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• Published: 15 June 2020

Entanglement-based secure quantum cryptography over 1,120 kilometres

• Juan Yin   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-9909-6211 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Yu-Huai Li 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Sheng-Kai Liao   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-4184-9583 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Meng Yang 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Yuan Cao   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-0354-2855 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Liang Zhang 2 , 3 , 4 ,
• Ji-Gang Ren 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Wen-Qi Cai 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Wei-Yue Liu 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Shuang-Lin Li 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Rong Shu 2 , 3 , 4 ,
• Yong-Mei Huang 5 ,
• Lei Deng 6 ,
• Li Li 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Qiang Zhang   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-3482-3091 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Nai-Le Liu 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Yu-Ao Chen   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-2309-2281 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Chao-Yang Lu   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-8227-9177 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Xiang-Bin Wang 2 ,
• Feihu Xu   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-1643-225X 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Jian-Yu Wang 2 , 3 , 4 ,
• Cheng-Zhi Peng   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-4753-5243 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Artur K. Ekert   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-1504-5039 7 , 8 &
• Jian-Wei Pan   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-6100-5142 1 , 2 , 3  

Nature volume  582 ,  pages 501–505 ( 2020 ) Cite this article

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• Quantum information
• Single photons and quantum effects

Quantum key distribution (QKD) 1 , 2 , 3 is a theoretically secure way of sharing secret keys between remote users. It has been demonstrated in a laboratory over a coiled optical fibre up to 404 kilometres long 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 . In the field, point-to-point QKD has been achieved from a satellite to a ground station up to 1,200 kilometres away 8 , 9 , 10 . However, real-world QKD-based cryptography targets physically separated users on the Earth, for which the maximum distance has been about 100 kilometres 11 , 12 . The use of trusted relays can extend these distances from across a typical metropolitan area 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 to intercity 17 and even intercontinental distances 18 . However, relays pose security risks, which can be avoided by using entanglement-based QKD, which has inherent source-independent security 19 , 20 . Long-distance entanglement distribution can be realized using quantum repeaters 21 , but the related technology is still immature for practical implementations 22 . The obvious alternative for extending the range of quantum communication without compromising its security is satellite-based QKD, but so far satellite-based entanglement distribution has not been efficient 23 enough to support QKD. Here we demonstrate entanglement-based QKD between two ground stations separated by 1,120 kilometres at a finite secret-key rate of 0.12 bits per second, without the need for trusted relays. Entangled photon pairs were distributed via two bidirectional downlinks from the Micius satellite to two ground observatories in Delingha and Nanshan in China. The development of a high-efficiency telescope and follow-up optics crucially improved the link efficiency. The generated keys are secure for realistic devices, because our ground receivers were carefully designed to guarantee fair sampling and immunity to all known side channels 24 , 25 . Our method not only increases the secure distance on the ground tenfold but also increases the practical security of QKD to an unprecedented level.

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Data availability

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding authors on reasonable request.

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Acknowledgements

We acknowledge discussions with X. Ma and C. Jiang. We thank colleagues at the National Space Science Center, China Xi’an Satellite Control Center, National Astronomical Observatories, Xinjiang Astronomical Observatory, Purple Mountain Observatory, and Qinghai Station for their management and coordination. We thank G.-B. Li, L.-L. Ma, Z. Wang, Y. Jiang, H.-B. Li, S.-J. Xu, Y.-Y. Yin, W.-C. Sun and Y. Wang for their long-term assistance in observation. This work was supported by the National Key R&D Program of China (grant number 2017YFA0303900), the Shanghai Municipal Science and Technology Major Project (grant number 2019SHZDZX01), the Anhui Initiative in Quantum Information Technologies, Science and Technological Fund of Anhui Province for Outstanding Youth (grant number 1808085J18) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (grant numbers U1738201, 61625503, 11822409, 11674309, 11654005 and 61771443).

