case study on constitution of india

Constitutional Law - Notes, Case Laws And Study Material

Explore constitutional law resources: notes, case laws, and study material at legal bites..

A basic understanding of the Constitutional Law is a must for every individual. The Constitution of India is the supreme law of the country. It includes the fundamental principles governing the Union and its territories; states and various rights; Executive, legislature and judiciary; Emergency provisions, etc. This subject also has ample weightage in every competitive exam related to law and order.

Legal Bites brings you the best study material on this subject with our brilliant up-to-date notes and case laws. The course is divided into fourteen modules to provide readers with a systematic study of constitutional laws. The modules have been specially designed to give students an in-depth insight into every aspect of constitutional law.

The well-researched miscellaneous articles and the 10-part series of important questions towards the end of this course give students an edge when participating in national-level competitions and exams. Our study material holds the key to success for aspiring lawyers.

Important articles and study material on Constitutional Law – Click on the links to Read:

Module i: historical overview and nature of the indian constitution.

Introduction to concepts of the Constitution, Constitutional law and Constitutionalism
Historical Background and Evolution of the Constitution
Constitutional Law MCQs for Law Aspirants : Solved High-Quality MCQs for Judiciary Prelims
Constituent Assembly – Journey and Challenges
Indian Constituent Assembly: Features and its Committees
Main Sources of the Indian Constitution
Introduction to the Constitution of India
Constitution of India – Full Text

Preamble: An Interpreter of the Constitution

Preamble to the Constitution of India: Introduction, Features and Significance
Features of the Constitution and a brief comparison with Various Constitutions
Limited Government in India | Explained

Important Books and Practice Tests (Must Have)

Constitutional Law of India by HM Seervai
Constitution of India by V. N. Shukla
The Constitution Of India Bare Act Along with Supreme Court Guidelines, Landmark Judgment, Important Tips, Legal Maxims, Words and phrases-Legally Defined
1000+ Detailed Questions MCQ Test Series for Competitions (Redirect to Law Aspirants)

Module II: Union and its Territory

Formation of a state
Concepts of Citizenship and Nationality
Citizenship law in India | All you need to know
A brief overview of the Citizenship Act, 1955

Module III: Concept of State and Various Fundamental Rights

Concept of 'State' under Article 12
Meaning of 'Law' under Article 13
Article 13 and Power of Amendment under Article 368
Right to Equality: Concept and Explanation | Article 14-18
Case Analysis: Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1993)
Case Study: R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India [AIR 1993 SC 1804]
Right to Freedom: Categories and Dimensions of Article 19
The Golden Triangle in the Indian Constitution: Articles 14, 19, and 21
Right to Life & Personal Liberty | Article 21 Explained
Right to Privacy: Evolution

Module IV: Other Fundamental Rights

Right to Education
Right to Have a Clean and Healthy Environment: Analysing the Judicial Trends
Right to Die with Dignity: A Constitutional Perspective
Right Against Exploitation: A Comprehensive Analysis
Right to Freedom of Religion (Articles 25-28)
Cultural and Educational Rights (Art 29-30)
Right to constitutional remedies (Art 32 and 226)
Right to Property under the Indian Constitution Explained
Martial Law in the Constitution of India

Module V: Interrelationship between Fundamental Rights and other parts of the Constitution

Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy
Parliamentary Privileges And Fundamental Rights
Fundamental Rights and Emergency Provisions
Freedom of Trade and Commerce: Explained

Module VI: Directive Principles Of State Policy And Fundamental Duties

Directive Principles of State Policy: An Overview
Fundamental Duties Enshrined in the Constitution of India

MODULE VII: Executive

Constitutional provisions related to the President of India
Constitutional provisions related to Governor
Federalism in India: Unitary, Quasi, Cooperative, Competitive

MODULE VIII: Parliament and State Legislature

The various forms of Government: A primary synopsis
Indian Parliament: Composition, Functions, Privileges & Inter-relation
State Legislature: Composition, Functions and Privileges
Anti-Defection Law / Tenth Schedule
Local Self Government In India | Panchayati Raj Institution & Urban Local self-governments

MODULE IX: Centre-State Relationship

Distribution of Power: Legislative Relations between Centre and State
Centre-State Financial relationship – Taxing powers of Union and State
Administrative Relationship between the Centre and States
Analysis of Provisions Related to Languages under the Indian Constitution

MODULE X: Union and State Judiciary

Union Judiciary – Composition, Appointment, Condition of Services and Removal of Judges
Jurisdiction of Supreme Court
Special Leave Petition; Article 136 | Concept & Explanation
State Judiciary – Composition, Appointment, Conditions of Services and Removal of Judges
Jurisdiction of High Courts
Judicial Review and Judicial Activism

MODULE XI: Emergency Provisions

National Emergency Provisions Under the Indian Constitution
Relationship between Fundamental Rights and Emergency Provisions

MODULE XII: Amendment of the Constitution

The Doctrine of Basic Structure
Judicial Review
Constitutional Values of Landmark Amendments in India
Important amendments in the Constitution of India

MODULE XIII: Other Miscellaneous Topics

Schedules in the Indian Constitution | Explained
Impact of Scrapping of Article 370 on the Fundamental Rights of the Citizens of J&K
Public Service Commissions: Background, Establishment & Function
Election Commission Of India: History, Composition, Powers and Functions
Order of Precedence of the Government of India

Important Doctrines

Doctrine of Autrefois Acquit and Autrefois Convict: Double Jeopardy Protections in Law

Doctrine of Territorial Nexus; Meaning, Explanation and Case Laws

Doctrine of Prospective Overruling

Doctrine of Eclipse in Constitutional Law: Analysis with Related Case Laws
Doctrine of Laches: Meaning and Elements
Doctrine of Colourable Legislation
Doctrine of Pith and Substance: Applicability in the Indian Constitution
Doctrine of Incidental or Ancillary Powers: Explanation with Related Case Laws

Doctrine of Repugnancy

Important Case Laws

Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965)
Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980)
Bennett Coleman v. Union of India (1973)
Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. v. The State of Kerala & Ors. (2018)
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006)
Lily Thomas v Union of India (2013)
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)
State of Haryana v. State of Punjab (2002)

Important Mains Questions Series for Judiciary, APO & University Exams

Constitutional Law Mains Questions Series Part-I
Constitutional Law Mains Questions Series Part-II
Constitutional Law Mains Questions Series Part-III
Constitutional Law Mains Questions Series Part-IV
Constitutional Law Mains Questions Series Part-V
Constitutional Law Mains Questions Series Part-VI
Constitutional Law Mains Questions Series Part-VII
Constitutional Law Mains Questions Series Part-VIII
Constitutional Law Mains Questions Series Part-IX
Constitutional Law Mains Questions Series Part-X

Your valuable feedback in the form of comments or any desired inputs are encouraged and always welcome. Every contribution toward a goal is valuable, regardless of how small it may be.

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Legal Bites Study Materials correspond to what is taught in law schools and what is tested in competitive exams. It pledges to offer a competitive advantage, prepare for tests, and save a lot of money.

Top 10 Landmark Cases of Constitution

So, college students often struggle with case laws, especially on the subject of the constitution. Here is the list of 10 landmark judgments of the Constitution of India. These cases are important not only for your college exams but will also help you in Judiciary exams. So, let’s get started!

Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950)

The SC held that freedom of propagating ideas through circulars is included in freedom of speech and expression.

State of Madras v. Amt. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)

The judgment led to the addition of this subsection (4) by the First Constitutional Amendment Act , 1951. Specifically, the Madras Government has reserved places in State engineering and medical institutes for various communities based on classes, religion, and race. This was challenged before the court as it violates Article 15 (1) of the Constitution. The SC held that the statute invalidates seat reservations based on race, religion, and caste (caste reservation in India) since it categorises students based on their castes, religions, and other factors rather than their academic ability. Clause (4) was inserted into Article 15 to mitigate the impact of the aforementioned SC judgment. This Article gives the STATE the authority to make specific provisions for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and for socially and educationally marginalized classes of citizens.

K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (1959)

At Sessions Court, the appellant was charged under S. 302 & S. 304 of the IPC and was tried by the Sessions Judge with the aid of a special jury. The jury passed a verdict of “not guilty” by 8: 1 majority under both the provisions of IPC, which was not agreed by the Sessions Judge, as in his view, the jury’s verdict was such that with regards to the evidence shown.

So, the learned Sessions Judge submitted the case under 307 of CrPC to the Bombay High Court & the Division Bench comprising of Justices Shelat and Naik passed separate judgments but held that the accused was guilty of murder under s. 302 of IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. Both the Justices of the High Court stated that there was misdirection to the jury and that the accused was clearly guilty of murder. No reasonable body must arrive at such a conclusion as delivered by the jury.

I.C. Golaknath and ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. (1967)

The main issue dealt with in this case was- Can an amendment be considered a law and whether or not fundamental rights can be amended? The SC stated that Fundamental Rights are not amendable under Article 13, and a new Constituent Assembly would be needed to modify such rights. Additionally, it was noted that while Article 368 outlines the process for amending the Constitution, it does not grant Parliament the authority to do so.

Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)

The Supreme Court defined the basic structure in this case . the court held that although the Parliament had the authority to amend any portion of Constitution, including the Fundamental Rights, the basic structure of the constitution could not be abrogated even by constitutional amendment. This acts as the basis of Indian law for the judiciary's power to invalidate any amendment made by Parliament those conflicts with the Constitution's fundamental principles.

Maneka Gandhi v. UOI (1978)

Whether the freedom to go abroad falls under Article 21's definition of the Right to Personal Liberty was a key question in this case. According to the SC, it is a part of the right to personal liberty. The SC further held that restricting personal freedom did not require more than the existence of an enabling law. Additionally, such a law must be "just, fair, and reasonable."

Minerva Mills Ltd. V. UOI (1980)

This case once again strengthens the Basic Structure concept. The decision declared two amendments introduced to the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 to be against the basic structure and invalidated them. It is quite evident from the ruling that the Constitution, not the Parliament, is superior.

Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and ors. (1985)

This is a crucial case in the struggle for Muslim women’s rights. The SC affirmed a Muslim woman's claim to alimony and declared that everyone, regardless of religion, is subject to the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure. This sparked a political debate, and the ruling was overturned by the government of the day by passing the Muslim Women (Protection on Divorce Act), 1986, which stipulates that alimony must only be paid during the iddat period (in tune with the Muslim personal law).

M.C. Mehta v. UOI (1986)

Three issues were addressed in this case : the application of Article 32, the application of the Rylands v. Fletcher rule of absolute liability, and the compensation problem. The SC held that its authority under Article 32 extends to corrective and preventive actions where rights are violated. Additionally, it was decided that Absolute Liability should be used in industries that participate in risky or intrinsically harmful activity. Finally, it added that in order to act as a deterrence, the compensation must be proportionate to the size and potential of the industry.

Vishaka and Ors v. State of Rajasthan (1997)

This case involved workplace sexual harassment. In its judgment, the SC provided a set of guidelines for employers and other accountable parties or organisations to ensure the avoidance of sexual harassment right away. They are referred to as "Vishaka Guidelines." Until the relevant legislation was passed, these were regarded as being in effect.

A legal content writer who pursued BBA-LL.B.(H) from Amity University Chhattisgarh. She has a keen interest in corporate and IPR sectors.

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Case Summary: Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) vs. Union of India, 2017

Title of the Case: Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retired). vs Union of India And Ors., 2017. Citation : Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012, (2017) 10 SCC 1 Court: Supreme Court of India Parties Involved: Appellant: Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retired) Respondent: Union of India and Others. Bench: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, R. K. Agrawal, J. S. Khehar, S. A. Bobde, S. A. Nazeer, R. K. Agrawal, J. Chelameswar, A.M. Sapre JJ.

Brief facts: A retired High Court Judge K.S. Puttaswamy filed a petition in 2012 against the Union of India before a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of Aadhaar because it is violating the right to privacy which had been established on reference from the Constitution Bench to determine whether or not the right to privacy was guaranteed as an independent fundamental right under the constitution of India following past decisions from Supreme Court benches.

Issues: 1. Whether or not there is any fundamental right of privacy under the Constitution of India?

2. Whether or not the decision made by the Court that there are no such fundamental rights in M.P. Sharma & Ors. vs. Satish Chandra, DM, Delhi & Ors. and also, in Kharak Singh vs. The State of U.P, is that the correct expression of the constitutional position?

Petitioner’s Argument: • It was argued from the side of the petitioner before the court is that the right to privacy is an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and same is to be protected by the constitution of India. • It was also put forward to evaluate the correctness of the decision noted in Karak Singh vs. The state of Uttar Pradesh and M. P. Sharma vs. Satish Chandra on the ground that it violates the Right to Privacy under Article 21 of the constitution.

Respondent’s Argument: • It was argued from the side of the defendant that the constitution of India does not specifically protect the Right to privacy and on this ground that the right of privacy was not guaranteed under the Constitution, and hence Article 21 of the Indian Constitution (the right to life and personal liberty) had no application in the case of both M. P. Sharma vs Satish Chandra and Karak Singh vs. State of UP.

The court has discussed various issues regarding privacy to felicitate the clear analysis 1. Privacy Concerns Against state and Non-State Actors. It was held that the claim of protection of privacy can be against both state and non- state actors as the danger in the age of technological development can originate not only from the state but from the non-state entities as well.

2. Informational Privacy (Not an absolute right). It was held that Informational privacy is an aspect of the right to privacy. The right of an individual to exercise control over his data and to be able to control his/her existence on the internet and unauthorized use of such information may, therefore, lead to violation of this right.

3. The ambit of Article 21 broadens by agreeing on opinions of the judges which recognized that rights which have been held to flow out include the following: i. Food preferences and animal slaughter – Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat & Ors. ii. Reproductive rights – medical termination of pregnancy – Suchita Srivastava & Anr vs. Chandigarh Administration. iii. Protection of personal information – privacy of health records – Mr. X v Hospital Z,1998 iv. The right to go abroad – Satwant Singh Sawhney v D Ramarathnam APO New Delhi v. The right of prisoners against bar fetters – Charles Sobraj v Supdt. Central Jail. vi. The right to legal aid – M H Hoskot v State of Maharashtra. vii. The right to a speedy trial – Hussainara Khatoon v Home Secretary, State of Bihar. viii. The right against handcuffing – Prem Shankar Shukla v Delhi Administration. ix. The right against custodial violence – Sheela Barse v State of Maharashtra. x. The right against public hanging – A G of India v Lachma Devi. xi. Right to doctor’s assistance at government hospitals – Paramanand Katara v Union of India. xii. Right to shelter – Shantistar Builders v N K Totame. xiii. Right to a healthy environment – Virender Gaur v State of Haryana. xiv. Right to compensation for unlawful arrest – Rudal Sah v State of Bihar. xv. Right to freedom from torture – Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration. xvi. Right to reputation – Umesh Kumar v State of Andhra Pradesh. xvii. Right to earn a livelihood – Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation.

Judgment: A nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India passed a landmark judgment on 24th August 2017, upholding the fundamental right to privacy under Article 21 of the constitution of India.

Article 21 of the Constitution reads as: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law” .

It is stated in the judgment that the privacy is to be an integral component of Part III of the Indian Constitution, which lays down the fundamental rights of the citizens. The Supreme Court also stated that the state must carefully balance the individual privacy and the legitimate aim, at any cost as fundamental rights cannot be given or taken away by law, and all laws and acts must abide by the constitution. The Court also declared that the right to privacy is not an absolute right and any invasion of privacy by state or non-state actor must satisfy the triple test i.e. 1. Legitimate Aim 2. Proportionality 3. Legality

Decision that has been passed by all nine judges holds: (i) The decision in M P Sharma vs. Satish Chandra which holds that the right to privacy is not protected by the Constitution of India stands over-ruled; (ii) The decision in Kharak Singh vs. State of UP to the degree that it holds that the right to privacy is not protected by the Constitution also stands over-ruled; (iii) The right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the constitution of India and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court of India has once again appeared as the sole protector of the constitution creating a legal framework for privacy protections in India. The judgment covers all the issues and established that privacy is a fundamental inalienable right, intrinsic to human dignity and liberty under article 21 of the constitution of India. The judgment gives a way for the decriminalization of homosexuality in India in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) and abolishing the provisions of the crime of Adultery under in the case of Joseph Shine v. Union of India (27 September 2018.

Cases cited for reference: M P Sharma v. Satish Chandra Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh A K Gopalan v. State of Madras Rustom Cavasji Cooper v. Union of India Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh R Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India

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Constitutional Studies

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Democracy and decolonization: How India was made

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Madhav Khosla, Democracy and decolonization: How India was made, International Journal of Constitutional Law , Volume 18, Issue 3, October 2020, Pages 1031–1035, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moaa078

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For some years, the endurance of constitutional democracy in India has been a puzzle for political scientists and public law scholars. The creation of self-government on Indian soil challenged Western political theory and history, and its survival in atypical and unusual circumstances has mystified students of comparative politics. 1 If the conventional wisdom is believed, self-rule in a country with major levels of poverty, illiteracy, and diversity should neither have been instituted nor sustained. 2 India has managed to hold elections with remarkable regularity, and it boasts of a constitutional culture where conflict has, for the most part, been articulated through legal means. 3 The troubling reality of contemporary Indian political life—where the principles of constitutional democracy appear to be under serious threat—does not take away from the achievement of modern India or from the puzzle that the nation’s history invites. Regardless of whether India will remain a constitutional democracy, it is somewhat astonishing that it was ever one to begin with.

Even though the perplexity of the Indian experience has been the subject of scholarly interest and popular fascination, the origins of this experience remain relatively understudied. Two new and important books—Ornit Shani’s How India Became Democratic: Citizenship and the Making of the Universal Franchise and Rohit De’s A People’s Constitution: The Everyday Life of Law in the Indian Republic— help to fill this void. They each further our understanding of how India succeeded in becoming a constitutional democracy, and they each shed light on the forces and factors that shaped one of the most crucial political transitions in the postcolonial world. Together, their contribution is significant: above all, they allow us to grasp how institutions and norms and practices come into being. At a time of considerable global anxiety around the working of constitutional democracy, such a contribution could hardly be more urgent. 4

Ornit Shani’s How India Became Democratic addresses a matter central to any democratic enterprise: the creation of an electoral roll. But the electoral roll that interests her is no ordinary one. Created amid civil war and mass migration, it brought into being the world’s largest democracy, a democracy where universal adult suffrage was granted at once rather than gradually. The electoral roll, Shani observes, would include 173 million people. And, of these several million, around 85% had no experience of voting. The book’s focus is on “the practical—rather than ideological—steps through which the nation and its democracy was built” (at 5). Shani is concerned with the institutional and bureaucratic story as it unfolded. Her principal source is the archive of the Election Commission of India, whose documents How India Became Democratic parses with clinical care.

The first roll had been drafted even before India’s Constitution came into effect in 1950. Thus, the foundation for making voters out of Indians had been laid prior to the nation becoming a republic; the all-important question of who was an Indian was negotiated before the Constitution’s vision of citizenship was formalized. 5 To prepare an electoral roll required determining who was eligible to be a citizen, and Shani captures how this enterprise involved intense interactions between the bureaucrats who undertook the process and individuals who sought to be registered as participants in the new nation. As she points out, “people and social groups not only engaged with the constitution, but also entered into dialogues with the [Constituent Assembly Secretariat] and their local government about draft citizenship provisions” (at 164).

