ideal form of government essay

If you're seeing this message, it means we're having trouble loading external resources on our website.

If you're behind a web filter, please make sure that the domains *.kastatic.org and *.kasandbox.org are unblocked.

To log in and use all the features of Khan Academy, please enable JavaScript in your browser.

US government and civics

Course: us government and civics   >   unit 1.

• The social contract
• Democratic ideals of US government

The ideas at the heart of US government

• Democratic ideals in the Declaration of Independence
• Democratic ideals in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution
• The Declaration of Independence
• Democratic ideals in the Preamble to the US Constitution
• The Preamble to the Constitution
• Ideals of democracy: lesson overview
• Ideals of democracy
• The US government is based on ideas of limited government, including natural rights, popular sovereignty, republicanism, and social contract.
• Limited government is the belief that the government should have certain restrictions in order to protect the individual rights and civil liberties of citizens.

Introduction

What is a limited government.

• What are the roles and responsibilities of this government?
• How will the government respond to the will of the people?

What are natural rights?

What is a social contract, what is popular sovereignty, what is republicanism, what do you think, want to join the conversation.

• Upvote Button navigates to signup page
• Downvote Button navigates to signup page
• Flag Button navigates to signup page

• Undergraduate
• High School
• Architecture
• American History
• Asian History
• Antique Literature
• American Literature
• Asian Literature
• Classic English Literature
• World Literature
• Creative Writing
• Linguistics
• Criminal Justice
• Legal Issues
• Anthropology
• Archaeology
• Political Science
• World Affairs
• African-American Studies
• East European Studies
• Latin-American Studies
• Native-American Studies
• West European Studies
• Family and Consumer Science
• Social Issues
• Women and Gender Studies
• Social Work
• Natural Sciences
• Pharmacology
• Earth science
• Agriculture
• Agricultural Studies
• Computer Science
• IT Management
• Mathematics
• Investments
• Engineering and Technology
• Engineering
• Aeronautics
• Medicine and Health
• Alternative Medicine
• Communications and Media
• Advertising
• Communication Strategies
• Public Relations
• Educational Theories
• Teacher's Career
• Chicago/Turabian
• Company Analysis
• Education Theories
• Shakespeare
• Canadian Studies
• Food Safety
• Relation of Global Warming and Extreme Weather Condition
• Movie Review
• Admission Essay
• Annotated Bibliography
• Application Essay
• Article Critique
• Article Review
• Article Writing
• Book Review
• Business Plan
• Business Proposal
• Capstone Project
• Cover Letter
• Creative Essay
• Dissertation
• Dissertation - Abstract
• Dissertation - Conclusion
• Dissertation - Discussion
• Dissertation - Hypothesis
• Dissertation - Introduction
• Dissertation - Literature
• Dissertation - Methodology
• Dissertation - Results
• GCSE Coursework
• Grant Proposal
• Marketing Plan
• Multiple Choice Quiz
• Personal Statement
• Power Point Presentation
• Power Point Presentation With Speaker Notes
• Questionnaire
• Reaction Paper
• Research Paper
• Research Proposal
• SWOT analysis
• Thesis Paper
• Online Quiz
• Literature Review
• Movie Analysis
• Statistics problem
• Math Problem
• All papers examples
• How It Works
• Money Back Policy
• Terms of Use
• Privacy Policy
• We Are Hiring

An Ideal Political System, Essay Example

Pages: 6

Words: 1598

Hire a Writer for Custom Essay

Use 10% Off Discount: "custom10" in 1 Click 👇

You are free to use it as an inspiration or a source for your own work.

The fact that humanity is inherently social means that we are also intrinsically political. Because people work together, live and die together, marry and have children together, and share a common world, it is necessary that some kind of rule of law be established in order to promote social order and safety. To contemporary minds, the word “anarchy” is equitable with lawlessness. And yet, the idea that minimalist government intrusion is the highest goal in determining a form of just government appeals to many of those who would reject the idea of anarchism as a desirable form of government. An ideal form of government for many is one where individual liberty is maximized and government oversight and regulation is kept to a minimum. The word “ideal” is very important in this context because it indicates the virtual impossibility of pragmatically implementing a government that both enhances personal liberty and remains relatively unobtrusive. If anything, history shows that individual liberty and rights are possible only through the regulation and enforcement of government, which in turn leads to an expansion ion government oversight and government power. Therefore, the ideal form of government is one that holds as its first priority the prevention of abuse of power at any level of society, which means that some form of anarchism is the best road to follow.

In regard to the American system of government, the Constitutional democracy that is indicated by the founding principles of the nation is made possible only through the establishing of a federal government to oversee the individual states. The founders of the nation understood that one of the most important principles of democracy was that governmental power had to be guarded against and that abuses of power were not exceptions to the rule, but rather the common obstacle that all institutions had to be vigilant against. In other words, the United States Constitution was designed with the idea that the people needed protection from government as much as they needed government to protect their civil rights and liberties. The system of “checks and balances” that was put into place by the founders created a separation of powers that was meant to divide the government into three arms, each with specific enumerated powers that were meant to off-set the potential abuse of power by the other two branches.

This system has resulted in one of the most corrupt and dysfunctional governmental systems in the history of the world. The safeguards envisioned by the founders to protect the ideals reflected in the Constitution have proven to be insufficient against the larger issue of corruption and greed. Due to this fact, it would seem that the liberties and rights that were envisioned by the founders are insufficiently protected by the current Constitutional democracy that is in effect in America. Additional protections against governmental abuse are not only necessary, they are indispensable. So long as the government is itself a threat to liberty, it must be regarded as having utterly failed in its functional and moral purpose. This is in some sense radical idea in an age where the purpose of government seems to be merely to perpetuate itself and the moneyed interests that so openly and casually bribe those in power to abuse government authority on behalf of a small oligarchy.

One of the key elements of the Constitutional democracy that was envisioned by the founders was the idea that the people would themselves function as a last bulwark against the erosion of liberty and rights. This is where the idea of Constitutional democracy most closely leads to the idea of anarchism. This is because the idea of the people being a safeguard against the abuse of government is, in fact, the foundation of anarchistic thought. Rather than standing for lawlessness, what anarchism really means is that government is regarded as a  necessary evil that must be viewed as a potential threat to liberty and freedom. The idea that democratic traditions begin with the people themselves is another way of saying that government is unnecessary for establishing these principles but must emerge out of them. For this to be an effective form of government, the perpetuation of government power must be kept to a minimum. The values and moral disposition of the people is, in effect, more important than any system of government that is put in place.

If the moral bearing and value system of the population is such that they value material acquisition and power more than they values the virtues of freedom and democracy then no form of government or policy or law will prove capable of ensuring a true Constitutional democracy. Similarly, if the values and moral ideals of the population are imbued with an intrinsic respect for justice and liberty, then the main obstacle to the implementation of a true democracy is the potential of abuse of government power. It is essential in an anarchistic system for the officials in government to embody the principles that are desired to maintain a maximum amount of liberty for the population. Even under an anarchistic system where authority is meant to be curbed, the “top down” influence of power still applies. If the government embodies virtuous principles, the people are more apt to embody them as well, and vice-versa.

Such a notion has much in common with certain virtues expressed in Confucianism. Although this might seem to be a surprising assertion, reference to some of the axioms about government that are in the Analects supports the idea. For example, when Confucius mentions that the only true power of governance is through righteous example rather than coercion, the end-result of this assertion is a proclamation in favor of a kind of anarchy. Keeping in mind that anarchy does not mean “lawless,” but instead means “viewing government as a potential enemy to freedom,” Confucius’s statement that “If a ruler is upright, all will go well without orders. But if he himself is not upright, even though he gives orders they will not be obeyed” (Analects, 32), offers the insight that enforcement of laws by a corrupt government is impossible. What he is saying, in effect, is that what people need from government (or leaders) more than laws and law enforcement is a sense of morality and an intact value system. If the government truly operates from principle, the people will, in effect, be “governed” or “led” in such a way as to promote a just an ordered society.

One similarity between the idea of anarchism and the concepts of government forwarded by Confucius in the Analects is the concept that government should serve the people and not the other way around. Confucius notes that the level of happiness in a given society is an indication as to how virtuous and effective the government is and also whether or not the government is serving the public welfare. He notes that “A government is good when those near are happy and those far-off are attracted” (Analects, 33). This contradicts the contemporary notions of xenophobia and distrust of immigrants. It also carries a subtle inference that the benevolence and justice ion a well-ordered society can spread beyond national borders to create a global good. This is also an anarchistic notion. In the anarchistic ideal, governments simple function as the protectors of the natural rights that belong to all of humanity regardless of race, culture, or national borders.

The one key difference between anarchism and the notions of government forwarded by Confucius is the way that leaders are viewed. In the Analects, Confucius retains a monarchal attitude, at least on the surface of his analysis. However, a close look at his words reveals that he may have been more subversive than it appears at first glance. Confucius asserts that leaders exert tremendous influence on society and that this influence is made by example. If the ruler is corrupt, the society will flounder. Therefore, leadership according to the Confucian ideal is a task that requires total commitment to the people rather than to self-service of greed. Confucius affirms this idea when he asserts that a good leader “cultivates himself so as to be able to bring comfort to the whole populace.” (Analects, 32) This statement reveals that Confucius views leaders as the servants of the population which is a actually more of an anarchistic than monarchal view.

Of course, an ideal society as envisioned through the Analects or by anarchistic philosophers is merely that: an ideal that stands as a symbolic articulation of underlying political and moral theories and principles. As such these kinds of societies are unlikely to ever be fully attained, but they are models of how an ideal political system might function. In the anarchistic model, government is viewed as a necessary evil that must be restricted in scope and power in order to stave off corruption and injustice. In the Confucian model, it is the tradition of virtue and moral uprightness that allows a collective society to function with tis leaders standing as examples of the desired virtues. In both philosophies the idea of government as a coercive or enforcing power is viewed as corrupt and dangerous. It is my personal opinion that any ideal form of government must start with this principle. Therefore any ideal government must incorporate the central tenant of anarchistic philosophy: that governments are a threat to freedom and the rights of the individual. The Constitutional democracy that is presently in place in the United States is a good example of how well-intended models of government can ultimately fail despite their design against the potential abuse of power by government

Confucius. The Analects . p. 20-33.

Stuck with your Essay?

Get in touch with one of our experts for instant help!

Community Colleges Should Be Free, Essay Example

Human Nature and Social Systems, Essay Example

Time is precious

don’t waste it!

Plagiarism-free guarantee

Privacy guarantee

Secure checkout

Money back guarantee

Related Essay Samples & Examples

Voting as a civic responsibility, essay example.

Pages: 1

Words: 287

Utilitarianism and Its Applications, Essay Example

Words: 356

The Age-Related Changes of the Older Person, Essay Example

Pages: 2

Words: 448

The Problems ESOL Teachers Face, Essay Example

Pages: 8

Words: 2293

Should English Be the Primary Language? Essay Example

Pages: 4

Words: 999

The Term “Social Construction of Reality”, Essay Example

Words: 371

• Utility Menu

Writing in Government

How do i write a gov paper .

Expos teaches you about the fundamentals of writing an analytical argument. As you write papers in Gov, you are adapting the elements of argument to a particular audience: readers in the social sciences. These readers have specific expectations about how to present arguments and supporting evidence. Writing successfully in Gov requires you to identify those expectations in assignment prompts and then  respond to them by making well-supported and clearly reasoned arguments.

__________________________________

"Everybody's work has to stand or fall on the basis of the arguments presented and the evidence." - Prof. Eric Nelson

Do the Exercise

In these exercises, you have two goals: to identify the common elements of essay prompts, and to learn strategies for developing arguments that respond effectively to the expectations presented by a given prompt. 

Decoding Prompts

Developing a thesis.

What to Do:

• Prepare  by reading about the elements of paper prompts in the "Tips" tool to the right.
• Read  the three sample prompts below and select one to work with.
• Answer  the questions in the text boxes below the sample prompts.
• Write  a 1-sentence version in your own words of the prompt you have selected. You can do this in the first “Re-write” box below the questions.
• Try re-writing  the other two prompts in a single sentence. 

Please note that these forms are not monitored; no feedback will be sent at this time.

Sample Prompts

1. The traditional definition of democracy is captured by Schumpeter’s statement that democracy is the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” Is Schumpeter’s “free competition for the free vote” a sufficient conceptual and normative definition of “democracy”? What else, if anything, would you add to this definition?

2. The majority of Gov 97 has focused on state actors, but the Internet is a whole new non-state world that currently has little to no formal governance. Should the Internet be governed democratically? What does it mean to have democratic governance of the Internet? (Will there be elected bodies? Will the Internet be governed by democratic principles?) If you were on a committee to develop Internet governance, what democratic processes (if any) would you recommend? Why?

3. How do new technologies affect democratic politics? We have read a number of accounts of traditional forms of democratic participation and democratic institutions – choose one topic or outcome (e.g. elections, campaign finance, regime change, economic institutions, the welfare state, democratic peace etc.) that we have read about, and think about how new technologies challenge or add to traditional theories about that outcome.

( Taken from Gov 97, Spring 2015)

Understanding Prompts

Design and purpose.

Instructors have two main goals with most prompts: First, they want to test how well you’ve understood assigned material for the course and gauge your progress over the term. Second, they want to encourage you to think about certain questions in a way that may not be directly covered in the course materials themselves. In this way, prompts facilitates guided learning through writing.

In most cases, the instructor will have both of these goals in mind. Depending on the assignment, though, one goal may carry greater emphasis than the other. 

Central Question

This is the main question that the instructor wants you to answer. It may be a yes/no question, where you need to agree or disagree with a given statement. Or it may be an open-ended question, where you need to develop your own line of argument. Either way, the central question is the core of the paper, i.e., the question your instructor is asking in order to test your knowledge about material from the course or to encourage you to develop a reasoned opinion based on that material. Your thesis statement should respond directly to this central question.

Example of a central question:

What do you think is Aristotle’s strongest justification for participatory citizenship?

Example of a multi-part central question:

What do you think is Aristotle’s strongest justification for participatory citizenship? Does it translate from ancient democracy to the present; does it apply today?

Supporting Questions

In addition to the central question, prompts typically include additional points to consider as you write your paper, and these points often come in the form of secondary or supporting questions. Supporting questions are meant to prompt your thinking and can help remind you of important debates that may exist within the topic you are writing about.  

That being said, prompts made up of more than one question can be harder to decode. For one thing, the first question in the prompt is not always the central question, and it might be possible to interpret more than one of the questions as the central question. This ambiguity might be intentional (to allow students to write a range of essays), or it might be unintentional. For these reasons, it is always helpful to try putting the prompt in your own words. What is the central question being asked? And what is the central question your paper is answering with its thesis? What are the supporting questions being asked? And how will your paper answer those questions in relation to your thesis?

In the following example prompt, notice how the first set of questions (greyed out and in italics) form a multi-part central question about an idea of Aristotle and its relevance to the present day. The subsequent supporting questions provide a number of possible directions in which to elaborate on this question, but none of these supporting questions should be the main focus of an argument responding to this particular prompt.  

Example:        

What do you think is Aristotle’s strongest justification for participatory citizenship? Does it translate from ancient democracy to the present; does it apply today? How do modern democracies define citizenship? Do modern democratic institutions (representation, voting and elections, political parties) and/or the organized groups of civil society (voluntary associations, demonstrations, social movements) provide arenas for political participation? If so, how and why is participation valued? If not, why not, and how is the division of political labor justified?

Additional Cues

Prompts often provide cues about what should or shouldn't be the focus of a writing assignment. For instance, there may be debates or themes that have been raised in the course, but which are not meant to be the particular focus of the paper at hand. In the following excerpt from a prompt, you can see that Aristotle's definition of "citizen" is crucial, but the goal of the essay is to  use  the definition to make a further point, rather than getting bogged down in the definition itself. 

Example from a Gov prompt:

In the Politics , Aristotle defined a citizen as someone who takes turns in ruling and being ruled, identified who was eligible (and ineligible) for citizenship, gave an account of citizens’ judgment, and set out reasons for popular political participation.

Restrictions

Prompts often include additional requirements that either guide or limit a writing assignment. These restrictions are usually straightforward requirements for the essay's form (how long it should be) or for its content (what question(s) it should answer and which sources or cases it should use). 

• You must analyze Aristotle’s text
• You may pick just one or two government institutions or civil society groups to 
illustrate your answer.
• You must refer to at least two authors (in addition to Aristotle) in composing your 
response. 
• Prepare by reading about the elements of thesis statements in the "Tips" tool to the right.
• Read the sample prompt below.
• Answer the questions in the text boxes below the sample prompts.  

Sample Prompt & Theses

Making reference to the cases of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, construct an argument that addresses the following questions: When you consider the various theories you've encountered about the emergence of ethnic politics in your readings as well as in lecture, how well (or how poorly) do specific elements of these two cases fit those theories? What is the strongest explanation overall for why ethnic violence broke out in these two cases and eventually assumed the proportions it did? Does the same answer apply to both cases, or do different answers best explain Rwanda and Yugoslavia separately?

• The Rwandan and Yugoslav genocides were similar in some ways. In other ways, though, they were different. 
• Ethnic politics leads to the emergence of ethnic violence.
• I argue that ethnic politics is important for understanding violence in Rwanda and Yugoslavia and for explaining the genocides there.
• Rwanda and Yugoslavia both experienced similar levels of ethnic politics and ethnic violence during the 1990s and followed similar paths to genocide.
• Ethnic politics does not always lead to ethnic violence, but in cases where the state collapses like it did in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the path from ethnic politics to genocide will be similar.

Taken from Gov 20, Fall 2015

What is an Argument?

In the social sciences, an argument typically make claims about the way the world works. It argues that the world is one way rather than another, and explains why it is that way .

The first part of the bolded statement above is really important. In social science courses, you will rarely be asked to just summarize a set of facts. You will instead be asked to make assertions about how something came to be or how some phenomenon caused another.

This implies a counterfactual , which is a statement about how the world would have been, if something else had happened. For example, you might argue that polarization in American politics is caused by people moving to areas where most people share their political beliefs. This implies that if people didn't move to neighborhoods or cities with like-minded people, there wouldn't be polarization. But they do , so there is .

The first part of the bolded statement above also implies that you will give evidence to show us that your argument is correct.

The latter part of the statement, in turn, implies that you will show us the "why" of the phenomenon you're looking at: how exactly does it work?

Thesis Requirements

A thesis statement will be in response to a specific question, whether that question is explicitly asked in a prompt or is a question you have yourself developed in response to course readings or class discussions. Therefore, your thesis statement should clearly be an answer to a question!

Your answer should not just contain a "what is" statement, but a statement of "how" your argument works. What is the "mechanism" of your argument? If you say that wealth causes democracy, make sure the “how” or “because” is also clearly previewed in your thesis.

This is also your introduction to the reader of what the paper’s really about, and it is your chance to explain how the paper will work. It should prepare them for the direction the paper is going, so they know what kinds of evidence they should expect.

In college-level papers, thesis statements can be more than one sentence long. Being concise is good, but it's ok to have a slightly longer thesis statement if your thesis is somewhat complex, e.g., if there are two or three steps in the "how" part of your paper. 

Scope Conditions

Most papers are not about making universal arguments that showcase  everything you know, but about making an valid argument within a set of parameters that are either provided by the assignment itself, or that you decide to keep your argument clear and effective.

In writing, be clear: what are the “scope conditions” of your argument? In other words, under what conditions or in which cases is your argument valid?

Example: “In democracies,” i.e., not for every country we’ve looked at, but only for democracies.

Example: “Among late developers” i.e., only in those countries that developed recently.

Make sure your these boundaries are clearly stated in your thesis statement . Do you think it will be intuitive to the reader why you used these scope conditions in particular? If not, you may need to briefly explain why you're using them, either in the thesis statement itself or just before (or after) your thesis statement.

Evaluating Theses

Can readers take your thesis statement and test it like they would a hypothesis? Would they know what to look for in order to evaluate how well your argument is made? If so, it's probably a strong thesis.

A hypothesis is a statement that can be tested . For example, in the statement "wealth leads to democracy," we can imagine testing it by looking for wealthy countries that aren't democratic.

If readers can look at your thesis statement and come up new evidence to refute your claim, it might mean there's room for healthy debate on the topic--and it might mean there's a genuine weakness in your argument--but it also means you probably have a clearly written thesis statement! 

A really common thesis-related problem for students is that readers don't know how to evaluate whether the argument is right or wrong . This idea of being able to test arguments against new evidence is what makes political science "scientific."

Additional Tips

Be direct, and own your answer. Don’t say, “The purpose of my paper is to show that economic development causes democracy.” Say, “Economic development causes democracy, because…”

But it is OK to use the first-person voice in political science! (Example: "Wealth is a necessary condition for democracy. I show this by examining all countries with an average GDP above $6,000 per year")

Make it clear where your thesis statement is. You don’t have to put the thesis statement at the end of a short, first paragraph...but this is common, because it keeps you from writing too much/too little introduction, and it’s often where your reader will look first (because it is so common!)

Avoid the word “prove,” which implies definitive proof (which is rarely possible in social sciences)

Avoid overly stylized language in your thesis statement, and keep it as clear, specific, and unambiguous as possible.

It’s ok to argue that sometimes things work one way, and sometimes another. For example, “wealthy countries are usually democratic, but sometimes they aren’t.” However, it’s much stronger to try and make this difference part of your argument---”Wealthy countries are usually democratic because [reason], but oil-rich countries are an exception because [reason].”

Is Democracy the Best Form of Government?

Cite this chapter.

• Howard P. Kainz  

31 Accesses

In posing again the traditional question about the ‘best form of government’, we might take a lead (this time around) from an idea prevalent in a philosophical movement which is not expressly political — the phenomenological movement. Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and other exponents of ‘phenomenology’ (or ‘existential phenomenology’), although they disagree about many things, seem to concur in at least one important insight: there is no possibility of studying consciousness in and for itself; consciousness is always consciousnessof something. In a somewhat parallel fashion, most people in our relativistic social milieu would be inclined to assent to the proposition that there is no validity to the pursuit of an ‘absolutely best’ form of government; in other words, a government can be adjudged ‘best’ only insofar as it is best- for the people who are governed.

Do democracies make more and greater mistakes than other forms of government? … Is not illegal lynching a lesser evil than legal liquidation? What is the difference between slavery, which the democracies abolished, and the labor camps which Soviet Russia has instituted? If we compare the (alleged) low level of universal education in American democracy with the high level of the selective aristocratic system in some European democracies, which is to be preferred? This being settled, how does the favored system compare in promise for humanity with the controlled system of education in Communist Russia? M. ten Hoor, Freedom Limited [The ‘old’ liberals, who were suspicious of interference from government in the affairs of the citizenry] had no glimpse of the fact that private control of the new forces of production, forces which affect the life of everyone, would operate in the same way as private unchecked control of political power. They saw the need for new legal institutions, and of different political conditions as a means to political liberty. But they failed to perceive that social control of economic forces is equally necessary if anything approaching economic equality and liberty is to be realised. John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (1935) The terrifying phenomenon of totalitarianism, which has been born into our world perhaps four times, did not issue from authoritarian systems, but in each case from a weak democracy: the one created by the February Revolution in Russia, the Weimar and the Italian Republics, and Chiang Kai-shek’s China. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, ‘Misconceptions about Russia’

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

• Available as PDF
• Read on any device
• Instant download
• Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Unable to display preview.  Download preview PDF.

There is some unavoidable ambiguity involved in the use of the term, ‘relative’, with respect to government, as T. L. Thorson shows in The Logic of Democracy (NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1967) ch. III.

