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Migration and asylum in europe – 2023 edition, migration and asylum in europe, migration-2023-introduction.

Migration and asylum in Europe  –  2023 interactive publication provides key data and trends on migration and asylum. It looks at topics such as people migrating to, within and from the EU, international protection of non-EU nationals, and irregular migration.

This publication allows you to explore, visualise and compare indicators on migration and asylum at EU and country level.

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Migration-2023-ch1-population-diversity, population diversity.

Learn more about the main destination countries of migrants, the reasons why non-EU citizens move to the EU, and the mix of nationals and non-nationals in the EU countries. This section presents statistics on immigration and emigration, citizenship, and residence permits for non-EU citizens.

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In 2022, 8% of the people living in EU countries were non-nationals. 3% were citizens of another EU country and 5% of a non-EU country.

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Migration to and from the eu.

In 2021, 2.3 million immigrants came to the EU from non-EU countries. This is an increase of nearly 18% compared with 1.9 million in 2020, but still below the pre-COVID-19 level of 2.7 million in 2019.

In 21 out of 27 EU countries, 50% or more immigrants came from outside the EU in 2021. The largest shares were observed in Lithuania (81% of all its immigrants), Spain (80%) and Slovenia (79%). In contrast, the lowest share was recorded in Luxembourg, where immigrants from outside the EU made up 9% of all its immigrants.

In absolute numbers, the most popular countries of destination for immigrants from outside the EU in 2021 were Germany (439 000 persons or 19% of all immigrants who came to the EU from non-EU countries) and Spain (421 000 or 19%), ahead of Italy (248 000 or 11%) and France (238 000 or 11%). People who migrated to these 4 EU members represented 60% of all immigrants who entered the EU from non-EU countries in 2021.

In the same year, about 1.1 million people emigrated from the EU to a non-EU country. This is also an increase compared with 956 000 people in 2020, and almost back to the pre-COVID-19 level of 1.2 million.

In 8 out of 27 EU countries, more than 50% of emigrants went to a country outside the EU in 2021. The largest share of people who emigrated to a non-EU country was recorded in France (68% of all its emigrants), followed by Slovenia (65%), Lithuania (64%) and Spain (63%). On the other hand, the lowest shares were observed in Slovakia (18% of all its emigrants) and Luxembourg (16%).

In absolute terms, the largest number of emigrants was recorded in Spain (239 000 or 21% of all emigrants to a non-EU country), followed by Germany (158 000 or 14%) and France (120 000 or 11%). Emigrants from these 3 EU members made up 46% of all emigrants leaving the EU countries in 2021. 

At EU level, the difference between the number of immigrants and emigrants resulted in a positive net migration in 2021, meaning that over 1 million more people moved to the EU than moved out.

For more information

• Statistics Explained article on migrant and migrant population statistics

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Free movement of people in the eu.

EU citizens have the right to move freely in the EU and to establish their residence in another EU country. In 2021, 1.4 million people moved from one EU country to another. This is an increase of 10% compared with 2020, which was affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

An analysis by place of previous residence reveals that in 2021 Germany was the country with the largest number of immigrants from other EU members (328 000 or 24% of all immigrants from other EU countries), followed by Poland (111 000 or 8%), Spain (108 000 or 8%), the Netherlands (106 000 or 8%) and Romania (104 000 or 8%).

In relative terms, Luxembourg recorded the largest share of immigrants coming from another EU country (91% of all its immigrants in 2021), followed by Slovakia (68%) and Austria (56%).

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Citizenships in the eu.

While in 2022 most people in the EU lived in their country of citizenship, 8% (37 million people) of the EU population were citizens of another country than their country of residence. 3% (14 million) were citizens of another EU country and 5% (24 million) of a non-EU country. Additionally, the EU population included 53 000 stateless people and 303 000 who were of unknown citizenship. 

Luxembourg topped the list of countries with the highest share of non-nationals in their population (47%), ahead of Malta (21%), Cyprus (19%), Austria (18%), and Estonia (15%). 

Looking specifically at citizens from other EU members, the largest share was recorded in Luxembourg (38%) followed by Cyprus (10%). The proportion of citizens from outside the EU was largest in Estonia (14%), Latvia (13%),  and Malta (12%).

In contrast, non-nationals represented less than 1% of the population in Romania (0.3%) and Croatia (0.9%).

In the EU countries, non-nationals are younger than nationals

Across the EU countries on 1 January 2022, people who were non-nationals in the respective EU country were younger than the national population. 

The distribution by age classes shows that, compared with nationals, the non-national population has a greater proportion of relatively young working age adults aged 20 to 49. This is the case for both men and women. One can see that:

• men aged 20 to 49 accounted for 29% of the non-national population, compared with 18% of the national population;
• women aged 20 to 49 accounted for 27% of the non-national population, compared with 18% of the national population. 

In contrast, the shares of people who are over 50 years were smaller for non-nationals than nationals. For example:

• men aged over 50 accounted for 12% of the non-national population, compared with 20% for nationals; 
• women aged over 50 accounted for 13% of the non-national population, compared with 24% of the national population. 

Romanians are the largest group of EU citizens residing in other EU countries

Citizens of EU countries have the right to live and work in any other EU country.

In 2022, Romania was the country with the largest number of its own nationals living in other EU members (3.1 million people or 24% of all EU citizens living in another EU country as non-nationals), ahead of Poland and Italy (both 1.5 million or 11%).

• Interactive map on EU citizens living in other EU countries
• Thematic page on international migration and citizenship

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Residence permits.

People from abroad move to the EU for different reasons, for example to work, to join their family, or to study. Non-EU citizens can stay in the EU if they obtain a residence permit.

In 2022, the EU countries together issued almost 3.5 million first residence permits to non-EU citizens. This is an increase of 18% compared with 2021 and of 14% compared with the pre-COVID-19 level in 2019.

Poland granted the highest number of permits (700  000 or 20% of total permits issued in the EU), followed by Germany (539  000 or 16%), Spain (467  000 or 14%), Italy (338  000 or 10%) and France (324  000 or 9%).

Most of the first-residence permits were granted to citizens from Ukraine (374  000 or 11% of all permits), Belarus (310  000 or 9%) and India (183  000 or 5%).

Work was the main reason for residence permits in 2022

The reasons for granting these residence permits in 2022 were:

• work: 1.2 million or 36% of all first residence permits issued 
• family reasons: 896  000 or 26%
• education: 457  000 or 13%

The remaining 25% of residence permits (861  000) were granted for other reasons such as international protection. 

The situation varies across the EU. In 2022, the share of permits issued for work reasons was largest in Croatia (93% of all first residence permits granted for employment reasons), ahead of Romania (74%) and Malta (73%). Family was the main reason in Belgium (49%), Luxembourg and Greece (both 45%), while education had the biggest share in Ireland (48%) and France (32%). The share of other reasons was highest in Austria (50%).

• Statistics Explained article on first residence permits issued
• Statistics Explained article on residence permits - statistics on stock of valid permits at the end of the year
• Thematic page on managed migration

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Protection and asylum.

There are many reasons why people migrate, including seeking protection from conflict, persecution, and human rights violations. This section presents statistics on asylum seekers, including children, and the different forms of protection given by the EU countries.

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In 2022, the EU countries granted protection status to 384 000 asylum seekers, up by 39% compared with 2021 (275 000).

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Asylum applicants.

In 2022, 875  000 people applied for international protection in the EU countries for the first time . This is an increase of 63% compared with 2021 and is the highest number since the peaks recorded during the refugee crisis related to the war in Syria in 2015 and 2016.

The EU countries that received the highest number of first-time applications in 2022 were Germany (218 000 or 25% of all first-time asylum applications in the EU) and France (138 000 or 16%), followed by Spain (116 000 or 13%), Austria (110 000 or 13%) and Italy (77 000 or 9%). These 5 EU countries together accounted for 75% of all first-time asylum applications in the EU.

Compared with the population of each EU country, the highest rate of first-time applicants in 2022 was recorded in Cyprus (24  000 applicants per million people), ahead of Austria (12  000) and Luxembourg (4  000). By contrast, the lowest rate was observed in Slovakia (90 per million people) and Hungary (5).

Syrians, Afghans, Venezuelans, and Turks lodged the most asylum applications in the EU

Almost half (47%) of the first-time asylum applicants in 2022 had Asian citizenship, 22% had African citizenship, 16% had European citizenship (non-EU) and 14% had North or South American citizenship. The share of persons who were stateless or with unknown citizenship was 1%.

In 2022, Syria was the main country of citizenship of asylum seekers (132 000 first-time applications or 15% of all first-time applications in the EU), ahead of Afghanistan (114 000 or 13%), Venezuela (50 000 or 6%) and Türkiye (49 000 or 6%).

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Check how many first-time asylum applications from outside the EU were lodged in your country in 2022 and the main citizenships of applicants.

• Statistics Explained article on asylum applications – annual statistics
• Statistics Explained article on asylum applications – monthly statistics
• Thematic page on asylum

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Asylum decisions.

In 2022, around 850 000 decisions on asylum applications were taken by the EU countries. Of these, 632 000 decisions were taken at first instance and 217 000 were final decisions taken upon appeal or review of first instance decisions.

First instance decisions granted protection status  to 311 000 asylum seekers, an increase of 54% compared with 2021. Through final decisions, the EU members granted protection status to 73 000 asylum seekers, a situation almost unchanged compared with 2021.

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Open more on first instance decisions.

In 2022, 23% or 143 000 first instance decisions taken by the EU countries granted refugee status, 16% or 102 000  subsidiary protection,  and 10% or 66 000  humanitarian protection .

The share of refugee status in all first decisions was highest in Portugal, where more than 7 out of 10 first instance decisions (71%) granted refugee status, followed by Luxembourg (59%).

The proportion of subsidiary protection was highest in Estonia (93% of all first instance decisions) and Bulgaria (89%).

The largest share of humanitarian protection was recorded in Ireland (47% of all first instance decisions).

The main beneficiaries of protection status were Syrians (32% of all asylum applicants who received protection status at first instance in the EU), followed by Afghans (23%) and Venezuelans (7%).

Open More on final decisions after an appeal or review

In 2022, 12% or 27 000 decisions taken upon appeal or review in the EU granted refugee status, 8% or 17 000  subsidiary protection, and 13% or 29 000  humanitarian protection .

Refugee status represented 50% of final decisions in Finland and Slovakia, the largest shares in the EU. The share of subsidiary protection was largest in Bulgaria (80%) and of humanitarian protection in Italy (56%).

The main beneficiaries of protection status were Afghans (22% of all asylum applicants granted protection status by final decisions in the EU), followed by Syrians (12%) and Nigerians (8%).

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In 2022, nearly half of asylum applicants received protection in first instance decisions.

To better understand who is granted protection in the EU, the recognition rate can be used. This rate represents the number of positive decisions as a percentage of the total number of decisions on applications for protection status.

In 2022, the recognition rate stood at 49% for first instance decisions, meaning there were 311 000 positive decisions out of 632 000 total decisions, and at 34% for final decisions in appeal or review, representing 73 000 positive decisions out of 217 000.

Among the EU countries, the recognition rate at first instance was highest in Estonia (96%), Bulgaria (91%) and the Netherlands (87%). In contrast, it was lowest in Cyprus (6%) and Malta (15%).

As regards final decisions, Bulgaria recorded a 100% recognition rate, meaning that all final decisions were positive. It was followed by Italy (72%), Austria and the Netherlands (each 67%). At the opposite end of the scale, the rate was equal to zero in Estonia and Portugal, meaning that no positive final decisions were taken in these countries, and it was almost zero in Cyprus and Poland.

Among the top 10 citizenships that received first instance decisions in 2022, Syrians (94%), Afghans (85%) and Venezuelans (76%) had the highest recognition rates. Among the top 10 citizenships that received final instance decisions after an appeal or review in 2022, the citizenships with the highest recognition rates were Syrian (79%), Afghan (74%) and Iranian (44%).

