critical thinking structure of argument

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Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking carefully, and the thinking components on which they focus. Its adoption as an educational goal has been recommended on the basis of respect for students’ autonomy and preparing students for success in life and for democratic citizenship. “Critical thinkers” have the dispositions and abilities that lead them to think critically when appropriate. The abilities can be identified directly; the dispositions indirectly, by considering what factors contribute to or impede exercise of the abilities. Standardized tests have been developed to assess the degree to which a person possesses such dispositions and abilities. Educational intervention has been shown experimentally to improve them, particularly when it includes dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring. Controversies have arisen over the generalizability of critical thinking across domains, over alleged bias in critical thinking theories and instruction, and over the relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking.

2.1 Dewey’s Three Main Examples

2.2 dewey’s other examples, 2.3 further examples, 2.4 non-examples, 3. the definition of critical thinking, 4. its value, 5. the process of thinking critically, 6. components of the process, 7. contributory dispositions and abilities, 8.1 initiating dispositions, 8.2 internal dispositions, 9. critical thinking abilities, 10. required knowledge, 11. educational methods, 12.1 the generalizability of critical thinking, 12.2 bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, 12.3 relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking, other internet resources, related entries.

Use of the term ‘critical thinking’ to describe an educational goal goes back to the American philosopher John Dewey (1910), who more commonly called it ‘reflective thinking’. He defined it as

active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends. (Dewey 1910: 6; 1933: 9)

and identified a habit of such consideration with a scientific attitude of mind. His lengthy quotations of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill indicate that he was not the first person to propose development of a scientific attitude of mind as an educational goal.

In the 1930s, many of the schools that participated in the Eight-Year Study of the Progressive Education Association (Aikin 1942) adopted critical thinking as an educational goal, for whose achievement the study’s Evaluation Staff developed tests (Smith, Tyler, & Evaluation Staff 1942). Glaser (1941) showed experimentally that it was possible to improve the critical thinking of high school students. Bloom’s influential taxonomy of cognitive educational objectives (Bloom et al. 1956) incorporated critical thinking abilities. Ennis (1962) proposed 12 aspects of critical thinking as a basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.

Since 1980, an annual international conference in California on critical thinking and educational reform has attracted tens of thousands of educators from all levels of education and from many parts of the world. Also since 1980, the state university system in California has required all undergraduate students to take a critical thinking course. Since 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking has sponsored sessions in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). In 1987, the APA’s Committee on Pre-College Philosophy commissioned a consensus statement on critical thinking for purposes of educational assessment and instruction (Facione 1990a). Researchers have developed standardized tests of critical thinking abilities and dispositions; for details, see the Supplement on Assessment . Educational jurisdictions around the world now include critical thinking in guidelines for curriculum and assessment.

For details on this history, see the Supplement on History .

2. Examples and Non-Examples

Before considering the definition of critical thinking, it will be helpful to have in mind some examples of critical thinking, as well as some examples of kinds of thinking that would apparently not count as critical thinking.

Dewey (1910: 68–71; 1933: 91–94) takes as paradigms of reflective thinking three class papers of students in which they describe their thinking. The examples range from the everyday to the scientific.

Transit : “The other day, when I was down town on 16th Street, a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12:20. This suggested that I had an engagement at 124th Street, at one o’clock. I reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination by one o’clock.” (Dewey 1910: 68–69; 1933: 91–92)

Ferryboat : “Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river is a long white pole, having a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere on the boat two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.

“I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of the pole, and to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (b) Possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving.

“In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the pilot’s position, it must appear to project far out in front of the boat. Moreover, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly.” (Dewey 1910: 69–70; 1933: 92–93)

Bubbles : “In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat, or by decrease of pressure, or both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside. But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse” (Dewey 1910: 70–71; 1933: 93–94).

Dewey (1910, 1933) sprinkles his book with other examples of critical thinking. We will refer to the following.

Weather : A man on a walk notices that it has suddenly become cool, thinks that it is probably going to rain, looks up and sees a dark cloud obscuring the sun, and quickens his steps (1910: 6–10; 1933: 9–13).

Disorder : A man finds his rooms on his return to them in disorder with his belongings thrown about, thinks at first of burglary as an explanation, then thinks of mischievous children as being an alternative explanation, then looks to see whether valuables are missing, and discovers that they are (1910: 82–83; 1933: 166–168).

Typhoid : A physician diagnosing a patient whose conspicuous symptoms suggest typhoid avoids drawing a conclusion until more data are gathered by questioning the patient and by making tests (1910: 85–86; 1933: 170).

Blur : A moving blur catches our eye in the distance, we ask ourselves whether it is a cloud of whirling dust or a tree moving its branches or a man signaling to us, we think of other traits that should be found on each of those possibilities, and we look and see if those traits are found (1910: 102, 108; 1933: 121, 133).

Suction pump : In thinking about the suction pump, the scientist first notes that it will draw water only to a maximum height of 33 feet at sea level and to a lesser maximum height at higher elevations, selects for attention the differing atmospheric pressure at these elevations, sets up experiments in which the air is removed from a vessel containing water (when suction no longer works) and in which the weight of air at various levels is calculated, compares the results of reasoning about the height to which a given weight of air will allow a suction pump to raise water with the observed maximum height at different elevations, and finally assimilates the suction pump to such apparently different phenomena as the siphon and the rising of a balloon (1910: 150–153; 1933: 195–198).

Diamond : A passenger in a car driving in a diamond lane reserved for vehicles with at least one passenger notices that the diamond marks on the pavement are far apart in some places and close together in others. Why? The driver suggests that the reason may be that the diamond marks are not needed where there is a solid double line separating the diamond lane from the adjoining lane, but are needed when there is a dotted single line permitting crossing into the diamond lane. Further observation confirms that the diamonds are close together when a dotted line separates the diamond lane from its neighbour, but otherwise far apart.

Rash : A woman suddenly develops a very itchy red rash on her throat and upper chest. She recently noticed a mark on the back of her right hand, but was not sure whether the mark was a rash or a scrape. She lies down in bed and thinks about what might be causing the rash and what to do about it. About two weeks before, she began taking blood pressure medication that contained a sulfa drug, and the pharmacist had warned her, in view of a previous allergic reaction to a medication containing a sulfa drug, to be on the alert for an allergic reaction; however, she had been taking the medication for two weeks with no such effect. The day before, she began using a new cream on her neck and upper chest; against the new cream as the cause was mark on the back of her hand, which had not been exposed to the cream. She began taking probiotics about a month before. She also recently started new eye drops, but she supposed that manufacturers of eye drops would be careful not to include allergy-causing components in the medication. The rash might be a heat rash, since she recently was sweating profusely from her upper body. Since she is about to go away on a short vacation, where she would not have access to her usual physician, she decides to keep taking the probiotics and using the new eye drops but to discontinue the blood pressure medication and to switch back to the old cream for her neck and upper chest. She forms a plan to consult her regular physician on her return about the blood pressure medication.

Candidate : Although Dewey included no examples of thinking directed at appraising the arguments of others, such thinking has come to be considered a kind of critical thinking. We find an example of such thinking in the performance task on the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+), which its sponsoring organization describes as

a performance-based assessment that provides a measure of an institution’s contribution to the development of critical-thinking and written communication skills of its students. (Council for Aid to Education 2017)

A sample task posted on its website requires the test-taker to write a report for public distribution evaluating a fictional candidate’s policy proposals and their supporting arguments, using supplied background documents, with a recommendation on whether to endorse the candidate.

Immediate acceptance of an idea that suggests itself as a solution to a problem (e.g., a possible explanation of an event or phenomenon, an action that seems likely to produce a desired result) is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection” (Dewey 1910: 13). On-going suspension of judgment in the light of doubt about a possible solution is not critical thinking (Dewey 1910: 108). Critique driven by a dogmatically held political or religious ideology is not critical thinking; thus Paulo Freire (1968 [1970]) is using the term (e.g., at 1970: 71, 81, 100, 146) in a more politically freighted sense that includes not only reflection but also revolutionary action against oppression. Derivation of a conclusion from given data using an algorithm is not critical thinking.

What is critical thinking? There are many definitions. Ennis (2016) lists 14 philosophically oriented scholarly definitions and three dictionary definitions. Following Rawls (1971), who distinguished his conception of justice from a utilitarian conception but regarded them as rival conceptions of the same concept, Ennis maintains that the 17 definitions are different conceptions of the same concept. Rawls articulated the shared concept of justice as

a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining… the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971: 5)

Bailin et al. (1999b) claim that, if one considers what sorts of thinking an educator would take not to be critical thinking and what sorts to be critical thinking, one can conclude that educators typically understand critical thinking to have at least three features.

• It is done for the purpose of making up one’s mind about what to believe or do.
• The person engaging in the thinking is trying to fulfill standards of adequacy and accuracy appropriate to the thinking.
• The thinking fulfills the relevant standards to some threshold level.

One could sum up the core concept that involves these three features by saying that critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking. This core concept seems to apply to all the examples of critical thinking described in the previous section. As for the non-examples, their exclusion depends on construing careful thinking as excluding jumping immediately to conclusions, suspending judgment no matter how strong the evidence, reasoning from an unquestioned ideological or religious perspective, and routinely using an algorithm to answer a question.

If the core of critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking, conceptions of it can vary according to its presumed scope, its presumed goal, one’s criteria and threshold for being careful, and the thinking component on which one focuses. As to its scope, some conceptions (e.g., Dewey 1910, 1933) restrict it to constructive thinking on the basis of one’s own observations and experiments, others (e.g., Ennis 1962; Fisher & Scriven 1997; Johnson 1992) to appraisal of the products of such thinking. Ennis (1991) and Bailin et al. (1999b) take it to cover both construction and appraisal. As to its goal, some conceptions restrict it to forming a judgment (Dewey 1910, 1933; Lipman 1987; Facione 1990a). Others allow for actions as well as beliefs as the end point of a process of critical thinking (Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b). As to the criteria and threshold for being careful, definitions vary in the term used to indicate that critical thinking satisfies certain norms: “intellectually disciplined” (Scriven & Paul 1987), “reasonable” (Ennis 1991), “skillful” (Lipman 1987), “skilled” (Fisher & Scriven 1997), “careful” (Bailin & Battersby 2009). Some definitions specify these norms, referring variously to “consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1910, 1933); “the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning” (Glaser 1941); “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication” (Scriven & Paul 1987); the requirement that “it is sensitive to context, relies on criteria, and is self-correcting” (Lipman 1987); “evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” (Facione 1990a); and “plus-minus considerations of the product in terms of appropriate standards (or criteria)” (Johnson 1992). Stanovich and Stanovich (2010) propose to ground the concept of critical thinking in the concept of rationality, which they understand as combining epistemic rationality (fitting one’s beliefs to the world) and instrumental rationality (optimizing goal fulfillment); a critical thinker, in their view, is someone with “a propensity to override suboptimal responses from the autonomous mind” (2010: 227). These variant specifications of norms for critical thinking are not necessarily incompatible with one another, and in any case presuppose the core notion of thinking carefully. As to the thinking component singled out, some definitions focus on suspension of judgment during the thinking (Dewey 1910; McPeck 1981), others on inquiry while judgment is suspended (Bailin & Battersby 2009, 2021), others on the resulting judgment (Facione 1990a), and still others on responsiveness to reasons (Siegel 1988). Kuhn (2019) takes critical thinking to be more a dialogic practice of advancing and responding to arguments than an individual ability.

In educational contexts, a definition of critical thinking is a “programmatic definition” (Scheffler 1960: 19). It expresses a practical program for achieving an educational goal. For this purpose, a one-sentence formulaic definition is much less useful than articulation of a critical thinking process, with criteria and standards for the kinds of thinking that the process may involve. The real educational goal is recognition, adoption and implementation by students of those criteria and standards. That adoption and implementation in turn consists in acquiring the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker.

Conceptions of critical thinking generally do not include moral integrity as part of the concept. Dewey, for example, took critical thinking to be the ultimate intellectual goal of education, but distinguished it from the development of social cooperation among school children, which he took to be the central moral goal. Ennis (1996, 2011) added to his previous list of critical thinking dispositions a group of dispositions to care about the dignity and worth of every person, which he described as a “correlative” (1996) disposition without which critical thinking would be less valuable and perhaps harmful. An educational program that aimed at developing critical thinking but not the correlative disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person, he asserted, “would be deficient and perhaps dangerous” (Ennis 1996: 172).

Dewey thought that education for reflective thinking would be of value to both the individual and society; recognition in educational practice of the kinship to the scientific attitude of children’s native curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry “would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste” (Dewey 1910: iii). Schools participating in the Eight-Year Study took development of the habit of reflective thinking and skill in solving problems as a means to leading young people to understand, appreciate and live the democratic way of life characteristic of the United States (Aikin 1942: 17–18, 81). Harvey Siegel (1988: 55–61) has offered four considerations in support of adopting critical thinking as an educational ideal. (1) Respect for persons requires that schools and teachers honour students’ demands for reasons and explanations, deal with students honestly, and recognize the need to confront students’ independent judgment; these requirements concern the manner in which teachers treat students. (2) Education has the task of preparing children to be successful adults, a task that requires development of their self-sufficiency. (3) Education should initiate children into the rational traditions in such fields as history, science and mathematics. (4) Education should prepare children to become democratic citizens, which requires reasoned procedures and critical talents and attitudes. To supplement these considerations, Siegel (1988: 62–90) responds to two objections: the ideology objection that adoption of any educational ideal requires a prior ideological commitment and the indoctrination objection that cultivation of critical thinking cannot escape being a form of indoctrination.

Despite the diversity of our 11 examples, one can recognize a common pattern. Dewey analyzed it as consisting of five phases:

• suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution;
• an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
• the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material;
• the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense on which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and
• testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey 1933: 106–107; italics in original)

The process of reflective thinking consisting of these phases would be preceded by a perplexed, troubled or confused situation and followed by a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (Dewey 1933: 106). The term ‘phases’ replaced the term ‘steps’ (Dewey 1910: 72), thus removing the earlier suggestion of an invariant sequence. Variants of the above analysis appeared in (Dewey 1916: 177) and (Dewey 1938: 101–119).

The variant formulations indicate the difficulty of giving a single logical analysis of such a varied process. The process of critical thinking may have a spiral pattern, with the problem being redefined in the light of obstacles to solving it as originally formulated. For example, the person in Transit might have concluded that getting to the appointment at the scheduled time was impossible and have reformulated the problem as that of rescheduling the appointment for a mutually convenient time. Further, defining a problem does not always follow after or lead immediately to an idea of a suggested solution. Nor should it do so, as Dewey himself recognized in describing the physician in Typhoid as avoiding any strong preference for this or that conclusion before getting further information (Dewey 1910: 85; 1933: 170). People with a hypothesis in mind, even one to which they have a very weak commitment, have a so-called “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998): they are likely to pay attention to evidence that confirms the hypothesis and to ignore evidence that counts against it or for some competing hypothesis. Detectives, intelligence agencies, and investigators of airplane accidents are well advised to gather relevant evidence systematically and to postpone even tentative adoption of an explanatory hypothesis until the collected evidence rules out with the appropriate degree of certainty all but one explanation. Dewey’s analysis of the critical thinking process can be faulted as well for requiring acceptance or rejection of a possible solution to a defined problem, with no allowance for deciding in the light of the available evidence to suspend judgment. Further, given the great variety of kinds of problems for which reflection is appropriate, there is likely to be variation in its component events. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the critical thinking process is as a checklist whose component events can occur in a variety of orders, selectively, and more than once. These component events might include (1) noticing a difficulty, (2) defining the problem, (3) dividing the problem into manageable sub-problems, (4) formulating a variety of possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (5) determining what evidence is relevant to deciding among possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (6) devising a plan of systematic observation or experiment that will uncover the relevant evidence, (7) carrying out the plan of systematic observation or experimentation, (8) noting the results of the systematic observation or experiment, (9) gathering relevant testimony and information from others, (10) judging the credibility of testimony and information gathered from others, (11) drawing conclusions from gathered evidence and accepted testimony, and (12) accepting a solution that the evidence adequately supports (cf. Hitchcock 2017: 485).

Checklist conceptions of the process of critical thinking are open to the objection that they are too mechanical and procedural to fit the multi-dimensional and emotionally charged issues for which critical thinking is urgently needed (Paul 1984). For such issues, a more dialectical process is advocated, in which competing relevant world views are identified, their implications explored, and some sort of creative synthesis attempted.

If one considers the critical thinking process illustrated by the 11 examples, one can identify distinct kinds of mental acts and mental states that form part of it. To distinguish, label and briefly characterize these components is a useful preliminary to identifying abilities, skills, dispositions, attitudes, habits and the like that contribute causally to thinking critically. Identifying such abilities and habits is in turn a useful preliminary to setting educational goals. Setting the goals is in its turn a useful preliminary to designing strategies for helping learners to achieve the goals and to designing ways of measuring the extent to which learners have done so. Such measures provide both feedback to learners on their achievement and a basis for experimental research on the effectiveness of various strategies for educating people to think critically. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing the kinds of mental acts and mental events that can occur in a critical thinking process.

• Observing : One notices something in one’s immediate environment (sudden cooling of temperature in Weather , bubbles forming outside a glass and then going inside in Bubbles , a moving blur in the distance in Blur , a rash in Rash ). Or one notes the results of an experiment or systematic observation (valuables missing in Disorder , no suction without air pressure in Suction pump )
• Feeling : One feels puzzled or uncertain about something (how to get to an appointment on time in Transit , why the diamonds vary in spacing in Diamond ). One wants to resolve this perplexity. One feels satisfaction once one has worked out an answer (to take the subway express in Transit , diamonds closer when needed as a warning in Diamond ).
• Wondering : One formulates a question to be addressed (why bubbles form outside a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , how suction pumps work in Suction pump , what caused the rash in Rash ).
• Imagining : One thinks of possible answers (bus or subway or elevated in Transit , flagpole or ornament or wireless communication aid or direction indicator in Ferryboat , allergic reaction or heat rash in Rash ).
• Inferring : One works out what would be the case if a possible answer were assumed (valuables missing if there has been a burglary in Disorder , earlier start to the rash if it is an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug in Rash ). Or one draws a conclusion once sufficient relevant evidence is gathered (take the subway in Transit , burglary in Disorder , discontinue blood pressure medication and new cream in Rash ).
• Knowledge : One uses stored knowledge of the subject-matter to generate possible answers or to infer what would be expected on the assumption of a particular answer (knowledge of a city’s public transit system in Transit , of the requirements for a flagpole in Ferryboat , of Boyle’s law in Bubbles , of allergic reactions in Rash ).
• Experimenting : One designs and carries out an experiment or a systematic observation to find out whether the results deduced from a possible answer will occur (looking at the location of the flagpole in relation to the pilot’s position in Ferryboat , putting an ice cube on top of a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , measuring the height to which a suction pump will draw water at different elevations in Suction pump , noticing the spacing of diamonds when movement to or from a diamond lane is allowed in Diamond ).
• Consulting : One finds a source of information, gets the information from the source, and makes a judgment on whether to accept it. None of our 11 examples include searching for sources of information. In this respect they are unrepresentative, since most people nowadays have almost instant access to information relevant to answering any question, including many of those illustrated by the examples. However, Candidate includes the activities of extracting information from sources and evaluating its credibility.
• Identifying and analyzing arguments : One notices an argument and works out its structure and content as a preliminary to evaluating its strength. This activity is central to Candidate . It is an important part of a critical thinking process in which one surveys arguments for various positions on an issue.
• Judging : One makes a judgment on the basis of accumulated evidence and reasoning, such as the judgment in Ferryboat that the purpose of the pole is to provide direction to the pilot.
• Deciding : One makes a decision on what to do or on what policy to adopt, as in the decision in Transit to take the subway.

By definition, a person who does something voluntarily is both willing and able to do that thing at that time. Both the willingness and the ability contribute causally to the person’s action, in the sense that the voluntary action would not occur if either (or both) of these were lacking. For example, suppose that one is standing with one’s arms at one’s sides and one voluntarily lifts one’s right arm to an extended horizontal position. One would not do so if one were unable to lift one’s arm, if for example one’s right side was paralyzed as the result of a stroke. Nor would one do so if one were unwilling to lift one’s arm, if for example one were participating in a street demonstration at which a white supremacist was urging the crowd to lift their right arm in a Nazi salute and one were unwilling to express support in this way for the racist Nazi ideology. The same analysis applies to a voluntary mental process of thinking critically. It requires both willingness and ability to think critically, including willingness and ability to perform each of the mental acts that compose the process and to coordinate those acts in a sequence that is directed at resolving the initiating perplexity.

Consider willingness first. We can identify causal contributors to willingness to think critically by considering factors that would cause a person who was able to think critically about an issue nevertheless not to do so (Hamby 2014). For each factor, the opposite condition thus contributes causally to willingness to think critically on a particular occasion. For example, people who habitually jump to conclusions without considering alternatives will not think critically about issues that arise, even if they have the required abilities. The contrary condition of willingness to suspend judgment is thus a causal contributor to thinking critically.

Now consider ability. In contrast to the ability to move one’s arm, which can be completely absent because a stroke has left the arm paralyzed, the ability to think critically is a developed ability, whose absence is not a complete absence of ability to think but absence of ability to think well. We can identify the ability to think well directly, in terms of the norms and standards for good thinking. In general, to be able do well the thinking activities that can be components of a critical thinking process, one needs to know the concepts and principles that characterize their good performance, to recognize in particular cases that the concepts and principles apply, and to apply them. The knowledge, recognition and application may be procedural rather than declarative. It may be domain-specific rather than widely applicable, and in either case may need subject-matter knowledge, sometimes of a deep kind.

Reflections of the sort illustrated by the previous two paragraphs have led scholars to identify the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a “critical thinker”, i.e., someone who thinks critically whenever it is appropriate to do so. We turn now to these three types of causal contributors to thinking critically. We start with dispositions, since arguably these are the most powerful contributors to being a critical thinker, can be fostered at an early stage of a child’s development, and are susceptible to general improvement (Glaser 1941: 175)

8. Critical Thinking Dispositions

Educational researchers use the term ‘dispositions’ broadly for the habits of mind and attitudes that contribute causally to being a critical thinker. Some writers (e.g., Paul & Elder 2006; Hamby 2014; Bailin & Battersby 2016a) propose to use the term ‘virtues’ for this dimension of a critical thinker. The virtues in question, although they are virtues of character, concern the person’s ways of thinking rather than the person’s ways of behaving towards others. They are not moral virtues but intellectual virtues, of the sort articulated by Zagzebski (1996) and discussed by Turri, Alfano, and Greco (2017).

On a realistic conception, thinking dispositions or intellectual virtues are real properties of thinkers. They are general tendencies, propensities, or inclinations to think in particular ways in particular circumstances, and can be genuinely explanatory (Siegel 1999). Sceptics argue that there is no evidence for a specific mental basis for the habits of mind that contribute to thinking critically, and that it is pedagogically misleading to posit such a basis (Bailin et al. 1999a). Whatever their status, critical thinking dispositions need motivation for their initial formation in a child—motivation that may be external or internal. As children develop, the force of habit will gradually become important in sustaining the disposition (Nieto & Valenzuela 2012). Mere force of habit, however, is unlikely to sustain critical thinking dispositions. Critical thinkers must value and enjoy using their knowledge and abilities to think things through for themselves. They must be committed to, and lovers of, inquiry.

