nature of critical thinking skills

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Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking carefully, and the thinking components on which they focus. Its adoption as an educational goal has been recommended on the basis of respect for students’ autonomy and preparing students for success in life and for democratic citizenship. “Critical thinkers” have the dispositions and abilities that lead them to think critically when appropriate. The abilities can be identified directly; the dispositions indirectly, by considering what factors contribute to or impede exercise of the abilities. Standardized tests have been developed to assess the degree to which a person possesses such dispositions and abilities. Educational intervention has been shown experimentally to improve them, particularly when it includes dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring. Controversies have arisen over the generalizability of critical thinking across domains, over alleged bias in critical thinking theories and instruction, and over the relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking.

2.1 Dewey’s Three Main Examples

2.2 dewey’s other examples, 2.3 further examples, 2.4 non-examples, 3. the definition of critical thinking, 4. its value, 5. the process of thinking critically, 6. components of the process, 7. contributory dispositions and abilities, 8.1 initiating dispositions, 8.2 internal dispositions, 9. critical thinking abilities, 10. required knowledge, 11. educational methods, 12.1 the generalizability of critical thinking, 12.2 bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, 12.3 relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking, other internet resources, related entries.

Use of the term ‘critical thinking’ to describe an educational goal goes back to the American philosopher John Dewey (1910), who more commonly called it ‘reflective thinking’. He defined it as

active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends. (Dewey 1910: 6; 1933: 9)

and identified a habit of such consideration with a scientific attitude of mind. His lengthy quotations of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill indicate that he was not the first person to propose development of a scientific attitude of mind as an educational goal.

In the 1930s, many of the schools that participated in the Eight-Year Study of the Progressive Education Association (Aikin 1942) adopted critical thinking as an educational goal, for whose achievement the study’s Evaluation Staff developed tests (Smith, Tyler, & Evaluation Staff 1942). Glaser (1941) showed experimentally that it was possible to improve the critical thinking of high school students. Bloom’s influential taxonomy of cognitive educational objectives (Bloom et al. 1956) incorporated critical thinking abilities. Ennis (1962) proposed 12 aspects of critical thinking as a basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.

Since 1980, an annual international conference in California on critical thinking and educational reform has attracted tens of thousands of educators from all levels of education and from many parts of the world. Also since 1980, the state university system in California has required all undergraduate students to take a critical thinking course. Since 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking has sponsored sessions in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). In 1987, the APA’s Committee on Pre-College Philosophy commissioned a consensus statement on critical thinking for purposes of educational assessment and instruction (Facione 1990a). Researchers have developed standardized tests of critical thinking abilities and dispositions; for details, see the Supplement on Assessment . Educational jurisdictions around the world now include critical thinking in guidelines for curriculum and assessment.

For details on this history, see the Supplement on History .

2. Examples and Non-Examples

Before considering the definition of critical thinking, it will be helpful to have in mind some examples of critical thinking, as well as some examples of kinds of thinking that would apparently not count as critical thinking.

Dewey (1910: 68–71; 1933: 91–94) takes as paradigms of reflective thinking three class papers of students in which they describe their thinking. The examples range from the everyday to the scientific.

Transit : “The other day, when I was down town on 16th Street, a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12:20. This suggested that I had an engagement at 124th Street, at one o’clock. I reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination by one o’clock.” (Dewey 1910: 68–69; 1933: 91–92)

Ferryboat : “Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river is a long white pole, having a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere on the boat two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.

“I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of the pole, and to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (b) Possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving.

“In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the pilot’s position, it must appear to project far out in front of the boat. Moreover, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly.” (Dewey 1910: 69–70; 1933: 92–93)

Bubbles : “In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat, or by decrease of pressure, or both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside. But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse” (Dewey 1910: 70–71; 1933: 93–94).

Dewey (1910, 1933) sprinkles his book with other examples of critical thinking. We will refer to the following.

Weather : A man on a walk notices that it has suddenly become cool, thinks that it is probably going to rain, looks up and sees a dark cloud obscuring the sun, and quickens his steps (1910: 6–10; 1933: 9–13).

Disorder : A man finds his rooms on his return to them in disorder with his belongings thrown about, thinks at first of burglary as an explanation, then thinks of mischievous children as being an alternative explanation, then looks to see whether valuables are missing, and discovers that they are (1910: 82–83; 1933: 166–168).

Typhoid : A physician diagnosing a patient whose conspicuous symptoms suggest typhoid avoids drawing a conclusion until more data are gathered by questioning the patient and by making tests (1910: 85–86; 1933: 170).

Blur : A moving blur catches our eye in the distance, we ask ourselves whether it is a cloud of whirling dust or a tree moving its branches or a man signaling to us, we think of other traits that should be found on each of those possibilities, and we look and see if those traits are found (1910: 102, 108; 1933: 121, 133).

Suction pump : In thinking about the suction pump, the scientist first notes that it will draw water only to a maximum height of 33 feet at sea level and to a lesser maximum height at higher elevations, selects for attention the differing atmospheric pressure at these elevations, sets up experiments in which the air is removed from a vessel containing water (when suction no longer works) and in which the weight of air at various levels is calculated, compares the results of reasoning about the height to which a given weight of air will allow a suction pump to raise water with the observed maximum height at different elevations, and finally assimilates the suction pump to such apparently different phenomena as the siphon and the rising of a balloon (1910: 150–153; 1933: 195–198).

Diamond : A passenger in a car driving in a diamond lane reserved for vehicles with at least one passenger notices that the diamond marks on the pavement are far apart in some places and close together in others. Why? The driver suggests that the reason may be that the diamond marks are not needed where there is a solid double line separating the diamond lane from the adjoining lane, but are needed when there is a dotted single line permitting crossing into the diamond lane. Further observation confirms that the diamonds are close together when a dotted line separates the diamond lane from its neighbour, but otherwise far apart.

Rash : A woman suddenly develops a very itchy red rash on her throat and upper chest. She recently noticed a mark on the back of her right hand, but was not sure whether the mark was a rash or a scrape. She lies down in bed and thinks about what might be causing the rash and what to do about it. About two weeks before, she began taking blood pressure medication that contained a sulfa drug, and the pharmacist had warned her, in view of a previous allergic reaction to a medication containing a sulfa drug, to be on the alert for an allergic reaction; however, she had been taking the medication for two weeks with no such effect. The day before, she began using a new cream on her neck and upper chest; against the new cream as the cause was mark on the back of her hand, which had not been exposed to the cream. She began taking probiotics about a month before. She also recently started new eye drops, but she supposed that manufacturers of eye drops would be careful not to include allergy-causing components in the medication. The rash might be a heat rash, since she recently was sweating profusely from her upper body. Since she is about to go away on a short vacation, where she would not have access to her usual physician, she decides to keep taking the probiotics and using the new eye drops but to discontinue the blood pressure medication and to switch back to the old cream for her neck and upper chest. She forms a plan to consult her regular physician on her return about the blood pressure medication.

Candidate : Although Dewey included no examples of thinking directed at appraising the arguments of others, such thinking has come to be considered a kind of critical thinking. We find an example of such thinking in the performance task on the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+), which its sponsoring organization describes as

a performance-based assessment that provides a measure of an institution’s contribution to the development of critical-thinking and written communication skills of its students. (Council for Aid to Education 2017)

A sample task posted on its website requires the test-taker to write a report for public distribution evaluating a fictional candidate’s policy proposals and their supporting arguments, using supplied background documents, with a recommendation on whether to endorse the candidate.

Immediate acceptance of an idea that suggests itself as a solution to a problem (e.g., a possible explanation of an event or phenomenon, an action that seems likely to produce a desired result) is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection” (Dewey 1910: 13). On-going suspension of judgment in the light of doubt about a possible solution is not critical thinking (Dewey 1910: 108). Critique driven by a dogmatically held political or religious ideology is not critical thinking; thus Paulo Freire (1968 [1970]) is using the term (e.g., at 1970: 71, 81, 100, 146) in a more politically freighted sense that includes not only reflection but also revolutionary action against oppression. Derivation of a conclusion from given data using an algorithm is not critical thinking.

What is critical thinking? There are many definitions. Ennis (2016) lists 14 philosophically oriented scholarly definitions and three dictionary definitions. Following Rawls (1971), who distinguished his conception of justice from a utilitarian conception but regarded them as rival conceptions of the same concept, Ennis maintains that the 17 definitions are different conceptions of the same concept. Rawls articulated the shared concept of justice as

a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining… the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971: 5)

Bailin et al. (1999b) claim that, if one considers what sorts of thinking an educator would take not to be critical thinking and what sorts to be critical thinking, one can conclude that educators typically understand critical thinking to have at least three features.

• It is done for the purpose of making up one’s mind about what to believe or do.
• The person engaging in the thinking is trying to fulfill standards of adequacy and accuracy appropriate to the thinking.
• The thinking fulfills the relevant standards to some threshold level.

One could sum up the core concept that involves these three features by saying that critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking. This core concept seems to apply to all the examples of critical thinking described in the previous section. As for the non-examples, their exclusion depends on construing careful thinking as excluding jumping immediately to conclusions, suspending judgment no matter how strong the evidence, reasoning from an unquestioned ideological or religious perspective, and routinely using an algorithm to answer a question.

If the core of critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking, conceptions of it can vary according to its presumed scope, its presumed goal, one’s criteria and threshold for being careful, and the thinking component on which one focuses. As to its scope, some conceptions (e.g., Dewey 1910, 1933) restrict it to constructive thinking on the basis of one’s own observations and experiments, others (e.g., Ennis 1962; Fisher & Scriven 1997; Johnson 1992) to appraisal of the products of such thinking. Ennis (1991) and Bailin et al. (1999b) take it to cover both construction and appraisal. As to its goal, some conceptions restrict it to forming a judgment (Dewey 1910, 1933; Lipman 1987; Facione 1990a). Others allow for actions as well as beliefs as the end point of a process of critical thinking (Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b). As to the criteria and threshold for being careful, definitions vary in the term used to indicate that critical thinking satisfies certain norms: “intellectually disciplined” (Scriven & Paul 1987), “reasonable” (Ennis 1991), “skillful” (Lipman 1987), “skilled” (Fisher & Scriven 1997), “careful” (Bailin & Battersby 2009). Some definitions specify these norms, referring variously to “consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1910, 1933); “the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning” (Glaser 1941); “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication” (Scriven & Paul 1987); the requirement that “it is sensitive to context, relies on criteria, and is self-correcting” (Lipman 1987); “evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” (Facione 1990a); and “plus-minus considerations of the product in terms of appropriate standards (or criteria)” (Johnson 1992). Stanovich and Stanovich (2010) propose to ground the concept of critical thinking in the concept of rationality, which they understand as combining epistemic rationality (fitting one’s beliefs to the world) and instrumental rationality (optimizing goal fulfillment); a critical thinker, in their view, is someone with “a propensity to override suboptimal responses from the autonomous mind” (2010: 227). These variant specifications of norms for critical thinking are not necessarily incompatible with one another, and in any case presuppose the core notion of thinking carefully. As to the thinking component singled out, some definitions focus on suspension of judgment during the thinking (Dewey 1910; McPeck 1981), others on inquiry while judgment is suspended (Bailin & Battersby 2009, 2021), others on the resulting judgment (Facione 1990a), and still others on responsiveness to reasons (Siegel 1988). Kuhn (2019) takes critical thinking to be more a dialogic practice of advancing and responding to arguments than an individual ability.

In educational contexts, a definition of critical thinking is a “programmatic definition” (Scheffler 1960: 19). It expresses a practical program for achieving an educational goal. For this purpose, a one-sentence formulaic definition is much less useful than articulation of a critical thinking process, with criteria and standards for the kinds of thinking that the process may involve. The real educational goal is recognition, adoption and implementation by students of those criteria and standards. That adoption and implementation in turn consists in acquiring the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker.

Conceptions of critical thinking generally do not include moral integrity as part of the concept. Dewey, for example, took critical thinking to be the ultimate intellectual goal of education, but distinguished it from the development of social cooperation among school children, which he took to be the central moral goal. Ennis (1996, 2011) added to his previous list of critical thinking dispositions a group of dispositions to care about the dignity and worth of every person, which he described as a “correlative” (1996) disposition without which critical thinking would be less valuable and perhaps harmful. An educational program that aimed at developing critical thinking but not the correlative disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person, he asserted, “would be deficient and perhaps dangerous” (Ennis 1996: 172).

Dewey thought that education for reflective thinking would be of value to both the individual and society; recognition in educational practice of the kinship to the scientific attitude of children’s native curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry “would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste” (Dewey 1910: iii). Schools participating in the Eight-Year Study took development of the habit of reflective thinking and skill in solving problems as a means to leading young people to understand, appreciate and live the democratic way of life characteristic of the United States (Aikin 1942: 17–18, 81). Harvey Siegel (1988: 55–61) has offered four considerations in support of adopting critical thinking as an educational ideal. (1) Respect for persons requires that schools and teachers honour students’ demands for reasons and explanations, deal with students honestly, and recognize the need to confront students’ independent judgment; these requirements concern the manner in which teachers treat students. (2) Education has the task of preparing children to be successful adults, a task that requires development of their self-sufficiency. (3) Education should initiate children into the rational traditions in such fields as history, science and mathematics. (4) Education should prepare children to become democratic citizens, which requires reasoned procedures and critical talents and attitudes. To supplement these considerations, Siegel (1988: 62–90) responds to two objections: the ideology objection that adoption of any educational ideal requires a prior ideological commitment and the indoctrination objection that cultivation of critical thinking cannot escape being a form of indoctrination.

Despite the diversity of our 11 examples, one can recognize a common pattern. Dewey analyzed it as consisting of five phases:

• suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution;
• an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
• the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material;
• the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense on which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and
• testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey 1933: 106–107; italics in original)

The process of reflective thinking consisting of these phases would be preceded by a perplexed, troubled or confused situation and followed by a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (Dewey 1933: 106). The term ‘phases’ replaced the term ‘steps’ (Dewey 1910: 72), thus removing the earlier suggestion of an invariant sequence. Variants of the above analysis appeared in (Dewey 1916: 177) and (Dewey 1938: 101–119).

The variant formulations indicate the difficulty of giving a single logical analysis of such a varied process. The process of critical thinking may have a spiral pattern, with the problem being redefined in the light of obstacles to solving it as originally formulated. For example, the person in Transit might have concluded that getting to the appointment at the scheduled time was impossible and have reformulated the problem as that of rescheduling the appointment for a mutually convenient time. Further, defining a problem does not always follow after or lead immediately to an idea of a suggested solution. Nor should it do so, as Dewey himself recognized in describing the physician in Typhoid as avoiding any strong preference for this or that conclusion before getting further information (Dewey 1910: 85; 1933: 170). People with a hypothesis in mind, even one to which they have a very weak commitment, have a so-called “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998): they are likely to pay attention to evidence that confirms the hypothesis and to ignore evidence that counts against it or for some competing hypothesis. Detectives, intelligence agencies, and investigators of airplane accidents are well advised to gather relevant evidence systematically and to postpone even tentative adoption of an explanatory hypothesis until the collected evidence rules out with the appropriate degree of certainty all but one explanation. Dewey’s analysis of the critical thinking process can be faulted as well for requiring acceptance or rejection of a possible solution to a defined problem, with no allowance for deciding in the light of the available evidence to suspend judgment. Further, given the great variety of kinds of problems for which reflection is appropriate, there is likely to be variation in its component events. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the critical thinking process is as a checklist whose component events can occur in a variety of orders, selectively, and more than once. These component events might include (1) noticing a difficulty, (2) defining the problem, (3) dividing the problem into manageable sub-problems, (4) formulating a variety of possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (5) determining what evidence is relevant to deciding among possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (6) devising a plan of systematic observation or experiment that will uncover the relevant evidence, (7) carrying out the plan of systematic observation or experimentation, (8) noting the results of the systematic observation or experiment, (9) gathering relevant testimony and information from others, (10) judging the credibility of testimony and information gathered from others, (11) drawing conclusions from gathered evidence and accepted testimony, and (12) accepting a solution that the evidence adequately supports (cf. Hitchcock 2017: 485).

