thesis of fed 70

The Federalist Papers

By alexander hamilton , james madison , john jay, the federalist papers summary and analysis of essay 70.

Many people think that a vigorous and strong president is incompatible with a republican form of government. Hamilton, however, does not agree. An energetic and forceful president is essential to good government. National defense, sound administration of the law, and the protection of property rights all depend upon the vitality of the Presidency. In addition, an energetic president best protects liberty when faction, anarchy, and the excessive ambitions of others threaten it. Anyone familiar with Roman history knows that it was often the Roman dictator who prevented the fall of the council. Men agree that the president should be strong. What, then constitutes strength and energy? What characteristics do we look for? Can sufficient strength in the Presidency be combined with the principles of republican government?

An energetic executive branch must be characterized by unity, sufficient powers, and a certain degree of secrecy. For these reasons, one chief executive is better than two or more. Two people, granted equal power and authority, are bound to differ. Personal ambition can never be totally subdued, and a dual presidency would be marked by dissension, weakened authority, and the growth of conflicting factions. It is unnecessary and unwise to establish an executive branch that would make this form of divisiveness possible and likely. Conflict and argument are dangerous in the executive branch where decisions must be prompt; in the Congress, on the other hand, differences of opinion force discussion and deliberation. This is quite proper in the legislative branch and helps to prevent coercion by majority. The function of the legislature is to pass laws; once a law is passed, effective opposition comes to an end. But the executive branch is charged with the execution of the laws; a law once passed should be executed promptly. Furthermore, in case of war, when so much depends upon a strong presidency, divisiveness could destroy the national security.

The same arguments against having two presidents can be made in opposition to an executive council. In either a plural or council form of executive, faults and defects are more easily concealed, and no person can be held responsible. The American president, unlike the English king, must not be immune from censure, accountability, or punishment. The English king is not held responsible for his administration, and his person is sacred. Sometimes a king forms a council to act as a buffer between him and his subjects. But such a council in no way diminished the king's power; he is not even bound by the resolutions the council passes. The council functions as a public relations body while, at the same time, it protects the king in his absolute power.

In conclusion, Hamilton claims that there is the matter of expense. Those who recommend a council form of executive admit that the council should be large. That being so, the salaries of the council members would constitute too great an expense for the nation to tolerate. Second, before the Constitution was written, intelligent men agreed that New York's single executive was one of the most admirable features of state government.

This essay concerning the powers of the executive department is one of the most referenced federalist papers concerning the presidency. Hamilton writes, "energy in the executive" is one of the most important parts of the executive department of the country, as defined in the Constitution. This "energy" is one of the most written about components and excuses for expansion of presidential power, especially in the 20th century. If the Federalist Papers can be said to have "themes," one of those themes would be the importance of energy in making the Constitution come alive. In this essay, Hamilton demonstrates the necessity energy is to the president and his duties. The office and power of the president was consciously designed to provide the energy, secrecy, and dispatch traditionally associated with the monarchial form.

Another important aspect of this essay is the evidence of the proportion and participation principles and their relation to each other in the state. Since Hamilton considers the individual's protection the end of the government, an explanation of the protection principle can be derived from his specification of that end. In other Federalist Papers, Hamilton claims that with government being instituted for the distribution of justice, the end of government is "the public happiness" or the "public good." More specifically, the people's happiness means the protection of their "general liberty," their "rights." From his distinction between liberty and property and life and property follows Hamilton's classification of those rights into the categories commonly used in his time, namely, the rights of life, liberty, and property.

Of these rights, those of property are most important. Their greater weight, as compared with the rights of liberty, follows Hamilton's enumeration, in order of importance, of the advantages of an energetic executive. He mentions, first, the protection of the community against foreign attacks; second, the steady administration of the laws; third, the protection of property against irregular and high-handed combinations that sometimes interrupt the ordinary courts of justice; and fourth, the security of liberty. Hamilton thus puts the protection of property before the security of liberty and connects it more closely with that all-embracing end of government, justice. The prevalence of property before liberty is confirmed when Hamilton states that among vested rights, those concerning life and property are most important. When, finally, he refers hardly ever to the right of life and very often to that of property, the conclusion can be drawn that either he considers the right of life to be already accepted, or he attributes a greater weight to the right of property, which he once referred to as "the great and fundamental distinction of society."

The Federalist Papers Questions and Answers

The Question and Answer section for The Federalist Papers is a great resource to ask questions, find answers, and discuss the novel.

how are conflictstoo often decided in unstable government? Whose rights are denied when this happens?

In a typical non-democratic government with political instability, the conflicts are often decided by the person highest in power, who abuse powers or who want to seize power. Rival parties fight each other to the detriment of the country.

How Madison viewed human nature?

Madison saw depravity in human nature, but he saw virtue as well. His view of human nature may have owed more to John Locke than to John Calvin. In any case, as Saul K. Padover asserted more than a half-century ago, Madison often appeared to steer...

How arguable and provable is the author of cato 4 claim

What specific claim are you referring to?

Study Guide for The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers study guide contains a biography of Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, literature essays, a complete e-text, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full summary and analysis.

• About The Federalist Papers
• The Federalist Papers Summary
• The Federalist Papers Video
• Character List

Essays for The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers essays are academic essays for citation. These papers were written primarily by students and provide critical analysis of The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.

• A Close Reading of James Madison's The Federalist No. 51 and its Relevancy Within the Sphere of Modern Political Thought
• Lock, Hobbes, and the Federalist Papers
• Comparison of Federalist Paper 78 and Brutus XI
• The Paradox of the Republic: A Close Reading of Federalist 10
• Manipulation of Individual Citizen Motivations in the Federalist Papers

Lesson Plan for The Federalist Papers

• About the Author
• Study Objectives
• Common Core Standards
• Introduction to The Federalist Papers
• Relationship to Other Books
• Bringing in Technology
• Notes to the Teacher
• Related Links
• The Federalist Papers Bibliography

E-Text of The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers e-text contains the full text of The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.

• FEDERALIST. Nos. 1-5
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 6-10
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 11-15
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 16-20
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 21-25

Wikipedia Entries for The Federalist Papers

• Introduction
• Structure and content
• Judicial use
• Complete list

Founders Online --> [ Back to normal view ]

The federalist no. 70, [15 march 1788], the federalist no. 70 1.

[New York, March 15, 1788]

To the People of the State of New-York.

THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks: It is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws, to the protection of property against those irregular and high handed combinations, which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman story knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals, who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community, whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies, who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.

There can be no need however to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution: And a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in practice a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic executive; it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy—how far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterise the plan, which has been reported by the convention?

The ingredients, which constitute energy in the executive, are first unity, secondly duration, thirdly an adequate provision for its support, fourthly competent powers. 2

The circumstances 3 which constitute safety in the republican sense are, Ist. a due dependence on the people, secondly 4 a due responsibility.

Those politicians and statesmen, who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles, and for the justness of their views, have declared in favor of a single executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand; while they have with equal propriety considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and 5 dispatch will generally characterise the proceedings 6 of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways; either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject in whole or in part to the controul and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. Of the first the two consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the states. New-York and New-Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only states, which have entrusted the executive authority wholly to single men. * Both these methods of destroying the unity of the executive have their partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections; and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.

The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. As far however as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be inamoured of plurality in the executive. We have seen that the Achæans on an experiment of two Præetors, were induced to abolish one. 7 The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissentions between the consuls, and between the military tribunes, who were at times substituted to the consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state, from the circumstance of the 8 plurality of those magistrates. That the dissentions between them were not more frequent, or more fatal, is matter of astonishment; until we advert to the singular position in which the republic was almost continually placed and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state, and pursued by the consuls, of making a division of the government between them. The Patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the Plebeians for the preservation of their antient authorities and dignities; the consuls, who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defence of the privileges of their order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established custom with the consuls to divide the administration between themselves by lot; one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs; the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must no doubt have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rivalships, which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of 9 the republic.

But quitting the dim light of historical research, and attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the executive, under any modification whatever.

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprize or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office in which they are cloathed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissentions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operations of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government, in the most critical emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most 10 violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes in their estimation an indispensable duty of self love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon, contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may in its consequences afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice in the human character.