Google Scholar  

However, as W. J. Stankiewicz points out in Aspects of Political Theory (London: Macmillan, 1976, pp. 17ff), one can also say that democracy makes the vox populi ‘absolute’.

Mortimer Adler in ‘A Disputation on the Future of Democracy’ ( The Great Ideas Today , 1978) p. 27, tries to overcome this standard dichotomy between ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ by developing the paradox that the state through education and social legislation should bring the less-than-ideal citizens up to the ideal level, so that ‘the best form of government absolutely is also the best relatively for every human group’.

F. Patrick Hubbard, ‘Justice, Limits to Growth, and an Equilibrium State’, in Philosophy and Public Affairs , Summer 1978.

See Roberto Mangabeira Ungar, Knowledge and Politics (NY: Free Press, 1975) Part I.

Yves Simon, Community of the Free , W. Task tr. (NY: Holt, 1947) p. 149.

See Alfonso Damico, Individuality and Community: The Social and Political Thought of John Dewey (Gainesville: University of Flordia Press, 1978) chs 5, 7.

Jane Mansbridge’s Beyond Adversary Democracy (NY: Basic Books, 1980) theorises from this latter standpoint and actually tries to work out the possibilities of homeostasis through illustrative case-studies.

Download references

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Copyright information

© 1984 Howard P. Kainz

About this chapter

Kainz, H.P. (1984). Is Democracy the Best Form of Government?. In: Democracy East and West. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17596-3_11

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17596-3_11

Publisher Name : Palgrave Macmillan, London

Print ISBN : 978-1-349-17598-7

Online ISBN : 978-1-349-17596-3

eBook Packages : Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies Collection Political Science and International Studies (R0)

Share this chapter

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research

No. 70: David Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth” (1777)

The oll reader: an anthology of the best of the oll, no. 70: david hume, "idea of a perfect commonwealth" (1777) < oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2712 >.

"As one form of government must be allowed more perfect than another, independent of the manners and humours of particular men; why may we not enquire what is the most perfect of all, though the common botched and inaccurate governments seem to serve the purposes of society, and though it be not so easy to establish a new system of government, as to build a vessel upon a new construction?"

David Hume (1711-1776)

The OLL Reader < oll.libertyfund.org/pages/best-of-the-oll > Quotations about Liberty and Power < oll.libertyfund.org/quotes >

[January, 2016]

Editor's Introduction

"All plans of government, which suppose great reformation in the manners of mankind, are plainly imaginary. Of this nature, are the Republic of Plato, and the Utopia of Sir Thomas More. The Oceana is the only valuable model of a commonwealth, that has yet been offered to the public."

"That the foregoing plan of government is practicable, no one can doubt, who considers the resemblance that it bears to the commonwealth of the United Provinces, a wise and renowned government."

"The plan of Cromwell’s parliament ought to be restored, by making the representation equal, and by allowing none to vote in the county elections who possess not a property of 200 pounds value."

David Hume (1711-1776) was a moral philosopher and historian and a leading member of the Scottish Enlightenment. In philosophy he was a skeptic. In his multi-volume History of England he showed how the rule of law and the creation of an independent judiciary created the foundation for liberty in England. Hume also wrote on economics, was a personal friend of Adam Smith, and was a proponent of free trade. His works highlighted the neutrality of money and the errors of the mercantilists.

After making his name as a philosopher with works like The Treatise of Human Nature (1740) and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), Hume turned to writing a multi-volume History of England (1754–62) in which he traced the emergence of modern Britain with its constutional monarchy. His ideal form of government was not known in any detail until the posthumous appearance of the essay "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" in 1777. He died before the American Revolution created a new form of a Republic which might have pleased him considerably.

In this essay, which is at times quite technical in its detail, he draws up an elaborate scheme for a "perfect commonwealth" for which he borrows aspects of James Harrington's Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) and Oliver Cromwell's Commonwealth (1653-59) during the English Revolution. His other model included the United Provinces of the Netherlands. Some of the interesting things to note include the following: that earlier attempts to create a perfect society made the fundamental error of trying to change human nature; government institutions should be radically decentralised into counties and parishes which would elect their own representatives; that only property owners who have stake in the society should be allowed to vote; that political power should be balanced by a Senate and a Representative (house of representatives); that small commonwealths (perhaps even city states) were "happier" than large ones; and that war and conquest were "the ruin of every free government."

David Hume, "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" (1777)

It is not with forms of government, as with other artificial contrivances; where an old engine may be rejected, if we can discover another more accurate and commodious, or where trials may safely be made, even though the success be doubtful. An established government has an infinite advantage, by that very circumstance of its being established; the bulk of mankind being governed by authority, not reason, and never attributing authority to any thing that has not the recommendation of antiquity. To tamper, therefore, in this affair, or try experiments merely upon the credit of supposed argument and philosophy, can never be the part of a wise magistrate, who will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of age; and though he may attempt some improvements for the public good, yet will he adjust his innovations, as much as possible, to the ancient fabric, and preserve entire the chief pillars and supports of the constitution.

The mathematicians in Europe have been much divided concerning that figure of a ship, which is the most commodious for sailing; and Huygens, 1 who at last determined the controversy, is justly thought to have obliged the learned, as well as commercial world; though Columbus had sailed to America, and Sir Francis Drake made the tour of the world, 2 without any such discovery. As one form of government must be allowed more perfect than another, independent of the manners and humours of particular men; why may we not enquire what is the most perfect of all, though the common botched and inaccurate governments seem to serve the purposes of society, and though it be not so easy to establish a new system of government, as to build a vessel upon a new construction? The subject is surely the most worthy curiosity of any the wit of man can possibly devise. And who knows, if this controversy were fixed by the universal consent of the wise and learned, but, in some future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution of some old government, or by the combination of men to form a new one, in some distant part of the world? In all cases, it must be advantageous to know what is most perfect in the kind, that we may be able to bring any real constitution or form of government as near it as possible, by such gentle alterations and innovations as may not give too great disturbance to society.

All I pretend to in the present essay is to revive this subject of speculation; and therefore I shall deliver my sentiments in as few words as possible. A long dissertation on that head would not, I apprehend, be very acceptable to the public, who will be apt to regard such disquisitions both as useless and chimerical.

All plans of government, which suppose great reformation in the manners of mankind, are plainly imaginary. Of this nature, are the Republic of Plato, and the Utopia of Sir Thomas More. 3 The Oceana is the only valuable model of a commonwealth, that has yet been offered to the public. 4

The chief defects of the Oceana seem to be these. First, Its rotation is inconvenient, by throwing men, of whatever abilities, by intervals, out of public employments. Secondly, Its Agrarian is impracticable. Men will soon learn the art, which was practised in ancient Rome, of concealing their possessions under other people’s name; till at last, the abuse will become so common, that they will throw off even the appearance of restraint. Thirdly, The Oceana provides not a sufficient security for liberty, or the redress of grievances. The senate must propose, and the people consent; by which means, the senate have not only a negative upon the people, but, what is of much greater consequence, their negative goes before the votes of the people. Were the King’s negative of the same nature in the English constitution, and could he prevent any bill from coming into parliament, he would be an absolute monarch. As his negative follows the votes of the houses, it is of little consequence: Such a difference is there in the manner of placing the same thing. When a popular bill has been debated in parliament, is brought to maturity, all its conveniencies and inconveniencies, weighed and balanced; if afterwards it be presented for the royal assent, few princes will venture to reject the unanimous desire of the people. But could the King crush a disagreeable bill in embryo (as was the case, for some time, in the Scottish parliament, by means of the lords of the articles 5 ), the British government would have no balance, nor would grievances ever be redressed: And it is certain, that exorbitant power proceeds not, in any government, from new laws, so much as from neglecting to remedy the abuses, which frequently rise from the old ones. A government, says Machiavel, must often be brought back to its original principles. 6 It appears then, that, in the Oceana, the whole legislature may be said to rest in the senate; which Harrington would own to be an inconvenient form of government, especially after the Agrarian is abolished.

Here is a form of government, to which I cannot, in theory, discover any considerable objection.

Let Great Britain and Ireland, or any territory of equal extent, be divided into 100 counties, and each county into 100 parishes, making in all 10,000. If the country, proposed to be erected into a commonwealth be of more narrow extent, we may diminish the number of counties; but never bring them below thirty. If it be of greater extent, it were better to enlarge the parishes, or throw more parishes into a county, than encrease the number of counties.

Let all the freeholders of twenty pounds a-year in the county, and all the householders worth 500 pounds in the town parishes, meet annually in the parish church, and chuse, by ballot, some freeholder of the county for their member, whom we shall call the county representative.

"Let all the freeholders of twenty pounds a-year in the county, and all the householders worth 500 pounds in the town parishes, meet annually in the parish church, and chuse, by ballot, some freeholder of the county for their member, whom we shall call the county representative."

Let the 100 county representatives, two days after their election, meet in the county town, and chuse by ballot, from their own body, ten county magistrates, and one senator. There are, therefore, in the whole commonwealth, 100 senators, 1100 county magistrates, and 10,000 county representatives. For we shall bestow on all senators the authority of county magistrates, and on all county magistrates the authority of county representatives.

Let the senators meet in the capital, and be endowed with the whole executive power of the commonwealth; the power of peace and war, of giving orders to generals, admirals, and ambassadors, and, in short, all the prerogatives of a British King, except his negative.

Let the county representatives meet in their particular counties, and possess the whole legislative power of the commonwealth; the greater number of counties deciding the question; and where these are equal, let the senate have the casting vote.

Every new law must first be debated in the senate; and though rejected by it, if ten senators insist and protest, it must be sent down to the counties. The senate, if they please, may join to the copy of the law their reasons for receiving or rejecting it.

Because it would be troublesome to assemble all the county representatives for every trivial law, that may be requisite, the senate have their choice of sending down the law either to the county magistrates or county representatives.

The magistrates, though the law be referred to them, may, if they please, call the representatives, and submit the affair to their determination.

Whether the law be referred by the senate to the county magistrates or representatives, a copy of it, and of the senate’s reasons, must be sent to every representative eight days before the day appointed for the assembling, in order to deliberate concerning it. And though the determination be, by the senate, referred to the magistrates, if five representatives of the county order the magistrates to assemble the whole court of representatives, and submit the affair to their determination, they must obey.

Either the county magistrates or representatives may give, to the senator of the county, the copy of a law to be proposed to the senate; and if five counties concur in the same order, the law, though refused by the senate, must come either to the county magistrates or representatives, as is contained in the order of the five counties.

Any twenty counties, by a vote either of their magistrates or representatives, may throw any man out of all public offices for a year. Thirty counties for three years.

The senate has a power of throwing out any member or number of members of its own body, not to be re-elected for that year. The senate cannot throw out twice in a year the senator of the same county.

The power of the old senate continues for three weeks after the annual election of the county representatives. Then all the new senators are shut up in a conclave, like the cardinals; and by an intricate ballot, such as that of Venice 7 or Malta, they chuse the following magistrates; a protector, who represents the dignity of the commonwealth, and presides in the senate; two secretaries of state; these six councils, a council of state, a council of religion and learning, a council of trade, a council of laws, a council of war, a council of the admiralty, each council consisting of five persons; together with six commissioners of the treasury and a first commissioner. All these must be senators. The senate also names all the ambassadors to foreign courts, who may either be senators or not.

The senate may continue any or all of these, but must re-elect them every year.

The protector and two secretaries have session and suffrage in the council of state. The business of that council is all foreign politics. The council of state has session and suffrage in all the other councils.

The council of religion and learning inspects the universities and clergy. That of trade inspects every thing that may affect commerce. That of laws inspects all the abuses of law by the inferior magistrates, and examines what improvements may be made of the municipal law. That of war inspects the militia and its discipline, magazines, stores, &c. and when the republic is in war, examines into the proper orders for generals. The council of admiralty has the same power with regard to the navy, together with the nomination of the captains and all inferior officers.

"The council of religion and learning inspects the universities and clergy. That of trade inspects every thing that may affect commerce. That of laws inspects all the abuses of law by the inferior magistrates, and examines what improvements may be made of the municipal law."

None of these councils can give orders themselves, except where they receive such powers from the senate. In other cases, they must communicate every thing to the senate.

When the senate is under adjournment, any of the councils may assemble it before the day appointed for its meeting.

Besides these councils or courts, there is another called the court of competitors; which is thus constituted. If any candidates for the office of senator have more votes than a third of the representatives, that candidate, who has most votes, next to the senator elected, becomes incapable for one year of all public offices, even of being a magistrate or representative: But he takes his seat in the court of competitors. Here then is a court which may sometimes consist of a hundred members, sometimes have no members at all; and by that means, be for a year abolished.

The court of competitors has no power in the commonwealth. It has only the inspection of public accounts, and the accusing of any man before the senate. If the senate acquit him, the court of competitors may, if they please, appeal to the people, either magistrates or representatives. Upon that appeal, the magistrates or representatives meet on the day appointed by the court of competitors, and chuse in each county three persons; from which number every senator is excluded. These, to the number of 300, meet in the capital, and bring the person accused to a new trial.

The court of competitors may propose any law to the senate; and if refused, may appeal to the people, that is, to the magistrates or representatives, who examine it in their counties. Every senator, who is thrown out of the senate by a vote of the court, takes his seat in the court of competitors.

The senate possesses all the judicative authority of the house of Lords, that is, all the appeals from the inferior courts. It likewise appoints the Lord Chancellor, and all the officers of the law.

Every county is a kind of republic within itself, and the representatives may make bye-laws; which have no authority ’till three months after they are voted. A copy of the law is sent to the senate, and to every other county. The senate, or any single county, may, at any time, annul any bye-law of another county.

"Every county is a kind of republic within itself, and the representatives may make bye-laws; which have no authority ’till three months after they are voted."

The representatives have all the authority of the British justices of peace in trials, commitments, &c.

The magistrates have the appointment of all the officers of the revenue in each county. All causes with regard to the revenue are carried ultimately by appeal before the magistrates. They pass the accompts of all the officers; but must have their own accompts examined and passed at the end of the year by the representatives.

The magistrates name rectors or ministers to all the parishes.

The Presbyterian government is established; and the highest ecclesiastical court is an assembly or synod of all the presbyters of the county. The magistrates may take any cause from this court, and determine it themselves.

The magistrates may try, and depose or suspend any presbyter.

The militia is established in imitation of that of Swisserland, which being well known, we shall not insist upon it. 8 It will only be proper to make this addition, that an army of 20,000 men be annually drawn out by rotation, paid and encamped during six weeks in summer; that the duty of a camp may not be altogether unknown.

The magistrates appoint all the colonels and downwards. The senate all upwards. During war, the general appoints the colonel and downwards, and his commission is good for a twelvemonth. But after that, it must be confirmed by the magistrates of the county, to which the regiment belongs. The magistrates may break any officer in the county regiment. And the senate may do the same to any officer in the service. If the magistrates do not think proper to confirm the general’s choice, they may appoint another officer in the place of him they reject.

All crimes are tried within the county by the magistrates and a jury. But the senate can stop any trial, and bring it before themselves.

Any county may indict any man before the senate for any crime.

The protector, the two secretaries, the council of state, with any five or more that the senate appoints, are possessed, on extraordinary emergencies, of dictatorial power for six months.

The protector may pardon any person condemned by the inferior courts.

In time of war, no officer of the army that is in the field can have any civil office in the commonwealth.

The capital, which we shall call London, may be allowed four members in the senate. It may therefore be divided into four counties. The representatives of each of these chuse one senator, and ten magistrates. There are therefore in the city four senators, forty-four magistrates, and four hundred representatives. The magistrates have the same authority as in the counties. The representatives also have the same authority; but they never meet in one general court: They give their votes in their particular county, or division of hundreds.

When they enact any bye-law, the greater number of counties or divisions determines the matter. And where these are equal, the magistrates have the casting vote.

The magistrates chuse the mayor, sheriff, recorder, and other officers of the city.

In the commonwealth, no representative, magistrate, or senator, as such, has any salary. The protector, secretaries, councils, and ambassadors, have salaries.

The first year in every century is set apart for correcting all inequalities, which time may have produced in the representative. This must be done by the legislature.

The following political aphorisms may explain the reason of these orders.

The lower sort of people and small proprietors are good judges enough of one not very distant from them in rank or habitation; and therefore, in their parochial meetings, will probably chuse the best, or nearly the best representative: But they are wholly unfit for county-meetings, and for electing into the higher offices of the republic. Their ignorance gives the grandees an opportunity of deceiving them.

"The lower sort of people and small proprietors are good judges enough of one not very distant from them in rank or habitation; and therefore, in their parochial meetings, will probably chuse the best, or nearly the best representative: But they are wholly unfit for county-meetings, and for electing into the higher offices of the republic. Their ignorance gives the grandees an opportunity of deceiving them."

Ten thousand, even though they were not annually elected, are a basis large enough for any free government. It is true, the nobles in Poland are more than 10,000, and yet these oppress the people. But as power always continues there in the same persons and families, this makes them, in a manner, a different nation from the people. Besides the nobles are there united under a few heads of families.

All free governments must consist of two councils, a lesser and greater; or, in other words, of a senate and people. The people, as Harrington observes, would want wisdom, without the senate: The senate, without the people, would want honesty.

A large assembly of 1000, for instance, to represent the people, if allowed to debate, would fall into disorder. If not allowed to debate, the senate has a negative upon them, and the worst kind of negative, that before resolution.

Here therefore is an inconvenience, which no government has yet fully remedied, but which is the easiest to be remedied in the world. If the people debate, all is confusion: If they do not debate, they can only resolve; and then the senate carves for them. Divide the people into many separate bodies; and then they may debate with safety, and every inconvenience seems to be prevented.

Cardinal de Retz says, that all numerous assemblies, however composed, are mere mob, and swayed in their debates by the least motive. 9 This we find confirmed by daily experience. When an absurdity strikes a member, he conveys it to his neighbour, and so on, till the whole be infected. Separate this great body; and though every member be only of middling sense, it is not probable, that any thing but reason can prevail over the whole. Influence and example being removed, good sense will always get the better of bad among a number of people.

There are two things to be guarded against in every senate: Its combination, and its division. Its combination is most dangerous. And against this inconvenience we have provided the following remedies. 1. The great dependence of the senators on the people by annual elections; and that not by an undistinguishing rabble, like the English electors, but by men of fortune and education. 2. The small power they are allowed. They have few offices to dispose of. Almost all are given by the magistrates in the counties. 3. The court of competitors, which being composed of men that are their rivals, next to them in interest, and uneasy in their present situation, will be sure to take all advantages against them.

The division of the senate is prevented, 1. By the smallness of their number. 2. As faction supposes a combination in a separate interest, it is prevented by their dependence on the people. 3. They have a power of expelling any factious member. It is true, when another member of the same spirit comes from the county, they have no power of expelling him: Nor is it fit they should; for that shows the humour to be in the people, and may possibly arise from some ill conduct in public affairs. 4. Almost any man, in a senate so regularly chosen by the people, may be supposed fit for any civil office. It would be proper, therefore, for the senate to form some general resolutions with regard to the disposing of offices among the members: Which resolutions would not confine them in critical times, when extraordinary parts on the one hand, or extraordinary stupidity on the other, appears in any senator; but they would be sufficient to prevent intrigue and faction, by making the disposal of the offices a thing of course. For instance, let it be a resolution, That no man shall enjoy any office, till he has sat four years in the senate: That, except ambassadors, no man shall be in office two years following: That no man shall attain the higher offices but through the lower: That no man shall be protector twice, &c. The senate of Venice govern themselves by such resolutions.

In foreign politics the interest of the senate can scarcely ever be divided from that of the people; and therefore it is fit to make the senate absolute with regard to them; otherwise there could be no secrecy or refined policy. Besides, without money no alliance can be executed; and the senate is still sufficiently dependant. Not to mention, that the legislative power being always superior to the executive, the magistrates or representatives may interpose whenever they think proper.

The chief support of the British government is the opposition of interests; but that, though in the main serviceable, breeds endless factions. In the foregoing plan, it does all the good without any of the harm. The competitors have no power of controlling the senate: They have only the power of accusing, and appealing to the people.

It is necessary, likewise, to prevent both combination and division in the thousand magistrates. This is done sufficiently by the separation of places and interests.

But lest that should not be sufficient, their dependence on the 10,000 for their elections, serves to the same purpose.

Nor is that all: For the 10,000 may resume the power whenever they please; and not only when they all please, but when any five of a hundred please, which will happen upon the very first suspicion of a separate interest.

The 10,000 are too large a body either to unite or divide, except when they meet in one place, and fall under the guidance of ambitious leaders. Not to mention their annual election, by the whole body of the people, that are of any consideration.

A small commonwealth is the happiest government in the world within itself, because every thing lies under the eye of the rulers: But it may be subdued by great force from without. This scheme seems to have all the advantages both of a great and a little commonwealth.

"A small commonwealth is the happiest government in the world within itself, because every thing lies under the eye of the rulers: But it may be subdued by great force from without."

Every county-law may be annulled either by the senate or another county; because that shows an opposition of interest: In which case no part ought to decide for itself. The matter must be referred to the whole, which will best determine what agrees with general interest.

As to the clergy and militia, the reasons of these orders are obvious. Without the dependence of the clergy on the civil magistrates, and without a militia, it is in vain to think that any free government will ever have security or stability.

In many governments, the inferior magistrates have no rewards but what arise from their ambition, vanity, or public spirit. The salaries of the French judges amount not to the interest of the sums they pay for their offices. The Dutch burgo-masters have little more immediate profit than the English justices of peace, or the members of the house of commons formerly. But lest any should suspect, that this would beget negligence in the administration (which is little to be feared, considering the natural ambition of mankind), let the magistrates have competent salaries. The senators have access to so many honourable and lucrative offices, that their attendance needs not be bought. There is little attendance required of the representatives.

That the foregoing plan of government is practicable, no one can doubt, who considers the resemblance that it bears to the commonwealth of the United Provinces, a wise and renowned government. The alterations in the present scheme seem all evidently for the better. 1. The representation is more equal. 2. The unlimited power of the burgo-masters in the towns, which forms a perfect aristocracy in the Dutch commonwealth, is corrected by a well-tempered democracy, in giving to the people the annual election of the county representatives. 3. The negative, which every province and town has upon the whole body of the Dutch republic, with regard to alliances, peace and war, and the imposition of taxes, is here removed. 4. The counties, in the present plan, are not so independent of each other, nor do they form separate bodies so much as the seven provinces; where the jealousy and envy of the smaller provinces and towns against the greater, particularly Holland and Amsterdam, have frequently disturbed the government. 5. Larger powers, though of the safest kind, are intrusted to the senate than the States-General possess; by which means, the former may become more expeditious, and secret in their resolutions, than it is possible for the latter.

"That the foregoing plan of government is practicable, no one can doubt, who considers the resemblance that it bears to the commonwealth of the United Provinces, a wise and renowned government. The alterations in the present scheme seem all evidently for the better."

The chief alterations that could be made on the British government, in order to bring it to the most perfect model of limited monarchy, seem to be the following. First, The plan of Cromwell’s parliament ought to be restored, by making the representation equal, and by allowing none to vote in the county elections who possess not a property of 200 pounds value. Secondly, As such a house of Commons would be too weighty for a frail house of Lords, like the present, the Bishops and Scotch Peers ought to be removed: The number of the upper house ought to be raised to three or four hundred: Their seats not hereditary, but during life: They ought to have the election of their own members; and no commoner should be allowed to refuse a seat that was offered him. By this means the house of Lords would consist entirely of the men of chief credit, abilities, and interest in the nation; and every turbulent leader in the house of Commons might be taken off, and connected by interest with the house of Peers. Such an aristocracy would be an excellent barrier both to the monarchy and against it. At present, the balance of our government depends in some measure on the abilities and behaviour of the sovereign; which are variable and uncertain circumstances.