A person may have a critical thinking disposition with respect to only some kinds of issues. For example, one could be open-minded about scientific issues but not about religious issues. Similarly, one could be confident in one’s ability to reason about the theological implications of the existence of evil in the world but not in one’s ability to reason about the best design for a guided ballistic missile.

Facione (1990a: 25) divides “affective dispositions” of critical thinking into approaches to life and living in general and approaches to specific issues, questions or problems. Adapting this distinction, one can usefully divide critical thinking dispositions into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started). The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, open-mindedness, in the sense of willingness to consider alternative points of view to one’s own, is both an initiating and an internal disposition.

Using the strategy of considering factors that would block people with the ability to think critically from doing so, we can identify as initiating dispositions for thinking critically attentiveness, a habit of inquiry, self-confidence, courage, open-mindedness, willingness to suspend judgment, trust in reason, wanting evidence for one’s beliefs, and seeking the truth. We consider briefly what each of these dispositions amounts to, in each case citing sources that acknowledge them.

• Attentiveness : One will not think critically if one fails to recognize an issue that needs to be thought through. For example, the pedestrian in Weather would not have looked up if he had not noticed that the air was suddenly cooler. To be a critical thinker, then, one needs to be habitually attentive to one’s surroundings, noticing not only what one senses but also sources of perplexity in messages received and in one’s own beliefs and attitudes (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Habit of inquiry : Inquiry is effortful, and one needs an internal push to engage in it. For example, the student in Bubbles could easily have stopped at idle wondering about the cause of the bubbles rather than reasoning to a hypothesis, then designing and executing an experiment to test it. Thus willingness to think critically needs mental energy and initiative. What can supply that energy? Love of inquiry, or perhaps just a habit of inquiry. Hamby (2015) has argued that willingness to inquire is the central critical thinking virtue, one that encompasses all the others. It is recognized as a critical thinking disposition by Dewey (1910: 29; 1933: 35), Glaser (1941: 5), Ennis (1987: 12; 1991: 8), Facione (1990a: 25), Bailin et al. (1999b: 294), Halpern (1998: 452), and Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo (2001).
• Self-confidence : Lack of confidence in one’s abilities can block critical thinking. For example, if the woman in Rash lacked confidence in her ability to figure things out for herself, she might just have assumed that the rash on her chest was the allergic reaction to her medication against which the pharmacist had warned her. Thus willingness to think critically requires confidence in one’s ability to inquire (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Courage : Fear of thinking for oneself can stop one from doing it. Thus willingness to think critically requires intellectual courage (Paul & Elder 2006: 16).
• Open-mindedness : A dogmatic attitude will impede thinking critically. For example, a person who adheres rigidly to a “pro-choice” position on the issue of the legal status of induced abortion is likely to be unwilling to consider seriously the issue of when in its development an unborn child acquires a moral right to life. Thus willingness to think critically requires open-mindedness, in the sense of a willingness to examine questions to which one already accepts an answer but which further evidence or reasoning might cause one to answer differently (Dewey 1933; Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b; Halpern 1998, Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). Paul (1981) emphasizes open-mindedness about alternative world-views, and recommends a dialectical approach to integrating such views as central to what he calls “strong sense” critical thinking. In three studies, Haran, Ritov, & Mellers (2013) found that actively open-minded thinking, including “the tendency to weigh new evidence against a favored belief, to spend sufficient time on a problem before giving up, and to consider carefully the opinions of others in forming one’s own”, led study participants to acquire information and thus to make accurate estimations.
• Willingness to suspend judgment : Premature closure on an initial solution will block critical thinking. Thus willingness to think critically requires a willingness to suspend judgment while alternatives are explored (Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Halpern 1998).
• Trust in reason : Since distrust in the processes of reasoned inquiry will dissuade one from engaging in it, trust in them is an initiating critical thinking disposition (Facione 1990a, 25; Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001; Paul & Elder 2006). In reaction to an allegedly exclusive emphasis on reason in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, Thayer-Bacon (2000) argues that intuition, imagination, and emotion have important roles to play in an adequate conception of critical thinking that she calls “constructive thinking”. From her point of view, critical thinking requires trust not only in reason but also in intuition, imagination, and emotion.
• Seeking the truth : If one does not care about the truth but is content to stick with one’s initial bias on an issue, then one will not think critically about it. Seeking the truth is thus an initiating critical thinking disposition (Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). A disposition to seek the truth is implicit in more specific critical thinking dispositions, such as trying to be well-informed, considering seriously points of view other than one’s own, looking for alternatives, suspending judgment when the evidence is insufficient, and adopting a position when the evidence supporting it is sufficient.

Some of the initiating dispositions, such as open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment, are also internal critical thinking dispositions, in the sense of mental habits or attitudes that contribute causally to doing a good job of critical thinking once one starts the process. But there are many other internal critical thinking dispositions. Some of them are parasitic on one’s conception of good thinking. For example, it is constitutive of good thinking about an issue to formulate the issue clearly and to maintain focus on it. For this purpose, one needs not only the corresponding ability but also the corresponding disposition. Ennis (1991: 8) describes it as the disposition “to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question”, Facione (1990a: 25) as “clarity in stating the question or concern”. Other internal dispositions are motivators to continue or adjust the critical thinking process, such as willingness to persist in a complex task and willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct (Halpern 1998: 452). For a list of identified internal critical thinking dispositions, see the Supplement on Internal Critical Thinking Dispositions .

Some theorists postulate skills, i.e., acquired abilities, as operative in critical thinking. It is not obvious, however, that a good mental act is the exercise of a generic acquired skill. Inferring an expected time of arrival, as in Transit , has some generic components but also uses non-generic subject-matter knowledge. Bailin et al. (1999a) argue against viewing critical thinking skills as generic and discrete, on the ground that skilled performance at a critical thinking task cannot be separated from knowledge of concepts and from domain-specific principles of good thinking. Talk of skills, they concede, is unproblematic if it means merely that a person with critical thinking skills is capable of intelligent performance.

Despite such scepticism, theorists of critical thinking have listed as general contributors to critical thinking what they variously call abilities (Glaser 1941; Ennis 1962, 1991), skills (Facione 1990a; Halpern 1998) or competencies (Fisher & Scriven 1997). Amalgamating these lists would produce a confusing and chaotic cornucopia of more than 50 possible educational objectives, with only partial overlap among them. It makes sense instead to try to understand the reasons for the multiplicity and diversity, and to make a selection according to one’s own reasons for singling out abilities to be developed in a critical thinking curriculum. Two reasons for diversity among lists of critical thinking abilities are the underlying conception of critical thinking and the envisaged educational level. Appraisal-only conceptions, for example, involve a different suite of abilities than constructive-only conceptions. Some lists, such as those in (Glaser 1941), are put forward as educational objectives for secondary school students, whereas others are proposed as objectives for college students (e.g., Facione 1990a).

The abilities described in the remaining paragraphs of this section emerge from reflection on the general abilities needed to do well the thinking activities identified in section 6 as components of the critical thinking process described in section 5 . The derivation of each collection of abilities is accompanied by citation of sources that list such abilities and of standardized tests that claim to test them.

Observational abilities : Careful and accurate observation sometimes requires specialist expertise and practice, as in the case of observing birds and observing accident scenes. However, there are general abilities of noticing what one’s senses are picking up from one’s environment and of being able to articulate clearly and accurately to oneself and others what one has observed. It helps in exercising them to be able to recognize and take into account factors that make one’s observation less trustworthy, such as prior framing of the situation, inadequate time, deficient senses, poor observation conditions, and the like. It helps as well to be skilled at taking steps to make one’s observation more trustworthy, such as moving closer to get a better look, measuring something three times and taking the average, and checking what one thinks one is observing with someone else who is in a good position to observe it. It also helps to be skilled at recognizing respects in which one’s report of one’s observation involves inference rather than direct observation, so that one can then consider whether the inference is justified. These abilities come into play as well when one thinks about whether and with what degree of confidence to accept an observation report, for example in the study of history or in a criminal investigation or in assessing news reports. Observational abilities show up in some lists of critical thinking abilities (Ennis 1962: 90; Facione 1990a: 16; Ennis 1991: 9). There are items testing a person’s ability to judge the credibility of observation reports in the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests, Levels X and Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). Norris and King (1983, 1985, 1990a, 1990b) is a test of ability to appraise observation reports.

Emotional abilities : The emotions that drive a critical thinking process are perplexity or puzzlement, a wish to resolve it, and satisfaction at achieving the desired resolution. Children experience these emotions at an early age, without being trained to do so. Education that takes critical thinking as a goal needs only to channel these emotions and to make sure not to stifle them. Collaborative critical thinking benefits from ability to recognize one’s own and others’ emotional commitments and reactions.

Questioning abilities : A critical thinking process needs transformation of an inchoate sense of perplexity into a clear question. Formulating a question well requires not building in questionable assumptions, not prejudging the issue, and using language that in context is unambiguous and precise enough (Ennis 1962: 97; 1991: 9).

Imaginative abilities : Thinking directed at finding the correct causal explanation of a general phenomenon or particular event requires an ability to imagine possible explanations. Thinking about what policy or plan of action to adopt requires generation of options and consideration of possible consequences of each option. Domain knowledge is required for such creative activity, but a general ability to imagine alternatives is helpful and can be nurtured so as to become easier, quicker, more extensive, and deeper (Dewey 1910: 34–39; 1933: 40–47). Facione (1990a) and Halpern (1998) include the ability to imagine alternatives as a critical thinking ability.

Inferential abilities : The ability to draw conclusions from given information, and to recognize with what degree of certainty one’s own or others’ conclusions follow, is universally recognized as a general critical thinking ability. All 11 examples in section 2 of this article include inferences, some from hypotheses or options (as in Transit , Ferryboat and Disorder ), others from something observed (as in Weather and Rash ). None of these inferences is formally valid. Rather, they are licensed by general, sometimes qualified substantive rules of inference (Toulmin 1958) that rest on domain knowledge—that a bus trip takes about the same time in each direction, that the terminal of a wireless telegraph would be located on the highest possible place, that sudden cooling is often followed by rain, that an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug generally shows up soon after one starts taking it. It is a matter of controversy to what extent the specialized ability to deduce conclusions from premisses using formal rules of inference is needed for critical thinking. Dewey (1933) locates logical forms in setting out the products of reflection rather than in the process of reflection. Ennis (1981a), on the other hand, maintains that a liberally-educated person should have the following abilities: to translate natural-language statements into statements using the standard logical operators, to use appropriately the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, to deal with argument forms and arguments containing symbols, to determine whether in virtue of an argument’s form its conclusion follows necessarily from its premisses, to reason with logically complex propositions, and to apply the rules and procedures of deductive logic. Inferential abilities are recognized as critical thinking abilities by Glaser (1941: 6), Facione (1990a: 9), Ennis (1991: 9), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 99, 111), and Halpern (1998: 452). Items testing inferential abilities constitute two of the five subtests of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser 1980a, 1980b, 1994), two of the four sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), three of the seven sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), 11 of the 34 items on Forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992), and a high but variable proportion of the 25 selected-response questions in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Experimenting abilities : Knowing how to design and execute an experiment is important not just in scientific research but also in everyday life, as in Rash . Dewey devoted a whole chapter of his How We Think (1910: 145–156; 1933: 190–202) to the superiority of experimentation over observation in advancing knowledge. Experimenting abilities come into play at one remove in appraising reports of scientific studies. Skill in designing and executing experiments includes the acknowledged abilities to appraise evidence (Glaser 1941: 6), to carry out experiments and to apply appropriate statistical inference techniques (Facione 1990a: 9), to judge inductions to an explanatory hypothesis (Ennis 1991: 9), and to recognize the need for an adequately large sample size (Halpern 1998). The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) includes four items (out of 52) on experimental design. The Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) makes room for appraisal of study design in both its performance task and its selected-response questions.

Consulting abilities : Skill at consulting sources of information comes into play when one seeks information to help resolve a problem, as in Candidate . Ability to find and appraise information includes ability to gather and marshal pertinent information (Glaser 1941: 6), to judge whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable (Ennis 1962: 84), to plan a search for desired information (Facione 1990a: 9), and to judge the credibility of a source (Ennis 1991: 9). Ability to judge the credibility of statements is tested by 24 items (out of 76) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) and by four items (out of 52) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). The College Learning Assessment’s performance task requires evaluation of whether information in documents is credible or unreliable (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Argument analysis abilities : The ability to identify and analyze arguments contributes to the process of surveying arguments on an issue in order to form one’s own reasoned judgment, as in Candidate . The ability to detect and analyze arguments is recognized as a critical thinking skill by Facione (1990a: 7–8), Ennis (1991: 9) and Halpern (1998). Five items (out of 34) on the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992) test skill at argument analysis. The College Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) incorporates argument analysis in its selected-response tests of critical reading and evaluation and of critiquing an argument.

Judging skills and deciding skills : Skill at judging and deciding is skill at recognizing what judgment or decision the available evidence and argument supports, and with what degree of confidence. It is thus a component of the inferential skills already discussed.

Lists and tests of critical thinking abilities often include two more abilities: identifying assumptions and constructing and evaluating definitions.

In addition to dispositions and abilities, critical thinking needs knowledge: of critical thinking concepts, of critical thinking principles, and of the subject-matter of the thinking.

We can derive a short list of concepts whose understanding contributes to critical thinking from the critical thinking abilities described in the preceding section. Observational abilities require an understanding of the difference between observation and inference. Questioning abilities require an understanding of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness. Inferential abilities require an understanding of the difference between conclusive and defeasible inference (traditionally, between deduction and induction), as well as of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions. Experimenting abilities require an understanding of the concepts of hypothesis, null hypothesis, assumption and prediction, as well as of the concept of statistical significance and of its difference from importance. They also require an understanding of the difference between an experiment and an observational study, and in particular of the difference between a randomized controlled trial, a prospective correlational study and a retrospective (case-control) study. Argument analysis abilities require an understanding of the concepts of argument, premiss, assumption, conclusion and counter-consideration. Additional critical thinking concepts are proposed by Bailin et al. (1999b: 293), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 105–106), Black (2012), and Blair (2021).

According to Glaser (1941: 25), ability to think critically requires knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning. If we review the list of abilities in the preceding section, however, we can see that some of them can be acquired and exercised merely through practice, possibly guided in an educational setting, followed by feedback. Searching intelligently for a causal explanation of some phenomenon or event requires that one consider a full range of possible causal contributors, but it seems more important that one implements this principle in one’s practice than that one is able to articulate it. What is important is “operational knowledge” of the standards and principles of good thinking (Bailin et al. 1999b: 291–293). But the development of such critical thinking abilities as designing an experiment or constructing an operational definition can benefit from learning their underlying theory. Further, explicit knowledge of quirks of human thinking seems useful as a cautionary guide. Human memory is not just fallible about details, as people learn from their own experiences of misremembering, but is so malleable that a detailed, clear and vivid recollection of an event can be a total fabrication (Loftus 2017). People seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs and expectations, often unconscious of their “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Not only are people subject to this and other cognitive biases (Kahneman 2011), of which they are typically unaware, but it may be counter-productive for one to make oneself aware of them and try consciously to counteract them or to counteract social biases such as racial or sexual stereotypes (Kenyon & Beaulac 2014). It is helpful to be aware of these facts and of the superior effectiveness of blocking the operation of biases—for example, by making an immediate record of one’s observations, refraining from forming a preliminary explanatory hypothesis, blind refereeing, double-blind randomized trials, and blind grading of students’ work. It is also helpful to be aware of the prevalence of “noise” (unwanted unsystematic variability of judgments), of how to detect noise (through a noise audit), and of how to reduce noise: make accuracy the goal, think statistically, break a process of arriving at a judgment into independent tasks, resist premature intuitions, in a group get independent judgments first, favour comparative judgments and scales (Kahneman, Sibony, & Sunstein 2021). It is helpful as well to be aware of the concept of “bounded rationality” in decision-making and of the related distinction between “satisficing” and optimizing (Simon 1956; Gigerenzer 2001).

Critical thinking about an issue requires substantive knowledge of the domain to which the issue belongs. Critical thinking abilities are not a magic elixir that can be applied to any issue whatever by somebody who has no knowledge of the facts relevant to exploring that issue. For example, the student in Bubbles needed to know that gases do not penetrate solid objects like a glass, that air expands when heated, that the volume of an enclosed gas varies directly with its temperature and inversely with its pressure, and that hot objects will spontaneously cool down to the ambient temperature of their surroundings unless kept hot by insulation or a source of heat. Critical thinkers thus need a rich fund of subject-matter knowledge relevant to the variety of situations they encounter. This fact is recognized in the inclusion among critical thinking dispositions of a concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Experimental educational interventions, with control groups, have shown that education can improve critical thinking skills and dispositions, as measured by standardized tests. For information about these tests, see the Supplement on Assessment .

What educational methods are most effective at developing the dispositions, abilities and knowledge of a critical thinker? In a comprehensive meta-analysis of experimental and quasi-experimental studies of strategies for teaching students to think critically, Abrami et al. (2015) found that dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring each increased the effectiveness of the educational intervention, and that they were most effective when combined. They also found that in these studies a combination of separate instruction in critical thinking with subject-matter instruction in which students are encouraged to think critically was more effective than either by itself. However, the difference was not statistically significant; that is, it might have arisen by chance.

Most of these studies lack the longitudinal follow-up required to determine whether the observed differential improvements in critical thinking abilities or dispositions continue over time, for example until high school or college graduation. For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods .

12. Controversies

Scholars have denied the generalizability of critical thinking abilities across subject domains, have alleged bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, and have investigated the relationship of critical thinking to other kinds of thinking.

McPeck (1981) attacked the thinking skills movement of the 1970s, including the critical thinking movement. He argued that there are no general thinking skills, since thinking is always thinking about some subject-matter. It is futile, he claimed, for schools and colleges to teach thinking as if it were a separate subject. Rather, teachers should lead their pupils to become autonomous thinkers by teaching school subjects in a way that brings out their cognitive structure and that encourages and rewards discussion and argument. As some of his critics (e.g., Paul 1985; Siegel 1985) pointed out, McPeck’s central argument needs elaboration, since it has obvious counter-examples in writing and speaking, for which (up to a certain level of complexity) there are teachable general abilities even though they are always about some subject-matter. To make his argument convincing, McPeck needs to explain how thinking differs from writing and speaking in a way that does not permit useful abstraction of its components from the subject-matters with which it deals. He has not done so. Nevertheless, his position that the dispositions and abilities of a critical thinker are best developed in the context of subject-matter instruction is shared by many theorists of critical thinking, including Dewey (1910, 1933), Glaser (1941), Passmore (1980), Weinstein (1990), Bailin et al. (1999b), and Willingham (2019).

McPeck’s challenge prompted reflection on the extent to which critical thinking is subject-specific. McPeck argued for a strong subject-specificity thesis, according to which it is a conceptual truth that all critical thinking abilities are specific to a subject. (He did not however extend his subject-specificity thesis to critical thinking dispositions. In particular, he took the disposition to suspend judgment in situations of cognitive dissonance to be a general disposition.) Conceptual subject-specificity is subject to obvious counter-examples, such as the general ability to recognize confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. A more modest thesis, also endorsed by McPeck, is epistemological subject-specificity, according to which the norms of good thinking vary from one field to another. Epistemological subject-specificity clearly holds to a certain extent; for example, the principles in accordance with which one solves a differential equation are quite different from the principles in accordance with which one determines whether a painting is a genuine Picasso. But the thesis suffers, as Ennis (1989) points out, from vagueness of the concept of a field or subject and from the obvious existence of inter-field principles, however broadly the concept of a field is construed. For example, the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning hold for all the varied fields in which such reasoning occurs. A third kind of subject-specificity is empirical subject-specificity, according to which as a matter of empirically observable fact a person with the abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker in one area of investigation will not necessarily have them in another area of investigation.

The thesis of empirical subject-specificity raises the general problem of transfer. If critical thinking abilities and dispositions have to be developed independently in each school subject, how are they of any use in dealing with the problems of everyday life and the political and social issues of contemporary society, most of which do not fit into the framework of a traditional school subject? Proponents of empirical subject-specificity tend to argue that transfer is more likely to occur if there is critical thinking instruction in a variety of domains, with explicit attention to dispositions and abilities that cut across domains. But evidence for this claim is scanty. There is a need for well-designed empirical studies that investigate the conditions that make transfer more likely.

It is common ground in debates about the generality or subject-specificity of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that critical thinking about any topic requires background knowledge about the topic. For example, the most sophisticated understanding of the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning is of no help unless accompanied by some knowledge of what might be plausible explanations of some phenomenon under investigation.

Critics have objected to bias in the theory, pedagogy and practice of critical thinking. Commentators (e.g., Alston 1995; Ennis 1998) have noted that anyone who takes a position has a bias in the neutral sense of being inclined in one direction rather than others. The critics, however, are objecting to bias in the pejorative sense of an unjustified favoring of certain ways of knowing over others, frequently alleging that the unjustly favoured ways are those of a dominant sex or culture (Bailin 1995). These ways favour:

• reinforcement of egocentric and sociocentric biases over dialectical engagement with opposing world-views (Paul 1981, 1984; Warren 1998)
• distancing from the object of inquiry over closeness to it (Martin 1992; Thayer-Bacon 1992)
• indifference to the situation of others over care for them (Martin 1992)
• orientation to thought over orientation to action (Martin 1992)
• being reasonable over caring to understand people’s ideas (Thayer-Bacon 1993)
• being neutral and objective over being embodied and situated (Thayer-Bacon 1995a)
• doubting over believing (Thayer-Bacon 1995b)
• reason over emotion, imagination and intuition (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• solitary thinking over collaborative thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• written and spoken assignments over other forms of expression (Alston 2001)
• attention to written and spoken communications over attention to human problems (Alston 2001)
• winning debates in the public sphere over making and understanding meaning (Alston 2001)

A common thread in this smorgasbord of accusations is dissatisfaction with focusing on the logical analysis and evaluation of reasoning and arguments. While these authors acknowledge that such analysis and evaluation is part of critical thinking and should be part of its conceptualization and pedagogy, they insist that it is only a part. Paul (1981), for example, bemoans the tendency of atomistic teaching of methods of analyzing and evaluating arguments to turn students into more able sophists, adept at finding fault with positions and arguments with which they disagree but even more entrenched in the egocentric and sociocentric biases with which they began. Martin (1992) and Thayer-Bacon (1992) cite with approval the self-reported intimacy with their subject-matter of leading researchers in biology and medicine, an intimacy that conflicts with the distancing allegedly recommended in standard conceptions and pedagogy of critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (2000) contrasts the embodied and socially embedded learning of her elementary school students in a Montessori school, who used their imagination, intuition and emotions as well as their reason, with conceptions of critical thinking as

thinking that is used to critique arguments, offer justifications, and make judgments about what are the good reasons, or the right answers. (Thayer-Bacon 2000: 127–128)

Alston (2001) reports that her students in a women’s studies class were able to see the flaws in the Cinderella myth that pervades much romantic fiction but in their own romantic relationships still acted as if all failures were the woman’s fault and still accepted the notions of love at first sight and living happily ever after. Students, she writes, should

be able to connect their intellectual critique to a more affective, somatic, and ethical account of making risky choices that have sexist, racist, classist, familial, sexual, or other consequences for themselves and those both near and far… critical thinking that reads arguments, texts, or practices merely on the surface without connections to feeling/desiring/doing or action lacks an ethical depth that should infuse the difference between mere cognitive activity and something we want to call critical thinking. (Alston 2001: 34)

Some critics portray such biases as unfair to women. Thayer-Bacon (1992), for example, has charged modern critical thinking theory with being sexist, on the ground that it separates the self from the object and causes one to lose touch with one’s inner voice, and thus stigmatizes women, who (she asserts) link self to object and listen to their inner voice. Her charge does not imply that women as a group are on average less able than men to analyze and evaluate arguments. Facione (1990c) found no difference by sex in performance on his California Critical Thinking Skills Test. Kuhn (1991: 280–281) found no difference by sex in either the disposition or the competence to engage in argumentative thinking.

