for responding to it are parallel. Both aim to resolve a number of dilemmas by arguing that the conflict is merely apparent; a discriminating understanding of the virtues or rules in question, possessed only by those with practical wisdom, will perceive that, in this particular case, the virtues do not make opposing demands or that one rule outranks another, or has a certain exception clause built into it. Whether this is all there is to it depends on whether there are any irresolvable dilemmas. If there are, proponents of either normative approach may point out reasonably that it could only be a mistake to offer a resolution of what is, ex hypothesi , irresolvable.

Another problem arguably shared by all three approaches is (e), that of being self-effacing. An ethical theory is self-effacing if, roughly, whatever it claims justifies a particular action, or makes it right, had better not be the agent’s motive for doing it. Michael Stocker (1976) originally introduced it as a problem for deontology and consequentialism. He pointed out that the agent who, rightly, visits a friend in hospital will rather lessen the impact of his visit on her if he tells her either that he is doing it because it is his duty or because he thought it would maximize the general happiness. But as Simon Keller observes, she won’t be any better pleased if he tells her that he is visiting her because it is what a virtuous agent would do, so virtue ethics would appear to have the problem too (Keller 2007). However, virtue ethics’ defenders have argued that not all forms of virtue ethics are subject to this objection (Pettigrove 2011) and those that are are not seriously undermined by the problem (Martinez 2011).

Another problem for virtue ethics, which is shared by both utilitarianism and deontology, is (f) “the justification problem.” Abstractly conceived, this is the problem of how we justify or ground our ethical beliefs, an issue that is hotly debated at the level of metaethics. In its particular versions, for deontology there is the question of how to justify its claims that certain moral rules are the correct ones, and for utilitarianism of how to justify its claim that all that really matters morally are consequences for happiness or well-being. For virtue ethics, the problem concerns the question of which character traits are the virtues.

In the metaethical debate, there is widespread disagreement about the possibility of providing an external foundation for ethics—“external” in the sense of being external to ethical beliefs—and the same disagreement is found amongst deontologists and utilitarians. Some believe that their normative ethics can be placed on a secure basis, resistant to any form of scepticism, such as what anyone rationally desires, or would accept or agree on, regardless of their ethical outlook; others that it cannot.

Virtue ethicists have eschewed any attempt to ground virtue ethics in an external foundation while continuing to maintain that their claims can be validated. Some follow a form of Rawls’s coherentist approach (Slote 2001; Swanton 2003); neo-Aristotelians a form of ethical naturalism.

A misunderstanding of eudaimonia as an unmoralized concept leads some critics to suppose that the neo-Aristotelians are attempting to ground their claims in a scientific account of human nature and what counts, for a human being, as flourishing. Others assume that, if this is not what they are doing, they cannot be validating their claims that, for example, justice, charity, courage, and generosity are virtues. Either they are illegitimately helping themselves to Aristotle’s discredited natural teleology (Williams 1985) or producing mere rationalizations of their own personal or culturally inculcated values. But McDowell, Foot, MacIntyre and Hursthouse have all outlined versions of a third way between these two extremes. Eudaimonia in virtue ethics, is indeed a moralized concept, but it is not only that. Claims about what constitutes flourishing for human beings no more float free of scientific facts about what human beings are like than ethological claims about what constitutes flourishing for elephants. In both cases, the truth of the claims depends in part on what kind of animal they are and what capacities, desires and interests the humans or elephants have.

The best available science today (including evolutionary theory and psychology) supports rather than undermines the ancient Greek assumption that we are social animals, like elephants and wolves and unlike polar bears. No rationalizing explanation in terms of anything like a social contract is needed to explain why we choose to live together, subjugating our egoistic desires in order to secure the advantages of co-operation. Like other social animals, our natural impulses are not solely directed towards our own pleasures and preservation, but include altruistic and cooperative ones.

This basic fact about us should make more comprehensible the claim that the virtues are at least partially constitutive of human flourishing and also undercut the objection that virtue ethics is, in some sense, egoistic.

(g) The egoism objection has a number of sources. One is a simple confusion. Once it is understood that the fully virtuous agent characteristically does what she should without inner conflict, it is triumphantly asserted that “she is only doing what she wants to do and hence is being selfish.” So when the generous person gives gladly, as the generous are wont to do, it turns out she is not generous and unselfish after all, or at least not as generous as the one who greedily wants to hang on to everything she has but forces herself to give because she thinks she should! A related version ascribes bizarre reasons to the virtuous agent, unjustifiably assuming that she acts as she does because she believes that acting thus on this occasion will help her to achieve eudaimonia. But “the virtuous agent” is just “the agent with the virtues” and it is part of our ordinary understanding of the virtue terms that each carries with it its own typical range of reasons for acting. The virtuous agent acts as she does because she believes that someone’s suffering will be averted, or someone benefited, or the truth established, or a debt repaid, or … thereby.

It is the exercise of the virtues during one’s life that is held to be at least partially constitutive of eudaimonia , and this is consistent with recognising that bad luck may land the virtuous agent in circumstances that require her to give up her life. Given the sorts of considerations that courageous, honest, loyal, charitable people wholeheartedly recognise as reasons for action, they may find themselves compelled to face danger for a worthwhile end, to speak out in someone’s defence, or refuse to reveal the names of their comrades, even when they know that this will inevitably lead to their execution, to share their last crust and face starvation. On the view that the exercise of the virtues is necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia , such cases are described as those in which the virtuous agent sees that, as things have unfortunately turned out, eudaimonia is not possible for them (Foot 2001, 95). On the Stoical view that it is both necessary and sufficient, a eudaimon life is a life that has been successfully lived (where “success” of course is not to be understood in a materialistic way) and such people die knowing not only that they have made a success of their lives but that they have also brought their lives to a markedly successful completion. Either way, such heroic acts can hardly be regarded as egoistic.

A lingering suggestion of egoism may be found in the misconceived distinction between so-called “self-regarding” and “other-regarding” virtues. Those who have been insulated from the ancient tradition tend to regard justice and benevolence as real virtues, which benefit others but not their possessor, and prudence, fortitude and providence (the virtue whose opposite is “improvidence” or being a spendthrift) as not real virtues at all because they benefit only their possessor. This is a mistake on two counts. Firstly, justice and benevolence do, in general, benefit their possessors, since without them eudaimonia is not possible. Secondly, given that we live together, as social animals, the “self-regarding” virtues do benefit others—those who lack them are a great drain on, and sometimes grief to, those who are close to them (as parents with improvident or imprudent adult offspring know only too well).

The most recent objection (h) to virtue ethics claims that work in “situationist” social psychology shows that there are no such things as character traits and thereby no such things as virtues for virtue ethics to be about (Doris 1998; Harman 1999). In reply, some virtue ethicists have argued that the social psychologists’ studies are irrelevant to the multi-track disposition (see above) that a virtue is supposed to be (Sreenivasan 2002; Kamtekar 2004). Mindful of just how multi-track it is, they agree that it would be reckless in the extreme to ascribe a demanding virtue such as charity to people of whom they know no more than that they have exhibited conventional decency; this would indeed be “a fundamental attribution error.” Others have worked to develop alternative, empirically grounded conceptions of character traits (Snow 2010; Miller 2013 and 2014; however see Upton 2016 for objections to Miller). There have been other responses as well (summarized helpfully in Prinz 2009 and Miller 2014). Notable among these is a response by Adams (2006, echoing Merritt 2000) who steers a middle road between “no character traits at all” and the exacting standard of the Aristotelian conception of virtue which, because of its emphasis on phronesis, requires a high level of character integration. On his conception, character traits may be “frail and fragmentary” but still virtues, and not uncommon. But giving up the idea that practical wisdom is the heart of all the virtues, as Adams has to do, is a substantial sacrifice, as Russell (2009) and Kamtekar (2010) argue.

Even though the “situationist challenge” has left traditional virtue ethicists unmoved, it has generated a healthy engagement with empirical psychological literature, which has also been fuelled by the growing literature on Foot’s Natural Goodness and, quite independently, an upsurge of interest in character education (see below).

Over the past thirty-five years most of those contributing to the revival of virtue ethics have worked within a neo-Aristotelian, eudaimonist framework. However, as noted in section 2, other forms of virtue ethics have begun to emerge. Theorists have begun to turn to philosophers like Hutcheson, Hume, Nietzsche, Martineau, and Heidegger for resources they might use to develop alternatives (see Russell 2006; Swanton 2013 and 2015; Taylor 2015; and Harcourt 2015). Others have turned their attention eastward, exploring Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions (Yu 2007; Slingerland 2011; Finnigan and Tanaka 2011; McRae 2012; Angle and Slote 2013; Davis 2014; Flanagan 2015; Perrett and Pettigrove 2015; and Sim 2015). These explorations promise to open up new avenues for the development of virtue ethics.

Although virtue ethics has grown remarkably in the last thirty-five years, it is still very much in the minority, particularly in the area of applied ethics. Many editors of big textbook collections on “moral problems” or “applied ethics” now try to include articles representative of each of the three normative approaches but are often unable to find a virtue ethics article addressing a particular issue. This is sometimes, no doubt, because “the” issue has been set up as a deontologicial/utilitarian debate, but it is often simply because no virtue ethicist has yet written on the topic. However, the last decade has seen an increase in the amount of attention applied virtue ethics has received (Walker and Ivanhoe 2007; Hartman 2013; Austin 2014; Van Hooft 2014; and Annas 2015). This area can certainly be expected to grow in the future, and it looks as though applying virtue ethics in the field of environmental ethics may prove particularly fruitful (Sandler 2007; Hursthouse 2007, 2011; Zwolinski and Schmidtz 2013; Cafaro 2015).

Whether virtue ethics can be expected to grow into “virtue politics”—i.e. to extend from moral philosophy into political philosophy—is not so clear. Gisela Striker (2006) has argued that Aristotle’s ethics cannot be understood adequately without attending to its place in his politics. That suggests that at least those virtue ethicists who take their inspiration from Aristotle should have resources to offer for the development of virtue politics. But, while Plato and Aristotle can be great inspirations as far as virtue ethics is concerned, neither, on the face of it, are attractive sources of insight where politics is concerned. However, recent work suggests that Aristotelian ideas can, after all, generate a satisfyingly liberal political philosophy (Nussbaum 2006; LeBar 2013a). Moreover, as noted above, virtue ethics does not have to be neo-Aristotelian. It may be that the virtue ethics of Hutcheson and Hume can be naturally extended into a modern political philosophy (Hursthouse 1990–91; Slote 1993).