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Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at the Microscale and Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China

Juan Yin, Yu-Huai Li, Sheng-Kai Liao, Meng Yang, Yuan Cao, Ji-Gang Ren, Wen-Qi Cai, Wei-Yue Liu, Shuang-Lin Li, Li Li, Qiang Zhang, Nai-Le Liu, Yu-Ao Chen, Chao-Yang Lu, Feihu Xu, Cheng-Zhi Peng & Jian-Wei Pan

Shanghai Branch, CAS Center for Excellence in Quantum Information and Quantum Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Shanghai, China

Juan Yin, Yu-Huai Li, Sheng-Kai Liao, Meng Yang, Yuan Cao, Liang Zhang, Ji-Gang Ren, Wen-Qi Cai, Wei-Yue Liu, Shuang-Lin Li, Rong Shu, Li Li, Qiang Zhang, Nai-Le Liu, Yu-Ao Chen, Chao-Yang Lu, Xiang-Bin Wang, Feihu Xu, Jian-Yu Wang, Cheng-Zhi Peng & Jian-Wei Pan

Shanghai Research Center for Quantum Science, Shanghai, China

Juan Yin, Yu-Huai Li, Sheng-Kai Liao, Meng Yang, Yuan Cao, Liang Zhang, Ji-Gang Ren, Wen-Qi Cai, Wei-Yue Liu, Shuang-Lin Li, Rong Shu, Li Li, Qiang Zhang, Nai-Le Liu, Yu-Ao Chen, Chao-Yang Lu, Feihu Xu, Jian-Yu Wang, Cheng-Zhi Peng & Jian-Wei Pan

Key Laboratory of Space Active Opto-Electronic Technology, Shanghai Institute of Technical Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Shanghai, China

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The Institute of Optics and Electronics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Chengdu, China

Yong-Mei Huang

Shanghai Engineering Center for Microsatellites, Shanghai, China

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Contributions

C.-Z.P., A.K.E. and J.-W.P. conceived the research. J.Y., C.-Z.P. and J.-W.P. designed the experiments. J.Y., Y.-H.L., S.-K.L., M.Y., Y.C., J.-G.R., S.-L.L., C.-Z.P. and J.-W.P. developed the follow-up optics and monitoring circuit. J.Y., Y.-M.H., C.-Z.P. and J.-W.P. developed the efficiency telescopes. J.Y., S.-K.L., Y.C., L.Z., W.-Q.C., R.S., L.D., J.-Y.W., C.-Z.P. and J.-W.P. designed and developed the satellite and payloads. J.Y., L.Z., W.-Q.C., W.-Y.L. and C.-Z.P. developed the software. F.X., X.-B.W., A.K.E. and J.-W.P. performed the security proof and analysis. L.L., Q.Z., N.-L.L., Y.-A.C., X.-B.W., F.X., C.-Z.P., A.K.E. and J.-W.P. contributed to the theoretical study and implementation against device imperfections. F.X., C.-Y.L., C.-Z.P. and J.-W.P. analysed the data and wrote the manuscript, with input from J.Y., Y.-H.L., M.Y., Y.C. and A.K.E. All authors contributed to the data collection, discussed the results and reviewed the manuscript. J.-W.P. supervised the whole project.

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Correspondence to Cheng-Zhi Peng or Jian-Wei Pan .

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Extended data figures and tables

Extended data fig. 1 satellite-to-delingha link efficiencies under different weather conditions..

a , The data in previous work 23 was taken in different orbits during the period of 7 December 2016 to 22 December 2016. b , The data in current work was taken in different orbits during the period of 6 September 2018 to 22 October 2018. Here the change of link efficiencies on different days was caused by the weather conditions.

Extended Data Fig. 2 Multiple orbits of satellite-to-Delingha link efficiencies under good weather conditions.

Stable and high collection efficiencies were observed during the period of October 2018 to April 2019.

