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On Self-Respect: Joan Didion’s 1961 Essay from the Pages of Vogue

By Joan Didion

Joan Didion , author, journalist, and style icon, died today after a prolonged illness. She was 87 years old. Here, in its original layout, is Didion’s seminal essay “Self-respect: Its Source, Its Power,” which was first published in Vogue in 1961, and which was republished as “On Self-Respect” in the author’s 1968 collection, Slouching Towards Bethlehem.​ Didion wrote the essay as the magazine was going to press, to fill the space left after another writer did not produce a piece on the same subject. She wrote it not to a word count or a line count, but to an exact character count.

Once, in a dry season, I wrote in large letters across two pages of a notebook that innocence ends when one is stripped of the delusion that one likes oneself. Although now, some years later, I marvel that a mind on the outs with itself should have nonetheless made painstaking record of its every tremor, I recall with embarrassing clarity the flavor of those particular ashes. It was a matter of misplaced self-respect.

I had not been elected to Phi Beta Kappa. This failure could scarcely have been more predictable or less ambiguous (I simply did not have the grades), but I was unnerved by it; I had somehow thought myself a kind of academic Raskolnikov, curiously exempt from the cause-effect relationships that hampered others. Although the situation must have had even then the approximate tragic stature of Scott Fitzgerald's failure to become president of the Princeton Triangle Club, the day that I did not make Phi Beta Kappa nevertheless marked the end of something, and innocence may well be the word for it. I lost the conviction that lights would always turn green for me, the pleasant certainty that those rather passive virtues which had won me approval as a child automatically guaranteed me not only Phi Beta Kappa keys but happiness, honour, and the love of a good man (preferably a cross between Humphrey Bogart in Casablanca and one of the Murchisons in a proxy fight); lost a certain touching faith in the totem power of good manners, clean hair, and proven competence on the Stanford-Binet scale. To such doubtful amulets had my self-respect been pinned, and I faced myself that day with the nonplussed wonder of someone who has come across a vampire and found no garlands of garlic at hand.

Although to be driven back upon oneself is an uneasy affair at best, rather like trying to cross a border with borrowed credentials, it seems to me now the one condition necessary to the beginnings of real self-respect. Most of our platitudes notwithstanding, self-deception remains the most difficult deception. The charms that work on others count for nothing in that devastatingly well-lit back alley where one keeps assignations with oneself: no winning smiles will do here, no prettily drawn lists of good intentions. With the desperate agility of a crooked faro dealer who spots Bat Masterson about to cut himself into the game, one shuffles flashily but in vain through one's marked cards—the kindness done for the wrong reason, the apparent triumph which had involved no real effort, the seemingly heroic act into which one had been shamed. The dismal fact is that self-respect has nothing to do with the approval of others—who are, after all, deceived easily enough; has nothing to do with reputation—which, as Rhett Butler told Scarlett O'Hara, is something that people with courage can do without.

To do without self-respect, on the other hand, is to be an unwilling audience of one to an interminable home movie that documents one's failings, both real and imagined, with fresh footage spliced in for each screening. There’s the glass you broke in anger, there's the hurt on X's face; watch now, this next scene, the night Y came back from Houston, see how you muff this one. To live without self-respect is to lie awake some night, beyond the reach of warm milk, phenobarbital, and the sleeping hand on the coverlet, counting up the sins of commission and omission, the trusts betrayed, the promises subtly broken, the gifts irrevocably wasted through sloth or cowardice or carelessness. However long we postpone it, we eventually lie down alone in that notoriously un- comfortable bed, the one we make ourselves. Whether or not we sleep in it depends, of course, on whether or not we respect ourselves.

Joan Didion

To protest that some fairly improbable people, some people who could not possibly respect themselves, seem to sleep easily enough is to miss the point entirely, as surely as those people miss it who think that self-respect has necessarily to do with not having safety pins in one's underwear. There is a common superstition that "self-respect" is a kind of charm against snakes, something that keeps those who have it locked in some unblighted Eden, out of strange beds, ambivalent conversations, and trouble in general. It does not at all. It has nothing to do with the face of things, but concerns instead a separate peace, a private reconciliation. Although the careless, suicidal Julian English in Appointment in Samarra and the careless, incurably dishonest Jordan Baker in The Great Gatsby seem equally improbable candidates for self-respect, Jordan Baker had it, Julian English did not. With that genius for accommodation more often seen in women than in men, Jordan took her own measure, made her own peace, avoided threats to that peace: "I hate careless people," she told Nick Carraway. "It takes two to make an accident."

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Like Jordan Baker, people with self-respect have the courage of their mistakes. They know the price of things. If they choose to commit adultery, they do not then go running, in an access of bad conscience, to receive absolution from the wronged parties; nor do they complain unduly of the unfairness, the undeserved embarrassment, of being named corespondent. If they choose to forego their work—say it is screenwriting—in favor of sitting around the Algonquin bar, they do not then wonder bitterly why the Hacketts, and not they, did Anne Frank.

In brief, people with self-respect exhibit a certain toughness, a kind of moral nerve; they display what was once called character, a quality which, although approved in the abstract, sometimes loses ground to other, more instantly negotiable virtues. The measure of its slipping prestige is that one tends to think of it only in connection with homely children and with United States senators who have been defeated, preferably in the primary, for re-election. Nonetheless, character—the willingness to accept responsibility for one's own life—is the source from which self-respect springs.

Self-respect is something that our grandparents, whether or not they had it, knew all about. They had instilled in them, young, a certain discipline, the sense that one lives by doing things one does not particularly want to do, by putting fears and doubts to one side, by weighing immediate comforts against the possibility of larger, even intangible, comforts. It seemed to the nineteenth century admirable, but not remarkable, that Chinese Gordon put on a clean white suit and held Khartoum against the Mahdi; it did not seem unjust that the way to free land in California involved death and difficulty and dirt. In a diary kept during the winter of 1846, an emigrating twelve-year-old named Narcissa Cornwall noted coolly: "Father was busy reading and did not notice that the house was being filled with strange Indians until Mother spoke about it." Even lacking any clue as to what Mother said, one can scarcely fail to be impressed by the entire incident: the father reading, the Indians filing in, the mother choosing the words that would not alarm, the child duly recording the event and noting further that those particular Indians were not, "fortunately for us," hostile. Indians were simply part of the donnée.

In one guise or another, Indians always are. Again, it is a question of recognizing that anything worth having has its price. People who respect themselves are willing to accept the risk that the Indians will be hostile, that the venture will go bankrupt, that the liaison may not turn out to be one in which every day is a holiday because you’re married to me. They are willing to invest something of themselves; they may not play at all, but when they do play, they know the odds.

That kind of self-respect is a discipline, a habit of mind that can never be faked but can be developed, trained, coaxed forth. It was once suggested to me that, as an antidote to crying, I put my head in a paper bag. As it happens, there is a sound physiological reason, something to do with oxygen, for doing exactly that, but the psychological effect alone is incalculable: it is difficult in the extreme to continue fancying oneself Cathy in Wuthering Heights with one's head in a Food Fair bag. There is a similar case for all the small disciplines, unimportant in themselves; imagine maintaining any kind of swoon, commiserative or carnal, in a cold shower.

But those small disciplines are valuable only insofar as they represent larger ones. To say that Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton is not to say that Napoleon might have been saved by a crash program in cricket; to give formal dinners in the rain forest would be pointless did not the candlelight flickering on the liana call forth deeper, stronger disciplines, values instilled long before. It is a kind of ritual, helping us to remember who and what we are. In order to remember it, one must have known it.

To have that sense of one's intrinsic worth which, for better or for worse, constitutes self-respect, is potentially to have everything: the ability to discriminate, to love and to remain indifferent. To lack it is to be locked within oneself, paradoxically incapable of either love or indifference. If we do not respect ourselves, we are on the one hand forced to despise those who have so few resources as to consort with us, so little perception as to remain blind to our fatal weaknesses. On the other, we are peculiarly in thrall to everyone we see, curiously determined to live out—since our self-image is untenable—their false notions of us. We flatter ourselves by thinking this compulsion to please others an attractive trait: a gift for imaginative empathy, evidence of our willingness to give. Of course we will play Francesca to Paolo, Brett Ashley to Jake, Helen Keller to anyone's Annie Sullivan: no expectation is too misplaced, no rôle too ludicrous. At the mercy of those we can not but hold in contempt, we play rôles doomed to failure before they are begun, each defeat generating fresh despair at the necessity of divining and meeting the next demand made upon us.

It is the phenomenon sometimes called alienation from self. In its advanced stages, we no longer answer the telephone, because someone might want something; that we could say no without drowning in self-reproach is an idea alien to this game. Every encounter demands too much, tears the nerves, drains the will, and the spectre of something as small as an unanswered letter arouses such disproportionate guilt that one's sanity becomes an object of speculation among one's acquaintances. To assign unanswered letters their proper weight, to free us from the expectations of others, to give us back to ourselves—there lies the great, the singular power of self-respect. Without it, one eventually discovers the final turn of the screw: one runs away to find oneself, and finds no one at home.

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The Impact of Self-Respect on Your Life

Sanjana is a health writer and editor. Her work spans various health-related topics, including mental health, fitness, nutrition, and wellness.

RgStudio / Getty Images

According to the American Psychological Association, having self-respect means having a healthy regard for your character, values, and dignity. It is a measure of your self-worth .

Self-respect demands an appreciation of your identity as an individual, which in turn impacts your thoughts, values, emotions, commitments, and behaviors, says Judith Zackson , PhD, Founder and Clinical Director of Zackson Psychology Group.

This article explains the importance of respecting yourself and suggests some strategies to improve your sense of self-respect.

Benefits of Having Self-Respect

These are some of the benefits of having a healthy sense of self-respect, according to Dr. Zackson:

• Internal sense of happiness: People who respect themselves understand that they must first look inward to discover their worth, esteem, and happiness. As a result, their life is more stable and fulfilling than those who compare themselves to others or those who rely on external sources of validation.
• Commitment to upholding personal values: People with self-respect have a set of morals and values by which they evaluate their character and actions. They are often willing to bet all they have on upholding these norms of behavior, as their very worth and sense of self depend on it.
• Ability to establish boundaries: Self-respect requires people to have the fortitude to establish limits and fight for them when they are threatened. Respecting oneself enough to stand up for one’s beliefs and boundaries also helps command the respect of others.
• Strong sense of dignity: Respecting oneself means having a strong sense of dignity toward one’s person and position, and honoring it at all times.

Judith Zackson, PhD

Self-respect is the everyday discipline of loving who you are. It is the bedrock of developing self-acceptance and self-love. It's hard, if not impossible, to live a fulfilled, meaningful, and joyous life if you don't respect yourself first.

Potential Pitfalls of Having Low Self-Respect

Below, Dr. Zackson outlines some of the potential pitfalls of having low self-respect:

• Relying on external validation: Individuals with low self-respect allow others to define them, rather than defining themselves. They are more concerned with how others perceive them than what actually matters to them, and often lead fake lives as a result. They have a constant need for external validation and tend to be people pleasers .
• Living a life that lacks meaning: People who lack self-respect are unconcerned with their intrinsic values and the meaning of their lives. They are often impulsive, irresponsible, reliant on others, and self-destructive.
• Having a negative self-view: Those with limited self-respect are more vulnerable to having a negative view of themselves, which can cause them to engage in self-defeating behaviors such as negative self-talk .
• Developing unhealthy relationships: A balanced, wholesome view of oneself and a healthy dose of self-respect are important ingredients in healthy relationships. Without it, people have trouble standing up for themselves and maintaining their boundaries. The lack of self-respect often gets reinforced over time, and people find themselves stuck in unhealthy situations, such as abusive or manipulative relationships.

Influences on Self-Respect

Below, Dr. Zackson describes some of the factors that can influence one’s sense of self-respect in childhood and adulthood.

Childhood Influences

Self-respect, like any other lasting quality, largely develops in childhood. Children learn that it's all right for them to love themselves when their parent or caregiver loves and appreciates them for who they are.

Giving one’s full love and attention to a child is the foundation to help them value themselves. The knowledge that they do not have to do anything special to deserve love and respect will make them much less likely to place artificial limits on such feelings for themselves.

Parents who value themselves and are at peace with their sense of self are more likely to share these values with their children. It is not so much what parents do but rather who they already are that will shape a child's sense of worth. The importance of self-respect is fostered at a young age and lasts a lifetime.

Adult Influences

While childhood factors often play a far greater role in influencing one’s sense of self-respect, the influences in adulthood also matter. Factors like relationships, work, and life experiences can contribute to a person’s sense of self-efficacy and self-confidence.

How to Improve Self-Respect

Dr. Zackson shares some strategies that can help you improve your sense of self-respect:

• Identify your values: Start by understanding yourself. Imagine suddenly losing everything you own and being left with nothing but yourself. Ask yourself: “What is important to me? What are my values? Why do I settle for less? What could remind me of my value?”
• Keep the focus on internal qualities: Be mindful that you may get caught up in thinking that your worth as a person is due to external factors like your net worth, position, looks, possessions, or the number of followers you have on social media. Self-respect however, is about internal qualities like your character, morals , values, and actions.
• Work on accepting yourself: Start to pay attention to your thought patterns without getting caught up in them. Concentrate on self-acceptance and let go of your harsh internal critic. Commit to forgiving yourself and accepting your flaws, bad habits, and all the things you don't like about yourself.
• Challenge negative thoughts: Pay attention to how your negative thought patterns affect your actions. Identify your triggers for negative thoughts and rationalize them. For instance, if a negative experience or lack of specific skills causes you to automatically call yourself unworthy, it can be helpful to recognize this thought process and challenge it: “Even if I’m not great at singing, I am still worthy of love and respect.”
• Don’t give in to self-doubt: Focus on loosening the grip of self-doubt. Nobody can make you feel unworthy of respect unless you permit them to do so. Develop a kinship with yourself and understand your strengths and values. Remind yourself that just as we have a moral obligation to respect others, we also have a moral obligation to respect ourselves.

Whenever you notice your inner critic starting to fire up, pause for a moment, challenge your thoughts as they whisper in your ear, and remind yourself that no matter what you do or don't do, you are nothing less than beautiful and worthy of self-respect.

Self-respect is an important part of your identity because it reflects how you view yourself, which in turn impacts every area of your life, including your relationships, work, and social life. Respecting and loving yourself is the first step toward gaining the love and respect of others.

If you have low self-respect, there are steps you can take to work on it and improve it. It may also be helpful to see a mental healthcare provider, who can help you identify your values, correct negative thought patterns, set firm boundaries, and learn to love yourself.

American Psychological Association. Self respect . Dictionary of Psychology .

Clucas C. Understanding self-respect and its relationship to self-esteem . Pers Soc Psychol Bull . 2020;46(6):839-855. doi:10.1177/0146167219879115

Dillon R. Self-respect and self-esteem . International Encyclopedia of Ethics . Doi: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee221.pub2

Corrigan PW, Bink AB, Schmidt A, Jones N, Rüsch N. What is the impact of self-stigma? Loss of self-respect and the "why try" effect . J Ment Health . 2016;25(1):10-15. doi:10.3109/09638237.2015.1021902

By Sanjana Gupta Sanjana is a health writer and editor. Her work spans various health-related topics, including mental health, fitness, nutrition, and wellness.

Respect Essay for Students and Children

500+ words essay on respect.

Respect is a broad term. Experts interpret it in different ways. Generally speaking, it is a positive feeling or action expressed towards something. Furthermore, it could also refer to something held in high esteem or regard. Showing Respect is a sign of ethical behavior . Unfortunately, in the contemporary era, there has been undermining of the value of Respect. Most noteworthy, there are two essential aspects of Respect. These aspects are self-respect and respect for others.

Self-Respect

Self-Respect refers to loving oneself and behaving with honour and dignity. It reflects Respect for oneself. An individual who has Self-Respect would treat himself with honour. Furthermore, lacking Self-Respect is a matter of disgrace. An individual who does not respect himself, should certainly not expect Respect from others. This is because nobody likes to treat such an individual with Respect.

Self-Respect is the foundation of a healthy relationship . In relationships, it is important to respect your partner. Similarly, it is equally important to Respect yourself. A Self-Respecting person accepts himself with his flaws. This changes the way how others perceive the individual. An individual, who honours himself, would prevent others from disrespecting him. This certainly increases the value of the individual in the eyes of their partner.

Lacking Self-Respect brings negative consequences. An individual who lacks Self-Respect is treated like a doormat by others. Furthermore, such an individual may engage in bad habits . Also, there is a serious lack of self-confidence in such a person. Such a person is likely to suffer verbal or mental abuse. The lifestyle of such an individual also becomes sloppy and untidy.

Self-Respect is a reflection of toughness and confidence. Self-Respect makes a person accept more responsibility. Furthermore, the character of such a person would be strong. Also, such a person always stands for his rights, values, and opinions.

Self-Respect improves the morality of the individual. Such an individual has a good ethical nature. Hence, Self-Respect makes you a better person.

Self-Respect eliminates the need to make comparisons. This means that individuals don’t need to make comparisons with others. Some people certainly compare themselves with others on various attributes. Most noteworthy, they do this to seek validation of others. Gaining Self-Respect ends all that.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Respect of Others

Everyone must Respect fellow human beings. This is an essential requirement of living in a society. We certainly owe a basic level of Respect to others. Furthermore, appropriate Respect must be shown to people who impact our lives. This includes our parents, relatives, teachers, friends, fellow workers, authority figures, etc.

One of the best ways of showing respect to others is listening. Listening to another person’s point of view is an excellent way of Respect. Most noteworthy, we must allow a person to express his views even if we disagree with them.

Another important aspect of respecting others is religious/political views. Religious and cultural beliefs of others should be given a lot of consideration. Respecting other people’s Religions is certainly a sign of showing mature Respect.

Everyone must Respect those who are in authority. Almost everyone deals with people in their lives that hold authority. So, a healthy amount of Respect should be given to such people. People of authority can be of various categories. These are boss, police officer, religious leader, teacher, etc.

In conclusion, Respect is a major aspect of human socialization. It is certainly a precious value that must be preserved. Respectful behaviour is vital for human survival.

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Joan Didion on Self-Respect

By maria popova.

From her 1968 essay anthology Slouching Towards Bethlehem ( public library ) comes “On Self Respect” — a magnificent meditation on what it means to live well in one’s soul, touching on previously explored inadequate externalities like prestige , approval , and conventions of success .

Didion writes:

The dismal fact is that self-respect has nothing to do with the approval of others — who are, after all, deceived easily enough; has nothing to do with reputation, which, as Rhett Butler told Scarlett O’Hara, is something people with courage can do without. To do without self-respect, on the other hand, is to be an unwilling audience of one to an interminable documentary that deals with one’s failings, both real and imagined, with fresh footage spliced in for every screening. There’s the glass you broke in anger, there’s the hurt on X’s face; watch now, this next scene, the night Y came back from Houston, see how you muff this one. To live without self-respect is to lie awake some night, beyond the reach of warm milk, the Phenobarbital, and the sleeping hand on the coverlet, counting up the sins of commissions and omission, the trusts betrayed, the promises subtly broken, the gifts irrevocably wasted through sloth or cowardice, or carelessness. However long we postpone it, we eventually lie down alone in that notoriously uncomfortable bed, the one we make ourselves. Whether or not we sleep in it depends, of course, on whether or not we respect ourselves. […] Character — the willingness to accept responsibility for one’s own life — is the source from which self-respect springs. Self-respect is something that our grandparents, whether or not they had it, knew all about. They had instilled in them, young, a certain discipline, the sense that one lives by doing things one does not particularly want to do, by putting fears and doubts to one side, by weighing immediate comforts against the possibility of larger, even intangible, comforts. […] Self-respect is a discipline, a habit of mind that can never be faked but can be developed, trained, coaxed forth. It was once suggested to me that, as an antidote to crying, I put my head in a paper bag. As it happens, there is a sound physiological reason, something to do with oxygen, for doing exactly that, but the psychological effect alone is incalculable: it is difficult in the extreme to continue fancying oneself Cathy in Wuthering Heights with one’s head in a Food Fair bag. There is a similar case for all the small disciplines, unimportant in themselves; imagine maintaining any kind of swoon, commiserative or carnal, in a cold shower. […] To have that sense of one’s intrinsic worth which constitutes self-respect is potentially to have everything: the ability to discriminate, to love and to remain indifferent. To lack it is to be locked within oneself, paradoxically incapable of either love or indifference. If we do not respect ourselves, we are on the one hand forced to despise those who have so few resources as to consort with us, so little perception as to remain blind to our fatal weaknesses. On the other, we are peculiarly in thrall to everyone we see, curiously determined to live out — since our self-image is untenable — their false notion of us. We flatter ourselves by thinking this compulsion to please others an attractive trait: a gist for imaginative empathy, evidence of our willingness to give. Of course I will play Francesca to your Paolo, Helen Keller to anyone’s Annie Sullivan; no expectation is too misplaced, no role too ludicrous. At the mercy of those we cannot but hold in contempt, we play roles doomed to failure before they are begun, each defeat generating fresh despair at the urgency of divining and meting the next demand made upon us. It is the phenomenon sometimes called ‘alienation from self.’ In its advanced stages, we no longer answer the telephone, because someone might want something; that we could say no without drowning in self-reproach is an idea alien to this game. Every encounter demands too much, tears the nerves, drains the will, and the specter of something as small as an unanswered letter arouses such disproportionate guilt that answering it becomes out of the question. To assign unanswered letters their proper weight, to free us from the expectations of others, to give us back to ourselves — there lies the great, the singular power of self-respect. Without it, one eventually discovers the final turn of the screw: one runs away to find oneself, and finds no one at home.

Slouching Towards Bethlehem is a superb read in its entirety. Also from it, Didion on keeping a notebook and not mistaking self-righteousness for morality .

— Published May 21, 2012 — https://www.themarginalian.org/2012/05/21/joan-didion-on-self-respect/ —

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As humans, we all want self-respect – and keeping that in mind might be the missing ingredient when you try to change someone’s mind

Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Washington

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Why is persuasion so hard, even when you have facts on your side?

As a philosopher , I’m especially interested in persuasion – not just how to convince someone, but how to do it ethically, without manipulation. I’ve found that one of the deepest insights comes from the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, a focus of my research , who was born 300 years ago: April 22, 1724.