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniencies from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary and therefore unwise to introduce them into the constitution of the executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberations and circumspection; and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favourable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissention in the executive department. Here they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure, to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the executive, which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigour and expedition, and this without any counterballancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the executive is the bulwark of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality.

It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first 11 case supposed, that is to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority; a scheme the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect: But they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight, to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and delatoriness.

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is that it tends to conceal faults, and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds, to censure and to punishment. The first is the most important of the two; especially in an elective office. Man, 12 in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him 13 unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him 14 obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated, that where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.

“I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions, that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point.” These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to be a collusion between the parties concerned, how easy is it to cloath the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties?

In the single instance in which the governor of this state is coupled with a council, that is in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. 15 Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases indeed have been so flagrant, that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When enquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council; who on their part have charged it upon his nomination: While the people remain altogether at a loss to determine by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified, and 16 so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.

It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power; first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office, or to their actual punishment, in cases which admit of it.

In England the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim, which has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing therefore can be wiser in that kingdom than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department; an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct, in the exercise of his office; and may observe or disregard the council given to him at his sole discretion.

But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behaviour in office, the reason which in the British constitution dictates the propriety of a council not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great-Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate; which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behaviour. In the American republic it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish the intended and necessary responsibility of the chief magistrate himself.

The idea of a council to the executive, which has so generally obtained in the state constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy, which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterballance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion in this particular with a writer whom the celebrated Junius 17 pronounces to be “deep, solid and ingenious,” that, “the executive power is more easily confined when it is one:” * 18 That it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and 20 in a word that all multiplication of the executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the executive is unattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult; or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power therefore is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who from the very circumstance of his being alone will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number, † were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an executive much more numerous than that body, from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The extreme of these numbers is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more to fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions; are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad, and are almost always a cloak to his faults.

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expence; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end, aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures, too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility.

I will only add, that prior to the appearance of the constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the states, who did not admit as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the Executive of this state was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our constitution.

The [New York] Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser , March 15, 1788. This essay appeared in New-York Packet on March 18. In the McLean description begins The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). description ends edition this essay is numbered 70, in the newspapers it is numbered 69.

1 .  For background to this document, see “The Federalist. Introductory Note.” October 27, 1787-May 28, 1788 .

2 .  The words “first,” “secondly,” “thirdly,” and “fourthly,” omitted in McLean description begins The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). description ends and Hopkins description begins The Federalist On The New Constitution. By Publius. Written in 1788. To Which is Added, Pacificus, on The Proclamation of Neutrality. Written in 1793. Likewise, The Federal Constitution, With All the Amendments. Revised and Corrected. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by George F. Hopkins, at Washington’s Head, 1802). description ends .

3 .  “ingredients” substituted for “circumstances” in McLean and Hopkins.

4 .  The words “Ist” and “secondly” omitted in McLean and Hopkins.

5 .  “and” omitted in the newspaper; inserted in McLean and Hopkins.

6 .  In the newspaper, “proceeding”; “proceedings” was substituted in McLean and Hopkins.

7 .  See essay 18 .

8 .  “circumstances of the” omitted in McLean and Hopkins.

9 .  “peace of” omitted in McLean and Hopkins.

10 .  “most” omitted in McLean and Hopkins.

11 .  In the newspaper, “full”; “first” was substituted in McLean and Hopkins.

12 .  “Men” substituted for “Man” in McLean and Hopkins.

13 .  “them” substituted for “him” in McLean and Hopkins.

14 .  “them” substituted for “him” in McLean and Hopkins.

15 .  See essay 69 .

16 .  “so unqualified, and” omitted in Hopkins.

17 .  Junius. Stat Nominis Umbra (London: Printed for Henry Sampson Woodfall … 1772), I, xxxi.

18 .  Junius referred to Jean Louis de Lolme, The Constitution of England, or An Account of the English Government; In which it is compared with the Republican Form of Government, and occasionally with the other Monarchies in Europe (3rd ed., London, 1781), 215.

19 .  In the newspapers, “De Lostme”; “De Lome” substituted in McLean and Hopkins.

20 .  “and” omitted in Hopkins.

Authorial notes

[The following note(s) appeared in the margins or otherwise outside the text flow in the original source, and have been moved here for purposes of the digital edition.]

*   New-York has no council except for the single purpose of appointing to offices; New-Jersey has a council, whom the governor may consult. But I think from the terms of the constitution their resolutions do not bind him.

*   De Lome. 19

Index Entries

You are looking at.

Get Email Updates from Ballotpedia

First Name *

Please complete the Captcha above

Ballotpedia on Facebook

  Share this page

  Follow Ballotpedia

Ballotpedia on Twitter

Federalist no. 70 by alexander hamilton (1788).

• Terms and definitions
• Court cases
• Major arguments
• State responses to federal mandates
• State responses to the federal grant review process survey, 2021
• State responses by question to the federal grant review process survey, 2021
• Federalism by the numbers: Federal mandates
• Federalism by the numbers: Federal grants-in-aid
• Federalism by the numbers: Federal information collection requests
• Overview of federal spending during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic
• Index of articles
• 1 Background of the author
• 2 Full text of The Executive Department Further Considered
• 3 Background of the Federalist Papers
• 4 Full list of Federalist Papers
• 6 External links
• 7 Footnotes

Federalist Number (No.) 70 (1788) is an essay by British-American politician Alexander Hamilton arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution . The full title of the essay is "The Executive Department Further Considered." It was written as part of a series of essays collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers . These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton , James Madison , and John Jay . They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation . [1]

• Author: Alexander Hamilton
• Source: Originally published in the New York Packet on March 18, 1788. Republished in 1788 as part of the collection The Federalist , now referred to as The Federalist Papers .
• Abstract: Hamilton argues for a unified Executive branch.

Background of the author

Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755-1804) was a British-American politician, lawyer, and military officer. He was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and is considered a Founding Father of the United States. Below is a summary of Hamilton's career: [2]

• 1775-1777: Officer in the New York Provincial Artillery Company
• Including service as an adviser to General George Washington
• 1787: Delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pa.
• 1787-1788: Author of 51 of the 85 essays in The Federalist Papers
• 1789-1795: First secretary of the treasury of the United States

Full text of The Executive Department Further Considered

The full text of Federalist No. 70 reads as follows: [1]

Background of the Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the full replacement of the Aritcles of Confederation. All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788. [4]

The Articles of Confederation were an agreement among the original thirteen states in the United States to unite under a central government consisting of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress proposed the Articles in 1777, and they became effective in March 1781.

The Articles primarily authorized the national government to govern diplomatic foreign relations and regulate and fund the Continental Army. Under the Articles, the Continental Congress lacked the power to levy taxes and could only request funds from the states. The inability of the national government to raise money caused the government to default on pension payments to former Revolutionary War soldiers and other financial obligations, resulting in unrest. Shay's Rebellion was a prominent example of unrest related to the weakness of the central government and the Continental Congress' inability to fulfill its obligations.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to solve the problems related to the weak national government. Federalists, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocated for a completely new government under the United States Constitution . They rejected the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing document that needed fully replaced. The federalists thought the strengthened national government could help protect individual rights from factional conflicts at the state and local levels. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals. [5] [6] [4]

Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry, Melancton Smith, and George Clinton argued that the national government proposed under the Constitution would be too powerful and would infringe on individual liberties. They thought the Articles of Confederation needed amended, not replaced. [5] [6] [4]

Full list of Federalist Papers

The following is a list of individual essays that were collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers . These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation .

• Federalist Papers
• Anti-Federalist papers

External links

• Search Google News for this topic
• ↑ 1.0 1.1 Yale Law School , "The Federalist Papers: No. 70," accessed June 17, 2022
• ↑ Biography.com , "Alexander Hamilton," accessed March 6, 2018
• ↑ Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
• ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 The Federalist Papers , "THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS," accesses May 27, 2022
• ↑ 5.0 5.1 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive , "Federalism," accessed July 27, 2021
• ↑ 6.0 6.1 Middle Tennessee State University , "Anti-Federalists," accessed July 27, 2021
• Pages using DynamicPageList3 dplreplace parser function
• Federalism tracking
• The Federalist Papers

Ballotpedia features 486,687 encyclopedic articles written and curated by our professional staff of editors, writers, and researchers. Click here to contact our editorial staff or report an error . For media inquiries, contact us here . Please donate here to support our continued expansion.

