respect for human dignity essay

What is Human Dignity? Common Definitions.

You’ll hear the term “human dignity” a lot these days. Human dignity is at the heart of human rights. What is human dignity exactly? What’s the history of this concept and why does it matter? In this article, we’ll discuss the history of the term, its meaning, and its place in both a human rights framework and a religious framework.

What is human dignity?

At its most basic, the concept of human dignity is the belief that all people hold a special value that’s tied solely to their humanity. It has nothing to do with their class, race, gender, religion, abilities, or any other factor other than them being human.

The term “dignity” has evolved over the years. Originally, the Latin, English, and French words for “dignity” did not have anything to do with a person’s inherent value. It aligned much closer with someone’s “merit.” If someone was “dignified,” it meant they had a high status. They belonged to royalty or the church, or, at the very least, they had money. For this reason, “human dignity” does not appear in the US Declaration of Independence or the Constitution . The phrase as we understand it today wasn’t recognized until 1948. The United Nations ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights .

Human dignity: the human rights framework

The original meaning of the word “dignity” established that someone deserved respect because of their status. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that concept was turned on its head. Article 1 states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Suddenly, dignity wasn’t something that people earned because of their class, race, or another advantage. It is something all humans are born with. Simply by being human, all people deserve respect. Human rights naturally spring from that dignity.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , adopted in 1966, continued this understanding. The preamble reads that “…these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.” This belief goes hand in hand with the universality of human rights. In the past, only people made dignified by their status were given respect and rights. By redefining dignity as something inherent to everyone, it also establishes universal rights.

Human dignity: the religious framework

The concept of human dignity isn’t limited to human rights. In fact, for centuries, religions around the world have recognized a form of human dignity as we now understand it. Most (if not all) religions teach that humans are essentially equal for one reason or another. In Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, it’s because humans were created in the image of God, becoming children of God. Dignity is something that a divine being gives to people. In Catholic social teaching, the phrase “Human Dignity” is used specifically to support the church’s belief that every human life is sacred. This defines the denomination’s dedication to social issues like ending the death penalty.

In Hinduism and Buddhism, respectively, dignity is inherent because humans are manifestations of the Divine or on a universal journey to happiness. In the Shvetasvatara Upanishad, an ancient Sanskrit text, it reads “We are all begotten of the immortal,” or “We are children of immortality.” Buddhism begins with the understanding that humans are “rare” because they can make choices that lead to enlightenment. Our dignity arises from this responsibility and ability, uniting all humans in their quest.

When everyone is equal, they are all equally deserving of basic respect and rights, at least in theory. Countless people have had their dignity disrespected over the years by religious institutions and others using religion as justification.

Why recognizing human dignity is so important

Why is human dignity so important when it comes to human rights? Human dignity justifies human rights. When people are divided and given a value based on characteristics like class, gender, religion, and so on, it creates unequal societies where discrimination runs rampant. People assigned a higher value get preferential treatment. Anyone who doesn’t fit into the privileged category is abandoned or oppressed. We’ve seen what happens in places where human dignity isn’t seen as inherent and human rights aren’t universal. While the privileged few in these societies flourish, society as a whole suffers significantly. Inevitably, violence erupts. If a new group takes power and also fails to recognize human dignity, the cycle of destruction continues, only with different participants.

Recognizing human dignity and the universality of human rights isn’t just so individuals can be protected and respected. It’s for the good of the entire world. If everyone’s rights were respected and everyone got equal opportunities to thrive, the world would be a much happier, more peaceful place.

Learn more how you can defend and protect human dignity in a free online course .

You may also like

16 Inspiring Civil Rights Leaders You Should Know

15 Trusted Charities Fighting for Housing Rights

15 Examples of Gender Inequality in Everyday Life

11 Approaches to Alleviate World Hunger 

15 Facts About Malala Yousafzai

12 Ways Poverty Affects Society

15 Great Charities to Donate to in 2024

15 Quotes Exposing Injustice in Society

14 Trusted Charities Helping Civilians in Palestine

The Great Migration: History, Causes and Facts

Social Change 101: Meaning, Examples, Learning Opportunities

Rosa Parks: Biography, Quotes, Impact

About the author, emmaline soken-huberty.

Emmaline Soken-Huberty is a freelance writer based in Portland, Oregon. She started to become interested in human rights while attending college, eventually getting a concentration in human rights and humanitarianism. LGBTQ+ rights, women’s rights, and climate change are of special concern to her. In her spare time, she can be found reading or enjoying Oregon’s natural beauty with her husband and dog.

Essay on Human Dignity

Students are often asked to write an essay on Human Dignity in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Human Dignity

What is human dignity.

Human dignity means treating every person with respect because they are valuable. It’s like saying every person is important, no matter who they are or where they come from. This idea is like a rule that helps us live together in peace.

Human Rights and Dignity

Human dignity is the heart of human rights. Rights like freedom and equality come from the belief that all people deserve respect. It’s like giving everyone a shield to protect them from being treated badly.

Respecting Others

To show human dignity, we should be kind and fair to others. It’s not just about not hurting people, but also about helping them feel good about themselves. When we respect others, we make the world a friendlier place.

Challenges to Dignity

Sometimes, people face bullying or unfair treatment, which attacks their dignity. Standing up against such wrongs is important. By doing so, we defend the value of each person and support a world where everyone is respected.

250 Words Essay on Human Dignity

Human dignity is the idea that every person is valuable and deserves respect. This means that no matter where you come from, what you look like, or what you believe in, you are important. Think of it like this: every person is like a precious gem that should be cared for and never harmed.

Why Human Dignity is Important

Human dignity is like the golden rule: treat others as you want to be treated. When we respect each other’s dignity, we create a world where everyone can feel safe and happy. This helps us get along better, make friends, and live peacefully. Without dignity, people might feel sad, scared, or alone.

Human Dignity in Our Lives

In school, human dignity shows up when teachers listen to students’ ideas and when students are kind to each other. At home, it’s when family members support one another. In the world, it means making sure everyone has food, a home, and a chance to learn.

Standing Up for Dignity

Sometimes, people’s dignity is not respected. When this happens, it’s important to stand up for them. This could be helping a friend who is being bullied or telling an adult when something is wrong. By doing this, you protect dignity and show that you care about others.

Human dignity is a simple yet powerful idea. It’s about seeing the worth in every person and acting with kindness. Remember, when you respect others, you help make the world a better place for everyone.

500 Words Essay on Human Dignity

Human dignity is a powerful idea that means every person is valuable and deserves respect. This idea is like a golden rule that tells us to treat others as we would like to be treated. It doesn’t matter where someone is from, what they look like, or what they believe in—every person has dignity just because they are human.

Human Dignity in Everyday Life

In our daily lives, human dignity can be seen in many ways. When a teacher listens to a student’s question with care, that’s dignity. When a doctor treats a patient, or when someone helps a person who is in trouble, they are showing respect for that person’s dignity. It means we recognize that everyone has the right to be happy, to speak their mind, and to live a life free from harm.

Human Dignity and Equality

Human dignity also means that all people should be treated as equals. No one is better or more important than anyone else. This is why there are rules and laws in countries around the world that try to make sure everyone is treated fairly. For example, when a girl and a boy are given the same chance to learn and play, it shows we value their dignity equally.

Human Dignity and Making Choices

Another part of human dignity is being able to make your own choices. This means that people should be able to decide things for themselves, like what they want to do when they grow up or what they believe is right and wrong. When we let others make choices for their own lives, we are showing respect for their dignity.

Challenges to Human Dignity

Sadly, not everyone’s dignity is always respected. Bullying, unfair treatment, and being mean to others are all ways that can hurt someone’s dignity. When this happens, it’s important to stand up and speak out. By doing this, we help protect the dignity of those who are being treated badly.

Our Role in Upholding Dignity

We all have a part to play in making sure we and the people around us are treated with dignity. This can be as simple as being kind, standing up for someone who is being picked on, or learning about different cultures to understand others better. When we do these things, we help create a world where everyone’s dignity is respected.

Human dignity is a special idea that touches every part of our lives. It reminds us that every person is important and deserves to be treated with kindness and respect. By understanding and upholding human dignity, we can make sure that we, and the people around us, live in a world that is fair and kind to everyone. Remember, it starts with you and the small acts of respect you show to others every day.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

If you’re looking for more, here are essays on other interesting topics:

• Essay on Human Behaviour
• Essay on Human Cloning
• Essay on Human Body System

Apart from these, you can look at all the essays by clicking here .

Happy studying!

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

Berkley Center

Human persons and human dignity: implications for dialogue and action.

By: Thomas Banchoff

August 19, 2013

" Contending Modernities ," August 19, 2013

What is the human person? As human beings, we are biological as well as social creatures; we inhabit both physical and cultural space. What distinguishes us as persons , and not just as organisms, is a culture of human dignity – the shared idea that, as human beings, we are entitled to respect and recognition from one another.

Where does the dignity of the human person come from? Broadly speaking, one can distinguish secular-scientific and religious foundations.

From a secular and scientific angle, we have dignity and should respect and recognize one another because of our common humanity. Some emphasize our shared capacity for independent thought; in line with Immanuel Kant, they see autonomy and rationality as a foundation for human dignity. Others focus more on our ability to identify and sympathize with others, an approach related to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of “pitié” and Adam Smith’s “moral sentiments.”

Recent advances in evolutionary biology and neuroscience have deepened our understanding of this latter, relational approach to the foundations of human dignity. In the long run, evolution appears to have favored the development of ecological sensitivity, group identification and solidarity, and cooperation in the acquisition and shared use of resources. In the here and now, new developments in neuroscience suggest that our brains are much more than autonomous information processors; they change and grow through our interactions and relationships with others and with our external environments.

Interestingly, scientific methods that do not begin with the concept of human dignity are increasingly leading to a conclusion compatible with it — that we have good evolutionary and biological reasons to acknowledge one another as fellow human beings worthy of respect and recognition and therefore endowed with an intrinsic dignity.

For Catholicism and Islam, the focus of the Contending Modernities project , the dignity of the human person has divine foundations. Because God created each of us and cares for each of us, each individual person has an intrinsic and inviolable dignity. The moral theology of the person is most developed in Christianity; it is connected with the mystery of the Trinity (one God in three persons), and in the Incarnation (God becoming a human being.) But the idea of the person, as a creature of an all powerful and merciful God, also plays an important role in Islam. God reveals his law to humankind and calls us to live as His co-regents on earth, honoring one another with recognition and respect.

There is, of course, a fundamental asymmetry between the secular-scientific and the religious understandings of the human person. The non-believer will reject the idea that the dignity of the human person has divine origins, while the believer will typically assert that human dignity has both divine and natural foundations.

Yet this asymmetry need not be a barrier to dialogue. In our contemporary era, even those who reject the idea of human dignity as fuzzy and unscientific generally affirm the importance of according basic respect and recognition to all human beings. The basic idea of the human person and of universal human dignity is shared, even as terminology differs. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which emerged out of decades of contestation within and across secular and religious traditions – and in revulsion against the horrors of two world wars and the Holocaust – remains the clearest and most powerful expression of this far-reaching consensus.

In practice we know that this broad contemporary convergence around the idea of the human person and human dignity, across the secular-religious divide, coexists with fierce disagreement on a range of ethical and policy questions. Is the human embryo or fetus a human person deserving of protection? Are primates or other non-human animals to be considered persons with intrinsic dignity or rights? Should governments work to secure equality of opportunity for their citizens and provide a minimum standard of living for all? Should governments and citizens share their wealth with those in need outside, as well as inside, a nation’s borders? Questions relating to the human person and human dignity can be multiplied across economic, social, cultural, and foreign policy domains (even if, in the United States, they tend to center on bioethics).

A key challenge in such ethical and policy debates, within and across secular-scientific and religious communities, is to keep the ideas of the human person and of human dignity in the foreground. That means asking what is at stake for particular people and their livelihoods in particular contexts, as well as thinking through the ethical implications of our individual and collective decisions for global humanity, at a time when the rapid advance of technology and of globalization in all its dimensions is rendering those decisions more complex and consequential.

A focus on the human person has a further implication, perhaps the most challenging of all – that in all these ethical and policy controversies, we should acknowledge the humanity and dignity of our interlocutors, no matter how much we may disagree.

This article was originally published on the University of Notre Dame blog " Contending Modernities ."

6 Ways we can help protect human dignity

Shutterstock

The first attitude that we should have when we contemplate our dignity is respect, and rejection of anything that turns human beings into a means to an end , not an end in and of themselves. We cannot treat any human being as an object, a “thing,” a means to achieve our personal goals. This moral imperative can take the form of various principles that should guide our behavior in concrete ways.

The principle of respect

In every action and intention, in every goal and every means, always treat each and every person — yourself and others — with the respect they deserve due to their dignity and value as a person. Every human being has equal intrinsic dignity and value, due to their basic condition of being human. The value of human beings is different from that of other things around us, which we use. Things have value based on exchange. They are replaceable. Human beings, on the contrary, have unlimited value, because as individuals with a unique identity, capable of knowing and choosing, they are unique and irreplaceable.

The principle of respect requires all people in general to be treated with respect. Objects can be manipulated and used, but not people: the freedom of choice of every human being must be respected. The principle of respect doesn’t only apply to other people, but also to ourselves. Thus, for example, self-respect means acting with integrity, whatever our profession may be.

The principle of good will and not ill will

In each and every one of your actions, avoid harming other people, and always seek their well-being.

Principle of double effect

In your actions, seek above all a beneficial effect. Assuming that in both your actions and your intentions you treat everyone with respect, ensure that there are no foreseeable harmful secondary effects out of proportion to the good that follows from the primary effect of your actions.

The principle of integrity

Behave at all times with the honesty of an authentic professional, making all your decisions with the respect you owe yourself, such that you make yourself worthy of living your profession to its fullness. Being a professional doesn’t mean just exercising a profession; it also means exercising it with professionalism — that is to say, with profound knowledge of your field, with total loyalty to ethical norms, and seeking to serve other people and society above any selfish interests.

The principle of justice

Treat others as is their due as human beings; be just, treating all people the same way. That is to say, treat each person in a similar way in similar circumstances. The main idea of the principle of justice is to treat people as we should, as corresponds to their equal dignity. This can manifest itself in different ways, since there are different kinds or aspects of justice. These include substantive justice, distributive justice, commutative justice, procedural justice, and retributive justice.

The principle of utility

Assuming that in both your actions and your intentions you treat all people with respect, always choose that form of action that will produce the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people. The principle of utility places emphasis on the consequences of an action. Nonetheless, it presupposes that you have acted with respect towards all involved. If you have to choose between two morally permissible actions, chose the one that has a better result for more people.

There’s an easy criterion you can use to determine if you are treating someone with respect: ask yourself whether or not the action you are going to perform could go both ways. That is to say, would you want someone to do to you what you are planning to do to someone else? This is the fundamental idea contained in the Golden Rule: “Treat others as you would have them treat you.” This idea isn’t unique to Christians; it is common in many religions and cultures.

Articles like these are sponsored free for every Catholic through the support of generous readers just like you.

Help us continue to bring the Gospel to people everywhere through uplifting Catholic news, stories, spirituality, and more.

Overcoming racism depends on respect for every person’s dignity

Assistant Professor, Interdisciplinary Studies, Carleton University

Disclosure statement

Evelyn Namakula Mayanja receives funding from SSHRC to conduct research on renewable energies.

Carleton University provides funding as a member of The Conversation CA.

Carleton University provides funding as a member of The Conversation CA-FR.

View all partners

I teach a course on race, racialization, racism and human rights. In my classes and some of my research , I highlight empathy, personhood and respect for human dignity as fundamental to overcoming racism.

On the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination , a student asked: Why does racism still exist against Black people , Indigenous people and people of colour when we have national and international mechanisms built upon notions of human dignity, equal rights and freedom?

National and international human rights mechanisms do not seem to provide reliable solutions to racism. They are tokenistic gestures that silence the consciousness of those benefiting from racialized systems and institutions.

Mechanisms for addressing racism

Mechanisms like the Canadian Constitution , the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) don’t address the root causes of racism and do not seem to provide reliable solutions to racism.

After the killing of George Floyd , people protested against anti-Black racism and against all forms of racism have become common. However, racism remains engraved in Canadian and global society.

Nineteen racialized students from my class remarked they are traumatized, because since childhood they have lived in fear of being stopped by police, incarcerated or killed because of their skin colour. Others lamented how their parents, with qualifications including doctorates, do precarious jobs.

One student said that in Canada, we hide behind race-neutral excuses, multiculturalism, the cultural mosaic and the myth that Canada is more welcoming than the United States.

What is human dignity and personhood?

Western theories of human dignity denote basic and inherent worth that belongs to all people. In philosophy, Cicero introduced the idea of “the dignity of the human race.”

The philosopher Immanuel Kant, in his 1785 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals , argued that every person has inherent dignity or value which demands moral respect in treating them.

Kant emphasized that every person has the obligation to always treat the Other “as an end” and “never merely as a means.” It is not only about treating others as you would like them to treat you, but behaving in a way that your conduct could be a model for universal laws .

In western law , human dignity is key to interpreting human rights and adjudication.

Yet clearly, factors beyond these have shaped our societies.

Greed, capitalism and racism

Slavery and colonialism emerged historically in racial capitalism , meaning that a denial of the dignity, rights and humanity of groups of African and Indigenous people was an intrinsic aspect of justifying economic control of their bodies, lands and resources.

Read more: The Vatican just renounced a 500-year-old doctrine that justified colonial land theft … Now what? — Podcast

Today, the denial of “others’” humanity to enable brutal violence and exploitation for profits continues to deny the dignity, rights and humanity of the racialized, and to commodify, objectify and kill them.

For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), rich with gold, diamonds, coltan and the critical minerals needed for transitioning to renewable energy, is exposed to corporate resource extraction.

In the Global North electronic vehicles and lithium batteries are considered a game changer for mitigating climate change. However, the extraction of minerals displaces communities, engenders deforestation, pollutes land, air and water and exposes people to diseases, poverty and incessant armed conflicts.

Read more: What coltan mining in the DRC costs people and the environment

Since 1996, the DRC has been embroiled in violence that even UN peacekeepers have failed to de-escalate .

Dismantling racism

Without dismantling racism, we cannot achieve sustainable development goals , global peace and security.

We need mechanisms and policies designed with the involvement of well-informed young people (like the ones I teach) who are determined to create new societies where every person’s dignity and humanity matters.

We need to dismantle racial capitalism that commodifies, objectifies and exploits the “other” and the planet to accumulate capital for a few. This implies being concerned with the humanity of others, including migrants: While Canada and the western world welcomed Ukrainians wholeheartedly, the same has not been the case for racialized migrants .

‘Obligations to the collective’

We need to notice each other’s personhood and be informed by wisdoms that acknowledge, affirm and celebrate our human and ecological interdependence.

Geographer Nicole Gombay examined how in Nunavut, “struggles of co-existence between a model of personhood founded in the gift and based on obligations to the collective,” seen in Inuit society, contrasted to colonial models “of personhood associated with individual rights and the market economy .”

The concept of Ubuntu, which has roots in humanist African philosophy , is based on personhood, the dignity of every person and interdependence among people. Translated, Ubuntu is “I am because we are and because we are, therefore I am.”

Desmond Tutu wrote that “Ubuntu is the essence of being human… We are different in order to know our need of each other.”

Need for liberation

Racism hurts the oppressed and exposes the indignity of the oppressor, highlighting the necessity to liberate both. When Nelson Mandela became South Africa’s president after 27 years of incarceration , he was committed to respecting the dignity and humanity of all races.

Mandela wrote that dismantling apartheid required liberating the oppressed and the oppressor .

The great Brazilian educator Paulo Freire was also committed to liberating the oppressor and the oppressed, the racist and the racialized. The oppressors who use their power to oppress, exploit and racialize “ cannot find in this power the strength to liberate either the oppressed or themselves . Only power that springs from the weakness of the oppressed will be sufficiently strong to free both.”

A key implication of this is that the oppressed, though “weak” because they are denied agency even in issues pertaining to their well-being, alone understand their condition. They are better situated in creating social, political and economic processes for change.

Racism affects us all

Parents and educators have an obligation to teach and exemplify empathy, love, care and respect for every person.

As Mandela noted, people “learn to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to love , for love comes more naturally to the human heart.”

Racism affects us all. When we understand this as individuals and as a society, we stop denying it and start asking: How is racism operating in our midst?

Then, we have a chance of recognizing how racism saps our strength that lies in diversity and interdependence.

• Human rights
• Colonialism
• Immanuel Kant
• Environmental racism
• Critical race
• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
• Human dignity
• Listen to this article

Lecturer / Senior Lecturer - Marketing

Communications and Engagement Officer, Corporate Finance Property and Sustainability

Assistant Editor - 1 year cadetship

Executive Dean, Faculty of Health

Lecturer/Senior Lecturer, Earth System Science (School of Science)

• Five Pillars , Human Dignity , Public Discourse

Respect for the Dignity of Every Human Person: The First Pillar of a Decent Society

• October 16, 2018

For the past ten years, Public Discourse has been a consistent, unwavering advocate for the dignity of every human person. Throughout this essay, you’ll find hyperlinks to essays we have published on various topics related to human dignity over the past ten years. As these essays demonstrate, our editorial vision is built upon the truth that dignity is not determined by talent or ability, by size or state of development.

