nrotc service assignment 2022

Midshipman in Motion

Nittany Battalion September – October 2022 Newsletter

Captains Corner

Welcome back Battalion!

Although the semester is over halfway through, this is my first opportunity to formally welcome you back in the newsletter.  The semester has been off to a great start due entirely to your efforts and I couldn’t be more proud of how you have represented the unit and our Navy and Marine Corps Team!  Your willingness to step up and answer the call for each other, the university and the community is commendable.  Whether it was color guard for various sporting events, participation in United Way Day of Caring, funeral support for the local community, mentoring Harrisburg NJROTC students and showing them what is in the realm of the possible, or the way you fostered a great relationship with Doggie’s for service assignment, your willingness to perform at a level that continues to exemplify what we stand is noteworthy and you should be proud. Your action build and foster the trust that I speak often of.

A few quick notes of interest.  It may not be known to all but thus far this semester the Marine options have run 96.9 miles (I’ll round down to 96 because it is such a motivational number for me), Navy option 58.5 miles and, as a unit you have run a total of 8,795 miles during PT.  That’s the equivalent of the unit forming a relay team to the First Island Chain in the Pacific (MIDN Rebert don’t get any ideas).  In anticipation of OCS and their future employment, the Marines have also hiked 702 miles thus far this semester.  As a unit you have volunteered 214 hours and given 59 units to the blood drive. Last, but certainly not least, you have raised over $30,000

from your participation in the concessions for the home football games (exact amount not yet known due to still waiting on payout for Minnesota and Ohio State). Great call by the Battalion leadership to man two stands and maximize profit this year.

As the semester comes to a close and we approach the holiday season, make sure that you are looking out for your teammates.  As a unit staff, our whole purpose here is to remove barriers for you to succeed.  Let us know what those barriers are and don’t “suffer in silence.”  I am indebted to the Navy for allowing me to return here as your Professor of Naval Science and am looking forward to the great things that we will accomplish as a Battalion in the upcoming months/years.  Make sure your uniforms are ready for the ball and come ready to have a great time and celebrate our proud Penn State and USMC history.

Keep Charging!

CAPT Majewski

Midshipmen of the Month

Meredith frey.

Midshipmen Third Class Frey has demonstrated a superior display of leadership during the first month of the semester. Midshipmen Frey has to lead several group sessions at Wagner to help build camaraderie, esprit de corps, and teach fellow midshipmen naval and Marine Corps knowledge. She not only exemplifies but sets the standards expected of a midshipman. Her hard work and dedication have left a favorable impression on those around her and showcase her commitment to the unit.

Jenna Haran

Midshipman Second Class Haran goes above and beyond and member of the Penn State NROTC unit. Midshipman Haran has gone out of her way on multiple occasions to stick up for her squad members. She has taken a position in BRC, has committed her efforts to the unit’s remedial PT program, works as an AE tutor, often volunteering to tutor for classes that are not tutor-required, and makes time to help out in our OBG THON organization. Midshipman Haran exemplifies the Navy’s values of honor, courage, and commitment and is a role model for her peers and lower classmen.

The Old and The New

Senior service assignment.

On October 6th, 2022, the battalion gathered at Doggie’s Pub for their service Assignment. Weeks prior, the first-class Navy midshipmen submitted their preferences sheet. Midshipmen ranked the warfare communities by their interest in joining them and then sat in anticipation, awaiting their service assignment. Midshipmen have dedicated much of their college experience to this very moment. Whether it was studying for the ASTB, joining clubs and committees, or excelling in their academics, all their efforts were being put forward to their service assignment.

At Doggies, each senior was called up joining Captain Majewski and Commander Kerr. They were then presented with their assignment. The night ended with eleven Naval Aviators, two Information Warfare Officers, seven Surface Warfare Officers, and nine Submarine Warfare Officers. The night followed suit with a celebration. The battalion congratulates all the first-class midshipmen and wishes them the best in their Navy careers. The Penn State NROTC unit is proud of all the seniors and excited to watch them commission this year and eventually become preeminent leaders in their communities.

~ MIDN 4/C Taylor Turley

New Student Orientation

On Monday, August 15th, Penn State NROTC welcomed roughly 30 prospective 4/C MIDN to campus to conduct the Units’ annual New Student Orientation (NSO). NSO is a tool used to introduce them to the unit and instill the discipline needed to be successful in the NROTC program. The MIDN Candidates received classes on military structure, customs and courtesies, program requirements, and many more. While not in the classroom, they were being trained by the upper-class MIDN in areas such as basic drill, physical training, and discipline. The Candidates participated in a campus tour in the form of a run, conducted a swim qualification and workout, and finished off the week by running through our off-campus endurance and obstacle course. The week concluded with a ceremony where the active-duty staff presented the now 4/C MIDN with their rank insignia for the Fall semester, and a battalion barbeque to welcome the new MIDN and their families into the unit.

~ MIDN 1/C Joseph Donofrio

Professional Proceedings

Change of command ceremony.

On September 1st, 2022, a Change of Command and Retirement Ceremony was held, celebrating CAPT Wayne Wall’s fulfilling career in the submarine community. CAPT Wall assumed duties as Commanding Officer of the Navy ROTC Battalion at Penn State in August 2019. The battalion will always remember to treat everyone with dignity, respect, and professionalism- and to appreciate the sport of pickleball as much as he does.

The ceremony welcomed the battalion’s new Commanding Officer CAPT Mike Majewski, also a Submarine Officer. Both officers used this opportunity to share sea stories and experiences in the fleet. The guest of honor was CAPT Timothy Poe, and he filled the room with laughter and memories of serving with CAPT Wall during his speech.

A Naval tradition was honored by presenting CAPT Wall with a national ensign, passed from service member to service member, until finally given to the Commanding Officer, symbolizing and honoring CAPT Wall’s leadership in the chain of command.

Another testament to Naval customs was carried out as various members around the room stood, reciting lines from the poem “The Watch,” the last line relieving CAPT Wall of the final watch of his career, leaving his command in capable hands

~ MIDN 2/C Julie Claycomb

Day of Caring

On October 6th the Battalion took part in the United Way Day of Caring 2022. The purpose of Day of Caring is to volunteer at specific places that require some form of volunteer help to ensure they can stay well-facilitated throughout the year. This year, the battalion spent its time at the Boalsburg Mansion and the Centre Furnace Mansion. Midshipmen had the opportunity to select a shift throughout their day to assist these attractions. Most midshipmen selected the Boalsburg Mansion for their shift and took turns carrying wheelbarrows of mulch to and from their desired locations. We also assisted the volunteers with clearing the hiking trail at the mansion. Members of the battalion also helped clear the stone walkway that led from the barn to the mansion itself. All in all, the battalion looks forward to events where they can assist the community and help to improve the overall image of the United States Navy.

~ MIDN 2/C Evan Naradko

Feeding Beaver Stadium

Since September 10th, dedicated midshipman have aided the unit in running two concession stands for all home football games. This is an increased duty compared to last year when the unit only had one concession stand. The proceeds from these stands go directly towards unit events and materials. We wanted to thank every midshipman who volunteered their time to help make our unit better.  