Information about voting

• What's on my ballot?
• Where do I vote?
• How do I register to vote?
• How do I request a ballot?
• When do I vote?
• When are polls open?
• Who represents me?

2024 Elections

• Presidential election
• Presidential candidates
• Congressional elections
• Ballot measures
• State executive elections
• State legislative elections
• State judge elections
• Local elections
• School board elections

2025 Elections

• State executives
• State legislatures
• State judges
• Municipal officials
• School boards
• Election legislation tracking
• State trifectas
• State triplexes
• Redistricting
• Pivot counties
• State supreme court partisanship
• Polling indexes

Public Policy

• Administrative state
• Criminal justice policy
• Education policy
• Environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG)
• Unemployment insurance
• Work requirements
• Policy in the states

Information for candidates

• Ballotpedia's Candidate Survey
• How do I run for office?
• How do I update a page?
• Election results
• Send us candidate contact info

Get Engaged

• Donate to Ballotpedia
• Report an error
• Newsletters
• Ballotpedia podcast
• Ballotpedia Boutique
• Media inquiries
• Premium research services
• 2024 Elections calendar
• 2024 Presidential election
• Biden Administration
• Recall elections
• Ballotpedia News

SITE NAVIGATION

• Ballotpedia's Sample Ballot
• 2024 Congressional elections
• 2024 State executive elections
• 2024 State legislative elections
• 2024 State judge elections
• 2024 Local elections
• 2024 Ballot measures
• Upcoming elections
• 2025 Statewide primary dates
• 2025 State executive elections
• 2025 State legislative elections
• 2025 Local elections
• 2025 Ballot measures
• Cabinet officials
• Executive orders and actions
• Key legislation
• Judicial nominations
• White House senior staff
• U.S. President
• U.S. Congress
• U.S. Supreme Court
• Federal courts
• State government
• Municipal government
• Election policy
• Running for office
• Ballotpedia's weekly podcast
• About Ballotpedia
• Editorial independence
• Job opportunities
• News and events
• Privacy policy
• Disclaimers

Explore the Constitution

The constitution.

• Read the Full Text

Dive Deeper

Constitution 101 course.

• The Drafting Table
• Supreme Court Cases Library
• Founders' Library
• Constitutional Rights: Origins & Travels

Start your constitutional learning journey

• News & Debate Overview
• Constitution Daily Blog
• America's Town Hall Programs
• Special Projects
• Media Library

America’s Town Hall

Watch videos of recent programs.

• Education Overview

Constitution 101 Curriculum

• Classroom Resources by Topic
• Classroom Resources Library
• Live Online Events
• Professional Learning Opportunities
• Constitution Day Resources

Explore our new 15-unit high school curriculum.

• Explore the Museum
• Plan Your Visit
• Exhibits & Programs
• Field Trips & Group Visits
• Host Your Event
• Buy Tickets

New exhibit

The first amendment, historic document, federalist 68, 70, 72 (1788).

Alexander Hamilton | 1788

After the Constitutional Convention adjourned in September 1787, Alexander Hamilton spearheaded an initiative to lead the public discussion of the draft instrument through The Federalist Papers . In a single week in March 1788, there appeared the three essays from which these extracts are excerpted, discussing the nature of the executive authority under the Constitution. In these essays, we find two strands of thought. First, the executive is identified as the unique vehicle of necessary “secrecy,” “energy,” and “dispatch” in administering the affairs of government. Secondly, Hamilton identifies the executive as part of that popular basis of the government that is designed to assure that government operates on the basis of the “deliberate sense of the community.” It is further to be observed that we find here the development of that nomenclature that leads the United States uniquely to deploy the term “Administration” in defining the executive office.

Selected by

William B. Allen

Emeritus Dean of James Madison College and Emeritus Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University

Jonathan Gienapp

Associate Professor of History at Stanford University

Federalist 68:

THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded. I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for.

It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided…

It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations. …

Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves… This advantage will also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice.

All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the national government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President...

The process of election affords a moral certainty…that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says: “For forms of government let fools contest That which is best administered is best,”…the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.”

Federalist 70:

THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy...

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention?

The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.

The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are, first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due responsibility.

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand, while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him…. They are both liable, if not equal, to similar objections, and may in most lights be examined in conjunction. …

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operation of those whom they divide…. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy. …

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department… …

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. …

It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it. …

[I]n a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.”

Federalist 72:

THE administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive, or judiciary; but in its most usual, and perhaps its most precise signification. it is limited to executive details and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive department. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory plans of finance, the application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the legislature, the arrangement of the army and navy, the directions of the operations of war, these, and other matters of a like nature, constitute what seems to be most properly understood by the administration of government. The persons, therefore, to whose immediate management these different matters are committed, ought to be considered as the assistants or deputies of the chief magistrate, and on this account, they ought to derive their offices from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to his superintendence. This view of the subject will at once suggest to us the intimate connection between the duration of the executive magistrate in office and the stability of the system of administration. To reverse and undo what has been done by a predecessor, is very often considered by a successor as the best proof he can give of his own capacity and desert; and in addition to this propensity, where the alteration has been the result of public choice, the person substituted is warranted in supposing that the dismission of his predecessor has proceeded from a dislike to his measures; and that the less he resembles him, the more he will recommend himself to the favor of his constituents. These considerations, and the influence of personal confidences and attachments, would be likely to induce every new President to promote a change of men to fill the subordinate stations; and these causes together could not fail to occasion a disgraceful and ruinous mutability in the administration of the government.

With a positive duration of considerable extent, I connect the circumstance of re-eligibility. The first is necessary to give to the officer himself the inclination and the resolution to act his part well, and to the community time and leisure to observe the tendency of his measures, and thence to form an experimental estimate of their merits. . . .

Nothing appears more plausible at first sight, nor more ill-founded upon close inspection, than a scheme which in relation to the present point has had some respectable advocates, I mean that of continuing the chief magistrate in office for a certain time, and then excluding him from it, either for a limited period or forever after. This exclusion, whether temporary or perpetual, would have nearly the same effects, and these effects would be for the most part rather pernicious than salutary.

One ill effect of the exclusion would be a diminution of the inducements to good behavior. There are few men who would not feel much less zeal in the discharge of a duty when they were conscious that the advantages of the station with which it was connected must be relinquished at a determinate period, than when they were permitted to entertain a hope of OBTAINING, by MERITING, a continuance of them. This position will not be disputed so long as it is admitted that the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct; or that the best security for the fidelity of mankind is to make their interests coincide with their duty. Even the love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit, requiring considerable time to mature and perfect them, if he could flatter himself with the prospect of being allowed to finish what he had begun, would, on the contrary, deter him from the undertaking, when he foresaw that he must quit the scene before he could accomplish the work, and must commit that, together with his own reputation, to hands which might be unequal or unfriendly to the task. The most to be expected from the generality of men, in such a situation, is the negative merit of not doing harm, instead of the positive merit of doing good. …

Explore the full document

Modal title.

Modal body text goes here.

Share with Students

• Teacher Opportunities
• AP U.S. Government Key Terms
• Bureaucracy & Regulation
• Campaigns & Elections
• Civil Rights & Civil Liberties
• Comparative Government
• Constitutional Foundation
• Criminal Law & Justice
• Economics & Financial Literacy
• English & Literature
• Environmental Policy & Land Use
• Executive Branch
• Federalism and State Issues
• Foreign Policy
• Gun Rights & Firearm Legislation
• Immigration
• Interest Groups & Lobbying
• Judicial Branch
• Legislative Branch
• Political Parties
• Science & Technology
• Social Services
• State History
• Supreme Court Cases
• U.S. History
• World History

Log-in to bookmark & organize content - it's free!

• Bell Ringers
• Lesson Plans
• Featured Resources

Lesson Plan: Federalist No. 70 Publius (Alexander Hamilton) The Executive Department

Federalist No. 70 Executive Power Hamilton's Belief

Professor discusses Hamilton understanding of Executive Power

Description

Federalist No. 70 is the fourth of eleven essays written by Hamilton defending the Presidency against the “unfairness” of the Antifederalist “representations.” The essay opens with the Antifederalist concern “that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government.” Hamilton’s response is that “energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.” Author Robert Scigliano communicates Hamilton’s belief that there is a need for Executive power and the office requires an energetic presence to hold it together. Law Professor John Yoo analyses Federalist No. 70 and makes modern connections to the actions of presidents and the repercussions of those actions.