In his final book on ethics, “ The Doctrine of Virtue ,” Kant writes that each of us has a certain duty when we try to correct others’ beliefs. If we think they’re mistaken, we shouldn’t dismiss them as “absurdities” or “poor judgment,” he says, but must suppose that their views “contain some truth.”

What Kant is describing might sound like humility – just recognizing that other people often know things we don’t. But it goes beyond that.

This moral duty to find truth in others’ mistakes is based on helping the other person “ preserve his respect for his own understanding ,” Kant claims. In other words, even when we encounter obviously false points of view, morality calls on us to help the person we’re talking to maintain their self-respect – to find something reasonable in their views.

This advice can come across as patronizing, as though we were supposed to treat other adults like children with fragile egos. But I think Kant is onto something important here, and contemporary psychology can help us see it.

The need for respect

Imagine that you had to postpone lunch because of a meeting. With only 15 minutes to spare and a growling stomach, you leave to get a burrito.

On your way, however, you run into a colleague. “I’m glad to see you,” they say. “I’m hoping to change your mind about something from the meeting.”

In that scenario, your colleague has little chance of persuading you. Why? Well, you need food, and they’re getting in the way of you satisfying that need.

As psychologists of persuasion have long recognized, a key factor in persuasion is attention, and people don’t attend to persuasive arguments when they have more pressing needs – especially hunger, sleep and safety. But less obvious needs can also make people unpersuadable.

One that has received a lot of attention in recent decades is the need for social belonging .

The psychologist Dan Kahan gives the example of somebody who, like everyone in their community, incorrectly denies the existence of climate change. If that person publicly corrected their beliefs, they might be ostracized from friends and family. In that case, Kahan suggests , it can be “perfectly rational” for them to simply ignore the scientific evidence about an issue that they can’t directly affect, in order to satisfy their social need for connection.

This means that a respectful persuader needs to take into account others’ need for social dignity, such as by avoiding public settings when discussing topics that might be sensitive or taboo.

… and self-respect

Yet external needs, like hunger or social acceptance, aren’t the only ones that get in the way of persuasion. In a classic 1988 article on self-affirmation , the psychologist Claude Steele argued that our desire to maintain some “self-regard” as a good, competent person profoundly shapes psychology.

In more philosophical terms: People have a need for self-respect. This can explain why, for instance, students sometimes blame low grades on bad luck and difficult material, but explain high grades in terms of their own ability and effort .

Steele’s approach has yielded some surprising results. For example, one study invited female students to write down values that were important to them – an exercise in self-affirmation. Afterward, many students who had done this exercise earned higher grades in a physics course, particularly girls who had previously performed worse than male students.

That study and many others illustrate how bolstering someone’s self-esteem can equip them to tackle intellectual challenges, including challenges to their personal beliefs.

With that in mind, let’s turn back to Kant.

Politics are personal

Recall Kant’s claim: When we encounter somebody with false beliefs, even absurdly false ones, we must help them preserve their respect for their own understanding by acknowledging some element of truth in their judgments. That truth could be a fact we’d overlooked, or an important experience they’d had.

Kant isn’t just talking about being humble or polite. He directs attention to a real need that people have – a need that persuaders have to recognize if they want to get a fair hearing.

For example, say that you want to change your cousin’s mind about whom to support in the 2024 election. You come equipped with well-crafted evidence and carefully choose a good moment for a one-on-one talk.

Despite all that, your chances will be slim if you ignore your cousin’s need for self-respect. In a country as polarized as the U.S. is today, an argument about whom to vote for can feel like a direct attack on someone’s competence and moral decency.

So providing somebody with evidence that they should change their views can run headfirst into their need for self-respect – our human need to see ourselves as intelligent and good.

Moral maturity

Persuasion, in other words, takes a lot of juggling: In addition to making strong persuasive arguments, a persuader also has to avoid threatening the other person’s need for self-respect.

Actual juggling would be a lot easier if we could slow down the objects. That’s why juggling on the Moon would be about twice as easy as on Earth, thanks to the Moon’s lower gravity.

When it comes to persuasion, though, we can slow things down by pacing the conversation, opening up time to learn something from the other person in return. This signals that you take them seriously – and that can bolster their self-esteem.

To be ethical, this openness to learning must be sincere. But that’s not hard: On most topics, each of us have limited experience. For example, perhaps Donald Trump or Joe Biden validated some of your cousin’s frustrations about their local government, in ways you couldn’t have guessed.

This approach has an important benefit to you as well: helping you preserve your own self-respect. After all, approaching others with humility shows moral maturity. Recognizing others’ need for self-respect can not only help you persuade someone, but persuade in ways you can feel proud of.

• Immanuel Kant

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Respect has great importance in everyday life. As children we are taught (one hopes) to respect our parents and teachers, school rules and traffic laws, family and cultural traditions, other people’s feelings and rights, our country’s flag and leaders, the truth and people’s differing opinions. And we come to value respect for such things; when we’re older, we may shake our heads (or fists) at people who seem not to have learned to respect them. We develop great respect for people we consider exemplary and lose respect for those we discover to be clay-footed; we may also come to believe that, at some level, all people are worthy of respect. We may learn that jobs and relationships become unbearable if we receive no respect in them; in certain social milieus we may learn the price of disrespect if we violate the street law: “Diss me, and you die.” Calls to respect this or that are increasingly part of public life: environmentalists exhort us to respect nature, foes of abortion and capital punishment insist on respect for human life, members of racial and ethnic minorities and those discriminated against because of their gender, sexual orientation, age, religious beliefs, or economic status demand respect both as social and moral equals and for their cultural differences. And it is widely acknowledged that public debates about such demands should take place under terms of mutual respect. We may learn both that our lives together go better when we respect the things that deserve to be respected and that we should respect some things independently of considerations of how our lives would go.

We may also learn that how our lives go depends every bit as much on whether we respect ourselves. The value of self-respect may be something we can take for granted, or we may discover how very important it is when our self-respect is threatened, or we lose it and have to work to regain it, or we have to struggle to develop or maintain it in a hostile environment. Some people find that finally being able to respect themselves is what matters most about finally standing on their own two feet, kicking a disgusting habit, or defending something they value; others, sadly, discover that life is no longer worth living if self-respect is irretrievably lost. It is part of everyday wisdom that respect and self-respect are deeply connected, that it is difficult both to respect others if we don’t respect ourselves and to respect ourselves if others don’t respect us. It is increasingly part of political wisdom both that unjust social institutions can devastatingly damage self-respect and that robust and resilient self-respect can be a potent force in struggles against injustice.

The ubiquity and significance of respect and self-respect in everyday life largely explains why philosophers, particularly in moral and political philosophy, have been interested in these two concepts. They turn up in a multiplicity of philosophical contexts, including discussions of justice and equality, injustice and oppression, autonomy and agency, moral and political rights and duties, moral motivation and moral development, cultural diversity and toleration, punishment and political violence, and a host of applied ethics contexts. Although a wide variety of things are said to deserve respect, contemporary philosophical interest in respect has overwhelmingly been focused on respect for persons, the idea that all persons should be treated with respect simply because they are persons. This focus owes much to the 18 th century German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, who argued that all and only persons and the moral law they autonomously legislate are appropriate objects of the morally most significant attitude of respect. Although honor, esteem, and prudential regard played important roles in moral and political theories before him, Kant was the first major Western philosopher to put respect for persons, including oneself, at the very center of moral theory, and his insistence that persons are ends in themselves with an absolute dignity who must always be respected has become a core ideal of modern humanism and political liberalism. In recent years many people have argued that moral respect ought also to be extended to things other than persons, such as nonhuman living beings and the natural environment.

Despite the widespread acknowledgment of the importance of respect and self-respect in moral and political life and theory, there is no settled agreement in either everyday thinking or philosophical discussion about such issues as how to understand the concepts, what the appropriate objects of respect are, what is involved in respecting various objects, and what the scope is of any moral requirements regarding respect and self-respect. This entry will survey these and related issues.

1.1 Elements of respect

1.2 kinds of respect, 2.1 some important issues, 2.2 kant’s account of respect for persons, 2.3 further issues, developments, and applications, 3. respect for nature and nonhuman beings, 4.1 the concept of self-respect, 4.2 treatment of self-respect in moral and political philosophy, 5. conclusion, philosophical works chiefly on respect and related concepts, philosophical works chiefly on self-respect and related concepts, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the concept of respect.

Philosophers have approached the concept of respect with a variety of questions. (1) One set concerns the nature of respect, including (a) What sort of thing is respect? Philosophers have variously identified it as a mode of behavior, a form of treatment, a kind of valuing, a type of attention, a motive, an attitude, a feeling, a tribute, a principle, a duty, an entitlement, a moral virtue, an epistemic virtue: are any of these categories more central than others? (b) Are there different kinds of respect? If so, is any more basic than others? (c) Are there different levels or degrees of respect? (d) What are the distinctive elements of respect, or a specific kind of respect? What beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and motives does (a specific kind of) respect involve, and what ways of acting and forbearing to act express or constitute or are regulated by it? (e) To what other attitudes, actions, valuings, duties, etc., is respect (or a specific kind) similar, and with what does it contrast? In particular, how is respect similar to, different from, or connected with esteem, honor, love, awe, reverence, recognition, toleration, dignity, contempt, indifference, discounting, denigration, and so on? (2) A second set of questions concerns objects of respect, including (a)What sorts of things can be reasonably be said to warrant respect? (b) What are the bases or grounds for respect, i.e., the features of or facts about objects in virtue of which it is reasonable and perhaps obligatory to respect them? (c) Must every appropriate object always be respected? Can respect be forfeited, can lost respect be regained? (3) A third set of questions focuses on moral dimensions of respect, including (a) Are there moral requirements to respect certain types of objects, and, if so, what are the scope and grounds of such requirements? (b) Why is respect morally important? What, if anything, does it add to morality over and above the conduct, attitudes, and character traits required or encouraged by various moral principles or virtues? (c) What does respect entail morally for how we should treat one another in everyday interactions, for issues in specific contexts such as health care and the workplace, and for fraught issues such as abortion, racial and gender justice, and global inequality?

It is widely acknowledged that there are different forms or kinds of respect. This complicates the answering of these questions, since answers concerning one form or kind of respect can diverge significantly from those about another. Much philosophical work has gone into explicating differences and links among the various kinds.

One general distinction concerns respect simply as behavior and respect as an attitude or feeling that may or may not be expressed in or signified by behavior. When we speak of drivers respecting the speed limit, hostile forces respecting a cease fire agreement, or the Covid-19 virus not respecting national borders, we can be referring simply to behavior which avoids violation of or interference with some boundary, limit, or rule, without any reference to attitudes, feelings, intentions, or dispositions, and even, as in the case of viruses, without imputing agency (Bird 2004). In such cases the behavior is regarded as constitutive of respecting. Where respect is conceived of as a duty or an entitlement, a certain kind of behavior or treatment may be all that is owed. Similarly, respect as a tribute could be just a certain mode of behavior, such as bowing or standing in silence. In other cases, however, we take respect to be or to express or signify an attitude or feeling, as when we speak of having respect for someone or of certain behaviors as showing respect or disrespect. Here, actions and modes of treatment count as respect insofar as they either manifest an attitude of respect or are of the sort through which the attitude is characteristically expressed; a principle of respect is one that necessarily must be adopted by someone with the attitude of respect or that prescribes the attitude or actions that express it (Frankena 1986; Downie and Telfer 1969); a moral virtue of respect involves having the attitude as a settled aspect of one’s way of being toward appropriate objects. Most discussions of respect for persons take attitude to be central. In what follows, I will focus chiefly on respect as attitude. There are, again, several different attitudes to which the term “respect” refers. Before looking at differences, however, it is useful first to note some elements common among varieties.

An attitude of respect is, most generally, a relation between a subject and an object in which the subject responds to the object from a certain perspective in some appropriate way. Respect necessarily has an object: respect is always directed toward, paid to, felt about, shown for some object. While a very wide variety of things can be appropriate objects of one kind of respect or another, the subject of respect (the respecter) is typically a person, that is, a conscious rational being capable of recognizing objects, intentionally responding to them, having and expressing values with regard to them, and being accountable for disrespecting or failing to respect them. Respect and disrespect can also be expressed or instantiated by or through things that are not persons, such as guidelines, rules, laws, and principles, systems, and institutional organizations and operations. So, we can say that laws that prohibit torture express respect for persons while the institution of slavery is profoundly disrespectful of human beings.

Ordinary discourse about respect as a responsive relation identifies several key elements, including attention, deference, judgment, valuing, and behavior. First, as its derivation from the Latin respicere , (to look back at, look again) suggests, respect is a form of regard: a mode of attention to and acknowledgment of an object as something to be taken seriously. Respecting something contrasts with being oblivious or indifferent to it, ignoring or quickly dismissing it, neglecting or disregarding it, or carelessly or intentionally misidentifying it. Respect is also perspectival: we can respect something from a moral perspective, or from prudential, evaluative, social, or institutional perspectives. From different perspectives, we might attend to different aspects of the object in respecting it or respect it in different ways. For example, one might regard another human individual as a rights-bearer, a judge, a superlative singer, a trustworthy person, or a threat to one’s security, and the respect one accords her in each case will be different. It is in virtue of this aspect of careful attention that respect is sometimes thought of as an epistemic virtue.

As responsive, respect is as much object-based as subject-generated; certain objects call for, claim, elicit, deserve, are owed respect. We respect something not because we want to but because we recognize that we have to respect it (Wood 1999); respect involves “a deontic experience”—the experience that one must pay attention and respond appropriately (Birch 1993). It thus is motivational: it is the recognition of something “as directly determining our will without reference to what is wanted by our inclinations” (Rawls 2000, 153). In this way respect differs from, for example, liking and fearing, which have their sources in the subject’s interests or desires. When we respect something, we heed its call, accord it its due, acknowledge its claim. Thus, respect involves deference, in the most basic sense of yielding to the object’s demands.

The idea that the object “drives” respect, as it were, is involved in the view that respect is an unmediated emotional response (Buss 1999b). But respect is typically treated as also an expression of the agency of the respecter: respect is deliberate, a matter of directed rather than grabbed attention, of reflective consideration and judgment. On this view, respect is reason-governed: we cannot respect a particular object for just any old reason or no reason at all. Rather, we respect something for the reason that it has, in our judgment, some respect-warranting characteristic, that makes it the kind of object that calls for that kind of response (Cranor 1975; Pettit 2021). And these reasons are both objective, in the sense that their weight or stringency does not depend on the respecter’s interests, goals, or desires, and categorical, in the sense that acting against these reasons, other things equal, is wrong (Raz 2001). Respect is thus both subjective and objective. It is subjective in that the subject’s response is constructed from her understanding of the object and its characteristics and her judgments about the legitimacy of its call and how fittingly to address the call. The objectivity of respect means that an individual’s respect for an object can be inappropriate or unwarranted, for the object may not have the features she takes it to have, or the features she takes to be respect-warranting might not be, or her idea of how properly to treat the object might be mistaken. Moreover, the logic of respect is the logic of objectivity and universality, in several ways. In respecting an object, we respond to it as something whose significance is independent of us, not determined by our feelings or interests. Our reasons for respecting something are, logically, reasons for other people to respect it (or at least to endorse our respect for it from a common point of view). Respect is thus, unlike erotic or filial love, an impersonal response to the object. And if F is a respect-warranting feature of object O, then respecting O on account of F commits us, other things equal, to respecting other things with feature F.

There are many different kinds of objects that can reasonably be respected and many different reasons why they warrant respect. Thus, warranted responses can take different forms. Some things are dangerous or powerful; respecting them can involve fear, awe, self-protection, or submission. Other things have authority over us and the respect they are due includes acknowledgment of their authority and perhaps obedience to their authoritative commands. Other forms of respect are modes of valuing, appreciating the object as having worth or importance that is independent of, perhaps even at variance with, our desires or commitments. Thus, we can respect things we don’t like or agree with, such as our enemies or someone else’s opinion. Valuing respect is kin to esteem, admiration, veneration, reverence, and honor, while regarding something as utterly worthless or insignificant or disdaining or having contempt for it is incompatible with respecting it. Respect also aims to value its object appropriately, so it contrasts with degradation and discounting. The kinds of valuing that respect involves also contrast with other forms of valuing such as promoting or using (Anderson 1993, Pettit 1989). Indeed, regarding a person merely as useful (treating her as just a sexual object, an ATM machine, a research subject) is commonly identified as a central form of disrespect for persons, and many people decry the killing of endangered wild animals for their tusks or hides as disrespectful of nature.

Finally, attitudes of respect typically have a behavioral component. In respecting an object, we often consider it to be making legitimate claims on our conduct as well as our thoughts and feelings and so we are disposed to behave appropriately. Appropriate behavior includes refraining from certain treatment of the object or acting only in particular ways in connection with it, ways that are regarded as fitting, deserved by, or owed to the object. And there are very many ways to respect things: keeping our distance from them, helping them, praising or emulating them, obeying or abiding by them, not violating or interfering with them, destroying them only in some ways, protecting or being careful with them, talking about them in ways that reflect their worth or status, mourning them, nurturing them. One can behave in respectful ways, however, without having respect for the object, as when a teen who disdains adults behaves respectfully toward her friend’s parents in a scheme to get the car, manipulating rather than respecting them. To be a form or expression of respect, behavior has to be motivated by one’s acknowledgment of the object as rightly calling for that behavior. On the other hand, certain kinds of feelings would not count as respect if they did not find expression in behavior or involved no dispositions to behave in appropriate ways, and if they did not spring from perceptions or judgments that the object is worthy of or calls for such behavior.

The attitudes of respect, then, have cognitive dimensions (beliefs, acknowledgments, judgments, commitments), affective dimensions (emotions, feelings, ways of experiencing things), and conative dimensions (motivations, dispositions to act and forbear from acting); some forms also have valuational dimensions. One last dimension is normative: the attitudes and actions of respect are governed by norms that set standards of success or failure in responding to respect-worthy-objects. Some norms are moral, grounded in moral principles or morally important characteristics of respect-worthy objects and both endorsable by and authoritative for all moral agents. Other norms are social, arising from dimensions of social life, grounded in socially significant characteristics of objectives, and authoritative or applicable (only) for participants in that form of sociality.

That it is the nature of the object that determines its respect-worthiness, and that there are different kinds of objects calling for correspondingly different responses, have led many philosophers to argue that there are different kinds of respect. In what follows, three sets of distinctions will be discussed.

Speculating on the historical development of the idea that all persons as such deserve respect, and using terms found in Kant’s writings on Achtung (the German word usually translated as “respect”), Feinberg (1975) identifies three concepts for which “respect” has been the name. (1) Respekt , is the “uneasy and watchful attitude that has ‘the element of fear’ in it” (1975, 1). Its objects are dangerous or powerful things. It is respekt that woodworkers are encouraged to have for power tools, a new sailor might be admonished to have for the sea, and a child might have for an abusive parent. Respekt contrasts with contemptuous disregard; it is shown in conduct that is cautious, self-protective, other-placating. (2) The second concept, observantia , is the moralized analogue of respekt. It involves regarding the object as making a rightful claim on our conduct, as deserving moral consideration in its own right, independently of considerations of personal well-being. It is observantia , Feinberg maintains, that historically was extended first to classes of non-dangerous but otherwise worthy people and then to all persons as such, regardless of merit or ability. Observantia encompasses both the respect said to be owed to all humans equally and the forms of polite respect and deference that acknowledge different social positions. On Kant’s account, observantia is the kind of respect we have an inviolable moral duty to give every person, both by acknowledging their claim to moral equality with us and by never treating persons as if they have little or no worth compared with ourselves (Kant 1797, 6:499). (3) Reverentia , the third concept, is the special feeling of profound awe and respect we involuntarily experience in the presence of something extraordinary or sublime, a feeling that both humbles and uplifts us. On Kant’s account, the moral law and people who exemplify it in morally worthy actions elicit reverentia from us, for we experience the law or its exemplification as “something that always trumps our inclinations in determining our wills” (Feinberg 1975, 2). Feinberg sees different forms of power as underlying the three kinds of respect; in each case, respect is the acknowledgment of the power of something other than ourselves to demand, command, or make claims on our attention, consideration, and deference. (See further discussion of Kant’s account in section 2.2.)

Hudson (1980) draws a four-fold distinction among kinds of respect, according to the bases in the objects. Consider the following examples: (a) respecting a colleague highly as a scholar and having a lot of respect for someone with “guts”; (b) a mountain climber’s respect for the elements and a tennis player’s respect for her opponent’s strong backhand; (c) respecting the terms of an agreement and respecting a person’s rights; and (d) showing respect for a judge by rising when she enters the courtroom and respecting a worn-out flag by burning it rather than tossing it in the trash. The respect in (a), evaluative respect , is similar to other favorable attitudes such as esteem and admiration; it is earned or deserved (or not) depending on whether and to the degree that the object is judged to meet certain standards. Obstacle respect , in (b), is a matter of regarding the object as something that, if not taken proper account of in one’s decisions about how to act, could prevent one from achieving one’s ends. The objects of (c) directive respect are directives: things such as requests, rules, advice, laws, or rights claims that may be taken as guides to action. One respects a directive when one’s actions intentionally comply with it. The objects of (d) institutional respect are social institutions or practices, positions or roles in an institution or practice, and persons or things that occupy positions in or represent the institution. Institutional respect is constituted by behavior that conforms to rules that prescribe certain conduct as respectful. These four forms of respect differ in several ways. Each identifies a quite different kind of feature of objects as the basis of respect. Each is expressed in action in quite different ways, although evaluative respect need not be expressed at all. Evaluative respect centrally involves having a favorable attitude toward the object, while the other forms do not. Directive respect does not admit of degrees (one either obeys the rule or doesn’t), but the others do (we can have more evaluative respect for one person than another). Hudson uses this distinction to argue that respect for persons is not a unique kind of respect but should be conceived rather as involving some combination or other of these four.

To Hudson’s four-fold classification, Dillon (1992a) adds a fifth form, care respect , which draws on feminist ethics of care. Care respect, which is exemplified in an environmentalist’s deep respect for nature, involves both regarding the object as having profound and perhaps unique value and so cherishing it, and perceiving it as fragile or calling for special care and so acting or forbearing to act out of felt benevolent concern for it.