~ MIDN 1/C Alexander Sanchez | MIDN 2/C Joseph Lock

Questions, Comments, Concerns? Contact us at [email protected] or on the contact us page !

Editors: MIDN 1/C Alexander Sanchez | MIDN 2/C Joseph Lock

Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps

Welcome to the Bulldog Battalion! 

The Bulldog Battalion gathers to celebrate the birthdays of the Navy and Marine Corps!

The Class of 2025 was sworn in and became part of the Bulldog Battalion after participating in a week-long New Student Orientation.

MIDN Klein, Bruning, and Fern enjoying a “Flight Suit Friday” while conducting training on CORTRAMID West in San Diego.

The Bulldog Battalion stands ready for inspection.

Marine Options from Yale, Cornell, MIT, Holy Cross, and RPI  embark on a three-mile hike while participating in a Field Exercise at Fort Devens.

The Yale Joint ROTC Colorguard poses with  Heidi and her partner, Yale Police Officer Rich Simon. Heidi serves the Yale community as a public safety service dog.

Navy Midshipmen and Air Force Cadets working jointly to solve geo-political scenarios during the Group Leadership Project

Midshipmen make critical decisions to solve this problem set at Camp Nett’s Leaders’ Reaction Course.

LT Barszowski presents GySgt Portell with a gift in honor of the Marine Corps’ 246th Birthday! OORAH!

BMCS Faron Carhee and CDMCM Kellen Voland join us during Naval Lab to discuss the important roll that the Chief Petty Officer plays in our Navy and how they work with Junior Officers to make ships and aircraft operate.

Battalion CO, MIDN Andrew Song, presents RADM Shoshana Chatfield, President of the Naval War College, with a plaque to commemorate her visit with the Bulldog Battalion.

The Class of 2022 received their service assignment. These are the career paths that these midshipmen will embark on upon commissioing.

Welcome to the Bulldog Battalion!

Thank you for coming to explore nrotc opportunties at yale.

The Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC) Program was established to educate and train qualified young men and women for service as commissioned officers in the US Navy (unrestricted line), or in the Marine Corps. As the largest single source of Navy and Marine Corps officers, the NROTC Scholarship Program fills a vital need in preparing mature young men and women for leadership and management positions in an increasingly technical Navy and Marine Corps.

We’d be happy to answer any question that you have about the NROTC program and how NROTC integrates into your life as a Yale student! If you’d like to speak with one of our staff officers, please fill out this form .

If you’d like the opportunity to speak with one of our current Midshipmen, please fill out this form and we will connect your with somewho who has similar interest!

University of Notre Dame

Notre Dame NROTC Official Site

• Commissioning

Navy-Option Midshipmen who successfully complete the NROTC program at Notre Dame will be commissioned as Ensigns. Notre Dame NROTC serves to commission Unrestricted Line Officers in the United States Navy.

Midshipmen will submit their Service Assignment preferences going into their senior year. They will be notified of their Service Assignment early in their senior year prior to commissioning.

Links for the Unrestricted Line Service Assignments can be found below.

Naval Aviation

Surface warfare (conventional), surface warfare (nuclear), submarine warfare, naval special warfare (seal), explosive ordnance disposal (eod).

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• Other Sources of Commission

NROTC RL Service Assignment

• Thread starter NavRattler
• Start date Sep 6, 2019
• Tags navy nrotc service assignment
• Sep 6, 2019

Hello all, I am currently a 3rd year student in the NROTC program and I will be submitting my service assignment package in about one year. Has anyone here had any experience with attempting to be assigned to a Restricted Line (RL) designator? It's no secret that most NROTC accessions are assigned into Unrestricted Line (URL) designators, however I have heard of some rare cases where midshipmen get assigned into RL designators. I'm prepared to select SWO (1160) and then push for a lat-transfer to once I've completed my first DIVO tour, but being a SWO isn't something I want to do for very long. Of course, there is always the reason of being NPQ for URL service, but I have no reason to believe I will be found NPQ when I complete my pre-commissioning physical. I have a strong desire to be an Information Professional Officer (1820) and my major is in Information Technology with a focus on information assurance/security and mobile programming. And I am working on getting a couple IT industry certifications before I graduate in order to bolster my chances. Any input would be greatly appreciated.  

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40 facts about elektrostal.

Written by Lanette Mayes

Modified & Updated: 02 Mar 2024

Reviewed by Jessica Corbett

Elektrostal is a vibrant city located in the Moscow Oblast region of Russia. With a rich history, stunning architecture, and a thriving community, Elektrostal is a city that has much to offer. Whether you are a history buff, nature enthusiast, or simply curious about different cultures, Elektrostal is sure to captivate you.

This article will provide you with 40 fascinating facts about Elektrostal, giving you a better understanding of why this city is worth exploring. From its origins as an industrial hub to its modern-day charm, we will delve into the various aspects that make Elektrostal a unique and must-visit destination.

So, join us as we uncover the hidden treasures of Elektrostal and discover what makes this city a true gem in the heart of Russia.

Key Takeaways:

• Elektrostal, known as the “Motor City of Russia,” is a vibrant and growing city with a rich industrial history, offering diverse cultural experiences and a strong commitment to environmental sustainability.
• With its convenient location near Moscow, Elektrostal provides a picturesque landscape, vibrant nightlife, and a range of recreational activities, making it an ideal destination for residents and visitors alike.

Known as the “Motor City of Russia.”

Elektrostal, a city located in the Moscow Oblast region of Russia, earned the nickname “Motor City” due to its significant involvement in the automotive industry.

Home to the Elektrostal Metallurgical Plant.

Elektrostal is renowned for its metallurgical plant, which has been producing high-quality steel and alloys since its establishment in 1916.

Boasts a rich industrial heritage.

Elektrostal has a long history of industrial development, contributing to the growth and progress of the region.

Founded in 1916.

The city of Elektrostal was founded in 1916 as a result of the construction of the Elektrostal Metallurgical Plant.

Located approximately 50 kilometers east of Moscow.

Elektrostal is situated in close proximity to the Russian capital, making it easily accessible for both residents and visitors.

Known for its vibrant cultural scene.

Elektrostal is home to several cultural institutions, including museums, theaters, and art galleries that showcase the city’s rich artistic heritage.

A popular destination for nature lovers.

Surrounded by picturesque landscapes and forests, Elektrostal offers ample opportunities for outdoor activities such as hiking, camping, and birdwatching.

Hosts the annual Elektrostal City Day celebrations.

Every year, Elektrostal organizes festive events and activities to celebrate its founding, bringing together residents and visitors in a spirit of unity and joy.

Has a population of approximately 160,000 people.

Elektrostal is home to a diverse and vibrant community of around 160,000 residents, contributing to its dynamic atmosphere.

Boasts excellent education facilities.

The city is known for its well-established educational institutions, providing quality education to students of all ages.

A center for scientific research and innovation.

Elektrostal serves as an important hub for scientific research, particularly in the fields of metallurgy, materials science, and engineering.

Surrounded by picturesque lakes.

The city is blessed with numerous beautiful lakes, offering scenic views and recreational opportunities for locals and visitors alike.

Well-connected transportation system.

