essay on electric vehicles the future of transport

Self Study Mantra

• Essay for IBPS PO Mains
• Essay for State PSC
• Essay for Banking Exam
• Important Essays
• Letter Writing
• हिन्दी निबंध
• One Word Substitution
• Computer Knowledge
• Important Days
• जीवन परिचय
• Government Schemes List

Essay on Electric Vehicles: The Future of Transport, Benefits of Electric Vehicles uses, Electric Vehicles

Electric Vehicles, essay on electric vehicles, benefits of electronic vehicles (EVs), paragraph on electric vehicle, article on electric vehicle (EVs), electric vehicles essay.

Essay on Electric Vehicles 

Today when the world is thriving to use day by day new technology everywhere, Electric Vehicles must be the future means of transport. Pollution , growing demand for fuel, Global Warming , promoting eco-friendly means of transport are some of the reasons for promoting electric vehicles.

Electric Vehicles

Electric Vehicles are means of transport that consume eclectic energy as fuel instead of traditional fuels such as petrol, diesel, and CNG. These vehicles may be powered through a collector system by electricity from off-vehicle sources or maybe inbuilt with a battery, solar panels, fuel cells, or an electric generator to convert fuel to electricity. Electric bikes, electric cars, electric rickshaws, etc are some examples of electric vehicles. Most of the trains including metros are already running worldwide through electricity.

Need of Electric Vehicles

These are following factors which creates urgent need for use of electric vehicles:

• To reduce pollution
• To conserve non-renewable natural resources
• To reduce import of petrol and diesel
• To promote use of renewable energy
• To reduce global warming
• To fulfill the need of growing demand of more means of transport .

The world population is increasing drastically day by day and the demand of means of transport also growing proportionally. Thus demand of fuel is also increasing.  Too much smoke comes out from traditional vehicles this cause air pollution which take many lives every year.

Benefits of Electric Vehicles uses

We all are living in an advance era of technology. Advancement of technology always helps for betterment of human life. Use of electric vehicles are very beneficial for human as well as for environment in many ways. Some of these are given below:

• Electric vehicles run from electricity and doesn't emit smoke thus it is very helpful for reducing the pollution which causes many types of life threatening disease.
• Smoke is also one of the major causes of global warming. Thus using electric vehicles will reduce global warming.
• Petrol, Diesel and CNG are non-renewable natural resources of energy. Over-use of these fuels is not good for nature also. Thus use of electric vehicles can be very helpful for conservation of these natural resources.
• Today when advancement of technology growing rapidly electric vehicles are new means of transport to fulfill the larger demand of people growing day by day.
• Electric vehicles are eco-friendly. Use of electric vehicles is good for environment as well as human life.
• Electric vehicles are new technology. This sector will grow day by day which will generate lot of employment in this field.
• Electric vehicle will reduce the dependency of a nation on petroleum export countries.
• This will reduce the import cost of petrol, diesel like fuels and thus it will help in growing the economy of the country.
• Cost of electric vehicles is also low if we compare the recurring expenditure on petrol and diesel used in traditional means of transport .

Government initiative towards use of Electric Vehicles

As electric vehicle is cheaper in long run and also environment friendly, Government is continuously promoting the use of electric vehicles . Since long time many trains including metros have been running on electricity. Indian Railways trains are now almost running on electricity. Electric bike, electronic car, electronic rikshaw are already in market. Now people should use more electric vehicles in place of traditional petrol & diesel vehicles. Government has started campaign to promote use of electric vehicles. Some rebate on taxes and subsidy on purchasing the electric vehicles, are also provided by the Government. Recently Delhi Government has launched ' Switch Delhi ' campaign to promote the use of electric vehicles. Essay on Electric Vehicle PDF Do of this Essay:  Click Here .

'Switch Delhi' Campaign

Recently Delhi Government has launched 'Switch Delhi' campaign a Jan Aandolan to promote use of electric vehicles . This initiative has been taken by Delhi Government to cut down air pollution caused due to smoke emitted by traditional petrol & diesel vehicles. Earlier in August 2020 Delhi Government introduced Delhi EV Policy. Under this policy Delhi Government provides waiver on road tax, benefits up to Rs.1.5 lakh on four wheelers and more.

Electric Vehicles are the future of means of transport. It becomes more necessary when we think about the growing pollution , pollution born disease and global warming . We must use electric vehicle keeping in mind the above points including the environment and also promote the use of electric vehicle.

• Download 50 PDF Essays for All Exams
• Essay on Beat Plastic Pollution
• Essay on Free and Fair Election
• Essay on Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam
• Essay on Artificial Intelligence (AI)
• Essay on Green Growth
• 20 Most Important Essays for All Competitive Exams

Hope you liked this essay on electric vehicle and it helped you in your exam preparation. In addition to this essay on electric vehicle you can read other important essays from here .

You may like these posts

Post a comment, 12 comments.

Very informative, thanks to write and publish such a post.

Thanks a lot for providing this much information at a single platform! It's really helpful

Thank you so much for putting efforts. Keep up the good work.

its our pleasure to make you happy

Will help me in CGL tier 3

can you please write an essay on "India's five trillion Economy by 2024-25"

Can you please write an essay on "India's 5 trillion economy"

Your content is very helpful.

i really appreciate your hard work...thank you so much for sharing such a wonderful essay

Very informative, thanks to write....

• Download PDF Essay for All Exams

Download PDF Essay for All Exams Most important essays ranging from 250 words to 1000 …

Popular this Month

Trending Essay Topics | Important Essay Topics for Competitive Exams

20 Most Important Essay Topics for CAPF 2024 | UPSC CAPF Essay Topics 2024

20 Most Important Formal Letter Topics for Class 10 | Formal Letter Topics for Class 10

My School Essay in English 10 Lines, Essay on My School

My Family Essay in English 10 Lines, Essay on My Family

20 Most Important Letter Writing Topics for Competitive Exams

Essay on One Nation One Election for Competitive Exams

Important Days in 2024 | Important National and International Days | Important Days and Dates

Important Essay Topics for All State PSC Exams

One word substitution (download here👇👇).

Essay Writing in English

Important Topics

• Essay in English
• Essay in Hindi
• 20 Essays for IBPS PO Descriptive Paper
• Trending Essay Topics
• IBPS PO Previous Year Descriptive Paper
• Important Essays for UPSC
• Essay Topics for UPSC CAPF AC Exam
• How To Crack SSC CGL In First Attempt?
• 100 Most Important One Word Substitution
• Essay on Artificial Intelligence
• Latest Jobs | Admit Card | Result
• Essay on Global Warming
• पर्यावरण प्रदूषण: नियंत्रण के उपाय
• Essay on Women Empowerment
• Daily Homework for Class 1 to 5

Blog Archive

Quick links.

• Paragraph in English
• Advertise With Us
• Career with Us
• Privacy Policy
• Disclaimer, Terms and Condition
• Shipping and Delivery Policy
• Cancellation and Refund Policy
• Products and Pricing
• 10 Lines 13
• Best Books for SSC CGL 2
• Biography 6
• Education System 6
• English Grammar 1
• Essay in Hindi 18
• Essay Topics 32
• essay writing 150
• Farmer Welfare Schemes 1
• Important National and International Days 34
• Mathematics 5
• One Word Substitution 2
• Online Classes 3
• Paragraph Writing 19
• Political Science 1
• Pollution 7
• Republic Day 1
• Speech in Hindi 1
• SSC Exams 5
• Study Tips 7
• जीवन परिचय 6

Azadi Ka Amrit Mahotsav Essay in English

Essay on Advantages and Disadvantages of Online Classes

Copyright (c) 2019-24 Self Study Mantra All Rights Reseved

The electrification of transport could transform our future – if we are prepared for it 

By 2040, more than half of new cars sold in the world will be electric. Image:  REUTERS/Luke MacGregor

.chakra .wef-1c7l3mo{-webkit-transition:all 0.15s ease-out;transition:all 0.15s ease-out;cursor:pointer;-webkit-text-decoration:none;text-decoration:none;outline:none;color:inherit;}.chakra .wef-1c7l3mo:hover,.chakra .wef-1c7l3mo[data-hover]{-webkit-text-decoration:underline;text-decoration:underline;}.chakra .wef-1c7l3mo:focus,.chakra .wef-1c7l3mo[data-focus]{box-shadow:0 0 0 3px rgba(168,203,251,0.5);} Amit Narayan

.chakra .wef-9dduvl{margin-top:16px;margin-bottom:16px;line-height:1.388;font-size:1.25rem;}@media screen and (min-width:56.5rem){.chakra .wef-9dduvl{font-size:1.125rem;}} Explore and monitor how .chakra .wef-15eoq1r{margin-top:16px;margin-bottom:16px;line-height:1.388;font-size:1.25rem;color:#F7DB5E;}@media screen and (min-width:56.5rem){.chakra .wef-15eoq1r{font-size:1.125rem;}} Mobility is affecting economies, industries and global issues

.chakra .wef-1nk5u5d{margin-top:16px;margin-bottom:16px;line-height:1.388;color:#2846F8;font-size:1.25rem;}@media screen and (min-width:56.5rem){.chakra .wef-1nk5u5d{font-size:1.125rem;}} Get involved with our crowdsourced digital platform to deliver impact at scale

Stay up to date:.

Electric vehicles (EVs) are set to change everything about how energy is consumed and supplied.

As a report from the World Economic Forum, Electric Vehicles for Smarter Cities: The Future of Energy and Mobility makes clear, we’re at the start of a mobility revolution. By 2040, more than half of new cars sold in the world will be EVs, with 70% of market share in Europe , and over 50% in China.

You may or may not already drive an EV. But sooner or later, you will. Certainly your kids will. Our grandchildren will look back at the gas-guzzler the way we associate horse-drawn carriages as something we only saw in the movies.

We’re at a crossroads. While the momentum of electric vehicles may be unstoppable, the road forks. One way – with plenty of EVs and minimal coordination and planning – limits the possible benefits and creates challenges for the grid. The other way, taking a more intelligent approach to EV management, could meet population and economic growth without congesting and polluting our cities. Ride-sharing, car-sharing and self-driving cars all need to be part of the plan for modern cities, but electrification of transport offers arguably the largest opportunity to transform our future.

As with any disruption, this shift from “molecules to electrons” to fuel our transportation needs will produce winners and losers. Major industries will be affected, including oil and gas, but much sooner, the automotive and power sectors. These threats can also be opportunities for the oil majors and automotive companies to adopt new business models in electric transportation, electric supply and energy flexibility management services.

Power and mobility will converge

One word from the World Economic Forum’s report is key to understanding where the EV revolution can take us: convergence. Namely, the convergence of power and mobility.

In the future, we’ll refuel not at filling stations but at charging stations, and more often, in the convenience of our homes and workplaces without the need to drive to a fueling station.

Electrifying the transportation system offers numerous benefits, including greater diversity in the fuel portfolio, reduced dependence on fossil-based sources, lowered total cost of ownership and increased price stability. And in addition: fostering national security, energy independence and a healthier environment.

The potential benefits to the electricity sector are tremendous. By 2035, one in nine cars sold worldwide will be electric . China, India and European countries are all planning to phase out fossil-fueled vehicles. With new mobility models and technologies emerging, EV growth will be exponential. EVs will need electricity to recharge, and utilities will be eager to supply that power.

For an industry with stagnating revenues and legitimate concerns about disruption, the added income from selling electrons to charge these vehicles’ batteries is exciting. Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) calculates the revenue stream from replacing all 236 million gas-powered cars in the United States with EVs at about $115 billion.

Turning electric vehicles into grid assets

We’re only scratching the surface of the promise of electrifying transportation.

Integrating solar and wind is challenging. Due to their intermittent nature, these resources require fast-responding backup generators, which are currently fueled by natural gas – a fossil fuel. This is not only expensive, but defeats the original purpose of achieving sustainability. Through a Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) approach, EVs represent a significant opportunity to bring more renewable energy onto the grid by managing and leveling those periods of intermittency.

Think of all those electric vehicles as grid assets; in effect, EVs are mobile storage units. Batteries on wheels, if you will. One EV can store as many as three days’ worth of a typical home’s energy usage. These batteries can store energy when it’s available and use it when it’s needed. EVs can absorb cheap energy from the grid when the wind blows and the sun shines. They can discharge that energy back to the grid during periods of peak demand. They can be cycled on and off – in response to automated price signals – when grid operators need to balance energy supply and demand. In other words, when aggregated and connected to the electricity grid, EVs collectively mimic a fast-responding backup generator – a very clean and quiet one.

The great thing is that utilities already have the capacity to do much of this. Existing EV charging management programs reinforce that these vehicles can act as a valuable source of flexible capacity and lead to higher levels of customer engagement and satisfaction. A study from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory found that 160 million EVs could be powered entirely by pre-existing off-peak generating capacity alone.

A new dawn for utilities companies

Executing this transformation will be a challenge. Research from the Smart Electric Power Alliance (SEPA) shows that utilities are generally ill-prepared for rapid EV adoption. According to the SEPA report , annual energy use from EVs in the United States will rise from a few terawatt-hours today to 118 TWh and by perhaps as much as 733 TWh by 2030.

While utilities welcome the new load from EVs, they don't want batteries charging when demand is highest. BNEF forecasts global electricity consumption from EV charging will reach 1,800 TWh by 2040. That would require investing more in peak capacity, incurring greater costs for equipment upgrades and potentially exacerbating air quality. SEPA’s report says many utilities risk being overrun by new peak demand unless they move quickly to adjust their systems, rates and demand-management programs.

The incorporation of more renewables will force utilities to develop core competency in flexible energy management. To meet the challenges of integrating more intermittent energy, distributed generation and EV load, utilities will also need to find a new business model. They will have to evolve from providers of commodity electrons, where the price of the commodity will continue to erode with the decline in renewable prices, and think of themselves as trusted, energy service providers across the whole spectrum for their customers. In this increasingly competitive new energy world, winners will need to find new ways to monetize differentiate new products for their customers.

Distributed assets, not just batteries and EVs, but also thermostats, water heaters, pool pumps, connected lighting systems, building management systems and billions of other Internet of Things (IoT) devices are being deployed in homes, buildings and factories across the globe. In this fourth industrial revolution, these assets will not only play a critical role in keeping the system balanced by providing flexibility when and where it’s needed, but will also enable several of new revenue streams and ways of diversifying for innovative utilities companies of the future.

For this, utilities will need to think about upgrading and digitizing both their information and operational systems. This IT/OT convergence will be necessary to accommodate a smart-charging infrastructure, innovate new rate structures to encourage load shifting to off-peak hours, and actively enable peer-to-peer energy transactions between energy prosumers.

Building a smart energy internet will mean enabling the visibility and control needed to lessen load impacts and safeguard the distribution network. Smart, or managed, charging and V2G services will supply utilities with enormous new capabilities to better control how and when EV charging happens. Utilities will also be able to remotely manage and troubleshoot charging stations, aggregate grid assets, optimize charging for demand response and collect data for measurement and verification.

We need a shared vision

If we are to meet the imperative of leaving our grandchildren with a healthier planet, we must shift to a decarbonized, decentralized and digitalized energy system, as well as an electrified transportation system.

The convergence of energy, grid-edge technologies and mobility will be critical to realizing this vision. As the World Economic Forum report warns, we won’t get there by doing business and policy as usual. It won’t be enough to simply replace our gas-fueled cars with electron-fueled vehicles.

It’s about taking that fork in the road. We need a shared vision that embraces new mobility patterns, vehicle ownership norms and self-driving technologies. By planning for the transformation of mobility and energy systems, we’ll speed the ability of cities to meet climate goals, optimize grid investments, enable innovation of services and infrastructure, and increase productivity and generate economic growth.

We need to lead the way forward - we owe it to our families, our companies and our communities.

Have you read?

Electric vehicles for smarter cities: the future of energy and mobility, china is leading a surge in electric vehicle sales, we haven't thought about the true impact of autonomous vehicles, don't miss any update on this topic.

Create a free account and access your personalized content collection with our latest publications and analyses.

License and Republishing

World Economic Forum articles may be republished in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License, and in accordance with our Terms of Use.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and not the World Economic Forum.

The Agenda .chakra .wef-n7bacu{margin-top:16px;margin-bottom:16px;line-height:1.388;font-weight:400;} Weekly

A weekly update of the most important issues driving the global agenda

How electric vehicles will shape the future

April 23, 2022 The electric vehicle landscape is rapidly changing as both technology and interest evolve, and the coming years will see many more EVs take to the roads, seas, and skies. In the US, electric vehicles sales have climbed by more than 40 percent a year since 2016. By 2035, the largest automotive markets will be fully electric—providing both a glimpse of a green future and significant economic opportunity. Explore our insights to find out:

• the future of flying taxis
• making electric vehicles profitable
• how to create a working EV infrastructure
• the impact of emissions legislation on electric vehicle adoption

Lithium mining: How new production technologies could fuel the global EV revolution

Why the automotive future is electric

The future of air mobility: Electric aircraft and flying taxis

Amid disruption, automotive suppliers must reimagine their footprints

Shaping the future of fast-charging EV infrastructure

Building the electric-vehicle charging infrastructure America needs

A turning point for US auto dealers: The unstoppable electric car

Electrifying the bottom line: How OEMs can boost EV profitability

Making electric vehicles profitable

EV fluids: Say goodbye to the oil change

Net-zero emissions in US government fleets

Accessibility Links

• Skip to content
• Skip to search IOPscience
• Skip to Journals list
• Accessibility help
• Accessibility Help

Click here to close this panel.

Purpose-led Publishing is a coalition of three not-for-profit publishers in the field of physical sciences: AIP Publishing, the American Physical Society and IOP Publishing.

Together, as publishers that will always put purpose above profit, we have defined a set of industry standards that underpin high-quality, ethical scholarly communications.

We are proudly declaring that science is our only shareholder.

The rise of electric vehicles—2020 status and future expectations

Matteo Muratori 13,1 , Marcus Alexander 2 , Doug Arent 1 , Morgan Bazilian 3 , Pierpaolo Cazzola 4 , Ercan M Dede 5 , John Farrell 1 , Chris Gearhart 1 , David Greene 6 , Alan Jenn 7 , Matthew Keyser 1 , Timothy Lipman 8 , Sreekant Narumanchi 1 , Ahmad Pesaran 1 , Ramteen Sioshansi 9 , Emilia Suomalainen 10 , Gil Tal 7 , Kevin Walkowicz 11 and Jacob Ward 12

Published 25 March 2021 • © 2021 IOP Publishing Ltd Progress in Energy , Volume 3 , Number 2 Focus on Transport Electrification Citation Matteo Muratori et al 2021 Prog. Energy 3 022002 DOI 10.1088/2516-1083/abe0ad

Article metrics

71858 Total downloads

Permissions

Get permission to re-use this article

Share this article

Author e-mails.

[email protected]

Author affiliations

1 National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Golden, CO, United States of America

2 Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, United States of America

3 Colorado School of Mines, Golden, CO, United States of America

4 International Transport Forum in Paris, France

5 Toyota Research Institute of North America, Ann Arbour, MI, United States of America

6 University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, United States of America

7 University of California, Davis, CA, United States of America

8 University of California, Berkeley, CA, United States of America

9 The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States of America

10 Institut VEDECOM, Versailles, France

11 Calstart, Pasadena, CA, United States of America

12 Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, United States of America

Author notes

13 Author to whom any correspondence should be addressed.

Matteo Muratori https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1688-6742

Doug Arent https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4219-3950

Morgan Bazilian https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1650-8071

Ahmad Pesaran https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0666-1021

Emilia Suomalainen https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6339-2932

Gil Tal https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7843-3664

Jacob Ward https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8278-8940

• Received 3 August 2020
• Accepted 27 January 2021
• Published 25 March 2021

Peer review information

Method : Single-anonymous Revisions: 3 Screened for originality? Yes

Buy this article in print

Electric vehicles (EVs) are experiencing a rise in popularity over the past few years as the technology has matured and costs have declined, and support for clean transportation has promoted awareness, increased charging opportunities, and facilitated EV adoption. Suitably, a vast body of literature has been produced exploring various facets of EVs and their role in transportation and energy systems. This paper provides a timely and comprehensive review of scientific studies looking at various aspects of EVs, including: (a) an overview of the status of the light-duty-EV market and current projections for future adoption; (b) insights on market opportunities beyond light-duty EVs; (c) a review of cost and performance evolution for batteries, power electronics, and electric machines that are key components of EV success; (d) charging-infrastructure status with a focus on modeling and studies that are used to project charging-infrastructure requirements and the economics of public charging; (e) an overview of the impact of EV charging on power systems at multiple scales, ranging from bulk power systems to distribution networks; (f) insights into life-cycle cost and emissions studies focusing on EVs; and (g) future expectations and synergies between EVs and other emerging trends and technologies. The goal of this paper is to provide readers with a snapshot of the current state of the art and help navigate this vast literature by comparing studies critically and comprehensively and synthesizing general insights. This detailed review paints a positive picture for the future of EVs for on-road transportation, and the authors remain hopeful that remaining technology, regulatory, societal, behavioral, and business-model barriers can be addressed over time to support a transition toward cleaner, more efficient, and affordable transportation solutions for all.

Export citation and abstract BibTeX RIS

This article was updated on 29 April 2021 to add the name of the fifth author and to correct the name of the eighth author.

1. Introduction

First introduced at the end of the 1800s, electric vehicles (EVs) 12 have been experiencing a rise in popularity over the past few years as the technology has matured and costs (especially of batteries) have declined substantially. Worldwide support for clean transportation options (i.e. low emissions of greenhouse gasses [GHG] to mitigate climate change and criteria pollutants) has promoted awareness, increased charging opportunities, and facilitated adoption of EVs. EVs present numerous advantages compared to fossil-fueled internal-combustion-engine vehicles (ICEVs), inter alia: zero tailpipe emissions, no reliance on petroleum, improved fuel economy, lower maintenance, and improved driving experience (e.g. acceleration, noise reduction, and convenient home and opportunity recharging). Further, when charged with clean electricity, EVs provide a viable pathway to reduce overall GHG emissions and decarbonize on-road transportation. This decarbonization potential is important, given limited alternative options to liquid fossil fuels. The ability of EVs to reduce GHG emissions is dependent, however, upon clean electricity. Therefore, EV success is intertwined closely with the prospect of abundant and affordable renewable electricity (in particular solar and wind electricity) that is poised to transform power systems (Jacobson et al 2015 , Kroposki et al 2017 , Gielen et al 2019 , IEA 2020b ). Coordinated actions can produce beneficial synergies between EVs and power systems and support renewable-energy integration to optimize energy systems of the future to benefit users and offer decarbonization across sectors (CEM 2020 ). A cross-sectoral approach across the entire energy system is required to realise clean future transformation pathways (Hansen et al 2019 ). EVs are expected to play a critical role in the power system of the future (Muratori and Mai).

EV success is increasing rapidly since the mid-2010s. EV sales are breaking previous records every year, especially for light-duty vehicles (LDVs), buses, and smaller vehicles such as three-wheelers, mopeds, kick-scooters, and e-bikes (IEA 2017 , 2018a , 2019 , 2020 ). To date, global automakers are committing more than $140 billion to transportation electrification, and 50 light-duty EV models are available commercially in the U.S. market (Moore and Bullard 2020 ). Approximately 130 EV models are anticipated by 2023 (AFDC 2020 , Moore and Bullard 2020 ). Future projections of the role of EVs in LDV markets vary widely, with estimates ranging from limited success (∼10% of sales in 2050) to full market dominance, with EVs accounting for 100% of LDV sales well before 2050. Many studies project that EVs will become economically competitive with ICEVs in the near future or that they are already cost-competitive for some applications (Weldon et al 2018 , Sioshansi and Webb 2019 , Yale E360 2019 , Kapustin and Grushevenko 2020 ). However, widespread adoption requires more than economic competitiveness, especially for personally owned vehicles. Behavioral and non-financial preferences of individuals on different technologies and mobility options are also important (Lavieri et al 2017 , Li et al 2017 , McCollum et al 2018 , Ramea et al 2018 ). EV adoption beyond LDVs has been focused on buses, with significant adoption in several regions (especially China). Electric trucks also are receiving great attention, and Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BloombergNEF) projects that by 2025, alternative fuels will compete with, or outcompete, diesel in long-haul trucking applications (Moore and Bullard 2020 ). These recent successes are being driven by technological progress, especially in batteries and power electronics, greater availability of charging infrastructure, policy support driven by environmental benefits, and consumer acceptance. EV adoption is engendering a virtuous circle of technology improvements and cost reductions that is enabled and constrained by positive feedbacks arising from scale and learning by doing, research and development, charging-infrastructure coverage and utilization, and consumer experience and familiarity with EVs.

Vehicle electrification is a game-changer for the transportation sector due to major energy and environmental implications driven by high vehicle efficiency (EVs are approximately 3–4 times more efficient than comparable ICEVs), zero tailpipe emissions, and reduced petroleum dependency (great fuel diversity and flexibility exist in electricity production). Far-reaching implications for vehicle-grid integration extend to the electricity sector and to the broader energy system. A revealing example of the role of EVs in broader energy-transformation scenarios is provided by Muratori and Mai, who summarize results from 159 scenarios underpinning the special report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C (SR1.5) by Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Muratori and Mai also show that transportation represents only ∼2% of global electricity demand currently (with rail responsible for more than two-thirds of this total). They show that electricity is projected to provide 18% of all transportation-energy needs by 2050 for the median IPCC scenario, which would account for 10% of total electricity demand. Most of this electricity use is targeted toward on-road vehicle electrification. These projections are the result of modeling and simulations that are struggling to keep pace with the EV revolution and its role in energy-transformation scenarios as EV technologies and mobility are evolving rapidly (McCollum et al 2017 , Venturini et al 2019 , Muratori et al 2020 ). Recent studies explore higher transportation-electrification scenarios: for example, Mai et al ( 2018 ) report a scenario in which 75% of on-road miles are powered by electricity, and transportation represents almost a quarter of total electricity use during 2050.

Vehicle electrification is a disruptive element in energy-system evolution that radically changes the roles of different sectors, technologies, and fuels in long-term transformation scenarios. Traditionally, energy-system-transformation studies project minimal end-use changes in transportation-energy use over time (limited mode shifting and adoption of alternative fuels), and the sector is portrayed as a 'roadblock' to decarbonization. In many decarbonization scenarios, transportation is seen traditionally as one of the biggest hurdles to achieve emissions reductions (The White House 2016 ). These scenarios rely on greater changes in the energy supply to reduce emissions and petroleum dependency (e.g. large-scale use of bioenergy, often coupled to carbon capture and sequestration) rather than demand-side transformations (IPCC 2014 , Pietzcker et al 2014 , Creutzig et al 2015 , Muratori et al 2017 , Santos 2017 ). In most of these studies, electrification is limited to some transportation modes (e.g. light-duty), and EVs are not expected to replace ICEVs fully (The White House 2016 ). More recently, however, major mobility disruptions (e.g. use of ride-hailing and vehicle ride-sharing) and massive EV adoption across multiple applications are proposed (Edelenbosch et al 2017 , Van Vuuren et al 2017 , Hill et al 2019 , E3 2020 , Zhang and Fujimori 2020 ). These mobility disruptions allow for more radical changes and increase the decarbonization role of transportation and highlight the integration opportunities between transportation and energy supply, especially within the electricity sector. For example, Zhang and Fujimori ( 2020 ) highlight that for vehicle electrification to contribute to climate-change mitigation, electricity generation needs to transition to clean sources. They note that EVs can reduce mitigation costs, implying a positive impact of transport policies on the economic system (Zhang and Fujimori 2020 ). In-line with these projections, many countries are establishing increasingly stringent and ambitious targets to support transport electrification and in some cases ban conventional fossil fuel vehicles (Wentland 2016 , Dhar et al 2017 , Coren 2018 , CARB 2020 , State of California 2020 ).

EV charging undoubtedly will impact the electricity sector in terms of overall energy use, demand profiles, and synergies with electricity supply. Mai et al ( 2018 ) show that in a high-electrification scenario, transportation might grow from the current 0.2% to 23% of total U.S. electricity demand in 2050 and significantly impact system peak load and related capacity costs if not controlled properly. Widespread vehicle electrification will impact the electricity system across the board, including generation, transmission, and distribution. However, expected changes in U.S. electricity demand as a result of vehicle electrification are not greater than historical growth in load and peak demand. This finding suggests that bulk-generation capacity is expected to be available to support a growing EV fleet as it evolves over time, even with high EV-market growth (U.S. DRIVE 2019 ). At the same time, many studies have shown that 'smart charging' and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) services create opportunities to reduce system costs and facilitate the integration of variable renewable energy (VRE). Charging infrastructure that enables smart charging and alignment with VRE generation, as well as business models and programs to compensate EV owners for providing charging flexibility, are the most pressing required elements for successfully integrating EVs with bulk power systems. At the local level, EV charging could increase and change electricity loads significantly, which could impact distribution networks and power quality and reliability (FleetCarma 2019 ). Distribution-network impacts can be particularly critical for high-power charging and in cases in which many EVs are concentrated in a specific location, such as clusters of residential LDV charging and possibly fleet depots for commercial vehicles (Muratori 2018 ).

This paper provides a timely status of the literature on several aspects of EV markets, technologies, and future projections. The paper focuses on multiple facets that characterize technology status and the role of EVs in transportation decarbonization and broader energy-transformation pathways focusing on the U.S. context. As appropriate, global context is provided as well. Hybrid EVs (for which liquid fuel is the only source of energy) and fuel cell EVs (that power an electric powertrain with a fuel cell and on-board hydrogen storage) have some similarities with EVs and could complement them for many applications. However, these technologies are not reviewed in detail here. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on the status of the light-duty-EV market and provides a comparison of projections for future adoption. Section 3 provides insights on market opportunities beyond LDVs. Section 4 offers a review of cost and performance evolution for batteries, power electronics, and electric machines that are key components of EV success. Section 5 reviews charging-infrastructure status and focuses on modeling and analysis studies used to project charging-infrastructure requirements, the economics of public charging, and some considerations on cybersecurity and future technologies (e.g. wireless charging). Section 6 provides an overview of the impact of EV charging on power systems at multiple scales, ranging from bulk power systems to distribution networks. Section 7 provides insights into life-cycle cost and emissions studies focusing on EVs. Finally, section 8 touches on future expectations.

1.1. Summary of take-away points

1.1.1. ev adoption.

• The global rate of adoption of light-duty EVs (passenger cars) has increased rapidly since the mid-2010s, supported by three key pillars: improvements in battery technologies; a wide range of supportive policies to reduce emissions; and regulations and standards to promote energy efficiency and reduce petroleum consumption.
• Adoption of advanced technologies has been underestimated historically in modeling and analyses; EV adoption is projected to remain limited until 2030, and high uncertainty is shown afterward with widely different projections from different sources. However, EVs hold great promise to replace conventional LDVs affordably.
• Barriers to EV adoption to date include consumer skepticism toward new technology, high purchase prices, limited range and lack of charging infrastructure, and lack of available models and other supply constraints.
• A major challenge facing both manufacturers and end-users of medium- and heavy-duty EVs is the diverse set of operational requirements and duty cycles that the vehicles encounter in real-world operation.
• EVs appear to be well suited for short-haul trucking applications such as regional and local deliveries. The potential for battery-electric models to work well in long-haul on-road applications has yet to be established, with different studies indicating different opportunities.

1.1.2. Batteries and other EV technologies

• Over the last 10 years, the price of lithium-ion battery packs has dropped by more than 80% (from over $1000 kWh −1 to $156 kWh −1 at the end of 2019, BloombergNEF 2020 ). Further price reduction is needed to achieve EV purchase-price parity with ICEVs.
• Over the last 10 years, the specific energy of a lithium-ion battery cell has almost doubled, reaching 240 Wh kg −1 (BloombergNEF 2020 ), reducing battery weight significantly.
• Reducing or eliminating cobalt in lithium-ion batteries is an opportunity to lower costs and reduce reliance on a rare material with controversial supply chains.
• While batteries are playing a key role in the rise of EVs, power electronics and electric motors are also key components of an EV powertrain. Recent trends toward integration promise to deliver benefits in terms of increased power density, lower losses, and lower costs.

1.1.3. Charging infrastructure

• With a few million light-duty EVs on the road, currently, there is about one public charge point per ten battery electric vehicles (BEVs) in U.S. (although most vehicles have access to a residential charger).
• Given the importance of home charging (and the added convenience compared to traditional refueling at public stations), charging solutions in residential areas comprising attached or multi-unit dwellings is likely to be essential for EVs to be adopted at large scale.
• Although public charging infrastructure is clearly important to EV purchasers, how best to deploy charging infrastructure in terms of numbers, types, locations, and timing remains an active area for research.
• The economics of public charging vary with location and station configuration and depend critically on equipment and installation costs, incentives, non-fuel revenues, and retail electricity prices, which are heavily dependent on station utilization.
• The electrification of medium- and heavy-duty commercial trucks and buses might introduce unique charging and infrastructure requirements compared to those of light-duty passenger vehicles.
• Wireless charging, specifically high-power wireless charging (beyond level-2 power), could play a key role in providing an automated charging solution for tomorrow's automated vehicles.

1.1.4. Power system integration

• Accommodating EV charging at the bulk power-system level (generation and transmission) is different in each region, but there are no major known technical challenges or risks to support a growing EV fleet, especially in the near term (approximately one decade).
• At the local level, however, EV charging can increase and change electricity loads significantly, causing possible negative impacts on distribution networks, especially for high-power charging.
• The integration of EVs into power systems presents opportunities for synergistic improvement of the efficiency and economics of electromobility and electric power systems, and EVs can support grid planning and operations in several ways.
• There are still many challenges for effective EV-grid integration at large scale, linked not only to the technical aspects of vehicle-grid-integration (VGI) technology but also to societal, economic, business model, security, and regulatory aspects.
• VGI offers many opportunities that justify the efforts required to overcome these challenges. In addition to its services to the power system, VGI offers interesting perspectives for the full exploitation of synergies between EVs and VRE as both technologies promise large-scale deployment in the future.

1.1.5. Life-cycle cost and emissions

• Many factors contribute to variability in EV life-cycle emissions, mostly the carbon intensity of electricity, charging patterns, vehicle characteristics, and even local climate. Grid decarbonization is a prerequisite for EVs to provide major GHG-emissions reductions.
• Existing literature suggests that future EVs can offer 70%–90% lower GHG emissions compared to today's ICEVs, most obviously due to broad expectations for continued grid decarbonization.
• Operational costs of EVs (fuel and maintenance) are typically lower than those of ICEVs, largely because EVs are more efficient than ICEVs and have fewer moving parts.

1.1.6. Synergies with other technologies and future expectations

• Vehicle electrification fits in broader electrification and mobility macro-trends, including micro-mobility in urban areas, new mobility business models regarding ride-hailing and car-sharing, and automation that complement well with EVs.
• While EVs are a relatively new technology and automated vehicles are not readily available to the general public, the implications and potential synergies of these technologies operating in conjunction are significant.
• The coronavirus pandemic is impacting transportation markets negatively, including those for EVs, but long-term prospects remain undiminished.
• Several studies project major roles for EVs in the future, which is reflected in massive investment in vehicle development and commercialization, charging infrastructure, and further technology improvement. Consumer adoption and acceptance and technology progress form a virtuous self-reinforcing circle of technology-component improvements and cost reductions.
• EVs hold great promise to replace ICEVs affordably for a number of on-road applications, eliminating petroleum dependence, improving local air quality and enabling GHG-emissions reductions, and improving driving experiences.
• Forecasting the future, including technology adoption, remains a daunting task. However, this detailed review paints a positive picture for the future of EVs across a number of on-road applications.

2. Status of electric-LDV market and future projections

This section provides a current snapshot of the electric-LDV market in a global and U.S. context, but focuses on the latter. The global rate of adoption of electric LDVs has increased rapidly since the mid-2010s 13 . By the end of 2019, the global EV fleet reached 7.3 million units—up by more than 40% from 2018—with more than 1.25 million electric LDVs in the U.S. market alone (IEA 2020 ). EV sales totaled more than 2.2 million in 2019, exceeding the record level that was attained in 2018, despite mixed performances in different markets. Electric-LDV sales increased in Europe and stagnated or declined in other major markets, particularly in China (with a significant slowdown due to changes in Chinese subsidy policy in July 2019), Japan, and U.S. U.S. EV adoption varies greatly geographically—nine counties in California currently see EVs accounting for more than 10% of sales (8% on average for California as a whole), but national-level sales remain at less than 3% (Bowermaster 2019 ). BEV sales exceeded those of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) in all regions.

The rapid increase in EV adoption is underpinned by three key pillars:

• (a)   Improvements and cost reductions in battery technologies, which were enabled initially by the large-scale application of lithium-ion batteries in consumer electronics and smaller vehicles (e.g. scooters, especially in China, IEA 2017 ). These developments offer clear and growing opportunities for EVs and HEVs to deliver a reduced total cost of ownership (TCO) in comparison with ICEVs.
• (b)   A wide range of supportive policy instruments for clean transportation solutions in major global markets (Axsen et al 2020 ), which are mirrored by private-sector investment. These developments are driven by environmental goals (IPCC 2014 ), including reduction of local air pollution. These policy instruments support charging-infrastructure deployment (Bedir et al 2018 ) and provide monetary (e.g. rebates and vehicle-registration discounts) and non-monetary (e.g. access to high-occupancy-vehicle lanes and preferred parking) incentives to support EV adoption (IEA 2018a , AFDC 2020 ).
• (c)   Regulations and standards that support high-efficiency transportation solutions and reduce petroleum consumption (e.g. fuel-economy standards, zero-emission-vehicle mandates, and low-carbon-fuel standards). These regulations are being supported by technology-push measures, consisting primarily of economic instruments (e.g. grants and research funds) that aim to stimulate technological progress (especially batteries), and market-pull measures (e.g. public-procurement programs) that aim to support the deployment of clean-mobility technologies and enable cost reductions due to technology learning, scale, and risk mitigation.

Transport electrification also has started a virtuous self-reinforcing circle. Battery-technology developments and cost reductions triggered by EV adoption provide significant economic-development opportunities for the companies and countries intercepting the battery and EV value chains. Adoption of alternative vehicles both is enabled and constrained by powerful positive feedback arising from scale and learning by doing, research and development, consumer experience and familiarity with technologies (e.g. neighborhood effect), and complementary resources, such as fueling infrastructure (Struben and Sterman 2008 ). In this context, more diversity in make and model market offerings is supporting vehicle adoption. As of April 2020, there are 50 EV models available commercially in U.S. markets (AFDC 2020 ), and ∼130 are anticipated by 2023 (Moore and Bullard 2020 ).

Measures that support transport electrification have been, and increasingly shall be, accompanied by policies that control for the unwanted consequences. Thus, the measures need to be framed in the broader energy and industry contexts.