Ask students to write down what elements must exist in order to allow a leader to function. This can be a leadership position on a sports team, school club, at work, or in political office.

Allow the students to share their thoughts.

The teacher can record the student responses on the board as a reference point when the students read through Federalist No. 70.

As a class, view video clip one and engage in a discussion to set the context of Federalist No. 70.

Video Clip 1: Federalist No. 70 Executive Power Hamilton’s Belief (00:36)

If you would like more information on the context of the Federalist Papers Professor Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman lectures about Alexander Hamilton’s role in the creation of the federal government in video clip two.

Video Clip 2. Alexander Hamilton (49:56)

Group students in teams of three or four and direct them to watch the video clip one again.

Assign each group three or four paragraphs to read from Federalist No. 70. Adjust group size and number of paragraphs as you see fit. There are 25 paragraphs in Federalist No. 70. Overlap will allow for multiple perspectives but be sure to assign all 25 paragraphs in order to cover the document in its entirety.

Allow each group to create a snap using the Snapchat app for each paragraph. Snapchat allows students to act out events, draw, and photograph items and events then enhance those images with text and clip art. Instruct the students to use their creativity to illustrate the main idea of each of the paragraphs they were assigned.

Ask one student to set up a geographic location for your classroom. This will allow the students to share their work with everyone in that area. This provides students with an opportunity to review the work of others. The teacher does not need a Snapchat account to utilize this formative assessment. Allow the students to show you the snaps they created on their phones or have them send you a screenshot of their creation through email.

Provide students with an opportunity to share their work as a class. If the students established a geographic location and shared their work with peers they may have begun this process. Have each group share their work with the class. Be sure the students explain what they believe the main idea of the paragraph was. Allow the groups to present in order of the writing of Federalist No. 70.

As the groups present be sure you make the class aware of how their work fits together as part of Federalist No. 70.

Once each of the groups has presented their snaps ask the students to review the elements they thought were necessary to allow a leader to function.

Discuss what the students thought was necessary and what Hamilton thought was necessary.

Ask the students to speculate on how the effectiveness of the Executive would be altered if a provision from Federalist No. 70 was eliminated?

To conclude the lesson view the video clip Federalist No. 70 Executive Power. (3:26)

Ask each of the students to create a snap that communicates Dr. John Yoo’s views on Federalist No. 70 and how modern presidents have overstepped Hamilton’s intentions.

Students could use a notecard to draw pictures and add text that communicates ideas as a substitution for the use of Snapchat in this lesson.

EXTENSION ACTIVITIES:

Argumentative Essay Free Response Question- Informal Powers Respond to this writing prompt (Google Doc) presented in the style of the Argumentative Question component of the redesigned AP Government and Politics exam.

Additional Resources

Transcript of Federalist No. 70

• Snapchat - The fastest way to share a moment!
• Lesson Plan: How Presidents Have Interpreted the Role of the Presidency
• Video Clip: President Obama on the Role of the President
• Lesson Plan: Brutus No. 1
• Essential Documents
• Federalist No. 70
• Separation Of Powers

Federalist 70

• Constitution
• Federal Government
• Political Culture
• March 14, 1788

No study questions

No related resources

Source:  The Federalist: The Gideon Edition,  eds. George W. Carey and James McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 362-369.

There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman history knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic executive; it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention?

The ingredients which constitute energy in the executive are unity; duration; an adequate provision for its support; and competent powers.

The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are a due dependence on the people, secondly a due responsibility.

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justness of their views have declared in favor of a single executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand; while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority, or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject in whole or in part to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counselors to him. Of the first, the two consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the States. New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which have entrusted the executive authority wholly to single men. Both these methods of destroying the unity of the executive have their partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections, and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.

The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches anything, it teaches us not to be enamored of plurality in the executive. We have seen that the Achaeans on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissentions between the consuls, and between the military tribunes, who were at times substituted to the consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates. That the dissentions between them were not more frequent or more fatal is matter of astonishment, until we advert to the singular position in which he republic was almost continually placed and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state, and pursued by the consuls, of making a division of the government between them. The patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebians for the preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities; the consuls, who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established custom with the consuls to divide the administration between themselves by lot—one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs; the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must no doubt have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the republic.

But quitting the dim light of historical research, and attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the executive, under any modification whatever.

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissentions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operations of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government in the most critical emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation an indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon, contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice, in the human character.

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissention in the executive department. Here they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition—vigor and expedition, and this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the executive is the bulwark of the national security, everything would be to be apprehended from its plurality.

It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed—that is, to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority, a scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though not with equal yet with considerable weight to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds—to censure and to punishment. The first is the most important of the two, especially in an elective office. Men in public trust will much oftener act in such a manner as to render them unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.

"I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point." These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happened to be a collusion between the parties concerned, how easy is it to cloth the circumstances with so much ambiguity as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties?

In the single instance in which the governor of this state is coupled with a council—that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases indeed have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council; who on their part have charged it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.

It is evident from these considerations that the plurality of the executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first , the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, second , the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.

In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the public peace that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department—an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office and may observe or disregard the council given to him at his sole discretion.

But in a republic where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office, the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the Chief Magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.

The idea of a council to the executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep, solid and ingenious," that "the executive power is more easily confined when it is one"; that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.

A little consideration will satisfy us that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the executive is unattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man, who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number, were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an executive much more numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The extreme of these numbers is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more to fear than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad, and are almost always a cloak to his faults.

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility.

I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the States who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our Constitution.

One of the People Called Quakers in the State of Virginia

Federalist 68, see our list of programs.

Conversation-based seminars for collegial PD, one-day and multi-day seminars, graduate credit seminars (MA degree), online and in-person.

Check out our collection of primary source readers

Our Core Document Collection allows students to read history in the words of those who made it. Available in hard copy and for download.

The Federalist No. 70

Benefits of Unitary President

Summary (not in original)

Despite some legitimate concerns, a republican government requires a strong chief executive.  The ingredients are unity, duration, support, and competent powers.  This essay deals with unity.  The safety and functioning of a republic depend upon a single executive rather than a plural executive or an executive oversight council.  By contrast, the legislature must have large enough numbers to prevent internal abuse, and operate slowly, allowing its dissentions to force delay and more deliberation.  The former excels regarding speed and quality of decision and execution of those decisions, is less easily compromised by internal dissensions, may be made more accountable and thus more easily controlled by the people, by removal if necessary, is less susceptible to corruption and abuse, and even if corrupt is less powerfully so than a cabal, and a plural executive is too expensive.

Independent Journal Saturday, March 15, 1788 Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

Despite some legitimate concerns about a strong executive in republican systems, the success of the system depends upon a strong chief executive

THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman story, knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.

A feeble executive means a feeble government, which means a bad government.

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

Then what are the components of power, how can they be made safe, and how close does the plan from the convention comport with both.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention?

The ingredients: unity, duration, support, competent powers

The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.

The safety of the republic depend upon the people and a sense of responsibility

The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are, first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due responsibility.

A single executive and a plural legislature is the best form, the former for effectiveness in execution, the latter for deliberation and wisdom

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand, while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.

Decision, action, discretion, and efficiency all argue for single rather than plural executive.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.

Unity may be compromised by a plurality of executives or a governing council which oversees his activities.  Several state constitutions enact the latter.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counselors to him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the States. New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which have entrusted the executive authority wholly to single men.[1] Both these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections, and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.

History offers no direct examples, but all indirect examples point to troubles when executive powers are distribution in any way.

The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be enamored of plurality in the Executive. We have seen that the Achaeans, on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes, who were at times substituted for the Consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates. That the dissensions between them were not more frequent or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until we advert to the singular position in which the republic was almost continually placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a division of the government between them. The patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established custom with the Consuls to divide the administration between themselves by lot — one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs, the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must, no doubt, have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rivalries which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the republic.