One of the many strengths of How India Became Democratic is its insight into the intricate and prosaic world of state-building. When constitutions come into being, their makers are required not merely to explore the forms and limits of state power, but also to negotiate the brutal reality of state formation. Before a state can be controlled, it must be created. 6 The preparation of the electoral roll provides a terrific window into the creation of state power and the emergence of state capacity. We learn about the singular role performed by the Constituent Assembly Secretariat, and about the different tasks undertaken by administrative offices and officials at multiple tiers of government. The challenges at hand included determining whether the electoral roll should be combined with the census; what documentation should count as proof of age and other details; whether the responsibility of registration should fall on the voter or state; the precise process by which registration should occur; and so forth.

Through an exploration of letters, circulars, newspaper reports, magazine editorials, and the like, we learn about the different queries and complaints, about procedural infirmities and state monitoring, and about how identification was undertaken. Some matters proved especially interesting, such as the registration of women, as many were reluctant to be registered under their own specific names. And some issues were particularly tricky, like the registration of refugees—even more so in partitioned regions such as Bengal and Punjab. This enterprise engendered much debate over the meaning and model of citizenship, and it brought into sharp focus the confusion between being registered as a voter and being registered for citizenship. “It was these contestations,” Shani points out, “over membership in the nation through the pursuit of a ‘place on the roll’ that gave a practical basis to the conceptions and principles of democratic citizenship that were debated at the time in the process of constitution making from above” (at 53).

These contestations involved state actors at various levels as well as different non-state actors. For instance, the question of paying for the preparation of the electoral roll and the costs of the entire process formed part of an intense and important set of exchanges between the Constituent Assembly Secretariat and the provincial and state governments. Through the story of the process by which persons sought to become voters, we are exposed to the ways in which central, state, and provincial governments engaged and interacted with one another and with civic bodies and associations. Throughout, this is a story of how actors from very different vantage points came together to be part of a joint project: how they individually and collectively negotiated the dramatic conceptual transition from the colonial frame of mind, which had seen universal suffrage to be both undesirable and infeasible in India, to the postcolonial one which put its faith in self-government.

The preparation of the electoral roll would inform and shape certain principles of constitutional government. On the abovementioned issue of costs, for example, the resolution of the disagreement between the Constituent Assembly Secretariat and the state and provincial governments involved “in effect, a means of disciplining the federation, and of legitimating the authority of the center” (at 143). More fundamentally, the process would have a direct impact on India’s final constitutional text. The Secretariat’s experience with the electoral roll—such as the local failures that sometimes occurred in following central instructions—influenced the eventual constitutional framework for the holding of elections. In particular, the Secretariat highlighted “the importance of setting up an impartial and independent body to direct and control the elections” (at 189). 7 The preparation of the first electoral roll thereby shaped the future of Indian democracy in direct ways.

The transition to universal suffrage was cemented in the public sphere and the popular imagination through widespread communication. Shani underlines, in this regard, the clear and informative press notes of the Constituent Assembly Secretariat and the commitment and interest displayed by the media. The engagement with the preparation of the electoral roll—on both substantive and procedural matters—did not merely further knowledge and understanding. In marking a shift from the modes by which the colonial state had enumerated people, such a conversation was itself crucial to the instantiation of democracy. Simply put, the publicity and dialogue around the electoral roll itself underlined the meaning of the right to vote. The descriptive and deliberative enterprises were, that is, themselves constitutive. Shani is weaker at capturing the conceptual moves at work here than one might have hoped, but this is perhaps an inevitable consequence of her emphasis on the nuts and bolts of the process rather than on the ideas that drove it.

Many of these themes—of engagement as cementing norms, of constitutionalism from below—lie at the heart of Rohit De’s A People’s Constitution . De considers how “large numbers of ordinary Indians, often from minorities or subaltern groups” (at 1–2), negotiated the Indian Constitution soon after it came into force. The Constitution, De shows us, “did not descend upon the people; it was produced and reproduced in everyday encounters” (at 3). The text was doubtless a product of an elite group of men and women, but we learn how it was embraced by diverse Indians who inhabited many different worlds. These citizens not only accepted the Constitution, but more significantly saw it as the means for asserting claims against the state. They filed writ petitions and sought to enforce constitutional remedies, and they saw themselves as rights-bearers.

The book is organized around different case studies whose themes range across ordinary and basic matters. Throughout, De is sensitive to the nature of the facts, the specific legal rules and regulations that applied, and to the character of the litigants, their professional setting, community environment, and social milieu. Indeed, A People’s Constitution superbly integrates legal materials with social reality. The history of a legal case is provided from start to finish, and at each stage we are shown the context and motivations that shape how laws are made, understood, and applied. We grasp how rules shaped behavior, and we thereby come to understand why constitutional challenges took the specific shape that they did. Legal doctrine was not a straightforward outcome of judicial trends and techniques. It was a function of how citizens, often those at the margins, came to think about the constitutional text and their place as participants in a grand constitutional project.

Given its emphasis on constitutional conversations, on how claims before courts were articulated and framed, on how matters travelled to courts in the first place, A People’s Constitution takes our attention away from the judicial verdicts that were delivered. All too often, De correctly recognizes, we singularly focus on the outcome delivered by a judgment, thereby missing the arguments and assertations that arise before the court—arguments and assertations that characterized the “citizen litigant” (at 26). This shift in orientation is certainty a worthy one; it is crucial to coming to a sense of how constitutional consciousness percolates. But though verdicts themselves are not the only variable in the creation of a constitutional culture, A People’s Constitution seems to somewhat sideline the inner logic of the judgments that were delivered. This is unfortunate for it limits the overall account. Any claim before a court, after all, internalizes some understanding of the logic by which courts determine matters, and that internalization is central to law’s legitimacy.

The four chapters in A People’s Constitution explore constitutional challenges involving prohibition laws, controls on commodities, the banning of cow slaughter, and prostitution as a profession. In each instance, De does an excellent job of providing the social and historical context of the litigation. In the case of prohibition, to offer but one simple example, De reminds us of the relationship between the Parsi community and the liquor trade. We are exposed to the experience of the litigants, the logic that drove the measures in question, the salience that rules carried, and—importantly—the transition in the legal environment in the process of democracy and decolonization. Perhaps the most compelling feature of these chapters, whether one learns about a butcher or a prostitute, is that they reveal how citizens used the constitutional text to claim their rights as free and equal beings. In accepting and relying upon the authority of the new legal system, they gave authority to that system.

As a window into litigation—the actors, the arguments, the context, the consequence— A People’s Constitution is superbly crafted. It is less certain, however, whether the book succeeds in explaining the spread and entrenchment of constitutionalism during the early years of the Indian republic. The case studies illustrate a great deal; there is certainly something rich and important in what they offer. But to what extent are they representative of legal disputes and citizen engagement at the time? Do they capture the history of Indian constitutionalism’s first period or do they instead provide an account that is engaging but ultimately limited to a select few cases? It is hard to fully know the answers to such questions, to fully appreciate the historical lessons that should be drawn from the material at hand. 8 In contrast, the account in How India Became Democratic is largely representative of India’s first experience with voting, though of course Shani does carefully observe important exclusions to the right to vote, both unintended and specified.

Despite this quibble, A People’s Constitution clearly impresses upon us how several Indians learned the new language of constitutionalism, just as How India Became Democratic underscores how they oriented themselves to democratic ways of being. There are some further similarities that bear mentioning. As I have observed, a common and vital theme in both books is the relationship between political elites and, for want of a better phrase, the common man. In How India Became Democratic , we are exposed to how bureaucrats engaged with a wide range of ordinary actors whose input and involvement was central to the creation and realization of the overall political vision. In A People’s Constitution , we notice the role that civil society played in building constitutionalism, how judges and courts play their parts and perform their responsibilities within the context of citizen engagement. The books reveal how constitutions are both elite pacts and social contracts, how constitution-making and constitutional endurance requires leadership as well as local support.

A related noteworthy theme is the role of struggle and conflict in the emergence of democratic constitutionalism. In both books, what we notice as invaluable is not merely the interaction between political elites and local actors but, more fundamentally, the debates between them. It was not the conversation but rather the contest over citizenship and rights—and the broader themes that the concepts implicate—that led to a constitutional culture. In that sense, the books serve to rehabilitate the role of disagreement in cementing the political worlds that we inhabit. 9 They remind us that disagreement may not only be unavoidable in politics and in law, but rather that it is central to the evolution of both domains. The disagreement, moreover, captured the background consensus that elections provided a peaceful means by which to transfer power, and law provided a peaceful means by which to resolve disputes. To disagree, to make claims upon the state, was a mark of taking the enterprise seriously.

Quite clearly, then, both How India Became Democratic and A People’s Constitution teach us a great deal about the birth of modern India and about the creation of constitutionalism. For far too long, Indian social scientists have focused—albeit with remarkable skill and energy—on either the struggle for freedom from British rule or the vagaries of India’s postcolonial political life. One casualty of this stress has been a deeper appreciation of the moment of decolonization, of the period of transition from empire to democracy. In addition to the mechanics behind state-building and the ways in which citizens internalized the new constitutional order, there is a further feature that is crucial to understanding this period of transition: the ideas that shaped the choice for democracy in a country that lacked the social, economic, and historical prerequisites upon which self-government was widely thought to be predicated. Simply put, how did India’s founders address the colonial arguments against Indian self-rule? How did they make democracy possible?

I have tried to provide an answer to this vital question in India’s Founding Moment , a book that attempts to shed light on the specificity and significance of the postcolonial constitutional moment. 10 India’s constitution-making endeavor exemplified the effort to rethink democratic theory: its founders suggested that it was politics itself—rather than submission to an alien force—that would result in an enlightened politics. A democratic citizenry would emerge by means of a democratic politics. The content of the Constitution reveals the institutional structure that could effectuate the shift from a colonial subject to a self-governing individual: it presents a vision of the architecture of democracy. Three mutually reinforcing elements would constitute a democratic citizen: a new language of rules; an overarching state; and the individualization of identity. Together, these elements would allow Indians to engage with one another on new terms; as free and equal beings present within a new world of knowledge and understanding.

Central to this vision was the belief that the Indian people could be created and recreated. For India’s founders, the conclusions that the imperial mind had drawn about the colonial people were not permanent historical facts; they were a contingent outcome of the politics to which the people had been subject. A new politics could, India’s founders felt, create a new people. Given present political events, both in India and elsewhere, we would do well to recall not only the institutionalization of constitutional democracy in India, but—more fundamentally—the ideological impulse behind the faith in democracy in the first place. India’s birth reminds us that our political world can be made and remade in dramatic and profound ways. It captures the profound constructability of the institutional environments that we inhabit—and, in our time just as in previous ones, that fact leaves us with both hope and fear.

On India’s democratic survival, see Arend Lijphart, The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation , 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 258 (1996); Ashutosh Varshney, Why India Survives , 9 J. Democracy 36 (1998); Devesh Kapur, Explaining Democratic Durability and Economic Performance, in Public Institutions in India 28 (Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta eds., 2005).

See generally Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study of Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Political Thought (1999); Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and Grance (2006).

See generally Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (2007); Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla & Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Locating Indian Constitutionalism , in Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution 1 ( Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla & Pratap Bhanu Mehta eds., 2016).

See generally Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson, and Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (2018).

On this vision, see Niraja Gopal Jayal, Citizenship and Its Discontents: An Indian History (2013); Niraja Gopal Jayal, Citizenship , in Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution 163 ( Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla & Pratap Bhanu Mehta eds., 2016).

State capacity remains a relatively underexplored matter in constitutional law. For a recent exploration, see Madhav Khosla and Mark Tushnet, Courts, Constitutionalism, and State Capacity: A Preliminary Inquiry , Am. J. Comp. L. (forthcoming).

On India’s Election Commission, see E. Sridharan and Milan Vaishnav, Election Commission of India, in Rethinking Public Institutions in India 417 ( Devesh Kapur, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, & Milan Vaishnav eds., 2017).

For a reflection on India’s first period, see Madhav Khosla, India’s First Period: Constitutional Doctrine and Constitutional Stability, in From Parchment to Practice: Implementing New Constitutions 76 (Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq eds., 2020).

The classic study of disagreement remains, of course, Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999).

Madhav Khosla, India’s Founding Moment: The Constitution of a Most Surprising Democracy (2020).

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Constitution of India: List of All Articles (1-395) and Parts (1-22)

Last updated on April 6, 2024 by Alex Andrews George

The Constitution of India contains 395 articles in 22 parts. Additional articles and parts are inserted later through various amendments. There are also 12 schedules in the Indian Constitution .

Links are given against each Part to understand the purpose and background of each article of the Constitution of India.

Titles are mentioned for all articles from 1-395, separated under various parts and chapters. The preamble and Repealed articles or parts are specially mentioned.

Table of Contents

WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN, SOCIALIST, SECULAR, DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation; IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November 1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.

PART I: THE UNION AND ITS TERRITORY

1 Name and territory of the Union. 2 Admission or establishment of new States. 2A [Repealed.] 3 Formation of new States and alteration of areas, boundaries or names of existing States. 4 Laws made under articles 2 and 3 to provide for the amendment of the First and the Fourth Schedules and supplemental, incidental and consequential matters.

PART II: CITIZENSHIP

5 Citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution. 6 Rights of citizenship of certain persons who have migrated to India from Pakistan. 7 Rights of citizenship of certain migrants to Pakistan. 8 Rights of citizenship of certain persons of Indian origin residing outside India. 9 Persons voluntarily acquiring citizenship of a foreign State not to be citizens. 10 Continuance of the rights of citizenship. 11 Parliament to regulate the right of citizenship by law.

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PART III : FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

General 12 Definition. 13 Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights. Right to Equality 14 Equality before law. 15 Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. 16 Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. 17 Abolition of Untouchability. 18 Abolition of titles. Right to Freedom 19 Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. 20 Protection in respect of conviction for offences. 21 Protection of life and personal liberty. 21A Right to education 22 Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. Right against Exploitation 23 Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour. 24 Prohibition of employment of children in factories, etc. Right to Freedom of Religion 25 Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion. 26 Freedom to manage religious affairs. 27 Freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular religion. 28 Freedom as to attendance at religious instruction or religious worship in certain educational institutions. Cultural and Educational Rights 29 Protection of interests of minorities. 30 Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions. 31 [Repealed.] Saving of Certain Laws 31A Saving of Laws providing for the acquisition of estates, etc. 31B Validation of certain Acts and Regulations. 31C Saving of laws giving effect to certain directive principles. 31D [Repealed.] Right to Constitutional Remedies 32 Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part. 32A [Repealed.] 33 Power of Parliament to modify the rights conferred by this Part in their application to Forces, etc. 34 Restriction on rights conferred by this Part while martial law is in force in any area. 35 Legislation to give effect to the provisions of this Part.

PART IV: DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY

36 Definition. 37 Application of the principles contained in this Part. 38 State to secure a social order for the promotion of the welfare of the people. 39 Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State. 39A Equal justice and free legal aid. 40 The organisation of village panchayats. 41 Right to work, to education and to public assistance in certain cases. 42 Provision for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. 43 Living wage, etc., for workers. 43A Participation of workers in the management of industries. 43B Promotion of co-operative societies. 44 Uniform civil code for the citizens. 45 Provision for free and compulsory education for children. 46 Promotion of educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections. 47 Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve public health. 48 The organisation of agriculture and animal husbandry. 48A Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and wildlife. 49 Protection of monuments and places and objects of national importance. 50 Separation of judiciary from the executive. 51 Promotion of international peace and security.

PART IVA: FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES

51A Fundamental duties.

PART V: THE UNION

Chapter i: the executive.

The President and Vice-President 52 The President of India . 53 The executive power of the Union. 54 Election of President. 55 Manner of election of President. 56 Term of office of President. 57 Eligibility for re-election. 58 Qualifications for election as President. 59 Conditions of the President’s office. 60 Oath or affirmation by the President. 61 Procedure for impeachment of the President. 62 Time of holding the election to fill the vacancy in the office of President and the term of office of person elected to fill the casual vacancy. 63 The Vice-President of India . 64 The Vice-President to be ex officio Chairman of the Council of States. 65 The Vice-President to act as President or to discharge his functions during casual vacancies in the office, or during the absence, of President. 66 Election of Vice-President. 67 Term of office of Vice-President. 68 Time of holding the election to fill the vacancy in the office of Vice-President and the term of office of person elected to fill the casual vacancy. 69 Oath or affirmation by the Vice-President. 70 Discharge of President’s functions in other contingencies. 71 Matters relating to, or connected with, the election of a President or Vice-President. 72 Power of President to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases. 73 The extent of executive power of the Union. Council of Ministers 74 Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President. 75 Other provisions as to Ministers. The Attorney-General for India 76 Attorney-General for India. Conduct of Government Business 77 Conduct of business of the Government of India. 78 Duties of Prime Minister as respects the furnishing of information to the President, etc.

CHAPTER II: PARLIAMENT

General 79 Constitution of Parliament. 80 Composition of the Council of States. 81 Composition of the House of the People. 82 Readjustment after each census. 83 Duration of Houses of Parliament. 84 Qualification for membership of Parliament. 85 Sessions of Parliament, prorogation and dissolution. 86 Right of President to address and send messages to Houses. 87 Special address by the President. 88 Rights of Ministers and Attorney-General as respects Houses. Officers of Parliament 89 The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Council of States. 90 Vacation and resignation of, and removal from, the office of Deputy Chairman. 91 Power of the Deputy Chairman or other person to perform the duties of the office of, or to act as, Chairman. 92 The Chairman or the Deputy Chairman not to preside while a resolution for his removal from office is under consideration. 93 The Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of the People . 94 Vacation and resignation of, and removal from, the offices of Speaker and Deputy Speaker. 95 Power of the Deputy Speaker or other person to perform the duties of the office of, or to act as, Speaker. 96 The Speaker or the Deputy Speaker not to preside while a resolution for his removal from office is under consideration. 97 Salaries and allowances of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman and the Speaker and Deputy Speaker. 98 Secretariat of Parliament. Conduct of Business 99 Oath or affirmation by members. 100 Voting in Houses, power of Houses to act notwithstanding vacancies and quorum. Disqualifications of Members 101 Vacation of seats. 102 Disqualifications for membership. 103 Decision on questions as to disqualifications of members. 104 Penalty for sitting and voting before making oath or affirmation under article 99 or when not qualified or when disqualified. Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and its Members 105 Powers, privileges, etc., of the Houses of Parliament and of the members and committees thereof. 106 Salaries and allowances of members. Legislative Procedure 107 Provisions as to introduction and passing of Bills. 108 Joint sitting of both Houses in certain cases. 109 Special procedure in respect of Money Bills. 110 Definition of “Money Bills”. 111 Assent to Bills. Procedure in Financial Matters 112 Annual financial statement. 113 Procedure in Parliament with respect to estimates. 114 Appropriation Bills. 115 Supplementary, additional or excess grants. 116 Votes on account, votes of credit and exceptional grants. 117 Special provisions as to financial Bills. Procedure Generally 118 Rules of procedure. 119 Regulation by law of procedure in Parliament in relation to financial business. 120 Language to be used in Parliament. 121 Restriction on discussion in Parliament. 122 Courts not to inquire into proceedings of Parliament.