Darwall (1977) distinguishes two kinds of respect: recognition respect and appraisal respect . Recognition respect is the disposition to give appropriate weight or consideration in one’s practical deliberations to some fact about the object and to regulate one’s conduct by constraints derived from that fact. (Frankena 1986 and Cranor 1982, 1983 refer to this as “consideration respect.”) A wide variety of objects can be objects of recognition respect, including laws, dangerous things, someone’s feelings, social institutions, nature, the selves individuals present in different contexts, people occupying certain social roles or positions, and persons as such. Appraisal respect, by contrast, is an attitude of positive appraisal, the “thinking highly of” kind of respect that we might have a great deal of for some individuals, little of for others, or lose for those whose clay feet or dirty laundry becomes apparent. Appraisal respect involves a grading assessment of a person in light of some qualitative standards that they can meet or not to greater and lesser degrees. It differs from the more widely grounded esteem and admiration in that it is concerned specifically with the moral quality of people’s character or conduct, or with other characteristics that are relevant to their moral quality as agents.

The recognition/appraisal distinction has been quite influential and is widely regarded as the fundamental distinction. Indeed, evaluative respect is similar to appraisal respect, while respekt , obstacle respect, observantia , directive respect, institutional respect, and care respect could be analyzed as forms of recognition respect. Some philosophers, however, have found the recognition/appraisal distinction to be inadequate, inasmuch as it seems to have no room for reverentia , especially in the form of the felt experience of the sublimity of the moral law and of persons as such (e.g., Buss 1999b), and it seems to obscure the variety of valuings that different modes of respect can involve. Much philosophical work has involved refining the recognition/appraisal distinction.

In the rest of this article, I will discuss respect and self-respect using Darwall’s term “recognition respect,” Hudson’s term “evaluative respect,” and Feinberg’s “reverential respect” (the last for the valuing feeling that is involuntary motivational without being deliberative), specifying the valuing dimensions as necessary.

In everyday discourse, respect most commonly refers to one of two attitudes or modes of conduct. The first is the kind of respect individuals show (or should show) others because of the latter’s social role or position. For example, children should respect their parents by listening and courtroom spectators should respect the judge. by rising upon her entrance. This is a social form of recognition respect that is, typically, structured by social institutions whose norms are authoritative for participants in the institutions and that need not involve any positive valuing of the object. “Respect” is also commonly used, second, in a valuing sense, to mean thinking highly of someone: having a lot of respect for someone who has overcome adversity or losing all respect for a betrayer. This is evaluative respect. However, philosophical attention to respect has tended to focus on recognition respect that acknowledges or values the object from a moral point of view, which we can call “moral recognition respect.” These discussions tend to relate such respect to the concepts of moral standing or moral worth. Moral standing, or moral considerability, is the idea that certain things matter morally in their own right and so are appropriate objects of direct fundamental moral consideration or concern (Birch 1993; P. Taylor 1986). Alternatively, it is argued that certain things have a distinctive kind of intrinsic moral worth, often called “dignity,” in virtue of which evoke reverential respect or ought to be accorded some valuing form of moral recognition respect. In modern philosophical discussions, humans are universally regarded as the paradigm objects of moral respect. Although some theorists argue that nature (or, all living beings, species, ecosystems) or societies (or, cultures, traditions) also warrant the moral consideration and valuing of moral recognition respect, most philosophical discussion of respect has focused on moral recognition respect for persons.

2. Respect for Persons

People can be the objects or recipients of different forms of respect. We can (directive) respect a person’s legal rights, show (institutional) respect for the president by calling her “Ms. President,” have a healthy (obstacle) respect ( respekt ) for an easily angered person, (care) respect someone by cherishing her in her concrete particularity, (evaluatively) respect an individual for her commitment to a worthy project, and accord one person the same basic moral respect we think any person deserves. Thus, the idea of respect for persons is ambiguous. Because both institutional respect and evaluative respect can be for persons in roles or position, the phrase “respecting someone as an R” might mean either having high regard for a person’s excellent performance in the role or behaving in ways that express due consideration or deference to an individual qua holder of that position. Similarly, the phrase “respecting someone as a person” might refer to appraising her as overall a morally good person, or acknowledging her standing as an equal in the moral community, or attending to her as the particular person she is as opposed to treating her like any other human being. In the literature of moral and political philosophy, the notion of respect for persons commonly means a kind of respect that all people are owed morally just because they are persons, regardless of social position, individual characteristics or achievements, or moral merit.

In times past, it was taken for granted that respect for human beings was a hierarchical notion; some humans, it was thought, have a higher moral standing and a greater moral worth than others and so are morally entitled to greater recognition respect. (Not just in times past – this is still the core of racism, sexism, and other forms of bigotry.) However, the modern understanding of respect for persons rests on the idea that all persons as such have a distinctive moral status in virtue of which we have unconditional obligations to regard and treat them in ways that are constrained by certain inviolable limits. This is sometimes expressed in terms of rights: all persons, it is said, have a fundamental moral right to respect simply because they are persons. Connected with this is the idea that all persons are fundamentally equal, despite the very many things that distinguish one individual from another. All persons, that is, have the moral standing of equality in the moral community and are equally worthy of and owed respect. Respect acknowledges the moral standing of equal persons as such and is also the key mode of valuing persons as persons.

But which kind of respect are all persons owed? It is obvious that we could not owe every individual evaluative respect, let alone equal evaluative respect, since not everyone acts morally correctly or has an equally morally good character. Moreover, since reverential respect is an involuntary emotional response to something that is “awesome,” but we can’t have a moral obligation to experience an emotion, reverential respect can’t be the kind we owe all persons. So, if it is true that all persons are owed or have a moral right to respect just as persons, then the concept of respect for person has to be analyzed as some form or combination of forms of moral recognition respect. One analysis takes moral recognition respect for a person as a person to involve recognizing that this being is a person, appreciating that persons as such have a distinctive moral standing and worth, understanding this standing and worth as the source of moral constraints on one’s attitudes, desires, and conduct, and viewing, valuing, and treating this person only in ways that are appropriate to and due persons (Dillon 1997, 2010).

It is controversial, however, whether we do indeed have a moral obligation to respect all persons regardless of merit, and if so, why. There are disagreements, for example, about the scope of the claim, the grounds of respect, and the justification for the obligation. There is also a divergence of views about the kinds of treatment that are respectful of persons.

One source of controversy concerns the scope of the concept of a person. Although in everyday discourse the word “person” is synonymous with “human being,” some philosophical discussions treat it as a technical term whose range of application might not be coextensive with the class of human beings (just as, for legal purposes, business corporations are regarded as persons). This is because some of the reasons that have been given for respecting persons entail both that some non-human things warrant the same respect on the very same grounds as humans and that not all humans do. Consequently, one question an account of respect for persons has to address is: Who or what are persons that are owed respect? Different answers have been offered, including all human beings; all and only those humans who are themselves capable of respecting persons; all beings capable of rational activity, or of sympathy and empathy, or of valuing, whether human or not; all beings capable of functioning as moral agents, whether human or not; all beings capable of participating in certain kinds of social relations, whether human or not. The second, third, and fourth answers would seem to exclude deceased humans and humans who lack sufficient mental capacity, such as the profoundly mentally disabled, the severely mentally ill and senile, those in persistent vegetative states, the pre-born, and perhaps very young children. The third, fourth, and fifth answers might include humans with diminished capacities, artificial beings (androids, sophisticated robots), spiritual beings (gods, angels), extraterrestrial beings, and certain animals (apes, dolphins).

In trying to clarify who or what we are obligated to respect, we are naturally led to a question about the ground or basis of respect: What is it about persons that makes them matter morally in such a way as to make them worthy of respect? One common way of answer this question is to look for some morally valuable natural qualities or capacities that are common to all beings that are noncontroversially owed respect (for example, all normal adult humans). Even regarding humans, there is a question of scope: Are all humans owed respect? If respect is something to which all human beings have an equal claim, then, it has been argued, the basis has to be something that all humans possess equally or in virtue of which humans are naturally equal, or a threshold quality that all humans possess, with variations above the threshold ignored. Some philosophers have argued that certain capacities fit the bill; others argue that there is no quality actually possessed by all humans that could be a plausible ground for a moral obligation of equal respect. Some draw from this the conclusion that respect is owed not to all but only to some human beings, for example, only morally good persons (Dean 2014). Another view is that the search for valuable qualities possessed by all humans that could ground universally owed moral recognition respect gets things backwards: rather than being grounded in some fact about humans, respect confers moral standing and worth on them (Sensen 2017; Bird forthcoming). But the last view still leaves the questions: why should this morally powerful standing and worth be conferred on humans? And is it conferred on all humans? Yet another question of scope is: Must persons always be respected? One view is that individuals forfeit their claim to respect by, for example, committing heinous crimes of disrespect against other persons, such as murder in the course of terrorism or genocide. Another view is that there are no circumstances under which it is morally justifiable to not respect a person, and that even torturers and child-rapists, though they may deserve the most severe condemnation and punishment and may have forfeited their rights to freedom and perhaps to life, still remain persons to whom we have obligations of respect, since the grounds of respect are independent of moral merit or demerit (Hill 2000b).

There is a further question of justification to be addressed, for it is one thing to say that persons have a certain valuable quality, but quite another thing to say that there is a moral obligation to respect persons (Hill 1997). So, we must ask: What reasons do we have for believing that the fact that persons possess quality X entails that we are morally obligated to respect persons by, for example, treating them in certain ways? Another way of asking a justification question seeks not a normative connection between qualities of persons and moral obligation, but an explanation for our belief that humans (and perhaps other beings) are owed respect, for example: What in our experience of other humans or in our evolutionary history explains the development and power of this belief? On some accounts, our actual felt experiences of reverential respect play a significant role (Buss 1999b). In other accounts, what justifies accepting our experience of respect for humans (or other beings) as grounds for an obligation is its coherence with our other moral beliefs (Hill 2000b; Margalit 1996; Gibbard 1990).

Other questions concern what respecting persons requires of us. Some philosophers argue that the obligation to respect person functions as a negative constraint: respect involves refraining from regarding or treating persons in certain ways. For example, we ought not to treat them as if they were worthless or had value only insofar as we find them useful or interesting, or as if they were mere objects or specimens, or as if they were vermin or dirt; we ought not to violate their basic moral rights, or interfere with their efforts to make their own decisions and govern their own conduct, or humiliate them, or treat them in ways that flout their nature and worth as persons. Other theorists maintain that we also have positive duties of respect: we ought, for example, to try to see each of them and the world from their own points of view, or help them to promote their morally acceptable ends, or protect them from their own self-harming decisions. And some philosophers note that it may be more respectful to judge someone’s actions or character negatively or to punish someone for wrongdoing than to treat them as if they were not responsible for what they did, although requirements of respect would impose limits on how such judgments may be expressed and how persons may be punished. Another question concerns equality of respect. While most theorists agree that moral recognition respect is owed equally to all persons and that it requires treating persons as equals (as all having the same basic moral worth and status), there is disagreement about whether respect requires that persons be treated equally (whatever is done or not done for or to one person must be done or not done for or to everyone). One view is that equal treatment would fail to respect important differences between individuals (Frankfurt 1999). Perhaps, however, as regards respect as a negative constraint, it is appropriate to treat all persons the same: no one should be treated like worthless garbage (just as no U.S. citizen should be compelled to incriminate themselves), while as regards respect as a positive duty, it may be more respectful of each person to treat individuals with different needs, aims, and circumstances differently (as a loving parent might allow her older children but not the younger ones to have social media accounts).

The most influential account of respect for persons is found in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1785, 1788, 1793, 1797). Indeed, most contemporary discussions of respect for persons explicitly claim to rely on, develop, or challenge some aspect of Kant’s ethics. Central to Kant’s ethical theory is the claim that all persons, regardless of personal qualities or achievements, social position, or moral track-record, are owed respect just because they are persons, that is, beings with rational and autonomous wills. To be a person is to have a status and worth unlike that of any other kind of being: it is to be an end in itself with dignity. And the only appropriate response to such a being is respect. Moreover, respect for persons is not only appropriate but also unconditionally required: persons must always be respected. Because we are all too often inclined not to respect each other, one formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which is the supreme principle of morality, commands that our actions express due respect for persons: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end” ( Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten ( Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals) (1785, 4:429). Although commentators disagree about how precisely to understand this imperative, one common view is that it defines our fundamental moral obligation as respect all persons, including ourselves, and thus defines morally right actions as those that express respect for persons as ends in themselves and morally wrong actions as those that express disrespect or contempt for persons (Wood 1999). (On other readings, respect is one of our fundamental duties, but there are others, such as love, justice, and moral self-improvement.) In addition to this general commandment, Kant argues that there are also more specific duties of respect for other persons and self-respect, to which we’ll return. For now, we must address the question, What is it to be an end in itself and to possess dignity?

An end, for Kant, is anything for the sake of which we act. Kant identifies two kinds of ends. The first are subjective ends, which are things we want, which we pursue or promote through means we think will help us to get or advance them. The value of subjective ends is conditional on or relative to the desire or interests of the individual who values them. The other kind of end is objective. These are ends in themselves, ends whose value is not dependent on any interests or desires but is absolute and unconditional, grounded solely in what they are. Kant maintains that all and only rational beings are ends in themselves. The technical term “persons” delineates the category of beings whose rational nature “already marks them out as ends in themselves…and an object of respect” ( Groundwork 4: 428).

To act for the sake of persons as ends in themselves, to respect them, is not to pursue or promote them, but to value them as the unconditionally valuable beings they are. It is also to acknowledge that there are constraints on our treatment of persons, for to be an end in itself is also to be a limit--just as the end of the road puts a limit on our travels, so an end in itself puts an absolute limit on the subjective ends we may set, the means we may use to pursue them, and, very importantly, on how we may treat ends in themselves. Such beings must never be used as if they were merely means, as if they were nothing more than tools that we may use however we want to advance our ends. Note, however, that it is not wrong to treat persons as means to our ends; indeed, we could not get along in life if we could not make use of the talents, abilities, service, and labor of other people. What we must never do is treat persons as mere means to our ends, to treat them as if the only value they have is what derives from their usefulness to us. Rather, we must always treat them “as the same time as an end.”

Kant holds that persons, as ends in themselves, have dignity ( Die Metaphysik der Sitten ( The Metaphysics of Morals ) (1797), 6: 435). But what is dignity? Until the last century or so, “dignity” (from the Latin dignitas , worthiness) referred to a high social status associated with the aristocracy, offices of power, and high church positions. Dignity thus distinguished socially important people from the hoi polloi , who had no dignity (Debes 2017). Kant’s view that every person has dignity thus marks a revolution in valuation (but see Dean 2014 and Hay 2012 for the view that only morally good people have dignity). Commentators disagree about how to understand what Kant means by dignity (cf. Sensen 2017, 2011; Cureton 2013; Darwall 2008). But the most common interpretation is that dignity is a distinctive kind objective worth that is absolute (not conditional on anyone’s needs, desires, or interests, and a value that everyone has an overriding reason to acknowledge); intrinsic or inherent (not bestowed or earned and not subject to being lost or forfeited); incomparable and the highest form of worth (a being with dignity cannot rationally be exchanged for or replaced by any other valued object, and is infinitely valuable, we might say, rather than worth $5 or $5 million).

In arguing for respect for the dignity of persons, Kant explicitly rejects two other conceptions of human value: the aristocratic idea of honor that individuals differentially deserve according to their social rank, individual accomplishments, or moral virtue (on the aristocratic dimensions of honor, see Darwall 2013; Berger 1983), and the view, baldly expressed by Hobbes, that:

… the value or worth of a man is, as of all other things, his price—that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power—and therefore is not absolute but a thing dependent on the need and judgment of another. (Hobbes 1651, 79)

In The Metaphysics of Morals , Kant agrees with Hobbes that if we think of humans as merely one kind of animal among others “in the system of nature,” we can ascribe a price to them, an extrinsic value that depends on their usefulness. But, he argues,

a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of morally practical reason, is exalted above all price…as an end in himself he possesses a dignity by which he exacts respect for himself from all other beings in the world. ( MM , 6: 434–435)

Against the aristocratic view Kant argues that although individuals as members of some social community or other may have or lack meritorious accomplishment or status or may deserve honor or evaluative respect to different degrees or not at all, and some people deserve social recognition respect based on their socially significant features or positions, all persons as members of the moral community, i.e., the community of all and only ends in themselves, are owed the same moral recognition respect, for the dignity that they possesses as rational is unconditional and independent of all distinguishing facts about or features of them.

As the Categorical Imperative indicates, in virtue of the humanity in them that persons are, and so ought to be treated as, ends in themselves. Commentators generally identify humanity (that which makes us distinctively human beings and sets us apart from all other animal species) with two closely related aspects of rationality: the capacity to set ends and the capacity to be autonomous, both of which are capacities to be a moral agent (for example, Wood 1999; Hill 1997; Korsgaard 1996). The capacity to set ends, which is the power of rational choice, is the capacity to value things through rational judgment: to determine, under the influence of reason independently of antecedent instincts or desires, that something is valuable or important, that it is worth seeking or valuing. It is also, thereby, the capacity to value ends in themselves, and so it includes the capacity for respect (Velleman 1999). The capacity to be autonomous is the capacity to be self-legislating and self-governing, that is, (a) the capacity to legislate moral laws that are valid for all rational beings through one’s rational willing by recognizing, using reason alone, what counts as a moral obligation, and (b) the capacity then to freely resolve to act in accordance with moral laws because they are self-imposed by one’s own reason and not because one is compelled to act by any forces external to one’s reason and will, including one’s own desires and inclinations. The capacity to be autonomous is thus also the capacity to freely direct, shape, and determine the meaning of one’s own life, and it is the condition for moral responsibility. It is then, not as members of the biological species homo sapiens that human beings have dignity and so are owed moral recognition respect, but as rational beings who are capable of moral agency.

There are several important consequences of the Kantian view of the scope of moral recognition respect for persons as persons. First, while all normally functioning human beings possess the rational capacities that ground recognition respect, there can be humans in whom these capacities are altogether absent and who therefore, on this view, are not persons and are not owed respect. Second, these capacities could, in principle, be possessed by beings who are not biologically human, and such beings would also be persons with dignity whom we are morally obligated to respect. Third, because dignity does not depend on how well or badly the capacities for moral agency are exercised, on whether a person acts morally or has a morally good character or not, dignity is not a matter of degree and cannot be diminished or lost through vice or morally bad action or increased through virtue or morally correct action. Thus, the morally worst person has the same dignity as the morally best, although the former, we might say, fail to live up to their dignity. Likewise, moral recognition respect is not something individuals have to earn or might fail to earn, so even the morally worst individuals must still be regarded as ends in themselves and treated with respect. Of course, wrongdoing may call for punishment and may be grounds for forfeiting certain rights, but it is not grounds for losing dignity, for being regarded as worthless scum, or denied all respect (Hill 2000b). What grounds dignity is something that all persons have in common, not something that distinguishes one individual from another. Thus, each person is to be respected as an equal among equals, without consideration of individual achievements or failures, social rank, moral merit or demerit. However, the equality of all rational beings does not entail that persons cannot also be differentially evaluated and valued in other ways for their particular qualities, accomplishments, merit, or usefulness, although such valuing and treatment must always be constrained by the moral requirement to accord recognition respect to persons as ends in themselves.

In The Metaphysics of Morals , Kant develops the implications of this view of persons as ends in themselves. His doctrine of justice holds that the fundamental freedom and equality of persons is the basis of the legitimate state, that freedom of choice must be respected and promoted, that persons are bearers of fundamental rights and that the moral status of persons imposes limits on permissible legal punishment. In his doctrine of virtue, Kant discusses specific moral duties of recognition respect for other persons, as well as duties of recognition self-respect, to which we’ll return below. Here, Kant explicitly invokes the notion of respect as observantia . We have no moral duty to feel respect for others; rather, the respect we owe others is “to be understood as the maxim of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person, and so as respect in the practical sense” ( MM , 6:449). This duty of recognition respect owed to others requires two things: first, that we adopt as a regulating policy a commitment to control our own desire to think well of ourselves (this desire being the main cause of disrespect), and, second, that we refrain from treating others in the following ways: treating them merely as means (valuing them as less than ends in themselves), showing contempt for them (denying that they have any worth), treating them arrogantly (demanding that they value us more highly than they value themselves), making them look like worthless beings by defaming them by publicly exposing their faults, and ridiculing or mocking them.

Subsequent work in a Kantian vein on the duty of respect for others has expanded the list of ways that we are morally required by respect to treat persons. In particular, although Kant says that the duties of recognition respect are strictly negative, consisting in not engaging in certain conduct or having certain attitudes, many philosophers have argued that respecting others involves positive actions and attitudes as well. The importance of autonomy and agency in Kant’s moral philosophy has led many philosophers to highlight respect for autonomy. Thus, we respect others as persons (negatively) by doing nothing to impair or destroy their capacity for autonomy, by not interfering with their autonomous decisions and their pursuit of the (morally acceptable) ends they value, and by not coercing or deceiving them or treating them paternalistically. We also respect them (positively) by protecting them from threats to their autonomy (which may require intervention when someone’s current decisions seem to put their autonomy at risk) and by promoting autonomy and the conditions for it (for example, by allowing and encouraging individuals to make their own decisions, take responsibility for their actions, and control their own lives). Some philosophers have highlighted Kant’s claim that rationality is the ground for recognition respect, arguing that to respect others is to engage with them not as instruments or obstacles but as persons who are to be reasoned with. The importance of the capacity to set ends and value things has been taken by some philosophers to entail that respect also involves helping others to promote and protect what they value and to pursue their ends, provided these are compatible with due respect for other persons, and making an effort to appreciate values that are different from our own. Kant’s emphasis in the doctrine of justice on the fundamental rights that persons have has led still others to view the duty of recognition respect for persons as the duty to respect the moral rights they have as persons; some have claimed that the duty to respect is nothing more than the duty to refrain from violating these rights (Benn 1988; Feinberg 1970).