Following Plato and Aristotle, modern virtue ethics has always emphasised the importance of moral education, not as the inculcation of rules but as the training of character. There is now a growing movement towards virtues education, amongst both academics (Carr 1999; Athanassoulis 2014; Curren 2015) and teachers in the classroom. One exciting thing about research in this area is its engagement with other academic disciplines, including psychology, educational theory, and theology (see Cline 2015; and Snow 2015).

Finally, one of the more productive developments of virtue ethics has come through the study of particular virtues and vices. There are now a number of careful studies of the cardinal virtues and capital vices (Pieper 1966; Taylor 2006; Curzer 2012; Timpe and Boyd 2014). Others have explored less widely discussed virtues or vices, such as civility, decency, truthfulness, ambition, and meekness (Calhoun 2000; Kekes 2002; Williams 2002; and Pettigrove 2007 and 2012). One of the questions these studies raise is “How many virtues are there?” A second is, “How are these virtues related to one another?” Some virtue ethicists have been happy to work on the assumption that there is no principled reason for limiting the number of virtues and plenty of reason for positing a plurality of them (Swanton 2003; Battaly 2015). Others have been concerned that such an open-handed approach to the virtues will make it difficult for virtue ethicists to come up with an adequate account of right action or deal with the conflict problem discussed above. Dan Russell has proposed cardinality and a version of the unity thesis as a solution to what he calls “the enumeration problem” (the problem of too many virtues). The apparent proliferation of virtues can be significantly reduced if we group virtues together with some being cardinal and others subordinate extensions of those cardinal virtues. Possible conflicts between the remaining virtues can then be managed if they are tied together in some way as part of a unified whole (Russell 2009). This highlights two important avenues for future research, one of which explores individual virtues and the other of which analyses how they might be related to one another.

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Walker, Rebecca L. and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), 2007, Working Virtue , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Watson, Gary, 1990, “On the Primacy of Character,” in Flanagan and Rorty, pp. 449–83, reprinted in Statman, 1997.
Welchman, Jennifer (ed.), 2006, The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Readings in Virtue Ethics , Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
White, Nicholas, 2015, “Plato and the Ethics of Virtue,” in Besser-Jones and Slote (2015), pp. 3–15.
Williams, Bernard, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
–––, 2002, Truth and Truthfulness , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wilson, Alan, 2018, “Honesty as a Virtue,” Metaphilosophy , 49: 262–280.
Wynn, Mark, 2020, Spiritual Traditions and the Virtues: Living between Heaven and Earth , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Yu, Jiyuan, 2007, The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue , New York: Routledge.
Zagzebski, Linda, 1996, Virtues of the Mind , New York: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 1998, “The Virtues of God and the Foundations of Ethics,” Faith and Philosophy , 15 (4): 538–553.
–––, 2004, Divine Motivation Theory , New York: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 2017, Exemplarist Moral Theory , New York: Oxford University Press.
Zwolinski, Matt and David Schmidtz, 2013, “Environmental Virtue Ethics,” in Russell (2013), pp. 221–239.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Bibliography on Virtue Ethics (in PDF, listed alphabetically), and Bibliography on Virtue Ethics (in PDF, listed chronologically), by Jörg Schroth.

Acknowledgments

Parts of the introductory material above repeat what was said in the Introduction and first chapter of On Virtue Ethics (Hursthouse 1999).

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1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology

Philosophy, One Thousand Words at a Time

Virtue Ethics

Author: David Merry Category: Ethics , Historical Philosophy Word Count: 1000

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Think of the (morally) best person you know. It could be a friend, parent, teacher, religious leader, thinker, or activist.

The person you thought of is probably kind, brave, and wise. They are probably not greedy, cruel, or foolish.

The first list of ‘character traits’ ( kind, brave, etc.) are virtues, and the second list ( arrogant, greedy, etc.) are vices . Virtues are ways in which people are good; vices are ways in which people are bad.

This essay presents virtue ethics, a theory that sees virtues and vices as central to understanding who we should be, and what we should do.

The main characters from The Wizard of Oz. Each has a vice, but they are seeking to become more virtuous.

1. Virtue and Happiness

Virtues are excellent traits of character. [1] They shape how we act, think, and feel. They make us who we are. Virtues are acquired through good habits, over a long period of time.

1.1. Eudaimonia

According to Aristotle (384-322 BCE) virtues are those, and only those, character traits we need to be happy. [2] Many virtue ethicists today agree. [3] These virtue ethicists are called eudaimonists, after the Greek word eudaimonia, usually translated as “happiness,” “flourishing,” or “well-being . ” [4]

For eudaimonists, happiness is more than a feeling: it involves living well with others and pursuing worthwhile goals. This includes cultivating strong relationships, and succeeding at such projects as raising a family, fighting for justice, and (moderate yet enthusiastic) enjoyment of pleasure. [5]

Eudaimonists believe our happiness is not easily separated from that of other people. Many would consider the happiness of their friends and family as part of their own. Eudaimonists may extend this to complete strangers, and non-human animals. Similarly for causes or ideals: eudaimonists believe complicity in injustice and deceit reduces a person’s happiness. , [6]

If eudaimonists are right about happiness, then it is plausible that we need virtues such as honesty, kindness, gratitude and justice to be happy. This is not to say that the virtues will guarantee happiness. But eudaimonists believe we cannot be truly happy without them.

One concern is that vicious people often seem happy. For example, dictators live in palaces, apparently rather pleasantly. Eudaimonists may not think this amounts to happiness, but many would disagree. And if dictators can be happy, then we certainly can be happy without the virtues. Answering this objection is an ongoing project for eudaimonists. [7]

1.2. Emotion, Intelligence, and Developing Virtue

Eudaimonists believe emotions are essential to happiness, and that our emotions are shaped by our habits. Good emotional habits are a question of balance.

For example, eudaimonists argue that honest people habitually want to and enjoy telling the truth, but not so much that they will ignore all other considerations–a habit of enjoying pointing out other people’s shortcomings will leave us friendless, and so is not part of honesty. [8]

Because virtue requires balancing competing considerations, such as telling the truth and considering other people’s feelings, virtue also requires experience in making moral decisions. Virtue ethicists call this intellectual ability practical intelligence, or wisdom. [9]

2. Virtue and Right Action

Virtue ethicists believe we can use virtue to understand how we should act, or what makes actions right.

According to some virtue ethicists, an action is right if, and only if, it is what a virtuous person would characteristically do under the circumstances. [10] On rare occasions, virtuous people do the wrong thing. But this is not acting characteristically.

2.1. Being Specific

“Do what virtuous people would do” is not very specific, and we may be left wondering what the theory is actually saying we should do.

One way to make it more specific is to generate rules for each of the virtues and vices, called “v-rules.” Two examples of v-rules are: be kind, don’t be cruel. The v-rules give specific guidance in many cases: writing an email just to hurt someone’s feelings is cruel, so don’t do it. [11]

Unfortunately, the virtues can conflict: if a friend asks whether we like their new partner, it may be more honest to say we do not , but kinder to say we do. In this case it is hard to say what the virtuous person would do.

Virtue ethicists might respond that other ethical theories will also struggle to give clear guidance in hard cases. [12]

Second, they might try to understand how a virtuous person would think about the situation. Remember that virtuous people have practical intelligence, and habitually care about other people’s happiness and telling the truth. So they may consider a lot of particular details, including how close the friendship is, how bad the partner is, how gently the friend may be told. [13]

This may not provide a specific answer, but virtue ethicists hope they can at least provide a helpful model for thinking about hard cases. [14]

2.2. Explaining Why

We have seen how virtue ethics tells us what to do. But we also want to know why we should do it.

Virtue ethicists point out that if we ask virtuous people, they will explain why they did what they did. [15] Their reasoning results from their excellent emotional habits and practical intelligence–that is, from their virtue. And if we want to be happy, we need to cultivate virtue. So these should be our reasons too.

But in explaining their decision, the virtuous person won’t necessarily mention virtue. They might, for example, say, “I wanted to avoid hurting their feelings, so I told the truth gently.” [16]

It might then seem that something other than virtue–in our example, the importance of other people’s feelings–explains why the action is right . But then this other thing should be central to ethical theory, instead of virtue.

Virtue ethicists may respond that the moral weight of this other thing depends on which character traits are virtues. Accordingly, if kindness were not a virtue, there may be no moral reason to care about others’ feelings. [17]

3. Conclusion

Virtue ethicists recommend reflecting on the character traits we need to be happy. They hope this will help us make better moral decisions. Virtue ethics may not always yield clear answers, but perhaps acknowledging moral uncertainty is not a vice.

[1] Others may define virtue as admirable or merely good traits of character. For additional definitions of virtue and understandings of virtue ethics, see Hursthouse and Pettigrove’s “Virtue Ethics.”

[2] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , Book One, Chapter 9, Lines 1099b25-29. For this interpretation, see Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. 6.

[3] Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics , pp. 165-169, “Virtue Theory and Abortion”, p. 226, Foot, Natural Goodness , pp. 99-116.

There are many other accounts of virtue worth considering. One major alternative is sentimentalist accounts, such as that of Hume and Zagbzebski, who define virtues as those character traits that attract love or admiration. Some scholars argue that Confucian ethics is a virtue ethic, though this is debated: see Wong, “Chinese Ethics.” Also see John Ramsey’s Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts . For an African understanding of virtue, see Thaddeus Metz’s The African Ethic of Ubuntu .

[4] Hursthouse has a detailed and accessible discussion of the merits of different translations of eudaimonia in On Virtue Ethics, pp. 9-10.

[5] Some people find this account of virtue surprising because they think virtue must involve sacrificing one’s own happiness for the sake of other people, and living like a saint, a monk, or just being a really boring and miserable person. In this case it may be more helpful to think in terms of ‘good character’ than ‘virtue’. David Hume amusingly argued that some alleged virtues, such as humility, celibacy, silence, and solitude, were vices. See his Enquiry 9.1.