The critics propose a variety of remedies for the biases that they allege. In general, they do not propose to eliminate or downplay critical thinking as an educational goal. Rather, they propose to conceptualize critical thinking differently and to change its pedagogy accordingly. Their pedagogical proposals arise logically from their objections. They can be summarized as follows:

• Focus on argument networks with dialectical exchanges reflecting contesting points of view rather than on atomic arguments, so as to develop “strong sense” critical thinking that transcends egocentric and sociocentric biases (Paul 1981, 1984).
• Foster closeness to the subject-matter and feeling connected to others in order to inform a humane democracy (Martin 1992).
• Develop “constructive thinking” as a social activity in a community of physically embodied and socially embedded inquirers with personal voices who value not only reason but also imagination, intuition and emotion (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
• In developing critical thinking in school subjects, treat as important neither skills nor dispositions but opening worlds of meaning (Alston 2001).
• Attend to the development of critical thinking dispositions as well as skills, and adopt the “critical pedagogy” practised and advocated by Freire (1968 [1970]) and hooks (1994) (Dalgleish, Girard, & Davies 2017).

A common thread in these proposals is treatment of critical thinking as a social, interactive, personally engaged activity like that of a quilting bee or a barn-raising (Thayer-Bacon 2000) rather than as an individual, solitary, distanced activity symbolized by Rodin’s The Thinker . One can get a vivid description of education with the former type of goal from the writings of bell hooks (1994, 2010). Critical thinking for her is open-minded dialectical exchange across opposing standpoints and from multiple perspectives, a conception similar to Paul’s “strong sense” critical thinking (Paul 1981). She abandons the structure of domination in the traditional classroom. In an introductory course on black women writers, for example, she assigns students to write an autobiographical paragraph about an early racial memory, then to read it aloud as the others listen, thus affirming the uniqueness and value of each voice and creating a communal awareness of the diversity of the group’s experiences (hooks 1994: 84). Her “engaged pedagogy” is thus similar to the “freedom under guidance” implemented in John Dewey’s Laboratory School of Chicago in the late 1890s and early 1900s. It incorporates the dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring that Abrami (2015) found to be most effective in improving critical thinking skills and dispositions.

What is the relationship of critical thinking to problem solving, decision-making, higher-order thinking, creative thinking, and other recognized types of thinking? One’s answer to this question obviously depends on how one defines the terms used in the question. If critical thinking is conceived broadly to cover any careful thinking about any topic for any purpose, then problem solving and decision making will be kinds of critical thinking, if they are done carefully. Historically, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem solving’ were two names for the same thing. If critical thinking is conceived more narrowly as consisting solely of appraisal of intellectual products, then it will be disjoint with problem solving and decision making, which are constructive.

Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives used the phrase “intellectual abilities and skills” for what had been labeled “critical thinking” by some, “reflective thinking” by Dewey and others, and “problem solving” by still others (Bloom et al. 1956: 38). Thus, the so-called “higher-order thinking skills” at the taxonomy’s top levels of analysis, synthesis and evaluation are just critical thinking skills, although they do not come with general criteria for their assessment (Ennis 1981b). The revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson et al. 2001) likewise treats critical thinking as cutting across those types of cognitive process that involve more than remembering (Anderson et al. 2001: 269–270). For details, see the Supplement on History .

As to creative thinking, it overlaps with critical thinking (Bailin 1987, 1988). Thinking about the explanation of some phenomenon or event, as in Ferryboat , requires creative imagination in constructing plausible explanatory hypotheses. Likewise, thinking about a policy question, as in Candidate , requires creativity in coming up with options. Conversely, creativity in any field needs to be balanced by critical appraisal of the draft painting or novel or mathematical theory.

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Pursuing Truth: A Guide to Critical Thinking

Chapter 2 arguments.

The fundamental tool of the critical thinker is the argument. For a good example of what we are not talking about, consider a bit from a famous sketch by Monty Python’s Flying Circus : 3

2.1 Identifying Arguments

People often use “argument” to refer to a dispute or quarrel between people. In critical thinking, an argument is defined as

A set of statements, one of which is the conclusion and the others are the premises.

There are three important things to remember here:

• Arguments contain statements.
• They have a conclusion.
• They have at least one premise

Arguments contain statements, or declarative sentences. Statements, unlike questions or commands, have a truth value. Statements assert that the world is a particular way; questions do not. For example, if someone asked you what you did after dinner yesterday evening, you wouldn’t accuse them of lying. When the world is the way that the statement says that it is, we say that the statement is true. If the statement is not true, it is false.

One of the statements in the argument is called the conclusion. The conclusion is the statement that is intended to be proved. Consider the following argument:

Calculus II will be no harder than Calculus I. Susan did well in Calculus I. So, Susan should do well in Calculus II.

Here the conclusion is that Susan should do well in Calculus II. The other two sentences are premises. Premises are the reasons offered for believing that the conclusion is true.

2.1.1 Standard Form

Now, to make the argument easier to evaluate, we will put it into what is called “standard form.” To put an argument in standard form, write each premise on a separate, numbered line. Draw a line underneath the last premise, the write the conclusion underneath the line.

• Calculus II will be no harder than Calculus I.
• Susan did well in Calculus I.
• Susan should do well in Calculus II.

Now that we have the argument in standard form, we can talk about premise 1, premise 2, and all clearly be referring to the same thing.

2.1.2 Indicator Words

Unfortunately, when people present arguments, they rarely put them in standard form. So, we have to decide which statement is intended to be the conclusion, and which are the premises. Don’t make the mistake of assuming that the conclusion comes at the end. The conclusion is often at the beginning of the passage, but could even be in the middle. A better way to identify premises and conclusions is to look for indicator words. Indicator words are words that signal that statement following the indicator is a premise or conclusion. The example above used a common indicator word for a conclusion, ‘so.’ The other common conclusion indicator, as you can probably guess, is ‘therefore.’ This table lists the indicator words you might encounter.

Each argument will likely use only one indicator word or phrase. When the conlusion is at the end, it will generally be preceded by a conclusion indicator. Everything else, then, is a premise. When the conclusion comes at the beginning, the next sentence will usually be introduced by a premise indicator. All of the following sentences will also be premises.

For example, here’s our previous argument rewritten to use a premise indicator:

Susan should do well in Calculus II, because Calculus II will be no harder than Calculus I, and Susan did well in Calculus I.

Sometimes, an argument will contain no indicator words at all. In that case, the best thing to do is to determine which of the premises would logically follow from the others. If there is one, then it is the conclusion. Here is an example:

Spot is a mammal. All dogs are mammals, and Spot is a dog.

The first sentence logically follows from the others, so it is the conclusion. When using this method, we are forced to assume that the person giving the argument is rational and logical, which might not be true.

2.1.3 Non-Arguments

One thing that complicates our task of identifying arguments is that there are many passages that, although they look like arguments, are not arguments. The most common types are:

• Explanations
• Mere asssertions
• Conditional statements
• Loosely connected statements

Explanations can be tricky, because they often use one of our indicator words. Consider this passage:

Abraham Lincoln died because he was shot.

If this were an argument, then the conclusion would be that Abraham Lincoln died, since the other statement is introduced by a premise indicator. If this is an argument, though, it’s a strange one. Do you really think that someone would be trying to prove that Abraham Lincoln died? Surely everyone knows that he is dead. On the other hand, there might be people who don’t know how he died. This passage does not attempt to prove that something is true, but instead attempts to explain why it is true. To determine if a passage is an explanation or an argument, first find the statement that looks like the conclusion. Next, ask yourself if everyone likely already believes that statement to be true. If the answer to that question is yes, then the passage is an explanation.

Mere assertions are obviously not arguments. If a professor tells you simply that you will not get an A in her course this semester, she has not given you an argument. This is because she hasn’t given you any reasons to believe that the statement is true. If there are no premises, then there is no argument.

Conditional statements are sentences that have the form “If…, then….” A conditional statement asserts that if something is true, then something else would be true also. For example, imagine you are told, “If you have the winning lottery ticket, then you will win ten million dollars.” What is being claimed to be true, that you have the winning lottery ticket, or that you will win ten million dollars? Neither. The only thing claimed is the entire conditional. Conditionals can be premises, and they can be conclusions. They can be parts of arguments, but that cannot, on their own, be arguments themselves.

Finally, consider this passage:

I woke up this morning, then took a shower and got dressed. After breakfast, I worked on chapter 2 of the critical thinking text. I then took a break and drank some more coffee….

This might be a description of my day, but it’s not an argument. There’s nothing in the passage that plays the role of a premise or a conclusion. The passage doesn’t attempt to prove anything. Remember that arguments need a conclusion, there must be something that is the statement to be proved. Lacking that, it simply isn’t an argument, no matter how much it looks like one.

2.2 Evaluating Arguments

The first step in evaluating an argument is to determine what kind of argument it is. We initially categorize arguments as either deductive or inductive, defined roughly in terms of their goals. In deductive arguments, the truth of the premises is intended to absolutely establish the truth of the conclusion. For inductive arguments, the truth of the premises is only intended to establish the probable truth of the conclusion. We’ll focus on deductive arguments first, then examine inductive arguments in later chapters.

Once we have established that an argument is deductive, we then ask if it is valid. To say that an argument is valid is to claim that there is a very special logical relationship between the premises and the conclusion, such that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true. Another way to state this is

An argument is valid if and only if it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false.

An argument is invalid if and only if it is not valid.

Note that claiming that an argument is valid is not the same as claiming that it has a true conclusion, nor is it to claim that the argument has true premises. Claiming that an argument is valid is claiming nothing more that the premises, if they were true , would be enough to make the conclusion true. For example, is the following argument valid or not?

• If pigs fly, then an increase in the minimum wage will be approved next term.
• An increase in the minimum wage will be approved next term.

The argument is indeed valid. If the two premises were true, then the conclusion would have to be true also. What about this argument?

• All dogs are mammals
• Spot is a mammal.
• Spot is a dog.

In this case, both of the premises are true and the conclusion is true. The question to ask, though, is whether the premises absolutely guarantee that the conclusion is true. The answer here is no. The two premises could be true and the conclusion false if Spot were a cat, whale, etc.

Neither of these arguments are good. The second fails because it is invalid. The two premises don’t prove that the conclusion is true. The first argument is valid, however. So, the premises would prove that the conclusion is true, if those premises were themselves true. Unfortunately, (or fortunately, I guess, considering what would be dropping from the sky) pigs don’t fly.

These examples give us two important ways that deductive arguments can fail. The can fail because they are invalid, or because they have at least one false premise. Of course, these are not mutually exclusive, an argument can be both invalid and have a false premise.

If the argument is valid, and has all true premises, then it is a sound argument. Sound arguments always have true conclusions.

A deductively valid argument with all true premises.

Inductive arguments are never valid, since the premises only establish the probable truth of the conclusion. So, we evaluate inductive arguments according to their strength. A strong inductive argument is one in which the truth of the premises really do make the conclusion probably true. An argument is weak if the truth of the premises fail to establish the probable truth of the conclusion.

There is a significant difference between valid/invalid and strong/weak. If an argument is not valid, then it is invalid. The two categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. There can be no such thing as an argument being more valid than another valid argument. Validity is all or nothing. Inductive strength, however, is on a continuum. A strong inductive argument can be made stronger with the addition of another premise. More evidence can raise the probability of the conclusion. A valid argument cannot be made more valid with an additional premise. Why not? If the argument is valid, then the premises were enough to absolutely guarantee the truth of the conclusion. Adding another premise won’t give any more guarantee of truth than was already there. If it could, then the guarantee wasn’t absolute before, and the original argument wasn’t valid in the first place.

2.3 Counterexamples

One way to prove an argument to be invalid is to use a counterexample. A counterexample is a consistent story in which the premises are true and the conclusion false. Consider the argument above:

By pointing out that Spot could have been a cat, I have told a story in which the premises are true, but the conclusion is false.

Here’s another one:

• If it is raining, then the sidewalks are wet.
• The sidewalks are wet.
• It is raining.

The sprinklers might have been on. If so, then the sidewalks would be wet, even if it weren’t raining.

Counterexamples can be very useful for demonstrating invalidity. Keep in mind, though, that validity can never be proved with the counterexample method. If the argument is valid, then it will be impossible to give a counterexample to it. If you can’t come up with a counterexample, however, that does not prove the argument to be valid. It may only mean that you’re not creative enough.

• An argument is a set of statements; one is the conclusion, the rest are premises.
• The conclusion is the statement that the argument is trying to prove.
• The premises are the reasons offered for believing the conclusion to be true.
• Explanations, conditional sentences, and mere assertions are not arguments.
• Deductive reasoning attempts to absolutely guarantee the truth of the conclusion.
• Inductive reasoning attempts to show that the conclusion is probably true.
• In a valid argument, it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false.
• In an invalid argument, it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false.
• A sound argument is valid and has all true premises.
• An inductively strong argument is one in which the truth of the premises makes the the truth of the conclusion probable.
• An inductively weak argument is one in which the truth of the premises do not make the conclusion probably true.
• A counterexample is a consistent story in which the premises of an argument are true and the conclusion is false. Counterexamples can be used to prove that arguments are deductively invalid.

( Cleese and Chapman 1980 ) . ↩︎

Unit 1: What Is Philosophy?

LOGOS: Critical Thinking, Arguments, and Fallacies

Heather Wilburn, Ph.D

Critical Thinking:

With respect to critical thinking, it seems that everyone uses this phrase. Yet, there is a fear that this is becoming a buzz-word (i.e. a word or phrase you use because it’s popular or enticing in some way). Ultimately, this means that we may be using the phrase without a clear sense of what we even mean by it. So, here we are going to think about what this phrase might mean and look at some examples. As a former colleague of mine, Henry Imler, explains:

By critical thinking, we refer to thinking that is recursive in nature. Any time we encounter new information or new ideas, we double back and rethink our prior conclusions on the subject to see if any other conclusions are better suited. Critical thinking can be contrasted with Authoritarian thinking. This type of thinking seeks to preserve the original conclusion. Here, thinking and conclusions are policed, as to question the system is to threaten the system. And threats to the system demand a defensive response. Critical thinking is short-circuited in authoritarian systems so that the conclusions are conserved instead of being open for revision. [1]

A condition for being recursive is to be open and not arrogant. If we come to a point where we think we have a handle on what is True, we are no longer open to consider, discuss, or accept information that might challenge our Truth. One becomes closed off and rejects everything that is different or strange–out of sync with one’s own Truth. To be open and recursive entails a sense of thinking about your beliefs in a critical and reflective way, so that you have a chance to either strengthen your belief system or revise it if needed. I have been teaching philosophy and humanities classes for nearly 20 years; critical thinking is the single most important skill you can develop. In close but second place is communication, In my view, communication skills follow as a natural result of critical thinking because you are attempting to think through and articulate stronger and rationally justified views. At the risk of sounding cliche, education isn’t about instilling content; it is about learning how to think.

In your philosophy classes your own ideas and beliefs will very likely be challenged. This does not mean that you will be asked to abandon your beliefs, but it does mean that you might be asked to defend them. Additionally, your mind will probably be twisted and turned about, which can be an uncomfortable experience. Yet, if at all possible, you should cherish these experiences and allow them to help you grow as a thinker. To be challenged and perplexed is difficult; however, it is worthwhile because it compels deeper thinking and more significant levels of understanding. In turn, thinking itself can transform us not only in thought, but in our beliefs, and our actions. Hannah Arendt, a social and political philosopher that came to the United States in exile during WWII, relates the transformative elements of philosophical thinking to Socrates. She writes:

Socrates…who is commonly said to have believed in the teachability of virtue, seems to have held that talking and thinking about piety, justice, courage, and the rest were liable to make men more pious, more just, more courageous, even though they were not given definitions or “values” to direct their further conduct. [2]

Thinking and communication are transformative insofar as these activities have the potential to alter our perspectives and, thus, change our behavior. In fact, Arendt connects the ability to think critically and reflectively to morality. As she notes above, morality does not have to give a predetermined set of rules to affect our behavior. Instead, morality can also be related to the open and sometimes perplexing conversations we have with others (and ourselves) about moral issues and moral character traits. Theodor W. Adorno, another philosopher that came to the United States in exile during WWII, argues that autonomous thinking (i.e. thinking for oneself) is crucial if we want to prevent the occurrence of another event like Auschwitz, a concentration camp where over 1 million individuals died during the Holocaust. [3] To think autonomously entails reflective and critical thinking—a type of thinking rooted in philosophical activity and a type of thinking that questions and challenges social norms and the status quo. In this sense thinking is critical of what is, allowing us to think beyond what is and to think about what ought to be, or what ought not be. This is one of the transformative elements of philosophical activity and one that is useful in promoting justice and ethical living.

With respect to the meaning of education, the German philosopher Hegel uses the term bildung, which means education or upbringing, to indicate the differences between the traditional type of education that focuses on facts and memorization, and education as transformative. Allen Wood explains how Hegel uses the term bildung: it is “a process of self-transformation and an acquisition of the power to grasp and articulate the reasons for what one believes or knows.” [4] If we think back through all of our years of schooling, particularly those subject matters that involve the teacher passing on information that is to be memorized and repeated, most of us would be hard pressed to recall anything substantial. However, if the focus of education is on how to think and the development of skills include analyzing, synthesizing, and communicating ideas and problems, most of us will use those skills whether we are in the field of philosophy, politics, business, nursing, computer programming, or education. In this sense, philosophy can help you develop a strong foundational skill set that will be marketable for your individual paths. While philosophy is not the only subject that will foster these skills, its method is one that heavily focuses on the types of activities that will help you develop such skills.

Let’s turn to discuss arguments. Arguments consist of a set of statements, which are claims that something is or is not the case, or is either true or false. The conclusion of your argument is a statement that is being argued for, or the point of view being argued for. The other statements serve as evidence or support for your conclusion; we refer to these statements as premises. It’s important to keep in mind that a statement is either true or false, so questions, commands, or exclamations are not statements. If we are thinking critically we will not accept a statement as true or false without good reason(s), so our premises are important here. Keep in mind the idea that supporting statements are called premises and the statement that is being supported is called the conclusion. Here are a couple of examples:

Example 1: Capital punishment is morally justifiable since it restores some sense of

balance to victims or victims’ families.

Let’s break it down so it’s easier to see in what we might call a typical argument form:

Premise: Capital punishment restores some sense of balance to victims or victims’ families.

Conclusion: Capital punishment is morally justifiable.

Example 2 : Because innocent people are sometimes found guilty and potentially

executed, capital punishment is not morally justifiable.

Premise: Innocent people are sometimes found guilty and potentially executed.

Conclusion: Capital punishment is not morally justifiable.

It is worth noting the use of the terms “since” and “because” in these arguments. Terms or phrases like these often serve as signifiers that we are looking at evidence, or a premise.

Check out another example:

Example 3 : All human beings are mortal. Heather is a human being. Therefore,

Heather is mortal.

Premise 1: All human beings are mortal.

Premise 2: Heather is a human being.

Conclusion: Heather is mortal.

In this example, there are a couple of things worth noting: First, there can be more than one premise. In fact, you could have a rather complex argument with several premises. If you’ve written an argumentative paper you may have encountered arguments that are rather complex. Second, just as the arguments prior had signifiers to show that we are looking at evidence, this argument has a signifier (i.e. therefore) to demonstrate the argument’s conclusion.

So many arguments!!! Are they all equally good?

No, arguments are not equally good; there are many ways to make a faulty argument. In fact, there are a lot of different types of arguments and, to some extent, the type of argument can help us figure out if the argument is a good one. For a full elaboration of arguments, take a logic class! Here’s a brief version:

Deductive Arguments: in a deductive argument the conclusion necessarily follows the premises. Take argument Example 3 above. It is absolutely necessary that Heather is a mortal, if she is a human being and if mortality is a specific condition for being human. We know that all humans die, so that’s tight evidence. This argument would be a very good argument; it is valid (i.e the conclusion necessarily follows the premises) and it is sound (i.e. all the premises are true).

Inductive Arguments : in an inductive argument the conclusion likely (at best) follows the premises. Let’s have an example:

Example 4 : 98.9% of all TCC students like pizza. You are a TCC student. Thus, you like pizza.

Premise 1: 98.9% of all TCC students like pizza

Premise 2: You are a TCC student.

Conclusion: You like pizza. (*Thus is a conclusion indicator)

In this example, the conclusion doesn’t necessarily follow; it likely follows. But you might be part of that 1.1% for whatever reason. Inductive arguments are good arguments if they are strong. So, instead of saying an inductive argument is valid, we say it is strong. You can also use the term sound to describe the truth of the premises, if they are true. Let’s suppose they are true and you absolutely love Hideaway pizza. Let’s also assume you are a TCC student. So, the argument is really strong and it is sound.

There are many types of inductive argument, including: causal arguments, arguments based on probabilities or statistics, arguments that are supported by analogies, and arguments that are based on some type of authority figure. So, when you encounter an argument based on one of these types, think about how strong the argument is. If you want to see examples of the different types, a web search (or a logic class!) will get you where you need to go.

Some arguments are faulty, not necessarily because of the truth or falsity of the premises, but because they rely on psychological and emotional ploys. These are bad arguments because people shouldn’t accept your conclusion if you are using scare tactics or distracting and manipulating reasoning. Arguments that have this issue are called fallacies. There are a lot of fallacies, so, again, if you want to know more a web search will be useful. We are going to look at several that seem to be the most relevant for our day-to-day experiences.

• Inappropriate Appeal to Authority : We are definitely going to use authority figures in our lives (e.g. doctors, lawyers, mechanics, financial advisors, etc.), but we need to make sure that the authority figure is a reliable one.

Things to look for here might include: reputation in the field, not holding widely controversial views, experience, education, and the like. So, if we take an authority figure’s word and they’re not legit, we’ve committed the fallacy of appeal to authority.

Example 5 : I think I am going to take my investments to Voya. After all, Steven Adams advocates for Voya in an advertisement I recently saw.

If we look at the criteria for evaluating arguments that appeal to authority figures, it is pretty easy to see that Adams is not an expert in the finance field. Thus, this is an inappropropriate appeal to authority.

