how virtue makes a good leader essay

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June 9, 2011

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Characteristics of a Good Leader Argumentative Essay

What makes a good leader of a country.

A leader can be defined as someone who leads others. According to Greer, “a leader can be someone who is in charge or commands others in an organization or a country” (30). Leadership cannot be based solely on an individual’s responsibility. It is important to add that a leader is not just about politics.

Thus, leaders can be found in every sector including sports, entertainment, and corporate sector among other areas. The argument about leadership focus on: what are the right qualities? What should the leaders do to strengthen these qualities? How are these qualities developed? This paper seeks to argue the qualities that ultimately define a good leader in a country.

To answer the question on what makes a good leader appropriate, it is important to acknowledge that traditional qualities that have defined a good leader such as aptitude, strength, determination, and vision are not sufficient in today’s world. In this changing world, a leader- in addition to the listed qualities- needs a high degree of emotional intelligence.

A look at history can reveal a number of highly skilled and intelligent leaders who took over leadership of their country only for them to perform dismally. Therefore, it can be concluded that finding the right leader is an art and science. Notably, “although leaders may share general qualities, each leader has a personal style of doing things. Some leaders are passive and analytical while others are very proactive and confrontational” (Daft and Lane 52).

Another important thing to acknowledge is that a leader, especially in a country or state, will often face different situations that will often require different approaches. While pursuing diplomacy, the leader will be required to be a sensitive negotiator; while consoling victims of a disaster, the leader will need to show empathy and comfort; when dealing with state enemies, the leader is needed to have a forceful authority.

The general conclusion, in my opinion, is that, to be leader, intelligence, hard work, and vision are important aspects to consider. However, even with all these, a leader should have the emotional intelligence to be successful and sustain the leadership status that is made possible by the primary characteristics listed.

There are various aspects of emotional intelligence that are critical to good leadership. According to Goleman, “they include self-awareness, enthusiasm and responsiveness. Others include group skills and self-regulation” (21). Researchers have carried out studies in the corporate world, and the results have shown that emotional intelligence is often what distinguishes the outstanding leader.

The first component I analyze is the aspect of self-awareness. This refers to the ability to have a deep understanding of one’s emotions, strengths, weaknesses, motivational factors. To be self aware means that one is honest with his or herself. It also implies that the individual is neither critical of others nor unrealistic.

Further, individuals who are self aware can predict how different emotions will affect them and the performance of their work. For example, a leader who has self awareness may know that interviews with the press often make him or her nervous. Therefore, it is prudent to avoid such interviews and choose other methods of communication.

The same self awareness can be applied when it comes to ideals and values in which an individual believes. It has often been said that a leader who does not believe in anything will fall for anything. Therefore, the leader with self-awareness will be able to turn down an investor’s request to set up a big industry in the country if that investment will hurt the environment.

Weak leaders who lack self awareness will accept to do something, but after two or three years down the line, they will rescind their decision. It can be noted that people who have self awareness are coherent and articulate. They are able to speak openly and precisely tackle the areas they are addressing. They are also able to describe themselves accurately (Northouse 154).

The other component of emotional intelligence is self regulation. From the onset, it is important to acknowledge that emotions are part human life. Although humans cannot do away with emotions, it is possible to control and manage them.

Self regulation is the ability to manage and control one’s feelings in order to make one free from distractions. In this case, individuals should also be able to direct these feelings to a useful channel. For example, a leader may witness a shambolic presentation by members of his cabinet to a key investor.

With the disappointment, the leader may feel the urge to kick a chair or bang the table which will bring a negative side of him to the investors. Therefore, self-regulation is the ability to apologize to the investor and carefully select the words that will authoritatively, yet humbly explain to the members of the cabinet the areas that will need to be corrected. Another example is when the leader of a country faces a threat of attack from another country.

In such a delicate matter, one wrong move can cost the country in many ways. However, if the leader maintains calmness, does not panic, and can prepare the relevant stakeholders to deal with the problem, then the effect is different, and the damage can be controlled.

Self-regulation is also a strong pillar of integrity. Thornton noted, “on many occasions, people with integrity are often caught in decisions that lack integrity” (p.13). Although such leaders have integrity, they lack self-regulation, which often enhances integrity. An example is a leader who is faced with a crisis and has no solution for the crisis.

In the heat of things, the leaders may decide to apply a solution that is outside the law. Thus, although the action may have been intended to help the country, lack of self regulation may lead the leader to undermine his own integrity. The third aspect of emotional intelligence is motivation. It is almost an unwritten rule that a good leader should have motivation. In this context, motivation refers to the urge to achieve.

A motivated leader is one who is never contented with the status quo. They are always striving to do better things and doing them differently. Such leaders often raise the performance bar, and they keep track of the scores. In this case, a good example is Thomas Sankara, the slain leader of Burkina Faso from Africa. Sankara became the leader of Burkina Faso at a time when the country was reliant on donor funds.

Uncomfortable, with the status quo, he led his countrymen on an overdrive to practice farming to a level that had hitherto been unseen. The country was for the first time able to feed all its population without the aid from foreign countries. The same leader introduced a government policy requiring all top government officials to stop the usage of the extravagant Mercedes Benzes. Instead, government officials were encouraged to use the modest Volkswagen vehicles so as to save money for increment of teacher’s salaries.

The fourth component of emotional integrity is empathy. The uniqueness of this component is that, unlike the aforementioned components, this component is very easy to identify and recognize. However, the modern world will rarely reward a leader in business or politics on account of empathy. In this case, the conventional understanding of empathy is to be able to take other peoples’ feelings and give them priority as if they were one’s own.

In this context, empathy refers to the ability of the leader to consider the interests of all stakeholders when making decisions. The last component is the idea of social skills. The two components are related as they are concerned with the ability to establish meaningful relationships with other people. A leader is always leading and managing people. Thus, a good leader should be able to get along with these people.

From the discussion, it is clear that, to lead a country, a great team is what will deliver great leadership. However, in every country, there is a leader. Some are led by a monarch, others by dictators, or others like the United States by a democratically elected leader. In monarchs and dictatorships, leaderships will tend to be highly concentrated around an individual.

On the other hand, democracies allow power to be decentralized to other institutions like the parliament, judiciary and the executive. The common denominator is that, whether the power is decentralized or centralized, the leader or leaders of the country need to possess certain qualities to lead the country effectively. The argument put forward is that, apart from the conventional qualities, a good leader of a country should possess the quality of emotional intelligence.

Works Cited

Daft, Richard, and Patricia Lane. The Leadership Experience . Mason, OH: Thomson/South-Western, 2008. Print.

Goleman, Daniel. Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ . London: Bloomsbury, 1996. Print.

Greer, Eddie. “Dare To Lead: Continuous Learning Creates The Best Leaders.” Professional Safety, 56.6 (2011): 30-31. Print.

Northouse, Peter. Leadership: Theory and Practice . Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2010. Print.

Thornton, Grant. What makes a good leader? 2008. Web. www.grant-thornton.co.uk/pdf/20-leadership-report.pdf

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2020, July 8). Characteristics of a Good Leader. https://ivypanda.com/essays/qualities-of-a-good-leader/

"Characteristics of a Good Leader." IvyPanda , 8 July 2020, ivypanda.com/essays/qualities-of-a-good-leader/.

IvyPanda . (2020) 'Characteristics of a Good Leader'. 8 July.

IvyPanda . 2020. "Characteristics of a Good Leader." July 8, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/qualities-of-a-good-leader/.

1. IvyPanda . "Characteristics of a Good Leader." July 8, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/qualities-of-a-good-leader/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Characteristics of a Good Leader." July 8, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/qualities-of-a-good-leader/.

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Virtuous leadership: a source of employee well-being and trust

Management Research Review

ISSN : 2040-8269

Article publication date: 13 February 2020

Issue publication date: 18 June 2020

The purpose of this paper is to examine how a supervisor’s virtuous leadership as perceived by subordinates influences subordinates’ work-related well-being and to examine the mediating role of trust in the leader and the moderating roles of individual leader virtues and various characteristics of subordinates and organizations.

Design/methodology/approach

An online survey was conducted through Prolific among a self-selected sample of 1,237 employees who worked with an immediate supervisor across various industries in primarily the UK and the USA. Structural equation modeling was used to test the hypotheses.

The empirical results indicate that an immediate supervisor’s virtuous leadership as evaluated by the subordinate positively influences all three considered dimensions of work-related well-being – job satisfaction, work-related affect and work engagement – for a wide variety of employees in different industries and countries. A subordinate’s greater trust in the supervisor fully mediates this positive influence for job satisfaction and work engagement and partially for work-related affect. All five individual core leader virtues – prudence, temperance, justice, courage and humanity – positively influence work-related well-being.

Practical implications

The findings underscore that promoting virtuous leadership is a promising pathway for improved employee well-being, which may ultimately benefit individual and organizational performance.

Originality/value

Despite an age-old interest in leader virtues, the lack of consensus on the defining elements of virtuous leadership has limited the understanding of its consequences. Building on recent advances in the conceptualization and measurement of virtuous leadership and leader character, this paper addresses this void by exploring how virtuous leadership relates to employees’ well-being and trust.

• Work engagement
• Trust in leader
• Job satisfaction
• Business ethics and sustainability
• Leader character
• Leader virtues
• Work-related affect

Hendriks, M. , Burger, M. , Rijsenbilt, A. , Pleeging, E. and Commandeur, H. (2020), "Virtuous leadership: a source of employee well-being and trust", Management Research Review , Vol. 43 No. 8, pp. 951-970. https://doi.org/10.1108/MRR-07-2019-0326

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2020, Martijn Hendriks, Martijn Burger, Antoinette Rijsenbilt, Emma Pleeging and Harry Commandeur.

Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode

Introduction

A leader’s character shapes his or her goals and behavior, which can have a profound impact on organizational outcomes, including the outcomes and behaviors of subordinates. As a result, leader character is considered “an indispensable component” of leadership performance in the contemporary business world ( Hannah and Avolio, 2011 , p. 979). Character is inextricably linked with virtue because good character is built through the practice and habituation of virtues ( Newstead et al. , 2020a , 2020b ; Sison and Ferrero, 2015 ). Virtues are acquired and socially valued dispositions that are voluntarily exhibited in the person’s habitual behavior in context-relevant situations ( Newstead et al. , 2018 ). Given their importance, character and the related virtues play roles in various leadership styles, such as ethical leadership, servant leadership and transformational leadership. However, these leadership styles do not comprehensively address the core defining characteristics of a virtuous leader, as they do not consider a coherent set of pre-eminent leader virtues and do not center on the character but, additionally, have a deontological focus on obligations to act or a teleological focus on the consequences of actions ( Hackett and Wang, 2012 ; Lemoine et al. , 2019 ).

Despite the role of leader virtues in various leadership styles, limited evidence exists on the isolated influence of virtuous leadership within organizations as assessed by a coherent measure of a leader’s virtuousness that centers on character ( Crossan et al. , 2017 ). This longstanding lack of attention to and knowledge regarding virtuous character may explain why many managers attempt to get ahead by “doing wrong” and why virtuous character traits often do not play a prominent role in the training and evaluation of managers ( Seijts et al. , 2019 ). A possible reason for the paucity of studies on the virtuous character of leaders is the traditional lack of definitional clarity; moreover, some scholars have considered virtues – and by extension virtuous character – “too abstract and general” to be measured ( Peterson and Seligman, 2004 , p. 31).

These concerns have been convincingly dispelled by the emerging literature on virtuous leadership and leader character with the development of more parsimonious, coherent and philosophically grounded conceptual frameworks of virtuous leadership and leader character ( Hackett and Wang, 2012 ; Crossan et al. , 2017 ; Adewale, 2020 ; Riggio et al. , 2010 ; Peterson and Seligman, 2004 ) and the development of sound measures of virtuous leadership that are empirically distinct from other leadership concepts such as ethical leadership and charismatic leadership ( Wang and Hackett, 2016 ; Thun and Kelloway, 2011 ; Riggio et al. , 2010 ). There is consensus in this emerging virtuous leadership literature that a virtuous leader can be regarded as a leader whose character and voluntary (i.e. intrinsically motivated and intentional) behavior consistently exhibited in context-relevant situations align with the prevailing pre-eminent leader virtues, as detailed below ( Newstead et al. , 2020a , 2020b ). By considering a more coherent and parsimonious set of virtues and by centering on character, virtuous leadership can uniquely contribute to stakeholder outcomes and the social environment in organizations compared with other leadership styles, such as ethical and transformational leadership.

Encouragingly, Wang and Hackett (2016) demonstrated that subordinates’ perceptions of a supervisor’s virtuous leadership relate positively to their overall happiness and life satisfaction, even after accounting for the supervisor’s charismatic leadership. The work-related well-being of employees or components thereof is also positively associated with organizational virtuousness ( Nikandrou and Tsachouridi, 2015 ) and specific virtues such as a manager’s behavioral integrity ( Prottas, 2013 ). However, the role of the virtuous leadership of individual leaders as determined by a coherent set of leader virtues for the work-related well-being of subordinates has remained unexplored.

This study aims to address the shortage of research on the role of a supervisor’s virtuous leadership for employee well-being and to advance current leadership and employee well-being research through three core contributions. First, this study offers theoretical refinement and empirical evidence of the link between virtuous leadership and employees’ work-related well-being. This link is pertinent given that employee well-being is important in itself for employees and instrumentally important in promoting individual and organizational performance ( Krekel et al. , 2019 ). Increasing employee well-being has therefore become a strategic priority in many organizations. Second, by outlining and testing the mediating role of trust in the leader, this study contributes to a better understanding of why employees with more virtuous supervisors may feel better at work. Third, this study contributes to an understanding of the conditions under which employees with more virtuous supervisors have higher well-being by exploring which leader virtues are particularly strongly related to work-related well-being and the extent to which the relationship depends on various organizational and employee characteristics. On a more general level, insights into how a supervisor’s virtuous leadership relates to a subordinate’s trust in the leader and work-related well-being can provide the basis for more detailed theorizing on the consequences of virtuous leadership, for example by helping explain why virtuous leadership tends to be positively related to the broader well-being and performance of individual employees and organizational performance ( Cameron and Winn, 2012 ; Wang and Hackett, 2016 ).

Theoretical framework and hypotheses

Virtuous leadership.

Hackett and Wang (2012) identified more than 60 virtues that have been associated with good leadership in their review of the leadership literature. Different studies emphasize the roles of different virtues in each leadership style. For instance, twenty-nine of those virtues have been explicitly linked to ethical leadership, and 32 have been linked to servant leadership. Various frameworks of virtuous leadership have been proposed to develop a more coherent, parsimonious, and philosophically grounded framework of the pre-eminent virtues of virtuous leaders, i.e. the virtues on which all other virtues hinge. Riggio et al. (2010) operationalized virtue-based ethical leadership in Western societies based on the cardinal virtues articulated first by Plato in the Republic and discussed in more detail by Aristotle – prudence, fortitude (courage), temperance, and justice. These four cardinal virtues have played a prominent role in the Western philosophical and Judeo-Christian traditions, along with a virtue ethics perspective derived from Aristotle’s understanding of a virtuous person ( Zeuschner, 2014 ). Taking a more global perspective, Peterson and Seligman (2004) reviewed the virtues identified in the major philosophical and spiritual traditions worldwide and identified six core leader virtues – wisdom (prudence), courage, humanity, justice, temperance and transcendence ( Thun and Kelloway, 2011 ). In Chinese Confucian philosophy, concepts closely associated with humanity, justice, wisdom, truthfulness and propriety are considered core virtues ( Huang, 1997 ). Combining Aristotelian and Confucian literatures on virtue ethics, Hackett and Wang (2012) developed a framework of virtuous leadership in which five of the six virtues overlap with those of Peterson and Seligman (2004) – humanity, courage, justice, temperance and prudence – and in which truthfulness is added as a sixth virtue. Crossan et al. (2017) developed a leader character framework that was validated with practitioners from five organizations from North and Latin America. This framework includes 11 virtues, with judgment (prudence) as the central dimension of character and most of the virtues of the aforementioned frameworks (justice, courage, temperance, humanity and transcendence) and some additional virtues mentioned by practitioners as fundamental for effective leadership (drive, collaboration, humility, integrity and accountability) as other core virtues. Addressing the African leadership challenge, Adewale (2020) introduced a virtuous leadership model underpinned by four primary virtues in African cultures – truthfulness, courage, humility and humanity. The virtues considered in the frameworks discussed above are to some extent inconsistent with related but distinct concepts considered in the more pragmatically oriented, less theoretically grounded, and less virtue ethics-oriented positive organizational inquiries (e.g. positive organizational scholarship) ( Meyer, 2018 ; Sison and Ferrero, 2015 ). For instance, Cameron et al. (2004) considers forgiveness, trust, integrity, optimism and compassion as core elements of organizational virtuousness.