[6] The idea that injustice erodes everybody’s happiness is not to deny that it especially harms people who are treated unjustly. However, eudaimonists consider being unjust, or deceiving others to be bad for us.

[7] For a compelling discussion of this objection to eudaimonism, see Blackburn, Being Good, pp. 112-118 . Eudaimonists have been trying to answer this objection for a long time. Indeed, arguing that it is more beneficial to be just than unjust is one of the major themes of Plato’s Republic. For more recent attempts to make the case, see Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics, Chapter 8, or Foot, Natural Goodness, especially Chapter 7. See also Kiki Berk’s Happiness .

[8] The idea that the virtues involve finding a balance is called ‘the doctrine of the mean.’ See Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Chapter 6, lines 1106b30-1107a5. For one contemporary account of the emotional aspects of virtue, see Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics, pp.108-121.

[9] Aristotle discusses practical intelligence in Nicomachean Ethics Book 6. For a contemporary account see Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics, pp. 59-62.

[10] Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 28-29. This is sometimes called a qualified-agent account. For some alternatives, see van Zyl’s “Virtue Ethics and Right Action”.

[11] Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 28-29.

[12] For other moral theories, see Deontology: Kantian Ethics by Andrew Chapman and Introduction to Consequentialism by Shane Gronholz. When reading, you might consider whether these theories would give you clearer guidance about your friend’s partner.

[13] See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, chapter 9, lines 1109a25-30. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics pp. 128-129.

[14] For two examples of how virtue ethics may be helpfully applied to tough moral decisions, see Hursthouse’s “Virtue Theory and Abortion”, and Foot’s “Euthanasia”.

[15] Hursthouse, “Virtue Ethics and Abortion”, especially p. 227, pp. 234-237. “Do what a virtuous person would do” is only supposed to tell us what we should do, not how we should think .

[16] This objection is discussed in Shafer-Landau’s The Fundamentals of Ethics, pp. 272-274.

[17] On this connection between facts about morality on facts about virtue and human happiness, see Hursthouse “Virtue Theory and Abortion”, pp. 236-238.

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics . C. 355-322 BCE. Trans. Roger Crisp. Cambridge UP. 2014.

Blackburn, S. Being Good. Oxford UP. 2001.

Boxill, B. “How Injustice Pays.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9(4): 359-371. 1980.

Foot, P. Natural Goodness. Oxford UP. 2001.

Foot, P. “Euthanasia”. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6(2): 85–112. 1977.

Foot, P. “Moral Beliefs.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 59: 83-104. 1958.

Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. 1777.

Hursthouse, R. “Virtue Theory and Abortion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs . 20(3): 223-246. 1991.

Hursthouse, R. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford UP. 1999.

Hursthouse, Rosalind and Glen Pettigrove, “Virtue Ethics”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Zalta, E.N (ed.). 2018,

Nussbaum, M. The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge UP. 2nd Edition, 2001.

van Zyl, L. “Virtue Ethics and Right Action”. In Russell, D. C (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics. Cambridge UP. 2013.

Plato. Republic. C. 375 BCE. Trans. Paul Shorey. Harvard UP. 1969.

Shafer-Landau, R. The Fundamentals of Ethics . Fourth Edition. Oxford UP. 2017.

Wong, D. “Chinese Ethics”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 Edition) . Zalta, E.N (ed). 2021.

Zagzebski, L.T. Exemplarist Moral Theory. Oxford UP. 2017.

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David Merry’s research is mostly about ethics and dialectic in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, although he also occasionally works on contemporary ethics and philosophy of medicine. He received a Ph.D. from the Humboldt University of Berlin, and an M.A in philosophy from the University of Auckland. He is co-editor of Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity . He offers interactive, discussion-based online philosophy classes and maintains a blog at Kayepos.com .

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Aristotle and Virtue Ethics

Explore the importance, advantages, application, and other aspects of virtue ethics theory with the help of our reflective essay sample! Get some ideas for your virtue ethics essay!

Virtue Ethics: Essay Introduction

The good girl movie, aristotle virtue ethics theory, application of the theory, personal reflection, virtue ethics: essay conclusion, works cited.

Aristotle holds that virtues originate from actions that human beings perform because one can either be a good or bad person based on actions. In his ethics, Aristotle asserts that whatever activities human beings do ultimately lead to a good or a bad end. Desire and passion compel human beings to pursue certain activities so that they can achieve certain ends, which determine virtue. If there were no desired ends, human beings would pursue activities in vain.

Human beings seek to achieve legitimate ends so that they can obtain happiness in life. Aristotle argues that human actions determine virtues that one achieves and subsequently influence happiness1. For example, a marriage partner who has experienced an unhappy marriage will struggle extremely hard to achieve a happy life out there with friends. Therefore, how does Aristotle’s virtue theory apply to The Good Girl movie?

The movie shows the story of a young woman, Justine, who is so troubled in her marriage because she has no children. Justine is 30 years old and has been unable to conceive because her husband, Phil, is impotent, according to the diagnosis of a doctor. Phil is sterile because he has continually abused drugs, which has permanently made him unable to make his wife conceive. Troubled by dying marriage, Justine planned to seek a man who would make her happy in life by giving her a baby.

Luckily, Justine found a young man aged 22, Holden, who was particularly attractive and mysterious2. From then, Justine and Holden continued with their secret love affair until when her workmates and friends discovered it. Discovery of their secret affair put Justine in a dilemma, as she was already pregnant and did not know what to tell Phil. Justine wanted to save her marriage and, at the same time, keep the baby by marrying Holden. However, Justine and Phil reconciled and lived happily after that with their daughter.

According to Aristotle’s ethical theory, virtues result from human actions, for the perception of the moral character of a person emanates from various activities. Human actions and activities aim at attaining excellence, which is a virtue in every aspect of life. According to Aristotle, every art and pursuit aims at attaining the good, which is a virtue that all human beings cherish3. Synchronized actions focus on achieving one objective or more objectives as ends of excellence.

The difference between plants or animals and human being is a rational principle. The rational principle gives human beings the ability to think and act. Through thoughts, a human being can coordinate actions that determine ethics because actions describe ethics. For instance, ’a good player’ and ’a bad player,’ in this case, good and bad, are descriptions of the action of playing, and they portray the virtues of players.

Actions are imperative in achieving virtues since no one can have virtues by a mere theoretical understanding of what ethics are. Thus, due to diversity and degree of actions, it is extraordinarily complicated to attribute certain actions to specified virtues, making ethics subjective.

The ethics theory further asserts that there are two types of virtues, moral and intellectual virtues; moral virtues emanate from habits, while intellectual virtue is an innate characteristic that undergoes a transformation in the course of life due to teaching and experience. Nature gives primary moral virtues, and through perfection by habitual activities, one attains given moral virtues. Since habituation is a process of achieving ethics for one to be excellent in a certain field, one should continually learn and exercise.

For example, one becomes a runner by running; likewise, people become good when they do good and bad by doing bad things. The emphasis here is that actions have a direct relation with virtues, for virtues cannot occur without actions.

Then, what actions are responsible for certain virtues? Confusingly, the same action produces both a virtue and vice. For instance, in playing as an action, we have both good and bad players. Aristotle argues that virtues exist in a continuum of excess and deficiency of actions, and thus, virtue occurs as an intermediate4. It, therefore, shows that deficiency or excess of action results in vices while intermediate actions give virtues.

Given that Aristotle’s ethics theory postulates that human actions determine their virtues, The Good Girl movie portrays a scenario where Justine’s actions led her to achieve happiness. For many years, Justine had been in a troubled marriage that was gradually dying since Phil was unable to make her conceive. In pursuit of happiness, Justine thought of the best way of achieving happiness amidst the daunting challenges of her marriage that seemed not to end unless she did something about them.

According to Aristotle, actions form the basis of virtue, for they determine goodness or badness as unique ends of actions, but since human beings aim at achieving a good end, happiness is then an end of actions5. Thus, Justine was struggling to achieve happiness in her marriage and life, as well.

The movie has termed her a ‘good’ girl because she thought of the best way of conceiving a baby so that she could achieve happiness in marriage and life. In her troubles, Justine had three options: to tolerate the hard life of marriage, to divorce her husband, or to conceive through a love affair. Relating to Aristotle’s ethical theory, deficiency and excess of action cause a vice that leads to an unhappy life.

Thus, the option of tolerating fruitless marriage life would have been a deficient action, while the option of divorce would have been an excessive action. Hence, the option of conceiving through a love affair, because her husband was sterile, enabled her to have a girl child who made their marriage happy again after reconciliation. Aristotle argues that intermediate passions and actions are the recipes to virtues that lead to happiness6. Therefore, Justine obtained happiness through intermediate passions and actions.

Aristotle’s ethical theory effectively describes how virtues occur in society. The assertion that human actions and passions aim at achieving good is a complex concept that needs elaboration since some actions ultimately lead to vice, no matter their moderation. For instance, an action such as killing has no moderation and hence lacks virtue. Moreover, since human actions are diverse, it is difficult to classify virtues according to diverse actions because it would lead to ambiguity.

Therefore, if actions only determine moral virtues according to Aristotle’s ethics theory, there could be indefinite virtues in society, proving that ethics are not only complex but also subjective. Assertions like human actions determine virtues pose a serious threat to ethical theories because it demands continued teaching of morality. If human moral values constantly change due to the influence of actions, then it is a daunting task to control moral virtues.

Regarding Aristotle concept of moderation, it is quite evident that intermediate actions yield virtues while extreme actions cause vices. The concept is particularly valuable as it shows that the moderation of human actions plays a significant role in shaping one’s morality through habituation.

In the case study of The Good Girl movie, Justine was able to moderate her actions so that she could achieve happiness in life, and she eventually became a ‘good’ girl. Thus, deficiency and excess of action cause vice, while an intermediate of an action results in virtue and happiness.

Since humans do not have stable character traits, ethical theories provide the basis for the understanding of moral virtues, but achieving the virtues demands actions. Knowing what actions give certain moral virtues enables one to pursue morality by habitually exercising them. As in the case of Justine in The Good Girl movie, one needs to know that excesses or deficiencies of actions will result in vices, and moderation of actions is vital in achieving desired virtues.