• Slippery Slope Arguments : Slippery slope arguments are found everywhere it seems. The essential characteristic of a slippery slope argument is that it uses problematic premises to argue that doing ‘x’ will ultimately lead to other actions that are extreme, unlikely, and disastrous. You can think of this type of argument as a faulty chain of events or domino effect type of argument.

Example 6 : If you don’t study for your philosophy exam you will not do well on the exam. This will lead to you failing the class. The next thing you know you will have lost your scholarship, dropped out of school, and will be living on the streets without any chance of getting a job.

While you should certainly study for your philosophy exam, if you don’t it is unlikely that this will lead to your full economic demise.

One challenge to evaluating slippery slope arguments is that they are predictions, so we cannot be certain about what will or will not actually happen. But this chain of events type of argument should be assessed in terms of whether the outcome will likely follow if action ‘x” is pursued.

• Faulty Analogy : We often make arguments based on analogy and these can be good arguments. But we often use faulty reasoning with analogies and this is what we want to learn how to avoid.

When evaluating an argument that is based on an analogy here are a few things to keep in mind: you want to look at the relevant similarities and the relevant differences between the things that are being compared. As a general rule, if there are more differences than similarities the argument is likely weak.

Example 7 : Alcohol is legal. Therefore, we should legalize marijuana too.

So, the first step here is to identify the two things being compared, which are alcohol and marijuana. Next, note relevant similarities and differences. These might include effects on health, community safety, economic factors, criminal justice factors, and the like.

This is probably not the best argument in support for marijuana legalization. It would seem that one could just as easily conclude that since marijuana is illegal, alcohol should be too. In fact, one might find that alcohol is an often abused and highly problematic drug for many people, so it is too risky to legalize marijuana if it is similar to alcohol.

• Appeal to Emotion : Arguments should be based on reason and evidence, not emotional tactics. When we use an emotional tactic, we are essentially trying to manipulate someone into accepting our position by evoking pity or fear, when our positions should actually be backed by reasonable and justifiable evidence.

Example 8 : Officer please don’t give me a speeding ticket. My girlfriend broke up with me last night, my alarm didn’t go off this morning, and I’m late for class.

While this is a really horrible start to one’s day, being broken up with and an alarm malfunctioning is not a justifiable reason for speeding.

Example 9 : Professor, I’d like you to remember that my mother is a dean here at TCC. I’m sure that she will be very disappointed if I don’t receive an A in your class.

This is a scare tactic and is not a good way to make an argument. Scare tactics can come in the form of psychological or physical threats; both forms are to be avoided.

• Appeal to Ignorance : This fallacy occurs when our argument relies on lack of evidence when evidence is actually needed to support a position.

Example 10 : No one has proven that sasquatch doesn’t exist; therefore it does exist.

Example 11 : No one has proven God exists; therefore God doesn’t exist.

The key here is that lack of evidence against something cannot be an argument for something. Lack of evidence can only show that we are ignorant of the facts.

• Straw Man : A straw man argument is a specific type of argument that is intended to weaken an opponent’s position so that it is easier to refute. So, we create a weaker version of the original argument (i.e. a straw man argument), so when we present it everyone will agree with us and denounce the original position.

Example 12 : Women are crazy arguing for equal treatment. No one wants women hanging around men’s locker rooms or saunas.

This is a misrepresentation of arguments for equal treatment. Women (and others arguing for equal treatment) are not trying to obtain equal access to men’s locker rooms or saunas.

The best way to avoid this fallacy is to make sure that you are not oversimplifying or misrepresenting others’ positions. Even if we don’t agree with a position, we want to make the strongest case against it and this can only be accomplished if we can refute the actual argument, not a weakened version of it. So, let’s all bring the strongest arguments we have to the table!

• Red Herring : A red herring is a distraction or a change in subject matter. Sometimes this is subtle, but if you find yourself feeling lost in the argument, take a close look and make sure there is not an attempt to distract you.

Example 13 : Can you believe that so many people are concerned with global warming? The real threat to our country is terrorism.

It could be the case that both global warming and terrorism are concerns for us. But the red herring fallacy is committed when someone tries to distract you from the argument at hand by bringing up another issue or side-stepping a question. Politicians are masters at this, by the way.

• Appeal to the Person : This fallacy is also referred to as the ad hominem fallacy. We commit this fallacy when we dismiss someone’s argument or position by attacking them instead of refuting the premises or support for their argument.

Example 14 : I am not going to listen to what Professor ‘X’ has to say about the history of religion. He told one of his previous classes he wasn’t religious.

The problem here is that the student is dismissing course material based on the professor’s religious views and not evaluating the course content on its own ground.

To avoid this fallacy, make sure that you target the argument or their claims and not the person making the argument in your rebuttal.

• Hasty Generalization : We make and use generalizations on a regular basis and in all types of decisions. We rely on generalizations when trying to decide which schools to apply to, which phone is the best for us, which neighborhood we want to live in, what type of job we want, and so on. Generalizations can be strong and reliable, but they can also be fallacious. There are three main ways in which a generalization can commit a fallacy: your sample size is too small, your sample size is not representative of the group you are making a generalization about, or your data could be outdated.

Example 15 : I had horrible customer service at the last Starbucks I was at. It is clear that Starbucks employees do not care about their customers. I will never visit another Starbucks again.

The problem with this generalization is that the claim made about all Starbucks is based on one experience. While it is tempting to not spend your money where people are rude to their customers, this is only one employee and presumably doesn’t reflect all employees or the company as a whole. So, to make this a stronger generalization we would want to have a larger sample size (multiple horrible experiences) to support the claim. Let’s look at a second hasty generalization:

Example 16 : I had horrible customer service at the Starbucks on 81st street. It is clear that Starbucks employees do not care about their customers. I will never visit another Starbucks again.

The problem with this generalization mirrors the previous problem in that the claim is based on only one experience. But there’s an additional issue here as well, which is that the claim is based off of an experience at one location. To make a claim about the whole company, our sample group needs to be larger than one and it needs to come from a variety of locations.

• Begging the Question : An argument begs the question when the argument’s premises assume the conclusion, instead of providing support for the conclusion. One common form of begging the question is referred to as circular reasoning.

Example 17 : Of course, everyone wants to see the new Marvel movie is because it is the most popular movie right now!

The conclusion here is that everyone wants to see the new Marvel movie, but the premise simply assumes that is the case by claiming it is the most popular movie. Remember the premise should give reasons for the conclusion, not merely assume it to be true.

• Equivocation : In the English language there are many words that have different meanings (e.g. bank, good, right, steal, etc.). When we use the same word but shift the meaning without explaining this move to your audience, we equivocate the word and this is a fallacy. So, if you must use the same word more than once and with more than one meaning you need to explain that you’re shifting the meaning you intend. Although, most of the time it is just easier to use a different word.

Example 18 : Yes, philosophy helps people argue better, but should we really encourage people to argue? There is enough hostility in the world.

Here, argue is used in two different senses. The meaning of the first refers to the philosophical meaning of argument (i.e. premises and a conclusion), whereas the second sense is in line with the common use of argument (i.e. yelling between two or more people, etc.).

• Henry Imler, ed., Phronesis An Ethics Primer with Readings, (2018). 7-8. ↵
• Arendt, Hannah, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” Social Research, 38:3 (1971: Autumn): 431. ↵
• Theodor W. Adorno, “Education After Auschwitz,” in Can One Live After Auschwitz, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003): 23. ↵
• Allen W. Wood, “Hegel on Education,” in Philosophers on Education: New Historical Perspectives, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (London: Routledge 1998): 302. ↵

LOGOS: Critical Thinking, Arguments, and Fallacies Copyright © 2020 by Heather Wilburn, Ph.D is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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Diagramming Arguments, Premise and Conclusion Indicators, with Many Examples

Abstract: Analyzing the structure of arguments is clarified by representing the logical relations of premises and conclusion in diagram form. Many ordinary language argument examples are explained and diagrammed.

“Argument” Defined

• How to Identify Arguments

How to Analyze Simple Arguments

• Premise Indicators
• Conclusion Indicators
• Equal Status Indicators

How to Analyze Complex Arguments

• Links to Diagramming Exercises
• Tutorials for Diagramming

Formal arguments are evaluated by their logical structure; informal arguments are studied and evaluated as parts of ordinary language and interpersonal discourse.

Statement or Proposition:

How to identify the presence of an argument.

[1] I conclude the dinosaurs probably had to cope with cancer. These are my reasons : [2] a beautiful lower leg bone was found in Alberta, [3] the end of the fibula was grossly malformed, and [4] this appearance closely matches osteosarcoma in humans.

Since [1] the solution turns litmus paper red, [2] I conclude it is acidic, inasmuch as [3] acidic substances react with litmus to form a red color.

• Ask yourself “What is the author trying to prove in this passage?” In order to determine whether or not an argument is present in a passage, it sometimes helps to pose this question. If an answer is directly forthcoming, then the passage is most likely an argument. Despite that, the presence of an argument cannot be always known with certainty; often the purpose of the passage can only be contextually surmised. Establishing the intention of a speaker or writer is sometimes the only determining factor of whether or not an argument is present. A charitable , and insofar as possible, an impartial conventional interpretation of the context, content, and purpose of the passage should be sought.

“[1] The types of sentences you use are quite varied. [2] I've noticed that your recent essays are quite sophisticated. [3] You have been learning much more about sentence structure.”

“ Because [1] of our preoccupation with the present moment and the latest discovery, [2] we do not read the great books of the past. Because [3a] we do not do this sort of reading, and [3b] do not think it is important, [4] we do not bother about trying to learn to read difficult books. As a result , [5] we do not learn to read well at all.” [1]

Statement [1] provides evidence for [2].

Next, [2] together with [3] ([3a] and [3b] being combined here as one compound statement for simplification) gives evidence for [4].

Finally, as a result of [4], statement [5] concludes with some degree of probability.

• The number of arguments in a passage is conventionally established by the number of conclusions in that passage.

[1] John didn't get much sleep last night. [2] He has dark circles under his eyes. [3] He looks tired.

[1] Studies from rats indicate that neuropeptide Y in the brain causes carbohydrate craving, and [2] galanin causes fat craving. Hence , [3] I conclude that food cravings are tied to brain chemicals [4] because neuropeptide Y and galanin are brain chemicals.

• The structure of the argument can be inferred by attending to the premise and conclusion indicators even though the content of the argument might not be fully understood.

[1] The piano teacher should consider an additional study of the pipe organ. [2] As an organist. the teacher would have added income at times when she is not teaching; consequently , and for this reason [3] she would receive added publicity and prestige. Therefore , [4] she would be likely to attract additional students and additional income.

Working with Premise Indicators:

for since as because [* when the term means “for the reason that” but not when it means “from the cause of”] in as much as follows from after all in light of the fact assuming seeing that granted that; given that in view of as shown by; as indicated by deduced from inferred from; concluded from due to the fact that for the reason [* often mistaken for a conclusion indicator ]

[2a] Reading the point of intersection of a graph depends on the accuracy with which the lines are drawn. [2b] Reading the point of intersection also depends upon the ability to interpret the coordinate of the point. [1]Thus, the graphical method for solving a system of equations is an approximation.

“[3] [the mind must] obtain a little strength by a slight exertion of its thinking powers.”

Working with Conclusion Indicators:

thus therefore consequently hence so it follows that proves that; demonstrates that; shows that indicates that accordingly [* an indicator often missed ] implies that; entails that; follows that this means we may infer; it can be inferred that suggests that results in in conclusion for this reason; for that reason [* often mistaken for premise indicators (a conclusion follows these phrases; a premise precedes these phrases .)]

“[3a] So it may well be that cancer is induced not by the original substances but [3b] [it may well be that cancer is induced] by the products of their metabolism once inside the organism.”

Working with Equal Status Indicators:

or [ the inclusive “or,” i.e. “ either or or both ”] and as [* when it connects similar clauses; not when it connects a result with a cause ] in addition although despite; in spite of besides though but yet however moreover nevertheless not only … but also ( and also the semicolon “;”)

• If one of the clauses has already been identified as a premise or a conclusion of an argument, then its coordinating clause is probably the same type of statement. Check the following examples.

Comment : Notice that statements [2] and [3] work together as a reason, so both together provide evidence for [1].

“ … [3] it depends on the indices of refraction of the lens material and [4] [it depends on] the surrounding medium.”

For [1] and [2], so [3].

[1] If students were environmentally aware, they would object to the endangering of any species of animal. [2] The well-known Greenwood white squirrel has become endangered [3] as it has disappeared from the Lander campus [4] because the building of the library destroyed its native habitat. [5] No Lander students objected. [6] Thus , Lander students are not environmentally aware.

as because thus

• Statement [6] is the final conclusion since it has the conclusion indicator “thus” and the import of the paragraph indicates that this statement is the main point of the argument. (It is also the last sentence in the paragraph.)

[1] If students were environmentally A ware, [ then ] they would O bject to the endangering of any species of animal. [5] No student O bjected [to the endangering of the Greenwood white squirrel].

[1] If A then O [5] Not O

“[6] Thus, Lander students are not environmentally A ware,”

[1] If A then O [5] Not O [6] Not A

“The explanation as to why productivity has slumped since 2004 is a simple one. That year coincided with the creation of Facebook ” [11]

“In The Voyage of the Dawn Treader, the ship's prow is ‘gilded and shaped like the head of a dragon with wide open mouth’ so when, a moment later, the children stare at the picture ‘with open mouths’, they are being remade in its image … The painted ocean to which Joan is drawn is ‘like a mighty animal’, a ‘wicked virile thing’. The implication in both cases is that art is not safe, and that this is why it's needed.” [emphasis mine] [12]

“He asked: ‘Who are the Âdityas?’ Yâ gñ avalkys replied: ‘The twelve months of the year, and they are Âdityas, because they move along (yanti) taking up everything [ i.e. , taking up the lives of persons, and the fruits of their work] (âdadânâ h ). Because they move along, taking up everything, therefore they are called Âdityas.’”[emphasis mine] [13]

Circular Argument:

Links to diagramming online quizzes with suggested solutions, notes: diagramming arguments.

1. Mortimer J. Adler, How to Read a Book (New York: Simon and Schuster: 1940), 89. ↩

2. Some English textbooks describe argumentative paragraph structure as deductive (proceeding from general to specific statements or inductive (proceeding from specific to general statements). For example, educator and rhetorician Fred Newton Scott writes:

“There are two orders of progress in thought, one proceeding from the statement of a general principle to particular applications of the principle (deductive reasoning), the other proceeding from the statement of particular facts to a general conclusion from those facts (inductive reasoning). In deductive reasoning, the general principle (stated usually at the beginning) is applied in the particulars; in inductive reasoning the general principle (stated usually at the end) if inferred from the particulars, as a conclusion. In a deductive paragraph, as would be expected, the sentences applying the principle to the particular case in hand, usually follow the topic-statement, which announces the principle. In an inductive paragraph the sentences stating the particular facts usually precede the topic-statement, which gives the general conclusion.” [emphases deleted]

Fred Newton Scott, Paragraph-Writing (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1909), 62-63. Since this distinction between induction and deduction proves faulty for many arguments, deductive arguments are now described as those that provide total support for their conclusion ( i.e. ,a they logically entail the conclusion); whereas, an inductive argument give partial support for their conclusion ( i.e. , they provide only some evidence for the conclusion.) ↩

3. Most paragraphs have a three-part structure: introduction (often a topic sentence), body (often supporting sentences), and conclusion (often a summary statement). In argumentative writing, the conclusion of an argument is often the topic sentence or main idea of a paragraph. Consequently, the first sentence or last sentence of many argumentative paragraphs contain the conclusion. ↩

4. René Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature (New York: Harcourt, Brace: 1956), 127. ↩

5. Mary Wollstonecraft, Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792 London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1891), 273. ↩

6. Irvin D. Yalom, The Gift of Therapy (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 133. ↩

7. Maxim D. Frank-Kamenetskii, Unraveling DNA trans. Lev Liapin (New York: VCH Publishers, 1993), 175. ↩

8. Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind (London: 1921 George Allen & Unwin, 1961), 40. ↩

9. Wollstonecraft, Vindication , 175. ↩

10. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations , trans George Long (New York: Sterling: 2006), 69. ↩

11. Nikko Schaff, “Letters: Let the Inventors Speak,” The Economist 460 no. 8820 (January 26, 2013), 16. ↩

12. Matthew Bevis, “What Most I Love I Bite,” in the “Review of The Collected Poems and Drawings of Stevie Smith ,” London Review of Books 38 No. 15 (28 July 2016), 19. ↩

13. B ri hadâra n yaka-Upanishad in The Upanishads , Pt. II, trans. F. Max Müller in The Sacred Books of the East , Vol. XV, ed. F. Max Müller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900), 141. ↩

Readings: Diagramming Arguments

Carnegie Mellon University, iLogos: Argument Diagram Software and User Guide Free software cross-platform. Also, a list with links to other argument diagramming tools.

Martin Davies, Ashley Barnett, and Tim van Gelder, “ Using Computer-Aided Argument Mapping to Teach Reasoning, ” in Studies in Critical Thinking , ed. J. Anthony Blair (Windsor, ON: Open Monograph Press, 2019), 131-176. Chapter outlining how to use argument mapping software in logic classes. doi: 10.22329/wsia.08.2019

Jean Goodwin, “ Wigmore's Chart Method ,” Informal Logic 20 no. 3 (January, 2000), 223-243. doi: 10.22329/il.v20i3.2278 Tree diagram method for complex argument representation and inference strength assessment for legal analysis.

Mara Harrell, Creating Argument Diagrams , Carnegie Mellon University. Tutorial on identification of indicators, rewriting statements, providing missing premises, and reconstruction of arguments. (28 pp.)

Dale Jacquette, “ Enhancing the Diagramming Method in Logic ,” Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 1 no. 2 (February, 2011), 327-360. Also here . An extension of the Beardsley diagramming method for disjunctive and conditional inferences as well as other logical structures.

Michael Malone, “On Discounts and Argument Identification,” Teaching Philosophy 33 no. 1 (March, 2010), 1-15. doi: 10.5840/teachphil20103311 Discount indicators such as “but”, “however”, and “although” are distinguished from argument indicators, but help in argument identification.

Jacques Moeschler, “Argumentation and Connectives,” in Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society , eds. Alessandro Capone and Jacob L. Mey (Cham: Springer, 2016), 653-676.

John Lawrence and Chris Reed, “ Argument Mining: A Survey ,” Computational Linguistics 45 no. 4 (September, 2019), 765-818. doi: 10.1162/coli_a_00364 Review of recent advances and future challenges for extraction of reasoning in natural language.

Frans H. van Eemeren, Peter Houtlosser, and Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, Argumentative Indicators in Discourse (Dordercht: Springer, 2007). Sophisticated study of indicators for arguments, dialectical exchanges, and critical discussion. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4020-6244-5

Wikipedia contributors, “ Argument Map , Wikipedia . History, applications, standards, and references for argument maps used in informal logic.

(Free) Online Tutorials with Diagramming

Carnegie Mellon University, Argument Diagramming v1.5 (Open + Free) . Free online course on argument diagramming using built-in iLogos argument mapping software by Carnegie Mellon's Open Learning Initiative. (With or without registration and two weeks for completion).

Harvard University, Thinker/Analytix: How We Argue . Free online course on critical thinking with argument mapping with Mindmup free diagramming software, videos, and practice exercises. (Requires registration and 3-5 hrs. to complete).

Joe Lau, “ Argument Mapping ” Module A10 on the Critical Thinking Web at the University of Hong Kong. (No registration and an hour to complete).

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The Structure of Argument

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The Structure of Argument teaches students how to approach, develop, and present arguments. It explains the fundamentals of argumentation: claims, support, assumptions, language, and logic. Practical and accessible, this guide carefully scaffolds argument for students, first modeling analysis and critical reading, then supporting students through guided practice using a variety of approaches to argument, including Toulmin, Aristotelian, and Rogerian models as well as stasis questions and multimodal genres. Brief readings on current topics model and reinforce the elements of argument while presenting opportunities for students to discuss and write about contemporary issues that affect their lives. The Tenth Edition strengthens the connection between argumentation and reading and writing processes through easy-to-use Strategies boxes. Robust research coverage is further updated to include more digital source types and reinforce the importance of evaluating sources (especially online) for bias, spin, and reliability.  A concise but thorough text, The Structure of Argument shows how each component of argument is interwoven with a writer’s choices to craft a compelling argument. Achieve for Readers & Writers Combining diagnostics with formative and summative assessments, Achieve for Readers & Writers is a quick, flexible solution for targeting instruction on critical reading, the writing process, grammar, mechanics, style, and punctuation to each individual student. New Achieve Writing Tools allow instructors and peer reviewers to easily comment on student writing, while fully editable writing assignments pair with powerful analytics to track student progress.

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Annette T. Rottenberg

Annette T. Rottenberg , formerly assistant director of the writing program at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, has taught composition and literature at Chicago City College, SUNY at Buffalo, Duke University, and schools abroad. She is the author of Elements of Argument and The Structure of Argument .

Donna Haisty Winchell

Donna Haisty Winchell has directed the Freshman Composition program and codirected Digital Portfolio Institutes at Clemson University, where she was Professor of English. She has edited several freshman writing anthologies—including Elements of Argument and The Structure of Argument for Bedford/St. Martin’s.

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Arguing Using Critical Thinking

(2 reviews)

Jim Marteney, Los Angeles Valley College

Copyright Year: 2020

Publisher: Academic Senate for California Community Colleges

Language: English

Formats Available

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Learn more about reviews.

Reviewed by Steve Gimbel, Professor, Gettysburg College on 9/29/22

There are separate sections on how to formulate an argument, how to evaluate an argument, the burdens adopted by those engaging in critical discourse, rhetorical strategies for effectively convincing an interlocutor, and errors in reasoning. In... read more

Comprehensiveness rating: 4 see less

There are separate sections on how to formulate an argument, how to evaluate an argument, the burdens adopted by those engaging in critical discourse, rhetorical strategies for effectively convincing an interlocutor, and errors in reasoning. In terms of the breadth of topics one generally wants covered in a critical thinking class, the book does a fine job at hitting them all.

Content Accuracy rating: 2

It is an admirable attempt to develop a post-modern, post-truth approach to critical discourse. "Truth is a word best avoided entirely in argumentation," the book tells students, "except when placed in quotes or with careful qualification." Invoking Wittgenstein and Sapir-Whorf in the introductory sections, the book seeks to develop a relational, psychological, rhetorical approach instead of one focused on informal logic. In doing so, it entirely removes the point of argumentation -- rational belief. Some things are true -- smoking DOES cause cancer, human activity is causing global warming, the Founders of the U.S. did want a separation between Church and State. These are true. There is a series of TED talks cited for inspirational rhetorical value, but in a world in which conspiracy theories are endangering democracy, we need to understand that replacing truth with the truthiness that emerges from this sort of post-modernism is playing directly into those who are undermining our discourse. It exacerbates the problem, it does not solve it.

Relevance/Longevity rating: 3

Since the book hinges less on logic and more on social science, there are elements that will be altered over time. Sapir-Whorf, as mentioned above, has not taken seriously by linguists for decades, yet is used as a foundation. The book seeks to speak to students using, in places, contemporary references that will become dated over time, but these are easily updated.