People matter even if they are not wanted, including the poor and marginalized, the elderly, the disabled, and unborn children. The answer to the question “who counts?” is “everyone.”

Beginning-of-Life Issues

Human dignity begins when human life begins, with the fusion of an egg and sperm in fertilization to create a new human being. Debates about human dignity begin with whether embryonic and fetal life is worthy of the same protections as more mature human life.

Start your day with Public Discourse

In Public Discourse’s early years, this was manifest in arguments over stem-cell research . George W. Bush’s compromise position neither prohibited nor promoted embryo-destructive research. Barack Obama changed this course, funding and advocating such research, even as alternative sources of human of stem cells continued to develop. But it’s not only embryos, children at the very earliest stages of development, whose bodies have been used for research. At the end of the Obama presidency, the Center for Medical Progress challenged the profit that organizations such as Planned Parenthood make from the sale of fetal parts for research. These revelations led to nationwide calls for Congress to defund the organization. The debate has continued into the Trump administration, whose Department of Health and Human Services recently announced that it will review all medical research involving fetal tissue.

American ethical debates depend primarily on empathy with others and preventing them from suffering harm. The more an embryo or fetus appears recognizably human and the more it is shown to suffer harm, the more likely we are to recognize it as human and prevent such harm. This explains why a woman casually discussing the sale of fetal limbs and organs would provoke more outrage than the quiet destruction of embryonic humans.

In the past decade, improvements in ultrasound technology have made the humanity of life in the womb more obvious and worthier of our empathy. The horrors of Kermit Gosnell exposed the lurid side of abortion clinics and the dangers abortion poses to women. Abortion rates have reached their lowest point since Roe v. Wade . Even pro-choice authors note the consequences of sex-selective abortion , which has led to a conspicuous dearth of girls in societies where women are less valued than men, especially under China’s one-child policy. And the rise of groups like the New Wave Feminists have led many to note that the pro-life movement is getting younger and more female—exactly the opposite of what its critics expected. The more the harms of abortion become visible, the more a consensus grows against unrestricted abortion, especially later in pregnancy.

Abortion and stem-cell research concern unwanted human life, but the desires for particular human life and particular medical treatments also drive contemporary concerns about human dignity. Popular infertility treatments involve the creation of many embryos for the sake of a desired child, leaving the embryos not chosen destroyed or in a frozen limbo. In the coming years, we are likely to see more attempts to use genetic modification to design children according to parents’ desires, not to mention new techniques for human cloning , with little pause for reflection on their ethics. The harms of the fertility industry are becoming more evident in other ways, too. Children conceived by anonymous reproductive donors have begun to speak out against the disconnect they feel from their biological parents. Others argue that third-party reproduction violates the rights of children to have a connection with their biological parents. Still more across the ideological spectrum have begun to expose the violence to women and children endemic in the surrogacy industry .

Euthanasia, Parental Rights, and the Role of Conscience in Healthcare

The injustices of the fertility industry point to deeper questions for medicine and bioethics that will only become more important in the coming years. Is medicine a service provided to consumers who have an unquestioned right to have their desires met, or is it an art aimed at the good of the health of the person?

This is a vital question in the debate over assisted suicide, which we can expect to see become more prevalent. That debate also asks whether human dignity depends on capacity and feelings. Can one be disabled and have dignity, or in pain and have dignity? European nations such as Belgium show how restrictions on assisted suicide loosen over time, or are simply not followed. This August, for instance, two children became the world’s youngest to be euthanized, at ages nine and eleven. Euthanasia endangers the disabled, those with mental illness, and other vulnerable members of society whose lives are deemed less worth living. It attacks the heart of the medical profession , which is the health and human flourishing of patients. In the coming years, we should expect advocates to press for its legalization in more states , and for its social consequences to become more evident where it has been adopted.

In a related vein, another trend to watch is the refusal of hospitals, backed by states, to provide treatment for patients over the objections of their caregivers. Notable examples include the cases of Alfie Evans and Charlie Gard in the UK. In light of this, scholars like Melissa Moschella have begun to advocate for rights of parental authority over children that the state must respect , since parents by nature have the responsibility of caring for their children.

We also see the converse happening when states demand that healthcare providers offer treatments that they cannot in good conscience perform. Many claim that medical providers’ conscientious objection should have no role to play in their willingness to perform medical procedures. They argue that doctors who refuse to perform surgeries or prescribe treatments that they deem unethical or ineffective should be forced to comply with a patient’s wishes. This began with objections to abortion and has become more prevalent in cases of sex-reassignment surgeries and hormonal therapies for teenagers and adults experiencing gender dysphoria. Here at Public Discourse , scholars have argued that a pluralistic society should seek alternative routes to public goods that do not violate conscientious beliefs, and that legislation is required to ensure that rights of conscience are not violated.

Religion and Public Life

Conscience protections have become contested in matters of religious liberty as well. We used to see more debate over the freedoms of religion and conscience in terms of statues of the Ten Commandments, prayers in civic settings, and what religious liberty looked like at the time of the Founding. Recent court cases over the HHS contraception mandate and Jack Phillips’s refusal to bake a same-sex wedding cake are a taste of conscience-protection and religious-liberty debates in the years to come.

The clash between dignitary harms and religious rights will become more intense as the “nones” continue to rise and religious convictions become less intelligible as deep-seated beliefs that must be respected. Yet religious convictions shape our understanding of who we are, the purpose and destiny of our lives, and how we ought to treat those around us. They guide our pursuit of the truth and our adherence to it when we find it. The freedom of religion and the freedom of conscience are therefore fundamental to the dignity of the human person.

Though not a confessional journal, Public Discourse has published a variety of thoughtful and important religious arguments, and we will continue to do so in the years to come. Two topics in this vein particularly stand out. The first is the nature of Islam, the place of Muslims in liberal western societies, and the place of Jews and other religious minorities in societies that are increasingly Islamic. Can we have an Islam that is respectful of rights and friendly to Jews and Christians, yet not eroded by cultural assimilation and progressive politics? How can other religious believers clarify misperceptions about Islam in their own communities and work together with Muslims toward common goals ? Second, should religious believers, especially Catholics, work toward confessional states ? Or should they support liberal regimes? As arguments about the benefits and viability of liberal society are likely to continue, as will arguments for and against integralism.

This makes the work we do at Public Discourse all the more vital. As our public debate coarsens and weakens, we will continue to publish respectful, rigorous arguments. We will continue to stand up for the rights and dignity of the most vulnerable members of society. We will continue to fight for the freedom of conscience and the freedom of religion, and to host debates on the place of religion in contemporary society. We hope you join us for them in the years ahead.

Related Posts

“LGBT rights” are being elevated above conscience rights when the two come into conflict—but this…

It is time for the international community to respond to the plight of Christians in…

Waging war against those who cannot in good conscience help perform or facilitate abortions does…

Latest Articles

Graced Imagination: Recovering True Creativity in the Age of Authenticity 

It Takes a Swarm to Raise a Village

What Makes America Family Unfriendly? A Q&A with Tim Carney

A Common Good Framework in Bioethics and Policy

Can AI Make Us Again a People of the Word?

Student Protests and the Old Gods

• Privacy Policy

© 2024 The Public Discourse

Privacy Overview

Subscribe to public discourse.

• Daily Emails
• Weekly Emails
• First Name *
• Last Name *

Brill | Nijhoff

Brill | Wageningen Academic

Brill Germany / Austria

Böhlau

Brill | Fink

Brill | mentis

Brill | Schöningh

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

V&R unipress

Open Access

Open Access for Authors

Open Access and Research Funding

Open Access for Librarians

Open Access for Academic Societies

Discover Brill’s Open Access Content

Organization

Stay updated

Corporate Social Responsiblity

Investor Relations

Policies, rights & permissions

Review a Brill Book

Author Portal

How to publish with Brill: Files & Guides

Fonts, Scripts and Unicode

Publication Ethics & COPE Compliance

Data Sharing Policy

Brill MyBook

Ordering from Brill

Author Newsletter

Piracy Reporting Form

Sales Managers and Sales Contacts

Ordering From Brill

Titles No Longer Published by Brill

Catalogs, Flyers and Price Lists

E-Book Collections Title Lists and MARC Records

How to Manage your Online Holdings

LibLynx Access Management

Discovery Services

KBART Files

MARC Records

Online User and Order Help

Rights and Permissions

Latest Key Figures

Latest Financial Press Releases and Reports

Annual General Meeting of Shareholders

Share Information

Specialty Products

Press and Reviews

Share link with colleague or librarian

Stay informed about this journal!

• Get New Issue Alerts
• Get Advance Article alerts
• Get Citation Alerts

Human Dignity and Human Rights: Fostering and Protecting Pluralism and Particularity

Human rights and their universality can lead to restrictions for individuals resulting from duties, which correspond to human rights of all human beings. This characteristic of human rights emphasizes the need for an ethical justification. Addressing the question of how human rights can be justified represents, therefore, an expression of respect for pluralism and particularity. Beyond that, human dignity and human rights lay the foundation for pluralism and particularity as they see all human beings as individuals that are all different and unique, and not as members of a collective. Only human rights protection of the autonomy of each individual allows all human beings to be particular and fosters pluralism. Finally, the concept of “adaptation” contributes to an understanding of the interaction between pluralism and particularity and human dignity and human rights as their foundation by capturing the relationship between human dignity and human rights and religious and worldview-based communities.

• 1 Respecting Pluralism and Particularity by Justifying Human Dignity and Human Rights

“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 expresses one of the eight essential characteristics of human rights: their universality. 1 Human rights are universal because all human beings are holders of human rights – always, everywhere and without exception. The phrase “everybody matters” 2 shows that human rights give the necessary protection to all human beings in all essential spheres and elements enabling the survival and the life as a human being.

The universality of human rights underpins the need for an ethical justification of human rights 3 , because human beings demand reasons for why human rights are also applicable to them. They ask for a justification for human rights and their corresponding duties, which might restrict them somehow.

The justifications are therefore pendent between the rights holder and the bearer of duties resulting from these rights. Both sides will only be able to accept a justification if this relation will be maintained and a justification will only seem adequate if it is applied to all persons concerned and will therefore be universal. 4

2 The Justification for Human Dignity and Human Rights Based on the Principle of Vulnerability

The question of how the four statements above can be justified, can be answered with the justification approach based on the principle of vulnerability. The term “vulnerability” 5 encompasses the possibility to be attacked or violated and, at the same time, a lack of ability or means to free oneself from this situation and to protect oneself from violations. 6 The vulnerability originates in the physical and psychological helplessness of human beings towards themselves, fellow human beings, their context and their environment 7 , and their dependence on the world. Human beings are dependent on themselves, other human beings, the context and the environment in so far as they can, on the one hand, be violated by them and, on the other hand, be protected by them from violation. 8 This shows a significant difference between the understanding of vulnerability and the term humiliation used by Avishai Margalit. He only traces humiliation back to human acts or omissions and not to the natural environment. 9 Here, however, environment (understood as human and natural environment) is also meant in its second meaning, namely as a source of vulnerability for human beings, because it can touch upon essential elements and spheres of human existence, and because human beings have various options to deal with it and react to it. For example, human beings that fell victims to a natural disaster should not simply be left to their own devices, but should be supported.

This justification approach for human rights based on the principle of vulnerability contains a first, second, and third step in filtering, which will lead to the emergence of an ethical justification for human rights in general and for specific human rights.

• 2.1 First Step of Filtering

The justification approach based on the principle of vulnerability starts from the observation that human beings will recognize their own vulnerability – a first element of the principle of vulnerability. 10 For example, the person who is healthy today knows that he or she might become ill tomorrow. Or – while living happily in the present – that he or she could be killed by others tomorrow. In this thought process, the person will go through a process of uncertainty, because he or she is made aware of his or her own vulnerability and, in the last consequence, his or her transience. 11 This possibility of self-awareness is true for all human beings.

Second, an essential part of the principle of vulnerability is the “first-person perspective”. 12 The awareness-building of one’s own vulnerability is a self-recognition process of human beings, the empirical correctness of which is not relevant. It is crucial that human beings are willing to do something about this awareness of their vulnerability, namely, to protect themselves from vulnerability or to find a reasonable way to deal with it. This also affects all human beings.

During this awareness-building process when a human being becomes aware of his or her own vulnerability, he or she recognizes, ex negativo , the first-person perspective . This encompasses the awareness of the human being that he or she as a singular person is a subject of self-awareness through which one can access one’s own vulnerability. On the other hand, the person experiences this basic anthropological situation of vulnerability as a subject (meaning as the first person singular). The acts, decisions, sufferings and the life of a human being originate from a person as subject. Furthermore, he or she interprets this basic anthropological situation of vulnerability as a subject and recognises the self-relation . 13

Third, the vulnerability will be perceived and revealed by humans from their first-person perspective as well as for the first-person perspective itself and the self-relation .

This awareness-building process of one’s own vulnerability and the first-person perspective leads, fourth, to human beings relating themselves to all other human beings. In this process, they realize that the vulnerability does not make them different from other human beings, but that they share this vulnerability with all human beings.

Fifth, the process of realizing their own vulnerability and the vulnerability of all other human beings enables them to realize that they share not only the vulnerability with all other human beings, but also the individual first-person perspective on individual vulnerability and the vulnerability of all other human beings, as well as the individual self-relation : Every human being is subject of his or her own life. Human beings therefore realize that the first-person perspective and the self-relation is a prerequisite for life as a human being.

Based on the perception of vulnerability of their own first-person perspective and their own self-relation , they become aware of the same vulnerability of all other human beings. Human beings, who first and foremost want to survive and live as human beings, become aware that the vulnerability concerns their own survival as well as the survival of all other human beings, and also their own life as human beings and the lives of all others as human beings, because the vulnerability does not stop with the first-person perspective and the self-relation as a prerequisite to human life. Faced with one’s own vulnerability, the human being primarily wants to survive and live a dignified life. Survival and a dignified life should not be allowed to be taken away from human beings. They must be legally enforceable in order to offer real protection and have to be applicable to the various dimensions, because vulnerability can encompass the legal, political, historical and ethical dimension. Based on the above-mentioned high priority they possess, and based on the unpredictability of the vulnerability, survival and a dignified life should be unconditional. Human beings share the desire to survive and live a dignified life with all other human beings equally. This desire is not individualistic, even if it is a concern of an individual, which each individual discovers through his or her first-person perspective and self-relation .

Because, sixth, human beings are aware of their vulnerability, but at the same time do not know if and when this vulnerability will manifest itself and turn into a violation, they are prepared to accord all human beings the first-person perspective and self-relation based on the equality of all human beings, because this presents the most rational and advantageous solution for themselves. Which means, to accord all human beings rights – that is to say human rights – in order to protect themselves and all others, since the vulnerability also contains the first-person perspective and the self-relation . On the one hand, this protection through human rights aims at avoiding the transformation of vulnerability into a concrete violation and, on the other hand, in the case of a possible transformation of vulnerability into a concrete violation, to receive active compensation. Humans are aware that the protection of human rights also encompasses the duties corresponding to the human rights, because they are not exclusive rights, but rights that all human beings are entitled to.

In view of the above-described awareness-building process for human rights, the question may arise as to why human beings should not opt for another form of self-limitation or another form of dealing with this situation (e.g. violence, subordination, etc.). As explained above, human beings are first and foremost interested in surviving and leading a dignified life. Human rights can best support this desire, which speaks in favor of human rights. On the other hand, violence or subordination – meaning alternative forms of protection against vulnerability and violation based on inequality and injustice among people (e.g. the powerful and the powerless, tyrants and subordinates, oppressors and oppressed) – can be excluded as rational and advantageous alternatives in view of the unpredictability of a possible transformation of vulnerability to violation because, due to the unpredictability of a possible transformation of vulnerability to violation, one does not know on which side one stands or will stand.

These six points on the principle of vulnerability explain that, seventh, the vulnerability in itself has no ethical quality, but the principle of vulnerability is normatively charged with the vulnerability, the first-person perspective and self-relation as an ethical claim. The principle of vulnerability affects all human beings and differentiates them from all other living beings. Because of the principle of vulnerability human beings accord each other human rights. Because they agree that, with human rights for themselves and all other human beings, a transformation from vulnerability into a concrete violation can be prevented or active compensation for all human beings would be provisioned in the case of a possible transformation of vulnerability into a concrete violation. It would be a decision by the moral society that human beings assign each other human rights based on the principle of vulnerability and consider all human beings as holders of human rights.

Therefore, human beings are not human rights holders because of their vulnerability, but they are human rights holders because they grapple with their own vulnerability and its relevance. They become aware of the first-person perspective and self-relation of themselves and all human beings, and they get to know the former as a prerequisite for human life. They even recognize the vulnerability of the first-person perspective and the self-relation of all human beings – because of the principle of vulnerability. Human beings differentiate vulnerability based on experiences of injustice and violations, and because of the principle of vulnerability they establish a protection of elements and spheres of human existence with specific human rights. The principle of vulnerability is therefore a starting point for justifying human rights per se as well as specific human rights.

Eighth, it is quite possible that the principle of vulnerability can be the basis for new suffering and experiences of injustice, which, because of their threatening character, will necessitate human rights protection. This necessity demands formulating rights that go beyond the human rights that exist today. The above-mentioned dynamic aligns with this possibility, which leaves human rights open to new opportunities and challenges that might arise. The principle of vulnerability contains an “exploratory function” 14 that leads to the potential for unlimited evolution and differentiation of human rights.

These eight points make up the first step in filtering the justification model based on the principle of vulnerability. Not all elements and spheres of human existence are worth considering for protection through human rights, but only those that are needed due to the principle of vulnerability and are necessary for humans to protect themselves and others.

• 2.2 Second Step of Filtering

The second step of filtering builds on the considerations above and goes into more detail regarding the areas of protection that all human beings as holders of human rights are entitled to, because the consensus on the protection against vulnerability does not include all elements and spheres of human existence. However, which elements and spheres of human existence should be placed under the protection of human rights? What criteria should inform the selection of these elements and spheres of human existence?

Starting points for discerning these criteria are historical experiences of suffering and injustice, which human beings are or could be exposed to based on the principle of vulnerability. Faced with these historically severe experiences of injustice and violence, and because of the principle of vulnerability, human beings agree to prevent for themselves and all other human beings the transformation from vulnerability to concrete violation and to stipulate active compensation in the case of a possible transformation from vulnerability to concrete violation.

Human rights protection does not apply to all historic experiences of violation. It is necessary to make a selection of historic experiences of injustice that call for human rights protection, which again demands criteria for this selection process. They can be derived from the above descriptions of human beings and the above-described weighting, because it shows what human beings want to protect themselves against. It allows human beings to understand which characteristics must be fulfilled for a historical experience of violence to warrant protection through human rights. First of all, human beings want to survive and live as human beings (fundamentality). Human beings become aware that the vulnerability concerns their own survival and the survival of all human beings as well as their own life as human beings and the lives of all others as human beings (universality), because the vulnerability does not stop at the first-person perspective and self-relation as a prerequisite to human life. Survival and a dignified life should not be allowed to be taken away from human beings (inalienability). They must be legally enforceable (enforceability) and have to be applicable to various dimensions (multi-dimensionality), because vulnerability can encompass the legal, political, historical and ethical dimension. Based on the above-mentioned high priority they possess, and based on the unpredictability of the vulnerability or a possible transformation from vulnerability to violation, survival and a dignified life should be unconditional (categorical character). Human beings share this desire to survive and live a dignified life with all other human beings equally (equality). This desire is not individualistic, even if each individual discovers it through their own first-person perspective and self-relation (individual applicability). Therefore, the following eight criteria determine the choice of those historical experiences of violence and vulnerabilities against which all human beings should be protected through specific human rights: fundamentality, universality, inalienability, enforceability, multi-dimensionality, categorical nature, equality and individual applicability.

The second step in filtering the justification model based on the principle of vulnerability characterizes an inherent openness to new threats, risks, and experiences of injustice, which at present are not yet in the human conscience or imagination or have not yet occurred, as well as an openness for experiences of injustice that occur in different religions, cultures, traditions, civilizations, and world views.

At the same time, the second step of filtering leads to the challenges to apply these eight criteria to historical experiences of injustice, for example the challenges of historical contingency and the universalization of particular experiences of injustice.

• 2.3 Third Step of Filtering

This step encompasses the application of the above-mentioned eight criteria in order to identify the elements and spheres of human existence that need to be protected by human rights. Human rights per se and all specific human rights can be ethically justified based on the principle of vulnerability. 15

• 3 Autonomy as Source of Pluralism and Particularity

Relying on their ethical justification, human dignity and human rights constitute the basis for pluralism and particularity by understanding all human beings as individuals that are all different and unique, and not simply members of a collective. Only the protection of human rights in its universality guarantees that all people are self-determined and can take their own positions and that those individual rights must be respected by all. Only this protection of autonomy of each individual allows all human beings to be particular. Therefore, human dignity and human rights take on a constitutive role for cultural, religious, and worldview-based pluralism and particularity, because the human rights-based appreciation of autonomy means at the same time celebrating particularity and, therefore, pluralism. 16 Autonomy furthers – it is even a precondition for – pluralism and particularity, because without autonomy there would be no choice for the individual, which would make it very hard for pluralism and particularity. 17

At the same time, pluralism and particularity are limited by human dignity and human rights of all human beings. 18 The freedom of the individual is protected and simultaneously restricted by human rights (by human rights of all other human beings) because, from a human rights perspective, one always has to accept the opposite as “an entity in a constant process of change; an entity we cannot quite imagine; an apparition in the process of becoming who faces us primarily to discomfort us and renegotiate both herself and ourselves.” 19 Rights and the corresponding duties interact with and restrict the arbitrary freedom of all human beings – for the protection of human dignity and human rights of all human beings.