Checklist conceptions of the process of critical thinking are open to the objection that they are too mechanical and procedural to fit the multi-dimensional and emotionally charged issues for which critical thinking is urgently needed (Paul 1984). For such issues, a more dialectical process is advocated, in which competing relevant world views are identified, their implications explored, and some sort of creative synthesis attempted.

If one considers the critical thinking process illustrated by the 11 examples, one can identify distinct kinds of mental acts and mental states that form part of it. To distinguish, label and briefly characterize these components is a useful preliminary to identifying abilities, skills, dispositions, attitudes, habits and the like that contribute causally to thinking critically. Identifying such abilities and habits is in turn a useful preliminary to setting educational goals. Setting the goals is in its turn a useful preliminary to designing strategies for helping learners to achieve the goals and to designing ways of measuring the extent to which learners have done so. Such measures provide both feedback to learners on their achievement and a basis for experimental research on the effectiveness of various strategies for educating people to think critically. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing the kinds of mental acts and mental events that can occur in a critical thinking process.

• Observing : One notices something in one’s immediate environment (sudden cooling of temperature in Weather , bubbles forming outside a glass and then going inside in Bubbles , a moving blur in the distance in Blur , a rash in Rash ). Or one notes the results of an experiment or systematic observation (valuables missing in Disorder , no suction without air pressure in Suction pump )
• Feeling : One feels puzzled or uncertain about something (how to get to an appointment on time in Transit , why the diamonds vary in spacing in Diamond ). One wants to resolve this perplexity. One feels satisfaction once one has worked out an answer (to take the subway express in Transit , diamonds closer when needed as a warning in Diamond ).
• Wondering : One formulates a question to be addressed (why bubbles form outside a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , how suction pumps work in Suction pump , what caused the rash in Rash ).
• Imagining : One thinks of possible answers (bus or subway or elevated in Transit , flagpole or ornament or wireless communication aid or direction indicator in Ferryboat , allergic reaction or heat rash in Rash ).
• Inferring : One works out what would be the case if a possible answer were assumed (valuables missing if there has been a burglary in Disorder , earlier start to the rash if it is an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug in Rash ). Or one draws a conclusion once sufficient relevant evidence is gathered (take the subway in Transit , burglary in Disorder , discontinue blood pressure medication and new cream in Rash ).
• Knowledge : One uses stored knowledge of the subject-matter to generate possible answers or to infer what would be expected on the assumption of a particular answer (knowledge of a city’s public transit system in Transit , of the requirements for a flagpole in Ferryboat , of Boyle’s law in Bubbles , of allergic reactions in Rash ).
• Experimenting : One designs and carries out an experiment or a systematic observation to find out whether the results deduced from a possible answer will occur (looking at the location of the flagpole in relation to the pilot’s position in Ferryboat , putting an ice cube on top of a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , measuring the height to which a suction pump will draw water at different elevations in Suction pump , noticing the spacing of diamonds when movement to or from a diamond lane is allowed in Diamond ).
• Consulting : One finds a source of information, gets the information from the source, and makes a judgment on whether to accept it. None of our 11 examples include searching for sources of information. In this respect they are unrepresentative, since most people nowadays have almost instant access to information relevant to answering any question, including many of those illustrated by the examples. However, Candidate includes the activities of extracting information from sources and evaluating its credibility.
• Identifying and analyzing arguments : One notices an argument and works out its structure and content as a preliminary to evaluating its strength. This activity is central to Candidate . It is an important part of a critical thinking process in which one surveys arguments for various positions on an issue.
• Judging : One makes a judgment on the basis of accumulated evidence and reasoning, such as the judgment in Ferryboat that the purpose of the pole is to provide direction to the pilot.
• Deciding : One makes a decision on what to do or on what policy to adopt, as in the decision in Transit to take the subway.

By definition, a person who does something voluntarily is both willing and able to do that thing at that time. Both the willingness and the ability contribute causally to the person’s action, in the sense that the voluntary action would not occur if either (or both) of these were lacking. For example, suppose that one is standing with one’s arms at one’s sides and one voluntarily lifts one’s right arm to an extended horizontal position. One would not do so if one were unable to lift one’s arm, if for example one’s right side was paralyzed as the result of a stroke. Nor would one do so if one were unwilling to lift one’s arm, if for example one were participating in a street demonstration at which a white supremacist was urging the crowd to lift their right arm in a Nazi salute and one were unwilling to express support in this way for the racist Nazi ideology. The same analysis applies to a voluntary mental process of thinking critically. It requires both willingness and ability to think critically, including willingness and ability to perform each of the mental acts that compose the process and to coordinate those acts in a sequence that is directed at resolving the initiating perplexity.

Consider willingness first. We can identify causal contributors to willingness to think critically by considering factors that would cause a person who was able to think critically about an issue nevertheless not to do so (Hamby 2014). For each factor, the opposite condition thus contributes causally to willingness to think critically on a particular occasion. For example, people who habitually jump to conclusions without considering alternatives will not think critically about issues that arise, even if they have the required abilities. The contrary condition of willingness to suspend judgment is thus a causal contributor to thinking critically.

Now consider ability. In contrast to the ability to move one’s arm, which can be completely absent because a stroke has left the arm paralyzed, the ability to think critically is a developed ability, whose absence is not a complete absence of ability to think but absence of ability to think well. We can identify the ability to think well directly, in terms of the norms and standards for good thinking. In general, to be able do well the thinking activities that can be components of a critical thinking process, one needs to know the concepts and principles that characterize their good performance, to recognize in particular cases that the concepts and principles apply, and to apply them. The knowledge, recognition and application may be procedural rather than declarative. It may be domain-specific rather than widely applicable, and in either case may need subject-matter knowledge, sometimes of a deep kind.

Reflections of the sort illustrated by the previous two paragraphs have led scholars to identify the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a “critical thinker”, i.e., someone who thinks critically whenever it is appropriate to do so. We turn now to these three types of causal contributors to thinking critically. We start with dispositions, since arguably these are the most powerful contributors to being a critical thinker, can be fostered at an early stage of a child’s development, and are susceptible to general improvement (Glaser 1941: 175)

8. Critical Thinking Dispositions

Educational researchers use the term ‘dispositions’ broadly for the habits of mind and attitudes that contribute causally to being a critical thinker. Some writers (e.g., Paul & Elder 2006; Hamby 2014; Bailin & Battersby 2016a) propose to use the term ‘virtues’ for this dimension of a critical thinker. The virtues in question, although they are virtues of character, concern the person’s ways of thinking rather than the person’s ways of behaving towards others. They are not moral virtues but intellectual virtues, of the sort articulated by Zagzebski (1996) and discussed by Turri, Alfano, and Greco (2017).

On a realistic conception, thinking dispositions or intellectual virtues are real properties of thinkers. They are general tendencies, propensities, or inclinations to think in particular ways in particular circumstances, and can be genuinely explanatory (Siegel 1999). Sceptics argue that there is no evidence for a specific mental basis for the habits of mind that contribute to thinking critically, and that it is pedagogically misleading to posit such a basis (Bailin et al. 1999a). Whatever their status, critical thinking dispositions need motivation for their initial formation in a child—motivation that may be external or internal. As children develop, the force of habit will gradually become important in sustaining the disposition (Nieto & Valenzuela 2012). Mere force of habit, however, is unlikely to sustain critical thinking dispositions. Critical thinkers must value and enjoy using their knowledge and abilities to think things through for themselves. They must be committed to, and lovers of, inquiry.

A person may have a critical thinking disposition with respect to only some kinds of issues. For example, one could be open-minded about scientific issues but not about religious issues. Similarly, one could be confident in one’s ability to reason about the theological implications of the existence of evil in the world but not in one’s ability to reason about the best design for a guided ballistic missile.

Facione (1990a: 25) divides “affective dispositions” of critical thinking into approaches to life and living in general and approaches to specific issues, questions or problems. Adapting this distinction, one can usefully divide critical thinking dispositions into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started). The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, open-mindedness, in the sense of willingness to consider alternative points of view to one’s own, is both an initiating and an internal disposition.

Using the strategy of considering factors that would block people with the ability to think critically from doing so, we can identify as initiating dispositions for thinking critically attentiveness, a habit of inquiry, self-confidence, courage, open-mindedness, willingness to suspend judgment, trust in reason, wanting evidence for one’s beliefs, and seeking the truth. We consider briefly what each of these dispositions amounts to, in each case citing sources that acknowledge them.

• Attentiveness : One will not think critically if one fails to recognize an issue that needs to be thought through. For example, the pedestrian in Weather would not have looked up if he had not noticed that the air was suddenly cooler. To be a critical thinker, then, one needs to be habitually attentive to one’s surroundings, noticing not only what one senses but also sources of perplexity in messages received and in one’s own beliefs and attitudes (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Habit of inquiry : Inquiry is effortful, and one needs an internal push to engage in it. For example, the student in Bubbles could easily have stopped at idle wondering about the cause of the bubbles rather than reasoning to a hypothesis, then designing and executing an experiment to test it. Thus willingness to think critically needs mental energy and initiative. What can supply that energy? Love of inquiry, or perhaps just a habit of inquiry. Hamby (2015) has argued that willingness to inquire is the central critical thinking virtue, one that encompasses all the others. It is recognized as a critical thinking disposition by Dewey (1910: 29; 1933: 35), Glaser (1941: 5), Ennis (1987: 12; 1991: 8), Facione (1990a: 25), Bailin et al. (1999b: 294), Halpern (1998: 452), and Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo (2001).
• Self-confidence : Lack of confidence in one’s abilities can block critical thinking. For example, if the woman in Rash lacked confidence in her ability to figure things out for herself, she might just have assumed that the rash on her chest was the allergic reaction to her medication against which the pharmacist had warned her. Thus willingness to think critically requires confidence in one’s ability to inquire (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Courage : Fear of thinking for oneself can stop one from doing it. Thus willingness to think critically requires intellectual courage (Paul & Elder 2006: 16).
• Open-mindedness : A dogmatic attitude will impede thinking critically. For example, a person who adheres rigidly to a “pro-choice” position on the issue of the legal status of induced abortion is likely to be unwilling to consider seriously the issue of when in its development an unborn child acquires a moral right to life. Thus willingness to think critically requires open-mindedness, in the sense of a willingness to examine questions to which one already accepts an answer but which further evidence or reasoning might cause one to answer differently (Dewey 1933; Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b; Halpern 1998, Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). Paul (1981) emphasizes open-mindedness about alternative world-views, and recommends a dialectical approach to integrating such views as central to what he calls “strong sense” critical thinking. In three studies, Haran, Ritov, & Mellers (2013) found that actively open-minded thinking, including “the tendency to weigh new evidence against a favored belief, to spend sufficient time on a problem before giving up, and to consider carefully the opinions of others in forming one’s own”, led study participants to acquire information and thus to make accurate estimations.
• Willingness to suspend judgment : Premature closure on an initial solution will block critical thinking. Thus willingness to think critically requires a willingness to suspend judgment while alternatives are explored (Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Halpern 1998).
• Trust in reason : Since distrust in the processes of reasoned inquiry will dissuade one from engaging in it, trust in them is an initiating critical thinking disposition (Facione 1990a, 25; Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001; Paul & Elder 2006). In reaction to an allegedly exclusive emphasis on reason in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, Thayer-Bacon (2000) argues that intuition, imagination, and emotion have important roles to play in an adequate conception of critical thinking that she calls “constructive thinking”. From her point of view, critical thinking requires trust not only in reason but also in intuition, imagination, and emotion.
• Seeking the truth : If one does not care about the truth but is content to stick with one’s initial bias on an issue, then one will not think critically about it. Seeking the truth is thus an initiating critical thinking disposition (Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). A disposition to seek the truth is implicit in more specific critical thinking dispositions, such as trying to be well-informed, considering seriously points of view other than one’s own, looking for alternatives, suspending judgment when the evidence is insufficient, and adopting a position when the evidence supporting it is sufficient.

Some of the initiating dispositions, such as open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment, are also internal critical thinking dispositions, in the sense of mental habits or attitudes that contribute causally to doing a good job of critical thinking once one starts the process. But there are many other internal critical thinking dispositions. Some of them are parasitic on one’s conception of good thinking. For example, it is constitutive of good thinking about an issue to formulate the issue clearly and to maintain focus on it. For this purpose, one needs not only the corresponding ability but also the corresponding disposition. Ennis (1991: 8) describes it as the disposition “to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question”, Facione (1990a: 25) as “clarity in stating the question or concern”. Other internal dispositions are motivators to continue or adjust the critical thinking process, such as willingness to persist in a complex task and willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct (Halpern 1998: 452). For a list of identified internal critical thinking dispositions, see the Supplement on Internal Critical Thinking Dispositions .

Some theorists postulate skills, i.e., acquired abilities, as operative in critical thinking. It is not obvious, however, that a good mental act is the exercise of a generic acquired skill. Inferring an expected time of arrival, as in Transit , has some generic components but also uses non-generic subject-matter knowledge. Bailin et al. (1999a) argue against viewing critical thinking skills as generic and discrete, on the ground that skilled performance at a critical thinking task cannot be separated from knowledge of concepts and from domain-specific principles of good thinking. Talk of skills, they concede, is unproblematic if it means merely that a person with critical thinking skills is capable of intelligent performance.

Despite such scepticism, theorists of critical thinking have listed as general contributors to critical thinking what they variously call abilities (Glaser 1941; Ennis 1962, 1991), skills (Facione 1990a; Halpern 1998) or competencies (Fisher & Scriven 1997). Amalgamating these lists would produce a confusing and chaotic cornucopia of more than 50 possible educational objectives, with only partial overlap among them. It makes sense instead to try to understand the reasons for the multiplicity and diversity, and to make a selection according to one’s own reasons for singling out abilities to be developed in a critical thinking curriculum. Two reasons for diversity among lists of critical thinking abilities are the underlying conception of critical thinking and the envisaged educational level. Appraisal-only conceptions, for example, involve a different suite of abilities than constructive-only conceptions. Some lists, such as those in (Glaser 1941), are put forward as educational objectives for secondary school students, whereas others are proposed as objectives for college students (e.g., Facione 1990a).

The abilities described in the remaining paragraphs of this section emerge from reflection on the general abilities needed to do well the thinking activities identified in section 6 as components of the critical thinking process described in section 5 . The derivation of each collection of abilities is accompanied by citation of sources that list such abilities and of standardized tests that claim to test them.

Observational abilities : Careful and accurate observation sometimes requires specialist expertise and practice, as in the case of observing birds and observing accident scenes. However, there are general abilities of noticing what one’s senses are picking up from one’s environment and of being able to articulate clearly and accurately to oneself and others what one has observed. It helps in exercising them to be able to recognize and take into account factors that make one’s observation less trustworthy, such as prior framing of the situation, inadequate time, deficient senses, poor observation conditions, and the like. It helps as well to be skilled at taking steps to make one’s observation more trustworthy, such as moving closer to get a better look, measuring something three times and taking the average, and checking what one thinks one is observing with someone else who is in a good position to observe it. It also helps to be skilled at recognizing respects in which one’s report of one’s observation involves inference rather than direct observation, so that one can then consider whether the inference is justified. These abilities come into play as well when one thinks about whether and with what degree of confidence to accept an observation report, for example in the study of history or in a criminal investigation or in assessing news reports. Observational abilities show up in some lists of critical thinking abilities (Ennis 1962: 90; Facione 1990a: 16; Ennis 1991: 9). There are items testing a person’s ability to judge the credibility of observation reports in the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests, Levels X and Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). Norris and King (1983, 1985, 1990a, 1990b) is a test of ability to appraise observation reports.