This plan of limited monarchy, however corrected, seems still liable to three great inconveniencies. First, It removes not entirely, though it may soften, the parties of court and country. Secondly, The king’s personal character must still have great influence on the government. Thirdly, The sword is in the hands of a single person, who will always neglect to discipline the militia, in order to have a pretence for keeping up a standing army.

We shall conclude this subject, with observing the falsehood of the common opinion, that no large state, such as France or Great Britain, could ever be modelled into a commonwealth, but that such a form of government can only take place in a city or small territory. The contrary seems probable. Though it is more difficult to form a republican government in an extensive country than in a city; there is more facility, when once it is formed, of preserving it steady and uniform, without tumult and faction. It is not easy, for the distant parts of a large state to combine in any plan of free government; but they easily conspire in the esteem and reverence for a single person, who, by means of this popular favour, may seize the power, and forcing the more obstinate to submit, may establish a monarchical government. On the other hand, a city readily concurs in the same notions of government, the natural equality of property favours liberty, and the nearness of habitation enables the citizens mutually to assist each other. Even under absolute princes, the subordinate government of cities is commonly republican; while that of counties and provinces is monarchical. But these same circumstances, which facilitate the erection of commonwealths in cities, render their constitution more frail and uncertain. Democracies are turbulent. For however the people may be separated or divided into small parties, either in their votes or elections; their near habitation in a city will always make the force of popular tides and currents very sensible. Aristocracies are better adapted for peace and order, and accordingly were most admired by ancient writers; but they are jealous and oppressive. In a large government, which is modelled with masterly skill, there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magistrates, who direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measures against the public interest.

"extensive conquests, when pursued, must be the ruin of every free government; and of the more perfect governments sooner than of the imperfect; because of the very advantages which the former possess above the latter."

It is needless to enquire, whether such a government would be immortal. I allow the justness of the poet’s exclamation on the endless projects of human race, Man and for ever! 10 The world itself probably is not immortal. Such consuming plagues may arise as would leave even a perfect government a weak prey to its neighbours. We know not to what length enthusiasm, or other extraordinary movements of the human mind, may transport men, to the neglect of all order and public good. Where difference of interest is removed, whimsical and unaccountable factions often arise, from personal favour or enmity. Perhaps, rust may grow to the springs of the most accurate political machine, and disorder its motions. Lastly, extensive conquests, when pursued, must be the ruin of every free government; and of the more perfect governments sooner than of the imperfect; because of the very advantages which the former possess above the latter. And though such a state ought to establish a fundamental law against conquests; yet republics have ambition as well as individuals, and present interest makes men forgetful of their posterity. It is a sufficient incitement to human endeavours, that such a government would flourish for many ages; without pretending to bestow, on any work of man, that immortality, which the Almighty seems to have refused to his own productions.

Christiaan Huygens (1629–95), Dutch mathematician, astronomer, physicist, and inventor, was one of his century’s leading men of science. Through Colbert’s influence and with the promise of a generous stipend, he was invited by Louis XIV in 1665 to take up residence in France, where he lived until 1681. Huygens and other scientists were enlisted to work on problems connected with navigation and shipbuilding as part of Colbert’s ambitious plan to improve the French navy.

Sir Francis Drake (1545–95) made his voyage around the world from 1577 to 1580. Queen Elizabeth I, who had furnished Drake with means for the voyage, conferred the honor of knighthood on him in 1581.

Sir Thomas More (1478–1535), for a time Lord Chancellor under Henry VIII, later incurred the king’s hostility for refusing to swear any oath that would recognize Henry’s right to divorce Queen Catherine or his supremacy over the church in England. More was convicted of high treason on perjured testimony and beheaded. In More’s Utopia, which was first published in Latin in 1516, a fictional mariner named Raphael Hythlodaeus recounts the details of a voyage to the island of Utopia (literally, “no place”). The government of Utopia resembles that sketched in Plato’s Republic in providing for a community of goods and the rule of the wise.

In the discussion that follows, Hume presupposes a familiarity with some of the distinctive institutions of Harrington’s Commonwealth of Oceana. Harrington’s model is an “equal commonwealth,” that is, one that avoids those extremes of inequality that give rise to party strife between the rich and the poor. Equality is preserved in the “foundation” of the commonwealth by its Agrarian Law and in the “superstructures” by its system of rotation. The Agrarian Law prevents the concentration of landed property in a few hands by requiring that the owner of a large estate leave his lands divided more or less equally among his male heirs, if there is more than one son. The system of rotation applies to the government of the commonwealth, which has three orders: the senate, consisting of men who are elected for their excellent qualities (a “natural aristocracy”), which debates and proposes legislation; the people, as represented by a popular assembly, who enact legislation; and the magistrates, who are elected for terms of one or three years and whose function is to execute the laws. The senate and the popular assembly are each upon a triennial rotation or annual change in the one-third part. The magistrates, after serving their terms, must enjoy an interval or vacation equal to the length of the time in office.

The Lords of the Articles was an ancient institution in the Scottish parliament, consisting of a committee chosen from the three estates. The king was able to shape the composition of the group through his influence over the bishops, who had a decisive voice in choosing the other members. As Hume points out in the History of England, chapter 55, no motion could be made in parliament without the previous consent of the Lords of the Articles. This gave the king, in addition to his negative after bills had passed through parliament, another, indirectly, before their introduction. This latter negative, in Hume’s view, was a prerogative of much greater consequence than the former; and “the nation, properly speaking, could not be said to enjoy any regular freedom” until the Lords of the Articles was abolished, first in 1641 and finally in 1690.

Niccolò Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la Prima Deca di Tito Livio (Discourses on the first ten books of Titus Livy), bk. 3, chap. 1. The Discourses, which was probably written between 1513 and 1518, was published posthumously in 1531. The first English translation was published in 1636.

The usual method by which the Great Council of Venice elected magistrates was as follows: “Three urns were placed in front of the ducal throne, those on the right and left containing half as many balls each as there were members present, all the balls being white with the exception of thirty in each urn which were of gold. In the middle urn were sixty balls, thirty-six gold and twenty-four white. The office to be filled having been announced to the Great Council, the members drew from the urns on the right and left. Those who drew white resumed their seats, the sixty who drew gold drew again from the middle urn. Of the sixty, the twenty-four who drew white resumed their seats, the thirty-six who drew gold became electors. They then divided themselves by lot into four groups of nine each. The groups retired separately, and each nominated a candidate for the vacant office, six votes being required for nomination. The four candidates thus nominated were then presented to the Great Council and voted for by that body, a plurality electing. No two members of any family were permitted to serve as electors for the same vacancy. If all four groups of electors agreed on the same candidate, he was declared elected without the formality of a ballot.” See George B. McClellan, The Oligarchy of Venice (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1904), pp. 159–60. John Adams, who describes the Venetian ballot in his Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, vol. 1, chap. 2, calls it “a complicated mixture of choice and chance.” Harrington adopted the Venetian Ballot in his Commonwealth of Oceana.

From the late thirteenth century onward, the cantons that made up the Swiss Confederation were pledged to use their militias for mutual defense, and this citizen army was notably successful in maintaining the country’s independence against foreign enemies. These militias were formed on the principle that all able-bodied males are liable to military service and should receive arms and regular training. For an elaboration of the argument that a militia on the Swiss model is the appropriate military system for a republic, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Considerations on the Government of Poland, chap. 12.

See Jean-François-Paul de Gondi, Cardinal de Retz (1614–79), Mémoires, in Œuvres, nouvelle éd. (Paris: Hachette, 1870–96), 2:422. While assistant to his uncle, the archbishop of Paris, Gondi was one of the leaders of the Fronde (1648–53), a rebellion against the government of Anne of Austria, regent for her son, Louis XIV, and her minister, Cardinal Mazarin. Gondi became cardinal in 1652 and afterward styled himself Cardinal de Retz. His Mémoires were first published in 1717. An English translation appeared in 1723.

The editor could not establish the identity of the poet cited here by Hume. The point of the poet’s exclamation seems to be that while man forever strives for perfection or permanence, his works are ever perishable. This may be another instance in which Hume paraphrases his source loosely rather than quoting it exactly. If so, possible sources might be Horace, Satires 2.8.62, or Lucretius, The Nature of Things 2.76 or 5.1430–31. Hume includes both Horace and Lucretius in his list of the great poets (see “Of the Middle Station of Life,” p. 550, under “Essays Withdrawn and Unpublished”).

Further Information

David Hume, Essays Moral, Political, Literary, edited and with a Foreword, Notes, and Glossary by Eugene F. Miller, with an appendix of variant readings from the 1889 edition by T.H. Green and T.H. Grose, revised edition (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1987). Part II, Essay XVI: Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth. < /titles/704#lf0059_label_827 >.

Other works by David Hume (1711-1776):

• < /people/david-hume >

School of Thought: The Scottish Enlightenment:

• < /collections/19 >.

Quotations about Liberty and Power. Each week a new quote is added to the front page of the OLL. It highlights a key idea about liberty or power by one of our authors. The collection now totals over 500 quotes which are categorized by topics such as free trade, money, abolition, law, literature, politics, war & peace, despots, etc. < oll.libertyfund.org/quotes >.

The OLL Reader is an anthology of some of the most important material in the Online Library of Liberty. They are chapter length extracts which have been formatted as pamphlets in PDF, ePub, and Kindle formats for easier distribution. These extracts are designed for use in the classroom and discussion groups, or material for a literature table for outreach. The full list can be found here < oll.libertyfund.org/pages/best-of-the-oll >.

The copyright to this material is held by Liberty Fund unless otherwise indicated. It is made available to further the educational goals of Liberty Fund, Inc. and may be used freely for educational and academic purposes. It may not be used in any way for profit.

The Online Library of Liberty is a project of Liberty Fund, Inc., a private educational foundation established in 1960 to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals. The Foundation develops, supervises, and finances its own educational activities to foster thought and encourage discourse on enduring intellectual issues pertaining to liberty.

The OLL website has a large collection of books and study guides about individual liberty, limited constitutional government, the free market, and peace. It makes these resources available at no charge to the public for educational purposes. The OLL has won a number of international awards and recognition from such bodies as the Library of Congress (we were selected for the Minerva Arching Project), the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the British Arts & Humanities Research Council.

• Liberty Fund: < www.libertyfund.org >
• OLL: <oll.libertyfund.org>.

Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University

Policy Strategy Economics Nov 1, 2012

Which form of government is best, democracies may not outlast dictatorships, but they adapt better..

Daron Acemoglu

Georgy Egorov

Konstantin Sonin

Fidel Castro. Muammar Gaddafi. Kim Il Sung. All of these dictators remained in power for many years, but that should come as no surprise, according to research by Georgy Egorov. Using a dynamic political economy model, he found that bad governments can last just as long as good ones.

“If you look empirically at what’s in the world, it’s not necessarily true that democratic countries have better governments,” at least when you look at the country’s economic performance, for example, says Egorov, now a professor of managerial economics and decision sciences at the Kellogg School of Management.

Is Democracy the Best Form of Government?

“A common notion is that a democracy should be superior to dictatorships because they are able to select the best people,” Egorov says. However, there are both successful dictatorships and unsuccessful democracies.

Where bad governments come from and whether democracies have an advantage over dictatorships are two questions that historians have grappled with throughout recent history. To answer these questions, Egorov, Daron Acemoglu, a professor at MIT, and Konstantin Sonin, now at the University of Chicago, used a mathematical model to describe these different forms of government.

Democracies differ from dictatorships, they suggest, by the amount of influence that the current government has on forming the next government. The current leaders in a perfect democracy would have zero influence, whereas an absolute dictatorship would place total control over the decision in one person’s hands. Between these extremes lie imperfect democracies and less strict dictatorships.

Having a Democracy Doesn’t Necessarily Mean You Have the Best Leaders.

What the researchers found was probably not what most people would expect. “It’s not necessarily true that more democratic governments are better at bringing in the best people,” Egorov says.

According to their model, when the conditions in the country do not change over time, dictatorships can last just as long as democracies can. This makes sense if you consider how current government officials choose new people to join them in leadership positions.

“It’s not necessarily true that more democratic governments are better at bringing in the best people.”

“In principle, if you’re in the government, there’s no reason for you not to select the most competent fellow members of the government,” Egorov says. But in a dictatorship, what happens if the people you select to help you run the country are better at the job than you are? The country would be run well, but your tenure may not last long. The new officials would have an incentive to oust you because you are now the least competent leader. There would be a good chance you would not remain in office as a result, Egorov says.

“So if you value being in office or being part of the government, then probably you wouldn’t want to select the best people into the government after all. In fact, you have an incentive to select worse people so you’ll be the smartest of them.” That, he says, is how bad governments can persist.

This logic does not apply to a perfect democracy. But when comparing real-world imperfect democracies and dictatorships, there is no predicting which will select more competent individuals.

Important Benefit for Democracies

The researchers did find a selection-related benefit to democratic governments, however. “As it turns out, democracies have a real edge in a changing environment,” Egorov says. This is because these governments are more flexible.

By contrast, if a shock like a war or economic crisis hits a country run by a dictator, even a government initially composed of competent officials may not be flexible enough to respond well.

To see how this might play out, imagine a country of six people, three of whom are brilliant generals and three of whom are economic geniuses. The country goes to war, and the generals form the government. In this scenario, the government is effective whether it was formed as a democracy or a dictatorship because the best people to lead during war are already in place.

When the war ends and the country slides into an economic recession, however, the differences between the two types of government start to become apparent. In a democracy, the country could adapt because the economic geniuses could be elected to office. But if the country is a dictatorship, the generals would still be in power and would be ineffective in the face of the new crisis. In a perfect world, the generals would appoint an economic genius to help out with the government. But in practice, the generals would fear the genius might replace them with fellow economists, Egorov says. Even though they may not be able to manage the crisis efficiently, they would refuse to cede power to another group.

“Here is where we get an unambiguous prediction that the more democratic a country is, the more able it is to fire people that are no longer competent and bring in people that are needed at the moment,” Egorov says. Therefore, the more flexible the government is, the better the outcome.

When a country is stable, its type of government does not have as large an impact on its success. But in a tumultuous world, democracies are more flexible and thus more successful, Egorov says.

The key is elections. During crises, people who are better suited to solve the problem are more likely to be ushered into office. “Whereas in dictatorships, if you started with a person who is very capable and the environment changes, you are pretty likely to still be stuck with [that person] even though they are no longer the one you would want to have in the government.”

For example, he says, if big crises were to hit both the United States and China, the United States would recover more quickly because its government could adapt. In China, that is less likely.

Who Is in Power Matters More than What System of Government You Have

Egorov admits that the quality of government does not only depend on the people in power; it also depends on the incentives they are given for performing well. At the end of the day, however, he and his co-authors decided to focus on the selection of the people in government, not accountability. “Yes, democracies should perform better because politicians are accountable. In a dictatorship, politicians are not accountable to anyone, so they should perform worse. And yet this is not exactly what we see in the world. Accountability alone cannot explain poorly performing democracies and, especially, fast-growing dictatorships. In this paper, we show that selection can.”

But the more important takeaway is that when crises are possible, democracies perform the best in the long run, which is what you might expect from looking at nineteenth and twentieth century history, Egorov says.

“Flexibility is really where democracies excel. This is not obvious and not what we expected when we started.”

James Farley/Booz, Allen & Hamilton Research Professor; Professor of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences

About the Writer Leigh Krietsch Boerner is a science and health writer based in Bloomington, Indiana.

Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. 2010. “Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments.” Quarterly Journal of Economics . 125(4): 1511-1575.

Read the original

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Aristotle’s Political Theory

Aristotle (b. 384–d. 322 BCE), was a Greek philosopher, logician, and scientist. Along with his teacher Plato, Aristotle is generally regarded as one of the most influential ancient thinkers in a number of philosophical fields, including political theory. Aristotle was born in Stagira in northern Greece, and his father was a court physician to the king of Macedon. As a young man he studied in Plato’s Academy in Athens. After Plato’s death he left Athens to conduct philosophical and biological research in Asia Minor and Lesbos, and he was then invited by King Philip II of Macedon to tutor his young son, Alexander the Great. Soon after Alexander succeeded his father, consolidated the conquest of the Greek city-states, and launched the invasion of the Persian Empire. Aristotle returned as a resident alien to Athens, and was a close friend of Antipater, the Macedonian viceroy. At this time (335–323 BCE) he wrote, or at least worked on, some of his major treatises, including the Politics . When Alexander died suddenly, Aristotle had to flee from Athens because of his Macedonian connections, and he died soon after. Aristotle’s life seems to have influenced his political thought in various ways: his interest in biology seems to be reflected in the naturalism of his politics; his interest in comparative politics and his qualified sympathies for democracy as well as monarchy may have been encouraged by his travels and experience of diverse political systems; he reacts critically to his teacher Plato, while borrowing extensively, from Plato’s Republic , Statesman , and Laws ; and his own Politics is intended to guide rulers and statesmen, reflecting the high political circles in which he moved.

Supplement: Characteristics and Problems of Aristotle’s Politics

Supplement: Presuppositions of Aristotle’s Politics

Supplement: Political Naturalism

4. Study of Specific Constitutions

5. aristotle and modern politics, glossary of aristotelian terms, a. greek text of aristotle’s politics, b. english translations of aristotle’s politics, c. anthologies, d. single-authored commentaries and overviews, e. studies of particular topics, other internet resources, related entries, 1. political science in general.

The modern word ‘political’ derives from the Greek politikos , ‘of, or pertaining to, the polis’. (The Greek term polis will be translated here as ‘city-state’. It is also commonly translated as ‘city’ or simply anglicized as ‘polis’. City-states like Athens and Sparta were relatively small and cohesive units, in which political, religious, and cultural concerns were intertwined. The extent of their similarity to modern nation-states is controversial.) Aristotle’s word for ‘politics’ is politikê , which is short for politikê epistêmê or ‘political science’. It belongs to one of the three main branches of science, which Aristotle distinguishes by their ends or objects. Contemplative science (including physics and metaphysics) is concerned with truth or knowledge for its own sake; practical science with good action; and productive science with making useful or beautiful objects ( Top . VI.6.145a14–16, Met . VI.1.1025b24, XI.7.1064a16–19, EN VI.2.1139a26–8). Politics is a practical science, since it is concerned with the noble action or happiness of the citizens (although it resembles a productive science in that it seeks to create, preserve, and reform political systems). Aristotle thus understands politics as a normative or prescriptive discipline rather than as a purely empirical or descriptive inquiry.

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle describes his subject matter as ‘political science’, which he characterizes as the most authoritative science. It prescribes which sciences are to be studied in the city-state, and the others — such as military science, household management, and rhetoric — fall under its authority. Since it governs the other practical sciences, their ends serve as means to its end, which is nothing less than the human good. “Even if the end is the same for an individual and for a city-state, that of the city-state seems at any rate greater and more complete to attain and preserve. For although it is worthy to attain it for only an individual, it is nobler and more divine to do so for a nation or city-state” ( EN I.2.1094b7–10). The two ethical works (the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics ) explain the principles that form the foundations for the Politics : that happiness is the highest human good, that happiness is the activity of moral virtue defined in terms of the mean, and that justice or the common advantage is the political good. Aristotle’s political science thus encompasses the two fields which modern philosophers distinguish as ethics and political philosophy. (See the entry on Aristotle’s ethics .) Political philosophy in the narrow sense is roughly speaking the subject of his treatise called the Politics . For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

2. Aristotle’s View of Politics

Political science studies the tasks of the politician or statesman ( politikos ), in much the way that medical science concerns the work of the physician (see Politics IV.1). It is, in fact, the body of knowledge that such practitioners, if truly expert, will also wield in pursuing their tasks. The most important task for the politician is, in the role of lawgiver ( nomothetês ), to frame the appropriate constitution for the city-state. This involves enduring laws, customs, and institutions (including a system of moral education) for the citizens. Once the constitution is in place, the politician needs to take the appropriate measures to maintain it, to introduce reforms when he finds them necessary, and to prevent developments which might subvert the political system. This is the province of legislative science, which Aristotle regards as more important than politics as exercised in everyday political activity such as the passing of decrees (see EN VI.8).

Aristotle frequently compares the politician to a craftsman. The analogy is imprecise because politics, in the strict sense of legislative science, is a form of practical knowledge, while a craft like architecture or medicine is a form of productive knowledge. However, the comparison is valid to the extent that the politician produces, operates, maintains a legal system according to universal principles ( EN VI.8 and X.9). In order to appreciate this analogy it is helpful to observe that Aristotle explains the production of an artifact such as a drinking cup in terms of four causes: the material, formal, efficient, and final causes ( Phys . II.3 and Met . A.2). For example, clay (material cause) is molded into a roughly cylindrical shape closed at one end (formal cause) by a potter (efficient or moving cause) so that it can contain a beverage (final cause). (For discussion of the four causes see the entry on Aristotle’s physics .)

One can also explain the existence of the city-state in terms of the four causes. It is a kind of community ( koinônia ), that is, a collection of parts having some functions and interests in common ( Pol . II.1.1261a18, III.1.1275b20). Hence, it is made up of parts, which Aristotle describes in various ways in different contexts: as households, or economic classes (e.g., the rich and the poor), or demes (i.e., local political units). But, ultimately, the city-state is composed of individual citizens (see III.1.1274a38–41), who, along with natural resources, are the “material” or “equipment” out of which the city-state is fashioned (see VII.14.1325b38–41).

The formal cause of the city-state is its constitution ( politeia ). Aristotle defines the constitution as “a certain ordering of the inhabitants of the city-state” (III.1.1274b32–41). He also speaks of the constitution of a community as “the form of the compound” and argues that whether the community is the same over time depends on whether it has the same constitution (III.3.1276b1–11). The constitution is not a written document, but an immanent organizing principle, analogous to the soul of an organism. Hence, the constitution is also “the way of life” of the citizens (IV.11.1295a40–b1, VII.8.1328b1–2). Here the citizens are that minority of the resident population who possess full political rights (III.1.1275b17–20).

The existence of the city-state also requires an efficient cause, namely, its ruler. On Aristotle’s view, a community of any sort can possess order only if it has a ruling element or authority. This ruling principle is defined by the constitution, which sets criteria for political offices, particularly the sovereign office (III.6.1278b8–10; cf. IV.1.1289a15–18). However, on a deeper level, there must be an efficient cause to explain why a city-state acquires its constitution in the first place. Aristotle states that “the person who first established [the city-state] is the cause of very great benefits” (I.2.1253a30–1). This person was evidently the lawgiver ( nomothetês ), someone like Solon of Athens or Lycurgus of Sparta, who founded the constitution. Aristotle compares the lawgiver, or the politician more generally, to a craftsman ( dêmiourgos ) like a weaver or shipbuilder, who fashions material into a finished product (II.12.1273b32–3, VII.4.1325b40–1365a5).

The notion of final cause dominates Aristotle’s Politics from the opening lines:

Since we see that every city-state is a sort of community and that every community is established for the sake of some good (for everyone does everything for the sake of what they believe to be good), it is clear that every community aims at some good, and the community which has the most authority of all and includes all the others aims highest, that is, at the good with the most authority. This is what is called the city-state or political community. [I.1.1252a1–7]

Soon after, he states that the city-state comes into being for the sake of life but exists for the sake of the good life (2.1252b29–30). The theme that the good life or happiness is the proper end of the city-state recurs throughout the Politics (III.6.1278b17–24, 9.1280b39; VII.2.1325a7–10).