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Temporary protection.

Temporary protection is an exceptional measure to provide immediate and temporary protection to displaced people from non-EU countries and those who are unable to return to their country of origin. 

Since Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine started in February 2022, the EU countries have granted temporary protection to people fleeing Ukraine.

By 31 December 2022, around 3.8 million non-EU citizens who fled Ukraine had received temporary protection status in the EU. Around 98% of them had Ukrainian citizenship.

The main EU countries where people fleeing Ukraine stayed in 2022 were Germany (968 000 or 25% of the total), Poland (961 000 or 25%) and Czechia (432 000 or 11%).

Compared with the population of each EU country, the highest numbers of temporary protection beneficiaries at the end of 2022 were recorded in Czechia (41.1 beneficiaries per 1 000 people), followed by Estonia (28.8) and Poland (25.5). In contrast, the lowest numbers were observed in France (1.0 per 1 000 people), Greece (2.1), and Italy (2.5). At EU level, there were 8.6 beneficiaries of temporary protection for every 1 000 people.

• Statistics Explained article on temporary protection for persons fleeing Ukraine - monthly statistics
• Thematic section on the impact of the war in Ukraine

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Children under international protection.

In 2022, 236 000 asylum applicants were aged less than 18, accounting for 25% of all applicants in the EU. Of these, around 40 000 or 17% were unaccompanied minors .

Compared with 2021, the number of asylum applications lodged by unaccompanied minors rose by 57%.

Most of the asylum applications from unaccompanied minors in 2022 were lodged either by Afghans (18 000 people or 45% of all first-time asylum applicants) or Syrians (10 000 or 24%).

The EU countries that received the highest number of asylum applications from unaccompanied minors in 2022 were Austria (13 000) and Germany (7 000), followed by the Netherlands (4 000) and Bulgaria (3 000).

2 in 3 first instance decisions on applications of unaccompanied minors were favourable

In 2022, the EU countries took 11 300 first instance decisions on asylum applications from unaccompanied minors. Of these, 8 400 or 74% were positive, meaning that they granted a protection status . Thus, the recognition rate for unaccompanied minors at first instance was higher than for adults (42%).

Across the EU countries, Germany issued the most positive decisions on applications from unaccompanied minors (2 900 or 34% of the EU total), followed by the Netherlands (1 400 or 17%), Italy and Greece (each 1 000 or 12%).

• Statistics Explained article on children in migration – asylum applicants
• Thematic page on children in migration

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Irregular migration and return.

Irregular migration is when non-EU citizens attempt to enter or stay in the EU territory without complying with the legal requirements. This section presents data on people who were refused entry to the EU, who are illegally present in the EU, and people who were returned.  

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In 2022, 143 000 non-EU citizens were refused entry into the EU, 1.1 million were found to be illegally present, 431 000 were ordered to leave an EU country and 74 000 were returned to a country outside the EU.

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Irregular migration.

In 2022, 143 000 non-EU citizens were refused entry into the EU at one of its external borders . Of these, 62% were stopped at external land borders, 34% at air borders and 4% at sea borders.

The main grounds for refusing entry to the EU were either that the purpose and conditions of stay were not justified (24% of all refusals) or that the people refused entry did not have a valid visa or residence permit (23%).

The situation varies across the EU countries also because some EU members do not have external EU borders, as they are either landlocked or only have an internal land border within the  Schengen area .

In 2022, Poland reported the largest number of refusals (23 000 or 16% of the EU total), ahead of Hungary (16 000 or 11%) and Croatia (12 000 or 8%). Most of the refusals at land borders were recorded in Poland, at sea borders in Italy and at air borders in Ireland.

Ukrainians accounted for the largest number of people refused entry to the EU in 2022 (29 000 people), followed by Albanians (16 000) and Russians (12 000).

In 2022, around 1.1 million non-EU citizens were found to be illegally present in the EU. This is an increase of 65% compared with 2021. Among the EU countries, the largest number of illegally present people was found in Hungary (223 000 or 20% of the EU total), Germany (198 000 or 18%) and Italy (138 000 or 12%).

Syrians were the biggest group of people found to be illegally present in the EU (197 000 people), ahead of Afghans (114 000) and Moroccans (60 000).

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Orders to leave and returns .

In 2022, a total of 431 000 non-EU citizens received an order to leave the EU country they were staying in. This is an increase of 27% compared with 2021. Among the EU countries, France issued the most return decisions (136 000 or 31% of all orders to leave issued in the EU), followed by Germany (44 000 or 10%), Croatia (41 000 or 9%), and Greece (34 000 or 8%).

Algerians (34 000) were the largest group of non-EU citizens ordered to leave the territory of an EU country, followed by Moroccans (31 000) and Pakistanis (25 000).

74 000 people were returned to a country outside the EU in 2022

In 2022, around 74 000 non-EU citizens were returned outside the EU, following an order to leave the territory of a specific EU country. 

The highest number of returns was recorded in France and Sweden (each 8 600 or 12% of all returns to non-EU countries), and Germany (7 700 or 11%).

The biggest groups of people returned to a country outside the EU were Albanians (9 500), followed by Georgians (7 500) and Turks (4 000).

• Statistics Explained article on enforcement of immigration legislation statistics
• Statistics Explained article on returns of irregular migrants - quarterly statistics

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Skills of migrants.

2023-2024 is the European Year of Skills, which aims to promote a mindset of reskilling and upskilling, helping people to get the right skills for relevant quality jobs.

In addition to the residence permits described earlier, there are various types of authorisations that allow non-EU citizens to study and work in the EU countries, making full use of their skills and talent. This section presents statistics on the EU Blue Cards, authorisations for study and research, and intra-corporate transfers.  

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The EU countries issued 82 000 Blue Cards, 421 000 permits to study and research and 11 000 intra-corporate transfer permits to non-EU citizens in 2022.

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Attracting skills and talent, eu blue card for highly qualified workers.

The EU Blue Cards is a work and residence permit for  highly qualified people  from outside the EU.

In 2022, around 82 000 highly qualified non-EU workers received an EU Blue Card. The biggest issuer was Germany (63 000 or 77% of all EU Blue Cards), followed by Poland (5 000 or 6%), Lithuania and France (each 3 900 or 5%).

Citizens of India were granted the most EU Blue Cards in 2022 (20 000 or 24% of all Blue Cards issued in the EU), ahead of citizens of Russia (8 000 or 9%), Belarus (6 000 or 7%) and Türkiye (5 000 or 6%).

Permits for researchers and students

Non-EU citizens can also stay in the EU to study and do research. In 2022, the EU countries issued in total 421 000 authorisations for study and research. Germany issued most authorisations (132 000 or 31% of all permits in the EU), followed by France (110 000 or 26%) and Spain (53 000 or 13%).

The main recipients were citizens from China (42 000 or 10% of all permits in the EU), India (40 000 or 10%), the United States (21 000 or 5%) and Morocco (20 000 or 5%).

Intra-corporate transfers of staff

Non-EU citizens can also apply for a so-called intra-corporate transfer residence permit to work in the EU. This means they can be posted from a company operating outside the EU to a branch in one of the EU countries. In 2022, the EU members issued in total 10 500 transfer permits, with the largest numbers in the Netherlands (3 300 or 31% of all permits), Germany (1 800 or 17%) and Hungary (1 600 or 15%).

Most of these permits were given to citizens from India (4 500 or 43% of all permits), China (1 200 or 11%) and South Korea (1 100 or 11%).

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Overqualification of migrants.

Looking at employed non-EU citizens aged 20-64 years with a degree , 39% of them were overqualified in 2022, meaning they were working in a low- or medium-skilled job position, for which a degree was not required. This compares with 32% for EU citizens living in another EU country and 21% for nationals living in their own country.

Across the EU countries, the over-qualification rate of non-EU citizens was highest in Greece (74%), Italy (68%) and Spain (58%). In contrast, it was lowest in Luxembourg (12%), the Netherlands (22%), and Finland (24%).

In comparison, the overqualification rate for employed EU citizens living in other EU countries was highest in Italy (49%), Cyprus (48%) and Spain (44%), while it was lowest in Luxembourg (7%), Czechia (11%) and Malta (16%).

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Check additional indicators in the Migrant integration and inclusion dashboard.

• Statistics Explained article on residence permits – statistics on authorisations to reside and work
• Statistics Explained article on migrant integration statistics - overqualification
• Thematic page on migrant integration
• European Year of Skills 2023

migration-2023-about-this-publication

About this publication.

Migration and asylum in Europe is an interactive publication released by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union.

Information on data

The data displayed in the visualisations come directly from the Eurostat online database for the reference year(s) mentioned in the visualisation. The accompanying text is from January 2024 and reflects the data situation at that moment in time. The data displayed in the visualisation on first-time asylum applicants by citizenships are from March 2023. 

• Thematic section on migration and asylum
• Database on international migration , asylum , managed migration , children in migration and migrant integration
• Statistics Explained articles on migration and asylum

If you have questions on the data, please contact the Eurostat user support .

Copyright and re-use policy

This publication should not be considered as representative of the European Commission’s official position.

© European Union, 2024

The reuse policy of European Commission documents is implemented based on Commission Decision 2011/833/EU of 12 December 2011 on the reuse of Commission documents (OJ L 330, 14.12.2011, p. 39). Except otherwise noted, the reuse of this document is authorised under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC-BY 4.0) licence. This means that reuse is allowed provided appropriate credit is given and any changes are indicated.

For any use or reproduction of elements that are not owned by the European Union, permission may need to be sought directly from the respective rightholders. The European Union does not own the copyright in relation to the following elements:

Cover photo: © r.classen/Shutterstock.com Population diversity: © fizkes/Shutterstock.com Protection and asylum: © Halfpoint/Shutterstock.com Irregular migration and return: © triple_v/Shutterstock.com Skills of migrants: © Atitaph_StockPHoTo/Shutterstock.com

For more information, please consult our page on copyright notice and free re-use of data .

Identifiers

Product code: KS-FW-23-004 ISBN 978-92-68-04508-4 ISSN 2600-3368 doi:10.2785/353399

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Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective

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• Christof Van Mol 3 &
• Helga de Valk 3 , 4  

Part of the book series: IMISCOE Research Series ((IMIS))

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In this chapter we outline the general developments of migration within and towards Europe as well as patterns of settlement of migrants. We provide a comprehensive historical overview of the changes in European migration since the 1950s. Main phases in immigration, its backgrounds, and its determinants across the continent are described making use of secondary literature and data. Different European regions are covered in the analyses, based on available statistics and an analysis of secondary material. This allows us to distinguish between different origins of migrants as well as migration motives. In addition to migration from outside Europe this chapter pays ample attention to patterns of mobility within Europe. The analyses cover the individual level with as much detail as possible with the available statistics and particularly take the demographic characteristics of migrants into account. The analyses on flows of migration are supplemented by a sketch of the residing immigrant population across Europe.

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Introduction

This chapter outlines the general developments of migration within and towards Europe as well as patterns of settlement of migrants since the 1950s. We take as our starting point the bilateral labour migration agreements signed by several European countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Three main periods can be distinguished from this point onwards. The first, up to the oil crisis in 1973–1974, was characterized by steady economic growth and development and deployment of guest worker schemes, (return) migration from former colonies to motherlands, and refugee migration, mainly dominated by movements from East to West. The second period started with the oil crisis and ended with the fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s. During this time North-Western European governments increasingly restricted migration, and migrants’ main route of entrance became family reunification and family formation. Furthermore, asylum applications increased. By the end of this period, migration flows had started to divert towards former emigration countries in Southern Europe. The third period is from the fall of the Iron Curtain until today, with increasing European Union (EU) influence and control of migration from third countries into the EU and encouragement of intra-European mobility.