Emotional abilities : The emotions that drive a critical thinking process are perplexity or puzzlement, a wish to resolve it, and satisfaction at achieving the desired resolution. Children experience these emotions at an early age, without being trained to do so. Education that takes critical thinking as a goal needs only to channel these emotions and to make sure not to stifle them. Collaborative critical thinking benefits from ability to recognize one’s own and others’ emotional commitments and reactions.

Questioning abilities : A critical thinking process needs transformation of an inchoate sense of perplexity into a clear question. Formulating a question well requires not building in questionable assumptions, not prejudging the issue, and using language that in context is unambiguous and precise enough (Ennis 1962: 97; 1991: 9).

Imaginative abilities : Thinking directed at finding the correct causal explanation of a general phenomenon or particular event requires an ability to imagine possible explanations. Thinking about what policy or plan of action to adopt requires generation of options and consideration of possible consequences of each option. Domain knowledge is required for such creative activity, but a general ability to imagine alternatives is helpful and can be nurtured so as to become easier, quicker, more extensive, and deeper (Dewey 1910: 34–39; 1933: 40–47). Facione (1990a) and Halpern (1998) include the ability to imagine alternatives as a critical thinking ability.

Inferential abilities : The ability to draw conclusions from given information, and to recognize with what degree of certainty one’s own or others’ conclusions follow, is universally recognized as a general critical thinking ability. All 11 examples in section 2 of this article include inferences, some from hypotheses or options (as in Transit , Ferryboat and Disorder ), others from something observed (as in Weather and Rash ). None of these inferences is formally valid. Rather, they are licensed by general, sometimes qualified substantive rules of inference (Toulmin 1958) that rest on domain knowledge—that a bus trip takes about the same time in each direction, that the terminal of a wireless telegraph would be located on the highest possible place, that sudden cooling is often followed by rain, that an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug generally shows up soon after one starts taking it. It is a matter of controversy to what extent the specialized ability to deduce conclusions from premisses using formal rules of inference is needed for critical thinking. Dewey (1933) locates logical forms in setting out the products of reflection rather than in the process of reflection. Ennis (1981a), on the other hand, maintains that a liberally-educated person should have the following abilities: to translate natural-language statements into statements using the standard logical operators, to use appropriately the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, to deal with argument forms and arguments containing symbols, to determine whether in virtue of an argument’s form its conclusion follows necessarily from its premisses, to reason with logically complex propositions, and to apply the rules and procedures of deductive logic. Inferential abilities are recognized as critical thinking abilities by Glaser (1941: 6), Facione (1990a: 9), Ennis (1991: 9), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 99, 111), and Halpern (1998: 452). Items testing inferential abilities constitute two of the five subtests of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser 1980a, 1980b, 1994), two of the four sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), three of the seven sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), 11 of the 34 items on Forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992), and a high but variable proportion of the 25 selected-response questions in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Experimenting abilities : Knowing how to design and execute an experiment is important not just in scientific research but also in everyday life, as in Rash . Dewey devoted a whole chapter of his How We Think (1910: 145–156; 1933: 190–202) to the superiority of experimentation over observation in advancing knowledge. Experimenting abilities come into play at one remove in appraising reports of scientific studies. Skill in designing and executing experiments includes the acknowledged abilities to appraise evidence (Glaser 1941: 6), to carry out experiments and to apply appropriate statistical inference techniques (Facione 1990a: 9), to judge inductions to an explanatory hypothesis (Ennis 1991: 9), and to recognize the need for an adequately large sample size (Halpern 1998). The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) includes four items (out of 52) on experimental design. The Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) makes room for appraisal of study design in both its performance task and its selected-response questions.

Consulting abilities : Skill at consulting sources of information comes into play when one seeks information to help resolve a problem, as in Candidate . Ability to find and appraise information includes ability to gather and marshal pertinent information (Glaser 1941: 6), to judge whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable (Ennis 1962: 84), to plan a search for desired information (Facione 1990a: 9), and to judge the credibility of a source (Ennis 1991: 9). Ability to judge the credibility of statements is tested by 24 items (out of 76) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) and by four items (out of 52) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). The College Learning Assessment’s performance task requires evaluation of whether information in documents is credible or unreliable (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Argument analysis abilities : The ability to identify and analyze arguments contributes to the process of surveying arguments on an issue in order to form one’s own reasoned judgment, as in Candidate . The ability to detect and analyze arguments is recognized as a critical thinking skill by Facione (1990a: 7–8), Ennis (1991: 9) and Halpern (1998). Five items (out of 34) on the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992) test skill at argument analysis. The College Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) incorporates argument analysis in its selected-response tests of critical reading and evaluation and of critiquing an argument.

Judging skills and deciding skills : Skill at judging and deciding is skill at recognizing what judgment or decision the available evidence and argument supports, and with what degree of confidence. It is thus a component of the inferential skills already discussed.

Lists and tests of critical thinking abilities often include two more abilities: identifying assumptions and constructing and evaluating definitions.

In addition to dispositions and abilities, critical thinking needs knowledge: of critical thinking concepts, of critical thinking principles, and of the subject-matter of the thinking.

We can derive a short list of concepts whose understanding contributes to critical thinking from the critical thinking abilities described in the preceding section. Observational abilities require an understanding of the difference between observation and inference. Questioning abilities require an understanding of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness. Inferential abilities require an understanding of the difference between conclusive and defeasible inference (traditionally, between deduction and induction), as well as of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions. Experimenting abilities require an understanding of the concepts of hypothesis, null hypothesis, assumption and prediction, as well as of the concept of statistical significance and of its difference from importance. They also require an understanding of the difference between an experiment and an observational study, and in particular of the difference between a randomized controlled trial, a prospective correlational study and a retrospective (case-control) study. Argument analysis abilities require an understanding of the concepts of argument, premiss, assumption, conclusion and counter-consideration. Additional critical thinking concepts are proposed by Bailin et al. (1999b: 293), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 105–106), Black (2012), and Blair (2021).

According to Glaser (1941: 25), ability to think critically requires knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning. If we review the list of abilities in the preceding section, however, we can see that some of them can be acquired and exercised merely through practice, possibly guided in an educational setting, followed by feedback. Searching intelligently for a causal explanation of some phenomenon or event requires that one consider a full range of possible causal contributors, but it seems more important that one implements this principle in one’s practice than that one is able to articulate it. What is important is “operational knowledge” of the standards and principles of good thinking (Bailin et al. 1999b: 291–293). But the development of such critical thinking abilities as designing an experiment or constructing an operational definition can benefit from learning their underlying theory. Further, explicit knowledge of quirks of human thinking seems useful as a cautionary guide. Human memory is not just fallible about details, as people learn from their own experiences of misremembering, but is so malleable that a detailed, clear and vivid recollection of an event can be a total fabrication (Loftus 2017). People seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs and expectations, often unconscious of their “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Not only are people subject to this and other cognitive biases (Kahneman 2011), of which they are typically unaware, but it may be counter-productive for one to make oneself aware of them and try consciously to counteract them or to counteract social biases such as racial or sexual stereotypes (Kenyon & Beaulac 2014). It is helpful to be aware of these facts and of the superior effectiveness of blocking the operation of biases—for example, by making an immediate record of one’s observations, refraining from forming a preliminary explanatory hypothesis, blind refereeing, double-blind randomized trials, and blind grading of students’ work. It is also helpful to be aware of the prevalence of “noise” (unwanted unsystematic variability of judgments), of how to detect noise (through a noise audit), and of how to reduce noise: make accuracy the goal, think statistically, break a process of arriving at a judgment into independent tasks, resist premature intuitions, in a group get independent judgments first, favour comparative judgments and scales (Kahneman, Sibony, & Sunstein 2021). It is helpful as well to be aware of the concept of “bounded rationality” in decision-making and of the related distinction between “satisficing” and optimizing (Simon 1956; Gigerenzer 2001).

Critical thinking about an issue requires substantive knowledge of the domain to which the issue belongs. Critical thinking abilities are not a magic elixir that can be applied to any issue whatever by somebody who has no knowledge of the facts relevant to exploring that issue. For example, the student in Bubbles needed to know that gases do not penetrate solid objects like a glass, that air expands when heated, that the volume of an enclosed gas varies directly with its temperature and inversely with its pressure, and that hot objects will spontaneously cool down to the ambient temperature of their surroundings unless kept hot by insulation or a source of heat. Critical thinkers thus need a rich fund of subject-matter knowledge relevant to the variety of situations they encounter. This fact is recognized in the inclusion among critical thinking dispositions of a concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Experimental educational interventions, with control groups, have shown that education can improve critical thinking skills and dispositions, as measured by standardized tests. For information about these tests, see the Supplement on Assessment .

What educational methods are most effective at developing the dispositions, abilities and knowledge of a critical thinker? In a comprehensive meta-analysis of experimental and quasi-experimental studies of strategies for teaching students to think critically, Abrami et al. (2015) found that dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring each increased the effectiveness of the educational intervention, and that they were most effective when combined. They also found that in these studies a combination of separate instruction in critical thinking with subject-matter instruction in which students are encouraged to think critically was more effective than either by itself. However, the difference was not statistically significant; that is, it might have arisen by chance.

Most of these studies lack the longitudinal follow-up required to determine whether the observed differential improvements in critical thinking abilities or dispositions continue over time, for example until high school or college graduation. For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods .

12. Controversies

Scholars have denied the generalizability of critical thinking abilities across subject domains, have alleged bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, and have investigated the relationship of critical thinking to other kinds of thinking.

McPeck (1981) attacked the thinking skills movement of the 1970s, including the critical thinking movement. He argued that there are no general thinking skills, since thinking is always thinking about some subject-matter. It is futile, he claimed, for schools and colleges to teach thinking as if it were a separate subject. Rather, teachers should lead their pupils to become autonomous thinkers by teaching school subjects in a way that brings out their cognitive structure and that encourages and rewards discussion and argument. As some of his critics (e.g., Paul 1985; Siegel 1985) pointed out, McPeck’s central argument needs elaboration, since it has obvious counter-examples in writing and speaking, for which (up to a certain level of complexity) there are teachable general abilities even though they are always about some subject-matter. To make his argument convincing, McPeck needs to explain how thinking differs from writing and speaking in a way that does not permit useful abstraction of its components from the subject-matters with which it deals. He has not done so. Nevertheless, his position that the dispositions and abilities of a critical thinker are best developed in the context of subject-matter instruction is shared by many theorists of critical thinking, including Dewey (1910, 1933), Glaser (1941), Passmore (1980), Weinstein (1990), Bailin et al. (1999b), and Willingham (2019).

McPeck’s challenge prompted reflection on the extent to which critical thinking is subject-specific. McPeck argued for a strong subject-specificity thesis, according to which it is a conceptual truth that all critical thinking abilities are specific to a subject. (He did not however extend his subject-specificity thesis to critical thinking dispositions. In particular, he took the disposition to suspend judgment in situations of cognitive dissonance to be a general disposition.) Conceptual subject-specificity is subject to obvious counter-examples, such as the general ability to recognize confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. A more modest thesis, also endorsed by McPeck, is epistemological subject-specificity, according to which the norms of good thinking vary from one field to another. Epistemological subject-specificity clearly holds to a certain extent; for example, the principles in accordance with which one solves a differential equation are quite different from the principles in accordance with which one determines whether a painting is a genuine Picasso. But the thesis suffers, as Ennis (1989) points out, from vagueness of the concept of a field or subject and from the obvious existence of inter-field principles, however broadly the concept of a field is construed. For example, the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning hold for all the varied fields in which such reasoning occurs. A third kind of subject-specificity is empirical subject-specificity, according to which as a matter of empirically observable fact a person with the abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker in one area of investigation will not necessarily have them in another area of investigation.

The thesis of empirical subject-specificity raises the general problem of transfer. If critical thinking abilities and dispositions have to be developed independently in each school subject, how are they of any use in dealing with the problems of everyday life and the political and social issues of contemporary society, most of which do not fit into the framework of a traditional school subject? Proponents of empirical subject-specificity tend to argue that transfer is more likely to occur if there is critical thinking instruction in a variety of domains, with explicit attention to dispositions and abilities that cut across domains. But evidence for this claim is scanty. There is a need for well-designed empirical studies that investigate the conditions that make transfer more likely.

It is common ground in debates about the generality or subject-specificity of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that critical thinking about any topic requires background knowledge about the topic. For example, the most sophisticated understanding of the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning is of no help unless accompanied by some knowledge of what might be plausible explanations of some phenomenon under investigation.

Critics have objected to bias in the theory, pedagogy and practice of critical thinking. Commentators (e.g., Alston 1995; Ennis 1998) have noted that anyone who takes a position has a bias in the neutral sense of being inclined in one direction rather than others. The critics, however, are objecting to bias in the pejorative sense of an unjustified favoring of certain ways of knowing over others, frequently alleging that the unjustly favoured ways are those of a dominant sex or culture (Bailin 1995). These ways favour:

• reinforcement of egocentric and sociocentric biases over dialectical engagement with opposing world-views (Paul 1981, 1984; Warren 1998)
• distancing from the object of inquiry over closeness to it (Martin 1992; Thayer-Bacon 1992)
• indifference to the situation of others over care for them (Martin 1992)
• orientation to thought over orientation to action (Martin 1992)
• being reasonable over caring to understand people’s ideas (Thayer-Bacon 1993)
• being neutral and objective over being embodied and situated (Thayer-Bacon 1995a)
• doubting over believing (Thayer-Bacon 1995b)
• reason over emotion, imagination and intuition (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• solitary thinking over collaborative thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• written and spoken assignments over other forms of expression (Alston 2001)
• attention to written and spoken communications over attention to human problems (Alston 2001)
• winning debates in the public sphere over making and understanding meaning (Alston 2001)

A common thread in this smorgasbord of accusations is dissatisfaction with focusing on the logical analysis and evaluation of reasoning and arguments. While these authors acknowledge that such analysis and evaluation is part of critical thinking and should be part of its conceptualization and pedagogy, they insist that it is only a part. Paul (1981), for example, bemoans the tendency of atomistic teaching of methods of analyzing and evaluating arguments to turn students into more able sophists, adept at finding fault with positions and arguments with which they disagree but even more entrenched in the egocentric and sociocentric biases with which they began. Martin (1992) and Thayer-Bacon (1992) cite with approval the self-reported intimacy with their subject-matter of leading researchers in biology and medicine, an intimacy that conflicts with the distancing allegedly recommended in standard conceptions and pedagogy of critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (2000) contrasts the embodied and socially embedded learning of her elementary school students in a Montessori school, who used their imagination, intuition and emotions as well as their reason, with conceptions of critical thinking as

thinking that is used to critique arguments, offer justifications, and make judgments about what are the good reasons, or the right answers. (Thayer-Bacon 2000: 127–128)

Alston (2001) reports that her students in a women’s studies class were able to see the flaws in the Cinderella myth that pervades much romantic fiction but in their own romantic relationships still acted as if all failures were the woman’s fault and still accepted the notions of love at first sight and living happily ever after. Students, she writes, should

be able to connect their intellectual critique to a more affective, somatic, and ethical account of making risky choices that have sexist, racist, classist, familial, sexual, or other consequences for themselves and those both near and far… critical thinking that reads arguments, texts, or practices merely on the surface without connections to feeling/desiring/doing or action lacks an ethical depth that should infuse the difference between mere cognitive activity and something we want to call critical thinking. (Alston 2001: 34)

Some critics portray such biases as unfair to women. Thayer-Bacon (1992), for example, has charged modern critical thinking theory with being sexist, on the ground that it separates the self from the object and causes one to lose touch with one’s inner voice, and thus stigmatizes women, who (she asserts) link self to object and listen to their inner voice. Her charge does not imply that women as a group are on average less able than men to analyze and evaluate arguments. Facione (1990c) found no difference by sex in performance on his California Critical Thinking Skills Test. Kuhn (1991: 280–281) found no difference by sex in either the disposition or the competence to engage in argumentative thinking.