Elektrostal benefits from an efficient transportation network, including highways, railways, and public transportation options, ensuring convenient travel within and beyond the city.

Famous for its traditional Russian cuisine.

Food enthusiasts can indulge in authentic Russian dishes at numerous restaurants and cafes scattered throughout Elektrostal.

Home to notable architectural landmarks.

Elektrostal boasts impressive architecture, including the Church of the Transfiguration of the Lord and the Elektrostal Palace of Culture.

Offers a wide range of recreational facilities.

Residents and visitors can enjoy various recreational activities, such as sports complexes, swimming pools, and fitness centers, enhancing the overall quality of life.

Provides a high standard of healthcare.

Elektrostal is equipped with modern medical facilities, ensuring residents have access to quality healthcare services.

Home to the Elektrostal History Museum.

The Elektrostal History Museum showcases the city’s fascinating past through exhibitions and displays.

A hub for sports enthusiasts.

Elektrostal is passionate about sports, with numerous stadiums, arenas, and sports clubs offering opportunities for athletes and spectators.

Celebrates diverse cultural festivals.

Throughout the year, Elektrostal hosts a variety of cultural festivals, celebrating different ethnicities, traditions, and art forms.

Electric power played a significant role in its early development.

Elektrostal owes its name and initial growth to the establishment of electric power stations and the utilization of electricity in the industrial sector.

Boasts a thriving economy.

The city’s strong industrial base, coupled with its strategic location near Moscow, has contributed to Elektrostal’s prosperous economic status.

Houses the Elektrostal Drama Theater.

The Elektrostal Drama Theater is a cultural centerpiece, attracting theater enthusiasts from far and wide.

Popular destination for winter sports.

Elektrostal’s proximity to ski resorts and winter sport facilities makes it a favorite destination for skiing, snowboarding, and other winter activities.

Promotes environmental sustainability.

Elektrostal prioritizes environmental protection and sustainability, implementing initiatives to reduce pollution and preserve natural resources.

Home to renowned educational institutions.

Elektrostal is known for its prestigious schools and universities, offering a wide range of academic programs to students.

Committed to cultural preservation.

The city values its cultural heritage and takes active steps to preserve and promote traditional customs, crafts, and arts.

Hosts an annual International Film Festival.

The Elektrostal International Film Festival attracts filmmakers and cinema enthusiasts from around the world, showcasing a diverse range of films.

Encourages entrepreneurship and innovation.

Elektrostal supports aspiring entrepreneurs and fosters a culture of innovation, providing opportunities for startups and business development.

Offers a range of housing options.

Elektrostal provides diverse housing options, including apartments, houses, and residential complexes, catering to different lifestyles and budgets.

Home to notable sports teams.

Elektrostal is proud of its sports legacy, with several successful sports teams competing at regional and national levels.

Boasts a vibrant nightlife scene.

Residents and visitors can enjoy a lively nightlife in Elektrostal, with numerous bars, clubs, and entertainment venues.

Promotes cultural exchange and international relations.

Elektrostal actively engages in international partnerships, cultural exchanges, and diplomatic collaborations to foster global connections.

Surrounded by beautiful nature reserves.

Nearby nature reserves, such as the Barybino Forest and Luchinskoye Lake, offer opportunities for nature enthusiasts to explore and appreciate the region’s biodiversity.

Commemorates historical events.

The city pays tribute to significant historical events through memorials, monuments, and exhibitions, ensuring the preservation of collective memory.

Promotes sports and youth development.

Elektrostal invests in sports infrastructure and programs to encourage youth participation, health, and physical fitness.

Hosts annual cultural and artistic festivals.

Throughout the year, Elektrostal celebrates its cultural diversity through festivals dedicated to music, dance, art, and theater.

Provides a picturesque landscape for photography enthusiasts.

The city’s scenic beauty, architectural landmarks, and natural surroundings make it a paradise for photographers.

Connects to Moscow via a direct train line.

The convenient train connection between Elektrostal and Moscow makes commuting between the two cities effortless.

A city with a bright future.

Elektrostal continues to grow and develop, aiming to become a model city in terms of infrastructure, sustainability, and quality of life for its residents.

In conclusion, Elektrostal is a fascinating city with a rich history and a vibrant present. From its origins as a center of steel production to its modern-day status as a hub for education and industry, Elektrostal has plenty to offer both residents and visitors. With its beautiful parks, cultural attractions, and proximity to Moscow, there is no shortage of things to see and do in this dynamic city. Whether you’re interested in exploring its historical landmarks, enjoying outdoor activities, or immersing yourself in the local culture, Elektrostal has something for everyone. So, next time you find yourself in the Moscow region, don’t miss the opportunity to discover the hidden gems of Elektrostal.

Q: What is the population of Elektrostal?

A: As of the latest data, the population of Elektrostal is approximately XXXX.

Q: How far is Elektrostal from Moscow?

A: Elektrostal is located approximately XX kilometers away from Moscow.

Q: Are there any famous landmarks in Elektrostal?

A: Yes, Elektrostal is home to several notable landmarks, including XXXX and XXXX.

Q: What industries are prominent in Elektrostal?

A: Elektrostal is known for its steel production industry and is also a center for engineering and manufacturing.

Q: Are there any universities or educational institutions in Elektrostal?

A: Yes, Elektrostal is home to XXXX University and several other educational institutions.

Q: What are some popular outdoor activities in Elektrostal?

A: Elektrostal offers several outdoor activities, such as hiking, cycling, and picnicking in its beautiful parks.

Q: Is Elektrostal well-connected in terms of transportation?

A: Yes, Elektrostal has good transportation links, including trains and buses, making it easily accessible from nearby cities.

Q: Are there any annual events or festivals in Elektrostal?

A: Yes, Elektrostal hosts various events and festivals throughout the year, including XXXX and XXXX.

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MoSCoW prioritization of the product backlog

Moscow backlog prioritization.

Prioritization is probably the most discussed part of development processes. Product backlogs are often quite complex with hundreds of requirements. How to find user stories in your story map which you should start developing first?

Traditional approach

The approach of traditional processes is simple. You have high, medium, low priorities. Ok, for some organizations it is still not enough so they have priorities on the scale of 0 to 10.

But do such priorities help deliver the most important and most valuable thing at the same time?

In agile, we want to support the pull principle. We want to let our developers pull the next requirement, develop it, deliver it. Then continue to the next one. So, in Agile we need a line of requirements.  Agile processes and frameworks focus on the delivery of valuable stuff first. This is fine; however, there is a necessity to consider other perspectives as well.  There are two kinds of companies.

If you want to prioritize and be agile, you can’t be just one of the types. You have to be company following both of them and even more .

Customers’ perspective

In ScrumDesk we prefer to consider the customer’s perspective first. The idea is that a satisfied customer is a driver of further changes and success of the product itself . A satisfied customer is willing to improve the product not just by social marketing, by new ideas, but in our case even by the development of the product itself.

As the product owner, the first thing you have to understand is who your customer/user is. You need to understand and describe her space, her context, her jobs, the pains or gains she is looking for.

The best part is just coming. Based on a more than 10 years old survey done by Scot Ambler, 45% of functionalities are NEVER, NOT ONCE, used. Only 7% are used always. Plus 13% very often.