CHAPTER III: LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

123 Power of President to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Parliament .

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CHAPTER IV: THE UNION JUDICIARY

124 Establishment and constitution of Supreme Court. 124A National Judicial Appointments Commission. (Declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, however not repealed by the Parliament) 124B Functions of Commission. 124C Power of Parliament to make law. 125 Salaries, etc., of Judges. 126 Appointment of acting Chief Justice. 127 Appointment of ad hoc judges. 128 Attendance of retired Judges at sittings of the Supreme Court. 129 Supreme Court to be a court of record. 130 Seat of Supreme Court. 131 Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 131A [Repealed.] 132 Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in certain cases. 133 Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in regard to Civil matters. 134 Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in regard to criminal matters. 134A Certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court. 135 Jurisdiction and powers of the Federal Court under existing law to be exercisable by the Supreme Court. 136 Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court. 137 Review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court. 138 Enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 139 Conferment on the Supreme Court of powers to issue certain writs. 139A Transfer of certain cases. 140 Ancillary powers of Supreme Court. 141 Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts. 142 Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc. 143 Power of President to consult Supreme Court. 144 Civil and judicial authorities to act in aid of the Supreme Court. 144A [Repealed.] 145 Rules of Court, etc. 146 Officers and servants and the expenses of the Supreme Court. 147 Interpretation.

CHAPTER V: COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR-GENERAL OF INDIA

148 Comptroller and Auditor-General of India. 149 Duties and powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. 150 Form of accounts of the Union and of the States. 151 Audit reports.

PART VI: THE STATES

Chapter i: general.

152 Definition.

CHAPTER II: THE EXECUTIVE

The Governor 153 Governors of States. 154 Executive power of State. 155 Appointment of Governor. 156 Term of office of Governor. 157 Qualifications for appointment as Governor. 158 Conditions of Governor’s office 159 Oath or affirmation by the Governor. 160 Discharge of the functions of the Governor in certain contingencies. 161 Power of Governor to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases. 162 Extent of executive power of State. Council of Ministers 163 Council of Ministers to aid and advise Governor. 164 Other provisions as to Ministers. The Advocate-General for the State 165 Advocate-General for the State. Conduct of Government Business 166 Conduct of business of the Government of a State. 167 Duties of Chief Minister as respects the furnishing of information to Governor, etc.

CHAPTER III: THE STATE LEGISLATURE

General 168 Constitution of Legislatures in States. 169 Abolition or creation of Legislative Councils in States. 170 Composition of the Legislative Assemblies. 171 Composition of the Legislative Councils. 172 Duration of State Legislatures. 173 Qualification for membership of the State Legislature. 174 Sessions of the State Legislature, prorogation and dissolution. 175 Right of Governor to address and send messages to the House or Houses. 176 Special address by the Governor. 177 Rights of Ministers and Advocate-General as respects the Houses. Officers of the State Legislature 178 The Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. 179 Vacation and resignation of, and removal from, the offices of Speaker and Deputy Speaker. 180 Power of the Deputy Speaker or other person to perform the duties of the office of, or to act as, Speaker. 181 The Speaker or the Deputy Speaker not to preside while a resolution for his removal from office is under consideration. 182 The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Legislative Council. 183 Vacation and resignation of, and removal from, the offices of Chairman and Deputy Chairman. 184 Power of the Deputy Chairman or other person to perform the duties of the office of, or to act as, Chairman. 185 The Chairman or the Deputy Chairman not to preside while a resolution for his removal from office is under consideration. 186 Salaries and allowances of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker and the Chairman and Deputy Chairman. 187 Secretariat of State Legislature. Conduct of Business 188 Oath or affirmation by members. 189 Voting in Houses, power of Houses to act notwithstanding vacancies and quorum. Disqualifications of Members 190 Vacation of seats. 191 Disqualifications for membership. 192 Decision on questions as to disqualifications of members. 193 Penalty for sitting and voting before making oath or affirmation under article 188 or when not qualified or when disqualified. Powers, privileges and immunities of State Legislatures and their Members 194 Powers, privileges, etc., of the Houses of Legislatures and of the members and committees thereof. 195 Salaries and allowances of members. Legislative Procedure 196 Provisions as to introduction and passing of Bills. 197 Restriction on powers of Legislative Council as to Bills other than Money Bills. 198 Special procedure in respect of Money Bills. 199 Definition of “Money Bills”. 200 Assent to Bills. 201 Bills reserved for consideration. Procedure in Financial Matters 202 Annual financial statement. 203 Procedure in Legislature with respect to estimates. 204 Appropriation Bills. 205 Supplementary, additional or excess grants. 206 Votes on account, votes of credit and exceptional grants. 207 Special provisions as to financial Bills. Procedure Generally 208 Rules of procedure. 209 Regulation by law of procedure in the Legislature of the State in relation to financial business. 210 Language to be used in the Legislature. 211 Restriction on discussion in the Legislature. 212 Courts not to inquire into proceedings of the Legislature.

CHAPTER IV : LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE GOVERNOR

213 Power of Governor to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Legislature.

CHAPTER V: THE HIGH COURTS IN THE STATES

214 High Courts for States. 215 High Courts to be courts of record. 216 Constitution of High Courts. 217 Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court. 218 Application of certain provisions relating to Supreme Court to High Courts. 219 Oath or affirmation by Judges of High Courts. 220 Restriction on practice after being a permanent Judge. 221 Salaries, etc., of Judges. 222 Transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another. 223 Appointment of acting Chief Justice. 224 Appointment of additional and acting Judges. 224A Appointment of retired Judges at sittings of High Courts. 225 Jurisdiction of existing High Courts. 226 Power of High Courts to issue certain writs. 226A [Repealed..] 227 Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. 228 Transfer of certain cases to High Court. 228A [Repealed.] 229 Officers and servants and the expenses of High Courts. 230 Extension of jurisdiction of High Courts to Union territories. 231 Establishment of a common High Court for two or more States.

CHAPTER VI : SUBORDINATE COURTS

233 Appointment of district judges. 233A Validation of appointments of, and judgments, etc., delivered by, certain district judges. 234 Recruitment of persons other than district judges to the judicial service. 235 Control over subordinate courts. 236 Interpretation. 237 Application of the provisions of this Chapter to certain class or classes of magistrates.

PART VII: THE STATES IN PART B OF THE FIRST SCHEDULE

238 [Repealed.]

PART VIII: THE UNION TERRITORIES

239 Administration of Union territories. 239A Creation of local Legislatures or Council of Ministers or both for certain Union territories. 239AA Special provisions with respect to Delhi. 239AB Provision in case of failure of constitutional machinery. 239B Power of the administrator to promulgate Ordinances during recess of the Legislature. 240 Power of the President to make regulations for certain Union territories. 241 High Courts for Union territories. 242 [Repealed.]

PART IX: THE PANCHAYATS

243 Definitions. 243A Gram Sabha. 243B Constitution of Panchayats. 243C Composition of Panchayats. 243D Reservation of seats. 243E Duration of Panchayats, etc. 243F Disqualifications for membership. 243G Powers, authority and responsibilities of Panchayats. 243H Powers to impose taxes by, and Funds of, the Panchayats. 243-I Constitution of Finance Commission to review financial position. 243J Audit of accounts of Panchayats. 243K Elections to the Panchayats. 243L Application to Union territories. 243M Part not to apply to certain areas. 243N Continuance of existing laws and Panchayats. 243-O Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters.

PART IXA: THE MUNICIPALITIES

243P Definitions. 243Q Constitution of Municipalities. 243R Composition of Municipalities. 243S Constitution and composition of Wards Committees, etc. 243T Reservation of seats. 243U Duration of Municipalities, etc. 243V Disqualifications for membership. 243W Powers, authority and responsibilities of Municipalities, etc. 243X. Power to impose taxes by, and Funds of, the Municipalities. 243 Finance Commission. 243Z Audit of accounts of Municipalities. 243ZA Elections to the Municipalities. 243ZB Application to Union territories. 243ZC Part not to apply to certain areas. 243ZD Committee for district planning. 243ZE Committee for Metropolitan planning. 243ZF Continuance of existing laws and Municipalities. 243ZG Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters.

PART IXB: THE CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES

243ZH Definitions 243ZI Incorporation of co-operative societies 243ZJ Number and term of members of the board and its office bearers. 243 ZK Election of members of board. 243ZL Supersession and suspension of the board and interim management. 243ZM Audit of accounts of co-operative societies. 243ZN Convening of general body meetings. 243ZO Right of a member to get information, 243ZP Returns. 243ZQ Offences and penalties. 243ZR Application to multi-state co-operative societies. 243ZS Application to Union Territories. 243ZT Continuance of existing laws.

PART X: THE SCHEDULED AND TRIBAL AREAS

244 Administration of Scheduled Areas and Tribal Areas. 244A Formation of an autonomous State comprising certain tribal areas in Assam and creation of local Legislature or Council of Ministers or both therefor.

PART XI: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNION AND THE STATES

Chapter i: legislative relations.

Distribution of Legislative Powers

245 Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States. 246 Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States. 246A Special provision with respect to goods and services tax. 247 Power of Parliament to provide for the establishment of certain additional courts. 248 Residuary powers of legislation. 249 Power of Parliament to legislate with respect to a matter in the State List in the national interest. 250 Power of Parliament to legislate with respect to any matter in the State List if a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation. 251 Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament under articles 249 and 250 and laws made by the Legislatures of States. 252 Power of Parliament to legislate for two or more States by consent and adoption of such legislation by any other State. 253 Legislation for giving effect to international agreements. 254 Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States. 255 Requirements as to recommendations and previous sanctions to be regarded as matters of procedure only.

CHAPTER II : ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS

256 Obligation of States and the Union. 257 Control of the Union over States in certain cases. 257A [Repealed.] 258 Power of the Union to confer powers, etc., on States in certain cases. 258A Power of the States to entrust functions to the Union. 259 [Repealed.] 260 Jurisdiction of the Union in relation to territories outside India. 261 Public acts, records and judicial proceedings. Disputes relating to Waters 262 Adjudication of disputes relating to waters of inter-State rivers or river valleys. Co-ordination between States 263 Provisions with respect to an inter-State Council.

PART XII: FINANCE, PROPERTY, CONTRACTS AND SUITS

Chapter i: finance.

General 264 Interpretation. 265 Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of law. 266 Consolidated Funds and public accounts of India and of the States. 267 Contingency Fund. Distribution of Revenues between the Union and the States 268 Duties levied by the Union but collected and appropriated by the State. 268A [Repealed.] 269 Taxes levied and collected by the Union but assigned to the States. 269A Levy and collection of goods and services tax in the course of inter-state trade or commerce. 270 Taxes levied and distributed between the Union and the States. 271 Surcharge on certain duties and taxes for purposes of the Union. 272 [Repealed.] 273 Grants in lieu of export duty on jute and jute products. 274 Prior recommendation of President required to Bills affecting taxation in which States are interested. 275 Grants from the Union to certain States. 276 Taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments. 277 Savings. 278 [Repealed.] 279 Calculation of “net proceeds”, etc. 279A Goods and Services Tax Council. 280 Finance Commission. 281 Recommendations of the Finance Commission. Miscellaneous financial provisions 282 Expenditure defrayable by the Union or a State out of its revenues. 283 Custody, etc., of Consolidated Funds, Contingency Funds and moneys credited to the public accounts. 284 Custody of suitors’ deposits and other moneys received by public servants and courts. 285 Exemption of property of the Union from State taxation. 286 Restrictions as to imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods. 287 Exemption from taxes on electricity. 288 Exemption from taxation by States in respect of water or electricity in certain cases. 289 Exemption of property and income of a State from Union taxation. 290 Adjustment in respect of certain expenses and pensions. 290A Annual payment to certain Devaswom Funds. 291 [Repealed.]

CHAPTER II: BORROWING

292 Borrowing by the Government of India. 293 Borrowing by States.

CHAPTER III: PROPERTY, CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, LIABILITIES, OBLIGATIONS AND SUITS

294 Succession to property, assets, rights, liabilities and obligations in certain cases. 295 Succession to property, assets, rights, liabilities and obligations in other cases. 296 Property accruing by escheat or laps or as bona vacantia. 297 Things of value within territorial waters or continental shelf and resources of the exclusive economic zone to vest in the Union. 298 Power to carry on trade, etc. 299 Contracts. 300 Suits and proceedings.

CHAPTER IV: RIGHT TO PROPERTY

300A Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law.

PART XIII: TRADE, COMMERCE, AND INTERCOURSE WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF INDIA

301 Freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse. 302 Power of Parliament to impose restrictions on trade, commerce, and intercourse. 303 Restrictions on the legislative powers of the Union and of the States with regard to trade and commerce. 304 Restrictions on trade, commerce, and intercourse among States. 305 Saving of existing laws and laws providing for State monopolies. 306 [Repealed.] 307 Appointment of authority for carrying out the purposes of articles 301 to 304.

PART XIV: SERVICES UNDER THE UNION AND THE STATES

Chapter i: services.

308 Interpretation. 309 Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State. 310 Tenure of office of persons serving the Union or a State. 311 Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State. 312 All-India services. 312A Power of Parliament to vary or revoke conditions of service of officers of certain services. 313 Transitional provisions. 314 [Repeated.]

CHAPTER II: PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS

315 Public Service Commissions for the Union and for the States. 316 Appointment and term of office of members. 317 Removal and suspension of a member of a Public Service Commission. 318 Power to make regulations as to conditions of service of members and staff of the Commission. 319 Prohibition as to the holding of offices by members of Commission on ceasing to be such members. 320 Functions of Public Service Commissions. 321 Power to extend functions of Public Service Commissions. 322 Expenses of Public Service Commissions. 323 Reports of Public Service Commissions.

PART XIVA: TRIBUNALS

323A Administrative tribunals. 323B Tribunals for other matters.

PART XV: ELECTIONS

324 Superintendence, direction and control of elections to be vested in an Election Commission. 325 No person to be ineligible for inclusion in, or to claim to be included in a special, electoral roll on grounds of religion, race, caste or sex. 326 Elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assemblies of States to be on the basis of adult suffrage. 327 Power of Parliament to make provision with respect to elections to Legislatures. 328 Power of Legislature of a State to make provision with respect to elections to such Legislature. 329 Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters. 329A [Repealed.]

PART XVI: SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO CERTAIN CLASSES

330 Reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the House of the People. 331 Representation of the Anglo-Indian community in the House of the People. 332 Reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative Assemblies of the States. 333 Representation of the Anglo-Indian community in the Legislative Assemblies of the States. 334 Reservation of seats and special representation to cease after sixty years. 335 Claims of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to services and posts. 336 Special provision for Anglo-Indian community in certain services. 337 Special provision with respect to educational grants for the benefit of the Anglo-Indian Community. 338 National Commission for Scheduled Castes. 338A National Commission for Scheduled Tribes. 338A National Commission for Backward Classes. 339 Control of the Union over the Administration of Scheduled Areas and the welfare of Scheduled Tribes. 340 Appointment of a Commission to investigate the conditions of backward classes. 341 Scheduled Castes. 342 Scheduled Tribes. 342A Socially and educationally backward classes.

PART XVII: OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

Chapter i: language of the union.

343 Official language of the Union. 344 Commission and Committee of Parliament on official language.

CHAPTER II: REGIONAL LANGUAGES

345 Official language or languages of a State. 346 Official language for communication between one State and another or between a State and the Union. 347 Special provision relating to language spoken by a section of the population of a State.

CHAPTER III: LANGUAGE OF THE SUPREME COURT, HIGH COURTS, ETC.

348 Language to be used in the Supreme Court and in the High Courts and for Acts, Bills, etc. 349 Special procedure for enactment of certain laws relating to language.

CHAPTER IV: SPECIAL DIRECTIVES

350 Language to be used in representations for redress of grievances. 350A Facilities for instruction in mother-tongue at the primary stage. 350B Special Officer for linguistic minorities. 351 Directive for development of the Hindi language.

PART XVIII: EMERGENCY PROVISIONS

352 Proclamation of Emergency. 353 Effect of Proclamation of Emergency. 354 Application of provisions relating to distribution of revenues while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation. 355 Duty of the Union to protect States against external aggression and internal disturbance. 356 Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in States. 357 Exercise of legislative powers under Proclamation issued under article 356. 358 Suspension of provisions of article 19 during emergencies. 359 Suspension of the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III during emergencies. 359A [Repealed.] 360 Provisions as to financial emergency.

PART XIX: MISCELLANEOUS

361 Protection of President and Governors and Rajprakukhs. 361A Protection of publication of proceedings of Parliament and State Legislatures. 361B Disqualification for appointment on remunerative political post. 362 [Repealed.] 363 Bar to interference by courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties, agreements, etc. 363A Recognition granted to Rulers of Indian States to cease and privy purses to be abolished. 364 Special provisions as to major ports and aerodromes. 365 Effect of failure to comply with, or to give effect to, directions given by the Union. 366 Definitions. 367 Interpretation.

PART XX: AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

368 Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor.

PART XXI: TEMPORARY, TRANSITIONAL AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS

369 Temporary power to Parliament to make laws with respect to certain matters in the State List as if they were matters in the Concurrent List. 370 Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 371 Special provision with respect to the States of Maharashtra and Gujarat. 371A Special provision with respect to the State of Nagaland. 371B Special provision with respect to the State of Assam. 371C Special provision with respect to the State of Manipur. 371D Special provisions with respect to the State of Andhra Pradesh. 371E Establishment of Central University in Andhra Pradesh. 371F Special provisions with respect to the State of Sikkim. 371G Special provision with respect to the State of Mizoram. 371H Special provision with respect to the State of Arunachal Pradesh. 371-I Special provision with respect to the State of Goa. 371J Special provision with respect to the State of Karnataka. 372 Continuance in force of existing laws and their adaptation. 372A Power of the President to adapt laws. 373 Power of President to make order in respect of persons under preventive detention in certain cases. 374 Provisions as to Judges of the Federal Court and proceedings pending in the Federal Court or before His Majesty in Council. 375 Courts, authorities and officers to continue to function subject to the provisions of the Constitution. 376 Provisions as to Judges of High Courts. 377 Provisions as to Comptroller and Auditor-General of India. 378 Provisions as to Public Service Commissions. 378A Special provision as to the duration of Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly. 379-391 [Repealed.] 392 Power of the President to remove difficulties.

PART XXII: SHORT TITLE, COMMENCEMENT, AUTHORITATIVE TEXT IN HINDI AND REPEALS

393 Short title. 394 Commencement. 394A Authoritative text in the Hindi language. 395 Repeals.

Indian Constitution: Features
Historical Background of Indian Constitution
Tribunals in India

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About Alex Andrews George

Alex Andrews George is a mentor, author, and social entrepreneur. Alex is the founder of ClearIAS and one of the expert Civil Service Exam Trainers in India.

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Important Supreme Court Judgments UPSC

25 Important Supreme Court Judgements for UPSC

Supreme Court judgements are very important to have a better understanding of the Constitution of the country. Many questions have been asked in the UPSC exam about various landmark SC judgements in the past. In this article, we give you a list of 25 of the most important SC judgements in India for the UPSC exam .

Supreme Court judgements are an essential part of the polity and governance segments of the IAS syllabus .