The critics propose a variety of remedies for the biases that they allege. In general, they do not propose to eliminate or downplay critical thinking as an educational goal. Rather, they propose to conceptualize critical thinking differently and to change its pedagogy accordingly. Their pedagogical proposals arise logically from their objections. They can be summarized as follows:

• Focus on argument networks with dialectical exchanges reflecting contesting points of view rather than on atomic arguments, so as to develop “strong sense” critical thinking that transcends egocentric and sociocentric biases (Paul 1981, 1984).
• Foster closeness to the subject-matter and feeling connected to others in order to inform a humane democracy (Martin 1992).
• Develop “constructive thinking” as a social activity in a community of physically embodied and socially embedded inquirers with personal voices who value not only reason but also imagination, intuition and emotion (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
• In developing critical thinking in school subjects, treat as important neither skills nor dispositions but opening worlds of meaning (Alston 2001).
• Attend to the development of critical thinking dispositions as well as skills, and adopt the “critical pedagogy” practised and advocated by Freire (1968 [1970]) and hooks (1994) (Dalgleish, Girard, & Davies 2017).

A common thread in these proposals is treatment of critical thinking as a social, interactive, personally engaged activity like that of a quilting bee or a barn-raising (Thayer-Bacon 2000) rather than as an individual, solitary, distanced activity symbolized by Rodin’s The Thinker . One can get a vivid description of education with the former type of goal from the writings of bell hooks (1994, 2010). Critical thinking for her is open-minded dialectical exchange across opposing standpoints and from multiple perspectives, a conception similar to Paul’s “strong sense” critical thinking (Paul 1981). She abandons the structure of domination in the traditional classroom. In an introductory course on black women writers, for example, she assigns students to write an autobiographical paragraph about an early racial memory, then to read it aloud as the others listen, thus affirming the uniqueness and value of each voice and creating a communal awareness of the diversity of the group’s experiences (hooks 1994: 84). Her “engaged pedagogy” is thus similar to the “freedom under guidance” implemented in John Dewey’s Laboratory School of Chicago in the late 1890s and early 1900s. It incorporates the dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring that Abrami (2015) found to be most effective in improving critical thinking skills and dispositions.

What is the relationship of critical thinking to problem solving, decision-making, higher-order thinking, creative thinking, and other recognized types of thinking? One’s answer to this question obviously depends on how one defines the terms used in the question. If critical thinking is conceived broadly to cover any careful thinking about any topic for any purpose, then problem solving and decision making will be kinds of critical thinking, if they are done carefully. Historically, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem solving’ were two names for the same thing. If critical thinking is conceived more narrowly as consisting solely of appraisal of intellectual products, then it will be disjoint with problem solving and decision making, which are constructive.

Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives used the phrase “intellectual abilities and skills” for what had been labeled “critical thinking” by some, “reflective thinking” by Dewey and others, and “problem solving” by still others (Bloom et al. 1956: 38). Thus, the so-called “higher-order thinking skills” at the taxonomy’s top levels of analysis, synthesis and evaluation are just critical thinking skills, although they do not come with general criteria for their assessment (Ennis 1981b). The revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson et al. 2001) likewise treats critical thinking as cutting across those types of cognitive process that involve more than remembering (Anderson et al. 2001: 269–270). For details, see the Supplement on History .

As to creative thinking, it overlaps with critical thinking (Bailin 1987, 1988). Thinking about the explanation of some phenomenon or event, as in Ferryboat , requires creative imagination in constructing plausible explanatory hypotheses. Likewise, thinking about a policy question, as in Candidate , requires creativity in coming up with options. Conversely, creativity in any field needs to be balanced by critical appraisal of the draft painting or novel or mathematical theory.

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Critical Thinking Definition, Skills, and Examples

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Critical thinking refers to the ability to analyze information objectively and make a reasoned judgment. It involves the evaluation of sources, such as data, facts, observable phenomena, and research findings.

Good critical thinkers can draw reasonable conclusions from a set of information, and discriminate between useful and less useful details to solve problems or make decisions. Employers prioritize the ability to think critically—find out why, plus see how you can demonstrate that you have this ability throughout the job application process. 

Why Do Employers Value Critical Thinking Skills?

Employers want job candidates who can evaluate a situation using logical thought and offer the best solution.

 Someone with critical thinking skills can be trusted to make decisions independently, and will not need constant handholding.

Hiring a critical thinker means that micromanaging won't be required. Critical thinking abilities are among the most sought-after skills in almost every industry and workplace. You can demonstrate critical thinking by using related keywords in your resume and cover letter, and during your interview.

Examples of Critical Thinking

The circumstances that demand critical thinking vary from industry to industry. Some examples include:

• A triage nurse analyzes the cases at hand and decides the order by which the patients should be treated.
• A plumber evaluates the materials that would best suit a particular job.
• An attorney reviews evidence and devises a strategy to win a case or to decide whether to settle out of court.
• A manager analyzes customer feedback forms and uses this information to develop a customer service training session for employees.

Promote Your Skills in Your Job Search

If critical thinking is a key phrase in the job listings you are applying for, be sure to emphasize your critical thinking skills throughout your job search.

Add Keywords to Your Resume

You can use critical thinking keywords (analytical, problem solving, creativity, etc.) in your resume. When describing your  work history , include top critical thinking skills that accurately describe you. You can also include them in your  resume summary , if you have one.

For example, your summary might read, “Marketing Associate with five years of experience in project management. Skilled in conducting thorough market research and competitor analysis to assess market trends and client needs, and to develop appropriate acquisition tactics.”

Mention Skills in Your Cover Letter

Include these critical thinking skills in your cover letter. In the body of your letter, mention one or two of these skills, and give specific examples of times when you have demonstrated them at work. Think about times when you had to analyze or evaluate materials to solve a problem.

Show the Interviewer Your Skills

You can use these skill words in an interview. Discuss a time when you were faced with a particular problem or challenge at work and explain how you applied critical thinking to solve it.

Some interviewers will give you a hypothetical scenario or problem, and ask you to use critical thinking skills to solve it. In this case, explain your thought process thoroughly to the interviewer. He or she is typically more focused on how you arrive at your solution rather than the solution itself. The interviewer wants to see you analyze and evaluate (key parts of critical thinking) the given scenario or problem.

Of course, each job will require different skills and experiences, so make sure you read the job description carefully and focus on the skills listed by the employer.

Top Critical Thinking Skills

Keep these in-demand critical thinking skills in mind as you update your resume and write your cover letter. As you've seen, you can also emphasize them at other points throughout the application process, such as your interview. 

Part of critical thinking is the ability to carefully examine something, whether it is a problem, a set of data, or a text. People with  analytical skills  can examine information, understand what it means, and properly explain to others the implications of that information.

• Asking Thoughtful Questions
• Data Analysis
• Interpretation
• Questioning Evidence
• Recognizing Patterns

Communication

Often, you will need to share your conclusions with your employers or with a group of colleagues. You need to be able to  communicate with others  to share your ideas effectively. You might also need to engage in critical thinking in a group. In this case, you will need to work with others and communicate effectively to figure out solutions to complex problems.

• Active Listening
• Collaboration
• Explanation
• Interpersonal
• Presentation
• Verbal Communication
• Written Communication

Critical thinking often involves creativity and innovation. You might need to spot patterns in the information you are looking at or come up with a solution that no one else has thought of before. All of this involves a creative eye that can take a different approach from all other approaches.

• Flexibility
• Conceptualization
• Imagination
• Drawing Connections
• Synthesizing

Open-Mindedness

To think critically, you need to be able to put aside any assumptions or judgments and merely analyze the information you receive. You need to be objective, evaluating ideas without bias.

• Objectivity
• Observation

Problem Solving

Problem-solving is another critical thinking skill that involves analyzing a problem, generating and implementing a solution, and assessing the success of the plan. Employers don’t simply want employees who can think about information critically. They also need to be able to come up with practical solutions.

• Attention to Detail
• Clarification
• Decision Making
• Groundedness
• Identifying Patterns

More Critical Thinking Skills

• Inductive Reasoning
• Deductive Reasoning
• Noticing Outliers
• Adaptability
• Emotional Intelligence
• Brainstorming
• Optimization
• Restructuring
• Integration
• Strategic Planning
• Project Management
• Ongoing Improvement
• Causal Relationships
• Case Analysis
• Diagnostics
• SWOT Analysis
• Business Intelligence
• Quantitative Data Management
• Qualitative Data Management
• Risk Management
• Scientific Method
• Consumer Behavior

Key Takeaways

• Demonstrate that you have critical thinking skills by adding relevant keywords to your resume.
• Mention pertinent critical thinking skills in your cover letter, too, and include an example of a time when you demonstrated them at work.
• Finally, highlight critical thinking skills during your interview. For instance, you might discuss a time when you were faced with a challenge at work and explain how you applied critical thinking skills to solve it.

University of Louisville. " What is Critical Thinking ."

American Management Association. " AMA Critical Skills Survey: Workers Need Higher Level Skills to Succeed in the 21st Century ."

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1 Introduction to Critical Thinking

I. what is c ritical t hinking [1].

Critical thinking is the ability to think clearly and rationally about what to do or what to believe.  It includes the ability to engage in reflective and independent thinking. Someone with critical thinking skills is able to do the following:

• Understand the logical connections between ideas.
• Identify, construct, and evaluate arguments.
• Detect inconsistencies and common mistakes in reasoning.
• Solve problems systematically.
• Identify the relevance and importance of ideas.
• Reflect on the justification of one’s own beliefs and values.

Critical thinking is not simply a matter of accumulating information. A person with a good memory and who knows a lot of facts is not necessarily good at critical thinking. Critical thinkers are able to deduce consequences from what they know, make use of information to solve problems, and to seek relevant sources of information to inform themselves.

Critical thinking should not be confused with being argumentative or being critical of other people. Although critical thinking skills can be used in exposing fallacies and bad reasoning, critical thinking can also play an important role in cooperative reasoning and constructive tasks. Critical thinking can help us acquire knowledge, improve our theories, and strengthen arguments. We can also use critical thinking to enhance work processes and improve social institutions.

Some people believe that critical thinking hinders creativity because critical thinking requires following the rules of logic and rationality, whereas creativity might require breaking those rules. This is a misconception. Critical thinking is quite compatible with thinking “out-of-the-box,” challenging consensus views, and pursuing less popular approaches. If anything, critical thinking is an essential part of creativity because we need critical thinking to evaluate and improve our creative ideas.

II. The I mportance of C ritical T hinking

Critical thinking is a domain-general thinking skill. The ability to think clearly and rationally is important whatever we choose to do. If you work in education, research, finance, management or the legal profession, then critical thinking is obviously important. But critical thinking skills are not restricted to a particular subject area. Being able to think well and solve problems systematically is an asset for any career.

Critical thinking is very important in the new knowledge economy.  The global knowledge economy is driven by information and technology. One has to be able to deal with changes quickly and effectively. The new economy places increasing demands on flexible intellectual skills, and the ability to analyze information and integrate diverse sources of knowledge in solving problems. Good critical thinking promotes such thinking skills, and is very important in the fast-changing workplace.

Critical thinking enhances language and presentation skills. Thinking clearly and systematically can improve the way we express our ideas. In learning how to analyze the logical structure of texts, critical thinking also improves comprehension abilities.

Critical thinking promotes creativity. To come up with a creative solution to a problem involves not just having new ideas. It must also be the case that the new ideas being generated are useful and relevant to the task at hand. Critical thinking plays a crucial role in evaluating new ideas, selecting the best ones and modifying them if necessary.

Critical thinking is crucial for self-reflection. In order to live a meaningful life and to structure our lives accordingly, we need to justify and reflect on our values and decisions. Critical thinking provides the tools for this process of self-evaluation.

Good critical thinking is the foundation of science and democracy. Science requires the critical use of reason in experimentation and theory confirmation. The proper functioning of a liberal democracy requires citizens who can think critically about social issues to inform their judgments about proper governance and to overcome biases and prejudice.

Critical thinking is a   metacognitive skill . What this means is that it is a higher-level cognitive skill that involves thinking about thinking. We have to be aware of the good principles of reasoning, and be reflective about our own reasoning. In addition, we often need to make a conscious effort to improve ourselves, avoid biases, and maintain objectivity. This is notoriously hard to do. We are all able to think but to think well often requires a long period of training. The mastery of critical thinking is similar to the mastery of many other skills. There are three important components: theory, practice, and attitude.

III. Improv ing O ur T hinking S kills

If we want to think correctly, we need to follow the correct rules of reasoning. Knowledge of theory includes knowledge of these rules. These are the basic principles of critical thinking, such as the laws of logic, and the methods of scientific reasoning, etc.

Also, it would be useful to know something about what not to do if we want to reason correctly. This means we should have some basic knowledge of the mistakes that people make. First, this requires some knowledge of typical fallacies. Second, psychologists have discovered persistent biases and limitations in human reasoning. An awareness of these empirical findings will alert us to potential problems.

However, merely knowing the principles that distinguish good and bad reasoning is not enough. We might study in the classroom about how to swim, and learn about the basic theory, such as the fact that one should not breathe underwater. But unless we can apply such theoretical knowledge through constant practice, we might not actually be able to swim.

Similarly, to be good at critical thinking skills it is necessary to internalize the theoretical principles so that we can actually apply them in daily life. There are at least two ways to do this. One is to perform lots of quality exercises. These exercises don’t just include practicing in the classroom or receiving tutorials; they also include engaging in discussions and debates with other people in our daily lives, where the principles of critical thinking can be applied. The second method is to think more deeply about the principles that we have acquired. In the human mind, memory and understanding are acquired through making connections between ideas.

Good critical thinking skills require more than just knowledge and practice. Persistent practice can bring about improvements only if one has the right kind of motivation and attitude. The following attitudes are not uncommon, but they are obstacles to critical thinking:

• I prefer being given the correct answers rather than figuring them out myself.
• I don’t like to think a lot about my decisions as I rely only on gut feelings.
• I don’t usually review the mistakes I have made.
• I don’t like to be criticized.

To improve our thinking we have to recognize the importance of reflecting on the reasons for belief and action. We should also be willing to engage in debate, break old habits, and deal with linguistic complexities and abstract concepts.

The  California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory  is a psychological test that is used to measure whether people are disposed to think critically. It measures the seven different thinking habits listed below, and it is useful to ask ourselves to what extent they describe the way we think:

• Truth-Seeking—Do you try to understand how things really are? Are you interested in finding out the truth?
• Open-Mindedness—How receptive are you to new ideas, even when you do not intuitively agree with them? Do you give new concepts a fair hearing?
• Analyticity—Do you try to understand the reasons behind things? Do you act impulsively or do you evaluate the pros and cons of your decisions?
• Systematicity—Are you systematic in your thinking? Do you break down a complex problem into parts?
• Confidence in Reasoning—Do you always defer to other people? How confident are you in your own judgment? Do you have reasons for your confidence? Do you have a way to evaluate your own thinking?
• Inquisitiveness—Are you curious about unfamiliar topics and resolving complicated problems? Will you chase down an answer until you find it?
• Maturity of Judgment—Do you jump to conclusions? Do you try to see things from different perspectives? Do you take other people’s experiences into account?

Finally, as mentioned earlier, psychologists have discovered over the years that human reasoning can be easily affected by a variety of cognitive biases. For example, people tend to be over-confident of their abilities and focus too much on evidence that supports their pre-existing opinions. We should be alert to these biases in our attitudes towards our own thinking.