So, why develop something that customers will not use? You just spent the life of your colleagues! Common! The answer is NO! Now MoSCoW prioritization comes to help.

Based on that you should be able to decide if a feature is:

• Must – a heart is a “must”. Without it, there is no live organism. What is a must in your application?
• Should – a hand is “should”. Without it is hard. But you can survive even without a hand. Well, in most cases.
• Could – hair is “could”. It is fine to have them, you even look nicer, but you will definitely survive without them
• Won’t – unnecessary waste. Btw, is there anything “won’t” in a body?

How to estimate MoSCoW values in 7 steps?

• As a Product Owner, try to be in the skin of your customer. There might be multiple types of them, so choose one, or some group of them.
• If you were him, will the feature be a must, should, could, or won’t?
• Forget about the time of development, forget about effort. It is just about customer and feature.
• What if this feature was not a must, but should? Would the customer realize that?
• What if the feature was could and not should? Would the customer realize that?
• Try to make it less “must”. Remember 7% features used always.
• Compare requirements to each other. Repeat a couple of times.

Let’s say your backlog looks like this:

After MoSCoW prioritization you should have a line of requirements ordered by MUST, SHOULD, COULD values. This might be done in ScrumDesk PLAN view

How to manage MoSCoW in ScrumDesk ?

To set the value to backlog item you need just click it (in any view, either STORY MAP , BACKLOG , PLAN or WORK ) to access details in the side view. Prioritization fields are displayed below the title of the backlog item. The first one is MoSCoW.

Value can be visible on cards in STORY MAP.

Once the value is entered, you can filter and group items based on it all ScrumDesk  views, i.e. in the product backlog.

However, you are not done with prioritization in this step. What about business value? More to follow…

< Print physical cards  | Content | Agile prioritization based on Business value >

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 4, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 4, 2023, 8:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2pm ET on July 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment. Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov reported on July 4 that Ukrainian forces are performing their main task of destroying Russian manpower, equipment, fuel depots, artillery, and air defenses and that a “war of destruction is equal to a war of kilometers.”[1] Danilov’s assessment underlines the prioritization of Ukraine’s ongoing campaign to attrit Russian manpower and assets over attempting to conduct massive sweeping mechanized maneuvers to regain large swaths of territory rapidly. NATO Military Committee Chair Admiral Bob Bauer reported on July 3 that Ukrainian forces are correct to proceed cautiously and avoid high casualties in the counteroffensive and acknowledged that the counteroffensive is difficult due to landmines and other obstacles up to 30km deep into Russian-occupied territory.[2] Bauer stated that Ukrainian forces should not face criticism or pressure for moving slowly.

Ukrainian forces have liberated territory in multiple areas of the front since the start of the counteroffensive in early June. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on July 3 that Ukrainian forces have liberated a total of 37.4 square kilometers in eastern and southern Ukraine in the past week.[3] Ukrainian forces are continuing to make steady, gradual advances.

The current pace of Ukrainian operations is not indicative of a stalemate or evidence that Ukraine cannot retake large areas. Ukrainian forces conducted slow and gradual interdiction campaigns against Russian concentration areas in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and limited ground attacks on the west (right) bank between August and November of 2022, before finally forcing the Russian withdrawal from the right bank in mid-November.[4] The situation in southern Ukraine is different, of course, because there is no natural bottleneck of the sort created by Russian reliance on the two bridges over the Dnipro. The Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson nevertheless alternated phases of relatively rapid advance with long periods of preparation, combat focused on attritting Russian forces, and limited gains that ultimately made Russian positions on the west bank of the river untenable.  By contrast, the Russian winter-spring offensive culminated in just over one month without making significant gains along the Luhansk-Kharkiv Oblast border.[5]  The current Ukrainian counter-offensive is less dramatic and rapid than the one that liberated much of Kharkiv Oblast, more successful than the failed Russian winter offensive, and generally most like the slower but ultimately successful Kherson counteroffensive in its pace and initial progress.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least four sectors of the front and advanced on July 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks in the Lyman direction.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area, in the western Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[7] Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces have made some unspecified advances on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks, and a prominent Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Bakhmut.[8] Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Valery Shershen stated that Ukrainian forces advanced up to two kilometers in the western Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reached Pryyutne, 15 kilometers southwest of Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk Oblast.[9] Geolocated footage confirms that Ukrainian forces made additional advances south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[10]

Russian and Ukrainian officials escalated their rhetoric surrounding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 4, but Russia is likely focused on accusing Ukraine of irresponsible actions around the ZNPP including setting conditions for a possible false flag attack . Russia remains unlikely to generate a radiological incident at the ZNPP at this time. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 4 that Ukrainian officials have begun preparations for a potential Russian provocation at the ZNPP “in the near future” and warned that Russian forces placed objects “resembling explosive devices” on the outer roofs of the ZNPP’s third and fourth reactors in order to blame damage to these areas on Ukrainian shelling.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky echoed this statement in his nightly address on July 4, and other Ukrainian military sources warned of possible Russian provocations at the plant.[12] As ISW has previously reported, it is unlikely that limited Russian sabotage at the ZNPP that Russia could hope to blame on Ukraine would be able to generate a massive radiological incident, as the ZNPP’s reactors were constructed to withstand considerable damage.[13] Ukrainian military sources reiterated this assessment and noted that even if the purported explosive devices detonate, the damage would not harm the reactor but would rather create the false impression that Ukrainian forces had shelled the reactors.[14] Advisor to the head of Russian nuclear energy operator Rosenergoatom, Renat Karchaa, also claimed on July 4 that Ukraine is planning to strike the ZNPP overnight on July 4-5.[15] ISW has previously assessed that such provocative Russian statements, and even the possibility of a tangible provocation at the plant, are likely part of a Russian wider information operation meant to accuse Ukraine of irresponsibility at the ZNPP ahead of the upcoming NATO summit and dissuade Ukrainian forces from conducting counteroffensive operations against occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[16]

The reported reorganization of Russian internal security organs suggests that the Kremlin has not yet concluded that it has effectively neutralized the threats of future armed rebellions following the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 rebellion. Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on July 3, citing internal law enforcement sources, that Russian law enforcement authorities are considering reassigning the “Grom” special units of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service (part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) to Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard).[17] Vedomosti noted that this reported change follows Russian President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with heads of various Russian law enforcement agencies on June 26 in the wake of the Wagner armed rebellion.[18] Several Russian sources spoke out against the reported transfer of ”Grom” to Rosgvardia, citing overall poorer equipment, training, and leadership quality.[19] Vedomosti claimed that Alexander Khinstein, former advisor to Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov, warned that the assignment of ”Grom” units to Rosgvardia would be a ”dangerous experiment.”[20] The alleged restructuring of Russia’s internal security forces suggests that the Kremlin is working to build an effective anti-rebellion force following Wagner’s armed rebellion. The fact that these purported changes are happening following the rebellion indicates that the Kremlin was correctly dissatisfied with the performance of security forces, which failed to stop or even contest Wagner’s march on Moscow, and suggests that the Kremlin has not ruled out the risk of future such rebellions.