Pleasures and pains accompany the pursuit of actions because excessive pleasures result in overindulgence, which is a vice, while too much pain results in serious fear, which is also a vice. Hence, moderation of actions enables one to achieve moral virtues, though it is hard to determine what the actions are and the extent of exercising them.

Ross, William. Nicomachean Ethics: Aristotle . Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999.

Weschler, Raymond. “The Good Girl.” Drama and Comedy , 2002: 1-23.

1 William Ross. Nicomachean Ethics: Aristotle . Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999, 14

2, Raymond Weschler. “The Good Girl.” Drama and Comedy , 2002: 1.

3 William Ross. Nicomachean Ethics: Aristotle . Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999.

4 William Ross. (1999): 28

5 William Ross. (1999): 10

6 William Ross. (1999): 31

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9.4 Virtue Ethics

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

Identify the central principles of virtue ethics.
Distinguish the major features of Confucianism.
Evaluate Aristotle’s moral theory.

Virtue ethics takes a character-centered approach to morality. Whereas Mohists and utilitarians look to consequences to determine the rightness of an action and deontologists maintain that a right action is the one that conforms to moral rules and norms, virtue ethicists argue that right action flows from good character traits or dispositions. We become a good person, then, through the cultivation of character, self-reflection, and self-perfection.

There is often a connection between the virtuous life and the good life in virtue ethics because of its emphasis on character and self-cultivation. Through virtuous development, we realize and perfect ourselves, laying the foundation for a good life. In Justice as a Virtue , for example, Mark LeBar (2020) notes that “on the Greek eudaimonist views (including here Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicurus) our reasons for action arise from our interest in [ eudaimonia , or] a happy life.” The ancient Greeks thought the aim of life was eudaimonia . Though eudaimonia is often translated as “happiness,” it means something closer to “a flourishing life.” Confucianism , with its strong emphasis on repairing the fractured social world, connects the promotion of virtuous development and social order. Confucians believe virtuous action is informed by social roles and relationships, such that promoting virtuous development also promotes social order.

Confucianism

As discussed earlier, the Warring States period in ancient China (ca. 475–221 BCE) was a period marked by warfare, social unrest, and suffering. Warfare during this period was common because China was comprised of small states that were not politically unified. New philosophical approaches were developed to promote social harmony, peace, and a better life. This period in China’s history is also sometimes referred to as the era of the “Hundred Schools of Thought” because the development of new philosophical approaches led to cultural expansion and intellectual development. Mohism, Daoism, and Confucianism developed in ancient China during this period. Daoism and Confucianism would later spread to Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, where they would be adopted and changed in response to local social and cultural circumstances.

Confucius (551–479 BCE) rose from lowly positions to become a minister in the government of a province in eastern China. After a political conflict with the hereditary aristocracy, Confucius resigned his position and began traveling to other kingdoms and teaching. Confucius’s teachings centered on virtue, veering into practical subjects such as social obligations, ritual performance, and governance. During his lifetime, Confucius despaired that his advice to rulers fell on deaf ears: “How can I be like a bitter gourd that hangs from the end of a string and can not be eaten?” (Analects 17:7). He did not foresee that his work and ideas would influence society, politics, and culture in East Asia for over 2000 years.

Confucius is credited with authoring or editing the classical texts that became the curriculum of the imperial exams, which applicants had to pass to obtain positions in government. His words, sayings, and exchanges with rulers and his disciples were written down and recorded in the Lun Yu , or the Analects of Confucius , which has heavily influenced the moral and social practice in China and elsewhere.

Relational Aspect of Virtue

Like Mohism, Confucianism aimed to restore social order and harmony by establishing moral and social norms. Confucius believed the way to achieve this was through an ordered, hierarchical society in which people know their place in relationship to other people. Confucius said, “There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son” (Analects, 7:11). In Confucianism, relationships and social roles shape moral responsibilities and structure moral life.

A cornerstone of Confucian virtue is filial piety . Confucius felt that the role of the father was to care for and educate his son, but the duty of the son must be to respect his father by obediently abiding by his wishes. “While a man's father is alive, look at the bent of his will; when his father is dead, look at his conduct. If for three years he does not alter from the way of his father, he may be called filial” (Analects, 1:11). Indeed, when the Duke of Sheh informed Confucius that his subjects were so truthful that if their father stole a sheep, they would bear witness to it, Confucius replied, “Among us, in our part of the country, those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this.” The devotion of the son to the father is more important than what Kant would call the universal moral law of truth telling.

There is therefore an important relational aspect of virtue that a moral person must understand. The virtuous person must not only be aware of and care for others but must understand the “human dance,” or the complex practices and relationships that we participate in and that define social life (Wong 2021). The more we begin to understand the “human dance,” the more we grasp how we relate to one another and how social roles and relationships must be accounted for to act virtuously.

Ritual and Ren

Important to both early and late Confucian ethics is the concept of li (ritual and practice). Li plays an important role in the transformation of character. These rituals are a guide or become a means by which we develop and start to understand our moral responsibilities. Sacrificial offerings to parents and other ancestors after their death, for example, cultivate filial piety. By carrying out rituals, we transform our character and become more sensitive to the complexities of human interaction and social life.

In later Confucian thought, the concept of li takes on a broader role and denotes the customs and practices that are a blueprint for many kinds of respectful behavior (Wong 2021). In this way, it relates to ren , a concept that refers to someone with complete virtue or specific virtues needed to achieve moral excellence. Confucians maintain that it is possible to perfect human nature through personal development and transformation. They believe society will improve if people abide by moral and social norms and focus on perfecting themselves. The aim is to live according to the dao . The word dao means “way” in the sense of a road or path of virtue.

Junzi and Self-Perfection

Confucius used the term junzi to refer to an exemplary figure who lives according to the dao . This figure is an ethical ideal that reminds us that self-perfection can be achieved through practice, self-transformation, and a deep understanding of social relationships and norms. A junzi knows what is right and chooses it, taking into account social roles and norms, while serving as a role model. Whenever we act, our actions are observed by others. If we act morally and strive to embody the ethical ideal, we can become an example for others to follow, someone they can look to and emulate.

The Ethical Ruler

Any person of any status can become a junzi . Yet, it was particularly important that rulers strive toward this ideal because their subjects would then follow this ideal. When the ruler Chi K’ang consulted with Confucius about what to do about the number of thieves in his domain, Confucius responded, “If you, sir, were not covetous, although you should reward them to do it, they would not steal” (Analects, 7:18).

Confucius thought social problems were rooted in the elite’s behavior and, in particular, in their pursuit of their own benefit to the detriment of the people. Hence, government officials must model personal integrity, understand the needs of the communities over which they exercised authority, and place the welfare of the people over and above their own (Koller 2007, 204).

In adherence to the ethical code, a ruler’s subjects must show obedience to honorable people and emulate those higher up in the social hierarchy. Chi K’ang, responding to Confucius’s suggestion regarding thievery, asked Confucius, “What do you say to killing the unprincipled for the good of the principled?” Confucius replied that there was no need to kill at all. “Let your evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good.” Confucius believed that the relationship between rulers and their subjects is and should be like that between the wind and the grass. “The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it” (Analects, 7:19).

Japanese Confucianism

Although Confucianism was initially developed in China, it spread to Japan in the mid-sixth century, via Korea, and developed its own unique attributes. Confucianism is one of the dominant philosophical teachings in Japan. As in China, Japanese Confucianism focuses on teaching individual perfection and moral development, fostering harmonious and healthy familial relations, and promoting a functioning and prosperous society. In Japan, Confucianism has been changed and transformed in response to local social and cultural factors. For example, Confucianism and Buddhism were introduced around the same time in Japan. It is therefore not uncommon to find variations of Japanese Confucianism that integrate ideas and beliefs from Buddhism. Some neo-Confucian philosophers like Zhu Xi, for example, developed “Confucian thinking after earlier study and practice of Chan Buddhism” (Tucker 2018).

Aristotelianism

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) was a preeminent ancient Greek philosopher. He studied with Plato (ca. 429–347 BCE) at the Academy , a fraternal organization where participants pursued knowledge and self-development. After Plato’s death, Aristotle traveled, tutored the boy who would later become Alexander the Great, and among other things, established his own place of learning, dedicated to the god Apollo (Shields 2020).

Aristotle spent his life in the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom. His extant works today represent only a portion of his total life’s work, much of which was lost to history. During his life, Aristotle was, for example, principal to the creation of logic, created the first system of classification for animals, and wrote on diverse topics of philosophical interest. Along with his teacher, Plato, Aristotle is considered one of the pillars of Western philosophy.

Human Flourishing as the Goal of Human Action

In the first line of Book I of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , he observes that “[every] art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1094a). If everything we do aims at some good, he argues, then there must be a final or highest good that is the end of all action (life’s telos ), which is eudaimonia , the flourishing life (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1097a34–b25). Everything else we pursue is pursued for the sake of this end.

Connections

See the chapter on epistemology for more on the topic of eudaimonia .

Nicomachean Ethics is a practical exploration of the flourishing life and how to live it. Aristotle, like other ancient Greek and Roman philosophers (e.g., Plato and the Stoics), asserts that virtuous development is central to human flourishing. Virtue (or aretê ) means “excellence. We determine something’s virtue, Aristotle argued, by identifying its peculiar function or purpose because “the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1097b25–1098a15). We might reasonably say, for example, that a knife’s function is to cut. A sharp knife that cuts extremely well is an excellent (or virtuous) knife. The sharp knife realizes its function and embodies excellence (or it is an excellent representation of knife-ness).

Aristotle assumed our rational capacity makes us distinct from other (living) things. He identifies rationality as the unique function of human beings and says that human virtue, or excellence, is therefore realized through the development or perfection of reason. For Aristotle, virtuous development is the transformation and perfection of character in accordance with reason. While most thinkers (like Aristotle and Kant) assign similar significance to reason, it is interesting to note how they arrive at such different theories.