25 Most Important Supreme Court Judgements

Download 25 Important Supreme Court Judgements – Indian Polity:- – Download PDF Here

UPSC Questions related to Important Supreme Court Judgements

What are the landmark judgements, is the supreme court decision final in india, is the supreme court more powerful than parliament, who was the first woman chief justice of india.

Relevant Links

Multiple Choice Question

Consider the following statements

Shah Bano Begum case (1985) was a Milestone case for Muslim women’s fight for rights. The SC upheld the right to alimony for a Muslim woman and said that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is applicable to all citizens irrespective of their religion. However, this judgement was overturned by the Government of the day.
In the Minerva Mills case (1980) judgement, SC struck down 2 changes made to the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment Act 1976, declaring them to be violative of the basic structure.
In the AK Gopalan Case (1950), SC contented that there was no violation of Fundamental Rights enshrined in Articles 13, 19, 21 and 22 under the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act if the detention was as per the procedure established by law.
In the Lily Thomas (2011), the SC ruled that individuals had a right to die with dignity, allowing passive euthanasia with guidelines.

Choose the correct option from the below-given options

A) Only Statements 1, 2, and 3 are true.

B) All of the above statements are true.

C) None of the above statements are true.

D) Only statements 1, 3, and 4 are true.

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Important Cases Dealing with Article 29 And 30 of the Constitution of India

Constitutional Law Subject-wise Law Notes
September 5, 2020

Introduction

Article 29 and 30 of the Constitution of India provide cultural and educational rights to religious and linguistic minorities in India to accommodate pluralism and embrace unity in diversity. These two articles further provide four different constitutional rights which are as follows:

Article 29(1) guarantees to the citizens of India residing in any part of India having a distinct language, script or culture of its own, the right to conserve the same.

Article 29(2) states that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the state or receiving aid out of state funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste or language.

The Article 30(1) grants the right to all the minorities whether based on religion or language, the right to establish and administer educational institutions. Two types of minorities: Religious and linguistic.

Article 30(2) prohibits the state in granting aid to education institutions to discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of Minority.

Distinction between Article 29(1) and Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India

1. 29(1) confers right on all sections of society, 30(1) – confers right only on minority based on language or religion.

2. 29(1) deals with three subjects: language, script and culture. 30(1) deal with minorities based on religion or language.

3. 29(1) provides right to conserve language, script or culture, 30(1) provides right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions.

4. 29(1) does not deal with education. 30(1) deals with only the establishment and administration of educational institutions.

Important case laws

S.P. Mittal v Union of India [1]: In this case, the validity of Auroville Act, 1980 was challenged. The court held that the benefit of Article 30(1) can be claimed by the community only on providing that it’s a religious or linguistic minority and that the institution was established by it. Since Auroville is not a religious denomination, but only reflects upon the teaching of Aurobindo, it does not constitute a separate religion by itself but only a philosophy.

State of Madras v Champakam Dorairajan [2]: In this case, an order by the Madras government fixing the proportion of each students that could be admitted into state medical and engineering colleges was challenged as it denied admission solely on the basis of religion or caste. It was held to be invalid violating Article 29(2) of the Indian Constitution. Subsequently, article 15(4) was amended by the 1st constitutional amendment empowering the state to make special provisions for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

Difference between Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) are as follows:

1. Art 15 protects all citizens against state, whereas Article 29(2) protects against state or anybody else who denies the right conferred.

2. Article 15 protects against discrimination generally, whereas Article 29(2) protects against denial of admission into educational institutions.

3. Article 15 is general and wide, whereas Article 29(2) is confined to educational institutions maintained or aided by the state.

4. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex or place of birth, whereas Article 29(2) does not mention these grounds.

5. Article 15 gives right to any member of the society, whereas Article 29(2) gives right to an individual.

State of Bombay v Bombay Educational Society [3]: In this case, an order was passed by the state government which provided that if Anglo-Indians want to maintain their educational institutions and teach in English, they should impart such education to Anglo-Indian students and if they decide to admit other Indians they would forfeit their aid unless they switched to Hindi as the medium of instruction. The Supreme Court struck down such order of the Bombay government banning admission of those whose mother tongue was not English into English medium schools because it denied admission solely on the ground of language and also held that minority educational institutions have the right to admit students of its choice, even if it receives government aid.

In DAV College, Bhatinda v State of Punjab [4]: In this case, the university had declared that the sole medium of instruction in the affiliated colleges would be Punjabi. The Petitioners had contended that the right of the minorities to establish and administer educational institution also included the right to have a choice of medium of instruction. However, the university’s order was infringing upon their rights to be instructed in Hindi and it was violative of Article 22(1) and 30(1). The court agreed with the petitioners and granted them the relief to teach in whichever medium they wanted to.

Re Kerala Education Bill [5]: In this case, the supreme court held that the fundamental right given to all minorities under Article 30(1) to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice does not militate against the claim of the state to insist that in granting aid the state may prescribe reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the institutions. The court though said that the condition for granting aid should not be imposed in such a manner so as to take away the rights of minority guaranteed by Article 30(1). Thus, the rights conferred on the religious and linguistic minorities to administer educational institutions of their choice is not an absolute right. This right is not free from regulation. Right to administer does not give rise to the Right of Maladministration. However, these regulations must satisfy the dual test which includes that such regulations must be reasonable and should be regulative of the educational character of the institution and are conducive in making the institution an effective vehicle of education.

St. Xaviers College v State of Gujarat [6]: In this case, the college was run by a Jesuit society of Ahmedabad with the object of giving higher education to Christian students. The validity of certain sections of Gujarat University act was challenged which provided for the administration of the college in effect to the government and the university through which the college is affiliated. The court held that these provisions abridged the right of the minority to administer the education institutions and therefore these provisions did not apply to minority institutions as the right to administer includes the right to ‘conduct’ and ‘manage’ the affairs of the institution.

St. Stephens college v University of Delhi [7]: In this case, the validity of admission programme and preference given to Christian students by the college was challenged as violative of Delhi University circulars for admission. The admission prospectus provided that there will be an interview prior to the final selection to college. The university stated that the college was bound to follow the university rules for admission and the college could not conduct an interview and had to take the students on the basis of their marks in the qualifying admission. The College filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court challenging the validity of the university circulars on the ground that they were violative of their fundamental right to manage their college under Article 30. The Supreme Court held that college was not bound by the university circulars because of their minority character and right under Article 30(1). The court also said that the right to select students for admission is an important facet of administration and thus is inherent in the right under Article 30(1). It further held that minority aided educational institutions may preserve 50% seats for their community candidates and are entitled to give them preference in admissions as it is necessary to maintain minority character of institutions.

T.M.A. Pai Foundation v State of Karnataka [8]: In this case, it was held that the state governments and universities cannot regulate the admission policy of unaided educational institutions run by linguistic and religious minorities but they can specify academic qualifications for students and make rules and regulations for maintaining academic standards and the same principle applies in the appointment of teachers and staff. The court held that minority educational institution does not lose its minority character simply because it receives aid from the government but at the same time made it clear that they would have to admit non-minority students whose constitutional rights under Article 29(2) are not to be infringed.

P.A. Inamdar v State of Maharashtra [9]: In this case the Supreme Court held that:

1. the private unaided professional institutions cannot be forced to accept reservation policy of the state as it is violative of Article 30 and 19(1)(g).

2. There is nothing wrong in having centralized entrance test being held for one group of institutions imparting similar education.

3. Every institution is free to devise its own fee structure subjected that there is no profiteering and no capitation fee directly or indirectly.

4. Charging of capitation fee is not permitted.

Bal Patil v Union of India [10]: In this case, it was held that the identification of a community as minority has to be done on a state basis and not all India basis. The central government has to exercise its powers for identification of minority groups not merely on the recommendation of the commission but on consideration of the social, cultural and religious conditions of the community in the state. It was further held that the Jain community is not a minority in the State of Maharashtra.

Author Details: Garima Darda (Symbiosis Law School, Pune)

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Landmark Judgments on Constitutional Law

Part I 1 of this article which is a roundup of all the 25-landmark constitutional law judgments delivered from January to June 2022. This part as a sequel takes forward and covers judgments from July to December 2022 inclusive of all the judgments that showcased consideration, interpretation, and evolution of important constitutional law principles.

The remaining judgments are as follows:

(1) Mohd. Zubair v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2

(Delivered on July 20, 2022)

Coram: 3-Judge Bench of HM Justices D.Y. Chandrachud, Surya Kant and A.S. Bopanna

Authored by: HD Justice D.Y. Chandrachud

The writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner challenged the series of FIRs registered against him for allegedly inciting communal hatred and disrupting harmony allegedly through his tweets, registered by the Delhi Police as well as the U.P. Police. A relief of grant of bail in multiple FIR’s registered in multiple districts and multiple States was sought for in the petition. The Supreme Court, whilst referring to all the tweets held that the investigating authorities viz. police had violated the provisions of Section 41( b )( ii ) CrPC, by not recording the reasons for the necessity of arrest of the petitioner. The Supreme Court came down heavily on police authorities for not following the law of the land especially the amended provisions of Chapter V, wherein it has been laid down that police cannot arrest any accused person, till and until necessary grounds subjecting him to custodial interrogation are made out. The court correlated the provisions of Sections 40 and 41 CrPC with Articles 19(1)( a ) and 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of the petitioner, who is a journalist and relying upon the judgment of Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India , 3 held that artistic and journalistic freedom under Article 19(1)( g ) can only be exercised when there is freedom from arrest or interference of liberty is not there by the petitioner. It was further held that courts should be alive to both ends of the spectrum — the need to ensure the proper enforcement of criminal law on the one hand and the need, on the other, of ensuring that the law does not become a ruse for targeted harassment and the need to ensure proper enforcement of criminal law on one hand and ensuring the liberty, dignity and freedom of all its citizens on the other. It was further held that successive repetitive FIRs filed on the same subject cannot be lodged in the manner as has been done in the case. The Court further held that a prospective condition like a blanket ban on tweeting by the accused person cannot be made as a precondition for grant of bail, as it is not only disproportionate but also contravenes the fundamental tenets of fair trial, especially under Section 437 CrPC. In this regard, the Court relied on the judgment of Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharashtra . 4 The court also passed a blanket order protecting the petitioner from arrest in relation to the FIR of a similar nature involving similar subject-matter likely to be registered anytime in future. Writ petitions were allowed.

(2) X v. Health & Family Welfare Department 5

(Delivered on July 21, 2022)

Authored by: HM Justice D.Y. Chandrachud

The issue before the Court arose in the context of inclusion of an unmarried women within the ambit of Rule 3( b ) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 (“MTP Rules”) for the termination of pregnancy in terms of Section 3(2)( b ) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (“MTP Act”). The petitioner was denied the opportunity of abortion of the fetus in her womb on the ground that she was an unmarried lady, and not covered by the provisions of Rule 3( b ). The Court held that the High Court took an extremely restrictive and narrow pedantic view of Rule 3( b ), excluding unmarried women from its ken. Referring to Explanation 1 and the phrase employed therein “women or her partner” , the Court held that the section intends to cover all categories of women within its purview, whosoever wants to get their fetus aborted for an unwanted pregnancy. The court compared the provisions of the pre-amendment and the post-amendment modifications to Section 3 of the MTP Act, wherein prior to the amendment the word “women or her partner” was not existing but was substituted through the amendment of 2021. Holding women’s rights to her reproductive choice as an insegregable and inseparable part of her personal liberty as under Article 21, it was held that women have a sacrosanct right to her bodily integrity. Referring to the longline of judgments of Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn., 6 K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 7 and High Court on its own Motion v. State of Maharashtra , 8 the Court held that if the woman does not want to continue her pregnancy, then forcing her to do so violates her bodily integrity and aggravates her mental trauma which would be deleterious to her mental health. Engagement in premarital sex cannot be labelled as vicious or criminal in nature only because notions of social morality are totally subjective. The plea of the women accordingly was entertained, judgment of the High Court was set aside, holding that the rules read with Section 3(2)( b ) of the MTP Act clearly envisages and encompasses unmarried women within their scope and purview. She was allowed to abort subject to the opinion of the Medical Board of AIIMS Delhi as an interim arrangement.

(3) Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India 9

(Delivered on July 27, 2022)

Coram: 3-Judge Bench of HM Justices A.M. Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari and C.T. Ravikumar

Authored by: HM Justice A.M. Khanwilkar

Challenge was laid to various provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA Act”) and the various Rules framed thereunder, specifically the provisions relating to the following three heads:

( a ) The registration of ECIR and procedures relating to disclosure of the same to the accused person.

( b ) Powers of arrest and grant of bail in relation thereto.

( c ) Attachment of property as proceeds arising out of crime/offence committed under the scheduled offences.

PMLA Act and objectives

The Court whilst referring to the parliamentary intent of PMLA Act observed that money laundering has become a means of livelihood for drug dealers, peddlers, terrorists, human traffickers, and host of white-collar criminals. Circulation of tainted money breeds discontent in the society and the country both, leading to more crime and civil unrest, consequentially obliging the Central Government to protect the people from such offences. The proactive steps taken towards checking such serious and deleterious offences for the society must always be facilitated and the interpretation of various provisions must also be in accord thereof.

The Court while adjudicating upon the constitutionality of the PMLA Act extensively referred to the international background, conferences and resolutions that compelled the enactment of such a strongly worded enactment viz. UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Basel Statement of Principles enunciated in 1989; the financial action task force (“FATF” ) established therein in July 1989, later adopted by the UN General Assembly in February 1990, urging the State parties and signatories to enact comprehensive legislation for dealing with the serious threat of money laundering. The Court also examined and scanned the Preamble, legislative intent, parliamentary objective, and other provisions behind enactment of the PMLA Act, to arrive at a finding that the purpose of PMLA Act was as serious as the major design to remedy it viz. putting a lid on activities emanating, relating, perpetuating, or leading to money laundering.

Section 5: Attachment, adjudication and confiscation of property involved in money laundering

Whilst repelling the challenge to Section 5 the Court held as follows:

( a ) The powers are vested in a senior responsible officer of the rank of Director (not below the rank of Deputy Director in any eventuality). Such authorised senior officer is expected to act only when there are reasons to believe “on the basis of material in his possession, recorded in writing” that when proceeds of crime (money laundering) are likely to be concealed, transferred, or dealt with in any manner resulting in frustrating, wiping out of the proceedings concerning confiscation, then he may order for immediate attachment of the property involved.

( b ) The order of attachment is preceded by order of provisional attachment, only after approval by the Magistrate or Court competent to take cognizance of the scheduled offence (under the Schedule II, PMLA Act). This acts as another check on arbitrary attachment or confiscation of the subject property.

( c ) The efficacy and urgency of prevention of money laundering demands an urgent, timely intervention by the authorised investigating agency, for which reason therefore, without registering FIR the power has rightly been conferred for provisionally attaching the apprehended proceeds of crime without formal registration of FIR.

( d ) The provisional attachment is operative for a time-bound period of 180 days, within which it has to be approved by 3-member adjudicating authority of senior responsible judicial officers, failing which it ceases to exist . The orders of adjudicating authorities are subject to appeal before Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 25 of the 2002 Act, thus not making the adjudicating authority the final arbiter on the said issue. The Appellate Tribunal can always decide on the validity of the same, which is further appealable before the High Court under Section 42 of the 2002 Act on both questions of fact and law.

Thus, Section 5 was held to be not arbitrary, unguided, or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India .

Validity of Sections 17 and 18 — Search and Seizure

The Court then examined the validity of Sections 17 and 18, whereupon it was argued that without registration of any FIR by the authorised officer, the powers of search and seizure could be resorted to. Holding the 2002 Act as a self-contained code and not influenced or affected by any of the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , especially relating to arrest, search and seizure, attachment, investigation, prosecution, etc., the Court held that CrPC cannot be made the basis for adjudicating upon the constitutionality of Section 17 of the PMLA Act. Even otherwise the pari materia provisions relating to such potent powers of search and seizure in other enactments viz. Income Tax Act, 1961 , Customs Act, 1962 (Sections 105 and 136), Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (Section 37), Court held that such powers and provisions are not new to PMLA Act but have been existing for many decades in other enactments, affirmed and upheld by the Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court.

Validity of Section 19 — Power to arrest

Considering challenge to Section 19, the Court declined to hold the same to be arbitrary or violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India on the ground that powers of arrest are invested with high-ranking officials with strong inbuilt safeguards (reasons to be recorded in writing and grounds of arrest to be informed to the affected person at the earliest). Referring to other statutory safeguards guarding against arbitrary, immediate, or impulsive arrest, Court held that justifiably arrest can be effected under Section 19 without any formal FIR; such a practice and power has been provided in multiple other enactments, which have been governing the field for long and even held to be constitutional by the Supreme Court in the past.

Reference in this regard was made to the pari materia provisions under the other economic legislations affirming and upholding the wide powers of arrest viz. FERA Act (Section 35), Customs Act (Section 104). Referring to the Constitution Bench judgment in Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of W.B. 10 and Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal 11 , on the powers of arrest, since the arrest could not be effected without “reasons to believe”, with immediate production before the Magistrate within 24 hours, it was stated that both measures ensure as a check over possibility of any arbitrary mechanical arrest. Referring to the judgments of Premium Granites v. State of T.N. 12 , Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab 13 and Ahmed Noormohmed Bhatti v. State of Gujarat 14 , it was held that the requirement 0f giving specific reasons for exercise of powers vested with higher and senior officers leads to presumption that the discretion will not be ordinarily abused. Section 19 cannot be held unreasonable or arbitrary merely because the authority in power may abuse its authority.

Validity of Section 45 — Provisions relating to bail

Referring to the Constitution Bench judgment of M.P.V. Sundararamier and Co. v. State of A.P. 15 , the Court drew a fine distinction between the effects of unconstitutionality of the statute, arising firstly, because of incompetency of the legislature and secondly, because of some of its provisions infringing constitutional guarantees (fundamental rights). In the latter case, the law becomes effective without re-enactment, if the constitutionally offensive provisions are zipped, tailored, and deleted, but not in the former. Thus, holding that Amendment of 2018 as the validating Act, removed the defect retrospectively, the basis of Section 45 being declared unconstitutional in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India 16 . The defect which had led to Section 45 being declared unconstitutional viz. the existence of the phrase “punishable for a term of imprisonment of more than three years” under Part A of the Schedule, stood substituted by words under this Act “through the 2018 Amendment” , and thus the effect of Nikesh Tarachand Shah 17 judgment was undone. The twin conditions now stand associated with all the offences under the 2002 Act, and Section 45 becomes operative, constitutional, and enforceable. The Court also referred to reasoning in the Constitution Bench judgment of Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality 18 , wherein “the doctrine of taking away” for validating Acts was elaborated and discussed for reviving the validity of unconstitutionally declared provisions under a re-enacted law. For the same proposition, reference was also made to the judgments of Comorin Match Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of T.N. 19 , Indian Aluminium Co. v. State of Kerala 20 , State of H.P. v. Narain Singh 21 , to reiterate and emphasise upon the said proposition. Accordingly, the challenge to Section 45 was repelled, in view of the 2018 Amendment and the defect being rectified by the Parliament.