Russian authorities are absolving Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of financial responsibility for damages caused by the Wagner Group rebellion and reportedly returned significant liquid assets to Prigozhin, possibly as part of the deal negotiated between Putin, Prigozhin, and Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko. The Rostov-on-Don administration claimed that the total damages from Prigozhin’s rebellion amounted to 92.5 million rubles (roughly $1 million), and that the administration will not recover damages from Prigozhin or the Wagner Group.[21] St. Petersburg news outlet Fontanka claimed, citing internal sources, that Russian authorities returned over 10 billion rubles (roughly $111 million) in cash, five gold bars, and hundreds of thousands of US dollars in cash to Prigozhin on July 2 that authorities had seized from Prigozhin-affiliated facilities in St. Petersburg on June 24.[22] Fontanka claimed that authorities only reversed their decision to hold onto Prigozhin‘s liquid assets on July 2 but did not specify a reason for the reversal. The legal basis that Russian authorities would have had for seizing Prigozhin’s assets remains unclear in any case, as Russian authorities dropped criminal charges against Prigozhin for the rebellion.[23] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that part of Prigozhin’s liquid assets were supposed to be compensation to the families of Russian pilots whom Wagner forces killed during the rebellion, but it is now uncertain whether Wagner will make those payments.[24] The milblogger assessed that Wagner will likely use at least part of the returned assets to support transferring Wagner Group personnel to Belarus.

The official Chechen response to an attack against a Russian opposition journalist in Chechnya may impact Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s standing in the Russian ultranationalist information space. Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported on July 4 that unspecified, masked actors in Grozny, Chechnya intercepted a car containing one of its journalists, Yelena Milashina, severely assaulted Milashina, destroyed her equipment and documents, and warned Milashina against writing “anything.”[25] Milashina traveled to Chechnya in order to cover the trial of Zarema Musayeva, the mother of an exiled Chechen opposition activist, and the attackers also assaulted Musayeva’s lawyer, Alexander Nemov, who was in the car with Milashina. Chechen courts sentenced Musayeva to five and a half years in prison on July 5 for alleged fraud and attacking Chechen authorities, but some Russian opposition voices claimed that Chechen authorities prosecuted Musayeva due to her son‘s activism.[26] Prominent Russian ultranationalist voices seized on Milashina’s attack despite its lack of relevance to the war in Ukraine likely out of concern for broader press censorship.[27] The voices condemned attacks against journalists – including Milashina – as unacceptable even though they disagree with Milashina.[28] The Russian Union of Journalists and the Russian Human Rights Council both issued statements of condemnation and opened investigations into the attack.[29]

Kadyrov’s prominence in the broader Russian information space will likely force Kadyrov to choose between preserving his regime and his support in the ultranationalist information space, however. Kadyrov’s response was a brief acknowledgment that the relevant Chechen authorities are investigating the ”incident” - a response inconsistent in tone and content with Kadyrov’s usual flamboyant, long-winded messaging.[30] Kadyrov previously condemned Milashina as a ”terrorist” and demanded her detention, which is largely consistent with his overall effort to retain his authoritarian rule in Chechnya.[31] If Kadyrov supports the investigation into Milashina’s attack, he risks undermining his domestic regime and crackdowns against Chechen opposition voices. But if Kadyrov refuses to support the investigation, then he risks undermining his standing within an information space that is hypersensitive to the prospect of increased censorship. Kadyrov already struggles to balance these dual aims in his force arrayment in Ukraine; Kadyrov portrays Akhmat forces as capable fighters against Ukraine but has simultaneously largely avoided committing them intensive and attritional combat, and some Russian milbloggers have complained that Chechen forces are distracted posing online while other Russian forces actually fight.[32]  Chechen forces notably failed to engage Prigozhin’s rebels despite ostentatiously mobilizing and moving ostensibly to fight them, although Putin might have directed Kadyrov to avoid combat with Wagner forces.[33]

Russia is reportedly forming a new combined arms army as part of the Northern Fleet, likely in order to posture its preparedness against NATO. Russian news outlet Izvestia reported that Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) sources claimed that the existing 14th Army Corps of the Northern Fleet will be reformed into the new combined arms army with motorized rifle brigades, divisions, and regiments subordinate to it.[34] Izvestia suggested that the 14th Army Corps‘ 200th and 80th Brigades will be reorganized into a division under the new combined arms army.[35] Russian army corps before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine existed only within fleets and largely performed the same functions as combined arms armies. The reported decision to form a new combined arms army is thus likely posturing ahead of the NATO summit on July 11-12 intended to show Russia’s military response to the accession of Finland and possibly Sweden to the alliance. The promotion of the 14th Army Corps to a combined arms army level will not by itself increase Russian combat capacity, and it is unclear where the Russian military leadership could find the personnel and equipment that would be needed for the new organization to generate a material difference.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone attack on Moscow Oblast and Novaya Moskva on July 4. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses shot down and electronic warfare suppressed five of five Ukrainian drones.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed two drones near Valuevo, electronic warfare suppressed one in the Odinstovo Raion, one drone fell near Krivosheino, and one flew toward a military unit in Kubinka - likely the Russian airbase there.[37] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may have intended to strike Vnukovo Airport, and Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin announced that Russian authorities temporarily redirected some flights from Vnukovo Airport in response to the drones.[38] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may have conducted the drone attack in retaliation for an alleged Russian strike on a Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) building in Sumy Oblast.[39]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment. The current pace of Ukrainian operations is not indicative of a stalemate or evidence that Ukraine cannot retake large areas.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least four sectors of the front and advanced on July 4.
• Russian and Ukrainian officials escalated their rhetoric surrounding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 5, but Russia is likely focused on accusing Ukraine of irresponsible actions around the ZNPP including setting conditions for a possible false flag attack. Russia remains unlikely to generate a radiological incident at the ZNPP at this time.
• The reported reorganization of Russian internal security organs suggests that the Kremlin has not yet concluded that it has effectively neutralized the threats of future armed rebellions following the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 rebellion.
• Russian authorities are absolving Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of financial responsibility for damages caused by the Wagner Group rebellion and reportedly returned significant liquid assets to Prigozhin, possibly as part of the deal negotiated between Putin, Prigozhin, and Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko.
• The official Chechen response to an attack against a Russian opposition journalist in Chechnya may impact Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s standing in the Russian ultranationalist information space.
• Kadyrov’s prominence in the broader Russian information space will likely force Kadyrov to choose between preserving his regime and his support in the ultranationalist information space, however.
• Russia is reportedly forming a new combined arms army as part of the Northern Fleet, likely in order to posture its preparedness against NATO.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone attack on Moscow Oblast and Novaya Moskva on July 4.
• Russian conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and south of Kreminna.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces escalated ground attacks in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 4.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russia continues efforts to mobilize its defense industrial base (DIB).