Deliberation, Practical Wisdom, and Character

To exercise or possess virtue is to demonstrate excellent character. For ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, the pursuit of intentional, directed self-development to cultivate virtues is the pursuit of excellence. Someone with a virtuous character is consistent, firm, self-controlled, and well-off. Aristotle characterized the virtuous character state as the mean between two vice states, deficiency and excess. He thought each person naturally tends toward one of the extreme (or vice) states. We cultivate virtue when we bring our character into alignment with the “mean or intermediate state with regard to” feelings and actions, and in doing so we become “well off in relation to our feelings and actions” (Homiak 2019).

Being virtuous requires more than simply developing a habit or character trait. An individual must voluntarily choose the right action, the virtuous state; know why they chose it; and do so from a consistent, firm character. To voluntarily choose virtue requires reflection, self-awareness, and deliberation. Virtuous actions, Aristotle claims, should “accord with the correct reason” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1103b30). The virtuous person chooses what is right after deliberation that is informed by practical wisdom and experience. Through a deliberative process we identify the choice that is consistent with the mean state.

The Role of Habit

Aristotle proposed that humans “are made perfect by habit” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1103a10–33). Habit therefore plays an important role in our virtuous development. When we practice doing what’s right, we get better at choosing the right action in different circumstances. Through habituation we gain practice and familiarity, we bring about dispositions or tendencies, and we gain the requisite practical experience to identify the reasons why a certain action should be chosen in diverse situations. Habit, in short, allows us to gain important practical experience and a certain familiarity with choosing and doing the right thing. The more we reinforce doing the right thing, the more we grow accustomed to recognizing what’s right in different circumstances. Through habit we become more aware of which action is supported by reason and why, and get better at choosing it.

Habit and repetition develop dispositions. In Nicomachean Ethics , for example, Aristotle reminds us of the importance of upbringing. A good upbringing will promote the formation of positive dispositions, making one’s tendencies closer to the mean state. A bad upbringing, in contrast, will promote the formation of negative dispositions, making one’s tendencies farther from the mean state (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1095b5).

Read Like a Philosopher

Artistotle on virtue.

Read this passage from from Book II of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics , considering what Aristotle means when he states that moral virtues come about as a result of habit. How should individuals make use of the two types of virtue to become virtuous?

Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance, the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit. Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyreplayers by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one. Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyreplayers are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.

Social Relationships and Friendship

Aristotle was careful to note in Nicomachean Ethics that virtuous development alone does not make a flourishing life, though it is central to it. In addition to virtuous development, Aristotle thought things like success, friendships, and other external goods contributed to eudaimonia .

In Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle points out that humans are social (or political) beings (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1097b10). It’s not surprising, then, that, like Confucius, Aristotle thinks social relations are important for our rational and virtuous development.

When we interact with others who have common goals and interests, we are more likely to progress and realize our rational powers. Social relations afford us opportunities to learn, practice, and engage in rational pursuits with other people. The ancient Greek schools (e.g., Plato’s Academy, Aristotle’s Lyceum , and Epicurus’s Gardens) exemplify the ways individuals benefit from social relations. These ancient schools offered a meeting place where those interested in knowledge and the pursuit of wisdom could participate in these activities together.

Through social relations, we also develop an important sense of community and take an interest in the flourishing of others. We see ourselves as connected to others, and through our interactions we develop social virtues like generosity and friendliness (Homiak 2019). Moreover, as we develop social virtues and gain a deeper understanding of the reasons why what is right, is right, we realize that an individual’s ability to flourish and thrive is improved when the community flourishes. Social relations and political friendships are useful for increasing the amount of good we can do for the community (Kraut 2018).

The important role Aristotle assigns to friendship in a flourishing life is evidenced by the fact that he devotes two out of the ten books of Nicomachean Ethics (Books VIII and IX) to a discussion of it. He notes that it would be odd, “when one assigns all good things to the happy man, not to assign friends, who are thought the greatest of external goods” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1169a35–b20). Aristotle distinguishes between incidental friendships and perfect friendships . Incidental friendships are based on and defined by either utility or pleasure. Such friendships are casual relationships where each person participates only because they get something (utility or pleasure) from it. These friendships neither contribute to our happiness nor do they foster virtuous development.

Unlike incidental friendships, perfect friendships are relationships that foster and strengthen our virtuous development. The love that binds a perfect friendship is based on the good or on the goodness of the characters of the individuals involved. Aristotle believed that perfect friends wish each other well simply because they love each other and want each other to do well, not because they expect something (utility or pleasure) from the other. He points out that “those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1156a27–b17). Aristotle argues that the happy man needs (true) friends because such friendships make it possible for them to “contemplate worthy [or virtuous] actions and actions that are [their] own” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1169b20–1170a6). This affords the good individual the opportunity to contemplate worthy actions that are not their own (i.e., they are their friend’s) while still thinking of these actions as in some sense being their own because their friend is another self. On Aristotle’s account, we see a true friend as another self because we are truly invested in our friend’s life and “we ought to wish what is good for his sake” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1155b17–1156a5).

Perfect friendships afford us opportunities to grow and develop, to better ourselves—something we do not get from other relationships. Aristotle therefore argues that a “certain training in virtue arises also from the company of the good” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1170a6–30). Our perfect friend provides perspective that helps us in our development and contributes to our happiness because we get to participate in and experience our friend’s happiness as our own. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that Aristotle considered true friends “the greatest of external goods” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1169a35–b20).

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Living Right: the Heartbeat of Virtue Ethics

This essay about virtue ethics presents a refreshing take on the philosophical approach that prioritizes character and virtues in ethical living. It explains how virtue ethics focuses on the qualities we need to cultivate, such as courage and honesty, and the vices we should avoid, like greed and deceit. The concept of practical wisdom, or phronesis, is discussed as crucial for applying moral principles to real-life situations, acting as a bridge between ideals and actions. The essay also introduces the virtuous agent, an individual whose actions inspire others to pursue a virtuous life. Through this exploration, virtue ethics is shown to be more than just a set of guidelines; it’s a call to live out the best versions of ourselves, making ethical decisions that reflect who we are and who we aspire to be. This approach to ethics encourages us not only to perform good acts but to embody goodness in every aspect of our lives.

How it works

When we dive into the realm of virtue ethics, we’re not just wading through another philosophical theory. This approach to ethics is like a compass for the soul, guiding us through the murky waters of moral dilemmas with the light of character and virtue. It’s about asking not just “What should I do?” but “Who should I be?” Here, we’ll unpack the essentials of virtue ethics, touching on the key distinctions between virtues and vices, the indispensable role of practical wisdom, and the inspirational figure of the virtuous agent.

Virtue ethics throws the spotlight on virtues—those stellar qualities like courage, honesty, and kindness that we admire in others and strive to embody in our own lives. It’s a call to polish these gems of character, making them shine brighter in our actions and decisions. On the flip side, we’ve got vices, the party crashers that can tarnish our character—think greed, deceit, or cowardice. Virtue ethics is like a personal trainer for the soul, pushing us to flex our moral muscles and shed those vices that weigh us down.

Now, let’s talk about practical wisdom, or phronesis. This isn’t about acing a philosophy quiz; it’s the down-to-earth, street-smart savvy that helps us navigate life’s ethical potholes. It’s knowing not just the good but how to bring it about, making choices that reflect our best selves in the real world. Practical wisdom is the bridge between high ideals and our everyday actions, ensuring that our moral compass is well-calibrated to the complexities of life.

And then there’s the virtuous agent, the kind of person who doesn’t just talk the talk but walks the walk. These are the folks who embody virtue in such a way that they light up a path for the rest of us to follow. They’re not saints or superheroes, but ordinary people who make a habit of choosing rightly, inspiring those around them to aim higher and dig deeper in their own ethical journeys.

In essence, virtue ethics invites us to look inward, to cultivate a character that’s not just about avoiding wrongdoing, but about actively seeking the good, making it a tangible reality in our lives and the lives of those around us. It’s a reminder that ethics is not a spectator sport; it’s an invitation to roll up our sleeves and get involved in the messy, beautiful work of becoming fully human.

So, there you have it—a quick tour through the landscape of virtue ethics. It’s a perspective that champions the best within us, encouraging us to build a life where virtue isn’t just an ideal, but a lived reality. In a world often fixated on the next big thing, virtue ethics calls us back to the timeless task of crafting a life marked by depth, integrity, and genuine goodness.

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Ethics and Virtue

Markkula Center for Applied Ethics
Ethics Resources
Ethical Decision Making

For many of us, the fundamental question of ethics is, "What should I do?" or "How should I act?" Ethics is supposed to provide us with "moral principles" or universal rules that tell us what to do. Many people, for example, read passionate adherents of the moral principle of utilitarianism: "Everyone is obligated to do whatever will achieve the greatest good for the greatest number." Others are just as devoted to the basic principle of Immanuel Kant: "Everyone is obligated to act only in ways that respect the human dignity and moral rights of all persons."

Moral principles like these focus primarily on people's actions and doings. We "apply" them by asking what these principles require of us in particular circumstances, e.g., when considering whether to lie or to commit suicide. We also apply them when we ask what they require of us as professionals, e.g., lawyers, doctors, or business people, or what they require of our social policies and institutions. In the last decade, dozens of ethics centers and programs devoted to "business ethics", "legal ethics", "medical ethics", and "ethics in public policy" have sprung up. These centers are designed to examine the implications moral principles have for our lives.

But are moral principles all that ethics consists of? Critics have rightly claimed that this emphasis on moral principles smacks of a thoughtless and slavish worship of rules, as if the moral life was a matter of scrupulously checking our every action against a table of do's and don'ts. Fortunately, this obsession with principles and rules has been recently challenged by several ethicists who argue that the emphasis on principles ignores a fundamental component of ethics--virtue. These ethicists point our that by focusing on what people should do or how people should act, the "moral principles approach" neglects the more important issue--what people should be. In other words, the fundamental question of ethics is not "What should I do?" but "What kind of person should I be?"

According to "virtue ethics", there are certain ideals, such as excellence or dedication to the common good, toward which we should strive and which allow the full development of our humanity. These ideals are discovered through thoughtful reflection on what we as human beings have the potential to become.

"Virtues" are attitudes, dispositions, or character traits that enable us to be and to act in ways that develop this potential. They enable us to pursue the ideals we have adopted. Honesty, courage, compassion, generosity, fidelity, integrity, fairness, self-control, and prudence are all examples of virtues.