The discussion above shows that there is no full consensus on the conceptualization of virtuous leadership. A primary reason is that the list of core leader virtues as well as their interpretations, enactments, and relative levels of importance vary somewhat between major philosophical and spiritual traditions globally ( Hursthouse, 1999 ). Nevertheless, the set of core leader virtues strongly overlaps between contemporary frameworks of virtuous leadership. More specifically, the following five empirically distinctive leader virtues emerge as pre-eminent or at least critical in nearly all philosophical and theological traditions, and there is consensus among contemporary leader character frameworks that these should be considered core and globally applicable – though, depending on context, not necessarily exhaustive – ingredients of virtuous leadership: being disposed to make the right judgments to achieve virtuous goals using appropriate means in a given situation (i.e. prudence or practical wisdom); controlling emotional reactions and desires for self-gratification (i.e. temperance ); giving others what they deserve (i.e. justice ); persevering in doing what is “right” despite the risk of unpleasant consequences (i.e. courage or fortitude); and treating others with love, care and respect (i.e. humanity ).

To encourage global discourse on the link between virtuous leadership and work-related well-being and to align the focus of the current study with the five virtues captured by Wang and Hackett’s (2016) validated measure of virtuous leadership, the current study focuses on these five pre-eminent leader virtues. Leader virtues for which there is less consensus about whether they should be considered core virtues are not considered here because they have not been shown to be empirically distinctive or highly correlated with at least one of these five core virtues, including transcendence ( Thun and Kelloway, 2011 ), truthfulness ( Wang and Hackett, 2016 ), drive, collaboration, humility, integrity and accountability ( Crossan et al. , 2017 ). That is, these additional virtues are, to a large extent, captured empirically by these five virtues. For this reason, Wang and Hackett (2016) excluded truthfulness from their measure of virtuous leadership. Another reason that some character traits, such as drive, are not considered here is that they lack a strong moral component but are included by Crossan et al. (2017) for their importance in leader effectiveness. The authors of the current study concur with the dominant virtue ethics perspective in the literature that virtuous leadership does not require an instrumental outcome to be of worth but requires leaders to engage in virtuous behaviors exactly because those behaviors are inherently moral ( Newstead et al. , 2018 ; Hackett and Wang, 2012 ; Flynn, 2008 ). However, it must be acknowledged that this list of five virtues is not exhaustive and optimal in each specific local context. In sum, virtuous leadership is defined here on a global level as a leadership style where the leader’s voluntary (i.e. intrinsically motivated and intentional) behavior consistently exhibited in context-relevant situations aligns with the virtues of prudence, temperance, humanity, courage, and justice.

Work-related well-being

Work-related well-being refers to good experiences and evaluations relating to one’s working life. In line with broader subjective well-being frameworks, the most traditionally considered positive forms of work-related well-being are job satisfaction and work-related affect ( Page and Vella-Brodrick, 2009 ). While job satisfaction refers to an employee’s cognitive evaluations about one’s work, work-related affect refers to the frequent experience of pleasant emotions (e.g. enthusiasm, contentment) as opposed to unpleasant emotions at work (e.g. worry, depression). Although related, experiences of negative and positive affect are not orthogonal ( Watson et al. , 1988 ). Inspired by Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia , recent employee well-being frameworks additionally include eudaimonic well-being-related concepts ( Page and Vella-Brodrick, 2009 ; Fisher, 2010 ). One popular concept in this regard is work engagement, defined as “a positive, fulfilling work-related state of mind that is characterized by vigor, dedication, and absorption” ( Bakker and Oerlemans, 2011 , p. 180). Work engagement taps eudaimonic well-being because of its strong association with using one’s character strengths and its focus on purpose, intrinsic motivation, and flow experiences ( Bakker and Oerlemans, 2011 ; Fisher, 2010 ). Therefore, this study follows the employee well-being framework of Bakker and Oerlemans (2011) by focusing on job satisfaction, work-related affect, and work engagement as the three main positive forms of work-related well-being.

Virtuous leadership, work-related well-being and trust

The virtuous leadership of supervisors can influence the work-related well-being of subordinates through several mechanisms. A relatively indirect mechanism is by exemplifying virtuousness. Leaders can influence, through internalization, the virtuous behavior of other people in the organization, thereby stimulating a more virtuous organizational climate ( Cameron and Winn, 2012 ). In turn, perceptions of organizational virtuousness contribute to the work-related well-being of subordinates through, for instance, enhanced trust and stronger relationships between employees ( Nikandrou and Tsachouridi, 2015 ). Virtuous leader behaviors can also affect subordinates in more ways that are direct. One way is through the leader’s influence on the objective job characteristics and outcomes of subordinates that are known predictors of work-related well-being. For instance, giving subordinates credit where credit is due can enhance subordinates’ career progress and job security, the fair and considerate allocation of work tasks can positively influence subordinates’ job content, and caring for the subordinate’s well-being can result in more suitable work hours.

Notwithstanding the abovementioned mechanisms, the thesis of this article is that a particularly influential way in which virtuous leaders have a direct influence on the long-term work-related well-being of followers is through a subjective process with trust in the leader at its center. There is clear consensus that trust within organizations and between supervisors and subordinates specifically is essential for the flourishing of organizations ( De Jong et al. , 2016 ). Trust refers to “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” ( Rousseau et al. , 1998 , p. 395). Based on this definition, Gillespie (2003) identified two main forms in which a subordinate’s trust in a leader can manifest: reliance-based trust, which refers to being willing to rely on the leader’s skills, knowledge, judgments, or actions, and disclosure-based trust, which refers to being willing to share work-related or personal information of a sensitive nature with the leader.

Leader character is considered a primary source of trust in leaders because trust is particularly built when moral behavior is intrinsically motivated, intentional, and consistently displayed in context-relevant situations ( Dirks and Ferrin, 2002 ). These conditions are essential for building trust because a leader’s consistent moral behavior under these conditions signals to employees that the leader will also behave morally in the future, particularly when the leader favors moral behavior over maximizing personal gain. By contrast, less trust is built when moral behavior is extrinsically motivated, unintentional, or inconsistent because it is less evident that the leader will act virtuously in future situations ( Dirks and Ferrin, 2002 ). This perspective suggests that the character-based concept of virtuous leadership may enhance trust even more than related leadership styles traditionally associated with trust, such as ethical leadership and transformational leadership, because those leadership styles do not fully center on character but also focus on behaviors that may generate less trust, such as conforming to rules or moral duties (a deontological focus) and goal-oriented behavior (a teleological focus).

In turn, trust is the catalyst of various follower attitudes and behaviors that contribute to work-related well-being, including those directly related to the leader, such as satisfaction with the leader and leader–member exchange ( Dirks and Ferrin, 2002 ), organization-related attitudes and behaviors, such as organizational identification ( Schaubroeck et al. , 2013 ), and broader psychological aspects such as reduced work stress ( Liu et al. , 2010 ). Together, these processes make trusting one’s leader essential for the well-being of employees. Trust strongly affects people because it is directly related to basic human needs, particularly safety and health aspects such as psychological distress ( Hardin, 2002 ). Many potential mechanisms linking (perceived) leader virtuousness and work-related well-being can thus be expected to be conditional on trust in the leader. One example is that virtuous leader behaviors from a trusted leader will more effectively influence the internalization and eventually the practicing of intrinsically rewarding moral behaviors ( Bass and Riggio, 2006 ).

Subordinates’ perceptions of their supervisor’s virtuous leadership positively influence their work-related well-being.

Higher trust in the supervisor mediates the influence of a subordinate’s perceptions of the supervisor’s virtuous leadership on the subordinate’s work-related well-being.

Contextual factors

Subordinates’ perceptions of their supervisor’s virtuous leadership positively influence the work-related well-being of subordinates regardless of the sector, industry, organizational size or the subordinate’s age, gender, education level or position in the organizational hierarchy.

The role of individual core virtues

All five individual core leader virtues positively influence subordinates’ work-related well-being and trust in the supervisor.

Methodology

A self-selected sample of 1,237 employees who were registered as having an immediate supervisor was recruited in January 2019 through the online crowdsourcing platform Prolific. Prolific has been used in many empirical studies in the social sciences and is generally of good quality ( Peer et al. , 2017 ). Nonnative speakers who were registered on Prolific as having fluent English language proficiency could participate in the survey only after passing a language test. The socio-demographic composition of the sample is summarized in Table I . The analysis sample comprises people working in a multitude of organizations across various sectors in primarily the UK and the USA, with relatively high proportions of employees who are young, highly educated and working full-time[ 1 ].

The respondents were instructed to answer the measures below in relation to their main job and their immediate supervisor within this job. The item scores of each scale were coded such that high values represent high levels of the constructs.

Virtuous leadership. The 18-item Virtuous Leadership Questionnaire developed by Wang and Hackett (2016) was used ( ɑ = 0.95) to measure leader character through one’s behaviors using three or four items for each core leader virtue, including courage (e.g. “My supervisor acts with sustained initiative, even in the face of incurring personal risk”), temperance (e.g. “My supervisor prioritizes organizational interests over self-interests”), justice (e.g. “My supervisor allocates valued resources in a fair manner”), prudence (e.g. “My supervisor exercises sound reasoning in deciding on the optimal courses of action”) and humanity (e.g. “My supervisor shows concerns for subordinates’ needs”).

Trust in leader. Trust in one’s supervisor was assessed with the ten-item behavioral trust inventory (ɑ = 0.95) developed by Gillespie (2003) . These items capture behavioral intentions and are split evenly into the two components of trust identified by Gillespie (2003) : reliance-based trust (e.g. “How willing are you to follow your supervisor’s advice on important issues?”) and disclosure-based trust (e.g. “How willing are you to share your personal feelings with your leader?”).

Work-related well-being. Job satisfaction was assessed by using the Michigan Organizational Assessment Questionnaire ( Cammann et al. , 1983 ). The three items are “All in all, I am satisfied with my job”, “In general, I don’t like my job” (reverse coded) and “In general, I like working here” ( α = 0.92). Work-related affect was assessed using Warr’s (1990) 12‐item measure that asks about the frequency of experiencing positive emotions (e.g. enthusiasm and contentment) and negative emotions (e.g. worry and depression) at work in the last month. Work engagement is measured using the UWES-3 developed by Schaufeli et al. (2017) . The UWES-3 ( ɑ = 0.86) includes one item for each dimension of engagement: “At my work, I feel bursting with energy” (vigor), “I am enthusiastic about my job” (dedication) and “I am immersed in my work” (absorption).

Control variables. Perceptions of virtuous leadership, trust, and work-related well-being may be affected by a variety of personal and organizational characteristics. Therefore, information was collected about the respondent’s age, gender, education level, country of residence, number of weekly work hours, supervisory responsibilities, position in the organizational hierarchy, and tenure with the supervisor and organization as well as the supervisor’s age and gender and the sector and industry in which the organization is active. “External” job liking was controlled for by the question “How much do you like your job regarding aspects that are outside of your immediate supervisor’s influence?” (1 = dislike a great deal; 7 = like a great deal). This question sought to alleviate the concern that reverse causality may be introduced if companies with cultures of employee well-being and trust hire or attract more virtuous leaders or if employee well-being shaped by causes other than the supervisor’s virtuousness and trustworthiness may drive perceptions of the leader’s virtuousness and trustworthiness. To isolate the specific role of trust in the supervisor, a subordinate’s general propensity to trust was controlled for using the 4-item propensity to trust scale developed by Frazier et al. (2013) . External job liking and propensity to trust can also capture social desirability bias that remains uncaptured by the marker variable discussed below.

Response bias

Several measures were taken to limit response bias. First, the main variables of interest were measured through validated scales to ensure content validity. Second, to encourage honest answers, the respondents were assured of anonymity and confidentiality, and they were not informed beforehand about the goal of the survey. To further detect and correct for possible common method variance, a marker variable deliberately developed for use as a marker variable was used: attitude toward the color blue ( Simmering et al. , 2015 ). The three items are “I like the color blue”, “I prefer blue to other colors” and “I like blue clothes” ( α = 0.79). This marker variable effectively, though not necessarily exhaustively, detects common method bias, as it is influenced by some of the same causes of common method variance (e.g. affectivity and acquiescence) as the substantive variables but is not theoretically related to those substantive variables.

Descriptive statistics, average variance extracted (AVE) and bivariate correlations among the variables studied are shown in Table II . As expected, the correlations among the three variables of interest are positive and significant.

Scale analysis

Prior to testing the hypotheses, a confirmatory factor analysis of the variables of interest was conducted to test the validity of the proposed model. As recommended by Wang and Hackett (2016) , virtuous leadership was modeled as a five-correlated-factor model, with each virtue representing a first-order factor. Two items were excluded from the model because their factor loadings were below 0.60[ 2 ]. Similarly, work-related affect was modeled as a second-order factor with positive and negative affect as first-order factors, and trust in leader was modeled as a second-order factor with reliance and disclosure as first-order factors. The five-factor measurement model – including virtuous leadership, trust in leader, job satisfaction, work-related affect and work engagement – fits the data well ( χ 2 (880) = 3359, p < 0.01; CFI = 0.95; RMSEA = 0.05; SRMR = 0.04). Two tests confirmed that the six-factor model has adequate discriminant validity. First, a χ 2 -test showed that the proposed model fits the data significantly better than alternative models with five or fewer factors (all p -values <0.001). Second, as can be derived from Table II , the square roots of the AVEs are greater than the interconstruct correlations. The model also has good convergent validity because all factor loadings exceed 0.60 and all AVEs exceed 0.50.

To test the presence of common method bias, blue attitude was added to the model, and the procedure outlined by Williams et al. (2010) was followed. A χ 2 -test showed that the unconstrained model has a significantly better fit than the zero-constrained model (Δ χ 2 = 79, Δdf = 44; p < 0.01), which signals shared variance between the constructs. A bias distribution test in which the unconstrained model was compared to an equal constrained model demonstrated that the common method bias is unevenly distributed across items (Δ χ 2 = 79, Δdf = 42; p < 0.01). The model in which the marked variable is allowed to load on every item of the main variables has an acceptable fit ( χ 2 (969) = 3513, p < 0.01; CFI = 0.95; RMSEA = 0.05; SRMR = 0.04). Therefore, blue attitude was retained in the model to test the hypotheses using common method bias-corrected measures.

Hypothesis testing

Structural equation modeling was used to test the hypotheses. The results of the unmediated model are presented in Figure 1 [ 3 ]. The estimated results show that subordinates’ perceptions of their supervisor’s virtuous leadership positively influence subordinates’ work engagement, work-related affect, and job satisfaction at the 99.9 per cent confidence level. This finding supports H1 .

The results of the best-fitting mediated model with trust in the leader as a mediating variable are presented in Figure 2 .[ 4 ] In this model:

subordinates’ perceptions of their supervisor’s virtuous leadership positively influence subordinates’ trust in their supervisor;

subordinates’ trust in their supervisor positively influences all three components of work-related well-being; and

subordinates’ perceptions of their supervisor’s virtuous leadership influence their work-related affect but not their job satisfaction and work engagement, independent of their trust in the supervisor.

The mediating role of trust in the supervisor was tested more rigorously using bias-corrected confidence intervals by means of the bootstrapped estimates from 2,000 samples. As shown in Table III , this test confirmed that trust in the supervisor significantly mediates the influence of subordinates’ perceptions of their supervisor’s virtuous leadership on their work-related well-being at the 99.9 per cent significance level. The proportion of the variance in work-related affect explained by virtuous leadership indirectly via trust in the mediator is 63 per cent, which is in the range of partial mediation (0.20 to 0.80) ( Hair et al. , 2014 ). Alternative models without a direct path between virtuous leadership and work-related affect or with direct effect paths between virtuous leadership and job satisfaction or work engagement fail to improve the model fit significantly (all p -values > 0.05), and the direct paths from virtuous leadership to job satisfaction ( β = 0.10; p = 0.17) and from virtuous leadership to work engagement ( β = 0.08; p = 0.30) are not statistically significant. This indicates that trust in the leader fully mediates the influence of virtuous leadership on job satisfaction and work engagement.