When looking at the future, EV-adoption forecasts remain highly uncertain. Technology-adoption projections are used by a number of stakeholders to guide investments, inform policy design and requirements (Kavalec et al 2018 ), assess benefits of previous and ongoing efforts (Stephens et al 2016 ), and develop long-term multi-sectoral assessments (Popp et al 2010 , Kriegler et al 2014 ). However, projecting the future, including technology adoption, is a daunting task. Past projections often have turned out to be inaccurate. Still, progress has been made to address projection uncertainty (Morgan and Keith 2008 , Reed et al 2019 ) and contextualize scenarios to explore alternative futures in a useful way. Scenario analysis is used largely in the energy-environment community to explore the possible implications of different judgments and assumptions by considering a series of 'what if' experiments (BP 2019 ).

Adoption of advanced technologies historically has been underestimated in modeling and analysis results (e.g. Creutzig et al 2017 ), which fail to capture the rapid technological progress and its impact on sales. Historical experiences suggest that technology diffusion, while notoriously difficult to predict, can occur rapidly and with an extensive reach (Mai et al 2018 ). Projecting personally owned LDV sales is particularly challenging because decisions are made by billions of independent (not necessarily rational) decision-makers valuing different vehicle attributes based on incomplete information (e.g. misinformation and skepticism toward new technologies) and limited financial flexibility.

Many studies make projections for future EV sales (see figure 1 for a comparison of different projections). Some organizations (e.g. Energy Information Administration [EIA]) historically have been conservative in projecting EV success, mostly due to scenario constraints and assumptions. Still, U.S. EV-sales projections from EIA in recent years are much higher than in the past. Others (e.g. BloombergNEF and Electric Power Research Institute [EPRI]) consistently have been more optimistic in terms of EV sales and continue to adjust sales projections upward. Policy ambition for EV adoption is also optimistic. For example, in September 2020, California passed new legislation that requires that by 2035 all new car and passenger-truck sales be zero-emission vehicles (and that all medium- and heavy-duty vehicles be zero-emission by 2045) (California, 2020). Projected EV sales and outcomes from major energy companies vary widely, ranging from somewhat limited EV adoption (e.g. ExxonMobil) to full market success (e.g. Shell). A survey from Columbia University (Kah 2019 ) considers 17 studies and shows that 'EV share of the global passenger vehicle fleet is not projected to be substantial before 2030 given the long lead time in turning over the global automobile fleet' and that 'the range of EVs in the 2040 fleet is 10% to 70%'. The studies compared in figure 1 show an even greater variability for 2050 projections, ranging from 13% to 100% of U.S. EV adoption for LDVs.

Figure 1.  Electric LDV (BEV and PHEV) new sales projections from numerous international sources. Unless otherwise noted, data refer to new U.S. sales. AEO2015 = EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2015, Reference Scenario. AEO2017 = EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2017, Reference Scenario. AEO2020 = EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2020, Reference Scenario. AEO2020HO = EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2020, High Oil Scenario. EFS Med = National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) Electrification Futures Study, Medium Scenario. EFS High = NREL Electrification Futures Study, High Scenario. EPRI Med = EPRI Plug-in Electric Vehicle Projections: Scenarios and Impacts, Medium Scenario. EPRI High = EPRI Plug-in Electric Vehicle Projections: Scenarios and Impacts, High Scenario. EPRI NEA = EPRI National Electrification Assessment, Reference Scenario. GEVO NP = IEA Global EV Outlook 2019, New Policies Scenario. GEVO CEM = IEA Global EV Outlook 2019, Clean Energy Ministerial 30@30 Campaign Scenario. BNEF = BloombergNEF EV Outlook 2020. Equinor Riv = Equinor 2019 Energy Perspectives, Rivalry Scenario. Equinor Ren = Equinor 2019 Energy Perspectives, Renewal Scenario. Shell Sky = Shell Sky Scenario. ExxonMobil = 2019 ExxonMobil Outlook for Energy. IEEJ Ref = The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan. 2019 Outlook, Reference Scenario (global sales). IEEJ Adv = The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan. 2019 Outlook, Advanced Technologies Scenario (global sales). CA ZEV Mandate = California zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) Executive Order N-79-20 (September 2020).

Download figure:

The future remains uncertain, but there is a clear trend in projections of light-duty EV sales toward more widespread adoption as the technology improves, consumers become more familiar with the technology, automakers expand their offerings, and policies continue to support the market.

A number of studies analyze the drivers of EV adoption (Vassileva and Campillo 2017 , Priessner et al 2018 ) and highlight several barriers for EVs to achieve widespread success, including consumer skepticism for new technologies (Egbue and Long 2012 ); uncertainty around environmental benefits (consumers wonder whether EVs actually are green; see section 7 for more clarity on the environmental benefits of EVs) and continued policy support; unclear battery aging/resale value; high costs (Haddadian et al 2015 , Rezvani et al 2015 , She et al 2017 ); lack of charging infrastructure (Melaina et al 2017 , Narassimhan and Johnson 2018 ); range anxiety (the fear of being unable to complete a trip) associated with shorter-range EVs; longer refueling times compared to conventional vehicles (Franke and Krems 2013 , Neubauer and Wood 2014 ; Melaina et al 2017 ); dismissive and deceptive car dealerships (De Rubens et al 2018 ); and other EV-supply considerations, such as limited model availability and limited supply chains.

A recent review of 239 articles published in top-tier journals focusing on EV adoption draws attention to 'relatively neglected topics such as dealership experience, charging infrastructure resilience, and marketing strategies as well as identifies much-studied topics such as charging infrastructure development, TCO, and purchase-based incentive policies' (Kumar and Alok 2019 ). Similar reviews published recently focus on different considerations, such as market heterogeneity (Lee et al 2019a ), incentives and policies (Hardman 2019 , Tal et al 2020 ), and TCO (Hamza et al 2020 ). Other than some limited discussions on business models and TCO, the literature is focused on one side of the story, namely demand. However, the availability (makes and models) of EVs is extremely limited compared to ICEVs (AFDC 2020 ). This is justified, in part, by new technologies requiring time to be introduced, and, in part, by the higher manufacturer revenues associated with selling and providing maintenance for ICEVs. Moreover, slow turnover in legacy industry (Morris 2020 ) and other supply constraints can be a major barrier to widespread EV uptake (Wolinetz and Axsen 2017 , De Rubens et al 2018 ). Kurani ( 2020 ) argues that in most cases, 'Results of large sample surveys and small sample workshops mutually reinforce the argument that continued growth of PEV markets faces a barrier in the form of the inattention to plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) of the vast majority of car-owning and new-car-buying households even in a place widely regarded as a leader. Most car-owning households are not paying attention to PEVs or the idea of a transition to electric-drive.'

3. EVs beyond light-duty applications

While much of the recent focus on vehicle electrification is with LDVs and small two- or three-wheelers (primarily in China), major progress also is being made with the electrification of medium- and heavy-duty vehicles. This includes heavy-duty trucks of various types, urban transit buses, school buses, and medium-duty vocational vehicles. As of the end of 2019, there were about 700 000 medium- and heavy-duty commercial EVs in use around the world (EV Volumes 2020 , IEA 2020 ).

A major challenge facing both manufacturers and end-users of medium- and heavy-duty vehicles is the diverse set of operational requirements and duty cycles that the vehicles encounter in real-world operation. When designing powertrain configurations and on-board energy-storage needs for new technologies, it is of critical importance to represent vehicle behavior accurately for different operations, including possible changes triggered by electrification (Delgado-Neira 2012 ). Medium- and heavy-duty vehicles can require a large number of powertrain and battery configurations, control strategies, and charging solutions. These needs depend on vehicle type (covering the full U.S. gross vehicle weight ratings [GVWR] spectrum from class 3 to class 8, 10 001–80 000 lb [4536–36 287 kg]), commercial operational situations and activities, and diverse drive cycles and charging opportunities (e.g. depot-based operations vs. long-haul). An example of this potential variability and its effect on the required battery capacity across multiple vehicle vocations is shown in figure 2 (Smith et al 2019 ).

Figure 2.  Battery capacity requirements vs. weight class for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles (Smith et al 2019 ).

Another example of the highly variable use cases for medium- and heavy-duty EVs shows energy efficiencies range between 0.8 kWh mile −1 and 3.2 kWh mile −1 (0.5–2.5 kWh km −1 ) (Gao et al 2018 ). If the on-board energy-storage needs for these vehicles are considered, assuming a daily operational range of between 50 miles and 200 miles (80–322 km), this results in battery-size requirements between 40 kWh and 640 kWh (assuming that the vehicle is recharged once daily). If additional charging strategies are considered (with their variability in expected charge times and associated power ratings), the range of vehicle-hardware and charging-infrastructure possibilities increases further. When adding variability across use cases with respect to temperature effects, battery-capacity degradation, payload, and road grade, it becomes clear that medium- and heavy-duty truck manufacturers face a significant challenge in designing, developing, and manufacturing systems that are able to meet the diverse operational requirements.

There are potential synergies between components of light-duty and medium- and heavy-duty electric vehicles. However, the requirements of medium- and heavy-duty vehicles place much greater burdens on powertrain components. The power and energy needs in heavy-duty applications are much larger than in light-duty applications. Heavy-duty vehicles could demand twice the peak power, four times the torque, and can consume more than five times the energy per mile (or km) driven compared to LDVs. In addition to using more energy per mile (or km) driven, typically, commercial vehicles drive many more miles (or km) per day, requiring much larger batteries and possibly much higher-power charging. Moreover, heavy-duty-vehicle users expect their vehicles to last more than a million miles, pointing to significantly higher durability requirements for heavy-duty-vehicle components (Smith et al 2019 ). Overall, these requirements, in combination with the needs for very high durability and very high-power drivelines and charging, may cause battery chemistries of heavy-duty vehicle batteries to diverge from those that are used in LDVs, hindering economies of scale. Demands for high efficiency, high power, and lower weight will put pressure on commercial vehicles to work at higher voltages than LDVs do. While LDVs are designed typically with powertrains that operate at a few hundred volts, it may be desirable to design large EVs with kilovolt powertrains. This will have a particularly significant impact on power electronics and could drive the development of wide-bandgap power electronics.

Historically, EVs have not been considered capable alternatives to heavy-duty diesel trucks (above 33 000 lb [14 969 kg] GVWR) due to high capital costs, high energy and power requirements, and weight and range-related battery constraints. International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT), for example, suggests that while conventional EV-charging methods may be sufficient for small urban commercial vehicles, overhead catenary or in-road charging are required for heavier vehicles (Moultak et al 2017 ). Recent studies dispute this, anticipating a much greater opportunity for EVs to replace diesel trucks in the short-term, even for long-haul applications (Mai et al 2018 , McCall and Phadke 2019 , Borlaug et al Forthcoming ), but the potential for battery-electric models to work well in long-haul applications has yet to be established (NACFE 2018 ). Studies show that a significant amount of payload capacity will be consumed by batteries, potentially up to 7 tons or 28% of capacity in a truck with a 500 mile (805 km) range with 1100 kWh battery capacity (Burke and Fulton 2019 ). Thus, batteries would reduce significantly the amount of cargo that can be carried. Other studies suggest this could be much less―on the order of 4% of lost payload capacity for 500 mile range (805 km) trucks and with overall lower TCO than diesel trucks (Phadke et al 2019 ). For short-haul applications, such as port drayage and regional or local deliveries, EVs appear well suited and battery weight may not affect the cargo or payload capacity adversely. Several heavy-duty battery-electric trucks for short- and medium-haul applications have been developed and tested in recent years by Balqon, Daimler Trucks NA, Peterbilt, TransPower, Tesla, US Hybrid, Volvo, and others (AFDC 2020 ).

Urban buses are also a major emerging market for electrification. In California, Innovative Clean Transit rules require transit agencies to transition completely to zero-emission technologies (batteries or fuel cells), with all new bus purchases being zero-emission by 2029 (CARB 2018 ). Eight of the ten largest transit agencies in California already are adopting zero-emission technologies into their fleets (CARB 2018 ). In a comparative study of urban buses running on diesel, compressed natural gas, diesel hybrid, fuel cells, and batteries, the battery buses are estimated to have the lowest CO 2 emissions in both California and Finland bus duty cycles at the time of the study (Lajunen and Lipman 2016 ). This study also shows that battery buses have only slightly higher overall costs per mile (or km) than fossil-fuel-based alternatives. Future projections out to 2030 show that electric buses have the lowest overall life-cycle costs, especially when CO 2 costs are included (Lajunen and Lipman 2016 ).

Medium-duty delivery vehicles (typically 10 000–33 000 lb [4536–14 969 kg] GVWR) are another attractive emerging area for electrification. The goods-delivery market is growing at approximately 9% per year in recent years, with a projected $343 billion global industry value in 2020 (Accenture 2015 ). The 'last mile' delivery vehicles that are needed for this market are undergoing changes and present good opportunities for electrification. Amazon, for example, has announced plans to purchase 100 000 custom-designed Rivian electric delivery vans by 2030, with 10 000 of the vehicles delivered by late 2022 (Davies 2019 ).

A significant challenge with electrifying these heavy- and medium-duty vehicles revolves around the installation of the required charging infrastructure (either at depots or along highways). While LDVs typically charge at power levels of 3 kW–10 kW, and potentially 50 kW–250 kW with DC fast chargers (DCFCs), a heavy-duty vehicle may require higher-power charging, depending on its duty cycle. Fleets of these vehicles charging in one location, such as a truck depot or travel center, may require several megawatts of power. This requires expensive charging infrastructure, potentially including costly and time-consuming distribution-grid upgrades, to provide the higher voltage and current levels that are needed. For example, a single 350 kW DCFC that may be suitable for heavy-duty applications costs almost $150 000 today (Nelder and Rogers 2019 , Nicholas 2019 ). These costs would, in turn, impact the business case for vehicle electrification. Potential costs of grid upgrades to support these new electrical loads would be additional expenses that may or may not be supported by the local utility, depending on the circumstances. To enable reliable, low-cost charging, which is crucial when considering the TCO for a fleet owner, the installation and operational costs of the charging infrastructure must be optimized, requiring engagement with power-supply stakeholders.

4. Batteries, power electronics, and electric machines

Electrification is a key aspect of modern life, and electric motors and machines are prevalent in manufacturing, consumer electronics, robotics, and EVs (Zhu and Howe 2007 ). One reason for the recent success and rise in adoption of EVs is the use of advanced lithium-ion batteries with improved performance, life, and lower cost. Improved energy and power performance, increased cycle and calendar life, and lower costs are leading to EVs with longer electric range and better acceleration at lower cost premia that are attracting consumers. This section summarizes the state-of-the-art for batteries and for power electronics, electric machines, and electric traction drives in terms of cost, performance, power and energy density, and reliability, and highlights some research challenges, pathways, and targets for the future.

4.1. Batteries

Over the last 10 years, the price of a lithium-ion battery pack has dropped by almost 90% from over $1000 kWh −1 in 2010 to $156 kWh −1 at the end of 2019 (BloombergNEF 2020 ). Meanwhile, the specific energy of a lithium-ion battery cell has almost doubled from 140 Wh kg −1 to 240 Wh kg −1 during that same window of time (BloombergNEF 2020 ). The improvement in performance and cost comes mainly from engineering improvements, use of materials with higher capacities and voltages, and development of methods to increase stability for longer life and improved safety. Improvements in cell, module, and pack design also help to improve performance and lower costs. Increases in manufacturing volume due to EV sales contribute significantly to cost reductions (Nykvist and Nilsson 2015 , Nykvist et al 2019 ). However, further reductions in battery costs, along with a reduction in the cost of electric machines and power electronics, are needed for EVs to achieve purchase-price parity with ICEVs. This parity is estimated by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to be achieved at battery costs of ∼$100 kWh −1 (preferably less than $80 kWh −1 ) (VTO, 2020 ). At that point, EVs should have both a purchase- and a lifetime-operating-cost benefit over ICEVs. Such cost benefits are likely to trigger drastic increases in EV sales. Figure 3 shows the observed price of lithium-ion battery packs from 2010 to 2018, as well as estimated prices through 2030. BloombergNEF projects that by 2024 the price for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to acquire battery packs will go below $100 kWh −1 and reach ∼$60 kWh −1 by 2030 if high levels of investments continue in the future (BloombergNEF 2020 ).

Figure 3.  Evolution of battery prices over the last 10 years and future projections (Goldie-Scot 2019 ). BloombergNEF 2019.

The typical anode material that is used in most lithium-ion EV batteries is graphite (Ahmed et al 2017 ). Research is underway to utilize silicon, in addition to graphite, due to its higher specific-energy capacity. For cathodes, there is more variety (Lee et al 2019 , Manthiram 2020 ). Consumer electronics such as mobile phones and computers almost exclusively have used lithium cobalt oxide, LiCoO 2 , due to its high specific-energy density (Keyser et al 2017 ). Most EV manufacturers (except Tesla) have avoided using LiCoO 2 in EVs due to its high cost and safety concerns. Lithium iron phosphate also has been used for electric cars and buses because of its long life and better safety and power capabilities. However, due to its low specific-energy density (110 Wh kg −1 ) when paired with a graphite anode, lithium iron phosphate is not used commonly for light-duty EVs in U.S. In recent years, battery makers and vehicle OEMs have moved to lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxides (NMC) with varying ratios of the three transition metals. Initially, OEMs used NMC111 (the numbers represent the molar fractions of nickel, manganese, and cobalt, which are equal in this case), but they have transitioned to NMC532 and utilize NMC622 now while working to stabilize the NMC811 cathode structure. The goal is eventually to reduce the amount of cobalt in the cathode to less than 5% and perhaps even eliminate the use of cobalt. The use of these cathodes with higher specific-energy density and less cobalt leads to lower battery cost per unit energy ($ kWh −1 ). Table 1 shows the specific energy and estimated (bottom-up) cost from Argonne National Laboratory's BatPaC Battery Performance and Cost model (Ahmed et al 2016 ) based on large-volume material processing, cell manufacturing, and pack manufacturing.

Table 1.  Calculated specific energy and cost of advanced lithium-ion batteries with different cathode/anode chemistries. Numbers are from BatPaC (Ahmed et al 2016 ) and are intended for relative comparison only. Final values can change depending on the components used and production volume, and costs reported do not reflect what a negotiated price could be between a battery and EV maker.

The cost of batteries is expected to decline in the future due to improved capacity of materials (such as Si anodes), increased percentage of active material components, use of lower-cost elements (no cobalt), improved packaging, and continued automation to increase yield while leading to a longer electric range. However, price increases for certain metals such as Ni and Li could prevent achieving those lower-battery-cost projections. Moreover, different battery chemistries can lead to very different costs and specific energies. For example, table 1 shows results obtained from bottom-up calculations with Argonne National Laboratory's BatPaC Battery Performance and Cost Model (Ahmed et al 2016 ), for a 100 kWh battery pack showing great variability in battery cost and performance for different chemistries.

Opportunities to improve performance and reduce costs further are being pursued in a number of major research areas. The battery community is investigating a number of materials, with the aim of reducing the cost and increasing the energy density of battery systems (Deign and Pyper 2018 ). Future work will involve utilizing silicon (Salah et al 2019 ) or lithium metal (Zhang et al 2020 ) as the anode while utilizing high-energy cathodes, such as NMC811 or lithium sulfur (Zhu et al 2019 ). Reducing the amount of critical material in lithium-ion batteries, especially cobalt, is an opportunity to lower the cost of batteries and improve supply-chain resilience. The private and public sectors are working toward developing new cathode materials along these lines (Li et al 2009 , 2017b ). Research and development (R&D) projects are underway to develop infrastructure and recycling technologies to collect batteries and recover the key battery materials economically and environmentally (Harper et al 2019 ). Reuse of end-of-life batteries from EVs would delay the need for additional battery materials, which should have positive environmental benefits (Neubauer et al 2012 ). Different battery technologies also are being explored. To increase energy density, reduce cost, and improve safety, the battery community is pursuing development of solid-state batteries with solid-state electrolytes (Randau et al 2020 ) that have ionic conductivities approaching those of today's liquid electrolyte systems. Solid-state lithium batteries enable the use of metallic lithium anodes, together with solid electrolytes and high-energy cathodes (such as high-nickel NMC or sulfur). Lithium-metal batteries based on solid electrolytes can, in principle, alleviate the safety concerns with current lithium-ion batteries with a flammable organic electrolyte. The main challenges facing lithium-metal anodes are dendritic growth, especially at low temperatures and higher current rates. Dendritic growth could lead to short circuit and thermal runaway and low Coulombic efficiency leading to poor cycle life (Xia et al 2019 ). Slow ion transport through the solid-state electrolyte leading to low power densities and manufacturing challenges, including poor mechanical integrity, pose additional challenges. Significant R&D activities are focused on developing solid-state electrolytes that prevent dendrite growth, have high ionic conductivity, good voltage-stability windows, and low impedance at the electrode–electrolyte interface. Recent cathode formulations in Li-S cells overcome the polysulfide problem, which could lead to lower efficiency and cycle life. Nevertheless, the deployment of cells with lower electrolyte-to-sulfur ratios for scale-up to large sizes is a remaining challenge. It may take another 5 to 10 years to mass-produce solid-state lithium batteries for EV applications.

As is discussed in section 5 , a network of fast chargers and batteries that can handle high charging-power rates is needed to address any potential barriers to widespread EV adoption. Research is focusing on developing batteries that can be charged very quickly (e.g. 80% of capacity in less than 15 min). A number of challenges to high-power charging, such as lithium plating, thermal management, and poor cycle life, need to be addressed (Ahmed et al 2017 ; DOE 2017 , Michelbacher et al 2017 ). Significant efforts also have focused on developing electrochemical and thermal modeling of batteries for EV applications (Kim et al 2011 , Chen et al 2016 , Keyser et al 2017 , Zhang et al 2017 ) to improve battery lifetime and efficiency in real-world applications. These efforts include lifetime-estimation and degradation modeling under different real-world climate and driving conditions (Hoke et al 2014 , Neubauer and Wood 2014 , Liu et al 2017b , Harlow et al 2019 , Li et al 2019 ); simplified models for control and diagnostics (e.g. state-of-charge estimation) (Muratori et al 2010 , Fan et al 2013 , Cordoba-Arenas et al 2015 , Bartlett et al 2016 ); and developing effective thermal management and control strategies (Pesaran 2001 , Serrao et al 2011 ).

Besides EV applications, batteries can offer energy-storage solutions for hybrid- or distributed-energy systems. These solutions include the use of batteries in integrated configurations with wind or solar photovoltaic (PV) systems or with EV fast-charging stations (Bernal-Agustín and Dufo-Lopez 2009 , Badwawi et al 2015 , Muratori et al 2019a ). Batteries also can provide stabilization and flexibility and can improve resilience and efficiency for power systems in general, especially for critical services or when a high share of variable power generation (e.g. from solar or wind) is expected (Divya and Østergaard 2009 , Denholm et al 2013 ; De Sisternes et al 2016 ). Lithium-ion batteries that have been developed for EV applications have found their way into stationary applications (Pellow et al 2020 ) because of their lower cost and modularity compared to other energy-storage technologies (Chen et al 2020 ). Moreover, EV batteries can be reused or repurposed at the end of their 'vehicle life' (usually considered when energy storage capacity drops below 70%–80% of the original nominal value, (Podias et al 2018 )) for stationary applications, improving their economic and environmental performance (Assuncao et al 2016 , Ahmadi et al 2017 , Martinez-Laserna et al 2018 , Olsson et al 2018 , Kamath et al 2020 ).

4.2. Power electronics, electric machines, and electric-traction-drive systems

While batteries are playing a key role in the rise of EVs, power electronics and electric motors and machines are also key components of an EV powertrain. Traditionally, the motor and power electronics drive were separate components in an EV. However, recent trends toward integration promise to deliver benefits in terms of increased power density, lower losses, and lower costs compared with separate motor and motor-drive solutions (Reimers et al 2019 ). Figure 4 shows the 2020 power density for power electronics, electric machines, and electric-traction-drive system from some example commercial vehicles as well as the 2025 DOE and U.S. DRIVE Partnership targets for near-term improvements (U.S. DRIVE 2017 , Chowdhury et al 2019 ). Commercially available vehicles exceed the 2020 power-density target. However, the 2025 target is at least a factor of six to eight higher than current commercial baselines. U.S. DRIVE Partnership also proposes electric-traction-drive-cost targets for 2020 and 2025: $8 kW −1 and $6 kW −1 , respectively, both of which are challenging targets (U.S. DRIVE 2017 , Chowdhury et al 2019 ). The authors are not aware of commercial systems meeting the 2020 target, and the 2025 target represents a further 33% reduction.

Figure 4.  Integrated electric-drive system and inverter power density for several commercial light-duty vehicles and DOE targets (data from U.S. DRIVE 2017 , Chowdhury et al 2019 ).

Improvements in compact power electronics and electric machines are applicable to novel emerging wheel-integrated solutions as well (Iizuka and Akatsu 2017 , Fukuda and Akatsu 2019 ). The development of advanced electric traction drive with improved efficiency is a strategy for increasing the range of electric-drive vehicles. In addition to this, chassis light-weighting is another strategy that is being pursued by the industry and the research community for increasing EV driving ranges. There are several technical challenges in meeting the DOE power-density targets (shown in figure 4 ). Challenges in meeting related DOE cost targets remain as well. A range of integration approaches are proposed in the literature, including surface mounting the power electronics on the motor housing (Nakada, Ishikawa, and Oki 2014 ), mounting on the motor stator iron (Wheeler et al 2005 ), and piecewise integration. Piecewise integration involves modularizing both power modules and machine stators into smaller units (Brown et al 2007 ). In all cases, the close physical positioning of the power electronics relative to the machine and the associated harsh thermal environment necessitate new concepts related to the active cooling of both components. A first strategy may be to isolate the power electronics from the machine thermally using parallel cooling mechanisms (Wheeler et al 2005 ). Another approach may be to use a fully integrated, series-connected, active-cooling loop (Tenconi et al 2008 , Gurpinar et al 2018 ). In either case, cost benefits may be realized through the possible elimination or combination of cooling loops. Significant research also has been focused on reducing rare-earth and heavy-rare-earth materials within the electric machines because that is an additional important pathway to reduce costs (U.S. DRIVE 2017 ).

Higher levels of integration go hand-in-hand with the utilization of wide-bandgap (WBG) semiconductor devices, which may be used at higher operational temperatures (e.g. >200 °C versus 150 °C for silicon) with reduced switching loss (Millán et al 2014 ). However, the adoption of WBG devices requires new packaging technologies to support the end goals of high temperature, high frequency, higher voltages, and more compact footprints. High-performance electrical interconnects (Cheng et al 2013 ), die-attach (Liu et al 2020 ), encapsulation (Cao et al 2010 ), and power-module-substrate technologies (Stockmeier et al 2011 ), along with thermal management and reliability of these technologies (Moreno et al 2014 , Paret et al 2016 , 2019 ), are critical aspects to consider. The new materials, devices, and components must be cost-effective and high-temperature-capable to be compatible with WBG devices. The downsizing of passive electrical components is another added benefit of adopting WBG devices and a further necessity for integrated machine-drive packaging solutions. Fortunately, the higher switching frequencies that are supported by WBG devices enable the downsizing of both the inductors and capacitors found in a traditional power-control unit (Hamada et al 2015 ). The development of economically viable and high-temperature-capable passives, capacitors in particular (Caliari et al 2013 ), is an area of great interest.

Besides EV applications, power electronics and electric machines with low cost, high performance, and high reliability are important for numerous energy-efficiency and renewable-energy applications, such as solar inverters, generators and electric drives for wind, grid-tied medium-voltage power electronics, and sensors and electronics for high-temperature geothermal applications (PowerAmerica 2020 ).

5. Charging infrastructure

Infrastructure planning and deploying an ecosystem of cost-effective and convenient public and private chargers is central to supporting EV adoption (CEM 2020 ). The lack of a sufficient refueling infrastructure has hampered many past efforts to promote alternatives to petroleum fuels (McNutt and Rodgers 2004 ). Extensive research is being done to address the diverse challenges that are posed by a transition from fossil-fuelled ICEVs to EVs and the special role of charging infrastructure in this transition (Muratori et al 2020b ).

At the end of 2019, there were an estimated 7.3 million EV chargers (or plugs) worldwide, of which almost 0.9 million were public, including approximately 264 000 public DCFCs (81% in China) (IEA 2020 ). Significant government support and private investments are helping to expand the network of public charging stations worldwide. With about 7.2 million light-duty BEVs on the road, there is about one public charger per 10 light-duty BEVs, and most vehicles have access to a residential charger. However, the number of public chargers per BEV varies widely among the 10 countries with the most BEVs (figure 5 ) because of different strategies for deploying fast versus slow public chargers. In addition to these LDV chargers, IEA estimated there are 184 000 fast chargers dedicated to electric buses (95% in China).

Figure 5.  Public charging availability by country in 2019, measured as Level-1 and Level-2 chargers per BEV and DCFC per 10 BEVs (Data from IEA 2020 ).

Studies show consistently that today's EVs do the majority (50%–80%) of their charging at home, followed by at work (15%–25% when workers use their vehicles to commute), and using public chargers (only about 5% of charging) (Hardman et al 2018 ). PHEVs conduct more charging at home than BEVs do, and they rely more on level-1 charging (Tal et al 2019 ). While single-household detached residences readily can accommodate level-1 or -2 charging, multi-unit dwellings require curbside public charging or installations in shared parking facilities (Hall and Lutsey 2017 ). Historical data on the charging behavior of California BEV owners reveals that 11% of their charging sessions were at level 1, 72% were at level 2, and 17% used DCFCs (Tal et al 2019 ). Use of DCFCs is lowest for BEVs with less than 100 miles (161 km) of range, highest for medium-range BEVs, and lower again for BEVs with ranges of 300 miles (483 km) or more.

5.1. Charging-siting modeling

Public charging infrastructure is clearly important to EV purchasers and supports EV sales by adding value (Narassimhan and Johnson 2018 , Greene et al 2020 ). However, how best to deploy charging infrastructure, in terms of numbers, types, locations, and timing remains an active area for research (Ko et al 2017 , Funke et al 2019 provide reviews). The literature includes many examples of geographically and temporally detailed models to optimize the location, number, and types of charging stations (e.g. Wood et al 2017 , Wu and Sioshansi 2017 , Zhao et al 2019 ). Geographically and temporally detailed data recording the movements of PEVs and their charging behavior are scarce. With few exceptions (e.g. Gnann et al 2018 ), simulation analyses rely on conventional ICEV databases (e.g. Dong et al 2014 , Wood et al 2015 , 2018 ), which do not reflect the changes PEV owners will make to maximize the utility of PEVs.

Given the importance of home charging, access to chargers for on-street parking in residential areas comprising attached or multi-unit dwellings is likely to be essential for PEVs to be adopted at large scale. Grote et al ( 2019 ) employ heuristic methods with geographical-information systems to locate curbside chargers in urban areas using a combination of census and parking data. The works of Nie and Ghamami ( 2013 ), Ghamami et al ( 2016 ), and Wang et al ( 2019 ) are examples of the variety of optimization methods that are applied to design DCFC networks to support intercity travel. Despite these examples, applied research is hindered by the scarcity of data on long-distance vehicle travel by PEVs (Eisenmann and Plötz 2019 ). Jochem et al ( 2019 ) estimate that 314 DCFC stations could provide minimum coverage of EU intercity routes with approximately 0.7 charging points per 1000 BEVs. Using a database of simulated U.S. intercity travel, He et al ( 2019 ) employ a mixed-integer model to optimize the location and number of DCFCs. They conclude that 250 stations could serve 98% of the long-distance miles of BEVs with ranges of 150 miles (241 km) or greater but only 73% of the long-distance miles of 100 mile range (161 km range) BEVs. Similarly, Wood et al ( 2017 ) estimate that 400 DCFC stations are required to cover the U.S. interstate-highway network with a 40 mile (64 km) spacing between stations. Others consider the optimal location of dynamic, wireless charging in combination with stationary charging (Liu and Wang 2017 ).

Optimization models for locating chargers to support commercial PEV fleets also appear in the literature (Jung et al 2014 , Shahraki et al 2015 ). In the future, if vehicle sharing becomes much more common, the downtime for charging could be an important disadvantage for PEVs. Using an integer model to optimize station allocation and PEV assignment, Roni et al ( 2019 ) find that charging time represents 72%–75% of vehicle downtime but that charging time could be reduced by almost 50% by optimal deployment of charging stations.

5.2. Beyond LDV charging

The electrification of medium- and heavy-duty commercial trucks and buses introduces unique charging and infrastructure requirements compared to those of LDVs. These requirements stem from the significantly higher battery capacities required on-board the vehicles, potentially shorter charging-dwell times (due to the in-service time requirements of the vehicles), and the potential of large facility charging loads (due to multiple trucks or buses charging in one location). One challenge is to understand the costs associated with the multitude of charging scenarios for commercial vehicles for current operations as well as future operations. It is expected that on-road freight vehicle miles (or km) traveled will increase by 75% from 2012 to 2045 (McCall and Phadke 2019 ). This increase may bring about new business models and potentially new charging-infrastructure approaches to meet this demand with electrified trucks. California's Innovative Clean Transit regulation, which will require California transit agencies to adopt zero-emission buses by 2040, is likely to drive large charging-infrastructure investments for buses (CARB 2018 ).

Today's commercial diesel-powered trucks in small fleets typically are fueled at publicly available on-road fueling stations, while nearly half of trucks in fleets of 10+ vehicles use company-owned facilities (Davis and Boundy 2020 ). Likewise, commercial EVs are charged primarily in fleet-owned facilities as their daily schedule allows (most often overnight). This depot-charging approach, which enables seamless integration of EVs into fleet logistics, might limit the electrification of some vehicle segments in the long term due to the battery capacity that is needed to satisfy their daily-range requirements (the need to complete their full-day function) and return to the facility to recharge fully 14 . Some studies suggest that long-haul battery-electric trucks are technically feasible and economically compelling (Phadke et al 2019 ) while others are more skeptical (Held et al 2018 ). Publicly available, high-power charging or en-route charging infrastructure for commercial vehicles could enable electrification for longer-distance vehicles (by enabling smaller on-board battery-capacity needs), but this scenario has cost challenges. En-route, high-power charging of over 1 MW might be needed to enable 500 miles (805 km) or more of daily driving. Installation of a 20 MW truck-charging station in California (capable of multiple 1.5 MW charge events for heavy-duty freight vehicles) is estimated to cost as much as 15 million USD. McCall and Phadke ( 2019 ) estimate that as many as 750 of these stations are needed to electrify the fleet of California Class-8 combination trucks. Charging commercial vehicles at depots requires additional infrastructure costs to install lower-power EV-supply equipment networks (e.g. 50 kW–100 kW) capable of charging multiple vehicles at these lower rates. These depot charging systems also will challenge existing facility electrical systems by adding a significant load that was not planned previously at the facility (Borlaug et al Forthcoming ).

5.3. Economics of public charging

PEV-charging economics vary with location and station configuration and depend critically on equipment and installation costs and retail electricity prices, which are dependent on utilization (Muratori et al 2019b , Borlaug et al 2020 ). In the early stages of market development, when there are relatively few vehicles, future demand is uncertain, and most charging is done at an EV's home base (Nigro and Frades 2015 , Madina et al 2016 ). Public charging stations tend to be lightly used during these initial stages (e.g. INL 2015 ), which poses a difficult challenge for private investment. Understanding and quantifying the value of public charging is hindered by lack of experience with PEVs on the part of consumers (Ito et al 2013 , Greene et al 2020 , Miele et al 2020 ) and the complexity of network effects in the evolution of alternative-fuel-vehicle markets (Li et al 2017a ). Nevertheless, it is likely that DCFCs will be profitable with sufficient demand. Considering vehicle ranges of between 100 km and 300 km and charging-power levels of between 50 kW and 150 kW, Gnann et al ( 2018 ) conclude that charger-usage fees could be between 0.05 € kWh −1 and 0.15 € kWh −1 in addition to the cost of electricity. The estimates were based on simulations with average daily occupancy of charging points of 10%–25% and peak-hour utilization of 20%–70%. In their simulations, utilization rates increase with increasing charger power and decrease with increased EV range. For intercity travel along European Union highways, Jochem et al ( 2019 ) estimate that a surcharge of 0.05 € kWh −1 of DCFC would make a minimal coverage of 314 stations (with 20 charge plugs each) profitable, even for station capital costs of one million EUR. He et al ( 2019 ) optimize DCFC locations along U.S. intercity routes and conclude that providing an adequate nationwide charging network for long-distance travel by 100 mile (161 km) range BEVs is more economical than increasing vehicle range and reducing the number of charging stations. Muratori et al ( 2019a ) consider a set of charging scenarios from real-world data and thousands of U.S. electricity retail rates. They conclude that batteries can be highly effective at mitigating electricity costs associated with demand charges and low station utilization, thereby reducing overall DCFC costs.

Early estimates show that the cost of public DCFC in U.S. can vary widely based on the station characteristics and level of use (Muratori et al 2019a ). Numerous new technology options are being explored to provide lower-cost electricity for light-duty passenger and medium- and heavy-duty commercial BEVs. Increasing the range of EVs through higher-power public charging stations as well as accommodating new potential BEV business models, such as transportation-network companies or automated vehicles, are driving new charging-technology solutions. Managed charging solutions that are available today can provide increased value to the BEV owner (lower electricity costs), charging station owner (lower operating costs), or grid operator (lower infrastructure-investment costs). For example, a managed-charging solution has been adopted and is currently in operation at a Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority depot to charge a fleet of Proterra electric buses optimally to ensure minimal stress on the grid (Ross 2018 ).

5.4. Emerging charging technologies

Wireless charging, specifically high-power wireless charging (beyond level-2 power levels), could play a key role in providing an automated charging solution for tomorrow's automated vehicles (Lukic and Pantic 2013 , Qiu et al 2013 , Miller et al 2015 , Feng et al 2020 ). Wireless charging also can enable significant electric range for BEVs by providing en-route opportunity charging (static or dynamic charging opportunities). If a network of wireless charging options is available to provide convenient and fast en-route charging, it could help reduce the amount of battery that is needed on-board a vehicle and reduce the cost of ownership for a BEV owner. Wireless charging is being developed for power levels of up to 300 kW for LDVs, 500 kW for medium-duty vehicles, and 1000 kW for heavy-duty vehicles. Bidirectional functionality, improved efficiency, interoperability of different systems, improved cybersecurity, and increased human-safety factors continue to be developed (Ozpineci et al 2019 ).

Connectivity and communication advances will enable new BEV-charging infrastructure and managed charging solutions. However, emerging cybersecurity threats also are being identified and should be addressed. There are concerns associated with data exchange, communications network, infrastructure, and firmware/software elements of the EV infrastructure (Chaudhry and Bohn 2012 ), and new charging-system security requirements and protocols are being developed to address these concerns (ElaadNL 2017 ). New emulation and simulation platforms also are being developed to address these threats and help understand the consequences and value of mitigating cyberattacks that could affect BEVs, electric-vehicle-supply equipment, or the electric grid (Sanghvi et al 2020 ).