To sum up, the city-state is a hylomorphic (i.e., matter-form) compound of a particular population (i.e., citizen-body) in a given territory (material cause) and a constitution (formal cause). The constitution itself is fashioned by the lawgiver and is governed by politicians, who are like craftsmen (efficient cause), and the constitution defines the aim of the city-state (final cause, IV.1.1289a17–18). Aristotle’s hylomorphic analysis has important practical implications for him: just as a craftsman should not try to impose a form on materials for which it is unsuited (e.g. to build a house out of sand), the legislator should not lay down or change laws which are contrary to the nature of the citizens. Aristotle accordingly rejects utopian schemes such as the proposal in Plato’s Republic that children and property should belong to all the citizens in common. For this runs afoul of the fact that “people give most attention to their own property, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to them to give attention” ( Pol. II.3.1261b33–5). Aristotle is also wary of casual political innovation, because it can have the deleterious side-effect of undermining the citizens’ habit of obeying the law (II.8.1269a13–24). For a further discussion of the theoretical foundations of Aristotle’s politics, see the following supplementary document:

It is in these terms, then, that Aristotle understands the fundamental normative problem of politics: What constitutional form should the lawgiver establish and preserve in what material for the sake of what end?

3. General Theory of Constitutions and Citizenship

Aristotle states, “The politician and lawgiver is wholly occupied with the city-state, and the constitution is a certain way of organizing those who inhabit the city-state” (III.1.1274b36–8). His general theory of constitutions is set forth in Politics III. He begins with a definition of the citizen ( politês ), since the city-state is by nature a collective entity, a multitude of citizens. Citizens are distinguished from other inhabitants, such as resident aliens and slaves; and even children and seniors are not unqualified citizens (nor are most ordinary workers). After further analysis he defines the citizen as a person who has the right ( exousia ) to participate in deliberative or judicial office (1275b18–21). In Athens, for example, citizens had the right to attend the assembly, the council, and other bodies, or to sit on juries. The Athenian system differed from a modern representative democracy in that the citizens were more directly involved in governing. Although full citizenship tended to be restricted in the Greek city-states (with women, slaves, foreigners, and some others excluded), the citizens were more deeply enfranchised than in modern representative democracies because they were more directly involved in governing. This is reflected in Aristotle’s definition of the citizen (without qualification). Further, he defines the city-state (in the unqualified sense) as a multitude of such citizens which is adequate for a self-sufficient life (1275b20–21).

Aristotle defines the constitution ( politeia ) as a way of organizing the offices of the city-state, particularly the sovereign office (III.6.1278b8–10; cf. IV.1.1289a15–18). The constitution thus defines the governing body, which takes different forms: for example, in a democracy it is the people, and in an oligarchy it is a select few (the wealthy or well born). Before attempting to distinguish and evaluate various constitutions Aristotle considers two questions. First, why does a city-state come into being? He recalls the thesis, defended in Politics I.2, that human beings are by nature political animals, who naturally want to live together. For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

Aristotle then adds, “The common advantage also brings them together insofar as they each attain the noble life. This is above all the end for all both in common and separately” (III.6.1278b19–24). Second, what are the different forms of rule by which one individual or group can rule over another? Aristotle distinguishes several types of rule, based on the nature of the soul of the ruler and of the subject. He first considers despotic rule, which is exemplified in the master-slave relationship. Aristotle thinks that this form of rule is justified in the case of natural slaves who (he asserts without evidence) lack a deliberative faculty and thus need a natural master to direct them (I.13.1260a12; slavery is defended at length in Politics I.4–8). Although a natural slave allegedly benefits from having a master, despotic rule is still primarily for the sake of the master and only incidentally for the slave (III.6.1278b32–7). (Aristotle provides no argument for this: if some persons are congenitally incapable of governing themselves, why should they not be ruled primarily for their own sakes?) He next considers paternal and marital rule, which he also views as defensible: “the male is by nature more capable of leadership than the female, unless he is constituted in some way contrary to nature, and the elder and perfect [is by nature more capable of leadership] than the younger and imperfect” (I.12.1259a39–b4).

Aristotle is persuasive when he argues that children need adult supervision because their rationality is “imperfect” ( ateles ) or immature. But he is unconvincing to modern readers when he alleges (without substantiation) that, although women have a deliberative faculty, it is “without authority” ( akuron ), so that females require male supervision (I.13.1260a13–14). (Aristotle’s arguments about slaves and women appear so weak that some commentators take them to be ironic. However, what is obvious to a modern reader need not have been so to an ancient Greek, so that it is not necessary to suppose Aristotle’s discussion is disingenuous.) It is noteworthy, however, that paternal and marital rule are properly practiced for the sake of the ruled (for the sake of the child and of the wife respectively), just as arts like medicine or gymnastics are practiced for the sake of the patient (III.6.1278b37–1279a1). In this respect they resemble political rule, which is the form of rule appropriate when the ruler and the subject have equal and similar rational capacities. This is exemplified by naturally equal citizens who take turns at ruling for one another’s advantage (1279a8–13). This sets the stage for the fundamental claim of Aristotle’s constitutional theory: “constitutions which aim at the common advantage are correct and just without qualification, whereas those which aim only at the advantage of the rulers are deviant and unjust, because they involve despotic rule which is inappropriate for a community of free persons” (1279a17–21).

The distinction between correct and deviant constitutions is combined with the observation that the government may consist of one person, a few, or a multitude. Hence, there are six possible constitutional forms ( Politics III.7):

This six-fold classification (which is doubtless adapted from Plato’s Statesman 302c–d) sets the stage for Aristotle’s inquiry into the best constitution, although it is modified in various ways throughout the Politics . For example, he observes that the dominant class in oligarchy (literally rule of the oligoi , i.e., few) is typically the wealthy, whereas in democracy (literally rule of the dêmos , i.e., people) it is the poor, so that these economic classes should be included in the definition of these forms (see Politics III.8, IV.4, and VI.2 for alternative accounts). Also, polity is later characterized as a kind of “mixed” constitution typified by rule of the “middle” group of citizens, a moderately wealthy class between the rich and poor ( Politics IV.11).

Aristotle’s constitutional theory is based on his theory of justice, which is expounded in Nicomachean Ethics book V. Aristotle distinguishes two different but related senses of “justice” — universal and particular — both of which play an important role in his constitutional theory. Firstly, in the universal sense “justice” means “lawfulness” and is concerned with the common advantage and happiness of the political community ( NE V.1.1129b11–19, cf. Pol. III.12.1282b16–17). The conception of universal justice undergirds the distinction between correct (just) and deviant (unjust) constitutions. But what exactly the “common advantage” ( koinê sumpheron ) entails is a matter of scholarly controversy. Some passages imply that justice involves the advantage of all the citizens; for example, every citizen of the best constitution has a just claim to private property and to an education ( Pol. VII.9.1329a23–4, 13.1332a32–8). But Aristotle also allows that it might be “in a way” just to ostracize powerful citizens even when they have not been convicted of any crimes (III.13.1284b15–20). Whether Aristotle understands the common advantage as safeguarding the interests of each and every citizen has a bearing on whether and to what extent he anticipates what moderns would understand as a theory of individual rights. (See Fred Miller and Richard Kraut for differing interpretations.)

Secondly, in the particular sense “justice” means “equality” or “fairness”, and this includes distributive justice, according to which different individuals have just claims to shares of some common asset such as property. Aristotle analyzes arguments for and against the different constitutions as different applications of the principle of distributive justice (III.9.1280a7–22). Everyone agrees, he says, that justice involves treating equal persons equally, and treating unequal persons unequally, but they do not agree on the standard by which individuals are deemed to be equally (or unequally) meritorious or deserving. He assumes his own analysis of distributive justice set forth in Nicomachean Ethics V.3: Justice requires that benefits be distributed to individuals in proportion to their merit or desert. The oligarchs mistakenly think that those who are superior in wealth should also have superior political rights, whereas the democrats hold that those who are equal in free birth should also have equal political rights. Both of these conceptions of political justice are mistaken in Aristotle’s view, because they assume a false conception of the ultimate end of the city-state. The city-state is neither a business enterprise to maximize wealth (as the oligarchs suppose) nor an association to promote liberty and equality (as the democrats maintain). Instead, Aristotle argues, “the good life is the end of the city-state,” that is, a life consisting of noble actions (1280b39–1281a4). Hence, the correct conception of justice is aristocratic, assigning political rights to those who make a full contribution to the political community, that is, to those with virtue as well as property and freedom (1281a4–8). This is what Aristotle understands by an “aristocratic” constitution: literally, the rule of the aristoi , i.e., best persons. Aristotle explores the implications of this argument in the remainder of Politics III, considering the rival claims of the rule of law and the rule of a supremely virtuous individual. Here absolute kingship is a limiting case of aristocracy. Again, in books VII-VIII, Aristotle describes the ideal constitution in which the citizens are fully virtuous.

Although justice is in Aristotle’s view the foremost political virtue ( Pol . III.9.1283a38–40), the other great social virtue, friendship, should not be overlooked, because the two virtues work hand in hand to secure every sort of association ( EN VIII.9.1159b26–7). Justice enables the citizens of a city-state to share peacefully in the benefits and burdens of cooperation, while friendship holds them together and prevents them from breaking up into warring factions (cf. Pol . II.4.1262b7–9). Friends are expected to treat each other justly, but friendship goes beyond justice because it is a complex mutual bond in which individuals choose the good for others and trust that others are choosing the good for them (cf. EE VII.2.1236a14–15, b2–3; EN VIII.2.1155b34–3.1156a10). Because choosing the good for one another is essential to friendship and there are three different ways in which something can be called ‘good’ for a human being—virtuous (i.e., good without qualification), useful, or pleasant—there are three types of friendship: hedonistic, utilitarian, and virtuous. Political (or civic) friendship is a species of utilitarian friendship, and it is the most important form of utilitarian friendship because the polis is the greatest community. Opposed to political friendship is enmity, which leads to faction or civil war ( stasis ) or even to political revolution and the breakup of the polis, as discussed in Book V of the Politics. Aristotle offers general accounts of political or civic friendship as part of his general theory of friendship in EE VII.10 and EN VIII.9–12.

The purpose of political science is to guide “the good lawgiver and the true politician” (IV.1.1288b27). Like any complete science or craft, it must study a range of issues concerning its subject matter. For example, gymnastics (physical education) studies what sort of training is best or adapted to the body that is naturally the best, what sort of training is best for most bodies, and what capacity is appropriate for someone who does not want the condition or knowledge appropriate for athletic contests. Political science studies a comparable range of constitutions (1288b21–35): first, the constitution which is best without qualification, i.e., “most according to our prayers with no external impediment”; second, the constitution that is best under the circumstances “for it is probably impossible for many persons to attain the best constitution”; third, the constitution which serves the aim a given population happens to have, i.e., the one that is best “based on a hypothesis”: “for [the political scientist] ought to be able to study a given constitution, both how it might originally come to be, and, when it has come to be, in what manner it might be preserved for the longest time; I mean, for example, if a particular city happens neither to be governed by the best constitution, nor to be equipped even with necessary things, nor to be the [best] possible under existing circumstances, but to be a baser sort.” Hence, Aristotelian political science is not confined to the ideal system, but also investigates the second-best constitution or even inferior political systems, because this may be the closest approximation to full political justice which the lawgiver can attain under the circumstances.

Regarding the constitution that is ideal or “according to prayer,” Aristotle criticizes the views of his predecessors in the Politics and then offers a rather sketchy blueprint of his own in Politics VII–VIII. Although his own political views were influenced by his teacher Plato, Aristotle is highly critical of the ideal constitution set forth in Plato’s Republic on the grounds that it overvalues political unity, it embraces a system of communism that is impractical and inimical to human nature, and it neglects the happiness of the individual citizens ( Politics II.1–5). In contrast, in Aristotle’s “best constitution,” each and every citizen will possess moral virtue and the equipment to carry it out in practice, and thereby attain a life of excellence and complete happiness (see VII.13.1332a32–8). All of the citizens will hold political office and possess private property because “one should call the city-state happy not by looking at a part of it but at all the citizens.” (VII.9.1329a22–3). Moreover, there will be a common system of education for all the citizens, because they share the same end ( Pol . VIII.1).

If (as is the case with most existing city-states) the population lacks the capacities and resources for complete happiness, however, the lawgiver must be content with fashioning a suitable constitution ( Politics IV.11). The second-best system typically takes the form of a polity (in which citizens possess an inferior, more common grade of virtue) or mixed constitution (combining features of democracy, oligarchy, and, where possible, aristocracy, so that no group of citizens is in a position to abuse its rights). Aristotle argues that for city-states that fall short of the ideal, the best constitution is one controlled by a numerous middle class which stands between the rich and the poor. For those who possess the goods of fortune in moderation find it “easiest to obey the rule of reason” ( Politics IV.11.1295b4–6). They are accordingly less apt than the rich or poor to act unjustly toward their fellow citizens. A constitution based on the middle class is the mean between the extremes of oligarchy (rule by the rich) and democracy (rule by the poor). “That the middle [constitution] is best is evident, for it is the freest from faction: where the middle class is numerous, there least occur factions and divisions among citizens” (IV.11.1296a7–9). The middle constitution is therefore both more stable and more just than oligarchy and democracy.

Although Aristotle classifies democracy as a deviant constitution (albeit the best of a bad lot), he argues that a case might be made for popular rule in Politics III.11, a discussion which has attracted the attention of modern democratic theorists. The central claim is that the many may turn out to be better than the virtuous few when they come together, even though the many may be inferior when considered individually. For if each individual has a portion of virtue and practical wisdom, they may pool these moral assets and turn out to be better rulers than even a very wise individual. This argument seems to anticipate treatments of “the wisdom of the multitude” such as Condorcet’s “jury theorem.” In recent years, this particular chapter has been widely discussed in connection with topics such as democratic deliberation and public reason.

In addition, the political scientist must attend to existing constitutions even when they are bad. Aristotle notes that “to reform a constitution is no less a task [of politics] than it is to establish one from the beginning,” and in this way “the politician should also help existing constitutions” (IV.1.1289a1–7). The political scientist should also be cognizant of forces of political change which can undermine an existing regime. Aristotle criticizes his predecessors for excessive utopianism and neglect of the practical duties of a political theorist. However, he is no Machiavellian. The best constitution still serves as a regulative ideal by which to evaluate existing systems.

These topics occupy the remainder of the Politics . Books IV–VI are concerned with the existing constitutions: that is, the three deviant constitutions, as well as polity or the “mixed” constitution, which are the best attainable under most circumstances (IV.2.1289a26–38). The mixed constitution has been of special interest to scholars because it looks like a forerunner of modern republican regimes. The whole of book V investigates the causes and prevention of revolution or political change ( metabolê ) and civil war or faction ( stasis ). Books VII–VIII are devoted to the ideal constitution. As might be expected, Aristotle’s attempt to carry out this program involves many difficulties, and scholars disagree about how the two series of books (IV–VI and VII–VIII) are related to each other: for example, which were written first, which were intended to be read first, and whether they are ultimately consistent with each other. Most importantly, when Aristotle offers practical political prescriptions in Books IV–VI, is he guided by the best constitution as a regulative ideal, or is he simply abandoning political idealism and practicing a form of Realpolitik?For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

Aristotle has continued to influence thinkers up to the present throughout the political spectrum, including conservatives (such as Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, and Eric Voegelin), communitarians (such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel), liberals (such as William Galston and Martha C. Nussbaum), libertarians (such as Tibor R. Machan, Douglas B. Rasmussen, and Douglas J. Den Uyl), and democratic theorists (such as Jill Frank and Gerald M. Mara).

It is not surprising that such diverse political persuasions can lay claim to Aristotle as a source. For his method often leads to divergent interpretations. When he deals with a difficult problem, he is inclined to consider opposing arguments in a careful and nuanced manner, and he is often willing to concede that there is truth on each side. For example, though he is critical of democracy, in one passage he allows that the case for rule by the many based on the superior wisdom of the multitude “perhaps also involves some truth” ( Pol. III.11.1281a39–42). Again, he sometimes applies his own principles in a questionable manner, for example, when he reasons that because associations should be governed in a rational manner, the household should be run by the husband rather than by the wife, whose rational capacity “lacks authority” (I.13.1260a13). Modern commentators sympathetic with Aristotle’s general approach often contend that in this case he applies his own principles incorrectly–leaving open the question of how they should be applied. Further, the way he applies his principles may have seemed reasonable in his socio-political context–for example, that the citizen of a polity (normally the best attainable constitution) must be a hoplite soldier (cf. III.7,1297b4)–but it may be debatable how these might apply within a modern democratic nation-state.

The problem of extrapolating to modern political affairs can be illustrated more fully in connection with Aristotle’s discussion of legal change in Politics II.8. He first lays out the argument for making the laws changeable. It has been beneficial in the case of medicine, for example, for it to progress from traditional ways to improved forms of treatment. An existing law may be a vestige of a primitive barbaric practice. For instance, Aristotle mentions a law in Cyme that allows an accuser to produce a number of his own relatives as witnesses to prove that a defendant is guilty of murder. “So,” Aristotle concludes, “it is evident from the foregoing that some laws should sometimes be changed. But to those who look at the matter from a different angle, caution would seem to be required” (1269a12–14). Since the law gets its force from the citizens’ habit of obedience, great care should be exercised in making any change in it. It may sometimes be better to leave defective laws in place rather than encouraging lawlessness by changing the laws too frequently. Moreover, there are the problems of how the laws are to be changed and who is to change them. Although Aristotle offers valuable insights, he breaks off the discussion of this topic and never takes it up elsewhere. We might sum up his view as follows: When it comes to changing the laws, observe the mean: don’t be too bound by traditional laws, but on the other hand don’t be overeager in altering them. It is obvious that this precept, reasonable as it is, leaves considerable room for disagreement among contemporary “neo-Aristotelian” theorists. For example, should the laws be changed to allow self-described transsexual persons to use sexually segregated restrooms? Conservatives and liberals might agree with Aristotle’s general stricture regarding legal change but differ widely on how to apply it in a particular case.

Most scholars of Aristotle advisedly make no attempt to show that he is aligned with any contemporary ideology. Rather, insofar as they find him relevant to our times, it is because he offers a remarkable synthesis of idealism and pragmatism unfolding in deep and thought-provoking discussions of perennial concerns of political philosophy: the role of human nature in politics, the relation of the individual to the state, the place of morality in politics, the theory of political justice, the rule of law, the analysis and evaluation of constitutions, the relevance of ideals to practical politics, the causes and cures of political change and revolution, and the importance of a morally educated citizenry.

• action: praxis
• citizen: politês
• city-state: polis (also ‘city’ or ‘state’)
• community: koinônia
• constitution: politeia (also ‘regime’)
• faction: stasis (also ‘civil war’)
• free: eleutheros
• friendship: philia
• good: agathos
• happiness: eudaimonia
• happy: eudaimôn
• justice: dikaiosunê
• lawgiver: nomothetês
• master: despotês
• nature: phusis
• noble: kalon (also ‘beautiful’ or ‘fine’)
• people ( dêmos )
• political: politikos (of, or pertaining to, the polis )
• political science: politikê epistêmê
• politician: politikos (also ‘statesman’)
• practical: praktikos
• practical wisdom: phronêsis
• revolution: metabolê (also ‘change’)
• right: exousia (also ‘liberty’)
• ruler: archôn
• self-sufficient: autarkês
• sovereign: kurios
• virtue: aretê (also ‘excellence’)
• without qualification: haplôs (also ‘absolute’)
• without authority: akuron

Note on Citations . Passages in Aristotle are cited as follows: title of treatise (italics), book (Roman numeral), chapter (Arabic numeral), line reference. Line references are keyed to the 1831 edition of Immanuel Bekker which had two columns (“a” and “b”) on each page. Politics is abbreviated as Pol. and Nicomachean Ethics as NE . In this article, “ Pol . I.2.1252b27”, for example, refers to Politics book I, chapter 2, page 1252, column b, line 27. Most translations include the Bekker page number with column letter in the margin followed by every fifth line number.

Passages in Plato are cited in a similar fashion, except the line references are to the Stephanus edition of 1578 in which pages were divided into five parts (“a” through “e”).

Caveat on Bibliography. Although fairly extensive, this bibliography represents only a fraction of the secondary literature in English. However, the items cited here contain many references to other valuable scholarly work in other languages as well as in English.

• Dreizehnter, Alois, Aristoteles’ Politik , Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1970 [generally the most reliable critical edition].
• Ross, W. D., Aristotelis Politica , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957.
• Barker, Ernest, revised by Richard Stalley, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Jowett, Benjamin, revised in The Complete Works of Aristotle (The Revised Oxford Translation), Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, vol. II, pp. 1986–2129.
• Lord, Carnes, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013, revised edition.
• Rackham, H., Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 1932.
• Reeve, C. D. C., Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2017 (new translation).
• Simpson, Peter L. P., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
• Sinclair, T. A., revised by Trevor J. Saunders, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983.

The Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford University Press) includes translation and commentary of the Politics in four volumes:

• Trevor J. Saunders, Politics I–II (1995).
• Richard Robinson with a supplementary essay by David Keyt, Politics III–IV (1995).
• David Keyt, Politics V–VI (1999).
• Richard Kraut, Politics VII–VIII (1997).
• Also of interest is the Constitution of Athens , an account of the history and workings of the Athenian democracy. Although it was formerly ascribed to Aristotle, it is now thought by most scholars to have been written by one of his pupils, perhaps at his direction toward the end of Aristotle’s life. A reliable translation with introduction and notes is by P. J. Rhodes, Aristotle: The Athenian Constitution . Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984.
• Barnes, Jonathan, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (eds.), Articles on Aristotle (Volume 2: Ethics and Politics), London: Duckworth, 1977.
• Boudouris, K. J. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, 2 volumes, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995.
• Deslauriers, Marguerite, and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
• Höffe, Otfried (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001.
• Keyt, David, and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
• Kraut, Richard, and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.
• Lockwood, Thornton, and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
• Lord, Carnes, and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
• Patzig, Günther (ed.), Aristoteles’ Politik: Akten des XI. Symposium Aristotelicum , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990.
• Aquinas, Thomas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics , translated by Richard J. Regan, Indianapolis Publishing Co.: Hackett, 2007.
• Barker, Ernest, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle , London: Methuen, 1906; reprinted, New York: Russell & Russell, 1959.
• Bodéüs, Richard, The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics , Albany: SUNY Press, 1993.
• Brill, Sara, Aristotle on the Concept of the Shared Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
• Hansen, Mogens Herman, Reflections on Aristotle’s Politics , Copenhagen: Tusculaneum Press, 2013.
• Keyt, David, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017.
• Kontos, Pavlos, Aristotle on the Scope of Practical Reason: Spectators, Legislators, Hopes, and Evils , Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2021.
• Kraut, Richard, Aristotle: Political Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Mulgan, Richard G., Aristotle’s Political Theory , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
• Newman, W. L., The Politics of Aristotle , 4 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1887–1902; reprinted Salem, NH: Ayer, 1985.
• Nichols, Mary, Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle’s Politics , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992.
• Pangle, Lorraine Smith, Reason and Character: The Moral Foundations of Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020.
• Pellegrin, Pierre, Endangered Excellent: On the Political Philosophy of Aristotle , translated by Anthony Preus, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2020.
• Riesbeck, David J., Aristotle on Political Community , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
• Roberts, Jean, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and the Politics , London and New York: Routledge, 2009.
• Schütrumpf, Eckart, Aristoteles: Politik , 4 vols. Berlin and Darmstadt: Akademie Verlag, 1999–2005.
• Simpson, Peter, A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle , Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
• Strauss, Leo, “On Aristotle’s Politics,” in The City and Man , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp. 13–49.
• Susemihl, Franz, and R. D. Hicks, The Politics of Aristotle , London: Macmillan, 1894. [Includes books I–III and VII–VIII renumbered as IV–V.]
• Trott, Adriel M., Aristotle on the Nature of Community , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
• Veogelin, Eric, Order and History (Vol. III: Plato and Aristotle ), Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1977.
• Yack, Bernard, The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

1. Biographical and Textual Studies

• Barker, Ernest, “The Life of Aristotle and the Composition and Structure of the Politics ,” Classical Review , 45 (1931), 162–72.
• Jaeger, Werner, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948.
• Kelsen, Hans, “Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle (Volume 2: Ethics and Politics), London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 170–94.
• Lord, Carnes, “The Character and Composition of Aristotle’s Politics ,” Political Theory , 9 (1981), 459–78.