In sum, the results indicate that greater trust in the supervisor fully mediates the influence of perceived virtuous leadership on work engagement and job satisfaction and partially mediates this influence for work-related affect, thereby supporting H2 .

Multigroup analysis was employed to test whether a positive influence of subordinates’ perceptions of virtuous leadership on their work-related well-being holds for various subgroups. The model in Figure 1 including the control variables was used for this purpose. The results, presented in Figure 3 , indicate that the influence of subordinates’ perceptions of their supervisor’s virtuous leadership on their work-related well-being is positive and statistically significant at the 5 per cent significance level regardless of the subordinate’s gender, age group, educational background, position in the organizational hierarchy, organizational size, or sector, and this positive influence holds across the various industries and cultures considered here. These findings support H3 and provide evidence for the prevalence of a positive influence of the perceived virtuous leadership of a supervisor on subordinate’ work-related well-being in the countries considered here.

To examine whether each core leader virtue positively influences subordinates’ trust in the leader and work-related well-being, the model was re-estimated after excluding all virtues other than the virtue of interest from the model. This procedure was repeated five times, once for each virtue. The results, presented in Table IV , indicate that each core leader virtue positively influences subordinates’ trust in the supervisor and their work-related well-being, and the degree of influence of the individual virtues is very similar. This large overlap is not surprising when considering that, in line with previous research, all correlations between individual virtues are between 0.69 and 0.85 in the data[ 5 ].

Leadership styles in which leader virtues play a significant role, such as ethical, servant, and transformational leadership, do not comprehensively address the core defining characteristics of a virtuous leader, as they do not consider a coherent set of core leader virtues and do not center on character ( Hackett and Wang, 2012 ; Lemoine et al. , 2019 ). Little is known about the isolated influence of virtuous leadership within organizations as assessed by a coherent measure of a leader’s virtuousness that centers on character ( Crossan et al. , 2017 ). Notably, despite the importance of employee well-being for firm performance ( Krekel et al. , 2019 ), the isolated influence of virtuous leadership on employee well-being has remained unexplored. The current study addresses this void in the literature by examining how a supervisor’s virtuous leadership as perceived by subordinates influences subordinates’ work-related well-being using a coherent measure of virtuous leadership. In addition, the mediating role of trust in the leader and the moderating roles of individual leader virtues and various characteristics of subordinates and organizations are examined to gain a deeper insight in the prevalence and underlying mechanisms of this effect.

The current study reveals that subordinates who perceive they have more virtuous immediate supervisors have higher work-related well-being across a wide variety of contexts in Western societies. This positive influence holds for all three considered dimensions of work-related well-being – job satisfaction, work-related affect and work engagement. These findings are consistent with previous research findings showing that virtuous leadership has a positive influence on various positive follower outcomes that are antecedents and consequences of work-related well-being, such as subordinates’ overall happiness, life satisfaction, psychological empowerment, organizational identification and moral identity ( Riggio et al. , 2010 ; Wang and Hackett, 2016 ). These findings are also in line with the documented positive influence of value-laden leadership styles such as ethical and transformative leadership on work-related well-being ( Bedi et al. , 2016 ; Banks et al. , 2016 ). In sum, the findings of this study extend the evidence for the importance of the character and virtuous behaviors of leaders in stimulating positive outcomes for subordinates and show the prevalence of this positive influence in at least Western contexts.

The results further show that subordinates’ greater trust in the supervisor fully mediates the positive influence of their perceptions of the supervisor’s virtuous leadership on job satisfaction and work engagement and partially mediates the positive influence for work-related affect. The full mediation effects for two of the three well-being indicators suggest that a subjective process with trust in the leader at its center is a particularly influential way in which virtuous leaders influence the work-related well-being of followers. Moreover, the sizes of the mediation effects suggest that this trust mechanism is probably more influential than alternative mechanisms, such as the creation of a more virtuous organizational climate and better objective job characteristics and outcomes of subordinates. The revealed strong influence of virtuous leadership on trust is consistent with the idea that trust is particularly built when moral behavior is intrinsically motivated and intentional, i.e. when the behavior is character-based. Following this rationale, trust in the leader may be more influenced by virtuous leadership compared with less character-based leadership styles that have been associated with increased trust, such as transformative leadership ( Altunoğlu et al. , 2019 ). The reference to a limited period (i.e. the past month) in the measure of work-related affect may explain why trust related less strongly to work-related affect because building trust is a long-term process, whereas virtuous leader behaviors also elicit short-term affective responses in followers independent of trust.

All five individual core leader virtues positively influenced trust in the supervisor and work-related well-being. This finding suggests that the five leader virtues that are prominent in the emerging frameworks of leader character and virtuous leadership each contribute to the well-being of employees. The similar influence of the individual virtues on trust and work-related well-being is inconsistent with the common viewpoint in Western philosophical and spiritual traditions that prudence is the central and most important virtue ( Zeuschner, 2014 ) and with the central role of prudence in some frameworks of leader character ( Crossan et al. , 2017 ) but is consistent with frameworks that do not make a hierarchical order among the five core virtues ( Peterson and Seligman, 2004 ; Hackett and Wang, 2012 ) and supports the philosophical viewpoint of some ethics scholars that virtues form a unified whole in creating positive outcomes ( MacIntyre, 1984 ). However, the consideration of individual leader virtues in specific situations remains essential, as the importance and the specific roles of virtues are context dependent ( Riggio et al. , 2010 ).

Implications

Theoretical implications.

The results suggest that the character and related virtues of leaders are important drivers of the documented positive influence of value-laden leadership styles such as ethical and transformative leadership on work-related well-being ( Bedi et al. , 2016 ; Banks et al. , 2016 ) and trust ( Altunoğlu et al. , 2019 ). Virtues should therefore have an important role in theories on how value-laden leadership styles affect follower outcomes. Another implication is that trust in leaders and work-related well-being seem to be important drivers of the positive influence of virtuous leadership and leader character on overall well-being, work performance, and other work-related outcomes ( Riggio et al. , 2010 ; Wang and Hackett, 2016 ).

More generally, the demonstrated positive influence of virtuous leadership on employee outcomes highlights the importance of further explorations into how leaders can be helped or stimulated to become more virtuous and provides support for recent calls to incorporate leader character and, more specifically, virtuous leadership in mainstream management theory ( Crossan et al. , 2017 ; Newstead et al. , 2020a , 2020b ).

This study highlights the potential relevance of leader virtuousness for leaders and organizations that aim for high levels of employee well-being and trust within the organization. Trust and well-being are not only desirable in themselves but are also instrumentally important in enhancing the recruitment, performance, and retention of employees ( Krekel et al. , 2019 ). This link suggests that virtuous leaders are often effective leaders and that often there is no trade-off between effective and virtuous leadership, contradicting the fear or conviction among many leaders that virtuous leadership comes at the expense of effectiveness. The positive influences of virtuous leadership shown in this study reinforce calls for promoting virtuous leadership in organizations ( Flynn, 2008 ; Cameron and Winn, 2012 ). Leader character is widely considered to be malleable, and following Aristotle, the related virtues are considered learnable and developable ( Newstead et al. , 2020a , 2020b ). Sison and Ferrero (2015) suggest that:

[…] a virtuous character comes from the cultivation of virtuous habits. However, virtuous habits themselves result from the repeated performance of virtuous actions, and virtuous actions, in turn, arise from one’s having nurtured virtuous inclinations or tendencies (p. S81).

These inclinations and tendencies can be promoted in several concrete ways, such as by verbally acknowledging virtuous behavior of leaders ( Alfano, 2013 ), role modeling virtuous behaviors, encouraging leaders to explain the rationale behind their virtuous decisions to employees, and offering training programs and workshops to promote and develop virtuous character traits ( Crossan et al. , 2017 ; Newstead et al. , 2020a , 2020b ). In addition, one could place greater emphasis on character when hiring and evaluating staff to create a virtue-based leadership culture. To develop excellent future leaders, the findings of this study also support Byrne et al. ’s (2018) call for education and training programs that raise awareness about the importance of virtuous character and helping to develop virtuous character traits, particularly in business schools (see also Eriksen et al. , 2019 ). For (prospective) employees, the revealed influence of leader character on employees’ outcomes suggests that a leader’s character should be an important criterion when making job decisions.

Limitations and future directions

First, while this study focused on perceptions of virtuous leadership, future research could examine the role of actual leader virtuousness using objective data regarding virtuous and vicious behaviors of leaders. Third, while endogeneity concerns were alleviated in this cross-sectional study by the inclusion of control variables and a marker variable, future research could test the causal directions of the proposed relationships more thoroughly by collecting longitudinal or experimental data. Fourth, the demonstrated relevance of virtuous leadership and the observed differences in the theorized and empirical factor structure of Wang and Hackett’s Virtuous leadership Questionnaire reinforce Dawson’s (2018) call to further develop and validate measures of individuals’ virtues in business. Fifth, future studies in other contexts and utilizing different data sources are needed to examine the generalizability of these findings. Sixth, future research can test the value of virtuous leadership beyond other leadership styles by exploring the extent to which it predicts unique variance in follower and organizational outcomes. Seventh, while this study shows that virtuous leadership is important for employees’ work-related well-being regardless of the specific context, more research is needed to explore the extent to which the role of specific virtues is context dependent, the interdependence of different virtues, and the effect of imbalances between leader virtues in creating positive outcomes ( Riggio et al. , 2010 ).

The present study demonstrates the positive impact of virtuous leadership as perceived by subordinates on the work-related well-being of subordinates across a wide variety of contexts in Western societies. In this regard, this study shows that subordinates who perceive they have more virtuous supervisors trust their leaders more and, in turn, have higher work engagement, job satisfaction and work-related affect. The findings suggest that organizations seeking to promote the well-being of their employees may strongly benefit from stimulating virtuous leadership and employee perceptions thereof. Despite some limitations, this study contributes to the existing literature by providing theoretical refinement and empirical evidence of the influence of virtuous leadership on trust and work-related well-being using a more coherent and philosophically grounded conceptual framework compared with the extant literature.

Unmediated model

Mediated model

The influence of virtuous leadership on work-related well-being by subgroup

Sample profile ( N = 1,237)

Notes: Standardized coefficients reported. * p  < 0.001. Control variables are as in Figure 1 for the work-related well-being variables and as in Figure 2 for trust in leader

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Acknowledgements

Funding : This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from Templeton World Charity Foundation Inc. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Templeton World Charity Foundation, Inc.

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Virtuous Leadership

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Character-based leadership ; Virtues-based leadership

Introduction

As part of wide-ranging efforts to better incorporate moral considerations into leadership practice (Lemoine et al. 2019 ), virtuous leadership is a leader-follower relationship wherein a leader’s situationally appropriate expression of virtues triggers follower perceptions of leader virtuousness, worthy of emulation (Wang and Hackett 2016 ). Although there are many perspectives concerning the meaning of virtue (Newstead et al. 2018 ), leadership based on the character-based virtue ethics school of moral philosophy (MacIntyre 1984 ) places less emphasis on the articulation of ethics-related principles and rules (e.g., regulations, codes of conduct, and audits) in favor of focusing on developing and nurturing moral character in leaders themselves, through the self-cultivation of moral virtues − character traits disposing a leader to achieve excellence (Wang and Hackett 2020 ).

Virtuous leadership includes three...

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Wang, G., Hackett, R.D. (2021). Virtuous Leadership. In: Poff, D.C., Michalos, A.C. (eds) Encyclopedia of Business and Professional Ethics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23514-1_1264-1

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1.7 Responsible Leadership as Virtuous Leadership

Cameron, K. (2011). Responsible leadership as virtuous leadership. Journal of Business Ethics , 98 (S1), 25–35. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-1023-6. Licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0 .

Responsible leadership is rare. It is not that most leaders are irresponsible, but responsibility in leadership is frequently defined so that an important connotation of responsible leadership is ignored. This article equates responsible leadership with virtuousness. Using this connotation implies that responsible leadership is based on three assumptions—eudaemonism, inherent value, and amplification. Secondarily, this connotation produces two important outcomes—a fixed point for coping with change, and benefits for constituencies who may never be affected otherwise. The meaning and advantages of responsible leadership as virtuous leadership are discussed.

Responsible leadership is rare. It is not that most leaders are irresponsible, but responsibility in leadership is frequently defined so that an important connotation of responsible leadership is ignored. The objective of this article is to highlight this oft-ignored attribute of responsible leadership, review its meaning, and identify two advantages it serves for organizations.

The idea that organizations need responsible leaders is quite common. In political elections, voters try to determine which candidate will actually follow-through on campaign promises, and in business organizations, boards of directors seek to select CEOs whom they estimate to be most responsible for the organization’s performance and capital. The literature on effective leadership has largely included an element of responsibility (Doh and Stumph 2005; Yukl et al. 2002). Responsibility in this sense most often is synonymous with accountability and dependability (as in being accountable for performance and being dependable in achieving promised performance) (Bass and Bass 2008; Meindl and Ehrlich 1987).

Responsibility is also commonly associated with freedom of action and empowerment, indicating that responsible individuals have discretion or volition and the necessary authority. They have the wherewithal and the resources to achieve an objective (as in having responsibility at work, or being given the responsibility for an activity or outcome) (Spreitzer 2007). These two connotations of leadership responsibility are closely related, as leaders are more likely to be accountable and dependable if they are able to act freely and to feel empowered to perform (Spreitzer et al. 1999; Salancik and Meindl 1984). In these two senses, responsibility means “ response – able ,” or possessing the capability and the capacity needed to respond.

A third connotation of responsible leadership has been proposed by Pless and colleagues in which responsible leaders are described as possessing certain characteristics and performing particular roles. Responsible leadership in these discussions is grounded in stakeholder theory—that is, leaders interact with and have responsibility for multiple stakeholders. The roles associated with responsible leadership include “architect, change agent, citizen, coach, networker, servant, storyteller, steward, and visionary” (Maak and Pless 2006b, p. 107; Pless 2007, p. 439), and the characteristics of responsible leaders are quite extensive. [1] Responsible leadership in these discussions is defined in this way: “Responsible leadership can be understood as the art of building and sustaining social and moral relationships between business leaders and different stakeholders (followers), based on a sense of justice, a sense of recognition, a sense of care, and a sense of accountability for a wide range of economic, ecological, social, political, and human responsibilities” (2007, p. 451). The multiple roles, characteristics, and relationships advocated are inclusive of most of the major theories of leadership (e.g., transformational, charismatic, servant, and ethical) and place responsible leadership as an encompassing ideal type.

A fourth connotation of the concept of responsible leadership is less frequently used but equally meaningful. It is the attribute that makes a certain type of responsible leadership rare. It refers to the ability or inclination to act in an appropriate fashion (as when an individual acts responsibly). The concept of appropriateness is key to this connotation in that it associates responsible action with what is right, correct, or best. Behaving responsibly in this sense means being good or doing good (Walsh et al. 2003). Of course, what is considered good is often controversial, [2] but one term that connotes universal standards of rightness, correctness, and goodness is the concept of virtuousness (Cameron and Winn 2012; Cameron et al. 2011) . This concept is a universally accepted standard for the best of the human condition (Comte-Sponville 2001; Dutton and Sonenshein 2007; Peterson and Seligman 2004). Using this connotation, responsible leadership is equated with virtuous leadership, or leadership oriented toward being and doing good.

Responsibility used in the first three ways is associated with achieving desired instrumental results, such as productivity, customer retention, sustainability, morale, effective networks, or employee well-being. Used in the fourth way, responsibility is associated with promoting goodness for its own sake (Cameron et al. 2003). It focuses on the highest potentiality of human systems, or on virtuousness.

The Meaning of Virtuousness in Leadership

Virtuousness is not a common term in scientific circles. The prevailing tradition in organizational studies suggests that discussions of virtuousness are associated with social conservatism, religious dogmatism, and scientific irrelevance (Chapman and Galston 1992; MacIntyre 1984; Schimmel 1997). Virtuousness is often relegated to theology, philosophy, or mere naiveté. Fowers (2008), for example, accused positive psychologists of being “superficial” and “colloquial” in their understanding of virtue. Fineman (2006) argued that virtuousness is culturally restrictive and narrow-minded. Its relevance in the world of work and in organizations has little credence in the face of economic pressures and stakeholder demands. Confirming this bias, Walsh (1999) analyzed word usage in the Wall Street Journal from 1984 through 2000 and reported that the appearance of terms, such as “win,” “advantage,” and “beat,” had risen more than fourfold over that 17-year period in reference to business organizations. Terms, such as “virtue,” “caring,” and “compassion,” on the other hand, seldom appeared at all in reference to business. The use of these terms remained negligible across the same 17-year period of time.