Cultural, religious, and worldview-based pluralism and particularity go back to these individual rights and freedoms. They are indirectly protected by human rights through the individual human rights of all human beings. 20 At the same time, there is a limit to religious and worldview-based pluralism and particularity, because religious and worldview-based communities have to respect, protect, enforce, and contribute to the realisation of human dignity and human rights inside and outside of their communities. Nevertheless, human dignity and human rights are not about levelling religious or worldview-based plurality. This would go against human dignity and human rights, which protect and promote religious or worldview-based pluralism and particularity indirectly by protecting the corresponding freedoms of the individual. By offering the preconditions and a framework for religious and worldview-based pluralism and particularity, human rights make it possible that difference becomes a reality and pluralism and particularity legitimate, even against resistance. 21 It would, for example, be conceivable that a religious or worldview-based community would deny people, who see themselves as being part of another or no religious or worldview-based community, the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion by referring to their own tradition, as well as cultural and religious pluralism and particularity. Therefore, human rights protection is needed for religious and worldview-based pluralism and particularity because it guarantees the autonomy of each human being. Religious and worldview-based communities are free within the human rights framework (which means within the preconditions that also protect their own existence). This means, as a last consequence, that they are free, as long as they respect, protect, enforce, and contribute to the realisation of human dignity and human rights.

In this sense, human dignity and human rights secure a peaceful coexistence in a pluralistic society. Human dignity and human rights can be thought of as a branch on which hang the different religious and worldview-based communities, their peaceful coexistence, as well as religious and worldview-based pluralism and particularity. This branch needs to be respected by religious and worldview-based communities – primarily because of the already established universal validity of human rights inside and outside of religious and worldview-based communities – and the corresponding responsibility of protecting, enforcing, and contributing to the enforcement of human rights must be fulfilled. Otherwise, religious and worldview-based communities are in danger of having their right of existence denied (particularly in contexts where they represent a minority). Also, they would endanger the peaceful coexistence of religious and worldview-based communities, the dialogue between religious and worldview-based communities, as well as religious and worldview-based pluralism and particularity as such and, therefore, saw off the branch they sit on.

The continued wrestling for common understanding between religious and worldview-based communities gets an ethically justified frame of reference 22 in human rights, which promotes respectful dealing with religious or worldview-based differences.

• 4 Adaptation – a Model for Bringing Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Religious and Worldview-Based Communities Together

In order to understand the interaction between pluralism and particularity and human dignity and human rights as their foundation, the concept of “adaptation” 23 tries to capture the relationship between human dignity and human rights and religious and worldview-based communities. Adaptation sees this relationship as coming together in dialogue, as meeting with reciprocal effect, and as continued interaction, within the limits of human dignity and human rights of all humans. First, adaptation considers the above-mentioned protection that human dignity and human rights indirectly offer to religious and worldview-based communities by protecting all humans in their mental, religious, worldview-based, and spiritual dimension of existence. With this first aspect of adaptation, human rights recognise – and take seriously – religious and worldview-based communities as objects of their protection, but also as duty-bearers.

Second, human dignity and human rights have a direct effect on religious and worldview-based communities, because the power and influence of religious and worldview-based communities also require the responsibility to respect, protect, enforce, and implement human dignity and human rights. Religious and worldview-based communities have a particular responsibility to use their power in accordance to and in favour of human dignity and human rights. All human beings everywhere in the world should know that they are not forgotten as holders of human dignity and human rights – inside and outside of religious and worldview-based communities. The adaptation of human dignity and human rights, therefore, takes religious and worldview-based communities as human rights actors seriously. It expects respect towards human dignity and human rights and contributes towards their protection, enforcement and realisation – it does not spare religious and worldview-based communities in this respect. At the same time, adaptation sees religious and worldview-based communities as partners that make sense of human dignity and human rights from their respective perspectives and that participate in the human rights discourse from their own position. In the course of adaptation, both lead to a greater identification with human dignity and human rights in religious and worldview-based communities, a deeper internalisation of human dignity and human rights, and a stronger ownership of human dignity and human rights. The criticism of religious and worldview-based communities of the human rights discourse and human rights practice and, reciprocally, of other or their own religious and worldview-based communities from a human rights perspective, always stays within the boundaries of human dignity and human rights when using adaptation.

Reciprocal criticism also means having the courage in the course of adaptation to “call human rights problems in religious communities by their name, to not simply accept appalling injustices in religious communities as God-given”. 24 Adaptation succeeds in creating a fertile and constructive foundation, because it sees the opposite not only as recipient of criticism, but also as sender of criticism that is embedded in the discourse depending on his or her self-conception.

The adaptation of human dignity and human rights proves to be dialogical when, during this process, religious and worldview-based communities also critically name developments in the human rights tradition, the human rights discourse, and human rights practice. 25 As such, a religious or worldview-based community could, for example, actively take a stand in the international human rights discourse when one category or generation of human rights is given more importance than another one on an international level and, through this, the principle of the indivisibility of human rights is not adhered to. Other religious and worldview-based communities name human rights violations of state and non-state actors and support victims of human rights violations and human rights defenders when they present their concerns and cases, introduce their perception of abuse and instrumentalization of human rights for other political causes (e.g. by states) into the human rights discourse, and criticise a lack of implementation and realisation of human rights for all people. The respect, protection, enforcement, and realisation of human dignity and human rights could benefit from the fact that religious and worldview-based communities are often very close to the action and witness events because of their institutionalisation and structures, and can report and bear witness to them by using their existing communication channels.

Third, adaptation aims at rendering for people in various contexts human dignity and human rights more tangible as their own human dignity and human rights. Using the word adaptation and not interpretation is deliberate. Because in the case of interpretation a change in content is definitely possible. For example, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam of 1990 as an interpretation of human rights changes the content of human rights, inter alia , with article 24: “All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Sharia.” This Sharia-reservation has an effect on the understanding of human rights as they are seen to be subordinate to Sharia.

Similarly, the Bangkok Declaration of Human Rights of 1993 also represents an interpretation of human rights because it changes the content of human rights, inter alia , with article 6: “Reiterate that all countries, large and small, have the right to determine their political systems, control and freely utilize their resources, and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” The first part of this article concerning the choice of political system leads to the fact that political participation rights are restricted by the self-determination of the state. A state could, therefore, constitute itself as a dictatorship with reference to this part of article 6. This would mean giving up parts of the political participation rights.

Fourth, adaptation includes translating human dignity and human rights into the language, mindset, terms, concepts, narratives, pictures, and symbols of the respective religion and worldview. In the case of human rights as global consensus, there exists a need “of translating itself into a local project that speaks to peoples lived experiences. The international human rights project has been criticized as abstract in its pronouncements, elitist and alien to those it seeks to help. Largely driven by powerful Western-based NGO  s, the international human rights movement has appeared to some in the developing world as a ‘civilizing mission’ that sometimes appears to suggest that local and domestic cultures are backward and at odds with human rights.” 26

Fifth, adaptation incorporates human dignity and human rights into the horizon of belief, knowledge, thinking, and understanding of religious and worldview-based communities. This uncovers the contributions of the respective religious and worldview-based community to the emergence and development of human dignity and human rights. Furthermore, human dignity and human rights are correlated with their specific contents, convictions, teachings, principles, and values of the respective religious or worldview-based community. Human dignity and human rights are also rediscovered as part of one’s own identity. In this way, human dignity and human rights can be related as the own to the own. In theology, in discourse, and in reflection within religious and worldview-based communities, a human rights oriented hermeneutic is used. 27

Sixth, adaptation also encompasses religious and worldview-based justifications for human dignity and human rights. Based on the horizon of belief, knowledge, thinking, and understanding of the respective religious and worldview-based community, the claim that all humans are holders of human dignity and human rights will be justified.

Outside the respective religious and worldview-based community, the relevant justifications for human dignity and human rights based on religion or worldview might be limited. For the respect of human dignity and human rights within the respective religious or worldview-based community and for the perception of human rights duties for the respective religious or worldview-based community and its members, a religious and worldview-based justification for human dignity and human rights, cannot be estimated high enough in its importance, even if there is no necessity for it. No necessity, because an ethical justification for human dignity and human rights and their universality is also binding for religious and worldview-based communities.

The high importance of human dignity and human rights justifications based on religion or worldview stems from the fact that a justification based on religion or worldview is able to show that human dignity and human rights correspond to, for example, God’s love or the love for God. 28 Additionally, an ethical justification for human dignity and human rights is needed so that all humans are offered a plausible and rational justification for human dignity and human rights. The unique and essential importance of religious and worldview-based justifications is based on the reinforcing effect that a religious and worldview-based justification for the validity of human dignity and human rights obtains inside the respective religious and worldview-based community, as well as for the respective religious and worldview-based community itself.

Without this additional religious and worldview-based justification of human rights one could, however, come to the conclusion that human dignity and human rights are something purely secular in the sense that they have no relevance for the respective religious and worldview-based community or its members. This conclusion, however, clearly contradicts the universality of human dignity and human rights.

The importance of this religious and worldview-based justification for human dignity and human rights becomes also obvious in view of the tendency to assume a religious or worldview-based space where human dignity and human rights allegedly do not apply. This tendency is based on the claim that a religious or worldview-based justification should be rejected out of respect for the general public and the secular character of human dignity and human rights. This tendency can only be countered with a justification within their own faith or worldview. Justifications based on religion and worldview give access to human dignity and human rights, in particular when emerging from a specific religion or worldview. According to this perspective, religious and worldview-based communities accept the invitation that was given implicitly during the preparatory phase of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights to develop various human rights justifications from religious or worldview-based perspectives, in order to respect pluralism and particularity, and to make human rights accessible for members and believers of a religion or worldview. On the one hand, this justification gives human rights the importance that they should have. On the other hand, it opens up the possibility to appreciate or use human rights as an ethical frame of reference in the respective religious and worldview-based community.

Professor of Theological Ethics and Director of the Institute of Social Ethics ISE at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Lucerne, and Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein (South Africa).

2011–2015 Member of the Board of the Swiss Centre of Expertise in Human Rights. 2011–2017 Member of the Expert-Jury of the Swiss Ethics Award. 2013 Visiting Scholar at the University of Technology Sydney (Australia). 2013–2014 Guest-Professor at the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium). 2013–2017 Fellow at the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Lund University (Sweden). 2015–2019 Guest-Lecturer at the Leuphana University Lueneburg (Germany). 2015–2017 Visiting Fellow at Yale University (USA).

• Bibliography

Appiah , Kwame Anthony : Der Kosmopolit. Philosophie des Weltbürgertums . München : C.H. Beck , 2007 .

• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Assmann , Jan : Exodus. Die Revolution der Alten Welt . München : Verlag C.H. Beck , 2015 .

Butler , Judith : Le pouvoir des mots. Politique du performatif . Paris : Éditions Amsterdam , 2004 .

Gozdecka , Dorota Anna : Rights, Religious Pluralism and the Recognition of Difference. Off the scales of justice . New York, NY : Routledge , 2016 .

Habermas , Jürgen : “ Zur Legitimation durch Menschenrechte ”, in: Hauke Brunkhorst / Peter Niesen (ed.): Das Recht der Republik . Frankfurt a. M. : Suhrkamp , 1999 , p. 386 – 403 .

Habermas , Jürgen : “ Das Konzept der Menschenwürde und die realistische Utopie der Menschenrechte ”, in: Jürgen Habermas (ed.): Zur Verfassung Europas. Ein Essay . Berlin : edition suhrkamp , 2011 , p. 13 – 38 .

Höffe , Otfried : Kategorische Rechtsprinzipien . Frankfurt a. M. : Suhrkamp , 1990 .

Hoffmaster , Barry : “ What Does Vulnerability Mean? ”, in: The Hastings Center Report 36 ( 2 / 2006 ), p. 38 – 45 .

Honnefelder , Ludger : “ Theologische und metaphysische Menschenrechtsbegründungen ”, in: Arnd Pollmann / Georg Lohmann (ed.): Menschenrechte. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch . Stuttgart : J. B. Metzler , 2012 , p. 171 – 178 .

Hörnle , Tatjana : “ Zur Konkretisierung des Begriffs ‘Menschenwürde’ ”, in: Jan C. Joerden / Eric Hilgendorf / Natalia Petrillo / Felix Thiele (ed.): Menschenwürde und moderne Medizintechnik . Baden-Baden : Nomos , 2011 , p. 57 – 76 .

Kirchschlaeger , Peter G. (ed.): Die Verantwortung von nichtstaatlichen Akteuren gegenüber den Menschenrechten ( Religionsrechtliche Studien 4 ), Zürich : Edition NZN bei TVZ , 2017 .

Kirchschlaeger , Peter G. : “ How Can We Justify Human Rights? ”, in: International Journal of Human Rights and Constitutional Studies 4 ( 4 / 2016 ), p. 313 – 329 .

Kirchschlaeger , Peter G. : Menschenrechte und Religionen. Nichtstaatliche Akteure und ihr Verhältnis zu den Menschenrechten . Paderborn : Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag , 2016 .

Kirchschlaeger , Peter G. : “ Human Rights and Canon Law ”, in: Felix Wilfred , Andrés Torres Queiruga , Enrico Galavotti (ed.): Revision of Canon Law [= Concilium 52 (5/2016) ], p. 65 – 77 .

Kirchschlaeger , Peter G. : “ Adaptation – A Model for Bringing Human Rights and Religions Together ”, in: Acta Academica , 47 ( 2 / 2015 ), p. 163 – 191 .

Kirchschlaeger , Peter G. : “ Menschenrechte als kontinuierliche Quelle von Wertegeneralisierung ”, in: Jahrbuch für Christliche Sozialwissenschaften 56 ( 2015 ), p. 227 – 250 .

Kirchschlaeger , Peter G. : “ Das Prinzip der Verletzbarkeit als Begründungsweg der Menschenrechte ”, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 62 ( 1 / 2015 ), p. 121 – 141 .

Kirchschlaeger , Peter G. : Wie können Menschenrechte begründet werden? Ein für religiöse und säkulare Menschenrechtskonzeptionen anschlussfähiger Ansatz . Münster : LIT-Verlag , 2013 .

Kirchschlaeger , Peter G. : “ Religionsfreiheit – ein Menschenrecht im Konflikt ”, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 60 ( 2 / 2013 ), p. 353 – 374 .

Kirchschlaeger , Peter G. : “ Das ethische Charakteristikum der Universalisierung im Zusammenhang des Universalitätsanspruchs der Menschenrechte ”, in: Stephan Ast / Klaus Mathis / Julia Hänni / Benno Zabel (ed.): Gleichheit und Universalität ( ARSP -Beiheft 128 ), Stuttgart 2011 , p. 301 – 312 .

Kottow , Michael H. : “ Vulnerability. What Kind of Principle Is It? ”, in: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 7 ( 2004 ), p. 281 – 287 .

Lohmann , Georg : “ Die unterschiedlichen Menschenrechte ”, in: Karl Peter Fritzsche / Georg Lohmann (ed.): Menschenrechte zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit . Würzburg : Ergon Verlag , 2000 , p. 9 – 23 .

Loretan , Adrian : “ Menschenrechte in den Religionsgemeinschaften ”, in: Peter G. Kirchschlaeger et al. (ed.): Menschenrechte und Wirtschaft im Spannungsfeld zwischen State und Nonstate Actors . Bern : Stämpfli Verlag ( Internationales Menschenrechtsforum Luzern IHRF , 2 ), 2005 , p. 51 – 59 .

Margalit , Avishai : The Decent Society . Cambridge : Harvard University Press , 1998 .

Marie , Jean-Bernard : “ De l’universalité des principes à l’universalité des pratiques des droits de l’homme ”, in: Avancées et confins actuels des droits de l’homme aux niveaux international, européen et national. Mélanges offerts à Silvio Marcus Helmons . Brüssel : Bruylant , 2003 , p. 219 – 229 .

Ong-Van-Cung , Kim Sang : “ Reconaissance et vulnérabilité ”, in: Archives de Philosophie 73 ( 2010 ), p. 119 – 141 .

Perry , Michael J. : “ ‘The Morality of Human Rights’. A Nonreligious Ground? ”, in: Emory Law Journal 54 ( 2005 ), p. 97 – 150 .

Raz , Joseph : The Morality of Freedom . Oxford : Clarendon House , 1986 .

Runggaldier , Edmund : “ Deutung menschlicher Grunderfahrungen im Hinblick auf unser Selbst ”, in: Günter Rager / Josef Quitterer / Edmund Runggaldier (ed.): Unser Selbst – Identität im Wandel neuronaler Prozesse . Paderborn : Ferdinand Schöningh , ² 2003 , p. 143 – 221 .

Ruteere , Mutuma : Bridging Valleys. Harnessing the Power of Religious Movements for and Human Rights. A Briefing Paper for the Raoul Wallenberg Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law . Turkey , 2014 [unpublished].

Sauer , Hanjo / Riedl , Alfons : Die Menschenrechte als Ort der Theologie. Ein fundamental- und moraltheologischer Diskurs . Frankfurt a. M. : Peter Lang , 2003 .

Schroeder , Doris / Gefenas , Eugenijus : “ Vulnerability. Too Vague and Too Broad? ”, in: Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 18 ( 2009 ), p. 113 – 121 .

Tasioulas , John : “ On the Foundations of Human Rights ”, in: Rowan Cruft / Matthew S. Liao / Massimo Renzo (ed.): Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2015 , p. 45 – 70 .

See in more detail Kirchschlaeger, Charakteristikum der Universalisierung , p. 301–312.

Appiah, Der Kosmopolit , p. 174.

Perry, Human Rights , p. 97–150; Tasioulas, Human Rights , p. 45–70.

Lohmann, Menschenrechte , p. 10.

Kirchschlaeger, Wie können Menschenrechte begründet werden , p. 241–267; Kirchschlaeger, Das Prinzip der Verletzbarkeit ; Kirchschlaeger, Justify Human Rights .

Schroeder/Gefenas, Vulnerability , p. 113–121; Kottow, Vulnerability , p. 281–287.

Ong-Vang-Cung, Reconaissance et vulnérabilité , p. 119.

Butler, Le pouvoir , p. 77.

Margalit, The Decent Society , p. 9–10.

See in more detail Kirchschlaeger, Wie können Menschenrechte begründet werden , p. 231–267.

Hoffmaster, Vulnerability , p. 42.

Runggaldier, Grunderfahrungen , p. 143–221.

Honnefelder, Menschenrechtsbegründungen , p. 171 et seq.

Habermas, Menschenwürde , p. 18.

Kirchschlaeger, Wie können Menschenrechte begründet werden , p. 290–335; Kirchschlaeger, Das Prinzip der Verletzbarkeit , p. 121–141.

Kirchschlaeger, Menschenrechte und Religionen ; Kirchschlaeger, Die Verantwortung .

Raz, Morality of Freedom , p. 395–399.

Marie, De l’universalité des principes , p. 225.

Gozdecka, Rights , p. 177.

Kirchschlaeger, Religionsfreiheit , p. 353–374.

Hoeffe, Rechtsprinzipien , p. 135–150.

Kirchschlaeger, Wie können Menschenrechte begründet werden ; Kirchschlaeger, Menschenrechte und Religionen .

Kirchschlaeger, Adaptation .

Loretan, Menschenrechte , p. 58 et seq.

Sauer/Riedl, Menschenrechte , p. 202–204.

Ruteere, Valleys , p. 5.

Kirchschlaeger, Human Rights , p. 65–77; Kirchschlaeger, Menschenrechte als kontinuierliche Quelle , p. 227–250.

Raz, Morality of Freedom , p. 31 et seq; Assmann, Exodus .

Content Metrics

Reference Works

Primary source collections

COVID-19 Collection

How to publish with Brill

Open Access Content

Contact & Info

Sales contacts

Publishing contacts

Stay Updated

Newsletters

Social Media Overview

Terms and Conditions  

Privacy Statement  

Cookie Settings  

Accessibility

Legal Notice

Terms and Conditions   |   Privacy Statement   |  Cookie Settings   |   Accessibility   |  Legal Notice   |  Copyright © 2016-2024

Copyright © 2016-2024

• [66.249.64.20|185.126.86.119]
• 185.126.86.119

Character limit 500 /500

Why Human Dignity is Important

What is Dignity?