Finally, it is worth noting that on Kant’s account, both the moral law and morally good people--those who do what is right out of respect for the moral law--are also objects of respect. The respect here is reverentia , the inescapable felt consciousness of the unconditional authority of the law and compelling examples of obedience to it, a consciousness of one’s mind “bowing,” as it were, in submission. Reverentia can give rise both to recognition respect of the law and persons as such and to evaluative respect for good people. (See discussions in kant’s Groundwork (4:401n); Metaphysics of Morals (6:399–418); Kritik der praktischen Vernunft ( Critique of Practical Reason ) (1788) (5:72–76); and Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft ( Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason ) (1793) (6:21–23); and in Stratton-Lake 200; Grenberg 1999; Wood 1999; Hill 1998; McCarty 1994).

Philosophical discussions of respect since Kant have tended, on the one hand, to develop or apply various aspects of it, or on the other, to take issue with it or develop alternative accounts of respect. Some of the discussions have focused on more theoretical issues. For example, Kant gives the notion of respect for persons a central and vital role in moral theory. One issue that has since concerned philosophers is whether respect for persons is the definitive focus of morality, either in the sense that moral rightness and goodness and hence all specific moral duties, rights, and virtues are explainable in terms of respect or in the sense that the supreme moral principle from which all other principles are derived is a principle of respect for persons. Some philosophers have developed ethical theories in which a principle of respect for persons is identified as the fundamental and comprehensive moral requirement (for example, Donagan 1977; Downie and Telfer 1969). Others (for example, Hill 1993; Frankena 1986; Cranor 1975) argue that while respect for persons is surely a very important moral consideration, it cannot be the principle from which the rest of morality is deduced. They maintain that there are moral contexts in which respect for persons is not an issue and that there are other dimensions of our moral relations with others that seem not to reduce to respect. Moreover, they argue, such a principle would seem not to provide moral grounds for believing that we ought to treat mentally incapacitated humans or nonhuman animals decently, or would (as Kant argues) make a duty to respect such beings only an indirect duty—one we have only because it is a way of respecting persons who value such beings or because our duty to respect ourselves requires that we not engage in activities that would dull our ability to treat persons decently—rather than a direct duty to such beings ( Metaphysics of Morals , 6:443).

Some theorists maintain that utilitarianism, a moral theory generally thought to be a rival to Kant’s theory, is superior with regard to this last point. A utilitarian might argue that it is sentience rather than the capacity for rational autonomy that is the ground of moral recognition respect, and so would regard mentally incapacitated humans and nonhuman animals as having moral standing and so as worthy of at least some moral respect in themselves. Another issue, then, is whether utilitarianism (or more generally, consequentialism) can indeed accommodate a principle of respect for persons. In opposition to the utilitarian claim, some Kantians argue that Kant’s ethics is distinguishable from consequentialist ethics precisely in maintaining that the fundamental demand of morality is not that we promote some value, such as the happiness of sentient beings, but that we respect the worth of humanity regardless of the consequences of doing so (Wood 1999; Korsgaard 1996). Thus, some philosophers argue that utilitarianism is inconsistent with respect for persons, inasmuch as utilitarianism, in requiring that all actions, principles, or motives promote the greatest good, requires treating persons as mere means on those occasions when doing so maximizes utility, whereas the very point of a principle of respect for persons is to rule out such trading of persons and their dignity for some other value (Benn 1988, Brody 1982). In opposition, other theorists maintain not only that a consequentialist theory can accommodate the idea of respect for persons (Cummiskey 2008, 1990; Pettit 1989; Gruzalski 1982; Landesman 1982; Downie and Telfer 1969), but also that utilitarianism is derivable from a principle of respect for persons (Downie and Telfer 1969) and that consequentialist theories provide a better grounding for duties to respect persons (Pettit 1989).

In addition to the debate between Kantian theory and utilitarianism, theoretical work has also been done in developing the role of respect for persons in Habermasian communicative ethics (Young 1997; Benhabib 1991) and in exploring respect in the ethics of other philosophers, including ancient Greek poets (Giorgini 2017), Plato (Rowe 2017), Aristotle (Thompson 2017; Weber 2017; Rabbås 2015; Jacobs 1995; Preus 1991), Hobbes (2017), Hegel (Laitinen 2017; Moland 2002), and Mill (Loizides 2017). Cross-cultural explorations include discussions of similarities and differences between western (Kantian) views of respect for persons and Indian (Ghosh-Dastidar 1987), Confucian (Liu 2019; Lu 2017; Chan 2006; Wawrytko 1982), and Taoist views (Wong 1984). Several theorists have developed distinctively feminist account of respect for persons (Farley 1993; Dillon 1992a).

Other philosophical discussions have been concerned with clarifying the nature of the respect that is owed to persons and of the persons that are owed respect. Some of these discussions aim to refine and develop Kant’s account, while others criticize it, or offer alternatives. One significant non-Kantian account is Pettit’s conversive theory of respect for persons (Pettit 2021, 2015). An influential development of the Kantian account is Darwall’s second-personal account (2021, 2015, 2008, 2006, 2004), according to which the regulation of conduct that moral recognition respect involves arises from our directly acknowledging each other as equal persons who have the moral authority to address moral demands to one another that each of us is morally obligated to accept. The reciprocal relations of persons as authoritative claims-makers and mutually accountable claims-responders is, in Darwall’s view, one way of understanding what Kant calls in the Groundwork a “kingdom of ends.”

Another area of interest has been the connections between respect and other attitudes and emotions, especially love and between respect and virtues such as trust. For example, Kant argues that we have duties of love to others just as we have duties of respect. However, neither the love nor the respect we owe is a matter of feeling (or, is pathological, as Kant says), but is, rather, a duty to adopt a certain kind of maxim, or policy of action: the duty of love is the duty to make the ends of others my own, the duty of respect is the duty to not degrade others to the status of mere means to my ends ( Metaphysics of Morals , 6: 449–450). Love and respect, in Kant’s view, are intimately united in friendship; nevertheless, they are in tension with one another and respect seems to be the morally more important of the two. Critics object to what they see here as Kant’s devaluing of emotions, maintaining that emotions are morally significant dimensions of persons both as subjects and as objects of both respect and love. In response, some philosophers contend that respect and love are more similar and closely connected in Kant’s theory than is generally recognized (Bagnoli 2003; Velleman 1999; Baron 1997; R. Johnson 1997). Others have developed accounts of respect that is or incorporates a form of love (agape) or care (Dillon 1992a; Downie and Telfer 1969; Maclagan 1960), and some have argued that emotions are included among the bases of dignity and that a complex emotional repertoire is necessary for Kantian respect (Wood 1999; Sherman 1998a; Farley 1993). In a related vein, some philosophers maintain that it is possible to acknowledge that another being is a person, i.e., a rational moral agent, and yet not have or give respect to that being. What is required for respecting a person is not simply recognizing what they are but emotionally experiencing their value as a person (Thomas 2001a; Buss 1999b; Dillon 1997). Other attitudes, emotions, and virtues whose connections with respect have been discussed are toleration (for example, Carter 2013; Deveaux 1998; Addis 2004), forgiveness (for example, Holmgren 1993), good manners (Stohr 2012; Buss 1999a), esteem (for example, Brennan and Pettit 1997), reverence (Woodruff 2003, 2001), honor (Darwall 2015), and appreciation (Hill 2021). Work has also been done on attitudes and emotions that are (usually taken to be) opposed to respect, such as arrogance (Dillon 2003) and contempt (Miceli and Castelfranci 2018; Mason 2017; Bell 2013).

Another source of dissatisfaction with Kant’s account has been with his characterization of persons and the quality in virtue of which they must be respected. In particular, Kant’s view that the rational will which is common to all persons is the ground of respect is thought to ignore the moral importance of the concrete particularity of each individual, and his emphasis on autonomy, which is often understood to involve the independence of one person from all others, is thought to ignore the essential relationality of human beings (for example, Noggle 1999; Farley 1993; Dillon 1992a; E. Johnson 1982). Rather than ignoring what distinguishes one person from another, it is argued, respect should involve attending to each person as a distinctive individual and to the concrete realities of human lives, and it should involve valuing difference as well as sameness and interdependence as well as independence. Other critics respond that respecting differences and particular identities inevitably reintroduces hierarchical discrimination that is antithetical to the equality among persons that the idea of respect for persons is supposed to express (for example, Bird 2004). Identity and difference may, however, be appropriate objects of other forms of consideration and appreciation.

The ideas of mutual respect or disrespect and respect for particularity and relationality has also become an important topic in moral and political philosophy. Helm has argued that a “community of respect” is essential to understanding what a person is (Helm 2017). Margalit argues that humiliation, both disrespect and the result of being disrespected, is a form of exclusion of individuals from the good of community (Margalit 1996). One issue is how persons ought to be respected in multicultural liberal democratic societies (for example, Balint 2006; Tomasi 1995; C. Taylor 1992; Kymlicka 1989). Respect for persons is one of the basic tenets of liberal democratic societies, which are founded on the ideal of the equal dignity of all citizens and which realize this ideal in the equalization of rights and entitlements among all citizens and so the rejection of discrimination and differential treatment. Some writers argue that respecting persons requires respecting the traditions and cultures that permeate and shape their individual identities (Addis 1997). But as the citizenry of such societies becomes increasingly more diverse and as many groups come to regard their identities or very existence as threatened by a homogenizing equality, liberal societies face the question of whether they should or could respond to demands to respect the unique identity of individuals or groups by differential treatment, such as extending political rights or opportunities to some cultural groups (for example, Native Americans, French Canadians, African-Americans) and not others. Some of these discussions are carried out in terms of recognition rather than of respect, although some theorists contrast recognition and respect (McBride 2013). Honneth develops a broader, critical account of recognition that argues for a harmonious relationship among universal (recognition) respect, esteem, and love, arguing that each is essential for the development of positive relations towards ourselves (Honneth 2007, 1995).

The idea that all persons are owed respect has been applied in a wide variety of contexts. For instance, some philosophers employ it to justify various positions in normative ethics, such as the claim that persons have moral rights (Benn 1971; Feinberg 1970; Downie and Telfer 1969) or duties (Fried 1978; Rawls 1971), or to argue for principles of equality (Williams 1962), justice (Narveson 2002a, 2002b; Nussbaum 1999), and education (Andrews 1976). Others appeal to respect for persons in addressing a wide variety of practical issues such as abortion, racism and sexism, rape, punishment, physician-assisted suicide, pornography, affirmative action, forgiveness, terrorism, sexual harassment, cooperation with injustice, treatment of gays and lesbians, sexual ethics, and many others. In political philosophy, respect for persons has been used to examine issues of global inequality (e.g., Moellendorf 2010). One very important application context is biomedical ethics, where the principle of respect for autonomy is one of four basic principles that have become “the backbone of contemporary Western health care ethics” (Brannigan and Boss 2001, 39; see also Beauchamp and Childress 1979/2001 and, for example, Kerstein 2021; Munson 2000; Beauchamp and Walters 1999). The idea of respect for patient autonomy has transformed health care practice, which had traditionally worked on physician-based paternalism, and the principle enters into issues such as informed consent, truth-telling, confidentiality, respecting refusals of life-saving treatment, the use of patients as subjects in medical experimentation, and so on.

Although persons are the paradigm objects of moral recognition respect, it is a matter of some debate whether they are the only things that we ought morally to respect. One serious objection raised against Kant’s ethical theory is that in claiming that only rational beings are ends in themselves deserving of respect, it licenses treating all things which aren’t persons as mere means to the ends of rational beings, and so it supports domination and exploitation of all nonpersons and the natural environment. Taking issue with the Kantian position that only persons are respect-worthy, many philosophers have argued that humans who are not agents or not yet agents, human embryos, nonhuman animals, sentient creatures, plants, species, all living things, biotic communities, the natural ecosystem of our planet, and even mountains, rocks, and viruses have (full or perhaps just partial) moral standing or worth and so are appropriate objects of or are owed moral recognition respect. Of course, it is possible to value such things instrumentally insofar as they serve human interests, but the idea is that such things matter morally and have a claim to respect in their own right, independently of their usefulness to humans.

A variety of different strategies have been employed in arguing for such respect claims. For example, the concept of moral recognition respect is sometimes stripped down to its essentials, omitting much of the content of the concept as it appears in respect for persons contexts. The respect that is owed to all things, it can be argued, is a very basic form of attentive contemplation of the object combined with a prima facie assumption that the object might have intrinsic value (Birch 1993). Another strategy is to argue that the true grounds for moral worth and recognition respect are other than or wider than rationality. One version of this strategy (employed by P. Taylor 1986) is to argue that all living things, persons and nonpersons, have equal inherent worth and so equally deserve the same kind of moral respect, because the ground of the worth of living things that are nonpersons is continuous with the ground of the worth for persons. For example, we can regard all living things as respect-worthy in virtue of being quasi-agents and centers of organized activity that pursue their own good in their own unique way. I

A third strategy, which is employed within Kantian ethics, is to argue that respect for persons logically entails respect for nonpersons. For example, one can argue that rational nature is to be respected not only by respecting humanity in someone’s person but also by respecting things that bear certain relations to rational nature, for example, by being fragments of it or necessary conditions of it. Respect would thus be owed to humans who are not persons and to animals and other sentient beings (Foreman 2017; Rocha 2015; Wood 1998). Another strategy argues against Kant that we can both acknowledge that rational moral agents have the highest moral standing and worth and are owed maximal respect, and also maintain that other beings have lesser but still morally significant standing or worth and so deserve less but still some respect. So, although it is always wrong to use moral agents merely as means, it may be justifiable to use nonpersons as means (for example, to do research on human embryos or kill animals for food) provided their moral worth is also respectfully acknowledged (Meyer and Nelson, 2001). Much philosophical work has been done, particularly in environmental ethics, to determine the practical implications of the claim that things other than persons are owed respect (e.g., Corral 2015; Foreman 2015; Schmidtz 2011; Bognar 2011; Connolly 2006; Wiggins 2000; Westra 1989).

4. Self-Respect

While there is much controversy about respect for persons and other things, there is surprising agreement among moral and political philosophers about at least this much concerning respect for oneself: self-respect is something of great importance in everyday life. Indeed, it is regarded both as morally required and as essential to the ability to live a satisfying, meaningful, flourishing life—a life worth living—and just as vital to the quality of our lives together. Saying that a person has no self-respect or acts in a way no self-respecting person would act, or that a social institution undermines the self-respect of some people, is generally a strong moral criticism. Nevertheless, as with respect itself, there is philosophical disagreement, both real and merely apparent, about the nature, scope, grounds, and requirements of self-respect. Self-respect is often defined as a sense of worth or as due respect for oneself; it has been analyzed in various ways: it is treated as a moral duty connected with the duty to respect all persons, as something to which all persons have a right and which it would be unjust to undermine, as a moral virtue essential to morally good living, and as something one earns by living up to demanding standards. Self-respect is frequently (but not always correctly) identified with or compared to self-esteem, self-confidence, dignity, self-love, a sense of honor, self-reliance, pride, and it is contrasted (but not always correctly) with servility, shame, humility, self-abnegation, arrogance, self-importance. Understanding how, if at all, self-respect is connected with and different from these other attitudes and stances is important to having a good understanding of self-respect and the other things.

In addition to the questions philosophers have addressed about respect in general, other questions have been of particular concern to those interested in self-respect, such as: (1) What is self-respect, and how is it connected to or different from related notions such as self-esteem, self-confidence, pride, and so on? How are respect for persons and respect for oneself alike and unalike? (2) How is self-respect related to such things as moral rights, virtue, autonomy, integrity, and identity? (3) Is there a moral duty to respect ourselves as there is a duty to recognition respect others? (4) Are there objective conditions—for example, moral standards or correct judgments—that a person must meet in order to have self-respect, or is self-respect a subjective phenomenon that gains support from any sort of self-valuing without regard to correctness or moral acceptability? (5) Does respecting oneself conceptually entail or causally require or lead to respecting other persons (or anything else)? And how are respect for other persons and respect for oneself alike and unalike? (6) What features of an individual’s psychology and experience, what aspects of the social context, and what modes of interactions with others support or undermine self-respect? (7) Are social institutions and practices to be judged just or unjust (at least in part) by how they affect self-respect? Can considerations of self-respect help us to better understand the nature and wrongness of injustices such as oppression and to determine effective and morally appropriate ways to resist or end them?

Self-respect is a form of self-regard, a moral relation of persons (and only persons) to themselves that concerns their own important worth. Self-respect is thus essentially a valuing form of respect. It is, moreover, a normative stance--it is due regard for oneself, proper regard for the dignity of one’s person or position (as the O.E.D. puts it). Like respect for others, self-respect is a complex of multilayered and interpenetrating phenomena; it involves all those aspects of cognition, valuation, affect, expectation, motivation, action, and reaction that compose a mode of being in the world at the heart of which is an appropriate appreciation of oneself as having significant worth. Unlike some forms of respect, self-respect is not something one has only now and again or that might have no effect on its object. Rather, self-respect has to do with the structure and attunement of an individual’s identity and of her life, and it reverberates throughout the self, affecting the configuration and constitution of the person’s thoughts, desires, values, emotions, commitments, dispositions, and actions. As expressing or constituting one’s sense of worth, it includes an engaged understanding of one’s worth, as well as a desire and disposition to protect and preserve it. Accounts of self-respect differ in their characterizations of the beliefs, desires, affects, and behaviors that are constitutive of it, chiefly because of differences concerning both the aspects or conception of the self insofar as it is the object of one’s respect and also the nature and grounds of the worth of the self or aspects of the self.

Most theorists agree that as there are different kinds of respect, so there are different kinds of self-respect. However, we clearly cannot apply all kinds of respect to ourselves: it makes no sense to talk of directive respect for oneself, for instance, and although one might regard oneself or some of one’s characteristics as obstacles (“I’m my own worst enemy”), this would not generally be considered a form of self-respect. Because the notion of self-worth is the organizing motif for self-respect, and because in the dominant Western tradition two kinds of worth are ascribed to persons, two kinds of self-respect can be distinguished.

One way of expressing the distinction is to focus on the kinds of self-worth around which it is oriented. One kind of worth has to do with what the individual is: occupant of a social role, member of a certain class, group, or people, someone with a certain place in a social hierarchy, or simply a human person. Kantian dignity is one form, but not the only form, of this kind of worth. Such status- or identity-grounded worth entails both entitlements to due treatment from others and responsibilities for the individual in virtue of being the kind of thing that is rightly the object of respect. Recognition self-respect centers on this kind of worth. (Bird calls this “entitlement self-respect” (Bird 2010); Schemmel calls it “standing self-respect” (Schemmel 2019)). The censuring question, “Have you no self-respect?”, the phrase “No self-respecting person would ...,” and the idea that everyone has a right to self-respect concern recognition self-respect. Another kind of self-respect depends not on what one is but on the kind of person one is making of oneself, on the extent to which one’s character and conduct meet standards of worthiness. Evaluative self-respect has to do with this second kind of worth, an acquired worth that we can call “merit,” which is based on the quality of one’s character and conduct. (Darwall (1997) calls this “appraisal self-respect”; Bird and Schemmel call it “standards self-respect,” since merit is a function of the standards to which one holds oneself and by which one evaluates or appraises oneself.) We earn or lose merit, and so deserve or don’t deserve evaluative self-respect, through what we do or become. Although they are different, recognition self-respect and evaluative self-respect are related. The former involves, among other things, recognizing certain norms as entailed by one’s identity-based worth and valuing oneself appropriately by striving to live in accord with them. The latter involves regarding oneself as having merit because one is or is becoming the kind of person who does live in accord with what one regards as appropriate norms or standards.

Individuals have numerous identities and so worth bases for different forms of recognition self-respect. While self-respect based on one’s social role or position can be quite important to the individual and how she lives her life as a self-respecting chef, rabbi, mother, teacher, Hindu, or member of the aristocracy, most philosophical discussions, heavily influenced by Kant, focus on dignity-based respect for oneself as a person, that is, on moral recognition self-respect. Recognition respect for oneself as a person, then, involves living in light of an understanding and appreciation of oneself as having dignity and moral status just in virtue of being a person, and of the moral constraints that arise from that dignity and status. All persons are morally obligated or entitled to have this kind of self-respect. Because the dominant Kantian conception of persons grounds dignity in three things—equality, agency, and individuality—we can further distinguish three kinds of recognition self-respect. The first is respect for oneself as a person among persons, as a member of the moral community with a status and dignity equal to every other person (see, for example, Thomas 1983a; Boxill 1976; Hill 1973). This involves having some conception of the kinds of treatment from others that would count as one’s due as a person and treatment that would be degrading or beneath one’s dignity, desiring to be regarded and treated appropriately, and resenting and being disposed to protest disregard and disrespectful treatment. Thinking of oneself as having certain moral rights that others ought not to violate is part of this kind of self-respect; servility (regarding oneself as the inferior of others) and arrogance (thinking oneself superior to others) are among its opposites.

The second kind of recognition self-respect involves an appreciation of oneself as an agent, a being with the ability and responsibility to act autonomously and value appropriately (see, for example, G. Taylor 1985; Telfer 1968). Persons who respect themselves as agents take their responsibilities seriously, especially their responsibilities to live in accord with their dignity as persons, to govern themselves fittingly, and to make of themselves and their lives something they believe to be good. So, self-respecting persons regard certain forms of acting, thinking, desiring, and feeling as befitting them as persons and other forms as self-debasing or shameful, and they expect themselves to adhere to the former and avoid the latter. They take care of themselves and seek to develop and use their talents and abilities in pursuit of their plans, projects, and goals. Those who are shameless, uncontrolled, weak-willed, self-consciously sycophantic, chronically irresponsible, slothfully dependent, self-destructive, or unconcerned with the shape and direction of their lives may be said to not respect themselves as agents.

A third kind of recognition self-respect involves the appreciation of the importance of being autonomously self-defining. One way a self-respecting individual does this is through having, and living in light, of a normative self-conception, i.e., a conception of being and living that she regards as worthy of her as the particular person she is. Such a self-conception both gives expression to ideals and commitments that shape the individual’s identity, and also organizes desires, choices, pursuits, and projects in ways that give substance and worth to the self. Self-respecting people hold themselves to personal expectations and standards the disappointment of which they would regard as unworthy of them, shameful, even contemptible (although they may not apply these standards to others) (Hill 1982). People who sell out, betray their own values, live inauthentic lives, let themselves be defined by others, or are complacently self-accepting lack this kind of recognition self-respect.