A review of scholarly literature relating to the concept of virtuousness (including the terms “virtues,” “civic virtues,” “moral virtues,” and “virtue ethics”) reveals that little agreement exists regarding its definition and attributes (Cameron and Winn 2012). Most articles focus on the debate about whether or not virtuousness actually exists (Alzola 2008; Wright and Goodstein 2007; Weaver 2006; Whetstone 2003), on the development of virtue in societies (Moore and Beadle 2006; Nielsen 2006), or on the definition of the term (Fowers 2009; Moberg 1999; Rachels 1999). A few articles have attempted to identify universal attributes of virtuousness or to develop instruments to measure them (Chun 2005; Peterson and Seligman 2004; Shanahan and Hyman 2003), but two striking features characterize this literature. First, virtuousness is seldom associated with leadership and almost never with organizations. Second, very few studies have been conducted in which virtuousness is investigated empirically (Rego et al. 2010; Den Hartog and De Hoogh 2009; Bright et al. 2006; Sison 2006; Caza et al. 2004; Cameron et al. 2004).

Virtue Versus Virtuousness

The term virtue refers to singular attributes that represent moral excellence. Based on the Latin word virtus , or the Greek arête , a virtue is not a product of social convention but is a basic element of the human condition (Rachels 1999). Aristotle (1999) equated it with “excellence in the human soul.” Virtue is sometimes equated with character strengths (Grant and Schwartz 2011; Peterson and Seligman 2004), but virtue and character strengths are not synonymous. One can possess too much or too little of a strength, and in doing so it may become a weakness or produce a negative outcome (as when too much tolerance becomes spinelessness and too little tolerance becomes bigotry). Virtuousness, on the other hand, cannot be exceeded.

Virtuousness also differs from the concept of ethics. A dominant (although not exclusive) emphasis in the leadership ethics literature is on avoiding harm, fulfilling contracts, ensuring compliance, and obeying rules and laws (Brown and Trevino 2006; Handelsman et al. 2002; Trevino et al. 2003). In practice, ethics are understood and implemented as duties (Rawls 1971). They are usually specifications designed to prevent damage or avoid injury (Orlikowski 2000), or to ensure compliance (Brown and Trevino 2006). Unethical action is harmful, detrimental, or destructive, and so to behave ethically is to avoid doing harm, damaging another individual, or destroying something valuable. Admittedly, a few authors (e.g., Maak and Pless 2006b; Sison 2006; Pless 2007) have included virtuousness as one of the attributes of responsible leadership, but the comprehensiveness of the characteristics incorporated and its association with instrumental outcomes differentiate it from virtuous leadership as discussed in the fourth connotation.

In contrast to the dominant approach to ethics, virtuousness possesses an affirmative bias and focuses on elevating, flourishing, and enriching outcomes. Virtuousness pursues the ultimate best—eudaemonism—rather than merely avoiding the negative or emphasizing the attainment of more valuable outcomes. More importantly, unlike ethics—which may be situational—virtuousness represents a universal and stable standard of the good (Cameron 2006).

Aquinas (1984) proposed that virtuousness is rooted in human character and represents “what human beings ought to be,” inherent goodness, humanity’s very best qualities, or being in complete harmony with the will of God (also, Aristotle, Metaphysics XII ; Sison 2006). Virtuousness refers to a constellation of virtues in the aggregate. Just as individuals may possess more than one virtue, responsible leadership in organizations also may display and enable more than one virtue. Responsible leadership as equated with virtuousness, then, is leadership that exemplifies a combination of virtues. From the organization level of analysis, virtuousness may be fostered by the organizational policies, processes, practices, and culture nurtured by leaders (Cameron 2010; Dutton and Sonenshein 2007).

Examples of virtuous leadership might be illustrated by the senior leaders at Prudential’s Relocation Company contacting senior executives at BP Oil Company shortly after the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. They offered to provide free relocation services from the UK to the U.S. until the spill was cleaned-up. The rationale: “We want to help, and we think that this is just the right thing to do” (personal communication). Or, the approach to cost cutting and downsizing at Griffin Hospital in which a culture characterized by “compassion, highest levels of integrity, forgiveness, and love” was developed by the senior leaders as a result of the announced downsizing activities (Cameron 2008). Or, the Rocky Flats Nuclear Arsenal case in which leadership honesty, virtuousness, and personal concern were keys to an extraordinary, almost unbelievably rapid and effective clean-up and closure of North America’s most dangerous location (Cameron and Lavine 2006).

Attributes of Virtuousness

Confusion regarding the meaning of virtuousness has been an important inhibitor to its use in organizational and leadership research. For example, virtuousness has been used interchangeably in the organization studies literature with corporate social responsibility (CSR), citizenship behavior, business ethics, justice, and strengths. Illustrations of the variety of definitions include Moberg’s (1999) equating virtuousness with some of the Big Five personality attributes—namely, agreeableness and conscientiousness of managers in organizations—or Ewin’s (1995) proposal that virtuousness is exemplified by the persuasive ability and influence techniques of salespersons. Sison (2006) associated virtuousness with the content of speech (logos), character traits (ethos), and emotional disposition (pathos) in the service of persuasion and governance, and Fowers (2005, 2009) equated virtuousness with ethics and with personal strengths in the pursuit of that which leads to beneficial instrumental outcomes, implying a hedonistic pursuit of human fulfillment.

Rather than being an instrumentally motivated action or emotion valued only because of what it produces, however, virtuousness as associated with responsible leadership refers to the most ennobling behaviors and outcomes, the excellence and essence of humankind, the best of the human condition, and the highest aspirations of humanity (Comte-Sponville 2001; Weiner 1993; Chapman and Galston 1992; Dent 1984; MacIntyre 1984). That is, virtuousness in leadership is less a means to another more desirable outcome than an ultimate good itself. This is important because some authors have criticized the current literature on virtuousness, ethics, and positivity as being co-opted by a market-based, profit-as-the-summon-bonum ethic (Caza and Carroll 2012). They claim that if virtuousness is relevant only to gain a desired end (e.g., fulfilling customer demands), it is akin to manipulation and cooptation by the powerful at the expense of the less powerful.

Virtuous leadership does not assume, however, that profitability, customer service, or shareholder value are the ultimate ends. Responsible leadership using the fourth connotation does not assume that more suitable outcomes are needed in order for virtuous action or virtuous decisions to be taken. Rather, responsible leadership in this sense is characterized by three core assumptions—a eudaemonic assumption, an inherent value assumption, and an amplification assumption (Bright et al. 2006; Cameron and Winn 2012).

The Eudaemonic Assumption

Virtuousness is synonymous with the eudaemonic assumption. This is the assumption that an inclination exists in all human beings toward moral goodness (Aristotle, Metaphysics ; Dutton and Sonenshein 2007). Several authors have provided evidence that the human inclination toward virtuousness is inherent and evolutionarily developed (Tangney et al. 2007; Miller 2007). Inherent virtuousness, or an inclination toward the best of the human condition, develops in the brain before the development of language. Studies of the human brain indicate that individuals appear to have a basic instinct toward morality and are organically inclined to be virtuous (Haight 2006; Hauser 2006; Pinker 1997). Krebs (1987, p. 113) asserted that human beings are “genetically disposed” to acts of virtuousness, and observing and experiencing virtuousness helps unlock the human predisposition toward behaving in ways that benefit others.

In functional terms, virtuousness is claimed to be evolutionarily developed because it allows people to live together, pursue collective ends, and protect against those who endanger the social order. From a genetic or biological perspective, virtuousness plays a role in the development and perpetuation of humanity. This also explains why virtuousness is highly prized and admired, and why virtuous individuals are almost universally revered, emulated, and even sainted. They help perpetuate the human species (Cameron and Winn 2012). Miller (2007) pointed out, for example, that a selective genetic bias for human moral virtuousness exists. He argued that mate selection evolved at least partly on the basis of displays of virtuousness.

Inherent Value Assumption

A second core assumption of virtuousness is that it represents “goods of first intent” (Aristotle 1999, p. 3), meaning that it represents inherent value. Virtuousness in leadership is not a means to obtain another end, but it is considered to be an end in itself. In fact, virtuousness in pursuit of another more attractive outcome ceases by definition to be virtuousness. Forgiveness, compassion, and courage in search of recompense are not virtuous. If kindness toward employees is demonstrated in an organization, for example, solely to obtain a payback or an advantage (kindness is displayed only if people work harder), it ceases to be kindness and is, instead, manipulation. Virtuousness is associated with social betterment, but this betterment extends beyond mere self-interested benefit. Virtuousness creates social value that transcends the instrumental desires of the actor(s) (Aristotle, Metaphysics VII ). Virtuous leadership produces advantages to others in addition to, or even exclusive of, recognition, benefit, or advantage to the actor or the organization (Cawley et al. 2000).

This also explains why leadership virtuousness is different than participation in normatively prescribed CSR, sponsoring environmentally friendly programs, or utilizing renewable resources (Bollier 1996; Hoffman and Haigh 2012). Although some activities included in the CSR and corporate citizenship domains may represent virtuousness, these activities are typically explained as motivated by instrumental benefit or exchange relationships. That is, engagement in these actions is initiated to acquire benefit to the firm or advantages from a reciprocal arrangement (Batson et al. 1995; Fry et al. 1982; Moore and Richardson 1988; Piliavin and Charng 1990; Sánchez 2000). Exchange, reciprocity, and self-serving motives, however, are not indicative of virtuousness. Barge and Oliver (2003) and Gergen (1999) argued that associating an instrumental motive with organizational virtuousness changes the nature of the relationships among organization members and causes the behavior to evolve into “another technique of manipulation and discipline” (Barge and Oliver 2003, p. 11). Of course, virtuousness does not stand in opposition to concepts such as citizenship, social responsibility, or ethics, but it extends beyond them.

Amplification Assumption

A third assumption is that virtuousness creates and fosters sustainable positive energy. It is elevating and self-perpetuating, and it requires no external motivator for its pursuit. Because it is an ultimate end and an inherent attribute of human beings, virtuousness produces an elevating effect. This is to say, virtuousness is amplifying when it is experienced (George 1995). Observing virtuous leadership creates a self-reinforcing inclination toward more of the same. One difference between Aristotle’s “goods of first intent” and “goods of second intent” is that people never tire of or become satiated with goods of first intent. Leaders cannot be too virtuous.

Fredrickson and Joiner (2002) found evidence that observing virtuousness in leaders creates upward spirals of positive dynamics. Compassion begets gratitude, gratitude motivates improved relationships, witnessing good deeds leads to elevation, elevation motivates prosocial behavior, and observing virtuousness fosters even more virtuousness (also see Algoe and Haight 2009; Maslow 1971; Hatch 1999; Sethi and Nicholson 2001). Studies reported by Cialdini (2000) and Asche (1952) support the idea that when people observe exemplary or virtuous behavior, their inclination is to follow suit. Fredrickson (2003) applied her “broaden and build” theory—explaining the effects of experiencing positive emotions—to virtuous leadership. Employees’ and organizations’ social, intellectual, and emotional capacities were expanded and increased as a result of experiencing and observing virtuousness (Fredrickson 2009).

This amplifying quality of virtuousness can be explained by its association with the heliotropic effect . The heliotropic effect is the attraction of all living systems toward positive energy and away from negative energy, or toward that which is life-giving and away from that which is life-depleting (Smith and Baker 1960; D’Amato and Jagoda 1962; Mrosovsky and Kingsmill 1985). In nature, this is exemplified by light from the sun. Several researchers have described the dynamics of individuals and groups that experience virtuousness (e.g., Cameron 2008; Eisenberg 1986; Hatch 1999; Leavitt 1996; Sethi and Nicholson 2001) proposing that under such conditions, individuals experience a compelling urge to build upon the contributions of others and to perpetuate a virtuous spiral (Fredrickson 2003, 2009; Erhard-Seibold 1937; Dutton and Heaphy 2003). Observing virtuousness creates a self-reinforcing cycle toward more virtuousness.

In sum, one infrequently acknowledged connotation of responsibility in leadership is its association with virtuousness. Because virtuousness is a universal standard for the best of the human condition, it addresses the question: What is the most responsible approach to leadership ? Being clear about what is meant by the term virtuousness is a prerequisite to addressing this question. Responsible leadership, of course, refers not only to the actions of leaders but also to the processes, strategies, and culture that they foster and enable which support and manifest collective virtuous behavior. That is, leaders behave in ways, and help foster organizational attributes, that are consistent with the highest aspirations of human kind. They enable and perpetuate virtuousness so that its self-perpetuating and amplifying effects are experienced by members of the organization in which they interact (Maak and Pless 2006b; Pless 2007).

Benefits of Virtuous Leadership

Accepting virtuousness as a key attribute of responsible leadership provides at least two functional benefits. While supplemental advantage is not needed for virtuous leadership to be valued, benefits do accrue nevertheless. One benefit is the role virtuousness plays in creating a fixed point in decision making. Another benefit is the increases in performance that virtuousness produces in organizations.

Virtuousness as a Fixed Point

It is commonly acknowledged that the most dominant feature of the current environment for organizations is turbulence. Change is generally acknowledged as ubiquitous and constant. Unfortunately, when everything is changing, it becomes impossible to manage change (Cameron 2006). Without a stable, unchanging reference point, direction and progress become indeterminate. Airplane piloting offers an instructive metaphor. The key to successful flight is adjusting the plane’s movement in relation to a stable, unchanging referent such as land or the horizon. Without a fixed referent, it is impossible to steer a course. Pilots with no visual or instrumentation contact with a fixed point are unable to navigate.

Consider the last flight of John Kennedy, Jr., who began a flight up the New England coast at dusk. He lost sight of land and, when it grew dark, the horizon line as well. He lost his fixed point of reference. The result was disorientation, and he flew his plane into the ocean, likely without even knowing he was headed toward the water. He was unable to manage the continuously changing position of his airplane without a standard that remained unchanged.

The same disorientation afflicts individuals and organizations in situations where there are no unchanging referents. When nothing is stable—no clear fixed points or undisputed guiding principles exist—leaders are left with nothing by which to steer. It becomes impossible to tell up from down or progress from regress. When nothing is stable—i.e., an absence of fixed points, dependable principles, or stable benchmarks—leaders tend to make up their own rules (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001; Weick 1993). They make sense of the ambiguity and chaos they experience by deciding for themselves what is real and what is appropriate based on criteria such as past experience, immediate payoff, personal reward, and so on (March 1994).

In the ethical arena, it has become clear that in high-pressure, high-velocity environments, some leaders have simply made up their own rules. They ended up cheating, lying, waffling, or claiming naiveté, not only because it was to their economic advantage, but because they had created their own rationale for what was acceptable. They operated in rapidly evolving, complex, and high-pressure environments where rules and conditions change constantly. Although their actions are now judged to be unethical and harmful to others, within the rationale they had created for themselves, and within their socially constructed context, those actions made perfect sense to themselves at the time (Mitchell 2001). This is why rules and standards meant to guide what is right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate, legal and illegal have escalated in the interest of identifying fixed points (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley).

The problem is, standards that avoid harm or control wrongdoing are not the same as standards that lead to one that is the best. Avoiding the bad is not the same as pursuing the good. Rules and standards that initially appear to guide ethical obligations and socially responsible action may actually lead to the reverse. For example, unions often “work to rule”—doing only what is specified in contracts and rules—as a substitute for going on strike. This pattern of behavior quickly destroys normal organizational functioning. Similarly, following the letter of the law in accounting practices, environmental pollution standards, or performance appraisal systems often leads to the opposite of the intended outcome—e.g., recalcitrance, rigidity, resistance, and rebellion (Caza and Cameron 2008).

More importantly, ethical standards often change over time and circumstance. Ethical standards regarding segregation in public schools, for example, have changed markedly between the 1960s and the present time. The same can be said for ethics associated with financial transactions, accounting principles, environmental policies, sustainability, death, marriage, free speech, and many others. Ethical standards frequently do not remain stable because they are socially constructed. Hence, ethics may serve as inadequate fixed points and may not always identify universalistic standards across different contexts. Rules meant to specify duty or control behavior may be inadequate standards because they change (thus, disqualifying them as fixed points) and do not always lead to desirable outcomes (Caza et al. 2004).

