assignment by operation law

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Anti-Assignment Provisions and Assignments by ‘Operation of Law’: What Do I Have to Do? What Should I Do?

Introduction.

One of the key roles of legal due diligence in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is to assist in the efficient and successful completion of any proposed M&A transaction. Due diligence is not merely a procedural formality but can serve as a proactive shield against unforeseen challenges and risks. One essential aspect of the legal due diligence process is reviewing third-party contracts to which the target entity is party, in order to better understand the scope of its commercial relationships and to anticipate any issues that may arise via the underlying contractual relationships as a result of completing the proposed M&A transaction.

A frequent reality in many M&A transactions is the requirement to obtain consents from third parties upon the “change of control” of the target entity and/or the transfer or assignment of a third-party contract to which the target is party. Notwithstanding the wording of such contracts, in many instances, the business team from the purchaser will often ask the question: “When is consent actually required?” While anti-assignment and change of control provisions are fairly ubiquitous in commercial contracts, the same cannot be said for when the requirement to obtain consent is actually triggered. The specifics of the proposed transaction’s structure will often dictate the purchaser’s next steps when deciding whether the sometimes-cumbersome process of obtaining consents with one or multiple third parties is actually needed.

This article examines what anti-assignment provisions are and how to approach them, depending on the situation at hand, including in the context of transactions where a change of control event may be triggered. This article also discusses how to interpret whether consent is required when faced with an anti-assignment provision which states that an assignment, including an assignment by operation of law , requires consent from the non-assigning party.

Understanding Anti-Assignment Provisions

Generally, an anti-assignment provision prohibits the transfer or assignment of some or all of the assigning party’s rights and obligations under the contract in question to another person without the non-assigning party’s prior written consent. By way of example, a standard anti-assignment provision in a contract may read as follows:

Company ABC shall not assign or transfer this agreement, in whole or in part, without the prior written consent of Company XYZ.

In this case, Company ABC requires Company XYZ’s prior written consent to assign the contract. Seems simple enough. However, not all anti-assignment provisions are cut from the same cloth. For example, some anti-assignment provisions expand on the prohibition against general contractual assignment by including a prohibition against assignment by operation of law or otherwise . As is discussed in greater detail below, the nuanced meaning of this phrase can capture transactions that typically would not trigger a general anti-assignment provision and can also trigger the requirement to get consent from the non-assigning party for practical business reasons.

To explore this further, it is helpful to consider anti-assignment provisions in the two main structures of M&A transactions: (i) asset purchases and (ii) share purchases.

Context of M&A Transactions: Asset Purchases and Share Purchases

There are key differences between what triggers an anti-assignment provision in an asset purchase transaction versus a share purchase transaction.

i) Asset Purchases

An anti-assignment provision in a contract that forms part of the “purchased assets” in an asset deal will normally be triggered in an asset purchase transaction pursuant to which the purchaser acquires some or all of the assets of the target entity, including some or all of its contracts. Because the target entity is no longer the contracting party once the transaction ultimately closes (since it is assigning its rights and obligations under the contract to the purchaser), consent from the non-assigning party will be required to avoid any potential liability, recourse or termination of said contract as a result of the completion of the transaction.

ii) Share Purchases

Provisions which prohibit the assignment or transfer of a contract without the prior approval of the non-assigning party will not normally, under Canadian law, be captured in a share purchase transaction pursuant to which the purchaser acquires a portion or all of the shares of the target entity. In other words, no new entity is becoming party to that same contract. General anti-assignment provisions are not typically triggered by a share purchase because the contracts are not assigned or transferred to another entity and instead there is usually a “change of control” of the target entity. In such cases, the target entity remains the contracting party under the contract and the consent analysis will be premised on whether the contract requires consent of the third party for a “direct” or “indirect” change of control of the target entity and not the assignment of the contract.

Importantly, some anti-assignment provisions include prohibitions against change of control without prior written consent. For example, the provision might state the following:

Company ABC shall not assign or transfer this agreement, in whole or in part, without the prior written approval of Company XYZ. For the purposes of this agreement, any change of control of Company ABC resulting from an amalgamation, corporate reorganization, arrangement, business sale or asset shall be deemed an assignment or transfer.

In that case, a change of control as a result of a share purchase will be deemed an assignment or transfer, and prior written consent will be required.

A step in many share purchase transactions where the target is a Canadian corporation that often occurs on or soon after closing is the amalgamation of the purchasing entity and the target entity. So, what about anti-assignment provisions containing by operation of law language – do amalgamations trigger an assignment by operation of law? The short answer: It depends on the jurisdiction in which the anti-assignment provision is being scrutinized (typically, the governing law of the contract in question).