6. Vehicle-grid integration (VGI)

Connecting millions of EVs to the power system, as may occur in the coming decades in major cities, regions, and countries around the world, introduces two fundamental themes: (a) challenges to meet reliably overall energy and power requirements, considering temporal load variations, and (b) VGI opportunities that leverage flexible vehicle charging ('smart charging') or V2G services to provide power-system services from connected vehicles. Multiple studies, which are reviewed in detail below, investigate the potential load growth, impact on load shapes, and infrastructure implications of increased EV adoption. These works focus especially on impact on distribution systems and opportunities for flexible charging to reshape aggregate power loads. Mai et al ( 2018 ), for example, shows that in a high-electrification scenario, transportation might grow from the current 0.2% to 23% of total U.S. electricity demand by 2050. This growth would impact system peak load and related capacity costs significantly if not controlled properly. In-depth analytics indicate a complex decision framework that requires critical understanding of potential future mobility demands and business models (e.g. ride-hailing, vehicle sharing, and mobility as a service), technology evolution, electricity-market and retail-tariff design, infrastructure planning (including charging), and policy and regulatory design (Codani et al 2016 , Eid et al 2016 , Knezovic et al 2017 , Borne et al 2018 , Hoarau and Perez 2019 , Gomes et al 2020 , Muratori and Mai 2020 , Thompson and Perez 2020 ).

While accommodating EV charging at the bulk-power (generation and transmission) level will be different in each region, no major technical challenges or risks have been identified to support a growing EV fleet, especially in the near term (FleetCarma 2019 , U.S. DRIVE 2019 , Doluweera et al 2020 ). At the same time, many studies show that smart charging and V2G create opportunities to reduce system costs and facilitate VRE integration (Sioshansi and Denholm 2010 , Weiller and Sioshansi 2014 , IRENA 2019 , Zhang et al 2019 ). Therefore, charging infrastructure that enables smart charging (e.g. widespread residential and workplace charging) and alignment with VRE generation and business models and programs to compensate EV owners for providing charging flexibility are critical elements for successful integration of EVs with bulk power systems.

6.1. Impact of EV loads on distribution systems

At the local level, EV charging can increase and change electricity loads significantly, having possible negative impacts on distribution networks (e.g. cables and distribution transformers) and power quality or reliability (Khalid et al 2019 ). Residential EV charging represents a significant increase in household electricity consumption that can require upgrades of the household electrical system which, unless managed properly, may exceed the maximum power that can be supported by distribution systems, especially for legacy infrastructure and during times of high electricity utilization (e.g. peak hours and extreme days) (IEA 2018b ). The impact of EVs on distribution systems also is influenced by the simultaneous adoption of other distributed energy resources, e.g. rooftop PV panels. While this interdependency complicates assessing the impact of EV charging, Fachrizal et al ( 2020 ) show that the two technologies support one other. Similarly, Vopava et al ( 2020 ) show that line overloads caused by rooftop PV panels can be reduced (but not avoided) by increasing EV adoption and vice versa.

The impact of EV charging on distribution systems is particularly critical for high-power charging and in cases in which many EVs are concentrated in specific locations, such as clusters of residential LDV charging and possibly fleet depots for commercial vehicles (Saarenpää et al 2013 , Liu et al 2017a , Muratori 2018 ). Smart charging, by which EV charging is timed based on signals from the grid and electricity prices that vary over time, or other forms of control, can help to minimize the impact of EV charging on distribution networks. However, smart charging requires both appropriate business models and signals (with related communication and distributed-control challenges). The market for distribution-system operators to provide such services is not mature yet (Everoze 2018 , Crozier, Morstyn, and McCulloch 2020 ). Time-varying pricing schemes, which are effective at influencing the timing of EV charging (PG&E 2017 ), typically do not include any distribution-level considerations. Thus, while consumers are responsive to such signals, the business models to include distribution-level metrics still are lacking. Moreover, price signals are offered usually to a large consumer base with the intent of reshaping the overall system load. At the local level, however, multiple consumers responding to the same signal might cause 'rebound peaks' (Li et al 2012 , Muratori and Rizzoni 2016 ) that can overstress distribution systems, calling for coordination among consumers connected to the same distribution network (e.g. direct EV-charging control from an intermediate aggregator).

Charging of larger commercial vehicles and highway fast-charging stations typically involves higher power levels: DCFC is typically at 50 kW/plug today, but power levels are increasing rapidly. Commercial charging locations with multiple plugs co-located at a specific location may lead to possible MW-level loads, which is roughly equivalent to the peak load of a large hotel. Commercial DCFC may require costly upgrades to distribution systems that can impact the cost-effectiveness of public fast charging heavily, especially if stations experience low utilization (Garrett and Nelder 2016 , Muratori et al 2019b ). While charging timing and speed at commercial stations is less flexible (consumers want to charge and leave or commercial fleets must meet business requirements), business models are often already in place to incentivize curbing maximum peak power from commercial installations. For example, demand charges (a fixed monthly payment that is proportional to the peak power that is drawn during a given month) are fairly common in U.S. retail tariffs and provide a reason to limit peak power. Furthermore, Muratori et al ( 2019a ) show that distributed batteries can be effective at mitigating the cost associated with demand charges by up to 50%, especially for 'peaky' or low-utilization EV-charging loads. Batteries also can facilitate coupling EV-charging stations with local solar electricity production or can provide grid services (Megel, Mathieu, and Andersson 2015 ), generating additional revenue.

6.2. Value of managed ('smart') EV charging for power systems

The integration of EVs into power systems presents several opportunities for synergistic improvement of the efficiency and economics of electromobility and electric power systems. These synergies stem from two inherent characteristics of EVs and power systems. Demand response and other forms of demand-side flexibility can be of value for power-system planning and operations (Albadi and El-Saadany 2007 , 2008 , Su and Kirschen 2009 , Muratori et al 2014 ). Contemporaneously, most personal-vehicle driving patterns entail vehicle-use for mobility purposes a relatively small proportion of the time (Kempton and Letendre 1997 ). If EVs are grid-connected for extended periods of time, they can provide demand-side flexibility in the form of smart charging or V2G services. Such use of an EV can improve its economics by leveraging cheaper electricity at little incremental cost (e.g. the costs of monitoring, communication, and control equipment that are needed to manage smart charging). EVs can support grid planning and operations in a number of ways. Figure 6 summarizes the key support services that EVs can provide. These services include reducing peak load and generation-, transmission-, and distribution-capacity requirements, deferring system upgrades, providing load response, supporting power-system dispatch (including VRE integration and real-time energy and operating reserves), providing energy arbitrage, and supporting power quality and end retail consumers.

Figure 6.  Summary of opportunities for EVs to provide demand-side flexibility to support power system planning and operations across multiple timescales.

Habib et al ( 2015 ) and Thompson and Perez ( 2020 ) provide detailed surveys of different potential uses of EVs for smart charging and V2G services. This includes active- and reactive-power services, load balancing, power-quality-related services (e.g. managing flicker and harmonics), retail-bill management, resource adequacy, and network deferral. In addition, Habib et al ( 2015 ) discuss different standards and technology needs relating to V2G services.

Kempton and Letendre ( 1997 ) provide the first description of the concept of EVs providing grid services, either in the form of smart charging or bidirectional V2G services (which can involve discharging EV batteries). Denholm and Short ( 2006 ) study the benefits of controlled overnight charging of PHEVs for valley-filling purposes. They demonstrate that with proper control of vehicle charging, up to 50% of the vehicle fleet could be electrified without needing new generation capacity to be built and at substantial savings compared to using liquid fuels for transportation. They show also that under conservative utility-planning practices, PHEVs could replace a significant portion of low-capacity-factor generating capacity by providing peaking V2G services. Tomić and Kempton ( 2007 ) examine the economics of using EVs for the provision of frequency reserves and demonstrate that such services can yield substantive revenues to vehicle owners in a variety of wholesale markets. Thompson and Perez ( 2020 ) conduct a meta-analysis of V2G services and value streams and find that power-focused services are of greater value than energy-focused services. They distinguish the two types of services based on the extent to which EV batteries must be discharged and degraded. Sioshansi and Denholm ( 2010 ) come to a similar conclusion in comparing the value of using PHEV batteries for energy arbitrage and operating reserves.

Another important synergy between EVs and power systems is using the flexibility of EV charging to manage the integration of VRE into power systems (Mwasilu et al 2014 , Weiller and Sioshansi 2014 ). Hoarau and Perez ( 2018 ) develop a framework for examining the synergies between EV charging and the integration of photovoltaic-solar resources into power systems. They find that the spatial footprint across which solar resources and EVs are deployed and the regulatory, policy, and market barriers to cooperation between solar resources and EVs are critical to realizing these synergies. Szinai et al ( 2020 ) find that controlled EV charging in California under its 2025 renewable-portfolio standards can reduce operational costs and renewable curtailment compared to unmanaged charging. They find that properly designed time-of-use retail tariffs can achieve some, but not all, of the benefits of controlled EV charging. They show also that these two approaches to managing EV charging (controlling EV charging directly and time-of-use tariffs) reduce the cost of infrastructure that is necessary to accommodate EV charging relative to a case of uncontrolled EV charging. Chandrashekar et al ( 2017 ) conduct an analysis of the Texas power system and find similar benefits of controlled EV charging in reducing wind-integration costs. Coignard et al ( 2018 ) show that under California's 2020 renewable-portfolio standards, controlled EV charging can deliver the same renewable-integration benefits that California's energy-storage mandate does but at substantially lower costs. They show that bidirectional V2G services deliver up to triple the value of controlled EV charging. Kempton and Tomić ( 2005 ) show that high penetrations of wind energy in U.S. could be accommodated at relatively low costs if 3% of the vehicle fleet provides frequency reserves and 8%–38% of the fleet provides operating reserves and energy-storage services to avoid wind curtailment. Loisel et al ( 2014 ) and Zhang et al ( 2019 ) conduct more forward-looking analyses of the synergies between EVs and renewables. The former examines German systems, and the latter examines California systems under potential renewable-deployment scenarios in the year 2030.

An important assumption underlying these works is that EV owners (or aggregations of EVs) are exposed to prices that signal the value of these services and that there are regulatory and business models that allow such services to be exploited (i.e. consumer are willing to engage in these programs and are compensated properly for providing flexible charging). Several pilot studies suggest that EV owners have interest in participating in utility-run controlled-charging programs and that a set of different compensation strategies beyond time-varying electricity pricing might maximize engagement (Geske and Schumann 2018 , Hanvey 2019 , Küfeoğlu et al 2019 , Delmonte et al 2020 ).

Niesten and Alkemade ( 2016 ) survey the literature on these topics and numerous European and U.S. pilot programs in terms of value generation for V2G services. They find that the ability of an aggregator to scale is related to its ability to develop a financially viable business model for V2G services. Another important consideration is the availability of control and communication technologies to manage EV charging based on power-system conditions. Key considerations in the design of control strategies are robustness in the face of uncertainty (e.g. renewable availability, EV-arrival times and charge levels upon arrivals, and EV-departure times), data privacy, and robustness to communication or other failures. Le Floch et al ( 2015a ), Le Floch et al ( 2015b ), ( 2016 ), develop a variety of distributed and partial-differential-equation-based algorithms for controlling EV charging. Rotering and Ilic ( 2011 ) develop a dynamic-optimization-based approach to control EV charging and bidirectional V2G services (with a focus on the provision of ancillary services). Donadee and Ilic ( 2014 ) develop a Markov decision process to optimize the offering behavior of EVs that participate in wholesale electricity markets to provide frequency reserves.

6.3. Remaining challenges for effective vehicle-grid integration at scale

There are still many challenges to tackle before smart charging and V2G can be deployed effectively at large scale. These challenges are linked to the technical aspects of VGI technology but also to societal, economic, security, resilience, and regulatory questions (Noel et al 2019a ). With regard to the technical challenges of VGI, existing barriers notably include battery degradation, charger availability and efficiency, communication standards, cybersecurity, and aggregation issues (Eiza and Ni 2017 , Sovacool et al 2017 , Noel et al 2019a ).

While the technical aspects of VGI are studied widely, this is much less the case for its key societal aspects. Societal issues include the environmental performance of VGI, its impact on natural resources, consumer acceptance and awareness, financing and business models, and social justice and equity (Sovacool et al 2018 ). There are also various regulatory and political challenges linked to clarifying the regulatory frameworks applicable to VGI as well as market-design issues, such as the proper valuation of VGI services and double taxation (Noel et al 2019a ) and the trade-offs between bulk power and distribution-system needs. Regulatory changes may be required to enable distribution-network operators and EV owners (or aggregators) to take a more active role in electricity markets. The Parker project, an experimental project on balancing services from an EV fleet, underlines some of the barriers to providing ancillary services, such as metering requirements (Andersen et al 2019 ). It is argued that insufficient regulatory action might keep us from attaining the full economic and environmental benefits of V2G (Thompson and Perez 2020 ) and that regulations are lagging behind technological developments (Freitas Gomes et al 2020 ). The lack of defined business models is seen by many experts as a key impediment (Noel et al 2019b ).

Major challenges that are linked to data-related aspects of VGI, including who has the right to access data from EVs (e.g. the state of EV batteries and charging) and how these data can be exploited, remain. Privacy concerns are one of the major obstacles to user acceptance (as is fear of loss of control over charging) (Bailey and Axsen 2015 ). In addition, there are also questions linked to cybersecurity (Noel et al 2019a ).

Nevertheless, VGI offers many opportunities that justify the efforts required to overcome these challenges. In addition to its services to the power system, VGI offers interesting perspectives for the full exploitation of synergies between EVs and renewable energy sources as both technologies promise large-scale deployment in the future (Kempton and Tomić 2005 , Lund and Kempton 2008 ). Exploiting EV batteries for VGI also is appealing from a life-cycle perspective, as the manufacturing of EV batteries has a non-trivial environmental footprint (Hall and Lutsey 2018 ). However, there are a few future developments that might compromise the potential of VGI, most notably cheaper batteries (including second-life EV batteries) that might compete with EVs for many potential services (Noel et al 2019b ). In addition, the impacts of new mobility business models, such as the rise of vehicle- and ride-sharing, on grid services remain unclear. Although smart charging will come first in the path toward grid integration, V2G services have the potential to provide additional value (Thingvad et al 2016 ).

7. Life-cycle cost and emissions

EVs differ from conventional ICEVs on an emissions basis. While the operation of gasoline- or diesel-powered ICEVs produces GHG and pollutant emissions that are discharged from the vehicle tailpipe, EVs have no tailpipe emissions. In a broader context, EVs still can be associated with so-called 'upstream' emissions from the processes that generate, transmit, and distribute the electricity that is used for their charging. Fueling an ICEV also involves upstream 'fuel-cycle' emissions from the raw-material extraction and transportation, refining, and final-product-delivery processes that make gasoline or diesel fuel available at a retail pump. These fuel-cycle emissions give rise to the colloquial jargon 'well-to-pump' emissions. Accordingly, a 'well-to-wheels' (WTW) life-cycle analysis (LCA) is an appropriate framework for comparing EV and ICEV emissions. WTW considers both upstream emissions from the fuel cycle ('well-to-pump') and direct emissions from vehicle operation ('pump-to-wheels') for a standardized functional unit and temporal period. WTW studies have a history of over three decades of use to evaluate direct and indirect emissions related to fuel production and vehicle operations (Wang 1996 ). WTW emissions are expressed typically on a per-mile or per-kilometer basis over a vehicle's assumed lifetime.

WTW analyses typically focus only on fuel production and vehicle operation. Some studies consider broader system boundaries that include vehicle production and decommissioning (i.e. recycling and scrappage) in an LCA framework. This broader system boundary considers what is commonly called the 'vehicle cycle' and provides a so-called 'cradle-to-grave' (or 'C2G') analysis. Vehicle-cycle emissions typically account for 5%–20% of today's ICEV C2G emissions and can be as low as 15% or as high as 80% of today's BEV emissions, depending on the underlying electricity-generation mix. Lower-carbon mixes result in vehicle-cycle emissions accounting for a greater portion of total emissions. As an extreme illustrative example, the case of zero-carbon electricity implies that vehicle-cycle emissions account for 100% of C2G emissions. In general, BEV vehicle-cycle emissions are 25% to 100% higher than their ICEV counterpart (Samaras and Meisterling 2008 , Ambrose and Kendall 2016 , Elgowainy et al 2016 , Hall and Lutsey 2018 , Ricardo 2020 ). As this section explores, higher initial BEV vehicle-cycle emissions almost always are counterbalanced by lower emissions during vehicle operation (with notable exceptions in cases in which BEVs are charged from especially high-emissions electricity).

Even including upstream emissions, EVs are championed as a critical technology for decarbonizing transportation (in line with anticipated widespread grid decarbonization). National Research Council ( 2013 ) identifies EVs as one of several technologies that could put U.S. on a path to reducing transportation-sector GHG emissions to 80% below 2005 levels in 2050. Furthermore, National Research Council ( 2013 ) estimates that BEVs would reduce emissions by 53%–72% compared to ICEVs in 2030. IEA ( 2019 ) contends, similarly, that EVs can reduce WTW GHG emissions by half versus equivalent ICEVs in 2030. Recently published literature also agrees, even on a C2G basis, estimating that future EV pathways offer 70%–90% lower GHG emissions compared to today's ICEVs (Elgowainy et al 2018 ). As such, the broad view across national, international, and academic-research perspectives is that EVs offer the potential to reduce transportation-related GHG emissions by 53% to 90% in the future.

Several studies find that EVs already reduce WTW GHG emissions today by as little as 10% or as much as 41% on average versus comparable ICEVs based on current electricity-production mixes. Samaras and Meisterling ( 2008 ), who are among the first to relate a range of potential electricity carbon intensities to associated EV-lifecycle emissions explicitly, estimate a 38%–41% GHG emissions benefit for EVs powered by the average 2008 U.S. grid. Hawkins et al ( 2012a ), informed by a meta-study of 51 previous LCAs, highlight great variations based on different electricity generation assumptions and vehicle lifetime. Hawkins et al ( 2012b ) estimate a decline of 10%–24% global warming potential (a measure proportional to GHG emissions) for EVs powered by the average 2012 European electricity mix. Elgowainy et al 2016 , 2018 ) estimate that EVs emit 20%–35% fewer GHG emissions when operating on the average 2014 U.S. grid mix.

Many factors contribute to variability in EV WTW emissions and estimated reduction opportunities compared to ICEVs—electricity-carbon intensity, charging patterns, vehicle characteristics, and even local climate (Noshadravan et al 2015 , Requia et al 2018 ). To illustrate these variabilities, figure 7 compares WTW GHG emissions of EVs versus comparable ICEVs. Relative emissions reductions are generally larger for larger vehicles. Woo et al ( 2017 ) find that electrifying SUVs reduces emissions more than electrifying sub-compact vehicles on a WTW basis versus comparable ICEVs (30%–45% and 10%–20%, respectively, assuming median national grid mixes). Ellingsen et al ( 2016 ) find that large EVs emit proportionally less than small EVs compared to comparable ICEVs on a C2G basis (27% and 19%, respectively).

Figure 7.  WTW GHG emissions for EVs versus comparable ICEVs on average and with illustrative variability by market segment, electricity generation pathway, grid mix, and ambient temperature.

Low-carbon electricity can lead to greater reductions in EV emissions. Electricity that is produced from coal, which has a high carbon intensity, can increase EV emissions by as much as 40% or decrease EV emissions by as much as 5% compared to an ICEV (depending on other assumptions). Conversely, electricity from hydropower, nuclear, solar, or wind, all of which offer near-zero carbon intensities, can decrease EV emissions by more than 95% compared to an ICEV (Woo et al 2017 ). Such variability in electricity-generation pathways affects the relative benefits of real-world grid mixes. For example, while EVs offer 30%–65% lower emissions versus comparable ICEVs on average in Europe (Woo et al 2017 , Moro and Lonza 2018 ), in individual countries relative emissions can range from as much as 95% lower to 60% higher (Orsi et al 2016 , Moro and Lonza 2018 ). Typically, U.S. EVs provide emissions reductions, but in some regions EV emissions are higher compared to an efficient ICEV (Reichmuth 2020 ). Changes in regional climate and daily weather add further variability: EV emissions can vary between 40% and 50% lower than a comparable ICEV even when charged from the same grid mix (Yuksel et al 2016 ). While outside the scope of a typical WTW comparison, the additional consideration of refueling infrastructure (i.e. gasoline stations for ICEVs and recharging equipment for EVs) is estimated to increase EV emissions by 4%–8% compared to a more modest 0.3%–0.7% increase for ICEV emissions (Lucas et al 2012 ).

When assessing EV emissions, average or marginal grid-emission factors are considered (Anair and Mahmassani 2012 , Traut et al 2013 , EPRI 2015 , Nealer and Hendrickson 2015 , Nealer et al 2015 , Elgowainy et al 2018 ), leading to significantly different results. Average emissions factors consider all electricity loads as equivalent, while marginal emission factors consider EVs as an additional load on top of existing electricity demands and estimate the associated incremental generation emissions. Marginal emissions could be higher or lower than average, depending on the relative emissions of marginal plants compared to the average in different regions. Different questions lead to using average or marginal metrics. Proper assessment of indirect EV emissions associated with electricity generation is complicated by numerous factors, including timescale (short or long term, aggregate or temporally explicit), system boundaries, impact of EV loads on power-system-expansion and -operation decisions, and non-trivial supply-demand synergies and allocation complexities. Yang ( 2013 ) reviews different grid-emissions-allocation methods concluding that there is no ideal approach to the allocation of emissions to specific end-use and stressing how different assumptions make it difficult to determine EV emissions and compare them to other alternatives and across studies. Nealer and Hendrickson ( 2015 ) discuss whether it is more appropriate to use marginal or average grid-emission factors to estimate EV emissions, concluding that 'average emissions may be the most accessible for long-term comparisons given the assumptions that must be made about the future of the electricity grid.'

Just as EVs offer typically a WTW-emissions reduction compared to ICEVs while shifting those emissions from the tailpipe to upstream, EVs shift costs as well. Operational (fuel and maintenance) costs of EVs are typically lower than those of ICEVs, largely because EVs are more efficient than ICEVs and have fewer moving parts. While data are still scarce, a recent Consumer Reports study estimates that maintenance and repair costs for EVs are about half over the life of the vehicle and that a typical EV owner who does most fueling at home can expect to save an average of $800 to $1000 a year on fuel costs over an equivalent ICEV (Harto 2020 ). Insideevs ( 2018 ) estimates a saving of 23% in servicing costs over the first 3 years and 60 000 miles (96 561 km). Borlaug et al ( 2020 ) estimate fuel savings between $3000 and $10 500 compared with gasoline vehicles (over a 15 year time horizon). However, vehicle capital costs for EVs are higher (principally due to the relatively high cost of EV batteries). In general, studies use a TCO metric to combine and compare initial capital costs with operational costs over a vehicle's lifetime. While some studies find that EVs are typically cost-competitive with ICEVs (Weldon et al 2018 ), others find that EVs are still more costly, even on a TCO basis (Breetz and Salon 2018 , Elgowainy et al 2018 ), or that the relative cost depends on other contextual factors, such as vehicle lifetime and use, economic assumptions, and projected fuel prices. Longer travel distance and smaller vehicle sizes favor relatively lower EV TCO (Wu et al 2015 ), as do lower relative electricity-versus-gasoline price differentials (Lévay et al 2017 ). Despite these differences regarding TCO conclusions across studies, there is general agreement that future EV costs will decline (Dumortier et al 2015 , Wu et al 2015 , Elgowainy et al 2018 ).

The existing literature suggests future EV emissions will decline, in large part due to expectations for continued grid decarbonization (Elgowainy et al 2016 , 2018 , Woo et al 2017 , Cox et al 2018 ). For example, Ambrose et al ( 2020 ) anticipate that evolution in vehicle types and designs could accelerate future decreases for EV GHG emissions. Several studies also posit repurposing used EV batteries for stationary applications could accrue additional GHG benefits (Ahmadi et al 2014 , 2017 , Olsson et al 2018 , Kamath et al 2020 ). Cox et al ( 2018 ) suggest future connectivity and automation technologies will enable energy-optimized EV-recharging behavior and associated lower carbon emissions. Similarly, future EV costs also are expected to decline as battery costs continue to decline (cf section 4 ), and new mobility modes such as ride-hailing lead to higher vehicle use that favors the business case for highly efficient EVs compared to ICEVs.

8. Synergies with other technologies, macro trends, and future expectations

Vehicle electrification fits within broader electrification trends, including power-system decarbonization and mobility changes. The latter include micro-mobility in urban areas, new mobility business models revolving around 'shared' services as opposed to vehicle ownership (e.g. ride-hailing and car-sharing), ride pooling, and automation. These trends are driven partially by the larger availability of efficient and cost-effective electrified technologies (Mai et al 2018 ) and the prospect of abundant and affordable renewable electricity and by other technological and behavioral changes (e.g. real-time communication). Abundant and affordable renewable electricity is a conditio sine qua non for EVs to provide a pathway to decarbonize road transportation. Direct use of PV on-board vehicles (i.e. PV-powered or solar vehicles) also is being considered. However, this concept still faces many challenges (Rizzo 2010 , Aghaei et al 2020 ). Yamaguchi et al ( 2020 ) show potential synergies for integration but also highlight that for this technology to be successful, the development of high-efficiency (>30%), low‐cost, and flexible PV modules is essential.

Urban micro-mobility is emerging recently as an alternative to traditional mobility modes providing consumers in most metropolitan areas worldwide with convenient options for last-mile transportation (Clewlow 2019 , Zarif et al 2019 , Tuncer and Brown 2020 ). Virtually all micro-mobility solutions use all-electric powertrains. Shared electric scooters and bikes (often dockless), e.g. those pioneered by Lime and Bird in the U.S., are experiencing rapid success and are 'the fastest-ever U.S. companies to reach billion-USD valuations, with each achieving this milestone within a year of inception' (Ajao 2019 ). Future expectations for micro-mobility remain uncertain due to issues related to sidewalk congestion, safety, and vandalism (heavily impacting the business case for these technologies). However, the nexus with EVs has not been questioned.

Similarly, ride-hailing—matching drivers with passengers at short notice for one-off rides through a smartphone application, which date back to Uber's introducing the concept in 2009—is an attractive alternative to traditional transportation solutions. These mobility-as-a-service solutions cater to the consumer's need for quick, convenient, and cost-effective transportation and may lead to drops in car-ownership and driver-licensure rates (Garikapati et al 2016 , Clewlow and Mishra 2017 , Movmi 2018 , Walmsley 2018 , Henao and Marshall 2019 , Arevalo 2020 ). After just over 10 years, ride-hailing is widely available and extremely successful, with hundreds of millions of consumers worldwide and 36% of U.S. consumers having used ride-hailing services (Mazareanu 2019 ). While most ride-hailing vehicles today are ICEVs (in line with the existing LDV stock), many ride-hailing companies are exploring electrification opportunities (Slowik et al 2019 ). EVs offer a number of potential advantages as high vehicle usage promotes a more favorable business model for recovering the higher EV purchase price by leveraging cheaper fuel costs (Borlaug et al 2020 ). At the same time, long-range vehicles and effective charging solutions are required for ride-hailing companies to transition to EVs (Tu et al 2019 ). Moreover, EVs can mitigate additional fuel use and emissions related to increased travel, mostly due to deadheading, which is estimated to be ∼85% (Henao and Marshall 2019 ). EVs also provide access to restricted areas in some cities (driving some regional goals for ride-hailing electrification). For example, Uber aims for half of its London fleet to be electric by 2021 and 100% electric by 2025 (Slowik et al 2019 ).

Automation trends are also poised to have the potential to disrupt transportation as we know it. The combination of electric and connected automated vehicles (CAVs) is hypothesized to offer natural synergies, including easier integration with CAV sensors and a greater affinity for cheaper fuels aligning with greater travel (Sperling 2018 ). The chief counterargument relates to high power requirements for a heavily instrumented CAV, which would deplete EV batteries quickly and may be accommodated better with PHEV powertrains. Wireless EV charging, both stationary and dynamic, increases the potential synergies enabling autonomous recharging. Also, CAVs may be required to maximize the efficiency of dynamic wireless charging. In fact, without the alignment accuracy enabled by CAVs, in-road dynamic charging may have limited efficacy. The literature on these synergies is relatively sparse, though some studies are beginning to investigate the implications of combining EV and CAV technologies.

Even though the technology is not widely available commercially, several studies are beginning to examine how consumer preferences may be influenced by the combination of connected, automated, and electric vehicles 15 . Thiel et al ( 2020 ), for example, highlight how full EV success may emerge as automated shared vehicles become predominant in a world where the border between public and private transport will cease to exist. Tsouros and Polydoropoulou ( 2020 ) develop a survey combining traditional attributes (e.g. car type and vehicle style) alongside future technology attributes (e.g. fuel type and degree of automation) and estimate preferences using a latent-class structural-regression approach. They find a specific class of consumers, described as technology-savvy, who have a high proclivity for both alternative-fuel vehicle technologies and higher degrees of automation. While the proportion of the population that can be classified as technology-savvy is unclear, Tsouros and Polydoropoulou ( 2020 ) provide early compelling evidence that consumers see explicit value in the combination of EVs and automation. Hardman et al ( 2019 ) provide a complementary perspective of early adopters of automated vehicles based on a survey of existing U.S. EV owners. Similar to the work of Tsouros and Polydoropoulou ( 2020 ), Hardman et al ( 2019 ) find that the type of consumers who would pursue automated vehicles have similar lifestyles, attitudes, and socio-demographic profiles as EV adopters. These include high-income consumers, with high levels of knowledge about technology features, who have positive perceptions of CAV attributes and technology in general, provided that safety concerns are resolved.

Another benefit of the combined technologies is the potential to integrate charging events better with the needs of the electricity grid. Several studies assess the combination of these technologies with new mobility services such as car-sharing systems to optimize VGI. Iacobucci et al ( 2018 ) consider a case study in Tokyo of the ability of connected, automated EVs to be dispatched to respond to both transportation demand and charging to meet demands and constraints of the electricity system. The authors observe the vehicles can take advantage of a variety of different time-of-day pricing structures—leading to a tradeoff between wait times and cost benefits from lower fuel prices. They find that the vehicles in Tokyo can supply on the order of 3.5 MW of charging flexibility per 1000 vehicles, even during times of high mobility demand. Miao et al ( 2019 ) conduct a similar study in a generic region. The authors develop an algorithm that simulates operational behavior of the connected, automated EV technology that includes trip demand and vehicle usage, vehicle relocation, and vehicle charging. Their results indicate that charging behavior is highly sensitive to different levels of charging due to the length of charging—which can affect service provision of trip demand.

The final topic of study considering synergistic opportunities between connected, automated vehicles and EVs focused on emissions benefits. Taiebat et al 2018 explore the environmental impacts of automated vehicles showing net positive environmental impacts at the local vehicle-urban levels due to improved efficiency, but acknowledge that greater vehicle utilization and shifts in travel patterns might to offset some of these benefits. Of course, EVs provide the significant benefit of eliminating tailpipe criteria-pollutant emissions, yielding significant human-health benefits. Regarding GHG emissions, two of the earliest studies on this topic examine the net effect of automation on reducing transport GHG emissions (Brown et al 2014 , Wadud et al 2016 ). Greenblatt and Saxena ( 2015 ) conduct a case-study application of connected and automated vehicles in taxi fleets and find large emissions benefits associated with electrification. They find a decrease of GHG emissions intensities ranging from 87% to 94% below comparable ICEVs in 2014 and 63% to 82% below hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) in 2030. The total emissions benefit is augmented relative to privately owned vehicles due to the higher travel intensity of taxi vehicles. Following these earlier works, additional case studies examine the hypothetical application of automated and electric fleets. These include two studies in Austin, Texas. Loeb and Kockelman ( 2019 ) examine a variety of scenarios to simulate the operation of different vehicle fleets replacing current-day transportation network companies and taxis. The primary goal of their work is to estimate costs associated with operation. They find that automated EVs are the most profitable and provide the best service among the vehicle-technology options that they examine. Gawron et al ( 2019 ) also perform a case study in Austin, Texas, but focus on the emissions benefits of electrifying an automated taxi fleet. They find that nearly 60% of emissions and energy in a base case CAV fleet can be reduced by electrifying powertrains. These improvements can be pushed up to 87% when coupled with grid decarbonization, dynamic ride-sharing, and various system- and technology-efficiency improvements. These results are consistent with a more generalized study by Stogios et al ( 2019 ), who, in a similar approach simulating fleet behavior, find that emissions from CAVs are most dramatically improved via electrification.

While EVs are a relatively new technology and automated vehicles are not widely available commercially, the implications and potential synergies of electrification and automation operating in conjunction are significant. The studies mentioned in this section are investigating a broad set of impacts when CAVs are coupled with EVs. Future research is necessary to generalize and refine many of these results. However, the potential for transformative changes to transportation emissions is clear.

8.1. Expectations for the future

EVs hold great promise to replace ICEVs for a number of on-road applications. EVs can provide a number of benefits, including addressing reliance on petroleum, improving local air quality, reducing GHG emissions, and improving driving experience. Vehicle electrification aligns with broader electrification and decarbonization trends and integrates synergistically with mobility changes, including urban micro-mobility, automation, and mobility-as-a-service solutions. The effective integration of EVs into power systems presents numerous opportunities for synergistic improvement of the efficiency and economics of electromobility and electric power systems, with EVs capable of supporting power-system planning and operations in several ways. Full exploitation of the synergies between EVs and VRE sources offers a path toward affordable and clean energy and mobility for all, as both technologies promise large-scale deployment in the future. To enable such a future continued technology progress, investments in charging infrastructure (and related building codes), consumer education, effective and secure VGI programs, and regulatory and business models supporting all aspects of vehicle electrification are all critical elements.

The coronavirus pandemic is impacting LDV sales in most countries negatively, and 2020 EV sales are expected to be lower than 2019, marking the first decline in a decade (BloombergNEF 2020 ). However, sales of ICEVs are set to drop even faster and, despite the crisis, EV sales could reach a record share of the overall LDV market in 2020 (Gul et al 2020 ). Despite these short-term setbacks, long-term prospects for EVs remain undiminished (BloombergNEF 2020 ).

Several studies project major roles for EVs in the future, which is reflected in massive investment in vehicle development and commercialization, charging infrastructure, and further technology improvement, especially in batteries and their supply chains. Consumer adoption and acceptance and technology progress form a virtuous self-reinforcing circle of technology-component improvements and cost reductions that can enable widespread adoption. Forecasting the future, including technology adoption, remains a daunting task. Nevertheless, this detailed review paints a positive picture for the future of EVs for on-road transport. The authors remain hopeful that technology, regulatory, societal, behavioral, and business-model barriers can be addressed over time to support a transition toward cleaner, more efficient, and affordable mobility solutions for all.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Paul Denholm, Elaine Hale, Trieu Mai, Caitlin, Murphy, Bryan Palmintier, and Dan Steinberg for valuable comments on figure 6 , as well as two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on the paper. This work was co-authored by National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), which is operated by Alliance for Sustainable Energy, LLC, for U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under Contract No. DE-AC36-08GO28308. No funding was received to support this work. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of DOE or the U.S. Government. The findings and conclusions in this publication are those of the authors alone and should not be construed to represent any official U.S. Government determination or policy, or the views of any of the institutions associated with this study's authors.

 EVs are defined as vehicles that are powered with an on-board battery that can be charged from an external source of electricity. This definition includes plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and battery electric vehicles (BEVs). EVs often are referred to as plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs).

 Transport electrification is confined not only to electric LDVs. Transport electrification includes a wide range of other vehicles, spanning from small vehicles that are used for urban mobility, such as three-wheelers, mopeds, kick-scooters, and e-bikes, to large urban buses and delivery vehicles. In 2019, the number of electric two-wheelers on the road exceeded 300 million and buses approached 0.6 million (IEA 2019 , Business Wire 2020 ), with new deliveries in 2019 close to 100 thousand units (EV Volumes 2020 ).

 Just over 10% of the U.S. heavy-duty truck (Class 7–8) population requires an operating range of 500 miles (805 km) or more, while nearly 80% operate within a 200 mile (322 km) range and around 70% within 100 miles (161 km). Only ∼25% of heavy truck VMT require an operating range of over 500 miles (805 km) (Borlaug et al Forthcoming ).

 As a counterargument, Tesla states that 'all new Tesla cars come standard with advanced hardware capable of providing Autopilot features today, and full self-driving capabilities in the future—through software updates designed to improve functionality over time'.