On the aspect of the twin conditions being reasonable conditions per se, the Court referring to Constitution Bench judgments in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab 22 , and Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat 23 , held that twin conditions as imposed by Section 45 have been held to be justifiable in the cases of heinous and serious offences in case of other enactments. On this aspect, the reasoning, and observations of the previous judgment of Nikesh Tarachand Shah 24 were distinguished and held to be inconsonant with the judgments of the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh 25 and Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon 26 . Holding that economic offences have a serious impact on the community, society, and the nation at large; they should not be viewed with any permissive eye, especially when the international community and State have felt the necessity of treating the offence of money laundering as a graver one, the twin conditions for grant of bail for under Section 45 can very well be held to be justifiable. The twin conditions do not impose absolute restraint on the grant of bail, but just restrict the discretion, vested in courts with judicial powers and judicial officers. On this aspect, the Court referred to the judgments of Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra 27 , in case of pari materia provisions in other enactments like Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA) [Section 21(4)]; Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Nittin Johari 28 , in the context of Section 212(6) of the Companies Act.

Referring to the mandate of Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution of India, Court held that economic offences stand on far graver footing as they harm the society as a whole and lead to illicit accumulation of wealth. Being a serious offence affecting the society and country at large, therefore, the twin conditions for grant of bail introduce an effective proportionate mechanism for checking the commission of such serious economic offences. The court accordingly upheld and affirmed the twin conditions for grant of bail.

Validity of Section 50 — Powers to summon, seizure, eliciting evidence and prosecution for any false disclosure

On the aspect of validity of Section 50, the said provision was challenged as being violative of Article 20(3), the fundamental right against self-incrimination. The Court explaining the scope of applicability, relied on the judgments of Raja Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry 29 , State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad 30 , Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of W.B. 31 and other host of judgments holding that Article 20(3) shall be attracted only if there is a formal accusation against any person in the capacity of an accused during an investigation. The proceeding contemplated under Section 50 is more in the nature of an inquiry and not investigation treating the person summoned as an accused in the proceedings, as the PMLA Act is also about prevention of the very activity and action of money laundering, which is a civil action per se. Thus, the constitutional bar under Article 20(3) or Section 25 of the Evidence Act cannot be resorted to as a sword for challenging Section 50, unless and until the person is arrested and such information contemplated under Section 50 is sought to be extracted after his arrest. The investigation under Section 50, even though titled as investigation, is more in the nature of inquiry which is not being undertaken “by a police officer” but by the authorities designated under the PMLA Act. Referring to the judgments of State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram 32 wherein Customs Officer under Land Customs Act, 1924 that not every officer authorised with the power to issue summons, or inquiry can be treated as a police officer. Multiple other judgments on the same proposition as to when an officer in such circumstances be treated as “a police officer” to attract Constitution protection under Article 20(3) viz. Badaku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore 33 and Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of W.B. 34 were quoted to highlight the difference between police officers exercising powers of ensuring law and order for controlling crime vis-à-vis the officers conducting inquiry under specialised legislations like PMLA Act.

Validity of the Schedule Part A to the PMLA, Act (Providing for various offences under which the PMLA offences are said to have been commissioned)

On the validity of Schedule to the PMLA Act, especially Part A, (providing for various offences under which the PMLA offences are said to have been commissioned), the Court held that it is a matter of pure legislative policy, which the courts are not supposed to be interfering into. It is the Parliament’s prerogative to decipher which offences to be covered under the fold of PMLA Act, which prerogative cannot be declared to be unconstitutional till and until the legislative competence to do so exists under Schedule VII to the Constitution of India.

Accordingly, the challenge to various provisions and rules made under the PMLA Act was repelled by the Supreme Court.

(4) State of M.P. v. R.D. Sharma 35

(Delivered on January 27, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices D.Y. Chandrachud and Bela M. Trivedi

Authored by: HM Justice Bela M. Trivedi

The judgments of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 28-4-2017 and 17-9-2019 passed in the original writ petition and the review petition respectively were assailed before the Supreme Court. The High Court had set aside the view taken by Central Administrative Tribunal and held that the respondent, when he retired from the post of Principal Chief Conservator of Forest (“PCCF”) in 2001 was on the principles of “equal pay for equal work” (“EPEW”) entitled for the same pay scale as was fixed and was payable for Head of Forest Force in the State of M.P. whilst directing so, the High Court took into consideration and applied impliedly the provisions of amended Rules of 2008 for amending the Forest Service (Pay) Rules, 1968. Two issues arose before the Supreme Court:

( a ) Maintainability of special leave petition under Article 136 before the Supreme Court against the order passed in the review petition, once the previous SLP against the main judgment in the original writ petition was withdrawn with liberty to approach the High Court, without any specific liberty for filing a fresh SLP against the judgment in review petition.

( b ) The applicability of principle of “EPEW” under Article 14, when the person though retired before the introduction of amendment to the service pay rules, but was officiating on the same post, to which the upgraded pay scale was effected, and applicability of Article 14 in such circumstances.

On the first issue, the Court referring to the recent judgment of Sudhakar Baburao Nangnure v. Noreshwar Raghunathrao Shende 36 held that where SLP against the judgment of writ petition is withdrawn with the liberty to approach the High Court and the Supreme Court observes or refrains from expressing any opinion on merits, then SLP against order/judgment passed in the review petition is also maintainable, without any specific mention of liberty being granted to approach the Supreme Court again challenging the judgment passed in the review petition. The Court thus, held that it would lead to an egregious failure of justice if the SLP is withdrawn without the court expressing any opinion on the merits of the matter against the judgment in the original writ petition and review is made non-maintainable against the judgment in the review petition. The SLP against the review petition was thus, held to be maintainable.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Rules could not have been applied automatically and retrospectively in case of the respondent by the High Court who had retired in the year 2001, much prior to introduction of amended Rules in 2008. The upgraded posts, subsequently through the amended Rules, even if it was equivalent to the posts existing in 2001, for 2 fundamental reasons, firstly, of a different nomenclature and secondly, the post under amended Rules to be filled up through “ selection” and not as a “matter of course”. Thus, the benefit of the pay scale of the upgraded post would have accrued only if the petitioner retired from the said post, not otherwise, even if he was serving and discharging the same duties of the Head of State of Forest Force. Explaining the concept of “selection post”, Court held that it involves the process of screening followed by shortlisting and eventual selection amongst many equally placed officers and therefore, the benefit of the upgraded “selection posts” cannot be granted automatically to the respondent writ petitioner.

Court distinguished the judgments of State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh 37 , holding that equation of posts and determination of pay scale is the primary function of the executive, not of the judiciary, an evaluation which is generally left to the expert bodies like the Pay Commissions to undertake. Referring beneficially on the said proposition to the judgments of Secy., Finance Deptt. v. W.B. Registration Service Assn. 38 and State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn. 39 , it was held that EPEW is not a fundamental right vested in any employee, albeit a constitutional goal to be achieved by the Government.

Accordingly, reversing the judgment of the High Court setting aside the view taken by CAT, the Court held that the High Court had wrongly exercised the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

(5) State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India 40

(Delivered on May 6, 2022)

Coram: 3-Judge Bench of HM Justices N.V. Ramana, Surya Kant, and Hima Kohli

Per Curiam (Full Court’s) Order of Reference

The batch of civil appeals and writ petitions was the third round of litigation between the parties viz. the Government of NCT of Delhi and the Central Government (UOI). The question related to the interpretation of Article 239-AA of the Constitution relatable to demarcation of exercise of legislative powers of the Legislative Assembly of the Union Territory of Delhi vis-à-vis the Parliament in respect of the National Capital Territory of Delhi; also, the power of the Parliament to annul the laws made by the Union Territory through the “doctrine of repugnancy”, in respect of which interpretation essentially turned upon Article 239-AA(3)( a ). In the reference made to the Constitution Bench, there were thus three set of opinions, whilst answering references made to it. The matter was then sent back to the 2-Judge Bench, which on singular issue again tossed the matter back to larger Bench, insofar as the legislative competence of the Government of Delhi considering Entry 41, List 2 of VIIth Schedule was concerned. The matter was thus placed before the 3-Judge Bench, which was considering the application under Article 145(3) of the Constitution. The Union of India contended that the previously constituted Constitution Bench has not interpreted certain phrases occurring under Article 239-AA, owing to which pronouncement cannot be treated as conclusive on the aforesaid two phrases, which were as follows:

“( a ) Insofar as any such matter is applicable to Union Territory.

( b ) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution.”

However, the Court declined the reference again to the larger Bench as prayed for by the Union of India under Article 143(3), but agreed to examine the limited issue of interpretation of word/term “services “ occurring under Article 239-AA (3)( a ), read with Entry 41 List 2, VIIth Schedule. In terms of the same, the matter was referred to Constitution Bench for answer to such limited issue and query.

(6) Satyajit Kumar v. State of Jharkhand 41

(Delivered on August 2, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna

Authored by: HM Justice M.R. Shah

The appeals were filed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court dated 21-9-2020, through which notifications issued by the Governor, State of Jharkhand and the consequential advertisements notifying the vacancies and letter of appointment issued qua posts of trained graduate teachers ( “TGT”) in government schools of 13 Scheduled areas as illegal, ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Division Bench had quashed the notification and all the appointments consequently made, whilst accepting a challenge to the 100% reservation made for the posts of those 13 districts. The 13 districts in the scheduled areas are these areas notified through Presidential Notification dated 11-4-2007, in which whilst issuing the posts, 100% reservation was made for local residents of these local districts, which fell for challenge on various grounds of being violative of Article 13, 14, 16(2), 19 of the Constitution of India. The Court formulated the following three issues for resolution and consideration:

Whether in exercise of powers conferred under Para 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution of India, the Governor can provide for 100% reservation contrary to Part III of the Constitution of India, more particularly, guaranteed under Articles 16(1) and (2)?

Whether in exercise of powers under Para 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution of India, the Governor has the power to modify the relevant recruitment rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India?

Whether the appointments that were already made against the notified vacancies and posts ought to be disturbed or left undisturbed?

The Court then examined Para 5 of the Vth Schedule of the Constitution titled as “law applicable to scheduled areas” and the previously passed Constitution Bench judgment of Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao v. State of A.P. 42 in the context of Andhra Pradesh. Relying on the judgment of Chebrolu Leela Prasad 43 , the Court held that the Governor under Schedule V of Constitution of India does not have any inherent power to introduce any new law, but has a limited power, of urgent nature of exempting the application of any law enacted by the Parliament of the State over any scheduled area for any particular time. The Vth Schedule does not recognise or confer such positive power to enact, but such power is only for applying any “existing law” with exception of modifications. Further, the Court held that the rules framed under Article 309 cannot be amended in exercise of powers under Para 5(1) of Schedule V, as such rules cannot be treated as a parliamentary or the State enactment.

On the aspect of applicability to Part III of the Constitution to powers of the Governor available under Para 5 of Schedule V, Court held that Part III applies with full rigour and restricts the power of Governor from impinging upon or interfering with the fundamental rights available under Part III of the Constitution of India. It was further held that 100% reservation is impermissible under the Constitution and is inherently violative of Articles 14, 15 and 16 as opportunity of public employment against public posts cannot be denied unjustly to the incumbents and made a prerogative of a few. The total exclusion of citizens by creating an opportunity for one class or few selected people without any proper classification with objective and justification cannot be treated as constitutionally justifiable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the High Court, holding the notifications and the appointments carried out to be unconstitutional and illegal. However, on the question of balancing of equities and protecting those already appointed against the posts, Court held that since the process right from its inception and beginning had been under challenge before the High Court which made its subject to final outcome of the same, therefore it could not be said that equities were created and third parties right were created prior to passing of the judgment. However, on the plea of not disturbing hundreds of appointment of local residents made on the post of TGTs that had already taken place, as a one-time arrangement, the Court modified the judgment of the High Court directing that instead of a fresh/de novo recruitment process being undertaken by quashing the appointment already made in scheduled/district areas, the State shall revise the merit list based on already published cut-off obtained by the last selected candidates in each TGT’s subject again the respective categories with respect to entire State and candidates from non-scheduled areas and scheduled areas/districts. The aforesaid directions were issued holding limited to the peculiar facts of the case under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and in the larger public interest of smooth running of schools and educational set-ups in the scheduled areas/districts.

(7) Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal 44

(Delivered on August 16, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices D.Y. Chandrachud and A.S. Bopanna

The matter travelled to Supreme Court from CAT Chandigarh, Punjab and Haryana High Court, which had both denied the advantage of the maternity leave to the appellant, who gave birth to a child whilst working on the post of Nursing Officer in Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh. The appellant was married to a person, who had 2 children from his prior marriage and was married to the appellant on the death of his previous wife. The first biological child of the appellant was born on 4-6-2019, when she in terms of Rule 43 of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972 (“Leave Rules”) applied for the grant of leave. The application for grant of maternity leave of 180 days and resultant allowances were denied to her on the ground that she already had two children from her marriage (which were, otherwise from the previous marriage of the person whom the appellant was married), owing to which maternity leave for the third child cannot be granted for the sanctioned period i.e. 2 yrs (730 days) during the entire service. The CAT Chandigarh and High Court both held the denial of leave in terms of Rule 43(1) to be just and fair, against both of which the matter travelled to the Supreme Court. Scanning the anatomy of Rule 43, specifically referable to “maternity leave”, the Court held that the wording of the rules in question requires beneficial and liberal construction having nexus with a purpose-oriented approach. If the little construction of the provision of such beneficial legislation leads to difficulties and absurdities, then the legislation should not be put in “procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian dimensions”. The principle of beneficial interpretation was aptly applied by referring to judgments of US Courts, as also the precedents of the Supreme Court. Referring to the longline of judgments of K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob 45 and Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse 46 , it was held that it is the bounden duty of the courts to advance the cause of “social justice” and it is the bounding duty of the court to bridge the gap between law and security. The Court underscored the necessity of “social context judging” by a fruitful application of equality jurisprudence evolved by the Parliament and Supreme Court over the passage of time, which is also known as social justice adjudication. The role of the court was stated to be primarily helping the law achieve its purpose. Thereafter, interpreting Section 3( c ) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 and correlating the definition of “delivery” with the same, the Court held that the Act of 1961 is aimed at securing women’s right to pregnancy, maternity leave and to afford reasonable flexibility to live both as a mother and as a worker. Referring further to Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Court advised interpretation of Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972 from the perspective of Article 15 and other relevant constitutional rights and provisions. Referring extensively to the international documents, treaties, and the declarations to which India has been a signatory to, the Court held that it is necessary to align ourselves by interpreting our local and domestic laws in tune with the international conventions and documents. Since in the present case, the appellant never had any biological children, except the two which were born from the previous marriage of the husband, the appropriate interpretation shall be applicability of Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972 to those contingencies when there is a biological childbirth. Thus, the appellant was entitled to the grant of maternity leave provided for any other category of employees (i.e. for a period of 2 years).

(8) Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India 47

(Delivered on August 26, 2022)

Coram : 3-Judge Bench of HM Justices N.V. Ramana, Hima Kohli and C.T. Ravikumar

The questions arose in the batch of writ petitions relating to promises made by the political parties for the distribution of free goods (freebies) as part of their election manifesto or during election speeches. Such “freebies” were challenged as having a large-scale impact on the economy of the State, which are made invariably without any assessment of the financial implications on the State but simply for attracting the vote bank. A request was made for reconsideration of the judgment of S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of T.N. 48 wherein the Supreme Court held whilst interpreting Section 123 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 that such pre-poll promises for “freebies” do not fall within the ambit of corrupt practices. The Court in S. Subramaniam Balaji 49 had issued directions to the ECI for framing of certain guidelines in the absence of any legislative enactment covering the field. The aforementioned reasoning of the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgment was challenged as having serious ramifications over the State policies and that directive principles of State policy override fundamental rights is a proposition erroneously stated in the aforementioned judgment.

Accordingly, the issue and the batch of writ petitions were referred to 3-Judge Bench for consideration.

(9) Ahmednagar Mahanagar Palika v. Kamgar Union 50

(Delivered on September 5, 2022)

The issue that arose before the Supreme Court was about the validity of the scheme of erstwhile Ahmednagar Municipal Council (later converted to Ahmednagar Municipal Corporation in 2003), through which the legal heirs/successors of all the retiring/superannuating employees were automatically considered for the appointment on the on the retirement. The question that arose was the validity and legality of implementation of such a scheme on the superannuation of the outgoing retiring employee, vis-à-vis Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Erstwhile Ahmednagar Municipal Council had a scheme in place approved by its apex body, through which the legal heirs of retiring/outgoing employees were given compassionate appointments on their retirement, for ensuring the economic dependence and balance of the family. However, the question arose about implementation of the said scheme and the rights of the legal heirs of employees who continued after the upgradation of the Municipal Council, Ahmednagar to Municipal Corporation, Ahmednagar.

The Court examined the said aspect, especially the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal in favour of the employees and held that the scheme of the erstwhile Municipal Council, Ahmednagar shall not be binding on the newly transformed Municipal Corporation, Ahmednagar, which shall be governed by the arrangement, scheme, and provision fixed by the State Government. Referring to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Secy. to Deptt. of Education v. Bheemesh 51 , the Court opined that the employees of newly constituted Municipal Corporation shall be governed by the scheme of State Government at par with the government employees, which does not provide for appointment on compassionate grounds to the legal heirs of employees on their retirement/superannuation.

Further, appointment on compassionate grounds, in view of the equality doctrine provided under Articles 14 and 16 is an exception and should not be incorporated or followed by way of a rule, since it leads to crusading and sacrifice of merit, which cannot be accepted. If such a scheme is allowed to continue, then it leads to denial of equality of opportunity of appointment to more meritorious, well-educated and qualified aspirants to the post. Therefore, the interpretation must be in accord with the constitutional spirit of Articles 14, 15, and 16 and eventually, the Court held the scheme of automatic compassionate appointment to be not applicable to the legal heirs of the outgoing/retiring employees.

(10) Pharmacy Council of India v. Rajeev College of Pharmacy 52

(Delivered on September 15, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices B.R. Gavai and P.S. Narasimha

Authored by: HM Justice B.R. Gavai

The petitioners laid a challenge to the validity of executive departmental resolutions passed by the Pharmacy Council of India “PCI”), through which a five-year moratorium (ban) was imposed on opening of new colleges in the country. The special leave petitions were preferred by the PCI before the Supreme Court against the judgments passed by various High Courts such as Delhi, Chhattisgarh, and Karnataka High Court, which had all quashed PCI Regulations, holding the same to be beyond jurisdiction and ultra vires the PCI Act. The broad issues and arguments before the Court revolved around the following contentions:

( a ) Right to open, operate and run educational institutions being a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)( g ) of the Constitution of India, the same could have never been taken away through executive instructions passed by way of resolution/departmental orders by the PCI.

( b ) The PCI could have introduced any such moratorium or ban only by way of a regulation notified in the Official Gazette and not otherwise. For want of proper notification, therefore the government resolutions (GRs) imposing ban by the PCI were unconstitutional.

( c ) The GRs imposing ban were discriminatory and violative of Article 14 on the ground that they exempted identically situated colleges/societies running existing colleges from opening a new institution, when societies who were opening maiden institutions were debarred from doing so.

( d ) The PCI could not have abdicated its statutory powers and duties of examining and scrutinising each and every application vested in it by virtue of Sections 12, 13 and 15 of the PCI Act, 1948.