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) 

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 4 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups made unsuccessful attempts to cross the northern international border between Ukraine and Russia in unspecified areas in the Siversk and Slobozhansk directions.[40]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and south of Kreminna on July 4. Geolocated footage published on July 4 shows that Russian forces made limited advances east of Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna).[41]  The Ukrainian General Staff reported that  Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove), Novovodyane (16km southwest of Svatove), Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna), the Serebrianske forest area (10km south of Kreminna), and Vesele (30km south of Kreminna).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces attempted to advance in the Svatove direction and that Russian forces conducted attacks near Kuzemivka (14km northwest of Svatove).[43] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on June 3 that Russian forces have about 180,000 troops in the area of responsibility of the Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces, 120,000 of which are operating in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction, including Airborne (VDV) forces, mechanized units, BARS (Russian Combat Reserve) units, Territorial Defense units, and Storm-Z assault units.[44] Footage published on July 4 purportedly shows the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating near Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[45]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Novoselivske, Novovodyane, and Yampolivka (16km west of Kreminna).[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks from Torske (16km west of Kreminna) and that artillery and UAV units of the Russian 120th Guards Artillery Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) repelled Ukrainian attacks near Dibrova.[47] 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian forces escalated ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on July 4. Ukranian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that the situation in Bakhmut has escalated, and that Russian and Ukrainian forces are dueling for the initiative and control of terrain.[48] Malyar also stated that Ukrainian forces are advancing on the southern flank of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and that fighting continues on Klishchiivka’s northern flank.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled nine Russian attacks near Hryhorivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), west of Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut), and southeast of Bila Hora (15km southwest of Bakhmut).[50] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations north and south of Bakhmut, entrenching themselves in new positions.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[52] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Klishchiivka, Ozarianivka (16km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdiumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[53] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces held their positions and counterattacked from Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut) and along the M-03 highway in the direction of Minkivka (13km northwest of Bakhmut).[54] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that units of the Russian Southern Group of Forces repelled 10 Ukrainian attacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Yahidne, and Klishchivka.[55]

Pervasive issues with Russian combat capabilities likely continue to affect the ability of Russian forces to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Bakhmut area. Former Russian officer and prominent critical milblogger Igor Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces are advancing north of Bakhmut where understaffed units of the Russian 3rd Army Corps (Western Military District) have been deployed.[56] ISW previously reported the formation and failure of the 3rd Army Corps, a new formation created in 2022 that was decimated during its first deployment to Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022 and again in its subsequent deployments to the Bakhmut area.[57] ISW previously assessed that issues with the ad hoc commitment of various depleted force groupings to the Bakhmut axis, alongside apparent command and control failures, were likely preventing Russian forces in the area from conducting sound defensive operations and would likely offer Ukrainian forces opportunities to exploit with limited counterattacks.[58]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces defended against Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka and repelled 15 Russian ground attacks near Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction.[60] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces carried out unsuccessful offensive operations in Marinka and on the southwestern approach to Avdiivka.[61]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on July 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Rivnopil, 10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border.[62] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in the Vuhledar area east of Velyka Novosilka and south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reached the borders of Pryyutne, 15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[64] Ukrainian Tavrisk Direction Spokesperson Valeriy Shershen noted on July 4 that Ukrainian forces have advanced up to 2km into Russian defenses in an unspecified area of the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts) direction.[65]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 4. Geolocated footage posted on July 4 shows elements of the 810 th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) shelling Ukrainian positions south of Orikhiv, indicating that Ukrainian forces have advanced to within 2km north of Robotyne.[66] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks towards Robotyne but that elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelled Ukrainian attacks west of Robotyne.[67] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that several small Ukrainian assault groups launched an attack southwest of Orikhiv towards the Pyatykhatyky-Zherebryanky line (about 25km southwest of Orikhiv) and reported that elements of the Crimea and Sudoplatov volunteer battalions and the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are defending in this area.[68]

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike in the Russian rear of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on July 4. Geolocated footage posted on July 4 shows the aftermath of a reported Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strike on an unspecified Russian warehouse facility in Yakymivka, about 23km southwest of Melitopol along the T2209 Melitopol-Chonhar highway.[69] Russian sources additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Vasylivka (35km north of Melitopol along the E105 highway).[70]

Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are active near the Antonivsky Bridge on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast despite the Russian MoD’s efforts to claim that Russian forces have full control of this area.[71] One Russian milblogger claimed that there are heavy battles ongoing near the Antonivsky Bridge, and another warned that Ukrainian troops are regrouping and replenishing units to prepare for further attacks across the Dnipro River.[72] The Russian MoD claimed on July 1 that Russian troops fully restored their positions along the eastern shoreline of the Dnipro River, but milbloggers have continued to warn that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence on the east bank and are preparing for additional attacks.[73] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk also noted that Russian forces near the Dnipro River are trying to retake positions previously flooded by the explosion of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam.[74]

An influx of Russian tourists to Crimea is generating serious traffic jams along one of Russia’s most important ground lines of communication, prompting Putin and other senior Russian officials to direct state resources to help tourists move closer to a zone of active hostilities. Russian Transport Minister Vitaly Saveliev met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 4 to report on the situation at the entrance to the Kerch Strait Bridge and to ask for increased ferry crossings to reduce traffic jams.[75] Putin called for maximizing the use of ferries to ”normalize” the transport situation across the Kerch Strait and indicated that the Russian MoD should also lend transport assets to the area.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that the traffic at the entrance of the Kerch Strait Bridge in Krasnodar Krai has increased by 40% since July 1 and is expected to increase further in the coming days as the summer tourist season is in full swing.[77] Another Russian milblogger called on the Black Sea Fleet to provide two large landing ships for the crossing of civilian vehicles to solve traffic issues and emphasized that Russian authorities have seriously underestimated the desire of Russians to continue vacationing in occupied Crimea despite ongoing hostilities.[78] Russian authorities are dealing with pervasive civilian and transport issues to Crimea partially because of their continued refusal to fully mobilize Russian society onto a wartime footing, resulting in the continued promotion of tourism to occupied Crimea despite the fact it is a legitimate rear-area target for continued Ukrainian strikes.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continues efforts to mobilize its defense industrial base (DIB). Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov, and unspecified other military leaders and DIB representatives discussed the implementation of the Russian state defense order to increase DIB production, but the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) did not provide details on the topics discussed or agreed plans.[79] Yelabuga, Tatarstan regional entity “Alabuga Start” advertised a program for women aged 16 to 22 to develop careers building drones.[80] The program claims to offer benefits including a 52,000 ruble ($577) monthly salary, training, housing, relocation aid, and opportunities for further education. ISW has previously reported that a Russo-Iranian contract is providing for the manufacture of Shahed drones in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ).[81]

Russian officials continue to posture Russia as able to generate enough manpower to maintain the war effort in Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed that Russian forces have recruited over 185,000 contract and conscripted personnel since January 1, 2023, 109,000 of whom are in reserve.[82] Medvedev claimed that Russian forces recruited 1,400 people per day for contract service in June 2023.