On the other hand, virtuousness can serve as a fixed point to guide leadership in times of ambiguity, turbulence, and high velocity change. This is because virtuousness represents what people aspire to be at their best—goodness and nobility—and these aspirations are universal and unchanging in essentially all societies, cultures, and religions (Peterson and Seligman 2004; Kidder 1994). Without virtuousness, it is difficult to identify unchanging fixed points by which to manage change. Thus, responsible leadership, as represented by virtuousness, is leadership that can effectively manage the turbulence and instability characterizing the current external environment. Virtuousness represents the unchanging standard by which to make decisions.

Virtuousness and Positive Organizational Outcomes

Despite the fact that virtuousness need not be associated with instrumental outcomes to be of worth, an extensive amount of evidence has been produced showing that virtuous behavior is associated with desirable outcomes. For example, honesty, transcendent meaning, caring and giving behavior, gratitude, hope, empathy, love, and forgiveness, among other virtues, have been found to predict desired outcomes, such as individuals’ commitment, satisfaction, motivation, positive emotions, effort, physical health, and psychological health (Andersson et al. 2007; Giacalone et al. 2005; Fry et al. 2005; Kellett et al. 2006; Gittell et al. 2006; Luthans et al. 2007; Dutton and colleagues 2006; Grant 2007; Cameron and Caza 2004; Snyder 1994; Sternberg 1998; Seligman 2002; Peterson and Bossio 1991; Harker and Keltner 2001; McCullough et al. 2000; Emmons 1999). While relatively few studies have investigated virtuousness in the leadership of organizations, a limited number of investigations have explored the effects of virtuous leadership on organizational performance.

For example, Cameron and Caza (2002) and Cameron et al. (2004) conducted a series of studies in which indicators of virtuousness and of performance outcomes were assessed in organizations across sixteen industries (e.g., retail, automotive, consulting, health care, manufacturing, financial services, not-for-profit). All organizations in these studies had recently downsized, so that the well-documented negative effects associated with downsizing were likely to accrue. That is, downsizing almost always produces deteriorating performance. Most organizations regress in productivity, quality, morale, trust, and customer satisfaction after downsizing (Cameron 1994, 1998; Cascio et al. 1997).

Leadership virtuousness scores in each organization were measured by means of a survey instrument assessing compassion, integrity, forgiveness, trust, and optimism in the organization’s leadership (concepts included on lists of universally valued virtues, e.g., Chun 2005; Peterson and Seligman 2004). Organizational performance outcomes consisted of objective measures of profitability, productivity, quality, customer retention, and employee retention (voluntary turnover) from company records, as well as employee ratings of similar outcomes. Statistically significance relationships were found between virtuousness scores and both objective and perceived measures of performance outcomes. Organizations with higher virtuousness scores had significantly higher productivity, quality, customer retention, and lower employee turnover than other organizations. When controlling for factors, such as size, industry, and amount of downsizing, organizations scoring higher in virtuousness were significantly more profitable, and, when compared to competitors, industry averages, stated goals, and past performance, they also achieved significantly higher performance on the other outcome measures as well.

In a more refined study, Bright et al. (2006) investigated tonic virtuousness—or virtuousness that occurs irrespective of conditions, such as kindness or integrity—and phasic virtuousness—or virtuousness that is dependent on circumstances, such as forgiveness when harm is done or courage when danger is present—in relation to organizational resilience. When leaders demonstrated virtuousness in the midst of downsizing, their organizations were significantly more able to absorb system shocks, to bounce back from difficulties, to heal relationships, and to collaborate. When organizations had virtuous leaders—both tonically and phasically —they were also more proficient at carrying on effectively despite the setbacks associated with downsizing.

A different kind of study was conducted in the U.S. airline industry after the tragedy of September 11, 2001. This study investigated the relationships between the virtuousness of the downsizing strategies implemented by leaders and the financial return achieved by the organizations (Gittell et al. 2006). The tragedy led to enormous financial losses for the U.S. airline companies, and the study examined the extent to which the leaders of these firms approached financial setbacks in virtuous ways. Virtuousness in this study was defined as preserving human dignity, investing in human capital, and providing an environment in which employee well-being was a priority. Eight of ten U.S. airline companies downsized, but leaders differed markedly in the ways that downsizing was approached.

Controlling for unionization, fuel price hedging, and financial reserves, the study found that the correlation between the virtuousness of the downsizing strategy and financial return (as measured by stock price gains) was p  = 0.86 in the first 12 months and p  = 0.79 over the next 5 years. The company with the highest level of leadership virtuousness earned the highest level of financial return in the industry. Virtuousness and financial return were positively and significantly related over the next 5 years.

Two additional studies specifically investigated the extent to which leadership virtuousness produces these performance improvements rather than having higher performance lead to virtuousness on the part of leaders (Cameron et al. 2011). One study examined 40 financial service organizations, and the other examined 30 health care organizations over multiple years to discover what happened to performance when virtuousness scores increased or decreased. These studies investigated the extent to which leaders fostered and enabled virtuous practices and promoted a culture characterized by virtuousness. Virtuousness was measured by six dimensions: caring (people care for, are interested in, and maintain responsibility for one another as friends), compassionate support (people provide support for one another including kindness and compassion when others are struggling), forgiveness (people avoid blaming and forgive mistakes), inspiration (people inspire one another at work), meaning (the meaningfulness of the work is emphasized, and people are elevated and renewed by their work), and respect, integrity, and gratitude (people treat one another with respect and express appreciation for one another as well as trusting one another and maintaining integrity). [3]

At the beginning of the study period, leaders of these financial services organizations had embarked on systematic efforts to incorporate virtuous practices into their corporate cultures. The performance outcomes of interest were employee turnover, organizational climate, and six financial performance measures, all of which were obtained from company records. Organizations that achieved higher levels of aggregated virtuousness scores also produced significantly higher financial performance, lower employee turnover, and better overall organizational climate 1 year later than did those organizations with lower virtuousness scores. Organizations that became highly virtuous generated better results in the following year than comparison organizations. This suggests that leadership virtuousness was predicting financial results rather than the reverse.

The second study conducted among 30 health care organizations also investigated changes in virtuousness scores over time and their effects on certain indicators of organizational performance. Leaders of these organizations had engaged in multi-day sessions designed to help them implement and facilitate virtuous practices and processes in their organizations. Two findings of interest emerged from this study. One is that when comparing organizations that attempted to improve in virtuousness compared to those that did not, organizations whose leaders were exposed to virtuousness training improved their virtuous practice scores significantly over a 3 year period. Units not exposed to virtuousness training did not improve.

A second finding is that organizations which improved the most in their virtuousness scores also produced the most improvement in the outcomes. Double digit improvement was detected over the 2 year period on the outcome measures included in the study. Organizations that improved in overall virtuousness outperformed organizations that did not improve in subsequent years in patient satisfaction, turnover, climate, resource adequacy, and quality of care.

The irony in this research is that while virtuousness does not require a visible, instrumental pay-off to be of worth, if observable, bottom-line impacts are not detected, then attention to virtuousness usually becomes subservient to the very real pressures related to enhancing financial return and organizational value (Jenson 2002; Davis 2008). Few business leaders invest in practices or processes that do not produce higher returns to shareholders, profitability, productivity, and customer satisfaction. Without visible payoff, in other words, those with stewardship for organizational resources ignore virtuousness and consider it of little relevance to important stakeholders. Hence, when associations between virtuousness and desired outcomes are observed in organizations, leaders may be more likely to respond to its pragmatic utility. Enhancing virtuousness also enhances economic outcomes.

Associating responsibility with virtuousness provides two advantages. One is that it helps identify a universally accepted standard for what leaders can consider the best or good for individuals and their organizations. Virtuousness represents the best of what humankind aspires to achieve, and responsible leadership in pursuit of the highest good is a worthy aspiration.

Second, evidence suggests that virtuous leadership produces desirable ends. These ends can provide advantages for all constituencies—rather than benefiting some at the expense of others—by focusing on virtuous outcomes. For example, Seligman (2011) recently articulated a goal for the field of psychology to be achieved by the year 2051. This goal is to have 51% of the world’s population flourishing by that date. Flourishing is defined as having people experience positive emotions, experience engagement (flow), experience satisfying relationships, experience meaningfulness in their activities, and experience achievement. These indicators were selected because they are argued to represent universally valued outcomes for all human beings. In the terms of this article, they represent potentially virtuous objectives. Huppert et al. (2009) found that the highest levels of flourishing are currently in Northern Europe (e.g., Denmark, Norway) at approximately 35%, whereas the lowest levels of flourishing are in Eastern Europe (e.g., Russia and Bulgaria) at approximately 5%. Adopting an approach to responsible leadership that includes the connotation of virtuousness would seem to be one of the most likely mechanisms for making progress toward such an aspiration.

Taking responsibility as a leader, in other words, certainly involves accountability, dependability, authority, and empowerment. If responsibility also includes the notion of virtuousness, however, the implications then become much more far-reaching and inclusive. Responsibility implies the pursuit of the ultimate best—eudaemonism—and, secondarily, to produce advantages for constituencies who may never be affected otherwise.

Note on Attribution

Chapter 1.7 Responsible Leadership as Virtuous Leadership was adapted from “Responsible Leadership as Virtuous Leadership” by Kim Cameron, licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0 .

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• Responsible leadership characteristics are reported to include “building public trust,” “sustaining an impeccable reputation,” “walking the talk,” “managing with integrity,” “making profits with principles,” “delivering on the triple bottom line,” “creating value for stakeholders,” “mobilizing people and teams,” “coaching and reinforcing employees,” “creating incentives to encourage respectful collaboration,” “safeguarding freedom of speech,” “ensuring adherence to employment standards,” “proving fair and equal employment opportunities,” “making sure that products and services meet customer needs,” “ensuring that ethical standards are respected,” “driven by a values-based vision of the future,” “having a fundamental values base,” “maintaining personal and professional integrity,” “making principled decisions,” “using values as a moral compass,” “promoting active citizenship inside and outside the organization,” “being rooted in an ethics of care,” “being driven by a desire to serve others,” “humility and modesty,” “an inclination to support others and to care for their interests and needs,” “being connected and close to stakeholders,” “growing and sustaining a web of stakeholder connections,” “having a drive to realize the vision in and through stakeholder engagement,” “being cooperative,” “being inclusive,” “being empathetic,” “creating a values-based sense of identify among stakeholders,” “a combination of cognitive, emotional, relational, and moral qualities,” and other characteristics (see Maak and Pless 2006a, b; Pless 2007). ↵
• This connotation of responsible leadership, of course, raises the issue of what is meant by right, correct, beneficial, or good. The problem, of course, is that some argue that what may be right or good for one may not be good for another, or what is beneficial for some may not be beneficial for all (Fineman 2006). This article does not propose to review these various arguments but, rather, to suggest that virtuousness can serve as one universalistic standard for what is defined as right, correct, or good. ↵
• These six dimensions of virtuousness were empirically derived from an assessment of 114 indicators of virtuousness. They are very similar to a proposed comprehensive list of virtues reported in prior published literature. Specifically, in one of the few published listings of proposed virtuous practices in organizations, Chun (2005) reviewed several previous inventories of virtues and analyzed the corporate ethical value statements of 158 Fortune Global firms. Her analyses produced six dimensions of virtuous practices. Her six dimensions incorporated lists of individual virtues proposed by Aristotle, Solomon (1999), Murphy (1999), Moberg (1999), and Shanahan and Hyman (2003). Each of Chun’s six dimensions is incorporated within the 6 positive practice dimensions that emerged in these studies. Specifically, Chun’s “integrity” is assessed as “respect, integrity, and gratitude” in this study. Chun’s “empathy” is assessed as “compassionate support” in this study. Chun’s “warmth” is assessed as “caring” in this study. Chun’s “courage” has similar items as “meaning” in this study. Chun’s “conscientiousness” has similar items as “forgiveness” in this study. And Chun’s “zeal” is assessed as “inspiration” in this study. ↵

Leading the Way: A Path Towards Ethical Leadership Copyright © by Thomas Edison State University and Kelly Alverson is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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The Virtues of a True Leader

The foundational lessons for effective leadership are these virtues..

Posted August 24, 2009

Recently, an interim director of a nonprofit organization asked me if I had any leadership tips for his term as an "interim leader." I told him the most important thing is to completely forget the "interim" part, and focus on just being the leader. Because what often happens with interim heads is that they don't lead. The title "interim" assumes that they are really just a placeholder and need to simply stay the course, and they certainly shouldn't try anything new or bold. But that is exactly the wrong strategy, and here is why:

We are doing work with Aristotle's cardinal virtues and how those relate to both ethical and effective leadership. The one that most came to mind (although all four apply) is fortitude, or courage. A good leader must be courageous, and simply staying the course as an interim director is not courageous. Effective leaders need to be bold. In our rapidly changing world, organizations need to innovate and keep up. Simply staying the course means that you will likely fall behind.

An interim leader, just like any leader, also should have the second virtue of prudence. Prudence involves gathering evidence, consulting with others, being objective and reflective before deciding on courses of action. It is particularly important for interim leaders to consult with knowledgeable managers and others - involving them in the decision making process (that leads to greater acceptance of the decisions).

Temperance is another cardinal virtue and it involves controlling one's emotions and "appetites." It is lack of temperance that gets many leaders into trouble. Temperance leads to humility - a quality found in the very best leaders - and temperance helps leaders admit when they've made mistakes and work to correct them.

Finally, justice is the last of the four cardinal virtues and it involves being fair in leading and in dealing with others. Leaders should not only treat everyone fairly, but they should not put their own gains over those of others.

These cardinal virtues - fortitude, prudence, temperance, and justice - are thousands of years old, but they still serve leaders well, even leaders who are only temporarily occupying a leadership role. They represent the fundamental qualities of outstanding leaders, and are a guideline for success.

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Ronald E. Riggio, Ph.D. , is the Henry R. Kravis Professor of Leadership and Organizational Psychology at Claremont McKenna College.

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What is Virtuous Leadership? Methods And Examples

Virtual leadership is a type of system, or you might even call it an approach, founded on the fundamental ideas and precepts that great leaders are developed via training rather than being born with these qualities. A genuine leader doesn’t have a particular approach or style.

What is important is how a leader conducts. A leader cannot exist without virtue and must govern and steer things correctly. A moral leader needs to be efficient and long-lasting.

He must possess a long list of moral traits, including restraint, bravery, pragmatism, justice, wisdom, and, in particular, the virtues and traits of humanity and kindness.

Table of Contents

What is Virtuous Leadership?

More specifically, virtual leadership entails reaching greatness by recognizing others’ superiority. Being a good person is insufficient. You should be able to inspire others with your goodness.

According to the online concept of moral leadership, men and women live with dynamic strength and trueness in character.

The ability to guide others toward greatness is a quality that true leaders should possess.

There is a school of moral leadership where instruction is given to produce leaders of the next generation with the proper character strengths and specialties.

Features of a Virtuous Leader

Virtuous managers are dynamic and possess the capacity and expertise to uphold the organization’s hierarchical connection with its workforce.

In this situation, it’s crucial to have the Leader’s behavior and thoughts in constant mind. A good leader must possess qualities to see the job through to completion.

The Honesty of the Leader

A strong sense of integrity and a preference for goodness and truth are qualities that the Leader should possess.

He strongly dislikes dishonest people, and his degree of coordination should be accurate and transparent.

A trustworthy leader would constantly search for clarity in others. The Leader will not favor individuals who travel down shadowy alleys and have a strong tendency toward manipulation. Straight, truthful people make good leaders.

Leaders should be Courageous.

The Leader should have high moral standards. He shouldn’t be concerned with appearances and criticism.

A leader might use these to experience and practice self-judgment. On the job, being honest can cost you and your colleagues. The wise Leader’sLeader’s courageous decisions can pay off in due course.

Once the Leader can overcome his doubts, he may show even more bravery. A fearless leader never worries about what others will think or where they will stand. They possess a high level of influence and the ability to motivate others.

A good and moral leader should never lose sight of self-charism and reputation. The individual should uphold moral and legitimate claims in life. A strong leader should possess structural virtue. He will be able to advance in life with confidence thanks to this.

A leader with Moral Vision

The most superior moral vision is essential for the morally upright Leader. They must act with moral bravery and comprehend what it means to live by moral principles. For many communities and groups, this is the appropriate mentality.