Reason alone justifies a single, unencumbered executive.

But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the Executive, under any modification whatever.

Division of the office will create internal dissentions between them, weakening their capacities to act in emergencies, and inspire in the outer community constituencies built around each which become factions.

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operation of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government, in the most critical emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy.

While men may oppose the unfamiliar, they often become virulent in their opposition to something for which they had some responsibility but lost a battle for what to do.

Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice, in the human character.

Free governments oblige this inconvenience in legislators, but must avoid them in executive offices.  Legislative broils often and consequent delays often promote deliberation and circumspection, averting hasty and unwise laws.  But the executive demands promptitude and expedition, particularly in matters of war.

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. Here, they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition — vigor and expedition, and this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality.

This objection, clearly applicable to plural executives, has less but no less important impact on executive councils, whose internal difficulties could impede both sense and expedition of executive decisions.

It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed — that is, to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.

One of the weightiest objections of a plural executive is the concomitant incapacity often to assess and assign responsibility for poor decisions.  

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds — to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.

They become a plea for excuses.

“I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point.” These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium, of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties?

Scandalous appointments made by the New York council have simply produced a circle of blame, never ending on a real culprit.

In the single instance in which the governor of this State is coupled with a council — that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on their part, have charged it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.

A plural executive denies the people a full measure of restraint of public opinion and accountability when deciding on removal from office or actual punishment.

It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, second, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.

A council is necessary to limit abuse in a monarchy; a council has the opposite effect in a republican government, diminishing if not destroying his responsibility to the office.

In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department — an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him at his sole discretion.

But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.

Ironically, we are safer with a single executive, who may be more easily watched and limited by the people than any plural combination.

The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be “deep, solid, and ingenious,” that “the executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE”;[2] that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.

Abuse by a small number more likely and more powerful than by one or a large number.

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is unattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number,[3] were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more to fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to his faults.

Also, the expense would be too great.  Everyone agrees with me.

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility. I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the States, who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our constitution.

1. New York has no council except for the single purpose of appointing to offices; New Jersey has a council whom the governor may consult. But I think, from the terms of the constitution, their resolutions do not bind him.

2. De Lolme.

E1. Two versions of these paragraphs appear in different editions.

Federalist Papers

• Introduction
• On Union, Factions, Size of Country
• On the Infirmities of the Articles of Confederation
• On the Necessity of Energy in the Federal Government
• On the Republican Form
• The House of Representatives
• The Executive Branch
• The Judiciary
• Concluding Essays

Presidential Power in Hamilton’s Federalist No. 70 Essay

The most significant argument presented in the Federalist paper number seventy involves giving the executive absolute power to make it strong and prevent any mischievous encroachment from both external and internal forces. It was presented by Alexander Hamilton on March 15, 1788. In his presentation, Hamilton emphasizes on the need to have an energetic executive over any other arm of government. To him, a vigorous executive defines the qualities of a good government. When absolute authority is vested in the executive, it will be able to carry out its functions properly. The analogy presented in the Federalist paper number seventy formed the basis of the present-day powerful executive in the United States.

It is common knowledge that an American president is the most powerful figure in the world. The paper outlines that anything contrary to a powerful executive that is led by a president is a recipe for a weak government. Hamilton explains in the second paragraph that people apply in their practical life what is written in theory. Therefore, a feeble executive means that the government will be weak, and as such the execution of functions will be bad. The question of whether there is a need for an energetic executive remains inconsequential as all well-wishers who are open-minded will agree that it is the only way the citizens can be served to the fullest. What is significant is to assess the constituents of the energy that should propel a strong executive to a level of becoming very vigorous. The process demands an evaluation of the degree to which the factors of energy can be joined to make sure that the republicans are safe.

The Federalist paper number seventy states that there are four qualities of a strong executive. They include harmony, time, satisfactory support, and proficient powers. Authority without power is useless. The safety of American people can be guaranteed if the executive relies on the service to humanity and having due responsibility that is accountable. Hamilton elaborates that the duty of checking the executive should be left to the legislature. In the distribution of power, the paper quotes the structure of Rome that was divided into two. Absolute power remained in Rome.

Rome could set the policy and agenda for its people while the second arm was left to the small distant institutions that helped in the running of the nation’s affairs. In the American case, the interests of the people will be brought through the legislature where the citizens’ own elected representatives would sit to deliberate on issues. Absolute power cannot be shared by two or more centers. If this happens then, unity will be destroyed because of the wrangles that would emerge. This could come from rivalry, competition, or normal human selfish interests. They may also be expressions of frustrations.

The eighth passage in the article explains why Hamilton feared for a nation whose executive was feeble. Political systems including parties were run in fear and were full divisive politics before the American Revolution. The founders of the nation of America hoped to strike unity of purpose across the entire U.S. They included Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and Alexander Hamilton. They, however, did not find this an easy ride as only thirteen states were prepared to take part in the war of the revolution.

Different competing interests from different states and leaders led to this tough journey towards unity. The fight for a united country is what led to Abraham Lincoln declaring war on states such as California that had defied the call for unity. The president had to be powerful to meet the cause of unity. This is captured in the eighth passage when Hamilton salutes the ideology of New York and New Jersey posting the center of power to one solitary entity. This is the ingredient of enhancing unity according to Alexander Hamilton. The act of distributing executive power led to the collapse of Rome.

The emphasis on ensuring that power is vested on one spot is to avoid the pitfalls that are highlighted in passage eleven. The paper identifies that any engagements involving more than one person will likely experience the impact of differing opinions. The situation is very precarious if the different parties are entrusted with a public or state office because the outcome could cause animosity. This will make the authority weak and distract the plans of execution by the feuding parties. Delivery of service in such a case will be impractical as important government functions will be curtailed.

The reoccurrence of such actions could split the nation into factions that oppose each other and the consequences could be violent war. Eventually, the nation may be forced to split because the warring factions could be irreconcilable. The remedy that would avoid all these likely occurrences is to have a strong executive office with absolute powers and a big legislature to check the executive. Up to date, the U.S. has an imperial presidency. What the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans who were the founders of the nation of America fought to meet that is Unity through an energetic executive is now being enjoyed by all Americans.

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2020, September 30). Presidential Power in Hamilton's Federalist No. 70. https://ivypanda.com/essays/presidential-power-in-hamiltons-federalist-no-70/

"Presidential Power in Hamilton's Federalist No. 70." IvyPanda , 30 Sept. 2020, ivypanda.com/essays/presidential-power-in-hamiltons-federalist-no-70/.

IvyPanda . (2020) 'Presidential Power in Hamilton's Federalist No. 70'. 30 September.

IvyPanda . 2020. "Presidential Power in Hamilton's Federalist No. 70." September 30, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/presidential-power-in-hamiltons-federalist-no-70/.

1. IvyPanda . "Presidential Power in Hamilton's Federalist No. 70." September 30, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/presidential-power-in-hamiltons-federalist-no-70/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Presidential Power in Hamilton's Federalist No. 70." September 30, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/presidential-power-in-hamiltons-federalist-no-70/.

• Growth of the US President Office
• Judicial Branch in Hamilton's Federalist Papers
• The Federalist Papers to Understand the United States Constitution
• Why the Republican Adopted the Hamilton’s Economic Policies?
• The Role of Alexander Hamilton in Federal Governments in the United States of America
• Political Science. The Federalist Papers
• Differences in Opinions Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton
• The Aggranoff’s Version of Federalist No. 44
• Federalist Paper Number 10
• Significance of Anti-Federalist Papers
• The Corruption Issue in the Contemporary Society
• Creating a 21st Century Welfare State
• "Democracy for the Few" by Michael Parenti
• Michael Parenti' Views on the United States Policy
• Governments in "From Egalitarianism to Kleptocracy" by Diamond

Federalist 70 | Primary Source Essentials

• Description

What were the essential characteristics of the executive branch according to Federalist 70? In this rapid-fire episode and Federalist 70 summary of BRI’s Primary Source Essentials, learn the arguments made by Alexander Hamilton, who wrote Federalist 70, in Federalist 70. Discover the Federalist 70 main points and why he believed in a strong executive branch to protect liberty and self-government.