• Search Menu
• Browse content in A - General Economics and Teaching
• Browse content in A1 - General Economics
• A10 - General
• A11 - Role of Economics; Role of Economists; Market for Economists
• A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
• A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
• A14 - Sociology of Economics
• Browse content in A2 - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics
• A20 - General
• A29 - Other
• A3 - Collective Works
• Browse content in B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches
• Browse content in B0 - General
• B00 - General
• Browse content in B1 - History of Economic Thought through 1925
• B10 - General
• B11 - Preclassical (Ancient, Medieval, Mercantilist, Physiocratic)
• B12 - Classical (includes Adam Smith)
• B13 - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Stockholm School)
• B14 - Socialist; Marxist
• B15 - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
• B16 - History of Economic Thought: Quantitative and Mathematical
• B17 - International Trade and Finance
• B19 - Other
• Browse content in B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925
• B20 - General
• B21 - Microeconomics
• B22 - Macroeconomics
• B23 - Econometrics; Quantitative and Mathematical Studies
• B24 - Socialist; Marxist; Sraffian
• B25 - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian
• B26 - Financial Economics
• B27 - International Trade and Finance
• B29 - Other
• Browse content in B3 - History of Economic Thought: Individuals
• B30 - General
• B31 - Individuals
• Browse content in B4 - Economic Methodology
• B40 - General
• B41 - Economic Methodology
• B49 - Other
• Browse content in B5 - Current Heterodox Approaches
• B50 - General
• B51 - Socialist; Marxian; Sraffian
• B52 - Institutional; Evolutionary
• B53 - Austrian
• B54 - Feminist Economics
• B55 - Social Economics
• B59 - Other
• Browse content in C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
• Browse content in C0 - General
• C00 - General
• C02 - Mathematical Methods
• Browse content in C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General
• C10 - General
• C12 - Hypothesis Testing: General
• C13 - Estimation: General
• C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
• C18 - Methodological Issues: General
• C19 - Other
• Browse content in C2 - Single Equation Models; Single Variables
• C20 - General
• C21 - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions
• C22 - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes
• C23 - Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
• C25 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
• Browse content in C3 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables
• C30 - General
• C32 - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models
• C34 - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models
• C38 - Classification Methods; Cluster Analysis; Principal Components; Factor Models
• Browse content in C4 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics
• C43 - Index Numbers and Aggregation
• C44 - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
• Browse content in C5 - Econometric Modeling
• C50 - General
• Browse content in C6 - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
• C60 - General
• C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
• C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
• C63 - Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling
• C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
• C67 - Input-Output Models
• Browse content in C8 - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs
• C82 - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Macroeconomic Data; Data Access
• C89 - Other
• Browse content in C9 - Design of Experiments
• C90 - General
• C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
• C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
• C93 - Field Experiments
• Browse content in D - Microeconomics
• Browse content in D0 - General
• D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
• D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
• D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
• Browse content in D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics
• D10 - General
• D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
• D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
• D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
• D14 - Household Saving; Personal Finance
• Browse content in D2 - Production and Organizations
• D20 - General
• D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
• D22 - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
• D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
• D24 - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
• D25 - Intertemporal Firm Choice: Investment, Capacity, and Financing
• Browse content in D3 - Distribution
• D30 - General
• D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
• D33 - Factor Income Distribution
• D39 - Other
• Browse content in D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
• D40 - General
• D41 - Perfect Competition
• D42 - Monopoly
• D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
• D46 - Value Theory
• Browse content in D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
• D50 - General
• D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
• D57 - Input-Output Tables and Analysis
• D58 - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
• Browse content in D6 - Welfare Economics
• D60 - General
• D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
• D62 - Externalities
• D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
• D64 - Altruism; Philanthropy
• D69 - Other
• Browse content in D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
• D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• D72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
• D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Browse content in D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
• D80 - General
• D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
• D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• D84 - Expectations; Speculations
• D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
• D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
• D87 - Neuroeconomics
• Browse content in D9 - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
• D91 - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
• Browse content in E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
• Browse content in E0 - General
• E00 - General
• E01 - Measurement and Data on National Income and Product Accounts and Wealth; Environmental Accounts
• E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
• Browse content in E1 - General Aggregative Models
• E10 - General
• E11 - Marxian; Sraffian; Kaleckian
• E12 - Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian
• E13 - Neoclassical
• E16 - Social Accounting Matrix
• E17 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
• Browse content in E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy
• E20 - General
• E21 - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
• E22 - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
• E23 - Production
• E24 - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
• E25 - Aggregate Factor Income Distribution
• E26 - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
• E27 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
• Browse content in E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
• E30 - General
• E31 - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
• E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
• E37 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
• Browse content in E4 - Money and Interest Rates
• E40 - General
• E41 - Demand for Money
• E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
• E43 - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
• E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
• E49 - Other
• Browse content in E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
• E50 - General
• E51 - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
• E52 - Monetary Policy
• E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
• Browse content in E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
• E60 - General
• E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
• E62 - Fiscal Policy
• E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
• E64 - Incomes Policy; Price Policy
• E65 - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
• Browse content in F - International Economics
• Browse content in F0 - General
• F00 - General
• F01 - Global Outlook
• F02 - International Economic Order and Integration
• Browse content in F1 - Trade
• F10 - General
• F11 - Neoclassical Models of Trade
• F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
• F13 - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
• F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade
• F15 - Economic Integration
• F16 - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
• F17 - Trade Forecasting and Simulation
• F18 - Trade and Environment
• Browse content in F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business
• F20 - General
• F21 - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
• F22 - International Migration
• F23 - Multinational Firms; International Business
• Browse content in F3 - International Finance
• F30 - General
• F31 - Foreign Exchange
• F32 - Current Account Adjustment; Short-Term Capital Movements
• F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
• F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems
• F35 - Foreign Aid
• F36 - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
• F37 - International Finance Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
• F39 - Other
• Browse content in F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
• F40 - General
• F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics
• F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
• F43 - Economic Growth of Open Economies
• F44 - International Business Cycles
• F45 - Macroeconomic Issues of Monetary Unions
• F47 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
• Browse content in F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
• F50 - General
• F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
• F53 - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
• F54 - Colonialism; Imperialism; Postcolonialism
• F55 - International Institutional Arrangements
• F59 - Other
• Browse content in F6 - Economic Impacts of Globalization
• F60 - General
• F61 - Microeconomic Impacts
• F62 - Macroeconomic Impacts
• F63 - Economic Development
• F64 - Environment
• F65 - Finance
• Browse content in G - Financial Economics
• Browse content in G0 - General
• G00 - General
• G01 - Financial Crises
• Browse content in G1 - General Financial Markets
• G10 - General
• G11 - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
• G12 - Asset Pricing; Trading volume; Bond Interest Rates
• G13 - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
• G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
• G15 - International Financial Markets
• G18 - Government Policy and Regulation
• G19 - Other
• Browse content in G2 - Financial Institutions and Services
• G20 - General
• G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
• G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
• G23 - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
• G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
• G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
• Browse content in G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
• G30 - General
• G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
• G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
• G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
• G35 - Payout Policy
• G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
• Browse content in G5 - Household Finance
• G51 - Household Saving, Borrowing, Debt, and Wealth
• Browse content in H - Public Economics
• Browse content in H1 - Structure and Scope of Government
• H10 - General
• H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
• H12 - Crisis Management
• Browse content in H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
• H20 - General
• H22 - Incidence
• H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
• H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies
• H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
• Browse content in H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
• Browse content in H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
• H40 - General
• H41 - Public Goods
• Browse content in H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
• H50 - General
• H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
• H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
• H56 - National Security and War
• Browse content in H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
• H60 - General
• H62 - Deficit; Surplus
• H63 - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
• H68 - Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt
• Browse content in H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
• H70 - General
• H74 - State and Local Borrowing
• H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
• Browse content in I - Health, Education, and Welfare
• Browse content in I0 - General
• I00 - General
• Browse content in I1 - Health
• I10 - General
• I12 - Health Behavior
• I14 - Health and Inequality
• I15 - Health and Economic Development
• Browse content in I2 - Education and Research Institutions
• I20 - General
• I21 - Analysis of Education
• I23 - Higher Education; Research Institutions
• I24 - Education and Inequality
• I26 - Returns to Education
• Browse content in I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
• I30 - General
• I31 - General Welfare
• I32 - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
• I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
• Browse content in J - Labor and Demographic Economics
• Browse content in J0 - General
• J00 - General
• J01 - Labor Economics: General
• J08 - Labor Economics Policies
• Browse content in J1 - Demographic Economics
• J10 - General
• J13 - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
• J15 - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
• J16 - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
• J18 - Public Policy
• Browse content in J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor
• J20 - General
• J21 - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
• J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
• J23 - Labor Demand
• J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
• J26 - Retirement; Retirement Policies
• J28 - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
• J29 - Other
• Browse content in J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
• J30 - General
• J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
• J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
• J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
• J38 - Public Policy
• Browse content in J4 - Particular Labor Markets
• J40 - General
• J41 - Labor Contracts
• J42 - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
• J44 - Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing
• J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets
• J46 - Informal Labor Markets
• J48 - Public Policy
• J49 - Other
• Browse content in J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
• J50 - General
• J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
• J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
• J53 - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
• J54 - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms; Employee Ownership
• J58 - Public Policy
• Browse content in J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers
• J60 - General
• J61 - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
• J62 - Job, Occupational, and Intergenerational Mobility
• J63 - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
• J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
• J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
• J68 - Public Policy
• J69 - Other
• Browse content in J7 - Labor Discrimination
• J71 - Discrimination
• J78 - Public Policy
• Browse content in J8 - Labor Standards: National and International
• J80 - General
• J81 - Working Conditions
• J83 - Workers' Rights
• J88 - Public Policy
• Browse content in K - Law and Economics
• Browse content in K0 - General
• K00 - General
• Browse content in K1 - Basic Areas of Law
• K11 - Property Law
• K12 - Contract Law
• K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
• Browse content in K2 - Regulation and Business Law
• K20 - General
• K21 - Antitrust Law
• K22 - Business and Securities Law
• K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
• K25 - Real Estate Law
• Browse content in K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law
• K31 - Labor Law
• K39 - Other
• Browse content in K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
• K40 - General
• K41 - Litigation Process
• K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Browse content in L - Industrial Organization
• Browse content in L0 - General
• L00 - General
• Browse content in L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
• L10 - General
• L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
• L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
• L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
• L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change; Industrial Price Indices
• Browse content in L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
• L20 - General
• L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
• L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
• L23 - Organization of Production
• L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
• L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
• L26 - Entrepreneurship
• L29 - Other
• Browse content in L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
• L30 - General
• L31 - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
• L32 - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
• L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
• L39 - Other
• Browse content in L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
• L40 - General
• L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
• Browse content in L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy
• L50 - General
• L52 - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
• Browse content in L6 - Industry Studies: Manufacturing
• L60 - General
• L61 - Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics
• L66 - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco; Wine and Spirits
• L67 - Other Consumer Nondurables: Clothing, Textiles, Shoes, and Leather Goods; Household Goods; Sports Equipment
• Browse content in L7 - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction
• L78 - Government Policy
• Browse content in L8 - Industry Studies: Services
• L80 - General
• L82 - Entertainment; Media
• Browse content in L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
• L97 - Utilities: General
• L98 - Government Policy
• Browse content in M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics
• Browse content in M0 - General
• M00 - General
• Browse content in M1 - Business Administration
• M10 - General
• M12 - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
• M13 - New Firms; Startups
• M16 - International Business Administration
• Browse content in M2 - Business Economics
• M21 - Business Economics
• Browse content in M3 - Marketing and Advertising
• M37 - Advertising
• Browse content in M4 - Accounting and Auditing
• M41 - Accounting
• M49 - Other
• Browse content in M5 - Personnel Economics
• M51 - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
• M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• M54 - Labor Management
• M55 - Labor Contracting Devices
• Browse content in N - Economic History
• Browse content in N0 - General
• N00 - General
• N01 - Development of the Discipline: Historiographical; Sources and Methods
• Browse content in N1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations
• N10 - General, International, or Comparative
• N11 - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
• N12 - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
• N13 - Europe: Pre-1913
• N14 - Europe: 1913-
• N15 - Asia including Middle East
• N17 - Africa; Oceania
• Browse content in N2 - Financial Markets and Institutions
• N20 - General, International, or Comparative
• N23 - Europe: Pre-1913
• N24 - Europe: 1913-
• N25 - Asia including Middle East
• N26 - Latin America; Caribbean
• Browse content in N3 - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy
• N30 - General, International, or Comparative
• N32 - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
• N34 - Europe: 1913-
• Browse content in N4 - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
• N43 - Europe: Pre-1913
• Browse content in N5 - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment, and Extractive Industries
• N50 - General, International, or Comparative
• N51 - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
• N52 - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
• N55 - Asia including Middle East
• N7 - Transport, Trade, Energy, Technology, and Other Services
• Browse content in N8 - Micro-Business History
• N80 - General, International, or Comparative
• Browse content in O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth
• Browse content in O1 - Economic Development
• O10 - General
• O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
• O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
• O13 - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
• O14 - Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology
• O15 - Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
• O16 - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
• O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
• O18 - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
• O19 - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
• Browse content in O2 - Development Planning and Policy
• O20 - General
• O23 - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
• O24 - Trade Policy; Factor Movement Policy; Foreign Exchange Policy
• O25 - Industrial Policy
• Browse content in O3 - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
• O30 - General
• O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
• O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
• O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
• O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
• O35 - Social Innovation
• O38 - Government Policy
• O39 - Other
• Browse content in O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity
• O40 - General
• O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
• O43 - Institutions and Growth
• O44 - Environment and Growth
• O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
• Browse content in O5 - Economywide Country Studies
• O50 - General
• O51 - U.S.; Canada
• O52 - Europe
• O53 - Asia including Middle East
• O54 - Latin America; Caribbean
• O55 - Africa
• Browse content in P - Economic Systems
• Browse content in P0 - General
• P00 - General
• Browse content in P1 - Capitalist Systems
• P10 - General
• P11 - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
• P12 - Capitalist Enterprises
• P13 - Cooperative Enterprises
• P14 - Property Rights
• P16 - Political Economy
• P17 - Performance and Prospects
• Browse content in P2 - Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies
• P20 - General
• P21 - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
• P25 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
• Browse content in P3 - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
• P30 - General
• P31 - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
• P32 - Collectives; Communes; Agriculture
• P35 - Public Economics
• P36 - Consumer Economics; Health; Education and Training; Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
• P37 - Legal Institutions; Illegal Behavior
• Browse content in P4 - Other Economic Systems
• P40 - General
• P41 - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
• P46 - Consumer Economics; Health; Education and Training; Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
• P48 - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
• Browse content in P5 - Comparative Economic Systems
• P50 - General
• P51 - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
• P52 - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies
• Browse content in Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics
• Browse content in Q0 - General
• Q00 - General
• Q01 - Sustainable Development
• Browse content in Q1 - Agriculture
• Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
• Q18 - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
• Browse content in Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
• Q30 - General
• Browse content in Q4 - Energy
• Q41 - Demand and Supply; Prices
• Q42 - Alternative Energy Sources
• Q48 - Government Policy
• Browse content in Q5 - Environmental Economics
• Q50 - General
• Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters; Global Warming
• Q56 - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
• Q57 - Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services; Biodiversity Conservation; Bioeconomics; Industrial Ecology
• Browse content in R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics
• Browse content in R0 - General
• R00 - General
• Browse content in R1 - General Regional Economics
• R10 - General
• R11 - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes
• R12 - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity
• R15 - Econometric and Input-Output Models; Other Models
• Browse content in R2 - Household Analysis
• R20 - General
• Browse content in R3 - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location
• R30 - General
• R31 - Housing Supply and Markets
• R4 - Transportation Economics
• Browse content in R5 - Regional Government Analysis
• R51 - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
• R58 - Regional Development Planning and Policy
• Browse content in Y - Miscellaneous Categories
• Browse content in Y1 - Data: Tables and Charts
• Y10 - Data: Tables and Charts
• Browse content in Y3 - Book Reviews (unclassified)
• Y30 - Book Reviews (unclassified)
• Browse content in Y8 - Related Disciplines
• Y80 - Related Disciplines
• Browse content in Z - Other Special Topics
• Browse content in Z0 - General
• Z00 - General
• Browse content in Z1 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology
• Z10 - General
• Z11 - Economics of the Arts and Literature
• Z12 - Religion
• Z13 - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
• Z18 - Public Policy
• Browse content in Z2 - Sports Economics
• Z29 - Other
• Advance articles
• Editor's Choice
• Author Guidelines
• Submission Site
• Open Access
• About Cambridge Journal of Economics
• About the Cambridge Political Economy Society
• Editorial Board
• Advertising and Corporate Services
• Self-Archiving Policy
• Dispatch Dates
• Terms and Conditions
• Journals on Oxford Academic
• Books on Oxford Academic

Article Contents

1. introduction, 2. paris purposes and the future we made, 3. the problem of unmaking, 4. conclusion: unmaking and is paris possible, conflict of interest statement, bibliography.

• < Previous

Electric vehicles: the future we made and the problem of unmaking it

• Article contents
• Figures & tables
• Supplementary Data

Jamie Morgan, Electric vehicles: the future we made and the problem of unmaking it, Cambridge Journal of Economics , Volume 44, Issue 4, July 2020, Pages 953–977, https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/beaa022

• Permissions Icon Permissions

The uptake of battery electric vehicles (BEVs), subject to bottlenecks, seems to have reached a tipping point in the UK and this mirrors a general trend globally. BEVs are being positioned as one significant strand in the web of policy intended to translate the good intentions of Article 2 of the Conference of the Parties 21 Paris Agreement into reality. Governments and municipalities are anticipating that a widespread shift to BEVs will significantly reduce transport-related carbon emissions and, therefore, augment their nationally determined contributions to emissions reduction within the Paris Agreement. However, matters are more complicated than they may appear. There is a difference between thinking we can just keep relying on human ingenuity to solve problems after they emerge and engaging in fundamental social redesign to prevent the trajectories of harm. BEVs illustrate this. The contribution to emissions reduction per vehicle unit may be less than the public initially perceive since the important issue here is the lifecycle of the BEV and this is in no sense zero-emission. Furthermore, even though one can make the case that BEVs are a superior alternative to the fossil fuel-powered internal combustion engine, the transition to BEVs may actually facilitate exceeding the carbon budget on which the Paris Agreement ultimately rests. Whether in fact it does depends on the nature of the policy that shapes the transition. If the transition is a form of substitution that conforms to rather than shifts against current global scales and trends in private transportation, then it is highly likely that BEVs will be a successful failure. For this not to be the case, then the transition to BEVs must be coordinated with a transformation of the current scales and trends in private transportation. That is, a significant reduction in dependence on and individual ownership of powered vehicles, a radical reimagining of the nature of private conveyance and of public transportation.

According to the UK Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT), the Tesla Model 3 sold 2,685 units in December 2019, making it the 9th best-selling car in the country in that month (by new registrations; in August, a typically slow month for sales, it had been 3rd with 2,082 units sold; Lea, 2019; SMMT, 2019 ). As of early 2020, battery electric vehicles (BEVs) such as the new Hyundai Electric Kona had a two-year waiting list for delivery and the Kia e-Niro a one-year wait. The uptake of electric vehicles, subject to bottlenecks, seems to have reached a tipping point in the UK and this transcends the popularity of any given model. This possible tipping point mirrors a general trend globally (however, see later for quite what this means). At the regional, national and municipal scale, public health and environmentally informed legislation are encouraging vehicle manufacturers to invest heavily in alternative fuel vehicles and, in particular, BEVs and plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEVs), which are jointly categorised within ‘ultra-low emission vehicles’ (ULEVs). 1 According to a report by Deloitte, more than 20 major cities worldwide announced plans in 2017–18 to ban petrol and diesel cars by 2030 or sooner ( Deloitte, 2018 , p. 5). All the major manufacturers have or are launching BEV models, and so vehicles are becoming available across the status and income spectrum that has in the past determined market segmentation. According to the consultancy Frost & Sullivan (2019) , there were 207 models (143 BEVs, 64 PHEVs) available globally in 2018 compared with 165 in 2017.

In 2018, the UK government published its Road to Zero policy commitment and introduced the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 , which empowers future governments to regulate regarding the required infrastructure. Road to Zero announced an ‘expectation’ that between 50% and 70% of new cars and vans will be electric by 2030 and the intention to ‘end the sale of new conventional petrol and diesel cars and vans by 2040’, with the ‘ambition’ that by 2050 almost all vehicles on the road will be ‘zero-emission’ at the point of use ( Department for Transport, 2018 ). Progress towards these goals was to be reviewed 2025. 2 However, on 4 February 2020, Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced that in the run-up to Conference of the Parties (COP)26 in Glasgow (now postponed), Britain would bring forward its 2040 goal to 2035. The UK is a member of the Clean Energy Ministerial Campaign (CEM), which launched the EV30@30 initiative in 2017, and its Road to Zero policy commitments broadly align with those of many European countries. 3 Norway has longstanding generous incentives for BEVs ( Holtsmark and Skonhoft, 2014 ) and 31% of all cars sold in 2018 and just under 50% in the first half of 2019 in Norway were BEVs. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), Norway is the per capita global leader in electric vehicle uptake ( IEA, 2019A ). 4

BEVs, then, are being positioned as one significant strand in the web of policy intended to translate the good intentions of Article 2 of the COP 21 Paris Agreement into reality (see Morgan, 2016 ; IEA, 2019A , pp. 11–2). Clearly, governments and municipalities are anticipating that a widespread shift to electric vehicles will significantly reduce transport-related carbon emissions and, therefore, augment their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to emissions reduction within the Paris Agreement. And, since the BEV trend is global, the impacts potentially also apply to countries whose relation to Paris is more problematic, including the USA (for Trump and his context, see Gills et al. , 2019 ). However, matters are more complicated than they may appear. Clearly, innovation and technological change are important components in our response to the challenge of climate change. However, there is a difference between thinking we can just keep relying on human ingenuity to solve problems after they emerge and engaging in fundamental social redesign to prevent the trajectories of harm. BEVs illustrate this. In what follows we explore the issues.

The aim of this paper, then, is to argue that it is a mistake to claim, assert or assume that BEVs are necessarily a panacea for the emissions problem. To do so would be an instance of what ecological economists refer to as ‘technocentrism’, as though simply substituting BEVs for existing internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles was sufficient. The literature on this is, of course, vast, if one consults specialist journals or recent monographs (e.g. Chapman, 2007 ; Bailey and Wilson, 2009 ; Williamson et al. , 2018 ), but remains relatively under-explored in general political economy circles at a time of ‘Climate Emergency’, and so warrants discussion in introductory and indicative fashion, setting out, however incompletely, the range of issues at stake. To be clear, the very fact that there is a range is itself important. BEVs are technology, technologies have social contexts and social contexts include systemic features and related attitudes and behaviours. Technocentrism distracts from appropriate recognition of this. At its worse, technocentrism fails to address and so works to reproduce a counter-productive ecological modernisation: the technological focus facilitates socio-economic trends, which are part of the broader problem rather than solutions to it. In the case of BEVs, key areas to consider and points to make include:

Transport is now one of, if not, the major source of carbon emissions in the UK and in many other countries. Transport emissions stubbornly resist reduction. The UK, like many other countries, exhibits contradictory trends and policy claims regarding future carbon emissions reductions. As such, it is an error to simply assume prior emissions reduction trends will necessarily continue into the future, and the new net-zero goal highlights the short time line and urgency of the problem.

Whilst BEVs are, from an emissions point of view, a superior technology to ICE vehicles, this is less than an ordinary member of the public might think. ‘Embodied emissions’, ‘energy mix’ and ‘life cycle’ analysis all matter.

There is a difference between ‘superior technology’ and ‘superior choice’, the latter must also take account of the scale of and general trend growth in vehicle ownership and use. It is this that creates a meaningful context for what substitution can be reasonably expected to achieve.

A 1:1 substitution of BEVs for ICE vehicles and general growth in the number of vehicles potentially violates the Precautionary Principle. It creates a problem that did not need to exist, e.g. since there is net growth, it involves ‘emission reductions’ within new emissions sources and this is reckless. Inter alia , a host of fallacies and other risks inherent to the socio-economy of BEVs and resource extraction/dependence also apply.

As such, it makes more sense to resist rather than facilitate techno-political lock-in or path-dependence on private transportation and instead to coordinate any transition to BEVs with a more fundamental social redesign of public transport and transport options.

This systematic statement should be kept in mind whilst reading the following. Cumulatively, the points stated facilitate appropriate consideration of the question: What kind of solution are BEVs to what kind of problem? And we return to this in the conclusion. It is also worth bearing in mind, though it is not core to the explicit argument pursued, that an economy is a complex evolving open system and economics has not only struggled to adequately address this in general, it has particularly done so in terms of ecological issues (for relevant critique, see especially the work of Clive Spash and collected, Fullbrook and Morgan, 2019 ). 5 Since we assume limited prior knowledge on the part of the reader, we begin by briefly setting out the road to the current carbon budget problem.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was created in 1992. Article 2 of the Convention states its goal as, the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ ( UNFCCC, 1992 , p. 4; Gills and Morgan, 2019 ). Emissions are cumulative because emitted CO 2 can stay in the atmosphere for well over one hundred years (other greenhouse gases [GHGs] tend to be of shorter duration). Our climate future is made now. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) collates existent models to produce a forecast range and has typically used atmospheric CO 2 of 450 ppm as a level likely to trigger a 2°C average warming. This has translated into a ‘carbon budget’ restricting total cumulative emissions to the lower end of 3,000+ Gigatonnes of CO 2 (GtCO 2 ). In the last few years, climate scientists have begun to argue that positive feedback loops with adverse warming and other climatological and ecological effects may be underestimated in prior models (see Hansen et al. , 2017 ; Steffen et al. , 2018 ). Such concerns are one reason why Article 2 of the UNFCCC COP 21 Paris Agreement included a goal of at least trying to do better than the 2°C target—restricting warming to 1.5°C. This further restricts the available carbon budget. However, current Paris Agreement country commitments stated as NDCs look set to exceed the 3,000+ target in a matter of a few short years ( UNFCCC, 2015 ; Morgan, 2016 , 2017 ).

Since the industrial revolution began, we have already produced more than 2,000 GtCO 2 . Total annual emissions have increased rather than decreased over the period in which the problem has been recognised. The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) publishes periodic ‘emissions gap’ reports. Its recent 10-year summary report notes that emissions grew at an average 1.6% per year from 2008 to 2017 and ‘show no signs of peaking’ ( Christensen and Olhoff, 2019 , p. 3). In 2018, the 9th Report stated that annual emissions in 2017 stood at a record of 53.5 Gigatonnes of CO 2 and equivalents (GtCO 2e ) ( UNEP, 2018 , p. xv). This compares to less than 25 GtCO 2 in 2000 and far exceeds on a global basis the level in the Kyoto Protocol benchmark year of 1990. According to the 9th Emissions Gap Report, 184 parties to the Paris Agreement had so far provided NDCs. If these NDCs are achieved, annual emissions in 2030 are projected to still be 53 GtCO 2e . However, if the current ‘implementation deficit’ continues global annual emissions could increase by about 10% to 59 GtCO 2e . This is because current emissions policy is not sufficient to offset the ‘key drivers’ of ‘economic growth and population growth’ ( Christensen and Olhoff, 2019 , p. 3). By sharp contrast, the IPCC Global Warming of 1.5 ° C report states that annual global emissions must fall by 45% from the 2017 figure by 2030 and become net zero by mid-century in order to achieve the Paris target ( IPCC, 2018 ). According to the subsequent 10th Emissions Gap Report, emissions increased yet again to 55.3 GtCO 2e in 2018 and, as a result of this adverse trend, emissions need to fall by 7.6% per year from 2020 to 2030 to achieve the IPCC goal, and this contrasts with less than 4% had reductions begun in 2010 and 15% if they are delayed until 2025 ( UNEP 2019A ). Current emissions trends mean that we will achieve an additional 500 GtCO 2 quickly and imply an average warming of 3 to 4°C over the rest of the century and into the next. We are thus on track for the ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ that the COP process is intended to prevent ( UNFCCC, 1992 , p. 4). According to the 10th Emissions Gap Report, 78% of all emissions derive from the G-20 nations, and whilst many countries had recognised the need for net zero, only 5 countries of the G-20 had committed to this and none had yet submitted formal strategies. COP 25, December 2019, meanwhile, resulted in no overall progress other than on measurement and finance (for detailed analysis, see Newell and Taylor, 2020 ). As such, the situation is urgent and becoming more so.

Problems, moreover, have already begun to manifest ( UNEP 2019B , 2019B ; IPCC 2019A , 2019B ). Climate change does not respect borders, some countries may be more adversely affected sooner than others, but there is no reason to assume that cumulative effects will be localised. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that they will be manageable based on our current designs for life. In November 2019, several prominent systems and climate scientists published a survey essay in Nature highlighting nine critical climate tipping points that we are either imminently approaching or may have already exceeded ( Lenton et al. , 2018 ). In that same month, more than 11,250 scientists from 153 countries (the Alliance of World Scientists) signed a letter published in BioScience concurring that we now face a genuine existential ‘Climate Emergency’ and warning of ‘ecocide’ if ‘major transformations’ are not forthcoming ( Ripple et al. , 2019 ). We live in incredibly complex interconnected societies based on long supply chains and just in time delivery–few of us (including nations) are self-sufficient. Global human civilisation is extremely vulnerable and the carbon emission problem is only one of several conjoint problems created by our expansionary industrialised-consumption system. Appropriate and timely policy solutions are, therefore, imperative. Cambridge now has a Centre for the Study of Existential Risk and Oxford a Future of Humanity Institute (see also Servigne and Stevens, 2015 ). This is serious research, not millenarian cultishness. The Covid-19 outbreak only serves to underscore the fragility of our systems. As Michael Marmot, Professor of epidemiology has commented, the outbreak reveals not only how political decisions can make systems more vulnerable, but also how governments can, when sufficiently motivated, take immediate and radical action (Harvey, 2020). To reiterate, however, according to both the IPCC and UNEP, emissions must fall drastically. 6

Policy design and implementation are mainly national (domestic). As such, an initial focus on the UK provides a useful point of departure to contextualise what the transition to BEVs might be expected to achieve.

The UK is a Kyoto and Paris signatory. It is a member of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The UK Climate Change Act 2008 was the world’s first long-term legally binding national framework for targeted statutory reductions in emissions. The Act required the UK to reduce its emissions by at least 80% by 2050 (below the 1990 baseline; this has been broadly in line with subsequent EU policy on the subject). 7 The Act put in place a system of five yearly ‘carbon budgets’ to keep the UK on an emissions reduction pathway to 2050. The subsequent carbon budgets have been produced with input from the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), an independent body created by the 2008 Act to advise the government. In November 2015, the CCC recommended a target of 57% below 1990 levels by the early 2030s (the fifth carbon budget). 8 Following the Paris Agreement’s new target of 1.5°C and the IPCC and UNEP reports late 2018, the CCC published the report Net Zero: The UK’s contribution to stopping global warming ( CCC, 2019 ). 9 The CCC report recognises that Paris creates additional responsibility for the UK to augment and accelerate its targets within the new bottom-up Paris NDC procedure. The CCC recommended an enhanced UK net-zero GHG emissions target (formally defined in terms of long-term and short-term GHGs) by 2050. This included emissions from aviation and shipping and with no use of strategies that offset or swap real emissions. In June 2019, Theresa May, then UK Prime Minister, committed to adopt the recommendation using secondary legislation (absorbed into the 2008 Act—but without the offset commitment). So, the UK is one of the few G-20 countries to, so far, provide a formal commitment on net zero, though as the UNEP notes, a commitment is not itself necessarily indicative of a realisable strategy. The CCC responded to the government announcement:

This is just the first step. The target must now be reinforced by credible UK policies, across government, inspiring a strong response from business, industry and society as a whole. The government has not yet moved formally to include international aviation and shipping within the target , but they have acknowledged that these sectors must be part of the whole economy strategy for net zero. We will assist by providing further analysis of how emissions reductions can be delivered in these sectors through domestic and international frameworks. 10

The development of policy is currently in flux during the Covid-19 lockdown and whilst Brexit reaches some kind of resolution. As noted in the Introduction section, however, May’s replacement, Boris Johnson has signalled his government’s commitment to achieving its statutory commitments. However, this has been met with some scepticism, not least because it has not been clear what new powers administrative bodies would have and over and above this many of the Cabinet are from the far right of the Conservative Party, and are on record as climate change sceptics or have a voting record of opposing environmentally focussed investment, taxes, subsidies and prohibitions (including the new Environment Secretary, George Eustice, formerly of UKIP). The policy may and hopefully will change, becoming more concrete, but it is still instructive to assess context and general trends.

The UK has one of the best records in the world on reducing emissions. However, given full context, this is not necessarily a cause for congratulation or confidence. It would be a mistake to think that emissions reduction exhibits a definite rate that can be projected from the past into the future. 11 This applies both nationally and globally. Some sources of relative reduction that are local or national have different significance on a global basis (they are partial transfers) and overall the closer one approaches net zero the more resistant or difficult it is likely to become to achieve reductions. The CCC has already begun to signal that the UK is now failing to meet its existent budgets. This follows periods of successive emissions reductions. According to the CCC, the UK has reduced its GHG emissions by approximately one-third since 1990. ‘Per capita emissions are now close to the global average at 7–8 tCO 2 e/person, having been over 50% above in 2008’ ( CCC, 2019 , p. 46). Other analyses are even more positive. According to Carbon Brief, emissions have fallen in seven consecutive years from 2013 to 2019 and by 40% compared with the 1990 benchmark. Carbon Brief claim that since 2010 the UK has the fastest rate of emissions reduction of any major economy. However, it concurs with the CCC that future likely reductions are less than the UK’s carbon budgets and that the new net-zero commitment requires: amounting to only an additional 10% reduction over the next decade to 2030. 12

Moreover, all analyses agree that the reduction has mainly been achieved by reducing coal output for use in electricity generation (switching to natural gas) and by relative deindustrialisation as the UK economy has continued to grow—manufacturing is a smaller part of a larger service-based economy. 13 And , the data are based on a production focussed accounting system. The accounting system does not include all emissions sources. It does not include those that the UK ‘imports’ based on consumption. UK consumption-based emissions per year are estimated to be about 70% greater than the production measure (for different methods, see DECC, 2015 ). 14 If consumption is included, the main estimates for falling emissions change to around a 10% reduction since 1990. Moreover, much of this has been achieved by relatively invisible historic transitions as the economy has evolved in lock-step with globalisation. That is, reductions have been ones that did not require the population to confront behaviours as they have developed. No onerous interventions have been imposed, as yet . 15 However, it does not follow that this can continue, since future reductions are likely to be more challenging. The UK cannot deindustrialise again (nor can the global economy, as is, simply deindustrialise in aggregate if final consumption remains the primary goal), and the UK has already mainly switched from coal energy production. Emissions from electricity generation may fall but it also matters what the electricity is being used to power. In any case, future emissions reductions, in general, require more effective changes in other sectors, and this necessarily seems to require everyone to question their socio-economic practices. Transport is a key issue.

As a ‘satellite’ of its National Accounts, the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) publishes Environmental Accounts and these data are used to measure progress. Much of the data refer to the prior year or earlier. In 2017, UK GHG emissions were reported to be 566 million tonnes CO 2 e (2% less than 2016 and, as already noted about one-third of the 1990 level; ONS, 2019 ). The headline accounts break this down into four categories (for which further subdivisions are produced by various sources) and we can usefully contrast 1990 and recent data ( ONS, 2019 , p. 4):

The Environmental Accounts’ figures indicate some shifting in the relative sources of emissions over the last 30 years. As we have intimated, electricity generation and manufacturing have experienced reduced emissions, though they are far from zero; household and transport, meanwhile, have remained stubbornly high. Moreover, the accounts are also slightly misleading for the uninitiated, since transport refers to the industry and not all transport. Domestic car ownership and use are part of the household sector, and it is the continued dependence on car ownership that provides, along with heating and insulation issues, one of the major sources of the persistently high level of household emissions. The UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (DBEIS) provides differently organised statistics and attributes cars to its transport category and uses a subsequent residential category rather than household category. The Department’s statistical release in 2018 thus attributes a higher 140 MtCO 2 e to transport for 2016, whilst the residential category is a correspondingly lower figure of approximately 106 MtCO 2 e. The 140 MtCO 2 e is just slightly less than the equivalent figure for 1990, although transport achieved a peak of about 156 MtCO 2 e in 2005 ( DBEIS, 2018 , pp. 8–9). As of 2016, transport becomes the largest source of emissions based on DBEIS data (exceeding energy supply) whilst households become the largest in the Environmental Accounts. In any case, looking across both sets of accounts, the important point here is that since 1990 transport as a source of emissions has remained stubbornly high. Transport emissions have been rising as an industrial sector in the Environmental Accounts or relatively consistent and recently rising in its total contribution in the DBEIS data. The CCC Net Zero report draws particular attention to this. Drawing on the DBEIS data, it states that ‘Transport is now the largest source of UK GHG emissions (23% of the total) and saw emissions rise from 2013 to 2017’ ( CCC, 2019 , p. 48). More generally, the report states that despite some progress in terms of the UK carbon budgets, ‘policy success and progress in reducing emissions has been far from universal’ ( CCC, 2019 , p. 48). The report recommends ( CCC, 2019 , pp. 23–6, 34):

A fourfold increase by 2050 in low carbon (renewables) electricity

Developing energy storage (to enhance the use of renewables such as wind)

Energy-efficient buildings and a shift from gas central heating and cooking

Halting the accumulation of biodegradable waste in landfills

Developing carbon capture technology

Reducing agricultural emissions (mainly dairy but also fertiliser use)

Encouraging low or no meat diets

Land management to increase carbon retention/absorption

Rapid transition to electric vehicles and public transport

As we noted in the Introduction section, the UK Department for Transport Road To Zero document stated a goal of ending the sale of conventional diesel- and petrol-powered ICE vehicles by 2040. The CCC suggested improving on this:

Electric vehicles. By 2035 at the latest all new cars and vans should be electric (or use a low-carbon alternative such as hydrogen). If possible, an earlier switchover (e.g. 2030) would be desirable, reducing costs for motorists and improving air quality. This could help position the UK to take advantage of shifts in global markets. The Government must continue to support strengthening of the charging infrastructure, including for drivers without access to off-street parking. ( CCC, 2019 , p. 34)

The UK government’s response to these and other similar suggestions has been to bring the target date forward to 2035 and to propose that the prohibition will also apply to hybrids. However, the whole is set to go out to consultation and no detail has so far (early 2020) been forthcoming. In its 11 March 2020 Budget, the government also committed £1 billion to ‘green transport solutions’, including £500 million to support the rollout of the electric vehicle charging infrastructure, whilst extending the current grant/subsidy scheme for new electric vehicles (albeit at a reduced rate of £3000 from £3500 per new registration). It has also signalled that it may tighten the timeline for sales prohibition further to 2030. 16 As a policy, much of this is, ostensibly at least, positive, but there is a range of issues that need to be considered regarding what is being achieved. The context of transition matters and this may transcend the specifics of current policy.

3.1 BEV transition: life cycles?

The CCC is confident that a transition to electric vehicles can be a constructive contribution to achieving net-zero emissions by mid-century. However, the point is not unequivocal. The previously quoted CCC communique following the UK government’s commitment to implement Net Zero uses the phrase ‘credible UK policies, across government, inspiring a strong response from business, industry and society as a whole’, and the CCC report places an emphasis on BEVs and a transition to public transport. The relative dependence between these two matters (and see Conclusion). BEVs are potentially (almost) zero emissions in use. But they are not zero emissions in practice. Given this, then the substitution of BEVs for current carbon-powered ICEs is potentially problematic, depending on trends in ownership of and use of powered vehicles (private transportation). These points will become clearer as we proceed.

BEVs are not zero emission in context and based on the life cycle. This is for two basic reasons. First, a BEV is a powered vehicle and so the source of power can be from carbon-based energy supply sources (and this varies with the ‘energy mix’ of electricity production in different countries; IEA, 2019A , p. 8). Second, each new vehicle is a material product. Each vehicle is made of metals, plastics, rubber and so forth. Just the cabling in a car can be 60 kg of metals. All the materials must be mined and processed, or synthesised, the parts must be manufactured, transported and assembled, transported again for sale and then delivered. For example, according to the SMMT in 2016, only 12% of cars sold in the UK were built in the UK and 80% of those built in the UK were exported in that year. Some components (such as a steering column) enter and exit the UK multiple times whilst being built and modified and before final assembly. Vehicle manufacture is a global business in terms of procuring materials and a mainly regional (in the international sense) business in terms of component manufacture for assembly and final sales. Power is used throughout this process and many miles are travelled. Moreover, each vehicle must be maintained and serviced thereafter, which compounds this utilisation of resources. BEVs are a subcategory of vehicles and production locations are currently more concentrated than for vehicles in general (Tesla being the extreme). 17 In any case, producing a BEV is an economic activity and it is not environmentally costless. As Georgescu-Roegen (1971) noted long ago and ecologically minded economists continue to highlight (see Spash, 2017 ; Holt et al. , 2009 ), production cannot evade thermodynamic consequences. In terms of BEVs, the primary focus of analysis in this second sense of manufacturing as a source of contributory emissions has been the carbon emissions resulting from battery production. Based on current technology, batteries are heavy (a significant proportion of the weight of the final vehicle) and energy intensive to produce.