How does a person develop virtues? Virtues are developed through learning and through practice. As the ancient philosopher Aristotle suggested, a person can improve his or her character by practicing self-discipline, while a good character can be corrupted by repeated self-indulgence. Just as the ability to run a marathon develops through much training and practice, so too does our capacity to be fair, to be courageous, or to be compassionate.

Virtues are habits. That is, once they are acquired, they become characteristic of a person. For example, a person who has developed the virtue of generosity is often referred to as a generous person because he or she tends to be generous in all circumstances. Moreover, a person who has developed virtues will be naturally disposed to act in ways that are consistent with moral principles. The virtuous person is the ethical person.

At the heart of the virtue approach to ethics is the idea of "community". A person's character traits are not developed in isolation, but within and by the communities to which he or she belongs, including family, church, school, and other private and public associations. As people grow and mature, their personalities are deeply affected by the values that their communities prize, by the personality traits that their communities encourage, and by the role models that their communities put forth for imitation through traditional stories, fiction, movies, television, and so on. The virtue approach urges us to pay attention to the contours of our communities and the habits of character they encourage and instill.

The moral life, then, is not simply a matter of following moral rules and of learning to apply them to specific situations. The moral life is also a matter of trying to determine the kind of people we should be and of attending to the development of character within our communities and ourselves.

This article appeared originally in Issues in Ethics V1 N3 (Spring 1988)

Home — Essay Samples — Philosophy — Virtue Ethics — Analysis Of The Philosophical Concept Of Virtue Ethics

Analysis of The Philosophical Concept of Virtue Ethics

Categories: Ethics Virtue Ethics

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Published: Mar 18, 2021

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Donlevy, J. K., & Walker, K. D. (2011). Ethical Schools of Thought. Working Through Ethics in Education and Leadership,21-32. doi:10.1007/978-94-6091-376-1_3

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Normative Virtue Ethics by Rosalind Hursthouse, Essay Example

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Rosalind Hursthouse presents the normative ethics theory as a framework that guides human behavior and actions based on moral values. Her main argument of morality is described by virtues that identify people concerning character and relationships with others. In this context, the normative ethics theory is considered part of two other frameworks: deontology and consequentialism. Some individuals comply or abide by duties and rules to guide individual actions and behavior. Deontology is another ethical theory that develops individual satisfaction as people perceive and think of others as they would expect from them. On the other hand, consequentialism is a theory that judges people’s actions and behavior by evaluating the outcomes or consequences. An action with potential positive benefits as outcomes is preferred to that with negative results (Hursthouse, 2018). Most importantly, Rosalind Hursthouse presents a normative ethics theory as a suitable model of ensuring and upholding morals and critical virtues which comply or abide by social and cultural expectations at personal, family, and community levels. The approach enhances personality traits through integration of progressive virtues and moral values required for enhanced interaction.

Hypothetical Application Scenario of Rosalind’s Theory

From a practical perspective, the normative ethics theory can be applied in instances requiring compassion, empathy, solidarity, and humility. For example, a homeless person begging for food along busy streets is an individual in need of assistance at emotional, physical, and psychological levels (Frey, 2020). The person needs assistance, which is offered by passers-by, well-wishers, and empathetic organizations. In this case, offering assistance in form of food, shelter or clothing is an action whose outcome is positive and morally acceptable. A person depicting values of the normative ethics theory would offer assistance since helping people in tough conditions is encouraged in their community (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). In this situation, an individual with community or religious roles would appreciate the act and commend it to others for peaceful coexistence. Therefore, Rosalind Hursthouse considers the ethical theory useful in ensuring consistency and sustainability of important community virtues. The theory focuses on the morals and virtues associated with human actions within a social, community or cultural context.

Relevant Components of the Author’s Main Argument

Theories of Normative Ethics

Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is a relatable ethics model that enforces of Rosalind’s argument of the normative ethical theory. This model provides an alternative to the ethics theory for understanding Rosalind’s argument from a different perspective. In this case, the utilitarian model states that an action or behavior is considered ethically and morally accurate based on its consequences (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). For example, the practical application of this theory in the practical application context would find the act of helping the homeless person morally just. In other words, any help to the needy person in the form of food, shelter, or water is considered ethical as the consequences include relief and survival (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). Fellow community members would find the assistance crucial to preventing unwarranted death from hunger. Utilitarianism is a relevant concept of normative ethics theory as it facilitates a deeper understanding of morality (Frey, 2020). For example, helping the needy person would be putting oneself at risk of arrest for supporting homelessness in some towns and cities.

Additionally, Kantianism offers useful knowledge for understanding and applying normative ethical theory. Established scholars and practitioners use this theory to distinguish actions and behaviors from intentions. In this case, Kantianism is a philosophical model that judges an action’s morality based on motives (Frey, 2020). According to this conceptual framework, the motivation behind an action or specific behavior offers a key determinant of moral intentions (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). Consequently, Kantianism is perceived ethically valuable if the activities are intended for positive outcomes. On the one hand, helping a homeless person is an action that is justified morally by the utilitarian approach. On the other hand, the action can be immoral in some communities, which discourage homelessness through minor empathetic acts to overcome the severity of the problem (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). Most importantly, scholars of the Kantianism theory perceive the helping idea and positive thoughts as morally just despite failing to offer assistance.

Ethical Intuition

Another useful model that explains the normative ethics theory includes the ethical intuition framework. Essentially, Rosalind Hursthouse identifies intuition as a crucial determinant of an action’s moral status. In simpler terms, ethical intuition enables individuals to make decisions based on unexplainable or intrinsic psychological forces (Hursthouse, 2018). In a hypothetical situation, an individual hesitating to help a homeless person for fear of being mugged or robbed acts under ethical intuition. This framework explains that not all actions and behaviors can be controlled using rules or outlined morals. It implies that people with ethical intuition fulfill their satisfaction in moral actions based on previous encounters or experiences (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). For instance, a stabbed after getting near homeless people abusing drugs would use ethical intuition to judge or get involved in a similar act. Most importantly, when evaluating using instincts, ethical intuition is a relevant component of Rosalind’s normative ethics theory.

Varying Forms of Virtue Ethics

The normative ethics theory by Rosalind contains different forms of the model when applied in diverse contexts. Virtue ethics is instrumental in developing behavioral traits that facilitate personal and professional growth at different levels (Timmons, 2012). Most significantly, forms of virtue ethics theory are related to Rosalind’s model as they enhance the basic structure and application essence of normative theories.

Eudaemonic Virtue Ethics

This normative ethics theory form determines morals and virtues concerning eudemonism. A eudaemonist develops virtues and values that contribute to their happiness or well-being as humans. In this context, helping a homeless person is an ethical act supported by most community values in multicultural contexts (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). The moral element of the action under eudaemonist would argue that the needy person would be encouraged despite toughening conditions. when offered assistance. For instance, presenting food to the person develops happiness and intrinsic satisfaction by offering help and the recipient. When keenly perceived, the eudaemonist form of normative ethics is crucial in forming sustainable and stable social relationships (Hursthouse, 2018). It implies that the homeless person would be sympathetic and helpful if he/she found the person who assisted her in a street robbery. The relationship of well-being enhanced by the helping act would be critical in overcoming future challenges by either of the involved individuals (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). Most importantly, eudaemonist is instrumental in advancing personal, professional, and community social relationships.

Agent-Based Virtue Ethics

Moreover, agent-based is a normative ethical theory that identifies the motivation for individual actions, thinking patterns, and behaviors. This approach stipulates that drivers of activities are critical in evaluating the morality of an action or explaining normativity (Frey, 2020). For example, helping a needy and homeless person is an act that requires extrinsic and intrinsic motivation sources. A person passing by, feeling the need to support the homeless person, could be motivated by a past similar experience (Timmons, 2012). A person who experienced homelessness would find it compassionate and empathetic to support the needy since the conditions are well-understood at a personal level (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). Additionally, the agent-based form of normative ethics requires extrinsic motivation based on guidelines used for behavior control (Hursthouse, 2018). This approach is depicted in social forums such as religious functions were leaders use similar illustrations for spiritual teachings.

Target-Centered Virtue Ethics

Target-centered virtue ethics is another form of normative ethical theory which focuses on the benefits or outcomes of a specific person trait or value (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). An individual who develops a specific virtue and actions surrounding integrates the principles of this form of normative ethics. In this context, an individual offering help to a homeless person depicts humility, kindness, and generosity virtues. In other words, these values are integral in the personality definition of the passer-by offering help to the homeless victim (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). When keenly perceived, this normative ethics form enhances and enforces actions that define generosity. For instance, preparing food for the victimized person is an empathetic act beyond the normal value of offering something to eat. It implies that the person makes an additional effort to prepare a decent meal depicting generosity (Hursthouse, 2018). Subsequently, the target-centered form of normative theory requires focus and concentration on deeds that demonstrate the morality or ethicality of an action.

Platonistic Virtue Ethics

Furthermore, the Platonist description of virtue ethics is envisaged like an individual action or behavior. In simpler words, this normative ethics theory uses Plato Socrates’ argument of explaining the nature of a good deed (Frey, 2020). For example, this approach would integrate several factors influencing the moral status of helping a homeless person in need of food. In this case, offering assistance is a positive and recommendable act from any individual who offers assistance (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). However, in this case, Plato’s argument would include defining goodness in helping the needy person. On the one hand, assisting the homeless requires long-term strategies to overcome the menace in urban communities. It includes taking them to a shelter home and advising them on education and employment matters (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). On the other hand, the Platonist form of normative virtue ethics would argue that food is a short-term remedy before taking sustainable measures for ending homelessness. Both acts of goodness are considered moral, but the definition of goodness cannot be established immediately.

Evaluation of the Argument’s Strengths and Weaknesses

Argument’s Strengths

Understanding the Nature of Moral Agency

Normative ethics theory is a valuable framework for enhancing the nature of moral agency. From a descriptive perspective, moral agency is an individual with the psychological capacity to discern right from wrong (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). The person has a sufficient professional qualifications and practical training to ensure transparency and accountability of their actions and decisions. In this context, helping a homeless person is the role of statutory agents responsible for the welfare and well-being of all people (Timmons, 2012). An official from the mandated agency has an understanding of moral agency that their assistance should be structured and communicated to the executive once a decision is made to assist the homeless person. Normative ethics theory is also beneficial in understanding the nature of moral agency from an accountability aspect (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). In other words, an individual understands the consequences of undertaking specific actions under their official capacity in an organization.