Russia continues efforts to expand international military cooperation. Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Nikolai Yevmenov and Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu met in Beijing on July 3 and discussed ongoing mutual cooperation and organizing joint military exercises.[83] Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Alexander Fomin met with Kuwaiti Army Assistant Chief of Staff Brigadier General Fawaz Al-Harbi in Moscow on July 4 and confirmed Russian and Kuwaiti intent to further defense cooperation.[84]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems) 

Russian officials continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of providing pediatric healthcare. Russian Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova claimed on July 4 that Russian authorities sent 23 disabled children from occupied Donetsk Oblast to a rehabilitation center in Krasnogorsk, Moscow Oblast and 12 children to a rehabilitation center in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast.[85] Lvova-Belova claimed that Russian authorities plan to send about 370 more children in at least four more trips to rehabilitation centers by the end of 2023.[86] Lvova-Belova did not specify if the children have returned or will return to occupied Donetsk Oblast. ISW has previously reported on Russian authorities using access to pediatric healthcare as a guise to deport children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.[87]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://twitter.com/OleksiyDanilov/status/1676116133819170817

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-right-be-cautious-with-counter-offensive-top-nato-official-says-2023-07-03/

[3] https://t.me/annamaliar/899

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2023

[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9ev...

[8] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/04/syly-oborony-prodovzhuyut-vesty-nastupalni-operacziyi-na-bahmutskomu-melitopolskomu-i-berdyanskomu-napryamkah/; https://t.me/strelkovii/5874 ; https://t.me/annamaliar/903

[9] https://suspilne dot media/521387-na-berdanskomu-napramku-zaporizkoi-oblasti-vijskovi-zsu-prosunulisa-do-dvoh-kilometriv-vpered/;  https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/videos/932914671129838/

[10] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676197514641387521; https://t.me/wargonzo/13655

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ABo9LEqPDXC5mk6WF1Y8DnZ7p1DBLvQt2gWt1TwufuY7FfCaM7yYvYP6eBhn7uYHl  

[12] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/svit-bachit-sho-yedinim-dzherelom-nebezpeki-dlya-zaporizkoyi-84065; https://t.me/AFUStratCom/18805 ; https://t.me/spravdi/31142

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112122 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062223

[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-accuse-each-other-pl...

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-accuse-each-other-pl...

[16] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept22 ;

[17] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/07/04/983567-vedomstva-prorabativayut-vopros-o-perepodchinenii-politseiskogo-spetsnaza-rosgvardii

[18] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/07/04/983567-vedomstva-prorabativayut-vopros-o-perepodchinenii-politseiskogo-spetsnaza-rosgvardii; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71530; https://t.me/mod_russia/27870    

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/20216; https://t.me/dva_majors/20220 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/10678 ; https://t.me/rosich_ru/44861

[20] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/07/04/983567-vedomstva-prorabativayut-vopros-o-perepodchinenii-politseiskogo-spetsnaza-rosgvardii

[21] https://www.kavkazr dot com/a/administratsiya-rostova-ne-budet-trebovatj-vozmescheniya-uscherba-ot-prigozhina-posle-myatezha-v-gorode/32488862.html; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/03/vlasti-rostova-na-donu-otsenili-pochti-v-sto-millionov-rubley-uscherb-gorodu-ot-myatezha-chvk-vagnera; https://rtvi dot com/news/glava-rostova-na-donu-rasskazal-o-summe-ushherba-ot-myatezha-chvk-vagner/

[22] https://www.fontanka dot ru/2023/07/04/72460373/

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[24] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91216

[25] https://t.me/novaya_pishet/41030 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/04/v-chechne-napali-na-zhurnalistku-novoy-gazety-elenu-milashinu-i-advokata-aleksandra-nemova-ih-zhestko-izbili-zhurnalistke-slomali-paltsy

[26] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2023/07/04/chechen-court-sentences-mother-of-prominent-activist-to-55-years-in-prison-a81728

[27] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18182187; https://t.me/sashakots/40758; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/14692

[28] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18182187; https://t.me/sashakots/40758 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/14692

[29] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18182187

[30] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3743;

[31] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/02/03/obozrevatel-novoy-gazety-elena-milashina-uedet-iz-rossii-posle-ugroz-kadyrova; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/04/razberemsya-ramzan-kadyrov-o-napadenii-na-elenu-milashinu-i-aleksandra-nemova; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20April%2016.pdf

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2023

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20May%2031%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[34] https://iz dot ru/1538203/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/poliarnyi-okrug-v-sostave-severnogo-flota-sozdadut-obshchevoiskovuiu-armiiu

[35] https://iz dot ru/1538203/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/poliarnyi-okrug-v-sostave-severnogo-flota-sozdadut-obshchevoiskovuiu-armiiu

[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/28057 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/28057; https://t.me/severrealii/18203 ; https://t.me/shot_shot/53667 ; https://t.me/shot_shot/53668 ; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/2376 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/19166 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/62267; https://t.me/vrogov/10743; https://t.me/istories_media/2957; https://t.me/astrapress/31717; https://t.me/astrapress/31721; https://t.me/astrapress/31723; https://t.me/astrapress/31724 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48938 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103099 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103100 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103102 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103107

[37] https://t.me/rybar/49303; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48650; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37131 ; https://gfsis.org.ge/maps/russian-military-forces

[38] https://t.me/rybar/49303; https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/5854

[39] https://t.me/milinfolive/103104

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9ev...

[41] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676238337202331648?s=20

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9ev...

[43] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91146

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/03/vorog-namagayetsya-nastupaty-na-lymano-kupyanskomu-napryamku-sergij-cherevatyj/

[45] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/10707

[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644 ; https://t.me/rybar/49287; https://t.me/kremlinprachka/24720

[48] https://t.me/annamaliar/903

[49] https://t.me/annamaliar/903

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkdwwHKJ5eZcJc9FQ6u2pJAfj4vkxsmmVQTVdqqNbJFGN4KTPEKy7wywg3ATtH9ol

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9evCzYCUKw7ZJdEccNPotT5BoeWZaKcopvwQGEWDWtirJjwTfl

[52] https://t.me/grey_zone/19409 ; https://t.me/strelkovii/5874  

[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644  

[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644  

[55] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072

[56] https://t.me/strelkovii/5874 

[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[58] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2023

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9evCzYCUKw7ZJdEccNPotT5BoeWZaKcopvwQGEWDWtirJjwTfl  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkdwwHKJ5eZcJc9FQ6u2pJAfj4vkxsmmVQTVdqqNbJFGN4KTPEKy7wywg3ATtH9ol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9evCzYCUKw7ZJdEccNPotT5BoeWZaKcopvwQGEWDWtirJjwTfl   

[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91146

[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkdwwHKJ5eZcJc9FQ6u2pJAfj4vkxsmmVQTVdqqNbJFGN4KTPEKy7wywg3ATtH9ol

[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072; https://t.me/mod_russia/28066

[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644

[65] https://suspilne dot media/521387-na-berdanskomu-napramku-zaporizkoi-oblasti-vijskovi-zsu-prosunulisa-do-dvoh-kilometriv-vpered/ ;  https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/videos/932914671129838/

[66] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676197514641387521 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/13655

[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48680 ; https://t.me/berloga_life/13918; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48664  

[68] https://t.me/rybar/49306; https://t.me/batalyon15/2205; https://t.me/batalyon15/2202; https://t.me/batalyon15/2200; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/8536; https://t.me/voin_dv/3520; https://t.me/rusich_army/9742; https://t.me/rusich_army/9741; https://t.me/rusich_army/9739; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48667  

[69] https://t.me/vrogov/10736 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676220226902294528?s=20; https://t.me/rybar/49304

[70] https://t.me/vrogov/10733 ; https://t.me/vrogov/10734; https://t.me/rybar/49304

[71] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91146; https://t.me/readovkanews/61932; https://t.me/dva_majors/20233 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/20234 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/20196 ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37139   

[73] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[74] https://suspilne dot media/521107-v-lavah-armii-rf-pevna-panika-tomu-voni-tak-golosno-kricat-pro-antonivskij-mist-gumenuk-pro-situaciu-na-hersonsini/

[75] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18188277

[76] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18188277

[77] https://t.me/southtower/8821  

[78] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91215

[79] https://t.me/mod_russia/28067 

[80] https://t.me/rusich_army/9749; https://t.me/AlabugaService/57

[81] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070323

[82] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/18189843 ; https://ria dot ru/20230704/kontraktniki-1882224486.html

[83] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/qwfb/16234721.html; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-03/china-says-it-wants-m...