Related Resources

Federalist 70

In this Federalist Paper, Alexander Hamilton argues for a strong executive leader, as provided for by the Constitution, as opposed to the weak executive under the Articles of Confederation. He asserts, “energy in the executive is the leading character in the definition of good government.

The Federalist Papers (1787-1788)

After the Constitution was completed during the summer of 1787, the work of ratifying it (or approving it) began. As the Constitution itself required, 3/4ths of the states would have to approve the new Constitution before it would go into effect for those ratifying states.

Federalist 70 Explained | Why Does the U.S. Have a Unitary Executive?

Why does the Constitution call for a unitary executive? In this episode of BRI’s Primary Source Close Reads, Kirk looks at Federalist 70 and the debate between adopting a singular or plural executive. How does Publius argue that unity and energy are embodied in a unitary executive? How does the role of disagreement differ between the legislature and the executive?

Watch CBS News

Chicago City Council approves $70 million more in migrant funding

By Todd Feurer , Sabrina Franza

Updated on: April 19, 2024 / 5:13 PM CDT / CBS Chicago

CHICAGO (CBS) -- Chicago will dedicate an additional $70 million to its efforts to house, feed, and provide other services to thousands of asylum seekers , after the City Council on Friday approved Mayor Brandon Johnson's request for more funds for the city's migrant crisis.

The 30-18 vote came after more than an hour of at times heated debate.

The council also unanimously approved $48 million in grant money from the state and federal government, much of which will be used to pay outstanding debt the city owes for staffing and shelter costs.

Budget Committee Chair Ald. Jason Ervin (28th) said, despite the political division the migrant crisis has exacerbated within the council, his colleagues need to come together to meet the needs of newly arrived asylum seekers in Chicago.

"Yes, this is a challenge. Do we want to spend this money like this right now? Of course not, but again, we have an obligation and we have a responsibility to move this ball forward," Ervin said.

The city already had budgeted $150 million to care for asylum seekers this year as part of the mayor's 2024 budget plan, but Johnson has acknowledged that won't be enough for the entire year. The mayor had been hoping to pressure the federal government to provide more funding for the city's migrant crisis, but his pleas have fallen on deaf ears.

In February, Johnson declined to commit to an additional $70 million for migrants as Gov. JB Pritzker and Cook County Board President Toni Preckwinkle pledged to seek a combined $250 million in state and county funding to help the city with its migrant costs .

But the mayor reversed course earlier this month, briefing aldermen on a plan to use funding from previous city surpluses to pay for the additional $70 million for migrant services.

Ald. Michael Rodriguez (22nd) noted that many aldermen have criticized the city and state for not doing more to help the city fund its migrant mission, and thanked Pritzker and Preckwinkle for coming through with a commitment to help Chicago with $250 million for the migrant crisis.

The city's efforts to provide shelter and other services for thousands of migrants over the past two years have become a particularly contentious matter for the City Council, with many aldermen criticizing how much the city is spending while still struggling with other longtime problems such as crime, homelessness, and a lack of economic development in many Black and Latino neighborhoods.

Ald. Byron Sigcho-Lopez (25th) suggested that much of the opposition to additional migrant funding was based on "bigotry and ignorance," prompting Ald. Scott Waguespack (32nd) to say, "that kind of rhetoric has to stop."

"I really expect the nonsense to stop. I think everybody in this room has had enough. I've had enough of the name-calling. I've had enough of the attacks on our colleagues," Waguespack said.

Ald. James Gardiner (45th) said he's concerned that the Johnson administration will be requesting another $60 to $80 million in funding for migrants in July.

"You know what we're going to do? We'll blame it on the DNC coming, or we'll blame it on that bad man in Texas, Governor Abbott, and we'll try to shine the light away from the reckless spending that we're agreeing on right now," he said.

Ald. Anthony Beale (9th), one of the most vocal critics of the Johnson administration's handling of the city's migrant crisis, said the city can't afford to keep spending millions to care for migrants, especially when only a handful of other cities in Illinois outside of Chicago have agreed to provide shelter to migrants brought here from Texas.

"The rest of the state said thanks but no thanks, but here in the city of Chicago we say, 'Come on to Chicago. We've got health care for you. We've got child care for you. We've got all kinds of housing. We've got education for you. We've got housing vouchers for you. We've got it all.' That's why everybody's coming to Chicago, but if you cut off the funding spigot, they won't come," Beale said.

Ald. Andre Vasquez (40th), who chairs the council's Immigrant and Refugee Rights Committee, dismissed Beale's suggestion that halting funding for migrants in Chicago would halt the flow of migrants into Chicago, arguing Texas Gov. Greg Abbott is sending migrants to Chicago in an effort to sow division ahead of the Democratic National Convention in August.

"You are kidding yourselves if you think that's going to slow any of the buses down. Whether you call it a sanctuary city or not, you are kidding yourself if you think that's going to slow the buses down. The whole goal has been to disrupt the city, and to break it, and to have us fighting amongst ourselves, and right now everything is going according to plan," he said.

Ald. Daniel La Spata (1st) criticized opponents of the spending plan, such as Beale, who have said the city shouldn't be spending so much money to care for newly arrived migrants who "don't pay taxes."

"When you talk about our migrants not paying taxes, that is truly frustrating. The fact is it's really hard to pay taxes in the city when the federal government will not permit you to work," La Spata said.

Ald. Jessie Fuentes (26th) was among aldermen warning of the potential consequences of voting down additional funding for the migrant crisis.

"We have 3,200 children in our shelter system. Where will they go when we can no longer operate our shelters?" she said. "They didn't charter those buses and ask to come to Chicago, but they are here in our care."

In seeking the additional funding, the Johnson administration has warned that without it, the city could again see migrants ending up sleeping on the floors of police stations, inside Chicago Park District fieldhouses, or on the city's streets. The mayor's aides also has warned that turning down the funding could strain the city's relationships with the county, state, and federal officials they have asked to help with the crisis.

Ald. Nicole Lee (11th) said she shared concerns that the city needs to do a better job of managing the money that it has spent on the migrant crisis, particularly when it comes to the conditions inside shelters.

"The reality is that I'm a person who will call a spade a spade. Look, we are paying Ritz Carlton rates for Super 8 service. I wouldn't want to be a migrant living in the shelter on Halsted," she said, referring to a shelter in Pilsen that has seen an outbreak of measles and cases of tuberculosis.

However, Lee said the $70 million would help the city coordinate with county and state officials to better care for migrants.

The mayor's staff has told aldermen that the combined $321 million in additional city, county, and state funding for migrant services should cover the city's expected costs this year, and they do not plan to ask for any more money for the migrant crisis this year.

The Cook County Board on Thursday unanimously approved spending up to $70 million to reimburse the city for providing food for migrants, but that approval didn't come without debate. Earlier this week, Cook County leaders wanted to make sure the money would go towards its intended use. The county's chief financial officer assured the board the county will require invoices and other documentation before reimbursing the city for expenses.

The Illinois General Assembly has yet to vote on Pritzker's budget plan for the next fiscal year, including the additional $181 million in state funding he is seeking for Chicago's migrant crisis.

More than 39,000 migrants have arrived in Chicago since August 2022. As of Friday morning, a total of 8,971 migrants were staying in 18 city-run shelters, with another 21 newly arrived asylum seekers awaiting placement in a shelter.

• Chicago City Council
• Brandon Johnson

Todd Feurer is a web producer at CBS News Chicago. He has previously written for WBBM Newsradio, WUIS-FM, and the New City News Service.

Featured Local Savings

More from cbs news.

Families of Chicago students with disabilities can apply for $500 city grants

Chicago Bears to unveil plan for new domed stadium on the lakefront

Bears expected to unveil plans for new lakefront stadium on Wednesday

Mayor Johnson does not address how ShotSpotter alerted CPD to Officer Luis Huesca shooting

Numbers, Facts and Trends Shaping Your World

Read our research on:

Full Topic List

Regions & Countries

• Publications
• Our Methods
• Short Reads
• Tools & Resources

Read Our Research On:

Who pays, and doesn’t pay, federal income taxes in the U.S.?

It may be true, as Benjamin Franklin wrote toward the end of his life, that “ in this world, nothing is certain except death and taxes .” But while we’re all in the 100% death bracket, the federal income tax’s impact on Americans is considerably more variable – depending on one’s income level, source of income, marital status, age, residence, homeownership, parenthood and many other factors.