The historical overview presented here stems from a comprehensive literature study, complemented by an analysis of available statistical data for trends in the last decade. It should be noted, however, that statistical data on migration and mobility in Europe is mostly incomplete, as they are based mainly on reports and registrations of the individuals concerned. Besides, data on immigration and emigration are not always fully available and are not consistently measured across countries and time (see, e.g., EMN 2013 ). This means that the quality of migration data is often limited (Abel 2010 ; Kupiszewska and Nowok 2008 ; Nowok et al. 2006 ; Poulain et al. 2006 ). Several initiatives and projects have been launched to overcome these problems and promote comparable definitions, statistics, and estimations of missing data (Raymer et al. 2011 ). Most of the EU’s current 28 member countries produce annual statistics on immigration and emigration. However, the information and level of detail is not yet comparable across countries (for an overview of databanks and limitations, see Raymer et al. 2011 ). The final section of this chapter presents figures on migration and migrants relying mainly on data from three research projects which aimed to create and improve harmonized and consistent migration data (Abel and Sander 2014 ; Raymer et al. 2011 , see www.nidi.nl for more information on the MIMOSA and IMEM projects). The conclusion summarizes the main patterns and discusses some implications of our findings.

Three Periods of Migration in Europe

From the 1950s to 1974: guest worker schemes and decolonization.

In the period after the Second World War, North-Western Europe was economically booming. Industrial production, for example, increased by 30 % between 1953 and 1958 (Dietz and Kaczmarczyk 2008 ). Native workers in this region became increasingly educated, and growing possibilities for social mobility enabled many of them to move up to white-collar work (Boyle et al. 1998 ). Local workers could not fill the vacancies, as labour reservoirs were limited. Furthermore, the local native population was no longer willing to take up unhealthy and poorly paid jobs in agriculture, cleaning, construction, and mining. As a result, North-Western European governments started to recruit labour in peripheral countries. The main destination countries were Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. The recruited foreign workers were expected to return home after completing a stint of labour. They therefore tended to be granted few rights and little or no access to welfare support (Boyle et al. 1998 ). At the end of this period, most migrants in North-Western Europe originated from Algeria, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

Initially, geographical proximity played an important role in the development of specific migration flows. For example, Sweden recruited labour from Finland, the UK from Ireland, and Switzerland from Italy. A migration system emerged whereby peripheral—especially Southern European—countries supplied workers to North-Western European countries. Migration flows were strongly guided by differences in economic development between regions characterized by pre-industrial agrarian economies and those with highly industrialized economies (Bade 2003 ; Barou 2006 ), both internationally and nationally (e.g., with unskilled workers moving from Southern Italy towards the industrial centres in Northern Italy). Within the origin countries, most migrant workers were from poor agricultural regions where there was insufficient work, such as Northern Portugal, Western Spain, Southern Italy, and Northern Greece (Bade 2003 ). However, European governments gradually enlarged their zones of recruitment to countries outside Europe. One of the main reasons was the Cold War division of Europe which severely restricted East-West labour mobility. In West Germany, for example, there was a significant inflow of workers from Greece, Italy, and Spain, as well as from East Germany. The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, however, put a stop to the latter. As a result, West Germany reoriented its recruitment towards elsewhere. Bilateral agreements were signed with Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968). Other destination countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Switzerland followed, also signing labour migration agreements with these countries in the 1960s.

In this period, international migration was generally viewed positively because of its economic benefits (Bonifazi 2008 ), from the perspective of both the sending and the receiving countries. In the Mediterranean region, for example, emigration helped to alleviate pressures on the labour market, as the region was characterized by significant demographic pressure, low productivity and incomes, and high unemployment (Page Moch 2003 ; Vilar 2001 ). A comparison of annual gross national product per capita in the 1960s illustrates this with US $353 for Turkey, $822 for Spain, and $1272 for Italy; $1977 for the UK and $2324 for France (Page Moch 2003 , 180). Furthermore, migrants’ remittances were expected to benefit the national economy. In Turkey, for example, the monetary returns of migrants became a vital element of the economy: the country even experienced economic destabilization when labour migration to Germany ended in 1974 (Barou 2006 ). However, reasons for origin countries to support emigration went beyond the economic. The Italian government, for example, considered the labour migration programmes of North-Western European countries as a way to ‘get rid of the unemployed and to deprive the socialist and communist parties of potential voters’ (Hoerder 2002 , 520).

Estimates of the numbers of individuals that left Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal between 1950 and 1970 vary from 7 to 10 million (Okólski 2012 ). As can be seen from Table 3.1 , in 1950 immigrant populations were most numerous in France, the UK, Germany, and Belgium.

Twenty years later, at the beginning of the 1970s, these numbers had increased substantially in both absolute and relative terms (Table 3.1 ). One in seven manual labourers in the UK and one in four industrial workers in Belgium, France, and Switzerland were of foreign origin in the mid-1970s (Page Moch 2003 , not in table). Eighty per cent of the total foreign stock in 1975 was concentrated in four countries, namely France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK (Bonifazi 2008 ).

At the same time, the process of decolonization gave rise to considerable migration flows towards Europe’s (former) colonial powers. A significant number of people from the colonies came to Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the UK, and in the 1970s, Portugal. Many of these (return) migrants were juridically considered citizens; estimates suggest that between 1940 and 1975 the number of people of European origin returning from the colonies was around 7 million (Bade 2003 ). The main (return) migration flows were from Kenya, India, and Malaysia to the UK, from Northern Africa to France and Italy, from Congo to Belgium (although in smaller numbers), and from Indonesia to the Netherlands (Bade 2003 ). Some of these migrants, as for example from the new Commonwealth, came for economic reasons (Page Moch 2003 ). Others, such as the Algerian harkis (auxiliaries in the French colonial army) in France, Asian Ugandans in Britain, and a substantial share of Surinamese in the Netherlands, arrived during or after independence (ibid.). In the 1970s, Portugal received a significant number of citizens “returning” from its former colonies, fleeing from violent combats in the struggle for independence. Although European migrants returning from the colonies were often quickly able to insert themselves into the social fabric of the mother country, this was less the case for those of non-European origin who were economically and socially deprived and also often discriminated (Bade 2003 ).

Lastly, the Iron Curtain severely limited East-West mobility. Nevertheless, it did not bring East-West migration to a complete halt (Fassmann and Münz 1994 ). Straddling our period demarcations we discuss these migrations patterns here, as they started in this period. Between 1950 and 1990, 12 million people migrated from East to West (Fassmann and Münz 1992 ), many of them to Germany. Between 1950 and 2004, for example, 4.45 million Aussiedler— ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe—returned to Germany (Dietz 2006 ). Until 1988, most of these Aussiedler migrated from Poland (Dietz 2006 ; Münz and Ulrich 1998 ). Nevertheless, the largest share of these Aussiedler (63 %) arrived after 1989 (Dietz 2006 ). The vast majority who came after the fall of the Iron Curtain originated from the former Soviet Union (Dietz 2006 ; Münz and Ulrich 1998 ). Occasionally, however, there were larger inflows of Eastern Europeans, following political crises such as from Hungary (1956–1957), Czechoslovakia (1968–1969), and Poland (1980–1981) (Castles et al. 2014 ; Fassmann and Münz 1992 , 1994 ). In line with the logic of the Cold War, whatever the motives of those who moved to the West, they were considered to be political refugees (Fassmann and Münz 1994 ).

From 1974 to the End of the 1980s: The Oil Crisis and Migration Control

The oil crisis of 1973–1974 had considerable impact on the economic landscape of Europe. The crisis gave impetus to economic restructuring, sharply reducing the need for labour (Boyle, Halfacree & Robinson 1998). During this period, belief in unbridled economic growth diminished. Switzerland and Sweden were the first countries to invoke a migration stop, respectively, in 1970 and 1972. Others followed: Germany in 1973 and the Benelux and France in 1974. Policies aiming to control and reduce migration, however, transformed rather than stopped migration. The number of foreign residents kept rising, due to a change in European migration systems from circular to chain migration and the related natural growth of migrant populations. Migrants from non-European countries who had come under labour recruitment schemes increasingly settled permanently, as returning to their home country for long periods now entailed a significant risk of losing their residence permit. Many migrants started to bring their families to Europe. Although governments initially tried to limit family migration, this met little success (Castles et al. 2014 ; Hansen 2003 ). After all, family reunification of migrant workers was considered a fundamental right, anchored in article 19 of the European Social Charter of 1961.

The composition of the residing migrant population also changed during this period. Whereas in the first period, European migrants were most numerous, the share of non-European migrant populations significantly grew during the second period. In Sweden, for example, 40 % of the foreign born were non-European by 1999, compared to only 7.6 % in 1970 (Goldscheider et al. 2008 ). This reflected the continuing immigration and natural growth of these populations. But it was also the result of a larger extent of return migration among Southern European populations, given the increased quality of life and employment opportunities in Southern Europe (Barou 2006 ). In countries on the other side of the Mediterranean, population pressure continued to be substantial, due to high fertility and unemployment rates. During this period, the number of Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Yugoslavian foreigners in Europe diminished (except in Switzerland, where the number of Portuguese and Yugoslavians grew), and a significant increase was observed in the number of Turks and North Africans across Europe (Bade 2003 ).

After the migration stop, countries increasingly controlled entries of foreigners, and migration became an important topic in national political and public debates (Bonifazi 2008 ; see also Doomernik & Bruquetas in this volume). Increasing unemployment levels due to the economic recession fuelled hostility, racism, and xenophobia towards certain “visible” groups of resident migrants. In several European countries, violent anti-foreigners incidents occurred. In France, for example, Le Pen’s Front National acquired considerable political support for its simple message that ‘2 million unemployed = 2 million immigrants too many’ (Boyle et al. 1998 , 27). During this period, however, awareness also grew that immigrant populations were here to stay. As a result, the need for adequate integration policies became apparent, and such policies slowly started to develop (see Doomernik and Bruquetas in this volume).

In this same phase, numbers of asylum applications started to rise in Europe (especially in the 1980s and after the fall of the Berlin Wall; Hansen 2003 ). Between the early 1970s and the end of the twentieth century the number of asylum applications in the EU, at that time 15 member states, increased from 15,000 to 300,000 annually (Hatton 2004 ). Germany was the largest recipient of asylum applications in Europe in all periods (Table 3.2 ). From the 1980s onwards, significant increases were also observed in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK. The different attractiveness of particular European countries over time is related to historical events that have induced new refugee flows. The dramatic increase in asylum applications from within Europe in the early 1990s, for example, accompanied the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslavian wars (Hatton 2004 , see also further on in this chapter).

The restrictions on the entrance of foreigners into North-Western Europe also had another effect. From the mid-1980s onwards, migration flows increasingly diverted towards Southern Europe, especially gaining momentum in the 1990s. Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain had long been emigration countries. As a result, they did not dispose of well-developed immigration legislation and entrance control systems. Furthermore, these countries were experiencing economic growth and falling birth rates, resulting in labour shortages (Castles et al. 2014 ). The jobs available were often irregular ones, characterized by unfavourable labour conditions and low pay, making them unattractive to the local population. Southern Europe thus became an attractive destination for non-European migrants, especially those from North Africa, Latin America, Asia, and—after the fall of the Iron Curtain—Eastern Europe (Castles et al. 2014 ).

Besides migration flows from non-European countries, the favourable economic conditions in Southern Europe also resulted in return migration among those who had moved to Northern Europe. Spain, for example, registered the return of 451,000 citizens during this period, of which 94 % had resided in another EU country (Barou 2006 ). Portugal, in contrast, experienced return migration from its former colonies, where fierce and violent struggles for independence were under way. Greece was the last country to transition from an emigration into an immigration country. Until 1973, some 1 million Greeks were working abroad (Bade 2003 ). Half of them returned in the period after the oil crisis (ibid.).