Dignity is the quality of being honourable, noble, excellent or worthy. With a human regarded as the most supreme living creature, dignity, in its appealing sense, is better referred to as human dignity. It is the conceptual basis for the formulation and execution of human rights and is neither granted by the society nor can it be legitimately granted by the society. An imperative implication of human dignity is that every human being should be regarded as a very invaluable member of the community with a uniquely free expression of their right to life, integrated bodily attributes and their spiritual nature (Chapman, Audrey R, 2010).

Human dignity is a sense of self-worth. Therefore, dignity is a sense of pride in oneself that a human being has with them. This conscious sense makes them feel that they deserve respect and honour from other human beings. Many scholars argue that if a human being is in a humiliating or compromising situation then this is a major threat to their dignity. However, other human persons may still assert that they have dignity even though they find themselves in such situations. All in all, humans deserve dignity not because of their lifelong achievements but by the fact they are already human beings (TerMeulen Ruud, 2010).

Three Perspectives of Human Dignity

The question of human dignity has hit the headlines world over in the recent past. The pre-colonial period has been used as the base reference for crimes against humanity and abuse of human dignity, thence redefinition of the term human dignity by international law courts and the United Nations. Human dignity has been defined from the philosophical, religious and legalistic perspectives.

The deep philosophical roots of the term human dignity were articulated by Emmanuel Kant, a great philosopher of the famous late Enlightenment. He is considered as the source of the now contemporary concept of human dignity. He holds that the fundamental principle behind moral duties of human beings is a categorical imperative. According to Kant, imperative means that it commands us to exercise our wills in a particular way. As a result, human beings with respect for human dignity should not possess any irrational wills against their fellow human beings and the generally acceptable societal norms and values.

And according to Emmanuel Kant, the only thing we should will about is our happiness as human beings. Once we have happiness we’ll be able to enjoy good health and nourish proper relationships (Sensen Oliver, 2011). Human dignity should operate on the basis of volitional principles or maxims. Hence, the basic rational requirements and morality should be the primary demands that apply to these maxims which motivate all our actions.

Human dignity has also been developed along the lines of religious, theological and ethical perspectives. Christian and Islam views make up this perspective at large. According to the Christians, the Bible reveals that God not only created the human nature but also endowed man with unique qualities after creating man in His own image and likeness (Genesis 1:26). It is from this basis that we can deduce that the human nature deserves a very inherent dignity.

According to the Russian Orthodox Church’s basic teaching on the issue of human dignity, God has endowed all human beings in a very generous manner by distributing His gifts equally such that His showing of human dignity, nature and abundance of His unending grace remains undisputable. Owing to the fact that Jesus Christ offered His life as a ransom for sin and the sinful nature of human beings, human dignity was lifted at its best, hence it should be respected. The Bible also asserts that life according to the desires of the flesh that don’t withstand respect for other human beings is loss of and abuse of human dignity.

The Islam Texts Society puts forth the idea that human dignity is the basis of human rights. Several references are drawn from the Holy Quran which indicates that a human being deserves dignity as a result of their physical and spiritual nobility. The Quran says that God’s love for humanity is immense, the sanctity for human life immeasurable, the necessity for freedom a prerequisite thus restating the need for human equality and accountability for all acts done to humanity (Kamali, H, M, 1999) .

For this reason, Sharia Laws have been developed to help in protecting human dignity and also promote a high level of social interaction. Since God has honoured mankind by His great love, human beings should also reciprocate the same and show their love and respect for their fellow human beings. In other words, dignity is not earned by the meritorious conduct which is an expression of the favour and grace of God towards human beings.

The legal perspective of the concept of human dignity was coined at the end of the Second World War. It has been regarded as the central perspective that discourses human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that all humans have been born with equality in dignity and rights. For this reason, they are endowed with enough reason and pure conscience, hence should acts towards one another with a deep spirit of brotherhood. In its preamble, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights seeks for recognition and respect for the inherent dignity as well as the equal and inalienable rights of every member of the human dignity despite where they come from, their religious beliefs or background history.

Drafters of this perspective add that the human person possesses many rights because of the fact they have been born as a person, wholly, a master and manager of oneself in many aspects (Frame Tom, 2007). Therefore, all human beings deserve to be treated with utmost dignity. International Law, in pointing out the contempt of and disregard for human dignity says that abuse of human rights has resulted in numerous barbarous acts that have completely outraged the pure conscience of mankind. Digging deep the question of human dignity has led to the coining of and questions in aspects of human liberty, equality and fraternity because many people died and suffered in the hands of their fellow human beings during the war.

Case Analysis of Human Dignity

In March 28, 2010, Conor McBride brutally murdered his fiancée before turning himself to police. As a result, nobody sought a death penalty. Several issues emanate from his ordeal: justice and several elements of justice, deterrence and forgiveness. However, of concern to us now is the question of human dignity by the murderer.

The death penalty for all crimes has been abolished in Australia. The major question that arises is whether we should use justice to arrive at human dignity and justice. Is punishment a means to attaining justice? First of all, McBride hasn’t respected the dignity of his fiancée by killing her. Nonetheless, killing him would be a disregard for his dignity as well.

Several arguments arise from the death penalty for someone who has shown contempt to human dignity. The most obvious one is the fact that a murderer loses their dignity by performing this act. Therefore, they also deserve to lose it in the same manner. The other argument says that by killing another person, a murder can only retain their human dignity by being put to death as well. The last argument says that a murder’s human dignity should be respected hence they shouldn’t be put to death (Perry, Michael J, 2005).

In the case of Oscar Pistorius who participated in the 2012 Olympic Games, a powerful thought and question on human dignity has been put forward. He became the first man with a disability to participate in the able-bodied competition. He was amputated on both legs at birth. This raised tough questions as to whether he should participate in the able-bodied Olympics or in the Paralympics for those with disabilities. He insisted that he wanted to participate in the normal-bodied Olympics. However, others argued that he had an undue advantage because he runs on blades.

Later on, a question as to whether technological advancements should be allowed to take toll in the issue of human dignity arose. This is clear because without the blades, Oscar Pistorius couldn’t have participated in the able-bodied Olympics. The arguments put forward in three perspectives say that human dignity actually places limits on the enhancements of individuals. Others say that it encourages human dignity while the last group argues that those who dispute that enhancements actually threaten human dignity are those who cannot benefit from such enhancements (Kurt Bayertz, Human Dignity, 1996).

In April 1986, an unidentified university lecturer from Belfast was practically seized by some Muslim gunmen in Beirut, Lebanon. After about 5 years, Brian Keenan was a free man once again. He had survived a painful incarceration, chained to some walls of a very tiny cell. To add insult to injury, he’s a blinded musician.

Everybody thought he was actually dead but after being released, he wished to travel the whole world, eat all the food in the world and make love possibly with all the women in the world as he had said. Silently, he began recording his ordeal on tape in an attempt to make sense of his life.

This ideally meant that his dignity had been abused and he never felt as though a human being. It deeply reminded him of the ancient times of slave trade when human beings haggled the price of their fellow human beings in attempt to claim supremacy and gain access to mighty riches. As a learned man, Keenan had been taken hostage to and work as a prisoner for the Jihad in Patagonia, Chile.

Brian was captured at Belfast as a man with full vision but after about five years, he came back blind. Why did this happen? Well, he was blinded by an attack of smallpox. He actually felt that he was better dead than alive at that time. This perhaps is the greatest disregard for human dignity when people you are offering services involuntarily and free of charge can’t even treat you so that you live as a human being just like them.

Brian Keenan, in an interview with The Guardian, a British newspaper, says that he wasn’t prepared for such an endeavour. He wasn’t a musician or historian but he found himself buried in those works of art. To this day, he can’t tell how he started playing the harp yet he wasn’t a musician. That’s why he said that when one ends up spending a lot of time in some small dark place, some strange people and ideas end up visiting you. He attributes all these as an attempt to recover one’s lost dignity. Anderson Duff Attorney

As a university lecturer before his capture, Brian Keenan could actually exercise his freedom of speech and movement and even do whatever he wanted but this didn’t turn out the same when he was captured. When he was a free man, Keenan never highly regarded those who visited him. However, he found himself being very grateful to those who visited him in what he describes as a cell without a wall. This he attributes to the fact that he was surrounded by conditions beyond his wish, conditions that he didn’t perceive to be good.

It is clear from various case studies that the question of human dignity brings out a lot of questions in the areas of justice and equality in the society. It affects societal norms and generally accepted principles. For instance, no society allows a human being to kill a fellow human being.

Critically looking at all the three perspectives from whence the issue of human dignity arises, it is important to look at all of them because without one perspective, several factors surrounding human dignity cannot be properly articulated. Therefore, all the three perspectives should be used depending on the situation bringing the issue of human dignity to question.

Chapman, Audrey R, Inconsistency of Human Rights Approaches ot Human Dignity with Transhumanism, The American Journal of Bioethics 10, no. 7 (2010): 61 – 63.

TerMeulen, Ruud, Dignity, Posthumanism, and the Community of Values, The American Journal of Bioethics 10, no. 7 (2010): 69 – 70

Frame, Tom 2007, The Legacy of Ronald Ryan’s Last Day, Quadrant  Magazine51, nos. 1-2 (2007): 53-60.

Kamali, H, M 1999, The Dignity of Man: An Islamic Perspective, 2nd edn, Ismalic Texts Society

Perry, Michael J, Capital Punishment and the Morality of Human Rights, Journal of Catholic Legal Studies 44 (2005): 1–36.

Anderson Duff Lawyer | Attorney

Anderson Duff Lawyer Crime

Sensen, Oliver 2011, Human Dignity in Historical Perspective: The Contemporary and Traditional Paradigms, European Journal of Political Theory, 10:1, 71-91.

Kurt Bayertz, Human Dignity: Philosophical Origin and Scientific Erosion of an Idea, (Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity, ed. Kurt Bayertz [Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1996], 73-90)

Mary Ann Glendon, The Bearable Lightness of Dignity, (First Things, May 2011, 41-45)

INSTANT PRICE

Get an instant price. no signup required.

We respect your privacy and confidentiality!

Share the excitement and get a 15% discount

Introduce your friends to The Uni Tutor and get rewarded when they order!

Refer Now >

FREE Resources

• APA Citation Generator
• Harvard Citation Generator
• Chicago Citation Generator
• MLA Referencing Generator
• Oscola Citation Generator
• Vancouver Citation Generator
• Turabian Citation Generator

New to this Site? Download these Sample Essays

• Corporate Law Thesis
• Political Philosophy
• Legal Writing Rules
• Sample Philosophy Thesis

Send me free samples >

How The Order Process Works

• Order Your Work Online
• Tell us your specific requirements
• Pay for your order
• An expert will write your work
• You log in and download your work
• Order Complete

Amazing Offers from The Uni Tutor Sign up to our daily deals and don't miss out!

Contact Us At

• e-mail: info@theunitutor.com
• tel: +44 20 3286 9122

Brought to you by SiteJabber

• Terms & Conditions
• Privacy Policy

Copyright © 2002-2024 - The Uni Tutor - Custom Essays. 10347001, info@theunitutor.com, +44 20 3286 9122 , All Rights Reserved. - Terms and Conditions   |   Privacy Policy

The Uni Tutor : We are a company registered in the United Kingdom. Registered Address London, UK , London , England , EC2N 1HQ

Human Dignity

Human dignity is the recognition that human beings possess a special value intrinsic to their humanity and as such are worthy of respect simply because they are human beings. This concept, once foundational to ethical reflection in such diverse areas of engagement as social ethics and human rights on to the clinical bedside and bioethics, has come under increasing criticism. As part of our institutional identity as a Christian bioethics center, The Center for Bioethics & Human Dignity is firmly committed to the belief that human dignity is an inherent quality in all human beings in virtue of our having been created in the image of God. Thus every human being, regardless of age, ability, status, gender, ethnicity, etc., is to be treated with respect. Furthermore, we believe that how one understands this concept affects how one views and engages bioethical issues across the entire life span. The articles in this section explore this key concept in both its foundational development and its application to the broader concerns of bioethics.

SUGGESTED RESOURCES

• CBHD Research Staff, “Human Dignity: The Fundamental Concept in Bioethics”
• Susan Haack, “Human Dignity: A Brief Overview”
• Michael Sleasman, “Bioethics Past, Present, and Future: Important Signposts in Human Dignity” (An overview of bioethics and the breadth of issues it encompasses)
• Andrew Fergusson and Matthew Eppinette, “Human Dignity: Still Defying Devaluation”
• Susan Haack, “Christian Explorations in the Concept of Human Dignity”
• David Gushee, “The Sanctity of Life”

Bibliography

Position statement, review of them before us: why we need a global children's rights movement.

Them before Us: Why We Need a Global Children’s Rights Movement, by Katy Faust and Stacy Manning, was written to persuade the reader that “adults need to do hard things so kids don’t have to” (xxix). The rights of the child are often neglected when discussions of marriage, divorce (specifically no-fault divorce), gamete donation, surrogacy, and adoption occur.

On Being Human: Reflections on Greta Gerwig’s Barbie Movie

The “Barbie” movie was a 2023 summer hit. As the highest-grossing film of the year, the flick has become a cultural icon. This is no doubt due to its expert marketing, nostalgia-inducing subject, and its playful set and tone. Yet there’s something deeper lurking beneath Barbie’s pretty pink fun house and plastic-like perfection—something that struck an emotional chord with its audience. For a movie about a doll, the film has much to say about what it means to be human. In this piece, I’ll dissect some of these themes and assess their helpfulness for understanding what it means to be human in light of key biblical texts.

Bioethics and the Incarnation

During this Christmas season, as believers celebrate the Messiah’s birth, it is worth looking afresh at the problem of bioethics.

Future Resurrection and the Right to Die: Using Strong Theology in Response to Shifting Societal Values

In times of pain, suffering, and loss of control, appeals to compassion and autonomy can make the “right to die” seem reasonable and attractive, and PAD seem forgivable—or even sanctioned. Despite the appeal of PAD, believers can be trusted to discern its wrongness when we make loving and impassioned appeals to historical Christian theology. Every believer can wield a sanctified moral reasoning that cuts carefully and humbly through the noise and appeal of popular notions of love, compassion, and autonomy.

A Biblical View on the Sanctity of Life, Part 1

At our core, we are predisposed to our own self-centered values, and we have no right to place those standards like a template over a person like Dan. We cannot judge another’s “quality of life” based on our one-sided prejudices. We need the biblical worldview to supplant our preconceived notions about life and its value. We need to give up our subjective criteria and accept an objective, transcendent worldview that ascribes true life-worth to someone like Dan.

A Biblical View on the Sanctity of Life, Part 2

In the 23 years since the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), I have watched its most celebrated ideals erode and crumble under a double standard. I had the honor of serving on the National Council on Disability when the ADA became law, and ideally, it was intended to guarantee the basic rights of Americans with disabilities. Many saw the ADA as a law which would help move society beyond the premise that one is “better off dead than disabled.” I am amazed, however, at how much people’s fears of disability have eroded the most basic of human rights, especially now that so many more people are surviving disabling conditions. And when society’s fundamental fear of disability provides the framework to legislate policy, the outcome can only result in a double standard.

Him Before All: Wisdom to Inform Bioethical Conversation

Bioethical dilemmas are being explored everywhere. Moral questions embedded in the application of medical technology are not reserved for elite medical roundtables. Rather, ethical decisions are the prevailing substance of entertainment. Stories do touch our souls.

Him Before Us: Wisdom to Inform Bioethical Conversation

The prevailing cultural narrative, woven into routine dialogue and highlighted throughout the entertainment industry, turns on how the individual alone must define what is good using one’s internal moral compass. The frame of reference for making optimal moral choices is exclusively located within the uniqueness of the autonomous person, who applies private and personal criteria to achieve happiness, wholeness, and significance.

C. S. Lewis and The Abolition of Man

In The Abolition of Man—published nearly 75 years ago—C. S. Lewis speaks indirectly, though perhaps prophetically, to our current complexities—reminding us that there is truly nothing new under the sun. In the title chapter of the book, Lewis asks the question, “In what sense is Man the possessor of increasing power over Nature?”[2] Are we able to have the control over Nature and live the autonomous lives we desire? In our attempt to understand and fully live out what it means to be human, is it possible to conquer those aspects of Nature we believe hinder, diminish, or destroy our flourishing, thereby solidifying our humanity?

What Is Human?

Christianity provides the radical answer that humans are created in the image of God, or the imago Dei (Gen 1:26–27). But what exactly does this mean? Until the mid-twentieth century, Christian thought on the imago Dei focused on uniquely human capacities, usually reason and morality.[1] But if a capacity is absent, or damaged, does this mean that the imago Dei is degraded? A focus on capacities risks dehumanizing the very old, the very young, or those with disabilities. Recent advances in archeology and history provide scholars a much richer context for understanding how the Bible uses the word “image”—one which goes beyond mere capacity.[2]

Ransoming Embryos

Throughout various points of the church calendar we are reminded of how God establishes the value of human life, namely, by the incarnation of God the Son—Christ. No doubt, this divine affirmation is needed now more than ever in a context where discussions on the value of all human life are a part of everyday conversation. But this post isn’t a typical bioethical argument, although it has implications for it given the importance of the subject, namely the human embryo. While other issues could be discussed, for our purposes here we offer some suggestions for thinking through one important issue concerning the embryo, the problem of so-called embryo glut (i.e., excess), which, we think, affords Christians an opportunity for redemptive action, i.e., the rescue of a human life frozen in a perpetual state of inactivity.

Celebrating WALL-E’s 10th Birthday

For those with eyes to see, the movie WALL-E (Disney and Pixar, 2008) can be something of an apocalypse, revealing God’s Kingdom and stoking a Christian imagination. 800 years from now the remnant of humanity exists on the Axiom, a space cruise ship. The high-tech deck chairs supporting their overfed/corpulent bodies double as hovercraft to move them around the ship. All interaction between humans is mediated by a device. Every hobby is virtual. Every meal comes in a cup. The trip on the Axiom was initially billed as a five-year cruise. But 700 years later, the remnant is unaware of any other existence, or indeed, of their ancestral home which had been so thoroughly trashed (literally) that it can no longer support life of any kind.

A Podcast for the MedTech Age: An Interview with Zac and Sally Crippen

Zac and Sally Crippen host Vernacular, a podcast that explores human flourishing through a broad range of categories, from sports, creative media, and food to philosophy and science. This interview highlights their work, experiences, and advice relating to bioethics.

Is Always On Always Good?

We are at a relatively early stage in developing digital social networks. With Facebook, smart phones, and GPS, we can find what we are looking for and track our friends with comparative ease. Interconnectivity is developing to the point at which, when we are sent electronic communications, algorithms identify what we might like on the basis of the included content. Satellite and CCTV offer some degree of surveillance, but not to the extent provided by the Bentham Grid. The narrator tells us that in 2023 “you can’t do anything in New York City without the Grid knowing who you are and where you are.” Merely science fiction? Read on.

Reawakening Medicine’s Twentieth Century Demons?

Throughout the last century, the spirit of the age exhibited a voracious appetite for human life. Medicine became the source for myriad racial enmities and immoral projects catalyzed by ascendant science and reckless medical research that was completely oblivious to the dignity of human life. The contingent bioethical lapses reflected the impact of social Darwinism on an age of physicians who primarily acted as scientists, not healers.

What Do We Make of the COVID-19 Vaccine?

As more and more of our friends, neighbors, and family members get vaccinated, it occurred to me that it would be helpful to offer some biblical counsel on the topic. As Christians, we must take every thought captive to Christ (2 Cor 10:5) as we consult both God’s Word and His world (i.e., scientific research) to discern whether the COVID-19 vaccine(s) are helpful and wise. To that end, I want to offer a set of biblical touchpoints to consider as you think about this issue.

Chasing Methuselah: Theology, the Body, and Slowing Human Aging

In Chasing Methuselah, Todd Daly examines the modern biomedical anti-aging project from a Christian perspective, drawing on the ancient wisdom of the Desert Fathers, who believed that the Incarnation opened a way for human life to regain the longevity of Adam and the biblical patriarchs through prayer and fasting. Daly balances these insights with the christological anthropology of Karl Barth, discussing the implications for human finitude, fear of death, and the use of anti-aging technology, weaving a path between outright condemnation and uncritical enthusiasm. Below is an interview with Daly on his book.

Disposition of the Heart

Every day at noon, she poured her heart out with vocal fervency before God. This experience of God as lovingly gentle and as one who invites us into his presence with the full spectrum of our human emotions comforted me throughout my life. I grew up loving God and his Word, attended church regularly with my family, and received salvation when I turned seven. However, that same inviting love and acceptance has not always been reflected in the church, with some holding unintentionally negative or stereotyped attitudes of me as a person with a disability.

Holey, Wholly, Holy Discipleship

If the risen and glorified Jesus is holey, wholly, holy, and our aim in discipleship is to look more like Him, then how do we disciple in brokenness (holey)? How do we embrace the whole, not simply neurological, person (wholly)? How do we form followers of Christ who look like Him (holy)?

Disabled Isn’t Unabled: What Living as a Disabled Pastor Has Taught Me about the Church

What is the purpose of a pastor? Is it to stand in front of a congregation, eloquently preaching from translated and exegeted original language notes? Should his or her leadership model the values of the world, where his congregants follow his lead because he sways them by the intellectual prowess and physical abilities that society so values?