Leader with Care

The virtue of a leader must include compassion and consideration for others. They must be able to interact with others and comprehend their following requirements. A competent leader should be able to defend his interpersonal interactions.

Sense of Fairness

A virtuous leader should be equally fair with all people. He should have a sense of justice and execute policies for all the people working within the organization.

The Leader should be amicable with all people, and his sense of righteousness should be able to encourage other people.

Creative Virtuous Leader

A moral leader ought to be capable of original thought. He needs to adopt a unique way of thinking.

A good leader should use effective methods to complete tasks and satisfy corporate objectives.

Anyone able to develop original, creative ideas will always have a place in the world. The leaders are sincere and offer creative responses to every strategy.

Aesthetic Value of the Leader

In seeing the group’s benefits, the Leader uses his virtue. The leader should focus on the organization’s aesthetic components in this situation.

The innovators of new services and goods are exceptional, and this has the power to influence customer and user preferences actively.

To have a Sense of Timing.

A wise and moral leader ought to have a good sense of timing. The Leader is a good man, but he must wait for the right moment to introduce fresh ideas within the business. The Leader should not be persuaded in the wrong way by unnecessary compliments.

Virtuous leaders need to remain receptive to criticism. They must be willing to embrace the truth and allow room for fresh interventions.

Leaders should be Selfless.

A good and moral leader should always be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice. When there is uncertainty or a crisis, the Leader should act sacrificially. He must make decisions without considering his financial gain.

When things are not going according to plan, the Leader should inspire others to work hard and overcome obstacles at work.

Attributes of a Virtuous Leader

A moral leader inside an organization must deal with difficulties brought on by moral and ethical problems.

These include issues with sexism, environmental responsibility, discrimination, data privacy, accounting procedures, and favoritism.

There is a constant stream of infractions, which are now growing more severe. A strong leader should offer employees a haven and constant protection to ensure their safety inside the organizational perimeter.

Here you can learn about the four special attributes of the virtuous Leader.

The integrity of the Leader

The virtue of the Leader is beyond any reasonable doubt. These leaders may be chosen specifically for their values and expertise.

The Leader continuously upholds the norms and principles of the organization.

The morally upright Leader will give importance to moral principles over making quick money or grabbing attention.

The Collaborative Leader

The noble and righteous Leader must assemble a coalition of power and assistance. The leaders put in a lot of effort to help the group reach the objective as quickly as possible. The Leader will put the company’s interests ahead of his or her own more often.

The Leader will motivate the team members and push them to go beyond their potential. Making them feel like a part of the expert team is the Leader’sLeader’s role.

Role of the Virtuous Leader

The moral Leader will never chase fame or attention. Moral leaders think that their own success depends on the success of those around them.

A good leader will be able to identify those in their immediate vicinity. This will force them to choose the appropriate people for the work at hand. People will act with confidence because of the leaders’ good attitudes, which are always making a difference.

Accountability of the Leader

A moral leader supports the idea of equality. He would much rather have the same standing as the other team members.

Employees within the organization can give their best effort with the Leader’sLeader’s encouragement.

As a result of the Leader’sLeader’s continual input, the team members will have room to grow and have room for improvisation.

Based on the level and expectations of performance inside the company, the executives will constantly want the workers to accomplish their full potential.

Methods of being a Virtuous Leader

A good leader should uphold a set of values and act in a way that facilitates the lives of others. The list of actions and instructions for the Leader is provided here.

Vision and Value

The person in charge needs to have a distinct vision and adhere to a set of ideals. He will work diligently and never permit you to err in questions of ethics and morality.

Conviction and Confidence

The Leader should foresee those who might disagree with him and generate issues within the company. He needs to be proactive and self-assured so that he can deal with problems more firmly.

Honesty and Prudence

The Leader must be prudent enough to acknowledge mistakes and will never let the group suffer.

He should be capable of raising the organization’s standing and standards both morally and intellectually.

Energizing the Team

The Team Leader should work to energize the group and generate fresh ideas for problems that arise inside the company.

He needs to think ahead to establish the business by fusing fresh and outdated ideas.

Calling for Decision

The Team Leader is in charge of including the other team members in the decision-making process. Employee dedication and value will increase as a result of their positive perception of the company.

Praising the Employee Efforts

Praise your team members’ efforts when they go above and beyond to spread the word about the business in order to become better Leaders.

As a result, there will be an increase in team morale and the degree of loyalty.

Providing Incentives

One should be able to comprehend the values that are present around him in order to be a moral leader. He needs to grasp the moral motivations of the team members in order to provide those rewards.

Stay Open to New Things

Relying on your preconceived ideas and beliefs is a smart idea. At the same time, it’s important to keep an open mind to fresh, original ideas.

This will enable adjustments to be made within the organisation and lead to improvisations.

Defensiveness and Receptive

When confronted with difficult difficulties within the organisation, a competent leader should exhibit defensiveness and dismissiveness.

The Leader should continue to be open to change because doing so can motivate the other team members.

Good Listener

You need to listen actively if you want to be a good leader. You must pay close attention without talking. As a result, the team members will engage with you more effectively.

Empathy is Important

When acting the part of the moral Leader, you should have empathy. This quality will make it simple for you to comprehend other people and empathise with the workers. Without empathy, team members would connect with one another the least.

Examples Of Virtuous Leaders

Here are some examples of virtuous leaders:

• Nelson Mandela : Mandela is known for his commitment to justice, equality, and forgiveness. He demonstrated these virtues throughout his life, even while he was imprisoned for 27 years. He led South Africa through its transition from apartheid to a democracy, and he is widely admired for his wisdom, humility , and compassion.
• Mahatma Gandhi : Gandhi was a leader in the Indian independence movement and is widely respected for his commitment to nonviolence, truth, and self-discipline. He was a spiritual leader who inspired millions of people to work for social justice and human rights.
• Martin Luther King Jr .: King was a Baptist minister and civil rights leader who led the American civil rights movement from the mid-1950s until his assassination in 1968. He is known for his commitment to nonviolence, social justice, and equality, and he inspired millions of people around the world to work for a more just and equal society.
• Mother Teresa : Mother Teresa was a Catholic nun who dedicated her life to serving the poorest of the poor in India. She is known for her humility, compassion, and dedication to helping others, and she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1979.
• Aung San Suu Kyi : Aung San Suu Kyi is a Burmese politician and democracy activist who has dedicated her life to promoting democracy and human rights in Myanmar. She is known for her courage, compassion, and commitment to justice, and she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991.

These are just a few examples of virtuous leaders who have positively impacted the world through their leadership and commitment to serving others.

The virtuous Leader’sLeader’s job is quite practical. To motivate the team within the organization, the Leader will employ feelings and emotions.

The team leader should always pay attention to the details. Even minor things that might eventually be advantageous for the business shouldn’t be let go, according to him.

The team members need to receive the appropriate encouragement from the moral Leader. He must immediately begin motivating the staff on a good note and never let them sit around doing nothing.

Selflessness is a trait of good leaders. They prioritize the growth of the business over their own financial gain.

How can virtuous leadership be developed?

Virtuous leadership can be developed through self-reflection, education, and the practice of ethical principles in daily life.

It can also be supported by organizational culture and leadership development programs.

How does virtuous leadership differ from other leadership styles?

Virtuous leadership differs from other leadership styles, such as transactional or transformational leadership , by placing greater emphasis on ethical principles and social responsibility.

Can virtuous leadership be applied in all industries and organizations?

Yes, virtuous leadership can be applied in all industries and organizations, regardless of their size or sector.

It is a flexible leadership style that can be adapted to suit the needs of different contexts and situations.

More To Explore:

• What Is Transformational Leadership: Unleashing The Power Of Influence
• What Is Traditional Leadership? Characteristics, Examples
• Military Leadership: Inspiring Teams to Achieve Goals
• Emergent Leadership: Definition, Theories & Characteristics
• What Is Natural Leadership? Traits And Qualities

“Vision, strategy, and inspiration – these three words describe me the best. I am the founder of “TheLeaderboy” dedicated to leadership and personal development. As a self-taught practitioner, I have been studying the principles of effective leadership for the past decade and my passion lies in sharing my insights with others. My mission is to empower individuals to become better leader

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Justice as a Virtue

The notion of justice as a virtue began in reference to a trait of individuals, and to some extent remains so, even if today we often conceive the justice of individuals as having some (grounding) reference to social justice. But from the start, the focus on justice as a virtue faced pressures to diffuse, in two different ways.

First, “justice as a virtue” is ambiguous as between individual and social applications. Rawls and others regard justice as “the first virtue of social institutions” (1971, p. 3), but Rawls is not the first to think of justice as a virtue of social institutions or societies — Plato was there long before him. However, justice as a virtue of societies, polities, and their institutions is addressed elsewhere , so the focus in this essay will be on justice as a virtue in individuals. That said, individuals typically live as members of political communities, so the societal dimension of justice as a virtue will never be long out of view (Woodruff 2018).

Second, from the start the effort to analyze the virtue of justice has led to attempts to formalize the requirements (or norms) of justice, and at times the latter project has threatened to swallow the first in ways that make thinking of a virtue of justice gratuitous or otiose. We might be tempted to think that the virtue of justice consists simply in compliance with the norms of justice our theory specifies: a just person will be one who complies with the norms of justice, whether those are narrowly interpersonal or more broadly social or political in scope. In this way the virtue becomes subsidiary to norms of justice independently specified (Anderson 2010, p. 2; LeBar 2014). Doing so threatens to lose the force that the notion of virtue had in the earliest thinking about justice.

A further complication is that even the idea of justice as a virtue of individuals seems ambiguous in regard to scope. Plato in the Republic treats justice as an overarching virtue of both individuals and societies, so that almost every issue he (or we) would regard as ethical comes in under the notion of justice. But in later usages justice covers only part of individual morality, and we don’t readily think of someone as unjust if they lie or neglect their children — other epithets more readily spring to mind. Individual justice first and most readily regards moral issues having to do with distributions of goods or property. It is, we say, unjust for someone to steal from people or not to give them what he owes them, and it is also unjust if someone called upon to distribute something good (or bad or both) among members of a group uses an arbitrary or unjustified basis for making the distribution. Discussion of justice as an individual virtue often centers on questions, therefore, about property and other distributable goods, though the broader sense broached by Plato never entirely disappears. Still there is disagreement over whether the broader distributive questions associated with political morality have subordinated or obscured the earlier Greek concerns with justice as a virtue of individual character (Hursthouse 1999, pp. 5–6; Coope 2007; Lu 2017).

1.1 Ancient

1.2 medieval and modern, 2. social psychology and justice, 3. justice as a virtue of societies.

• 4. Justice and other Virtues

5. Recent Developments

6. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries.

Philosophical discussion of justice begins with Plato, who treats the topic in a variety of dialogues, most substantially in Republic . There Plato offers the first sustained discussion of the nature of justice ( dikaiosune ) and its relation to happiness, as a departure from three alternatives receiving varying degrees of attention. First, there is a traditionalist conception of justice (speaking the truth and paying your debts). Second, Plato has Socrates rebut the Sophist conception of justice which built on a distinction between nature ( phusis ) and convention ( nomos ) As Plato has this conception articulated by Thrasymachus in Book I, justice is simply the “advantage of the stronger,” not tracking anything like the sort of value attributed to it by traditionalists. Finally, Plato has Socrates confront a conventionalist conception of justice that anticipates modern contractarian views, in which justice — forbearing preying on others in exchange for not being preyed on by them — is a “second-best alternative,” not as good as being able to prey at will upon others, but better than being the prey of others. These last two challenges give rise to the central question of the book: to whose advantage is justice? Would we really be better off being unjust if we could get away with it? Plato’s negative answer to that question is the project of the balance of the work.

Plato’s method involves the provocative idea that justice in the city ( polis ) is the same thing as justice in the individual, just “writ large.” There are good reasons to worry about that assumption (Williams 1973; Keyt 2006). But in Plato’s sociology of the city, there are three classes engaged in a kind of division of labor. There is a guardian class which rules, a class of “auxiliaries” that provide the force behind the ruling, and the class of merchants that produce to satisfy the needs and desires of the city. Similarly, the psyche of the individual has three parts: a reasoning part to rule, a “spirited” part to support the rule of reason, and an appetitive part. Plato finds justice in the city to consist in each part “having and doing its own,” and since the smaller is just like the larger, justice in the individual consists in each part of the psyche doing its own work. (This grounds the idea, later enshrined by Justinian, that justice is “giving every man his due;” Justinian I.i). Further, Plato argues, justice is a master virtue in a sense, because in both the city and the psyche, if each part is doing its own job, both city and psyche will also have wisdom, courage, and moderation or self-discipline. This conception of justice sustains the contrast with the conventionalist view advocated by the Sophists. On the other hand, at least initially it leaves it an open question whether the just individual refrains from such socially proscribed actions as lying, killing, and stealing. Plato eventually seeks to show that someone with a healthy, harmonious soul wouldn’t lie, kill, or steal, but it is not clear that argument succeeds, nor, if it does, that that is the right understanding of why we ought not to lie, kill, or steal (Sachs 1963; LeBar 2013, ch. XII).

Plato gives a somewhat different treatment of justice in Crito , in which Socrates’ eponymous friend attempts to persuade Socrates to accept his (Crito’s) offer to bribe a way out of the death sentence Socrates is waiting to have executed. Here Plato’s arguments first associate the just life with the good life, thus the life Socrates has most reason to live. And justice, he then argues, requires not only not inflicting wrong or injury on others, even in response to wrongs from them, but fulfilling one’s agreements, and — in particular — abiding by one’s (tacit or explicit) agreement to abide by the laws of the city unless one can persuade it to change them. Of course, justice cannot require one to abide by laws that require one to act unjustly, as Socrates’ own case (as characterized in Apology ) shows (Kraut 1984).

It is worth noting (as Johnston 2011 observes) that even if Plato’s is the first philosophical discussion of justice, a concern with what an individual is due as a matter of justice is a driving issue in Homer’s Iliad , though there is no counterpart concern there with justice as a property of a society or tribe. So even Plato’s philosophical concerns are building on well-established questions about what justice requires of us in our treatment of one another.

Aristotle does not see the virtue of justice in quite the comprehensive sense Plato does; he treats it as a virtue of character (in the entirety of one of the ten books of the Nicomachean Ethics , also common to the Eudemian Ethics ), and as a virtue of constitutions and political arrangements (in Politics ). The question naturally arises as to the relation between these forms of justice. Aristotle seems to think they are closely related, without being synonymous applications of the same concept. As the latter is a conception of political justice, we will focus here on the former. Justice as a personal virtue follows Aristotle’s model for virtues of character, in which the virtue lies as an intermediate or mean between vices of excess and defect ( Nicomachean Ethics V). While he grants that there is a “general” sense of justice in which justice is coincident with complete virtue, there is a “particular” sense in which it is concerned with not overreaching ( pleonexia ). It is not clear, however, exactly how Aristotle understands this arrangement, or the nature of the vices of excess and defect which this “particular” justice is to counteract. One very plausible reading has it that justice is opposed to a desire for maldistribution of “goods of fortune” such as money, fame, or honor (Williams 1980; Curzer 1995). On another it is opposed to an insufficient attention to others’ rights (Foot 1988, p. 9). On still another it focuses on the goods of others, or common goods (O’Connor 1988; Miller 1995).

These issues remain open in part because Aristotle seems most interested in establishing a conception of the formal structure of “particular” justice, which seems to reflect a conception of desert. He distinguishes between justice in distribution and justice in rectification. The former, he claims, adheres to a kind of proportionality, in which what each deserves is proportional to the relationship between the contributions. If A contributes twice as much as B (of whatever the metric of merit is relevant in some particular case), then A’s return ought also to be twice B’s. This conception of distributive justice obviously lends itself to “goods of fortune” — and to some goods, like wealth, more obviously than others — but it need not in principle be confined to such goods, although the examples Aristotle provides suggest such applications. Similarly, justice in rectification involves a sort of “arithmetical proportion.” If C defrauds D by amount X, then justice requires depriving C of X and restoring X to D, as a matter of reestablishing a kind of equality between them. These structural devices are elegant and attractive, but they leave open a number of questions (LeBar, forthcoming). First, as indicated, to what are we to suppose they apply? Second, in what way do they figure into the nature of the person who is just in the particular sense? (That is, how are they related to justice as a virtue?) Does a model of particular justice as a virtue fit the general model of virtue as a mean, and if so, what sort of mean is it? Aristotle seems torn between a conception of justice as a virtue in his distinctive understanding of what a virtue is — with a requirement that one have all the virtues to have any ( Nicomachean Ethics VI.13), and rooted in the doctrine of the mean — and justice as having the form of a formal normative structure, to which the virtue threatens to become subsidiary. All this is to leave aside questions of the relation between this “particular” sense of justice and political justice, and the role of the virtue of justice in the individual as it contributes to justice in the polis.