( e ) The ban imposed by the PCI were creating a monopoly and anti-competitive environment, favouring the existing colleges and players in the field of pharmacy education, whilst restraining the new players from entering the field and proving their competence and capabilities.

The Supreme Court examined the essential contentions of the petitioner about infringement and impairment of fundamental rights through executive instructions. Relying on the longline of judgments from TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka 53 , and Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka 54 , and P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra 55 (all Constitution Bench judgments) Court held that running, setting up and operation of educational institutions can safely be inferred and labelled as fundamental rights under Article 19(1)( g ) of the Constitution of India and a citizen cannot be deprived of the said right except in accordance with law. Referring to the judgment of State of Bihar v. Project Uchcha Vidya Sikshak Sangh, 56 the Court further held that the requirement of law for putting restrictions under Article 19(6) of the Constitution can by no stretch of imagination be achieved by issuing a circular or a policy decision in terms of Article 162 of the Constitution otherwise, but such law must be duly enacted by the legislation. Accordingly, on the second issue of authorisation and delegation by the PCI Act to impose a moratorium-cum-ban on opening of new institutions, the Court referred to a host of judgments viz. Hira Devi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur 57 , V.T. Khanzode v. RBI 58 , to hold that statutory corporations can do only such acts and take decisions as authorised by the statute creating it and the powers of such corporations cannot extend beyond what statutes provide expressly or by necessary implications. If an act is neither expressly or impliedly authorised by the statute which creates the corporation, it must be taken and presumed to be prohibited. Accordingly, referring to the Halsbury Law of England , 4th Edn., the Court held that such a power of imposing a ban cannot be read into PCI Act, more so being issued through an office memorandum in the form of executive instructions. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the views taken by the Karnataka, Delhi, and Chhattisgarh High Courts as a correct position of law setting aside the ban.

(11) Aishat Shifa v. State of Karnataka 59

(Delivered on October 13, 2022)

Coram: 2-Judge Bench of HM Justices Hemant Gupta and Sudhanshu Dhulia

Authored by: HM Justice Hemant Gupta

The Government of Karnataka had issued a Circular dated 5-2-2022 mandating all government schools in the State to abide by official uniform. Vide the said order, restricted the wearing of hijab, which was challenged to be violating liberty, equality, and fraternity as well as the primary idea of secularism as is enshrined in Preamble to the Indian Constitution. The Karnataka High Court upheld the said government order and the same was under challenge and decided by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was confronted with the following issues in the present case:

( i ) Whether the case should be referred to a Constitution Bench and if present case should be heard along with the Kantaru Rajeevaru (Right to Religion, In re-9 J.) (2) v. Indian Young Lawyers Assn . 60

( ii ) Whether prohibition or restriction or otherwise by the College Development Committee (“CDC”) on headscarves is violative of Section 143 of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983 (“Education Act” ) and whether State Government can delegate its decision to implement its decision of wearing uniform by the College Development Committee or the Board of Management?

( iii ) What is the scope of freedom of “conscience” and “religion”, and its ambit under Article 25?

( iv ) What is essential religious practice and its scope and ambit under Article 25 of the Constitution?

( v ) Whether fundamental rights to privacy under Article 21 and freedom of expression under Article 19(1)( a ) are mutually exclusive or complementary to each other; whether the government order for the purposes of Articles 21 and 14 fulfills the mandate of reasonableness?

( vi ) Whether wearing hijab can be considered to be an essential religious practice and if so, does a student have the right to wear a headscarf in a secular school?

( vii ) Whether the students are expected to give up their fundamental rights under Articles 19, 21, and 25 to access education in a State institution?

( viii ) Whether the State is obligated to provide “reasonable accommodation” to its citizens?

( ix ) Whether the government order goes against the legitimate State interest of promoting literacy and education as outlined in Articles 21, 21-A, 39( f ), 41, 46 and 51-A of the Constitution?

( x ) Whether the government order achieves equitable access to education, promotes secularism, and aligns with the objectives of the Karnataka Education Act?

The Court whilst delving into the various issues, delivered a split verdict, wherein the 2-Judge Bench of HMJ Hemant Gupta and HMJ Sudhanshu Dhulia gave opposing opinions on the matter. While deciding the appeal, Justice Hemant Gupta held as follows:

Deciding on whether the present case to be referred to a larger Bench for joint hearing with Kantaru Rajeevaru (Sabrimala Temple Review-5J) v. Indian Young Lawyers Assn. 61 , to determine what is to be considered “essentially religious” in terms of practice and being an innate and indispensable part of the religion. Justice Hemant Gupta noted that the questions in Kantaru Rajeevaru (Right to Religion, In re-9 J.) (2) v. Indian Young Lawyers Assn 62 deal with questions that are much wider in their scope. Thus, the issue at hand was not referred to a larger Bench (Constitutional Bench) since the issue being dealt by the Court was not one where the power of judicial review is examined rather, the Court was presented with the issue of deciding whether a secular institution in a State can regulate religious practices which are essential to the said religion. Justice Gupta relied on the 9-Judge Bench judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 63 in which it has been held that only the Supreme Court has the power to decide whether a substantial issue of interpretation of the Constitution be referred to a Constitution Bench under Article 145(3) or not.

Deciding on the second issue, Justice Gupta held that the scope and ambit of the powers exercised by CDC are well within their own Constitution (CDC Constitution) and that it is a body that serves to raise and maintain the academic standards. The CDC thus, was not acting against any of the provisions of the Act or Rules made thereunder or that prescribing the uniform was beyond their scope. Justice Hemant Gupta further held that the government order establishes a link with the powers delegated to the executive and the States rule-making power under Section 133 of the Education Act and Article 162 of the Constitution of India respectively. Reliance was place on the judgment of Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 64 wherein the Supreme Court held that while the Government cannot supersede statutory rules vide administrative instructions, it can however supplement the statutory rules to fill in the gaps where the rules are silent. Further reliance was placed on Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal 65 in which the Supreme Court held that instructions cannot be issued to supplant the statutory rules but can be issued to supplement it.

Deciding on the third issue, Justice Gupta examined the freedom of religion and conscience with special reference to Article 25(1) of the Constitution. Reference was made to the judgment of TMA Pai Foundation 66 in which the Supreme Court held that Article 25(1) of the Constitution is not only concerned with public order, morality, and health, rather the Article 25(1) is also subject to “other provisions of Part III of the Constitution” . Thus, the right provided under Article 25(1) is not an absolute right, it is liable to be curtailed in view of violations occurring in “other provisions of Part III” . Justice Gupta further clarified that the object of the government order issued, mandating the government schools to follow the prescribed uniform was to encourage a secular environment and uniformity, and could not be said to be in violation to Article 14 of the Constitution. The right to religion is not absolute but should be read in conformity and with reasonable restrictions along with other rights given in Part III of the Constitution. Also, the rights provided are not to be compartmentalised into one but to read all in conformity and aid with each other, as a whole. It was held that Articles 19(1)( a ) and 21, are complementary to each other and not mutually exclusive.

Deciding on the fourth issue, Justice Gupta examined Muslim law and its sources. The reference was made to the Constitutional Bench judgment in M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India 67 wherein the Supreme Court held that offering of prayer could be a religious practice however doing the same at any and every possible place will not be considered as an essential religious practice or an integral part of religion. This Court in Commr. of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta 68 opined that the core beliefs on which the religion is founded and without which the religion will not be religion, are the essential religious practices. Justice Gupta while deciding this issue held that the appellants were not claiming to perform their practices at religious places, but to wear hijab in educational institutions. It was also held that wearing of headscarf is not allowed only in the school or during school hours and the students can wear it outside schools. Beliefs or marks such as tilak which demonstrate a person’s religious identity should not be allowed in educational institutions funded by the Government. Hence, directing the schools which are run and funded by the Government to prescribe uniforms is not beyond the jurisdiction of the Government. A host of other judgments such as Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore 69 , Durgah Committee v. Syed Hussain Ali 70 , Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay 71 , Shayara Bano v. Union of India 72 were also referred in this context for concluding that Article 25(2) is a negatively worded enabling provision allowing/providing the State to act in the matters mentioned therein. The case of Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala 73 was referred however was not of much importance since the circular in question was applicable to all schools and not just secular schools.

Deciding on the fifth issue, Justice Gupta referred to the landmark judgment of this Court, Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab 74 and observed that the object of the impugned government order and the State Act and Rules under which it was issued, was to encourage and provide for the better and holistic environment and discipline the student. Mandating the uniform is one of the facets to fulfil the object of the said Act and Rules thereunder. Justice Gupta held that since, the right to religion is not an absolute, while there is reasonable restriction the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)( a ) and keeping Bachan Singh 75 in view, the incidental effect on freedom of speech and expression, and right to privacy cannot be said to be unreasonable restriction.

Deciding on the sixth issue, Justice Gupta examined the values enshrined in Part III of the Constitution and referred to Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India 76 wherein 3-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that the values such as liberty, equality, dignity, and fraternity are assured by the Preamble. The State must treat everyone alike and it is also expected that the citizens treat each other alike. Arguments of the plaintiff that the said government order was in antithesis to the constitutional values of unity in diversity. Justice Gupta while disregarding this argument observed that the aim of our Constitution is to assimilate unity in diversity 77 and the said government order does not harm the aim of the Constitution, “unity and diversity”. 78 Fraternity, as it is understood, should not be seen through the prisms of community but should be for all irrespective of caste, creed, religion, and sex. Justice Gupta found the argument stating that wearing of headscarf gives dignity to the girl students as not tenable. It was observed that at the pre-university level, all students should feel, look, and think alike and cultivate their minds in a cohesive and cordial environment. The constitutional aim for fraternity would be harmed if the students of a particular community were allowed to use their religious marks in schools. Hence, with this reasoning, Justice Gupta held that the said government order promotes a healthy environment to encourage fraternity in the true sense and does not infringe constitutional values. Landmark judgments of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 79 and K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India 80 were also referred to by the Court in deciding this issue.

Deciding on the seventh issue, Justice Gupta held that as a matter of secular schools, the students are required to oblige the discipline mandated by such schools run and funded by the Government. The reference was made to M. Ajmal Khan v. Election Commission of India 81 wherein the Madras High Court disregarded the argument that wearing of purdah by Muslim women is mandated by the holy Quran and interference with this practice by direction of the Election Commission is in violation of their fundamental rights. It was held that to curb the bogus voting and improve transparency in the process, the directions to put photographs in the electoral roll is not violative of Article 25 of the Constitution. Justice Gupta held that, though the said judgment relates to the elections, however, the ratio can be used in the present case as the State-run schools should provide education without discrimination. Hence, the students are not allowed to wear hijab in schools as a matter of right.

Deciding the eighth issue, Justice Gupta examined and referred to Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India 82 observed that the fundamental rights provided in Part III of the Constitution are not to be bartered. The reliance was also placed on Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat 83 in that effect. The Court also referred to HMJ D.Y. Chandrachud’s discussion on “decisional autonomy” in K.S. Puttaswamy 84 Justice Gupta held that the students of a particular community should not put conditions that unless and until they are permitted to wear hijab, they will not attend the classes. The right to education is available to all irrespective of their castes and religions, but in the end, it is the choice of the students whether to avail the right or not. The decision to attend the classes or not is of the students and not of the school while the right to education under Article 21 continues to be available.

Dealing with the ninth issue, where the appellant argued that they should be allowed to attend school wearing headscarves matching the school uniform. Even the Kendriya Vidyalaya across the country allows the wearing of hijab to Muslim girls so the State-run schools should also allow the same. Tackling this argument, Justice Gupta held that, in the case of Kendriya Vidyalayas falls under the Ministry of Education under the Government of India, and an autonomous body, and the purpose behind the same is that the Central Government employees are transferred regularly to meet the educational needs of their children by providing the same kind of education. The concept of reasonable accommodation is a special treatment meant for a special child or person. Justice Gupta while taking the argued foreign judgments in view held that, if a reasonable accommodation is allowed in the present case, it would be in contrast to equality provided in Article 14 as it would be a different or special treatment to the students belonging to a particular community. Constitutional values such as liberty, equality, dignity, and fraternity are for all, and no one should get preference in that.

While dealing with the tenth issue, Justice Gupta referred to the Commission of Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005, international treaties, and the Convention on Child Rights to which India is a signatory. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India. 85 was referred to and observed that the right to education falls under Article 21, right to life. It is widely acknowledged that those who are deprived of education are deprived of the dignity and freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 of the Constitution. Also, only the students at the pre-university colleges are mandated to follow the prescribed uniform so that the values of equality and fraternity be imbibed in them. The students at university/college are not mandated and are open to carry on their religious faiths and practices. For the reasons mentioned above, HMJ Gupta held that the government order is not against the legitimate State interest of promoting literacy and education as outlined in Articles 21, 21-A, 39( f ), 41, 46, and 51-A of the Constitution. There is also a question about the applicability of Article 21-A as all the students concerned are over the age of 14 years of age. Thus, it was held that while there is a right to education, there is no such right to wear additional clothes (under the garb of essential religious practice) to the uniform in a secular school.

Deciding the eleventh issue, Justice Gupta observed that creating a friendly and healthy environment of education for students is the duty of the State. Having a uniform promotes oneness, and equality fades the differences in terms of social and economic status, and the values of fraternity among the young minds of the nation. It also helps to improve discipline and spirit among the students. Constitutional values are provided and available for all irrespective of any grounds, therefore allowing a particular community to wear hijab, a religious symbol, would be against equality and secularism. Therefore, the impugned government order is in accordance with the ethic of secularism and the objectives of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983. The Court referred to Indibly Creative (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B. 86 holding that every citizen being entitled to wear their religious symbols would be antithesis to the doctrine of secularism, the government order cannot be stated to be going against the doctrine of secularism.

HMJ Sudhanshu Dhulia dismissed all appeals and writ petitions on the grounds mentioned above. He, while disagreeing with Justice Gupta held as follows:

Dealing with the essential religious practice issue, Justice Dhulia referred to the famous case of Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt 87 and Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay 88 and observed that the essential religious practice is to be left to the specific religion to which it belongs. However, the issue of determining the essential religious practice is not involved in this dispute. Meaning that the case concerns Article 25(1) and not Article 25(2) or Article 26 of the Constitution of India.

It was observed that discipline is required in schools, but it cannot be equated with jail or military camp. Also, it should not be seen at the cost of freedom and dignity provided by the Constitution. To ask a school girl to take off her hijab at the gate of the school is, certainly, an invasion of her privacy and dignity, and a clear violation of her fundamental rights. She carries her right to dignity and privacy in her person whether it be at the school gate or the classrooms. The Puttaswamy 89 judgment and some foreign judgments were referred to by HMJ Dhulia. Then, HMJ Dhulia referred to the case of Bijoe Emmanuel 90 stating it to be one which is the closest in facts to the present case.

Justice Dhulia observed that the school administration and the State should prioritise what they want, the education of girl child or mandating school dress code. Specifically, it is for girl children, for whom it was difficult from the start. The Karnataka High Court failed to answer some important questions such as how the wearing of hijab is against public morality, order, or health. The decision of the High Court saying that the rights become derivatives inside the classroom is not correct.

Justice Dhulia while dealing with the values of religious tolerance, equality, reasonable accommodation, and “unity in diversity” of culture has referred to Aruna Roy v. Union of India 91 and Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India 92 .

It was observed that the impugned government order dated 5-2-2022, putting restrictions on the wearing of headscarves in the schools violates the basic and fundamental tenets of the Constitution. The Preamble provides for the liberty of thoughts, beliefs, expression, and worship. Also, the trinity, liberty, equality, and fraternity is to go hand in hand. One cannot survive without the others. The wearing of hijab is purely a matter of choice. It is secondary whether it forms an essential religious practice or not, but it is a matter of conscience, beliefs, and expression, provided by Part III of the Constitution. If a girl wants to wear a headscarf inside the classroom by her own choice, she should not be stopped. Wearing a hijab should according to Justice Dhulia is simply a matter of choice.

The impugned government order issued, unfortunately, restricting girls of a particular community from entering the schools, hence, depriving them from education, and consequently, from the right to dignity. The question that needs to ponder over is whether the Government is making the life of a girl child better by depriving her from education because of hijab or headscarves.

Justice Dhulia while allowing the appeal held that the impugned government order issued by the Government is an invasion on the privacy, attack on the dignity, and denying the secular education to the girls of a particular community.

The 2-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has delivered the split judgment. Justice Hemant Gupta while dismissing all appeals and writ petitions on the abovementioned grounds held that the government order cannot be said to be against the idea of secularism or the objective of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983.

On the other hand, Justice Dhulia while allowing the appeal held that there shall be no restriction on the wearing of hijab anywhere in schools and colleges in Karnataka. Justice Dhulia extensively relied on the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court in Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Karnataka 93 .

Since the views taken by the Bench were different, the matter has been referred to a larger Bench of 3 Judges.

(12) Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India 94

(Delivered on November 7, 2022)

Coram: 5-Judge Bench of HM Justices Uday U. Lalit, Dinesh Maheshwari, S. Ravindra Bhat, Bela M. Trivedi and J.B. Pardiwala

Authored by: HM Justice Dinesh Maheshwari

The subject of reservation has always been a hotly contested one in the constitutional canvas of the country. It was found with the intention of giving the backward members of society opportunities they were unable to get because of their social standing or institutionalised oppression. For the ST, SC, and OBC, the First Amendment created a constitutional clause that gave the Government the authority to implement reservation laws. People have embraced and rejected the ideas of reservation over time, with there being sharp divisions in public opinion. Then the 103rd Constitutional Amendment was passed, adding 10% reservation to the already existing layer of reservations for the economically weaker sections (“EWS”). The validity of this reservation was questioned since it exceeded the 50% threshold established previously in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 95 . There were multiple other grounds of challenge to the same.

The three main issues before the Supreme Court essential to the discussion surrounding this case were as follows:

Whether the 103rd Constitutional Amendment can be said to breach the basic structure of the Constitution by permitting the State to make special provisions including reservation, based on economic criteria?

Whether the 103rd Constitutional Amendment can be said to breach the basic structure of the Constitution by permitting the State to make special provisions in relation to admission to private unaided institutions?

Whether the 103rd Constitutional Amendment can be said to breach the basic structure of the Constitution in excluding the SEBCs/OBCs/SCs/STs from the scope of EWS reservation?

While the main points for a determination as noted by the Supreme Court were:

( a ) As to whether the reservation is an instrument for the inclusion of socially and educationally backward classes to the mainstream of society and, therefore, reservation structured singularly on economic criteria violates the basic structure of the Constitution of India?

( b ) As to whether the exclusion of classes covered under Articles 15(4), 15(5), and 16(4) from getting the benefit of reservation as economically weaker sections violate the equality code and thereby, the basic structure doctrine?

( c ) As to whether reservation for economically weaker sections of citizens up to ten per cent in addition to the existing reservations results in violation of basic structure on account of breaching the ceiling limit of fifty percent?