IV. Defining Critical Thinking

There are many different definitions of critical thinking. Here we list some of the well-known ones. You might notice that they all emphasize the importance of clarity and rationality. Here we will look at some well-known definitions in chronological order.

1) Many people trace the importance of critical thinking in education to the early twentieth-century American philosopher John Dewey. But Dewey did not make very extensive use of the term “critical thinking.” Instead, in his book  How We Think (1910), he argued for the importance of what he called “reflective thinking”:

…[when] the ground or basis for a belief is deliberately sought and its adequacy to support the belief examined. This process is called reflective thought; it alone is truly educative in value…

Active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends, constitutes reflective thought.

There is however one passage from How We Think where Dewey explicitly uses the term “critical thinking”:

The essence of critical thinking is suspended judgment; and the essence of this suspense is inquiry to determine the nature of the problem before proceeding to attempts at its solution. This, more than any other thing, transforms mere inference into tested inference, suggested conclusions into proof.

2) The  Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal  (1980) is a well-known psychological test of critical thinking ability. The authors of this test define critical thinking as:

…a composite of attitudes, knowledge and skills. This composite includes: (1) attitudes of inquiry that involve an ability to recognize the existence of problems and an acceptance of the general need for evidence in support of what is asserted to be true; (2) knowledge of the nature of valid inferences, abstractions, and generalizations in which the weight or accuracy of different kinds of evidence are logically determined; and (3) skills in employing and applying the above attitudes and knowledge.

3) A very well-known and influential definition of critical thinking comes from philosopher and professor Robert Ennis in his work “A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities” (1987):

Critical thinking is reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do.

4) The following definition comes from a statement written in 1987 by the philosophers Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the  National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking (link), an organization promoting critical thinking in the US:

Critical thinking is the intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action. In its exemplary form, it is based on universal intellectual values that transcend subject matter divisions: clarity, accuracy, precision, consistency, relevance, sound evidence, good reasons, depth, breadth, and fairness. It entails the examination of those structures or elements of thought implicit in all reasoning: purpose, problem, or question-at-issue, assumptions, concepts, empirical grounding; reasoning leading to conclusions, implications and consequences, objections from alternative viewpoints, and frame of reference.

The following excerpt from Peter A. Facione’s “Critical Thinking: A Statement of Expert Consensus for Purposes of Educational Assessment and Instruction” (1990) is quoted from a report written for the American Philosophical Association:

We understand critical thinking to be purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation of the evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations upon which that judgment is based. CT is essential as a tool of inquiry. As such, CT is a liberating force in education and a powerful resource in one’s personal and civic life. While not synonymous with good thinking, CT is a pervasive and self-rectifying human phenomenon. The ideal critical thinker is habitually inquisitive, well-informed, trustful of reason, open-minded, flexible, fairminded in evaluation, honest in facing personal biases, prudent in making judgments, willing to reconsider, clear about issues, orderly in complex matters, diligent in seeking relevant information, reasonable in the selection of criteria, focused in inquiry, and persistent in seeking results which are as precise as the subject and the circumstances of inquiry permit. Thus, educating good critical thinkers means working toward this ideal. It combines developing CT skills with nurturing those dispositions which consistently yield useful insights and which are the basis of a rational and democratic society.

V. Two F eatures of C ritical T hinking

A. how not what .

Critical thinking is concerned not with what you believe, but rather how or why you believe it. Most classes, such as those on biology or chemistry, teach you what to believe about a subject matter. In contrast, critical thinking is not particularly interested in what the world is, in fact, like. Rather, critical thinking will teach you how to form beliefs and how to think. It is interested in the type of reasoning you use when you form your beliefs, and concerns itself with whether you have good reasons to believe what you believe. Therefore, this class isn’t a class on the psychology of reasoning, which brings us to the second important feature of critical thinking.

B. Ought N ot Is ( or Normative N ot Descriptive )

There is a difference between normative and descriptive theories. Descriptive theories, such as those provided by physics, provide a picture of how the world factually behaves and operates. In contrast, normative theories, such as those provided by ethics or political philosophy, provide a picture of how the world should be. Rather than ask question such as why something is the way it is, normative theories ask how something should be. In this course, we will be interested in normative theories that govern our thinking and reasoning. Therefore, we will not be interested in how we actually reason, but rather focus on how we ought to reason.

In the introduction to this course we considered a selection task with cards that must be flipped in order to check the validity of a rule. We noted that many people fail to identify all the cards required to check the rule. This is how people do in fact reason (descriptive). We then noted that you must flip over two cards. This is how people ought to reason (normative).

• Section I-IV are taken from http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/ and are in use under the creative commons license. Some modifications have been made to the original content. ↵

Critical Thinking Copyright © 2019 by Brian Kim is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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How to build critical thinking skills for better decision-making

It’s simple in theory, but tougher in practice – here are five tips to get you started.

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Have you heard the riddle about two coins that equal thirty cents, but one of them is not a nickel? What about the one where a surgeon says they can’t operate on their own son?

Those brain teasers tap into your critical thinking skills. But your ability to think critically isn’t just helpful for solving those random puzzles – it plays a big role in your career. 

An impressive 81% of employers say critical thinking carries a lot of weight when they’re evaluating job candidates. It ranks as the top competency companies consider when hiring recent graduates (even ahead of communication ). Plus, once you’re hired, several studies show that critical thinking skills are highly correlated with better job performance.

So what exactly are critical thinking skills? And even more importantly, how do you build and improve them? 

What is critical thinking?

Critical thinking is the ability to evaluate facts and information, remain objective, and make a sound decision about how to move forward.

Does that sound like how you approach every decision or problem? Not so fast. Critical thinking seems simple in theory but is much tougher in practice, which helps explain why 65% of employers say their organization has a need for more critical thinking. 

In reality, critical thinking doesn’t come naturally to a lot of us. In order to do it well, you need to:

• Remain open-minded and inquisitive, rather than relying on assumptions or jumping to conclusions
• Ask questions and dig deep, rather than accepting information at face value
• Keep your own biases and perceptions in check to stay as objective as possible
• Rely on your emotional intelligence to fill in the blanks and gain a more well-rounded understanding of a situation

So, critical thinking isn’t just being intelligent or analytical. In many ways, it requires you to step outside of yourself, let go of your own preconceived notions, and approach a problem or situation with curiosity and fairness.

It’s a challenge, but it’s well worth it. Critical thinking skills will help you connect ideas, make reasonable decisions, and solve complex problems.

7 critical thinking skills to help you dig deeper

Critical thinking is often labeled as a skill itself (you’ll see it bulleted as a desired trait in a variety of job descriptions). But it’s better to think of critical thinking less as a distinct skill and more as a collection or category of skills. 

To think critically, you’ll need to tap into a bunch of your other soft skills. Here are seven of the most important. 

Open-mindedness

It’s important to kick off the critical thinking process with the idea that anything is possible. The more you’re able to set aside your own suspicions, beliefs, and agenda, the better prepared you are to approach the situation with the level of inquisitiveness you need. 

That means not closing yourself off to any possibilities and allowing yourself the space to pull on every thread – yes, even the ones that seem totally implausible.

As Christopher Dwyer, Ph.D. writes in a piece for Psychology Today , “Even if an idea appears foolish, sometimes its consideration can lead to an intelligent, critically considered conclusion.” He goes on to compare the critical thinking process to brainstorming . Sometimes the “bad” ideas are what lay the foundation for the good ones. 

Open-mindedness is challenging because it requires more effort and mental bandwidth than sticking with your own perceptions. Approaching problems or situations with true impartiality often means:

• Practicing self-regulation : Giving yourself a pause between when you feel something and when you actually react or take action.
• Challenging your own biases: Acknowledging your biases and seeking feedback are two powerful ways to get a broader understanding. 

Critical thinking example

In a team meeting, your boss mentioned that your company newsletter signups have been decreasing and she wants to figure out why.

At first, you feel offended and defensive – it feels like she’s blaming you for the dip in subscribers. You recognize and rationalize that emotion before thinking about potential causes. You have a hunch about what’s happening, but you will explore all possibilities and contributions from your team members.

Observation

Observation is, of course, your ability to notice and process the details all around you (even the subtle or seemingly inconsequential ones). Critical thinking demands that you’re flexible and willing to go beyond surface-level information, and solid observation skills help you do that.

Your observations help you pick up on clues from a variety of sources and experiences, all of which help you draw a final conclusion. After all, sometimes it’s the most minuscule realization that leads you to the strongest conclusion.

Over the next week or so, you keep a close eye on your company’s website and newsletter analytics to see if numbers are in fact declining or if your boss’s concerns were just a fluke. 

Critical thinking hinges on objectivity. And, to be objective, you need to base your judgments on the facts – which you collect through research. You’ll lean on your research skills to gather as much information as possible that’s relevant to your problem or situation. 

Keep in mind that this isn’t just about the quantity of information – quality matters too. You want to find data and details from a variety of trusted sources to drill past the surface and build a deeper understanding of what’s happening. 

You dig into your email and website analytics to identify trends in bounce rates, time on page, conversions, and more. You also review recent newsletters and email promotions to understand what customers have received, look through current customer feedback, and connect with your customer support team to learn what they’re hearing in their conversations with customers.

The critical thinking process is sort of like a treasure hunt – you’ll find some nuggets that are fundamental for your final conclusion and some that might be interesting but aren’t pertinent to the problem at hand.

That’s why you need analytical skills. They’re what help you separate the wheat from the chaff, prioritize information, identify trends or themes, and draw conclusions based on the most relevant and influential facts. 

It’s easy to confuse analytical thinking with critical thinking itself, and it’s true there is a lot of overlap between the two. But analytical thinking is just a piece of critical thinking. It focuses strictly on the facts and data, while critical thinking incorporates other factors like emotions, opinions, and experiences. 

As you analyze your research, you notice that one specific webpage has contributed to a significant decline in newsletter signups. While all of the other sources have stayed fairly steady with regard to conversions, that one has sharply decreased.

You decide to move on from your other hypotheses about newsletter quality and dig deeper into the analytics. 

One of the traps of critical thinking is that it’s easy to feel like you’re never done. There’s always more information you could collect and more rabbit holes you could fall down.

But at some point, you need to accept that you’ve done your due diligence and make a decision about how to move forward. That’s where inference comes in. It’s your ability to look at the evidence and facts available to you and draw an informed conclusion based on those. 

When you’re so focused on staying objective and pursuing all possibilities, inference can feel like the antithesis of critical thinking. But ultimately, it’s your inference skills that allow you to move out of the thinking process and onto the action steps. 

You dig deeper into the analytics for the page that hasn’t been converting and notice that the sharp drop-off happened around the same time you switched email providers.

After looking more into the backend, you realize that the signup form on that page isn’t correctly connected to your newsletter platform. It seems like anybody who has signed up on that page hasn’t been fed to your email list. 

Communication

3 ways to improve your communication skills at work

If and when you identify a solution or answer, you can’t keep it close to the vest. You’ll need to use your communication skills to share your findings with the relevant stakeholders – like your boss, team members, or anybody who needs to be involved in the next steps.

Your analysis skills will come in handy here too, as they’ll help you determine what information other people need to know so you can avoid bogging them down with unnecessary details. 

In your next team meeting, you pull up the analytics and show your team the sharp drop-off as well as the missing connection between that page and your email platform. You ask the web team to reinstall and double-check that connection and you also ask a member of the marketing team to draft an apology email to the subscribers who were missed. 

Problem-solving

Critical thinking and problem-solving are two more terms that are frequently confused. After all, when you think critically, you’re often doing so with the objective of solving a problem.

The best way to understand how problem-solving and critical thinking differ is to think of problem-solving as much more narrow. You’re focused on finding a solution.

In contrast, you can use critical thinking for a variety of use cases beyond solving a problem – like answering questions or identifying opportunities for improvement. Even so, within the critical thinking process, you’ll flex your problem-solving skills when it comes time to take action. 

Once the fix is implemented, you monitor the analytics to see if subscribers continue to increase. If not (or if they increase at a slower rate than you anticipated), you’ll roll out some other tests like changing the CTA language or the placement of the subscribe form on the page.

5 ways to improve your critical thinking skills

Beyond the buzzwords: Why interpersonal skills matter at work

Think critically about critical thinking and you’ll quickly realize that it’s not as instinctive as you’d like it to be. Fortunately, your critical thinking skills are learned competencies and not inherent gifts – and that means you can improve them. Here’s how:

• Practice active listening: Active listening helps you process and understand what other people share. That’s crucial as you aim to be open-minded and inquisitive.
• Ask open-ended questions: If your critical thinking process involves collecting feedback and opinions from others, ask open-ended questions (meaning, questions that can’t be answered with “yes” or “no”). Doing so will give you more valuable information and also prevent your own biases from influencing people’s input.
• Scrutinize your sources: Figuring out what to trust and prioritize is crucial for critical thinking. Boosting your media literacy and asking more questions will help you be more discerning about what to factor in. It’s hard to strike a balance between skepticism and open-mindedness, but approaching information with questions (rather than unquestioning trust) will help you draw better conclusions. 
• Play a game: Remember those riddles we mentioned at the beginning? As trivial as they might seem, games and exercises like those can help you boost your critical thinking skills. There are plenty of critical thinking exercises you can do individually or as a team . 
• Give yourself time: Research shows that rushed decisions are often regrettable ones. That’s likely because critical thinking takes time – you can’t do it under the wire. So, for big decisions or hairy problems, give yourself enough time and breathing room to work through the process. It’s hard enough to think critically without a countdown ticking in your brain. 

Critical thinking really is critical

The ability to think critically is important, but it doesn’t come naturally to most of us. It’s just easier to stick with biases, assumptions, and surface-level information. 

But that route often leads you to rash judgments, shaky conclusions, and disappointing decisions. So here’s a conclusion we can draw without any more noodling: Even if it is more demanding on your mental resources, critical thinking is well worth the effort.

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Our Concept and Definition of Critical Thinking

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An empirical analysis of the relationship between nature of science and critical thinking through science definitions and thinking skills

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• Volume 2 , article number  270 , ( 2022 )

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• María Antonia Manassero-Mas   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-7804-7779 1 &
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Critical thinking (CRT) skills transversally pervade education and nature of science (NOS) knowledge is a key component of science literacy. Some science education researchers advocate that CRT skills and NOS knowledge have a mutual impact and relationship. However, few research studies have undertaken the empirical confirmation of this relationship and most fail to match the two terms of the relationship adequately. This paper aims to test the relationship by applying correlation, regression and ANOVA procedures to the students’ answers to two tests that measure thinking skills and science definitions. The results partly confirm the hypothesised relationship, which displays some complex features: on the one hand, the relationship is positive and significant for the NOS variables that express adequate ideas about science. However, it is non-significant when the NOS variables depict misinformed ideas about science. Furthermore, the comparison of the two student cohorts reveals that two years of science instruction do not seem to contribute to advancing students’ NOS conceptions. Finally, some interpretations and consequences of these results for scientific literacy, teaching NOS (paying attention both to informed and misinformed ideas), for connecting NOS with general epistemic knowledge, and assessing CRT skills are discussed.

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Introduction

Among other objectives, school science education perennially aims to improve scientific literacy for all, which involves being useful and functional for making adequate and sound personal and social daily life decisions. An essential component of scientific literacy is the knowledge “about” science, that is, knowledge about how science works and validates its knowledge and intervenes in the world (along with technology). This study focuses on the knowledge about science, which is often referred to in the literature as nature of science (NOS), scientific practice, ideas about science, etc., in turn, related to a continuous innovative teaching tradition (Vesterinen et al., 2014 ; Khishfe, 2012 ; Lederman, 2007 ; Matthews, 2012 ; McComas, 1996 ; Olson, 2018 ; among others).