Epicurus’ conception of the role of justice was more central to his eudaimonism perhaps than its counterpart in Plato and Aristotle, but that reflects in part his distinctive understanding of eudaimonia , or happiness. For Epicurus this consisted in ataraxia — tranquility, or freedom from disturbance. Given that the good life is the life without disturbance, justice plays a key instrumental role. One might, Epicurus thinks, withdraw entirely from human society to avoid disturbance, but the alternative is to live socially under terms which secure the avoidance of disturbance. This is the structure of the ideal Epicurean community, in which each forbears aggression (Armstrong 1997, Thrasher 2013). Justice is a matter of keeping agreements generally, and in particular the agreement not to harm or transgress social norms.

In this way Epicurus offers a conception of the virtue of justice that harmonizes both its personal and its political dimensions. The personal virtue consists in the motivation to abide by a contract not to aggress or harm others. The political virtue inheres in a polity in which such norms regulate the conduct of its citizens, and these two dimensions of justice as a virtue reinforce each other.

The other great ethical tradition of antiquity (Stoicism) had remarkably little to say about justice (Annas 1993, p. 311), so we pass on to the medieval and modern periods.

The legacy of the ancients — Aristotle in particular — continued into the medieval period, notably in the work of Thomas Aquinas, who appropriated much of Aristotle’s philosophy while setting it into a Christian theological framework. As in Aristotle, virtue and virtues are prominent parts of his ethical theory. And, like Aristotle justice is an important virtue, though for Aquinas it less important than the virtue of charity, a Christian virtue that did not appear among the virtues recognized by Aristotle. There are other elements of his account that situate it in an interesting way in the transition from ancient eudaimonist accounts of virtue, to virtue as it appears in the modern era, before it recedes from prominence in ethical theory.

But to the extent Christian writers allied themselves with Plato and Aristotle, they were downplaying another central element in Christian thought and morality, the emphasis on agapic love. Such love seems to be a matter of motivationally active feeling rather than of being rational, and some writers on morality (eventually) allowed this side of Christianity to have a major influence on what they had to say about virtue.

Significant elements of the Aristotelian account of justice reappear in Aquinas’. First, justice is first and foremost a virtue of character rather than institutions, although Aquinas draws a distinction among such virtues not found in Aristotle. For Aquinas, justice as a virtue is a matter of perfection of the will, rather than the passions (ST II-II 58.4). Aquinas offers no account of justice as a virtue of societies or institutions, though he interprets the “general” sense of justice he borrows from Aristotle as being a matter of individual willing and action for the common good. “Particular” justice, which as in Aristotle’s account is most of his focus, has to do with relationships -- in particular but not limited to exchange -- between individuals as individuals (ST II-II 58.8).

Second, Aquinas grounds the norms for these exchanges in the ancient formula of Justinian, which hearkens back to Plato: justice is giving each his own. But his interpretation of this formula situates him astride a deep but subtle divide between ancient and modern thought. To some extent this effect is an upshot of his inheriting not only the Greek eudaimonist tradition, but also a Roman jurisprudential tradition in which notions like standing and right as claim (rather than, say, fairness) had begun to emerge (Porter 2016, p. 143). As a result, Aquinas’ synergistic account has some novel complications.

One major complication, relative to the ancient accounts, is that what is ours by right is a recognition of a kind of status, as an effect of the order among people ordained by God ( ST I-II 100.8). As Jean Porter points out, this establishes a normative standard for justice that does not grow out of the agent’s own perfection or eudaimonia (Porter 2016, p. 157). There are two significant follow-on implications.

First, the fabric of the eudaimonist approach to practical reasoning and life — inherited from the Greeks — begins to fray. For better or worse, on the Greek eudaimonist views (including here Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicurus) our reasons for action arise from our interest in a happy life. If the reason-giving nature of others arises from a different source, as this reading of Aquinas suggests, then practical reason seems to have a duality of ultimate sources, with the complications that kind of duality brings.

Second, this is the first step in the diminution of the theoretical significance of the virtues — a process that will not begin to be reversed until the middle of the 20th century. On Aristotle’s view, for example, the virtuous person sees reasons for acting that the non-virtuous do not (and that arguably are not there to be seen absent the effects of virtue — LeBar 2013; Berryman 2019). Virtue is no longer the normative epicenter of the theory, as it was for the Greeks. To the extent that this aspect of Aquinas’s view has virtue responsive to value or reasons that is accounted for in some way other than the work of virtue, it is the leading edge of process that will result in a much-reduced role for virtue in later ethical accounts

Hume is an excellent exemplar of this point, in both the Treatise and the Enquiries . Virtue, Hume maintains, is a matter of “some quality or character,” produced in one by “durable principles of the mind” ( T III.iii.I, p. 575). We deem such qualities virtues not, as on the ancient Greek view, because they conduce to the happiness of the person who has them, but because they have a “tendency to the good of mankind” or society. ( T III.iii.I). This service renders them pleasing to our “moral tastes:” our approbation, Hume tells us, has its source in “view of a character, which is naturally fitted to be useful to others, or to the person himself, or which is agreeable to others, or to the person himself” ( T III.iii.I, 591). We can think of that as the criterion some quality of character must have to be deemed a virtue. In consequence, what counts as virtuous is an upshot of, and not the source of, the normative foundations of this view.

By Hume’s time the content of justice as a virtue has shifted as well. In Hume’s treatment, the focus of justice is property — relations of “mine and thine.” It is a “cautious, jealous” virtue in the sense that it is focused on the sorts of exclusionary powers that are characteristic of property rules and relations. We may always be aspiring for more but justice aims at the preservation and security of what one has already ( E III.1, p. 184). So the virtue of justice, as Hume thinks of it, will in the main consist of a quality in one which disposes one to observe and uphold these rules.

What Hume wants to show is, first, that we can have such a disposition or quality (that is, that it is possible for us to have a quality or character to observe the rules of justice), and, second, that such a quality would count as a virtue, given his criteria. His approach to these questions in the Treatise is framed by a problem he has set up himself. To appreciate that problem, we have to step back to Hume’s broader view about moral motivation. Hume had argued that moral principles “are not conclusions of our reason” ( T III.i.I); instead, they are “more properly felt than judg’d of” ( T III.i.II). Morality, and virtue, is a matter of sentiments or passions. Why? Hume marshals a number of arguments to this effect which are not relevant to our purposes. The basic reason is that the functional roles of reason and the passions are markedly different, in Hume’s view. The task of reason is to discover truth or falsehood, in “relations of ideas” or “matters of facts” ( T III.i.I); as such, it utterly lacks the capacity to move us to action. Only the passions can do that ( T II.iii.III). The passions, on the other hand, have no representational content whatsoever; they are “original existences” ( T II.iii.III; III.i.I). Virtue is paradigmatically a practical matter: it is a property of what we do, and to act we must be motivated. That means any successful account of virtue must find it in our passions, not in any aspect of our reason ( T III.i.I). So far so good.

However, when we come to justice, we look in vain for a passion that can supply motive power for us to act justly. If anything, our natural motives move us away from justice ( T III.ii.II). Self-love requires “correcting and restraining” ( T III.ii.I). And only a passion can do that. But which? Hume himself dismisses the possibilities of public or private beneficence or universal love. In the end he concludes that there is no natural passion to explain it. Instead, it is in a certain crucial sense artificial ( T III.ii.VI). Under certain conditions, given that we are sensible of the advantages of living in human society, our self-love or self-interest may be given an “alteration of its direction,” and induce us to respect the rules of justice. These Hume thinks of primarily as involving honesty and “particular” property rules ( T III.ii.II). That “alteration” needs explanation.

Two facts about the conditions in which we act — one about us, one about our environment — set this alteration in motion. First, Hume maintains, we are limited in our generosity or benevolence. And second, we live in conditions of scarcity ( T III.ii.II). We have to work to make a go of it, and we cannot count on others to do so for us. We need control of our world to meet our needs, but we are vulnerable to the selfishness and predation of others.

The solution, Hume argues, is that we naturally fall into a “convention” by which we observe that rules of property — the observance of which is key to the virtue of justice — is good for all of us. This convention is no formal agreement; Hume argues that it cannot be something like the product of promise or compact ( T III.ii.II). Instead, “it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it” ( T III.ii.II, p. 490). Much as two men pulling the oars in a boat together need no explicit agreement to find they prosper by such an arrangement, so do we generally. (Wilson 2018 explores support for Hume’s hypothesis through work in experimental economics.) So in the end it is self-interest that drives us to comply with the requirements of justice, though Hume adds that sympathy with the public interest induces our endorsement of it once justice has become established. This endorsement, however, is reserved for a scheme of property rules taken generally; as Hume observes, individual instances of compliance may frequently be “contrary to public interest,” though such compliance is still required of us. Hume believes the benefit of the system overall, both to society and to individual, requires that rules not admit of exceptions ( T III.ii.II, E Appendix III, §256). Self-interest accounts for the possibility of our being motivated to act as the virtue of justice requires, and both the utility and the agreeableness, both to ourselves and others, of a resulting social order with respected property rules, leads to our approbation of that motivation as a virtue.

In fact, this point — that “public utility is the sole origin of justice” — is the point of Hume’s discussion of justice in the Enquiries (III.I, ¶145). Scarcity imposes a need for us to distinguish mine from thine, and we have not sufficient generosity in our natures to do without property rules (as we might, say, in our families). And once again Hume argues that our recognition of the utility and necessity of justice provides “entire command over our sentiments” ( E III.II, ¶163).As David Johnston observes (Johnston 2011, p. 138), Hume’s understanding of the value of justice as instrumental in the promotion of utility marks a sharp shift from earlier understandings which invoked various forms of reciprocity in understanding that value.

Such a sentimentalist account of justice is also found in Adam Smith; in fact, a focus on the sentiments almost completely swamps concern for virtue. Our judgments of virtue and vice, he says, are compounded by consideration of two different “relations” in a sentiment: “the cause or object which excites or causes it, and … the end which it proposes” (TMS II.i.introduction). His focus on those two “relations” obviates any independent discussion of virtue per se. He does however explicitly countenance a virtue of justice, developed in contrast with the virtue of beneficence. In Smith, even more clearly than in Hume, one can see that this virtue consists in conformity to “rules” or “laws” of justice that appear to exist antecedently to the realization of the virtue itself, unlike ancient accounts. Smith indicates that justice merits resentment when absent, that it may be “extorted by force,” and that in the main it requires forbearing from harming others.. Smith calls justice a “negative virtue” in this respect: often all it requires is that we sit still and do nothing (Smith 1759, II.ii.I.5, 9). It is essential to the subsistence of society, Smith tells us (Smith 1759, II.ii.3.3-4), but — in contrast to Hume — is not reducible in its motivational basis to regard for society. Instead, our just concern for “multitudes” is compounded of our concern for individuals, which arises from “fellow-feeling,” which is yet short of “love, esteem, and affection” (Smith 1759, II.ii.3.7).

In Kant, finally, along with a movement away from sentimentalism we see the completion of the distinction between justice as a virtue and justice as a norm to which a virtue may or may not correspond. While Kant has a theory (or “doctrine”) of virtue, he distinguishes that theory precisely against a counterpoised theory of justice. The two are complementary elements in the “metaphysics of morals.” Moreover, the doctrine of justice itself has two parts, roughly corresponding to the distinction present since Plato’s work, between the role of justice in the individual and the role of justice in the state. Kant calls these “private right” and “public right,” respectively. But right in either case is not how Kant at least conceives of virtue; instead, right is a “condition” that can obtain between the moral agents comprising a moral or legal community, in virtue of their principles of choice in acting (Kant 1797). Little remains here of the notion of justice as a virtue of individuals as it began with the ancient Greeks.

20th-century developmental psychology drew deeply on the Kantian legacy. Piaget (1932/1948) treated moral development as principally involving increasing cognitive sophistication. More particularly, Piaget saw that sophistication as a matter of taking more and more general or universal views of moral issues, and endorsed the Kantian and rationalist idea that morality rests on and can be justified in terms of considerations of justice. Piaget saw a “law of evolution” in moral development, from an understanding of rules (including moral rules) as being “heteronomous” impositions of authority, to which one is objectively responsible, to a grounding in mutual respect, accompanied by subjective responsibility to others (Piaget 1932/1948, p. 225). This transition is fostered through social interaction, and attention to norms of equality and reciprocity replace those of mere obedience.

Educational psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg was inspired by Piaget to propose a conception of moral development that postulated six stages of human moral development. In his earliest work, Kohlberg identified the highest stage of such development with a concern for justice and human rights based on universal principles. Concern for relationships and for individual human well-being was embedded in a framework of conformity to social norms, at lower stages of the process. Moreover, he saw the ordering of the different stages in Piagetian fashion as basically reflecting differences in rational understanding: those whose moral thinking involved the invoking of universal principles of justice and rights were thought to show a more advanced cognitive development than those whose moral thought appeals primarily to the importance of relationships and of human well-being or suffering. The paradigm of moral development involves judgments that are “reversible,” in the sense that each party to the issue can accept the correct judgment by reversing his or her perspective and taking up the viewpoint of the other (Kohlberg 1981). The sophisticated moral reasoner will engage in a process of “moral musical chairs,” taking up the positions of the parties to the conflict successively. It is, on this version of Kohlberg’s thought, that formal feature of the deliberative process that is characteristic of greatest moral development. As his research and thought progressed, however, Kohlberg increasingly acknowledged that these formal features were less characteristic of overall moral development and thought than of the deployment of specifically justice-based concepts. In fact, Kohlberg was impressed by the work of Rawls, and thought that the nature of Rawls’ “original position of equality” exemplified the kind of reversibility that is paradigmatic of the highest form of moral thought (Kohlberg 1981, p. 204). However, his approach treats utilitarianism as less cognitively advanced (more primitive) than rationalist views like Kant’s, and utilitarians (like R.M. Hare) naturally called into question the objectivity and intellectual fairness of Kohlberg’s account.

More significantly, perhaps, the evidence for Kohlberg’s stage sequence was drawn from studies of boys, and when one applies the sequence to the study of young girls, it turns out that girls on average end up at a less advanced stage of moral development than boys do. In her 1982 book In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development , Carol Gilligan responded to Kohlberg’s views by questioning whether a theory of moral development based solely on a sample of males could reasonably be used to draw conclusions about the inferior moral development of women. Gilligan argued that her own studies of women’s development indicated that the moral development of girls and women proceeds and ends in a different fashion from that of boys and men, but that that proves nothing about inferiority or superiority: it is merely a fact of difference. In particular, Gilligan claimed that women tend to think morally in terms of connection to others (relationships) and in terms of caring about (responsibility for) those with whom they are connected; men, by contrast and in line with Kohlberg’s studies, tend to think more in terms of general principles of justice and of individual rights against (or individual autonomy from) other people. But Jean Hampton, among others, responded that Gilligan’s critique was itself a distortion, and that concerns for justice and individual rights are as significant for and in the moral lives of women as for men (Hampton 1993).

In recent years, a variety of social sciences have intensified investigation into aspects of our natures that are plausibly important for a virtue of justice. For example, Widlok 2018 surveys cross-cultural anthropological work examining the development of “ethical skill” in rightful and just sharing practices.

For a variety of reasons, many ethical thinkers have thought that justice cannot be based in sentiment but requires a more intellectually constructive rational(ist) basis, and in recent times this view of the matter seems to have been held, most influentially, by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice . Rawls makes clear his belief in the inadequacy of benevolence or sympathetic human sentiment in formulating an adequate conception of social justice. He says in particular that sentiment leaves unanswered or indeterminate various important issues of justice that a good theory of justice ought to be able to resolve.