From the 1990s to 2012: Recent Trends in Migration towards and Within Europe

Patterns of migration from, towards, and within Europe underwent significant changes and further diversification starting in 1990. The collapse of the Iron Curtain and the opening of the borders of Eastern Europe induced new migration flows across Europe. The end of the Cold War, as well as the wars in the former Yugoslavia led to new flows of asylum seekers to Western Europe. Between 1989 and 1992, for example, asylum applications increased from 320,000 to 695,000, to decline to 455,000 by the end of the decade (Hansen 2003 ) and increase again to 471,000 in 2001 (Castles et al. 2014 ). The top-five countries of origin during this period were the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (836,000), Romania (400,000), Turkey (356,000), Iraq (211,000), and Afghanistan (155,000) (ibid.). In the first decade of the twenty-first century, new asylum applications followed the conjuncture of admission restrictions and numbers of violent conflicts (ibid.). Between 2002 and 2006, asylum applications in the EU-15 decreased from 393,000 to 180,000 (ibid.). From 2006 onwards, however, asylum applications rose due to the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and more recently, the Arab Spring. By 2010, the EU-25 plus Norway and Switzerland had received 254,180 applications, and humanitarian migration accounted for 6 % of newcomers to the EU (ibid.). Most applications were made in France (47,800), Germany (41,300), Sweden (31,800), the UK (22,100), and Belgium (19,900) (OECD 2011 , Table A.1.3., cited in Castles et al. 2014 , 229).

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty’s abolition of borders considerably eased intra-EU movements (see also next sections of this chapter). At the same time, entrance into the EU became progressively restricted due to the unification of the European market, which imposed strict border controls and visa regulations. These controls on the entrance of foreigners went hand in hand with increased irregular migration (Bade 2003 ; Bonifazi 2008 ; Castles et al. 2014 ). Migrants’ countries of origin as well as their migration motives became increasingly diversified.

[Nowadays migrants] come to Europe from all over the world in significant numbers: expatriates working for multinational companies and international organizations, skilled workers from all over the world, nurses and doctors from the Philippines, refugees and asylum seekers from African, near Eastern and Asian countries, from the Balkan and former Soviet Union countries, students from China, undocumented workers from African countries, just to single out some of the major immigrant categories (Penninx 2006 , 8).

During this third period, integration issues became a central policy concern (see Doomernik & Bruquetas in this volume). Many European countries stepped up attempts to attract highly skilled or educated migrants. This goal is still reflected in a number of national programmes today, for example, in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the UK. The EU established its Blue Card Scheme, an EU-wide residence and work permit (Eurostat 2011 ). Moreover, student migration from outside the EU became increasingly important in some parts of the EU (ibid.). Some countries’ governments have actively recruited students with the intention of incorporating the “best and brightest” into their domestic labour market upon graduation (Lange 2013 ). Institutions of higher education have joined these efforts, stimulated by the economic benefits of attracting international students in the form of high tuition fees (Findlay 2011 ). In this context, several European countries, such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK simplified procedures for international students to make the education-to-work transition (Tremblay 2005 ; Van Mol 2014 ).

In the last section of this chapter, we differentiate between intra-EU mobility of European citizens and migration within and towards the EU of third-country nationals, as these groups are subject to different legislation. Intra-European mobility is often considered in positive terms, as contributing to the EU’s ‘vitality and competitiveness’ (e.g., EC 2011 , 3–4). European citizens, moreover, are entitled to move freely within the EU without the need for a visa, and hence may face fewer institutional barriers in migration trajectories. Migration into the EU, in contrast, remains largely associated with active measures of access restriction and border control (see, e.g., Council of the EU 2002 ). In recent decades, European migration policy has thus represented ‘different intersecting regimes of mobility that normalise the movements of some travellers while criminalising and entrapping the ventures of others’ (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013 , 189). The global economic crisis that started in 2008 might be considered the end of this third period, as it brought, at least temporarily, an end to ‘rapid economic growth, EU expansion and high immigration’ (Castles et al. 2014 , 103). However, as Castles, De Haas and Miller (ibid.) observe, the decline in immigration from non-European countries has been rather modest, and the anticipated mass returns to migrants’ home countries have not occurred as yet. The crisis mainly seems to have affected intra-European migration, with a decrease in overall free movement within the EU and with the peripheral countries hardest hit by the crisis—particularly Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—again becoming emigration countries (Castles et al. 2014 ).

Migration Towards and from Europe

We first analyse general trends in migration towards Europe, based on new estimates of global migration flows by Abel and Sander ( 2014 ). Their figures are based on stock statistics published by the United Nations. Note, however, that using stock data might be misleading for measuring flows. Furthermore, although the tables below represent the best estimates available, they are far from complete, as they are based on national statistics and thus reflect different legislation and definitions. This causes, for example, difficulties in comparability between countries as well as over time. The presented figures should thus be seen as indicative of larger patterns. The circular plots present migration flows from different world regions towards Europe and vice versa (Fig. 3.1 ) for four five-year periods between 1990 and 2010. Broader lines indicate more sizeable migration flows, while the arrow indicates the direction of the flow. As can be observed, migration from former Soviet Union countries to Europe gained momentum after the fall of the Berlin Wall but gradually decreased thereafter. Migration from Africa to Europe increased, especially in the mid-1990s. Furthermore, migration from East, South, and South-East Asia and from Latin America significantly rose, particularly after the start of the twenty-first century. Finally, migration from North America, Oceania, and West Asia remained relatively stable. Additional Eurostat data (not in the plots) show that between 2009 and 2012, the influx of non-EU migrants into the EU decreased slightly, from 1.4 million in 2009 to 1.2 million in 2012 (Eurostat 2014a ).

Circular plots of migration flows towards and from Europe, per 5 year period between 1990 and 2010 ( Source : www.global-migration.info )

In terms of the stock, 4 % of the total EU population in 2013 was a non-EU national, accounting for about 6 % of the EU’s total working age population (Eurostat 2014a ). Non-EU nationals were evenly split between men and women (ibid.). Note, however, that these data by nationality do not include all foreign-origin European residents (meaning those born abroad or having a foreign-born parent), as they cover only those who did not hold the nationality of the country they resided in. We further deconstruct these general trends below with a main focus on the last decade.

Looking at the top-15 countries of origin of newly arrived immigrants in 2009 and 2012, we find large numbers of migrants from India and China, followed by Morocco and Pakistan (Table 3.3 ). Based on figures from 2008, the majority of Indian and Pakistani migrants seems to have headed to the UK. Most Chinese migrants seem to have gone to Spain (Eurostat 2011 ), and Moroccan migrants were mainly attracted to Italy and Spain.

In addition to the data on newly arriving immigrants (flow statistics), it is also relevant to know the main countries of origin of non-European migrants residing in the EU (stock statistics). When considering the top-10 countries of origin of non-EU nationals residing in the EU (Table 3.4 ), it can be noted that the largest residing populations are from countries where Europe recruited labour in the post-war period (Morocco and Turkey), as well as from former colonies (India and Pakistan), and countries near the EU’s eastern border (Albania, Russia, and Serbia). The large Chinese diaspora is also prominent as well as the—mostly highly-skilled and lifestyle (Castles et al. 2014 )—migrants from the USA.

Until the 1990s, the vast majority of migrants could conveniently be classified under the categories “family reunification”, “labour migration”, and “asylum”. Since the 1990s, however, migration motives have become increasingly diversified, including a growing number of young people migrating to attend higher education. According to Eurostat ( 2014a ), in 2012, 32 % of migrants received a residence permit for family reasons, 23 % for work, 22 % for education, and 23 % for other reasons including asylum. Moreover, it should be noted that these categories report only the main migration motive as captured in the official statistics. In practice, these categories reflect migration motives as accepted in admission labels. Both may shift in the course of time. International students, for example, might become labour migrants upon graduation, and subsequently seek family reunification.

Lastly, migration is often not limited to moving from Country A to Country B but may involve several successive destinations. Considering intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals, an upward trend is observed between 2007 and 2011. This trend is most prominent in Germany, where the number of third-country nationals arriving from European Economic Area countries more than tripled, from 3784 in 2007 to 11,532 in 2011 (EMN 2013 ). A similar rise is also observed in the UK, where numbers increased from 1000 to 3000 (ibid.). Increases seem to be more modest in other EU countries, such as Austria (33.6 %), Finland (17.1 %), the Netherlands (53.7 %), and Sweden (30.2 %) (ibid.). However, whereas these percentages are high, absolute numbers are generally low. Compared with European citizens, intra-EU moves of third-country nationals are found to form only a small share of total intra-EU mobility between 2007 and 2011. The share of non-EU nationals in these movements barely surpasses 4 % in the countries for which statistics are available: 1.8 % in Germany, 3.6 % in Austria, 3.7 % in Finland, 2.3 % in the Netherlands, and 1.2 % in the UK (ibid.). Third-country nationals, moreover, move to geographically close countries, for example, from Germany and Italy to Austria, from Estonia and Sweden to Finland, from the Czech Republic and Germany to Poland, from Austria and the Czech Republic to Slovakia, and from Denmark and Germany to Sweden (ibid.). In sum, although it is often assumed that linear migration trajectories between two countries are less common now (see, e.g., Pieke et al. 2004 ), non-EU migrants do not seem to move frequently within the EU. This might be due to the legal restrictions often imposed on this group of migrants, or it could be more related to factors such as language similarities between bordering countries (De Valk and Díez Medrano 2014 ).

Mobility of EU Citizens

Numbers and destinations.

Previous studies indicate that only a small share of the European population is mobile (Bonin et al. 2008 ; Pascouau 2013 ). Favell and Recchi ( 2009 ), for example, show that less than one in fifty Europeans lives abroad, and around 4 % have some experience of living and working abroad. Nevertheless, the scale of intra-EU mobility clearly increased between 2000 and 2011 (Fig. 3.2 ). Data from Eurostat ( 2011 ), for example, show that nearly 2 million EU citizens moved within the EU in 2008. In absolute numbers, Polish migration made up the greatest share of intra-EU flows in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Fig. 3.2 ). Migration between Poland and Germany was most prevalent, and consists of movements from as well as to Poland. The prevalence of Polish-German migration might be explained by the fact that such migration has been regulated since 1990, when the German and Polish governments signed a bilateral agreement allowing Polish citizens to engage in legal seasonal employment for 3 months in specific sectors of the German economy (Dietz and Kaczmarczyk 2008 ). This led to a sharp increase in the inflow of Polish seasonal workers in Germany, from approximately 78,600 in 1992 to 280,000 in 2002 (ibid.). From 2004 to 2007, after Poland’s EU accession, we observe a similar increase in population movements from Poland to the UK. This can be attributed to the fact that—unlike other EU member states—Ireland, Sweden, and the UK did not restrict migration from the new member states. Of these three destinations, Ireland and the UK were the most popular, in part due to favourable labour market conditions (Castles et al. 2014 ). In more recent years, however, many Polish migrants have left the UK, indicating increasing return migration, perhaps related to the economic crisis, as the Polish economy has kept growing (Castles et al. 2014 ). Apart from the migration flows from and towards Poland, similar inflows and outwards movements from Romania were observed between 2000 and 2011. Whereas between 2000 and 2003 some 39,000 Romanians migrated to Italy and Spain, these numbers increased to about 110,000 in the subsequent years. Furthermore, Romanian migration to Italy remained relatively stable, in sharp contrast with the migration flow towards Spain, which dropped sharply between 2008 and 2011. This can be attributed to the more difficult labour market conditions in Spain, because of the economic crisis, which has redirected the movement of Romanian migrants towards other EU countries (OECD 2013 ).

Top-ten intra-European migration flows, 2000–2011 (absolute numbers)

Besides migration between Eastern Europe and several other EU countries, migration flows have been considerable between the UK, France, and Spain. These movements likely include retirement migration from Northern to Southern Europe, but also point to increased labour mobility between these countries, especially considering the flows towards the UK, as will be further discussed later.