Comparative estimates regarding the relative life cycle emissions of BEVs with equivalent fossil fuel-powered vehicles are not new. 18 Over the last decade, the number of life cycle studies has steadily risen as the interest in and uptake of BEVs have increased. Clearly, there is great scope for variation in findings, since the energy mix for electricity supply varies by country and the assumptions applied to manufacturing can vary between studies. At the same time, the general trend over the last decade has been for the energy mix in many countries to include more renewables and for manufacturing to become more energy efficient. This is partly reflected in metrics based on emissions per $GDP, which in conjunction with relative expansion in service sectors are used to establish ‘relative decoupling’. So, given that both the energy mix of power production and the emissions derived from production can improve, then one might expect a general trend of improved emissions claims for BEVs in recent years and this seems to be the case.

For example, if we go back to 2010, the UK Royal Academy of Engineering found that technology would likely favour PHEVs over BEVs in the near future because the current energy mix and state of battery technology indicated that emissions deriving from charging were typically higher for BEVs than an average ordinary car’s fuel consumption—providing a reason to persist with ICE vehicles or, more responsibly, choose hybrids over pure electric ( Royal Academy of Engineering, 2010 ). Using data up to 2013, but drawing on the previous decade, Holtsmark and Skonhoft (2014) come to similar conclusions based on the most advanced BEV market—Norway. Focussing mainly on energy mix (with acknowledgement that a full life cycle needs to be assessed) they are deeply sceptical that BEVs are a significant net reduction in carbon emissions ( Holtsmark and Skonhoft, 2014 , pp. 161, 164). Neither the Academy nor Holtsmark and Skonhoft are merely sceptical. The overall point of the latter was that more needed to be done to accelerate the use of low or no carbon renewables for power infrastructure (a point the CCC continues to make). This, of course, has happened in many places, including the UK. That is, acceleration of the use of renewables, though it is by no means the case government can take direct credit for this in the UK (and there is also evidence on a global level that a transition to clean energy from fossil fuel forms is much slower than some data sources indicate; see Smil, 2017A , 2017B ). 19 In terms of BEVs, however, recent analyses are considerably more optimistic regarding emissions potential per BEV (e.g. Hoekstra, 2019 ; Regett et al. , 2019 ). Research by Staffell et al. (2019) at Imperial for the power corporation, Drax, provides some interesting insights and contemporary metrics.

Staffell et al. split BEVs into three categories based on conjoint battery and vehicle size: a 30–45 kWh battery car, equivalent to a mid-range or standard car; a heavier, longer-range, 90–100 kWh battery car, equivalent to a luxury or SUV model; and a 30–40 kWh battery light van. They observe that a 40-litre tank of petrol releases 90–100 kgCO 2 when burnt and the ‘embodied’ emissions represented by the manufacture of a standard lithium-ion battery are estimated at 75–125 kgCO 2 per kWh. They infer that every kWh of power embodied in the manufacture of a battery is, therefore, approximately equivalent to using a full tank of petrol. For example, a 30 kWh battery embodies thirty 40-litre petrol tank’s worth of emissions. The BEV’s are also a source of emissions based on the energy mix used to charge the battery for use. The in-use emissions for the BEV are a consequence of the energy consumed per km and this depends on the weight of car and efficiency of the battery. 20 They estimate 33 gCO 2 per km for standard BEVs, 44–54 gCO 2 for luxury and SUVs and 40 gCO 2 for vans. In all cases, this is significantly less than an equivalent fossil-fuel vehicle.

The insight that the estimates and comparisons are leading towards is that the battery embodies an ‘upfront carbon cost’ which can be gradually ‘repaid’ by the saving on emissions represented by driving a BEV compared with driving an equivalent fossil fuel-powered vehicle. That is, the environmental value of opting for BEVs increases over time. Moreover, if the energy mix is gradually becoming less carbon based, this effect is likely to improve further. Based on these considerations, Staffell et al. estimate that it may take 2–4 years to repay the embodied emissions in the battery for a standard BEV and 5 to 6 for the luxury or SUV models. Fundamentally, assuming 15 years to be typical for the on-the-road life expectancy of a vehicle, they find lifetime emissions for each BEV category are lower than equivalent fossil-fuel vehicles.

Still, the implication is that BEVs are not zero emission. Moreover, the degree to which this is so is likely to be significantly greater than a focus on the battery alone indicates. Romare and Dahlöff (2017) , assess the life-cycle of battery production (not use), and in regard of the stages of battery production find that the manufacturing stages account for about 50% of the emissions and the mining and processing stages about the same. They infer that there is significant scope for further emissions reductions as manufacturing processes improve and the Drax study seems to confirm this. However, whilst the battery may be the major component, as we have already noted, vehicle manufacture is a major process in terms of all components and in terms of distance travelled in production and distribution. It is also worth noting that the weight of batteries creates strong incentives to opt for lighter materials for other parts of the vehicle. Most current vehicles are steel based. An aluminium vehicle is lighter, but the production of aluminium is more carbon intensive than steel, so there are also further hidden trade-offs that the positive narrative for BEVs must consider. 21

The general point worth emphasising here is that there is basic uncertainty built into the complex evolving process of transition and change. There is a basic ontology issue here familiar in economic critique: there is no simple way to model the changes with confidence, and in broader context confidence in modelling may itself be a problem here when translated into policy, since it invites complacency. 22 That said, the likely direction of travel is towards further improvements in the energy mix and improvements in battery technology. Both these may be incremental or transformational depending on future technologies (fusion for energy mix and organics and solid-state technologies for batteries perhaps). 23 But one must still consider time frames and ultimate context. 24 The context is a carbon budget and the need for radical reductions in emissions by 2030 and net zero by mid-century. Consider: if just the battery of a car requires four years to be paid back then there is no significant difference in the contribution to emissions from the vehicle into the mid 2020s. For larger vehicles, this becomes the later 2020s, and each year of delay in transition for the individual owner is another year closer to 2030. Since transport is (stubbornly) the major source of emissions in the UK and a major source in the world, this is not irrelevant. BEVs can readily be a successful failure in Paris terms. This brings us to the issue of trends in vehicle ownership and substitutions. This also matters for what we mean by transition.

3.2 Substitutions and transformations: successful failure?

There are many ways to consider the problem of transition. Consider the ‘Precautionary Principle’. This is Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration: ‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary principle shall be widely applied by the States [UN members] according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’ (UNCED). Assuming we can simply depend on unrealised technology potentially violates the Principle. Why is this so? If BEVs are a source of net emissions, then each new vehicle continues to contribute to overall emissions. The current number of vehicles to be replaced, therefore, is a serious consideration, as is any growth trend. Here, social redesign rather than merely adopting new technology is surely more in accordance with the Precautionary Principle. BEVs may be sources of lower emissions than fossil fuel-powered vehicles, but it does not follow that we are constrained to choose between just these two options or that it makes sense to do so in aggregate, given the objective of radical and rapid reduction in emissions. If time is short and numbers of vehicles are large and growing then the implication is that substitution of BEVs should (from a precautionary point of view) occur in a context that is oppositional to this growing trend. That is, the goal should be one of reducing private car ownership and use, and increasing the availability, pervasiveness and use of public transport (and alternatives to private vehicle ownership). This is an issue compounded by the finding that there is an upfront carbon cost from BEVs. Some consideration of current vehicle numbers and trends in the UK and globally serve to reinforce the point.

The UK Department for Transport publishes annual statistics for vehicle licensing. According to the 2019 statistical release for 2018 data, there were 38.2 million licensed vehicles in Britain and 39.4 million including Northern Ireland ( Department for Transport, 2019 ). Vehicles are categorised into cars, light goods vehicles, heavy goods vehicles, motorcycles and buses and coaches. Cars comprised 31.5 million of the total (82%) and the total represented a 1.2% increase in the year 2017. There is, furthermore, a long-term year-on-year trend increase in vehicles since World War II and over the last 20 years that growth (the net change as new vehicles are licensed and old vehicles taken off the road) has averaged 630,000 vehicles per year ( Department for Transport, 2019 , p. 7). This is partly accounted for not only by population growth, and business growth, but also by an increase in the number of vehicles per household. According to the statistical release, 2.9 million new vehicles were registered in 2018, and though this was about 5% fewer than 2017 the figure remained broadly consistent with long-term trends in numbers and still represented growth (contributing to the stated 1.2% increase). 25 Of the total new registrations in 2018, 2.3 million were cars and 360,000 were light goods vehicles. Around 2 million has been typical for cars.

The point to take from these metrics is that numbers are large and context matters. Cars represent 31.5 million emission sources and there are 39.4 million vehicles in the UK. Replacing these 1:1 reproduces an emissions problem. Replacing them in conjunction with an ownership growth trend exacerbates the emissions problem that then has to be resolved. If around 2 million new cars are registered per year then the point at which the BEVs amongst these new registrations can be assumed to begin payback for embodied emissions prior to the point at which they become net sources of reduced (and not zero ) emissions is staggered over future years based on the rate of switching. There are then also net new vehicles. Given there are 31.5 million cars to be replaced over time (plus net growth), there is a high likelihood of significant transport emissions up to and beyond 2030. The problem, of course, is implicit in the Department for Transport policy commitment to end sales of petrol and diesel vehicles by 2035 and ensure all vehicles are zero-emission in use by 2050. Knowingly committing to this ingrained emission problem, given we have already recognised the urgency and challenge of the carbon budget and the ‘stubbornness’ of transport emissions, is not prudent, if alternatives exist . It is producing a problem that need not exist purely because enabling car ownership and use is a line of least resistance in policy terms (it requires the least change in behaviour and thus provokes limited opposition). It is also worth noting that the UK, like most countries, has an ‘integrated’ transport policy. However, the phrasing disguises the relative levels of investment between different modes of transport. Austerity politics may have resulted in declining road quality in the UK but, in general terms, the UK is still committed to heavy investment in and expansion of its road system. 26 This infrastructure investment not only seems ‘economically rational’, but it is also a matter of relative emphasis and ‘lock-in’. The future policy is predicated on the dominance of road use and thus vehicle use.

The crux of the matter here is how we view political expedience. Surely this hinges on the consequences of policy failure. That is, the failure to implement an effective policy given the genuine problem expressed in the goal of 1.5 or 2°C. ‘Alternatives’ may seem unrealistic, but this is a matter of will and policy—of rational social design rather than impossibility. The IPCC and other sources suggest that achieving the Paris goals requires mobilisation of a kind not previously seen outside of wartime. Policy can pivot on this quite quickly, even if perhaps this can seem unlikely in 2020. Climate events may make this necessary and popular pressure and opinion may be transformed. This is currently uncertain. Positions on this may yet move quite quickly.

Lock-in also implies an underlying sociological issue. This is important to consider regarding simply opting for substitution without greater emphasis on reduction. Even if substitution occurs smoothly, it places greater pressure on areas of reduction over which we have less control as societies and involves an orientation that has further potential policy consequences that cannot be readily quantified and which increase the overall uncertainty regarding NDCs. As any modern historian, urban geographer or sociologist will attest, car ownership has been imbricate with the development and design—the configuration—of modern societies, and it has been deeply integrated into identity. Cars are social technologies and philosophers also have much to say about this sociality in general (e.g. Faulkner and Runde, 2013 ; Lawson, 2017 ). Cars are more than merely convenient; they are sources of autonomy and status (e.g. John Urry explored the sociology of ‘automobility’; see, Dennis and Urry, 2009 ). As such, the more that environmental and transport policy validate the car, then the more that the car is normalised through socialisation for the citizen, perhaps leading to citizens being more prepared to countenance locked-in harms (congestion, etc.) prior to change, in turn, making it less likely (sub)urban spaces are redesigned in ways predicated on the absence of (or severe limits to) private transport. The trend in many countries over the car era has been that building roads leads to more car use, which leads to congestion, which leads to more roads (especially in concentrated zones around [sub]urban spaces).

According to the UK Ordnance Survey, Britain has increased its total road surface by 132 square miles over the decade since 2010 (a 9% increase). According to the UK Department for Transport, vehicle traffic increased by 0.8% in 2019 (September to September) to 330.1 billion miles travelled and car travel, as a subset, increased to 258 billion miles (a 1.5% increase). 27 The 11 March 2020 Budget seems to confirm the trend. Whilst it commits around £1 billion to ‘green transport solutions’, this is in the context of a £27 billion announced investment in roads, including upgrading and a proposed 4,000 miles of new road. As the Green Party MP, Caroline Lucas, noted there is a basic disconnect here, since this seems set to increase the UK’s dependence on private transport, when it makes more sense to begin to curtail that dependence, given how significant the UK’s transport emissions are. 28 So, within the various tensions in policy, there seems to be a tendency to facilitate techno-political lock-in or path-dependence on private transportation. As Mattioli et al. (2020) argue, the multiple strands of policy and practice that maintain car dependence contribute to ‘carbon lock-in’. The systemic consequences matter both for the perpetuation of fossil fuel vehicle use in the short term and, given they are not net zero for emissions, powered vehicles in the longer term. Not only does this matter in the UK, but it also matters globally. All the issues stated are reproduced globally. Moreover, in some ways, they are compounded for countries where widespread car ownership is relatively new.

3.3 The fallacy of composition, problems that need not exist and resource risk

Estimates vary for the global total number of vehicles. According to Wards Intelligence, the global total was 1.32 billion in 2016 ( Petit, 2017 ). Extrapolated estimations imply that the total likely increased to more than 1.5 billion in 2019. In 1976, the figure was 342 million and in 1996, 670 million, so the trend implies an approximate doubling every 20 years, which if it continued would imply a figure approaching 3 billion by end of the 2030s. Clearly, it is problematic to simply extrapolate a linear trend, but it is not unreasonable to assume a general trend of growth. Observed experience is that many ‘developed’ country middle-class households have accommodated more than one car per household. This is classically the case in the USA. In 2017, the USA, with a population of 325.7 million in that year, reported a total of 272.5 million registered vehicles compared with 193 million in 1990 ( Statista, 2019A ). In any case, the world population is still growing, incomes are growing and many countries are far from a position of one car per household. China with a population of 1.3 billion overtook the USA in the total number of registered vehicles around 2016 to 2017, with 300.3 million registered vehicles in March of 2017 (Zheng, 2017). Growth is rapid and the China Traffic Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security reported a total of 325 million registered vehicles, December 2018, an increase of 15.56 million in the year ( China Daily , 2018 ). The People’s Republic is now the world’s largest car market and the number of registered cars increased to 240 million in 2018 ( Statista, 2019B ). India too has rapidly growing car ownership and on a lesser scale this is replicated across the developing world.

For our purposes, two well-known concepts and a further resource dependence risk seem to apply here. First, there is patently a ‘fallacy of composition’ issue. That is, the assumption that many can do what few previously did without changing the conditions or producing different (adverse) consequences than arose when only a few adopted that behaviour or activity. Those consequences are climatological and ecological. It remains the case that we are socialised to desire and appreciate cars and it remains a fact that private transport can be extremely convenient. It can also, given the commentary above, appear hypocritical to be suggesting shifting to a far greater reliance on public transport, since this implicitly involves denying to developing country citizens a facet of modernity enjoyed previously by developed country citizens. But this is a distraction from the underlying collective interest in reduced car ownership and use. It denies the basic premise that a Precautionary Principle applies to all and that societies that are not yet car dependent have the opportunity to avoid a problem, rather than have to manage it via either moving straight to private transport BEVs or a transition from fossil fuel-powered ICEs to BEVs with all that entails in terms of ingrained emissions. Policy may be mainly domestic, but climate change is global and aggregate effects do not respect borders, which brings us to a second concept or risk that may be exacerbated.

Second, a ‘quasi-Jevons’ effect’ may apply. Growth of vehicle use is a problem of resource use and this is a thermodynamic and emissions problem. However, it is, as we have noted, also the case that battery technology and energy mix for BEVs are improving. So, this may involve significant declines in relative cost, which in turn may create a tendency for BEV ownership to accelerate which could exacerbate net growth in numbers of vehicles. Net growth could ironically be to the detriment of emissions savings. Whether this is so, depends, in part, on what kind of overall transport policy countries adopt and whether consumers, corporations and markets are allowed to be the arbiter of which area of transport dominates. It also depends, in part, on what materials are required for future batteries. Current technology implies massive increases in costs based on securing sources of lithium and cobalt as battery demand rises. So even if a Jevons’ effect is avoided, a different issue may apply. Resource procurement is a Precautionary Principle issue since effective BEVs at the kind of numbers necessary to substitute for all vehicles seem to require technological transformation—without it, multiple problems apply whilst emissions remain ingrained.

For example, when the UK CCC announced its 2035 recommendation to accelerate the BEV transition, members of the Security of Supply of Mineral Resources (SSMR) project wrote a research note to the CCC (Webster, 2019). They pointed out that the current total European demand for cobalt is 19,800 tonnes and that producing the batteries to replace 2.3 million cars in the UK (in accordance with contemporary statistics for new registrations) would require 15,600 tonnes. The UK would also need 20,000 tonnes of lithium, which is 45% of the current total European demand. If we replicate this ramping up of demand across Europe and the globe for vehicles, recognising that there are other growing demands for the minerals and metals (including batteries for other purposes) then it seems unlikely that supply can respond, unless dependence on lithium and cobalt (and other constituents) falls sharply as technology changes. Clearly, the problem is also contingent on the uptake of BEVs. Over recent years, there has, in fact, been an oversupply of the main materials for battery production because several of the main mining corporations anticipated that battery demand would take off faster than it actually has. For example, global prices of cobalt, nickel and lithium carbonate have increased significantly over the last decade but have fallen in 2018 to the end of 2019. However, industry analysis indicates that current annual global production is the equivalent of about 10 million standard BEVs based on current technology, and as the previous statistics on global vehicle numbers (see also next section) indicate, this is far less than transition via substitution would seem to require in the next decade. 29

Shortages and price rises, therefore, are if not inevitable, at least likely. Currently, about 60% of the cost of a BEV is the battery and 80% of that 60% (about 50% of the vehicle) is the cost of battery materials. It is, therefore, important to achieve secure supply and stable costs. The further context here is the issue of UK domestic battery capacity. In 2013, the government created the Advanced Propulsion Centre (APC) with a 10 year £500 million investment commitment matched by industry. The APC’s remit is to address supply chain issues for electric vehicles. Not unexpectedly, the APC quickly identified lack of domestic battery production capacity as a major impediment. In response in 2016 another government initiative, Innovate UK set up the Faraday Battery Challenge to encourage domestic capacity and innovation. The Battery Industrialisation Centre was then set up in Coventry, to attract manufacturers in the supply chain for BEVs to locate there, focussed around a centre of research excellence. However, the APC has no control over the global supply and prices of battery materials, the investment and location decisions of battery manufacturers or the necessary infrastructure for BEVs to be a feasible technology. 30 For example, according to the APC, if domestic BEV demand were 500,00 per year by 2025, then the UK would need three ‘gigafactories’. Battery manufacture is currently dominated by LG Chem and Samsung in South Korea, CATL in China and Panasonic in Japan. None of these have current plans to build a gigafactory in the UK. In any case, there is a further problem here which raises a whole set of environmental and ethical issues explored in ecological circles under the general heading ‘extractivism’ (see, e.g. Dunlap, 2019 ). As time goes by, the UK and the world may become dependent on high price supplies of materials drawn from unstable or hostile regimes (the Democratic Republic of Congo, etc.), which is a risk in many ways (and a likely source of Dutch disease—the ‘resource curse’—for unstable regimes). So, not placing a relative emphasis on substituting BEVs for ICEs and not endorsing the current vehicle growth trend (which is different as a suggestion than rejecting BEVs entirely) avoid multiple problems and risks.

It is also worth noting that simple market decisions can have a further collective adverse consequence based on individual consumer preference and reasoning, which may also affect BEVs in the short term. Many current BEVs have smaller or low efficiency batteries and thus short ranges. These favour urban use for short journeys, but most people own cars with a view also to range further afield. As such, it seems likely that until the technology is all long range (and the charging infrastructure is pervasive) many consumers, if the choice exists and income allows, will own BEVs as an additional vehicle, not a replacement vehicle. 31 This may be a short-term issue, given the regulatory changes focussed from 2030 to 2040 in many countries. But, again, from a Paris point of view, taking the IPCC 1.5°C and UNEP Emissions Gap reports into consideration, this matters. This brings us to a final issue. What is the actual take-up of BEVs (and ULEVs)? How rapid is the transition? In the Introduction section, I suggested that the UK had reached a tipping point and that this mirrored a general trend globally. This, however, needs context.

3.4 How many electric vehicles?

The data emerging in recent years and stated in the Introduction section are a step-change, but as a possible tipping point it begins from a low base and BEVs (the least emitting of the low emission vehicles) are a subset, albeit a rapidly expanding one, of ULEVs. According to the UK Department for Transport statistical release for 2018, there were 200,000 ULEVs registered in total, of which 63,992 ULEVs were newly registered in that year ( Department for Transport, 2019 , p. 4). 93% of the total registrations were cars and the total constitutes a 39% increase on the year 2017 total and a 20% increase in the rate of registration—there were just 9,500 ULEVs at the beginning of 2010 (so, about 20 times greater in a decade). However, the 2018 data mean that ULEVs accounted for just 0.5% of all licensed vehicles and were still only 2.1% of all new registrations in that year. Preliminary data available early 2020 indicate continued growth with almost 38,000 new BEV registrations in 2019, a 144% year-on-year increase. As a recent UK House of Commons Briefing Paper notes, however, the government prefers to emphasise the percentage changes in take-up rather than the percentages of the absolute numbers or the absolute numbers themselves ( Hirst, 2019 ). The International Energy Agency (IEA) places the UK in its leading countries list by ULEV and BEV market share (measured by the percentage of total annual registration): Norway dominates, followed by Iceland, Sweden, the Netherlands and then a significant drop-off to a trailing group including China, the USA, Germany, the UK, Japan, France, Canada and South Korea. However, the market share in this trailing group is less than 5% in every case (see appended Figure 1 ). China, given its size (and because of the urgency of its urban air quality problems and its capacity for authoritarian implementation), dominates the raw numbers in terms of total ULEVs and BEVs. All this notwithstanding, the IEA confirms the general point that up-take is accelerating, but the base is low and so achieving total ULEV or BEV coverage is some way off:

The global electric car fleet exceeded 5.1 million in 2018, up by 2 million since 2017, almost doubling the unprecedented amount of new registrations in 2017. The People’s Republic of China… remained the world’s largest electric car market with nearly 1.1 million electric cars sold in 2018 and, with 2.3 million units, it accounted for almost half of the global electric car stock. Europe followed with 1.2 million electric cars and the United States with 1.1 million on the road by the end of 2018 and market growth of 385000 and 361000 electric cars from the previous year. Norway remained the global leader in terms of electric car market share at 46% of its new electric car sales in 2018, more than double the second-largest market share in Iceland at 17% and six-times higher than the third-highest Sweden at 8%. In 2018, electric buses continued to witness dynamic developments, with more than 460000 vehicles on the world’s road, almost 100000 more than in 2017…In freight transport, electric vehicles (EVs) were mostly deployed as light-commercial vehicles (LCVs), which reached 250000 units in 2018, up 80000 from 2017. Medium truck sales were in the range of 1000–2000 in 2018, mostly concentrated in China. ( IEA, 2019A , p. 9)

Over the next few years, it seems likely we will see rapid changes in these metrics. There is a great deal of discussion in policy analysis regarding bottlenecks and impediments and these, of course, are also important (consumer uncertainty, ‘range anxiety’, availability of sufficient infrastructure for charging and so on). 32 However, as everything argued so far indicates regarding transition and trends, underlying the whole is the conditionality of success and the potential for failure, involving avoidable ingrained emission and risks. There is a basic difference between a superior technology and a superior choice since the latter is a socio-economic matter of context: of rates of change, scales and substitutions. Ultimately, this creates deep concerns in terms of achieving the Paris goals. The IEA explores two forecast scenarios for the uptake of ULEVs. Both involve a projection of annual ULEV sales and total stock to 2030 ( IEA, 2019A ). First a ‘New Policies’ Scenario. This takes the current policy commitments of individual countries and extrapolates. By 2030, the scenario projects global ULEV sales at 23 million in that year and a total stock of 130 million. This is considerably less than 30% of all vehicles now and in 2030. Second, the EV30@30 Scenario. This assumes an accelerated commitment that adopts the @30 goals (notably 30% annual sales share for BEVs by 2030; IEA, 2019A , pp. 29–30). By 2030, the scenario projects global ULEV sales at 43 million in that year and a total stock of 250 million. Again, this is less than 30% of all vehicles now and in 2030.

The figures, of course, are highly conditional, but the point is clear, even the best-case scenario currently being anticipated has ULEVs and BEVs as a minority of all vehicles in 2030—and 2030 is a key year for achieving Paris, according to the October 2018 IPCC 1.5°C report. Moreover, it is notable that the projections assume continuous growth in the number of vehicles (and so continuous growth in ICE vehicles) and the major areas of numerical growth in BEVs continue to be China, so some significant part of the anticipated total will be new ingrained emissions that arguably did not need to exist. 33 Again, this is highly conditional but it at least creates questions regarding what is being ‘saved’ when the IEA claims that the New Policies Scenario results in 2.5 million barrels a day less demand for oil in 2030 and the EV30@30 Scenario 4.3 million barrels a day ( IEA, 2019A , p. 7). 34 Less of more is not a saving in an objective sense, if this is a preventable future, and it is not a rational way to set about ‘saving’ the planet. It remains the case, of course, that this is better than nothing, but it is deeply questionable whether in policy terms any of this is the ‘best that can be done’. As stated in the Introduction section, technocentrism distracts from appropriate recognition of this. At its worse, technocentrism fails to address and so works to reproduce a counter-productive ecological modernisation: the technological focus facilitates socio-economic trends, which are part of the broader problem rather than solutions to it. The important inference is that there are multiple reasons to think that greater emphasis on social redesign and less private transport avoids successful failure and is more in accordance with the Precautionary Principle.

I ended the introduction to this essay by stating that we would be exploring the foregrounding question: What kind of solution are BEVs to what kind of problem? It should be clearer now what was meant by this. Ultimately, the balance between private and public transport matters if the Paris goals are to be achieved. Equally clearly, this is not news to the UK CCC or to any serious analyst of electric vehicles and the transport issue for our climatological and ecological future (again, e.g. Chapman, 2007 ; Bailey and Wilson, 2009 ; Williamson et al. , 2018 ; Mattioli et al. , 2020 ). At the same time, the context and issues are not widely understood and the problems are often understated, at least in so far as, discursively, most weight is placed on stating progress in achieving a transition to ULEVs and BEVs. This is technocentric. Despite its general concerns and careful critical stance, the CCC is also partly guilty of this. For example, Ewa Kmietowicz, Transport Team Leader of the CCC Secretariat, refers to the UK Road to Zero strategy as a ‘lost opportunity’, and the CCC identifies a number of shortfalls in the strategy. 35 However, the general thrust of the CCC position is to focus on a rapid transition to BEVs and to overcoming bottlenecks. 36 Broader feasibility is subsumed under general assumptions about continued economic expansion and expansion of the transport system. So, there is more of a situation of complementarity (with caveats) between public and private transport, and the whole becomes an exercise in types of investment within expansionary trends, rather than a more radical recognition of the fundamental problems that we ought to think about avoiding. It is also worth noting that many of the major advocates of BEVs are industry organisations. The UK Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, for example, are not unconcerned but they are not impartial either; they have a vested interest in the vehicle industry and its growth. For industry, ULEVs and BEVs are an opportunity before they are a solution to a problem. There are, however, recognitions that a rethink is required. These range from direct activism, such as ‘Rocks in the Gearbox’ (along the lines of Extinction Rebellion), to analysis from establishment think tanks, such as the World Economic Forum 37 , and statements from government oversight committees. For example, the UK Commons Science and Technology Committee (CSTC) not only endorses the CCC 2035 accelerated BEV target but also states more explicitly:

In the long-term, widespread personal vehicle ownership does not appear to be compatible with significant decarbonisation. The Government should not aim to achieve emissions reductions simply by replacing existing vehicles with lower-emissions versions. Alongside the Government’s existing targets and policies, it must develop a strategy to stimulate a low-emissions transport system, with the metrics and targets to match. This should aim to reduce the number of vehicles required, for example by: promoting and improving public transport; reducing its cost relative to private transport; encouraging vehicle usership in place of ownership; and encouraging and supporting increased levels of walking and cycling. ( CSTC, 2019 )

This, as Caroline Lucas suggests, speaks to the need to coordinate public and private transport policy more effectively and clearly, and there is a need for broader informed debate here. In political ecological circles, for example, there is a growing critique of the tensions encapsulated in the concept of an ‘environmental state’ (see Koch, 2019 ). That is the coordination and coherence of environmental imperatives with other policy concerns. State-rescaling and degrowth and postgrowth work highlight the profound problems that are now starting to emerge as states come to terms with the basic mechanisms that have been built into our economies and societies (see also Newell and Mulvaney, 2013 ; Newell, 2019 ). 38 New thinking is required and this extends to the social ontology and theory we use to conceptualise economies (see Spash and Ryan, 2012 ; Lawson, 2012 , 2019 ) and political formations (see Bacevic, 2019 ; Patomäki, 2019. Covid-19 does not change this ( Gills, 2020 ).

In transport terms, there are many specific issues to consider. Some solutions are simple but overlooked because we are always thinking in terms of sophisticated innovations and inventions. However, we do not need to conform to the logics of ‘technological fixes’, that we somehow think will enable the impossible, to perhaps see some scope in ‘fourth industrial revolution’ transformations ( Center for Global Policy Solutions, 2017 ; Morgan, 2019B ). For example, public transport may also extend to a future where no individual owns a range extensive powered vehicle (perhaps just local scooters for the young and mobility scooters for the infirm) and instead a system operates of autonomous fleet vehicles that are coordinated by artificial intelligence with logistics implemented through Smartphone calendar access booking systems—and coordination functions could maximise sharing, where vehicles could also be (given no drivers are involved) adaptable connective pods that chain together to minimise congestion and energy use. This seems like science fiction now, and perhaps a little ridiculous, but a few years ago so did the Smartphone. And the technology already exists in infancy. Such a system could be either state-funded and run or private partnership and franchise, but in either case, it radically redraws the transport environment whilst working in conformity with the geography of living spaces we have already developed. Will is what is required and if the outcome of COP24 ( UNFCCC, 2018 ) and COP25 ( Newell and Taylor, 2020 ) with limited progress towards the Paris goals persists, then it seems likely that emissions will accumulate rapidly in the near future and the likelihood of a serious climate event with socio-economic consequences rises. At that stage, more invasive statutory and regulatory intervention may start to occur as the carbon budget becomes a more urgent target. Prohibitions, transport rationing and various other possibilities may then be on the agenda if we are to unmake the future we are currently writing and, to mix metaphors, avoid a road to nowhere.

None declared

Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for extensive and useful comment—particularly regarding the systematic statement of issues in the Introduction section and for additional useful references. Jamie Morganis Professor of Economic Sociology at Leeds Beckett University, UK. He coedits the Real-World Economics Review with Edward Fullbrook. RWER is the world’s largest subscription based open access economics journal. He has published widely in the fields of economics, political economy, philosophy, sociology, and international politics. His recent books include: Modern Monetary Theory and its Critics (ed. with E. Fullbrook, WEA Books, 2020), Economics and the ecosystem (ed. with E. Fullbrook, WEA Books, 2019); Brexit and the political economy of fragmentation: Things fall apart (ed. with H. Patomäki, Routledge, 2018); Realist responses to post-human society (ed. with I. Al-Amoudi, Routledge, 2018); Trumponomics: Causes and consequences (ed. with E. Fullbrook, College Publications, 2017); What is neoclassical economics? (ed., Routledge, 2015); and Piketty’s capital in the twenty-first century (ed. with E. Fullbrook, College Publications, 2014).

Bacevic , J . 2019 . Knowing neoliberalism , Social Epistemology , vol. 33 , no. 4 , 380 – 92

Google Scholar

Bailey , I. and Wilson , G . 2009 . Theorising transitional pathways in response to climate change: technocentrism, ecocentrism, and the carbon economy , Environment and Planning A , vol. 41 , no. 10 , 2324 – 41

CCC. 2019 . Net Zero: The UK’s Contribution to Stopping Global Warming , London , Author

Google Preview

Center for Global Policy Solutions. 2017 . Stick Shift: Autonomous Vehicles, Driving Jobs and the Future of Work , Washington DC , Author

Chapman , L . 2007 . Transportation and climate change: a review , Journal of Transport Geography , vol. 15 , no. 5 , 354 – 67

China Daily. 2018, December 1 . China has 325 million motor vehicles , China Daily

Christensen , J. and Olhoff , A . 2019 . Lessons from a Decade of Emissions Gap Assessments , Nairobi , UNEP

CSTC. 2019 . Clean Growth: Technologies for Meeting the UK’s Emissions Reduction Targets , London , Author

DBEIS. 2018 . Annex: 1990–2016 UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Final Figures by end User , London , Author

DECC. 2015 . Different Approaches to Reporting UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions , London , Author

Deloitte. 2018 . Battery Electric Vehicles. New market. New entrants. New challenges , London , Author

Dennis , K. and Urry , J . 2009 . After the Car , Cambridge , Polity

Department for Transport. 2018 . The Road to Zero: Next Steps Towards Cleaner Road Transport and Delivering our Industrial Strategy , London , Author

Department for Transport. 2019 . Vehicle Licensing Statistics: Annual 2018 , London , Author

Dunlap , A . 2019 . Wind, coal and copper: the politics of land grabbing, counterinsurgency and the social engineering of extraction , Globalizations vol. 17 , no. 4 , 661 – 82

Environmental Audit Committee. 2016 . Sustainability in the Department of Transport [Third Report of Sessions 2016–17], London , House of Commons

Faraday Institution. 2019 . UK Electric Vehicle and Battery Production Potential to 2040 , London , Author

Faulkner , P. and Runde , J . 2013 . Technological objects, social positions and the transformational model of social activity , MIS Quarterly , vol. 37 , no. 3 , 803 – 18

Frost & Sullivan. 2019 . Global Electric Vehicle Market Outlook, 2019 , Author , London

Fullbrook , E. and Morgan , J. (eds.). 2019 . Economics and the Ecosystem , London , World Economic Association Books

Georgescu-Roegen , N . 1971 . The Entropy Law and the Economic Process , Cambridge and London , Harvard University Press

Gills , B . 2020 . Deep Restoration: from the Great Implosion to the Great Awakening , Globalizations , vol. 17 , no. 4 , 577 – 9

Gills , B. and Morgan , J . 2019 . Global Climate Emergency: after COP24, climate science, urgency, and the threat to humanity , Globalizations

Gills , B. , Morgan , J. and Patomäki , H . 2019 . President Trump as status dysfunction , Organization , vol. 26 , no. 2 , 291 – 301

Hansen , J. et al.  2017 . Young people’s burden: requirement of negative CO2 emissions , Earth System Dynamics , vol. 8 , 577 – 616

Harvey , F . 2020, March 28 . Tackle climate crisis and poverty with zeal of Covid-19 fight scientists urge , The Guardian

Hirst , D . 2019 . ‘ Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure’ , Briefing Paper no. CBP07480, London , House of Commons Library

Hoekstra , A . 2019 . The underestimated potential of battery electric vehicles to reduce emissions , Joule , vol. 3 , no. 6 , 1412 – 4

Holt , R. , Pressman , S. and Spash , C. (eds.). 2009 . Post Keynesian and Ecological Economics , Cheltenham , Edward Elgar

Holtsmark , B. and Skonhoft , A . 2014 . The Norwegian support and subsidy policy for electric cars. Should it be adopted by other countries? Environmental Science & Policy , vol. 42 , 160 – 8

IEA. 2019A . Global EV Outlook 2019: Scaling up the Transition to Electric Mobility , Paris , Author

IEA. 2019B . World Energy Outlook , Paris , Author

IPCC. 2018 . Global Warming of 1.50C: Summary for Policymakers , Geneva , Author

IPCC. 2019A . IPCC Special Report on Climate Change, Desertification, Land Degradation Sustainable Land Management Food Security and Greenhouse Gas fluxes in Terrestrial Ecosystems , Geneva , Author

IPCC. 2019B . The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate , Geneva , Author

Koch , M . 2019 . The state in the transformation to a sustainable postgrowth economy , Environmental Politics , vol. 29 , no. 1 , 115 – 33

Lawson , C . 2012 . Aviation lock-in and emissions trading , Cambridge Journal of Economics , vol. 36 , no. 5 , 1221 – 43

Lawson , C . 2017 . Technology and Isolation , Cambridge , Cambridge University Press

Lawson , T . 2019 . The Nature of Social Reality: Issues in Social Ontology , London , Routledge

Lea , R . 2019, September 6 . Tesla Model 3 enters sales chart at No3 , The Times

Lenton , T. , Rockstrom , J. , Gaffney , O. , Rahmstorf , S. , Richardson , K. , Steffen , W. and Schellnuber , H . 2018 . Climate tipping points too risky to bet against , Nature , vol. 575 , 592 – 5

Manzetti , S. and Mariasiu , F . 2015 . Electric vehicle battery technologies: from present state to future systems , Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews , vol. 51 , 1004 – 12

Mattioli , G. , Roberts , C. , Steinberger , J. , and Brown , A . 2020 . The political economy of car dependence: a systems of provision approach , Energy Research & Social Science , vol. 66 , 1 – 18

Morgan , J . 2016 . Paris COP21: power that speaks the truth? Globalizations , vol. 13 , no. 6 , 943 – 51

Morgan , J . 2017 . Piketty and the growth dilemma revisited in the context of ecological economics , Ecological Economics , vol. 136 , 169 – 77

Morgan , J . 2019A . Intervention, policy and responsibility: economics as over-engineered expertise?, pp. 145 – 63 in Dolfsma , W. and Negru , I. (eds.), 2019 The Ethical Formation of Economists , London , Routledge

Morgan , J . 2019B . Will we work in twenty-first century capitalism? A critique of the fourth industrial revolution literature , Economy and Society , vol. 48 , no. 3 , 371 – 98

Morgan , J. and Patomäki , H . 2017 . Contrast explanation in economics: its context, meaning, and potential , Cambridge Journal of Economics , vol. 41 , no. 5 , 1391 – 418

Nasir , A. and Morgan , J . 2018 . The unit root problem: affinities between ergodicity and stationarity, its practical contradictions for central bank policy, and some consideration of alternatives , Journal of Post Keynesian Economics , vol. 41 , no. 3 , 339 – 63

National Audit Office. 2019 . Department of Transport Sustainability Update , London , Author

Newell , P . 2019 . Transformismo or transformation? The global political economy of energy transitions , Review of International Political Economy , vol. 26 , no. 1 , 25 – 48

Newell , P. and Mulvaney , D . 2013 . The political economy of the “just transition” , The Geographical Journal , vol. 179 , no. 2 , 132 – 40

Newell , P. and Taylor , O . 2020 . Fiddling while the planet burns? COP 25 in perspective , Globalizations , vol. 17 , no. 4 , 580 – 92

ONS. 2019 . UK Environmental Accounts: 2019 , London , Author

Patomäki , H . 2019, July 9 . ‘The Climate Movement? What’s Next?’, available at https://patomaki.fi/en/2019/07/the-climate-movement-whats-next/

Petit , S . 2017 . World vehicle population rose 2.6% in 2016 , Ward Intelligence

Regett , A. , Mauch , W. and Wagner , U . 2019 . Carbon Footprint of Electric Vehicles – A Plea for More Objectivity , available at https://www.ffe.de/attachments/article/856/Carbon_footprint_EV_FfE.pdf

Ripple , W. , Wolf , C. , Newsome , T. , Barnbard , P. , Moomaw , W. and 11,258 signatories. 2019 . World Scientists’ warning of a climate emergency , BioScience , vol. 70 , no. 1 , 8 – 12

Romare , M. and Dahlöff , L . 2017 . ‘ The Life Cycle Energy Consumption and Greenhouse gas Emissions From Lithium-Ion Batteries’ , Report No. C243, Stockholm , IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute

Royal Academy of Engineering. 2010 . Electric Vehicles: Charged with Potential , London , Author

Servigne , P. and Stevens , R . 2015 . Comment tout peut s’efondrer , Paris , Science Humaines , available at https://www.seuil.com/ouvrage/comment-tout-peut-s-effondrer-pablo-servigne/ 9782021223316

Smil , V . 2017A . Energy and Civilization , Boston , MIT Press

Smil , V . 2017B . Energy Transitions , Colorado , Praeger

SMMT. 2019 . UK Electric Car Registrations Surge in August but it’s a Long Road to Zero and Barriers Must be Addressed , Press Release September 5th, London , Author

Spash , C. (ed.). 2017 . Routledge Handbook of Ecological Economics: Nature and Society , New York , Routledge

Spash , C . 2020 . A tale of three paradigms: realising the revolutionary potential of ecological economics , Ecological Economics vol. 169 ,

Spash , C. and Ryan , A . 2012 . Economic schools of thought on the environment: investigating unity and division , Cambridge Journal of Economics , vol. 36 , no. 5 , 1091 – 121

Staffell , I. Green , R. Gross , R. and Green , T . 2019 . How clean is my car? , Electric Insights Quarterly , vol. Q2 , 7 – 10

Statista. 2019A . Number of Motor Vehicles Registered in the United States from 1990 to 2017 (in 1000s) , [data updated June 2019], available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/183505/number-of-vehicles-in-the-united-states-since-1990/

Statista. 2019B . Car “Parc” in China from 2007 to 2018 (millions) , [data updated August 2019], available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/285306/number-of-car-owners-in-china/

Steffen , W. et al.  2018 . Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene , Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA , vol. 115 , 8252 – 9

Taylor , M . 2015 . The Political Ecology of Climate Change Adaptation , London , Routledge/Earthscan

UNEP. 2012 . Global Environmental Outlook Report 5: Environment for the Future We Want , New York , Author

UNEP. 2018 . Emissions Gap Report 2018 , 9th ed., New York , Author

UNEP. 2019A . Emissions Gap Report 2019 , 10th ed., New York , Author .