Sanctity of Life Sunday

The questions regarding the sanctity of human life are complex with developments like this. No longer direct questions of who lives and who dies, but questions like “What does it mean to be human?” Where are the boundaries between the human and the non-human? Where is the line between correcting things that are broken and enhancing abilities and even creating new capabilities?

Ontological Chimeras: Human Beings as Rational Animals

On being human: some biblical and theological reflections, a review of the book the blank slate: the modern denial of human nature, theological anthropology for bioethics, human machines: a review of the movie a.i., a review of the book body & soul: human nature & the crisis in ethics, defining dignity: worldviews and the fate of bioethics, when i was hungry, you gave me to eat: the dignity of hand feeding in persons with dementia, paul ramsey and preconceptive eugenics, prenatal diagnostic screening: an update & cbhd engagement, christian explorations in the concept of human dignity, global women’s health, commodification, and the abortion debate, what is so bad about epo, being clinically depressed: the positive effects of gracious christian religion on mental health.

A Web of Air

Agents of S.H.I.E.L.D.

Annihilation

Black Mirror

Carbide Tipped Pens

Cerebellix: A Dystopian Novel

Children of a Lesser God

Children of the Mind

Codename: Freedom - Vanguard

Coming Home

Dark Matter

Do You Remember Love?

Electric Dreams

Ender in Exile

Ender's Game

Ender's Shadow

Erin Brockovich

Fever Crumb

Foundation and Earth

Foundation and Empire

Foundation's Edge

Fox Forever

Good Will Hunting

How to Survive a Robot Uprising

Humans, Bow Down

Keepers of the House

Klara and the Sun

Miss Evers' Boys

My Left Foot

One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest

Oryx and Crake

Person of Interest

Philadelphia

Prelude to Foundation

Ready Player Two: A Novel

Robogenesis

Robopocalypse: A Novel

Scrivener's Moon

Second Foundation

Shadow Puppets

Shadow of the Giant

Shadow of the Hegemon

Shadows in Flight

Speaker for the Dead

Station Eleven

Terminal Games

The Adoration of Jenna Fox

The Artifice Girl

The Big Door Prize

The Bradbury Report

The Call of Earth

The Country of the Blind: A Memoir at the End of Sight

The Currents of Space

The Digital Plague

The Electric Church

The Elephant Man

The Eternal Prison

The Fox Inheritance

The House of Eve

The Hydrogen Sonata

The Intouchables

The Memory of Earth

The Naked Sun

The Robots of Dawn

The Ships of Earth

The Windup Girl

The Year of the Flood

When a Man Loves a Woman

Life and Dignity of the Human Person

Genesis 1:26-31          God created man and woman in his image.      

Deuteronomy 10:17-19            God loves the orphan, the widow, and the stranger.        

Psalms 139:13-16              God formed each of us and knows us intimately.        

Proverbs 22:2            The Lord is the maker of both rich and poor.

Luke 10:25-37            The  good Samaritan recognized the dignity in the other and cared for his life.

John 4:1-42     Jesus  broke with societal and religious customs to honor the dignity of the Samaritan  woman.

Romans 12: 9-18            Love one another, contribute to the needs of others, live peaceably with all.

1 Corinthians 3:16            You are holy, for you are God’s temple and God dwells in you.

Galatians 3:27-28            All Christians are one in Christ Jesus.

James 2:1-8            Honor  the poor.

1 John 3: 1-2            See  what love the Father has for us, that we should be called Children of God.

1 John 4:7-12            Let us  love one another because love is from God.

Tradition  

“The world exists for everyone, because all of us were born with the same dignity. Differences of color, religion, talent, place of birth or residence, and so many others, cannot be used to justify the privileges of some over the rights of all. As a community, we have an obligation to ensure that every person lives with dignity and has sufficient opportunities for his or her integral development.” (Pope Francis, On Fraternity and Social Friendship  [ Fratelli Tutt i], no. 118) 

“The dignity of others is to be respected in all circumstances, not because that dignity is something we have invented or imagined, but because human beings possess an intrinsic worth superior to that of material objects and contingent situations. This requires that they be treated differently. That every human being possesses an inalienable dignity is a truth that corresponds to human nature apart from all cultural change. For this reason, human beings have the same inviolable dignity in every age of history and no one can consider himself or herself authorized by particular situations to deny this conviction or to act against it.” (Pope Francis, On Fraternity and Social Friendship [ Fratelli Tutt i], no. 213) 

“Our defense of the innocent unborn, for example, needs to be clear, firm and passionate, for at stake is the dignity of a human life, which is always sacred and demands love for each person, regardless of his or her stage of development. Equally sacred, however, are the lives of the poor, those already born, the destitute, the abandoned and the underprivileged, the vulnerable infirm and elderly exposed to covert euthanasia, the victims of human trafficking, new forms of slavery, and every form of rejection. We cannot uphold an ideal of holiness that would ignore injustice in a world where some revel, spend with abandon and live only for the latest consumer goods, even as others look on from afar, living their entire lives in abject poverty.” (Pope Francis, Rejoice and Be Glad [ Gaudete et Exsultate ], no. 101) 

“Human beings too are creatures of this world, enjoying a right to life and happiness, and endowed with unique dignity. So we cannot fail to consider the effects on people’s lives of environmental deterioration, current models of development and the throwaway culture.” (Pope Francis,  On Care for Our Common Home  [ Laudato Si' ], no. 43). 

"When we fail to acknowledge as part of reality the worth of a poor person, a human embryo, a person with disabilities – to offer just a few examples – it becomes difficult to hear the cry of nature itself; everything is connected." (Pope Francis, On Care for Our Common Home [ Laudato Si' ], no. 117) "Just as the commandment 'Thou shalt not kill' sets a clear limit in order to safeguard the value of human life, today we also have to say 'thou shalt not' to an economy of exclusion and inequality. Such an economy kills. How can it be that it is not a news item when an elderly homeless person dies of exposure, but it is news when the stock market loses two points? This is a case of exclusion. Can we continue to stand by when food is thrown away while people are starving? This is a case of inequality. Today everything comes under the laws of competition and the survival of the fittest, where the powerful feed upon the powerless. As a consequence, masses of people find themselves excluded and marginalized: without work, without possibilities, without any means of escape. Human beings are themselves considered consumer goods to be used and then discarded. We have created a 'throw away' culture which is now spreading. It is no longer simply about exploitation and oppression, but something new. Exclusion ultimately has to do with what it means to be a part of the society in which we live; those excluded are no longer society's underside or its fringes or its disenfranchised – they are no longer even a part of it. The excluded are not the 'exploited' but the outcast, the 'leftovers'." (Pope Francis, The Joy of the Gospel [ Evangelii Gaudium ], no. 53)

"The dignity  of the individual and the demands of justice require, particularly today, that  economic choices do not cause disparities in wealth to increase in an excessive  and morally unacceptable manner." (Pope Benedict XVI, Charity  in Truth [ Caritas in Veritate ], no. 32)

Human persons are  willed by God; they are imprinted with God's image. Their dignity does not come  from the work they do, but from the persons they are. (See St. John Paul II, On the Hundredth Year [ Centesimus annus] , no. 11)

"The  basis for all that the Church believes about the moral dimensions of economic  life is its vision of the transcendent worth -- the sacredness -- of human  beings. The dignity of the human person, realized in community with others, is  the criterion against which all aspects of economic life must be measured.

All  human beings, therefore, are ends to be served by the institutions that make up  the economy, not means to be exploited for more narrowly defined goals. Human personhood must be respected with a reverence that is religious. When we deal  with each other, we should do so with the sense of awe that arises in the  presence of something holy and sacred. For that is what human beings are: we  are created in the image of God ( Gn 1:27 )." (United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All , no. 28)

"Every individual, precisely by reason of the mystery of  the Word of God who was made flesh (cf. Jn 1:14 ), is entrusted  to the maternal care of the Church. Therefore every threat to human dignity and  life must necessarily be felt in the Church's very heart; it cannot but affect  her at the core of her faith in the Redemptive Incarnation of the Son of God,  and engage her in her mission of proclaiming the Gospel of life in all the  world and to every creature (cf. Mk 16:15 )." (St. John Paul II, The  Gospel of Life [ Evangelium vitae ] , no. 3)

"As explicitly formulated, the precept 'You shall not kill' is strongly negative: it indicates the extreme limit which can never be  exceeded. Implicitly, however, it encourages a positive attitude of absolute  respect for life; it leads to the promotion of life and to progress along the  way of a love which gives, receives and serves." (St. John Paul II, The Gospel of Life [ Evangelium vitae ], no. 54)

"This teaching rests on one basic principle: individual human beings are the foundation, the cause and the end of every  social institution. That is necessarily so, for men are by nature social beings." (St. John XXIII, Mother and Teacher [ Mater et Magistra ] , no. 219)

"There exist also sinful inequalities that affect millions  of men and women. These are in open contradiction of the Gospel: 'Their equal  dignity as persons demands that we strive for fairer and more humane  conditions. Excessive economic and social disparity between individuals and  peoples of the one human race is a source of scandal and militates against  social justice, equity, human dignity, as well as social and international  peace'." ( Catechism of the Catholic Church , no. 1938 citing Gaudium et Spes, 29)

"Whatever  insults human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary  imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution, the selling of women and  children; as well as disgraceful working conditions, where men are treated as mere tools for profit, rather than as free and responsible persons; all these things and others of their like are  infamies indeed. They poison human society, but they do more harm to those who  practice them than those who suffer from the injury." (Second Vatican Council, The Church in the Modern World [ Gaudium et Spes ], no. 27)

• Search Menu
• Advance articles
• Author Guidelines
• Submission Site
• Open Access
• About International Journal of Constitutional Law
• Editorial Board
• Advertising and Corporate Services
• Journals Career Network
• Self-Archiving Policy
• Dispatch Dates
• Journals on Oxford Academic
• Books on Oxford Academic

Article Contents

1. introduction: appeals to dignity in the era of abortion’s constitutionalization, 2. constitutional claims on dignity in early abortion cases, 3. competing conceptions of dignity in the abortion cases, 4. dignity, sexuality, and life, 5. dignity claims in cases concerning the rights of gays and lesbians, 6. conclusion.

• < Previous

Dignity and sexuality: Claims on dignity in transnational debates over abortion and same-sex marriage

• Article contents
• Figures & tables
• Supplementary Data

Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and sexuality: Claims on dignity in transnational debates over abortion and same-sex marriage, International Journal of Constitutional Law , Volume 10, Issue 2, 30 March 2012, Pages 355–379, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mos013

• Permissions Icon Permissions

Dignity’s meaning is famously contested. This essay explores competing claims on dignity in late twentieth-century debates over abortion and in the first decisions on the constitutionality of abortion legislation that these debates prompted. Advocates and judges appealed to dignity to vindicate autonomy, to vindicate equality, and to express respect for the value of life itself. Appeals to these distinct conceptions of dignity are now appearing in debates over the regulation of same-sex relations. Analyzed with attention to competing claims on dignity, we can see that in the debate over same-sex relations, as in the debate over abortion, a crucial question recurs: Do laws that restrict non-procreative sexuality violate or vindicate human dignity? Agonists who hold fundamentally different views about sexuality share an allegiance to dignity, enough to fight for the authority to establish dignity’s meaning in debates over sexual freedom. Today, as in the 1970s, dignity’s meaning is being forged in cross-borders conflict over dignity’s sex.

This essay explores competing claims on dignity in transnational debates over abortion and same-sex marriage. To do so, the essay revisits debates about abortion in the 1970s and the first constitutional litigation on abortion these debates prompted. It shows how competing claims on dignity came to shape prominent judicial decisions concerning abortion in Germany and the United States. The essay concludes by demonstrating that this struggle over dignity has begun to spread to the same-sex marriage debates.

In these different contexts, advocates and judges have invoked dignity to express liberty claims, to express equality claims, and to express respect for the value of life itself, in the process seeking to vindicate different understandings of sexuality’s role in human flourishing. After four decades of debate, advocates are now self-consciously engaged in a cross-borders struggle to establish the meaning of dignity in matters of sexuality. The story of this conflict—featuring transnational exchange among social movements, political parties, religious institutions, and courts—sheds light on how belief in the importance of dignity claims in human rights law unites agonists who otherwise act from fundamentally different beliefs about law’s role in regulating sexuality. 1

does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions… . Dignity provides a convenient cover for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees that appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally, highly contingent on local circumstances…..“Dignity’s” primary beneficial function in human rights adjudication lies in its importance to legal process, rather than its philosophical substance. 3

McCrudden offers a court-centered institutional and professional account of dignity’s authority: dignity meets needs of judiciary negotiating tensions of globalization.

The account of dignity this essay offers differs. However dignity may function in other areas, in debates over the regulation of sexuality, claims on dignity (1) are popular, as well as professional; (2) are asserted outside as well as inside courts; and (3) are carried across borders, by transnational social movements and religious organizations that (4) deploy dignity in regular and intelligible ways. Over the decades, these transnational processes seem to have accelerated, as courts have played an increasing role in reviewing laws regulating sexuality and as advocates have become more self-conscious about the logic and stakes of the conflict.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, calls for the decriminalization of abortion from emerging feminist movements accelerated in the United States and Europe. Feminist movements were by no means the sole impetus for reform, but feminist claims dramatically altered the stakes and tenor of conversation about abortion. 4 Amidst this growing transnational conversation, courts in the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, and Italy began for the first time to review the constitutionality of abortion laws. 5 I sample some moments in the story of abortion’s constitutionalization to demonstrate how citizens and judges of very different views increasingly came to make claims on dignity of a kind that had never been associated with abortion before.

In the late nineteenth century, abortion was banned throughout the United States. By the 1960s, calls grew for legislative reform that would allow abortion for public health reasons. The American Law Institute recommended legislation permitting abortion in cases where a panel of doctors determined it was appropriate to protect the life or health of the mother, in cases of rape/incest, or of fetal anomaly. 6 By 1967–8, some states had begun to relax criminal restrictions on this model—a trend that accelerated as public health advocates calling for the liberalization of abortion law were joined by environmentalists worried about overpopulation. 7 But many states refused.

The Council feels that should an unborn child become a thing rather than a person in the minds of people, in any stage of its development, the dignity of human life is in jeopardy. The family, too, which is the very basis of our society, would be minimized or perhaps destroyed. 8

Similarly, Dr. Jack Willke, a Catholic obstetrician, published a 1971 Handbook on Abortion which translated Catholic arguments against abortion into the discourse of science and civil rights and featured photos of human development and appeals to human dignity. 9 The Handbook sold millions of copies worldwide.

[T]here is no freedom, no equality, no full human dignity and personhood possible for women until we assert and demand the control over our own bodies, over our own reproductive process … . The real sexual revolution is the emergence of women from passivity, from thing-ness , to full self-determination, to full dignity… .” 11

Friedan was speaking as part of a national feminist movement that by 1970 had begun to speak out about abortion, breaking conventions of shame and silence by telling stories in “consciousness raising” sessions, in strike actions, and in litigation protesting the indignities and injuries inflicted by abortion laws that punished women for nonprocreative sex and pushed women into motherhood. 12

Friedan was also speaking as part of a transnational feminist movement. By the early 1970s, women in a number of countries were calling for an end to restrictive national abortion laws 13 using “speak-out” strategies of dissent, including “self-incrimination” 14 campaigns in which women “outed” themselves as having had abortions, and so exposed themselves to criminal prosecution. By telling their abortion stories, despite threat of sanction, women performatively asserted their dignity—a strategy the gay rights movement would soon employ to challenge “the closet.”

In France, 343 women drew international attention by declaring that they had had abortions in a public manifesto that appeared in the French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur in April 1971. 15 The text of the manifesto, written by Simone de Beauvoir, called for an end to secrecy and silence and demanded access to free birth control and to abortion services. 16 Two months after the release of the French manifesto, Aktion 218, a women’s organization in the Federal Republic of Germany named for the Penal Code section criminalizing abortion, undertook its own “self-incrimination” campaign, publishing abortion stories and the names of 374 German women in Der Stern . 17 They denounced the law criminalizing abortion because it subjected women to “degrading and life-threatening circumstances,” coerced women, and “branded them as criminals.” 18 Within months, women in Italy undertook their own self-incrimination campaign, releasing on August 4, 1971 a statement that women signed, acknowledging that they had had an abortion, and calling for abolition of the crime, on the ground that abortion should be “available for each class” and that motherhood should be a “free, conscious choice.” 19 Women in the United States also joined in, with a petition, on the model of the French campaign, published in the Spring 1972 edition of Ms. Magazine . 20

Today, appeals to dignity are common in constitutional jurisprudence concerning abortion. 21 I consider how this discursive practice began in the first constitutional cases on abortion, focusing on the American and German cases because of their prominence in modeling constitutional frameworks governing the regulation of abortion.

Claims on dignity entered this new body of constitutional case law in stages. The first major constitutional cases on abortion appeared in the United States, 22 initially making no express reference to dignity. In the United States, movements seeking to liberalize abortion on grounds of public health, environmentalist concern about overpopulation of the planet, and sexual freedom were joined by feminists seeking to give women choice in matters of sex and motherhood—and together they achieved legislative reform in many states. 23 By the early 1970s, the feminist movement was not only advocating legislative reform; movement lawyers filed numerous suits challenging the constitutionality of abortion restrictions. 24 In 1973, as the Catholic Church mounted significant opposition to reform, 25 the United States Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade 26 that the constitutional right of privacy protected a woman’s decision whether to terminate a pregnancy, until the point of viability. The United States Supreme Court’s decision was plainly responsive to public health arguments, but only indirectly addressed feminist claims. 27 While the appellant’s brief in Roe argued that the Texas law banning abortion “severely impinges [a woman’s] dignity, her life plan and often her marital relationship,” 28 the Roe decision focused much more clearly on the doctor’s autonomy than on his patients. 29

In the Federal Republic of Germany, movements seeking the decriminalization of abortion won an even more decisive victory, securing the decriminalization of abortion through legislation; but the Federal Constitutional Court interpreted the Basic Law to prohibit the new legislation—expressly repudiating the dignity claims of the German women’s movement. Through this conflict the West German court became the first to constitutionalize abortion with a focus on dignity.

For much of the twentieth century, paragraph 218 of the German Penal Code banned abortion without exception, although in practice judges regularly read into the statute an exception to save a woman’s life/health. 30 In the 1970s, organizing “hundreds of political actions—from street theatre and mass demonstrations to speak-out ‘tribunals’ and openly publicized bus trips to abortion clinics in the Netherlands,” feminists succeeded in eliciting widespread public support for reform. 31 Reformers joined the cause for a variety of reasons, but feminist claims remained audible throughout. As the Federal Parliament was considering liberalizing the abortion law, the New York Times reported that “vandals sprayed the doors and walls of the cathedral and three other Munich churches with slogans—‘Whether to have children is for us to decide, not doctors.’” 32

As in the United States, the Catholic Church mobilized in opposition to rising public support for liberalization. 33 Conservative Catholic opponents condemned abortion reform as an expression of Nazism. 34 However, despite the efforts of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) to block reform, 35 the Federal Parliament passed the Abortion Reform Act of 1974 (the Reform Act). 36 Enacted a year after Roe , the statute liberalized access to abortion, but on more restrictive terms. The Reform Act permitted abortion up to twelve weeks of pregnancy, provided a woman first received counseling designed to discourage abortion and to limit it to cases of “necessity.” 37

The conference of German Catholic Bishops had called for a suit challenging the abortion reform legislation if enacted. 38 Once the legislation was enacted, five CDU/CSU state governments and nearly 200 hundred conservative members of the Federal Parliament petitioned the Federal Constitutional Court for a ruling that the Reform Act violated the Basic Law. 39 In 1975, the Constitutional Court struck down the Reform Act as a violation of the postwar constitution, in particular the provision that: “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.” 40

The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the new law, which decriminalized abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy for women provided abortion-dissuasive counseling, violated the dignity of human life. 41 The court justified its decision on the grounds that life was “the living foundation of human dignity and the prerequisite for all other fundamental rights.” 42

The opinion expressed in the Federal Parliament during the third deliberation on the Statute to Reform the Penal Law, the effect of which is to propose the precedence for a particular time “of the right to self-determination of the woman which flows from human dignity vis-à-vis all others, including the child’s right to life” … is not reconcilable with the value ordering of the Basic Law. 43

In the court’s estimation, the fetus was included in the definition of “human life,” and “[w]here human life exists, human dignity is present to it; it is not decisive that the bearer of this dignity himself be conscious of it or know personally how to preserve it. The potential faculties present in the human being form the beginning suffice to establish human dignity.” 44 Given the overriding importance of the dignity of human life, the Court concluded, “the legal order may not make the woman’s right to self-determination the sole guideline of its rulemaking. The state must proceed, as a matter of principle, from a duty to carry the pregnancy to term.” 45 The state should endeavor “[t]o reawaken and, if required, to strengthen the maternal duty to protect” prenatal life, “entrusted by nature in the first place to the protection of the mother.” 46 The Court ruled that women were subject to this duty to carry a pregnancy to term, imposed by “nature” and law, except where the burdens exceeded those “normally” 47 associated with pregnancy. An exception was required where pregnancy posed a threat to the woman’s life, and the Court gave the legislature discretion to exempt women from the duty of pregnancy in other extraordinary circumstances, as well. 48

Underlying the Basic Law are principles for the structuring of the state that may be understood only in light of the historical experience of the spiritual-moral confrontation with the previous system of National Socialism. In opposition to the omnipotence of the totalitarian state which claimed for itself limitless dominion over all states of social life and which, in the prosecution of its goals of state, consideration for the life of the individual fundamentally meant nothing, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany has erected an order bound together by values which places the individual being and his dignity at the focal point of all of its ordinances. 49

Two justices dissented, including the only woman on the court. The dissenting justices insisted that the court had overstepped the scope of its authority in interpreting the Basic Law to require the recriminalization of abortion. 50 Looking abroad, the dissenters insisted that it was reasonable to regulate abortion in terms that evolved over the course of pregnancy through a trimester framework, 51 noting other European countries did not see liberalized access to abortion as incompatible with the right to life. 52 The dissenters also disputed the historical justification for criminalization offered by the majority, arguing that criminalizing abortion did not repudiate, but instead preserved a mode of regulating women associated with National Socialism. The dissenters pointed out that the Nazi regime was known for its natalist policies and harsh punishment of abortion, 53 including sentencing some women who procured abortions to death for “‘injur[ing] the vitality of the German people.’” 54 Far from justifying continued punitive measures, they argued, the lessons of history counseled “restraint in employing criminal punishment, the improper use of which in the history of mankind has caused endless suffering.” 55

The decision of the Constitutional Court drew strong public reaction. Polls showed widespread disagreement with the court’s ruling, 56 and the feminist movement quickly moved to denounce it. A radical left feminist group bombed the Court and the headquarters of the Federal Doctors’ Association, which had opposed abortion reform. 57 Once again, women’s groups used the tactic of the public speak out, with six thousand women declaring in Der Stern that they would continue to seek abortions and help other women to do so. 58

In 1976, Parliament reformed paragraph 218 to provide immunity from prosecution for abortion in the case of specific “indications” including the life and health of the mother, fetal deformity, rape and incest, or “social need/emergency.” 59 Figures differ, but approximately eighty to ninety percent of abortions fell in the last category. 60

The abortion conflict involves more than a story about two rights holders with conflicting claims on dignity. As early debates on abortion illustrate, there are also competing conceptions of dignity at play, which I have elsewhere termed: dignity as liberty, dignity as equality, dignity as life. 61

Dignity as liberty entails claims on autonomy, on privacy, and on free development of personality. By contrast, dignity as equality involves claims about status, honor, respect, and recognition. Dignity as life appeals to something prior to these forms of social relations, seeking through the regulation of birth, sex, or death to give symbolic expression to the value of human life itself.