Finally, in recent years, the global economic crisis seems to have impacted patterns of intra-EU migration. Data from the OECD ( 2013 ) show, for example, an increase in emigration from countries heavily affected by the crisis (Table 3.5 ). Cases in point are Greece and Spain where unemployment rose to unprecedented levels—27.3 % in Greece and 26.1 % in Spain in 2013, with youth unemployment rates of, respectively, 58.3 and 55.5 % that same year (Eurostat 2014b ). Countries that eased their way into economic recovery, such as Iceland and Ireland, have already registered declines in the numbers of individuals leaving these countries (OECD 2013 ). Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK appear to be popular destination countries, as intra-European migration flows towards these countries almost doubled in the 5 years prior to 2012. The crisis, however, also led to migration to non-European countries, such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Turkey, the USA, and in the case of Portugal, to former colonies in Africa (Castles et al. 2014 ).

It is important to keep in mind that most of the previous analyses are based on absolute numbers, whereby EU member states with larger populations are logically more visible. We now consider the relative importance of migration flows as a share of countries’ total immigration and emigration figures. Figure 3.3 shows the relative share of EU migration for selected EU countries.

Share of intra-European migrants in total emigration and immigration for selected European countries, 2008–2011 (%)

Intra-EU migration forms a substantial share of movements to and from the majority of the countries in Fig. 3.3 . Based on these numbers, we can discern several groups. The first group consists of countries where intra-EU immigration and emigration comprises the largest share of migration movements. It includes Austria, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, and Denmark. The attraction of these countries is explained by their well-developed economies. Particularly significant within this group are Polish and Lithuanian migrants moving on to other European destinations. The second group is made up of countries where more than half of emigration moves are directed towards other European countries, and immigration is mostly non-European. This group is comprised of Finland, Italy, Latvia, and Romania. Their geographical location at the borders of Europe might explain this pattern, as these countries receive immigrants from neighbouring (non-European) countries and function as transit countries. Furthermore, these countries might be less attractive to migrants from other EU countries because of their limited economic opportunities and relatively low wages (except for Finland). The third group consists of countries where both emigration and immigration from and to non-European countries is still of considerable importance. This group includes Spain, Sweden, and the UK. For Sweden, the most popular destinations for migrants are (besides the Nordic neighbours) English-speaking countries such as the UK and the USA (Mannheimer 2012 ). In terms of the arriving population, humanitarian refuge and family reunification are the main channels of immigration in Sweden, which explains the large share of non-European migrants (Fredlund-Blomst 2014 ). Spain’s and the UK’s migration balances might reflect continuing migration from former colonies and historical links with various world regions which include, for example, language similarities. The UK attracts a considerable number of migrants from ex-colonies such as India and Pakistan (Office for National Statistics 2011 ). Furthermore, the principal non-European destinations for UK migrants are English-speaking countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA (Murray et al. 2012 ). For Spain, non-European migrants mainly originate from Morocco and Latin American countries, and Spanish migrants emigrate to Latin American countries such as Argentina and Venezuela (INE 2014 ).

Demographic Characteristics of Intra-EU Movers

It has been suggested that free movement within the EU is particularly availed of by the highly educated (Favell 2008 ). We therefore investigate the demographic characteristics of those who move within Europe, focusing on selected cases and the period 2008–2011. Contrasting these cases, for which we have detailed information, suggests the diversity of migration flows and motives within Europe. Obviously this analysis does not do justice to more recent moves from Southern Europe to North-Western Europe, but data to make similar analyses are not yet at hand.

We start with characteristics of those who move. Figure 3.4 shows population pyramids for Polish migrants heading to Germany and vice versa. As we demonstrated previously (see Fig. 3.2 ), Polish-German migration is the most prominent intra-European migration flow in absolute numbers. The population pyramids are indicative of the trend in the preceding years. Mobility between both countries is clearly dominated by men, particularly those between 20 and 50 years of age. This strongly male-dominated movement of Polish workers towards Germany appears temporary, as a similar population moves back again (compare Fig. 3.4a and b ).

Population pyramid of migrants from Poland to Germany ( a ) and Germany to Poland ( b ), 2008 (%)

When we compare Polish migration to Germany with Polish migration to the Netherlands, we find a different panorama (Fig. 3.5 ). Polish migrants in the Netherlands are significantly younger, the majority being between 20 and 35 years of age. Moreover, there is a more equal gender balance. The coincidence of these migration flows with other life transitions, such as having children and forming a union, is crucial to gain insight into the way intra-European mobility develops over the life course.

Population pyramid of Polish migrants to the Netherlands, 2009 (%)

Recent research on Polish migrants based on Dutch population registers shows that having children as well as the choice of partner are important determinants of permanent settlement (Kleinepier et al. 2015 ). Similar findings have been reported on intra-EU migrant groups in other destinations such as Belgium and the UK (see, e.g., Levrau et al. 2014 ; Ryan and Mulholland 2013 ). Where generally circular and return migration of intra-EU movers is high, this seems especially so for those who are young, single, and do not have children (see, e.g., Bijwaard 2010 ; Braun and Arsene 2009 ; Kleinepier et al. 2015 ; Nekby 2006 ).

The relationship between life course and migration becomes more apparent when we compare migrants from Romania and those from the UK residing in Spain (Fig. 3.6 ). Romanian migration to Spain is clearly dominated by young people, with an overrepresentation of the 20–24 year category. Most of these men and women arrived in Spain for work or study. The population pyramid of British residents in Spain has a totally different structure. Some of the British migrants are 30–40 years old, and many are in the older age groups, from 55 years and older. Thus, British migrants in Spain seem to be free movers coming to work in Spain alongside retirement migrants.

Population pyramid of Romanian ( a ) and British ( b ) migrants in Spain, 2008–2011 (%)

In sum, patterns of intra-EU migration are becoming increasingly diverse. European citizens enjoy the right of freedom of movement, and might decide to temporarily or permanently settle in another European country for a variety of reasons, including family formation, retirement, study, and work. Finally it is crucial to realize that categorization of migrants into certain migration motives is rather difficult as very often multiple different reasons overlap (see, e.g., Gilmartin and Migge 2015 ; Santacreu et al. 2009 ; Verwiebe 2014 ).

Conclusions

In this chapter we addressed the first key actor of the binomials presented in Chap. 1 of this volume, namely migrants themselves. We first of all presented a historical overview of trends in international migration to and within Europe since the 1950s. Furthermore, we examined the demographic characteristics of these migration flows as well as the characteristics of residing migrants across Europe using recent data. We looked at both immigration and emigration in the European context to do sufficient justice to the dynamic nature of migration. Yet, our findings provide only a general overview, as the complexity of migration to and from Europe extends well beyond the scope of a single chapter. Three historical periods were distinguished. It is important to bear these different periods in mind when studying current migration flows in Europe. They help to frame but also for analysing the (demographic) behaviour of migrant populations. The distinguished periods may help us to structure and understand the socio-demographic situations which migrants face today. In addition, this distinction into different periods enables us to appreciate the current and ongoing political and public debates on migration in Europe.

The first period was characterized by labour migration and a favourable stance towards migration, covering the years from the beginning of the bilateral guest worker agreements until the oil crisis. European governments first recruited guest workers in Southern Europe, but quickly expanded towards countries at Europe’s borders. Apart from labour migration, a significant postcolonial migration flow characterized this period. Due to struggles for independence in former colonies, many European countries received return migrants as well as migrants fleeing hostile conflict environments. The Cold War limited East-West mobility during this period.

The second period extended from the oil crisis in the early 1970s to the fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s. It was characterized by a cessation of guest worker migration and stringent entry restrictions for new migrants. Nevertheless, migration flows were transformed rather than halted. Whereas previously labour migration had been the main migration channel, family reunification (and family formation) now took over the primary role, and asylum applications were also on the rise. European governments became aware that migrant populations were likely to remain on their territory, and they slowly began to develop integration policies. This continues to be an important issue in the discourse today.

The third period dates from the 1990s to the present day. During this time, we find substantial diversification in terms of countries of origin, destinations, flows, migration motives, and structure of migrant populations. One of the most important elements in this period has been the removal of barriers to intra-European mobility, while migration into the EU has become more restricted. As such, intra-EU mobility and migration into the EU have become embedded in different and often opposing discourses. The end of this third period might be the economic crisis, which so far seems to have affected mainly intra-European mobility patterns. Peripheral countries have been hit particularly hard by the crisis, and an increasing tendency towards emigration can be observed from countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Immigration of non-EU migrants, however, seems less affected. This is perhaps because many migrants from outside Europe have found other routes of arrival, including irregular entrance and stay. Moreover, European countries are interested in highly skilled migrants in the context of a global competition for talent.

As a result, it seems that comparable to the “migration stop” after the oil crisis of the 1970s or during the Cold War, migration towards Europe will be transformed rather than come to a complete halt in the coming years. Mobility within Europe, in this regard, cannot be seen as separate from migration from outside the EU. Studying migration systems rather than focusing exclusively on one aspect of mobility is thus called for. At the same time, our analyses in this chapter also suggest an increasing dichotomy between migrants who are in a favourable situation with easy access and rights in Europe (e.g., EU free movers and highly skilled migrants) and those in less favourable situations (mainly those arriving from outside Europe for other reasons). Development of this dichotomy has important consequences for the lives of individual migrants and for social cohesion. European societies must demonstrate awareness of this with policies crafted to acknowledge the diverse nature and dynamic character of migration that we have shown in this chapter.

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Van Mol, C., de Valk, H. (2016). Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective. In: Garcés-Mascareñas, B., Penninx, R. (eds) Integration Processes and Policies in Europe. IMISCOE Research Series. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21674-4_3

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The latest available international migrant stock data (2020) 210 show that nearly 87 million international migrants lived in Europe 211 , an increase of nearly 16 per cent since 2015, when around 75 million international migrants resided in the region. A little over half of these (44 million) were born in Europe, but were living elsewhere in the region; this number has increased since 2015, rising from 38 million. In 2020, the population of non-European migrants in Europe reached over 40 million.

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EU Migration Policy: The EU as a Questionable Actor and a Realist Power

EU migration policy has become a highly contested matter in international and European politics, with different interpretations, perceptions, and narratives being present. This essay explores what kind of actor and power the EU is regarding its migration policy. It will be argued that in this respect the EU is internally divided, which questions its actorness, and a realist, self-interested power. These qualities have become increasingly more pronounced with recent challenges, like the high influx of migrants in 2015. Simplified, the main interests that the EU is defending would be the regulation of the number of irregular migrants arriving and a focus on the entry of highly skilled workers on a short-term basis. This contrasts the interests and desires of the countries of origin, typically African developing countries. Recognising the potential migration holds, they wish to increase the legal pathways to the EU, through visa facilitation and labour migration schemes (Adam et al., 2020).

After explaining the institutional setup, this essay will firstly examine the internal divergences within the Union when it comes to migration policy. Firstly, tensions within the institutional arrangement exist due to conflicting interests on the supranational and intergovernmental levels. With it being an area of shared competence and Member States holding on to important capacities, the Union’s power is weakened, particularly in negotiations requiring issue-linkage. Reluctance to pool sovereignty, discrete attitudes towards migration in domestic politics and competing narratives further deepen the divide. More importantly, on this policy issue, the EU fails to be the normative, liberal power it is often described as, promoting its own interests instead. This realist behaviour becomes apparent in the gap between the rhetoric on migration and the harsh practice. Further, development funds are misused for securitising matters, and aid is made conditional on migration cooperation. The externalisation of migration policy leads to significant human rights implications. Hence, how normative considerations on morality and universal values are put aside in favour of self-interests will be explored.