Broad points of the judgment of the majority and the minority are as follows:

HMJ Dinesh Maheswari discussed the impact of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala 96 on Article 368, which now starts with a non obstante clause further stating that any amendment that is made under Article 368 would not come under the purview of Article 13 of the Constitution. In this case, sub-clause (4) ensures that any amendments made to the Constitution of India under Article 368 would not be subject to Article 13. Furthermore, it was decided that the challenge to the constitutional amendment pertains only to the notion that the amendment in question is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution, and thereby constitutional amendment to Articles 15 and 16 needs to be examined through the doctrine of basic structure. Vide the judgment of 13-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati, 97 it was held that the Constitution can be amended by the Parliament however, the basic structure of the Constitution cannot be damaged. A longline of judgments such as the Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain 98 , Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India 99 , Waman Rao v. Union of India 100 , P. Sambamurthy v. State of A.P. 101 , Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu 102 , Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India 103 , L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India 104 , Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India 105 and many other such judgments were discussed to infer that there is no fixed formula for determining whether a constitutional amendment violates the basic structure or not. Further, discussing the topic of economic disabilities and affirmative action, the Court observed that economic and social inequalities form part of a real and substantive problem, that a mere formal action for equality cannot deal with. The Court further observed that the US Supreme Court has also made some strides to ensure that economic considerations are considered, due to which economic backwardness becomes a ground for providing reservation. The Court observed that Article 14 and the concept of equality in India follow a similar principle as well.

Addressing the concerns surrounding the sole criterion of economic backwardness being violative of the basic structure of the Constitution, HMJ Maheswari observed while relying on judgments of M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore 106 , R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore 107 , Janki Prasad Parimoo v. State of J&K 108 , State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas 109 and other such judgments, stated that the argument, while the State is free to adopt any measure to alleviate the economic backwardness, at the same time, State cannot make provisions for affirmative action on the reservation as it can only do so for SEBCs/OBCs/SCs/STs is invalid and suffers from grave incompatibility with our constitutional scheme. Thus, it was observed that there is a reasonable classification between the “other weaker sections” and “economically weaker sections” thereby holding that the constitutional amendment under challenge is not violative of the basic structure and that classes already receiving the benefit under Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) would not be entitled to this reservation as it would open the floodgates to whole other issues of unconstitutional and invalid situations.

Discussing the impact of the constitutional amendment on the 50% ceiling of reservations and the basic structure, the Court referred to the following judgments in M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore 110 , T. Devadasan v. Union of India 111 , Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India, 112 M. Nagaraj v. Union of India 113 and many others, observing that while 50% is the desirable ceiling limit in matters of education and public employment, it is not inflexible and inviolable at all times, in light of the affirmative action taken against harm done due to preferential treatment qua other innocent class of competitors.

Justice Maheshwari speaking for the majority concluded by observing:

“Reservations for EWS of citizens up to 10% in addition to the existing reservations does not result in violation of any essential feature of the Constitution and does not cause any damage to the basic structure of the Constitution of India on account of breach of the ceiling limit of 50% because, that ceiling limit itself is not inflexible and in any case applies only to the reservations envisioned by Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India.”(Para 233) .

HMJ Bela M. Trivedi (concurring opinion) observed that differential treatment is not violative of the concept of equality, however, unjustified distinction/classification is violative of the concept of equality. Referring to the judgments of Ashoka Kumar Thakur 114 , State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas 115 , it was held that reasonable classification is vital to the concept of equality and that such a classification permeates the distinction between vertical and horizontal classification. The EWS reservation is its own vertical classification, while the other reservations as provided under Articles 15 and 16 are vertical as well, though this would mean that a particular class of people belonging to a vertical reservation classification cannot take benefit of the other vertical classification. Thus, agreeing with the majority reasoning of Justice Maheswari, Justice Trivedi stated that the exclusion of other classes from the 103rd Constitutional Amendment is not violative of the basic structure since it creates a separate class with a reasonable nexus to the object sought i.e. “economically weaker sections” seeking EWS reservation which does not impede or overlap the other reservations provided for other classes under Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4). Justice Bela M. Trivedi referred to K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. State of Karnataka 116 in this regard and observed that reservation must have a time span; however, after 75 years of independence, it is imperative that we revisit the whole system of reservation in the larger interests of the society.

Justice Bela M. Trivedi thus concluded by observing:

“The SC, ST, and the backward class for whom the special provisions have already been provided in Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) form a separate category as distinguished from the general or unreserved category. They cannot be treated at par with the citizens belonging to the general or unreserved category. The 103rd amendment creates a separate class of ‘economically weaker sections of the citizens’ from the general/unreserved class, without affecting the special rights of reservations provided to the SC, ST, and backward class of citizens covered under Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4). Therefore, their exclusion from the newly created class for the benefit of the ‘economically weaker sections of the citizens’ in the impugned amendment cannot be said to be discriminatory or violative of the equality code. Such amendment could certainly be not termed as shocking, unconscionable, or unscrupulous travesty of the quintessence of equal justice as sought to be submitted by the learned counsels for the petitioners.” (Para 257)

HMJ J.B. Pardiwala concurring with the judgment of Justice Maheswari stated that while classification under Constitution is permissible, it has to be based on certain factors as envisaged under Articles 15 and 16. Referring to the judgments of State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan 117 and Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra 118 , it was held that if State wanted to take affirmative action with respect to classes mentioned in Article 15(4), such an action cannot always be challenged under Article 15(1) of the Constitution.

Further referring to Constitution Bench judgment of Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India, 119 wherein the Court held that the 93rd Constitutional Amendment inserting clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution is not violative of the basic structure of the Constitution Justice Pardiwala held that Article 15(6) cannot be held as unconstitutional since it also does not alter the basic structure of the Constitution. Justice Pardiwala further expounded on the aspects of constitutional interpretation; referred to the American Supreme Court judgment of United States v. Classic 120 and stated that while interpreting the Constitution, it is imperative that certain other social considerations are to be taken into account when interpreting the Constitution.

Justice J.B. Pardiwala in his concurring opinion with Justice Maheshwari opined that:

“103rd Amendment signifies the Parliament’s intention to expand affirmative action to hitherto untouched groups — who suffer from similar disadvantages as the OBCs competing for opportunities. If economic advance can be accepted to negate certain social disadvantages for the OBCs (creamy layer concept) the converse would be equally relevant. At least for considering the competing disadvantages of EWS.” (Para 336).

He also believed that reservation for certain weaker sections other than SCs/STs and socially and educationally backward classes. He was of the view that the amendment in question was meant for economically weaker sections who are unable to afford basic education for their children or unable to secure employment in the services of the State. (Para 348)

HMJ S. Ravindra Bhat dissenting from the majority opinion held against the validity of the 103rd Constitutional Amendment. According to Justice Bhat, while the addition or insertion of an “economic criterion” furthering the objective of Article 46 is not per se unconstitutional or invalid, it is the manner of its implementation that has proved to be questionable. Exclusive exclusion of classes covered under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) from EWS reservation violates the basic structure of the Indian Constitution and the fundamental rights of the classes so concerned. Referring to judgments such as the National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India 121 , Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. State of Kerala 122 , and Charu Khurana v. Union of India 123 , it was held that none of the materials that were placed on record showed any reasonable explanation as to why SCs/STs/OBCs are being excluded from the 103rd Constitutional Amendment. According to Justice Bhat, it is unreasonable to exclude 82% of the country’s population from the scope of the amendment to further advance the object of economically weaker sections of the society. Thus, the poorest of people (tribals) would also be exempted from an amendment meant for the economically weaker sections. Justice Bhat however agreed that classification based on “economic criteria” is permissible under Article 15, however the same is not true for Article 16. It was held that economic emancipation is an objective and purpose that is enshrined in our Constitution in Articles 38, 46, and even the Preamble. Ensuring economic well-being and economic justice to everyone through amendments shines a new light on the concept of upliftment of economically backward/weaker sections of society.

Justice Bhat further held that Article 16(4) is there to ensure that there is equality in opportunities in public employment however, there is no way of knowing if the “economically weaker sections” of the society belong to a “forward” class or caste which already enjoys the benefit of not being classified as “socially backward”. Thus, the constitutional amendment violates the basic principle of equality of opportunity in public employment under Article 161(1).

Justice Bhat penned the dissenting opinion operatively as follows:

“‘Economic factors’ are appropriate for the purposes of Article 16 (reservation in public employment). He stressed that it was specifically stated in Indra Sawhney 124 that reservations cannot be issued merely on the basis of economic concerns.”

According to Justice Bhat, the basis for the reservation imposed in accordance with Article 16(4) is “adequate representation”. The economically disadvantaged sections are not qualified for the reservation sought under Article 16, since they do not lack representation. Granting reservations to a section that is not socially backward and whose community is represented in public employment would be in violation of the Preamble and Article 16(1). Justice Bhat further referred to o the National Crime Records Bureau Report titled “Crime in India 2021” and the Sinho Commission Report to back up the claim that the poorest of the poor are being denied the benefits of reservation under the said amendment. Further, on the issue of 50% cap for reservation, it was observed that the decision of this Court in this particular judgment might have a bearing on the pending litigation in the matter of the 76th Constitutional Amendment 1994. There might be a negative effect on the said pending litigation viz. the parties might not be heard accordingly. It is also observed that such compartmentalisation of the percentage cap on the reservation might create issues in the future, which stem from providing 10% reservation over and above the 50% cap. However, Justice Bhat left this question open for answering.

The verdict was rendered with a majority of 3:2. This ruling has removed all restrictions and increased the scope for constitutional interpretation, sustaining the 10% EWS quota reservation. As society develops, social and economic norms also change over time. Flexibility is essential to fostering adaptation to changing circumstances and providing various opportunities to all social strata. With this decision, the Supreme Court has gone beyond its original guidelines, overturning the ceiling limit, and allowing for a more liberal interpretation, stating that adding 10% to the existing reservations of a different nature does not violate any fundamental feature of the Constitution or harm its basic structure.

Brief points of majority opinion

1. On the point of basic structure, the Court highlighted that the provisions for providing reservation to the weaker section by way of affirmative action do not form a part of the basic feature of the Constitution, as it is merely enabling in nature.

2. On the point of exclusion of SCs/STs/OBCs/SEBCs, Court opined that the exclusion of other classes in the EWS reservation is not an abrogation of the basic structure and the fundamental rights of the weaker section of society. Since SCs/STs/OBCs/SEBCs are already getting the benefit of affirmative action under the Articles 15(4), 15(5), and 16(4).

3. EWS reservation does not impact the benefit already accorded to the socially and educationally backward classes, as it does not encroach upon their ambit of quota provided to them.

4. On the point of economic criteria as the sole criterion of deciding for reservation, State is empowered to make provisions for the economically disadvantaged section of the society under Articles 38 and 46 of Part IV of the Constitution. Restricting affirmative action to SCs/STs/OBCs/SEBCs would defeat the purpose of the concept of substantive justice as espoused in the Constitution.

5. On the point of the 50% ceiling limit on reservations, the Court took the stance that the 50% reservation is not inviolable. The limit could be breached in extraordinary situations. The basis of this 50% ceiling limit is that reservation should not be such that it adversely affects another section of society.

Brief points of minority opinion

HMJ Ravindra Bhat collectively held that the 103rd amendment is violative of the basic structure of the constitution on the following grounds:

1. The exclusion of SCs/STs/OBCs/SEBCs is against the equality code which is essential to the nature of the Constitution. Such an exclusion is furtherance of discrimination against historically disadvantaged and deprived communities.

2. Economic factors cannot be the sole criteria for giving reservations therefore, it is not appropriate for the purposes of Article 16(1) which deals with reservation in public employment.

3. There is a considerable body of past judgments enunciating the principle that any exclusionary basis should be rational, and non-discriminatory.

4. The basis of classification in the impugned amendment, enacted in furtherance of Article 46 is economic deprivation. Applying that criterion, it is either income, or landholding, or value of assets or the extent of resources controlled, which are classifiers thus, social origins or identities of the target group are irrelevant.

5. The question pertaining to the 50% cap/limit on the reservation is left open since there can be negative repercussions of this judgment on the pending litigation in the matter of the 76th Amendment 1994.

† Partner, SVS Attorneys. Expert in constitutional, civil and securitisation laws and practising advocate at the Supreme Court of India.

†† Fourth Year Student at Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai.

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Case Study Questions Class 8 Civics The Indian Constitution

Case study questions class 8 civics chapter 1 the indian constitution.

CBSE Class 8 Case Study Questions Civics The Indian Constitution. Important Case Study Questions for Class 8 Board Exam Students. Here we have arranged some Important Case Base Questions for students who are searching for Paragraph Based Questions The Indian Constitution.

At Case Study Questions there will given a Paragraph. In where some Important Questions will made on that respective Case Based Study. There will various types of marks will given 1 marks, 2 marks, 3 marks, 4 marks.

CBSE Case Study Questions Class 8 Civics The Indian Constitution

Case Study 1

While all democratic countries are likely to have a Constitution, it is not necessary that all countries that have a Constitution are democratic. The Constitution serves several purposes. First, it lays out certain ideals that form the basis of the kind of country that we as citizens aspire to live in. Or, put another way, a Constitution tells us what the fundamental nature of our society is. A country is usually made up of different communities of people who share certain beliefs but may not necessarily agree on all issues. A Constitution helps serve as a set of rules and principles that all persons in a country can agree upon as the basis of the way in which they want the country to be governed. This includes not only the type of government but also an agreement on certain ideals that they all believe the country should uphold.

1.) In a democracy, what is the main function of the Constitution?

Answer: In a democracy, a Constitution’s main function is extremely important since it lays forth the fundamental goals and rules that all citizens concur upon. The Constitution offers a thorough set of laws and principles that not only direct the country’s government but also profoundly mould society’s very foundation. reflecting the beliefs and ambitions of its citizens.

2.) What role does a constitution play in managing societies with diverse cultures and complex identities?

Answer: By promoting social cohesiveness and harmony among multiple identities, a constitution plays a crucial role in regulating varied communities. Additionally, it offers a cohesive framework of accepted guidelines and precepts, enabling the defence of personal freedoms. Promote inclusive policies and encourage equal representation at the same time. Thus, a strong sense of national identity and a common goal are created.

3.) Why does having a Constitution not automatically assure a democracy in a country?

Answer: Although establishing a constitution is an important first step towards democracy, it does not ensure it. The efficacy of the constitution depends on the people and the government’s honest commitment and engagement. Both of these organisations must sincerely work to defend democratic principles, the rule of law, protect human rights, and foster political diversity.

4.) How many different ways does a constitution help a country grow and become strong?

Answer: Flexibility is ensured by a constitution’s capacity to modify itself in response to shifting social circumstances.Furthermore, it represents rigidity in its capacity as an unyielding moral compass for equity and inclusivity. These are only a handful of the numerous ways that constitutions support a country’s development and adaptability. As a result, transparency and democratic accountability in government are ensured. Citizens have the chance to actively contribute to the advancement of their nation.

Case Study 2

Until recently, Nepal was a monarchy. The previous Constitution of Nepal, which had been adopted in 1990, reflected the fact that the final authority rested with the King. A people’s movement in Nepal fought for several decades to establish democracy and in 2006 they finally succeeded in putting an end to the powers of the King. The people had to write a new Constitution to establish Nepal as a democracy. The reason that they did not want to continue with the previous Constitution is because it did not reflect the ideals of the country that they want Nepal to be, and that they have fought for. As in the game of football, in which a change in the constitutive rules will change the game altogether, Nepal, by moving from a monarchy to a democratic government, needs to change all its constitutive rules in order to usher in a new society. This is why, the people of Nepal adopted a new Constitution for the country in 2015. The caption alongside elaborates Nepal’s struggle for democracy. The second important purpose of a Constitution is to define the nature of a country’s political system. For example, Nepal’s earlier Constitution stated that the country was to be ruled by the King and his council of ministers. In countries that have adopted a democratic form of government or polity, the Constitution plays a crucial role in laying out certain important guidelines that govern decision-making within these societies. In a democracy, we choose our leaders so that they can exercise power responsibly on our behalf. However, there is always the possibility that these leaders might misuse their authority and the Constitution usually provides safeguards against this.

1.) What significant historical event led to the adoption of a new Constitution in Nepal in 2015?

Answer: The people’s movement in Nepal worked for decades to bring about democracy until ultimately succeeding in 2006 in ending the King’s authority. As a result, a new Constitution was adopted in 2015 to reflect their aspirations for the country and to make Nepal a democratic country.

2.) A change in the Constitution affects a nation’s political system Using Nepal’s transition from a monarchy to a democracy as an example, reflect on the statement.

Answer: Changing Nepal’s Constitution from a monarchy to a democracy brought a very large change in the political structure of the nation. The previous Constitution granted the King and his council of ministers ultimate power rule without criticisms. Whereas the new democratic Constitution established rules for decision-making, gave the people the power to elect their leaders. Furthermore, provided safeguards against potential abuse of power by elected officials.

3.) Describe the Constitution’s second most important function in a democratic society?

Answer: In a democracy, defining the character of the political system is the second essential function of the Constitution. It sets the framework for decision-making. While it also ensures that elected officials utilise their authority in a responsible manner on behalf of the people. Moreover it also includes protections against potential abuses of power.

4.) How will the process of drafting a new Constitution affect Nepal’s society and political structure?

Answer: As we have seen in Nepal’s struggle for democracy, the process of drafting a new Constitution has a profound impact on all aspects of society.. Significant socioeconomic reforms are introduced, and the country’s monarchical political structure is replaced with a democratic one. The new Constitution alters decision-making while strengthening the voice of the people. It gives people the chance to actively take part in governance, laying the path for a society that is more accountable and inclusive.

Case study 3

The Constitution usually contains rules that ensure that minorities are not excluded from anything that is routinely available to the majority. Another reason why we have a Constitution is precisely to prevent this tyranny or domination by the majority of a minority. This can refer to one community dominating another, i.e. inter-community domination, or members of one community dominating others within the same community, i.e. intra-community domination. The third significant reason why we need a Constitution is to save us from ourselves. This may sound strange but what is meant by this is that we might at times feel strongly about an issue that might go against our larger interests and the Constitution helps us guard against this. the Constitution helps to protect us against certain decisions that we might take that could have an adverse effect on the larger principles that the country believes in. For example, it is possible that many people who live in a democracy might come to strongly feel that party politics has become so acrimonious that we need a strong dictator to set this right. Swept by this emotion, they may not realise that in the long run, dictatorial rule goes against all their interests. A good Constitution does not allow these whims to change its basic structure. It does not allow for the easy overthrow of provisions that guarantee rights of citizens and protect their freedom.

1.) How does the Constitution prevent minorities from being left out of democratic society?

Answer: The Constitution protects minorities’ rights and interests through a thorough collection of laws and tenets. It guarantees that minorities are not denied of opportunities and benefits that are typically available to the majority by enshrining the principles of equality and non-discrimination. It prohibits any sort of dominance between or within communities. This fosters an inclusive society where everyone has access to equal legal protection, regardless of their personal history or religious convictions.

2.) What is the third crucial argument for any nation having a constitution?

Answer: The capacity of the Constitution to protect society against itself is the third important justification for having one. The Constitution ensures that the country’s fundamental values and long-term well-being are upheld by serving as a barrier against rash judgement and short-sighted interests. It serves as a constant reminder to not let fleeting emotions cause us to compromise the core principles that the nation upholds.

3.) How can a Constitution guard against rash choices that might compromise a nation’s core values?

Answer: A constitution’s inclusion of clauses that resist sudden changes to its fundamental structure has a significant impact on deterring rash decisions. It establishes a strong framework that safeguards citizens’ rights and upholds their liberties, making it difficult to undermine these guiding ideals. The Constitution ensures that any proposed modifications receive careful examination and public consideration by setting significant procedural safeguards. It inhibits hasty decisions that might betray the nation’s cherished ideals and guiding principles.