Clarity rating: 1

There are some very good sections in the book. The distinction it draws between matters of fact, value, and policy is very well done. As is the catalogue it gives of different sorts of evidence. The clarity with which it sets out the difference in burdens between the pro and anti sides of a debate is wonderful.

In terms of accessibility, the book is written engagingly in a way that first year students should not be lost. It intentionally uses a new set of technical terms modeled on standard usage -- claim, evidence, issues, contentions, cases,... and does well to define them in accessible (at times loosey-goosey) ways.

However, there are problems for those trying to teach critical thinking as informal logic. You will not find the words "conclusion" or "premise" anywhere in the book. This is clearly intentional as it seeks to eliminate the idea of arguments as providing good reason to believe something is true. Again, truth is not to be discussed. Instead, it sort of tries to use a sort of sliding scale, but it is never at all clear what the scale is actually measuring. The book uses the term validity (much more on that below), but that term is used in a stunningly ambiguous way.

Consistency rating: 2

The central notion in the book is validity. This is not unexpected as that is a standard term in logic. As logicians use the word, an argument is valid if and only, assuming the truth of the premises for the sake of argument, the conclusion is at least likely true, that is, the truth of the conclusion is imp;lied by the truth of the premises. Validity is a matter relating to the internal structure of an argument, connecting the posited truth of the premises to the consequential necessary or probable truth of the conclusion. Yet the book says something quite different, "Critical thinkers need to remember that there is no necessary or inherent connection between Truth and validity." Ummmmm? Validity is DEFINED in terms of a relation between premises and conclusion and how that relation determines or does not determine truth. There could not be a MORE inherent connection between truth and validity.

It is clear that by "capital T Truth," the book is looking to encourage students not to be absolutists, to be able to question deeply held convictions and this is, indeed, a necessary function of any critical thinking class, but with its post-truth orientation, the book uses the term "validity" as a replacement for it in several completely different and inconsistent ways. At times, it is uses validity as a replacement for the truth concept. In this way, sentences are more or less valid, that is, truer or less true. This is the "sliding bead" model that is repeatedly alluded to throughout the text.

At other times, however, the usual meaning of validity is used, where it is not sentences, but arguments that can be valid or invalid according to whether or not the conclusion (claim) is properly connected to the premises (evidence). There is a loose, hand-waving section on what this sense of validity means. In most texts, this is the HEART of critical thinking. How to tell valid from invalid arguments.

At yet other times, there is a third use of the term validity. A viewpoint is more or less valid based upon the support it receives from arguments in favor of it. Unlike the traditional sense of validity, this is not a particular argument that is evaluated as successful in terms of its inner-structure, and it is not the likely truth or falsity of the conclusion of a particular argument, but a more general sense of the degree to which a perspective has arguments to bolster it.

This sort of slipperiness in the central notion of the entire course is problematic. The point of good reasoning is clarity and rigor. But that is exactly what this book tries to eliminate.

Modularity rating: 3

There are parts of this text that are fantastic and which I could absolutely see wanting to use in my critical thinking class. However, because of the intentional avoidance of standard logical terminology and the unusual reinterpretations of the standard terms it does use, it would be difficult to use sections of this book in conjunctions with sections of other critical thinking texts.

Organization/Structure/Flow rating: 5

If one were to use this text as the centerpiece of a course on critical thinking, there is a clear and logical flow to the way the pieces build on themselves. There is motivation up front, tools in the middle, applications and concerns about misusing the tools in the end. The structural is well-thought out and well-executed. The one complaint in terms of organization is that it is two-thirds the way through the text before certain central notions are defined.

Interface rating: 5

It is a clean and effective design with images that brighten up the text without distracting. Easy to read and aesthetically well-laid out. There are a couple of line breaks that add a couple of blank lines where they don't need to be here and there, but that is nitpicky stuff. Overall, it looks great.

Grammatical Errors rating: 5

It is a clean and effective design with images that brighten up the text without distracting. Easy to read and aesthetically well-laid out. There are a couple of line breaks that add a couple of blank lines where they don't need to be here and there, but that is nitpicky stuff. Overall, it reads and looks great.

Cultural Relevance rating: 2

The text is not culturally insensitive, indeed, the problem with it is exactly the opposite. It is clear that part of the goal of this text is to change how we think about critical thinking, moving from a logical model in which we strive for truth, to a rhetorical model in which we engage in open dialogue across varied perspectives. This is a noble goal. However, in trying to create discourse communities where voices that are often underrepresented or silenced have a place, the book does away with the point of that discourse. We want multiple perspectives because they provide insights that lead to truths we may have otherwise missed. They are correctives that undermine problematic presuppositions we did not even realize we were making that leads us away from truth. They allow us to see other ways of valuing things that we would not have values under our initial set of meanings. Eliminating the centrality of truth as a goal in discourse does not create room for other voices, it eliminates the point of needing those other voices. Indeed, the unintentional consequence of this approach to critical thinking is the devaluing of rationality, of truth, of scientific findings. We need to take action to reverse climate change. This can only be done if we have a robust notion of truth and its importance.

Logic is an activity you learn by doing. The lack of exercises or active engagement projects in the text is something that would place a load on the instructor to develop if this were to be an effective book in use.

Reviewed by Marion Hernandez, Adjunct Instructor English Department/DCE, Bunker Hill Community College on 12/27/20, updated 1/6/21

The book does name, identify and define key terms of argument and the basis for effective argument. read more

The book does name, identify and define key terms of argument and the basis for effective argument.

Content Accuracy rating: 4

This text has no grammatical errors and is unbiased in the definitions and the various contexts in which arguments occur.

Relevance and longevity do not really apply to the subject and context of this text. The book is very general and the time and place do not play a role.

Clarity rating: 2

The definitions and graphs/charts (only 2 or 3 have been added) are very basic, almost to the point of being counter productive. The Inductive and deductive chart has no value in the design or in the side notes accompanying the graph. No enough detail or design features were added to this one graph.

Consistency is not a feature to discuss because every chapter has a different main idea from types of arguments to resolving arguments to types of behavior commonly seen during arguments. There is no sequencing of material from beginning to end in term of moving from basic through intermediate and advanced level of thinking.

The book clearly defines the title of each section, but again, all taken together, no advancement in theory is developed throughout.

Organization/Structure/Flow rating: 2

The chapters do not appear in any type of order. The book moves from arguing to argument and behaviors commonly found during arguments. The last chapters talk about reasoning skills such as inductive and deductive thinking.

Interface rating: 1

The graphic and pictures do nothing to promote thinking or understanding and are therefore superfluous.

Grammatical Errors rating: 2

This critique here is not so much grammar but but point of view. The book really reads like a self help book or guide for a very basic reader. But the point of view shifts from 'you" as is what "you" should do to the the third person "they". This is very poor writing and leads to the next point which is its lack of value as a high school or college text. It is difficult to understand what student and in what circumstances would benefit or be inspired to read it.

Cultural Relevance rating: 5

There is no politically incorrect content.

As briefly mentioned, the causal, offhand, self help nature of this book is not designed in any way to be used as a text. Because each chapter is separate with no sequencing, it would be impossible to develop any in depth assignments, No exercises are added so nothing would materialize in the way of theory, practice, analysis or discussion.

Table of Contents

• 1: Standing Up For Your Point Of View
• 2: Communicating An Argument
• 5: Building Your Case With Issues, Analysis And Contentions
• 6: Evidence
• 7: Reasoning
• 8: Validity Or Truth
• 9: Changing Beliefs, Attitudes and Behavior
• 10: Decision Making - Judging an Argument
• 11: Discovering, Examining and Improving Our Reality
• 12: The Foundations of Critical Thinking

Ancillary Material

About the book.

There is a quote that has been passed down many years and is most recently accounted to P.T. Barnum, “There is a sucker born every minute.” Are you that sucker? If you were, would you like to be “reborn?” The goal of this book is to help you through that “birthing” process. Critical thinking and standing up for your ideas and making decisions are important in both your personal and professional life. How good are we at making the decision to marry? According to the Centers for Disease Control, there is one divorce in America every 36 seconds. That is nearly 2,400 every day. And professionally, the Wall Street Journal predicts the average person will have 7 careers in their lifetime. Critical thinking skills are crucial.

Critical thinking is a series learned skills. In each chapter of this book you will find a variety of skills that will help you improve your thinking and argumentative ability. As you improve, you will grow into a more confident person being more in charge of your world and the decisions you make.

About the Contributors

Jim Marteney , Professor Emeritus (Communication Studies) at Los Angeles Valley College

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10 Using Computer-Aided Argument Mapping to Teach Reasoning

Martin davies; ashley barnett; and tim van gelder, introduction [1] , [2].

Argument mapping is a way of diagram m ing the l ogical structure of an argument to explicitly and concisely represent reasoning. (See F igure 1, for a n example.) The use of argument mapping in critical thinking instruction has increased dramatically in recent decades. A brief history of argument mapping is provided at the end of this p a per.

P re- and post-test studies have demonstrate d t he pedagogi cal ben e fit of argument mapping using cohorts of university students and i n telligence analysts as subjects, and by comparing argument map ping intervention s with data from comparison groups or benchmarks from other meta-analytic reviews . It has been found that intensive practice mapping argume n ts with the aid of software has a strong positive e f fect on the critical thinking ability of students . Meta-analys i s has shown that high-intensity argument mapping courses improve critical thinking scores by around 0.8 of a standard deviation — more than twice the typical effect size for standard c ritical thinking courses (van Gelder, 2015) . This strongly suggests that argument mapping is a very effective way to teach critical thinking.

The process of making an argument map is beneficial because it encourages students to construct (or reconstruct) their arguments with a level of clarity and rigor that, when divorced from prose, often goes unnoticed. The shortcomings of a badly-constructed map are plain to see. This is not the case with dense blocks of written prose, which can give an impressionisti c sense of rigor to the reader.

Figure 1. A short argument showing the main conventions used in argument mapping. The main conclusion is placed at the top of the map. The reasons for the main conclusion are identified by green shaded areas connected by lines to the main conclusion. The main conclusion in this example has two reasons, 1A and 1B. Inside the green shaded areas white claim boxes are used to display individual premises. Premises are placed in separate premise boxes because each premise needs its own justification. The surrounding green reason envelope effectively groups together linked premises working together to form a reason for the conclusion. Argument maps clearly show which premises of a reason are supported by further reasoning. For example, 1A-a is a premise, which is itself supported by a reason, 2A-a. As claim 1A-a is both a premise in one inference and a conclusion in another it sometimes called an ‘intermediate conclusion’ or lemma. Objections to claims are identified by a red shaded area. In the map above, there is only one objection, 2C-a. NB: When colour cannot be used the labels to the right of the shading helps to designate reasons and objections (i.e., the words ‘supports’, ‘opposes’).

Argument maps can also help students evaluate reasoning because they can easily focus on eva luating each inferential step of an arg u ment. These inferential steps are indicated by the green and red co n necting lines in the example provided. Students using argument ma p ping software can easily see how their evaluation of each step affects the conclusion. For example, i n the argument in figure 1 , suppose the objection in red is strong enough that we can no longer accept claim 1B-a in the reason above it. That would mean that the second reason given for the contention (formed by claims 1B-a and 1B-b ) no longer offers any support for the con clusion . However, the first reason (formed by claims 1A-a and 1A-b ) is unaffected by the objection and may still be strong enough to establish the conclusion. A map makes this very intuitive. It is much harder to see the implications of chan g ing premises using prose alone and without the visual markers pr o vided by mapping software.

One of the main pitfalls when using argument mapping in teaching is that student s may find the level of rigor and clarity encouraged by the tec hnique to be onerous. However, u sing interesting examples that increase the demands of the argument mapping course gradually and incrementally allow s students to have fun exploring how different argument s work . In most argument mapping software students can freely move the parts of an argument around and experiment with d ifferent logical structures. This ability to “play around” with an a r gument allows students , over time, to gain a deep and practiced u n derstanding of the structure of arguments —an important aim of any critical thinking course . Anecdotally, i t also helps with student e n gagement: by manipulating parts of a map using a software, partic i pants more actively engage with critical thinking tasks than they would do otherwise (i.e., if maps were not being used) .

From an instructor’s point of view, adapting a classroom to teach critical thinking using argument mapping requires flexibility, and a willingness to experiment and try out new methodologies and princ i ples. Some of these are covered in this paper. Fortunately , a variety of s oftware and the exercises needed to run an argument mapping course are available for free online. We return to these later.

Computer-aided argument m apping

Computer-aided argument mapping (CAAM) uses software programs specifically designed to allow students to quickly represent reasoning using box and line diagrams. This can, in principle, be done without software (Harrell, 2008) , but the software makes it much easier. Bo x es are used to contain claims and line s are used to show which claims are reasons for other s . The software does no t itself analyze argume n t ative text s , or ch eck the validity of the argument s , but by making argument maps students can, with practic e, get better at argument analysis and evaluation .

In terms of entry-level skills required to use CAAM, little more is needed other than a solid understanding of the target language, basic computer skills, a broad familiarity with the importance of critical thinking, and a willingness to experiment with argument mapping software. In terms of achieving expertise in using CAAM, however, a rigorous approach to text analysis is involved, along with adoption of a number of CAAM methodical principles, and of course, the help of a dedicated and experienced instructor. Lots of argument mapping practice (LAMP) is also recommended (Rider & Thomason, 2008) .

The theoretical basis for argument mapping improving critical thinking skills is based on two principles:

• It takes for granted the well-established notion of dual coding as it is understood in cognitive science. Human information processing is enhanced by the use of a number of sensory modalities. Diagrams and words allow better cognitive processing of complex information than words alone.
• It assumes the not unreasonable point that cognitive processing capacity in humans is limited, and that understanding complex arguments is enhanced by “off-loading” information as visual displays (in other words, it’s easier to remember and understand information if one can draw a diagram).

Argument mapping is similar to other mapping tools such as mind mapping and concept mapping. All attempt to represent complex rel a tionships. However, there are also important differences. Unlike mind mapping, which is concerned with associational relationships between ideas, and concept mapping, which is concerned with relational co n nections between statements and events, argument mapping is princ i pally concerned with inferential or logical relationships between claims (Davies, 2011) . There is a difference between argument ma p ping and various diagrammatic representations in formal logic too. Argument mapping is concerned with representing informal, i.e., “r e al world”, or natural language argumentation. It thus contrasts with the use of diagrammatic techniques such as Venn diagrams as used in formal logic. In an important sense, argument maps should make i n telligible what is going on in arguments as they are (imperfectly) e x pressed in prose.

As noted, a rgument mapping software provides several benefits in the classroom. The software makes building argument maps easy, so teachers can provide their students with many practical exercises to work on. Because the software allows the students to edit their maps freely, they can engage in sel f-directed exploratory learning as they try out different argument structures to see what works best.

Argument maps also show the anatomy of an argument more clea r ly than can be done in prose . By seeing models of well- constructed map s, students can appreciate how all arguments are made up of claims and how some of these work together as co-premises. They can see at a glance how claims belong to separate line s of reasoning, and can see why some claims are necessary for an argument to su c ceed and why some are not.

For example, o ften when students are presented with a range of re a sons for a conclusion in prose , they will focus on counting the mi s takes and erroneously think that the side of the debate that made the most number of outrageous mistakes must be wrong about the co n clusion. But by presenting the argument in the form of a map illu s trate s the point that these bad reasons neither increase or decrease the reliability of a conclusion, and hence are irrel evant to our final eval u ation. Instead, attention needs to be focused on the strongest reasons, not the number. It i s possible that the side of an argument that pr e sented the worst reasons for a given conclusion also provided the most conclusive reason (s ee figure 2).

Argument maps can make discussing complicated arguments in a classroom much easier too. The number of reasons or objections to a contention can be easily “read-off” an argument map (this is difficult to do with a prose equivalent). Example arguments can be displayed on the projector and the teacher can point precisely to the part of the argument that he or she want to discuss. When debating issues in a classroom using argument maps can help externalize and depersona l ize the debate so that the students are no longer arguing with one a n other in a competitive way but are collaborating on mapping an a r gument together in an attempt to construct the best argument for or against the conclusion. This promotes a sense of involvement in a joint scholarly enterprise.

Figure 2. Argument maps clearly distinguish between separate reasons, so it easier to focus on the logical implications of the good reasons and not get distracted by the bad reasons that should just be ignored when it comes to evaluating the conclusion.

An additional benefit is this: Maps also make assessing student’s reasoning skills much easier in assignments, because the teacher can clearly see what his or her students had in mind without the confounding variables to be found in an argumentative essay (Davies, 2009). Also, asking the students to make an argument map prior to writing an argumentative essay can also help ensure that the basic structure of the argument is adequate before they start writing. For a number of reasons, this can assist in the process of essay writing.

Teaching using computer-aided argument mapping

Let us now look at how to teach critical th inking using argument mapping . Some of these point s apply to any informal logic or critical thinking class, but they are particularly relevant to any class intending to use argument mapping as a teaching tool .

The parts of an argument

In teaching students about argument mapping it is helpful to first di s t inguish the following component parts of an argument and to provide examples of each:

• contention/conclusion (a singular claim being argued for);
• reasons (a set of claims working together to support a conclusion or sub-conclusion)
• objections (a claim, or set of claims working together to oppose or undermine a conclusion, another reason, or an inference);
• inference (a logical move or progression from reasons to contention).
• Inference indicator words (a word or phrase that identifies a logical progression from reasons to a contention, such as ‘because’, ‘therefore’ or ‘it can be concluded that’);
• Evidential sources taken as the endpoint of a line of reasoning (arguments must end somewhere, and often this will be a source of information, e.g. a media report, or an expert opinion , that we expect people to accept without the need for additional arg u ment.)

A rgument mapping concerns itself with relationships between claims or propositions. The first main challenge is to discuss with students the nature of claims. Experience in teaching argument mapping has shown us that students find this concept problematic, a nd , if students are unclear about claims, they cannot easily create argument maps.

How can the notion of a claim be taught to students? One might start with definition s such as:

• A claim is a declarative sentence that has a truth value; or
• A claim is an assertion that can be agreed with or disagreed with (or partly agreed with).

O ften , however, students find such definitions difficult to grasp. It is best to start with examples of simple empirical statements using the first definition above . M odel claims can be instructive here , along with a discussion about the states of affairs that can establish if and whether certain sentences can be said to be true or false (or empirica l ly uncertain) :

• The door is shut . (This might be true, false, or empirically u n clear , i.e., when viewed from an angle ) .
• Donald Trump was elected President of the United States . (T his is clearly true, and there are a number of facts that make it so. )
• Sally is at McDonald’s . (T his could be determined by observ a tional evidence and perhaps knowledge of Sally dining habits . )
• Acid turns blue litmus paper red . (T his could be determined by procedures used in the science of Chemistry . )

Students should then be encouraged to find similar claims in published literature. They should practice reading passages from texts, paying attention to whether the claims meet the standard criteria. The criteria are as follows.

Claims should be:

• Singular declarative sentences (i.e., not making more than one point);
• Complete sentences (not fragments);
• Precisely expressed with a potential truth value (not vague or ambiguous);
• Free of inference indicator words.

Once simple empirical claims are successfully used to clarify the notion of the claim, instructors can begin to use examples less reliant on a truth value, i.e., claims more subject to dispute and more likely to engender arguments. The second definition of a claim is apposite here: an assertion which can be agreed with or disagreed with (or partly agreed with). For example:

• In a democracy, the poor have more power than the rich.

This is not a simple empirical claim (there is no discoverable fact of the matter) yet it is a claim with a potential truth value—even if this is not easily ascertained. While not a claim with an empirical basis, the same criteria for claims still apply. Examples like this can lead to many useful departure points for instruction and debate.

Once appraised of the distinction between an empirical claim and a contestable claim, one can introduce the distinction between claims and reasons. This is where inference indicator words become important. For example, it would be a mistake to include the following inference as a single claim in an argument map, because it contains two claims connected by the inference indicator ‘because’.

• In a democracy the poor have more power than the rich, because there are more of them.

i .e., not :

but instead:

It should be mad e clear to students that t here should be no reaso n ing going on inside a claim box. S tudents should watch out for typical inference indicator terms that occur in passages of text such as: so, since, consequently, therefore, as a result/consequence, in view of the fact that, as shown by (see Table 1 , below). These terms are repr e sented as relationships between the claims and their location in the map rather than in the premise boxes themselves. Because in this e x ample becomes an inference indicator (not part of the statement), and any claims in boxes are rendered as complete sentences (not fra g ments). This is important to stress because the argument mapping software doesn’t check what the students put into the claim boxes. Without instructor input, students can create unintelligible maps b e cause they put either multiple claims into each box or ungrammatical or fra g mentary sentences that don’t have a potential truth value .

It is also important to make clear to students that claims are not questions, commands, demands, exhortations, warnings, and so on. Shut the door! (a demand) is not a claim as it is not potentially true or false. Similarly, interrogative forms such as: Is Sally going to McDonald’s? is not a claim. (One cannot ask: Is the question: Is Sally going to McDonald’s? true or false?) By contrast, one can establish the truth of the assertion: Sally is at McDonald’s . Practice should be emphasised in establishing claims in key passages of text, identifying non-claims, and turning non-claims into claims.

It is generally helpful to make sure that claims are singular statements and do not include conjunctions (e.g., and, but, moreover) though there is nothing logically wrong with putting conjunctions into an argument map. Conjunctions are permitted in a single claim box if they expand or elaborate on a singular claim rather than add another. If they add another claim they must be treated differently. For example, take So c rates is a man but he is not famous . This is two separate claims: So c rates is a man AND Socrates is not famous —the first true; the second clearly false, and in an argument map we generally shouldn’t conflate them. These would be represented in separate claim boxes.

It is also important to stress that claims are always complete sentences. They should also be clearly potentially true or false: “ Reshine moisturiser may make you look better ” is not even a potentially clear claim (how would one decide if it is true or false?) whereas the more precise “ Reshine moisturiser will make all your wrinkles disa p pear from your face within 24 hours ” is a claim that is much easier to verify or falsify. Moreover, it seems to beg a reason (e.g., that Reshine moisturiser might have exfoliate properties) and this suggests at least that there might be some science behind this. In the latter case, but not the former, there is—potentially at least—a fact of the matter that can be empirically determined. All claims can be mapped, but those with reasons and evidentiary support will inevitably be seen as much stronger—as they should.

The distinction between (a) simple empirical claims; (b) contestable claims that unclearly expressed; and (c) clearly expressed contestable claims which potentially admit of reasons that could be potentially true or false, is fundamental to argument mapping and time needs to be given to explore the differences.

These points are important to establish early in argument mapping as one of the ways in which students can fail to map arguments properly is either by (a) constructing a map without claims at all; (b) using unclear claims or truth-dubious claims; or (c) putting more than one claim inside a reason, objection or contention box. Any of these can lead to poorly constructed maps. Argument mapping can help students understand why these problems are important, but the software doesn’t assess students’ work for these problems. Some programs however offer online tutorials that cover some of these points. [3] Importantly, students should be given time to play around with the argument mapping software being used, and to practice putting claims into boxes. Simple examples of prose, e.g., from Letters to the Editor, advertising slogans, or extracts from academic texts can be used for this purpose.