The German Court interpreted the nation’s postwar constitution to prohibit the decriminalization of abortion by reading the Basic Law’s guarantee of dignity in this symbolic register, as requiring government efforts to protect life and to affirm its value. The women of Aktion 218 advanced, in part, a dignity claim of this kind; they argued that laws criminalizing abortion threatened women’s lives, a claim to which the 1975 decision in part responded. 62 But German women sought more: they appealed to dignity as liberty and equality, seeking freedom to decide whether to continue a pregnancy and recognition of their authority and competence to make decisions about sex, health, parenting, partners, and life plans. 63

In ruling that the Basic Law’s protections for dignity required the recriminalization of abortion, the Federal Constitutional Court expressly rejected dignity claims of the kind that the women of Aktion 218 asserted. 64 Instead, the Court ruled that the state must act “[t]o reawaken and, if required, to strengthen the maternal duty to protect” prenatal life, unless continuing a pregnancy would impose extraordinary burdens on a woman. 65 The German Court based its interpretation of dignity, not only on a contested claim about the Holocaust and abortion, but also on a contested claim about the state’s role in enforcing the duties of a pregnant woman. 66 The Federal Constitutional Court refused to extend constitutional protections to pregnant women of the kind the United States Supreme Court had extended two years earlier in its 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade .

In what follows, I consider the competing conceptions of dignity in constitutional decisions concerning abortion in United States and Germany. As we will see, courts in each nation have reasoned about dignity differently—and differently over time. As a result, two constitutional frameworks that once seemed quite fundamentally opposed have grown in important respects to resemble one another. Each now understands dignity as liberty and dignity as life to be implicated in the regulation of abortion; each now reasons about the dignity claims of pregnant women in ways unheard of before 1970.

3.1. Competing conceptions of dignity in U.S. abortion cases

Roe does not mention dignity. While the appellant’s brief in Roe v. Wade had argued that the Texas law banning abortion “severely impinges [a woman’s] dignity, her life plan and often her marital relationship,” 67 the Roe decision did not adopt this language, and focused more on the doctor’s autonomy than his patients’. 68 Yet over years of conflict, the United States Supreme Court has come to reason about constitutional protections for women’s decisions about abortion in the language of dignity—despite the fact that dignity is not expressly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution. 69

Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision—with the guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in Roe— whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice freely is fundamental. Any other result, in our view, would protect inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to all. 71

Blackmun’s appeal to dignity in describing women’s constitutional interests in making decisions about abortion expressly concerned, not only autonomy, but also equality: women’s equal freedom with men to be self-governing.

In the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey , 72 the portion of the plurality opinion attributed to Justice Kennedy invoked dignity to explain why the Constitution protects decisions regarding family life: “These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 73 Casey also invokes dignity in sex-egalitarian registers; as it reaffirms the abortion right, the joint opinion summons the understanding that the state cannot impose “its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture.” 74

Yet, Casey reflects, not only the influence of decades of feminist advocacy, but also of antiabortion advocacy. Even as Casey reaffirms women’s constitutionally protected right to decide whether to end a pregnancy, it also allows government more authority to regulate abortion, throughout the course of pregnancy, to protect potential life, so long as the regulation does not impose an “undue burden” on women’s right to end a pregnancy. In Casey , the U.S. Court upheld for the first time counseling designed to dissuade women from ending pregnancies, so long as such counseling is “truthful and not misleading.” 75

The United States Supreme Court’s increasing solicitude for the government’s interest in regulating abortion to protect potential life has come to shape the Court’s understanding of dignity in the abortion context. While Thornburgh and Casey invoke dignity as a reason to prevent the government from depriving women of control over the abortion decision, Justice Kennedy invokes dignity quite differently in the Court’s 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart . 76 In Carhart , Justice Kennedy authors an opinion upholding, under the Casey framework, the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, which proscribed a particular method of performing late term abortions. The Court emphasized that Congress had authority to adopt a law regulating the methods physicians use to perform late term abortions in order to “express respect for the dignity of human life.” 77 The “dignity” to which the Court refers in Carhart is plainly not the “dignity” invoked in Thornburgh and Casey , which concerned women’s equal freedom to lead self-governing lives. In Carhart , the Court makes no mention of women’s decisional interests in dignity, and instead speaks of the government’s interest in protecting women from making mistaken decisions in choosing abortion methods that they might later regret. 78

Carhart reasons about abortion by appeal to dignity as life rather than dignity as autonomy or dignity as equality. Even so, Carhart doesn’t interpret the United States Constitution to require the criminalization of abortion, as the German Court insisted. Rather, in Carhart , the U.S. Court upholds a law restricting the methods doctors may use in performing late term abortions, reasoning about this legislative restriction on abortion expressively, as a vehicle for constructing social meaning. The Carhart opinion allows Congress to restrict the methods of performing late term abortions in order to communicate ethical understandings that “express respect for the dignity of human life.” 79 The Court presents this form of expressive regulation of abortion as consistent with the Casey framework, insisting that respect for the dignity of human life can be vindicated in a framework that also respects women’s dignity in making decisions about abortion. 80

3.2. Competing conceptions of dignity in German abortion cases

As in the United States, constitutional law governing abortion in Germany has evolved since the 1975 decision of the Constitutional Court, and there are now striking convergences between the two systems. 81

Reunification of Germany in 1990 required reconciling two bodies of abortion law. 82 Prior to reunification, women in the German Democratic Republic had access to abortion on demand in the first trimester. 83 Upon reunification, the German Federal legislature enacted the Pregnant Women’s and Family Assistance Act, which decriminalized abortion in the early weeks of pregnancy, but instituted new forms of dissuasion, including a modified counseling requirement for pregnant women as well as social supports for pregnant women and mothers of young children. 84

Again, the Federal Constitutional Court intervened. In a 1993 decision handed down a year after Casey , the Court reaffirmed its 1975 decision requiring that the legislature recriminalize abortion throughout pregnancy, urging “[w]herever human life exists, it should be accorded human dignity.” 85 Yet the Court allowed the government to offer immunity from prosecution for abortion to women who submitted to counseling designed to persuade them to continue the pregnancy. 86 The Court’s acceptance of dissuasive counseling, rather than threat of criminal punishment, as a means of protecting life rested in part in a changed understanding of a woman’s responsibility for making decisions concerning the shape of her own life. The Court recognized that laws criminalizing abortion implicated, not only dignity as life but dignity as liberty, warning however: “reference to a woman's human dignity and her ability to make responsible decisions herself does not demand that unborn life be abandoned.” 87 (The dissenting justices argued that decriminalization of abortion was constitutionally permissible, given “an altered understanding of the personality and dignity of the woman.” 88 )

In the wake of the 1993 decision, abortion remains criminally prohibited except under restricted indications, but a woman who completes counseling can receive a certificate granting her immunity from prosecution for an abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. 89 Counseling is designed expressly to persuade a woman to continue the pregnancy and to counter any pressure from third parties who might be pushing her to end the pregnancy. 90 In this new compromise framework, the state pays for “the overwhelming majority of abortions,” and Catholic lay groups are involved in counseling, and where necessary, issuing abortion certificates and providing the sex education required by law, although this has been the subject of much and extended controversy. 91

As the contest over dignity in the American and German cases illustrates, the abortion conflict is not a “zero sum game” in which only one interest can prevail. The case law vindicates competing dignity interests. Today, German constitutional law requires government to provide dissuasive counseling as a condition for allowing women access to abortion, while U.S. constitutional law permits state governments to require dissuasive counseling as a condition for allowing women access to abortion—symbolic regimes understood to vindicate both the dignity of women and of the unborn. 92 Despite the dramatically different foundational premises of the two constitutional systems, today the German framework, in which abortion remains criminalized, functions to provide greater access to abortion in many parts of Germany than in the United States. 93

Why have constitutional courts allowed or imposed restrictions on women’s access to abortion, despite the dignity claims about abortion that women have been asserting over the last several decades? On the familiar account, courts are responding to the belief held by many citizens that abortion involves taking at least a potential human life. On this view, objections to abortion, even if rooted in religious belief, embody concerns about the unborn that are fully consistent with liberalism’s harm principle—not illiberal views about women’s roles or the proper ends of sexual expression. On this view, constitutional law incorporating these views would grant women dignity and self-determination in matters of sex and motherhood, but for the harm done to the dignity interests of another: the fetus. Given accidents of physiology, in matters of abortion, dignity as life “trumps” dignity as autonomy.

In what follows, I demonstrate that this common explanation of the abortion decisions ignores claims about human dignity frequently asserted by opponents of abortion, because it misreads certain religious claims about dignity as if they were secular claims about dignity—as if the wrong of abortion could be wholly grasped through the harm principle. For many conservatives, the wrong of abortion involves more killing; it also concerns sex. Conservative claims about respecting the dignity of human life often concern constraints on killing and sexuality.

I draw this account of dignity’s sex from the Catholic Church, which led opposition to abortion’s decriminalization in the United States and Germany, and today works actively to oppose abortion transnationally. 94 But as I show, the view that respect for the dignity of life requires limits on sex as well as killing is held by many other conservative Christian denominations as well.

In Catholic doctrine, respecting the dignity of human life entails restrictions on extramarital and nonprocreative sex. In the words of the Catholic Catechism: “ Fornication is carnal union between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman. It is gravely contrary to the dignity of persons and of human sexuality which is naturally ordered to the good of spouses and the generation and education of children.” 95 In the 1968 encyclical Humane Vitae , the Church reasserted that both abortion and contraception violate the procreative ends of sexual expression. 96

contraception and abortion are specifically different evils: the former contradicts the full truth of the sexual act as the proper expression of conjugal love, while the latter destroys the life of a human being; the former is opposed to the virtue of chastity in marriage, the latter is opposed to the virtue of justice and directly violates the divine commandment “You shall not kill.” 100

At the same time, Pope John Paul II asserted that contraception and abortion were “fruits of the same tree” because “such practices are rooted in a hedonistic mentality unwilling to accept responsibility in matters of sexuality, and they imply a self-centered concept of freedom, which regards procreation as an obstacle to personal fulfillment [sic].” 101 Thus, he observed, “[t]he close connection which exists, in mentality, between the practice of contraception and that of abortion is becoming increasingly obvious.” 102 On this understanding, Catholic beliefs about respecting the dignity of life entail views about sex, and not only killing: “ The port of entry for the culture of death in our society has been the abandonment of the respect for the procreative meaning of the conjugal act. It is the contraceptive way of thinking, the fear of the life-giving dimension of conjugal love, which very much sustains that culture. ” 103

In transforming culture so that it supports life, women occupy a place, in thought and action, which is unique and decisive. It depends on them to promote a “new feminism” which rejects the temptation of imitating models of “male domination,” in order to acknowledge and affirm the true genius of women in every aspect of the life of society, and overcome all discrimination, violence and exploitation. 104

On this view, respecting the dignity of human life is realized by imposing restrictions on sexual expression and on sex roles—restrictions on liberty that cannot be explained through secular understandings of the harm principle.

The belief that respect for dignity as life is promoted by channeling sexuality into procreation in marriage enjoys strong support from a variety of non-Catholic organizations that are part of an emerging global alliance “between conservative Christians, Muslims, and, to a lesser extent, Jews,” working internationally to defend and support the “natural family.” 105 One of the key actors in the global “natural family” movement is the Howard Center for Family, Religion and Society, the headquarters of the World Congress of Families, which connects Christian groups around the world, and has promulgated a natural family manifesto that numerous conservative religious groups have endorsed. 106 Vocal in its absolute opposition to abortion and homosexuality, the Center declares that all “[p]olicy should respect the inherent dignity of human life.” 107

A brief consideration of claims on dignity in the gay rights context demonstrates that concerns about sexuality link the abortion and gay rights debates, despite manifest differences between them.

In the United States and Commonwealth countries there is a growing body of judicial decisions restricting government’s power to criminalize sodomy and recognizing the right of same-sex couples to marry that appeal to dignity as liberty and to dignity as equality in terms that are conceptually consistent with appeals to dignity in the abortion cases we have examined. In this emergent line of U.S. and Commonwealth cases, judges invoke dignity in support of gay and lesbian claims for sexual freedom, and to condemn laws that punish or denigrate same-sex sexual expression. Those who oppose legal recognition of same-sex relations increasingly appeal to dignity, as well. As in the abortion context, opponents of same-sex relations reason from an understanding of dignity as life that is very much concerned with reserving sex for procreation.

Examining this emergent conflict over dignity exposes deep rivers of common concern linking debates over abortion and same-sex relations—two issues that many believe involve fundamentally different questions. Analyzed with attention to competing claims on dignity, we can see that in the debate over same-sex marriage, as in the debate over abortion, a crucial question recurs: Do legal restrictions on nonprocreative sexuality violate or vindicate human dignity?

5.1. Dignity as liberty and equality

When the United States Supreme Court struck down the law criminalizing same-sex sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas , Justice Kennedy quoted Casey on the importance of according persons dignity and autonomy in the ordering of their intimate and family lives, observing that “[p]ersons in homosexual relationships may seek autonomy for these purposes [loving sexual relations] just as heterosexual persons do.” 108 In Lawrence, as in Casey , the Court appealed to dignity to vindicate values of liberty and equality. Courts have invoked dignity in the register of equality to protect gays and lesbians against discrimination in Canada, 109 South Africa, 110 and India. 111 The European Court of Human Rights is beginning to employ this usage as well.

Recently, the Mexico Supreme Court invoked dignity as liberty in recognizing the claim to same-sex marriage. 112 Dignity as equality has figured centrally in judicial decisions recognizing claims to same-sex marriage, in Ontario, Canada 113 and in the Constitutional Court of South Africa, which declared that the failure of the common law and Marriage Act to provide for same-sex marriage violated the express constitutional guarantee of dignity. Noting the close relationship between dignity and equality, the South African court held: “[R]ights of dignity and equality are closely related. The exclusion to which same-sex couples are subjected, manifestly affects their dignity as members of society.” 114 The California Supreme Court similarly found, pursuant to the state’s constitution, that “reserving the historic designation of ‘marriage’ exclusively for opposite-sex couples poses at least a serious risk of denying the family relationship of same-sex couples such equal dignity and respect …” thus “perpetuating an understanding of gay individuals and same-sex couples as ‘second-class citizens.’ 115

5.2. The conservative counterclaim: dignity as life and the right to marry

Appeals to dignity as life in the abortion cases are commonly construed as expressing concerns about killing, not sex; if this were so there would be no analogous claim on dignity in the marriage cases, which all agree involve no killing. But there is a conservative rejoinder to marriage claims that appeals to dignity as life. Once again, I locate the genesis of the dignity as life objection to same-sex marriage in Catholic doctrine, but note that these arguments are taken up by the broader “natural family” movement, as well.

provide arguments drawn from reason which could be used by Bishops in preparing more specific interventions, appropriate to the different situations throughout the world, aimed at protecting and promoting the dignity of marriage, the foundation of the family, and the stability of society, of which this institution is a constitutive element. The present Considerations are also intended to give direction to Catholic politicians by indicating the approaches to proposed legislation in this area which would be consistent with Christian conscience. 116

Homosexual unions are totally lacking in the biological and anthropological elements of marriage and family which would be the basis, on the level of reason, for granting them legal recognition. Such unions are not able to contribute in a proper way to the procreation and survival of the human race. The possibility of using recently discovered methods of artificial reproduction, beyond involving a grave lack of respect for human dignity, does nothing to alter this inadequacy. 117

The vote in New York to redefine marriage advances the cause of loosening norms of sexual ethics, and promoting as innocent—and even “liberating”—forms of sexual conduct that were traditionally regarded in the West and many other places as beneath the dignity of human beings as free and rational creatures.” 123

(By contrast, members of DignityUSA, the nation’s oldest association of Catholics organized to promote the rights gays and lesbians, celebrated New York’s decision to recognize same-sex marriage, announcing: “We rejoice in this tremendous victory for equality, justice, and human dignity.” 124 )

The competing claims on dignity that we have been examining are part of a contest over social ordering that is of transnational dimensions.

In both the abortion and gay rights contexts, those who invoke dignity in support of claims of sexual freedom assert that (1) sexual expression can be separated from procreation and parenting and can be coordinated with parenting, according to an individual’s decision—and that (2) that these acts of self-fashioning and relationship building are worthy of social respect. The dignity-based claims for abortion rights and marriage equality seek more than tolerance, privacy, or freedom from social control; they seek social recognition of relationships that resist traditional norms and roles enforced by family and the church. In both the abortion rights and gay rights contexts, those who invoke dignity to contest traditional roles are endeavoring to democratize control over sexual norms and social structure.

Their opponents invoke dignity to defend traditional sexual roles. They understand human dignity as realized through discipline and conformity with customary sexual roles rather than through freedom and self-fashioning, and so interpret acts in defiance of traditional sexual roles as violating human dignity.

This conflict over dignity’s sex has run on for decades, across borders, and is now spilling from abortion rights to gay rights. It offers a fascinating window on processes through which dignity has acquired meaning and authority in human rights contests.

Claims on dignity in cases concerning the regulation of sexuality exhibit forms of conceptual consistency, not only within, but across constitutional orders. The abortion and same-sex marriage cases do not fit Christopher McCrudden’s observation that there is “little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions.” 125 In the cases we have examined, judges are not endeavoring to elide or mask differences in usage. 126 Dignity is not functioning as a specialized legal discourse that conceals variance in meaning from popular audiences. Judges and the advocates interested in influencing their judgments seem acutely aware of the stakes. They disagree about dignity’s meaning and proper entailments—and seem well aware that they disagree. 127 Both supporters and opponents greeted New York’s enactment of same-sex marriage by appeal to dignity. 128 The association of Catholics who support rights for same-sex couples calls itself DignityUSA. 129 The newly formed conservative “family values” organization monitoring developments in Brussels calls itself European Dignity Watch. 130

In the conflict we have been examining, dignity’s authority does not arise because ambiguous language conceals disagreement. Instead, dignity’s authority seems to be produced through disagreement. Human rights organizations, on the one hand, and the Catholic Church (and the transnational family values movement), on the other, act from conflicting pictures of human flourishing—but they are agonists who share an allegiance to dignity, enough to fight for the authority to establish dignity’s meaning in debates over sexual freedom. They appeal to dignity—not because dignity’s meaning is obscure, or because dignity’s meaning is naturally or historically fixed—but instead because dignity’s meaning is unsettled in matters concerning the regulation of sexuality, and may yet be shaped through appeal to government officials and citizens. 131 Today, as in the 1970s, dignity’s meaning is being forged in cross-borders conflict over dignity’s sex.