[84] https://t.me/mod_russia/28080

[85] https://t.me/malvovabelova/1675

[86] https://t.me/malvovabelova/1675

[87] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2023

Foreign Service Messages

From Kabul to Nairobi – My Risky Assignments in the Pioneering Age of Radio & Security

Conversations About Am Embassy Moscow | Secret Tunnels & Microwave Radiation

1978: the shepheard hotel bar, cairo egypt.

I sat on a stool at the Shepheard Bar and digested what Regional Security Officer Childress had told me about the Soviets radiating our embassy in Moscow with microwave energy. While Childress went to the restroom I came to the conclusion that the only reason why he would bring this up was to recruit me on the SY technical team.

<feature photo:  SY tech officer crawls out from a chimney at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1978 (courtesy US Department of State)

“Another beer?” Childress said as he hopped on the stool next to me.

The bartender knew the RSO’s subtle signal to order.

“Where were we?” Childress said.

“I think the Soviets were in the process of sterilizing the U.S. Embassy Moscow staff with microwave radiation.”

He gave me a double take and said, “Good one,” with the makings of a smile.

“Just kidding,” I said when he added a questioning gaze. “That amount of radiation probably… I mean… it wouldn’t cause damage to the precious… to the vital organs. You said the congressional study indicated no risk.”

I was beginning to sound like Brig. General Jack Ripper in Dr. Strangelove. That role, of course, had to belong to RSO Childress. I got back on course with, “So you were saying that SY tech support found an antenna in a U.S. Embassy chimney and the tunnel beneath it that led to another building.”

The bartender slid two more Stella draught beers in front of us. Childress used the pause to take a swig and gather his thoughts.

“First the Soviets hit us with TUMS, then SMUT-1 and SMUT-2. Now a mysterious fire. It’s time to take definitive action.”

It sounded funny, but I knew it was no laughing matter. I had already gone out to the edge with my “sterilization” comment.

Childress rotated his head, lifted his shoulders and took in a heavy breath of the Shepherd Bar air before he continued.

The Am Embassy Moscow Fire

“In August of last year, a mysterious fire broke out at the embassy in Moscow. The fire engulfed the entire ECON section on the eighth floor. It soon spread to the ninth and tenth floors and the attic. Although policy dictated otherwise, the ambassador gave permission to the Soviet fire fighters to enter the eighth floor.”

Childress paused to get my take.

“No shit?” I said.

“Later Soviet firemen were allowed to fight the fire from aerial ladders when it broke through the chancery’s roof. Although the ambassador denied the Soviets access to the tenth floor, four unescorted Soviet firemen entered the classified area—the Communications and Records Office—of the ninth floor through a window.”

Childress shook his head. “We’ve got to do better at controlling these situations.”

I didn’t have anything add to that.

The Soviets backed off when they saw a Defense Attaché́ officer aiming a camera at them. The embassy chancery offices and the roof suffered extensive damage. Fortunately, the RSO concluded that sensitive equipment and records had not been compromised.”

I had to cut to the chase. The Marine Guard TGIF party had already begun an hour ago. “Is this related to the antenna in the chimney at the American embassy there?”

Childress turned to me and with a bold expression said, “Most assuredly. That’s all I can say at the moment.” While continuing to gaze at me he added, “I guess you’re wondering why I’m telling you all of this.”

“It crossed my mind.”

“I must remind you that this is all confidential.”

“Understood.”

I followed his lead and quaffed a few ounces out of the flagon of Stella beer.

A Recruiter’s “Pitch”

“I’ve been impressed by your work here.”

Here we go. “Thanks.”

“You’ve probably figured out that we may need some help in Moscow on the technical side identifying these microwave radiation issues. As I mentioned earlier I’ll be heading to Moscow after I return from home leave. We anticipate the assignment duration will be about three months. In the meantime SY is putting together a team.”

Childress paused to let that sink in.

“Think you might be interested in joining the team?”

What about my radio cohort Al back at the RCO office in Karachi? He depended on me to handle all the fieldwork. Three months? I bet it would be more like six months. Or it could be an indeterminate time period. OC/PE-R could reassign me Moscow for two years.

“Why don’t you return to Karachi and talk to RCO Roberson about it? It would be for the good of the Foreign Service you know.”

I said, “I appreciate your offer, but I’m going to have to respectfully decline.”

His expression told me that Childress didn’t take too kindly that I had not even considered his offer.

To further explain my response I said, “I’m new in the Foreign Service. This is my first assignment overseas. If I had a few years experience under my belt I’d probably say, ‘Sure, I’ll take up your offer.’”

His expression changed from put off to disappointed.

“We’re responsible for over sixty missions out of the RCO radio office in Karachi. There’s only two of us. I’ve got a lot of people over here counting on me. This area has been neglected for quite a while. Can I make a suggestion?”

“Sure, go ahead,” he said in a discouraged tone.

“Senior CEO Norm Bates helped you guys out in South America. I suggest you contact him. He’s about the best we’ve got and he’s currently back at SECSTATE.”

“We’ve already contacted him. He’s got health issues.”

“Oh, sorry to hear it.”

Would Norm’s gout hold him back?

“You know, there’s some sharp radio techs back at the department awaiting assignments…”

“What is it?” Childress said.

Zoom Zoom, our super-sleuth radio tech would be the perfect guy for the job.

“CEO Parker is a recent hire back at OC/R. I think he would be a good fit for the Moscow assignment.”

Childress chugged the remainder of the beer, glanced at his watch, and said, “We’ll consider CEO Parker. In the meantime, if you reconsider send me a message.”

He gaged my expression and said, “I’m sure they’ll be numerous perks upon completion of the assignment.”

I didn’t ask about the perks.

RSO Childress tapped the bar top and said,  “I’ve got to go pack. The wife’s got big plans for me back home.”

“Have a good trip,” I said. “Sorry I wasn’t able to help you out.”

He gave me an expression that hinted that he wasn’t so sure about that, which made me nervous.

RSO Childress paid the bill, rose off the stool, and said, “See ya around.”

“Yeah, the Cairo upgrades will take a few days to complete. I’ll message you and Bob [my boss in Karachi, RCO Robert Roberson] when I finish.”

“Keep up the good work.”

“Thanks, I will.”

I hoped that was the last I ever heard of TUMS and SMUT and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

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