The American tax system manages to combine ubiquity, complexity and opacity. With the 2023 tax season nearing its end, Pew Research Center analyzed IRS data to shed light on a poorly understood topic.

The IRS, by the nature of its mission, collects copious data on Americans’ financial lives. It makes much of that data available through its Statistics of Income program. We concentrated most of our research on the individual income tax – the federal government’s single largest revenue source, and what most people tend to associate with “paying my taxes.” (That said, for millions of middle- and lower-income Americans, the payroll taxes that fund Social Security and Medicare take a bigger bite out of their gross income than income taxes do. Nor did we attempt to quantify the relative incidence of state and local taxes, such as sales tax and property tax.)

The IRS data we used was derived from a stratified probability sample of all individual income tax returns filed in a given year. IRS researchers then weighted the sample data for each stratum, or subpopulation, to reflect the total number of returns in it. (The strata were defined not only by income, but also by such factors as the presence or absence of special forms or schedules.)

In most cases the IRS breaks down its estimates into 18 groups by adjusted gross income , or AGI, plus a 19th group with no AGI. For much of our analysis, we combined the IRS’s AGI categories into eight larger groups, which made some underlying trends easier to see. Along with the IRS data, we relied on the Office of Management and Budget for historical data on the share of federal receipts from various sources.

All told, the federal government expects to collect about $2.33 trillion in individual income taxes this year, accounting for nearly half (48.5%) of its total receipts, according to the Office of Management and Budget . The IRS expects more than 168 million individual tax returns to be filed this year; if previous years’ patterns continue, about two-thirds of those returns will show some taxable income.

Taken as a whole, the federal income tax is progressive, meaning that those with higher incomes pay at higher rates. But the system’s progressivity tends to break down at the very uppermost income levels.

In 2020, the most recent year for which the IRS has detailed data, all groups of taxpayers with $1 million or more in adjusted gross income (AGI) had average effective tax rates of more than 25%.

Average effective tax rates, defined here as total income tax as a percentage of AGI, were highest among taxpayers with AGIs between $2 million and $10 million (nearly 28%). The average effective tax rate for taxpayers with AGIs of $10 million or more was actually a bit lower (25.5%), mainly because they tend to get more of their income from dividends and long-term capital gains, which are taxed at lower rates than wages, salaries and other so-called “ordinary income.”

At the other end of the income scale, tens of millions of Americans owed little or no federal income tax, especially after factoring in the effects of refundable tax credits, such as the child and earned-income credits.

In 2020, the IRS received nearly 5.3 million individual tax returns that showed no AGI and hence no taxable income. (About 4,600 of those people ended up paying tax anyway, mainly due to the alternative minimum tax .) Another 60.3 million returns showed AGIs of less than $30,000. The average effective tax rate for those taxpayers was 1.5%, even before refundable tax credits were applied.

Millions of Americans actually get money from the IRS, largely due to refundable tax credits. (This is distinct from the refunds eagerly awaited by legions of taxpayers, which typically result from more tax being withheld from people’s paychecks than they end up owing.)

Credits are used to offset taxes owed – not only income tax but certain other taxes, too, such as the self-employment tax or the penalty tax on early withdrawals from qualified retirement plans. But if the value of refundable tax credits exceeds total taxes owed, the excess can be paid out to the taxpayer. This primarily benefits people with lower incomes.

After refundable credits were figured in, taxpayers with AGIs below $30,000 (including those with no AGI or with negative AGI) collectively got back more than $78.6 billion from the IRS in 2020. For taxpayers with AGIs between $1 and $15,000, their average effective tax rate fell to ‑14.8%, from ‑10.3% in 2019, largely due to coronavirus pandemic-related federal relief efforts, some of which were structured as tax credits.

Since 2000, there has been a downward trend in average effective tax rates for all but the richest taxpayers – those with AGIs of $10 million or more. But the three major tax law overhauls during this period have affected different classes of taxpayers quite differently:

• The Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 benefited the highest-income taxpayers the most. Those with AGIs of $5 million or more saw their average effective tax rate drop from 27.2% in 2002 to 23.2% in 2003. Taxpayers with AGIs between $500,000 and $5 million saw their average effective rates fall from 28.8% to 25.5%. Other taxpayers with lower incomes experienced much smaller rate cuts.
• In 2013, by contrast, two provisions aimed squarely at higher-income taxpayers kicked in. A new net investment income tax and Medicare surtax , enacted to help pay for the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”), helped raise the average effective tax rate on the highest-earning taxpayers (those with AGIs of $5 million or more) from 20.7% in 2012 to 27% the following year. Those with AGIs ranging from $500,000 to under $5 million also saw their average effective tax rate increase, from 24.2% to 27.5%, while other groups experienced little to no change.
• The Trump tax cuts of 2017 , which altered provisions throughout the tax code, had their biggest impact on upper-middle-income taxpayers: those with AGIs of at least $200,000 but less than $500,000. Although average effective tax rates fell for all income groups, they fell the most for that upper-middle group, from 19.2% in 2017 to 16.6% in 2018.

Besides average effective tax rates, another way to look at the relative burden on different groups of taxpayers is by examining how much of the total bill they foot.

The IRS collected $1.66 trillion in individual income taxes in 2020 (excluding the $78.6 billion in negative tax liabilities referred to earlier). Close to 54% of that sum came from taxpayers with AGIs between $100,000 and $1 million – a group that accounted for just under a fifth of all returns filed (31.3 million), and about 30% of all taxable returns (31 million).

At the very top of the income ladder, only 0.02% of all returns filed in 2020 showed AGIs of $10 million or more, but those taxpayers collectively paid $210.2 billion in taxes after refundable tax credits, or 12.6% of total individual income tax collections.

Corporate tax brings in smaller share of federal revenues

Although the focus this time of year is on individual income taxes, corporate income taxes are also a significant source of federal revenue. This year, the Office of Management and Budget projects that the government will collect $546 billion in corporate taxes, or 11.4% of estimated total receipts. That’s less than half the corporate-tax share of total revenues that prevailed in the 1950s.

Several big corporations, including Amazon, Nike and FedEx, have come under fire in recent years for paying little to no income tax . But comparing corporate and individual income taxes is tricky. For one thing, corporations can report income and taxes differently to the IRS than they do publicly to investors. They can also spread losses in a given year across several years’ worth of taxes – meaning, in effect, that taxes due on this year’s profits can be offset by a previous year’s losses .

Also, some types of business income generally aren’t taxed through the corporate income tax at all. Sole proprietorships, partnerships and entities called “S corporations” pass their income (or loss) through to their owner or owners, who include it in their individual taxes. In 2020, 9 million taxpayers reported income or losses from partnerships and S corporations, and 27.7 million reported income or losses as sole proprietors or self-employed professionals.

The rules governing what constitutes business or individual income, and how it should be taxed, are only part of what makes the U.S. tax code as complex as it is. One rough measure of that complexity: The printed version of the 2021 edition of the Internal Revenue Code runs a total of 4,074 pages, excluding front matter. More than half of those pages (2,448) are devoted to the income tax alone.

The tax code’s complexity is one of the biggest things Americans dislike about it. In a recent Pew Research Center survey , 53% of U.S. adults said the system’s complexity bothered them a lot. Larger shares, however, said they were bothered a lot by the feeling that some corporations and wealthy people don’t pay their fair share of taxes (61% and 60%, respectively). By contrast, 38% said they were bothered a lot by the amount they personally paid.

• Economic Policy
• Economy & Work

Drew DeSilver is a senior writer at Pew Research Center

7 facts about Americans and taxes

Americans’ top policy priority for 2024: strengthening the economy, congress has long struggled to pass spending bills on time, what the data says about food stamps in the u.s., inflation, health costs, partisan cooperation among the nation’s top problems, most popular.

1615 L St. NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 USA (+1) 202-419-4300 | Main (+1) 202-857-8562 | Fax (+1) 202-419-4372 |  Media Inquiries

Research Topics

• Age & Generations
• Coronavirus (COVID-19)
• Family & Relationships
• Gender & LGBTQ
• Immigration & Migration
• International Affairs
• Internet & Technology
• Methodological Research
• News Habits & Media
• Non-U.S. Governments
• Other Topics
• Politics & Policy
• Race & Ethnicity
• Email Newsletters

ABOUT PEW RESEARCH CENTER  Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. Pew Research Center does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of  The Pew Charitable Trusts .