Institutional Framework

First of all, the institutional arrangements and framework of EU migration and asylum policy shall be explained, creating a foundation to understand its role as an actor and power. Migration policy is an area of shared competence between the EU and the Member States, meaning that both can adopt legally binding acts. Internal migration policy has been shaped by the 1985 Schengen Agreement, which removed internal borders and created a common external EU frontier, demanding shared management (Faure et al., 2015). The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam gave the EU competence over the matter, with the 2009 Lisbon Treaty refining the division of competencies (Neframi, 2011). A crucial step was the 1999 Tampere Presidency Conclusions, where the goal of “establishing a Common European Asylum System, based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention” (European Council, 1999) was set. The 2005 Global Approach to Migration, revised in 2011 as the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, sets the framework for external cooperation on migration. Its four pillars consist of “legal migration and mobility, irregular migration and trafficking in human beings, international protection and asylum policy, and maximising the development impact of migration and mobility” (European Commission, 2011). Under the Global Approach, two types of agreements regarding migration governance between the EU and third countries exist: Mobility Partnerships and a Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM).

The EU as an Internally Divided, Questionable Actor

Now, there are a variety of reasons for perceiving the EU as a deeply divided actor on this issue. Firstly, the institutional setup causes tension. In the case of migration policy, the European Commission can adopt certain measures and negotiate agreements with third countries. However, the Council must agree and the Member States can decide themselves about signing the Mobility Partnerships or the number of migrants to accept, limiting the Commission’s power. The two institutions’ policy agendas do not always align, as the Council favours a more restrictive approach than the Commission. As an intergovernmental institution, the Council is influenced by the home affairs ministries, which in turn act on the often sceptical and negative perceptions of migration in the respective domestic politics of the Member States (Hampshire, 2016). Member States may be hesitant to pool sovereignty in a high politics area as salient as migration. In general, the Member States could be divided into holding either intergovernmentalist or integrationist attitudes. Thus, some view further cooperation as undermining national interests, while others recognise it as a vital expansion of EU responsibilities (Friis & Juncos, 2019). These sentiments are heightened regarding the sensitive policy area of migration, as it has important implications for national sovereignty .

Division of Competences as a Complicating Factor

Additionally, international negotiations on migration policy are complex and often require issue linkage, which is problematic due to the Commission not necessarily having full agency over other policy areas. Issue-linkage, “the simultaneous discussion of two or more issues for joint settlement” (Poast, 2013, p. 287) is needed when interests do not align, as is the case with the EU’s negotiations on migration with other countries. Typically, the EU seeks to co-operate on the readmission of irregular migrants, often including even third-country nationals due to difficulties in determining a migrant’s citizenship, which is characterised by non-reciprocity, and hence, asymmetric interests. Thus, another incentive is necessary to encourage negotiations and agreements (Jurje & Lavenex, 2014). Due to the nature of the division of competencies, the task of providing significant mobility incentives lies with the Member States that might be reluctant to do so (Hampshire, 2016). This further complicates negotiations.

Different Attitudes and Narratives regarding Migration

Furthermore, diverging attitudes toward migration are present in the domestic politics of Member States. Depending on historical ties and geographic location, they experience varying levels of migration, which, in combination with labour market structures and demographics, impact their need for migration, and hence, their policies (Hampshire, 2016). The interests of particularly Mediterranean countries like Spain, Italy, and Greece, which have been highly affected by migrants coming over the sea route, diverge greatly from others’ views that do not wish to increase solidarity mechanisms. For instance, the Dublin Regulation, stating that the country of the first arrival is responsible for processing asylum claims, still has not been fully reformed, despite it putting much pressure on Southern states. This creates the need for bilateral agreements between the Member States like Spain or Italy and African nations to cope with the influx of migrants (Schöfberger, 2019). The most drastic example of diverging Member State attitudes can be seen in the first reactions to the unprecedented high number of refugees and irregular migrants arriving in 2015. Responses ranged from Germany or Sweden accepting entry to borders being shut and fences being built within the Schengen area, failing to find a common approach (Morsut & Kruke, 2018). These diverging attitudes stem from the competing narratives and rhetorics around migration. Frames and narratives construct a view of reality and give matters a certain meaning. Migration can then be perceived either as an opportunity with great potential or as a threat to the arrival country and its national security. These conceptions will impact policymaking and whether borders are seen to be ‘liquid’ or ‘solid’; thus whether movement across borders is restricted or facilitated. In recent years, particularly since the 2015 crisis, migration has increasingly been securitised and framed as a threat, linking it to terrorism and the danger to migrant lives (Schöfberger, 2019).

Summed up, the EU displays great internal divisions regarding migration policy, resulting in the inability to speak with one united voice, which could lead to the questioning of its actorness. Recognition, authority, autonomy, and cohesion have been named as important elements of being an actor (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998) and might not be present in the EU migration policy. Cohesion is lacking due to inner divergences, and the EU is not given full authority and autonomy over migration policies, with it being an area of shared competence. Therefore, third countries might not necessarily recognise the EU as an actor in international negotiations and prefer bilateral agreements with the individual Member States. Hence, while the EU’s actorness is sometimes generally questioned, doubts might be justified regarding migration policy. That proposes the idea of the EU not even being an actor in this matter.

The EU as a Self-interested, Realist Power

Further, the EU is more of a realist, self-interested power when it comes to migration policy than the ‘Normative Power Europe’ it likes to be portrayed: as a civilian actor promoting universal values and human rights (Manners, 2002). This criticism applies not only to migration but also to other matters, creating a pattern. For instance, the EU claims to be a promoter of human rights, peace, and democracy, and therefore, has so-called human rights clauses in treaties. Those, however, are applied selectively and commonly not in countries in which the EU has interests. Those realist interests include historical ties, commercial interests, e.g. regarding the provision of energy, or security concerns, as some nations are perceived as allies in combatting terrorism. Hence, from a realist perspective, sanctions become a foreign policy tool and are applied only in case of aligned interests instead of promoting liberal norms regardless of the potential personal gains and losses (Del Biondo, 2015). With several cases, such as non-interference in Ethiopia or Rwanda, supporting that thesis, the EU has shown a poor compliance record as a normative actor. This rhetoric-reality gap is more prominent than for other actors due to the public commitment to norm promotion (Carbone & Keijzer, 2016).

This gap is also present regarding migration policy. The rhetoric emphasises that all policies should be migrant-centred and focus on human rights and the importance of dialogue (European Commission, 2011). In its discourse with African partners, the EU claims to centre its attention on managing migration and creating opportunities for mobility and legal migration. In practice, the restriction of irregular migrations plays a bigger role. Consequently, in the Mobility Partnerships with other countries, the EU prioritises its own interests. Its commitment to creating opportunities for legal migration remains vague, while the demands towards the other country regarding border management and readmission are very specific and concrete (Zanker, 2019). The questionable practices regarding development and human rights in relation to migration, as examined in the following, are also indicative of the rhetoric-reality gap.

Problematic Linkage of Migration & Development

Moreover, the link between migration and development is much discussed in both the literature and within policies and negotiations. On the one hand, migrants can contribute to the development of their country of origin through remittance flows or skill transfers. On the other hand, the EU tends to perceive underdevelopment as a cause for migration, hence encouraging development to prevent migrants from entering the EU (Zanker, 2019). It has to be noted that this causal link between the two areas has been contested, as some scholars argue for an increase in migration with growing levels of development (D’Humières, 2018). The creation of a nexus between development and migration could be interpreted as attempting to improve policy coherence, meeting the goals of the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). The PCD refers to the alignment of development policy with other areas that have an impact on developing countries. Development could be promoted through migration policies that revolve around supporting remittance flows, engaging the diaspora, and combating brain drain (Kejzer et al., 2016). Instead, scholars have critiqued EU development policy for increasingly being influenced by their foreign policy and security concerns, and therefore, turning it into a tool to foster its own interests instead of improving the living conditions of those most in need. This self-interested stance is confirmed in the 2016 ‘Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy’, which discusses the concept of principled pragmatism and the importance of aligning policies with strategic priorities. As a result, the 2016 Migration Partnership Framework involves Common Security and Defence Policy missions (European Commission, 2016a), which are a central part of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Widening the scope of the development agenda under the guise of greater coherence allows for the inclusion of issues like migration management or border control. These practices deflect from conventional development goals, which should focus on poverty reduction, promotion of democracy and human rights, and sustainability. Therefore, a broadened development agenda needs to be examined critically, as it questions what the actual goals of development policy should be (Orbie, 2020).

This can be observed in the 2015 EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), also referred to as Migration Trust Fund. Introduced at the Valletta Summit for Migration, as a reaction to the large influx of migrants and asylum seekers in 2015, its objectives are “greater economic and employment opportunities, strengthening resilience of communities, improved migration management [and] improved governance and conflict prevention” (European Commission, 2015). Addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displacement is the official narrative put forward by the EU. Still, it mainly advances the EU’s interests of reducing the number of irregular migrants arriving in Europe. From an African perspective, it consists of a “European-imposed migration agenda that prioritises EU interests over African ones” (Castillejo, 2017, p. 1), with little opportunity for African ownership and agency, as it lacks a formal co-management requirement. Another problem is posed by the diversion of fund allocations away from the least-developed countries towards those significant for the EU’s migration agenda, particularly since most of the budget for the EUTF stems from development instruments that should be used according to the Official Development Assistance criteria (Castillejo, 2017). Instead, 26% of EUTF funding has been allocated to migration governance and less than 1.5% to regular migration schemes (Raty & Shilhav, 2020).

Further, the EU has started to make development aid conditional on cooperation on migration management, which is highly problematic, due to the dependence of states on development assistance and EU capacity. This was controversially also included in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement with the ACP states, where Article 13 links development aid to the normalisation of migration flows (Arts, 2020). Using the example of the Cotonou Agreement shines a light on the power imbalances that are present in the negotiations between the EU and developing countries: The agreement has been criticised as the EU taking advantage of the asymmetry by imposing its interests and using coercion (Carbone, 2015). While developing countries have some leverage in migration pacts, the relationship is still characterised by reliance instead of equality and could be understood as neocolonialist (Strange & Oliveira Martins, 2019). Consequently, any negotiations on migration agreements are not undertaken on an equal, fair level.

Ethical Consequences and Moral Responsibilities of Externalisation

Overall, the EU’s engagement in the externalisation of migration policy is an indicator of self-interested behaviour. Externalisation refers to controlling immigration to the EU outside of its borders and involving external actors through international agreements. Therefore, Mobility Partnerships or CAMMs are means of externalising, since other states take on the responsibility of readmitting migrants, increasing their border controls, or setting up migration centres. The ethical concerns regarding this practice are multifold. Essentially, the aim is to “prevent migrants, including asylum seekers, from entering the legal jurisdictions or territories of destination countries or regions or making them legally inadmissible without individually considering the merits of their protection claims” (Frelick et al., 2016, p. 193). So, externalising migration allows the EU to reduce its responsibilities and legal obligations to the detriment of the lives of migrants and asylum seekers. The externalisation also exposes the discrepancy between the EU’s rhetorical commitment to norm promotion and the realist pursuit of its own interests. This hypocrisy becomes particularly clear in the case of Turkey. Publicly, Turkey’s human rights abuses and infringement of democratic principles are condemned (European Commission, 2021). Then again, the EU used incentives, such as visa liberalisation, the prospect of EU membership, and financial aid, to reach an agreement in the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. This facilitates the return of all irregular migrants who arrived at the Greek islands from Turkey (European Commission, 2016b), allowing the EU to avoid assuming responsibility. The human rights implications are severe: Turkey does not allow non-Europeans to qualify for refugee status and only Syrian nationals are eligible for temporary protection (Frelick et al., 2016), which leaves individuals in an extremely vulnerable position. The question of whether the EU is then responsible for human rights breaches outside of its territory, which are related to externalisation, poses a dilemma. Legally, the EU’s assistance in wrongful acts can only be condemned if there was awareness of the conditions, which is hard to prove (Santos Vara & Pascual Matellán, 2021). Still, as a truly normative or even ethical power Europe (Aggestam, 2008) would not operate in a legal grey zone and endanger human lives while protecting its interests, reinforcing the idea of the EU as a realist power. Comparably, NGOs and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees have criticised provisions like the problematic ‘safe third country’ regulation, which allows the EU to deny asylum to those that have previously travelled through other nations deemed to be safe (Borchelt, 2002). At best, showcasing this “defensive exclusion more than inclusive-cooperative security or strong support for human rights and democratic norms” (Smith & Youngs, 2018, p. 53) can be read as very contingent liberalism, exposing the EU’s realist side.