Extended Data Fig. 3 The comparison of satellite-to-Delingha link efficiency under the best-orbit condition.

a , After improving the link efficiency with high-efficiency telescopes and follow-up optics, on average, the current work shows a 3-dB enhancement in the collection efficiency over that of ref. 23 . The lines are linear fits to the data. b , Some representative values.

Extended Data Fig. 4 The finite-key secret key rate R versus the QBER.

For the 3,100 s of data collected in our experiment, a QBER of below about 6.0% is required to produce a positive key. The previous work 23 demonstrated a QBER of 8.1%, which is not sufficient to generate a secret key. In this work, a QBER of 4.5% and a secret key rate of 0.12 bits per second are demonstrated over 1,120 km. If one ignores the important finite-key effect, the QBER in ref. 23 is slightly lower than the well known asymptotic limit of 11% (ref. 43 ).

Extended Data Fig. 5 Schematics of the detection and blinding-attack monitoring circuit.

The biased voltage (HV) is applied to an avalanche photodiode through a passive quenching resistance ( R q  = 500 kΩ) and a sampling resistance ( R s  = 10 kΩ). The avalanche signals are read out as click or no-click events through a signal-discrimination circuit. The blinding signal monitor is shown in the dot-dash diagram. A resistor-capacitor filter and a voltage follower are used to smooth and minimize the impact on the signals. The outputs of an analogue to digital converter (ADC), at a sampling rate of 250 kHz, are registered by computer data acquisition (PC-DAQ). R1, resistor; C1, capacitor; OA, operational amplifier.

Extended Data Fig. 6

The transmission of the beam splitter within the selected bandwidth of wavelength.

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Yin, J., Li, YH., Liao, SK. et al. Entanglement-based secure quantum cryptography over 1,120 kilometres. Nature 582 , 501–505 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2401-y

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Issue Date : 25 June 2020

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2401-y

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CSE Associate Professor Attila Yavuz and his lab, Applied Cryptography Research Laboratory (ACRL), will be participating in a large-scale research project funded by the Department of Energy: "Zero-Trust Authentication: Multifactor, Adaptive, and Continuous Authentication with Post-Quantum Cryptography." This large-scale research project aims to defend smart-grid systems against powerful state-level attackers, including those equipped with advanced quantum computing capabilities. Professor Yavuz’s research group is part of a nation-wide coalition that was recently awarded $4.5 million, and his lab’s portion of the funds was $650,000. The coalition includes four other universities, including Texas A&M University-Kingsville, one national lab, one research laboratory, and three utilities.

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“It was a great experience to be part of this proposal, wherein I found an opportunity to develop novel ideas with a diverse team of collaborators comprised of excellent researchers.” Said Professor Yavuz.

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VIAVI introduces performance testing for Post-Quantum Cryptography deployments

VIAV has added performance testing capability for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) system deployments.

TeraVM Security Test is trusted by leading network security infrastructure vendors, service providers, research institutes, governments and enterprises to emulate large-scale user endpoint traffic applications over secure access connections while measuring individual traffic flow performance across multiple quality vectors.

Quantum computers have the potential to break public-key cryptography once they begin operating at a large scale – an event not anticipated to occur for several more years.

The US federal government has mandated the migration of all existing public-key cryptographic systems including network security devices such as firewalls and VPN gateways to PQC.

TeraVM is the first cloud-enabled test platform to support PQC algorithms mandated by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

TeraVM Security Test enables benchmarking of the performance of enterprise devices, content delivery networks and endpoints that initiate or terminate IPSec Traffic using PQC. It is a software-based test tool which can be run on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) servers or on cloud platforms.

The platform is in wide use by network equipment manufacturers, network operators and research institutes.

“Our customers have announced significant initiatives to secure their networks from post-quantum threats without compromising their users’ workday experience,” said Ian Langley, Senior Vice President and General Manager, Wireless Business Unit, VIAVI.

“TeraVM Security Test will give them confidence in their capabilities through rigorous testing using standardized algorithms, emulated users, real office applications and loaded networks.”

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