Rawls’s positive view of justice is concerned primarily with the justice of institutions or (what he calls) the “basic structure” of society: justice as an individual virtue is derivative from justice as a social virtue defined via certain principles of justice. The principles, famously, are derived from an “original position” in which (very roughly) rational contractors under a “veil of ignorance” decide how they wish to commit themselves to being governed in their actual lives. Rawls deliberately invokes Kantian rationalism (or anti-sentimentalism) in explaining the intellectual or theoretical motivation behind his construction, and the two principles of justice that he argues would be agreed upon under the contractual conditions he specifies represent a kind of egalitarian political liberalism. Roughly, those principles stress (equality of) basic liberties and opportunities for self-advancement over considerations of social welfare, and the distribution of opportunities and goods in society is then supposed to work to the advantage of all (especially the worst-off members of society). He also says that the idea of what people distributively deserve or merit is derivative from social justice rather than (as with Aristotle and/or much common-sense thinking) providing the basis for thinking about social justice.

According to Rawls, individual justice is theoretically derivative from social justice because the just individual is to be understood as someone with an effective or “regulative” desire to comply with the principles of justice. However, it is not merely social justice that Rawls understands in (predominantly) rationalist fashion. When he explains how individuals (within a just society) develop a sense and/or the virtue of justice, he invokes the work of Piaget. Rawls lays more stress than Piaget does on the role our affective nature (sympathy and the desire for self-mastery) plays in the acquisition of moral virtue. But, like Piaget, he stresses the need for a sufficiently general appreciation and rational understanding of social relations as the grounding basis of a sense of duty or of justice and he explicitly classifies his account of moral development as falling within the “rationalist tradition.”

4. Justice and Other Virtues

Few would doubt that justice is a virtue of character. But there are other moral virtues. How is justice related to them? Is it more important? Even in Republic , in which Plato makes justice a “master virtue” of sorts, there are other virtues (wisdom, courage, and self-discipline), and elsewhere (notably Gorgias ) Plato makes self-discipline ( sophrosune ) the “master virtue,” so it is not clear that justice has any sort of priority over these other virtues. Likewise, though the texts we have show Aristotle devoting more space to justice, it is not clear that the particular form of the virtue of justice has any sort of pre-eminence. On the other hand, Cicero claims that justice is the “crowning glory” of the virtues ( De Officiis I.7). If we take virtue of character to have the moral centrality the ancients (perhaps in contrast to the moderns), how much importance should we accord to justice among the virtues?

Aquinas cites Cicero as a target in developing a sophisticated view of the relationships among the virtues ( ST II-II 58.12). On Aquinas’ view, Cicero is half right, for Aquinas distinguishes between virtues as responsive to appetites of our animal nature (moral virtues) and as responsive to appetites of our intellect (virtues of the will). He takes it that justice is preeminent over the moral virtues because it inheres in the rational part of the soul, and because its object is more noble (the good of others, or the common good, rather than the individual good). On that point he can agree with Cicero. However, these virtues themselves are not as excellent as the theological virtues, of which the greatest is love (or charity -- caritas; ST II-II 23.6). There are several arguments for this claim but it is grounded in Paul’s admonition to the Corinthians, that love is the greatest among the virtues of faith and hope (1 Corinthians 13:13).

In recent decades there have been secular challenges to the primacy of justice among virtues. Recall that Carol Gilligan had argued for a “different voice” for women in coming to grips with moral problems. Instead of a rights-based understanding of morality that gave special consideration to the individual, women saw relationships between people as primary (Gilligan 1983, pp. 19, 29). Kohlberg had offered a thought experiment about a man (“Heinz”) tempted to steal a life-saving drug to save his sick wife (Kohlberg 1981, p. 12). Whereas boys are more likely to think of Heinz’ dilemma in terms of what is the right thing to do, girls, Gilligan argues, see the world as “a world of relationships and psychological truths where an awareness of the connection between people gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one another” (Gillian 1983, p. 30). Gilligan carefully frames this contrast as one between voices, not a matter of ranking of dispositions or virtues, but her work can and did provide a basis for making that sort of assessment between virtues, one on which (as in Aquinas’ case) love and care for others turns out to be more important than considerations of justice.

In some ways, Nel Nodding’s pioneering work in laying out an “ethic of care” takes such a step. Following Gilligan, she sees much ethical theory as missing a feminine voice, one which grounds moral concern for the concrete other in caring for them and their needs, and thus as relational rather than individualistic (Noddings 1983, 1999). Yet some caution is required before seeing her as taking up something like a Thomistic stance on the priority of love over justice. For one thing, to a significant degree she wants to emphasize the importance of the concrete and particular as opposed to the abstract and general (or the reliance on universal principles) in thinking and acting morally. But that is an emphasis which animates some particularistic forms of virtue ethics, and does not distinguish justice from love or other virtues. Moreover, where she explicitly argues that care “‘picks up’ where justice leaves off” (Noddings 1999, p. 12), she is thinking of justice as a property of institutions (e.g. Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness), and institutional implementations of those theories, not a virtue of character. She is clearly concerned about the limits of “rights-talk,” but that at least historically has not been a prominent part in thinking about justice as a virtue of character. Thus she does not clearly take a side in this matter.

Like Noddings, Virginia Held frames much of the point of the ethics of care against a historical theoretical backdrop of attention to justice (Held 1995, 2004, 2006). To some extent, like Noddings, for Held the relevant notion of justice is not a virtue of character but a concern with fairness, equality, and individual rights, or perhaps more generally impartial universal principles (Held 2004, p. 144; 2006, p. 14). In fact, Held more clearly poses an ethics of care as an alternative to virtue ethics (Held 2004, 143; 2006, 14). This is for two reasons. First, virtue ethical theories focus on dispositions and traits of individuals, whereas an ethics of care focuses on relations between individuals. Second, an ethics of care sees people as partially constituted by their relations with others, as opposed to the individualism characteristic of virtue ethics. Held does not think an ethics of care can do without a concern for justice as a value, however (Held 1995, 129). More generally, she believes, caring provides a “wider network” within which concerns for justice and virtue (as well as utility) should be fitted (2004, 147; 2006, 72). Margaret McLaren (2001), on the other hand, responds on the basis of commonalities between care ethics and virtue ethics that care ethics actually is most attractive when situated as an ethics of virtue. Marilyn Friedman (1987) similarly seems accepting of the general framework of virtue ethics, and of crucial places for virtues of both caring and justice within such a framework, responsive to different degrees and in different ways to gender differences she believes actually do hold, though not falling along a caring/justice fault line.

Michael Slote also accepts care ethics as well-situated as a virtue ethical theory, but argues for the necessity of conceiving such a theory as “agent-based” -- holding that motivation or motives are “the ultimate bases for evaluation of action, institutions, laws, and societies” (Slote 1998, p. 173). As he has developed his view, empathic motivation has come to take an increasing role (Slote 2010, p. 124). As with Noddings and Held, for Slote the relevant questions about justice are about forms of social organization, the allocation of rights, and so on. If there is a vestige of the Platonic/Justinian model of justice as a virtue, it would appear to figure in only as a rationale for the shape of some social policies reflecting e.g. social (or perhaps global) distributive justice. But empathy is the focal normative concern throughout. The justice of a society constitutively depends on the motives of the individuals who make it up (Slote 1998, p. 187; 2010, p. 128). If the relevant motives are caring or empathic ones, then Slote’s analysis would seem to collapse the distinction between caring and justice as virtues of individual character (or motivation). That is, individuals would count as just exactly to the degree that their motivations are empathic, and they thus contribute to the laws, policies, institutions, and so on in ways that are reflective of similar motivations across society. But that is just to say that they are caring motivations as well.

A somewhat different feminist critique of a focus on a virtue of justice comes from Robin Dillon. Like Slote, her concern is more with social institutions, structures, and hierarchies than with traits of character, and in fact these priorities lead her to be critical of virtue ethical theories which, she believes, cannot ask the right questions about virtues and vices (Dillon 2012, p. 86). However, she does accept the point that character traits matter, though she believes attending to the vices that allow and support social structures that allow for oppression and domination is more pertinent to feminist moral philosophy.

Lisa Tessman, on the other hand, accepts the basic framework of Aristotelian thinking about virtues of character, and with it the virtue of justice (Tessman 2005). However, she argues that oppressive social conditions can interfere in ways Aristotle did not anticipate with the formation of virtues of character and consequently (given Aristotle’s framework) with prospects for happiness (eudaimonia). One point of amendment, then, to Aristotelian thought is to recognize that oppressive social conditions may make other traits — traits that are important for liberatory struggle — into virtues. Another, congruent with other lines of feminist critique, is that Aristotle is insufficiently appreciative of the need for sensitivity to and response to suffering, so that something like the kind of supplementation recommended by care ethics is appropriate. A different model of response to the development of the virtue of justice specifically under non-ideal or unjust social conditions, one modeled on Kohlberg’s original architectonic understanding of the virtue, is defended by Jon Garthoff (Garthoff 2018).

Finally, in recent work Talbot Brewer has argued that a “revisionist” version of Aristotelian virtue ethics does a better job than competitors (including Kantian and contractualist theories) at recognizing the “irreplaceable value” of each human being (Brewer 2018). Brewer believes that a robust conception of the virtue of justice does important work for such a theory, not just focusing on distribution and allocation, but more generally establishing the space for virtuous recognition of ways that others can demand that we treat them (Brewer 2018, p. 25). Still, Brewer invokes Aquinas to argue that such justice is not enough, that that what is required is a recognition of a virtue of love to unify and perfect the other virtues of character.

While Rawls’ work has sparked an explosion of work in distributive justice and social justice more generally, in recent years a variety of strategies to return to a focus on justice as a personal virtue has emerged. These strategies vary across both dimensions we have considered, taking with various degrees of seriousness the connection between institutional and personal forms of justice, and focusing on the latter as a virtue, among (and like) other virtues.

One such strategy is that of Jon Drydyk, who builds on the “capability approach” to human welfare to make a case for a capabilities-based account of the justice of individual agents, in particular as against an “Aristotelian” approach that stresses justice as a matter of response to merit. Acting justly involves “striving to reduce and remove inequalities in people’s capabilities to function in ways that are elemental” to a truly human life (Drydyk 2012, pp. 31, 33). This is a “subsidiary” virtue account, in that we begin with a prior conception of the content of the requirements of justice, and conform the virtue to this conception. However, Drydyk emphasizes justice as a virtue of individuals, rather than institutions or societies. Drydyk’s strategy offers a counterpoint both to the Rawlsian way of thinking about just societies and to the ancient Greek way of thinking about justice as a virtue of individuals.

John Hacker-Wright argues that what is needed to replace a “legalistic” concern with moral status (as on modern liberal conceptions of justice) is instead an ethic of virtue with a different conception of the virtue of justice. Instead of a concern for the resolution of claims in something like reciprocal, contractual relations, Hacker-Wright’s conception of the virtue of justice is a matter of sensitivity to “vulnerability of value” in things, animate and otherwise. Thus, the threat of unjust — vicious -- wronging hangs not only over people who are sufficiently cognitively impaired so as not to perceive insults, but also corpses, animals, and even rare and valuable rock formations (p. 463). This counts as a sense of justice in that, on Hacker-Wright’s view it is not merely that we can act wrongly or viciously toward such entities, but (following Midgley 1983) that they can be wronged by us by our doing so. However, while Hacker-Wright claims that on a virtue ethic “The character of the agent is recognized as ineliminable in picking out facts as they figure in our moral deliberation,” this does not strictly speaking seem to be true, as prior to virtue there is value which it is up to the just or virtuous person to respond with sensitivity (Hacker-Wright 2007, pp. 461, 463, 464).

David Schmidtz and John Thrasher suggest rethinking the relationship between social justice and individual justice (Schmidtz and Thrasher 2014). Turning Plato’s account of justice in Republic on its head, they depict justice as a bridge between a virtue of the soul and of the polis : because we are essentially social, we need community, and justice is a matter of harmony with the community. On their view this is (largely) a matter of compliance with rules and institutions that enable people to live in harmony and flourish together.

An alternative proposal for thinking of the justice as a personal virtue ties it intimately to the experiences we have as emotional creatures. On this approach, instead of justice standing as distinct from “natural virtues” motivated by passions (as on Hume’s account), or needing to be replaced by sentimentally-driven attitudes such as care or compassion, justice is to be seen as a virtue largely constituted by emotion (Solomon 1994, Roberts 2010). The virtue amounts to a stable disposition of character to respond in the relevant ways to instances of injustice, perhaps consisting in those occasions in which one does not receive his or her due, and on the other hand to be disposed to a “will to give each his due” (Roberts 2010, p. 38). For Roberts, this is a will to realize “objective justice,” and as on other recent accounts, the virtue (and the passion) are theoretically subsidiary to this primary notion of “objective justice.”

There are also recent ventures in the spirit of the ancient Greek thinking about the individual virtue of justice. Rasmussen and Den Uyl (2005) argue for two interpersonal senses of justice (pp. 160-63). One is the familiar Aristotelian virtue. The second is a “metanormative” principle governing the institutions and legal frameworks in which individual agents (just and otherwise) live their lives and exercise their practical agency. The second of these senses of interpersonal justice does not draw its content from the exercise of virtue, but rather makes a place for it. The former does depend on virtue overall (including the exercise of practical wisdom) for its demands, but these are construed broadly in the traditional way of rendering to each his due. Bloomfield (2011) similarly suggests extending the Aristotelian virtue of justice, but in an inward direction, arguing that self-respect is necessary for happiness, and treating oneself fairly requires treating oneself fairly, as one treats others fairly, as a property of justice as individuals.

On the other hand, Wolterstorff (2008) argues that the eudaimonism of Greek thought prevents a proper appreciation for the nature and significance of justice and rights. Whether there is theoretical space remaining for a virtue of justice is not a question Wolterstorff considers, but he does believe there is no hope for an adequate grip on justice in an Aristotelian or Stoic framework.

Recent thinkers have grappled with the question of priority between formal principle and virtue that vexed Aristotle, and offered solutions that for the most part subordinate the virtue of justice to the prior notion of the justice of distributions, as Aristotle himself seems to have suggested. Bernard Williams claims explicitly that this is so (Williams 1980, p. 197), as does David Wiggins, in an attempt to bring a “pre-liberal,” Aristotelian conception of justice to bear on modern liberal conceptions, a la Kant and Rawls (Wiggins 2004). To do so, Wiggins distinguishes three senses of justice: (A) a matter of outcomes or states of affairs in which each gets what is due; (B) a disposition to promote justice (A); (C) a condition of the polis in virtue of which (A) is realized. Wiggins claims that the proper outcome of this collision of conceptions is one that recognizes a form of logical priority of justice (A) over justice (B) (p. 489). At the same time, against Williams he insists that the normative demands of justice (A) are “comprehensible” only within the perspective of a person with justice (B). And in fact he claims that a necessary condition on acts and outcomes satisfying the norms of justice (A) is that they be recognized to be so by those with the virtue of justice (B). Wiggins’ thinking here is not transparent, but perhaps the thought is that the logical point is purely formal: someone with justice (B) must, in act or judging justly, be responding to some norm which counts as justice (A). But, as merely formal, that tells us nothing about the substantive content of that norm. To get that, we have ineliminable need to refer to the judgment of the person with justice (B). That marks a way perhaps of restoring Aristotle’s focus on virtue in coming to understand the virtue of justice.

LeBar (2013, 2014) takes a similar tack in attempting to incorporate Kantian and post-Kantian insights into just demands on the treatment of others into an Aristotelian virtue framework. On his view, there is no way to specify the contents of the demands of justice, or to spell out its norms, independently of the wider possession and exercise of the virtues, including the virtue of practical wisdom. At the same time, what the virtuous and just person sees, in inhabiting a social world with equals in moral standing, are the norms which have become associated with the liberal conception: the standing to obligate others and hold them accountable, for example.

Finally, all of these are Western treatments of an individual virtue of justice. May Sim (Sim 2007, 2018) makes the case that there are informative parallels between the Confucian treatment of the virtues (in particular, yi) and the virtue of justice as adumbrated in Plato and Aristotle.

There are many different conceptions of the virtue of justice, and only some of them are distinctively virtue ethical. Many non-virtual ethical approaches put forward theories of virtue, and what distinguishes them from virtue ethics is that the given theory of virtue comes later in the order of explanation, rather than itself serving as the basis for understanding (all of) morality. This is especially the case with justice, where (as we have seen) it is naturally tempting to account for the norms of justice first and derive an account of the virtue in light of those norms. The question of the priority of norms of justice or the virtue of justice is likely to continue to generate exploration and debate, as is the question of how our lives as social and political animals contributes to understanding the virtue of justice. These vexed questions have inspired a profusion of views and no doubt will continue to do so.

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