UNEP. 2019B . Global Environmental Outlook Report 6: Healthy Planet Healthy People , New York , Author

UNFCCC. 1992 . United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change , New York , Author

UNFCCC. 2015 . Adoption of the Paris Agreement and Annex: Paris Agreement , Paris , Author

UNFCCC. 2018 . Katowice Texts , Katowice , Author

Webster , B . 2019, June 6 . Britain “could be held to ransom” on electric cars , The Times

Williamson , K. , Satre-Meloy , A. , Velasco , K. and Green , K . 2018 . Climate Change Needs Behaviour Change: Making the Case for Behavioural Solutions to Reduce Global Warming , Arlington, VA , Centre for Behaviour and the Environment

Zheng , S . 2017, April 19 . China now has over 300 million vehicles… that’s almost America’s total population , South China Morning Post

Global electric car sales and market share, 2013–18.

Source : IEA (2019, p. 10).

ULEV refers to vehicles that emit less than 75 gCO 2 per km. This essentially means BEVs, PHEVs, range-extended (typically an auxiliary fuel tank) electric vehicles, fuel cell (non-plug-in) electric vehicles and hybrid models (non-plug in vehicles with a main fuel tank but whose battery recharges and which drive short distances in electric mode).

Note, there is little sign of legislative and regulatory detail to plans as of early 2020. Furthermore, there is a difference between acknowledging that the uptake of alternatively fuelled vehicles, including BEVs, is growing and drawing the inference that UK government policy (channelled primarily via the Department for Transport) is as effective as it might be (see Environmental Audit Committee, 2016 ; National Audit Office, 2019 and also later discussions).

CEM is coordinated by the IEA and is an initiative lead by Canada and China (but including a steadily growing number of signatory countries). The EV30@30 initiative aims to achieve a 30% annual sales share for BEVs by 2030.

IEA headline statistics include plug-in hybrids so 2018 becomes 46% for Norway (IEA, 2019A, p. 10).

For example, Spash (2020) and Spash and Ryan (2012) . One might also note the work of John O’Neill at Manchester University. Perhaps the most prominent ‘realist’ working on transport and ecology is Petter Naess, at Norwegian University of Life Sciences.

The UNEP 9th Report calls for a 55% reduction by 2030.

The initial rationale in 2008 was that to achieve a maximum limit of 2°C warming global emissions needed to fall from the levels at that time to 20–24 GtCO 2 e with an implied average of 2.1–2.6 t CO 2 per capita on a global basis in 2050. This translated to a 50–60% reduction to the then global total. Since UK emissions were above average per capita, the UK reduction required was estimated at about 80%. Given that emissions then increased and atmospheric ppm has risen the original calculations are now mainly redundant.

For the work of the CCC, see: https://www.theccc.org.uk/about/ .

The report also provides useful context regarding the UN sustainable development goals ( CCC, 2019 : p. 66) and CCC thinking on growth and economics ( CCC, 2019 : pp. 46–7).

https://www.theccc.org.uk/2019/06/11/response-to-government-plan-to-legislate-for-net-zero-emissions-target/ .

And further methodological issues apply in economics (see; Morgan and Patomäki, 2017 ; Nasir and Morgan, 2018 ; Morgan, 2019A ).

For a full analysis, see https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-uks-co2-emissions-have-fallen-29-per-cent-over-the-past-decade . The Carbon Brief analysis omits shipping and aviation. As the campaign group Transport and Environment notes UK shipping was responsible for 14.4 MtCO 2 , which is the third highest in Europe (after the Netherlands and Spain) and shipping is exempt from tax on fossil fuels under EU law. See p. 20: https://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/publications/Study-EU_shippings_climate_record_20191209_final.pdf .

UK coal use for energy supply reduced by approximately 90% from 1990 to 2017 and in 2019 amounted to just 2% of the energy mix and in 2019 the UK went two weeks without using any coal at all for power production (the first time since 1882); 1990 to 2010 natural gas use steadily increased from a near-zero base but has declined since 2010 as use of renewables has grown. Coal use in manufacturing has decreased by 75% from 1990 to 2017 ( ONS, 2019 ). As noted, some assessments place the reduction in total emissions at around 40% based on other metrics and the tabulated figures I provide indicate yet another percentage— all however are trend decreases indicative of a general direction of travel.

‘Embedded emissions’ or the UK carbon footprint is addressed by the UK Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). To be clear, there is a whole set of further issues that one might address in regard of measurement of emissions—how they are attributed and what this means (where created, where induced through demand, which state, what corporation and so different ‘Cartesian’ claims regarding the significance of location are possible), and this is indicative of the conflict over representation and partition of responsibility (so whilst the climate does not care about borders, they have infected measurement and policy). There is no scientifically neutral way to achieve this, merely different sets of criteria with different consequences (I thank an anonymous referee for extended comment on this, see also Taylor, 2015 ; who argues that adaptation politics produces a focus on governance within existing political and economic structures based on borders, etc.).

Congestion charges in London or a plastic bag tax do not meet this threshold.

This is supported, for example, by The Climate Group’s EV100 initiative: a voluntary scheme where corporations commit to making electric the ‘new normal’ of their vehicle fleets by 2030 (recognising that over half of annual new registrations are owned by businesses) https://www.theclimategroup.org/project/ev100 .

Until recently Tesla had one main production centre in California. However, it now also has a $5 billion factory in Shanghai and plans for a factory in Berlin. Tesla is currently the world’s largest producer of BEVs (368,000 units in 2019), followed by the Chinese company BYD Auto (195,000 units in 2019). Tesla was founded in July 2003 by Martin Eberhard and Mark Tarpenning in response to General Motors scrapping its EV programme (as unprofitable). Elon Musk joined as a HNWI first-round investor in February 2004 (he put in $6.5 m of the total $7.5 m and became chairman of the Tesla board); Eberhard was initially CEO but was removed and replaced by Musk in 2007 and Tarpenning left in 2008. Tesla floated on the Nasdaq in June 2010 at $17 per share and exceeded $500 per share for the first time in January 2020. Tesla is the USA’s most valuable car manufacturer by market capitalisation (worth more than Ford and GM combined).

The European Commission’s collaborative research forum JEC has been producing ‘well-to-wheels’ analyses of energy efficiency of different engine technologies since the beginning of the century. The USA periodically publishes the findings of its GREET model (the Greenhouse gases Regulated Emissions and Energy use in Transportation model). See https://greet.es.anl.gov .

For example, since 1985 according to Carbon Brief global coal use in power production measured in terawatt hours only reduced in 2009 and 2015 (though it seems likely to do so in 2019); China notably continues to build coal-fired power plants though the rate of growth of use has slowed. (According to the IEA Coal report, 2019, China consumed 3,756 million tonnes of coal in 2018 (a 1% increase) and India 986 million tonnes (a 5% increase). Renewables are a growing part of an expanding global energy system.

https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-global-coal-power-set-for-record-fall-in-2019 .

Staffell et al . observe that the British electricity grid produces an average 204 gCO 2 per kWh in 2019 and a standard petrol car emits 120–160 gCO 2 per km.

This is a point made by Richard Smith. There are, of course, alternatives to aluminium. One should also note that manufacturers are responding to consumer preference by increasing the average size of models and this is increasing the weight and resource use. In February 2020, for example, Which Magazine analysed 292 popular car models and found that they were on average 3.4% or 67 kg heavier than older models and this was offsetting some of the efficiency gains for emissions.

And the argument this is leading to is that it makes far greater sense to default to greater dependence on prudential social redesign, rather than optimistic technocentrism, behind which is techno-politics.

For discussion of battery technology and scope for improvement, see Manzetti and Mariasiu (2015) and Faraday Institution (2019) . Currently, most BEVs use lithium-ion phosphate, nickel-manganese cobalt oxide or aluminium oxide batteries. Liquid electrolyte constituents require containment and shielding. Specifically, a battery creates a flow of electrons from the positive electrode (the cathode made of a lithium metal oxide, etc. from the previous list) through a conducting electrolyte medium (lithium salt in an organic solution) to a negative electrode (the anode made typically of carbon, since early experiment with metals tended to produce excess heating and fire). This creates a current. Charging flows to the anode and discharge oxidises the anode which must then be recharged. The batteries are relatively low ‘energy density’ and can be a fire hazard when they heat. Given the chemical constituents, battery disposal is also a significant environmental hazard (see IEA, 2019A: pp. 8, 22–3). A ‘solid-state’ battery uses a specially designed (possibly glass or ceramic) solid medium that allows ions to travel through from one electrode to another. The solid-state technology is in principle higher energy density, much lighter and more durable. The implication is higher kWh batteries with greater range, charging capacity and durability and efficiency. Jeremy Dyson has reportedly invested heavily in solid-state technology and though his proposed own brand BEV is not now going ahead, reports indicate the battery technology investment will continue.

One might also consider hydrogen battery technology. Hydrogen fuel cell technology for vehicles is different than BEV. The vehicle has a tank in the rear for compressed cooled gas, which supplies the cell at the front of the car whilst driving. Refuelling is a rapid pumping process rather than a long wait. The gas has two possible origins: natural gas conversion where ‘steam methane reformation’ separates methane into hydrogen and CO 2 or water electrolysis, where grid AC electricity is converted to DC, which is applied to water and using a membrane splits it into hydrogen and waste oxygen. Currently, over 95% of hydrogen is from the former. Major investors in hydrogen technology are Shell (for natural gas conversion), IMT Power (in partnership with Shell) for water conversion and Toyota whose Mirai model is hydrogen powered.

Though fewer new cars were registered than in previous years, this significant metric for the total number of vehicles is the cumulative number of registrations (taking into account cars no longer registered). There are, however, some underlying issues: uncertainty regarding the status of diesel cars and problems of availability, cost and trust in BEVs seems to be causing many people in the UK to delay buying a new car; the expansion of Uber meanwhile has had a generational and urban effect, reducing car ownership as an aspiration amongst the young.

And re aviation, a new runway at Heathrow between 2026 and 2050.

See: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/852708/provisional-road-traffic-estimates-gb-october-2018-to-september-2019.pdf .

See: https://greenworld.org.uk/article/budget-deeply-disappointing-says-caroline-lucas

For example, global production of cobalt in 2018 was 120,000 tonnes, and production of about 2 million BEVs currently requires around 25,000 tonnes, so 10 million BEVs would require all of the current output. Cobalt traded at more than US$90,000 per ton 2018 but had fallen to around US$30,000 at the end of 2019.

In the UK, the current daily consumption of petrol and diesel for road transport is about 125 million litres or about 45 billion litres per year. So, BEVs are essentially substituting for this scale of energy use, shifting demand to electricity generation. National Grid attempted to model this in 2017. Their forecast (highly contingent obviously) suggests that if all cars sold by 2040 were BEVs and thus the car market was dominated by BEVs by 2050 and if most vehicles were charged at peak times in 2050 then an additional 30 gigawatts of electricity would be required. This is about 50% greater than the current peak winter demand in 2017. This was widely reported in the press. This best/worst case, of course, does not allow for innovative solutions such as off-peak home charging pioneered by Ovo and other niche suppliers. However, even with such solutions, there will still be a net increase in required capacity from the system. This has been estimated at about 10 new Hinckley power stations.

One possible long-term solution currently in development is toughened solar panel devices that can be laid as a road or car park surfaces, enabling contact recharging of the vehicle (in motion or otherwise). There are, however, multiple problems with the technology so far.

For example, analysis from Capital Economics suggests a three-way charging split is likely to develop: home recharging is likely to dominate, followed by an on-route charging model (substituting for current petrol forecourts at roadside) and destination recharging (given charging is slower than filling a fuel tank it makes sense to transform car parks at destinations into charging centres—supermarkets, etc.). They estimate UK demand at 25 million BEV chargers by 2050 of which all but 2.6 million will be home charging. As of early 2020, there were 8,400 filling stations which might be fully converted. Tesco has a reported commitment to install 2,400 charging points. These are issues frequently reported in the press.

This point can also be made in other ways. Not only does the emissions saving relate to net new sources of cars, but the contrast is also in terms of trend changes in the size of vehicle. According to the recent IEA World Energy Outlook report ( IEA, 2019B ), the number of SUVs is increasing and these consume around 25% more fuel than a mid-range car. If current growth trends continue (SUVs are 42% of new sales in China, 30% in India and about 50% in the USA), the IEA projects that the take-up of ICE SUVs will more than offset any marginal gains in emissions from the transition to BEVs.

It is also the case that the projected ‘savings’ from ULEVs are likely inaccurate. Following the EU, most countries adopted (and manufacturers report using) the Worldwide Harmonised Light Vehicle Test Procedure (WLTP). This became mandatory in the UK from September 2018. The WLTP is the new laboratory defined test for car distance-energy metrics. Vehicles are tested at 23°C, but without associated use of A/C or heating. Though claimed to as realistic than its predecessors, it is still basically unrealistic. Temperature range for ULEVs has significant consequences for battery performance and for use of on-board services, so real distance travelled per unit of energy is liable to be less. For similar reasons, ICEs will also travel less distance per litre of fuel so this is not a comparative gain for ICEs, it is likely a comparative loss to all of us if we rely on the figures.

See https://www.theccc.org.uk/2018/07/10/road-to-zero-a-missed-opportunity/ .

See https://www.theccc.org.uk/2018/07/10/governments-road-to-zero-strategy-falls-short-ccc-says/ .

See https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/08/shared-avs-could-save-the-world-private-avs-could-ruin-it/ .

For practical network initiatives, see, for example, https://climatestrategies.org .

Email alerts

Citing articles via.

• Contact Cambridge Political Economy Society
• Recommend to your Library

Affiliations

• Online ISSN 1464-3545
• Print ISSN 0309-166X
• Copyright © 2024 Cambridge Political Economy Society
• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Institutional account management
• Rights and permissions
• Get help with access
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

On the Move: Unpacking the Challenges and Opportunities of Electric Vehicles

By joseph glandorf.

November 5, 2020

Electric vehicles have the potential to reshape the transportation sector in the United States, drastically cutting carbon emissions and clearing the way for significant climate progress. Transportation is the highest-emitting sector in the country, producing 28 percent of all carbon (CO2) emissions in 2018. Electric cars could transform this high-emissions sector. A study released by the Union of Concerned Scientists in 2015 shows that, in the United States, electric cars generate half or less than half of the emissions of comparable gasoline-powered cars from manufacturing to disposal.

California Governor Gavin Newsom recently underscored the importance of electric vehicles when he announced on September 23 that California would require all new cars and passenger trucks sold in the state to be zero-emission vehicles by 2035. Though electric vehicles (EVs) still emit carbon emissions through the manufacturing process and from the fossil fuels used to generate the electricity they need to recharge, their enhanced energy efficiency secures significant emission reductions. On average, EVs convert over 77 percent of the electrical energy from the grid to power at the wheels, while gasoline vehicles only convert between 12 to 30 percent of the energy stored in gasoline to power at the wheels. Nevertheless, there remain significant hurdles to widespread adoption of electric vehicles, which are explored below in part 1. Congress is considering legislation that would address these hurdles, including the Electric Vehicle Freedom Act, and has already passed the Charging Helps Agencies Realize General Efficiencies (CHARGE) Act (see part 2 of this article).

Part 1: Electric Vehicle Challenges and Opportunities

Charging times. There are three major “levels” of chargers available for EVs. The standard 120-volt plug, often used for home appliances, charges slowly but can fill a battery to near full capacity with several nights’ charge, or about 20 to 40 hours . The 240-volt "level two” chargers generally provide 20 to 25 miles of charge in an hour, which shortens charging time to eight hours or less. In homes, level two chargers can use the same outlet type required for clothes dryers or electric ovens. In the EV industry, the connectors used for level two charging are known as SAE J1772. Finally, "level 3" direct current (DC) fast chargers can charge a battery up to 80 percent in 30 minutes. Currently, level two chargers are the most widely available—the Department of Energy lists 22,816 public stations in the United States. There are important cost differences between charger types. According to a study by the Rocky Mountain Institute, costs for a level two charger’s components range from $2,500 to $7,210 and from $20,000 to $35,800 for a DC fast charger. The decision of which stations to install requires balancing the cost of installation with the needs and convenience of drivers.

Charger compatibility.  Level two charger development has been a relatively coordinated process, with all automakers besides Tesla using the same charge port model (with Tesla drivers using an adapter to connect). Three different varieties of DC fast chargers are used by different auto manufacturers: the SAE Combined Charging System (CCS), used by most manufacturers; CHAdeMO, used by Nissan and Mitsubishi; and the Tesla Supercharger (only available to Tesla drivers). This lack of vehicle compatibility differs from universal vehicle access to gas stations and could be an obstacle to widespread electric car adoption.

Availability of charging infrastructure. Rather than being refueled at a typical gas station, electric vehicles must be charged at electrical outlets in order to run. Many EV owners charge their cars at home in their garage using a special wall-mounted charger. This arrangement works for most people, because the average person drives 29 miles per day. This distance is well within the range of today’s electric vehicles, most of which can travel between 150 and 250 miles on a charge, depending on the model. However, two major difficulties arise. First, for drivers who live in apartments, parking garages are rarely equipped with charging infrastructure, and installing such infrastructure may be cost prohibitive for building managers. There is also the additional problem of the electric costs incurred at common outlets . Because regular EV charging consumes more energy than most other residential uses, building managers need a mechanism to monitor EV charging to ensure the driver of each vehicle pays for their own electricity usage.

Second, expanded charging infrastructure is needed for EVs to make long-distance trips that require multiple stops for charging. A recent study by the International Council on Clean Transportation indicated that 10,000 more charging stations will be required to support EVs traveling on inter-city corridors by 2025, based on trends of increasing EV ownership. When it comes to longer trips, EV owners can experience “range anxiety,” the fear that the car will run out of power before reaching a suitable charging station. Surveys show that concerns about range and charging availability are an important limit on consumer uptake of EVs. A 2018 report by the Harris polling firm found that 58 percent of respondents named “running out of power” as their top reason for not purchasing an EV, and 49 percent named “low availability of charging stations.”

Renewable energy and climate mitigation . While not a hurdle to widespread EV adoption in and of itself, the electrical grid’s continued reliance on fossil fuels can reduce the cost-effectiveness of EV adoption as an emissions abatement strategy. Despite reducing emissions even when connected to a fossil-powered grid, electric vehicles are a much more cost-effective emission reduction tool when renewable energy sources make up a greater proportion of the energy mix. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), on a relatively high-carbon grid (which produces 500–600 grams of CO2 equivalent emissions per kilowatt-hour of power generation), light-duty electric vehicles can cost “many hundreds of dollars” per ton of CO2 abated. However, in a relatively low-carbon grid (which emits below 200 grams of CO2 equivalent per kilowatt-hour), EVs cost below $200 per ton of abatement. Maximizing the use of renewable energy to power electric vehicles is therefore crucial.

Grid capacity. Trading out a national fleet of gasoline-powered cars and trucks for a fleet of EVs means that millions of people will depend on the electric grid in new ways. Therefore, power generation capacity will need to increase to accommodate these vehicles without straining the grid. Expert assessments vary on how much electricity demand will increase with widespread EV use. The Department of Energy predicts a 38 percent increase in electricity consumption by 2050, mostly due to a high penetration of electric vehicles. Researchers at the Energy Institute at the University of Texas Austin conducted a state-by-state assessment of a scenario in which all personal cars, trucks, and SUVs are converted to plug-in electric models. The study finds that state energy consumption would range from an increase of 17 percent in Wyoming to 55 percent in Maine. Most states ’ consumption increases clustered between 20 to 30 percent. While some state grids have the available excess capacity to generate increased amounts of power with existing infrastructure under favorable assumptions for charging times, others do not. The ability of grids to handle EV charging also depends on what time of day the vehicles are plugged in. EVs have a much lower chance of overloading grids if charged at off-peak hours , when fewer consumers are using electricity.

Vehicle costs. Electric cars generally have higher sticker prices than their gasoline-fueled counterparts, mostly because of expensive materials and processes used in battery production . Although these costs have fallen steeply over the last decade, the average sticker price on a new electric vehicle is around $30-40,000. However, electric vehicles are likely to accrue significant savings on fuel over a 15-year lifespan. According to a study by the U.S. Department of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and the Idaho National Laboratory, under baseline scenario assumptions about gas prices, electricity costs, and charging behavior, electric vehicles could save consumers anywhere between $4,500 to $12,000. The savings depend on the driver’s state of residence, with Hawaii offering the lowest savings and California the highest. Even with the savings over time, it remains important for electric vehicles to be affordable at point of purchase to compete with gasoline-powered cars.

Charging behavior. Electric vehicle charging behavior differs significantly from the refueling behaviors of cars owners with conventional internal combustion engines. According to the Department of Energy, 80 percent of EV charging is done at home. However, many consumers are uneasy about the prospect of long charging times at public stations on longer trips that exceed the range of their vehicles.

Sales outlook . According to the Department of Energy, as of 2019, electric cars made up 2.1 percent of all new light-duty vehicle sales in the United States, up from 0.7 percent in 2015. Currently, Tesla sells the largest share of new electric vehicles in the United States, but the Nissan Leaf makes up the largest share of used EV sales. The Edison Electric Institute predicts that electric vehicles will make up 7 percent of all vehicles on the road by 2030, or about 18.7 million vehicles. While this growth rate is impressive, it will need to be dramatically increased if uptake is to progress fast enough to meet international climate targets.

Charging station financing and ownership. Electric vehicle charging stations are expensive to install—as mentioned above, public station component costs can range from as little as $2,500 for a level two charger up to $35,800 for a DC fast charger. These price ranges do not include installation costs and “soft costs,” such as navigating the permitting process, regulations, and interconnection with utilities. These costs raise the question of who pays for the construction of these stations. Currently, charging station construction is paid for primarily by car and energy companies and business owners , including the managers of parking lots and garages, shopping centers, and retailers seeking to attract EV users. Some of the largest charging station projects in the country are Volkswagen’s Electrify America program and Tesla’s station deployment. Each company is spending around $2 billion on its respective project. EVgo , a company that installs DC fast chargers, is currently working on a project funded by venture capital and grants from state governments and environmental programs. Historically, such large projects have tended to be unprofitable due to high upfront costs; electric car use will need to become more widespread before they can turn a profit. Several states, including California and Texas, have also allowed utilities to invest in EV charging stations. Some state officials have expressed concern that utility participation could reduce private competition, but officials in states that have allowed it argue that it has expanded charging station infrastructure at a much faster rate.

Pricing. Unlike gas stations, where the price of fuel is set per gallon, EV charging can currently follow a number of different pricing schemes, which can lead to inconsistent pricing and sometimes high charging costs. Home charging prices are consistent rates per kilowatt-hour (kWh) set by utility regulators . Public charging station pricing has used schemes including per-session fees, per-minute fees, and tiered pricing based on a vehicle’s max charging speed. Charging fees are often not displayed at charging stations. This inconsistency and lack of transparency are barriers to EV adoption because they can lead to frustration and negative customer experiences. Per-kWh pricing models most clearly resemble gas prices in that the price is determined per unit of energy delivered to the vehicle. EV drivers typically favor this pricing model. Available pricing structures are constrained by state laws. States are increasingly moving to allow per-kWh pricing, sometimes with a tiered pricing structure, which charges higher rates for faster charging speeds. In states like Maryland where charging stations are operated by regulated utilities, drivers pay per-kWh rates set by the utility regulator.

Part 2: Federal EV Legislation

Congress is actively working to break down barriers for EVs. A recent piece of legislation, the Charging Helps Agencies Realize General Efficiencies (CHARGE) Act ( Public Law No: 116-160 ) became law on October 1, 2020. The bipartisan bill, originally sponsored by Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) with Rep. Anthony Gonzalez (R-Ohio) in the House and Sen. Gary Peters (D-Mich.) with Sen. Rob Portman (R-Ohio) in the Senate, allows federal employees to use Fleet Service Cards provided by the General Services Administration (GSA) to pay for charging at public electric vehicle charging stations. Fleet Service Cards provide for the refueling of government vehicles, but currently only cover gas station refueling. This means that federal employees who own EVs are unable to take advantage of the card and must shoulder higher costs. The Act aims to facilitate more widespread use of EVs by federal employees by removing this obstacle to charging availability. It also lowers fuel costs for federal agencies by taking advantage of the energy efficiency of EVs.

Another recent piece of legislation looks towards a more comprehensive expansion of EVs. The Electric Vehicle Freedom Act , or EV Freedom Act ( H.R. 5770 ), proposed in February by Rep. Andy Levin (D-Mich.), intends to construct electric vehicle supply equipment along all public roads in the National Highway System within five years so that EV drivers can travel anywhere on these roads in the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico without running out of charge. Specifically, the electric vehicle supply equipment would be level three DC fast chargers. The charging stations must be compatible with multiple brands of electric vehicle so as not to favor any individual manufacturer.

The EV Freedom Act’s primary aim is to eliminate range anxiety on long-distance trips, and therefore address one of the major concerns of would-be EV drivers. By mandating the use of DC fast chargers, the bill also intends to eliminate inconvenience to drivers as much as possible, allowing drivers to fill 80 percent of the car battery in about half an hour. As of mid-2020, according to the Department of Energy , only 3,653 publicly available fast-charging stations were operating in the United States, so this bill would constitute a dramatic expansion.

Given the high costs of producing and installing DC fast charging stations, the cost of the project would likely be steep. In the trade-off between cost and driver convenience, the bill leans heavily toward convenience. However, the bill cannot fully eliminate the inconveniences associated with EV charging, since even a half-hour charging time takes longer than a visit to a gas station. Driver adaptation will still be necessary. Further, there may be long waiting times at charging stations if EVs reach high market penetration. The bill attempts to address this concern by explicitly mandating consideration of “dense corridors where multiple stations or a greater number of charging ports at the location are necessary” to meet demand.

The bill’s concern for standardization of DC fast-charging stations would also remedy the current problems of interoperability between car manufacturers. Setting this DC standard would require coordination between manufacturers, but the bill provides for extensive consultations with them and other stakeholders.

The bill would direct the Secretary of Energy and Secretary of Transportation to convene and create a national electric vehicle supply equipment plan within three years of its passage, in consultation with government entities, Native American nations, nonprofit organizations, and businesses. The plan would then be presented to Congressional committees with jurisdiction over transportation, energy, and environment. The plan would consider ways to optimize EV connectivity with renewable energy infrastructure, thus lowering the CO2 abatement costs of EV use. It also calls for “electric distribution upgrades,” so that grids are able to handle energy demand at peak charging times.

To conduct a study of suitable financial instruments and public-private partnership arrangements, the bill would commission a study by the Transportation Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences. According to Rep. Levin during a recent webinar hosted by the Environmental Law and Policy Center , the study would aim to find ways to maximize direct investment from the private sector. Private businesses, such as retailers, would operate the charging stations instead of regulated utilities. However, public-private collaborations of this kind risk distributing costs disproportionately to the public by requiring the government put up a higher initial investment than the private sector, so the details of the financing plan are crucial.

The legislation calls for a plan to impose “pricing guidelines that enable operators of publicly available electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), namely charging stations, to allow free charging or impose a fee for charging, promoting a consistent, reliable consumer charging and payment experience.” This addresses concerns over inconsistent or unreasonably high charging prices, but leaves the response to those concerns an open question without favoring specific tools to keep prices low, such as regulated utility rates or per-kWh pricing.

Electric vehicles have great potential to draw down carbon emissions if widely adopted. Vehicle costs are falling as battery prices have decreased 87 percent in the last decade, and EV sales are increasing at a rapid rate. But, meaningful emissions mitigation through mainstream EV adoption is inhibited by many complex technological, economic, and behavioral problems and trade-offs, and policy responses are needed to address these challenges. The CHARGE Act is a promising first step and the EV Freedom Act provides possible next steps. But many different approaches are possible, and all deserve consideration as political momentum builds on this critical issue.

By: Joseph Glandorf

Electric Vehicles and Their Future Perspectives Essay

I think electric vehicles are the future of the automobile industry, even though they share only a small part of the total automobile market now. Despite being in a developing state today, they are more reliable, ecological, and flexible compared to the internal compulsion engines (ICEs), which use gasoline and similar products. However, many issues prevent them from conquering the automobile market: they require frequent recharge and consume a lot of electricity. While people often prefer gasoline cars over electric ones, I believe the future is on the side of EVs, as their advantages are vivid, and the disadvantages will be overcome with technical progress.

Recent studies show that the popularity and robustness of EVs have risen, and this tendency is continuing. Electric vehicles are safer, more flexible, and easier to drive, in addition to their higher ecological value (Un-Noor et al. 1225–27). Public charging facilities are an important part of the EV industry, as they need to be recharged regularly. The power of charging stations and batteries’ capacity is constantly increasing, and the refueling frequency was close to the ordinary internal compulsion engine in 2018 (Gnann et al. 326).

It means that the worktime of EV batteries and gasoline cars’ engines became similar, and ICEs lost their advantage. While before, the capacity of the electric battery was expected to be quite low, the situation is changing as more advanced batteries are developing (Un-Noor et al. 1239–40). Thus, electric vehicle issues are continuously solving, and future electric cars may be even more productive than gasoline ones.

The main current problem, however, is the large price of EVs and their service compared to ICE. It is much easier to simply pour the fuel into the car than create an electric battery that can be recharged. Electric vehicles were popular at the beginning of the automobile industry despite being slow and expensive, similar to all cars in those times (Un-Noor et al. 1218). The quickly developing internal compulsion engines replaced them due to the low fuel prices and larger velocities. Despite today’s EVs conquering the market again, they are quite heavy for the power infrastructure and require smart recharge stations, which do not load the system much (Un-Noor et al. 1268–69). Social acceptance of buying EVs depends highly on the recharge stations’ availability, and while some countries provide privileges for electric car purchasing, people still accept gasoline cars better (Gnann et al. 315; Un-Noor et al. 1276). Still, as one can see, this situation will change as EVs become more and more developed.

As I would need a car for traveling in urbanized and semi-urbanized areas, I would buy an EV. There are enough charging stations in cities, and if I need to travel for a long distance, which will probably be rare, I can use additional batteries. The advantages of electric cars, along with their ecological clearness, are their robustness, safety, and high flexibility. In my opinion, as EV technologies will continue to improve, electric cars will become much better than today. Therefore, buying such a car is also an investment in the future.

One can see that EVs are a robust and useful tool. Despite having issues, such as high prices, overreliance on charging stations, and large loads on power infrastructure, those problems are solving actively. Batteries’ power and capacity are constantly rising as technical progress continues, and smart charging stations enable them to recharge quickly and without a high-power load. I would certainly buy an EV, as I believe it is the best choice for city travel, and their technologies will be developing actively. Despite being unreliable for traveling long distances, the situation is constantly improving, and the future of EVs is certainly bright.

Works Cited

Gnann, Till, et al. “ Fast Charging Infrastructure for Electric Vehicles: Today’s Situation and Future Needs. ” Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment , vol. 62, 2018, pp. 314–29. Web.

Un-Noor, Fuad, et al. “ A Comprehensive Study of Key Electric Vehicle (EV) Components, Technologies, Challenges, Impacts, and Future Direction of Development. ” Energies , vol. 10, no. 8. 2017, p. 1217. Web.

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2023, December 14). Electric Vehicles and Their Future Perspectives. https://ivypanda.com/essays/electric-vehicles-and-their-future-perspectives/

"Electric Vehicles and Their Future Perspectives." IvyPanda , 14 Dec. 2023, ivypanda.com/essays/electric-vehicles-and-their-future-perspectives/.

IvyPanda . (2023) 'Electric Vehicles and Their Future Perspectives'. 14 December.

IvyPanda . 2023. "Electric Vehicles and Their Future Perspectives." December 14, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/electric-vehicles-and-their-future-perspectives/.

1. IvyPanda . "Electric Vehicles and Their Future Perspectives." December 14, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/electric-vehicles-and-their-future-perspectives/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Electric Vehicles and Their Future Perspectives." December 14, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/electric-vehicles-and-their-future-perspectives/.

• Treatment of Wastewater
• Contrast Between Electric and Gasoline Cars
• Electric Vehicle Charging System Infrastructure Support
• Indigenous Elders' Impact on Urbanized Children
• Pricing Strategy for a General Motors' Chevrolet Bolt EV
• Selecting Specification of Electric Vehicle
• Electric vs. Internal Combustion Engine Vehicles: Comparison
• Comparison of Electric and Gas-Powered Vehicles
• The EV Products in China
• Analysis of the Better Place Electric Car Scheme
• Self-Driven Cars from the Future Perspectives
• Driving in the Winter and in the Summer
• Electric and Gasoline Cars Comparison
• Intelligent Transportation Systems' Challenges and Needs
• Public Transportation in Australia: Impact of COVID-19

Your browser is ancient! Upgrade to a different browser or install Google Chrome Frame to experience this site.

Electric vehicles are widely seen as an optimal solution to wean ourselves off fossil fuels in transportation. 

Electric vehicles are the future of green transportation

Photo: Pixabay / geralt 

As we seek to decarbonize transportation and eliminate air pollution in urban areas, electric vehicles are widely seen as an optimal solution to wean ourselves off fossil fuels.

However, many people continue to resist making major changes and switching to an electric vehicle would qualify as one. A drawback of current models of EVs is that you can’t just pull up to the nearest gas station to refuel whenever necessary. Instead, you have to find charging points.

That said, a study this year of Americans by Consumer Reports indicates that 71% of respondents were interested in purchasing electtic vehicles. A further breakdown indicated 14% of them would go with an EV if they were to buy or lease a car. That’s significant since only 4% said so in the 2020 survey. Moreover, 22% would seriously consider getting an electric car and 35% might consider doing so.

Another takeaway was that 53% of respondents said tax rebates or perks given at the time of purchase would make them more likely to buy EVs. However, 46% said they were unaware of EV-related incentives. That suggests automobile dealerships and others in the industry should make a bigger effort to educate potential buyers.

Electric vehicles are gaining global momentum 

Making lasting positive changes with clean transportation requires people to commit to doing things differently. Electric vehicles are not the only path to a cleaner future in transportation, but they’re significant contributors to it.

The 2022 Global Electric Vehicle Outlook from the International Energy Agency indicated that 2 million electric cars were sold in the first quarter of 2022. That was a three-quarter rise from the same period in the previous year. The IEA counts both fully electric vehicles and hybrids in its statistics.

Another finding was that electric car sales set a new record of 6.6 million in 2021, doubling the previous year’s rate. Some areas of the world had even more robust growth.

In China, people purchased 3.3 million EVs throughout 2021. There was also a 65% sales increase in Europe, totaling 2.3 million cars sold. The 2021 EV sales in the United States reached 630,000, representing more than double the previous year’s totals.

It’ll probably be a while before electric cars surpass conventional ones, but things are moving in the right direction. People who see EVs readily available and notice them on the roads more often will be open to purchasing them.

Corporate fleets are getting electrified 

Electric vehicle use cannot happen only on the consumer level to get the widespread adoption it needs to support a cleaner, greener future. Decision-makers at corporations must also get on board with EV adoption.

Research shows 28% of all emissions come from the transport sector. Taking buses to work is a good start, especially if those vehicles are electric. However, the inefficiency of many bus routes makes it impractical for some people to use them for daily commutes. Others don’t live in areas with well-developed public transit networks, making it impossible to rely on them.

Many jobs come with a company car as a perk. Business leaders can make a sustainable choice by prioritizing electric vehicles when giving employees vehicles to drive.

There’s slow but steady progress in company representatives modernizing their fleets to feature more electric options. Logistics provider DHL has nearly 20,000 electric scooters and bicycles in its fleet. Offering more electric options has also helped rental brand Hertz see healthy profits. If company leaders aren’t ready to buy EVs for employees, securing electric rentals for business trips is the next best thing.

There’s even the option of letting employees use corporate cars through a subscription service. Onto is an option based in the United Kingdom that will soon expand into Europe, with Germany as the first target. Subscribers can currently drive 750 miles per month and charge the cars within a United Kingdom network of 12,500 locations.

Research from the Corporate Electric Vehicle Alliance, a collaboration of businesses motivated to accelerate the EV transition, showed that its members want to buy more EVs and would even purchase from different manufacturers if needed.

Members collectively plan to buy almost 333,000 electric vehicles of various types. Additionally, 96% said they would change automakers if necessary to get their desired EV configurations.