On the other hand, some international reports and experts state that critical thinking (CRT) skills are key and transversal competencies for all educational levels, subjects and jobs in the 21st century. For instance, the European Union ( 2014 ) proposes seven key competencies that require developing a set of transversal skills, namely CRT, creativity, initiative, problem-solving, risk assessment, decision-making, communication and constructive management of emotions. In the same vein, the National Research Council ( 2012 ) proposes the transferable knowledge and skills for life and work, which explicitly details the following skills: argumentation, problem-solving, decision-making, analysis, interpretation, creativity, and others. In short, these and many other proposals converge in pointing out that teaching students to think and educating in CRT skills is an innovative and significant challenge for 21st century education and, of course, for science education. The CRT construct has been widely developed within psychological research. Yet, the field is complex, and terminologically bewildering (i.e., higher-order skills, cognitive skills, thinking skills, CRT, and other terms are used interchangeably), and some controversies are still unresolved. For instance, scholars do not agree on a common definition of CRT, and the most appropriate set of skills and dispositions to depict CRT is also disputed. As the differences among scholars still persist, the term CRT will be adopted hereafter to generally describe the variety of higher-order thinking skills that are usually associated in the CRT literature.

Further, some science education research currently suggests connections between NOS and CRT, arguing that CRT skills and NOS knowledge are related. Some claim that thinking skills are key to learning NOS (Erduran & Kaya, 2018 ; Ford & Yore, 2014 ; García-Mila & Andersen, 2008 ; Simonneaux, 2014 ), and specifically, that argumentation skills may enhance NOS understanding (Khishfe et al., 2017 ). In contrast, as argumentation skills are a key competence for the construction and validation of scientific knowledge, other studies claim that NOS knowledge (i.e., understanding the differences between data and claims) is also key to learning CRT skills such as argumentation (Allchin & Zemplén, 2020 ; Greene et al., 2016 ; Settlage & Southerland, 2020 ). Both directions of this intuitive relationship between CRT skills and NOS are fruitful ways to enhance scientific literacy and general learning. Hence, this study aims to empirically explore the NOS-CRT relationship, as the prior literature is somewhat mystifying and its contributions are limited, as will be shown below.

Theoretical contextualization

This study copes with two different, vast and rich realms of research, namely NOS and CRT, and their theoretical frameworks: the interdisciplinary context of philosophy, sociology, and history of science and science education for NOS; and psychology and general education for CRT skills. Both frameworks are summarized below to meet the journal space limitations.

Under the NOS label, science education has developed a fertile and vast realm of “knowledge about scientific knowledge and knowing”, which is obviously a particular case of human thinking, and probably the most developed to date. NOS represents the meta-cognitive, multifaceted and dynamic knowledge about what science is and how science works as a social way of knowing and explaining the natural world (knowledge construction and validation). This knowledge has been interdisciplinarily elaborated from history, philosophy, sociology of science and technology, and other disciplines. Scholars raised many and varied NOS issues (Matthews, 2012 ), which are relevant to scientific research and widely surpass the reduced consensus view (Lederman, 2007 ). Despite NOS complexity, it has been systematized across two broad dimensions: epistemological and social (Erduran & Dagher, 2014 ; Manassero-Mass & Vazquez-Alonso, 2019 ). The epistemological dimension refers to the principles and values underlying knowledge construction and validation, which are often described as the scientific method, empirical basis, observation, data and inference, tentativeness, theory and law, creativity, subjectivity, demarcation, and many others. The social dimension refers to the social construction of scientific knowledge and its social impact. It often deals with the scientific community and institutions, social influences, and general science-technology-society interactions (peer evaluation, communication, gender, innovation, development, funding, technology, psychology, etc.).

From its beginning, NOS research agrees that students (and teachers) hold inadequate and misinformed beliefs on NOS issues across different educational levels and contexts. Further, researchers agree that effective NOS teaching requires explicit and reflective methods to overcome the many learning barriers (Bennássarr et al., 2010 ; García et al., 2011 ; Cofré et al., 2019 ; Deng et al., 2011 ). These barriers relate to the basic processes of gathering (observation) and elaborating (analysis) data, decision-making in science, and specifically, the inability to differentiate facts and explanations and adequately coordinate evidence, justifications, arguments and conclusions; the lack of elementary meta-cognitive and self-regulation skills (i.e., the quick jump to conclusions as self-evident); the introduction of personal opinions, inferences, and reinterpretations and the dismissal of the counter-arguments or evidence that may contradict personal ideas (García-Mila & Andersen, 2008 ; McDonald & McRobbie, 2012 ).

As these barriers point directly to the general abilities involved in thinking (observation, analysis, answering questions, solving problems, decision-making and the like), researchers attribute those difficulties to the lack of the cognitive skills involved in the adequate management of the barriers, whose higher-order cognitive nature corresponds to many CRT skills (Kolstø, 2001 ; Zeidler et al., 2002 ). Thus, the solutions to overcome the barriers imply mastering the CRT skills, and, consequently, achieving successful NOS learning (Ford & Yore, 2014 ; McDonald & McRobbie, 2012 ; Simonneaux, 2014 ). Erduran and Kaya ( 2018 ) argue that the perennial aim of developing students’ and teachers’ NOS epistemic insights still remains a challenge for science education, despite decades of NOS research, due to the many aspects involved. They conclude that NOS knowledge critically demands higher-order cognitive skills. The paragraphs below elaborate on these higher-order cognitive skills or CRT skills.

Critical thinking

As previously stated, the CRT field shows many differences in scholarly knowledge on the conceptualization and composition of CRT. Ennis’ ( 1996 ) simple definition of CRT as reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do is likely the most celebrated definition among many others. A Delphi panel of experts defined CRT as an intentional and self-regulated judgment, which results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation and inference, as well as the explanation of the evidentiary, conceptual, methodological, criterial or contextual considerations on which that judgment is based (American Psychological Association 1990 ).

However, the varied set of skills associated with CRT is controversial (Fisher, 2009 ). For instance, Ennis ( 2019 ) developed an extensive conception of CRT through a broad set of dispositions and abilities. Similarly, Madison ( 2004 ) proposed an extensive and comprehensive list of skills (Table 1 ).

The development of CRT tests has contributed to clarifying the relevance of the many CRT skills, as the test’s functionality requires concentrating on a few skills. For instance, Halpern’s ( 2010 ) questionnaire assesses, through everyday situations, problem-solving, verbal reasoning, probability and uncertainty, hypothesis-testing, argument analysis and decision-making. Watson and Glaser’s ( 2002 ) instrument assesses deduction, recognition of assumptions, interpretation, inference, and evaluation of arguments. The California Critical Thinking Skills Test assesses analysis, evaluation, inference, deduction and induction (Facione et al., 1998 ). It is also worth mentioning that most CRT tests target adults, although the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests (Ennis & Millman, 2005 ) were developed for a variety of young people and address several CRT skills (X test, induction, deduction, credibility, and identification of assumptions; Class Test, classical logical reasoning from premises to conclusion, etc.). The large number of CRT skills led scholars to perform efforts of synthesis and refinement that are summarized through some exemplary proposals (Table 1 ).

The CRT psychological framework presented above places the complex set of skills within the high-level cognitive constructs whose practice involves a self-directed, self-disciplined, self-supervised, and self-corrective way of thinking that presupposes conscious mastery of skills and conformity with rigorous quality standards. In addition to skills, CRT also involves effective communication and attitudinal commitment to intellectual standards to overcome the natural tendencies to fallacy and bias (self-centeredness and socio-centrism).

Science education and thinking skills

CRT skills mirror the scientific reasoning skills of scientific practice, and vice versa, based on their similar contents. This intuitive resemblance may launch expectations of their mutual relationship. Science education research has increased attention to CRT skills as promotors of meaningful learning, especially when involving NOS and understanding of socio-scientific issues (Vieira et al., 2011 ; Torres & Solbes, 2016 ; Vázquez-Alonso & Manassero-Mas, 2018 ; Yacoubian & Khishfe, 2018 , among others). Furthermore, Yacoubian ( 2015 ) elaborated several reasons to consider CRT a fundamental pillar for NOS learning.

Some authors stress the convergence between science and CRT based on the word critical , as thinking and science are both critical. Critical approaches have always been considered consubstantial to science (and likely a key factor of its success), as their range spreads from specific critical social issues (i.e., scientific controversies, social acceptance of scientific knowledge, social coping with a virus pandemic) to the socially organized scepticism of science (i.e., peer evaluation, scientific communication). The latter is considered a universal value of scientific practice to guarantee the validity of knowledge (Merton, 1968 ; Osborne, 2014 ). In the context of CRT research, the term critical involves normative ways to ensure the quality of good thinking, such as open-minded abilities and a disposition for relentless scrutiny of ideas, criteria for evaluating the goodness of thinking, adherence to the norms, standards of excellence, and avoidance of errors and fallacies (traits of poor thinking). These obviously also apply to scientific knowledge through peer evaluation practice, which represents a superlative form of good normative thinking (Bailin, 2002 ; Paul & Elder, 2008 ).

Another important feature of the convergence of CRT and science is the broad set of common skills sharing the same semantic content in both fields, despite that their names may seem different. Induction, deduction, abduction, and, in general, all kinds of argumentation skills, as well as problem-solving and decision-making, exemplify key tools of scientific practice to validate and defend ideas and develop controversies, discussions, and debates. Concurrently, they, too, are CRT skills (Sprod, 2014 ; Vieira et al., 2011 ; Yacoubian & Kishfe, 2018 ). In addition, Santos’ ( 2017 ) review suggests the following tentative list of skills: observation, exploration, research, problem-solving, decision-making, information-gathering, critical questions, reliable knowledge-building, evaluation, rigorous checks, acceptance and rejection of hypotheses, clarification of meanings, and true conclusions. Beyond skill names and focusing on their semantic content, (Manassero-Mas & Vázquez-Alonso, 2020a ) developed a deeper analysis of the skills usually attributed to scientific thinking and critical thinking, concluding that their constituent skills are deeply intertwined and much more coincident than different. This suggests that scientific and critical thinking may be considered equivalent concepts across the many shared skills they put into practice. However, equivalence does not mean identity, as important differences may still exist. For instance, the evaluation and judgment of ideas involved in organized scientific skepticism (i.e., peer evaluation) are much more demanding and deeper in scientific practice than in daily life thinking realms.

In sum, research on the CRT and NOS constructs is plural, as they draw from two different fields and traditions, general education and cognitive psychology, and science education, respectively. However, CRT and NOS share many skills, processes, and thinking strategies, as they both pursue the same general goal, namely, to establish the true value of knowledge claims. These shared features provide further reasons to investigate the possible relationships between NOS and CRT skills.

Research involving nature of science and thinking skills

The research involving both constructs is heterogeneous, as the operationalisations and methods are quite varied, given the pluralized nature of NOS and thinking. For example, Yang and Tsai ( 2012 ) reviewed 37 empirical studies on the relationship between personal epistemologies and science learning, concluding that research was heterogeneous along different NOS orientations: applications of Kuhn’s ( 2012 ) evolutionary epistemic categories, use of general epistemic knowledge categories, studies on epistemological beliefs about science (empiricism, tentativeness, etc.), and applications of other epistemic frameworks. The studies dealing with the epistemological beliefs about science were a minority. Another example of heterogeneity comes from Koray and Köksal’s ( 2009 ) study about the effect of laboratory instruction versus traditional teaching on creativity and logical thinking in prospective primary school teachers, where the laboratory group showed a significant effect in comparison to the traditional group. However, the NOS contents involved in laboratory instruction are still unclear. Dowd et al. ( 2018 ) examined the relationship between written scientific reasoning and eight specific CRT skills, finding that only three aspects of reasoning were significantly related to one skill (inference) and negatively to argument.

A series of studies suggest implicit relationships between NOS and thinking skills. Yang and Tsai ( 2010 ) interviewed sixth-graders to examine two uncertain science-related issues, finding that children who developed more complex (multiplistic) NOS knowledge displayed better reflective thinking and coordination of theory and evidence. Dogan et al. ( 2020 ) compared the impact of two epistemic-based methodologies (problem-based and history of science) on the creativity skills of prospective primary school teachers, finding that the problem-solving approach was more effective in increasing students’ creative thinking. Khishfe ( 2012 ) and Khishfe et al. ( 2017 ) found no differences in decision-making and argumentation in socio-scientific issues regarding NOS knowledge, but more participants in the treatment groups referred their post-decision-making factors to NOS than the other groups. Other studies found relationships between NOS understanding and variables that do not match CRT skills precisely. For instance, Bogdan ( 2020 ) found that inference and tentativeness relate to attitudes toward the role of science in social progress, but creativity does not, and the same applies to the acceptance of the evolution theory (Cofré et al., 2017 ; Sinatra et al., 2003 ).

Another set of studies comes from science education research on argumentation, which is based on the rationale that argumentation is a key scientific skill for validating knowledge in scientific practice. Thus, reasoning skills should be related to NOS understanding. Students who viewed science as dynamic and changeable were likely to develop more complex arguments (Stathopoulou & Vosnidou, 2007 ). In a floatation experience, Zeineddin and Abd-El-Khalick ( 2010 ) found that the stronger the epistemic commitments, the greater the quality of the scientific reasoning produced by the individuals. Accordingly, the term epistemic cognition of scientific argumentation has been coined, although specific research on argumentation and epistemic cognition is still relatively scarce (He et al., 2020 ).

Weinstock’s ( 2006 ) review suggested that people’s argumentation skills develop in proportion to their epistemic development, which Noroozi ( 2016 ) also confirmed. Further, Mason and Scirica ( 2006 ) studied the contribution of general epistemological comprehension to argumentation skills in two readings, finding that participants at the highest level of epistemic comprehension (evaluative) generated better quality arguments than participants at the previous multiplistic stage (Kuhn, 2012 ). In addition, the review of Rapanta et al. ( 2013 ) on argumentative competence proposed a three-dimensional hierarchical framework, where the highest level is epistemological (the ability to evaluate the relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability of arguments). Again, Henderson et al. ( 2018 ) discussed the key challenges of argumentation research and pointed to students’ shifting epistemologies about what might count as a claim or evidence or what might make an argument persuasive or convincing, as well as developing valid and reliable assessments of argumentation. On the contrary, Yang et al. ( 2019 ) found no significant associations between general epistemic knowledge and the performance of scientific reasoning in a controversial case with undergraduates.

From science education, González‐Howard and McNeill ( 2020 ) analysed middle-school classroom interactions in critique argumentation when an epistemic agency is incorporated, indicating that the development of students’ epistemic agency shows multiple and conflating approaches to address the tensions inherent to critiquing practices and to fostering equitable learning environments. This idea is further developed in the special section on epistemic tools of Science Education (2020), which highlights the continual need to accommodate and adapt the epistemic tools and agencies of scientific practices within classrooms while taking into account teaching, engineering, sustainability, equity and justice (González‐Howard & McNeill, 2020 ; Settlage & Southerland, 2020 ).

Finally, some of the above-mentioned research used a noteworthy concept of epistemic knowledge (EK) as “knowledge about knowledge and knowing” (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997 ), which has been developed in mainstream general education research and involves some meta-cognitions about human knowledge that research has largely connected to general learning and CRT skills (Greene et al., 2016 ). Obviously, EK and NOS knowledge share many common aspects (epistemic), suggesting a considerable overlap between them. However, it is noteworthy that NOS research is oriented toward CRT skills impacting NOS learning, while EK research orientates toward EK impacting CRT skills and general learning.