Copyright 2024 Pew Research Center

Terms & Conditions

Privacy Policy

Cookie Settings

Reprints, Permissions & Use Policy

The Federalist No. 70

The executive department further considered, independent journal saturday, march 15, 1788 [alexander hamilton], to the people of the state of new york:.

T HERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman story, knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention?

The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.

The ingredients which constitute safety in the repub lican sense are, first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due responsibility.

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand, while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.

This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the States. New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which have intrusted the executive authority wholly to single men. 1 Both these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections, and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.

The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive. We have seen that the Achaeans, on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes, who were at times substituted for the Consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates. That the dissensions between them were not more frequent or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until we advert to the singular position in which the republic was almost continually placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a division of the government between them. The patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established custom with the Consuls to divide the administration between themselves by lot -- one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs, the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must, no doubt, have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the republic.

But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the Executive, under any modification whatever.

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operation of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government, in the most critical emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice, in the human character.

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. Here, they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition -- vigor and expedition, and this without anycounterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality.

It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed -- that is, to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.

[But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds -- to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.] E1

[But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.

Responsibility is of two kinds -- to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.] E1

"I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point." These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium, of a strict scrunity into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties?

In the single instance in which the governor of this State is coupled with a council -- that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on their part, have charged it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.

It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first , the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, second , the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.

In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the pub lic peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department -- an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him at his sole discretion.

But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.

The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious," that "the executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE ";[2] that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is unattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number, 3 were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more to fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to his faults.

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility. I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the States, who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our constitution.

1. New York has no council except for the single purpose of appointing to offices; New Jersey has a council whom the governor may consult. But I think, from the terms of the constitution, their resolutions do not bind him.

2. De Lolme.

E1. Two versions of these paragraphs appear in different editions.

• Election 2024
• Entertainment
• Newsletters
• Photography
• Personal Finance
• AP Investigations
• AP Buyline Personal Finance
• AP Buyline Shopping
• Press Releases
• Israel-Hamas War
• Russia-Ukraine War
• Global elections
• Asia Pacific
• Latin America
• Middle East
• Election Results
• Delegate Tracker
• AP & Elections
• Auto Racing
• 2024 Paris Olympic Games
• Movie reviews
• Book reviews
• Personal finance
• Financial Markets
• Business Highlights
• Financial wellness
• Artificial Intelligence
• Social Media

Prehistoric lake sturgeon is not endangered, US says despite calls from conservationists

FILE - Two lake sturgeons are set to be weighed near Black Lake in Cheboygan County, Mich., Feb. 4, 2017. Lake sturgeon don’t need Endangered Species Act protections, federal wildlife officials announced Monday, April 22, 2024, saying that stocking programs have helped the prehistoric fish return to areas where they had vanished. (Julia Nagy/Lansing State Journal via AP, File)

FILE - People gather to look at a lake sturgeon, before it is weighed, near Black Lake in Cheboygan County, Mich., Feb. 4, 2017. Lake sturgeon don’t need Endangered Species Act protections, federal wildlife officials announced Monday, April 22, 2024, saying that stocking programs have helped the prehistoric fish return to areas where they had vanished. (Julia Nagy/Lansing State Journal via AP, File)

• Copy Link copied

MADISON, Wis. (AP) — Lake sturgeon don’t need Endangered Species Act protections, federal wildlife officials announced Monday, saying that stocking programs have helped the prehistoric fish return to areas where they had vanished.

The decision ends the Arizona-based Center of Biological Diversity’s petition filed in May 2018 asking the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to list lake sturgeon as endangered or threatened. Such listings would make harvesting the fish illegal, but without them, popular sturgeon harvest seasons in states such as Wisconsin and Michigan can continue.

The center argued that overharvesting and deteriorating habitat have “severely depleted” the species. Dams block access to spawning and rearing habitat and water pollution and diversions have done “irreparable harm,” the center said.

“This is a disappointing decision because though some populations are well managed, overall the lake sturgeon has suffered a drastic decline,” said Tierra Curry, a senior scientist at the center. “Endangered Species Act protection would bring a comprehensive recovery plan and ongoing funding to restore these iconic fish across their former range.”

Chuck Traxler, the wildlife service’s Midwest deputy regional director, said stocking has helped grow adult lake sturgeon populations and increase spawning, agency officials said. Putting the creatures on the list would be like going to the emergency room, and the rebounding species doesn’t need that level of protection, said

“It doesn’t mean everything is good right now,” he said. “It means keep up the good work.”

Populations aren’t at historical highs, the agency acknowledged in a December assessment, but stocking returned them to the Red River of the North between Minnesota and North Dakota, the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, portions of the Mississippi River and the Coosa River.

Dam removals and habitat restoration efforts also have helped, the agency has said, citing work in 2015 to retrofit a dam on Wisconsin’s Menominee River to allow spawning sturgeon to travel upstream and the removal of the Brecksville Dam on Ohio’s Cuyahoga River in 2020.

The agency also pointed to reef restoration work in the corridor connecting Lake Huron and Lake Erie that has created a place for sturgeon to lay eggs and noted that nine of 43 toxic spots along Great Lakes shorelines have been cleaned up.

The assessment also noted the adaptable species should be able to withstand warmer water due to climate change.

Lake sturgeon are ancient North American freshwater fish. They’re essentially living fossils, first appearing about 136 million years ago when dinosaurs ruled the planet. They resemble torpedoes, with dorsal ridges and snouts. They can grow up to 7 feet (2 meters) long and weigh up to 300 pounds (136 kilograms). Males typically live about 50 years. Females can live anywhere between 80 and 150 years.

They’re found in the upper and lower Mississippi River basin as well as the Great Lakes. Commercial anglers considered lake sturgeon a nuisance because they tore their nets, leading to widespread over-harvesting in the 1800s that continued into the 20th century.

Lake sturgeon can’t reproduce fast enough to replace the losses. It takes up to three decades before they reach spawning age, and even then they don’t spawn annually. And many don’t survive the trip back to their birth waters to spawn. The wildlife service has compared lake sturgeon losses to the mass destruction of the American buffalo.

Twenty states have outlawed sturgeon harvesting. Fourteen of those states have listed lake sturgeon as threatened or endangered. Volunteers and Wisconsin natural resources officials have been guarding spawning sturgeon from poachers on the Wolf River for 30 years.

Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin still hold hook-and-line lake sturgeon fishing seasons. Michigan and Wisconsin hold sturgeon spearing seasons each winter as well where anglers drill holes through lake ice and impale sturgeon as they swim past.

The Wisconsin natural resources department reported 432 sturgeon were taken in February, down from 1,405 in 2023. Warm weather and poor ice conditions led to the diminished return, according to the department. Michigan officials set the total harvest limit at just six sturgeon but ended up canceling due to warm weather and unsafe ice conditions.

Those states’ seasons are so tightly regulated that the harvests don’t impact the species overall, said Lori Nordstrom, the wildlife service’s Midwest assistant regional director of ecological services.

Michigan and Wisconsin, for example, allow an angler to take only one sturgeon per year. Minnesota anglers must release any sturgeon they catch in inland waters. Wisconsin regulations are designed to keep the harvest rate below 5%, with all tag fees going to the state’s sturgeon conservation program, according to the wildlife service.

Leaders of Sturgeon for Tomorrow, a nonprofit organization that works to rehabilitate sturgeon in Wisconsin and Michigan and supports harvesting the fish, praised the wildlife service’s decision Monday. They said the ruling enables the states to continue managing sturgeon and allows harvesting to continue, which in turn helps researchers learn more about the ancient creatures.

“We’re very happy with it,” said Jim Patt, president of the Southwest Chapter of Sturgeon for Tomorrow, one of five chapters along the Lake Winnebago system, which hosts Wisconsin’s spearing season. “This is a big thing. we can keep our research going and keep our population strong and continue what we’ve been doing.

• Avalon Statement of Purpose
• Accessibility at Yale
• Yale Law Library
• University Library
• Yale Law School
• Search Morris
• Search Orbis