Sources of evidence and the provisional endpoints of arguments

Arguments and argument maps need to stop somewhere and where possible it is good practice to finish a line of reasoning with an evidence source that is uncontentious and can be accepted without further debate. Evidential sources come in many forms. For example, a person might accept the claim that he or she has disease x because they trust the expert opinion of their doctor. Evidence sources include assertions, data, common belief, case studies, legal judgements, expert opinion, personal experience, quotes, statistics, and so on. The argument mapping software Rational e™ allows users to represent sources of evidence as unique claim boxes that can be used to clearly mark the current endpoint of a line of reasoning (see Figures 3 and 4 below).

Of course, whether a source of evidence is uncontentious or not is provisional, and this provisional nature make the notion of an endpoint to an argument difficult to teach to students. Teachers need to make the point clear to students that context matters when deciding if a particular source of evidence can be used as an endpoint in an argument. It is probably fine to take the testimony of one’s housemate that there is no milk in the fridge, but it is not acceptable to take for granted the assertion that Donald Trump is a part of a conspiracy of reptilian space aliens trying to take over the planet. It probably helps to reassure students that deciding on an acceptable endpoint to their argument is a very difficult thing to do and they can always revise their argument map at a later point in time if they tied off a line of debate too quickly.

Figure 3. Example of source of evidence used to end a line of reasoning. The argument mapping software Rationale™ has unique icons for different sources.

Once the notion of a claim is clear, the concept of an argument needs to be introduced and applied using CAAM software. The notion of an argument, like the notion of claim, may also need some explanation. An argument qua an unpleasant interpersonal quarrel between individuals, is in such common use that it can be hard for students to see the alternative. The philosophical concept of an argument is typically defined as a connected series of claims intending to establish some concl u sion, or variations on this, e.g., a sequence of claims with an inference i.e., a logical move, to a conclusion/contention . Students should be taught to appreciate that while claims are singular propositions only, arguments are—by definition—claims for which reason(s) are given.

Figure 4. Ideally, a good argument map requires all premises to be either supported by further reasoning or provisional sources of evidence.

Simple, Complex and Multi-Layer Arguments

Early on, the distinction between simple and complex arguments should be made clear. A simple argument is one for which a single reason is given; a complex, or multi-reason argument—as the name suggests—is one with a set of reasons supporting a contention. Here is an example of each:

Simple argument with a single reason

Complex argument with more than one reason

A key pitfall for students is in telling whether an argument has separate reasons working independently (as in this last example) or whether the reasons work together as dependent co-premises. We return to this later.

As students advance their understanding of argument mapping, multi-layer arguments can be introduced. These arguments have primary reasons supported by secondary level reasons.

An example is provided below. Here is should be noted that the contention of one argument can become a premise of another argument (naturally, mapping an argument does not imply one agrees with it):

A multi-layer argument

It takes a great deal of practice for students to accurately reconstruct multi-layer arguments from a passage of raw text. Gratuitous assumptions are often made in authentic prose, premises are left out, and connections between premises are contentions are not clear. The job of the argument mapper is to make all connections between reasons and contentions, and between primary and secondary-level reasons very explicit. There is no substitute for a skilful pedagogy that builds student’s skills from achieving competence in analysing and reconstructing simple and complex arguments, eventually to multi-layer arguments.

Expressed as a single multi-level argument this becomes:

The notion of an objection can be generally explained without difficulty as it mirrors the structure of reasons. Indeed, objections are simply reasons against something, and likewise, come in simple, complex and multi-layer variations.

When discussing objections, it should be made clear to students that objections can be supported by reasons—reasons here provide evidence that suggests an objection is a good one. For example:

Students should be made aware that very often passages of text are ambiguous. Argument mapping has to deal with such ambiguities. Is the following example a singular claim, or a claim for which a reason is given (an argument)? i.e., is it best rendered as a simple conditional claim?

Or should it be rendered as an argument (a contention with a premise offered in support of it)?:

Such examples are often context-dependent; a function of whether the author is trying to convince the reader of something, or whether they are merely asserting something. Class time should be devoted to looking at passages of text, establishing whether they are arguments or mere assertions and translating them into the argument mapping software.

As well as statements that could be arguments, there are also arguments that have implicit inferences that need elucidation. This phenomenon is very common. For example:

• If you want a new car, now is the time and Hindmarsh is the place.

This advertising slogan for a Building Society money-lender is probably best interpreted (charitably) as an argument, not merely a conditional statement. It is trying to convince us of something. Context, and knowledge of the role of money-lenders in society can help interpret it. A moment’s reflection will tell us that the passage is trying to convince us that we should borrow money from Hindmarsh . Unfortunately for students, this contention is not present in the passage but must be gleaned from it. Indeed, the passage also intimates we want a new car! What seems like a simple conditional assertion appears to be a subtle argument with an intermediate conclusion and number of assumed premises. A possible interpretation of the argument is represented using the argument mapping software Rationale™ below.

No argument software can assist on its own with the interpretation of difficult passages of text like this, and an instructor’s role is essential (Note that argument mapping convention requires that implicit or hidden claims, when explicated, are expressed in square brackets […].).

Exposure to many different texts, and teaching sensitivity to argument context, can help. For example, the following advertising slogan:

• The bigger the burger the better the burger, and the burgers are bigger at [Hungry] Jack’s.

conceals an implicit conclusion: So/Therefore the burgers are better at [Hungry] Jack’s. Not including the contention renders the passage as a simple assertion rather than what it really is, namely, an argument with an implied contention—and a non-sequitur at that!

Enthymematic arguments (with suppressed claims) are difficult for students, and are commonplace in reasoning. In this example, these premises work together as co-premises to support the (implied) contention. We shall discuss how to deal with these below.

As well as dealing with enthymematic arguments, mapping is also helpful in clearly identifying and exposing instances of circular reasoning—where question-begging supporting reasons are provided, as the following example indicates:

Inference indicators

Early in class instruction it is important to introduce the idea of an inference indicator. There are two types: (a) reason indicators and (b) conclusion indicators. The difference between them is the role they play in an argument. It should be demonstrated how these words and phrases have different grammatical roles too. Reason indicators such as because point to the reason in a grammatical construction; conclusion indicators (like so and therefore) point to the contention. The role they play in sentence construction can be introduced and it can be shown how they can be transposed.

Students should learn the different kinds of indicators to help determine what a reason is; and what a conclusion is. They should be given practice in translating passages like these into simply box and arrow diagrams, or—if they are confident—into argument maps. A table showing how the indictors work can be helpful here (examples provided here are not exhaustive).

At present, CAAM software has a limited range of inference indic a tors most ly using because or the neutral term supports exclusively (i.e., premise X supports contention Y ; or X because Y ) . S tudents need to be able to translate the many inference indicators used in text into the blunt categories offered by CAAM software. This is one of its drawbacks. F uture develo pments might address this. Given present limitations, it is important that students understand how to interpret ordinary language arguments replete in inference indicators of diffe r ent kinds. Nothing substitutes for class work using passages of text that illuminate the many examples of indicator words in use.

Over-interpretation of inference indicators

When students are sufficiently informed about inference indicators, they can be prone to overuse their relevance and see arguments when they are not there. This is something the instructor needs to be wary of as well. Take, for example, the sentence: Sally said she was hungry before, so that is why you can see her eating a sandwich now . This appears to have an inference connector, “so”, but the “so” functions grammatically to connect an explanation to an observation, not as an inference indicator. The passage is not concluding that you can see Sally eating a sandwich. Similarly, Synonyms are good servants but bad masters , therefore select them with care . This is not proffering a contention; it is best interpreted as a subtle piece of advice. Inference indicator words are thus not always indicating an inference (neither is the indictor word thus in that sentence). There is a difference between their use in inference-making and their use in grammatical construction. Again, lots of text-based practice is needed.

Tiers of Reasons/Objections :

A procedural approach to argument m apping.

We have mentioned that arguments can be represented in terms of tiers of reasons and objections in the form of multi-layered arg u ments . It is very easy for students to become overwhelmed by the di f ficulty of this task. How is this best taught and what are the things to watch out for?

As always, it is best to start with simple examples and then attempt more complex examples. The following example , the kind of thing to be found in a ‘Letter to the Editor’ , provides an instructive case.

• Dogs fetch balls and cats don’t, so you can play with dogs. I mean, who’d disagree with that? It’s obvious isn’t it? You can’t play with cats, of course. They are too stuck up. Dogs clearly make better pets.

It is clearly an argument. How can one map it to clearly display the reasoning? To establish this, it is best to ask students to follow a s e ries of steps. Th is is important as th ere is a strong tendency for st u dents to jump into the task of mapping a passage without clearly thinking through the text, nor establishing the connections between the component parts of an argument.

Here is a suggested step-by-step approach that could be used with students to help them understand arguments . It is a good idea to a sk student s to follow these steps for any argument under consideration :

This step is follow by: 

Eliminating the redundant expressions not germane to the argument, and the questions (non-claims), we get the following: <1>Dogs fetch balls and cats don’t, so <2>you can play with dogs. I mean, who’d disagree with that? It’s obvious isn’t it? <3>You can’t play with cats, of course. They are too stuck up. <4>Dogs clearly make better pets.

The claims are as follows:

• Dogs fetch balls and cats don’t
• You can play with dogs
• You can’t play with cats
• Dogs make better pets

Using the What’s the point? test mentioned above, the conclusion reveals itself to be the last claim <4>. This is placed at the top of the map, but how are the reasons supporting it to be arranged? The temptation might be that there are two independent reasons supporting the contention: You can play with dogs and You can’t play with cats.

But this representation of the argument is missing something. W hat is to be done with claim <1> Dogs fetch balls but cats don’t? A t this point a ttention should be drawn to the inference indicator “so” that seems to draw a conclusion , i.e., it is not merely functioning gra m matically in the sentence . But this “so” is clearly not an inference to claim <4>; it appears to be an inference to an intermediate conclusion that consists of claim <2> and thus should thus be represented in a multi-level argument like this:

On reflection, it can be seen that that the two supporting reasons <2> and <3> are best rendered as a single claim—an intermediate concl u sion (they are both making a point about “playing”) —and the claim about “ fetching ” can be seen as reasoned support for this . This ca p tures the intended use of the connector word “so” linking <1> to <2>. There is thus another rule to consider:

The resulting argument map provides a clear example of serial re a soning that accurately represents the case being made:

In the case of more complex arguments additional principles need to be followed.

The principle of abstraction

A very useful guideline for argument mapping is the principle of a b straction . In many cases, t he higher the claim in a multi-layered a r gument the greater the degree of abstraction; or to put it differently, the lower the claim the more specific it should be. In the above exa m ple, “playing” is more abstract than “ fetching balls ” , and both claims are less abstract than “better pet ”. They provide serial support for each other . Students should be guided in how to apply this principle, as without this, maps can become a jumble of disorganized claims with no clear hierarchical structure. Once again, this requires practice and students should be given a number of exercises where they are required to rank claims in terms of their degree of abstraction. To our series of rules we can add the following :

The principle of level consistency

Complex arguments have both a vertical and a horizontal axis. A r guments can be multi-layered along the vertical axis (as we have just seen) , but premises are present along a horizontal axis as well. I n sofar as many premises can be brought to bear in an argument it is i m portant to stress another principle, the principle of level consistency. W ithin each horizontal level, reasons or objections should be appro x imately of equal weighting in terms of their abstraction or generality. In the following argument t his rule is not adhered to and is cons e quently hard to interpret:

This argument is improved by subordinating lower-level claims to a more general claims at the middle-level, and ensuring level consiste n cy at the lower level, as follows:

We can thus add another guideline :

Missing Premises

Teaching students how to look out for missing premises is complex, but there are strategies that can help. It is difficult because reasoning is often replete in missing premises. Indeed, it is very rare that all premises are made explicit in reasoning. This is due to the implicit reliance of speakers or writers on the background beliefs assumed to be shared in any argumentative exchange. Here is a simple example.

• Art must represent the world if it is to appeal to a broad audience for generations to come . So t hat’s why Blue Poles will not appeal to a broad audience .

In a normal human exchange, this would be a perfectly clear expression of a (rather dated) view about the painting Blue Poles . It is also an argument. We are giving a reason for a conclusion, as indicated by the words “so that’s why”. However, when teaching argument mapping it is an example of an argument with a missing premise; a premise that needs to be exposed, and made clear. What, precisely, is being argued?

In this case, it is easy to see what missing is. It is the assumption that Blue Poles does not represent the world . Exposing this missing premise allows it to be evaluated, confirmed or rejected. In this example, the missing premise can stated quite easily; in simple passages, this is often the case. But for more complex reasoning a series of steps need to be followed to ensure all missing premises are catered for. Fortunately, there is a very simple way to establish missing premises. This is done by applying two rules: the Rabbit Rule and the Holding Hands Rule . These rules are outlined in more detail in online tutorials available with the software Rationale™ .

Assumptions and how to find them using the Rabbit Rule and Holding Hands Rule

The Rabbit Rule is applied (vertically) to the inferential link between conclusion and the premises. This rule states that no conclusion should come out of thin air. (No rabbits out of hats!) The conclusion term(s) have to be present in the terms of the premises of an argument for it to appear in the conclusion. In the argument under consideration we can see that “ Blue Poles ” appears in the conclusion but does not appear in the available premise. We therefore know that Blue Poles must be supplied to the missing premise.

The Holding Hands Rule is applied horizontally between premises to any remaining terms after the Rabbit Rule has been applied (that is, if a term is not already supplied by means of the Rabbit Rule). The remaining terms must “hold hands” with another premise. No term can appear in one premise alone—there is always a companion term “holding hands”. In this example, we can see that “represent the world” appears in the stated premise, so it must be present in the missing premise. As the argument is negating something about Blue Poles , we similarly apply a corresponding negation to the terms of the missing premise.  The argument can be expressed as follows:

We can add the following to our list of procedural rules to establish missing premises:

The following example of a famous deductively valid argument in Philosophy demonstrates how both the Rabbit Rule and the Holding Hands Rule are satisfied. It also demonstrates an example of co-premises in action:It may not have escaped notice that the two claims that support the above contention are jointly necessary for the conclusion to follow. Strictly speaking they are not two independent reasons supporting the conclusion, but are co-premises that jointing support the conclusion. This raises the important issue of co-premises or “linked” premises. This is another crucial methodological principle that students find difficult.

A co-premise is when two or more premises are jointly necessary for the truth of the conclusion. Co-premises are often enthy me matic and s ome times a co-premise is trivial. For example, a person who reasons that they should rent a house because they should find a place to live as quickly as possible , tacitly assumes that renting a house is quickest way of find ing a place to live .

Such assumed claims are often tacit in arguments in both writing and speech , and are often so trivial they do not need to be stated . However, they are an important feature of arguments. Indeed, every argument has at least two of them. In CAAM this is often mentio ned as “The Golden Rule”: every argument has at least two co-premises. In the following example, we have extended the previous argument discussed by the addition of enthymematic co-premises.

While ubiquitous in reason ing, co-premises are not always unco n troversial . Often, co-premises conceal hidden assumptions that are false or misleading. This is why it is good argument mapping practice to expose them. For example, it need not be accepted (without ev i dence— or even intuitively) that pets that you can play with make be t ter pets than those you can’t [play with] (elderly people , the infirm or disabled , for example, like more docile pets). Being able to e x pose hidden assumption clearly for the purpose of critiquing them is a m a jor advantage of argument mapping. Argu ment mapping software makes identification and representation of hidden claims easier by using color conventions and shading; however, this does not help st u dents deciding how to determine how to locate a co -premise in a pa s sage of text. Clear i nstruction and LAMP is needed. Probably the best way to approach co-premises in the classroom is to begin by discus s in g the differences between complex reasoning and linked reasoning.

Co-p remises (Linke d r easoning)

S tudents find the distinction between linked reasoning (dependent premises) and complex reasoning (independent premises ) hard to grasp. It is best taught by showing students a number of simple multi-premise a rguments and asking them to classify examples of complex and linked reasoning . In the following example, it is fairly easy to see that the supporting premises are independent and not necessary for each other .

Plausibly, neither premise could be true; or both could, or one coul d be true and the other false. If either premise was true t he conclusion could sensibly follow in either case. The conclusion could follow even if one of the claims was missing.

In other examples, co-premises are neede d as the claims are not ind e pendent of each other and are examples of linked reasoning . For i n stance :

• We should go to Rome for our holidays. Rome is beautiful. Also, it will enable us to visit your relatives and this is something really need to do.

The passage complete with numbered claims would look like this:

• <1 We should go to Rome for our holidays>. <2 Rome is beautiful.> Also, <3 It will enable us to visit your relatives> , and <4 this is something really need to do>.

How can one teach students w hich premises are linked and which are independent?

To our set of suggested procedural rules discu ssed earlier, we can add another step:

In the example above the claim Rome is beautiful is an independent reason (it does not depend on visiting relatives) and the contention We should go to Rome for our holidays can be supported by it. The contention can follow from Rome being beautiful regardless of the other claims provided. However, the claims about visiting the relatives appear to be linked. The claim: This is something [Visiting your relatives] we really need to do will not alone support the conclusion without including the claim It [Visiting Rome] will enable us to visit your relatives . Note however, this relationship is not symmetrical. Premise <3> can support the contention without premise <4>. However, <4> can’t without <3>. If one premise can’t support a conclusion without another premise, they are said to be “linked”. In convergent (or divergent) reasoning, none of the claims are dependent on any other claim; either one of the claims might support the conclusion alone. By contrast, in linked reasoning, the claims are not independent; they are necessary for each other for the conclusion to follow.

With <2> as an independent premise, and <3> and <4> being linked premises, the map would appear as follows:

A useful feature of argument mapping is the capacity to display linked premises in an intuitive visual way . Like other software, t he software Rationale™ (used here) uses the colo r green for reasons and the colo r red for objections ( the colo r orange is used exclusiv e ly for rebuttals , i.e., objections to objections ) . Co-premises are ind i cated by an umbrella shading that fades to white . This is a subtle visual indic a tion that no argument is ever complete and more premises could p o tentially be added.

O bjections too can be linked as co-premises as the following exte n sion to the argument indicate. We have added a rebuttal against an objection (in orange) to demonstrate their use.

• On the other hand <5 > travelling to Rome is very expensive ,> primarily because <6 > flights are so expensive>. And <7 > we don’t have a lot of money at the moment>. But then again, <there is plenty of money in the children’s bank account we could use>.

We have laid out the complete map of the argument on page 169.

Note here that the claim that Travelling to Rome is expensive could well object to the conclusion alone, but premise could not (without premise ). The premises under consideration must independently support the conclusion to stand as independent reasons. If this is not the case, the premises are said to be linked.

A brief history of argument mapping

Argument mapping can be traced to the work of Richard Whately in his Elements of Logic (1834/1826) but his notation was not widely adopted. In the early twentieth century, John Henry Wigmore mapped legal reasoning using numbers to indicate premises (Wigmore, 1913; Wigmore, 1931) . Monroe Beardsley developed this, and it became standard model of an argument map (Beardsley, 1950) . On this a p proach, premises are numbered, a legend is provided to the claims identified by the numbers, and serial, divergent and convergent re a soning can be clearly represented. An example of each of these forms of reasoning using the standard model is provided below.

This model is still widely used and is advantageous in contexts where students are required to produce argument maps without access to software (e.g., in paper-based logic and reasoning exams under timed conditions).

In 1958, Stephen Toulmin devised another model of an argument map that included the notion of a “warrant” (which licenses the inference from the reasons, which he called “data”, to the claim), “backing” (which provides the authority for the warrant), modal qualifiers (such as “probably”), and “rebuttals” (which mention conditions restricting the inference) (Toulmin, 1958). An example of a Toulmin map is provided below.

In 1973, Stephen L. Thomas refined Beardsley’s approach (Thomas, 1997/1973) . Thomas included in his approach the important notion of “linked” arguments where two or more premises work together to support a conclusion (the distinction between dependent and ind e pendent premises having being described earlier). This innovation made it feasible for arguments to include “hidden” premises. He is also said to have introduced the terms “argument diagram”, “basic” (or “simple”) reasons, i.e., those not supported by other reasons (as distinct from “complex” reasons). He also made the distinction b e tween “intermediate” conclusions (a conclusion reached before a final conclusion) and a “final” conclusion (not used to support another conclusion). Thomas also suggested including objections as reasons against a proposition, and that these too should be included in arg u ment maps.

In 1976 , Michael Scriven proposed a procedure for mapping that could be recommended to students (Scriven, 1976) . This involved a number of steps: ( 1) writing out the statements in an argument; ( 2) clarifying their meaning; ( 3) listing the statements, including any hi d den claims; and ( 4) using numbers for premises along the lines of the Beardsley-Thomas model. In the case of hidden assumptions, Scriven’s notation used an alphabetical letter to distinguish hidden assumptions from explicit reasons. Scriven also emphasized the i m portance of a rebuttal in argument mapping, a notion identified earlier by Thomas.

In the 1990s a number of innovations occurred. Robert Horn helped popularize the notion of an argument map by producing idiosyncratic, large-format argument diagrams on key issues in philosophy such as “Can Computers Think?” (Horn, 1999; Horn, 2003) . These maps did not adopt either the standard model or Toulmin -style notation for mapping arguments, but did use arrows and pictures to make the co n tent clear, making it obvious for the first time that argument maps could be visually interesting as well as informative. These were di s tributed widely and used in class teaching. In addition, computer software programs began to be developed. This was important, as dedicated argument mapping software allowed premises to be co m posed, edited and placed within an argument map, as distinct from a legend alongside the map.

Argument mapping software

Once dedicated computer software was introduced, the standard mo d el of numbered premises became outdated in all contexts outside its use in examinations. Several iterations of mapping software were d e veloped in Australia and the U . S .A. with increasingly greater levels of sophistication. Tim van Gelder developed Rationale™ and bC i sive ™ , the former designed as a basic argument mapping software, the latter designed for business decision-making applications (van Gelder, 2007, 2013) . Both were later purchased by Dutch company Kritisch Denken BV .

A variety of argument mapping packages are now available, inclu d ing Araucaria, Compendium, Logos, Argunet , Theseus, Convince Me, LARGO, Athena, Carneades and SEAS . These range from single-user software such as Rationale™ , Convince Me and Athena ; to small group software such as Digalo , QuestMap , Compendium, Belvedere, and AcademicTalk ; to collaborative online debating tools for arg u mentation such as Debategraph and Collaboratorium . Enhancements to argument mapping software proceed apace. For example, there are moves to introduce a Bayesian network model to Rationale™ to cater for probabilistic reasoning.

Rationale™ or bCisive are perhaps the easiest programs to use for teaching argument mapping, but they require a subscription. E xcellent free alternative s i nclude the Argumen t Visualization mode in the online MindMup : https://www.mindmup.com/tutorials/argument-visualization.html , and the cross-platform desktop package iLogos

http://www.phil.cmu.edu/projects/argument_mapping/

Argument mapping class room examples

There are a number of free argument resources available online.