To these three Kantian kinds of recognition self-respect, we can add a fourth, which has to do with the fact that it is not just as abstract human beings or as agents with personal and universalizable moral goals and obligations that individuals can, do, or should respect themselves but also as concrete persons embedded in particular social structures and occupying various social positions with status-related responsibilities they must meet to be self-respecting (Middleton 2006). This last kind also has political implications, as discussed below.

Evaluative self-respect, which expresses confidence in one’s merit as a person, rests on an appraisal of oneself in light of the normative self-conception that structures recognition self-respect. Recognition self-respecting persons are concerned to be the kind of person they think it is good and appropriate for them to be and they try to live the kind of life such a person should live. Thus, they have and try to live by certain standards of worthiness by which they are committed to judge themselves. Indeed, they stake themselves, their value and their identities, on living in accord with these standards. Because they want to know where they stand, morally, they are disposed to reflectively examine and evaluate their character and conduct in light of their normative vision of themselves. And it matters to them that they are able to “bear their own survey,” as Hume says (1739, 620). Evaluative self-respect contains the judgment that one is or is becoming the worthy kind of person one seeks to be, and, more significantly, that one is not in danger of becoming an unworthy kind of person (Dillon 2004). Evaluative self-respect holds, at the least, the judgment that one “comes up to scratch,” as Telfer (1968) puts it. Those whose conduct is unworthy or whose character is shameful by their own standards do not deserve their own evaluative respect. However, people can be poor self-appraisers and their standards can be quite inappropriate to them or to any person, and so their evaluative self-respect, though still subjectively satisfying, can be unwarranted, as can the loss or lack of it. Interestingly, although philosophers have paid scant attention to evaluative respect for others, significant work has been done on evaluative self-respect. This may reflect an asymmetry between the two: although our evaluative respect for others may have no effect on them, perhaps because we don’t express it or they don’t value our appraisal, our own self-evaluation matters intensely to us and can powerfully affect our self-identity and the shape and structure of our lives. Indeed, an individual’s inability to stomach herself can profoundly diminish the quality of her life, even her desire to continue living.

Some philosophers have contended that a third kind of self-valuing underlies both recognition and evaluative self-respect. It is a more basic sense of worth that enables an individual to develop the intellectually more sophisticated forms, a precondition for being able to take one’s qualities or the fact that one is a person as grounds of positive self-worth. It has been called “basic psychological security” (Thomas 1989), “self-love” (Buss 1999), and “basal self-respect” (Dillon 1997). Basal self-valuing is our most fundamental sense of ourselves as mattering and our primordial interpretation of self and self-worth. Strong and secure basal self-respect can immunize an individual against personal failing or social denigration, but damage to basal self-respect, which can occur when people grow up in social, political, or cultural environments that devalue them or “their kind,” can make it impossible for people to properly interpret themselves and their self-worth, because it affects the way in which they assess reality and weigh reasons. Basal self-respect is thus the ground of the possibility of recognition and evaluative self-respect.

There are also non-deontological accounts of moral recognition self-respect. Utilitarians, for example, can treat self-respect as of paramount importance to a flourishing or happy life, and thereby justifying moral constraints on the treatment of others (Scarre 1992). Similarly, one could give a virtue-theoretical account of recognition self-respect, especially the agentic form (Dillon 2015), although this avenue has been relatively unexplored

It is common in everyday discourse and philosophical discussion to treat self-respect and self-esteem as synonyms. It is evaluative self-respect, typically, with which self-esteem is conflated (Dillon 2013). Evaluative self-respect and (high) self-esteem are both forms of positive self-regard concerned with one’s worth, both involve having a favorable view of oneself in virtue of one’s activities and personal qualities, and a person can have or lack either one undeservedly. Nevertheless, many philosophers have argued that the two attitudes are importantly different (for example, Dillon 2004, 2013; Harris 2001; Chazan 1998; Sachs 1981; Darwall 1977), although some theorists treat the evaluative stance as a form of self-esteem (“mortal self-esteem”). The main difference between the two is that evaluative self-respect is a normative stance and self-esteem is not: the former calls for justification in light of standards one has good reason to regard as appropriate, while the latter arises from beliefs about oneself whose justification need not matter to one and that need not involve standards-based self-assessment. Many philosophers agree that evaluative self-respect is morally important, which makes sense inasmuch as it is in the service of the moral demands of dignity, worthy character, agency, and one’s moral commitments, and so is a motivation for morally appropriate living. Self-esteem--having a good opinion of oneself or feeling good about oneself--is one of the most extensively studied phenomena in psychology and social psychology; it is generally regarded by social scientists as central to healthy psychological functioning and well-being, although they note that it has no necessary connection to moral values, is central to such negative states as narcissism, and can lead to serious disrespect of others and harm unless appropriately constrained (Baumeister et al 1996). (But see Keshen (2017) on the value of reasonable self-esteem.) One way of distinguishing evaluative self-respect and self-esteem is by their grounds and the points of view from which they are appraised. Evaluative self-respect involves an assessment from a moral point of view of one’s character and conduct in light of standards one regards as implied by one’s moral worth as an agent and a person. Self-esteem, as popularly and scientifically understood, is based both on whatever qualities or activities one prizes or thinks others prize, and on the esteem one believes one gets from others whose esteem one values. It does not essentially concern morally significant worth, appropriate self-valuing, or self-assessment from a moral point of view, and it can be based on features wholly unrelated to or even opposed to good character. For example, one can have a good opinion of oneself in virtue of being a good joke-teller or for having won an important sports competition and yet not think one is a good person because of it (Darwall 1977). And depending on what serves one’s psychological needs or suits one’s companions, one can derive high self-esteem from successful thuggery as from being honest and kind. To have self-esteem is to feel good about oneself; to have evaluative self-respect is to feel justified, to be able to hold one’s head up, look others in the eye, face oneself in the mirror. Another way of distinguishing them focuses on what it is to lose them: to lose evaluative respect for oneself is to find oneself to be shameful, contemptible, or intolerable; to lose self-esteem is to think less well of oneself, to be downcast because one believes one lacks qualities that would add to one’s luster (Harris 2001) or that others think less well of one.

Self-respect is also often identified with pride, although the two are rather different (Morton 2017). Just as there are different kinds of self-respect so, there are different kinds of pride, which are complexly related. In one sense, pride is the pleasure or satisfaction taken in one’s achievements, possessions, or associations; this kind of pride can be an affective element of either evaluative self-respect or self-esteem. In another sense, pride is inordinate self-esteem or vanity, an excessively high opinion of one’s qualities, accomplishments, or status that can make one arrogant and contemptuous of others. This kind of pride contrasts with both well-grounded evaluative self-respect and the interpersonal kind of moral recognition self-respect. But pride can also be a claim to and celebration of a status worth or to equality with others, especially other groups (for example, Black Pride), which is interpersonal recognition self-respect (Thomas 1993a, 1978–79). Pride can also be “proper pride,” which is a sense of one’s dignity that prevents one from doing what is unworthy; this is the agentic dimension of recognition self-respect. Pride’s opposites, shame and humility, are also closely related to self-respect. A loss of evaluative self-respect may be expressed in shame, but shameless people manifest a lack of recognition self-respect; and although humiliation can diminish or undermine recognition self-respect and evaluative self-respect, humility is an appropriate dimension of the evaluative self-respect of any imperfect person.

One issue with which contemporary philosophers have been concerned is whether self-respect is an objective concept or a subjective one. If it is the former, then there are certain beliefs, attitudes, and dispositions a person must have to be self-respecting. A person who thought of herself as a lesser sort of being whose interests and well-being are less important than those of others would not count as having moral recognition self-respect, no matter how appropriate she regards her stance. If self-respect is a subjective concept, then a person counts as having self-respect if, for example, she believes she is not tolerating treatment she regards as unworthy or behaving in ways she thinks is beneath her, regardless of whether her judgments about herself are accurate or her standards or sense of what she is due are judged by others to be reasonable or worthy (Massey 1983a). Psychologists, for whom “self-esteem” is the term of practice, tend to regard the various dimensions of a person’s sense of worth as subjective. Many philosophers treat the interpersonal dimension of recognition self-respect objectively, and it is generally thought that having manifestly inaccurate beliefs about oneself is good grounds for at least calling an individual’s sense of worth unjustified or compromised (Meyers 1989). But there is no consensus regarding the standards to which individuals hold themselves and by which they judge themselves, and certainly the standards of the self-defining dimension of moral recognition self-respect are inescapably, though perhaps not exclusively, subjective. Complicating the objective/subjective distinction, however, is the fact of the social construction of self-respect. What it is to be a person or to have a status worthy of respect, what treatment and conduct are appropriate to a person or one with such a status, what forms of life and character have merit—all of these are given different content in different sociocultural contexts. Individuals necessarily, though perhaps not inalterably, learn to engage with themselves and with issues of self-worth in the terms and modes of the sociocultural conceptions in which they have been immersed. And different kinds of individuals may be given different opportunities in different sociocultural contexts to acquire or develop the grounds of the different kinds of self-respect (Dillon 2021, 1997; Moody-Adams 1992–93; Meyers 1989; Thomas 1983b). Even fully justified self-respect may thus be less than strongly objective and more than simply subjective.

Self-respect is frequently appealed to as a means of justifying a wide variety of philosophical claims or positions, generally in arguments of the form: x promotes (or undermines) self-respect; therefore, x is to that extent to be morally approved (or objected to). For example, appeals to self-respect have been used to argue for, among many other things, the value of moral rights (Feinberg 1970), moral requirements or limits regarding forgiving others or oneself (Dillon 2001; Holmgren 1998, 1993; Novitz 1998; Haber 1991; Murphy 1982), and both the rightness and wrongness of practices such as affirmative action. Such arguments rely on rather than establish the moral importance of self-respect. Most philosophers who attend to self-respect tend to treat it as important in one of two ways, which are exemplified in the very influential work of Kant and John Rawls.

Kant argues that, just as we have a moral duty to respect others as persons, so we have a moral duty to respect ourselves as persons, a duty that derives from our dignity as rational beings. This duty requires us to act always in an awareness of our dignity and so to act only in ways that are consistent with our status as ends in ourselves and to refrain from acting in ways that abase, degrade, defile, or disavow our rational nature. That is, we have a duty of moral recognition self-respect. In The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant argues for specific duties to oneself generated by the general duty to respect humanity in our persons, including duties to not engage in suicide, misuse of our sexual powers, drunkenness and other unrestrained indulgence of inclination, lying, self-deception, avarice, and servility. Kant also maintains that the duty of self-respect is the most important moral duty, for unless there were duties to respect oneself, there could be no moral duties at all. Moreover, fulfilling our duty to respect ourselves is a necessary condition of fulfilling our duties to respect other persons. Kant maintains that we are always aware of our dignity as persons and so of our moral obligation to respect ourselves, and he identifies this awareness as a feeling of reverential respect for ourselves. This is one of the natural capacities of feeling which we could have no duty to acquire but that make it possible for us to be motivated by the thought of duty. Reverence for self is, along with “moral feeling,” conscience, and love of others, a subjective source of morality, and it is the motivational ground of the duty of self-respect. Kant also discusses evaluative self-respect, especially in Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and his Lectures on Ethics (1779), as a combination of noble pride, which is the awareness that we have honored and preserved our dignity by acting in morally worthy ways, and a healthy dose of humility, which is the awareness that we inevitably fall short of the lofty requirements of the moral law. Kant regards well-grounded evaluative self-respect as a subjective motivation to continue striving to do right and be good.

Rawls, by contrast, views self-respect neither as something we are morally required to have and maintain nor as a feeling we necessarily have, but as an entitlement that social institutions are required by justice to support and not undermine. In A Theory of Justice (1971) he argues that self-respect (which he sometimes calls “self-esteem” is a “primary good,” something that rational beings want whatever else they want, because it is vital both to the experienced quality of individual lives and to the ability to carry out or achieve whatever projects or aims an individual might have. It is, moreover, a social good, one that individuals are able to acquire only under certain social and political conditions. Rawls defines self-respect as including “a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out,” and it implies “a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions” (Rawls 1971, 440). He argues that individuals’ access to self-respect is to a large degree a function of how the basic institutional structure of a society defines and distributes the social bases of self-respect, which include the messages about the relative worth of citizens that are conveyed in the structure and functioning of institutions, the distribution of fundamental political rights and civil liberties, access to the resources individuals need to pursue their plans of life, the availability of diverse associations and communities within which individuals can seek affirmation of their worth and their plans of life from others, and the norms governing public interaction among citizens. Since self-respect is vital to individual well-being, Rawls argues that justice requires that social institutions and policies be designed to support and not undermine self-respect. Rawls argues that the principles of justice as fairness are superior to utilitarian principles insofar as they better affirm and promote self-respect for all citizens.

Rawls’s view that the ability of individuals to respect themselves is heavily dependent on their social and political circumstances has been echoed by a number of theorists working in moral, social, and political philosophy. For example, Margalit (1996) argues that a decent society is one whose institutions do not humiliate people, that is, give people good reason to consider their self-respect to be injured (but see Bird 2010). Honneth’s theory of social criticism (1995) focuses on the way people’s self-respect and self-identity necessarily depend on the recognition of others and so are vulnerable to being misrecognized or ignored both by social institutions and in interpersonal interactions. Some theorists have used the concept of self-respect to examine the oppression of women, people of color, gays and lesbians, and other groups that are marginalized, stigmatized, or exploited by the dominant culture, identifying the plethora of ways in which oppressive institutions, images, and actions can do damage to the self-respect of members of these groups. Other writers discuss ways that individuals and groups might preserve or restore self-respect in the face of injustice or oppression, and the ways in which the development of self-respect in individuals living under oppression or injustice empowers them to participate in the monumental struggles for justice and liberation (for example, Babbitt 2000, 1993; Bartky 1990a, 1990b, 1990c; Basevich 2022; Boxill 1992, 1976; Boxill and Boxill 2015; Collins 1990; Dillon 2021, 1997, 1995; Diller 2001; Hay 2013, 2011; Holberg 2017; Ikuenobe 2004; Khader 2021; Meyers 1989, 1986; Mohr 1992, 1988; Moody-Adams 1992–93; Seglow 2016; Statman 2002; Thomas 2001b, 1983a, 1978–79; Weber 2016). Some theorists, especially those working within a feminist framework, have argued that the prevailing conceptions of self-respect in Kantian theory or in contemporary liberal societies themselves contain features that reflect objectionable aspects of the dominating culture, and they have attempted to reconceive self-respect in ways that are more conducive to empowerment and emancipation (for example, Borgwald 2012, Dillon 1992c).

In moral philosophy, theorists have also focused on connections between self-respect and various virtues and vices, such as self-trust (Borgwald 2012; Govier 1993), justice (Bloomfield 2011), honesty (Mauri 2011), benevolence (Andrew 2011), humility (Dillon 2020, 2015; Grenberg 2010), self-forgiveness (Dillon 2001; Holmgren 1998; Novitz 1998), self-improvement (Johnson 2011), general immorality (Bagnoli 2009; Bloomfield 2008), and arrogance (Dillon 2022, 2021, 2015, 2007, 2003).

Everyday discourse and practices insist that respect and self-respect are personally, socially, politically, and morally important, and philosophical discussions of the concepts bear this out. Their roles in our lives as individuals, as people living in complex relations with other people and surrounded by a plethora of other beings and things on which our attitudes and actions have tremendous effects, cannot, as these discussions reveal, be taken lightly. The discussions thus far shed light on the nature and significance of the various forms of respect and self-respect and their positions in a nexus of profoundly important but philosophically challenging and contestable concepts. These discussions also reveal that more work remains to be done in clarifying these attitudes and their places among and implications for our concepts and our lives.

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Importance of Respect for Self

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Essays on Respect: Delving into the Core Values and Implications for Society

Respect is not just a word, it's a powerful force that can change the world. Struggling to write an essay on respect? These examples are here to guide you!

Have you ever noticed how a simple act of respect, like holding the door open for someone or saying 'thank you,' can brighten someone's day and make the world feel a little kinder? Respect is a fundamental value that we all need to thrive, yet it can sometimes feel in short supply in our fast-paced, competitive world. 

That's why in this series of essays, we're diving deep into the topic of respect: what it means, why it matters, and how we can cultivate it in our daily lives. We'll explore the power of reverence, examining how showing respect can be a transformative act that creates connection, understanding, and empathy. We'll also delve into the role of respect in relationships, discussing how treating others with dignity and kindness can be a foundation for healthy connections and flourishing communities. And, of course, we'll discuss the practical applications of respect, including how it can enhance communication and lead to more productive, satisfying interactions. 

By the end of this blog post, we hope you'll come away with a renewed appreciation for the value of respect and a host of tools and strategies for practicing it in your daily life. Join us on Jenni.ai to learn more and gain access to a wealth of resources for essay writing and more. Let's dive in!

Examples of Essays on Respect

The Importance of Respect in Building Healthy Relationships

Respect is an essential ingredient for any healthy relationship to thrive. When two people treat each other with respect, they can build a strong and lasting bond that withstands the test of time. Respect is not just about being polite or courteous to one another, but it's also about acknowledging and appreciating each other's unique qualities and differences. In this article, we'll explore the importance of respect in building healthy relationships and how it can help you maintain a happy and fulfilling connection with your partner.

What is respect?

Respect is a feeling of deep admiration for someone or something elicited by their abilities, qualities, or achievements. In the context of relationships, respect means treating your partner with dignity, recognizing their worth, and valuing their opinions and feelings. It involves listening to them, being considerate of their needs, and acknowledging their boundaries.

Why is respect important in relationships?

Respect is the foundation on which healthy relationships are built. Without respect, a relationship can quickly deteriorate into a toxic and unhealthy dynamic where one partner dominates the other or both partners constantly belittle each other. Respect is what allows two people to trust each other, communicate effectively, and build a strong emotional connection. Here are some reasons why respect is crucial in building healthy relationships:

It fosters trust and intimacy

When two people respect each other, they can trust each other to be honest and transparent. This trust allows them to open up and be vulnerable with each other, leading to a deeper emotional connection and intimacy. Trust and intimacy are essential for any healthy relationship to thrive, and respect is the foundation on which they are built.

It promotes effective communication

Respectful communication involves listening actively, being mindful of each other's feelings, and avoiding hurtful language or behaviors. When two people communicate respectfully, they can resolve conflicts in a constructive and healthy manner, leading to a stronger and more fulfilling relationship.

It builds a sense of safety and security

When two people respect each other, they feel safe and secure in each other's company. They know that they can rely on each other and that their partner will always have their back. This sense of safety and security is essential for building a healthy and long-lasting relationship.

It helps to maintain individuality

Respect is not just about acknowledging your partner's worth, but also about respecting their individuality and unique qualities. When two people respect each other, they can appreciate each other's differences and allow each other to grow and develop as individuals. This helps to maintain a healthy balance between dependence and independence in the relationship.

How to show respect in a relationship?

Showing respect in a relationship involves a combination of behaviors and attitudes. Here are some ways you can show respect to your partner:

Listen actively

One of the most important ways to show respect is to listen actively to your partner. This means paying attention to what they are saying, asking questions, and responding with empathy and understanding.

Be considerate of their feelings

Respect also means being considerate of your partner's feelings. Avoid saying or doing things that might hurt them or make them feel uncomfortable.

Acknowledge their achievements

Respect involves acknowledging and appreciating your partner's achievements and successes. Celebrate their accomplishments and encourage them to pursue their goals and dreams.

Respect their boundaries

Respect also means respecting your partner's boundaries. Avoid pressuring them to do things they are uncomfortable with and always seek their consent before engaging in any intimate activities.

Avoid criticizing or belittling them

Respectful communication also involves avoiding hurtful language or behaviors. Avoid criticizing or belittling your partner, and instead focus on expressing your concerns in a constructive and respectful manner.

Show appreciation and gratitude

Showing appreciation and gratitude is another important way to demonstrate respect in a relationship. Let your partner know that you value and appreciate them, and express your gratitude for the things they do for you.

Be honest and transparent

Honesty and transparency are crucial components of respectful communication. Be truthful with your partner, and avoid hiding things from them or being deceitful in any way.

Take responsibility for your actions

Respect also means taking responsibility for your actions and acknowledging when you make mistakes. Apologize when you've done something wrong, and work together with your partner to find a solution.

How to handle disrespect in a relationship?

Disrespectful behavior can have a significant impact on a relationship and can quickly lead to conflict and tension. Here are some ways to handle disrespect in a relationship:

Communicate your concerns

The first step in addressing disrespect in a relationship is to communicate your concerns to your partner. Let them know how their behavior is making you feel, and work together to find a solution.

Set boundaries

Setting boundaries is an important part of respecting yourself in a relationship. Let your partner know what you will and won't tolerate, and be prepared to enforce these boundaries if necessary.

Seek outside help

If you're struggling to handle disrespect in your relationship, consider seeking outside help from a therapist or counselor. They can provide you with the tools and support you need to navigate the situation.

Respect is an essential ingredient for building healthy and fulfilling relationships. When two people treat each other with respect, they can develop a strong emotional connection based on trust, intimacy, and mutual appreciation. By listening actively, being considerate of each other's feelings, and communicating respectfully, you can show your partner that you value and respect them. Remember that respect is a two-way street, and it's essential to treat your partner the way you would like to be treated.

Cultivating Respect: Strategies for Fostering a Culture of Civility

Respect is a fundamental aspect of human interactions. It is essential to creating a positive and productive workplace culture. Unfortunately, respect is often in short supply in many organizations, leading to negative outcomes such as high turnover rates, low employee engagement, and poor job satisfaction. In this article, we will explore strategies for cultivating respect in the workplace to foster a culture of civility.

Introduction

The workplace is a complex environment that involves the interaction of various individuals with diverse backgrounds and personalities. This diversity often results in conflicts that can negatively impact the work environment. Therefore, fostering a culture of civility is critical to ensuring a healthy and productive workplace. Civility refers to respectful behavior and polite communication, even in situations where there is disagreement or conflict.

The Importance of Respect in the Workplace

Respect is vital to creating a positive and productive work environment. It promotes employee engagement, job satisfaction, and overall well-being. Respectful interactions also encourage collaboration, creativity, and innovation. When employees feel respected, they are more likely to share ideas, provide feedback, and take risks.