2. Methodology and Foundations of Aristotle’s Political Theory

• Adkins, A. W. H., “The Connection between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 75–93.
• Cherry, Kevin M., Plato, Aristotle and the Purpose of Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
• Depew, David J., “The Ethics of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Ryan K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 399–418.
• Frank Jill, “On Logos and Politics in Aristotle,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 9–26.
• Frede, Dorothea, “The Political Character of Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 14–37.
• Gerson, Lloyd, “On the Scientific Character of Aristotle’s Politics,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. I, pp. 35–50.
• Irwin, Terence H., “Moral Science and Political Theory in Aristotle,” History of Political Thought , 6 (1985), pp. 150–68.
• Kahn, Charles H., “The Normative Structure of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Günther Patzig (ed.) Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 369–84.
• Kamtekar, Rachana, “The Relationship between Aristotle’s Ethical and Political Discourses ( NE X 9),” in Ronald Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 370–82.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 165–95.
• Lockwood, Thornton, “ Politics II: Political Critique, Political Theorizing, Political Innovation,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 64–83.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “The Unity of Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” in David Konstan and David Sider (eds.), Philoderma: Essays in Greek and Roman Philosophy in Honor of Phillip Mitsis (Siracusa: Parnassos Press, 2022), pp. 215–43.
• Ober, Joshua, “Aristotle’s Political Sociology: Class, Status, and Order in the Politics ,” in Carnes Lord and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
• Pellegrin, Pierre, “On the ‘Platonic’ Part of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in William Wians (ed.) Aristotle’s Philosophical Development , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996, pp. 347–59.
• –––, “Is Politics a Natural Science?” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 27–45.
• –––, “Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Christopher Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 558–85.
• Peonids, F., “The Relation between the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics Revisited,” History of Political Thought 22 (2001): 1–12.
• Rowe, Christopher J., “Aims and Methods in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 57–74.
• Salkever, Stephen G., “Aristotle’s Social Science,” Political Theory , 9 (1981), pp. 479–508; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 27–64.
• –––, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
• Santas, Gerasimos X.,“The Relation between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. I, pp. 160–76.
• Smith, Nicholas D. and Robert Mayhew, “Aristotle on What the Political Scientist Needs to Know,” in K. I. Boudouris (ed.) Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1995, vol. I, pp. 189–98.
• Vander Waerdt, Paul A., “The Political Intention of Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy,” Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985), 77–89.
• –––, “The Plan and Intention of Aristotle’s Ethical and Political Writings,” Illinois Classical Studies 16 (1991), 231–53.

3. Political Naturalism

• Ambler, Wayne, “Aristotle’s Understanding of the Naturalness of the City,” Review of Politics , 47 (1985), 163–85.
• Annas, Julia, “Aristotle on Human Nature and Political Virtue,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 731–54.
• Berryman, Sylvia, Aristotle on the Sources of the Ethical Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2919, esp. Ch. 3 “Naturalism in Aristotle’s Politics. ”
• Chan, Joseph, “Does Aristotle’s Political Theory Rest on a Blunder?” History of Political Thought , 13 (1992), 189–202.
• Chappell, Timothy, “‘Naturalism’ in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” in Ryan K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 382–98.
• Cherry, K. and E. A. Goerner, “Does Aristotle’s Polis Exist ‘By Nature’?” History of Political Thought , 27 (2006), 563–85.
• Cooper, John M., “Political Animals and Civic Friendship,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 220–41; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 65–89.
• DePew, David J., “Humans and Other Political Animals in Aristotle’s Historia Animalium ,” Phronesis , 40 (1995), 156–76.
• –––, “Political Animals and the Genealogy of the Polis : Aristotle’s Politics and Plato’s Statesman ,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 238–57.
• Everson, Stephen, “Aristotle on the Foundations of the State,” Political Studies , 36 (1988), 89–101.
• Karbowski, Joseph, “Political Animals and Human Nature in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 221–37.
• Keyt, David, “The Meaning of BIOS in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” Ancient Philosophy , 9 (1989), 15–21; reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 101–9.
• –––, “Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 118–41; reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 111–38.
• Kullmann, Wolfgang, “Man as a Political Animal in Aristotle,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 94–117.
• Lloyd, Geoffrey, “Aristotle on the Natural Sociability, Skills and Intelligence of Animals,” in Verity Harte and Melissa Lane (eds.), Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 277–94.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle: Naturalism,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 321–43.
• Mulgan, Richard, “Aristotle’s Doctrine that Man is a Political Animal,” Hermes , 102 (1974), 438–45.
• Reeve, C. D. C., “The Naturalness of the Polis in Aristotle,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 512–25.
• Roberts, Jean, “Political Animals in the Nicomachean Ethics ,” Phronesis , 34 (1989), 185–202.

4. Household: Women, Children, and Slaves

• Booth, William James, “Politics and the Household: A Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics Book One,” History of Political Thought , 2 (1981), 203–26.
• Brunt, P. A., “Aristotle and Slavery,” in Studies in Greek History and Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 434–88.
• Chambliss, J. J., “Aristotle’s Conception of Children and the Poliscraft,” Educational Studies , 13 (1982), 33–43.
• Cole, Eve Browning, “Women, Slaves, and ‘Love of Toil’ in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 127–44.
• Deslauriers, Marguerite, “The Virtues of Women and Slaves,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 25 (2003), 213–31.
• –––, “Political Rule Over Women in Politics ,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 46–63.
• Fortenbaugh, W. W., “Aristotle on Slaves and Women,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle , vol. 2, Ethics and Politics. London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 135–9.
• Frank, Jill, “Citizens, Slaves, and Foreigners: Aristotle on Human Nature,” American Political Science Review , 98 (2004), 91–104.
• Freeland, Cynthia, Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle , University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998.
• Garnsey, Peter, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
• Lindsay, Thomas K., “Was Aristotle Racist, Sexist, and Anti-Democratic?: A Review Essay,” Review of Politics 56 (1994), 127–51.
• Lockwood, Thornton, “Justice in Aristotle’s Household and City,” Polis , 20 (2003), 1–21.
• –––, “Is Natural Slavery Beneficial?” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 45 (2007), 207–21.
• Mayhew, Robert, The Female in Aristotle’s Biology: Reason or Rationalization , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
• Modrak, Deborah, “Aristotle: Women, Deliberation, and Nature,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 207–21.
• Mulgan, Robert G., “Aristotle and the Political Role of Women,” History of Political Thought , 15 (1994), 179–202.
• Nagle, D. Brendan, The Household as the Foundation of Aristotle’s Polis , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
• Pellegrin, Pierre, “Natural Slavery,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 92–116.
• Saxenhouse, Arlene W., “Family, Polity, and Unity: Aristotle on Socrates’ Community of Wives,” Polity , 15 (1982), 202–19.
• Schofield, Malcolm, “Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Theory of Slavery,” in Günther Patzig (ed.) Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 1–27; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 91–119.
• Senack, Christine M., “Aristotle on the Woman’s Soul,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 223–36.
• Simpson, Peter, “Aristotle’s Criticism of Socrates’ Communism of Wives and Children,” Apeiron , 24 (1991), 99–114.
• Smith, Nicholas D., “Plato and Aristotle on the Nature of Women,” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 21 (1983), 467–78.
• –––, “Aristotle’s Theory of Natural Slavery,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 142–55.
• Spelman, E. V., “Aristotle and the Politicization of the Soul,” in Sandra Harding and M. B. Hintikka (eds) Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science , Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983, pp. 17–30.
• –––, “Who’s Who in the Polis,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 99–125.
• Stauffer, Dana J., “Aristotle’s Account of the Subjection of Women,” Journal of Politics , 70 (2008), 929–41.

5. Political Economy

• Ambler, Wayne H., “Aristotle on Acquisition,” Canadian Journal of Political Science , 17 (1984), 487–502.
• Crespo, Ricardo F., A Re-assessment of Aristotle ’ s Economic Thought . London: Routledge, 2014.
• Dobbs, Darrell, “Aristotle’s Anticommunism,” American Journal of Political Science , 29 (1985), 29–46.
• Finley, M. I., “Aristotle and Economic Analysis,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle , vol. 2, Ethics and Politics. London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 140–58.
• Gallagher, Robert L., Aristotle’s Critique of Political Economy with a Contemporary Application. London: Routledge, 2018.
• Hadreas, Peter, “Aristotle on the Vices and Virtue of Wealth,” Journal of Business Ethics, 39 (2002), 361–76.
• Hartman, Edwin M., “Virtue, Profit, and the Separation Thesis: An Aristotelian View,” Journal of Business Ethics ,99 (2011), 5–17.
• –––, Virtue in Business: Conversations with Aristotle . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
• Inamura, Kazutaka, “The Role of Reciprocity in Aristotle’s Theory of Political Economy,” History of Political Thought , 32 (2011), 565–87.
• Irwin, Terence H., “Aristotle’s Defense of Private Property,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.). A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 200–25.
• Judson, Lindsay, “Aristotle on Fair Exchange,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 15 (1997), 147–75.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle and the Joy of Working,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, pp. 223–39.
• Mathie, William,“Property in the Political Science of Aristotle,” in Anthony Parel & Thomas Flanagan(eds.), Theories of Property: Aristotle to the Present . Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979, pp. 12–35.
• Mayhew, Robert, “Aristotle on Property,” The Review of Metaphysics , 46 (1993), 802–31.
• McNeill, D., “Alternative Interpretations of Aristotle on Exchange and Reciprocity,” Public Affairs Quarterly , 4 (1990), 55–68.
• Mei, Todd S., “The Preeminence of Use: Reevaluating the Relation between Use and Exchange in Aristotle’s Economic Thought,” American Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2009), 523–48.
• Meikle, Scott, “Aristotle on Money” Phronesis 39 (1994), 26–44.
• –––, Aristotle’s Economic Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Miller, Fred D. Jr., “Property Rights in Aristotle,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 121–44.
• –––, “Was Aristotle the First Economist?” Apeiron , 31 (1998), 387–98.
• –––, “Aristotle and Business: Friend or Foe?” in Eugene Heath and Byron Kaldis (eds.), Wealth, Commerce and Philosophy: Foundational Thinkers and Business Ethics , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017, pp. 31–52.
• Morris, Tom, If Aristotle Ran General Motors: The New Soul of Business , New York: Henry Holt, 1997.
• Nielsen, Karen Margrethe, “Economy and Private Property,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 67–91.
• Solomon, Robert C., “Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics,” Business Ethics Quarterly , 2 (1992), 317–39.
• –––, “Aristotle, Ethics, and Business Organizations,” Organization Studies, 25 (2004), 1021–43.

6. Political Justice and Injustice

• Brunschwig, Jacques, “The Aristotelian Theory of Equity,” in Michael Frede and Gisela Striker (eds.), Rationality in Greek Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 115–55.
• Marguerite Deslauriers, “Political Unity and Inequality,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 117–43.
• Georgiadis, Constantine, “Equitable and Equity in Aristotle,” in Spiro Panagiotou (ed.), Justice, Law and Method in Plato and Aristotle , Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1987, pp. 159–72.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle’s Theory of Distributive Justice,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 238–78.
• –––, “The Good Man and the Upright Citizen in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 220–40. Reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 197–221.
• –––, “Nature and Justice,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, pp. 1–19.
• Lockwood, Thornton, “Polity, Political Justice, and Political Mixing,” History of Political Thought , 27 (2006), 207–22.
• Morrison, Donald, “The Common Good,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 176–98.
• Nussbaum, Martha C., “Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 153–87.
• Roberts, Jean, “Justice and the Polis,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 344–65.
• Rosler, Andrés, “Civic Virtue: Citizenship, Ostracism, and War,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 144–75.
• Saxonhouse, Arlene W., “Aristotle on the Corruption of Regimes: Resentment and Justice,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 184–203.
• Schütrumpf, Eckart, “Little to Do With Justice: Aristotle on Distributing Political Power,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 163–83.
• Young, Charles M., “Aristotle on Justice,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy , 27 (1988), 233–49.
• Zingano, Marco, “Natural, Ethical, and Political Justice,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 199–222.

7. Political Friendship and Enmity

• Hatzistavrou, Antony, “Faction,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 301–23.
• Irrera, Elena, “Between Advantage and Virtue: Aristotle’s Theory of Political Friendship,” History of Political Thought , 26 (2005), 565–85.
• Jang, Misung, “Aristotle’s Political Friendship as Solidarity,” in Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer, & Nuno M.S. Coelho (eds.), Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics, Dordrecht: Springer, 2018. pp. 417–33.
• Kalimtzis, Kostas, Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease: An Inquiry into Stasis , Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000.
• Kreft, Nora, “Aristotle on Friendship and Being Human,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 182–99.
• Kronman, Anthony, “Aristotle’s Idea of Political Fraternity,” American Journal of Jurisprudence , 24 (1979),114–138.
• Leontsini, Eleni, “The Motive of Society: Aristotle on Civic Friendship, Justice, and Concord,” Res Publica , 19 (2013), 21–35.
• Ludwig, Paul W., Rediscovering Political Friendship: Aristotle’s Theory and Modern Identity, Community, and Equality , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle on Deviant Constitutions,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. II, pp. 105–15.
• Mulgan, Richard, “The Role of Friendship in Aristotle’s Political Theory,” in Preston King, and Heather Devere (eds.), The Challenge to Friendship in M odernity , London: Frank Cass, 2000, pp. 15–32.
• Schofield, Malcolm, “Political Friendship and the Ideology of Reciprocity,” in Saving the City , London: Routledge, 1999, pp. 82–99.
• Schwarzenbach, Sibyl, “On Civic Friendship,” Ethics , 107 (1996), 97–128.
• Skultety, Steven C.,. “Defining Aristotle’s Conception of Stasis in the Politics ,” Phronesis 54 (2009), 346–70.
• –––, Conflict in Aristotle ’ s Political Philosophy , Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 2019.
• Sosa, Javier Echeñique & Jose Antonio Errázuriz Besa, “Aristotle on Personal Enmity,” Ancient Philosophy , 62 (2022), 215–31.
• Ward, Ann, “Friendship and politics in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics ,” European Journal of Political Theory , 10 (2011), 443–62.
• Weed, Ronald, Aristotle on Stasis: A Psychology of Political Conflict , Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2007.
• Yack, Bernard, “Community and Conflict in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” Review of Politics , 47 (1985), 92–112.
• –––, “Natural Right and Aristotle’s Understanding of Justice,” Political Theory , 18 (1990), 216–37.

8. Citizenship, Civic Obligation, and Political Rights

• Allan, D. J., “Individual and State in the Ethics and Politics ,” Entretiens sur l’Antiquité Classique IX, La ‘Politique’ d’Aristote , Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1964, pp. 53–95.
• Barnes, Jonathan, “Aristotle and Political Liberty,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 249–63; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 185–201.
• Collins, Susan D., Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
• Frede, Dorothea, “Citizenship in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 167–84.
• Horn, Christoph, “Law, Governance, and Political Obligation,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 223–46.
• Irwin, Terence H., “The Good of Political Activity,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 73–98.
• Kraut, Richard, “Are There Natural Rights in Aristotle?” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 755–74.
• Lane, Melissa, “Claims to Rule: The Case of the Mutlitude,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 247–74.
• Long, Roderick T., “Aristotle’s Conception of Freedom,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 775–802; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 384–410.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle and the Origins of Natural Rights,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 873–907.
• –––, “Aristotle’s Theory of Political Rights,” in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 309–50.
• Morrison, Donald, “Aristotle’s Definition of Citizenship: A Problem and Some Solutions,” History of Philosophy Quarterly , 16 (1999), 143–65.
• Mulgan, Robert G., “Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation,” Political Theory , 18 (1990), 195–215.
• Roberts, Jean, “Excellences of the Citizen and of the Individual,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 555–65.
• Samaras, Thanassis, “Aristotle and the Question of Citizenship,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 123–41.
• Schofield, Malcolm, “Sharing in the Constitution,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 831–58; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 353–80.
• Zuckert, Catherine H., “Aristotle on the Limits and Satisfactions of Political Life,” Interpretation , 11 (1983), 185–206.

9. Constitutional Theory

• Balot, Ryan, “The ‘Mixed Regime’ In Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 103–22.
• Bates, Clifford A., Aristotle’s “Best Regime”: Kingship, Democracy, and the Rule of Law , Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003.
• Bobonich, Christopher, “Aristotle, Decision Making, and the Many,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 142–62.
• Cherry, Kevin M., “The Problem of Polity: Political Participation in Aristotle’s Best Regime,” Journal of Politics , 71 (2009), 406–21.
• Coby, Patrick, “Aristotle’s Three Cities and the Problem of Faction,” Journal of Politics , 50 (1988), 896–919.
• Destrée, Pierre, “Aristotle on Improving Imperfect Cities,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 204–23.
• Dietz, Mary G., “Between Polis and Empire: Aristotle’s Politics ,” American Political Science Review 106 (2012), 275–93.
• Garsten, Bryan, “Deliberating and Acting Together,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 324–49.
• Huxley, G., “On Aristotle’s Best State,” in Paul Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (eds.), Crux: Essays Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix , London: Duckworth, 1985, pp. 139–49.
• Johnson, Curtis N., Aristotle’s Theory of the State , New York: Macmillan, 1990.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle and Anarchism,” Reason Papers , 18 (1993), 133–52; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety. Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 203–22.
• Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle’s Critique of False Utopias,” in Otfried Höffe (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001, pp. 59–73.
• Lintott, Andrew, “Aristotle and Democracy,” The Classical Quarterly (New Series), 42 (1992), 114–28.
• Mayhew, Robert, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Republic , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.
• –––, “Rulers and Ruled,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 526–39.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle on the Ideal Constitution,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 540–54.
• –––, “The Rule of Reason,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 38–66.
• Mulgan, Richard, “Aristotle’s Analysis of Oligarchy and Democracy,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 307–22.
• –––, “Constitutions and the Purpose of the State,” in Otfried Höffe (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001, pp. 93–106.
• Mulhern, J. J., “ Politeia in Greek Literature, Inscriptions, and in Aristotle’s Politics : Reflections on Translation and Interpretation,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 84–102.
• Murray, O., “Polis and Politeia in Aristotle,” in Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), The Ancient Greek City-State , Copenhagen: Muksgaard, 1993, pp. 197–210.
• Ober, Joshua, “Aristotle’s Natural Democracy,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 223–43.
• –––, “Democracy’s Wisdom: An Aristotelian Middle Way for Collective Judgment,” American Political Science Review , 107 (2013), 104–22.
• –––, “Nature, History, and Aristotle’s Best Possible Regime,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 224–43.
• Polansky, Ronald, “Aristotle on Political Change,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 322–45.
• Rosler, Andres, Political Authority and Obligation in Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
• Rowe, C. J., “Reality and Utopia,” Elenchos , 10 (1989), 317–36.
• –––, “Aristotelian Constitutions,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 366–89.
• Strauss, Barry, “On Aristotle’s Critique of Athenian Democracy,” in Carnes Lord and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, pp. 212–33.
• Vander Waert, Paul A., “Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Best Regime,” Phronesis , 30 (1985), 249–73.
• Waldron, Jeremy, “The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle’s Politics ,” Political Theory , 20 (1992), 613–41; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 145–65.
• Wilson, James L., “Deliberation, Democracy, and the Rule of Reason in Aristotle’s Politics ,” American Political Science Review , 105 (2011), 259–74.

10. Education

• Burnyeat, Myles F., “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good,” in Amelie O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 69–92.
• Curren, Randall R., Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.
• Depew, David J., “Politics, Music, and Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ideal State,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 346–80.
• Destrée, Pierre, “Education, Leisure, and Politics,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 301–23.
• Frede, Dorothea, “The Deficiency of Human Nature: The Task of a ‘Philosophy of Human Nature’,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 258–74.
• Jimenez, Marta, Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.
• Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle on Method and Moral Education,” in Jyl Gentzler (ed.), Method in Ancient Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 171–90.
• –––, “Aristotle on Becoming Good: Habituation, Reflection, and Perception,” in Christopher Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 529–57.
• Lord, Carnes, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982.
• Lynch, John Patrick, Aristotle’s School , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
• Muzio, G. D., “Aristotle on Improving One’s Character,” Phronesis , 45 (2000), 205–19.
• Reeve, C. D. C,  “Aristotelian Education,” in A. O. Rorty (ed.), Philosophers on Education , London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 51–65.
• Stalley, Richard, “Education and the State,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 566–76.
• Brooks, Richard O. and James B. Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003.
• Burns, Tony, “Aristotle and Natural Law,” History of Political Thought , 19 (1998), 142–66.
• Duke, George, Aristotle and Law: The Politics of Nomos , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Gordley, James R., “Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tradition,” in Salvador Rus Rufino (ed.), Aristoteles: El Pensamiento Politico y Juridico . León & Seville: University of León & University of Seville, 1999, pp. 71–97.
• Hamburger, Max, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle’s Legal Theory , New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951.
• Huppes-Cluysenaer, Liesbeth & Nuno M..S. Coelho (eds.), Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics , Dordrecht: Springer, 2018.
• Miller, Eugene, “Prudence and the Rule of Law,” American Journal of Jurisprudence , 24 (1979), 181–206.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle’s Philosophy of Law,” in Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Carrie-Ann Biondi (eds.), A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics [vol. 6 of A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence , ed. Enrico Pattaro]. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007, pp.79–110.
• Schroeder, Donald N., “Aristotle on Law,” Polis , 4 (1981), 17–31; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 37–51.
• Wormuth, F. D., “Aristotle on Law,” in M. R. Korvitz and A. E. Murphy (eds.), Essays in Political Theory Presented to G. H. Sabine,  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1948, pp. 45–61.
• Zanetti, Gianfrancesco, “Problematic Aspects of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Law,” Archiv f ü r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie , 81 (1995), 49–64.