Assignments by Operation of Law

In Canada, the assignment of a contract as part of an asset sale, or the change of control of a party to a contract pursuant to a share sale – situations not normally effected via legal statute or court-ordered proceeding in M&A transactions – will not in and of itself effect an assignment of that contract by operation of law . [1]

Still, one must consider the implications of amalgamations, especially in the context of a proposed transaction when interpreting whether consent is required when an anti-assignment provision contains by operation of law language. Under Canadian law, where nuances often blur the lines within the jurisprudence, an amalgamation will not normally effect the assignment of a contract by operation of law . The same does not necessarily hold true for a Canadian amalgamation scrutinized under U.S. legal doctrines or interpreted by U.S. courts. [2]

Difference Between Mergers and Amalgamations

As noted above, after the closing of a share purchase transaction, the purchasing entity will often amalgamate with the target entity ( click here to read more about amalgamations generally). When two companies “merge” in the U.S., we understand that one corporation survives the merger and one ceases to exist which is why, under U.S. law, a merger can result in an assignment by operation of law . While the “merger” concept is commonly used in the U.S., Canadian corporations combine through a process called “amalgamation,” a situation where two corporations amalgamate and combine with neither corporation ceasing to exist. For all of our Canadian lawyer readers, you will remember the Supreme Court of Canada’s description of an amalgamation as “a river formed by the confluence of two streams, or the creation of a single rope through the intertwining of strands.” [3] Generally, each entity survives and shares the pre-existing rights and liabilities of the other, including contractual relationships, as one corporation. [4]

MTA Canada Royalty Corp. v. Compania Minera Pangea, S.A. de C.V.

As a practical note and for the reasons below, particularly in cross-border M&A transactions, it would be wise to consider seeking consent where a contract prohibits assignment by operation of law without the prior consent of the other contracting party when your proposed transaction contemplates an amalgamation.

In MTA Canada Royalty Corp. v. Compania Minera Pangea, S.A. de C.V. (a Superior Court of Delaware decision), the court interpreted a Canadian (British Columbia) amalgamation as an assignment by operation of law , irrespective of the fact that the amalgamation was effected via Canadian governing legislation. In essence, the Delaware court applied U.S. merger jurisprudence to a contract involving a Canadian amalgamation because the contract in question was governed by Delaware law. This is despite the fact that, generally, an amalgamation effected under Canadian common law jurisdictions would not constitute an assignment by operation of law if considered by a Canadian court. As previously mentioned, under Canadian law, unlike in Delaware, neither of the amalgamating entities cease to exist and, technically, there is no “surviving” entity as there would be with a U.S.-style merger. That being said, we bring this to your attention to show that it is possible that a U.S. court (if the applicable third-party contract is governed by U.S. law or other foreign laws) or other U.S. counterparties could interpret a Canadian amalgamation to effect an assignment by operation of law . In this case, as prior consent was not obtained as required by the anti-assignment provision of the contract in question, the Delaware court held that the parties to that agreement were bound by the anti-assignment provision’s express prohibition against all assignments without the other side’s consent. [5]

To avoid the same circumstances that resulted from the decision in MTA Canada Royalty Corp. , seeking consent where an anti-assignment provision includes a prohibition against assignment by operation of law without prior consent can be a practical and strategic option when considering transactions involving amalgamations. It is generally further recommended to do so in order to avoid any confusion for all contracting parties post-closing.

Practical Considerations

The consequences of violating anti-assignment provisions can vary. In some cases, the party attempting to complete the assignment is simply required to continue its obligations under the contract but, in others, assignment without prior consent constitutes default under the contract resulting in significant liability for the defaulting party, including potential termination of the contract. This is especially noteworthy for contracts with third parties that are essential to the target entity’s revenue and general business functions, as the purchaser would run the risk of losing key contractual relationships that contributed to the success of the target business. As such, identifying assignment provisions and considering whether they are triggered by a change of control and require consent is an important element when reviewing the contracts of a target entity and completing legal due diligence as part of an M&A transaction.

There can be a strategic and/or legal imperative to seek consent in many situations when confronted with contractual clauses that prohibit an assignment, either by operation of law or through other means, absent the explicit approval of the non-assigning party. However, the structure of the proposed transaction will often dictate whether consent is even required in the first place. Without considering this nuanced area of M&A transactions, purchasers not only potentially expose themselves to liability but also risk losing key contractual relationships that significantly drive the value of the transaction.