Identification of Morally Right Actions

Rosalind’s normative ethics theory is beneficial in the identification of morally right actions. Individuals who display moral values in their actions and behaviors benefit from making wise and sound decisions in different contexts (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). For example, assisting a homeless person is a morally right only when performed in different circumstances (Hursthouse, 2018). In this case, assisting the person would be ethically justified if the person is satisfied and depicts gratitude. The assistance would also be morally accurate if the motive is intrinsically motivated (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). Subsequently, the normative ethics theory helps advance actions with morals and virtues. This includes supporting empathetic acts from others and rewarding good deeds from young ones. Most importantly, Rosalind Hursthouse helps enhance the application of ethics among individuals reforming from rogue or aggressive behavior (Frey, 2020). This approach is useful in improving virtues that identify an individual concerning their community or cultural practices.

Justification of Moral Beliefs

Additionally, the normative ethics theory is valuable in justifying the source and practice of moral beliefs. Individuals with virtues pride their wisdom in community values that identify with their originality (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). For instance, virtuous people acquire progressive attributes after following important teachings at cultural, religious, and community levels. These social settings allow important persons to share stories of individuals with empathetic values for others to follow (Timmons, 2012). Sources of obtained virtues are distinct as people depict diversity in origin, race, and, cultural beliefs. It includes persons with similar life experiences identifying with certain values under the same context. In this aspect, moral beliefs are justified if their outcomes attract prosperity and spiritual or cultural blessings (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). Most importantly, the normative ethics theory is instrumental in ensuring the continuity and sustainability of progressive virtues. Communities or families associated with progressive virtues ensure accountability by ensuring ultimate behavior control.

Enhancing Social Relationships

Improving interpersonal relationships is another benefit of the normative ethics theory by Rosalind Hursthouse. Through individual interaction at personal and professional levels, they learn how to engage with others (Frey, 2020). For example, an individual with managerial roles would assist the homeless person by identifying a sustainable solution. This approach includes facilitating important goods and items crucial to the victim’s survival. In this case, the normative ethics theory is critical in advancing the social relationship between the manager and the homeless person, as evidenced through communication (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). Most importantly, the ethics framework enables the individual to develop progressive values that strengthen the stability of friends and relatives. The normative ethical theory is useful in advancing one’s relationship at a professional level. It includes engagement with colleagues during the implementation of organizational projects or in informal contexts (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). Advancing professional networks requires the development of virtues that include empathy, humility, and generosity.

Encourage Integration of Ethical Practices in Multicultural Communities

Most significantly, the normative ethics theory is beneficial in encouraging the integration of progressive community values. Rosalind Hursthouse recognizes the multicultural attribute of modern societies due to globalization. Individuals with diverse cultural and ancestral origins move across regions and continents for better lives. In this case, meeting local people with a distinct language and cultural practices requires patience and tolerance to enhance understanding. In this case, the normative ethics assessment is valuable in allowing individuals to learn and engage consciously on ethical issues with cultural significance. Subsequently, the integration of ethical practices with virtues allows people to co-exist peacefully with harmony despite differences in cultural origins. Individuals with integrated virtues interact with caution to optimize the outcomes of relationships at social and professional levels (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). Most importantly, ethical practices that thrive in multicultural communities enhance the sustainability of critical values among younger generations. Individuals learn to co-exist with harmony, having learned different values from culturally diverse persons.

Weaknesses of Normative Ethics Theory

Application Challenge in Contemporary Societies

Unfortunately, the normative ethics theory depicts significant weaknesses as a philosophical model. The framework enables individuals to advance their traits and character that advances their social relationships (Frey, 2020). However, the theory depicts weaknesses when applying the normative ethical theory. For example, the ongoing pandemic has caused financial problems for many families. Consequently, helping a homeless person would be difficult for a jobless individual. Rosalind Hursthouse presents a hypothetical model explaining people’s behavior and thinking patterns. However, it is difficult for individuals to apply the challenge in contemporary societies which fail to award good behavior and acts. Many people have become judgmental and misinterpret activities and actions entailing morals and virtues (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). In this case, assisting a homeless person can easily be translated to imply the exploitation of needy people for monetary gains. Identifying and recognizing possible outcomes under the normative ethical theory is vital.

Inadequacy in Upholding Integrated Moral Values

Another weakness of the normative ethics theory is its inadequacy in upholding integrated moral values. In essence, an ethical person with progressive virtues as their trait requires the incorporation of several values (Frey, 2020). For example, helping a homeless person requires collaboration and integration of key values, including empathy, generosity, kindness, and humility. Executing an intrinsically motivated act would only be possible if the individual depicts all the traits holistically (Campodonico & Navarini, 2020). On the one hand, a humble person willing to share a meal with a homeless person should also be generous and not expect anything in return. The integration of these virtues is critical in attaining the best behavior and progressive thinking patterns (Hursthouse, 2018). On the other hand, a humble person without kindness and empathy cannot achieve the morality level related to the act. In this case, the normative ethics theory has weaknesses in its inadequacy to uphold integrated moral values.

Presents Barriers to Resolving Situational Problems

Furthermore, the normative ethics assessment presents challenges in resolving situational problems. These are challenges encountered when addressing a problem arising from an immediate situation. It is common for individuals to remember recommended behavior in a conflict situation which evokes anger and aggression (Frey, 2020). People engage physically in this context by forgetting values and virtues which guide their behavior and actions. Most fundamentally, resolving problems is an important practice that requires the integration of morals and virtues. Parties conflicting on a specific topic need tolerance and patience to understand the viewpoints of each other. Failure to comprehend points of difference contributes to inadequacy and potential barriers to resolving situation problems (Hursthouse, 2018). Rosalind Hursthouse offers an impractical framework that rarely works during aggression or conflict. Individuals forget the values and principles of a virtuous person and act under anger and aggression.

Campodonico, A., & Navarini, C. (2020). Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology. Editorial Note. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 23 (2), 273-276. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-020-10096-x

Frey, J. A. (2020). Revisiting Modern Moral Philosophy. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , 87 , 61-83. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246119000262

Hursthouse, R. (2018). The grammar of goodness in foot’s ethical naturalism. In Philippa Foot on Goodness and Virtue (pp. 25-46). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-91256-1_2

Timmons, M. (2012). Moral theory: An introduction . Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

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Ethical Virtues and Vices Essay

Ideals are moral standards that people pursue, and they are very important because they set benchmarks of ethics. Moral ideals define ethical standards and character of people in the society. Concisely, moral ideals are perfect standards of ethics that the society strives to uphold in norms, beliefs, and principles that govern humanity. Melleman (2010) asserts that an ideal is a moral attribute that an individual presents as a character trait or behavior. Common examples of moral ideals are honesty, integrity, generosity, beneficence, sincerity, veracity, and fidelity amongst many others. In the modern society where moral fabric is weak, the most important ideals are honesty, integrity, generosity, and beneficence. These ideals are very important because they do not only enable people to do good deeds in their lives, but also perform noble duties to others who are in need.

Worth is the value of something relative to what people consider as ideal. In other words, it is the measure or degree of perfection in a given construct or a person. Ethically, the best way to determine a person’s worth is by assessing the intrinsic value, as one is worth the intrinsic value that the society bestows to humans. Baum, Haqq-Misra, and Domagal-Magal (2011) argue that “human ethics is often anthropocentric in the sense that it places value only on human phenomena such as human life, human happiness, or other human factors” (p. 2121). Since humans are unique beings in the universe with rational capacity, they have intrinsic value. Humans have intrinsic worth because they are entities of life, which exist on their own. In this view, I consider my worth to be a life entity that deserves life, happiness, dignity, and freedom to serve other humans.

Ethical virtues are constructive behaviors or qualities that are in line with societal norms and ethics. They are qualities that enhance the greatness of individuals and society. Some of the virtues that are important in the life of an individual include integrity, justice, love, wisdom, honesty, prudence, loyalty, and temperance According to Kawall (2009), virtues are important because they are morally acceptable behaviors that drive people cultivate good character traits. Essentially, virtues are fundamental in promoting people to cultivate quality and productive lives. Thus, virtues are crucial in the lives of individuals as they lead to productive, ethical, and good behaviors.

Ethical vices refer to immoral behaviors that lower the integrity of a person and society. Essentially, ethical vices emanate from the deficits or excesses that occur in virtues (Mellema, 2010). Examples of vices are selfishness, hate, cruelty, cowardice, dishonesty, folly, and disloyalty. In this view, the ethical vices that I consider the worst are dishonesty and disloyalty. A dishonest and disloyal person has no integrity, and thus can do anything to achieve certain ends in life. The ethical vices that I possess are selfishness and hate, and I would like to cure these vices by being generous and kind to all people that I meet in the course of life.

Baum, S., Haqq-Misra, J., & Domagal-Magal, S. (2011). Would Contact Extraterrestrials Benefit or Harm Humanity? A Scenario Analysis. Acta Astronautica, 68(12), 2114-2129.

Kawall, J. (2009). In Defense of the Primacy of Virtues. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 3 (2), 1-21.

Mellema, G. (2010). Moral Ideals and Virtue Ethics. The Journal of Ethics, 14 (2), 173-180.

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David French

The Atmosphere of the ‘Manosphere’ Is Toxic

By David French

Opinion Columnist

To understand the state of men in this country, it’s necessary to know three things.

First, millions of men are falling behind women academically and suffering from a lack of meaning and purpose. Second, there is no consensus whatsoever on whether there’s a problem, much less how to respond and pull millions of men back from the brink. Third, many men are filling the void themselves by turning to gurus to guide their lives. They’re not waiting for elite culture, the education establishment or the church to define manhood. They’re turning to Andrew Tate, Joe Rogan, Jordan Peterson and a host of others — including Elon Musk and Tucker Carlson — to show them the way.

Not all of these influencers are equally toxic. Tate, for example, is in a class by himself. He’s a pornographer who is facing human trafficking and rape charges in Romania. Peterson, by contrast, mixes good advice with a bizarre ideology . He’ll swing between compassionate insight and wild conspiracy. I’ve known men who genuinely improved their lives through elements of Peterson’s teaching. But to spend time watching and reading these gurus as a group is to understand why men continue to struggle even though the market is now flooded with online advice.