12. Aristotle and Contemporary Politics

• Biondi, Carrie-Ann, “Aristotle on the Mixed Constitution and Its Relevance for American Political Thought,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 176–98.
• Frank, Jill, A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle and the Work of Politics , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
• Galston, William A., Justice and the Human Good , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
• Garver, Eugene, Aristotle’s Politics: Living Well and Living Together , Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011.
• Goodman, Lenn E. and Robert Talise (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics Today , Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.
• Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle and Rawls on the Common Good,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 350–74.
• Lord, Carnes, “Aristotle and the Idea of Liberal Education,” in Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick (eds.), Demokrateia: A Conversation of Democracy, Ancient and Modern , Princeton: Princeton University Press Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, pp. 271–88.
• Machan, Tibor R., “Aristotle and the Moral Status of Business,”  Journal of Value Inquiry , 38 (2004), 217–33.
• Mara, Gerald M., “The Culture of Democracy: Aristotle’s Athênaiôn Politeia as Political Theory,” in Aristide Tessitore (ed.), Aristotle and Modern Politics: The Persistence of Political Philosophy , Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002, 307–41.
• Mulgan, Robert G., “Was Aristotle an ‘Aristotelian Social Democrat’?” Ethics , 111 (2000), 79–101.
• Murphy, James Bernard, The Moral Economy of Labor: Aristotelian Themes in Economic Theory , New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
• Nussbaum, Martha C., “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in R. Bruce Douglas, Gerald M. Mara, and Henry S. Richardson (eds.) Liberalism and the Good , London: Routledge, 1990, pp. 203–52.
• –––, “Capabilities and Human Rights,” Fordham Law Review , 66 (1997), 273–300; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 413–40.
• –––, “Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities: A Response to Anthony, Arneson, Charlesworth, and Mulgan,” Ethics , 111 (2000), 102–40.
• Pack, Spencer J., “Aristotle’s Difficult Relationship with Modern Economic Theory,” Foundations of Science , 13 (2008), 256–80.
• Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Douglas J. Den Uyl, Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order , La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991.
• –––, Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics , University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005.
• Schollmeier, Paul, Rewriting Contemporary Political Philosophy with Plato and Aristotle: An Essay on Eudaimonic Politics,  London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019.
• Salkever, Stephen S., Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
• Tessitore, Aristide (ed.), Aristotle and Modern Politics: The Persistence of Political Philosophy , Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002.
• Wallach, John C., “Contemporary Aristotelianism,” Political Theory , 20 (1992), 613–41.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

[Please contact the author with suggestions.]

Aristotle, General Topics: biology | Aristotle, General Topics: ethics | Aristotle, Special Topics: natural philosophy

Copyright © 2022 by Fred Miller < fmiller @ sppfbg . org >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2023 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Plato's Regimes and the Ideal Form of Government

A deep dive into the five different regimes established in book viii of plato's republic..

Reading time: 15 mins.

Around 375 BCE, Plato published The Republic , which served as a blueprint of interpretation for other philosophers such as Aristotle from before the Common Era and also philosophers such as John Locke from the Modern Era. In Book VIII of The Republic , Plato establishes that there are five kinds of government. These are timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny and aristocracy. Plato states that of these five principal forms of regime, four are defective, or less than perfect, while one of them is the preferred form, deemed by Plato as the ideal form of government.

The first of these forms of government discussed in The Republic is timocracy, or the rule for the sake of honor. This regime is motivated by ambition and love for honor and, according to Plato, it is the regime that naturally follows aristocracy. Specifically, he states, “Clearly, the new state, being in mean between oligarchy and the perfect State, will partly follow one and partly the other” (Plato 2). This statement by Plato, during his conversation with Glaucon, implies that timocracy is sort of a mixture between oligarchic tendencies and tendencies from aristocracy—the perfect state. This is formed after the “philosopher king” is preceded by someone who is not fit to rule on the basis of reason and understanding and gives rise to oligarchic tendencies such as the glorification of war and acquisition. Money and status begin to characterize the individual and, as the timocratic ruler begins to grow into his role as leader, his ability to rationalize is greatly severed next to passion and appetite. Finally, as Glaucon eloquently put it, “Undoubtedly … the form of government, which you describe, is a mixture of good and evil,” to which Plato replied, “Why there is a mixture … but one thing … is predominantly seen, --the spirit of contention and ambition … due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element,” when referring to the way the timocratic man pursues his actions (Plato 3).

The next form of government is none other than oligarchy, or the rule of the few. This regime deals with a small group of people having the majority of control within the state. Plato defines oligarchy as “a government resting on a valuation of property, in which the rich have power and the poor man is deprived of it” (Plato 4). The sentiment here is that an oligarchy is not in reality one state but two, divided between the rich and the poor. Nearly all who are not in a position of power are poor. This type of regime, according to Plato, follows after timocracy dives too deep within avarice and passion, so deep that citizens become haunted by it. He states, “the accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the ruin of timocracy.” Moreover, “one, seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival him, and thus the great mass of the citizens become lovers of money” (Plato 5). This creates the belief within the state that rich men and riches are what is honored, and that virtues are dishonored.

The third regime discussed in The Republic is democracy, or the majority rule of the people. In this form of government, the majority of the population are in control of the state and their decisions are intended to benefit the many and not the few. According to Plato, this occurs when the poor rise up against the rich in an oligarchic state and conquer them, executing some while ridding the others of power. He states, “democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of power.” This is a regime of freedom, where the individual can “order for himself his own life as he pleases” (Plato 11). In this freedom prevails the “forgiving spirit of democracy,” where the sentiment within the regime is one that has little regard for anything, be that honor, wisdom, or duty, placing only importance on the great freedom that has been bestowed upon its state and citizens (Plato 12). In other words, law and order are sacrificed to liberty and equality.

The fourth and final defective regime in Plato’s The Republic is none other than tyranny, or the rule by a despot. A despot is someone who holds absolute power over the state and typically exercises that power in a cruel and oppressive way. Ironically, Socrates calls tyranny “the most beautiful of all” constitutions because of the simplicity and uniformity of it. This regime is formed when the democratic man has “drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom” (Plato 15). This stems from the unsatiable desires of the public in a democracy, concerning freedom. The citizens “chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority,” which in turn has them turn to the tyrannical man who claims he will restore these freedoms (Plato 16). The citizens, now in this tyrannical state, must obey the head of state’s every wish and desire, or be punished severely for it. They do not—initially—rise against this oppressive state because they are either too blind to see the truth or too scared to enforce it themselves. Eventually, tyranny acts as a sort of eye-opener for the citizens that were previously complaining about their freedoms in a democracy and their lack of riches in an oligarchy, leading them to eventually instate—if it wasn’t already in place previously—what can only be described by Plato as the “perfect state” (Plato 2).

As mentioned before, the previously discussed forms of government are all flawed in the eyes of Plato. These four “defective” forms are timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and finally tyranny. The transitions between all of these regimes, with the exception of tyranny, comes from an insatiable desire from either the minority or the majority that turns into a battle between the two in order to see which comes out on top.

New Frame . A visual representation of the transition between regimes.

The transition between timocracy to oligarchy is quite simple. First, the warriors who are enveloped in the idea of honor and ambition grow so attached to this belief that it naturally consumes them. For instance, take a man who was the commander of an army in a successful battle. In a timocratic regime, his accomplishments as commander will bring him great amounts of appreciation and glory from the citizens upon his arrival to the city. These appreciations turn into riches and feelings of lust and greed, which now the commander feels he deserves because of his great accomplishments in war. This is what directly causes the transition from timocracy to oligarchy, an unsatiable desire for glory and acquisitions that can never be fulfilled. Leading the timocratic state to become an oligarchic one, in which the rich prosper while the poor steadily become poorer and have less of a say in political matters.

 The next transition that occurs is the transition between oligarchy and democracy. This initially occurs by the obvious fact that the majority of citizens are currently poor and have astronomically little say in what goes on within their state. This becomes a revolution of sorts in which the poor rise up against the rich, “slaughtering some and banishing some” as mentioned before (Plato 11). The natural problem with democracy is that, once the majority gets control over the state, they also become unsatisfied with yet another insatiable desire; freedom. This form of government also involves equality because of the divisiveness between the rich and the poor during an oligarchic state, but the main idea of a democracy in Plato’s The Republic is freedom. Citizens begin to propose “fairer” laws for the benefit of the majority, while undermining the minority. This lust for freedom transforms into somewhat of a sacrifice, in which the state sacrifices integrity, law, and order for the newly glorified ideals of equality, representation, and freedom. This is what makes the democratic state so dangerous; it appeals to ideals that everyone wants, but the disorder will most likely interfere with the principles of good government and virtue. This goes down to the basic fact that in a democracy, not every single citizen can be happy with the current state of affairs. This in turn marks the beginning of the end for democracy, when, as eloquently expressed by Plato, the democratic man has “drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom”—as briefly mentioned before (Plato 15). Causing the shift from a democratic regime to a tyrannical one.

The final transition between the four non-perfect states, according to Plato’s The Republic , is between democracy and tyranny. This occurs from the flaws that sacrificed law and order for freedom in a democratic state. The ones who feel that their freedoms have become threated by any display of order or restrictions, turn to a single entity who will restore these freedoms to them—the tyrannical man. In the beginning, the tyrannical man might not even seem as a bad, power-driven person—in fact—his current duty is to reestablish the freedoms his followers claim they have lost. He does this by challenging the powers that are in control of the democracy (the majority) and establishing a permanent seat of power for only himself in the state. Once in this state of power, the tyrannical man reveals his true nature and the betrayed followers finally acknowledge the grand mistake they have made. Most of the oppressed citizens in a tyrannical government agree that something must be done to correct this mishap, but by giving a single individual so much power it becomes nearly impossible to challenge his authority without immediate consequences. The few who do not see this still blindly believe that the tyrannical man will restore their freedoms, and that such measures of oppression are necessary for that to happen. The reality is that most are too scared to speak up against him because it would mean that they will be punished, often publicly, in a severe manner. Eventually these people realize that they took all of their previous liberties for granted and decide to establish—if not reestablish—a perfect state; an aristocratic regime.

The ideal regime expressed in Plato’s The Republic is aristocracy, or the rule by a philosopher king. As stated previously, this is the type of government that Plato idealizes. An aristocracy is composed of three caste-like parts: the guardians (ruling class), the auxiliaries, and the majority. The guardians are made up of philosopher kings, who are grounded on the basis of knowledge and wisdom to make decisions; they are considered to have souls of gold in The Republic . The auxiliaries are composed of soldiers who will enforce the wise policies the ruling class puts out; they have souls of silver. Finally, the majority is made up of citizens who do not fall within the previously mentioned castes which are allowed to own property and produce goods for the benefit of all; they have souls of bronze or iron.

Raphael’s School of Athens , depicting Plato and Aristotle in the center.

Plato argues that aristocracy is the best form of government for many reasons, but primarily because it is a regime centered on the basis of reason and wisdom. In an aristocracy, the rule of the few is for the benefit of the many; no guardian has any unsatiable desire and instead, are dedicated to their work which is to make laws and regulations that are reasonable. Unlike the flawed regimes, an aristocracy has no insane desires that could never be achieved by the ruling class. The next caste, the soldiers, also have an important purpose in government; they are in charge of enforcing the rules laid out by the guardians and of maintaining the order and peace within the city. Lastly, the majority is allowed to have property of their own and are advised to produce goods for themselves, the soldiers, and the guardians. This is the best state because it is one that is well-balanced and has a respectable social hierarchy, where everyone has a purpose to maintain and improve the state and thus, no one feels left out.

As one can easily see, all forms of government in Plato’s The Republic have some sort of downfall. The timocratic man is too obsessed with honor and passion, the oligarchical man is too obsessed with greed and riches, the democratic man is too obsessed with freedom and equality, and finally, the aristocratic man is perfect until someone unfit to rule takes charge, causing the cycle to repeat itself once again. It is true that aristocracy might be the best of these regimes—according to Plato—but even the nature of the most perfect regime is destined to fail at some time or another due to the conflicting nature of humans.

Plato. "Plato, Republic, Book 8".  Perseus.Tufts.Edu , 2020, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D8. Accessed 15 Jan 2022. Course Hero. “The Republic By Plato | In-Depth Summary & Analysis.” YouTube . 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P4fydrydX5o. Accessed 18 Jan 2022.

Ready for more?

Democracy as the Best Form of Government Essay

A democracy is a form of governance characterized by power sharing. The implication of this is that all the citizens have an equal voice in the way a nation is governed. This often encompasses either direct or indirect involvement in lawmaking. “Democracy” can be a very delicate subject for any writer.

Throughout history, various scholars, including ancient philosophers, have had a divergent view on whether democracy is the best form of governance (Kelsen 3). Some of these arguments are discussed in this essay. Democracy appears to go hand in hand with national unity.

This is particularly true because this form of governance is all about people, and these people are working together towards attainment of national goals. The cohesiveness also results from the freedom prevailing in a democratic environment. Unity and liberty in a nation lay a fertile ground for economic and social growth (Weatherford 121).

In a democratic form of government, the entire citizenry is cushioned against exploitation and all form of abuse. As opposed to other governance approaches (for instance monarchy and dictatorship), democracy engages the people in decision-making processes. This ensures efficient delivery of basic services such as education, health care, and security.

Moreover, these services will be of high quality. Having people govern themselves significantly minimizes the risk of running a nation into chaos. In operational democracies, policies must undergo thorough scrutiny by many organs of government and stakeholders before they are made laws. The modalities of implementing the laws are also carefully determined.

In such a corporate system, it would be rare for all the involved people to be wrong. Therefore democracy protects a nation against the consequences of human errors. As a consequence of reduced possibility for human errors, people will experience a nation devoid of civil wars and strife. This atmosphere, in turn, perpetuates the general growth of a nation.

Democracy acts as a framework within which the law about the basic human rights operates (Barak 27). In a democratic environment, the law gives equal entitlement to the bill of rights with total disregard of race, ethnicity or economic class.

On the other hand, democracy may not be worth the high status it has been accorded for centuries by many schools of thought. Democracy gives an opportunity for all citizens to vote (Williamson 36). This can be technically hazardous to a nation. An average voter is not adequately equipped with the necessary information on the economic and political aspects of a nation.

The direct implication is that a fairly large percentage of voters will base their choice on limited and incorrect information. This situation can greatly impair development. Democratic approaches tend to slow down the process of policy-making and implementation (Dahl 49). This is due to the bureaucracies associated with democracy.

For example, it may take twelve months for parliament to debate over a bill, pass it into law and fully enforce it. In a dictatorial system, however, the same process would take utmost one day. For many years, democracy has been synonymous with political instability (Snell 18). The high turnover rate of governments comes with drastic changes in national and international policies.

New governments tend to attract much criticism from the media and non-governmental bodies. This criticism and alteration of international relations policies keep off foreign investors, something that can have immense economic implications to a nation.

The seemingly most feared danger of democracy relates to the basic rights of the minority. A case in point is the Netherlands. The Dutch parliament enacted a law against female genital mutilation. The Somali living in the Netherlands could not have a say in this because they are a small group.

In conclusion, the name a government gives itself is immaterial. Whether a government calls itself democratic, anarchy, monarchy, or dictatorial, the most important question should be “Are the people getting back what they deserve?”

Works Cited

Barak, Aharon. The Judge in a Democracy . New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006. Print.

Dahl, Robert. Democracy and its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. Print.

Kelsen, Hans. “Foundations of Democracy.” Ethics 66.1 (1955):1–101.

Snell, Daniel. Flight and Freedom in the Ancient Near East . Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2001. Print.

Weatherford, McIver. Indian givers: how the Indians of the America transformed the world . New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1988. Print.

Williamson, Thames. Problems in American Democracy . Montana: Kessinger Publishing, 2004. Print.

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2023, October 31). Democracy as the Best Form of Government. https://ivypanda.com/essays/democracy-as-the-best-form-of-government/

"Democracy as the Best Form of Government." IvyPanda , 31 Oct. 2023, ivypanda.com/essays/democracy-as-the-best-form-of-government/.

IvyPanda . (2023) 'Democracy as the Best Form of Government'. 31 October.

IvyPanda . 2023. "Democracy as the Best Form of Government." October 31, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/democracy-as-the-best-form-of-government/.

1. IvyPanda . "Democracy as the Best Form of Government." October 31, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/democracy-as-the-best-form-of-government/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Democracy as the Best Form of Government." October 31, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/democracy-as-the-best-form-of-government/.

• Overview of the Netherlands’ Economy
• Rhetorics in Autocratic Iraq vs. Dictatorial Belarus
• Healthcare Issues: Denmark and Netherlands, and US
• History of Housing Policies in the UK and Netherlands
• Employee Participation in the Netherlands
• Governmental Drug Policy in the Netherlands and Sweden
• Controversial Berlin: the City's Dictatorial Background
• The UK Parliament and Democratic Legislature
• Fascist Elements in Dictatorial Ideas of Mussolini and Hitler
• Interest Rate and Inflation in Netherlands
• Scholars on Postmodernism as Social Theory
• Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses
• Analysis of Hugo Chavez and Muamar Gaddafi's Reign Through Machiavelli's Eye
• Machiavelli’s Views on Democratization and Their Relation to Modern Politics
• "The Corporation" by Joel Bakan

• Democracy Is The Best Form Of Government: Arguments For And Against

• There are actually two types of democracy: direct democracy and indirect democracy.
• Democracy was born in Athens, Greece in 5th century BC.
• The 20th century was marked by an expansion in representative democracy.

What is democracy ? You probably hear this term in history or civics courses but take it for granted because it is such a common political system today. In 2013, it was reported that 123 countries in the world can be considered democracies. However, democracies were not always common. This governing system became more popular after World War I . Before the spread of democracy, colonial empires were commonplace. Colonial empires were systems of government that were ruled by kings, queens, or autocratic leaders. World War II was one of the only 20th century periods during which democracies did not expand, but many former colonies declared independence after World War II and shifted to democratic systems. 

Ancient Greek Democracy

Democracy may have become a popular way for countries to govern themselves during the 20th century, but the ideas of democracy were born in Greece . Athens, Greece operated under a democratic system in the 5th century BC, and other Greek cities and towns did the same. The idea was to have a government by the people. Direct democracy, where people met in assemblies and made decisions, was once a popular form of democracy. Direct democracy was more appropriate for smaller communities. Most countries in the world today operate under indirect democracy. People choose representatives to protect their interests in government. In either case, there are arguments for and against democracy. Many people who are for democracy say that this prevents one person from gaining too much power and becoming a dangerous authoritarian. Even so, there are people who are critical of democracy and it is worthwhile to examine why some people feel this way.

Where We Stand Today

A Pew Research Survey found that most people are in favor of a democracy, but some people would be open to alternative modes of government. Their findings show that some people would prefer a direct democracy where people govern themselves directly. However, some people actually support autocratic governments, and many people say they would be open to having a government that is run by experts who are competent. People with different levels of education favor certain types of governments over others. A country’s economic position can also affect people's opinions. Feelings about democracy can change depending on economic circumstances.

Key Definitions  

Here are some terms you should know:

• Monarchy : rule by a single person, usually because they were born into the position.
• Oligarchy : a government run by a few people.  
• Autocracy : a government with a singular head of state, usually with unlimited power.
• Fascism : a type of autocracy that puts the interests of a nation or race above others.  
• Communism : a political theory that fights against the ownership of private property, and in which things are owned by the public and available for use whenever others need them. 

Arguments for Democracy

Countries around the world embraced democracy in the 20th century, most notably after WWI and WWII. Prior to this shift, countries were ruled by oligarchies, monarchies, and self-appointed autocratic leaders. During World War II, the world saw the dangers of fascism and fascist leaders like Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Democracy was supported because it allowed people to choose representatives with set term limits. Many citizens had seen how their countries were ravaged due to corruption and inequality caused by the rule of the few. Democracy was seen as a way to make sure no one person had too much power. Many democracies also wanted a free market. Before democracy, few people had control or say in the economy which allowed rulers and those in power to use their economic influence to silence critics or give large rewards to those who followed their lead. Democracies were seen as a way to decentralize the market, but many of the same forces that freed the market were imperative to the development of democracy. People need more resources and education in order to vote and make educated purchases or financial decisions. A free market allowed more people to improve their status, and the economic boom that occurred after WWII created favorable conditions for democracies that were born out of former dictatorships, autocracies, and monarchies.

Freedom of Speech

Experts and citizens often defend democracy because they say it allows people to speak freely and have the ability to criticize leaders they feel might not be doing what the public wants. In fascist regimes, people who criticized leaders were often punished, and many critics were tortured or executed. Philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn was a proponent of the link between democracy and free speech.  

Respect for Human Rights

Pro-democracy arguments also include a greater likelihood of respect for human rights. That is because people must vote to make changes to laws or statutes. Democratic leaders cannot solely make unilateral decisions, and there are often other branches of government that can step in if this occurs. This is supposed to encourage democratic governments to be transparent about their work. 

Checks on Power

Another common argument for democracy is that it allows citizens to be empowered to elect their representatives, which means that everyone is expected to compromise so that no one interest is considered more important. Elections are also a way to make sure leaders know there are limits to their power.

Debate and Exchange of Ideas

Democracies allow citizens to be exposed to various points of view before making their choice. This allows candidates, citizens, and stakeholders to have a proper debate about why they would better represent the people that elect them. Transparency in elections is also meant to promote peace because people are more likely to accept the results of a fairly-won election, even if the candidate that won is not the one they chose.

Arguments Against Democracy

There are also arguments against democracy. The Greek philosopher Socrates made some compelling arguments against democracy by birthright as early as 399 BC. It is important to consider the possible negatives when discussing democracy. 

Charismatic, but Unqualified Leadership

Socrates argued that people need to be equipped to vote during elections instead of going about the process without the right information. Socrates felt that people need to be rational about who they vote for, not that they should not have the right to vote. He warned that people may be swayed by leaders who seem to provide all the right answers or know what to say. Basically, Socrates said that people might vote for someone because of how the candidate makes them feel, not because the candidate is able to do the job correctly.

Democracy Might Devolve into Tyranny

Another Greek philosopher, Plato, was also critical of democracy. He examined five existing government styles and looked at the pros and cons of these systems in his famous book The Republic . His argument is that people become tired of systems such as oligarchy and then succumb to democracy because they are hungry for power. He felt that crumbling democratic societies are more easily able to transition into tyranny once democracy becomes unsustainable. 

There Might Be Reasonable Alternatives

At best, voting for the wrong person means that nothing gets done at the taxpayer’s expense. At worst, people are making an uninformed vote. Modern-day philosopher Jason Brennan echoes many of the warnings of Socrates, but he also created a new term to describe what he perceives as an ideal alternative to democracy: epistocracy. Brennan argues that people need to think about what they expect from the government and then become informed so they can choose representatives that accomplish the tasks their citizens want. He also argues for the “competence principle.” Voters should use their right and power to vote to the best of their ability in order to maintain their right to vote. Brennan also says that Singapore is a modern-day example of a technocracy . In a technocracy, experts run the government. 

More in Politics

What are ‘Red Flag’ Laws And How Can They Prevent Gun Violence?

The Most and Least Fragile States

What is the Difference Between Democrats and Republicans?

The Black Codes And Jim Crow Laws

Iroquois Great Law of Peace

United States-Iran Conflict

The War In Afghanistan

The United States-North Korea Relations

Plato’s, Aristotle’s, and Machiavelli’s Perspectives on the Ideal Form of Government

Introduction.

The phenomenon of human nature has long been a source of continuous and quite heated philosophical discussions due to its multifaceted and remarkably complex structure and the necessity to approach it from several different perspectives. Additionally, numerous philosophers have pondered the concept of an ideal governmental structure, linking it to a variety of factors and shaping it according to their perception of the perceived ideal framework of interpersonal interactions. However, approaching the issue with an analytical scalpel, one will realize that the political views and, most importantly, the preferred form of government for famous philosophers, including Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli, was defined largely by their understanding of the human nature.

Human Nature

To understand the connection between Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli’s concept of the human nature and their solution of the ideal political regime, one must first compare the former. Despite being divided by time and cultures, Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli share quite a number of ideas concerning the human nature and its intrinsic characteristics, as well as the factors on which its development hinges. Remarkably, Plato (375 B. C.) was the first one to bring the social aspect of the human nature into the limelight, emphasizing the dependence of one’s personal development on the social environment and the people surrounding one.