Strategies for Fostering a Culture of Civility

Lead by Example: The behavior of leaders sets the tone for the entire organization. Leaders should model respectful behavior and communicate clear expectations for civility in the workplace.

Communication: Encourage open and honest communication by creating a safe and supportive environment. Ensure that all employees have an opportunity to share their thoughts and ideas.

Education: Provide training on conflict resolution, effective communication, and cultural awareness. This will equip employees with the necessary skills to navigate difficult conversations and work collaboratively with diverse individuals.

Policies and Procedures: Establish clear policies and procedures for addressing conflicts and promoting respectful behavior. Ensure that all employees are aware of these policies and understand the consequences of violating them.

Recognition: Recognize and reward employees who demonstrate respectful behavior and contribute to a positive work environment. This will encourage others to follow suit and foster a culture of civility.

Challenges and Solutions

Cultivating respect and promoting civility in the workplace is not always easy. There are several challenges that organizations may face, including resistance to change, lack of resources, and differing perspectives. However, these challenges can be overcome by implementing the following solutions:

Address Resistance: Address resistance to change by communicating the benefits of cultivating respect and promoting civility. Explain how it will benefit the organization, employees, and customers.

Allocate Resources: Allocate the necessary resources to promote respectful behavior, such as training programs, policies and procedures, and recognition programs.

Understand Differences: Encourage employees to understand and respect cultural and individual differences. This will help to foster an environment of inclusivity and respect.

Cultivating respect and promoting civility in the workplace is essential to creating a positive and productive work environment. It requires leadership, communication, education, policies, and recognition. Organizations that prioritize respect and civility will benefit from increased employee engagement, job satisfaction, and overall well-being. By implementing the strategies discussed in this article, organizations can create a culture of civility that fosters respect, collaboration, and innovation.

In conclusion, cultivating respect and promoting civility in the workplace is critical to creating a positive and productive work environment. It requires the commitment and effort of all employees, starting with leadership. By implementing the strategies discussed in this article, organizations can create a culture of civility that fosters respect, collaboration, and innovation. By doing so, they will benefit from increased employee engagement, job satisfaction, and overall well-being, leading to greater success and growth.

Understanding Empathy: The Key to Building Respectful Connections

Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of others. It is a powerful tool that helps us connect with people and build healthy relationships. In this article, we will explore the meaning of empathy, its importance in building respectful connections, and how to cultivate empathy in our daily lives.

What is Empathy?

Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of others. It involves putting yourself in someone else's shoes and seeing the world from their perspective. Empathy helps us connect with people and build healthy relationships by creating a sense of mutual understanding and respect.

The Different Types of Empathy

There are three different types of empathy: cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, and compassionate empathy.

Cognitive Empathy

Cognitive empathy is the ability to understand someone's thoughts and feelings intellectually. It involves seeing the world from their perspective and understanding their needs and concerns.

Emotional Empathy

Emotional empathy is the ability to share someone's feelings and emotions. It involves feeling what they feel and experiencing their emotions alongside them.

Compassionate Empathy

Compassionate empathy is the ability to feel someone's emotions and take action to help them. It involves understanding their needs and concerns and taking steps to address them.

How to Cultivate Empathy

Cultivating empathy requires practice and effort. Here are some strategies you can use to cultivate empathy in your daily life:

Active Listening

Active listening involves fully concentrating on what someone is saying and actively engaging with them. It involves asking questions, providing feedback, and demonstrating that you are fully present and engaged.

Putting Yourself in Someone Else's Shoes

Putting yourself in someone else's shoes involves imagining how they are feeling and seeing the world from their perspective. It involves suspending judgment and taking the time to understand their needs and concerns.

Practicing Self-Reflection

Practicing self-reflection involves taking the time to reflect on your own thoughts and feelings. It involves being honest with yourself about your biases and assumptions and actively working to challenge them.

Practicing Empathy Exercises

Practicing empathy exercises involves actively seeking out opportunities to practice empathy. These exercises may involve volunteering, practicing active listening, or engaging in role-playing activities.

Empathy is a crucial tool for building respectful connections with others. It allows us to understand and share the feelings of others, creating a sense of mutual understanding and respect. By practicing empathy in our daily lives, we can build stronger relationships, enhance our communication skills, and improve our overall well-being.

Respect and Communication: How Listening and Dialogue Can Build Bridges

Communication is the foundation of any relationship, be it personal or professional. However, communication isn't just about talking; it also involves listening actively and with respect. In this article, we will explore how respect and communication can build bridges and help create strong relationships.

Definition of communication

Importance of communication

Communication challenges

Building Bridges through Communication

Communication is a powerful tool that can be used to create and maintain bridges between people. By communicating effectively, we can connect with others on a deeper level and build trust and respect. Here are some ways to build bridges through communication:

Active listening is the key to effective communication. When we listen actively, we give the other person our undivided attention, and we try to understand their perspective without interrupting or judging them.

Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of another person. When we empathize with others, we put ourselves in their shoes, and we try to see things from their perspective. This helps us to communicate more effectively and build stronger relationships.

Respect is essential in any relationship. When we respect others, we treat them with dignity and honor their views and opinions, even if we disagree with them. This creates a safe space for communication and encourages people to share their thoughts and feelings openly.

Open Communication

Open communication is critical for building bridges. When we communicate openly, we share our thoughts and feelings honestly and transparently, and we encourage others to do the same. This helps to build trust and creates a deeper connection between people.

Communication Challenges

Effective communication isn't always easy, and there are many challenges that can arise. Here are some of the most common communication challenges:

Language Barriers

Language barriers can make communication difficult, especially when there are cultural differences. It's essential to be patient and to try to understand the other person's perspective, even if there are language barriers.

Emotional Triggers

Emotions can often get in the way of effective communication. When we feel triggered, we may become defensive or angry, which can create a barrier to communication. 

Power Imbalances

Power imbalances can make communication difficult, especially in a professional setting. When one person has more power or authority than the other, it can be challenging to communicate effectively. 

Effective communication is critical for building bridges and creating strong relationships. By listening actively, empathizing, showing respect, and communicating openly, we can overcome communication challenges and build bridges that last. Remember to be patient, kind, and understanding, and always approach communication with an open mind and heart.

The Power of Reverence: How Respect Can Shape Our Lives

Respect is an essential aspect of our lives that plays a crucial role in shaping our personalities and building meaningful relationships. When we show respect to others, we create a positive environment that allows everyone to thrive. The power of reverence goes beyond basic etiquette; it influences our behavior, decisions, and outlook on life. In this article, we will explore the importance of respect and how it can shape our lives.

Understanding Respect

Respect is defined as a feeling of deep admiration for someone or something elicited by their abilities, qualities, or achievements. It is an attitude that acknowledges the worth of another person or thing. Respect is a fundamental aspect of human interaction that creates a positive environment for everyone. It is essential in building trust, maintaining healthy relationships, and promoting cooperation.

Respect in Personal Relationships

Respect is an essential ingredient in creating meaningful personal relationships. It is the foundation on which all relationships are built. When we show respect to our partners, friends, and family members, we create an environment of trust, empathy, and mutual understanding. Respect allows us to communicate effectively, express our opinions, and solve conflicts in a healthy manner. It is also the key to maintaining healthy boundaries and creating a safe space for everyone involved.

Respect in Professional Relationships

Respect is equally important in professional relationships. It is the key to building trust, fostering collaboration, and creating a positive work environment. When we show respect to our colleagues, supervisors, and subordinates, we promote teamwork, productivity, and job satisfaction. Respectful communication allows for the sharing of ideas, constructive feedback, and the creation of a supportive work culture.

The Benefits of Respect

The power of reverence has numerous benefits that can positively impact our lives. Respect promotes empathy, understanding, and cooperation, allowing us to build healthy relationships with others. It creates a positive environment that fosters personal and professional growth, leading to increased productivity, job satisfaction, and overall well-being. Showing respect also improves our self-esteem, allowing us to feel more confident and empowered.

The Consequences of Disrespect

On the other hand, disrespect can have severe consequences that negatively impact our lives. Disrespectful behavior can damage relationships, erode trust, and create a hostile work environment. It can lead to misunderstandings, conflicts, and even legal issues in extreme cases. Disrespectful behavior can also damage our self-esteem, leading to feelings of inadequacy and insecurity.

Cultivating Respect

Cultivating respect is an ongoing process that requires mindfulness and conscious effort. It involves acknowledging the worth of others, recognizing their contributions, and treating them with dignity and kindness. Cultivating respect also means recognizing our own worth and treating ourselves with kindness and compassion. When we cultivate respect, we create a positive environment that allows everyone to thrive.

In conclusion, the power of reverence is an essential aspect of our lives that can positively impact our personal and professional relationships. Respect allows us to build healthy relationships, promotes empathy and understanding, and fosters personal and professional growth. It is the key to creating a positive environment that allows everyone to thrive. Cultivating respect is an ongoing process that requires mindfulness and conscious effort, but the benefits are worth it.

In conclusion, these essays have explored the multifaceted concept of respect, examining its core values and societal implications. We have seen how respect can foster healthy relationships, promote empathy and understanding, and facilitate productive communication. Through examples from literature, history, and contemporary events, we have gained insights into the power of reverence and the importance of cultivating a culture of civility.

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Essay on Respect: Best Samples Available for Students

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• Nov 7, 2023

Essay on Respect: Mahatma Gandhi once said, ‘I cannot conceive of a greater loss than the loss of one’s self-respect.’ We all deserve respect from others when they interact with us, regardless of how we are as individuals. Polite, considerate and courteous behaviour are all part of respect. Respect is a larger concept which encompasses treating others the way you would like to be treated, listening to different viewpoints with an open mind, and refraining from causing harm or offence to others. It is considered a fundamental aspect of healthy relationships, effective communication, and a harmonious society. Let’s discuss more through some samples in the essay on respect.

Table of Contents

• 1 Essay on Respect in 100 Words
• 2 Essay on Respect in 200 Words
• 3 Essay on Respect in 300 Words

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Essay on Respect in 100 Words

Respect is a two-way concept; you receive respect when you show respect to others. Whether you are in a professional or a personal environment, talking respectfully is always appreciated. Respect is not just talking politely but a profound acknowledgement of the dignity of others. 

Respect involves listening to others with an open mind, appreciating the uniqueness of everyone, and refraining from actions that cause harm or undermine the well-being of others. We can consider respect as a timeless virtue. It is necessary for maintaining healthy relationships, communities, and societies. From the way we talk to the way we behave, respect is highlighted in our every move.

Also Read: Essay on Parents

Essay on Respect in 200 Words

‘Respect is what we owe; love, is what we give.’ – Philip James Bailey

How can you expect others to respect you when you cannot serve it to others? We never disrespect people whom we care about. Neither do they. As humans when interacting with others, we expect respectful behaviour from others. It is considered the fundamental aspect of binding human interactions and enabling us to live in harmony with others. 

We can acknowledge and appreciate people, which is one of the most important parts of respectful behaviour. At its essence, respect transcends cultural barriers and fosters empathy, understanding, and kindness among individuals.

Respect is shown via thoughtful actions and considerate behaviour. It involves treating others with courtesy, refraining from causing harm and valuing diverse perspectives. When one respects another person, one listens attentively, seeking to understand rather than to judge. This practice nurtures a culture of open communication and mutual understanding, facilitating the resolution of conflicts and the forging of strong, enduring relationships.

Our respectful attitude and behaviour cultivate a sense of belonging and safety in social settings. In school, respect forms the basis for effective learning and growth. The respectful behaviour of teachers and students fosters an atmosphere of trust and collaboration, nurturing an environment where knowledge is shared, and intellectual curiosity is encouraged.

Essay on Respect in 300 Words

‘Respect your efforts, respect yourself. Self-respect leads to self-discipline. When you have both firmly under your belt, that’s real power.’ – Clint Eastwood

Respect functions as the cornerstone of considerate and empathetic human interaction, forming the basis for a harmonious and equitable society. What we learn is what we say to others. Our respectful behaviour shows our inherent value and dignity. It also fosters empathy, understanding, and compassion, nurturing relationships that are founded on mutual admiration and consideration.

Showing a passive attitude that reflects in one’s behaviour and treatment of others shows who we really are. It entails treating individuals with dignity and kindness, valuing their perspectives, and honouring their rights and boundaries. When one demonstrates respect, they engage in thoughtful communication, listen attentively, and seek to understand differing viewpoints. Such actions lay the groundwork for trust and cooperation, facilitating the resolution of conflicts and the cultivation of strong, enduring bonds.

There are three types of respect: Respect for Personhood; Respect for Authority; and Respect for Honour.

• Respect for personhood is the recognition and acknowledgement of the inherent dignity, autonomy, and worth of every individual. This concept emphasizes the importance of treating each person as a unique and valuable being, deserving of ethical consideration and moral regard.
• Respect for authority acknowledges the legitimacy and position of individuals or institutions that hold power or influence in a particular context. It involves recognizing the roles and responsibilities of those in positions of authority and adhering to their directives or decisions within the boundaries of ethical and legal standards.
• Respect for honour upholding the principles of integrity, dignity, and moral uprightness in both oneself and others

Respect is not confined to personal relationships and educational institutions; it is a fundamental element that shapes the fabric of society.

Ans: Here are some best tips for respecting people: act responsibly, be empathetic, accept mistakes, listen to others, be relentlessly proactive, pay attention to non-verbal communication, keep your promises, etc.

Ans: To write an essay you need to highlight what respect means to you and how it can serve as an effective tool for coexisting with others. The concept of respect goes beyond talking politely and actively listening. It is considered a fundamental aspect of healthy relationships, effective communication, and a harmonious society. 

Ans: Here are three types of respect: Respect for Personhood, Respect for authority and Respect for honour.

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Essays About Self: 5 Essay Examples and 7 Creative Essay Prompts

Essays about self require brainstorming and ample time to reflect on who you are. See our top picks and prompts to use in your essay writing.

“Tell me about yourself.” It’s a familiar question we are asked in social situations, job interviews, or on the first day of class. It’s also a customary essay writing topic in schools to prepare students for future career interviews, cover letters, and, most importantly, to assist individuals in assessing their personalities. 

Self refers to qualities of one’s identity or character. It’s a broad topic, but many find it confusing. Before your get started on this topic, learn how to write personal essays to make this challenging topic easier to tackle.

5 Essay Examples

1. essay on defining self by anonymous on wowessays.com, 2. long essay on about myself by prasanna, 3. self discovery: my journey to understanding myself and the world around by anonymous on samplius.com, 4. how my future self is my hero by anonymous on gradesfixer.com, 5. essay on self-respect by bunty rane, 7 writing prompts on essays about self, 1. who am i, 2. a look at my personality, 3. my life: a self-reflection, 4. my best and worst qualities, 5. reasons to write about myself, 6. overcoming challenges and mistakes, 7. the importance of self-awareness.

“Google provided a definition of self as a “person’s essential being that distinguishes them from others, esp. considered as the object of introspection or reflexive action.” (Google.com, 2013) This may be as simple as this, but the word “self” is far more complicated than the things that make an individual different from other people.”

The author defines self as the physical and psychological way of perceiving and evaluating ourselves, which has two aspects. First is the development of an existential self which includes awareness of being different from others. Meanwhile, the second aspect is when someone realizes their categorical self or that they have the same physical characteristics as others. 

The essay includes three aspects of self-definition. One is sell-image, or how a person views himself. Two is self-esteem, which dramatically affects how a person values ​​and carries himself. And three is the ideal self, where people compare their self-image with their ideal characteristics, often leading to a new definition of themselves.

“Each person finds their mission differently and has a different journey. Thus, when I write about myself, I write about my journey and what makes the person I am because of the trip. I try to be myself, be passionate about my dreams and hobbies, live honestly, and work hard to achieve all that I want to make.”

Prassana divides her essay into sections: hobbies, dreams, aspirations, and things she wants to learn. Her hobbies are baking and reading books that help her relax. She’s lucky to have parents who let her choose her career where she’ll be happy and stable, which is being a traveler. Prasanna finds learning fun, so she wants to continue learning simple things like cooking specific cuisine, scuba, and sky diving.

“High school has taught me about myself, and that is the most important lesson I could have learned. This metamorphosis has taken me from what I used to be to what I am now.”

In this essay, the writer shows the importance of self-discovery to become a better version of yourself. During their high school days, the author was a typically shy and somewhat childish person who was afraid to speak. So they hid in their room, where they felt safe. But as days pass and they grow older, the writer learns to be strong and stabilize their emotions. Soon, they left their cocoon, managed to express their feelings, and believed in themselves.

Because of self-discovery, the author realized they have their thoughts, ideas, morals, likes, and dislikes. They are no longer afraid of mistakes and have learned to enjoy life. The writer also believes that to succeed, and everyone must trust themselves and not give up on reaching their dreams.

“Bold, passionate, humble these are how I envision my hero to be and these are the three people I want to work on, moving forward as I strive to become the self I want to be in the future.”

The essay shows how a simple award speech by Matthew McConaughey moves the writer’s mind and ultimately creates their hero. They come up with three main qualities they want their future self to have. The first is to be someone who is not afraid to take advantage of any opportunities. Next is to stop being content with just being alive and continue searching for their purpose and genuine passion. Last, they strive to be humble and grateful to every person who contributes to their success.

“People with self-respect have the courage of accepting their mistakes. They exhibit certain toughness, a kind of moral courage, and they display character. Without self-respect, one becomes an unwilling audience of one’s failing both real and imaginary.”

Self-respect is a form of self-love. For Rane, it’s a habit of the mind that will never fail anyone. It’s a ritual that makes a person remember who they are. It reminds us to live without needing anyone else’s approval and walk alone toward our goals. Meanwhile, people with no self-respect hate those who have it. As a result, they become weak and lose their identity.

People can describe who you are in many ways, but the only person who truly knows you is yourself. Use this prompt to introduce yourself to the readers. Share personal and exciting details such as your name’s origin, quirky family routines, and your most memorable moments. It doesn’t have to be too personal. You only need to focus on information that distinguishes you from everyone else.

Personality is a person’s unique way of thinking, feeling, and behavior. You can apply this prompt to describe your personality as a student or working adult. Write about how you develop your skills, make friends, do everyday tasks, and many more. Differentiate “self” and “personality” in your introduction to help readers understand your essay content better.

Connect with your inner self and conduct a self-reflection. This practice helps us grow and improve. In writing this prompt, you will need time to reflect on your life to identify and explain your qualities and values. 

For instance, talk about the things you are grateful for, words that best describe you according to the people around you, and areas of yourself that you’d like to improve. Then, discuss how these things affect your life.

Every individual is a work in progress. Although you consider yourself a good person, there are still parts of you that you want to improve. Discuss these shortcomings with your readers. Expound on why people like and dislike these traits. Include how you plan to change your bad characteristics. You can add instances demonstrating your good and bad qualities to make your piece more relatable.

Writing about yourself is a great way to use your creativity in exploring and examining your identity. But, unfortunately, it’s also a great medium to release emotional distress and work through these feelings. So, for this prompt, delve into the benefits of writing about oneself. Then, persuade your readers to start writing about themselves and give tips to help them get started.

For help with this topic, read our guide explaining what is persuasive writing ?

If you want to connect emotionally with your readers, this prompt is the best to use for your essay. Identify and discuss difficult life experiences and explain how these challenging times helped you learn and grow as a person. 

Tip : You can use this prompt even if you haven’t faced any life-changing challenges. The problem you may have encountered can be as simple as finding it hard to wake up early.

Some benefits of self-awareness include being a better decision-maker and effective communicator. Define and explain self-awareness. Then, examine how self-awareness influences our lives. You can also include different types of self-awareness and their benefits to a person.

If you want to try these techniques, check out our round-up of the best journals !

Maria Caballero is a freelance writer who has been writing since high school. She believes that to be a writer doesn't only refer to excellent syntax and semantics but also knowing how to weave words together to communicate to any reader effectively.

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Analytical Essay: The importance of self-respect

Young people are told so often that self-respect is very important, and that they need it for many different reasons. The amount of self-respect we have varies greatly; some people have too little and perhaps some have too much. It’s necessary to examine why self-respect is important, and whether there is anything else more vital for a person’s happiness and well-being.

The primary reason that people need self-respect is that without it, they will be unhappy and not take care of themselves. Without self-respect, many people will fail to realize that what they want and need in life does actually matter, and because of this, they will go through life being miserable. They are also more likely to take risks with their health and the law, because they don’t think that their life is worth all that much, or that people don’t care what happens to them. Self-respect is necessary to having a happy and satisfying life, so everybody needs to have respect for themselves.

The second important reason that people need self-respect is that you need to respect yourself before anyone else will respect you. If someone has so little self-respect and self-esteem that they are unable to stand up for themselves, no one is going to respect them. One very good example of this is the case of peer pressure. A young person who gives in to everything will not be respected by their peers at all: simply expected to do the next big thing that they’re pressured to do. People who care about themselves will care enough about the body and their life to refuse things that they don’t want to do. Because of this, they will not only be able to demand respect from their peers, but also live a happier, healthier life where they don’t do everything just to please others.

However, having plenty of self-respect is no good if it totally outweighs the level of respect that we have for others. Respect is a two-way street, and if you don’t treat other people with the respect they deserve, you may respect yourself but nobody else will. Take teachers, for example. They have to earn respect and if they treat their students with respect, they will get it in return. If they just demand it without deserving it, however, nobody will respect them at all.

In conclusion, there’s no doubt that self-respect is important. We need a certain amount to get what we need out of life, and get the respect that we need from others. But, respecting others is equally important. Ultimately, if the world were a more respectful place, where we respected ourselves and those around us, it would be a happier place.