4.) How does the Constitution help a nation’s fundamental values and interests be upheld over time?

Answer: In maintaining a nation’s fundamental values and interests across time, the Constitution acts as a durable and unchanging foundation. The Constitution serves as a framework for decision-making, guaranteeing that the nation’s treasured principles and fundamental rights be upheld regardless of fleeting political feelings. The Constitution promotes continuity and stability by having the flexibility to adjust to changing conditions while preserving its underlying precepts, protecting the nation’s fundamental values and interests for future generations.

Case Study 4

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Indian national movement had been active in the struggle for independence from British rule for several decades. During the freedom struggle the nationalists had devoted a great deal of time to imagining and planning what a free India would be like. Under the British, they had been forced to obey rules that they had had very little role in making. The long experience of authoritarian rule under the colonial state convinced Indians that free India should be a democracy in which everyone should be treated equally and be allowed to participate in government. What remained to be done then was to work out the ways in which a democratic government would be set up in India and the rules that would determine its functioning. This was done not by one person but by a group of around 300 people who became members of the Constituent Assembly in 1946 and who met periodically for the next three years to write India’s Constitution. These members of the Constituent Assembly had a huge task before them. The country was made up of several different communities who spoke different languages, belonged to different religions, and had distinct cultures. Also, when the Constitution was being written, India was going through considerable turmoil. The partition of the country into India and Pakistan was imminent, some of the Princely States remained undecided about their future, and the socio-economic condition of the vast mass of people appeared dismal. All of these issues played on the minds of the members of the Constituent Assembly as they drafted the Constitution. They rose to the occasion and gave this country a visionary document that reflects a respect for maintaining diversity while preserving national unity. The final document also reflects their concern for eradicating poverty through socio-economic reforms as well as emphasising the crucial role the people can play in choosing their representatives.

1.) Reflect upon the primary aims of the anti-British national movement in India.

Answers: The Indian national movement not only desired independence from British rule but also a democratic India where everyone would be treated equally and fairly. Additionally, they favoured giving citizens a chance to engage in politics. Indians, who had previously lived under repressive colonial rule, yearned to establish a free nation that upheld democratic principles and respected the rights of all individuals..

2.) Describe the process used to draught the Indian Constitution.

Answer: The work of writing India’s Constitution was assigned to a group of roughly 300 people. These individuals won seats in the Constituent Assembly in 1946. They worked together to create the Constitution for the ensuing three years as they met frequently. In light of the imminent partition, the unreliable Princely States, and socioeconomic inequality, they thought about the diversity and difficulties facing the nation.

3.) What difficulties did the Constituent Assembly members encounter when they drafted the Indian Constitution?

Answer: During the writing process, the Constituent Assembly members faced numerous difficulties. A Constitution that honoured and safeguarded national unity while recognising diversity was required due to India’s diverse population, which includes people who speak different languages, practise different religions, and have different cultural traditions. The challenge of creating a visionary statement that addressed these complex issues was further exacerbated by the coming division, uncertainty of some Princely States, and socioeconomic hardships.

4.) What concerns and goals of the Constituent Assembly were reflected in the final draught of the Indian Constitution?

Answer: In addition to fostering national unity while respecting variety, the final draught of the Indian Constitution also addressed socio-economic disparities and sought to end poverty through progressive reforms. In order to ensure democratic involvement and representation, the Constitution emphasised the importance of the people’s role in choosing their representatives.

5.) How did the Indian Constitution’s formulation reflect the Constituent Assembly’s commitment to building a progressive and inclusive society?

Answer: By establishing a framework that upheld individual rights, encouraged democratic governance, and aimed to help the socioeconomically disadvantaged, the Constituent Assembly’s crafting of India’s Constitution displayed its steadfast commitment to forging a progressive and inclusive nation. The Constituent Assembly rose to the occasion and gave India a visionary Constitution that provided the groundwork for a democratic and multiethnic country, despite the difficulties faced by partition and societal inequalities.

Case Study 5

Federalism refers to the existence of more than one level of government in the country. In India, we have governments at the state level and at the centre. Panchayati Raj is the third tier of government. The vast number of communities in India meant that a system of government needed to be devised that did not involve only persons sitting in the capital city of New Delhi and making decisions for everyone. Instead, it was important to have another level of government in the states so that decisions could be made for that particular area. While each state in India enjoys autonomy in exercising powers on certain issues, subjects of national concern require that all of these states follow the laws of the central government. The Constitution contains lists that detail the issues that each tier of government can make laws on. In addition, the Constitution also specifies where each tier of government can get the money from for the work that it does. Under federalism, the states are not merely agents of the federal government but draw their authority from the Constitution as well. All persons in India are governed by laws and policies made by each of these levels of government.

1.) What does the term “federalism” mean? how is it organised in India?

Answer: In a country, having numerous levels of governance is referred to as federalism. In India, federalism is organised with a third tier of government known as Panchayati Raj in addition to state and federal administrations. With this structure, decision-making power can be decentralised so that states can have autonomy while still complying to the laws of the federal government on topics of national importance.

2.) How does the Indian Constitution ensure a distribution of powers and responsibilities between different levels of government?

Answer: The Indian Constitution contains lists that delineate the issues on which each tier of government can make laws, ensuring a clear distribution of powers and responsibilities. While some issues are under the control of the states, the federal government is in charge of problems of national significance. The Constitution also establishes a framework for fiscal autonomy and accountability by outlining the financing sources for each level of government.

3.) What role does Panchayati Raj play in India’s federal structure?

Answer: Panchayati Raj serves as the third tier of government in India’s federal structure, promoting local governance and community participation in decision-making. It empowers rural areas with the authority to address region-specific issues and manage local resources. Panchayats derive their legitimacy and authority from the Constitution, making them vital components of India’s federal system.

4.) How does federalism ensure effective governance and representation in India?

Answer: Federalism in India facilitates effective governance and representation by allowing decisions to be made at different levels of government. This ensures that local concerns are addressed by state and local authorities, while issues of national significance are handled by the central government. The distribution of powers under federalism fosters a cooperative approach among different levels of government, catering to the diverse needs of India’s vast population and promoting inclusive governance.

Case Study 6

The Constitution of India guarantees universal adult suffrage for all citizens. When they were making the Constitution, the members of the Constituent Assembly felt that the freedom struggle had prepared the masses for universal adult suffrage and that this would help encourage a democratic mindset and break the clutches of traditional caste, class and gender hierarchies. This means that the people of India have a direct role in electing their representatives. Also, every citizen of the country, irrespective of his/her social background, can also contest in elections. These representatives are accountable to the people. According to the Constitution, there are three organs of government. These are the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The legislature refers to our elected representatives. The executive is a smaller group of people who are responsible for implementing laws and running the government. In order to prevent the misuse of power by any one branch of government, the Constitution says that each of these organs should exercise different powers. Through this, each organ acts as a check on the other organs of government and this ensures the balance of power between all three.

1.) What is universal adult suffrage? Why is it so necessary?

Answer: The visionary architects of our Constitution foresaw that embracing universal adult suffrage would act as a potent disruptor, shattering the age-old barriers of caste, class, and gender norms, steering us toward a more egalitarian and inclusive societal structure.It would allow the people to directly choose the nation’s leaders.

1.) Name the three organs of the government? How are they different from one another?

Answer: The legislative, executive, and judicial branches of Indian government each have a distinct function. The judiciary guarantees that laws passed by the Legislature are interpreted correctly. The executive branch is in charge of leading the nation and upholding the law. The Constitution’s guiding principles guide how the Legislature creates laws.

2.) The Constitution allows every citizen to run for elections. why?

Answer: To encourage inclusiveness and diversity, every citizen—regardless of their socioeconomic status—must have the opportunity to cast a ballot. Representative democracy is promoted by this practise. By providing equitable chances for political participation, the Constitution encourages variety among possible candidates. As a result, the country’s government can incorporate a vast variety of perspectives, reflecting the needs and ambitions of its multiethnic populace.

3.) How does India’s democratic process benefit from the Constitution’s emphasis on elected officials’ accountability?

Answer:The public’s right to hold elected authorities accountable is emphasised strongly in the Constitution. By making sure that representatives answer for their deeds and decisions, it maintains democratic values like accountability, responsiveness, and public service. As a result, a strong and accountable democratic system is fostered, with elected officials prioritising the welfare of their constituents.

Case Study 7

The section on Fundamental Rights has often been referred to as the ‘conscience’ of the Indian Constitution. Colonial rule had created a certain suspicion of the State in the minds of the nationalists and they wanted to ensure that a set of written rights would guard against the misuse of State power in independent India. Fundamental Rights, therefore, protect citizens against the arbitrary and absolute exercise of power by the State. The Constitution, thus, guarantees the rights of individuals against the State as well as against other individuals. Moreover, the various minority communities also expressed the need for the Constitution to include rights that would protect their groups. The Constitution, therefore, also guarantees the rights of minorities against the majority. As Dr Ambedkar has said about these Fundamental Rights, their object is two-fold. The first objective is that every citizen must be in a position to claim those rights. And secondly, these rights must be binding upon every authority that has got the power to make laws. In addition to Fundamental Rights, the Constitution also has a section called Directive Principles of State Policy. This section was designed by the members of the Constituent Assembly to ensure greater social and economic reforms, and to serve as a guide to the independent Indian State to institute laws and policies that help reduce the poverty of the masses.

1.) Why is the Indian Constitution’s Fundamental Rights clause frequently referred to as its “conscience”?

Answer: Due to its significant significance in defending people’ rights against the arbitrary exercise of power by the State, the section on Fundamental Rights is frequently referred to as the “conscience” of the Indian Constitution. By guaranteeing individual rights not only against the State but also against other individuals, and providing protections for minority communities against the majority, the Fundamental Rights uphold democratic principles and promote a just and inclusive society, making it a cornerstone of the nation’s conscience.

2.) What was the objective behind including Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution, as stated by Dr Ambedkar?

Answer: Dr Ambedkar’s vision behind including Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution was multifaceted. Firstly, he envisioned that every citizen must possess the ability to claim these rights, empowering them against any infringement on their liberties. By offering a shield against arbitrary actions, the Fundamental Rights ensure that individuals can freely exercise their rights without fear of undue interference. Secondly, Dr Ambedkar stressed that these rights should be binding upon every authority with the power to make laws, thus establishing an unequivocal commitment to uphold and protect these fundamental guarantees, securing justice and equality for all.

3.) What is the purpose of including Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution?

Answer: The inclusion of Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution serves as a visionary guidepost for the independent Indian State to actively pursue social and economic reforms.This could help to uplift the marginalized and reduce poverty. Though not enforceable in courts, these principles provide a moral imperative for the government to work towards creating a just and egalitarian society. By setting forth guidelines for policymaking, the Directive Principles imbue the governance process with a sense of welfare and social responsibility, ensuring the equitable distribution of resources and opportunities for the welfare of the masses.

4.) How did the Constitution address the concerns of minority communities regarding their rights and protections?

Answer: The Constitution effectively addressed the concerns of minority communities by incorporating provisions that guarantee their rights against any potential majority domination. The Constitution prioritises inclusivity and equal protection, and it works to safeguard the interests and cultural identities of minority groups in order to promote a cohesive and peaceful society. The Constitution shows a commitment to fostering diversity and guaranteeing that all people are entitled to equal rights and opportunities, regardless of their origin or views, by enshrining these protections.

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Current Affairs 25th April 2024 for UPSC Prelims Exam

StudyIQ offers Daily Current Affairs and Important News for UPSC Exam 2024. Check here Current Affairs of 25th April 2024 for UPSC Exam and State PSC Exam.

Table of Contents

Unopposed Candidates in Elections

Context: The BJP candidate Mukesh Dalal from Surat Lok Sabha constituency in Gujarat was declared elected unopposed.

Legal Framework for Nominations

Candidate: Must be an elector (voter) above 25 years old.
National/State recognized party candidate: 1 proposer, an elector from the constituency.
Unrecognised party/Independent candidate : 10 proposers, all electors from the constituency.
Number of Nominations : A candidate can file up to 4 nomination papers with different sets of proposers.
The Returning Officer (RO) scrutinises nomination papers.
Minor defects won’t lead to rejection (e.g., typos).
Missing or forged signatures of the candidate or proposer are grounds for rejection.

Current Issue

Similar issues arose with the nomination papers of a substitute candidate put forth by the same party.
These complications were further compounded by objections raised by members of a rival party, leading to the scrutiny and eventual rejection of the nominations.
This series of withdrawals and rejections effectively left one candidate standing unopposed in the election.

Legal Recourse

This provides a structured legal avenue for addressing grievances related to electoral processes.

Redistributing Privately Owned Property

Context: The Supreme Court of India began hearings on a case regarding the government’s power to acquire and redistribute privately owned properties as “material resources of the community,” as stipulated in Article 39(b) of the Constitution.

Article 39(b) of the Constitution

This article is part of the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) in Part IV of the Constitution, which are guiding principles for lawmaking but are not enforceable in court.
Case of State of Karnataka v Shri Ranganatha Reddy (1977) : A seven-judge bench concluded by a 4:3 majority that private resources do not fall within “material resources of the community.”
Justice Krishna Iyer’s Minority Opinion: In contrast, Justice Krishna Iyer argued that private resources should be considered community material resources , stating that excluding private ownership from Article 39(b) negates its purpose of redistribution.

Supreme Court Affirmation of Iyer’s Opinion

This interpretation suggested that the transformation of wealth from private to public ownership is encompassed within the article.
Mafatlal Industries Ltd v Union of India (1996): Expanded the definition of “material resources” under Article 39(b) to include both natural resources and all movable or immovable property, public and private.

Current Case: Acquisition of Cessed Properties in Mumbai

The case originated from a 1986 amendment to the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (MHADA), which involved acquiring cessed buildings in Mumbai to transfer them to needy persons.
This amendment aimed to address the city’s issue with unsafe, dilapidated buildings by facilitating repairs and reconstructions.
Property owners challenged the amendment, arguing it violated their Right to Equality under Article 14.

Legal History

The Bombay High Court rejected the challenge, citing Article 31C which protects laws based on DPSPs.
The Association appealed to the SC in 1992. The central question is whether Article 39(b) covers private resources.
The case has been through multiple benches since then, with some judges expressing reservations about including private resources.
Currently, a nine-judge bench is hearing the case.

A 244(A), Autonomous Regions

Context: In Assam’s tribal-majority Diphu Lok Sabha constituency candidates of all parties have promised the implementation of Article 244(A) of the Constitution to create an autonomous ‘state within a state’.

About Article 244 (A) of the Indian Constitution

Added by The Constitution (22nd Amendment) Act, 1969, it allows Parliament to form an autonomous state within Assam comprising specified tribal areas.
This autonomous state would have its own legislature and/or council of ministers , granting greater autonomy compared to the Sixth Schedule provisions for tribal areas.
It aims to provide greater autonomy beyond what the Sixth Schedule offers, including having its own legislature or council of ministers.

Historical Context

The push for autonomy in Diphu dates back to the 1950s and contributed to the formation of Meghalaya in 1972.
Although Karbi Anglong opted to remain with Assam due to the promise of Article 244(A).
Memorandum of Settlement 1995 : Increased the number of departments under the autonomous councils’ control from 10 to 30.
The Autonomous State Demand Committee (ASDC) contested elections and continues to advocate for autonomy.
Unfulfilled promises led to armed insurgency by some groups.
Peace accords have been signed with militant groups in recent years, offering development packages but not addressing Article 244(A).

Mass Graves in Gaza

Context: The United Nations has called for a clear and credible investigation into mass graves found at two major hospitals in war-torn Gaza.

Population and Demographics

Density: The Gaza Strip is one of the world’s most densely populated regions.
Population Count : Over 2 million inhabitants reside here.
Ethnic Majority: Predominantly Palestinian with a Sunni Muslim majority.
Post-1948 Control: Egypt administered the Gaza Strip after 1948 until Israel took over following the 1967 Six-Day War.
Israeli Settlements: Israel maintained control for 38 years, during which time 21 Jewish settlements were established.
2005 Israeli Disengagement: Israel withdrew settlers and military presence, leaving the Palestinian Authority with governance responsibilities.

Current Governance

Ruling Body: Hamas, an Islamist Palestinian organisation, has been the de facto governing body since 2007.
Political Background : Hamas secured control following election victories in 2006 and has since not held further elections.
Stance on Israel: Hamas does not recognize the state of Israel.
Blockade: Israel imposed a land, sea, and air blockade on the Gaza Strip starting in 2007.

Examples, Data and Case Studies for Value Addition

Global Food Crisis (GS 2) : As per the 2024 Global Report on Food Crisis (GRFC), nearly 282 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 59 countries in 2023, with extreme weather being the second most significant factor driving the food crisis.
Rejuvenation of River (GS 3): Vaijinath Ghongade, a 77-year-old from Maharashtra, spurred the revitalization of the Manganga River , enhancing local ecosystems and farming livelihoods. Mobilising community efforts and funds, the six-year initiative removed 20 lakh cubic metres of silt, replenished soil fertility, and improved water retention, benefitting hundreds of farmers in the drought-prone region.

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Constitutional Law - Notes, Case Laws And Study Material

Important articles and study material on Constitutional Law – Click on the links to Read:

Important Books and Practice Tests (Must Have)

Module II: Union and its Territory

Module III: Concept of State and Various Fundamental Rights

Module IV: Other Fundamental Rights

Module V: Interrelationship between Fundamental Rights and other parts of the Constitution

Module VI: Directive Principles Of State Policy And Fundamental Duties

MODULE VII: Executive

MODULE VIII: Parliament and State Legislature

MODULE IX: Centre-State Relationship

MODULE X: Union and State Judiciary

MODULE XI: Emergency Provisions

MODULE XII: Amendment of the Constitution

MODULE XIII: Other Miscellaneous Topics

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Top 10 Landmark Cases of Constitution

Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950)

State of Madras v. Amt. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)

K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (1959)

I.C. Golaknath and ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. (1967)

Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)

Maneka Gandhi v. UOI (1978)

Minerva Mills Ltd. V. UOI (1980)

Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and ors. (1985)

M.C. Mehta v. UOI (1986)

Vishaka and Ors v. State of Rajasthan (1997)

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Constitution of India: List of All Articles (1-395) and Parts (1-22)

PART I: THE UNION AND ITS TERRITORY

PART II: CITIZENSHIP

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PART III : FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

PART IV: DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY

PART IVA: FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES

PART V: THE UNION

CHAPTER II: PARLIAMENT

CHAPTER III: LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

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CHAPTER IV: THE UNION JUDICIARY

CHAPTER V: COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR-GENERAL OF INDIA

PART VI: THE STATES

CHAPTER II: THE EXECUTIVE

CHAPTER III: THE STATE LEGISLATURE

CHAPTER IV : LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE GOVERNOR

CHAPTER V: THE HIGH COURTS IN THE STATES

CHAPTER VI : SUBORDINATE COURTS

PART VII: THE STATES IN PART B OF THE FIRST SCHEDULE

PART VIII: THE UNION TERRITORIES

PART IX: THE PANCHAYATS

PART IXA: THE MUNICIPALITIES