• The designers of Rationale™ made tutorials to be used with their software. https://www.rationaleonline.com/docs/en/tutorials#tvy5fw
• Simon Cullen, who helped design the MindMup argument visualisation function, has posted some of the activities he uses for teaching philosophical arguments using argument maps. http://www.philmaps.com
• Ashley Barnett, who has written lots of questions for argument mapping courses for students and intelligence analysts has posted his teaching material on http://www.ergoshmergo.com

In this paper we have covered some of the basic concepts and considerations that teachers need to be aware of when using CAAM in the classroom. A set of procedural steps was suggested that is recommended for use with students. Understanding claims and arguments and how they are structured is only the start. Students should also be aware of how to interpret inference indicators, construct and analyse simple, complex and multi-layer arguments, and be able to integrate objections and rebuttals. They should be wary of misusing inference indicators, confusing reasons with evidence for reasons, and misinterpreting independent reasons for co-premises. There is much more we could have discussed. We have not touched on the use of inference objections (in contrast to premise objections). We have not mentioned argument webs or chains of reasoning, nor have we discussed in detail the appropriate ways to integrate evidence into an argument. However, it should be clear from this brief outline how CAAM can assist students in disentangling arguments in everyday prose—replete, as it often is, with non-sequiturs, repetition, irrelevancies, unstated conclusions, and other infelicities.

Beardsley, M. C. (1950). Practical logic. New York: Prentice-Hall.

Davies, M. (2009). Computer-assisted argument mapping: a rationale approach. Higher Education, 58, 799-820. Higher Education, 58(6), 799-820.

Davies, M. (2011). Mind Mapping, Concept Mapping, Argument Mapping: What are the Differences and Do they Matter? Higher Education, 62 (3), 279-301.

Harrell, M. (2008). No Computer program required: Even pencil-and-Paper argument mapping improves critical-thinking skills. Teaching Philosophy, 31 (4), 351-374.

Horn, R. (1999). Can Computers Think? : Macrovu.

Horn, R. E. (2003). Infrastructure for Navigating Interdisciplinary Debates: Critical Decisions for Representing Argumentation. In P. A. Kirschner, S. J. B. Shum, & C. S. Carr (Eds.), Visualizing argumentation: Software tools for collaborative and educational sense-making . New York: Springer-Verlag.

Rider, Y., & Thomason, N. (2008). Cognitive and Pedagogical Benefits of Argument Mapping: L.A.M.P. Guides the Way to Better Thinking. In A. Okada, S. Buckingham Shum, & T. Sherborne (Eds.), Knowledge Cartography: Software Tools and Mapping Techniques (pp. 113-130): Springer.

Scriven, M. (1976). Reasoning . New York: McGraw-Hill.

Thomas, S. N. (1997/1973). Practical reasoning in natural language (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Toulmin, S. E. (1958). The uses of argument (first ed.). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

van Gelder, T. (2007). The Rationale for Rationale™. Law, Probability and Risk, 6 , 23-42.

van Gelder, T. (2013). Rationale 2.0.10. Retrieved from http://rationale.austhink.com/download

van Gelder, T. J. (2015). Using argument mapping to improve critical thinking skills. In M. Davies & R. Barnett (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Thinking in Higher Education (pp. 183-192). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Whately, R. (1834/1826). Elements of logic: comprising the substance of the article in the Encyclopædia metropolitana: with additions, &c. (5th ed.). London: B. Fellowes.

Wigmore, J. (1913). The Problem of Proof. Illinois Law Review, 8 , 77.

Wigmore, J. (1931). The Science of Judicial Proof as Given by Logic, Psychology and General Experience and Illustrated in Judicial Trials (2 ed. Vol. Little, Brown and Co. ): Boston.

• © Martin Davies, Ashley Barnett, & Tim van Gelder ↵
• The colored versions of the argument maps in this chapter are available only in the open-access Ebook edition of this book at: https://windsor.scholarsportal.info/omp/index.php/wsia/catalog ↵
• https://www.rationaleonline.com/docs/en/tutorials#tvy5fw). ↵

Studies in Critical Thinking Copyright © by Martin Davies; Ashley Barnett; and Tim van Gelder is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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ENGL001: English Composition I

Five essential parts of an argument.

Read article on the parts of an argument, especially warrants. How do warrants differ from reasons and evidence?

Why Does Little Red Schoolhouse (LRS) View Writing as Argument?

When we disagree about an issue, care deeply about an outcome, or try to convince others of the validity of our approach, we often resort to argument. Argument as it is depicted on television and experienced in times of stress or conflict carries with it many negative connotations of anger, high emotion, and even irrationality. But each of us also makes arguments every day, and in settings that help us become more rational, better informed, and more clearly understood.

Arguments help us to gather information from our own experience and that of others, to make judgments based on evidence, and to marshal information toward sound conclusions. Argument is appropriate when we seek understanding or agreement, when we want to solve a problem or answer a question, and when we want others to act or think in ways we deem beneficial, suitable, or necessary. Argument also comes in handy when we seek to convince, persuade, or produce change in our audience, and when circumstances require trust, respect, belief in our evidence or agreement with our reasoning.

Argument is everywhere – on television and radio, in politics and publications, and also in our day-to-day decisions about what to have for dinner, when to schedule the next meeting, and who should walk the family dog. As Colomb and Williams point out, the common notion that argument must be combative is built into our very language: opposing sides attack , defend , hold off , triumph , struggle , crush objections and slaughter competitors. On the other hand, in order to use argument as productive and collaborative communication, we must certainly find a way to transcend the vocabulary of argument-as-war. We must negotiate the audience's needs along with the speaker's agenda.

Argument is also about conversation. Although sometimes we forget, the best arguments are a forum for:

• Obtaining and expressing information;
• Airing and sharing assumptions and reasons;
• Establishing common ground;
• Coming to mutual agreement.

Productive argumentation starts with a problem. It makes us realize why we have an interest in seeing that problem solved. It also claims a solution, convincing its audience of the validity of that solution with evidence and reasons that it will accept.

Writing and Argument

The Little Red Schoolhouse (LRS) focus on argumentation raises writers' and readers' awareness of:

• The importance of audience;
• The intersecting languages of information and persuasion; and
• The reading process through which we share the tasks of critical thinking and decision-making.

Argument structure also helps writers to avoid:

• The formulaic "five paragraph essay" that is often assigned in high school ("Scientific progress is good. Here are several reasons why scientific progress is good. In conclusion, scientific progress is good.");
• The default structure of chronological order (First I set up the lab, then I opened my notebook, then performed the first step in my experiment…);
• Simple summary with no so what ; and
• Binary structures where two issues or ideas are described without connection to each other.

Preparing Your Argument

To prepare to make an effective argument you must first:

• Translate your topic into a problem statement ;
• Frame a situation that is debatable or contestable;
• Formulate a question about which reasonable people might disagree; and
• Find a claim your analysis has led you to assert.

Now you can begin to imagine what it will take to convince your audience. What evidence, methods, or models do they expect? What conventions must you follow to win approval?

Sketch Your Approach

• What do you want to show?
• Why should readers agree?
• Based on what evidence?
• What are some possible alternatives or objections?
• What conclusion will you offer, and why should your readers accept it as valuable?

The Five Parts of Argument

The questions that lead to your topic, broadly conceived, also steer you toward what The Craft of Argument formalizes in the five parts of argument .

• Acknowledgement and Response.

These Correspond to the Williams' and Colomb's Five Questions of Argument:

• What are you claiming?
• What reasons do you have for believing your claim?
• What evidence do you base those reasons on?
• What principle connects or makes your reasons relevant to your claims?
• What about such-and-such potential disagreement/difficulty?

Constructing Claims

We learn that, at bottom, an argument is just a claim and its support:

Reason therefore Claim

Claim because of Reason .

Your claim is your main point. It should either be clearly conceptual (seeking to change how we think) or clearly pragmatic (seeking to change how we act). Claims should, by definition, require good reasons. Audiences should be able to disagree with your claim and, by extension, to be convinced and converted by your evidence.

More about Claims

• Make sure your readers can recognize why your claim is significant.
• Ensure that your claim is clear and concise. Readers should be able to tell what is at stake and what principles you intend to use to argue your point.
• Confirm that the claim accurately describes the main tenets of the argument to follow.
• Moderate your claim with appropriate qualifiers like "many", "most", "often", in place of "all", "always", etc.

Evaluating Good Claims

• Your solution is possible.
• Your solution is ethical (moral, legal, fair, etc.).
• Your solution is prudent – it takes into consideration both the problem you seek to resolve and the possible ramifications of your proposal.

Reasons and Evidence

Most arguers know from experience that reasons and evidence help to convince audiences. In the simplest terms, reasons answer the question: "Why are you making that claim?" Evidence offers tangible support for reasons.

When stating reasons, always be aware of your audience. You will need to choose the reasons that support your evidence that are also the most likely to convince your specific readers or listeners. Knowing the general values and priorities of your readers will help you to determine what they will count as compelling reasons.

Knowing what kind of arguments and evidence they will expect from you will guide you in choosing reasons that meet those expectations.

Tailor your appeal to the specific needs and acknowledged concerns of your reading community, because arguments are always audience specific.

Evidence should be reliable and based upon authoritative and trustworthy research and sources. It should be appropriately cited, and ample enough to convince. Evidence should also be designed to appeal to your target audience's values and priorities.

When Arguing through Evidence

• Present evidence from general to specific.
• Build on what readers know.
• Do not rehearse your own work process; instead, support your conclusions.
• Use diagrams, graphs, and other visuals.
• Keep support appropriate and simple.
• Make sure data is authoritative/expert.
• Help the audience to know what is important.

The words reason and evidence are much more familiar to most students of written and oral argument than the term warrant . But reasons and evidence are most powerful when they are utilized within the structure of argument we have been discussing.

To be convincing, the reasons and evidence you present in support of your claim need to be connected through warrants. Warrants express a general belief or principle in a way that influences or explains our judgments in specific cases.

Take, for example, the old saying:  "Measure twice, cut once".

Expressing as it does a general belief or principle – that when you take the time to do a thing properly, you don't make mistakes – the saying provides a viable warrant for an argument like:

"It is never a good idea to hurry a task. [Reason] [Connected by the beliefs and assumptions expressed by the warrant to the supporting evidence that] Careless mistakes take longer to fix than it would to do things right the first time." [Evidence]

Warrants express justifying principles, shared beliefs, or general assumptions. They are the spoken or unspoken logic that connects your reasons to your evidence. Warrants take many forms, but Williams and Colomb emphasize that they always have or imply two parts:

• One articulating a general belief or circumstance.
• One stating a conclusion we can infer from applying that circumstance to a specific situation.

Warrants often take the form: Whenever X, then Y. For example, take the commonly held belief expressed by the old saying "When it rains, it pours". The same sentiment and set of assumptions could be described by the general truism "If one thing goes wrong, everything goes wrong". Whether implied or explicit, and whether it takes the form of a general observation or a cultural belief, a warrant states a broader principle that can be applied in a particular case to justify the thinking behind an argument.

More on Clear Warrants

Warrants connect your reasons to your claim in logical ways. Whether a warrant is assumed or implied, it is still crucial that the audience be able to recognize your warrant and be able to determine that they agree with or accept your warrant.

Questions for Determining Good Warrants

• Do readers know the warrant already?
• Will all readers think it is true?
• Will they see its connection to this circumstance or situation?
• If they think it is both valid and appropriate, will they think it applies to their family, corporation, or community?

Warranting: A Specific Case

Consider a case when an audience might not accept your argument unless it first accepts your warrant. Take, for example, the following discussion between a mother and her child.

Child (to mother): "I need new shoes."

Mother: "But why, what are your reasons?"

Child: "Because all the other kids have them." X

Child: "Because red is 'in' this season and my shoes are blue." X

Mother: "Sorry, but I don't accept your argument that you need new shoes."

Above all, warrants require common ground. In the example above, the success of the child's argument depends upon his mother's sharing the values and assumptions upon which the argument for new shoes is based.

Productive argument will require that the child find, and address, some common belief or assumption about what constitutes "need". While his mother might not be influenced by peer pressure or style trends, she probably does share a set of values that would ultimately lead to agreement (Common Ground).

Consider a situation in which the child's previous reasons had not convinced his mother to accept his argument, and we can see how compelling reasons and evidence can be developed alongside shared warrants.

Child: "I need new shoes because these ones have holes in them and it's the rainy season." √

Mother: "Well why didn't you say so?! I agree that you shouldn't be walking around with wet feet!"

We are most likely to accept an argument when we share a warrant. In this case, it is unstated, but implied:

Warrant = When shoes no longer protect the feet from stones and weather, it is time to buy new ones.

There is another way to look at warrants that don't necessarily fit a certain mold. If you believe in a general principle stated about general circumstances (for example, "People who fall asleep at work probably aren't getting enough sleep at home".), then you are likely to link a specific instance (of nodding off at your computer) with a specific conclusion (that you haven't gotten adequate rest). Warrants here can be defined as general truths that lead us to accepted conclusions.

Acknowledgement and Response

Acknowledgement and response can be included in your argument in order to:

• Produce trust;
• Mediate or moderate objections;
• Limit the scope of your claim;
• Demonstrate experience or immersion in a wider field or discipline.

Brainstorm useful concessions to potential dissenters by thinking about the difficulties or questions your argument is likely to produce. Within your argument, acknowledgements and responses often begin with: To be sure , admittedly , some have claimed , etc.

Concessions allow the writer to predict problems that might weaken an argument and respond with rebuttals and reassessments. Acknowledgement and response frequently employs terms like but , however , on the other hand , etc.

Using the Five Parts of Argument

After you have sketched out your full argument, and even after you have drafted the entire piece of writing, you should revisit your claim. Ask yourself: Does the claim still introduce and frame the discussion that follows? Are there elements of the claim that need to be revised? Built upon? Eliminated? Explained?

• Is your claim clear and concise?
• Is it contestable?
• Is there good evidence for your solution?
• Will your audience agree?

Evaluate and Revise Reasons

Consider the specific needs and perspectives of your audience and select reasons that will connect to their priorities and motivations. Make sure that you provide ample reasons for each claim or subclaim you assert. Order your reasons in a way that is logical and compelling: Depending on your argument, you may want to lead with your best reason or save your strongest reason for last. Finally, ask yourself whether any essential evidence is missing from your discussion of the problem.

• Do your reasons make a strong case for the validity of your claim?
• Can you imagine other reasons that would appeal more strongly to your audience?

Assess and Improve Evidence

If there are authorities to appeal to, experts who agree, or compelling facts that support your argument, make sure you have included them in full. Whether you are speaking from experience, research, or reading, make sure to situate yourself firmly in your field. Create confidence in your authority and establish the trustworthiness of your account.

• Have you consulted reputable sources?
• Have you conducted your research and formatted your findings according to accepted standards?
• What does your audience need to know to appreciate the solution you propose?
• What makes it easy or difficult to accept?
• What further support might you offer?

Scrutinize Your Warrants

If you can't articulate the connection between what you claim and why you believe the audience should accept your assertion, your readers probably can't either! Good warrants often take the form of assumptions shared by individuals, communities or organizations. They stem from a shared culture, experience, or perspective. If understanding your claim means sharing a particular set of beliefs or establishing common ground with your reader, make sure your argument takes time to do so.

• Can your audience easily connect your claim to your reasons?
• Are your warrants shared? Explicit? Implied?
• What unspoken agreements do your conclusions depend upon?

Concede and Explain

Gracefully acknowledge potential objections when it can produce trust and reinforce the fairness and authority of your perspective. Try to anticipate the difficulties that different types of readers might have with your evidence or reasoning

• Where are my readers most likely to object or feel unsettled?
• How can I concede potential problems while still advancing the authority of my claim?

Assessing and Revising Your Argument

By way of conclusion, we can revisit the issue of method. Little Red Schoolhouse (LRS) encourages thinking about the parts of argument in order to produce logic that is

• Easy to understand, and
• Easy to acknowledge or accept.

Argument structures comprehension by giving readers a framework within which to understand a given discussion. Argument supplies criteria for judgment, and connects reasons with claims through implicit or explicit warrants. Sometimes, crafting a good argument is as simple as asking yourself three basic questions:

• What do you want to say?
• Why should readers care?

When you set about answering these questions using the five parts of argument, you will hone introductions and thesis statements to make clear and precise claims, make relevant costs and benefits explicit, and connect reasons and evidence through shared and compelling warrants.

Examples taken or adapted from:

• Williams, J. (2005). Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace. (8th ed.). New York: Pearson.
• Williams, J., Colomb, G. (200 3). The Craft of Argument. ( Concise ed.). New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc.

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17 Arguments II: Argument Structure; Arguments vs. Explanations

We’re going to focus in this chapter on some strategies for identifying the structure of an argument. After that, we’re going to shift gears and think about explanations , for these are another important thing we use claims for, and they can sometimes be confused with arguments.

1 . Argument Structure

So, as you now know:

• An argument is a set of claims (the premises ) given to support or justify another claim (the conclusion ).

You’ve already seen a number of examples of arguments in the previous chapters and in your homework. Here are a few more, mostly much shorter examples, which will let us more easily think about argument structure than some of the longer ones you’ve seen before. These and lots of the other examples we will work with will have two premises, but keep in mind that there’s no set number of premises an argument has to have . Some have one, some two, some more than that.

Example Arguments

• It’s raining today, therefore it’s going to rain tomorrow.
• 2 is greater than 1. 3 is greater than 2. Thus, 3 is greater than 1.
• All cats are cuddly. Twilight is cuddly, for Twilight is a cat.
• People who take anti-depressants recover from depression at about the same rate as those who increase the amount of exercise they engage in. Exercise is less expensive than medication. So, you should exercise more, since you want to save money and you want to feel less depressed.
• Raising taxes on the wealthy is the only way we will be able to increase funds for education. We need more funds for education. Therefore, we ought to raise taxes on the wealthy.
• It’s probably up to ordinary people and non-governmental organizations to act to slow climate change. For something must be done about it, and governments and corporations are failing to do anything.
• Shockey robbed the bank, for his fingerprints are on the vault door, and the security camera clearly shows him in the building.

The structure of an argument refers to its different parts and how they are related, i.e., the premises, the conclusion, and the order in which they occur.

How do you identify the structure?

• This means asking: what is this passage most basically trying to convince me of?
• If it’s well composed, there will only be one conclusion, while there could be many premises (though there doesn’t have to be more than one).
• But, as these examples show, the conclusion can be at the beginning of an argument, at the end, or, sometimes, in the middle.
• Indicator words can help: see below for more on those.
• They may not be good  reasons, in your view, or they may not ultimately be enough logically to yield the conclusion. But that doesn’t matter when you are just trying to identify the structure of the argument.
• Remember, claims and sentences are not the same thing. A sentence can have more than one claim, so you have to be careful to separate them out. For example, in the previous sentence, there are two claims: “A sentence can have more than one claim,” and “you have to be careful to separate them out.” Note that the first is non-evaluative and the second evaluative. Since there are different standards for assessing evaluative and non-evaluative claims, it’s important to separate them.
• In general, if a sentence involves a conjunction (“and” or “but”), or it is broken up by one of the indicator words below, then it has multiple claims you can separate when you are trying to figure out what the premises are and what the conclusion is.
• On the other hand, some complex sentences cannot be broken up. If a sentence has two claims joined by “or,” or if it has two linked by “if…then…”, then it should be kept as a single (but complex) claim. For example, look at the previous sentence. It has three claims in it: (1)  “a sentence has two claims joined by ‘or'”; (2) “it has two linked by ‘if…then…'”; and (3), “it should be kept as a single (but complex) claim.” But the sentence as a whole is an “if…then…” sentence, and within the part that goes with “if” are the first two claims, joined by “or.” That’s pretty complex! If you split it up into the separate claims, you would lose its meaning.
• For most of your work, I’m going to keep the examples much simpler, as I want you to learn the main ideas about argument structure. We’ll do a little bit in the next Module with complex claims.

As noted above, there are certain indicator words that are often used to signal parts of an argument. Here are some of the most common ones:

Indicator Words for  Conclusions

therefore                      thus                                 so

consequently                it follows that               hence

Indicator Words for Premises

          because                        since                            assuming that

          for                               given that                     the reason being

Let’s take our above examples and find their structure. As a first step, we identify the conclusions. These are underlined, and indicator words are in bold.

Example Arguments with Conclusions Underlined

• It’s raining today, therefore it’s going to rain tomorrow .
• 2 is greater than 1. 3 is greater than 2. Thus, 3 is greater than 1
• All cats are cuddly. Twilight is cuddly , for Twilight is a cat.
• People who take anti-depressants recover from depression at about the same rate as those who increase the amount of exercise they engage in. Exercise is less expensive than medication. So, you should exercise more , since you want to save money and you want to feel less depressed.
• Raising taxes on the wealthy is the only way we will be able to increase funds for education. We need more funds for education. Therefore, we ought to raise taxes on the wealthy .
• It’s probably up to ordinary people and non-governmental organizations to act to slow climate change . For something must be done about it, and governments and corporations are failing to do anything.
• Shockey robbed the bank , for his fingerprints are on the vault door, and the security camera clearly shows him in the building.

Once you have identified premises and conclusion, the next thing to do is to  outline the argument.  This means rewriting it so that the conclusion is at the bottom and the premises are numbered and listed separately above it.

Here are what the above arguments look like when outlined. Note that each premise as well as the conclusion is a distinct claim. Also note that indicator words have been omitted from those claims.

Example Arguments Outlined

1) It’s raining today.

Conclusion:  it’s going to rain tomorrow.

1) 2 is greater than 1.

2) 3 is greater than 2.

Conclusion: 3 is greater than 1

1) All cats are cuddly.

2) Twilight is a cat.

Conclusion:   Twilight is cuddly

1) People who take anti-depressants recover from depression at about the same rate as those who increase the amount of exercise they engage in.

2) Exercise is less expensive than medication.

3) You want to save money and you want to feel less depressed.

Conclusion:   You should exercise more.

1) Raising taxes on the wealthy is the only way we will be able to increase funds for education.

2) We need more funds for education.

Conclusion: We ought to raise taxes on the wealthy.

1) Something must be done about [climate change].

2) Governments and corporations are failing to do anything.

Conclusion: It’s probably up to ordinary people and non-governmental organizations to act to slow climate change.

1) Shockey’s fingerprints are on the bank vault door.

2)The security camera clearly shows Shockey in the bank building.

Conclusion:   Shockey robbed the bank.

For each of these arguments, you are then in a position to identify any  hidden/implicit premises. A later chapter will talk about that. And once you’ve done that, you can evaluate it whether the argument is successful (valid and sound ).

2. Arguments and Explanations

Claims are the building blocks of arguments, but not everything built out of claims is an argument. Another important thing we do with claims is offer explanations . Explanations are easy to confuse with arguments, so we need to spend a little time thinking about what they are and how they are different.

• An explanation is a series of claims that explains why or how something is the case. By contrast, an argument establishes that something is the case.

Here are some simple examples of explanations, with what is being explained — the “explanandum” — underlined. That which does the explaining is called the  explanans .

(“Explanandum” and “explanans” are Latin words. The fact that we still use Latin terms here  — and elsewhere, as you’ll see — has to do with the fact that the study of logic and reasoning goes back to ancient times, and Latin was the shared standard language of European scholars well into the modern era.  Only in the 20th century did this really change, and by then terminology such as this had been adopted into English. The same is true of the law, which retains a huge number of Latin terms.)

Examples of Explanations

• I ran into a tree , for I was driving too fast, the roads were slippery, and I had to swerve to hit a deer.
• Because they wanted to bring public attention to the injustice of the laws that enforced segregation, the protestors marched in the streets .
• Shockey robbed the bank , for he wanted money to buy a new house.
• They wanted to see if the new vaccine would work , so they tested it on a control group of human subjects.