Specifically, in “Republic,” Plato postulates that copying established behavioral standards while interacting with others socially is what defines the subject matter: “[…] human nature, Adeimantus, seems to me to be minted in even smaller coins than this, so that an individual can neither imitate many things well nor perform well the actions themselves of which those imitations are likenesses” (Plato, 375 B.C., p. 76). The specified quote points to Plato’s understanding of the human nature as a sociocultural phenomenon.

In his works, Aristotle elaborates on the ideas developed by Plato, adding a certain layer of the individualist perspective into the framework. Specifically, Aristotle makes an additional step in connecting the human nature to the desirable form of government by insisting that the former entails the emergence of statesmanship (Aristotle, 350 B.C.). Therefore, while accepting the importance of external factors in shaping the human nature, the philosopher links it to human nature. Namely, the philosopher accentuates the role of ethics in amplifying the core constituents of the human nature (Aristotle, 350 B.C.). However, what makes Aristotle’s perspective on the human nature particularly prominent and distinguishable from others is the introduction of the notion of Eudaimonia (happiness). Postulating that the human nature is predicated on happiness, Aristotle, therefore, makes another step toward determining the form of government that allows satisfying the needs of individuals to the fullest extent possible.

Compared to Plato and Aristotle’s ideas of the human nature, the approach suggested by Machiavelli makes a noticeable detour. While Aristotle does introduce the ethical component into the subject matter, he does not go as far as making qualitative statements concerning the human nature from an ethical perspective, which Machiavelli does immediately. Specifically, according to Machiavelli, the human nature can be characterized as vile and despicable (Machiavelli, 1994). In the words of the philosopher himself, “Men are impatient, and

they cannot put off trying to satisfy their desires for year after year.” (Machiavelli, 1994, p. 198). Moreover, Machiavelli defines the human nature as “ambitious and suspicious,” therefore, delineating that control is a necessary measure for containing the negative potential of individual citizens (Machiavelli, 1994, p. 73). Overall, the specified concept of the human nature as interpreted by Machiavelli justifies the latter’s perspective on monarchy is the only possible means of governing the state. However, surprisingly, the philosopher introduces another component to his recipe for an ideal form of government.

Political Views and Governmental Power

The statements that Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli express in their works on the issue of the human nature can be connected to the political views of the thinkers. In fact, most of their ideas concerning the ideal form of government stem directly from their perceived concept of the human nature and the way in which it evolves. As a result, the authors’ speculations regarding the subject matter not only overlap, but represent a clear continuity, with their main concept of a perfect state with an impeccable structure and internal hierarchy being connected to their idea of the human nature.

Starting with Plato’s interpretation of an ideal governmental system, one must address Plato’s attitude toward laws as the foundation for building a healthy and orderly society. Specifically, being convinced that, for a state to function, a set of legal standards must be established as the only and unchangeable framework, Plato argues that aristocracy will be able to support the specified structure without disrupting it: “if one outstanding man emerges among the rulers, it is called a kingship; if more than one, it is called an aristocracy” (Plato, 375 B.C., p. 135). By likening the aristocratic community to an expansion of kingship, Plato emphasizes the inherent power that the specified structure contains.

The described perspective is tightly connected to Plato’s idea of the human nature as a product of social interactions. Specifically, by outlining that people develop their identity based on their social status and community specifics, Plato concludes that a certain tier of society can be entitled to govern the rest (Plato, 375 B.C.). Thus, Plato’s interpretation of the human nature entails his idea of a perfect state.

Plato’s emphasis on the social component as the foundation for the human nature and the resulting need to introduce the aristocratic rule into an ideal state is further expanded by Aristotle, who concludes that public and personal happiness should be prioritized. As emphasized above, Aristotle’s interpretation of the human nature involved the active promotion of happiness as a necessary condition for perfect society where the relationships between its members remain in complete harmony. One might expect that the happiness of all citizens would lead Aristotle to the idea of democracy as the fundamental principle that must constitute the basis for an impeccable government and a perfect state.

However, while some elements of democratic ideas echo in Aristotle’s theory of an ideal state, the philosopher still envisions the best form of government as a different structure. Namely, building upon Plato’s ideas, Aristotle concludes that oligarchy as the notion of power being focused in the hands of the few should be envisioned as the perfect form of government (Aristotle, 350 B. C.). Indeed, in his “Politics,” the philosopher declares oligarchy to be the solution that will advance the development of what he defined as the city-state (Aristotle, 350 B. C.). Specifically, in Aristotle’s understating, the ruling class should be provided with an opportunity to steer the process of social development toward the provision of education for all citizens (Aristotle, 350 B. C.). According to the philosopher, the specified method of encouraging community development will allow introducing citizens to the core democratic ideas and virtues (Aristotle, 350 B. C.). Therefore, balancing between the concepts of oligarchy and democracy, Aristotle approaches the current understanding of the nature of the state power and the way in which it must be exerted. Specifically, Aristotle concludes that “Oligarchy is really control by the wealthy; democracy is really control by the poor. It just so happens that the wealthy are always few in number, while the poor are always many” (Aristotle, 350 B. C., lxv). Therefore, Aristotle’s concept of an ideal state, where power is given to the few that are capable of exerting it in a useful manner, aligns both with his idea of longing for content as the basis of the human nature and the philosophical groundwork prepared by Plato.

Finally, Machiavelli’s perception of the ideal state as it stems from his interpretation of the human nature is worth being discussed. Remarkably, even though Machiavelli unambiguously promotes monarchy as the only viable form of government for an ideal state, his perspective on monarchy is comparable to that one of Aristotle on oligarchy. Namely, like Aristotle, Machiavelli incorporates certain democratic principles into his vision of an ideal state (Machiavelli, 1994). The specified representation of a perfect government is quite surprising given Machiavelli’s convictions concerning the human nature, namely, it being vile and overall despicable (Machiavelli, 1994). However, on closer scrutiny, Machiavelli’s description of an ideal government does make sense both when framed as an extension of his view on the human nature and as a natural evolution of the argument provided by Plato and Aristotle.

Namely, Machiavelli’s assumption, which condemns a range of aspects of the human nature, viewing it as intrinsically flawed, can be considered similar to that one of Aristotle, who insists on the necessity for a ruling class that could embrace the flaws of the human nature to exist. As a result, Machiavelli’s side a of monarchy being the saving grace of the humankind represents a logical continuation both to his own ideas of the humankind and the human nature, and the perceptions of the subject matter that Plato and Aristotle had. Namely, Machiavelli insists on the opportunity to prepare the grounds for citizens to develop a strong moral core once the people capable of promoting the specified qualities are at the helm (Machiavelli, 1994). For instance, Machiavelli claims that “This is the cycle through which all states revolve, and power is still passed, as it always has been, from hand to hand. But it rarely happens that the same people return to power” (Machiavelli, 1995, p. 90). Therefore, the importance of Monarchy as the process of keeping power over the state and its citizens within a specific group that is expected to build the required qualities and competencies is justified from Machiavelli’s perspective, which representing a continuum given the standpoints of Aristotle and Plat on the subject matter.

Since Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli each single out a particular characteristic of human nature, their idea of a perfect political regime is tethered to it accordingly. Despite the obvious differences in the perspectives of all three philosophers, the connection between their idea of the human nature and their suggested framework for the perfect state is obvious. Moreover, there are certain intersections between the stances that Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli take on the notion of a perfect state, each agreeing that some form of a ruling class, be it the aristocracy, the oligarchy, or the royal family, is necessary. Though contemporary philosophers might not necessarily agree with the stance that Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli take on the subject matter, the profound and grounded nature of their argumentation must be acknowledged.

Aristotle. (350 B.C.). Politics . (C. D. C. Reeve, Trans.). Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Machiavelli, N. (1994). Selected political writings . (D. Wooton, Trans.). Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Plato. (375 B.C.). Republic . (C. D. C. Reeve, Trans.). Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Cite this paper

• Chicago (N-B)
• Chicago (A-D)

StudyCorgi. (2023, March 28). Plato’s, Aristotle’s, and Machiavelli’s Perspectives on the Ideal Form of Government. https://studycorgi.com/platos-aristotles-and-machiavellis-perspectives-on-the-ideal-form-of-government/

"Plato’s, Aristotle’s, and Machiavelli’s Perspectives on the Ideal Form of Government." StudyCorgi , 28 Mar. 2023, studycorgi.com/platos-aristotles-and-machiavellis-perspectives-on-the-ideal-form-of-government/.

StudyCorgi . (2023) 'Plato’s, Aristotle’s, and Machiavelli’s Perspectives on the Ideal Form of Government'. 28 March.

1. StudyCorgi . "Plato’s, Aristotle’s, and Machiavelli’s Perspectives on the Ideal Form of Government." March 28, 2023. https://studycorgi.com/platos-aristotles-and-machiavellis-perspectives-on-the-ideal-form-of-government/.

Bibliography

StudyCorgi . "Plato’s, Aristotle’s, and Machiavelli’s Perspectives on the Ideal Form of Government." March 28, 2023. https://studycorgi.com/platos-aristotles-and-machiavellis-perspectives-on-the-ideal-form-of-government/.

StudyCorgi . 2023. "Plato’s, Aristotle’s, and Machiavelli’s Perspectives on the Ideal Form of Government." March 28, 2023. https://studycorgi.com/platos-aristotles-and-machiavellis-perspectives-on-the-ideal-form-of-government/.

This paper, “Plato’s, Aristotle’s, and Machiavelli’s Perspectives on the Ideal Form of Government”, was written and voluntary submitted to our free essay database by a straight-A student. Please ensure you properly reference the paper if you're using it to write your assignment.

Before publication, the StudyCorgi editorial team proofread and checked the paper to make sure it meets the highest standards in terms of grammar, punctuation, style, fact accuracy, copyright issues, and inclusive language. Last updated: March 28, 2023 .

If you are the author of this paper and no longer wish to have it published on StudyCorgi, request the removal . Please use the “ Donate your paper ” form to submit an essay.

Essay On My Ideal Government

Throughout the history of the world, there have been many different forms of government, ranging from monarchies, dictatorships, republics, and even anarchy. Respectively each of these governments has their good points and bad points. I believe that a government where the people choose who is in power and has a say in everyday political decisions is the best government available. I myself know that living under a government that controls where I live, the job I have, the clothes I wear and the religion that I practice. It would be wrong to assume that any government in today 's world is perfect. If I had my choice in a government I wouldn 't just choose just one. Rather it would be a composite of all the good points of various other …show more content…

To me, if the public could not take part in the decisions that affect their everyday life, and would just have life altering decisions made for them, would not make sense. I would want to know that I had a say in what goes on my community and country. Because of these feeling I would like all elections in which people chose their representative like the Indian elections. Bio Electronic voting machines will be used in election to overcome cheating and other mistakes. Local government election is also held on time to facilitate people of lower …show more content…

Health facilities should be given free of finance to every person in the state. Health ministry should be controlled by national government and provincial governments should also take an active part in it. 1000 beds Hospitals should be built at every district level. Dispensaries and medical stores should be available in every town. National Health Card should be launched for every person so that he/she can easily purchase medicine from any stores. There should be medical universities at every district and the students who got his/her undergraduate degree from Government universities will serve for 3 years in a district hospital as an

Essay On The Purpose Of Government

The U.S 's first government was created on September 17, 1787 when the US Constitution was signed. This event brought together all 13 states by a unanimous vote. With this, our new government was formed, but now that we have this new system and much more freedom, what exactly is the purpose of our government? Is it to run our businesses? make treaties? or just to say that we have one?

Compulsory Voting Dbq

Mandatory voting makes large numbers of people vote, which will make the country run more efficiently because the election was based on the hopes and aspiration of the people for the future leader. Voting should be made compulsory because its positive effects exceeds its negative

Libertarianism Vs Utilitarian Government

What is the most effective way of governing? Is any one form government the correct one? Is there a form of government that is absolutely better and will significantly improve the quality of life of the individuals it governs? If people were sent somewhere far off for example, Mars, should the individuals sent there live under utilitarian principles or libertarian principles? Some individuals believe that a libertarian government would best govern individuals within its geographic control, and I concur with the libertarian perspective.

Fourth Branch Of Government Essay

writing prompt #6: Explain why the media has been called the fourth branch of government. Include your opinion of whether this is an accurate portrayal. Media is considered the fourth branch of government, but why? Media influences lives on the daily and can influence governmental thoughts, opinions , and decisions as well. Because of this it could be used for or against the government.

Essay On Divided Government

Divided government occurs when one political party controls the presidency and another controls one or both houses of Congress. The struggle between parties can create significant issues for the government, including the appointment of judges and high officials and the creation of effective problem-solving legislation. Divided government creates an issue for the president in making federal appointments. The president has the constitutional power to nominate ambassadors, judges, and high officials, but these nominees are subject to Senate confirmation. When the government is divided the president and the Senate are of different political parties, this creates a problem in the appointment of these positions.

Elite Democracy Vs Popular Democracy Essay

There will always be different views and opinions when it comes to government politics. One interesting view is whether or not our nation is led by an Elite or Popular Democracy. A democracy is a form of government that is run by elected officials that are voted into public office by the people for representation. There are different perspectives on how a democratic system should work.

Rousseau Vs Thomas Paine Essay

Thomas Paine essentially wrote Common Sense for the common man. Being a pamphlet, its structure and simplicity made reading easy for those who were literate. Its minimalism enabled citizens in the colonies to unite under one common cause — independence against Britain. He was inspired by both John Locke’s The Second Treatise of Government as well as Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s

Thomas Hobbes: The Four Purpose Of Government

Thomas Hobbes described that life in a state of nature would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” In addition, no one would be able to survive in an Anarchy society where there is no order and the safeguard of others is at risk. Therefore, governments require for citizens to surrender some freedom to obtain the benefits of the government. Thus, the government has preserved its two major purposes: maintaining order and providing public goods to the public and an uprising purpose of promoting equality. The main and oldest purpose of government is to maintain order by establishing laws to preserve life and protect property.

Advantages Of The Two Party System

An ideal government would be a government which understands the cause of the current global crisis and works on connection between all the countries in the world without taking advantage of each other’s situation. A government which works for the benefit of society and wellbeing for all people by providing them all basic needs like food, shelter, education, health program. Instead of power and money they could

Examples Of Injustice In Health Care

The farmers and the poor always are unable to get the sufficient health care. Secondly, the problem is the imbalance of illness 's prevention between medical resources. For a long time, prevention approaches are not well implemented, cure light-proof and lack of government investment in public health and public health system is weak. This situation seriously limited the capacity of service and did not achieve the desired benefits of disease prevention

Similarities Between Plato And John Locke

Everyone has a perspective of their own about the government whether it be good or bad. Ancient Greek philosopher Plato and English philosopher John Locke both discuss the topic of government in their literatures. In the Republic by Plato, Plato introduces this concept of a just city. In this city, he believes that the older and wisest person(s) should rule as they are very knowledgeable. Everyone is born innately different according to Plato.

Different Types Of Government Essay

In order to compare and contrast varying types of government within two or more countries, one must have a clear definition of Government and know the purposes it serves. Therefore, I did some research and I have established that Government is a group that exercises dominant power over a nation, state, society or other body of people. Governments are commonly responsible for constructing and implementing laws, handling money, and defending the general population from external threats, and may have other obligations or privileges. All over the world, there are many different types of government within countries. Each kind has its advantages as well as disadvantages regarding the general well-being of its peoples and economy.

Disadvantages Of Liberal Democracy

Conclusion: Page 6 6. Bibliography: Page 6 Introduction: This an age old argument on whether the people should be ruled by one single all powerful leader who isn’t challenged or a leader who is democratically elected into power. In this academic piece I will be looking at the benefits and pitfalls of each form of government as well as give a few examples of each and decide if they were successful.

Role Of Government Essay

Government Government is a system of social control under which the right to make laws, and the right to enforce them, is given to a particular group in society. Government power can be held by one individual, a few, or a majority. Government come in different forms. The basic law determining the form of government is called the constitution and may be written, as in the United States, or largely unwritten, as in Great Britain.

My Ideal Government Essay

But, imagine your government falling apart. You then realize that the people and country are affected. Some people do not know that having a good government is mainly for a person living in that country. Good governed countries keep people from doing criminal acts in their towns.

More about Essay On My Ideal Government

Related topics.

• United States
• Form of government
• President of the United States

Locke's Ideal Government

A Study On the Ideal Form of Government With nearly two thousand years between their ground-breaking works, the philosophical writers Aristotle and John Locke had very contrasting outlooks on governments and the role they have in the city-state. For Aristotle, the role of government is fairly broad, and when analyzing his work, readers can interpret his message very differently, while Locke has a more focused and defined purpose for government in his ideal city-state. This study will focus on providing a brief recollection of each writers’ views, the strengths and weaknesses that each type of government has based on the author’s analysis, and will conclude with how and why Locke’s interpretation of the purpose of government is more ideal for …show more content…

Being published just a few months for the start of the Glorious Revolution, Locke’s radical controversy with the accepted political writings of Filmer seemed to justify the actions of the English revolutionaries. Locke describes his ideal form of government as limited in its capabilities, to prevent the corruption and give the people of the city-state the freedom entitled to them by the state of nature. Unlock Aristotle , Locke focuses on one aspect of freedom that he believes to be, above all others, the best representation of human freedom, which is the ability for humans to accumulate and own property . As with Aristotle it is best to look at the natural law that Locke believes drives humans to adequately understand why he believes that governments are in place in the city-state. Locke and Aristotle believe that reason is the natural law that guides humans, but Locke writes that when in the state of nature, humans are equals in every way and naturally interact and form communities. Locke states that the one right that all humans have, is to protect themselves from harm, “… every man upon this score, by the Right he hath to preserve Mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them” (Locke, ch.2 sc.8). This statement is the foundation for why Locke believes governments are necessary. Government exists for the sole purpose of protecting each individual’s right to own property, “Political Power then I take to be a Right of making laws with Penalties of Death, and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of Property” (ch.1 sc.3). Government allows individuals their natural right to accumulate property without fear of others harming them or taking away their

John Locke Views On Government

I am John Locke. I heard that you're going to have a meeting with the statesman. So, I decided to give you my ideas about the government that would inspire you. As you know it's really important to give citizens their natural rights (life, liberty, and property). Because I believed that everyone was born free, equal, and independent. And the meaning of my natural rights are life: everyone is entitled to live. Liberty: everyone is entitled to do anything they want to so long as it doesn't conflict with the first right. Property: everyone is entitled to own all they create or gain through gift or trade so long as it doesn't conflict with the first two rights. Another thing if the government agrees to give citizens their natural rights. I've

John Locke And The Locke Of The United States

The Lockean ideas are fundamental in the founding documents. In the preamble of the U.S. Constitution, it begins with a revolutionary phrase, “We the people.”The first three words of the preamble to the Constitution suggest one element unique to the American Revolution. First, its outcome was a government created by the people, and for the service of the people. The new American government was not one existing independently of them or, in some respect, over them. The idea of popular sovereignty in the United States predates the

John Locke : An Influential Philosopher

In his Second Treatise on Government Locke focus’ on liberalism & capitalism, defending the claim that men are by nature free and equal against the idea that God had made all people subject to a king. He argued that people have ‘natural rights’, such as the right to life, liberty, and property, that hold the foundation for the major laws of a society. He says, “…we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit.” (2nd Treatise, Chapter 2, sec 4). John Locke used this claim, that all men were naturally free and equal, for understanding the idea of a government as a result of a social contract. This is where people in the state of nature transfer some of their rights to the government in order to better guarantee the steady and comfortable enjoyment of their lives, liberty, and property.

John Locke's Influence on the Founding Fathers Essay

• 2 Works Cited

A few examples of the similarities of the Declaration and Locke’s Second Treatise of Government will suffice,

Political Theory of John Locke Essay

What would the American government be like today if it was not for the mind and political theory of John Locke? Some historians and philosophers believe that without John Locke our government would only be a shadow of what it is today. Arguably, one of his most important political and philosophical works was his Two Treatises of Government. There he argues that the function of the state is to protect the natural rights of its citizens, primarily to protect the right to property. John Locke, in many eyes, can be viewed as one of the father’s of Democracy. He embraced many of ideas in his theories on the state of nature and the rise of political society today. In Locke’s political society,

John Locke's The Second Treatise Of Government

While reading the “The Second Treatise of Government,” you can notice and see that John Locke has a strong standing for civil rights as well as helping with the development of the Constitution of the United States. He states that the “consent of the governed,” is basically saying that communities are not put together by the divine right or ruled by. Paternal, familial, and political are types of powers that John Locke mentions that have all have unlike characteristics. He inspired others to believe in and want equal rights and democracy. John Locke talks about the state of nature, which basically states that no one has the power to be ruler of someone, as well as they are able to do what they want in a freely matter. In other words people are born just like anyone else that is born, and should have equally rights to property, health, and liberty, and that no one should have the power over anyone. Everyone should be able to live and enjoy his or her own freedom and wellbeing. However, the state of nature is not a guarantee to have natural laws, which could help with the protecting of one’s property. According to him having your own personal freedom was the true meaning of state of nature. John Locke thought that people were following his faith in human rationality through the declaration of Locke. John Locke states that if the government takes away from others for them to empower them then the people have right and opportunity to go against

Comparing John Locke And Aristotle's Ideal Government

Aristotle provides very unique and compelling arguments for what he believes to be the ideal form of government for a city-state, but because of the time period he was alive, he did not have the necessary knowledge to realize how limited his view of human nature was. Due to its limited power and sole purpose being to protect individuals’ right to own property, which in turn allows individuals to live happy lives, Locke’s form of government is more

The Petition Of Rights, And The Articles Of Confederation

In his writings, he proclaimed his opinion of mans natural right. He believed every man had the right to life, liberty, and property. That the government should put its efforts into protecting these God given rights, for the power the government holds is given to it by the people. Locke states, “But though men, when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of Nature into the hands of society. . . ” He is explaining the sacrifices people make by moving into an organized society. He states that by giving up these things, protection is placed upon the persons property, because governments make laws to protect each citizens rights. However, in some cases, when the general public believe fit, the people can remove their legislative power. They then can replace it with someone who respects the power given to them, and follows the peoples wishes instead of their own

John Locke: Second Treatise of Civil Government Essay

Locke feels that this system of government is lacking in that the ruler has all control, and may not be stopped in abuses of power, which Locke fears. Humans beings decide to form a society out of the state of nature because there must be unity among men in order to protect one another, and so that they may punish offenders of the justice. Men do this under the rule of an indivdual who is selected by the people, and to whom the people give up some of their personal rights.Though humans give up certain rights to the chosen authoriy, they are entitled to certain rights reserved to them alone, which they hold within the society. All members of the society should be equal under the law of justice, and that no man is better than another, since all men are created equal, and all are equal before the laws of nature. The law of nature states that people attain property through the labour they do.The ruler or authority over a society should be an indivdual

The Role Of Government In John Locke's Of Civil Government

As demonstrated in excerpts of John Locke’s Of Civil Government, the reason men needs government is for the assurance to their rights to life and property, which are otherwise not guaranteed. Based upon the needs of men, such a government will be structured to contain a legislative body, a judicial system, and an executive authority. As noted within an editorial by Fareed Zakaria entitled “Stop being afraid of more government. It’s exactly what we need”, the size of government will shift to address temporal issues which address the nation. However, the basic structure of government will remain the same. The position of government as a legislative, judicial, and executive authority allows it to address the needs of men, who require government to guarantee them their rights and freedoms.