My aim in this brief essay is not to canvass all of dignity’s meanings, nor to analyze differences in dignity’s authority across legal systems, nor to survey all the arguments advanced in the abortion and same-sex marriage debates. For other accounts of dignity in domestic and transnational law, see Susanne Baer, Dignity, Liberty, Equality: A Fundamental Rights Triangle of Constitutionalism , 59 U. T ORONTO L.J. 417 (2009); Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, A human dignitas ? Remnants of the ancient legal concept in contemporary dignity jurisprudence , 9 I NT ’ L J. C ONST . L. (I·CON) 32 (2011); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse , 65 M ONT . L. R EV . 15 (2004); Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights , 19 E UR . J. I NT ’ L L. 655 (2008); Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty , 55 S TAN . L. R EV . 1921 (2003); and Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Rank , 48 A RCHIVES E UROP é ENNES DE S OCIOLOGIE 201 (2007).

McCrudden, supra note 1.

Id . at 655. Cf . M ICHEL R OSENFELD , T HE I DENTITY OF THE C ONSTITUTIONAL S UBJECT : S ELFHOOD , C ITIZENSHIP , C ULTURE , AND C OMMUNITY 276 (2010) (describing how key pluralist normative concepts, such as dignity, vary across borders providing thicker and deeper transnational bonds).

See A BORTION P OLITICS , W OMEN ’ S M OVEMENTS , AND THE D EMOCRATIC S TATE : A C OMPARATIVE S TUDY OF S TATE F EMINISM 1, 4 (Dorothy McBride Stetson ed., 2003) [hereinafter A BORTION P OLITICS ] (discussing feminist efforts to gender the abortion debate). For accounts of individual national movements and their impact on law reform, see id . at 19, 25 (Austria); id . at 86–88 (France); id . at 11, 117 (Germany); id . at 186–187, 189 (Italy); and id . at 242, 252, 254 (United States). For scholarship on feminist mobilizations of the 1970s, see T HE N EW P OLITICS OF A BORTION (Joni Lovenduski & Joyce Outshoorn eds., 1986); Reva B. Siegel, Roe ’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims that Engendered Roe, 90 b.u. l. r EV. 1875 (2010); D AGMAR H ERZOG , S EXUALITY IN E UROPE : A T WENTIETH -C ENTURY H ISTORY (2011). For a general account of legislative reform in western democracies in the 1970s, see Joel E. Brooks, Abortion Policy in Western Democracies: A Cross-National Analysis , 5 G OVERNANCE 342 (1992).

Starting in 1970, the U.S. women’s movement began litigation in a number of states in a quest to move federal courts to address the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion, ultimately prevailing in January of 1973 in the Supreme Court. See Siegel, Roe ’s Roots , supra note 4, at 1884–1894. Over two years (1974–5), four courts in Western Europe issued judgments on the constitutionality of the legal regulation of abortion. m ACHTELD n IJSTEN, A BORTION AND C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW : A C OMPARATIVE E UROPEAN -A MERICAN S TUDY (1990). See also Donald P. Kommers, Liberty and Community in Constitutional Law: The Abortion Cases in Comparative Perspective , 3 B.Y.U. L. R EV . 371, 371–372 (1985).

See M ODEL P ENAL C ODE § 230.3 Abortion (1962), reprinted in BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT ’ S RULING 24, 25 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2010).

For decades, concerns about reproductive rates of the poor and populations of color shaped conversations about “overpopulation” and birth control. But by the late 1960s, the discourse of overpopulation also supplied a language in which to discuss the virtues of nonprocreative sex for the wealthy as well as the poor, and in this form provided one mainstream idiom in which to discuss abortion. See G REENHOUSE & S IEGEL , BEFORE ROE V. WADE , supra note 6, at 54–58 (discussing forms of population control talk); Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade : New Questions About Backlash , 120 Y ALE L. J. 2028, 2035–2046 (2011) (surveying early justifications for abortion reform in the U.S.). For one early example, see Gerritt Harden, Abortion and Human Dignity , in T HE CASE FOR L EGALIZED A BORTION N OW 69–86 (Alan F. Guttmacher ed., 1967) (invoking dignity in calling for abortion’s decriminalization, to emancipate women and to address overpopulation).

Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 815–816 (D. Conn. 1972) (Clarie, J., dissenting).

The Catholic obstetrician became one of the most influential strategists and leaders of the transnational Right to Life movement. DR. & MRS. J. C. WILLKE, HANDBOOK ON ABORTION (1st ed., 1971), reprinted in BEFORE ROE V. WADE supra note 6, at 99, 101 (2010) (“The value, dignity, and right to life of each individual which has been a hallmark of and lies at the core of western culture is, at least in part, directly related to our Judeo-Christian heritage.”).

Betty Friedan, President, Nat’l Org. for Women, Address at the First National Conference on Abortion Laws: Abortion: A Woman’s Civil Right (Feb. 1969), reprinted in BEFORE ROE V. WADE , supra note 6, at 38, 38–40.

Id . at 39–40.

See Greenhouse & Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade, supra note 7, at 2043 n. 46 (describing feminist testimony during legislative hearings and in constitutional litigation); id . at 116 (describing protest activities associated with the 1970 women’s Strike for Equality); Siegel, Roe ’s Roots , supra note 4, at 1880 (describing consciousness raising efforts including March 1969 speak out Abortion: Tell It Like It Is ).

See supra note 4.

Alice Schwarzer, Nachwort [ Epilogue ] to F RAUEN g EGEN DEN § 218. 18 P ROTOKOLLE , a UFGEZEICHNET VON A LICE S CHWARZER [W OMEN A GAINST § 218: E IGHTEEN I NTERVIEWS , R ECORDED BY A LICE S CHWARZER ] 133 (Alice Schwarzer ed., 1971).

La liste des 343 françaises qui ont le courage de signer le manifest « je me suis fait avorter » [The list of 343 French women who have the courage to sign the manifesto “I have had an abortion”], L E N OUVEL O BSERVATEUR , April 5, 1971, at 5.

One million women in France have an abortion every year. Condemned to secrecy, they have abortions in dangerous conditions when this procedure, performed under medical supervision, is among the simplest. These women are shrouded in silence. I declare that I am one of them. I have had an abortion. Just as we demand free access to birth control, we demand the freedom to have an abortion. Id . For one account of feminist mobilization in France, see Jean C. Robinson, Gendering the Abortion Debate: The French Case , in A BORTION P OLITICS , supra note 13, at 86 . See also H ERZOG , supra note 4, at 156–159.

Schwarzer, supra note 14, at 146.

In the Federal Republic, around one million women have abortions every year. Hundreds die, tens thousands are left ill and sterile, because the surgery was performed by non-specialists . Done by medical specialists, abortion is a simple procedure. Women with money can safely have abortions at home and abroad. Paragraph 218 forces women without money onto the kitchen tables of the quack. It brands them as criminals and threatens them with imprisonment of up to five years. Nevertheless, millions of women have abortions—in degrading and life-threatening conditions. I am one of them. I had an abortion. I am opposed to Paragraph 218 and for desired children. We women do not want charity from the legislature or reform in installments! We demand the complete elimination of § 218! We demand comprehensive sexual education for all and free access to contraception! We demand the right to abortion covered by health insurance! Id. at 17.

“Anche in Italia ‘autodenunce’ per l’aborto,” L IBERAZIONE N OTIZIE , August 4, 1971, reprinted at Even in Italy “autoenunce” for abortion, available at http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44852&lang=&cms= . See H ERZOG , supra note 4, at 159, n. 24; Marina Calloni, Debates and Controversies on Abortion in Italy , in A BORTION P OLITICS , supra note 4, at 181, 187 (describing the Italian feminist movement’s use of the self-incrimination tactic).

Barbaralee D. Diamonstein, We Have Had Abortions , M S ., Spring 1972, at 34 (referring to the petition by “343 prominent and respected Frenchwomen” and promising to send a complete list of signatures “to the White House, to every State Legislature, and to our sisters in other countries who are signing similar petitions”); cf . Siegel, Roe ’s Roots , supra note 4, at 1880, 1885 (describing feminist speak-out strategies about abortion, in public fora and through the incorporation of women’s personal stories in constitutional litigation).

For abortion decisions that reason from dignity, see, for example, Tribunal Constitucional. Acórdão no 75/2010, Processos n° 733/07 e 1186/07 26 de Março de 2010, Diário da República vol. 60, at 15566 (Port.), available at http://dre.pt/pdf2sdip/2010/03/060000000/1556615605.pdf; Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 10, 2006, Sentencia C-355/2006, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.) (partial translation is available in W OMEN ’ S L INK W ORLDWIDE , C-355/2006: E XCERPTS OF THE C ONSTITUTIONAL C OURT ’ S R ULING THAT L IBERALIZED A BORTION IN C OLOMBIA (2007), available at http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/pdf_pubs/_pub_c3552006.pdf ) [hereinafter Decision No. C-355/2006]; Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision no. 2001-446DC, June 27, 2001, Rec. 74 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/a2001446dc.pdf; Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa & others v. Minister of Health & others 1998 (4) SA 113 (T), 1998 (11) BCLR 1434 (T); R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.), available at http://scc.lexum.org/en/1988/1988scr1-30/1988scr1-30.html; Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court], Decision 48/1998 (XI. 23.), Official Gazette (Magyar Közlöny) MK 1998/105 (Hung.), available at www.mkab.hu/admin/data/file/710_48_1998.pdf; Corte Constitucional, STC 53/1985, 11 de Abril de 1985, 1985-49 Boletin de Jurisprudencia Constitucional 515 (Spain), available at http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=tc&id=SENTENCIA-1985-0053 .

See supra note 5.

Greenhouse & Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade, supra note 7, at 2035–2046.

See Siegel, Roe ’s Roots , supra note 4, at 1884–1894.

See Greenhouse & Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade, supra note 7, at 2047–2052.

G REENHOUSE & S IEGEL , B EFORE R OE V . W ADE , supra note 6, at 256–258.

See Siegel, Roe ’s Roots , supra note 4, at 12 (analyzing the ways Roe responds to, and effaces, feminist abortion rights claims of the era).

Brief for Appellants, Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973), (No. 70-18) 1971 WL 128054, reprinted in BEFORE ROE V. WADE , supra note 6, at 230, 234.

Siegel, Roe ’s Roots , supra note 4, at 1897, 1899–1900.

See Donald P. Kommers, Abortion and the Constitution: The Cases of United States and West Germany, in A BORTION : N EW D IRECTIONS FOR P OLICY S TUDIES 83, 88 (Edward Manier, William Lin, & David Solomon eds., 1977).

D AGMAR H ERZOG , S EX A FTER F ASCISM : M EMORY AND M ORALITY IN T WENTIETH C ENTURY G ERMANY 225 (2005). Eighty percent of Protestant and forty percent of Catholic women supported legalized abortion in the early 1970s. Id . (describing campaigns for legalization).

Craig R. Whitney, Bonn Parliament Is Due To Act on Bills To Legalize Abortion , N.Y. T IMES , April 22, 1974, at 14.

On the role of the Catholic Church in opposing liberalization of abortion law in the 1970s, see Greenhouse & Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade, supra note 7, at 2047–2052 (United States); L EWIS J OACHIM E DINGER , W EST G ERMAN P OLITICS 281 (1986) (Germany) (“The adamant opponents of any reform—spearheaded by Catholic clerical and lay leaders—were no less active.”); H ERMANN T ALLEN , D IE A USEINANDERSETZUNG ü BER § 218 S T GB (1977) (chronicling the Catholic Church’s mobilization against the liberalization of § 218 in the 1970s); S IMONE M ANTEI , N EIN UND J A ZUR A BTREIBUNG : D IE E VANGELISCHE K IRCHE IN DER R EFORMDEBATTE UM § 218 S T GB (1970–6), 50–52, 135–136, 182–187, 227–234, 529–533 (2004) (same); M ANFRIED S PIEKER , K IRCHE UND A BTREIBUNG IN D EUTSCHLAND 21–37 (2d ed. 2008) (same).

For examples, see H ERZOG , supra note 31, at 225; E DINGER , supra note 33, at 281.

E DINGER , supra note 33, at 282. The Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union were and are identified with the Catholic Church. Jack D. Dowell, The Politics of Accommodation: German Social Democracy and the Catholic Church , 7 J. OF C HURCH & S TATE 78, 79–80 (1965); Hans-Georg Betz, The Evolution and Transformation of the German Party System , in T RANSFORMATION OF THE G ERMAN P OLITICAL P ARTY S YSTEM 30, 40–43 (Christopher S. Allen ed., 1999); Judy Dempsey, Victory Brings Risk of Conflict with Merkel's Allies , N.Y. T IMES , Sept. 27, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/28/world/europe/28berlin.html .

Kommers, Abortion and the Constitution , supra note 30, at 89.

Michael G. Mattern, German Abortion Law: The Unwanted Child of Reunification , 13 L OY . L.A. I NT ’ L & C OMP . L. R EV . 643, 658–660 (1991); Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Germany: Should Americans Pay Attention? , 10 J. C ONTEMP . H EALTH L. & P OL ’ Y 1, 6 (1994).

E DINGER , supra note 33, at 282.

Kommers, The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Germany , supra note 37, at 5. Five German states challenged the law: Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975, 39 E NTSCHEIDUNGEN DES B UNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BV ERF GE] 1 translated in John D. Gorby & Robert E. Jonas, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. M ARSHALL J. P RAC . & P ROC . 551, 608–609 (1976) [hereinafter Abortion I ].

G RUNDGESETZ F ü R DIE B UNDESREPUBLIK D EUTSCHLAND [GG] [B ASIC L AW ], May 23, 1949, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] 1, art. 1.

Abortion I , supra note 39, at 643 (citing German Federal Parliament, Seventh Election Period, 96th Sess., Stenographic Reports, 6492).

Id . at 642.

Id . at 641.

Id . at 644.

Id . at 647.

Id . at 624, 647–648. The Court gave the legislature discretion whether to allow abortion on eugenic, rape, and social emergency indications. Id .

Abortion I , supra note 39, at 662.

Id . at 677–683.

Id . at 673 (citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade).

Id . at 683.

Id . at 669–670 (Rupp von Brüneck & Simon, JJ., dissenting). See, generally , J ILL S TEPHENSON , W OMEN IN N AZI G ERMANY 38–40 (2001) (describing Nazi efforts to combat abortion among the “valuable”).

Abortion I , supra note 39, at 670.

Id . at 670. For a rich account of the ways that “conflicts over sexual mores [in post-War Germany became] an important site for managing the memory of Nazism and Holocaust,” see H ERZOG, supra note 31, at 5.

Edinger, supra note 33, at 283 (“Mass opinion polls indicated that most West Germans disapproved of the Court’s decision and only about a third endorsed it.”); Mantei, supra note 33, at 448 (citing the results of two mass opinion polls, which, though divergent, both showed that substantial numbers of West Germans disagreed with the Court's ruling).

MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 31 (1987); J. S MITH & ANDRE MONCOURT, THE RED ARMY FACTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, VOLUME I: PROJECTILES FOR THE PEOPLE 438, 447 (2009); D IE F R ü CHTE DES Z ORNES : T EXTE UND M ATERIALIEN ZUR G ESCHICHTE DER R EVOLUTION ä REN Z ELLEN UND DER R OTEN Z ORA 122–124 (Berlin, ID-Archiv 1993).

Hildegrad Kawan & Barbara Weber, Reflections on a Theme: The German Women’s Movement, Then and Now , 4 W OMEN ’ S S TUD . I NT ’ L Q. 421 (1981). Continuing resistance, women’s centers again organized “abortion trips” to Holland. Id . at 430.

Myra Marx Ferree & William A. Gamson, The Gendering of Governance and the Governing of Gender: Abortion Politics in Germany and the US , in R ECOGNITION S TRUGGLES AND S OCIAL M OVEMENTS : C ONTESTED I DENTITIES , A GENCY AND P OWER 35, 41 (Barbara Hobson ed., 2003).

Id . at 41.

Reva B. Siegel , Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 Y ALE L.J. 1694, 1736 (2008).

Compare sources cited, supra note 18, ( Der Stern manifesto protesting the death and injury criminal abortion laws inflict on women) with text, supra note 48 (German decision providing exception to constitutional ban on abortion where doctors determine abortion is necessary to save a woman’s life).

See supra note 18 (manifesto in Der Stern demanding “comprehensive sexual education for all and free access to contraception”). These valences of dignity as equality and autonomy gained state recognition in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) when that country liberalized its abortion law in 1972, some have suggested in response to the Stern campaign in the Federal Republic. See E NDE DER S ELBSTVERST ä NDLICHKEIT ? D IE A BSCHAFFUNG DES § 218 IN DER DDR: D OKUMENTE 137–138 (Kirsten Thietz, ed. 1992). The Minister of Health introduced the legislation to the Parliament by explaining that women’s equality and their “dignity in a socialist society” required that women should have the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, see id . at 165–166 (quoting the legislative history), and the official newspaper of the ruling Socialist Unity Party announced the reform with the headline “Women’s Rights and Dignity Fully Guaranteed.” See Recht und Würde der Frau vollauf garantiert , N EUES D EUTSCHLAND (Berlin), Mar. 11, 1972, at 1. The law’s preamble justified abortion liberalization on the ground that “the equality of women in education, profession, marriage and family requires that a woman be able to decide herself whether to carry a pregnancy to term.” Gesetz über die Unterbrechung der Schwangerschaft [Act on the Interruption of Pregnancy], Mar. 9, 1972, G ESETZBLATT DER D EUTSCHEN D EMOKRATISCHEN R EPUBLIK I at 89 (G.D.R.).

See supra text accompanying notes 45–48.

See supra text accompanying notes 50–55 (dissenting opinion).

Brief for Appellants Roe v. Wade, supra note 28, at 234.

See Siegel, Roe ’s Roots , supra note 4, at 1897, 1899–1900 (considering the ways that Roe recognized and the ways that the decision ignored feminist claims for abortion rights).

For one history of dignity’s role in the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, see Gerald Neuman, Human Dignity in United States Constitutional Law , in Z UR A UTONOMIE DES I NDIVIDUUMS : L IBER A MICORUM S PIROS S IMITIS 249 (Dieter Simon & Manfred Weiss eds., 2000). See also Erin Daly, The New Liberty , 11 W IDENER L. R EV . 221 (2005); Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence , 84 N EB . L. R EV . 740 (2006).

Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of SE. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

Thornburgh, supra note 70.

Casey, supra note 70.

Id . at 851 (O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ., Joint Opinion).

Id . at 852. The opinion ties constitutional protection for women’s abortion decision to the understanding, forged in the Court’s sex discrimination cases, that government cannot use law to enforce traditional sex roles on women. See Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression , 56 e MORY l.j. 815, 831 (2007) (“The joint opinion expresses constitutional limitations on abortion laws in the language of its equal protection sex discrimination opinions, illuminating liberty concerns at the heart of the sex equality cases in the very act of recognizing equality concerns at the root of the liberty cases.”).

Casey, supra note 70, at 882.

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).

Id . at 157.

Id . at 159. For the social movement roots of woman-protective antiabortion arguments, see Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection , supra note 61. Antiabortion groups throughout the world have adopted the woman-protective argument.

Carhart, supra note 76, at 157.

For closer analysis of the different roles of dignity in the United States abortion decisions, see Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection , supra note 61.

Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse, and the Right to Protection in the United States and Germany , 43 A M . J. OF C OMP . L. 273, 273 (1995). See also McCrudden, supra note 1, at 717–719.

See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993, 2 E NTSCHEIDUNGEN DES B UNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 2/90 available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/fs19930528_2bvf000290en.html [hereinafter Abortion II ].

See Dagmar Herzog, Post coitum triste est …? Sexual politics and cultures in postunification Germany , 28 G ERMAN p OL . & S OC ’ Y 111, 122 (2010); Mary Anne Case, Perfectionism and Fundamentalism in the Application of the German Abortion Laws , in C ONSTITUTING E QUALITY : G ENDER E QUALITY AND C OMPARATIVE C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW 93, 96 (Susan H. Williams ed., 2009).

Case, supra note 83, at 97.

Abortion II , supra note 82, ¶ 146 (citations omitted).

Id . ¶ 224. Women who submitted to counseling were granted access to abortion with immunity from criminal prosecution, and in some cases, even given public support. See id . ¶¶ 347–348.

Id . ¶ 156.

Compare id . ¶ 380 (Mahrenholz and Sommer, JJ., dissenting) with Abortion I , supra note 82, ¶¶ 669–670, 683.

See Strafgesetzbuch [StGB][Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998, BGBl. I, at 3322, ¶ 218a available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#StGB_000P218; Case, supra note 83, at 98.

Abortion II , at ¶ 303. The court also required the government to keep statistics on abortion, on the theory that the regime of counseling was only constitutionally permissible if it reduced the number of abortions more effectively than criminalization had. Id .

Id . ¶¶ 103, 106. See Case, supra note 83, at 100 (noting the “paradoxical” nature of this scheme).

The U.S. framework gives expression to federalism, allowing states to regulate abortion within the constitutional framework Casey sets forth.