In conclusion, when it comes to migration policy, the EU is internally divided and fails to speak with one united voice, which is why its actorness is disputed. Several cleavages would have to be overcome to achieve unity: the supranational, more liberal Commission and the intergovernmental, more restrictive Council need to come together, while the hesitancy to pool sovereignty should be diminished. The Member States would need to be willing to see beyond their attitudes, which are influenced by varying narratives on migration, to achieve cooperation through compromises. Besides, the EU’s self-interests outweigh normative considerations of morality and values, which becomes apparent in several aspects. There is a gap between the ethical rhetoric and the restrictive practices regarding migration, where deals with other states are used to advance European interests. Acting as a realist power, even development tools are misused to align with the EU’s strategic interests instead of fulfilling moral commitments, as foreign aid is redefined in the EU’s favour and made conditional on migration cooperation. Through the externalisation of migration, referring to the involvement of other actors, the EU is indirectly responsible for human rights breaches, and thus, not upholding its status as an ethical power. Consequently, this essay has argued for the EU as being a questionable actor and a self-interested power, when it comes to migration policy. 

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Key facts about recent trends in global migration

The number of international migrants grew to 281 million in 2020, meaning that 3.6% of the world’s people lived outside their country of birth that year, according to the United Nations’ International Organization for Migration (IOM) . The increase came despite widespread restrictions on travel and international movement in the early stages of the coronavirus pandemic .

Here are eight key facts about international migrants, based on the latest available data from the UN and other sources.

Pew Research Center conducted this analysis to better understand trends in global migration and remittances, or the money that migrants send back to their home countries.

Data on the number of international migrants comes from the 2020 International Migrant Stock datasets from the United Nations. Data on the number of refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced people and other globally displaced Venezuelans comes from the UN’s World Migration Report 2022 . The total population estimates for countries and regions used to calculate ratios and percentages for charts come from the UN’s 2022 World Population Prospects dataset . Intraregional migration data for Latin America comes from the International Organization for Migration regional office for South America and Central America, North America and the Caribbean.

To examine changes in monthly remittances during the COVID-19 pandemic, this analysis uses global estimates of remittance flows from the World Bank.

The UN uses a taxonomy of regions, nations and territories that counts those who were born in Puerto Rico and are living in the 50 states or the District of Columbia as international migrants to the U.S., even though they are U.S. citizens by birth. For this reason, some UN estimates of the foreign-born population shown here may differ from other estimates published by the U.S. Census Bureau or Pew Research Center.

Europe and Asia have the most international migrants. An estimated 86.7 million international migrants lived in Europe in 2020, followed by 85.6 million in Asia. The number of international migrants living in these two regions has steadily increased since 2005, according to the IOM.

The Latin America and Caribbean region has the fastest-growing international migrant population. Since 2005, the region’s international migrant population has roughly doubled.

International migrants make up a larger share of Oceania’s population than any other region. In 2020, 21.4% of all residents in Oceania – which includes Australia, New Zealand and various Pacific island nations and territories – were international migrants. The Northern America region is second after Oceania, with migrants making up 15.7% of the population. In Europe, migrants account for 11.6% of the population. In all other world regions, they represent 2.3% or less of the population.

Using other regional groupings, however, Oceania might be surpassed. For example, in Gulf Cooperation Council countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – more than half (52.7%) of resident populations are international migrants, according to UN data.

The United States has more international migrants than any other country. With nearly 51 million migrants in 2020, the U.S. leads the world on this measure by a wide margin. Germany has the next-largest such population with about 15.8 million migrants, followed by Saudi Arabia with 13.5 million. (For the U.S., the UN counts some people living in the 50 states or the District of Columbia as international migrants even if they were born in Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories; those born in Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories are U.S. citizens at birth.)

The countries that have the most international migrants are generally not the same countries where international migrants make up the greatest share of the population. For example, while the U.S. has more migrants than any other nation, migrants only account for about 15.1% of the U.S. population – a smaller share than in 24 countries or territories with a total population of at least 1 million.

The Middle East accounts for most of the top 10 countries when looking at the migrant share of the population. In 2020, 93.9% of all people living in the United Arab Emirates were international migrants, followed by 80.6% of people in Qatar and 71.3% of people in Kuwait. Other Middle Eastern countries among the top 10 include Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon.

India remains the top origin country for the world’s migrants. India has been a large source of international migrants for more than a century. In 2020, 17.9 million international migrants traced their origins back to India, followed by Mexico with about 11.2 million and Russia with about 10.8 million.

India’s migrants are dispersed around the world, but the countries with the largest Indian migrant populations are the United Arab Emirates (3.5 million), the U.S. (2.7 million) and Saudi Arabia (2.5 million).

Though India is the single largest source of international migrants, its 17.9 million migrants in 2020 accounted for only 1.3% of all people born in India by that year. By comparison, the United Kingdom’s 4.7 million international migrants accounted for 7.6% of those born in the UK by 2020. Mexico’s 11.2 million international migrants accounted for 8.2% of those born in Mexico.

Remittances – the money that migrants send to their home countries – decreased by about $11 billion from 2019 to 2020 as the coronavirus pandemic arrived. Global remittances had been steadily increasing since 2010, but they fell from $722 billion in 2019 to $711 billion in 2020. (These figures are nominal values, meaning they are not adjusted for inflation.) Notably, some countries in Latin America saw remittances fall sharply in the first half of 2020 – especially in April, when much of the U.S. was locked down due to the COVID-19 outbreak – before rebounding.

According to the World Bank, remittances reached $781 billion in 2021 and are estimated to reach $794 billion in 2022, both record highs.

India has been the world’s top receiver of remittances since 2010. Remittances to India grew from $53 billion in 2010 to $89 billion in 2021.

The U.S. has been the top sending country for remittances since 1990, the earliest year with available statistics. In 2021, international migrants living in the U.S. sent $73 billion in remittances globally.

The number of displaced people in the world rose to a new high of 89.4 million in 2020. Displaced people are those forced to leave their homes due to conflict, violence or disasters. They include refugees , asylum seekers , and people internally displaced within their country of birth. Overall, the number of displaced persons rose from 84.8 million in 2019 to 89.4 million in 2020, according to the UN’s World Migration Report 2022 . Overall, about 1.1% of the world’s population are displaced people.

Among the world’s displaced people, about 34%, or 30.5 million, were living outside their country of birth as refugees (26.4 million) or asylum seekers (4.1 million) in 2020. An additional 3.9 million displaced Venezuelans who have not applied for refugee or asylum status lived outside of Venezuela in 2020. The majority of displaced people, 55 million, were internally displaced in their birth countries because of conflict, violence or disasters.

The share of international migrants who are men has ticked up in recent decades. In 2000, 50.6% of international migrants were men and 49.4% were women. By 2020, men made up 51.9% of global migrants while 48.1% were women, according to estimates by the United Nations.

A majority of the world’s international migrants lived within their region of origin in 2020. While some migrants may go to new regions of the world, a majority (54.9%) lived within their region of origin in 2020. However, international migration within regions still varies widely. For example, 69.9% of Europe’s international migrants resided in another European country in 2020, reflecting migration out of Eastern European countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Poland and Romania to Western European ones.

International migrants in Asia and Oceania are the next most likely to live in their region of origin at 59.6% and 56.2%, respectively. Migrants from Africa are about as likely to live within Africa as they are to live outside of the continent (51.6% vs. 48.4%).

Migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as the Northern America region, are the least likely to live within their region of origin, at 26.3% and 25.2%, respectively.

Note: Here is the UN’s list of  countries and territories grouped by region .

• Immigrant Populations
• Immigration & Migration
• Immigration Trends
• Remittances

Anusha Natarajan is a former intern at Pew Research Center .

Mohamad Moslimani is a research assistant focusing on race and ethnicity at Pew Research Center .

Mark Hugo Lopez is director of race and ethnicity research at Pew Research Center .

Key facts about Asian Americans living in poverty

Latinos’ views on the migrant situation at the u.s.-mexico border, key facts about the nation’s 47.9 million black americans, key facts about the wealth of immigrant households during the covid-19 pandemic, what we know about unauthorized immigrants living in the u.s., most popular.

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Migration in Europe Discussion

Europe has long been a center of attraction for migrants from all over the world. It is due both to the developed health care, education, and security system, as well as to the overall level of development of the countries of the European Union. Many migrants do not migrate for economic reasons but because of political pressure or the danger to their lives that awaits them in their home countries. Currently, there is a tendency for xenophobic and nationalistic attitudes to spread in Europe, which is associated with several problems related to migration. Contrary to existing stereotypes, migrants often turn out to be good specialists with a decent education, positively impacting European countries’ labor market and demographics.

The European Union is a political-economic association but not a single state. Therefore, within the European Union, there are many opposing sides, each of which pursues the interests of its state or follows the demands of society. Since some European countries strive not to comply with the agreements on the admission of migrants, and some try to shift this responsibility to other countries, there is a problem in standardizing the approach to the issues of irregular migration.

Many people born in other countries live in modern Europe; in Germany, for example, there is a well-established Turkish community of many millions. Nevertheless, it is still incorrect to speak of a true multiculturalism in Europe since, despite some successes in adapting migrants, conflicts between representatives of different cultures still occur. Italy and Sweden differ significantly in their political discourse on migrants(Bale, 2017). While Sweden seeks to integrate migrants into its society by allowing them to learn the Swedish language and culture and to ensure equal rights with other citizens, anti-immigrant attitudes have become increasingly assertive in Italy in recent years. Indeed, such views also exist in Sweden, but they have a greater significance in Italian political discourse, where nationalist sentiments are rising. Besides, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, for example, declared the collapse of the idea of multiculturalism in France, which he attributed to the unwillingness of migrants to integrate into the common French culture.

There are several narratives in European societies about migrants being terrorists, stealing jobs from locals, living off government assistance, and bringing only crime and violence to society. Many populist politicians in Europe use such narratives to reinforce their positions by promoting nationalist ideas and discrediting the image of migrants, often using Islamophobic ideas in the process. The reinforcement of such unfair but popular xenophobic positions can lead to even greater segregation of cultures living in the same country from one another and an increase in tensions in society.

Roma is one of the oldest discriminated peoples in Europe and the world. Roma is often deprived of social benefits and state support and has difficulties finding employment, and in society, their image is often associated with crime, magic, and other negative phenomena. At the same time as antigypsyism, another universal form of discrimination – Islamophobia – began to spread in the modern century. Islamophobia is closely related to the 9/11 attacks in the United States and other terroristic acts in Europe. It consists of the idea that Muslims are not civilized enough and are all terrorists and criminals. These two ideas are developed to a greater or lesser degree in almost all European Union countries, complicating the integration of these cultures into public life and unfairly discriminating against people based on their nationality.

Thus, European society perceives the influx of refugees into Europe differently. Any conflicts between different cultures, various cases of aggression, or terrorist attacks increase xenophobic sentiments in many European societies, which populist parties and politicians skillfully exploit. The problem is complicated by lobbying from different countries seeking to satisfy their constituents’ demands, making it impossible to reach a consensus on defining European migration policy. European society needs some time and a series of legislative changes to improve the adaptation of migrants to assess the contribution of migrants to the European economy constructively.

Bale, T. (2017). European Politics: a comparative introduction. Palgrave.

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Seven out of 10 Europeans believe their country takes in too many immigrants

More than 60% say the eu should strengthen its support for ukraine and favor a ceasefire with moscow, according to a survey in all 27 member states.