It’s as if an entire self-help industry decided the best cure for one form of dysfunction is simply a different dysfunction. Replace passivity and hopelessness with frenetic activity, tinged with anger and resentment. Get in the weight room, dress sharper, develop confidence and double down on every element of traditional masculinity you believe is under fire.

Yes, men are absolutely feeling demoralized, as Richard Reeves put it in his brilliant book “ Of Boys and Men : Why the Modern Male Is Struggling, Why It Matters, and What to Do About It.” But what is the influencer advice in response? Lash out. Fight. Defy the cultural elite that supposedly destroyed your life.

I’m reminded of my colleague David Brooks’s distinction between “résumé virtues” and “eulogy virtues.” As David described it, résumé virtues “are those skills you bring to the marketplace.” Eulogy virtues, by contrast, “are talked about at your funeral — whether you were kind, brave, honest or faithful. Were you capable of deep love?” Most of the “manosphere” influencers look at men’s existential despair and respond with a mainly material cure. Yes, some nod at classical values (and even cite the Stoics , for example), but it’s in service of the will to win. Success — with money, with women — becomes your best revenge.

The problems with this approach are obvious to anyone with an ounce of wisdom or experience, but I’m reminded of a memorable line from “The Big Lebowski”: “I mean, say what you want about the tenets of national socialism, Dude, at least it’s an ethos.” It’s hard to counter something with nothing, and when it comes to the crisis confronting men and boys, there is no competing, holistic vision for our sons.

One reason for this vacuum is that any discussion of the crisis among men almost immediately devolves into a debate over masculinity itself. Is traditional masculinity toxic? Or is it toxic to abandon traditionally masculine approaches to raising boys? What is traditional masculinity anyway? Is “masculinity” even a concept worth pursuing, or does it jam too many boys into stereotypical boxes, magnifying their misery?

After reading a new book, I’m wondering if there is another, better way. Can we sidestep the elite debate over masculinity by approaching the crisis with men via an appeal to universal values rather than to the distinctively male experience? In other words, is there a universal approach to shaping character that can have a disproportionately positive impact on our lost young men?

The book I am talking about is called “ The Pursuit of Happiness .” It’s by Jeffrey Rosen, the president of the National Constitution Center (where I’ve spoken at a number of events), and it’s not a self-help book, nor is it a guide for young men. But it does contain a superior moral vision for the good life, one that is directly connected to the philosophy of the founding generation.

The core argument of the book is that the phrase “pursuit of happiness” — Thomas Jefferson’s memorable phrase in the Declaration of Independence — is fundamentally misunderstood. We think of happiness as the pursuit of pleasure, Rosen writes, “but classical and Enlightenment thinkers defined happiness as the pursuit of virtue — as being good, rather than feeling good.”

He explains how several of the founders imperfectly but quite intentionally and systematically listed the virtues they aspired to uphold and engaged in critical self-reflection about their own faults. As Rosen writes, “The classical definition of the pursuit of happiness meant being a lifelong learner, with a commitment to practicing the daily habits that lead to character improvement, self-mastery, flourishing and growth.” The emphasis is on the word “lifelong” — the pursuit of happiness is a quest, not a destination, in part because we are always a work in progress, even to our last days.

And what are these classical virtues? Benjamin Franklin’s list included temperance, silence, order, resolution, frugality, industry, sincerity, justice, moderation, cleanliness, tranquillity, chastity and humility. I prefer the shorter and simpler formulation in Aristotle’s four cardinal virtues : prudence, justice, temperance and courage.

None of these virtues is distinctly male, of course. Rosen speaks of the influence of classical virtues on Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s moral development, for example. At the same time, however, I’ve never met a struggling young man whose life wouldn’t be enriched by greater commitment to any one of those cardinal virtues, much less all four. Regardless of your definition of masculinity, is there any world or any relevant ideology in which a prudent, just, temperate and courageous man isn’t a good man?

In Rosen’s book, you’ll find both the people and the philosophy that can replace the influencers of the modern manosphere. Franklin, John Adams and other founders were hardly perfect, but their ideas and examples are orders of magnitude more positive than the ideas and examples that dominate masculine discourse today.

Too much of our education establishment and too many of our nation’s parents are focused on success ethics, not virtue ethics. Our schools train students for careers, and parents push their children toward success, hovering over them to monitor their progress or snowplowing to clear their way. In the success ethic, virtues are often a means to an end. Prudence, temperance and industry can contribute to your success, but that is not their ultimate purpose.

Yet success ethics are ultimately empty, and our children feel that emptiness. If they fall behind, they feel panic and dread. But even when they succeed, their success doesn’t fill that hole in their hearts, at least not for long. Virtue, however, is different. Perfection is impossible, but virtue is a purpose all its own. And it’s that pursuit of virtue, not mere achievement (and certainly not resentment), that ultimately defines who we are.

I fall back to these universal values not because I reject the idea that young men have a distinct masculine experience, but rather because the argument about ideal masculinity is diverting our attention from the more urgent quest, to fill the hole in the hearts of our children, to provide them with a purpose that is infinitely more satisfying than the ambition and rebellion that define the ethos of the gurus who are leading so many young men astray.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook , Instagram , TikTok , WhatsApp , X and Threads .

David French is an Opinion columnist, writing about law, culture, religion and armed conflict. He is a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom and a former constitutional litigator. His most recent book is “Divided We Fall: America’s Secession Threat and How to Restore Our Nation .” You can follow him on Threads ( @davidfrenchjag ).

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Virtue ethics is a theory that focuses on character development and what virtues one should obtain to be who they are supposed to be, as oppose to actions. An example of virtue ethics would be someone who is patient, kind, loving, generous, temperance, courage and flourishing as oppose to a person who lies, cheats, and …show more content….
Ethics and Virtue
The virtue approach urges us to pay attention to the contours of our communities and the habits of character they encourage and instill. The moral life, then, is not simply a matter of following moral rules and of learning to apply them to specific situations. The moral life is also a matter of trying to determine the kind of people we should ...
Analysis of The Philosophical Concept of Virtue Ethics
Each approach provides a different way to understanding ethics. Ethics or moral philosophy is a branch of philosophy that involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong conduct. The field of ethics, along with aesthetics, concerns matters of value, and thus comprises the branch of philosophy called axiology.
The Principles Of Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics as defined by Aristotle - is of two categories, mainly rational and righteous or virtuous or moral. Intellectual or rational virtue can be subcategorized as theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom [phronesis}. For Aristotle virtue was implied as excellence. Phronesis is needed for moral virtuousness.
Virtue Ethics in Philosophy
Virtue Ethics in Philosophy. This essay sample was donated by a student to help the academic community. Papers provided by EduBirdie writers usually outdo students' samples. The ethics of virtue is a normative moral theory, one of the essential aims of which is to help people to make good decisions. Human beings are worthy of moral consideration.
Aristotle's
Aristotle's - The Ethics of Virtue Essay. Ethics is defined as the attempt to investigate the key aspects and the human conduct fundamental principles, further, it also focuses on the examination of universal values, that is, the males and females' essential equality, obeying the land law, caring about safety and health of one's natural ...
Virtue Ethics, Free Essay Sample
Virtue ethics establishes the appropriateness and inappropriateness of actions of individuals by relating the choice to admirable character traits. In addition, it concentrates on aiding individuals to develop excellent character traits such as honesty and kindness. Virtue theorists believe that when one develops admirable characters traits, he ...
Essay on Moral Theories: Deontology, Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics
Philosophers attempt to use moral theories to ideally determine whether an individual is a moral and ethical person. This essay will include the theories; Deontology, Utilitarianism, and Virtue Ethics, and how each significant theory can make an individual a moral member of society, but with contrasting views of other philosophers' ideas.
Normative Virtue Ethics by Rosalind Hursthouse, Essay Example
Thesis. Rosalind Hursthouse presents the normative ethics theory as a framework that guides human behavior and actions based on moral values. Her main argument of morality is described by virtues that identify people concerning character and relationships with others. In this context, the normative ethics theory is considered part of two other ...
Ethical Virtues and Vices
Ethical vices refer to immoral behaviors that lower the integrity of a person and society. Essentially, ethical vices emanate from the deficits or excesses that occur in virtues (Mellema, 2010). Examples of vices are selfishness, hate, cruelty, cowardice, dishonesty, folly, and disloyalty. In this view, the ethical vices that I consider the ...
Opinion
The Atmosphere of the 'Manosphere' Is Toxic. To understand the state of men in this country, it's necessary to know three things. First, millions of men are falling behind women academically ...

15 Virtue Ethics Examples

Definition of Virtue Ethics

15 Examples of Virtue Ethics

History of Virtue Ethics

Central Concepts in Virtue Ethics

1. Virtue (aretê)

2. Eudaimonia (“happiness” or “human flourishing”)

3. Practical Wisdom (phronêsis)

Major Forms of Virtue Ethics

1. Ethics of Care

2. Agent-Based Theories

3. Eudaimonist Approach

Critique of Virtue Ethics

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Bibliography

Virtue Ethics

1.2 Practical Wisdom

2. Forms of Virtue Ethics

Acknowledgments

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Virtue Ethics

1. Virtue and Happiness

1.1. Eudaimonia

1.2. Emotion, Intelligence, and Developing Virtue

2. Virtue and Right Action

2.1. Being Specific

2.2. Explaining Why

3. Conclusion

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Aristotle and Virtue Ethics

Virtue Ethics: Essay Introduction

9.4 Virtue Ethics

Confucianism

Relational Aspect of Virtue

Ritual and Ren

Junzi and Self-Perfection

The Ethical Ruler

Japanese Confucianism

Aristotelianism

Human Flourishing as the Goal of Human Action

Connections

Deliberation, Practical Wisdom, and Character

The Role of Habit

Read Like a Philosopher

Social Relationships and Friendship

Living Right: the Heartbeat of Virtue Ethics

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Ethics and Virtue

Analysis of The Philosophical Concept of Virtue Ethics

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Normative Virtue Ethics by Rosalind Hursthouse, Essay Example

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