Regarding the Likert formats for research tools, test makers are concerned about the control of response biases that cause a lack of true reflection on the statement content and may damage the fidelity of data and correlations. Respondents’ tendency to agree with statements (acquiescence bias) is widespread. Further, neutrality bias and polarity bias reflect respondents’ propensity to choose fixed score points of the scale, either the midpoints (neutrality) or the extreme scores (polarity), either extreme high scores (positive bias) or extreme low scores (negative bias). To mitigate biases, experts recommend avoiding the exclusive use of positively worded statements within the instruments and combining positive and reversed items. This recommendation has been implemented here using three categories for NOS phrases that operationalize positive, intermediate and reversed statements (Vázquezr et al., 2006 ; Kreitchmann et al., 2019 ; Suárez-Alvarez et al., 2018 ; Vergara & Balluerka, 2000 ). However, the use of varied styles for phrases harms the instrument’s reliability and validity, and reliability is underestimated (Suárez-Alvarez et al., 2018 ).

All in all, the theoretical framework is twofold: CRT and NOS research. The above-mentioned research shares the hypothesis that the relationship between NOS and CRT skills matters. However, it displays a broad heterogeneity of research methods, variables, instruments and mixed results on the NOS-CRT relationship that do not allow a common methodological standpoint. Further, mainstream research focuses on college students and argumentation skills. In this regard, this study aims to empirically research the NOS-CRT relationship by applying standardized assessment tools for both constructs. This promotes comparability among researchers and provides quick diagnostic tools for teachers. Secondly, this study addresses younger students, which involves the creation of NOS and CRT tools adapted to young participants, for which some test validity and reliability data are provided. The research questions within this framework are: Do NOS knowledge and CRT skills correlate? What are the traits and limits conditions of this relationship, if any?

Materials and methods

The data gathering took place in Spain in the year 2018. At this time, the enacted school curriculum missed the international standards and specific curriculum proposals about CRT and NOS issues, so NOS issues could be implicitly related to some curricular contents about scientific research. Despite this lack of curricular emphasis, the principals of the participant Spanish schools expressed interest in diagnosing students’ thinking skills and NOS knowledge and agreed with the authors on the specific CRT and NOS-skills to be tested. As the Spanish school curriculum does not emphasize CRT and NOS issues, the students are expected to be equally trained, and this context conditioned the design of tentative tests through simple contents and an open-ended format, as they are cheap and easy to administer and interpret.

Participants

The participant schools (17) included some public (4) and state-funded private schools (13) that spread across mixed socio-cultural contexts and large, medium, and small Spanish townships. The participant students were tested in their natural school classes (29) of the two target grades. The valid convenience samples are two cohorts of students, each representing students of 6 th grade of Primary Education (PE6) ( n  = 434; 54.8% girls and 45.2% boys; mean age 11.3 years) and 8th grade of Secondary Compulsory Education (SCE8) ( n  = 347; 48.5% girls and 51.5% boys; mean age 13.3 years). In Spain, 6 th grade is the last year of the primary stage (11–12-year-old students), and the 8 th grade is the second year of the lower secondary compulsory stage (13–14-year-old students).

Instruments

Two assessment tools were tailored by researchers (a CRT skill test and a NOS scenario) to operationalise CRT and NOS to empirically check their relationships. As the Spanish school curriculum lacks CRT standards, the specific thinking skills that represent the CRT construct were agreed upon between principals and researchers. The design of the tool to assess NOS knowledge took into account that NOS was not explicitly taught in Spanish schools. Both tools were designed to match the schools’ interests and the students’ developmental level; the latter particularly led to choosing a simple NOS issue (definition of science) to match the primary students’ capabilities better.

Thinking challenge tests

Two CRT thinking skill test were developed for the two participant cohorts (PE6 and SCE8). The design aligns with the tradition of most CRT standardised tests that concentrate assessment on a few selected thinking skills (i.e., Ennis & Millman, 2005 ; Halpern, 2010 ). The test for the 6th-graders (PE6) assesses five skills: prediction, comparison and contrast, classification, problem-solving and logical reasoning. The test for the 8th-graders (SCE8) assesses causal explanation, decision-making, parts-all relationships, sequence and logical reasoning.

As most CRT tests are designed for adults, many tests and item pools were reviewed to select suitable items for younger students. The selection criteria were the fit of the items’ cognitive demand with students’ age, the addressed skill and the motivational challenge for students. Moreover, items must be readable, understandable, adequate, and interesting for the participant students. Then, two 45-item and 38-item tests were agreed on and piloted. Their results are described elsewhere (Manassero-Mas & Vázquez-Alonso, 2020b ). The items were examined by the authors according to their reliability, correlation and factor analysis to eliminate unfair items. Again, the former criteria were used to add new items to conform the two new 35-item Thinking Challenge Tests (TCT) to assess the CRT skills of this study.

The items of the first two skills were drawn from the Cornell (Nicoma) test, which evaluates four CRT skills through the information provided by a fictional story about some explorers of the Nicoma planet and asks questions about the story. Some items from prediction and comparison skills were drawn for the 6th-grade TCT (PE6), and some items from causal explanation and decision-making skills were drawn for the 8th-grade TCT (SCE8). The two TCT include three additional items on logical reasoning that were selected from the 78-item Class-Reasoning Cornell Test (Ennis & Millman, 2005 ). One item was also drawn from the 25-situation Halpern CRT test (Halpern, 2010 ) for the problem-solving skill of the PE6 test. The authors adapted the remaining figurative items (Table 2 ) to enhance students’ challenge, understanding, and motivation and make the TCT free of school knowledge (Appendix).

Overall, the TCT items pose authentic culture-free challenges, as their contents and cognitive demands are not related to or anchored in any prior school curricular knowledge, especially language and mathematics. Therefore, the TCT are intended to assess culture-free thinking skills.

The item formats involve multiple-choice and Likert scales with appropriate ranges and rubrics that facilitate quick and objective scoring and the elaboration of increasing adjustment between items’ cognitive demand and their corresponding skill, thereby leading to further revision based on validity and reliability improvement. This format also allows setting standardised baselines for hypothesis-testing through comparisons of research, educational programs, and teaching methodologies.

Nature of science assessment

A scenario on science definitions is used to assess the participants’ NOS understanding because this simple issue may better fit the lack of explicit NOS teaching and the developmental stage of the young students, especially the youngest 6th-graders. The scenario provides nine phrases that convey an epistemic, plural and varied range of science definitions, and respondents rate their agreement-disagreement with the phrases on a 9-point Likert scale (1 =  strongly disagree , 9 =  strongly agree ) to allow better nuancing of their NOS beliefs and avoid psychometric objections to the scale intervals. The scenario is drawn from the “Views on Science-Technology-Society” (VOSTS) pool that Aikenhead and Ryan ( 1992 ) developed empirically by synthesizing many students’ interviews and open answers into some scenarios, written in simple, understandable, and non-technical language. They consider that VOSTS items have intrinsic validity due to their empirical development, as the scenario phrases come from students, not from researchers or a particular philosophy, thus avoiding the immaculate perception bias and ensuring students’ understanding. Lederman et al. ( 1998 ) also consider VOSTS a valid and reliable tool for investigating NOS conceptions. Manassero et al. ( 2003 ) adapted the scenarios into the Spanish language and contexts, and developed a multiple-rating assessment rubric, based on the phrase scaling achieved through expert judges’ consensus. The rubric assigns indices whose empirical reliability has been presented elsewhere (Vázquezr et al., 2006 ; Bennássar et al., 2010 ).

The students completed the two tests through digital devices led by their teachers within their natural school classroom groups during 2018–19. To enhance students’ effort and motivation, the applications were infused into curricular learning activities, where students were encouraged to ask about problems and difficulties. During applications students did not ask questions to teacher that may reflect some difficulty to understand the tests. The database was processed with SPSS 25 and Factor program (Baglin, 2014 ) for exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis through polychoric correlations and Robust Unweighted Least Squares (RULS) method that lessen conditions on the score distribution of variables. Effect size statistics use a cut-off point ( d  = 0.30) to discriminate relevant differences.

There was no time limit for students to complete the tests, and the applications took between 25 and 50 min. Correct answers score one point, incorrect answers zero points, and no random corrections were applied. The skill scores were computed by adding the scores of the items that belong to each skill, which are independent. The addition of the five skill scores makes up a test score (thinking total) that estimates students’ global CRT competence and is dependent on the skill scores (Table 2 ).

The different types of validity maintain a reciprocal influence and represent the various parts of a whole, so they are not mutually independent. The Thinking Challenge tests’ validity relies on the quality of the CRT pools and tests examined by the authors, their agreement to choose the items that best matched the criteria, and the reviewed pilot results (Manassero-Mas & Vázquez-Alonso, 2020b ). The Factor program computes several reliability statistics (Cronbach alpha, EAP, Omega, etc.).

Nature of science scenario

The nine phrases describe different science definitions, and students rated each one on a 1–9 agreement scale. According to the experts’ current views on NOS, a panel of qualified judges reached a 2/3-consensus to categorize each phrase within a 3-level scheme (Adequate, Plausible, Naive), which has been widely used in NOS assessment (Khishfe, 2012 ; Liang et al., 2008 ; Rubba et al., 1996 ). The scheme means the phrases express informed (Adequate), partially informed (Plausible), or uninformed (Naive) NOS knowledge (see Appendix). According to this scheme, an evaluation rubric transforms the students’ direct ratings (1–9) into an index [− 1 to + 1], which is proportionally higher when the person agrees with an Adequate phrase, partially agrees with a Plausible phrase, or disagrees with a Naive phrase. All the rubric indices balance positive and negative scores, which are symmetrical for Adequate and Naïve phrases, but plausible indices are somewhat loaded toward agreement, as higher agreement would be expected. The index unifies the NOS measurements to make them homogeneous (positive indices mean informed conceptions), invariant (measurement independent of scenario/phrase/category), and standardised (all measures within the same interval [− 1, + 1]). The index proportionally values the adjustment of students’ NOS knowledge to the current views of science: the higher (or lower) the index, the better (or worse) informed is their NOS knowledge (Vázquezr et al., 2006 ).

Three category variables (Adequate, Plausible, and Naïve) are computed by averaging their phrase indices, which are mutually independent. The average of the three category variables computes a global NOS index representing the student’s overall NOS knowledge (Global). The use of three categories aligns with test makers’ recommendations to avoid using only positively worded phrases in order to elude the acquiescence bias, which harms reliability and validity (Suárez-Alvarez et al., 2018 ).

The links between thinking skills and NOS are empirically explored through correlational methods and one-way ANOVA procedures of the variables of the Thinking Challenge test and science definitions.

The results include the descriptive statistics of the target variables, twelve thinking variables (five skills plus thinking total for each group) and four variables of the science definitions (adequate, plausible, naive, and global), the analysis of the correlations, a linear regression analysis among these variables, and a comparison of thinking skills between NOS categorical groups through a one-way ANOVA.

Descriptive statistics

Most mean thinking variables scores fell near the midpoint of the scale range. Four skills (classification, problem-solving, causal explanation and sequence) scored above the midpoints of their ranges, whereas two variables (logical reasoning and decision) scored slightly below their midpoints. Overall, these results indicate the medium difficulty of the tests for the students, neither easy nor difficult, which means the CRT tests can be acceptable to assess young students’ thinking skills (Table 3 ).

The EAP reliability indices of classification, problem-solving, sequence, parts (mainly figurative items) and thinking scales were excellent, good for the remaining scales, but poor for logical reasoning. Low reliability indicates a need for item revision and limited applicability (i.e., inappropriate for individual diagnosis), but is insufficient to reject the test in research purposes (U.S. Department of Labor, 1999 ). As test reliability critically depends on the number of items, increasing the length of logical reasoning over its three current items will improve its reliability.

The descriptive results for the direct scores of the NOS variables (Table 4 ) showed a biased pattern toward agreement (average phrases between 4.9 and 7.4), which suggests some acquiescence bias in spite of presenting varied phrases. The average indices obtained positive scores for the adequate category, slightly negative ones for the naïve category, and close-to-zero for the plausible phrases (the effect size of the differences concerning a zero score was low). The overall weighted average index for the whole sample (global variable) was close-to-zero and slightly positive, meaning that the students’ overall epistemic conception of science definition was not significantly informed. The overall average index of Adequate phrases obtained the highest positive score for both samples of students, which means that most students agreed with the Adequate phrases (expressing informed beliefs about science). In contrast, the Naïve overall average index obtained the lowest negative mean score, indicating that the students agreed instead of disagreeing with phrases expressing uninformed views about science. The Plausible variable (phrases expressing partially informed beliefs, neither adequate nor naive) obtained a close-to-zero average score, meaning that the students’ beliefs about these variables were far from informed. Overall, the students presented slightly informed views on Adequate phrases, close-to-zero average indices scores (not informed views) for Plausible phrases and slightly uninformed views on Naive statements.

Polychoric correlations among NOS direct scores computed through Factor attained good scores on all NOS items, indicating a unidimensional structure (but Phrase I). The exploratory factor analysis (EFA) applied to phrase scores displayed a dominant eigenvalue, whose general factor had acceptable loadings for all phrases (only phrase I had low loading). The unidimensional model obtained fair statistics in the confirmatory factor analysis. These results suggest one general factor underlying students’ scores and justify a global score representing the variance of all the NOS phrases. The expected a posteriori (EAP) reliability scores for the entire NOS scale were good (Table 4 ).

The comparison of NOS scores between primary and secondary grades highlights that the four NOS variable scores on science definitions were significantly equal for both cohorts of students, despite the two years separation. So, the educational impact of the two-year period on NOS seems almost null, given the close-to-zero differences in science definitions. This result could be expected, as NOS is not explicitly planned in Spanish science curricula and is not usually taught in the classroom.

Both cohorts answered the same anchoring CRT item (see Appendix), whose correct answer rate (27% primary; 33% secondary) suggests a slight improvement in CRT skills that sharply contrasts with the former NOS comparison. Summing up, despite that CRT and NOS have not been taught to Spanish students, developmental learning may increase CRT skills but not improve NOS knowledge. This reinforces the claim for explicit and reflective teaching of NOS, as implicit developmental maturation alone seems ineffective.

Correlations between nature of science and thinking skills

The empirical analysis of the hypothesised relationships between thinking skills and NOS epistemic variables (Adequate, Plausible, Naive) was performed through correlational methods (Pearson’s bivariate correlation coefficients and linear regression analysis) and one-way analysis of variance.

The Pearson correlation coefficients revealed a pattern of the relationships between NOS and thinking skills (Table 5 ): all thinking skills positively correlated with the Adequate variable, and most were significant, except for prediction and logical reasoning in EP6, which were non-significant. However, the correlations with the Naive and Plausible variables were overall non-significant. However, there were some exceptions: first, the Plausible/problem-solving correlation in EP6 was significant (and negative); second, the correlations between Naïve and logical reasoning (positive in EP6) and also between decision-making, logical reasoning and the thinking total score (negative in SCE8) were significant.

Thus, the noteworthy pattern for the NOS-CRT relationship showed that the Adequate variable positively correlated with all the thinking variables and was mostly statistically significant (83%); the highest positive correlations corresponded to problem-solving (EP6), sequence and parts-all (ES8), and the thinking total skills for both groups ( p  < 0.01). This pattern means that students with higher (lower) thinking skill scores expressed higher (lower) agreement with Adequate phrases.

The correlation pattern between thinking skills and the Plausible and Naive variables was mainly non-significant (75%). Only two correlations were significant in the EP6 group; the Plausible-problem-solving correlation was negative (higher scorers on problem-solving did not recognize the intermediate value of Plausible science definitions), whereas the Naïve-logical reasoning correlation was positive (higher scorers on logical reasoning tended to disagree with Naive science definitions). Three Naïve correlations were significant and negative in the secondary group (SCE8): parts-all, logical reasoning skills and thinking total.

Overall, the positive and significant correlation pattern of the Adequate variable was stronger than the mainly non-significant and somewhat negative Naive and Plausible correlation pattern.