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• Essay on Psychology

Self Respect Essays

Type of paper: Essay

Topic: Psychology , Education , Environment , Discipline , Morality , Character , Evidence , Respect

Published: 03/16/2021

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Self respect has been defined by the Oxford advanced learners dictionary as “a feeling of pride in yourself that what you do, say, etc. is right and good”. Other sources give almost similar definitions of the term albeit using different wording. Self respect can also be defined as holding yourself in esteem and also believing that you are good and worthy of being treated well, according to the American Heritage Dictionary. From these definitions, we can gather that self respect is basically respect for one’s self, regard for ones character and taking responsibility for ones actions whether good or bad. Self respect is known to be an extremely important quality for an upright personality, confidence and dignity of an individual. People with self respect often exhibit the courage of even accepting their own mistakes, exhibit toughness and display a good character that is acceptable to many. More often than not, a self respecting person accepts responsibilities for his / her life. Self respect is known to be a kind of discipline, a habit that has never failed anyone. People with self respect, regardless of the challenges that they face, always stand the test of time, since self respect is a recipe for integrity, leadership and self esteem. Self respect is in effect ones worth, its one’s ability! At least in one’s own eyes. Self respecting people are mostly confident and are likely to succeed in their lives since they attract likeminded people who are likely to propel them to success. Lack of self respect is a recipe for unruly behavior that results to the hatred to those who respect themselves. This makes one to be blind of their weaknesses. Self respecting people do not need anyone’s approval and ones repute is never at the mercy of others. a self respecting person will do what they think is right, according to their own reason and will not care what the next person is thinking of their actions since they can always defend their actions in confidence. Needless to say, the respect that we have for ourselves guides our actions and by extension, our morals. To garner the respect of others, we need to respect ourselves first. This therefore means that self respecting people will naturally have straight morals and that’s the only way they are able to earn the respect of others. In order to fully respect ourselves, we need to fully understand who we really are and what we stand for. Its always a better idea to do the right thing and displease others rather than being a people follower in doing the wrong thing. In a nutshell, self respect is a necessary virtue that will guarantee a lasting pleasant personality. Some of the best quotes that I have ever come across in regard to this subject are summed up below.”Perhaps the surest test of an individual's integrity is his refusal to do or say anything that would damage his self-respect”, Thomas S Monson. “Respect your efforts, respect yourself. Self-respect leads to self-discipline, When you have both firmly under your belt, that's real power,” Clint Eastwood. “Self respect knows no considerations” Mahatma Gandhi There is an unwavering relationship between self respect and the respect for the environment. As earlier stated, self respect entails doing what is right regardless of the opinions of others. Man has a responsibility to respect and take care of the environment. The current trend however reveals a very different scenario all together. Mankind has mercilessly exploited the environment, cut down trees without panting others, poached and destroyed wildlife among other evils. This is a sure lack of respect for the environment which we as humans are expected to protect, however, the good news is that we have self respecting individuals who have taken it upon themselves to respect and protect the environment. These are individuals who refused to accept the situation as it is, have stood out of their comfort zones and invested their time and resources in protecting and preserving the environment. These are the few individuals who can be said to respect the environment, an aspect that stems from the respect that they have for themselves that drives them to do what is right.

The oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary: Online edition The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company.

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Essay on Self Esteem

Students are often asked to write an essay on Self Esteem in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Self Esteem

Understanding self-esteem.

Self-esteem is the opinion we have about ourselves. It’s about how much we value and respect ourselves. High self-esteem means you think highly of yourself, while low self-esteem means you don’t.

Importance of Self-Esteem

Self-esteem is important because it heavily influences our choices and decisions. It allows us to live life to our potential. High self-esteem leads to confidence, happiness, fulfillment, and achievement.

Building Self-Esteem

Building self-esteem requires positive self-talk, self-acceptance, and self-love. It’s about focusing on your strengths, forgiving your mistakes, and celebrating your achievements.

250 Words Essay on Self Esteem

Introduction.

Self-esteem, a fundamental concept in psychology, refers to an individual’s overall subjective emotional evaluation of their own worth. It encompasses beliefs about oneself and emotional states, such as triumph, despair, pride, and shame. It is a critical aspect of personal identity, shaping our perception of the world and our place within it.

The Dual Facet of Self-Esteem

Self-esteem can be divided into two types: high and low. High self-esteem is characterized by a positive self-image and confidence, while low self-esteem is marked by self-doubt and criticism. Both types significantly influence our mental health, relationships, and life outcomes.

Impact of Self-Esteem

High self-esteem can lead to positive outcomes. It encourages risk-taking, resilience, and optimism, fostering success in various life domains. Conversely, low self-esteem can result in fear of failure, social anxiety, and susceptibility to mental health issues like depression. Thus, it’s crucial to nurture self-esteem for psychological well-being.

Building self-esteem involves recognizing one’s strengths and weaknesses and accepting them. It requires self-compassion and challenging negative self-perceptions. Positive affirmations, setting and achieving goals, and maintaining healthy relationships can all contribute to enhancing self-esteem.

In conclusion, self-esteem is a complex, multifaceted construct that significantly influences our lives. It is not static and can be improved with conscious effort. Understanding and nurturing our self-esteem is vital for achieving personal growth and leading a fulfilling life.

500 Words Essay on Self Esteem

Self-esteem, a fundamental aspect of psychological health, is the overall subjective emotional evaluation of one’s self-worth. It is a judgment of oneself as well as an attitude toward the self. The importance of self-esteem lies in the fact that it concerns our perceptions and beliefs about ourselves, which can shape our experiences and actions.

The Two Types of Self-esteem

Self-esteem can be classified into two types: high and low. High self-esteem indicates a highly favorable impression of oneself, whereas low self-esteem reflects a negative view. People with high self-esteem generally feel good about themselves and value their worth, while those with low self-esteem usually harbor negative feelings about themselves, often leading to feelings of inadequacy, incompetence, and unlovability.

Factors Influencing Self-esteem

Self-esteem is shaped by various factors throughout our lives, such as the environment, experiences, relationships, and achievements. Positive reinforcement, success, and supportive relationships often help to foster high self-esteem, while negative feedback, failure, and toxic relationships can contribute to low self-esteem. However, it’s important to note that self-esteem is not a fixed attribute; it can change over time and can be improved through cognitive and behavioral interventions.

Impact of Self-esteem on Life

Self-esteem significantly impacts individuals’ mental health, relationships, and overall well-being. High self-esteem can lead to positive outcomes, such as better stress management, resilience, and life satisfaction. On the other hand, low self-esteem is associated with mental health issues like depression and anxiety. It can also lead to poor academic and job performance, problematic relationships, and increased vulnerability to drug and alcohol abuse.

Improving Self-esteem

Improving self-esteem requires a multifaceted approach. Cognitive-behavioral therapies can help individuals challenge their negative beliefs about themselves and develop healthier thought patterns. Regular physical activity, healthy eating, and adequate sleep can also boost self-esteem by improving physical health. Furthermore, positive social interactions and relationships can enhance self-esteem by providing emotional support and validation. Lastly, self-compassion and self-care practices can foster a more positive self-image and promote higher self-esteem.

In conclusion, self-esteem is a critical component of our psychological well-being, influencing our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. It is shaped by various factors and can significantly impact our lives. However, it’s not a fixed attribute, and with the right strategies and support, individuals can improve their self-esteem, leading to better mental health, relationships, and overall quality of life. Therefore, understanding and fostering self-esteem is essential for personal growth and development.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

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• Essay on Secret of Happiness

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Respect Essay

500+ words respect essay.

Respect is one way of expressing our love and gratitude towards others. It may indeed be the glue that binds people together. If respect is akin to “positive regard”, it is the belief that enables one to value other people, institutions, and traditions. If we want others to give us respect, it is important that we respect them too. Respect is the most powerful ingredient that nourishes all relationships and creates a good society. Students should learn the true meaning of respect. They must understand what respect means with reference to themselves and to other people. This ‘Respect’ essay will help them to do so. Students can also get the list of CBSE Essays on different topics and boost their essay writing skills. Doing so helps them to participate in various essay writing competitions.

Respect Begins with Oneself

Respect is an important component of personal self-identity and interpersonal relationships. We must respect and value ourselves so that the rest of the world recognises us and respect us. Respect is treating others the way we want to be treated. People treat us with the same amount of dignity and respect we show for others. Treating someone with respect means:

• Showing regard for their abilities and worth
• Valuing their feelings and their views, even if you don’t necessarily agree with them
• Accepting them on an equal basis and giving them the same consideration you would expect for yourself.

Respect is the overall esteem we feel towards a person. We can also feel respect for a specific quality of a person. For example, we might not like somebody’s behaviour, but we can respect their honesty.

Importance of Respect

Respect is a lesson that we learn over the years in our life. The ability to treat everyone with respect and equality is an easy trait to learn, but a difficult trait to carry out. Respect is one of the most valuable assets. A respectful person is one who shows care and concern for others. He is courteous, kind, fair, honest and obedient. With respect comes a better and more clear way of life. Respect for others helps to promote empathy and tolerance. It helps in building healthy relationships with family and friends. We feel motivated and happy when we are respected by others.

Ways to Show Respect to Others

Respect is a feeling of care for someone, which can be shown through good manners. There are several ways in which we can show respect to others. We all inculcate the value of respecting others from childhood. Doing namaste when guests come to our home is one way of showing respect to them. It is a gesture of acknowledgement & greeting people. We touch the feet of elders to show respect to them. We must take permission before using another person’s property. Teasing, threatening, or making fun of others can hurt them. So, we should respect others’ feelings and should not do anything that hurts them.

Respect is learned, earned, and returned. If we expect respect, then be the first to show it!

Students must have found “Respect Essay” useful for improving their essay writing skills. Visit the BYJU’S website to get the latest updates and study material on CBSE/ICSE/State Board/Competitive Exams, at BYJU’S.

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Self-Esteem and Self-Compassion: A Narrative Review and Meta-Analysis on Their Links to Psychological Problems and Well-Being

Peter muris.

1 Department of Clinical Psychological Science, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Maastricht, the Netherlands

2 Department of Psychology, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa

Henry Otgaar

3 Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law and Criminology, Catholic University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

The present review addressed the relationship between two self-related concepts that are assumed to play a role in human resilience and well-being: self-esteem and self-compassion. Besides a theoretical exploration of both concepts, a meta-analysis ( k = 76, N = 35,537 participants) was conducted to examine the magnitude of the relation between self-esteem and self-compassion and their links to indices of well-being and psychological problems. The average correlation between self-esteem and self-compassion was strong ( r = 0.65, effect size = 0.71), suggesting that – despite some distinct features – the overlap between both self-related constructs is considerable. Self-esteem and self-compassion displayed relations of a similar magnitude to measures of well-being and psychological problems, and both concepts accounted for unique variance in these measures once controlling for their shared variance. Self-esteem and self-compassion can best be seen as complementary concepts and we invite researchers to look more at their joint protective role within a context of well-being and mental health as well as to their additive value in the treatment of people with psychological problems.

Introduction

William James already described “selfhood” as an essential concept of human psychology. He divided the self into two parts: the “Me”, which refers to people’s reflections about themselves (ie, subjective perceptions of personal characteristics, eg, defining oneself as “rich”, “introvert”, or “intelligent”), and the “I”, which refers to the thinking self that knows who one is or what he/she has been doing in the current and past (also known as the mind). 1 Ever since, many scholars attempted to conceptualize the self, 2 varying from rather concrete descriptions, such as “a collection of abilities, temperament, goals, values, preferences that distinguish one individual from another” 3 to more abstract conceptualizations involving the dynamic self-constructive process of one’s identity as a result of reflexive activities involving thinking, being aware of thinking, and taking the self as an object of thinking. 4 Many self-related constructs, processes, and phenomena have been described in the psychological literature, 5 but within the field of mental health and psychopathology, two concepts have received a considerable amount of empirical attention: self-esteem and self-compassion.

Self-esteem and self-compassion reflect an affectively and/or cognitively charged attitude or response to the self. The nature of both constructs is fundamentally positive, meaning that persons with high levels of self-esteem and self-compassion ought to display greater resilience and higher levels of well-being, and hence lower levels of all kinds of mental health problems. Despite their conceptual overlap, there exist a number of differences between self-esteem and self-compassion. 6 The present review article is focused on the relationship between self-esteem and self-compassion. We will first describe both concepts independently from a more theoretical perspective and address their protective role within the context of mental health and psychopathology. Next, we will focus on the link between self-esteem and self-compassion thereby addressing similarities as well as dissimilarities. The review is not only qualitative in nature, but also includes a meta-analysis to assess the strength of the relation between self-esteem and self-compassion as well as to examine the (unique) links between both self-related concepts on the one hand and indices of well-being and psychopathology on the other hand. Furthermore, we will discuss to what extent self-esteem and self-compassion are susceptible to change and hence might be a suitable target for psychological interventions. Finally, we will provide a brief summary of our findings and address the role and importance of both self-related constructs for understanding human resilience and well-being.

Self-Esteem

Self-esteem refers to an affectively laden evaluation of the self. 7 More specifically, this construct refers to “an individual’s subjective evaluation of his or her worth as a person”. 8 This is defined by a person’s perception of his/her abilities and qualities in various domains, including intellect, work performance, social skills, physical appearance, and athletics. It is important to emphasize that self-esteem does not necessarily reflect the actual abilities or features of a person but mainly refers to how a person thinks or feels about these qualities and characteristics. There is concrete evidence that the concept reflects a trait-like variable that is relatively stable across time. For example, Kuster and Orth 9 conducted a longitudinal study with repeated measurements taken from adolescence to old age and showed that

self-esteem does not fluctuate continuously over time in response to the inevitable mix of successes and failures we all experience as we go through life [but has] a level of stability that is comparable to that of basic personality characteristics such as neuroticism and extraversion.

Their data indicated that one can foretell a person’s relative level of self-esteem (as compared to other people, eg, high versus low) across decades of life. 8

Regarding the function of self-esteem, three main perspectives have been proposed. First, the self-determination perspective assumes that self-esteem serves a motivational function that prompts people to take care of themselves and to explore and reach their full potential. 10 A distinction is made between contingent self-esteem, which refers to positive feelings and thoughts about oneself that are dependent on some achievement or fulfilment of expectations, and true self-esteem, which pertains to a stable, securely based, and solid sense of the self. Or in other words: The person is comfortable with whom he/she is and how others will perceive him/her and is no longer involved in a process of critical self-evaluation. Both types of self-esteem are related to human motivation. Contingent self-esteem is predominantly linked with extrinsic motivation: A good sense of the self is achieved because one engages in activities that will yield a reward or avoid punishment, whereas true self-esteem is typically associated with intrinsic motivation: Positive feelings of self-worth are elicited when performing activities that match one’s personal needs and values.

The second perspective on the function of self-esteem is subsumed under the terror management theory. 11 According to this perspective, human beings can be distinguished from other species because they can reflect on the fact that the world in which they live is an uncontrollable, absurd setting in which their own impeding death is the only inevitable certainty. To cope with this mortality salience, people have developed a cultural worldview that is infused by order, predictability, meaning, and continuity. Terror management theory postulates that self-esteem refers to a sense of personal value that is grounded in beliefs about the validity of the worldview and the extent to which one can abide to the cultural standards of that worldview, which would function as a buffer against the fear of death. 12 People with high self-esteem have a more positive and less fatalistic attitude towards life than people with low self-esteem, and hence are better able to deal with everyday reminders of their death and the finiteness of life.

The third account is the sociometer perspective that views self-esteem as an innate monitoring system that measures a person’s relational value to other people, or in more concrete words: “the degree to which other people regard their relationship with the individual to be valuable, important, or close”. 13 When self-esteem is high, the person has the idea that he/she is valued by others as a respectable and worthy individual and this will fuel behaviours that serve to maintain and enhance relationships with other people in order to preserve this social status. In contrast, when self-esteem is low, the person perceives that his/her social position is on the line, which evokes an emotional response as an alarm signal that prompts behaviours to gain and restore relations with others. Thus, according to sociometer perspective, self-esteem is viewed as an affect-driven meter that continuously monitors and reacts to signs of social acceptance and rejection. This monitoring system would have evolutionary roots because relationships with other people are an important asset promoting survival. 14

Self-Esteem and Life Outcomes

Whether conceiving self-esteem as a vehicle of motivation, a buffer against the fear of death, or a social thermometer, all these functional accounts align with the notion that the construct has a positive nature and hence may promote psychological well-being and protect against mental health problems. Although some scholars are rather critical and sceptic about the presumed benefits of self-esteem, arguing that its merits are quite limited and that there are even downsides of having (too) much confidence in one’s worth, 15 there is a voluminous amount of empirical work supporting its association with positive outcomes. For instance, in an influential large-scale study including more than 13,000 college students in 31 countries from all over the world, self-esteem correlated positively with life satisfaction (with an average r of 0.44), 16 meaning that the more participants were content with themselves, the stronger they indicated being happy with their life. As another example, Chen et al 17 conducted a meta-analysis to examine the relationship between self-esteem and depression. Using the data of 50 cross-sectional studies conducted in Taiwan, a mean correlation of −0.48 was detected, indicating that higher levels of self-esteem were associated with lower levels of this type of emotional psychopathology. In a recent comprehensive meta-analytic review of the literature, Orth and Robbins 18 drew up the balance and concluded that

high self-esteem helps individuals adapt to and succeed in a variety of life domains, including having more satisfying relationships, performing better at school and work, enjoying improved mental and physical health, and refraining from antisocial behaviour.

Self-Compassion

Self-compassion refers to how people treat themselves when they encounter failure, deficiencies, or suffering in their personal life. According to the widely used definition of Neff, 19 the construct consists of three key elements: (1) self-kindness, which refers to being warm, kind, and understanding towards oneself in times of adversity; (2) common humanity, which pertains to the acknowledgment that all human beings face challenges in life and hence are subject to drawbacks and suffering; and (3) mindfulness, which has to do with an awareness of personal discomfort while maintaining the perspective on other more positive aspects in life. In general, self-compassion entails displaying a positive and healthy attitude to the self, which enables the individual to deal effectively with the usual setbacks in human existence. 20

About the functionality of self-compassion, Gilbert 21 conceptualized the construct in evolutionary terms. This scholar initially focused on compassion, which he viewed as a motivational system to regulate the negative affect of other people through engagement in supportive and affiliative actions that ultimately serve to maintain the group bonding and as such the survival of the species. Because human beings gradually developed the mental capacity to reflect on themselves, they can also deploy compassion towards the self in case they encounter setbacks and associated negative emotions. This self-compassion enables them to effectively cope with such emotional dysregulation ensuring their full participation in social life.

In a recent review of the literature, Strauss et al 22 concluded that

[self-]compassion is a complex construct that includes emotion but is more than an emotion, as it includes perceptiveness or sensitivity to suffering, understanding of its universality, acceptance, non-judgment, and distress tolerance, and intentions to act in helpful ways.

In view of these elements, one might expect that self-compassion tends to fluctuate over time and across situations, but there are clear indications that the construct – just like self-esteem – is quite stable and thus can best be seen as a trait-like individual difference variable. 23

Self-Compassion and Life Outcomes

Since its introduction in the psychological literature, many studies have been conducted investigating the positive effects of self-compassion. For example, Zessin et al 24 conducted a meta-analysis examining the relationship between self-compassion and various types of well-being, such as happiness, positive affect, optimism, life satisfaction, health, belongingness, and autonomy. Combining the results of 79 samples that included a total of 16,416 participants, an overall positive effect size of 0.47 was found with higher levels of self-compassion being generally accompanied by higher levels of well-being. This suggests that a caring attitude towards oneself when facing adversity serves to maintain a sense of feeling comfortable, happy, and healthy in life. In a similar vein, MacBeth and Gumley 25 synthesized the findings of 14 studies linking self-compassion to indices of psychopathology to obtain an average effect size of r = –0.54. This demonstrates that higher levels of this self-related trait are associated with lower symptom levels of anxiety, stress, and depression, and is in line with the notion that self-compassion may immunize individuals from developing psychological problems. 26

(Dis)similarities Between Self-Esteem and Self-Compassion

Self-esteem is a concept with a fairly long research tradition: especially after Rosenberg published his seminal book in the mid-1960s, 27 which also included a comprehensive scale for measuring the construct, psychologists increasingly focused on this construct in their research. This steadily culminated in an annual amount of more than 600 publications and over 26,000 citations in 2022 (in Web-of-Science using [“self-esteem” in title] as the search term), which makes self-esteem currently one of the most frequently studied concepts in psychology. The construct of self-compassion was introduced only at the beginning of the 21st century when Neff published her first papers on the topic, 20 , 28 but its popularity is still clearly on the rise (reaching 382 publications and 10,123 citations in 2022). 19 , 29 It is important to note here that the concept of self-compassion was partly introduced because of dissatisfaction with the construct of self-esteem. Specifically, critical scholars argued that because self-esteem is largely contingent on responses of others and events happening in life, the concept was argued to have little predictive value. It would merely reflect social status and personal failure or success, and as such it is hardly surprising that people who are marginalized, face a lot of adversity in life (eg, abuse and neglect), and suffer from psychopathological conditions, also display low levels of self-esteem. 15 , 30 Moreover, questions were raised regarding the malleability of (low) self-esteem: for example, positive feedback, flattering, and praise are difficult to reconcile with the negative picture that people (sometimes) have about themselves and hence do not automatically result in a more positive self-view. 20 Self-compassion is assumed to not have these drawbacks: This trait would be less dependent on the proceedings of life and is also thought to be more mouldable, making it a suitable target for intervention. 19

Whether the critical attitude towards self-esteem and the positive stance towards self-compassion is all justified, is still a matter of debate. 18 , 29 Fact is that both self-related concepts also share a number of important features. That is, as noted earlier, both are trait-like variables that refer to a benign psychological attribute of human beings characterized by a positive reflection about the self. Furthermore, from a theoretical point-of-view, they are both thought to promote adaptive and prosocial behaviour and as such are generally considered to be protective in nature, boosting the person’s positive affect and well-being, and preventing the development of psychological problems.