On the face of it, these look a lot like arguments, including using some of the same indicator words. And, for one of them, the explanandum  is actually the same claim that figures as a conclusion  in one of the example arguments.

Let’s put these two side by side, so that you can see the difference.

Argument for a Claim vs. Explanation of a Claim

In the first, the argument, the task is to establish  that  Shockey robbed the bank. (I didn’t! I swear I’m innocent!) Evidence to support the truth of that claim is offered by the premises.

In the second, the explanation, by contrast, it is assumed that Shockey did in fact rob the bank. In other words, the work of argument has already been done. This is then taking the further step of explaining why  he did the thing the argument proves he did (robbed the bank).

Once you know what you’re dealing with, argument or explanation, you will need to ask different questions.

For an argument, the question will be: do the premises give good reason for thinking the conclusion is true?

For an explanation, the question will be whether the  explanans  is adequate, whether there are better alternatives, etc.

What counts as a good explanation will depend entirely on the specifics of the topic involved. As you take other classes, particularly in the natural and social sciences, you are learning how explanation works in those areas.

This is connected to something you should all be on the lookout for in your own writing, as you work to construct arguments. This is the tendency to substitute explanations for how to implement a course of action or policy for reasons for why to do so. You’ll later be asked to come up with your own argument for a particular policy, expressed in an evaluative claim. Suppose the claim you want to argue for is this:

• Doctors should treat their patients with respect.

An argument for this claim should say why doctors should treat their patients with respect. Very often when I give this sort of assignment, however, instead of premises that show why respect is important, I will see claims such as: “Doctors should see their patients in a timely manner,” “they should answer all questions patients have,” and “they should make sure their support staff is friendly and welcoming.”

All of these claims explain how  to show respect to patients. They don’t say why respect is important in the first place. They assume it is.

So, be careful: don’t substitute an explanation when an argument is needed!

Phil-P102 Critical Thinking and Applied Ethics Copyright © 2020 by R. Matthew Shockey is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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Structure of Arguments | Logical Reasoning | UGC NET Paper 1

Arguments: An argument is a set of statements, one of which, the conclusion is taken to be supported by the remaining statements, the premises .

For example; Premises: All men are mortal Socrates is a man Conclusion: Socrates is mortal

What is Argument?

In the above example, there are three statements, 1) All men are mortal, 2) Socrates is a man, and 3) Socrates is mortal. The premises of the Argument is the first two statement, and the last statement is a Conclusion. The statements of premises support the statement of conclusion. This type of arrangement is called an Argument.

Forms of Arguments

There are three types of Arguments:

1. Deductive Arguments 2. Inductive arguments, and 3. Abductive arguments

1. Deductive Argument

An argument where the conclusion follows validly from the premises. In other words, an argument where the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion.

Example: Premises: All men are mortal Socrates is a man Conclusion Socrates is mortal

In the above example, the premises, all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, give a guarantee the truth of the conclusion; Socrates is mortal. The conclusion follows the validity according to the premises.

2. Inductive Argument

An argument where the premises point several cases of some pattern and the conclusion states that this pattern will hold in general.

An inductive argument will not be deductively valid, because even if a pattern is found many times, that does not guarantee it will always be found. Therefore, an inductive argument provides weaker, less trustworthy support for the conclusion than a deductive argument does.

For Example: Premises: We have seen 1000 swans, and All of them have been white Conclusion: All swans are white.

In the above example, we have seen just 1000 swans (not all in the world), and all of them have been white. But it does not mean that all swans in the world are white. White swans are a case of a pattern in those particular circumstances. Hence, we have concluded in general that all swans are white. But it might not be true actually. This type of arrangement of premises and conclusion is an example of an Inductive argument.

3. Abductive (or Hypothetico-Deductive) Argument

An argument that (i) points out a particular fact, (ii) points out that if a particular hypothesis were true, we would get this fact, and so (iii) concludes that the hypothesis is indeed true.

Abductive arguments seem to make an even bigger jump than inductive arguments. Inductive arguments generalize, while abductive arguments say that successful predictions “prove” theory is true. Abductive arguments are not deductively valid because false theories can make true predictions. So, true predictions do not guarantee that the theory is true.

Example: Premises: These coins conduct electricity (fact) If these coins are made of gold (hypothesis), then they would conduct electricity (prediction). Conclusion: These coins are made of gold.

Structure of Categorical propositions

A proposition is simply a claim about the world that has truth value. Every proposition can be expressed as a declarative (i.e., not a question or command) sentence.

Categorical Proposition is any statement which relates two classes or categories of entities. In other words, a categorical proposition is a proposition that relates two classes of objects. A class is a group of objects.

Example: Cats are mammals

Here, a class or category (Cats) are related to another class or category (Mammals). So, “Cats are mammals” is a Categorical proposition.

Components of Categorical Propositions

For a any categorical proposition, there are four components:

• Subject Term: First category or class
• Predicate Term: Second category or class
• Copula: The grammatical link (verb) between subject and predicate terms.
• Quantifiers: Words that specify the quantity of the subject and predicate terms.

Two Important terms of Categorical Proposition

• Affirmative: ‘All’ (includes all of a class)
• Negative: ‘No’ (excludes all of a class)

Particular: ‘Some’ (includes part of a class)

Example: All cats are mammals

Here, All – Quantifier Cats – Subject Term Are – Copula Mammals – Predicate term

Properties of Categorical Propositions

Each categorical proposition has both quantity and quality properties. The followings are the properties:

Quantity: The quantity of a categorical proposition is determined by the quantifier used. Quality: The quality of a categorical proposition is determined according to whether the proposition asserts of denies an overlap between the classes. Affirmative: if a proposition asserts an overlap between the classes or category named, the quality of the proposition is affirmative. Negative: In this, a proposition denies an overlap between the categories or classes named, Distribution: If the proposition refers to the entire class named by a term, that term is distributed and if it does not refer to the entire class named by a term, then the term is undistributed.

Types of Categorical Proposition

There are four types of categorical position:

• All politicians are liars ( Universal Affirmative) – A
• No politicians are liars. ( Universal Negative) – E
• Some politicians are liars. ( Particular affirmative) – I
• Some politicians are not liars. ( Particular negative) – O

Universal Affirmative (A- Propositions): In a proposition, if every member of the subject class is also a member of the predicate class, then it is called Universal Affirmative Proposition . In other words, whole of one class is included or contained in another class.

In an example “ All politicians are liars ” , every member of the class of politicians, is a member of another class of liars.

An universal affirmative proposition can be written as: All S is P

S and P represent the subject and predicate terms, respectively. Such a proposition affirms that the relation of class inclusion holds between the two classes and says that the inclusion is complete, or universal.

Universal Negative (E- Proposition): The proposition in which no members of the subject class are members of the predicate class.

In an example “ No politicians are liars”, no member of the class of politicians, is a member of another class of liars.

Systematically, Universal Negative proposition can be represented as: No S is P

Such a proposition affirms that the no relation of class inclusion holds between the two classes and says that the exclusion is complete, or universal.

Particular affirmative (I-proposition): The proposition in which at least one members of the subject class is also a member of the predicate class.

In an example “Some politicians are liars”, some member of the class of politicians, is a member of another class of liars.

Systematically, Particular affirmative proposition can be represented as: Some S is P

Particular negative ( O-proposition): The proposition in which at least one members of the subject class is not a member of the predicate class.

In an example “Some politicians are not liars”, some member of the class of politicians, is a member of another class of liars.

Systematically, Particular affirmative proposition can be represented as: Some S is not P.

A brief of Four Kind of Categorical Proposition

Classical Square of Opposition

The opposition is an immediate inference grounded on the relation between propositions which have the same terms, but differ in quantity or quality (or both).

For any formal opposition between two propositions, it is essential that their terms should be the same. There can be no opposition between two such propositions as these:

• All angels have
• No cows are

The square of opposition shows us the logical inferences ( immediate inferences) we can make from one proposition type ( A , I , E , and O ) to another.

Contradictory : Two propositions are said to be contradictory if both cannot be true, and both cannot be false at the same time. In other words, if the opposition is between two propositions, which differ both in quantity and quality.

Here, A – All politicians are liars and O – Some politicians are not liars, and similarly, E and I propositions are contradictory.

Contrary: Universal propositions are said to be contrary because they cannot both be simultaneously true. In other words, the opposition is between two universals which differ in quality. A- All politicians are liars is true, the E- No politicians are liars must be false.

Similarly, if the E- proposition is true, then the A- proposition is false.

Sub-contrary: If the two particular propositions can both be true but cannot both be false. In other words, the opposition is between two particulars which differ in quality. It means that they cannot both be simultaneously false. Sub alternation: The universal to particular and particular to universal inferences are called subalternation. In other words, the opposition is between two propositions which differ only in quantity.

These inferences are valid if the subaltern ( A or E ) is true, then the subaltern ( I or O ) is true. If the subaltern is false, then the subaltern is false.

Categorical Syllogism

A syllogism is an argument containing two premises and a conclusion.

Categorical syllogism: A categorical syllogism is a syllogism whose premises and conclusion are categorical propositions. For example: Premises:

• All hats are fashionable clothing.
• All fashionable clothing is purple.

Conclusion:

• So, some hats are purple.

A Standard Form Categorical Syllogism Contains:

• Two premises and a conclusion, each a standard form categorical proposition.
• Major Term: A major term which appears only in the first premise and the predicate of the conclusion.
• Minor Term: A minor term which appears only in the second premise and the subject of the conclusion
• Middle Term: A middle term which appears in both premises but not in the conclusion.
• Major Premises: The major premise is the premise which contains the major term.
• Minor Premise: The minor premise is the premise which contains the minor term.

Mood and Figure of Syllogism

The categorical syllogisms can be categorise as:

• The kind of standard form categorical proposition which appears as its first (i.e., major) premise,
• The kind of standard form categorical proposition which appears as its second (i.e., minor) premise, and
• The kind of standard form categorical propositions which appears as its conclusion.

When the major premise, the minor premise, and the conclusion of a categorical syllogism arranage in a series of three letters (A, E, I, or O) corresponding to the type of categorical proposition is called MOOD of an argument.

Example: Premises: All P are M All S are M Conclusion: Some S are P

The first premise is of the form A The second premise is of the form A The conclusion is of the form I .

Thus, the mood of this Argument is AAI.

In another example, to figure out the FORM of the premises and the conclusion in the following example:

Premises: No S are P (E-propostion) Some S are P (I-Proposition) Conclusion: Some S are not P (O-Proposition)

Thus, the mood of this Argument is “EIO”.

When you have to determine the mood of a categorical syllogism, you need to find out which of the four forms of categorical proposition each line of the Argument is (A, E, I, or O).

The figure of a categorical syllogism is a number which corresponds to the placement of the two middle terms.

For example , consider the following arguments:

P 1. All mammals are creatures that have hair. P 2. All dogs are mammals. P 3. Therefore, all dogs are creatures that have hair.

Notice that the middle term in the major premise is on the LEFT, while the middle term in the minor premise is on the RIGHT. Whenever this happens, we say that the argument has figure “1.”

There are four possible figures in the categorical syllogism:

Figure1: When the middle term is on the left in P 1, and on the right in P 2. Figure2: When the middle term is on the right in both premises. Figure3: When the middle term is on the left in both premises. Figure4: When the middle term is on the right in P 1, and on the left in P 2.

Important Points of Mood and Figures:

• There are 64 different moods
• And each mood has 4 different figures.
• Thus, there are 64*4= 256 different kinds of standard form categorical syllogisms.

Valid Argument Forms

There are two kinds of valid argument forms:

Unconditionally Valid Forms: There are fifteen combinations of mood and figures that are valid from the Boolean standpoint, and we call these “unconditionally valid”argument forms. The chart below depicts ALL of 15 the unconditionally valid argument forms.

Conditionally Valid Forms: There are some inferences that are NOT valid from the Boolean standpoint, which is valid from the Aristotelian standpoint. In addition to the fifteen unconditionally valid argument forms, there are nine conditionally valid argument forms for categorical syllogisms:

Rules For Validity

A standard form categorical syllogism is valid on the modern theory if and only if each of the following five propositions is all true of it. A standard form categorical syllogism is valid on the traditional theory if and only if each of the first four propositions is true of it.

• The middle-term is distributed at least once.
• If a term is distributed in a conclusion, then that term is distributed in one of the premises.
• There is at least one affirmative premise.
• There is a negative premise if and only if there is a negative conclusion.
• If both premises are universal, then the conclusion is universal.

Informal and Formal Fallacy

Simply, a fallacy is a mistake in reasoning. In other words, a defect in an argument that misleads the mind is called a fallacy. There are two types of fallacy:

Formal Fallacies: A fallacy in which there is the involvement of an error in the form, arrangement, or technical structure of an argument is called Formal Fallacy.

Informal Fallacies: Informal fallacies are a matter of unclear expression that deal with the logic of the meaning of language. Opposite to it, formal fallacies deal with the logic of the technical structure.

An informal fallacy involves such things as:

• the misuse of language such as words or grammar,
• misstatements of fact or opinion,
• misconceptions due to underlying presuppositions, or
• just plain illogical sequences of thought.

Uses of Language in Logic

A logic always deals with the analysis and evaluation of arguments. Since arguments are expressed in language, the study of arguments requires a carefully attention to language in which arguments are expressed.

The followings are three important uses of language:

• Informative,
• Expressive and
• Direc­tive uses of language.

Informative use of language: It involves an effort to communicate some content or to describe something or to give information about something. When I say a child, “The Second of October is the Gandhi Jayanti.” The language I used is informative.

This kind of use of language presumes that the content of what is being communicated is true, so it will be our main focus in the study of logic.

When a sentence is used informatively, it reports that something has some feature or that something lacks some feature. Consider the following two sentences:

• Parrot has a feather.
• Parrot is not mammals.

The first proposition reports that having feather is a feature of a Parrot. The second proposition reports that Parrot do not have some essential qualities found in mammals. In, both cases it provides information about the world. Two main aspects of this function are generally noted: (1) evoking certain feelings and (2) expressing feelings. Expressive discourse, qua expressive discourse, is best regarded as neither true or false.

Expressive use of Language: This type of l anguage is often used to express our emotions, feelings, or attitudes. For example: It’s too bad!, It’s wonderful!, etc.

When language is used expressively or emotively, it cannot be characterized as true or false.

Direc­tive uses of language: When the use of language is often to give direction as Commands, requests, instructions, questions etc., to do or not to do something.

Consider the following examples:

• Finish your homework.
• Wash your clothes.
• Are you feeling well?

In all the above examples, the direc­tive use of language. Directive use of language is not normally considered true or false (although various logics of commands have been developed).

Connotations and denotations of terms

Denotation is t he dictionary definition or literal meaning of a word only. Not emotions or feelings are associated with the word.

Ex: The teacher walked into the classroom. This example does not have any hidden meaning. A teacher simply walked into a classroom.

Connotation: A word’s emotional meaning; suggestions and associations that are connected to a word. Words can be positive, negative, or neutral. Words can also connote specific feelings or emotions.

Different types of Definition

Lexical: The purpose of a lexical definition is to report the way a word is standardly used in a language. Most definitions found in a dictionary are lexical definitions.

Ex. Fossil, Cat, Dogs etc.

Persuasive : The purpose of a persuasive definition is to influence people’s attitudes, not to neutrally and objectively capture the standard meaning of a word. Eg. Teenagers, Abortion etc.

Stipulative: A stipulative definition stipulates (assigns) a meaning to a word by coining a new word or giving an old word a new meaning. A stipulative definition is neither true nor false; it is neither accurate nor inaccurate. Eg. Sugarnecker, Black Holes, etc.

Theoretical: Theoretical definitions can explain concepts theoretically. Sometimes definitions are given for terms, not because the word itself is unfamiliar, but because the term is not understood. Such concepts require theoretical definitions, which are often scientific or philosophical in nature.

For example, when your chemistry teacher defines water by its chemical formula H2O, he is not trying to increase your vocabulary (you already knew the term water), but to explain its atomic structure.

Accepting a theoretical definition is like accepting a theory about the term being defined. If you define spirit as “the life-giving principle of physical organisms,” you are inviting others to accept the idea that life is some how a spiritual product.

Precising: A precising definition takes a word that is normally vague and gives it a clear precisely defined meaning. Eg. Lite, Low-income, middle aged, etc.

Related Topics: UGC NET Syllabus (Updated): Paper 1 and 2 Solved Question Papers of UGC NET Paper 1 UGC NET Study Materials for Paper 1 (Download PDF) Official Website for UGC NET

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1.4: More Complex Argument Structures

• Last updated
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• Page ID 205008

• Matthew Van Cleave
• Lansing Community College

So far we have seen that an argument consists of a premise (typically more than one) and a conclusion. However, very often arguments and explanations have a more complex structure than just a few premises that directly support the conclusion. For example, consider the following argument:

No one living in Pompeii could have survived the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius. The reason is simple: the lava was flowing too fast and there was nowhere to go to escape it in time. Therefore, this account of the eruption, which claims to have been written by an eyewitness living in Pompeii, was not actually written by an eyewitness.

The main conclusion of this argument—the statement that depends on other statements as evidence but doesn’t itself provide any evidence for any other statement—is:

A. This account of the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius was not actually written by an eyewitness.

However, the argument’s structure is more complex than simply having a couple of premises that provide evidence directly for the conclusion. Rather, some statement provides evidence directly for the main conclusion, but that statement itself is supported by another statement. To determine the structure of an argument, we must determine which statements support which. We can use our premise and conclusion indicators to help with this. For example, the passage contains the phrase, “the reason is...” which is a premise indicator, and it also contains the conclusion indicator, “therefore.” That conclusion indicator helps us to identify the main conclusion, but the more important thing to see is that statement A does not itself provide evidence or support for any of the other statements in the argument, which is the clearest reason why statement A is the main conclusion of the argument. The next question we must answer is: which statement most directly supports A? What most directly supports A is:

B. No one living in Pompeii could have survived the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius.

However, there is also a reason offered in support of B. That reason is that:

C. The lava from Mt. Vesuvius was flowing too fast and there was nowhere for someone living in Pompeii to go in order to escape it in time.

So the main conclusion (A) is directly supported by B, and B is supported by C. Since B acts as a premise for the main conclusion but is also itself the conclusion of further premises, we refer to B as an intermediate conclusion. The important thing to recognize here is that one and the same statement can act as both a premise and a conclusion. Statement B is a premise that supports the main conclusion (A), but it is also itself a conclusion that follows from C. Here is how we would put this complex argument into standard form (using numbers this time, as we always do when putting an argument into standard form):

1. The lava from Mt. Vesuvius was flowing too fast and there was nowhere for someone living in Pompeii to go in order to escape it in time. 2. Therefore, no one living in Pompeii could have survived the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius. (from 1) 3. Therefore, this account of the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius was not actually written by an eyewitness. (from 2)

Notice that at the end of statement 2 I have written in parentheses “from 1” (and likewise at the end of statement 3 I have written “from 2”). This is a shorthand way of saying: “this statement follows from statement 1.” We will use this convention as a way of keeping track of the structure of the argument. It may also help to think about the structure of an argument spatially, as figure 1 shows:

The main argument here (from 2 to 3) contains a subargument, in this case the argument from 1 to 2. A subargument , as the term suggests, is a part of an argument that provides indirect support for the main argument. The main argument is simply the argument whose conclusion is the main conclusion.

Another type of structure that arguments can have is when two or more premises provide direct but independent support for the conclusion. Here is an example of an argument with that structure: I know that Wanda rode her bike to work today because when she arrived at work she had her right pant leg rolled up (which cyclists do in order to keep their pants legs from getting caught in the chain). Moreover, our coworker, Bob, who works in accounting, saw her riding towards work at 7:45 am.

The conclusion of this argument is “Wanda rode her bike to work today” and there are two premises that provide independent support for it: the fact that Wanda had her pant leg cuffed and the fact that Bob saw her riding her bike. Here is the argument in standard form:

• Wanda arrived at work with her right pant leg rolled up.
• Cyclists often roll up their right pant leg.
• Bob saw Wanda riding her bike towards work at 7:45.
• Therefore, Wanda rode her bike to work today. (from 1-2, 3 independently)

Again, notice that next to statement 4 of the argument I have written the premises from which that conclusion follows. In this case, in order to avoid any ambiguity, I have noted that the support for the conclusion comes independently from statements 1 and 2, on the one hand, and from statement 3, on the other hand. It is important to point out that an argument or subargument can be supported by one or more premises. We see this in the present argument since the conclusion (4) is supported jointly by 1 and 2, and singly by 3. As before, we can represent the structure of this argument spatially, as figure 2 shows:

There are endless different argument structures that can be generated from these few simple patterns. At this point, it is important to understand that arguments can have these different structures and that some arguments will be longer and more complex than others. Determining the structure of very complex arguments is a skill that takes some time to master. Even so, it may help to remember that any argument structure ultimately traces back to some combination of these.

Write the following arguments in standard form and show how the argument is structured using a diagram like the ones I have used in this section.

• There is nothing wrong with prostitution because there is nothing wrong with consensual sexual and economic interactions between adults. Moreover, since there’s no difference between a man who goes on a blind date with a woman, buys her dinner and then has sex with her and a man who simply pays a woman for sex, that is another reason for why there is nothing wrong with prostitution.
• Prostitution is wrong because it involves women who have typically been sexually abused as children. We know that most of these women have been abused from multiple surveys done with women who have worked in prostitution and that show a high percentage of self-reported sexual abuse as children.
• There was someone in this cabin recently because there was warm water in the tea kettle and because there was wood still smoldering in the fireplace. But the person couldn’t have been Tim because Tim has been with me the whole time. Therefore, there must be someone else in these woods.
• It is possible to be blind and yet run in the Olympic Games since Marla Runyan did it at the 2000 Sydney Olympics.
• The train was late because it had to take a longer, alternate route since the bridge was out.
• Israel is not safe if Iran gets nuclear missiles since Iran has threatened multiple times to destroy Israel and if Iran had nuclear missiles it would be able to carry out this threat. Moreover, since Iran has been developing enriched uranium, they have the key component needed for nuclear weapons—every other part of the process of building a nuclear weapon is simple compared to that. Therefore, Israel is not safe.
• Since all professional hockey players are missing front teeth and Martin is a professional hockey player, it follows that Martin is missing front teeth. And since almost all professional athletes who are missing their front teeth have false teeth, it follows that Martin probably has false teeth.
• Anyone who eats the crab rangoon at China Food restaurant will probably have stomach troubles afterward. It has happened to me every time, which is why it will probably happen to other people as well. Since Bob ate the crab rangoon at China Food restaurant, he will probably have stomach troubles afterward.
• Albert and Caroline like to go for runs in the afternoon in Hyde Park. Since Albert never runs alone, we know that any time Albert is running, Caroline is running too. But since Albert looks like he has just run (since he is panting hard), it follows that Caroline must have ran too.
• Just because Jeremy’s prints were on the gun that killed Tim and the gun was registered to Jeremy, it doesn’t follow that Jeremy killed Tim since Jeremy’s prints would certainly be on his own gun and someone else could have stolen Jeremy’s gun and used it to kill Tim.