Europeans view immigration with increasing suspicion. Seven out of 10 Europeans believe that their country takes in too many migrants, according to a survey carried out by BVA Xsight for ARTE Europe Weekly, a project led by the French-German TV channel ARTE GEIE and which EL PAÍS has participated in, as part of the countdown to the European elections in June.

The survey shows that 85% of respondents feel the European Union needs to take more action to combat irregular migration . And only 39% believe that Europe needs immigration today.

The countries where most people consider immigration a problem are Bulgaria (74% of respondents), the Czech Republic (73%), Hungary and Cyprus (68% in both cases). Paradoxically, in Italy, the European country where the largest number of immigrants entered irregularly last year (157,652), only 44% of respondents viewed it as a problem and only 14% saw it as the main problem. In Greece and Spain, the second and third countries with the most irregular arrivals in 2023, respectively, only 11% of respondents considered it the issue of most concern to them, below the European average of 17%. However, Greece is the country where the most people (90%) believe their country takes in too many migrants .

These are some of the conclusions from a survey carried out online between March 27 and April 9 in the 27 member states, where 22,726 people over 15 years of age were interviewed, with a representative sample from each country. In addition to El PAÍS, the media organizations Gazeta Wyborcza, Internazionale, Ir, Kathimerini, Le Soir and Telex collaborated in the survey.

Beyond the data on migration, health is the biggest concern for Europeans (41%), followed by the war in Ukraine (38%). The environment and inflation are tied in third place at 24%. Each country also presents some unique features when it comes to the order of priorities. In France, purchasing power is a top concern; in Poland people are particularly focused on security; the Irish are notably preoccupied with housing and Spaniards are very worried about unemployment.

This picture of Europeans’ concerns emerges one month before more than 400 million people from to the 27 countries of the European Union are called to vote in the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held between June 6 and 9. Voters will elect 705 MEPs in a chamber whose composition will be key to deciding issues such as pushing or stopping a policy of self-defense, and the promotion of measures for the green transition — under threat by the far right, which is forecast to perform well at the polls.

On the economic front, 73% of those surveyed feel optimistic about their personal future, although 57% believe that the economic situation in the EU has worsened and 63% feel the same way about their own country.

Only a third of respondents believe that EU decisions have a positive impact on their lives. And there is only one country, Portugal, where the majority (51%) highlighted the positive influence of the EU on their lives. Portugal is followed by Spain, Luxembourg, Malta and Romania, all of them with 43% positive responses. At the opposite pole, France and the Czech Republic (21% in both cases) are where the smallest number of people believe that the EU affects their lives favorably, followed by Hungary (24%) and the Netherlands (26%).

In the population as a whole, only 9% admit to feeling more European than their own nationality. In several of the member states that joined the EU most recently, citizens recognize that, when they vote, they prioritize their national needs over European ones: Romania (82%), Bulgaria (81%), Greece and Latvia (79% in both cases). However, the majority of countries would like to see the common European policy strengthened, especially in defense (72%) and immigration (70%).

Pollsters believe the survey paints a portrait of a Europe divided between those who worry more about the “end of the world” — security and the war between Russia and Ukraine — and those who focus more on “end of the month” issues. The first group includes Estonia, Finland and Poland, who are closer to the Russian borders. The second group, more concerned about the loss of purchasing power, encompasses France, Belgium, Spain and Portugal.

The war that began with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 might have served to reinforce the feeling of belonging to the EU. But it did not turn out that way. Only 14% of citizens say they feel more European now than before the invasion of Ukraine. And 15% of those surveyed consider themselves less European since the beginning of the conflict.

Fear of an imminent war

The survey shows that 62% of Europeans fear an imminent war with Russia, a fear that is felt most strongly in the countries geographically closest to the invading country, such as Poland, the Baltic States, Finland and Romania. Only 30% think that Europe has enough military resources to respond to a possible attack. Although 61% believe that the EU should strengthen its support for Ukraine, a similar majority (63%) believe that a ceasefire should be negotiated.

Fully 63% of Europeans are in favor of Ukraine’s accession to the EU. However, the countries most favorable to negotiations with Vladimir Putin (Hungary, Czech Republic, Austria, Bulgaria) are also the most reluctant to the admission of Ukrainians into the European club.

Climate change, important for 82%

The environment occupies, along with the loss of purchasing power, the third place among the top concerns of Europeans. Last year was the warmest on Earth since records began in the 19th century. For 82% of respondents, this is an important problem. And for 43%, the fight against global warming is a priority, especially in southern Europe — Malta, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus and Spain — where droughts and heat waves are felt most keenly.

The measures that generate the most support to combat climate change are those decided by governments and the European Parliament, such as the reduction of pesticides (60%) or massive investment in public transportation (57%). However, decisions that involve changes in individual behavior, such as increasing taxes to reduce personal vehicle use, are well received in only 21% of cases.

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Far-right extremism spreads among young people in Central and Eastern Europe

EU Parliament approves final set of environmental regulations amid far-right threats to revoke green laws

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Poland is strengthening its border with Belarus to deter illegal migration

FILE - Members of a group of some 30 migrants seeking asylum are seen in Bialowieza, Poland, on Sunday, 28 May 2023. Poland’s defense minister said Thursday that the metal barrier against illegal migration on border with Bealrus is being strengthened and plans are being made to reinforce the security of border with Russia. (AP Photo/Agnieszka Sadowska, File)

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WARSAW, Poland (AP) — Poland’s defense minister said Thursday his country is strengthening the metal barrier along its border with Belarus to deter illegal migration.

“We are mending the barrier on the Polish-Belarusian border, we are strengthening this barrier,” Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz said on private Radio Zet. “The spending on these purposes is the highest in (Poland’s) history.”

Kosiniak-Kamysz said the increased presence of Polish and allied military forces in regions close to the border is also helping to tighten the eastern frontier of NATO and the European Union. That presence has been increased since Russia’s aggression in Ukraine in 2022.

He spoke in favor of Poland building a line of defensive bunkers, trenches and ditches along that border and the one with Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad, steps that the Baltic states have already taken.

Poland says a massive wave of illegal migration from Belarus, especially in 2022, was orchestrated by that country and by Russia to destabilize Poland, a Ukrainian ally, and the European Union. The influx was largely curbed by the metal barrier that Poland completed last year, but some illegal crossings continue.

The minister’s comments also suggested that the barrier is seen as a wider defense measure during Russia’s war with Ukraine, which borders Poland.

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Guest Essay

Europe Is About to Drown in the River of the Radical Right

Ms. Ypi, a professor of political theory at the London School of Economics, wrote from London.

Europe is awash with worry. Ahead of parliamentary elections widely expected to deliver gains to the hard right, European leaders can barely conceal their anxiety. In a speech in late April, President Emmanuel Macron of France captured the prevailing mood. After eloquently warning of threats to the continent, he pronounced the need for a newly powerful Europe, a “Europe puissance.”

As I watched the speech , I was reminded of Niccolò Machiavelli’s comments in the opening pages of “The Prince,” his seminal 16th-century treatise on political power. In a dedication to Lorenzo de’ Medici, the ruler of the Florentine Republic, Machiavelli suggested that politics is in many ways like art. Just as landscape painters imaginatively place themselves in the plains to examine the mountains and on top of mountains to study the plains, so too should rulers inhabit their domains. “To know the nature of the people well, one must be a prince,” Machiavelli wrote, “and to know the nature of princes well, one must be of the people.”

Here was a politician grappling with the first part of Machiavelli’s sentence, an officeholder trying to comprehend the lay of the land. What is power in contemporary Europe, and how should it be exercised by the European Union? Mr. Macron answered in princely fashion, showing awareness of both the finite nature of every political community — Europe is “mortal,” he said — and its cyclical vulnerability to crisis. He concluded with a passionate defense of European “civilization” and urged the creation of a paradigm to revive it.

Yet for all his aspirations, Mr. Macron neglected the second half of Machiavelli’s sentence: that people also form views on their rulers, which rulers ignore at their peril. Mr. Macron brushed aside the many Europeans who feel the bloc is aloof and inaccessible, describing their disenchantment as a result of “false arguments.” The dismissal was no aberration. For decades, the leaders of the European Union have overlooked the people in the plains, shutting out the continent’s citizens from any meaningful political participation. This exclusion has changed the contours of the European landscape, paving the way for the radical right.

When Machiavelli reflected on the crises of his time — among them conflicts between major European powers, discontent with public officials and the collapsing legitimacy of the Roman Catholic Church — he turned to the Roman Republic for inspiration. When there is skepticism about values, he wrote, history is our only remaining guide. The secret to Roman freedom, he explained in the “Discourses on Livy,” was neither its good fortune nor its military might. Instead, it lay in the Romans’ ability to mediate the conflict between wealthy elites and the vast majority of people — or as he put it, “i grandi” (the great) and “il popolo” (the people).

While the inherent tendency of the great, Machiavelli argued, is to accumulate wealth and power to rule the rest, the inherent desire of the people is to avoid being at the elites’ mercy. The clash between the groups generally pulled polities in opposite directions. Yet the Roman Republic had institutions, like the tribunate of the plebs, that sought to empower the people and contain the elites. Only by channeling rather than suppressing this conflict, Machiavelli said, could civic freedom be preserved.

Europe has not heeded his advice. For all its democratic rhetoric, the European Union is closer to an oligarchic institution. Overseen by an unelected body of technocrats in the European Commission, the bloc allows for no popular consultation on policy, let alone participation. Its fiscal rules, which impose strict limits on the budgets of member states, offer protection for the rich while imposing austerity on the poor. From top to bottom, Europe is dominated by the interests of the wealthy few, who restrict the freedom of the many.

Its predicament, of course, is not unique. Businesses, financial institutions, credit rating agencies and powerful interest groups call the shots everywhere, severely constraining the power of politicians. The European Union is far from the worst offender. Still, in nation-states, the semblance of democratic participation can be sustained through allegiance to a shared constitution. In the European Union, whose founding myth is the free market, the case is much harder to make.

The transnational character of the bloc is often supposed to be behind Europeans’ dislike of it. Yet those who resist the current European Union do not do so because it is too cosmopolitan. Very simply, and not unreasonably, they resist it because it fails to represent them. The Parliament for which Europeans will be voting next month, to take one glaring example of the bloc’s lack of democracy, has little legislative power of its own: It tends to merely rubber-stamp decisions made by the commission. It is this representative gap that is filled by the radical right, turning the problem into simple binaries — either you or them, the state or Europe, the white worker or the migrant.

It is perhaps surprising that the bloc’s democratic deficit has become a rallying cry for the radical right, but it explains much of its success. A recent poll , for example, showed that Europe’s citizens are much more concerned about poverty, jobs, living standards and climate change than they are about migration. This suggests that the appeal of the radical right lies less in its obsessive hostility to migrants than in its criticism of the bloc’s failures to address people’s everyday concerns. European politicians could seek to remedy that by changing institutions to improve citizens’ bargaining power and make them feel heard. Instead, they prefer to give stern lectures.

The radical right may be on the rise in Europe, but it does not have to be this way. Politics is always at the mercy of fortune. Yet fortune, as Machiavelli emphasized in “The Prince,” is like a river whose overflow can be prevented by building dikes and dams. If European politicians are increasingly trapped in emergency management, it’s because they have failed in the first task of politics worthy of the name: to diagnose the causes of crisis, to explain who is represented and who is excluded and to defend those whose freedom is endangered.

The politics of the people presented by the radical right may be narrowly ethnocentric, but it is the only one on offer that speaks directly to people’s disillusionment. Our modern princes may choose to look away. Yet as long as the radical right continues to dominate the terms of mainstream debate, while its historical roots are discreetly ignored, no appeal to European values will stop the river in which we’re all about to drown.

Lea Ypi ( @lea_ypi ) is a professor of political theory at the London School of Economics and the author of “Free: Coming of Age at the End of History.”

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