Linear regression analysis between nature of science and thinking skills

Regression analysis (RA) compares the power of a set of variables to predict a dependent variable and the common variance. Two linear regression analyses were carried out to test the mutual contribution of the CRT and NOS variables. The first RA uses the NOS variables (Adequate, Plausible, Naive and Global) as the dependent variables, and the five independent thinking skills as predictors (Table 6 ). The second RA (Table 7 ) reversed the roles of the variables, thus establishing the thinking skills as the dependent variables and the three independent NOS variables (Adequate, Plausible and Naive) as the predictors. Collinearity tests were negative for all RAs through tolerance, variance inflation factor and condition index statistics.

The first RA (Table 6 ) showed that the NOS Adequate variable achieved the highest proportion of common variance with thinking skill predictors at both educational levels (4.2% in PE6 and 9.2% in SCE8), whereas the other two NOS variables achieved much lower levels of explained variance. In PE6, the most significant predictor skill of NOS was problem-solving, whereas the other predictor skills did not reach statistical significance in any case. In SCE8, the most significant predictors were three skills (sequencing, reasoning, and parts-all), whereas the remaining skills did not reach statistical significance (the predictors of the Plausible variable were negative).

The second RA (Table 7 ) showed that the Adequate variable achieved the greatest predictive power, as most thinking skills displayed statistically significant standardised beta coefficients at the two educational levels, while Plausible and Naïve variables had a much lower predictive power, and Plausible standardised coefficients were non-significant for any skill predictor. The common variance displayed a similar amount to the first analysis; the thinking total variable displayed the largest variance at both educational levels (4.8% PE6; 9.6% SCE8), and the problem-solving skills at PE6 (5.3%) and parts-all at SCE8 (7.1%).

In summary, the Adequate variable and the classification and problem-solving skills (PE6) and sequencing and parts-all skills (SCE8) were the variables that presented the largest standardised coefficients and statistical significance regarding the research question raised in this study about the positive relationship between NOS and thinking skills.

Analysis of variance between nature of science and thinking skills

Further exploration of the NOS-skills relationship was conducted through one-way between-groups analysis of variance. According to performance on the Adequate, Plausible and Naive variables, the participants were allocated to four percentile groups (low group: 0–25%; medium–low: 25–50%; medium–high: 50–75%; high: 75–100%), which made up the independent variable of the ANOVA for testing the differences in thinking skills (dependent variable) among these four groups.

The Adequate groups yielded a statistically significant main effect for the thinking total in primary [ F (3, 429) = 7.745, p  = 0.000] and secondary education [ F (3, 343) = 2.607, p  = 0.052]. The effect size of the differences in the thinking total scores between the high and low groups was large for the primary ( d  = 0.69) and secondary ( d  = 0.86) cohorts. Furthermore, comparison, classification, and problem-solving skills also replicated this pattern of large differences between high-low groups that supports the NOS/CRT positive relationship. However, prediction ( p  = 0.069) and logical reasoning ( p  = 0.504) did not display differences among the Adequate groups.

Post-hoc comparisons (Scheffé test) showed that the low group achieved significantly lower scores than the other three Adequate groups. The Adequate low group scores on thinking total, comparison, classification, and problem-solving skills were significantly lower than the scores of the other three groups, whereas the differences among the Adequate groups on prediction and logical reasoning scores were non-significant.

The main effect of the Plausible groups on the thinking total variable did not reach statistical significance for the primary F (3, 430) = 1.805, p = 0.145] and secondary groups [ F (3, 343) = 2.607, p  = 0.052]. The effect size was small ( d  = − 0.31 primary; d  = − 0.32 secondary) and negative (the thinking total mean score of the low group was higher than that of the high group). Post-hoc comparisons (Scheffé test) confirmed the trend, as they did not yield significant differences among the Plausible groups, although the mean score of the Plausible high group was lower than the other three groups. Exceptionally, problem-solving skill (primary) displayed a statistically significant difference between the Plausible high group (the lowest mean score) and the remaining three groups.

The main effect of Naive groups on the thinking total variable did not reach statistical significance [ F (3, 430) = 1.075, p  = 0.367 primary; F (3, 343) = 1.642, p  = 0.179 secondary] and the effect size of the differences was small ( d  = 0.32 primary; d  = − 0.31 secondary). The opposite direction of the differences in primary (positive) and secondary education (negative) is noteworthy, as it means that the highest mean score corresponded to the Naive high group in primary (positive) or the Naive low group in secondary (negative). Post-hoc comparisons (Scheffé test) showed that there were no significant differences among the Naive groups. However, the league table of groups across the Naive groups revealed differences between primary and secondary cohorts. Overall, the primary Naive groups followed the pattern of the Adequate variable (the low group displayed the lowest score), whereas the secondary Naive groups followed the pattern of the Plausible variable (the high group tended to display the lowest score).

The empirical findings of this study quantify through correlations some significant and positive relationships between thinking skills and NOS beliefs about science definitions, as the main answer to the research question. However, the analysis shows a complex pattern of the relationship, which depends on the kind of the NOS variable under consideration: the NOS Adequate variable, which represents phrases expressing informed views on science, is positively and significantly related to most thinking skills, whereas the uninformed Naive and intermediate Plausible variables show a lower predictive power of thinking skills. Summing up, the positive significant CRT-NOS relationship is not displayed by all NOS variables, as it is limited to those NOS variables that express an Adequate view of science, while the other NOS variables do not significantly correlate with CRT skills.

The implications of this study for research are twofold. On the one hand, the variables of this study specifically operationalise the two constructs under investigation, namely, CRT skills and NOS knowledge, which has been a challenge throughout their mixed operationalisation in the reviewed research. On the other hand, via Pearson correlations and regression analysis, this study quantifies the amount of the common variance between specific CRT skills and specific NOS knowledge, which is significant in many cases. Both contributions improve the features of previous studies, as most of them investigated the relationship from varied methodological frameworks: some reported group comparison, fewer analysed correlations, and most of the latter used a diversity of variables, which often did not match either CRT skills or NOS variables. For instance, Vieira et al. ( 2011 ) correlated thinking skills with science literacy (not NOS) and reported Pearson correlations that were lower than the correlations obtained herein, even though they used a smaller sample, which favours higher correlations.

The findings reveal the complexity of the NOS-CRT relationship, which limits the positive and relevant relationship to the NOS Adequate variables about science definitions, but not to the Plausible or Naive conceptualizations, which mainly display non-significant and somewhat negative correlations. The positive relationship between thinking and Adequate science definitions is a remarkable finding, which empirically supports the hypothesis that better thinking skills involve better NOS knowledge and confirms the concomitant intuitions and claims of some studies about the importance of thinking skills for learning NOS epistemic topics (Erduran & Kaya, 2018 ; Ford & Yore, 2014 ; Simonneaux, 2014 ; Torres & Solbes, 2016 ; Yacoubian, 2015 ). The findings also contribute to establishing the limit of the significant relationship, which applies when the NOS is conveyed by informed statements (Adequate phrases) and does not apply for non-adequate NOS statements, which are a minority in the face of most NOS literature, which conveys informed statements on NOS (Cofré et al., 2019 ).

The implications of the collateral finding on the lack of differences in science definitions between primary and secondary cohorts deserve further comments. Obviously, the finding confirms that two educational years have a scarce impact on improving Spanish students’ understanding of science definitions; that is, NOS teaching seems ineffective and stagnated, probably due to poor curriculum development and the lack of teacher training and educational resources. Besides, the students’ higher performance on adequate phrases than on plausible and naïve phrases also suggests that Spanish students may achieve some mild knowledge about the informed traits of science because they are implicitly displayed in teaching, textbooks and media. However, plausible and naïve knowledge is not usually available from those sources, as it requires explicit and reflective teaching, which Spanish students usually lack. Both findings suggest the need for further attention to misinformed NOS knowledge to invigorate explicit and reflective NOS teaching (Cofré et al., 2019 ; McDonald & McRobbie, 2012 ).

The unexpected non-significant/negative relationships between thinking and Plausible and Naive variables may need some elaboration due to the complexity of students’ NOS conceptions. For instance, Bennássar et al. ( 2010 ) described the students’ inconsistent agreements when rating opposite statements. Bogdan ( 2020 ) found that epistemic conceptions of science creativity did not relate to attitudes to science, and Khishfe ( 2012 ) reported complex relationships between epistemic aspects of science and decision-making about genetically modified organisms or the acceptance of the evolution theory (Cofré et al., 2017 ; Sinatra, et al., 2003 ). Thus, a tentative interpretation of those paradoxical relationships is elaborated.

Higher-thinking-skill students might develop better quality reflections that elicit more confident and higher scores on NOS phrases than lower-thinking-skill students. The latter tend toward less confident and low-quality reflection, which may elicit intermediate, less polarized scores. On average, this differential pattern explains the complex pattern of relationships between CRT and NOS variables. For the Adequate phrases (where the rubric assigns the best indices to the highest scores), higher-thinking students will achieve higher NOS indices than lower-thinking students, explaining the observed positive CRT-NOS correlations in the Adequate variables and the ANOVA results. On the other hand, when Naive and, especially, Plausible phrases are involved (which obtain their highest indices at low and intermediate scores, respectively), the differential response pattern would lead the lower-thinking students to achieve higher NOS indices than the higher-thinking students, thus shifting to the observed non-significant or negative correlations for Naive and Plausible phrases. In short, unconfident/confident and lower/higher quality reflection on NOS knowledge of the lower-/higher-thinking students would explain the shift from the positive and significant relationship of CRT-Adequate phrases to the non-significant correlations of Plausible and Naive phrases. This interpretation agrees with the striking finding of O’Brien et al. ( 2021 ) about a similar unexpected higher adherence to pseudoscientific claims in students with higher trust in science, which the authors attributed to the acritical acceptation of any scientific contents. Similarly, mastery of CRT skills is a desirable learning outcome, but it may make master students vulnerable to positive polarization in science definitions. However, further research is needed to confirm the non-significant correlations and the interpretation of the differential response pattern.

As the previous reference suggests, the findings about the complex CRT-NOS relationship connect with some pending controversies about NOS teaching, namely, the marginalized attention paid to misinformed ideas or myths about science, in favour of the informed ideas, which reveal implicit and non-reflective NOS teaching, as obviously misinformed ideas contribute to triggering more reflection than informed ideas (Acevedo et al., 2007 ; McComas, 1996 ). The effect of this under-exposure is students’ under-training about misinformed NOS ideas, which may act as obstacles to authentic NOS epistemic learning, explaining the differences presented herein. The remedy to this situation and the unconfident bias may lie in devoting more time and explicit attention to uninformed or incomplete NOS claims through reflective teaching.

This study is determined and limited by the contextual conditions of its correlational methodology. First, the research question implied measurements of thinking skills and NOS knowledge; second, the young participants (12–14-year-olds) required measurement tools appropriate to this age; third, the thinking skill tests had to match the thinking skills demanded by the participant school; fourth, the selected NOS tool was conditioned by the students’ age and the lack of appropriate NOS assessment tools. Thus, further suggestions to overcome these limitations are focused on expanding empirical support for the NOS-CRT relationship. On the one hand, some new NOS issues, such as additional epistemological and social aspects of science, should be explored to extend the representativeness of NOS knowledge. Similar reflections apply to including new skills to expand the scope of the CRT tool. Furthermore, the number of items of the logical reasoning scale should be increased to improve its reliability. Overall, the perennial debate between open-ended and closed formats is also noteworthy for future research, as quantitative methods could be complemented with qualitative methods (such as students’ interviews and the like).

Finally, the main educational implication of this study is that students may need to master some competence in CRT skills to learn NOS knowledge or general epistemic knowledge. Conversely, mastery of CRT skills may foster learning NOS knowledge. Although this study focuses on epistemic NOS knowledge drawn from science education, educational research has parallelly elaborated the epistemic knowledge (EK) construct for general education (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997 ), which opens further prospective research developments for NOS comprehension and CRT skills. On the one hand, the study of the NOS-EK relationship may shed light on convergent epistemic teaching and learning, both in science and in general education. On the other hand, the importance of CRT skills for NOS, and vice versa, may help coordinate teaching NOS-EK issues (Erduran & Kaya, 2018 ; Ford & Yore, 2014 ; McDonald & McRobbie, 2012 ; Simonneaux, 2014 ). This joint prospective of NOS-EK elaboration may also provide new answers to two aspects: the mutual connections between CRT skills and NOS-EK issues and the EK assessment tools that may also contribute to advancing the evaluation of CRT skills and NOS.

Data availability

The Spanish State Research Agency and the University of the Balearic Islands hold the property of all data and materials of this study, which may be available under reasonable request to them.

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Grant EDU2015-64642-R of the Spanish State Research Agency and the European Regional Development Fund, European Union.

Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature. This study is part of a research project funded by Grant No EDU2015-64642-R of the Spanish State Research Agency and the European Regional Development Fund, European Union.

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Manassero-Mas, M.A., Vázquez-Alonso, Á. An empirical analysis of the relationship between nature of science and critical thinking through science definitions and thinking skills. SN Soc Sci 2 , 270 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-022-00546-x

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Received : 11 December 2021

Accepted : 10 October 2022

Published : 08 December 2022

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-022-00546-x

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Growth Mindset

The decline of critical thinking skills, here's how to get back this important life skill..

Updated July 5, 2023 | Reviewed by Ray Parker

• Young people find themselves stuck in practical or survival thinking as a result of the pandemic.
• Thinking deeply is not easy in a world of distractions, so it's important to practice.
• Here are several ways to boost your critical thinking skills, such as active listening and lifelong learning.

Thinking clearly, deeply, and productively is one of our most valuable life skills. But, research shows that it is becoming one of the most endangered.

Unsurprisingly, there has been a decline in people’s ability to think deeply and reflectively in the past few years. One study, which focused on Millennial and Gen Z workers in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Japan, found that many people reported burning out and struggling to make ends meet. So they’ve been spending more time thinking about their immediate challenges, rather than the more profound, meaningful types of thinking that might lead to better outcomes.

One concern in the report (released by the Lenovo computer company ) is that the changes young people had to make to deal with the pressures of 2020 are not temporary. Instead, many young people seem to find themselves stuck in a practical or survival thinking mindset that can negatively impact their ability to function personally and professionally over time.

How can you improve your critical thinking skills? Here are some strategies that can help:

1. Avoid the urgency trap: If you tend to rush through decision-making when under the pressure of too many demands, you can develop self-awareness of your counterproductive habit, and learn to pause or take a break before rushing forward.

2. Engage in reflective thinking: Take the time to reflect on your own thoughts, experiences, and biases. Reflective thinking helps you gain self-awareness, consider different perspectives, and evaluate your own reasoning.

3. Practice active listening and effective communication: Engage in active listening to understand others’ viewpoints and perspectives. Practice expressing your thoughts clearly, constructively, and logically, fostering productive discussions and debates.

4. Solve problems systematically: Break down complex problems into smaller components, identify underlying issues, and consider multiple solutions. Practice problem-solving techniques, such as brainstorming, evaluating alternatives, and anticipating potential consequences.

5. Embrace curiosity and lifelong learning: Cultivate a mindset of interest and a thirst for knowledge. Be open to new ideas, seek diverse perspectives, and continuously expand your understanding through reading, research, and learning from others.

6. Engage in critical thinking exercises: Solve puzzles, riddles, or logical problems that challenge your reasoning abilities. Engage in debates, analyze case studies, or participate in critical thinking workshops or courses to sharpen your skills.

7. Practice self-compassion: Thinking deeply is not easy in a world of distractions. Develop a regular meditation or exercise practice to manage stress . Remember that deep thinking requires nurturing yourself and taking time to slow down.

Copyright 2023 Tara Well PhD

Tara Well, Ph.D. , is a professor in the department of psychology at Barnard College of Columbia University.

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