Those statistics came as members presented some of the world’s leading automakers with a framework for developing the kinds of vehicles corporate purchasers want and need. They have meaningful future purchasing power since companies in the Alliance, including Best Buy and Amazon, collectively own, lease or use 1.3 million vehicles in the United States.

Electric vehicles don’t dominate on the road yet, but it’s clear there will be more of them in the future. As that happens, people can participate in a cleaner way of getting around that provides the convenience they need.

Topics we care about

SUBSCRIBE AND FOLLOW

Related articles.

Most sources of protein in the US contain vast quantities of microplastics

Banking on change: How your accounts have climate impact

Sparxell’s glitter is golden with nature-based color, design

Create an account

Create a free IEA account to download our reports or subcribe to a paid service.

Trends in electric cars

• Executive summary

Electric car sales

Electric car availability and affordability.

• Electric two- and three-wheelers
• Electric light commercial vehicles
• Electric truck and bus sales
• Electric heavy-duty vehicle model availability
• Charging for electric light-duty vehicles
• Charging for electric heavy-duty vehicles
• Battery supply and demand
• Battery prices
• Electric vehicle company strategy and market competition
• Electric vehicle and battery start-ups
• Vehicle outlook by mode
• Vehicle outlook by region
• The industry outlook
• Light-duty vehicle charging
• Heavy-duty vehicle charging
• Battery demand
• Electricity demand
• Oil displacement
• Well-to-wheel greenhouse gas emissions
• Lifecycle impacts of electric cars

Cite report

IEA (2024), Global EV Outlook 2024 , IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2024, Licence: CC BY 4.0

Share this report

• Share on Twitter Twitter
• Share on Facebook Facebook
• Share on LinkedIn LinkedIn
• Share on Email Email
• Share on Print Print

Report options

Nearly one in five cars sold in 2023 was electric.

Electric car sales neared 14 million in 2023, 95% of which were in China, Europe and the United States

Almost 14 million new electric cars 1 were registered globally in 2023, bringing their total number on the roads to 40 million, closely tracking the sales forecast from the 2023 edition of the Global EV Outlook (GEVO-2023). Electric car sales in 2023 were 3.5 million higher than in 2022, a 35% year-on-year increase. This is more than six times higher than in 2018, just 5 years earlier. In 2023, there were over 250 000 new registrations per week, which is more than the annual total in 2013, ten years earlier. Electric cars accounted for around 18% of all cars sold in 2023, up from 14% in 2022 and only 2% 5 years earlier, in 2018. These trends indicate that growth remains robust as electric car markets mature. Battery electric cars accounted for 70% of the electric car stock in 2023.

Global electric car stock, 2013-2023

While sales of electric cars are increasing globally, they remain significantly concentrated in just a few major markets. In 2023, just under 60% of new electric car registrations were in the People’s Republic of China (hereafter ‘China’), just under 25% in Europe, 2 and 10% in the United States – corresponding to nearly 95% of global electric car sales combined. In these countries, electric cars account for a large share of local car markets: more than one in three new car registrations in China was electric in 2023, over one in five in Europe, and one in ten in the United States. However, sales remain limited elsewhere, even in countries with developed car markets such as Japan and India. As a result of sales concentration, the global electric car stock is also increasingly concentrated. Nevertheless, China, Europe and the United States also represent around two-thirds of total car sales and stocks, meaning that the EV transition in these markets has major repercussions in terms of global trends.

In China, the number of new electric car registrations reached 8.1 million in 2023, increasing by 35% relative to 2022. Increasing electric car sales were the main reason for growth in the overall car market, which contracted by 8% for conventional (internal combustion engine) cars but grew by 5% in total, indicating that electric car sales are continuing to perform as the market matures. The year 2023 was the first in which China’s New Energy Vehicle (NEV) 3 industry ran without support from national subsidies for EV purchases, which have facilitated expansion of the market for more than a decade. Tax exemption for EV purchases and non-financial support remain in place, after an extension , as the automotive industry is seen as one of the key drivers of economic growth. Some province-led support and investment also remains in place and plays an important role in China’s EV landscape. As the market matures, the industry is entering a phase marked by increased price competition and consolidation. In addition, China exported over 4 million cars in 2023, making it the largest auto exporter in the world, among which 1.2 million were EVs. This is markedly more than the previous year – car exports were almost 65% higher than in 2022, and electric car exports were 80% higher. The main export markets for these vehicles were Europe and countries in the Asia Pacific region, such as Thailand and Australia.

In the United States, new electric car registrations totalled 1.4 million in 2023, increasing by more than 40% compared to 2022. While relative annual growth in 2023 was slower than in the preceding two years, demand for electric cars and absolute growth remained strong. The revised qualifications for the Clean Vehicle Tax Credit, alongside electric car price cuts, meant that some popular EV models became eligible for credit in 2023. Sales of the Tesla Model Y, for example, increased 50% compared to 2022 after it became eligible for the full USD 7 500 tax credit. Overall, the new criteria established by the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) appear to have supported sales in 2023, despite earlier concerns that tighter domestic content requirements for EV and battery manufacturing could create immediate bottlenecks or delays, such as for the Ford F-150 Lightning . As of 2024, new guidance for the tax credits means the number of eligible models has fallen to less than 30 from about 45, 4 including several trim levels of the Tesla Model 3 becoming ineligible. However, in 2023 and 2024, leasing business models enable electric cars to qualify for the tax credits even if they do not fully meet the requirements, as leased cars can qualify for a less strict commercial vehicle tax credit and these tax credit savings can be passed to lease-holders. Such strategies have also contributed to sustained electric car roll-out.

In Europe, new electric car registrations reached nearly 3.2 million in 2023, increasing by almost 20% relative to 2022. In the European Union, sales amounted to 2.4 million, with similar growth rates. As in China, the high rates of electric car sales seen in Europe suggest that growth remains robust as markets mature, and several European countries reached important milestones in 2023. Germany, for example, became the third country after China and the United States to record half a million new battery electric car registrations in a single year, with 18% of car sales being battery electric (and another 6% plug-in hybrid).

However, the phase-out of several purchase subsidies in Germany slowed overall EV sales growth. At the start of 2023, PHEV subsidies were phased out, resulting in lower PHEV sales compared to 2022, and in December 2023, all EV subsidies ended after a ruling on the Climate and Transformation Fund. In Germany, the sales share for electric cars fell from 30% in 2022 to 25% in 2023. This had an impact on the overall electric car sales share in the region. In the rest of Europe, however, electric car sales and their sales share increased. Around 25% of all cars sold in France and the United Kingdom were electric, 30% in the Netherlands, and 60% in Sweden. In Norway, sales shares increased slightly despite the overall market contracting, and its sales share remains the highest in Europe, at almost 95%.

Electric car registrations and sales share in China, United States and Europe, 2018-2023

Sales in emerging markets are increasing, albeit from a low base, led by southeast asia and brazil.

Electric car sales continued to increase in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) outside China in 2023, but they remained low overall. In many cases, personal cars are not the most common means of passenger transport, especially compared with shared vans and minibuses, or two- and three-wheelers (2/3Ws), which are more prevalent and more often electrified, given their relative accessibility and affordability. The electrification of 2/3Ws and public or shared mobility will be key to achieve emissions reductions in such cases (see later sections in this report). While switching from internal combustion engine (ICE) to electric cars is important, the effect on overall emissions differs depending on the mode of transport that is displaced. Replacing 2/3Ws, public and shared mobility or more active forms of transport with personal cars may not be desirable in all cases.

In India, electric car registrations were up 70% year-on-year to 80 000, compared to a growth rate of under 10% for total car sales. Around 2% of all cars sold were electric. Purchase incentives under the Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric Vehicles (FAME II) scheme, supply-side incentives under the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme, tax benefits and the Go Electric campaign have all contributed to fostering demand in recent years. A number of new models also became popular in 2023, such as Mahindra’s XUV400, MG’s Comet, Citroën’s e-C3, BYD’s Yuan Plus, and Hyundai’s Ioniq 5, driving up growth compared to 2022. However, if the forthcoming FAME III scheme includes a subsidy reduction, as has been speculated in line with lower subsidy levels in the 2024 budget, future growth could be affected. Local carmakers have thus far maintained a strong foothold in the market, supported by advantageous import tariffs , and account for 80% of electric car sales in cumulative terms since 2010, led by Tata (70%) and Mahindra (10%).

In Thailand, electric car registrations more than quadrupled year-on-year to nearly 90 000, reaching a notable 10% sales share – comparable to the share in the United States. This is all the more impressive given that overall car sales in the country decreased from 2022 to 2023. New subsidies, including for domestic battery manufacturing, and lower import and excise taxes, combined with the growing presence of Chinese carmakers , have contributed to rapidly increasing sales. Chinese companies account for over half the sales to date, and they could become even more prominent given that BYD plans to start operating EV production facilities in Thailand in 2024, with an annual production capacity of 150 000 vehicles for an investment of just under USD 500 million . Thailand aims to become a major EV manufacturing hub for domestic and export markets, and is aiming to attract USD 28 billion in foreign investment within 4 years, backed by specific incentives to foster investment.

In Viet Nam, after an exceptional 2022 for the overall car market, car sales contracted by 25% in 2023, but electric car sales still recorded unprecedented growth: from under 100 in 2021, to 7 000 in 2022, and over 30 000 in 2023, reaching a 15% sales share. Domestic front-runner VinFast, established in 2017, accounted for nearly all domestic sales. VinFast also started selling electric sports utility vehicles (SUVs) in North America in 2023, as well as developing manufacturing facilities in order to unlock domestic content-linked subsidies under the US IRA. VinFast is investing around USD 2 billion and targets an annual production of 150 000 vehicles in the United States by 2025. The company went public in 2023, far exceeding expectations with a debut market valuation of around USD 85 billion, well beyond General Motors (GM) (USD 46 billion), Ford (USD 48 billion) or BMW (USD 68 billion), before it settled back down around USD 20 billion by the end of the year. VinFast also looks to enter regional markets, such as India and the Philippines .

In Malaysia, electric car registrations more than tripled to 10 000, supported by tax breaks and import duty exemptions, as well as an acceleration in charging infrastructure roll-out. In 2023, Mercedes-Benz marketed the first domestically assembled EV, and both BYD and Tesla also entered the market.

In Latin America, electric car sales reached almost 90 000 in 2023, with markets in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico leading the region. In Brazil, electric car registrations nearly tripled year-on-year to more than 50 000, a market share of 3%. Growth in Brazil was underpinned by the entry of Chinese carmakers, such as BYD with its Song and Dolphin models, Great Wall with its H6, and Chery with its Tiggo 8, which immediately ranked among the best-selling models in 2023. Road transport electrification in Brazil could bring significant climate benefits given the largely low-emissions power mix, as well as reducing local air pollution. However, EV adoption has been slow thus far, given the national prioritisation of ethanol-based fuels since the late 1970s as a strategy to maintain energy security in the face of oil shocks. Today, biofuels are important alternative fuels available at competitive cost and aligned with the existing refuelling infrastructure. Brazil remains the world’s largest producer of sugar cane, and its agribusiness represents about one-fourth of GDP. At the end of 2023, Brazil launched the Green Mobility and Innovation Programme , which provides tax incentives for companies to develop and manufacture low-emissions road transport technology, aggregating to more than BRA 19 billion (Brazilian reals) (USD 3.8 billion) over the 2024-2028 period. Several major carmakers already in Brazil are developing hybrid ethanol-electric models as a result. China’s BYD and Great Wall are also planning to start domestic manufacturing, counting on local battery metal deposits, and plan to sell both fully electric and hybrid ethanol-electric models. BYD is investing over USD 600 million in its electric car plant in Brazil – its first outside Asia – for an annual capacity of 150 000 vehicles. BYD also partnered with Raízen to develop charging infrastructure in eight Brazilian cities starting in 2024. GM, on the other hand, plans to stop producing ICE (including ethanol) models and go fully electric, notably to produce for export markets. In 2024, Hyundai announced investments of USD 1.1 billion to 2032 to start local manufacturing of electric, hybrid and hydrogen cars.

In Mexico, electric car registrations were up 80% year-on-year to 15 000, a market share just above 1%. Given its proximity to the United States, Mexico’s automotive market is already well integrated with North American partners, and benefits from advantageous trade agreements, large existing manufacturing capacity, and eligibility for subsidies under the IRA. As a result, local EV supply chains are developing quickly, with expectations that this will spill over into domestic markets. Tesla, Ford, Stellantis, BMW, GM, Volkswagen (VW) and Audi have all either started manufacturing or announced plans to manufacture EVs in Mexico. Chinese carmakers such as BYD, Chery and SAIC are also considering expanding to Mexico. Elsewhere in the region, Colombia and Costa Rica are seeing increasing electric car sales, with around 6 000 and 5 000 in 2023, respectively, but sales remain limited in other Central and South American countries.

Throughout Africa, Eurasia and the Middle East, electric cars are still rare, accounting for less than 1% of total car sales. However, as Chinese carmakers look for opportunities abroad, new models – including those produced domestically – could boost EV sales. For example, in Uzbekistan , BYD set up a joint venture with UzAuto Motors in 2023 to produce 50 000 electric cars annually, and Chery International established a partnership with ADM Jizzakh. This partnership has already led to a steep increase in electric car sales in Uzbekistan, reaching around 10 000 in 2023. In the Middle East, Jordan boasts the highest electric car sales share, at more than 45%, supported by much lower import duties relative to ICE cars, followed by the United Arab Emirates, with 13%.

Strong electric car sales in the first quarter of 2024 surpass the annual total from just four years ago

Electric car sales remained strong in the first quarter of 2024, surpassing those of the same period in 2023 by around 25% to reach more than 3 million. This growth rate was similar to the increase observed for the same period in 2023 compared to 2022. The majority of the additional sales came from China, which sold about half a million more electric cars than over the same period in 2023. In relative terms, the most substantial growth was observed outside of the major EV markets, where sales increased by over 50%, suggesting that the transition to electromobility is picking up in an increasing number of countries worldwide.

Quarterly electric car sales by region, 2021-2024

From January to March of this year, nearly 1.9 million electric cars were sold in China, marking an almost 35% increase compared to sales in the first quarter of 2023. In March, NEV sales in China surpassed a share of 40% in overall car sales for the first time, according to retail sales reported by the China Passenger Car Association. As witnessed in 2023, sales of plug-in hybrid electric cars are growing faster than sales of pure battery electric cars. Plug-in hybrid electric car sales in the first quarter increased by around 75% year-on-year in China, compared to just 15% for battery electric car sales, though the former started from a lower base.

In Europe, the first quarter of 2024 saw year-on-year growth of over 5%, slightly above the growth in overall car sales and thereby stabilising the EV sales share at a similar level as last year. Electric car sales growth was particularly high in Belgium, where around 60 000 electric cars were sold, almost 35% more than the year before. However, Belgium represents less than 5% of total European car sales. In the major European markets – France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom (together representing about 60% of European car sales) – growth in electric car sales was lower. In France, overall EV sales in the first quarter grew by about 15%, with BEV sales growth being higher than for PHEVs. While this is less than half the rate as over the same period last year, total sales were nonetheless higher and led to a slight increase in the share of EVs in total car sales. The United Kingdom saw similar year-on-year growth (over 15%) in EV sales as France, about the same rate as over the same period last year. In Germany, where battery electric car subsidies ended in 2023, sales of electric cars fell by almost 5% in the first quarter of 2024, mainly as a result of a 20% year-on-year decrease in March. The share of EVs in total car sales was therefore slightly lower than last year. As in China, PHEV sales in both Germany and the United Kingdom were stronger than BEV sales. In Italy, sales of electric cars in the first three months of 2024 were more than 20% lower than over the same period in 2023, with the majority of the decrease taking place in the PHEV segment. However, this trend could be reversed based on the introduction of a new incentive scheme , and if Chinese automaker Chery succeeds in appealing to Italian consumers when it enters the market later this year.

In the United States, first-quarter sales reached around 350 000, almost 15% higher than over the same period the year before. As in other major markets, the sales growth of PHEVs was even higher, at 50%. While the BEV sales share in the United States appears to have fallen somewhat over the past few months, the sales share of PHEVs has grown.

In smaller EV markets, sales growth in the first months of 2024 was much higher, albeit from a low base. In January and February, electric car sales almost quadrupled in Brazil and increased more than sevenfold in Viet Nam. In India, sales increased more than 50% in the first quarter of 2024. These figures suggest that EVs are gaining momentum across diverse markets worldwide.

Since 2021, first-quarter electric car sales have typically accounted for 15-20% of the total global annual sales. Based on this observed trend, coupled with policy momentum and the seasonality that EV sales typically experience, we estimate that electric car sales could reach around 17 million in 2024. This indicates robust growth for a maturing market, with 2024 sales to surpass those of 2023 by more than 20% and EVs to reach a share in total car sales of more than one-fifth.

Electric car sales, 2012-2024

The majority of the additional 3 million electric car sales projected for 2024 relative to 2023 are from China. Despite the phase-out of NEV purchase subsidies last year, sales in China have remained robust, indicating that the market is maturing. With strong competition and relatively low-cost electric cars, sales are to grow by almost 25% in 2024 compared to last year, reaching around 10 million. If confirmed, this figure will come close to the total global electric car sales in 2022. As a result, electric car sales could represent around 45% of total car sales in China over 2024.

In 2024, electric car sales in the United States are projected to rise by 20% compared to the previous year, translating to almost half a million more sales, relative to 2023. Despite reporting of a rocky end to 2023 for electric cars in the United States, sales shares are projected to remain robust in 2024. Over the entire year, around one in nine cars sold are expected to be electric.

Based on recent trends, and considering that tightening CO 2 targets are due to come in only in 2025, the growth in electric car sales in Europe is expected to be the lowest of the three largest markets. Sales are projected to reach around 3.5 million units in 2024, reflecting modest growth of less than 10% compared to the previous year. In the context of a generally weak outlook for passenger car sales, electric cars would still represent about one in four cars sold in Europe.

Outside of the major EV markets, electric car sales are anticipated to reach the milestone of over 1 million units in 2024, marking a significant increase of over 40% compared to 2023. Recent trends showing the success of both homegrown and Chinese electric carmakers in Southeast Asia underscore that the region is set to make a strong contribution to the sales of emerging EV markets (see the section on Trends in the electric vehicle industry). Despite some uncertainty surrounding whether India’s forthcoming FAME III scheme will include subsidies for electric cars, we expect sales in India to remain robust, and to experience around 50% growth compared to 2023. Across all regions outside the three major EV markets, electric car sales are expected to represent around 5% of total car sales in 2024, which – considering the high growth rates seen in recent years – could indicate that a tipping point towards global mass adoption is getting closer.

There are of course downside risks to the 2024 outlook for electric car sales. Factors such as high interest rates and economic uncertainty could potentially reduce the growth of global electric car sales in 2024. Other challenges may come from the IRA restrictions on US electric car tax incentives, and the tightening of technical requirements for EVs to qualify for the purchase tax exemption in China. However, there are also upside potentials to consider. New markets may open up more rapidly than anticipated, as automakers expand their EV operations and new entrants compete for market share. This could lead to accelerated growth in electric car sales globally, surpassing the initial estimations.

More electric models are becoming available, but the trend is towards larger ones

The number of available electric car models nears 600, two-thirds of which are large vehicles and SUVs

In 2023, the number of available models for electric cars increased 15% year-on-year to nearly 590, as carmakers scaled up electrification plans, seeking to appeal to a growing consumer base. Meanwhile, the number of fully ICE models (i.e. excluding hybrids) declined for the fourth consecutive year, at an average of 2%. Based on recent original equipment manufacturer (OEM) announcements, the number of new electric car models could reach 1 000 by 2028. If all announced new electric models actually reach the market, and if the number of available ICE car models continues to decline by 2% annually, there could be as many electric as ICE car models before 2030.

As reported in GEVO-2023, the share of small and medium electric car models is decreasing among available electric models: in 2023, two-thirds of the battery-electric models on the market were SUVs, 5 pick-up trucks or large cars. Just 25% of battery electric car sales in the United States were for small and medium models, compared to 40% in Europe and 50% in China. Electric cars are following the same trend as conventional cars, and getting bigger on average. In 2023, SUVs, pick-up trucks and large models accounted for 65% of total ICE car sales worldwide, and more than 80% in the United States, 60% in China and 50% in Europe.

Several factors underpin the increase in the share of large models. Since the 2010s, conventional SUVs in the United States have benefited from less stringent tailpipe emissions rules than smaller models, creating an incentive for carmakers to market more vehicles in that segment. Similarly, in the European Union, CO 2 targets for passenger cars have included a compromise on weight, allowing CO 2 leeway for heavier vehicles in some cases. Larger vehicles also mean larger margins for carmakers. Given that incumbent carmakers are not yet making a profit on their EV offer in many cases, focusing on larger models enables them to increase their margins. Under the US IRA, electric SUVs can qualify for tax credits as long as they are priced under USD 80 000, whereas the limit stands at USD 55 000 for a sedan, creating an incentive to market SUVs if a greater margin can be gathered. On the demand side, there is now strong willingness to pay for SUVs or large models. Consumers are typically interested in longer-range and larger cars for their primary vehicles, even though small models are more suited to urban use. Higher marketing spend on SUVs compared to smaller models can also have an impact on consumer choices.

The progressive shift towards ICE SUVs has been dramatically limiting fuel savings. Over the 2010-2022 period, without the shift to SUVs, energy use per kilometre could have fallen at an average annual rate 30% higher than the actual rate. Switching to electric in the SUV and larger car segments can therefore achieve immediate and significant CO 2 emissions reductions, and electrification also brings considerable benefits in terms of reducing air pollution and non-tailpipe emissions, especially in urban settings. In 2023, if all ICE and HEV sales of SUVs had instead been BEV, around 770 Mt CO 2 could have been avoided globally over the cars’ lifetimes (see section 10 on lifecycle analysis). This is equivalent to the total road emissions of China in 2023.

Breakdown of battery electric car sales in selected countries and regions by segment, 2018-2023

Nevertheless, from a policy perspective, it is critical to mitigate the negative spillovers associated with an increase in larger electric cars in the fleet.

Larger electric car models have a significant impact on battery supply chains and critical mineral demand. In 2023, the sales-weighted average battery electric SUV in Europe had a battery almost twice as large as the one in the average small electric car, with a proportionate impact on critical mineral needs. Of course, the range of small cars is typically shorter than SUVs and large cars (see later section on ranges). However, when comparing electric SUVs and medium-sized electric cars, which in 2023 offered a similar range, the SUV battery was still 25% larger. This means that if all electric SUVs sold in 2023 had instead been medium-sized cars, around 60 GWh of battery equivalent could have been avoided globally, with limited impact on range. Accounting for the different chemistries used in China, Europe, and the United States, this would be equivalent to almost 6 000 tonnes of lithium, 30 000 tonnes of nickel, almost 7 000 tonnes of cobalt, and over 8 000 tonnes of manganese.

Larger batteries also require more power, or longer charging times. This can put pressure on electricity grids and charging infrastructure by increasing occupancy, which could create issues during peak utilisation, such as at highway charging points at high traffic times.

In addition, larger vehicles also require greater quantities of materials such as iron and steel, aluminium and plastics, with a higher environmental and carbon footprint for materials production, processing and assembly. Because they are heavier, larger models also have higher electricity consumption. The additional energy consumption resulting from the increased mass is mitigated by regenerative braking to some extent, but in 2022, the sales-weighted average electricity consumption of electric SUVs was 20% higher than that of other electric cars. 6

Major carmakers have announced launches of smaller and more affordable electric car models over the past few years. However, when all launch announcements are considered, far fewer smaller models are expected than SUVs, large models and pick-up trucks. Only 25% of the 400+ launches expected over the 2024-2028 period are small and medium models, which represents a smaller share of available models than in 2023. Even in China, where small and medium models have been popular, new launches are typically for larger cars.

Number of available car models in 2023 and expected new ones by powertrain, country or region and segment, 2024-2028

Several governments have responded by introducing policies to create incentives for smaller and lighter passenger cars. In Norway, for example, all cars are subject to a purchase tax based on weight, CO 2 and nitrogen oxides (NO x ) emissions, though electric cars were exempt from the weight-based tax prior to 2023. Any imported cars weighing more than 500 kg must also pay an entry fee for each additional kg. In France, a progressive weight-based tax applies to ICE and PHEV cars weighing above 1 600 kg, with a significant impact on price: weight tax for a Land Rover Defender 130 (2 550 kg) adds up to more than EUR 21 500, versus zero for a Renault Clio (1 100 kg). Battery electric cars have been exempted to date. In February 2024, a referendum held in Paris resulted in a tripling of city parking fees for visiting SUVs, applicable to ICE, hybrid and plug-in hybrid cars above 1 600 kg and battery electric ones above 2 000 kg, in an effort to limit the use of large and/or polluting vehicles. Other examples exist in Estonia, Finland, Switzerland and the Netherlands. A number of policy options may be used, such as caps and fleet averages for vehicle footprint, weight, and/or battery size; access to finance for smaller vehicles; and sustained support for public charging, enabling wider use of shorter-range cars.

Average range is increasing, but only moderately

Concerns about range compared to ICE vehicles, and about the availability of charging infrastructure for long-distance journeys, also contribute to increasing appetite for larger models with longer range.

With increasing battery size and improvements in battery technology and vehicle design, the sales-weighted average range of battery electric cars grew by nearly 75% between 2015 and 2023, although trends vary by segment. The average range of small cars in 2023 – around 150 km – is not much higher than it was in 2015, indicating that this range is already well suited for urban use (with the exception of taxis, which have much higher daily usage). Large, higher-end models already offered higher ranges than average in 2015, and their range has stagnated through 2023, averaging around 360-380 km. Meanwhile, significant improvements have been made for medium-sized cars and SUVs, the range of which now stands around 380 km, whereas it averaged around 150 km for medium cars and 270 km for SUVs in 2015. This is encouraging for consumers looking to purchase an electric car for longer journeys rather than urban use.

Since 2020, growth in the average range of vehicles has been slower than over the 2015-2020 period. This could result from a number of factors, including fluctuating battery prices, carmakers’ attempts to limit additional costs as competition intensifies, and technical constraints (e.g. energy density, battery size). It could also reflect that beyond a certain range at which most driving needs are met, consumers’ willingness to pay for a marginal increase in battery size and range is limited. Looking forward, however, the average range could start increasing again as novel battery technologies mature and prices fall.

More affordable electric cars are needed to reach a mass-market tipping point

An equitable and inclusive transition to electric mobility, both within countries and at the global level, hinges on the successful launch of affordable EVs (including but not limited to electric cars). In this section, we use historic sales and price data for electric and ICE models around the world to examine the total cost of owning an electric car, price trends over time, and the remaining electric premium, by country and vehicle size. 7 Specific models are used for illustration.

Total cost of ownership

Car purchase decisions typically involve consideration of retail price and available subsidies as well as lifetime operating costs, such as fuel costs, insurance, maintenance and depreciation, which together make up the total cost of ownership (TCO). Reaching TCO parity between electric and ICE cars creates important financial incentives to make the switch. This section examines the different components of the TCO, by region and car size.

In 2023, upfront retail prices for electric cars were generally higher than for their ICE equivalents, which increased their TCO in relative terms. On the upside, higher fuel efficiency and lower maintenance costs enable fuel cost savings for electric cars, lowering their TCO. This is especially true in periods when fuel prices are high, in places where electricity prices are not too closely correlated to fossil fuel prices. Depreciation is also a major factor in determining TCO: As a car ages, it loses value, and depreciation for electric cars tends to be faster than for ICE equivalents, further increasing their TCO. Accelerated depreciation could, however, prove beneficial for the development of second-hand markets.

However, the trend towards faster depreciation for electric vehicles might be reversed for multiple reasons. Firstly, consumers are gaining more confidence in electric battery lifetimes, thereby increasing the resale value of EVs. Secondly, strong demand and the positive brand image of some BEV models can mean they hold their value longer, as shown by Tesla models depreciating more slowly than the average petrol car in the United States. Finally, increasing fuel prices in some regions, the roll-out of low-emissions zones that restrict access for the most polluting vehicles, and taxes and parking fees specifically targeted at ICE vehicles could mean they experience faster depreciation rates than EVs in the future. In light of these two possible opposing depreciation trends, the same fixed annual depreciation rate for both BEVs and ICE vehicles has been applied in the following cost of ownership analysis.

Subsidies help lower the TCO of electric cars relative to ICE equivalents in multiple ways. A purchase subsidy lowers the original retail price, thereby lowering capital depreciation over time, and a lower retail price implies lower financing costs through cumulative interest. Subsidies can significantly reduce the number of years required to reach TCO parity between electric and ICE equivalents. As of 2022, we estimate that TCO parity could be reached in most cases in under 7 years in the three major EV markets, with significant variations across different car sizes. In comparison, for models purchased at 2018 prices, TCO parity was much harder to achieve.

In Germany, for example, we estimate that the sales-weighted average price of a medium-sized battery electric car in 2022 was 10-20% more expensive than its ICE equivalent, but 10-20% cheaper in cumulative costs of ownership after 5 years, thanks to fuel and maintenance costs savings. In the case of an electric SUV, we estimate that the average annual operating cost savings would amount to USD 1 800 when compared to the equivalent conventional SUV over a period of 10 years. In the United States, despite lower fuel prices with respect to electricity, the higher average annual mileage results in savings that are close to Germany at USD 1 600 per year. In China, lower annual distance driven reduces fuel cost savings potential, but the very low price of electricity enables savings of about USD 1 000 per year.

In EMDEs, some electric cars can also be cheaper than ICE equivalents over their lifetime. This is true in India , for example, although it depends on the financing instrument. Access to finance is typically much more challenging in EMDEs due to higher interest rates and the more limited availability of cheap capital. Passenger cars have also a significantly lower market penetration in the first place, and many car purchases are made in second-hand markets. Later sections of this report look at markets for used electric cars, as well as the TCO for electric and conventional 2/3Ws in EMDEs, where they are far more widespread than cars as a means of road transport.

Upfront retail price parity

Achieving price parity between electric and ICE cars will be an important tipping point. Even when the TCO for electric cars is advantageous, the upfront retail price plays a decisive role, and mass-market consumers are typically more sensitive to price premiums than wealthier buyers. This holds true not only in emerging and developing economies, which have comparatively high costs of capital and comparatively low household and business incomes, but also in advanced economies. In the United States, for example, surveys suggest affordability was the top concern for consumers considering EV adoption in 2023. Other estimates show that even among SUV and pick-up truck consumers, only 50% would be willing to purchase one above USD 50 000.

In this section, we examine historic price trends for electric and ICE cars over the 2018-2022 period, by country and car size, and for best-selling models in 2023.

Electric cars are generally getting cheaper as battery prices drop, competition intensifies, and carmakers achieve economies of scale. In most cases, however, they remain on average more expensive than ICE equivalents. In some cases, after adjusting for inflation, their price stagnated or even moderately increased between 2018 and 2022.

Larger batteries for longer ranges increase car prices, and so too do the additional options, equipment, digital technology and luxury features that are often marketed on top of the base model. A disproportionate focus on larger, premium models is pushing up the average price, which – added to the lack of available models in second-hand markets (see below) – limits potential to reach mass-market consumers. Importantly, geopolitical tension, trade and supply chain disruptions, increasing battery prices in 2022 relative to 2021, and rising inflation, have also significantly affected the potential for further cost declines.

Competition can also play an important role in bringing down electric car prices. Intensifying competition leads carmakers to cut prices to the minimum profit margin they can sustain, and – if needed – to do so more quickly than battery and production costs decline. For example, between mid-2022 and early-2024, Tesla cut the price of its Model Y from between USD 65 000 and USD 70 000 to between USD 45 000 and USD 55 000 in the United States. Battery prices for such a model dropped by only USD 3 000 over the same period in the United States, suggesting that a profit margin may still be made at a lower price. Similarly, in China, the price of the Base Model Y dropped from CNY 320 000 (Yuan renminbi) (USD 47 000) to CNY 250 000 (USD 38 000), while the corresponding battery price fell by only USD 1 000. Conversely, in cases where electric models remain niche or aimed at wealthier, less price-sensitive early adopters, their price may not fall as quickly as battery prices, if carmakers can sustain greater margins.

Price gap between the sales-weighted average price of conventional and electric cars in selected countries, before subsidy, by size, in 2018 and 2022

In China, where the sales share of electric cars has been high for several years, the sales-weighted average price of electric cars (before purchase subsidy) is already lower than that of ICE cars. This is true not only when looking at total sales, but also at the small cars segment, and is close for SUVs. After accounting for the EV exemption from the 10% vehicle purchase tax, electric SUVs were already on par with conventional ones in 2022, on average.

Electric car prices have dropped significantly since 2018. We estimate that around 55% of the electric cars sold in China in 2022 were cheaper than their average ICE equivalent, up from under 10% in 2018. Given the further price declines between 2022 and 2023, we estimate that this share increased to around 65% in 2023. These encouraging trends suggest that price parity between electric and ICE cars could also be reached in other countries in certain segments by 2030, if the sales share of electric cars continues to grow, and if supporting infrastructure – such as for charging – is sustained.

As reported in detail in GEVO-2023 , China remains a global exception in terms of available inexpensive electric models. Local carmakers already market nearly 50 small, affordable electric car models, many of which are priced under CNY 100 000 (USD 15 000). This is in the same range as best-selling small ICE cars in 2023, which cost from CNY 70 000 to CNY 100 000. In 2022, the best-selling electric car was SAIC’s small Wuling Hongguang Mini EV, which accounted for 10% of all BEV sales. It was priced around CNY 40 000, weighing under 700 kg for a 170-km range. In 2023, however, it was overtaken by Tesla models, among other larger models, as new consumers seek longer ranges and higher-end options and digital equipment.

United States

In the United States, the sales-weighted average price of electric cars decreased over the 2018-2022 period, primarily driven by a considerable drop in the price of Tesla cars, which account for a significant share of sales. The sales-weighted average retail price of electric SUVs fell slightly more quickly than the average SUV battery costs over the same period. The average price of small and medium models also decreased, albeit to a smaller extent.

Across all segments, electric models remained more expensive than conventional equivalents in 2022. However, the gap has since begun to close, as market size increases and competition leads carmakers to cut prices. For example, in 2023-2024, Tesla’s Model 3 could be found in the USD 39 000 to USD 42 000 range, which is comparable to the average price for new ICE cars, and a new Model Y priced under USD 50 000 was launched. Rivian is expecting to launch its R2 SUV in 2026 at USD 45 000, which is much less than previous vehicles. Average price parity between electric and conventional SUVs could be reached by 2030, but it may only be reached later for small and medium cars, given their lower availability and popularity.

Smaller, cheaper electric models have further to go to reach price parity in the United States. We estimate that in 2022, only about 5% of the electric cars sold in the United States were cheaper than their average ICE equivalent. In 2023, the cheapest electric cars were priced around USD 30 000 (e.g. Chevrolet Bolt, Nissan Leaf, Mini Cooper SE). To compare, best-selling small ICE options cost under USD 20 000 (e.g. Kia Rio, Mitsubishi Mirage), and many best-selling medium ICE options between USD 20 000 and USD 25 000 (e.g. Honda Civic, Toyota Corolla, Kia Forte, Hyundai Avante, Nissan Sentra).

Around 25 new all-electric car models are expected in 2024, but only 5 of them are expected below USD 50 000, and none under the USD 30 000 mark. Considering all the electric models expected to be available in 2024, about 75% are priced above USD 50 000, and fewer than 10 under USD 40 000, even after taking into account the USD 7 500 tax credit under the IRA for eligible cars as of February 2024. This means that despite the tax credit, few electric car models directly compete with small mass-market ICE models.

In December 2023, GM stopped production of its best-selling electric car, the Bolt, announcing it would introduce a new version in 2025. The Nissan Leaf (40 kWh) therefore remains the cheapest available electric car in 2024, at just under USD 30 000, but is not yet eligible for IRA tax credits. Ford announced in 2024 that it would move away from large and expensive electric cars as a way to convince more consumers to switch to electric, at the same time as increasing output of ICE models to help finance a transition to electric mobility. In 2024, Tesla announced it would start producing a next-generation, compact and affordable electric car in June 2025, but the company had already announced in 2020 that it would deliver a USD 25 000 model within 3 years. Some micro urban electric cars are already available between USD 5 000 and USD 20 000 (e.g. Arcimoto FUV, Nimbus One), but they are rare. In theory, such models could cover many use cases, since 80% of car journeys in the United States are under 10 miles .

Pricing trends differ across European countries, and typically vary by segment.

In Norway, after taking into account the EV sales tax exemption, electric cars are already cheaper than ICE equivalents across all segments. In 2022, we estimate that the electric premium stood around -15%, and even -30% for medium-sized cars. Five years earlier, in 2018, the overall electric premium was less advantageous, at around -5%. The progressive reintroduction of sales taxes on electric cars may change these estimates for 2023 onwards.

Germany’s electric premium ranks among the lowest in the European Union. Although the sales-weighted average electric premium increased slightly between 2018 and 2022, it stood at 15% in 2022. It is particularly low for medium-sized cars (10-15%) and SUVs (20%), but remains higher than 50% for small models. In the case of medium cars, the sales-weighted average electric premium was as low as EUR 5 000 in 2022. We estimate that in 2022, over 40% of the medium electric cars sold in Germany were cheaper than their average ICE equivalent. Looking at total sales, over 25% of the electric cars sold in 2022 were cheaper than their average ICE equivalent. In 2023, the cheapest models among the best-selling medium electric cars were priced between EUR 22 000 and EUR 35 000 (e.g. MG MG4, Dacia Spring, Renault Megane), far cheaper than the three front-runners priced above EUR 45 000 (VW ID.3, Cupra Born, and Tesla Model 3). To compare, best-selling ICE cars in the medium segment were also priced between EUR 30 000 and EUR 45 000 (e.g. VW Golf, VW Passat Santana, Skoda Octavia Laura, Audi A3, Audi A4). At the end of 2023, Germany phased out its subsidy for electric car purchases, but competition and falling model prices could compensate for this.

In France, the sales-weighted average electric premium stagnated between 2018 and 2022. The average price of ICE cars also increased over the same period, though more moderately than that of electric models. Despite a drop in the price of electric SUVs, which stood at a 30% premium over ICE equivalents in 2022, the former do not account for a high enough share of total electric car sales to drive down the overall average. The electric premium for small and medium cars remains around 40-50%.

These trends mirror those of some of the best-selling models. For example, when adjusting prices for inflation, the small Renault Zoe was sold at the same price on average in 2022-2023 as in 2018-2019, or EUR 30 000 (USD 32 000). It could be found for sale at as low as EUR 25 000 in 2015-2016. The earlier models, in 2015, had a battery size of around 20 kWh, which increased to around 40 kWh in 2018‑2019 and 50 kWh in newer models in 2022-2023. Yet European battery prices fell more quickly than the battery size increased over the same period, indicating that battery size alone does not explain car price dynamics.