Compare and Contrast John Locke and Thomas Hobbes

Locke believed that people are willing to unite under a form of government to preserve their lives, liberty, and estate. Since natural law is already good, government not only preserves natural law, but also works to enhance it.

John Locke's Views: A Good Form Of Government

In my views I believe that Matt aka John Locke had the best views compared to my actual views. When we conversed we talked about how that the building of the Versailles was an outrageous expensive and that taking of the peoples money to build such a tremendous structure, then taxing the people more money after building it was dumb and not need because to much money was spent on this palace. Yes it is a very nice palace but it was unneeded. In the following topic discussed among us was that of god given right. He believe that a King saying he has divine right to rule and that he sits on gods thrown is not okay. John believed that kings don’t have god given right. That assuming you are equal god is invalid and ridiculousness. I believe as me a student that a king is only granted the thrown if is a

Thomas Hobbes And John Hobbes

For Locke, the sole reason for a government is to protect the well being of the people. Locke writes, “Salus Populi Suprema Lex” which illustrates that the only purpose for is government, again, is to keep the commonwealth

John Locke A Legitimate Government

In the society illustrated by John Locke, the human nature is characterized as free and independent; however, the problem with society is that it has too many small inconveniences, which could be as trivial as a tree blocking the sidewalk. To solve these problems, a legitimate government, characterized by explicit consent, checks on institutions and the right to revolt by the people, is needed. The utmost legitimate government, in comparison to Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, is based on John Locke’s social contract in Second Treatise of Government because each aspect of a legitimate government protects the citizen’s life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Through each aspect, the people can actively participate in government to prevent the sovereign from taking advantage of their powers to further their own goals.

John Locke And William Godwin

Locke regarded humans naturally in “a state of perfect freedom to order their actions” (Locke Two treatises ex.4). Along with this comes unbounded indulgence of the benefits of law of nature whereby men “has by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others” (Locke Two treatises ex.87). In addition, “it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into society” (Locke Two treatises ex.77). Locke views that the formation of government “derive[d] from God’s will” (Dunn 2003, p. 37) and originated from men’s need to protect their property as a collective, where a common

Related Topics

• Political philosophy

John Locke's Ideal Form Of Democracy

Show More John locke influenced the idea of Thomas Jefferson when writing the Declaration of Independence because John Locke’s ideal form of government was a form of democracy, and that humans should have the right to life, liberty and property, and that humans need government to protect the people’s rights. John Locke influenced the Declaration of Independence because he thought that the idea form of government was a form of democracy . His form of government is stated as “The people agree to give up some freedoms if the government agrees to protect everyone’s rights. If the government fails to deliver, the people revolt.” This statement supports the claim that Locke influenced the Declaration of Independence because the form of government in America is similar to this because our government consists of everyone having the government protect them in exchange for the people giving up a few of their rights, similar to Locke’s ideal form of government. The American government also is …show more content… The Declaration of Independence states something quite similar to this when it states: “That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,” This statement from the Declaration of Independence directly states that government should protect the rights of the governed. John Locke states something similar to this idea when he states: “Most importantly, Locke believed governments should protect people’s natural rights.” These two statements are extremely similar because they both state the same thing only displayed by inconsistent word choice, they both state that the government should protect the people’s natural rights. In conclusion, both the Declaration of Independence and John locke state that government should protect the people’s natural

Related Documents

Why did salutary neglect of the 13 colonies end after the seven years war.

READING: Chapter 7: The Road to Revolution 1763-1775 Key Concept Questions: Why did salutary neglect of the 13 Colonies end after the Seven Years’ War (French & Indian War)? Salutary neglect is a historical term that refers to the 17th & 18th century when Britain avoided strict enforcement of parliamentary laws. These laws were meant to keep American colonies obedient to England but with the lack of enforcing these laws, they did the opposite. Salutary neglect of the 13 colonies ended after the Seven Years’ War due to the massive debt owed.…

1776-1800 Dbq Essay

The newly created United States government upholded the Revolutionary principles from 1776 to 1800 by creating the basic law and order of our government in current time. The United States government in the period 1776-1800 relied on Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Adams, and George Washington to produce the foundation of the new American government. Successfully, the five writers developed important reference documents that Americans still use today for freedoms and rights. In document one, John Locke, an enlightenment thinker, writes in his “Second Treatise on Government” that a man will allow himself give up his rights and subject himself to the dominion and control of an other power of government. This statement implies that man is only interested in his own self, his own liberty, and his own property.…

How Did The Founding Fathers Influence The Declaration Of Independence

The U.S. Founding Fathers were influenced by many great thinkers and past societies when they collectively wrote the famous documents such as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution that shape our government and country. After events such as the Boston Tea Party, Americans, to put it bluntly, were fed up with Great Britain’s jurisdiction. They desired to form their own government, completely dissimilar to England’s, thus the Founding Fathers essentially sat down and devised an effective government system, and together with the combination of ideas from inspirations such as John Locke and Charles Montesquieu they created a novel U.S. government. John Locke was a key influence on both the Declaration of Independence (which declared…

French Revolution Dbq Analysis

Locke was a vocal supporter of the freedoms of equality and the protection of democratic government. In his Second Treatise on Civil Government, Locke stated that “there [is] nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank…should also be equal” (Document A). This idea of equality among citizens was important in promoting acceptance and fairness in English society after the adoption of a constitutional monarchy. In addition, Locke believed that, “When the government is dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new legislative[ure]” (Document A). This revolutionary idea of overthrowing a failing government greatly influenced the American colonists in their revolt against Great Britain, and is evidenced in the Declaration of Independence.…

What Are John Locke's Ideas Of Government

Spencer Escue Coach Quinn European History November 24, 2015 The Ideas of John Locke A philosopher is someone who is engaged or learned in philosophy. So who were some of the greatest philosophers?…

Explain What Was The Main Point Of The Enlightenment Dbq

MaKenna Jueneman World History 31 Oct. 2017 What Was the Main Point of the Enlightenment Philosophers? The Enlightenment was known as a philosophical movement or the age of reason. It took place in the late 17th and 18th century.…

French Revolution Dbq

In Locke’s book “Second Treatise of Government” he states that “Being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possession” (Locke Sec.6). With these rights that were stated in his book. They ended up becoming the foundation for the primary document during the French Revolution. Some of the French monarchy didn’t agree because this document was used to state that the role of the Government was to protect the natural rights of the citizens. Many might not know but with the ideas of these natural rights were the foundation that helped create The Declaration of…

Dbq Essay On The Enlightenment

John Locke contended that individual freedom was highly important in order to succeed in a suitable government. In “Of the State of Nature” and “Of the Dissolution of Government,” Locke stated that men and women are by nature independent and free, and have the absolute right to take care and maintain this freedom. (Document A). In order to take good care of the government, there would need to be two branches: a legislative and executive branch. Locke argued that a government that had been created by free individuals was more successful to preserve it, versus a monarchy.…

Individual Rights Dbq Analysis

To begin, individual rights was an important part of John Locke’s ideas on government. John Locke mentions, “a state of perfect freedom...within the bounds of the law of nature”(DocA).He also stated that, “when the government is dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide forthemselves, by erecting a new legislative...”(Doc A).…

Individual Freedom Dbq Essay

This idea was a key part of their thinking in four areas: government, religion, economics, and social equality for women. John Locke argued that individual freedom was an important part of Locke's ideas on government. According to document A in the first paragraph, Locke first wrote that people are naturally free and have the right to maintain their freedom. In addition, on the same document paragraph 2, Locke states " To preserve this freedom, men need to create a government with a legislative and an executive. " Freedom was the main idea of Locke’s thoughts about government because a government that is created by free individuals was more likely than a monarchy to preserve the freedom of individuals.…

What Are The Causes Of The American Revolution Dbq

John Locke an english philosophe says in the Second Treatise on Civil Government, “a state of perfect freedom to order their possessions and to order actions… within bounds of the law of nature… ”(Document A). In other words John Locke argues that people should have freedoms within limits. According to Locke, if the government fails the people, the people have the power to overthrow the government. Freedom was the main idea of Locke’s thoughts about government because, all…

Framers Of The Constitution Essay

The framers of the Constitution were visionaries who sought to establish a limited representative government which not only restricted the powers of an existing government, but also safeguarded the rights of the minority through restricting majority rule. A republic, they believed, would be the only form of government in which the liberty of the people could be preserved. Greatly influenced by the 17th century British philosopher John Locke, who advocated for the protection of natural rights of man by entering into a social contract, separation of governmental powers, and individuals’ right to consent to being governed, the founding fathers were able to incorporate such teachings into the Constitution of the United States. The American founders…

How Did John Locke And Hobbes Influence The Declaration Of Independence

The founders of the Declaration of Independence sought to create a government that would be formed from the ideas and concepts that they had encountered through their various readings and studies. John Locke and Thomas Hobbes are by far the most influential thinkers of the Constitution and continue to affect American thought even today. Many of John Locke’s ideas directly correlate with those included in the Declaration of Independence yet they are reworded to suit the needs of the new government.…

Impact of the Enlightenment on the Declaration of Independence

These ideas were formed on the premise that government’s duty is to safeguard people’s natural rights such as liberty, life, and property. Therefore, these rights could not be taken away as there were ‘unalienable’. However, when the government failed to perform its duties, Locke argued that they should set up a new one. These Enlightenment ideas about natural rights became the reason for the Declaration of Independence. Additionally, the idea of popular sovereignty (political power) was based on the disposition that government’s power comes from people.…

Compare And Contrast John Locke And Jean Jacque Rousseau

Locke’s Second Treatise of Government allowed for the ideal that no ruler or government could do whatever they pleased because there were moral laws that encompassed all of society. However, Rousseau was adamant in his belief that man “is born free and everywhere he is in chains. ”1 Rousseau defended the right of the people to rule, he argued that the people were only accountable for themselves and the ruler or government had no right to subjugate the people. Locke and Rousseau’s idea of government are similar in the fact that they both embody some aspects of our government today. Rousseau inspired the phrase “We the people…”2 at the beginning of the Declaration of Independence because of his belief in the wisdom of the people to decide in their own affairs.…

Related Topics

• Political philosophy
• United States
• United States Constitution

Ready To Get Started?

• Create Flashcards
• Mobile apps
•   Facebook
•   Twitter
• Cookie Settings

Your Article Library

Essay on government of india: meaning, forms and other information’s.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

Essay on Government of India: Meaning, Forms and Other Information’s!

It’s meaning:

Sometimes confusion is made between state and Government and the two words are used interchangeably. Government is an instrument of the state through which it carries out its purposes. A state, as we have seen, is a politically organized and geographically limited body of people that possesses the right to use force. It is an abstract entity and so must have an instrument through which to operate. Government is such an instrument. All the citizens of a state are not part of a government.

A government includes only those officials and persons who are appointed or elected to determine, interpret and carry out the regulations of the state. Thus it has three main organs-the legislative to determine the laws of the state, the executive to carry out these laws and the judiciary to interpret them. The sole purpose of a government is to act as the instrumentality of the state. Its powers and organization are defined by the basic law called ‘constitution’ of the country.

Most states have now written constitutions. The Indian Constitution is the ultimate basis for judging the legality of any law a legislative body enacts or any order an executive body issues. The Supreme Court of India has the final power to determine whether laws or executive orders are made in pursuance of the constitution.

It’s Forms:

Governments may take several forms. In history there have appeared many forms of government. Aristotle had given a six fold classification of governments—three normal and three perverted forms of government. The three normal types of government are monarchy, rule by one person; aristocracy, rule by a few; polity, rule by many. If these normal forms are perverted, monarchy becomes tyranny, aristocracy becomes oligarchy and polity becomes democracy.

Thus Aristotle regarded democracy as the worst form of government, but he felt that the potential capacity of the citizens for sound collective Judgement could assure the success of this form. After Aristotle, numerous classifications of governments have been proposed by political thinkers but as pointed by Garner, “There seems to be no single principle, or criterion, Juridical or otherwise, upon which a satisfactory classification of governments can be made.”

Today, our attention is drawn to two major forms: totalitarianism in which the control is in the hands of one or a few persons; and democracy, in which political power is diffused among the governed by the process of representation. The citizens in many states are in a quandary as to which form they should adopt. Russia and China are the classic instances of totalitarian form of government. Under totalitarianism, there is rigidly patterned social organization.

It does not allow unrestricted or uncontrolled associations. It subjects all social groupings to the designs of the state. Usually, questioning of the ideas and practices of the rules is not tolerated. Freedom of expression by the press or individual is denied. Obedience is the supreme law which is enforced by the use of police powers.

Democracy is founded upon the principle of popular sovereignty, i.e., ultimate power resides in the citizens. An Important principle of democracy is that all citizens have equal political privileges which only they can exercise and which they cannot transfer to any other persons.

Another foundational principle is that rule of the majority shall prevail, this majority to be expressed by the citizens either through direct voting or through their elected representatives. A third principle is that citizens can vote the government out of office if it loses their confidence.

Democracy is based upon two basic cultural values of equality and liberty. It has attained a marked popularity in the world, yet it is often criticized for certain defects. The first of these is that the citizens do not fully exercise their rights nor accept their obligations. Voting is a paramount right of the citizens in a democracy, but the citizens do not fully and honestly discharge their obligation to vote.

The percentage of the Indian citizens who fulfill this obligation ranges between 40 to 45 per cent. Moreover, voting is on the basis of caste and extraneous considerations. Election campaigns instead of educating the voters become exercise in praising one’s own side and condemning the other to the extreme. Voting is so quantitatively and qualitatively poor that the whole process of democratic government becomes jeopardized.

Another defect lies in leadership. Democracy can succeed only under able leaders who are neither class conscious nor interest controlled. The leaders in a democracy indulge in unscrupulous activities in order to come into power and remain in power once they have got it. They are often faulty of unethical practices.

As a consequence, democracy attracts only those people who are unscrupulous or have little knowledge for governmental careers. It is a serious defect of democracy that so much of it is in the hands of poorly qualified persons in the art of government. Political leaders in democracy must be of the people and not of any class, peasantry or industrial, rural or urban. They should not be dominated by special interests.

James Bryce in his exhaustive study of modern democracies has given a succinct summary of the working of democratic government:

(i) It has maintained public order while securing the liberty of the individual citizen:

(ii) It has given civil administration as efficient as other forms of government have provided;

(iii) It has not been ungrateful or inconstant;

(iv) Its legislation has been directed to the welfare of the poorer classes than has been that of other governments;

(v) It has been often wasteful and usually extra arrogant;

(vi) It has not produced general contentment in each nation;

(vii) It has not diminished class selfishness and has done little to improve international relations and ensure peace;

(viii) It has not weakened patriotism or courage;

(ix) It has not extinguished corruption and the influence of wealth;

(x) It has not removed the fear of revolution;

(xi) It has not enlisted the services of the most honest and capable persons;

(xii) Nevertheless, it has, taken all in all, given better practical results than either the Rule of one Man or the Rule of a class.

Political Parties:

Political parties have become necessary adjuncts of government in modern times. They are the instruments whereby candidates are nominated and elected. Though they are not official organisations created by the state, they are nevertheless, quasi-official in the sense that states sanction, regulate and permit them to offer candidates for public office. The ultimate aim of a political party is to capture political power and keep control of the government.

The numbers of political parties in a state vary from one to many. England and the United States have two-party system. The advantage of this system is its capacity to present clearer cut issues and fewer candidates instead of a multiplicity of positions on issues and a wide number of candidates.

The losing party in this system serves as an effective opposition. France is the instance of a state with multiple party systems. Under a multiple party system governments change rapidly. The voters are bewildered by a number of viewpoints presented and the multiplicity of candidates they must assess.

Russia and China are the states with one party system. In Russia however, with the disintegration of U.S.S.R. under the impact of Glasnost and Perestroika, the dictatorship of the communist party has tumbled down and other political parties have made their appearance on the political horizon. Germany and Italy were one party state under Nazism and Fascism.

One party system does not allow any opposition or criticism of state policy. The party leaders enjoy monopoly of power and it is difficult to remove them peaceably. India has a multiple party system. Defections and counter-defections continue.

The political parties in India are ‘personality-centered’ than ‘policy centered’. More than forty parties operate at the national and local levels. There is frequent competition and factional conflict within the parties. Sometimes, inner cliques or “rings” develop. The political party which acts as a link between the people and their government has become the media for a politician to gain an occupation. The politician plays a very important role in our whole system. There is a close nexus between politician, mafia and bureaucrat.

The Election symbols (Reservation and Allotment) order, 1968 provides for recognition of political parties for the purpose of specification, reservation, choice and allotment of symbols for elections in parliamentary and assembly constituencies. Clause 6 of the aforesaid order specifies the following conditions to be fulfilled by a political party before it could be recognized by the election commission.

A political party shall be treated as a recognized political party in a state if, and only if, either the conditions specified in Clause (A) or the conditions specified in Clause (B) are fulfilled by that party and not otherwise, that is to say:

(A) Such party—

(a) Has been engaged in political activity for a continuous period of five years; and

(b) Has at the general elections in that state to the House of People, or as the case may be, to the Legislative Assembly for the time being in existence and functioning, returned either, (i) at least one member to the House of People for every twenty five members of that House or any fraction of that number elected from that state; or (ii) at least one member of the Legislative Assembly of that state for every thirty members of that Assembly or any fraction of that number;

(B) That the total number of valid votes polled by all the contesting candidates set up by such party at the general election in the state to the House of People, or as the case may be, to the Legislative Assembly, for the time being in existence and functioning (excluding the valid votes of each such contesting candidates in a constituency as has not been elected and has not polled at least one-twelfth of the total number of valid votes polled by all the contesting candidates on that constituency), is not less than four percent of the total number of valid votes polled by the’ contesting candidates at such general election in the state (including the valid votes of those candidates who have forfeited their deposits).

A recognized political party has been classified either as a “national party” or a “state party” in paragraph 7 of the order. If a political party is recognized in four or more states, it is deemed to be a “national party” and a political party recognized in less than four states is a “state party” in the state or states in which it is recognized as such. In all eight parties are recognized as “national” and 28 at state level.

Election or voting is a distinctive feature of a modern democratic policy. One of the main functions of political parties is to contest elections. Their first function is to select suitable candidates for party ticket and assist such candidates to win the elections. Voting is the process of electing representatives to a body representing the people.

It is these elected representatives who in a democracy perform decision making functions. For the successful working of any democracy, a healthy system of voting is a sine qua non. The right to vote is a basic right guaranteed by the fundamental law of the country. However, not every national is entitled to vote.

The minors, some categories of criminals and lunatics are usually excluded from the list of voters. In some states, women are not given the right to vote. Some states impose property and educational qualifications to limit franchise. However, universal adult suffrage is recognized to be the most democratic system of franchise. In India every man and woman of 18 years of age is entitled to be enrolled as a voter.

Voting Behaviour:

Voting behaviour depends upon several factors and differs from place to place. Generally speaking, educated and urban population is seen more involved in elections whereas the illiterate and rural population shows its apathy. Some voters are committed to a particular party while some take decision at the time of election.

In India, voting behaviour has undergone tremendous change. Since independence, the level of political awareness is constantly rising among all segments of population. Political mobilisation is taking place at a faster speed in rural areas. There is only minor difference in the turn-out rate between urban and rural areas. The level of identification with political parties or leaders is increasing. The number of floating or uncommitted votes is gradually decreasing.

Voting behaviour is affected by the following factors:

(i) Religion:

India since ancient days has been predominantly a country inhabited by different religions. Despite the fact that the -Constitution declares India to be a secular state, no political party including, the Congress (I) has ever ignored it.

The religious structure of a constituency is kept in mind while selecting the candidates or begging votes. During election campaign the religious sentiments are exploited to the maximum. Voters are attracted to the candidates belonging to their own religion. The Ayodhya issue has been exploited by all the political parties for the politics of votes.

(ii) Caste:

Elections in India are contested very much on the basis of casteism. The voters are asked to vote for their caste candidates and casteism is maintained by the elected leaders after the elections are over, Political parties sponsor only that candidate from a particular constituency whose caste is the most numerous in that area.

Inspite of their professions to the contrary, the Indian politicians including the political tacticians of the Congress and the CPI give a great deal of attention to caste considerations. While caste itself as a social institution is undergoing radical changes on account of the influence of western education and the development of urban life, it nevertheless, continues to play an important role in determining the choice of voters from among the various candidates.

(iii) Community:

Community feeling is another factor influencing the voters. Community feelings had led the Telugu people to demand separate state of Andhra; likewise hilly people in Uttar Pradesh are asking for Uttrakhand state. The voters of a particular community say Punjabi, vote for their community candidate not because he is the best but because he belongs to their own community.

The candidates also make appeals in the name of community pointing out the injustices being suffered by their community and take pledge to ameliorate their condition. All politicians have been exploiting community sentiment since the first general elections in India.

(iv) Class:

It is one of the factors influencing voting behaviour in the regions where the electorate is mostly composed of voters belonging to working class. In big industrial towns like Bombay. Ahmedabad and Kanpur a trade union leader wins election on the basis of class considerations.

The workers aspire that their leader should be elected to fight their cause in the legislature. A number of our legislators are persons who have at one time or other been in the forefront of Trade Union movement.

Money perhaps plays the greatest role during elections Crores of rupees are spent by the political parties in their bid to capture political power. A lot of money is spent in election campaign and helicopters are hired to reach the voters in far flung constituencies.

Big industrialists and business magnates contribute a lot of money for election funds. Votes are purchased through payment in cash or kind. As a majority of voters are poor people consisting of lower castes, they are easily swayed away by money.

(vi) Charisma:

The personality of the party leader also influences the choice of voters. Thus the Congress won several elections in the name of Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Sonia Gandhi campaigned for the congress during 1998 elections.

(vii) Accidental factors:

Sometimes some accidental factors like excesses during Emergency or the murder of Rajiv Gandhi or a wave also influence the voters.

To conclude, voters in India seldom vote after objective assessment of the comparative merits of various candidates or scientific analysis of the election manifestoes; they are mostly influenced in their choice by non-rational factors like those of religion, caste and community etc.

Pressure Groups:

Pressure groups play a vital role in the process of government. A pressure group is an interest group which seeks to promote the interests of its members through external inducement. It is not a political group seeking to capture political power, though it may possess a political character for the sake of expediency. A pressure group is generally an association of persons with a common economic interest who try to influence governmental action in legislation, administrative procedures or judicial decisions.

The Chamber of Commerce, the Trade Unions, the Scheduled Caste Federation, Kissan Sammelan are instances of pressure groups. They come into being to make the government responsive to the interests of groups of citizens. In the Indian political system, pressure groups play conspicuous part in the political process as a whole. Their role in elections is conspicuous.

At different levels of electoral process in nomination, canvassing and campaigning these groups take cudgels on behalf of their favourites and get them a coveted place in the legislature and later in the cabinet. They have a sizeable block of voters in their pockets and also contribute to the financial sinews of the party concerned. The members elected with the support of a pressure group are compelled to do their biddings with far greater strength than the biddings of their party.

The pressure groups make use of all their resources and persuasive forms to procure political decisions and administrative actions of their choice. They also influence public opinion through mass media at their disposal. In a democracy their role is greater than in a totalitarian government. The party in power in a totalitarian political system does not recognize the existence of such particularistic entities and even regards their emergence as anathema.

Related Articles:

• Political Parties: Paragraphs on Political Parties of India
• Essay on Voting Behaviour in India

No comments yet.

Leave a reply click here to cancel reply..

You must be logged in to post a comment.