Regional variations in access in the United States and Germany greatly complicate cross-country comparisons. In Germany today, access to abortion during the trimester of pregnancy is described as “relatively simple,” involving counseling and a short waiting period. M YRA M ARX F ERREE ET AL ., S HAPING A BORTION D ISCOURSE : D EMOCRACY AND THE P UBLIC S PHERE IN G ERMANY AND THE U NITED S TATES 3 (2002). State-funded counseling is available at family planning associations, such as Pro Familia, and Catholic Church-affiliated centers. While counseling must be directive, favoring continuation of pregnancy, there has always been significant variance in practice. Pro Familia offers counseling services intended to support free and informed decision-making consistent with science and law, emphasizing acceptance of the woman’s decision. E UROPEAN W OMEN ’ S H EALTH N ETWORK , S TATE OF A FFAIRS , C ONCEPTS A PPROACHES , O RGANIZATIONS IN THE H EALTH M OVEMENT . C OUNTRY R EPORT : G ERMANY 123–124 (2000). Popular reports suggest that in cities such as Berlin, counselors tend to adopt an even more liberal interpretation of the law, while in smaller towns church-affiliated counseling tends to be more directive with open persuasion. Why are there more abortions in Berlin? Local (Jun. 8, 2008), available at http://www.thelocal.de/lifestyle/20080605-12291.html .

In the United States, states have incrementally restricted access to abortion in ways that test the limits of the Casey ruling, enacting more intrusive counseling requirements, waiting periods and burdensome regulations on facilities and providers. See Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection , supra note 61, at 1707–1712. These vary by state. See G UTTMACHER I NSTITUTE , S TATE P OLICIES IN B RIEF : M ANDATORY C OUNSELING AND W AITING P ERIODS FOR A BORTION (June 2011), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf; Rachel K. Jones et al., Abortion in the United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005 , 40 P ERSP . ON S EXUAL & R EPROD . H EALTH 6 (2008).

See supra text accompanying notes 25, 33–38 and infra , text accompanying notes 95–104; see also Julieta LeMaitre, By Reason Alone: Catholicism, Constitutions, and Sex in the Americas , 10 I NT ’ L J. C ONST . L. (I·CON) 493-511 (2012).

T HE C ATECHISM OF THE C ATHOLIC C HURCH ¶ 2353, available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a6.htm .

POPE PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE , Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 60, 481–503 (1968) [H UMAN L IFE , The Pope Speaks, 13 (Fall. 1969), 329–346], ¶ 14, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html [hereinafter H UMANAE V ITAE ]. In the 1968 encyclical, Pope Paul IV explained “the direct interruption of the generative process already begun and, above all, all direct abortion, even for therapeutic reasons, are to be absolutely excluded as lawful means of regulating the number of children.” See id . ¶ 20 (observing that “this endurance enhances man's dignity and confers benefits on human society”).

See, e.g , A NDRZEJ K ULCZYCKI , T HE A BORTION D EBATE IN THE W ORLD A RENA 55–60 (1999); Françoise Girard, Negotiating Sexual Rights and Sexual Orientation at the UN , in S EX P OLITICS : R EPORTS FROM THE F RONT L INES 311, 324, 328 (Richard Parker, Rosalind Petchesky & Robert Sember eds., 2007).

POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE [T HE G OSPEL OF L IFE ] (1995), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html [hereinafter E VANGELIUM V ITAE ].

Evangelium Vitae appeals specifically to dignity to ground its arguments on abortion and contraception. Id . ¶81 (“Society as a whole must respect, defend and promote the dignity of every human person, at every moment and in every condition of that person's life.”).

Pastoral Letter from Raymond L. Burke, Bishop of La Crosse, to Catholics in La Crosse, WI, 10 (Nov. 23, 2003), available at http://www.ewtn.com/library/BISHOPS/burkeciv.htm . (emphasis added). Raymond Burke was once the Archbishop of St. Louis and now serves in Rome. See Biography of Raymond Leo Cardinal Burke, Archdiocese of St. Louis, available at http://archstl.org/archstl/page/raymond-leo-cardinal-burke .

EVANGELIUM VITAE , supra note 98, ¶ 99. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, MULIERIS DIGNITATEM , [T HE D IGNITY OF W OMEN ] (1988) available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_15081988_mulieris-dignitatem_en.html (describing sex role complementarity in the dignity and vocation of women). See id . ¶ 10 (“In the name of liberation from male ‘domination,’ women must not appropriate to themselves male characteristics contrary to their own feminine ‘originality.’ There is a well-founded fear that if they take this path, women will not ‘reach fulfillment,’ but instead will deform and lose what constitutes their essential richness .”).

A 1998 address by Pope John Paul II to “pro-life” activists reasons about abortion in this sex-role based framework. Pope John Paul II exhorted the movement to defend the family and noted as an encouraging sign that today “there are many who, in consideration of the dignity of woman as a person, wife and mother, see permissive abortion laws as a defeat and humiliation for woman and her dignity .” Pope John Paul II, Address to Members of the Italian Pro-Life Movement (May 22, 1998), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1998/may/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19980522_movimento-vida_en.html (emphasis added). He made a similar point when attacking family planning policies and the prevalence of abortion in Cuba. Pope John Paul II, Homily at Santa Clara, (Jan. 22, 1998), available at http://ordendemaltacuba.com/popesantaclara.aspx (last visited 01 September 2011) (“[m]otherhood is sometimes presented as something backward or as a limitation of women’s freedom, thus distorting its true nature and dignity.”).

D ORIS B USS & D IDI H ERMAN , G LOBALIZING F AMILY V ALUES : T HE C HRISTIAN R IGHT IN I NTERNATIONAL P OLITICS xiv (2003); J ENNIFER S. B UTLER , B ORN A GAIN : T HE C HRISTIAN R IGHT G LOBALIZED 103–104 (2006); J ANE W. M UTHUMBI , P ARTICIPATION , R EPRESENTATION , AND G LOBAL C IVIL S OCIETY : C HRISTIAN AND I SLAMIC F UNDAMENTALIST A NTI -A BORTION N ETWORKS AND U NITED N ATIONS C ONFERENCES (2010).

See Allan C. Carlson & Paul T. Mero, The Natural Family: A Manifesto , F AM . A M . (S PECIAL E D .), March 2005, available at http://www.heartland.org/custom/semodpolicybot/pdf/17267.pdf . The World Congress of Families lists numerous “partner” organizations from around the world that provide financial support to the Congress organization and conferences. See W ORLD C ONGRESS OF F AMILIES , http://www.worldcongress.org/wcfnl/wcfnl.cur.htm . This pan-Christian transnational network has been described by Doris Buss and Didi Herman. B USS & H ERMAN , supra note 105, at x.

Principles & Purpose & Persuasive Insight , T HE H OWARD C ENTER FOR F AMILY , R ELIGION & S OCIETY (April 3, 2007), http://www.profam.org/THC/xthc_principles.htm .

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).

See Vriend v. Alberta [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, ¶ 102 (Can.) (“The potential harm to the dignity and perceived worth of gay and lesbian individuals constitutes a particularly cruel form of discrimination.”).

See Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice 1998 (6) BCLR 726 (W) ¶ 28 (S. Afr.) (observing that law criminalizing sodomy “gay men degrades and devalues gay men” and so “is a palpable invasion of their dignity”).

See Naz Found. v. Gov’t of NCT of New Delhi, WP(C) No.7455/2001, ¶¶ 26, 131 (H.C. New Del., 2009) (India) (“Indian constitutional law does not permit the statutory criminal law to be held captive by the popular misconceptions of who the LGBTs are… . it is the recognition of equality which will foster the dignity of every individual.”).

Acción de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, Novena Época, 16 de agosto de 2010 (Mexico) (“263. […] This Court [has affirmed] that, from human dignity, as a superior fundamental right […], the free development of the personality is derived, that is, the right of every person to choose, in a free and autonomous manner, how to live her life, which implies, among other expressions, the freedom to contract marriage or not to; have children and how many, as well as not to have them; to choose their personal appearance; as well as their free sexual option.”).

Halpern v. Canada [2003], 65 O.R. 3d 161, ¶¶ 2, 107 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (“Exclusion [from the institution of marriage] perpetuates the view that same-sex relationships are less worthy of recognition than opposite-sex relationships, [hence] offends the dignity of persons in same-sex relationships.”).

Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) ¶ 114 (S. Afr.) (holding that failure of the common law and Marriage Act to provide for same-sex marriage violated the express constitutional guarantee of dignity).

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400, 402 (Cal. 2008).

CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING PROPOSALS TO GIVE LEGAL RECOGNITION TO UNIONS BETWEEN HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS ¶ 1 (2003), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homosexual-unions_en.html .

CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING PROPOSALS TO GIVE LEGAL RECOGNITION TO UNIONS BETWEEN HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS ¶¶ 3, 7 (2003), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homosexual-unions_en.html .

The Catechism teaches that “[e]ach of the two sexes is an image of the power and tenderness of God, with equal dignity though in a different way.” C ATECHISM OF THE C ATHOLIC C HURCH , supra note 95, ¶ 2335. The Catechism further instructs that “[e]veryone, man and woman, should acknowledge and accept his sexual identity . Physical, moral, and spiritual difference and complementarity are oriented toward the goods of marriage and the flourishing of family life.” Id . ¶ 2333 (emphasis added). Pope Benedict recently observed that the family is based on marriage of a man and a woman and that departure from this understanding threatens human dignity. See “Holy Father’s Annual Address to the Diplomatic Corps, Vatican Information Service,” January 9, 2012, available at http://visnews-en.blogspot.com/2012/01/holy-fathers-annual-address-to.html (“[P]ride of place goes to the family, based on the marriage of a man and a woman. This is not a simple social convention, but rather the fundamental cell of every society. Consequently, policies which undermine the family threaten human dignity and the future of humanity itself.”).

Deacon Keith Fournier, Catholics and Evangelicals: Defense of Marriage and the ‘New Ecumenism , C ATHOLIC O NLINE (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.catholic.org/politics/story.php?id=34358 .

Carlson & Mero, supra note 106, at 1, 16.

For background on the Manhattan Declaration, see Laurie Goodstein, Christian Leaders Unite on Political Issues , N.Y. T IMES , Nov. 20, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/us/politics/20alliance.html; Matthew J. Franck, In the Gay Marriage Debate, Stop Playing the Hate Card , W ASH . P OST , Dec. 17, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/17/AR2010121702528.html .

See ROBERT GEORGE, TIMOTHY GEORGE , & CHUCK COLSON, MANHATTAN DECLARATION: A CALL OF CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE (November 20, 2009), available at http://www.manhattandeclaration.org/the-declaration/read.aspx (arguing that marriage is intrinsically “about procreation,” a relationship shaped by its “aptness for the generation, promotion and protection of life”). See, generally , Sherif Girgis, Robert P. George, & Ryan T. Anderson, What is Marriage? 34 H ARV . J. L. & P UB . P OL ’ Y 245 (2010) (arguing that that same-sex couples can be excluded from marriage because the core purpose of the institution is procreation).

See Sex and the Empire State: Losing Marriage to Sexual Liberalism , N AT ’l R EV . (June 28, 2011), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/270662/sex-and-empire-state-interview (quoting Professor Robert George).

See DignityUSA, available at http://www.dignityusa.org/category/site-index-terms/new-york .

See supra text accompanying note 1.

For example, in the course of embracing dignity as life, the Federal Republic’s 1975 abortion decision was quite clear in repudiating women’s claims to dignity as liberty. See supra text accompanying notes 41–48.

Leaders of the “family values” movement appeal to the religious roots of dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and protest the secular understandings of family and sexuality that have come to shape the concept of dignity with the maturation of the human rights movement. See, e.g ., Allan Carlson, The Howard Ctr. for Family, Religion & Soc’y, Globalizing Family Values, A Talk for the Charismatic Leaders’ Fellowship (Jan. 12, 2004), available at http://www.profam.org/docs/acc/thc.acc.globalizing.040112.htm . For recent papal efforts to shape the meaning of dignity in human rights discourse, see, e.g ., Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization (Apr. 18, 2008), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2008/april/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080418_un-visit_en.html; Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Members of Italy’s Pro-Life Movement (May 12, 2008), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2008/may/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080512_movimento-vita_en.html . See also Catholic Family & Human Rights Institute, International Call for the Rights and Dignity of the Human Person and the Family, http://www.c-fam.org/campaigns/lid.2/default.asp (last visited Aug. 16, 2010) (“Defending Sovereignty and Human Dignity at International Institutions”).

See supra text accompanying notes 123–124.

See DignityUSA, available at http://www.dignityusa.org/ .

The newly founded European Dignity Watch monitors developments in Brussels of concern to conservatives. Its mission statement and website suggest an interest in religious conscience claims, abortion, and in preserving the gender-complementary family (i.e. opposing same-sex marriage). See European Dignity Watch Mission Statement, available at http://www.europeandignitywatch.org/about-us/mission-statement.html .

As European Dignity Watch explains, “You can support our cause by spreading important information, contact[ing] decision makers, discussing current issues and thus influencing our political and cultural atmosphere in favor of the dignity of the person.” See European Dignity Watch (Network), available at http://www.europeandignitywatch.org/network/our-network.html

Email alerts

Citing articles via.

• I·CONnect
• Recommend to your Library

Affiliations

• Online ISSN 1474-2659
• Print ISSN 1474-2640
• Copyright © 2024 New York University School of Law and Oxford University Press
• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Institutional account management
• Rights and permissions
• Get help with access
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

Unraveling the Enigma of Liberty

This essay about freedom offers a profound exploration of its multifaceted nature, delving into both its individual and societal dimensions. It highlights the concepts of “freedom from” and “freedom to,” emphasizing the importance of both negative and positive liberties in ensuring human dignity and autonomy. Additionally, the essay explores the philosophical underpinnings of freedom, affirming the inherent worth and agency of every individual. Through insightful analysis and vivid imagery, it underscores the enduring significance of freedom as a driving force for social progress and justice in the modern world.

How it works

Freedom, a concept etched into the annals of human history, has sparked debates, inspired revolutions, and fueled the aspirations of countless individuals across time and space. Its essence, though elusive, resonates with the primal yearning for autonomy, choice, and dignity. Yet, defining freedom proves to be an intricate dance between the tangible and the intangible, the personal and the collective. It transcends mere absence of restraint, weaving through the fabric of society, culture, and philosophy.

In its rawest form, freedom emerges as the absence of shackles, both physical and legal.

This portrayal, often dubbed as “freedom from,” encapsulates the notion of liberation from external coercion or imposition. It finds expression in fundamental civil liberties—the freedom to speak, to assemble, to worship—enshrined in democratic doctrines and legal frameworks worldwide. This negative liberty forms the bedrock of modern democracies, safeguarding individual rights against encroachment by the state or other entities.

Yet, freedom’s tapestry extends beyond the confines of legal statutes, unfurling into the realm of opportunity and empowerment. This expansive vision, known as “freedom to,” envisions a world where individuals not only break chains but also chase dreams. It heralds the pursuit of education, employment, and economic security as essential pathways to self-realization. In this narrative, freedom transcends passive non-interference, evolving into an active force for human flourishing and social progress.

Moreover, freedom emerges as a beacon of human dignity and moral agency, asserting the inherent worth and autonomy of each individual. It echoes in the corridors of conscience, challenging authoritarian regimes and paternalistic structures that seek to stifle individual expression and choice. This philosophical underpinning of freedom proclaims the right of every person to shape their destiny, to chart their course amidst the tumult of existence. It demands recognition of the inherent dignity and equality of all human beings, irrespective of race, gender, or creed.

In the tapestry of freedom, threads of resistance and resilience weave a narrative of struggle and triumph. Across continents and centuries, individuals and communities have risen against tyranny and oppression, asserting their right to liberty and justice. From the abolitionist movements to the fight for civil rights, from the quest for gender equality to the struggle for LGBTQ+ rights, the journey towards freedom is marked by acts of courage, solidarity, and defiance. It is a testament to the enduring spirit of human resilience and the quest for a more just and equitable world.

In conclusion, freedom stands as a complex and multifaceted concept, embracing both individual liberties and broader notions of social justice and human dignity. It is a beacon of hope in a world fraught with inequality, injustice, and oppression. As societies grapple with the challenges of the 21st century, the quest for freedom remains a central aspiration of humanity, driving social progress and shaping the contours of a more inclusive and equitable world.

Cite this page

Unraveling the Enigma of Liberty. (2024, May 12). Retrieved from https://papersowl.com/examples/unraveling-the-enigma-of-liberty/

"Unraveling the Enigma of Liberty." PapersOwl.com , 12 May 2024, https://papersowl.com/examples/unraveling-the-enigma-of-liberty/

PapersOwl.com. (2024). Unraveling the Enigma of Liberty . [Online]. Available at: https://papersowl.com/examples/unraveling-the-enigma-of-liberty/ [Accessed: 14 May. 2024]

"Unraveling the Enigma of Liberty." PapersOwl.com, May 12, 2024. Accessed May 14, 2024. https://papersowl.com/examples/unraveling-the-enigma-of-liberty/

"Unraveling the Enigma of Liberty," PapersOwl.com , 12-May-2024. [Online]. Available: https://papersowl.com/examples/unraveling-the-enigma-of-liberty/. [Accessed: 14-May-2024]

PapersOwl.com. (2024). Unraveling the Enigma of Liberty . [Online]. Available at: https://papersowl.com/examples/unraveling-the-enigma-of-liberty/ [Accessed: 14-May-2024]

Don't let plagiarism ruin your grade

Hire a writer to get a unique paper crafted to your needs.

Our writers will help you fix any mistakes and get an A+!

Please check your inbox.

You can order an original essay written according to your instructions.

Trusted by over 1 million students worldwide

1. Tell Us Your Requirements

2. Pick your perfect writer

3. Get Your Paper and Pay

Hi! I'm Amy, your personal assistant!

Don't know where to start? Give me your paper requirements and I connect you to an academic expert.

short deadlines

100% Plagiarism-Free

Certified writers

Holocaust & Human Rights Education Center In White Plains Gets A Boost

W HITE PLAINS, NY — An Westchester-based group that has worked tirelessly to spread a message of understanding and diligence against abuses has earned a funding grant to help make sure their efforts reach as many as possible.

Assembly Members Amy Paulin, Chris Burdick, Dana Levenberg, Steve Otis, Gary Pretlow, Nader Sayegh, and MaryJane Shimsky worked together to secure $100,000 from NYS for the Holocaust & Human Rights Education Center (HHREC).

"Given the alarming incidents of anti-Semitism that are happening in New York and around the country, it’s imperative that we support human rights education," Paulin said. "One of the lessons of the Holocaust is that we must act decisively when we see the Jewish people being scapegoated or attacked. Jews were attacked on October 7, and have been continually under attack via harassment and intimidation. We must combat this rise in anti-Semitism by supporting a constructive path to peace through education by organizations such as the HHREC. I’m thrilled that we have been able to help fund the HHREC’s programs so that they can continue their great work of education and awareness to ensure that atrocities such as those of the Holocaust never happen again."

HHREC is a White Plains-based nonprofit that serves schools, synagogues, colleges, churches and civic centers in the Hudson Valley. The organization's mission is to reenforce the lessons of the Holocaust and the right of all people to be treated with dignity and respect. HHREC works with teachers and students to help schools fulfill the state mandate that the Holocaust and other human rights violations be included in curriculums. Over three decades, the nonprofit has brought the lessons of the Holocaust, genocide and human rights violations to more than 3,000 teachers, and through them to thousands of students.

"We’re grateful to the Assembly delegation for their strong commitment to arrest the rising tide of antisemitism and other forms of hate by offering funds to the Holocaust & Human Rights Education Center so that we can continue to develop and present appropriate programming to the student and adult community," The group's Executive Director Millie Jasper said.

HHREC provides educational opportunities for students and educators, as well as community events such as the annual Westchester County Yom HaShoah (Day of Remembrance) Commemoration at the Garden of Remembrance and the Kristallnacht (Night of Broken Glass) commemoration with Iona University. The center also has a Holocaust survivor speakers bureau which reaches over 50,000 students each year.

" I am thrilled that we were able to provide the Holocaust and Human Rights Education Center (HHREC) with funds that will help them to further their mission of ending bigotry and prejudice," Assemblymember Chris Burdick said. "The lessons of the Holocaust have never been more important as we face persistent ignorance, antisemitism, and hatred. I’ve worked with HHREC and know the incredible work the organization does, not only in imparting lessons of the Holocaust but also in providing positive and uplifting teachings that stress the importance of treating all people with dignity and respect. HHREC is truly making a difference here in Westchester, particularly its focus on our youth, who will help to shape our future."

Assemblywoman Levenberg said she feels a special connection to the organization.

"As the daughter of a Holocaust survivor, I am acutely aware of the necessity of education about this chapter in history," Levenberg said. While my mother is still with us, every day we lose more people from the generation that lived through the Holocaust. Now more than ever, with living memory of the Holocaust receding and antisemitism and Holocaust denialism surging, we need institutions like the Holocaust and Human Rights Education Center to help ensure that we remember and do not repeat the mistakes of the past."

The article Holocaust & Human Rights Education Center In White Plains Gets A Boost appeared first on White Plains Patch .