In 2023, the cheapest electric cars in France were priced between EUR 22 000 and EUR 30 000 (e.g. Dacia Spring, Renault Twingo E-Tech, Smart EQ Fortwo), while best-selling small ICE models were available between EUR 10 000 and EUR 20 000 (e.g. Renault Clio, Peugeot 208, Citroën C3, Dacia Sandero, Opel Corsa, Skoda Fabia). Since mid-2024, subsidies of up to EUR 4 000 can be granted for electric cars priced under EUR 47 000, with an additional subsidy of up to EUR 3 000 for lower-income households.

In the United Kingdom, the sales-weighted average electric premium shrank between 2018 and 2022, thanks to a drop in prices for electric SUVs, as in the United States. Nonetheless, electric SUVs still stood at a 45% premium over ICE equivalents in 2022, which is similar to the premium for small models but far higher than for medium cars (20%).

In 2023, the cheapest electric cars in the United Kingdom were priced from GBP 27 000 to GBP 30 000 (USD 33 000 to 37 000) (e.g. MG MG4, Fiat 500, Nissan Leaf, Renault Zoe), with the exception of the Smart EQ Fortwo, priced at GBP 21 000. To compare, best-selling small ICE options could be found from GBP 10 000 to 17 000 (e.g. Peugeot 208, Fiat 500, Dacia Sandero) and medium options below GBP 25 000 (e.g. Ford Puma). Since July 2022, there has been no subsidy for the purchase of electric passenger cars.

Elsewhere in Europe, electric cars remain typically much more expensive than ICE equivalents. In Poland , for example, just a few electric car models could be found at prices competitive with ICE cars in 2023, under the PLN 150 000 (Polish zloty) (EUR 35 000) mark. Over 70% of electric car sales in 2023 were for SUVs, or large or more luxurious models, compared to less than 60% for ICE cars.

In 2023, there were several announcements by European OEMs for smaller models priced under EUR 25 000 in the near-term (e.g. Renault R5, Citroën e-C3, Fiat e-Panda, VW ID.2all). There is also some appetite for urban microcars (i.e. L6-L7 category), learning from the success of China’s Wuling. Miniature models bring important benefits if they displace conventional models, helping reduce battery and critical mineral demand. Their prices are often below USD 5 000 (e.g. Microlino, Fiat Topolino, Citroën Ami, Silence S04, Birò B2211).

In Europe and the United States, electric car prices are expected to come down as a result of falling battery prices, more efficient manufacturing, and competition. Independent analyses suggest that price parity between some electric and ICE car models in certain segments could be reached over the 2025-2028 period, for example for small electric cars in Europe in 2025 or soon after. However, many market variables could delay price parity, such as volatile commodity prices, supply chain bottlenecks, and the ability of carmakers to yield sufficient margins from cheaper electric models. The typical rule in which economies of scale bring down costs is being complicated by numerous other market forces. These include a dynamic regulatory context, geopolitical competition, domestic content incentives, and a continually evolving technology landscape, with competing battery chemistries that each have their own economies of scale and regional specificities.

Japan is a rare example of an advanced economy where small models – both for electric and ICE vehicles – appeal to a large consumer base, motivated by densely populated cities with limited parking space, and policy support. In 2023, about 60% of total ICE sales were for small models, and over half of total electric sales. Two electric cars from the smallest “Kei” category, the Nissan Sakura and Mitsubishi eK-X, accounted for nearly 50% of national electric car sales alone, and both are priced between JPY 2.3 million (Japanese yen) and JPY 3 million (USD 18 000 to USD 23 000). However, this is still more expensive than best-selling small ICE cars (e.g. Honda N Box, Daihatsu Hijet, Daihatsu Tanto, Suzuki Spacia, Daihatsu Move), priced between USD 13 000 and USD 18 000. In 2024, Nissan announced that it would aim to reach cost parity (of production, not retail price) between electric and ICE cars by 2030.

Emerging market and developing economies

In EMDEs, the absence of small and cheaper electric car models is a significant hindrance to wider market uptake. Many of the available car models are SUVs or large models, targeting consumers of high-end goods, and far too expensive for mass-market consumers, who often do not own a personal car in the first place (see later sections on second-hand car markets and 2/3Ws).

In India, while Tata’s small Tiago/Tigor models, which are priced between USD 10 000 and USD 15 000, accounted for about 20% of total electric car sales in 2023, the average best-selling small ICE car is priced around USD 7 000. Large models and SUVs accounted for over 65% of total electric car sales. While BYD announced in 2023 the goal of accounting for 40% of India’s EV market by 2030, all of its models available in India cost more than INR 3 million (Indian rupees) (USD 37 000), including the Seal, launched in 2024 for INR 4.1 million (USD 50 000).

Similarly, SUVs and large models accounted for the majority share of electric car sales in Thailand (60%), Indonesia (55%), Malaysia (over 85%) and Viet Nam (over 95%). In Indonesia, for example, Hyundai’s Ionic 5 was the most popular electric car in 2023, priced at around USD 50 000. Looking at launch announcements, most new models expected over the 2024-2028 period in EMDEs are SUVs or large models. However, more than 50 small and medium models could also be introduced, and the recent or forthcoming entry of Chinese carmakers suggests that cheaper models could hit the market in the coming years.

In 2022-2023, Chinese carmakers accounted for 40-75% of the electric car sales in Indonesia, Thailand and Brazil, with sales jumping as cheaper Chinese models were introduced. In Thailand, for example, Hozon launched its Neta V model in 2022 priced at THB 550 000 (Thai baht) (USD 15 600), which became a best-seller in 2023 given its relative affordability compared with the cheapest ICE equivalents at around USD 9 000. Similarly, in Indonesia, the market entry of Wuling’s Air EV in 2022-2023 was met with great success. In Colombia, the best-selling electric car in 2023 was the Chinese mini-car, Zhidou 2DS, which could be found at around USD 15 000, a competitive option relative to the country’s cheapest ICE car, the Kia Picanto, at USD 13 000.

Electric car sales in selected countries, by origin of carmaker, 2021-2023

Second-hand markets for electric cars are on the rise.

As electric vehicle markets mature, the second-hand market will become more important

In the same way as for other technology products, second-hand markets for used electric cars are now emerging as newer generations of vehicles progressively become available and earlier adopters switch or upgrade. Second-hand markets are critical to foster mass-market adoption, especially if new electric cars remain expensive, and used ones become cheaper. Just as for ICE vehicles – for which buying second-hand is often the primary method of acquiring a car in both emerging and advanced economies – a similar pattern will emerge with electric vehicles. It is estimated that eight out of ten EU citizens buy their car second-hand, and this share is even higher – around 90% – among low- and middle-income groups. Similarly, in the United States, about seven out of ten vehicles sold are second-hand, and only 17% of lower-income households buy a new car.

As major electric car markets reach maturity, more and more used electric cars are becoming available for resale. Our estimates suggest that in 2023, the market size for used electric cars amounted to nearly 800 000 in China , 400 000 in the United States and more than 450 000 for France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom combined. Second-hand sales have not been included in the numbers presented in the previous section of this report, which focused on sales of new electric cars, but they are already significant. On aggregate, global second-hand electric car sales were roughly equal to new electric car sales in the United States in 2023. In the United States, used electric car sales are set to increase by 40% in 2024 relative to 2023. Of course, these volumes are dwarfed by second-hand ICE markets: 30 million in the European countries listed above combined, nearly 20 million in China, and 36 million in the United States . However, these markets have had decades to mature, indicating greater longer-term potential for used electric car markets.

Used car markets already provide more affordable electric options in China, Europe and the United States

Second-hand car markets are increasingly becoming a source of more affordable electric cars that can compete with used ICE equivalents. In the United States, for example, more than half of second-hand electric cars are already priced below USD 30 000. Moreover, the average price is expected to quickly fall towards USD 25 000, the price at which used electric cars become eligible for the federal used car rebate of USD 4 000, making them directly competitive with best-selling new and used ICE options. The price of a second-hand Tesla in the United States dropped from over USD 50 000 in early 2023 to just above USD 33 000 in early 2024, making it competitive with a second-hand SUV and many new models as well (either electric or conventional). In Europe , second-hand battery electric cars can be found between EUR 15 000 and EUR 25 000 (USD 16 000‑27 000), and second-hand plug-in hybrids around EUR 30 000 (USD 32 000). Some European countries also offer subsidies for second-hand electric cars, such as the Netherlands (EUR 2 000), where the subsidy for new cars has been steadily declining since 2020, while that for used cars remains constant, and France (EUR 1 000). In China , used electric cars were priced around CNY 75 000 on average in 2023 (USD 11 000).

In recent years, the resale value 8 of electric cars has been increasing. In Europe, the resale value of battery electric cars sold after 12 months has steadily increased over the 2017-2022 period, surpassing that of all other powertrains and standing at more than 70% in mid-2022. The resale value of battery electric cars sold after 36 months stood below 40% in 2017, but has since been closing the gap with other powertrains, reaching around 55% in mid-2022. This is the result of many factors, including higher prices of new electric cars, improving technology allowing vehicles and batteries to retain greater value over time, and increasing demand for second-hand electric cars. Similar trends have been observed in China.

High or low resale values have important implications for the development of second-hand electric car markets and their contributions to the transition to road transport electrification. High resale values primarily benefit consumers of new cars (who retain more of the value of their initial purchase), and carmakers, because many consumers are attracted by the possibility of reselling their car after a few years, thereby fostering demand for newer models. High resale values also benefit leasing companies, which seek to minimise depreciation and resell after a few years.

Leasing companies have a significant impact on second-hand markets because they own large volumes of vehicles for a shorter period (under three years, compared to 3 to 5 years for a private household). Their impact on markets for new cars can also be considerable: leasing companies accounted for over 20% of new cars sold in Europe in 2022.

Overall, a resale value for electric cars on par with or higher than that of ICE equivalents contributes to supporting demand for new electric cars. In the near term, however, a combination of high prices for new electric cars and high resale values could hinder widespread adoption of used EVs among mass-market consumers seeking affordable cars. In such cases, policy support can help bridge the gap with second-hand ICE prices.

International trade for used electric cars to emerging markets is expected to increase

As the EV stock ages in advanced markets, it is likely that more and more used EVs will be traded internationally, assuming that global standards enable technology compatibility (e.g. for charging infrastructure). Imported used vehicles present an opportunity for consumers in EMDEs, who may not have access to new models because they are either too expensive or not marketed in their countries.

Data on used car trade flows are scattered and often contradictory, but the history of ICE cars can be a useful guide to what may happen for electric cars. Many EMDEs have been importing used ICE vehicles for decades. UNEP estimates that Africa imports 40% of all used vehicles exported worldwide, with African countries typically becoming the ultimate destination for used imports. Typical trade flows include Western European Union member states to Eastern European Union member states and to African countries that drive on the right-hand side; Japan to Asia and to African countries that drive on the left-hand side; and the United States to the Middle East and Central America.

Used electric car exports from large EV markets have been growing in recent years. For China, this can be explained by the recent roll-back of a policy forbidding exports of used vehicles of any kind. Since 2019 , as part of a pilot project, the government has granted 27 cities and provinces the right to export second-hand cars. In 2022, China exported almost 70 000 used vehicles, a significant increase on 2021, when fewer than 20 000 vehicles were exported. About 70% of these were NEVs, of which over 45% were exported to the Middle East. In 2023, the Ministry of Commerce released a draft policy on second-hand vehicle export that, once approved, will allow the export of second-hand vehicles from all regions of China. Used car exports from China are expected to increase significantly as a result.

In the European Union, the number of used electric cars traded internationally is also increasing . In both 2021 and 2022, the market size grew by 70% year-on-year, reaching almost 120 000 electric cars in 2022. More than half of all trade takes place between EU member states, followed by trade with neighbouring countries such as Norway, the United Kingdom and Türkiye (accounting for 20% combined). The remainder of used EVs are exported to countries such as Mexico, Tunisia and the United States. As of 2023, the largest exporters are Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain.

Last year, just over 1% of all used cars leaving Japan were electric. However these exports are growing and increased by 30% in 2023 relative to 2022, reaching 20 000 cars. The major second-hand electric car markets for Japanese vehicles are traditionally Russia and New Zealand (over 60% combined). After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, second-hand trade of conventional cars from Japan to Russia jumped sharply following a halt in operations of local OEMs in Russia, but this trade was quickly restricted by the Japanese government, thereby bringing down the price of second-hand cars in Japan. New Zealand has very few local vehicle assembly or manufacturing facilities, and for this reason many cars entering New Zealand are used imports. In 2023, nearly 20% of all electric cars that entered New Zealand were used imports, compared to 50% for the overall car market.

In emerging economies, local policies play an important role in promoting or limiting trade flows for used cars. In the case of ICE vehicles, for example, some countries (e.g. Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Peru) limit the maximum age of used car imports to prevent the dumping of highly polluting cars. Other countries (e.g. Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, India, South Africa) have banned used car imports entirely to protect their domestic manufacturing industries.

Just as for ICE vehicles, policy measures can either help or hinder the import of used electric cars, such as by setting emission standards for imported used cars. Importing countries will also need to simultaneously support roll-out of charging infrastructure to avoid problems with access like those reported in Sri Lanka after an incentive scheme significantly increased imports of used EVs in 2018.

The median age of vehicle imports tends to increase as the GDP per capita of a country decreases. In some African countries, the median age of imports is over 15 years. Beyond this timeframe, electric cars may require specific servicing to extend their lifetime. To support the availability of second-hand markets for electric cars, it will be important to develop strategies, technical capacity, and business models to swap very old batteries from used vehicles. Today, many countries that import ICE vehicles, including EMDEs, already have servicing capacity in place to extend the lifetimes of used ICE vehicles, but not used EVs. On the other hand, there are typically fewer parts in electric powertrains than in ICE ones, and these parts can even be more durable. Battery recycling capacity will also be needed, given that the importing country is likely to be where the imported EV eventually reaches end-of-life. Including end-of-life considerations in policy making today can help mitigate the risk of longer-term environmental harm that could result from the accumulation of obsolete EVs and associated waste in EMDEs.

Policy choices in more mature markets also have an impact on possible trade flows. For example, the current policy framework in the European Union for the circularity of EV batteries may prevent EVs and EV batteries from leaving the European Union, which brings energy security advantages but might limit reuse. In this regard, advanced economies and EMDEs should strengthen co-operation to facilitate second-hand trade while ensuring adequate end-of-life strategies. For example, there could be incentives or allowances associated with extended vehicle lifetimes via use in second-hand markets internationally before recycling, as long as recycling in the destination market is guaranteed, or the EV battery is returned at end of life.

Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, “electric cars” refers to both battery electric and plug-in hybrid cars, and “electric vehicles” (EVs) refers to battery electric (BEV) and plug-in hybrid (PHEV) vehicles, excluding fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV). Unless otherwise specified, EVs include all modes of road transport.

Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, regional groupings refer to those described in the Annex.

In the Chinese context, the term New Energy Vehicles (NEVs) includes BEVs, PHEVs and FCEVs.

Based on model trim eligibility from the US government website as of 31 March 2024.

SUVs may be defined differently across regions, but broadly refer to vehicles that incorporate features commonly found in off-road vehicles (e.g. four-wheel drive, higher ground clearance, larger cargo area). In this report, small and large SUVs both count as SUVs. Crossovers are counted as SUVs if they feature an SUV body type; otherwise they are categorised as medium-sized vehicles.

Measured under the Worldwide Harmonised Light Vehicles Test Procedure using vehicle model sales data from IHS Markit.

Price data points collected from various data providers and ad-hoc sources cover 65-95% of both electric and ICE car sales globally. By “price”, we refer to the advertised price that the customer pays for the acquisition of the vehicle only, including legally required acquisition taxes (e.g. including Value-Added Tax and registration taxes but excluding consumer tax credits). Prices reflect not only the materials, components and manufacturing costs, but also the costs related to sales and marketing, administration, R&D and the profit margin. In the case of a small electric car in Europe, for example, these mark-up costs can account for around 40% of the final pre-tax price. They account for an even greater share of the final pre-tax price when consumers purchase additional options, or opt for larger models, for which margins can be higher. The price for the same model may differ across countries or regions (e.g. in 2023, a VW ID.3 could be purchased in China at half its price in Europe). Throughout the whole section, prices are adjusted for inflation and expressed in constant 2022 USD.

This metric of depreciation used in second-hand technology markets represents the value of the vehicle when being resold in relation to the value when originally purchased. A resale value of 70% means that a product purchased new will lose 30% of its original value, on average, and sell at such a discount relative to the original price.

Reference 1

Reference 2, reference 3, reference 4, reference 5, reference 6, reference 7, reference 8, subscription successful.

Thank you for subscribing. You can unsubscribe at any time by clicking the link at the bottom of any IEA newsletter.

The lost history of the electric car – and what it tells us about the future of transport

To every age dogged with pollution, accidents and congestion, the transport solution for the next generation seems obvious – but the same problems keep coming back

I n the 1890s, the biggest cities of the western world faced a mounting problem. Horse-drawn vehicles had been in use for thousands of years, and it was hard to imagine life without them. But as the number of such vehicles increased during the 19th century, the drawbacks of using horses in densely populated cities were becoming ever more apparent.

In particular, the accumulation of horse manure on the streets, and the associated stench, were impossible to miss. By the 1890s, about 300,000 horses were working on the streets of London, and more than 150,000 in New York City. Each of these horses produced an average of 10kg of manure a day, plus about a litre of urine. Collecting and removing thousands of tonnes of waste from stables and streets proved increasingly difficult.

The problem had been building up for decades. A newspaper editor in New York City said in 1857 that “with the exception of a very few thoroughfares, all the streets are one mass of reeking, disgusting filth, which in some places is piled to such a height as to render them almost impassable to vehicles”. As well as filling the air with a terrible stench, the abundance of horse manure turned streets into muddy cesspools whenever it rained. An eyewitness account from London in the 1890s describes the “mud” (the accepted euphemism among prudish Victorians) that often flooded the Strand, one of the city’s main thoroughfares, as having the consistency of thick pea soup. Passing vehicles “would fling sheets of such soup – where not intercepted by trousers or skirts – completely across the pavement”, spattering and staining nearby houses and shop fronts. Manure collected from the streets was piled up at dumps dotted around major towns and cities. Huge piles of manure also built up next to stables and provided an attractive environment for flies.

All of this was bad for public health. The board of health’s statisticians in New York City found higher levels of infectious disease “in dwellings and schools within 50 feet of stables than in remoter locations”, the New York Times reported in 1894. According to one turn-of-the-century calculation, 20,000 New Yorkers died annually from “maladies that fly in the dust”, clear evidence of the dangers posed to health by reliance on horses. To make matters worse, horses were frequently overworked, and when they dropped dead, their bodies were often left rotting on the streets for several days before being dismembered and removed, posing a further health risk. By the 1880s, 15,000 dead horses were being removed from the streets of New York City each year.

Paradoxically, the advent of the steam locomotive and the construction of intercity railway links, starting in the 1830s, had helped make the problem worse. Faster and more efficient transport between cities increased the demand for rapid transport of people and goods within them, which required a greater number of horse-drawn vehicles. “Our dependence on the horse has grown almost pari passu [step for step] with our dependence on steam,” noted one observer in 1872. The result was more horses, more manure – and steadily worsening congestion. One observer in 1870 wrote that Broadway in Manhattan was “almost impassable” at some times of the day. And when the traffic did move, it was deafening, as metal horseshoes and iron-rimmed wheels clattered over uneven surfaces. Straw was sometimes strewn on roads outside hospitals, and some private houses, to reduce the din.

Pollution, congestion and noise were merely the most obvious manifestations of a deeper dependency. An outbreak of equine influenza in North America in October 1872 incapacitated all horses and mules for several weeks, providing a stark reminder of society’s reliance on animal power. The New York Times noted “the disappearance of trucks, drays, express-wagons and general vehicles” from the streets. “The present epidemic has brought us face to face with the startling fact that the sudden loss of horse labor would totally disorganize our industry and commerce,” noted the Nation. Horses and stables, the newspaper observed, “are wheels in our great social machine, the stoppage of which means injury to all classes and conditions of persons, injury to commerce, to agriculture, to trade, to social life”.

Yet societies on both sides of the Atlantic continued to become steadily more dependent on horses. Between 1870 and 1900, the number of horses in American cities grew fourfold, while the human population merely doubled. By the turn of the century there was one horse for every 10 people in Britain, and one for every four in the US. Providing hay and oats for horses required vast areas of farmland, reducing the space available to grow food for people. Feeding the US’s 20 million horses required one-third of its total crop area, while Britain’s 3.5 million horses had long been reliant on imported fodder.

Horses had become both indispensable and unsustainable. To advocates of a newly emerging technology, the solution seemed obvious: get rid of horses and replace them with self-propelling motor vehicles, known at the time as horseless carriages. Today, we call them cars.

In recent years this transition has been cited as evidence of the power of innovation, and an example of how simple technological fixes to seemingly intractable problems will show up just when they are needed – so there is no need to worry about climate change, for instance. Yet it should instead be seen as a cautionary tale in the other direction: that what looks like a quick fix today may well end up having far-reaching and unintended consequences tomorrow. The switch from horses to cars was not the neat and timely technological solution that it might seem, because cars changed the world in all kinds of unanticipated ways – from the geography of cities to the geopolitics of oil – and created many problems of their own.

M uch of the early enthusiasm for the automobile stemmed from its promise to solve the problems associated with horse-drawn vehicles, including noise, traffic congestion and accidents. That cars failed on each of these counts was tolerated because they offered so many other benefits, including eliminating the pollution – most notably, horse manure – that had dogged urban thoroughfares for centuries.

But in doing away with one set of environmental problems, cars introduced a whole set of new ones. The pollutants they emit are harder to see than horse manure, but are no less problematic. These include particulate matter, such as the soot in vehicle exhaust, which can penetrate deep into the lungs; volatile organic compounds that irritate the respiratory system and have been linked to several kinds of cancer; nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide and sulphur dioxide; and greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide, that contribute to climate change. Cars, trucks and buses collectively produce around 17% of global carbon dioxide emissions. Reliance on fossil fuels such as petrol and diesel has also had far-reaching geopolitical ramifications, as much of the world became dependent on oil from the Middle East during the 20th century.

None of this could have been foreseen at the dawn of the automobile age. Or could it? Some people did raise concerns about the sustainability of powering cars using non-renewable fossil fuels, and the reliability of access to such fuels. Today, electric cars, charged using renewable energy, are seen as the logical way to address these concerns. But the debate about the merits of electric cars turns out to be as old as the automobile itself.

In 1897, the bestselling car in the US was an electric vehicle: the Pope Manufacturing Company’s Columbia Motor Carriage . Electric models were outselling steam- and petrol-powered ones. By 1900, sales of steam vehicles had taken a narrow lead: that year, 1,681 steam vehicles, 1,575 electric vehicles and 936 petrol-powered vehicles were sold. Only with the launch of the Olds Motor Works’ Curved Dash Oldsmobile in 1903 did petrol-powered vehicles take the lead for the first time.

Perhaps the most remarkable example, to modern eyes, of how things might have worked out differently for electric vehicles is the story of the Electrobat, an electric taxicab that briefly flourished in the late 1890s. The Electrobat had been created in Philadelphia in 1894 by Pedro Salom and Henry Morris, two scientist-inventors who were enthusiastic proponents of electric vehicles. In a speech in 1895, Salom derided “the marvelously complicated driving gear of a gasoline vehicle, with its innumerable chains, belts, pulleys, pipes, valves and stopcocks … Is it not reasonable to suppose, with so many things to get out of order, that one or another of them will always be out of order?”

The two men steadily refined their initial design, eventually producing a carriage-like vehicle that could be controlled by a driver on a high seat at the back, with a wider seat for passengers in the front. In 1897 Morris and Salom launched a taxi service in Manhattan with a dozen vehicles, serving 1,000 passengers in their first month of operation. But the cabs had limited range and their batteries took hours to recharge. So Morris and Salom merged with another firm, the Electric Battery Company. Its engineers had devised a clever battery-swapping system, based at a depot at 1684 Broadway, that could replace an empty battery with a fully charged one in seconds, allowing the Electrobats to operate all day.

In 1899 this promising business attracted the attention of William Whitney, a New York politician and financier, who had made a fortune investing in electric streetcars, or trams. He dreamed of establishing a monopoly on urban transport, and imagined fleets of electric cabs operating in major cities around the world, providing a cleaner, quieter alternative to horse-drawn vehicles. Instead of buying cars, which were still far beyond the means of most people, city dwellers would use electric taxis and streetcars to get around. But realising this vision would mean building Electrobats on a much larger scale. So Whitney and his friends teamed up with Pope, maker of the bestselling Columbia electric vehicle. They formed a new venture called the Electric Vehicle Company, and embarked on an ambitious expansion plan. EVC raised capital to build thousands of electric cabs and opened offices in Boston, Chicago, New Jersey and Newport. In 1899 it was briefly the largest automobile manufacturer in the US.

But its taxi operations outside New York were badly run and failed to make money. Repeated reorganisations and recapitalisations prompted accusations that EVC was an elaborate financial swindle. The industry journal the Horseless Age, a strong advocate of petrol-powered vehicles, attacked the firm as a would-be monopolist and said electric vehicles were doomed to fail. When news emerged that EVC had obtained a loan fraudulently, its share price plunged from $30 to $0.75, forcing the firm to start closing its regional offices. The Horseless Age savoured its collapse and cheered its failure to “force” electric vehicles on a “credulous world”.

In the years that followed, as more people bought private cars, electric vehicles took on a new connotation: they were women’s cars. This association arose because they were suitable for short, local trips, did not require hand cranking to start or gear shifting to operate, and were extremely reliable by virtue of their simple design. As an advertisement for Babcock Electric vehicles put it in 1910, “She who drives a Babcock Electric has nothing to fear”. The implication was that women, unable to cope with the complexities of driving and maintaining petrol vehicles, should buy electric vehicles instead. Men, by contrast, were assumed to be more capable mechanics, for whom greater complexity and lower reliability were prices worth paying for powerful, manly petrol vehicles with superior performance and range.

Two manufacturers, Detroit Electric and Waverley Electric, launched models in 1912 that were said to have been completely redesigned to cater to women. As well as being electric, they were operated from the back seat, with a rear-facing front seat, to allow the driver to face her passengers – but also making it difficult to see the road. For steering they provided an old-fashioned tiller, rather than a wheel, which was meant to be less strenuous but was less precise and more dangerous.

Henry Ford bought his wife, Clara, a Detroit Electric rather than one of his own Model Ts. Some men may have liked that electric cars’ limited range meant that the independence granted to their drivers was tightly constrained.

By focusing on women, who were a small minority of drivers – accounting for 15% of drivers in Los Angeles in 1914, for example, and 5% in Tucson – makers of electric cars were tacitly conceding their inability to compete with petrol-powered cars in the wider market.

That year, Henry Ford confirmed rumours that he was developing a low-cost electric car in conjunction with Thomas Edison. “The problem so far has been to build a storage battery of light weight which would operate for long distances without recharging,” he told the New York Times, putting his finger on the electric car’s primary weakness. But the car was repeatedly delayed, as Edison tried and failed to develop an alternative to the heavy, bulky lead-acid batteries used to power electric cars. Eventually, the entire project was quietly abandoned.

T he failure of electric vehicles in the early 20th century, and the emergence of the internal combustion engine as the dominant form of propulsion, had a lot to do with liquid fuel providing far more energy per unit mass than a lead-acid battery can. But the explanation is not purely technical. It also has a psychological component. Buyers of private cars, then as now, did not want to feel limited by the range of an electric vehicle’s battery, and the uncertainty of being able to recharge it.

In the words of the historian Gijs Mom, private cars in this period were primarily seen as “adventure machines” that granted freedom to their owners – and an electric vehicle granted less freedom than the petrol-powered alternative. “To possess a car is to become possessed of a desire to go far afield,” wrote one city-dwelling car enthusiast in 1903. Sales of electric cars peaked in the early 1910s. As internal combustion engines became more reliable, they left electric vehicles in the dust.

But as car ownership expanded dramatically during the 20th century, relying on oil turned out to have other costs. By the 1960s, American cars were, on average, three-quarters of a tonne heavier than those made in Europe and Japan, and their V8 engines had more than twice the engine capacity of the four-cylinder engines most prevalent elsewhere. As a result, they used a lot more fuel. An increasing proportion of that fuel came from imported oil. Imports, mostly from the Middle East, accounted for 27% of the US’s supply by 1973. In December that year the Middle Eastern members of Opec (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) cut off oil exports to the US in protest at its support for Israel in the Yom Kippur war. The price of oil surged, and the sudden reduction in supply resulted in higher petrol prices, the introduction of rationing, and long queues at gas stations. For the first time, American drivers realised they could not take the supply of petrol for granted. The oil shock led the government to introduce a national speed limit of 55mph, and fuel-economy standards that required US manufacturers to achieve an average fuel economy, across their entire product lines, of 18 miles per gallon by 1978, and 27.5 by 1985.

But American carmakers did little to change their products. By the late 70s, 80% of American-made cars still had V8 engines. In 1979, in a second oil shock, oil supplies from the Middle East were once again disrupted, this time as a result of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the outbreak the following year of the Iran-Iraq war. The actual production of oil barely fell, but prices soared and panic buying ensued. This second oil shock stimulated the demand for smaller cars.

Electric cars might have been expected to benefit from the concerns over the sustainability of gas-guzzlers. But electric-car technology had made little progress since the 1920s. The biggest problem remained the battery: lead-acid batteries were still heavy and bulky and could not store much energy per unit of weight. The most famous electric vehicles of the 1970s, the four-wheeled lunar rovers driven by American astronauts on the moon, were powered by non-rechargeable batteries because they only had to operate for a few hours.

On Earth, attempts to revive electric cars as commercial products failed to get off the ground – until the emergence in the 90s of the rechargeable lithium ion battery. By 2003, Alan Cocconi and Tom Gage, two electric-car enthusiasts, had built an electric roadster called the tzero, powered by 6,800 camcorder batteries, capable of 0-60mph in less than four seconds and with a range of 250 miles. Tesla was founded to commercialise that technology.

Lithium-ion batteries have made the switch to electric cars possible, but because of tightening regulation of combustion-powered vehicles in order to address climate change, that switch now seems inevitable.

The automobile, having been introduced in part to address one pollution problem, has contributed to another one: carbon dioxide emissions from the burning of fossil fuels.

To what extent will electrifying road vehicles help address the climate crisis? Globally, transport (including land, sea and air) accounts for 24% of carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels. Emissions from road vehicles are responsible for 17% of the global total. Of those emissions, about one-third are produced by heavy-duty, mostly diesel-powered vehicles (such as trucks and buses), and two-thirds by light-duty, mostly petrol-powered vehicles (such as cars and vans).

Switching to electric cars would thus make a big dent in global emissions, though the challenges of switching large trucks, ships and planes away from fossil fuels would remain. But it would not address other problems associated with cars, such as traffic congestion, road deaths or the inherent inefficiency of using a one-tonne vehicle to move one person to the shops. And just as the rise of the automobile led to worries about the sustainability and geopolitical consequences of relying on oil, the electric car raises similar concerns. The supply of lithium and cobalt needed to make batteries, and of the “rare earth” elements need to make electric motors, are already raising environmental and geopolitical questions .

Lithium is quite abundant, but cobalt is not, and the main source of it is the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where around a quarter of production is done by hand, using shovels and torches. Conditions for miners are grim, and the industry is dogged by allegations of corruption and use of child labour. Once mined, cobalt is mostly refined in China, which also has the lion’s share of global lithium ion battery production capacity, and dominates production of rare-earth elements, too.

Geopolitical tensions have already led to disputes between China and western countries over the supply of computer chips and related manufacturing tools. So it is not hard to imagine similar disagreements breaking out over the minerals and parts needed to build electric vehicles. (This explains why Tesla has struck a deal with Glencore, a mining giant, to guarantee its supply of cobalt, and also operates its own battery factories , inside and outside China. It also explains why some companies are looking to deep-sea mining as an alternative source of cobalt.)

Moreover, history suggests it would be naive to assume that switching from one form of propulsion to another would mean things would otherwise continue as they were; that is not what happened when cars replaced horse-drawn vehicles. Some people say it’s time to rethink not just the propulsion technology that powers cars, but the whole idea of car ownership.

T he future of urban transport will not be based on a single technology, but on a diverse mixture of transport systems, knitted together by smartphone technology. Collectively, ride-hailing, micromobility and on-demand car rental offer new approaches to transport that provide the convenience of a private car without the need to own one, for a growing fraction of journeys. Horace Dediu, a technology analyst, calls this “unbundling the car”, as cheaper, quicker, cleaner and more convenient alternatives slowly chip away at the rationale for mass car ownership.

Its ability to connect up these different forms of transport, to form an “internet of motion”, means that the smartphone, rather than any particular means of transport, is the true heir to the car. The internet of motion provides a way to escape from the car-based transport monoculture that exists in many cities. That should be welcomed, because the experience of the 20th century suggests that it would be a mistake to replace one transport monoculture with another, as happened with the switch from horses to cars. A transport monoculture is less flexible, and its unintended consequences become more easily locked in and more difficult to address.

As combustion engines are phased out, and cars, trains and other forms of ground transport go electric, direct emissions should not be a problem. (Electric transport will only be truly emission-free when it is powered by renewable power from a zero-carbon grid.) But transport systems will produce another form of potentially problematic output: data. In particular, they will produce reams of data about who went where, and when, and how, and with whom. They already do.

In an infamous (and since deleted) blog post from 2012, entitled Rides of Glory, Uber analysed its riders’ behaviour to identify the cities and dates with the highest prevalence of one-night stands, for example. The post caused a furore, and was seen as symptomatic of the unrestrained “tech bro” culture that prevailed at Uber at the time. But it highlights a broader point. Shared bikes and e-scooters also track who went where, and when, for billing purposes.

The companies that operate mobility services are keen to keep this data to themselves: it helps them predict future demand, can be useful when preparing to launch new services, and can also be used to profile riders and target advertising. Cities want to track the position and usage of shared bicycles and e-scooters so they can adjust the provision of bike lanes, compare levels of usage in low-income and high-income neighbourhoods, check that vehicles are not being used in places where they should not be, and so forth. For this reason, dozens of cities around the world have adopted a system called the Mobility Data Specification (MDS). At present, MDS only covers bicycles and e-scooters, though it could be expanded to cover ride-hailing, car-sharing and autonomous taxi services in the future.

But mobility-service providers and privacy groups are concerned that MDS lets cities track individuals, and could, for example, allow the police to identify people who attend a demonstration or visit a particular location. They also worry that the foundation that oversees MDS will not store the data securely. It is not difficult to imagine the sort of things that an authoritarian regime might do with such data.

All of this suggests that personal-mobility data is likely to become a flashpoint in the future. This may seem like an esoteric concern, but the same could have been said of worries about carbon dioxide emissions, which are just as invisible, at the dawn of the automotive era. And unlike the people of that time, those building and using new mobility services today have the chance to address such concerns before it is too late.

This is an edited extract from A Brief History of Motion: From the wheel to the car to what comes next, published by Bloomsbury on 18 August

• The long read
• Motoring (Technology)
• City transport
• Electric, hybrid and low-emission cars
• Automotive industry
• Transport policy
• Urbanisation

Most viewed

The Role of Renewable Energy Generation in Electric Vehicles Transition and Decarbonization of Transportation Sector

Ieee account.

• Change Username/Password
• Update Address

Purchase Details

• Payment Options
• Order History
• View Purchased Documents

Profile Information

• Communications Preferences
• Profession and Education
• Technical Interests
• US & Canada: +1 800 678 4333
• Worldwide: +1 732 981 0060
• Contact & Support
• About IEEE Xplore
• Accessibility
• Terms of Use
• Nondiscrimination Policy
• Privacy & Opting Out of Cookies

A not-for-profit organization, IEEE is the world's largest technical professional organization dedicated to advancing technology for the benefit of humanity. © Copyright 2024 IEEE - All rights reserved. Use of this web site signifies your agreement to the terms and conditions.

Going Green on Wheels: Why Electric Vehicles Are the Future of Transportation

T he transportation industry is experiencing a significant shift towards electric vehicles (EVs) as we strive for a more sustainable future. The rise of EVs is driven by several key factors, making them the frontrunners in the quest for greener transportation solutions.

One of the main reasons why EVs are gaining popularity is their positive environmental impact. Traditional gasoline-powered vehicles contribute significantly to air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast, EVs produce zero tailpipe emissions, reducing our carbon footprint and improving air quality. By choosing electric vehicles, we can play an active role in combatting climate change and preserving the planet for future generations.

In addition to their environmental benefits, EVs also offer cost savings in the long run. Although the upfront cost of purchasing an electric vehicle may be higher compared to a conventional car, the operational costs are considerably lower. Electricity is generally cheaper than gasoline, and EVs require less maintenance due to their simpler mechanical components. Over time, the savings on fuel and maintenance can offset the initial investment, making EVs a financially viable option.

Another advantage of electric vehicles is their technological advancements. The development of high-capacity batteries has significantly improved the driving range of EVs, alleviating concerns about range anxiety. Modern EVs can travel several hundred miles on a single charge, making them suitable for both daily commuting and long-distance trips. Additionally, the charging infrastructure is expanding rapidly, with more public charging stations and home charging solutions becoming available. This infrastructure growth ensures convenient and accessible charging options for EV owners.

The future of transportation also lies in the integration of renewable energy sources. As we transition towards a greener energy grid, charging electric vehicles with renewable energy becomes increasingly feasible. This synergy between clean energy production and clean transportation creates a harmonious ecosystem that minimizes our reliance on fossil fuels.

Furthermore, governments and policymakers around the world are actively promoting the adoption of electric vehicles through various incentives and regulations. These measures include tax credits, subsidies, and initiatives to develop charging infrastructure. By incentivizing the transition to EVs, governments are accelerating the shift towards sustainable transportation and supporting the growth of the electric vehicle market.

In conclusion, electric vehicles are revolutionizing the transportation industry and are poised to become the future of mobility. Their environmental benefits, cost savings, technological advancements, and support from governments all contribute to their increasing popularity. By embracing electric vehicles, we can make a significant impact in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving air quality, and creating a more sustainable world. The time to go green on wheels is now, as we drive towards a future of cleaner, quieter, and more efficient transportation.

For more information and tips on cars, visit Microsoft Autos Marketplace .

How Volvo landed a cheap Chinese EV on U.S. shores in a trade war

• Medium Text

• Company Volvo AB Follow
• Company BYD Co Ltd Follow
• Company Ford Motor Co Follow

LEASING LOOPHOLE

'extinction' event, volvo quality, geely cost, import-export business.

Sign up here.

Reporting by Norihiko Shirouzu and Chris Kirkham. Editing by David Clarke, Claudia Parsons and Brian Thevenot

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles. New Tab , opens new tab

Thomson Reuters

Chris Kirkham is a business reporter in Los Angeles who has covered topics including tobacco, worker safety, internet privacy and corporate sustainability efforts. Chris previously worked at The Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times.

Business Chevron

Warren Buffett says Berkshire sold entire Paramount holdings at a loss

Warren Buffett said on Saturday Berkshire Hathaway sold its entire holding in Paramount at a loss, a decision he said was his sole responsibility.