Despite these commonalities, there are also a number of notable differences between self-esteem and self-compassion. First of all, the relationship with the self is not the same for both concepts. That is, whereas self-esteem pertains to a positive evaluation of the self as compared to others or in the light of some general normative standard, self-compassion concerns a positive attitude towards the self when facing difficulties, without making any evaluative or comparative judgments. 19 Second, self-esteem is more concerned with a cognitive appraisal process that – although initiating defensive reactions to maintain or even improve one’s sense of worth – by itself does not incorporate any coping mechanism. 31 , 32 In contrast, self-compassion incorporates a positive action tendency: 22 cognitive strategies, such as positive self-talk and cognitive reappraisal strategies are deployed to alleviate the suffering. 33 Third and finally, self-esteem and self-compassion are thought to be mediated by different brain-based systems. 34 , 35 In terms of Gilbert’s social mentalities theory, 21 , 36 self-esteem seems to be more associated with an activation of the sympathetic threat system, which alerts the person for possible downward social mobility and inferiority and instigates operations of agency and competition. In contrast, self-compassion would reflect an activation of the parasympathetic soothing system, which aims to regulate negative emotions by seeking support and connection with others. 6 , 37

Meta-Analytic Intermezzo

Given the similarities between self-esteem and self-compassion, while also acknowledging their differences, it can be expected that both constructs will be “moderately correlated”. 6 Furthermore, there is a tendency in the literature to depict self-compassion as the more beneficial psychological concept, 19 , 20 , 37 and so it can be predicted that self-compassion will show more robust links to indices of well-being and show greater potential for shielding against stress and other psychological problems than self-esteem. To empirically test these suppositions, we conducted a meta-analysis which has the advantage of combining the results of multiple scientific studies, thereby providing a more accurate look at these topics. 38

Meta-Analytic Procedure

In the first week of March 2023 (more specific, on March 6, 2023), a literature search was conducted in Web-of-Science with [“self-compassion” in topic] AND [“self-esteem” in topic] as the search terms. The searching period was 2003 (ie, the year that the construct of self-compassion was first referred to in the scientific literature) to 2023. Wilson’s 39 online meta-analysis effect size calculator was used to calculate the Fisher’s z -transformed correlation ( r ) and the accompanying 95% confidence interval (CI) as an effect size indicator for the correlation between self-esteem and self-compassion in each study as well as for the correlations between self-esteem and self-compassion on the one hand and each variable representing well-being or a psychological problem. Fisher’s z -transformed correlations and CIs of multiple well-being or psychological problems indicators were averaged for each study and eventually across all studies. We expected to obtain positive effect sizes for the relations between self-esteem/self-compassion and indices of well-being, whereas we anticipated negative effect sizes between both self-related concepts and measures of psychological problems.

Results of the Meta-Analysis

As can be seen in the PRISMA flow diagram 40 ( Figure 1 ), the literature search yielded 221 hits, which were all inspected for suitability by the first author. Seventy-six papers (including 85 samples) were identified as relevant because they included the correlation between the traits of self-esteem and self-compassion. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 27 was used in 66 of these studies (86.8%), whereas the Self-Compassion Scale 28 (or its short-form 41 ) was employed in 71 investigations (93.4%), indicating that these self-reports are the dominant measures in this research field. As can be seen in Table 1 , the average correlation between self-esteem and self-compassion was positive and strong: r = 0.65, with an effect size of 0.71. Outcomes were rather heterogeneous [which may have been caused by sample differences (eg, adolescent versus adult, clinical versus non-clinical), and measures of self-esteem and self-compassion used (eg, shortened versus long version, other measures than the Neff and Rosenberg scale)] and the funnel plot ( Figure 2 ) showed some asymmetry (rank correlation: value = −0.23, p = 0.002; regression test: value = −3.21, p = 0.001): This was mainly due to a number of investigations showing a relatively small correlation between self-esteem and self-compassion. However, none of the studies showed a result that was in contrast with the average outcome.

Results of the Meta-Analysis of Studies on the Relation Between Self-Esteem (SE) and Self-Compassion (SC) and the Relations Between Both Self-Related Constructs and Indices of Well-Being and Psychological Problems

Notes : † Heterogeneity was evaluated by means of the open-source software package Jamovi ( https://www.jamovi.org ). The Q-statistic was significant for all analyses, indicating that the results were heterogeneous across studies.

PRISMA flow diagram depicting the selection of articles that were included in the meta-analysis on self-esteem, self-compassion, and psychological problems/well-being.

Funnel plot of the studies reporting on the correlation between self-esteem and self-compassion.

Sixty-nine studies reported on the relations between self-esteem and self-compassion, on the one hand, and variables reflecting aspects of well-being ( k = 45, 46 samples; eg, satisfaction with life, meaning in life, positive affect, belongingness, support, self-control, self-efficacy) and/or psychological problems ( k = 69, 72 samples; eg, anxiety, depression, self-criticism, negative affect, rumination, body dissatisfaction, stress, narcissism, and anger), on the other hand. As can be seen in Table 1 , both self-related constructs displayed comparable relations to indices of well-being and psychological problems. That is, the relations between self-esteem and self-compassion and well-being variables were positive, while the relations with psychological problems were negative, with all average effect sizes being quite large (ie, between |± 0.40| and |± 0.49|). Data showed again considerable heterogeneity (which is not that surprising given the large variety in well-being and psychological problems variables) although the outcomes of individual studies were generally in the same direction as the average outcomes. Note further that the obtained average effect sizes compared well with those found in previous meta-analyses investigating the effects of self-esteem and self-compassion separately. 16 , 17 , 24 , 25

Given the overlap between self-esteem and self-compassion, we conducted an additional analysis using an online second-order partial correlations calculator ( http://vassarstats.net/par2.html ). With this tool, it was possible to compute correlations between self-esteem and self-compassion and other variables, while controlling for the overlap between both self-related traits. The results showed that the links of self-esteem and self-compassion with indices of well-being and psychological problems clearly attenuated when controlling for this shared variance (ie, effect sizes between |± 0.19| and |± 0.30| ( Table 1 and Figure 3 ). However, the effect sizes of the partial correlations were of a similar magnitude for both self-related constructs and remained statistically significant, indicating that self-esteem and self-compassion each accounted for a unique proportion in the variance of well-being and psychological problems measures.

Average effect sizes ( r ) found for the (partial) relations between self-compassion and self-esteem, on the one hand, and indices of well-being and psychological problems, on the other hand.

Altogether, the results of our meta-analysis demonstrate that the relation between self-esteem and self-compassion is quite strong and that the effect size for their correlation should be qualified as “large” rather than “moderate”. 42 This signifies that – despite some unique features – the overlap between both self-related constructs is considerable and implies that in research aiming to explore the relative contributions of self-esteem and self-compassion in the prediction of well-being or psychological problems, these variables will to some extent compete for the same proportion of the variance. Nevertheless, we also noted that even when controlling for their overlap, self-esteem and self-compassion remained significant correlated to indices of well-being and psychological problems. The average effect sizes for their unique contributions were largely comparable, with statistical comparisons even indicating that self-esteem was somewhat stronger correlated to both well-being and psychological problems than self-compassion ( Z ’s being 10.60, p < 0.001 and 6.58, p < 0.001, respectively). Thus, no evidence was obtained to support the claim that self-compassion has more potential as a positive-protective variable than self-esteem.

Further Reflections on the Link Between Self-Esteem and Self-Compassion

The above findings warrant some further elaboration on the relation between self-esteem and self-compassion. The strong correlation points out that these two self-related constructs have much in common: Those who positively evaluate their worth as a person, will also treat themselves with kindness when facing adversities. In particular, it seem plausible that individuals with “true” self-esteem, that is, an authentic sense of self-worth that is not dependent on comparisons with others or fulfilling some general standard, will be more inclined to display self-compassionate responding in times of suffering. 20 There are also empirical data to support this notion. In a longitudinal study, 43 2809 adolescents completed measures of trait self-esteem and self-compassion annually for a period of four years. The results indicated that on each point in time, self-esteem and self-compassion were substantially correlated, and that across time, both self-related constructs demonstrated considerable stability. Most importantly, the data showed that self-esteem emerged as a consistent predictor of self-compassion across the four years of the study, but not vice versa. The researchers concluded that “the capacity to extend compassion toward the self depends on one’s appraisal of worthiness”, 43 which suggests that self-esteem is a more generic positive trait that serves as the basis from which compassionate self-responding may develop.

Measurement issues might also be partially responsible for the observed overlap between self-esteem and self-compassion. The dominant measures in this research field – the Self-Compassion Scale (as well its short version) and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale – not only consist of items that directly measure the intended positive constructs, but also contain items that reflect their negative counterparts, ie, uncompassionate self-responding (including self-criticism, social isolation, and rumination) and lack of self-esteem. 44 , 45 It is unclear to what extent the shared variance between the common self-esteem and self-compassion measures can be attributed to the overlap between the protective elements in both measures or to the reversed scored vulnerability components included in both scales. As an aside, it should also be noted that the inclusion of vulnerability components in measures of self-esteem and self-compassion may undermine their external validity: Relations with indices of positive psychological features of well-being could be constricted, while relations with indices of psychological problems might be inflated. In the self-compassion literature, empirical evidence exists for such an unwanted measurement artifact 29 , 45 , 46 (although it has been consistently trivialized as “the differential effects fallacy” by self-compassion advocates), 19 , 47 but in self-esteem research this issue has been largely neglected. In spite of its widespread use only relatively few scholars have taken interest in studying the unwanted effects of the inclusion of the negatively worded items in the Rosenberg scale, 44 , 48 , 49 and hence this remains a timely and important topic for further scientific inquiry.

Self-Esteem–Enhancing Interventions

Numerous interventions have been proposed that aim to raise people’s self-esteem, but cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) is one of the most frequently employed methods. 50 CBT is based on the notion that low self-esteem can best be seen as negative beliefs about the self (eg, “I am not good enough”, “I am not competent”, “I am unlovable”) – that originate from negative life experiences – which prompt maladaptive (ie, avoidant and unhelpful) behaviours. These maladaptive actions are likely to reinforce the negative self-beliefs and eventually the person becomes trapped in a downward spiral of dysfunctional cognition, emotion, and behaviour. During CBT, psychoeducation is provided (to enhance the person’s awareness of this vicious circle), cognitive therapy is applied (to challenge the negative beliefs and to replace these by more realistic and positive beliefs), and adaptive behaviour is practiced and reinforced. Meta-analyses have indicated that CBT is indeed quite successful in promoting self-esteem in clinical and non-clinical populations. 50 , 51

Other interventions that have been applied to boost self-esteem include among others: reminiscence-based therapy, during which positive autobiographical memories are retrieved and discussed (this intervention was originally developed for elderly individuals 52 but can also be applied to younger people); 53 support groups that focus on the discussion of problems and receiving positive feedback and support from peers; 54 art therapy, which involves the deployment of creative activities (such as painting, sculpture, dance, and music) to explore, express, and adjust inner thoughts and feelings, resulting in greater self-understanding and less negative emotion; 55 and evaluative conditioning, which involves a computerized training during which self-related stimuli (eg, “I” or the person’s name) are systematically paired with positively valenced traits and features. 56 All these treatments have indeed been demonstrated useful for enhancing self-esteem, with effect sizes in the small (ie, evaluative conditioning, reminiscence-based therapy) to moderate (ie, support groups, art therapy) range. 50

Positive psychology interventions have also been put forward to promote people’s self-esteem. Such interventions have the purpose to encourage the person to discover and foster his/her character strengths, thereby increasing self-acceptance and self-worth. 57 Compassion-focused treatments are a good example of a positive psychology approach, and this type of intervention has also been explored as a way to enhance self-esteem. 58 For instance, Louis and Reyes 59 developed an online cognitive self-compassion program for promoting self-exploration, self-awareness, self-acceptance, and self-love, positive coping, and emotion-regulation skills in young people. In a first test, the efficacy of the self-compassion program was evaluated in a sample of 192 adolescents aged 11 to 17 years who had been exposed to domestic violence. 60 Half of the adolescents were randomly assigned to the experimental group, whereas the other half was allocated to the waiting list control group. It was found that adolescents in the experimental group showed a substantial increase in self-esteem, and such a positive change was not noted in the control group. Based on this result, the researchers concluded that the online self-compassion program seems to be a useful intervention for enhancing self-esteem in at-risk youth.

Meta-analyses have indicated that in both child and adult populations, various types of interventions yielded a positive effect on people’s general self-esteem, with average effect sizes being in the small to moderate range (with d ’s of 0.38 and 0.21). 50 , 61 O’Mara et al 62 obtained a larger effect size ( d = 0.51), but it should be noted that their analysis also included studies that examined the effects of interventions targeting one specific self-concept domain (which appears to be more effective). Interestingly, some interventions (eg, CBT) were more successful in boosting self-esteem than others (eg, reminiscence-based therapy), 50 but compassion-focused treatments certainly belonged to the most powerful ones. 58

Regarding the benefits of self-esteem interventions, two additional remarks are in order. First, most of the research on this topic has focused on self-esteem as the outcome variable, which is logical as promotion of this self-related concept is the primary target. However, self-esteem interventions are typically conducted in people with or at risk for mental health problems (eg, anxiety, depression, aggression). There is no meta-analysis to quantify the effects of self-esteem interventions on these secondary outcomes, but it can be expected that the magnitude of effects is somewhat smaller than that found for the primary outcome measure of self-esteem. 63 Second, it has been put forward that enhancing self-esteem is not only advantageous but may also contain a risk: When levels of self-esteem become inflated and exaggerated, this might take the form of narcissism, 64 which is a frequently used argument for preferring self-compassion over self-esteem interventions. 19 Although research has indicated that self-esteem and narcissism are positively correlated, 65 it has also been noted that this relation is quite weak and that both constructs are different in nature. 66 Moreover, the danger of inadvertently enhancing self-esteem to excessively high levels seems less plausible in clinical settings where most patients display a lower sense of self-worth.

Compassion-Focused Interventions

During the past 20 years, interventions have been developed that focus on the cultivation of compassion, 67 and typically such treatments can also be applied for fostering self-compassion. 68 , 69 Well-known examples are Compassion-Focused Therapy, 70 Mindful Self-Compassion, 71 and Cognitively Based Compassion Training. 72 Although these interventions share a number of features, such as psychoeducation on the role of (self-) compassion for people’s well-being, mindfulness exercises – which promote self-awareness and paying attention to the present moment, without judgment, and active experiential activities during which participants rehearse specific (self-) compassion strategies, there are also notable differences among them that are guided by specific theoretical underpinnings. 73 This implies that there is considerable variation across treatments regarding the competencies that are targeted (eg, empathy, distress tolerance, acceptance) as well as the methods that are employed (eg, meditation, guided imagery, cognitive techniques).

With regard to the efficacy of the self-compassion treatments, two meta-analyses 68 , 69 have demonstrated that such interventions are effective at increasing self-compassion (with g ’s being 0.75 and 0.52, respectively) and decreasing various types of psychopathology indicators, such as anxiety, depression, stress, and rumination (with g ’s in the 0.40–0.67 range). From these findings, it can be concluded that self-compassion is a malleable trait and that engendering compassionate self-responding also has positive effects for people’s well-being and mental health. Furthermore, a comparison of the effect sizes with those of self-esteem interventions yields the impression that it is somewhat easier to increase people’s self-compassion than to boost their self-esteem.

A few studies have directly compared the effects of self-compassion and self-esteem interventions. For example, Leary et al 74 invited participants to write about a negative event that happened to them in the past. The main contrast involved participants who were prompted to think and write about themselves in a self-compassionate manner (by engaging in self-kindness and adopting a common humanity perspective and a mindful point-of-view) versus participants who were guided to think and feel positive about themselves to promote their self-esteem (by focusing on their positive characteristics and interpreting the event in a more positive way). The self-compassion intervention resulted in a more pronounced reduction of negative affect and greater self-acceptance than the self-esteem intervention. Similar results have been obtained in research comparing the efficacy of self-compassion and self-esteem interventions within the context of eating disorders and body dissatisfaction: Self-compassion–inducing writing produced more positive bodily feelings and greater reduction in eating disorder symptoms than self-esteem–inducing writing. 75–77

In conclusion, while these were all studies with non-clinical samples in which a rather simple manipulation of self-compassion and self-esteem was conducted by means of writing exercises, the results nevertheless indicated that induced self-compassion is associated with better outcomes than induced self-esteem. Together with the observation that self-compassion appears easier to generate, one might conclude that interventions targeting this characteristic have greater potential for building resilience and well-being than interventions focusing on self-esteem.

Self-esteem and self-compassion are both constructs that involve a positive attitude towards the self, which are thought to serve psychological resilience and as such play a role in the preservation of people’s mental health and well-being. 78 While self-esteem is already an older concept that has been a topic of psychological investigation for more than half a century, self-compassion was only introduced some 20 years ago during the start of the positive psychology movement. 79 If one wants to introduce a new psychological construct, it is always wise to point out in what way it can be differentiated from or adds something new beyond any existing concept. 80 So, in the first writings on self-compassion, a comparison was made with self-esteem in an attempt to differentiate the two from one another. 20 Basically, four arguments have been advanced in the literature to make the distinction between the two constructs and to contend that self-compassion has incremental value over self-esteem.

The first argument that has been made is that self-esteem and self-compassion would only be “moderately” correlated. 6 , 20 Our meta-analysis, however, showed that the average correlation between measures of these constructs (mostly the Self-Compassion Scale and the Rosenberg scale) was quite substantial: a mean effect size of 0.71 was found, which should be interpreted as “large”. As we do note important differences between self-esteem and self-compassion (eg, self-evaluation versus self-attitude, appraisal versus coping, and sympathetic threat system versus parasympathetic soothing system), it is certainly not our intention to state that they reflect a similar construct. Meanwhile, the attempts to draw a dividing line between self-esteem and self-compassion have led to the absence of a search for a meaningful link among them. The study by Donald et al 43 is interesting and important in this regard as the results suggest that self-esteem is the more basic trait providing the foundation for the more coping-oriented trait of self-compassion. This makes sense: appreciation and love prompt people to act with kindness to others, and in similar vein a sense of self-worth or self-love will enable persons to be kind and compassionate to themselves. We therefore urge for more studies on the commonalities between self-esteem and self-compassion as well as their temporal association.

The second argument refers to the claim that self-compassion continues to explain a significant proportion of the variance in well-being and psychological symptoms after controlling for levels of self-esteem. 6 , 19 , 20 , 37 Such a result would indicate that self-compassion displays a unique link to these external variables that is not accounted for by self-esteem. Our meta-analysis indeed showed that once controlling for the shared variance between both self-related concepts, self-compassion remained significantly associated with indices of well-being and psychological symptoms, which indeed confirms that self-compassion has incremental value over self-esteem. However, the reverse was also true: when controlling for the influence of self-compassion, self-esteem also remained a significant correlate of well-being and psychological symptoms. The effects sizes documented for the independent contributions (partial correlations) to the external variables were comparable for self-esteem and self-compassion, suggesting that – besides communalities – both concepts harbour unique features that are relevant for understanding human resilience.

The third argument is concerned with intervention. It has been noted that because self-esteem is often contingent on the evaluation of others or on the fulfilment of some general standard – which are both factors outside a person’s control, it is difficult to manipulate this self-related trait. In contrast, self-compassion pertains to how people deal with themselves when they encounter adversities in life, thus referring to a personal attitude that would be more susceptible to change. Indeed, when looking at the effect sizes obtained by researchers on the malleability of both self-related traits, the conclusion seems justified that compassionate self-responding is easier to initiate by treatment than generic feelings of self-worth. This may also account for the finding that self-compassion interventions generally produce greater effects than self-esteem interventions. Assuming that self-esteem is the more basic trait that forms the foundation for self-compassion, a comparison arises with other therapeutic interventions. For example, the cognitive behavioural model of psychopathology assumes that people with emotional problems are often bothered by negative automatic thoughts that fuel disturbing emotions and lead to dysfunctional behaviour. The negative automatic thoughts are grounded in underlying personal schemas, which reflect the core beliefs about oneself, others, and the world. In CBT, therapists will usually first try to tackle the negative automatic thoughts, before addressing the fundamental schemas, which are formed early in life and formed by upbringing and prior experiences, are deeply rooted and hence more difficult to change. 81 However, many CBT-oriented therapists currently adhere the notion that in the treatment of persistent emotional disorders, it is essential to not only focus on negative automatic thoughts but also to attend the underlying schemas. 82 This could also be true when trying to improve self-focused characteristics: An initial intervention to improve self-compassion followed by an intervention to ameliorate self-esteem might yield superior and more lasting effects for building people’s resilience and well-being.

The fourth and final argument that has been made for preferring self-compassion over self-esteem has to do with the presumed downside of self-esteem, namely that (too) high levels of this trait are no longer protective but rather take the form of narcissistic tendencies, which have been found to be associated with a host of pathological outcomes. 83 While it is true that self-esteem and narcissism are positively correlated, 65 it should be noted that this link is not that strong and so this risk should not be exaggerated. Our meta-analysis of the relation between self-esteem and psychological problems still indicated a clear-cut protective effect for this self-related trait even though several studies included narcissism as an outcome variable. 6 , 84 , 85 This implies that on average the positive effects mostly outweigh possible downsides of high levels of self-esteem. Moreover, it may well be the case that a strong reliance on self-compassion also comes with drawbacks. For example, it has been noted that high levels of self-compassion may be accompanied by feelings of self-pity and self-indulgence, which would undermine a person’s responsibility for his problems, and interfere with the motivation to try to change the adverse circumstances. 86 There has been a consistent tendency to quickly discard this notion, 19 , 20 but as far as we can see no empirical study can be found that has actually investigated the topic. Certainly, this is an interesting issue for further empirical scrutiny.

To take an advance on the research agenda, Figure 4 depicts a basic model in which self-esteem (true and contextual) and self-compassion (self-kindness and allied adaptive coping strategies) form a psychological buffer that promotes resilience and preserves mental well-being in time of adversity. It is assumed that there is a temporal link between self-esteem and self-compassion, in which the former serves as the foundation of the latter. Interesting, a number of studies have already explored this by testing mediation models in which self-compassion acts as the connecting variable between self-esteem (independent variable) and indices of psychological problems 87 , 88 and well-being 89 (dependent variable). Note also that the model includes potential downsides of both self-related concepts: defensiveness (including narcissistic tendencies) in the case of self-esteem and passivity (in the form of self-indulgence and self-pity) in the case of self-compassion, which may undermine the effectivity of the self-related screen against the drawbacks in life.

Model depicting the presumed role of self-esteem and self-compassion in resilience and well-being.

Final Conclusion

In this paper, we want to put forward that self-esteem and self-compassion are relevant inter-correlated (predominantly) positive constructs that play a role in people’s resilience and maintenance of well-being, and hence provide leads for psychological interventions. Rather than creating a competition – in which it is argued that one construct (ie, self-compassion) is more important than the other (ie, self-esteem), it seems more appropriate to view both concepts as complementary. This would imply that researchers should devote more attention to the unique protective roles of self-esteem and self-compassion within a context of well-being and mental health as well as to their additive value in the treatment of people with psychological problems.

The authors report no conflicts of interest in this work.