The  Capital Markets Group  at Aird & Berlis will continue to monitor developments in cross-border and domestic Canadian M&A transactions, including developments related to anti-assignment provisions and commercial contracts generally. Please contact a member of the group if you have questions or require assistance with any matter related to anti-assignment provisions and commercial contracts generally, or any of your cross-border or domestic M&A needs.

[1] An assignment by operation of law can be interpreted as an involuntary assignment required by legal statute or certain court-ordered proceedings. For instance, an assignment of a contract by operation of law may occur in, among other situations: (i) testamentary dispositions; (ii) court-ordered asset transfers in bankruptcy proceedings; or (iii) court-ordered asset transfers in divorce proceedings.

[2] MTA Canada Royalty Corp. v. Compania Minera Pangea, S.A. de C.V ., C. A. No. N19C-11-228 AML, 2020 WL 5554161 (Del. Super. Sept. 16, 2020) [ MTA Canada Royalty Corp. ].

[3] R. v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co. , [1975] 1 S.C.R. 411.

[4] Certain Canadian jurisdictions, such as the Business Corporations Act (British Columbia), explicitly state that an amalgamation does not constitute an assignment by operation of law (subsection 282(2)).

[5] MTA Canada Royalty Corp .

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Do Change of Control Transactions Constitute an Assignment by Operation of Law?

Commercial landlords often rely on anti-assignment provisions to restrict the ability of tenants to assign their interest in a lease to a third party. Such provisions often restrict assignments by “operation of law,” which are generally considered involuntary assignments mandated via a court order. Commercial landlords may assume that a change of control transaction violates a basic anti–assignment clause. Landlords wishing to restrict change of control of a tenant entity, however, should have clear anti-assignment provisions in their leases that expressly restrict such transactions and characterize such “changes of control” as assignments.  

A change of control is a significant change in the equity, ownership, or management of a business entity. This can occur through a merger, consolidation or acquisition.  

The general rule is that change of control of a corporate entity is not an assignment by operation of law, and therefore does not violate a basic anti-assignment provision. Courts have reasoned that a landlord entering into a lease with a corporate tenant should be aware that a corporation, or limited liability company, is an entity which exists separate and apart from its ownership, and that a change in ownership of the corporate entity does not change the tenant entity under the lease.  

Courts in many states including Florida, New York and Delaware have held that a change of control is not an assignment by operation of law. In  Sears Termite & Pest Control, Inc. v. Arnold , a Florida court held, “[t]he fact that there is a change in the ownership of corporate stock does not affect the corporation’s existence or its contract rights, or liabilities.” Further, in  Meso Scale Diagnostics LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GMBH , a Delaware court ruled, “[g]enerally mergers do not result in an assignment by operation of law of assets that began as property of the surviving entity and continued to be such after the merger.” 

Importantly, the rule is different if the tenant entity does not survive the transaction. In  MTA Canada Royalty Corp. v.  Compania  Minera Pangea , a Delaware Superior Court held that a merger in which the contracting entity does not survive may be held to be an assignment by operation of law.  

If a landlord intends for a change of control of a tenant to violate the anti-assignment clause in its lease, the landlord should ensure that its lease expressly states that a change of control constitutes an assignment.

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Operation of Law (Best Overview: Definition And Examples)

What is operation of law ?

How do you define operation of law?

Can the law create rights or obligations automatically and by default?

In this article, we will break down the notion of “ operation of law ” so you know all there is to know about it.

We will look at the operation of law definition , how it works , how the law can operate a termination of rights, assignment or transfer , we’ll look at an agency by operation of law example , operation of law in real estate and more.

Be sure to read this entire post as we have amazing content for you!

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Table of Contents

Operation of law definition

According to Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Institute, operation of law is defined as:

A way in which someone gets certain rights (or sometimes responsibilities) automatically under the law without taking action, requiring cooperation from another person, or being the subject of a court order.  Author

What is notable with this definition is that certain “ rights ” or “ responsibilities ” will apply to a situation by default or automatically by applying the legal regime or statute.

What does operation of law mean

Operation of law or by operation of law means that a person’s rights and obligations are created by the application of the law, statute or regulation regardless of the person’s desire or intention.

In other words, a person may acquire certain rights or become liable for certain obligations through the application of legal rules without consideration of his or her intention .

The law can grant rights, impose restrictions or prohibitions on a person by operation of law or determine what a person can or cannot do.

For example:

If two people own a property as joint tenants with right of survivorship, in the event one dies, the other will acquire full title to the property by operation of law Author

In this example, the law operates a transfer of title of the property by the application of the joint tenancy rules.

Agency by operation of law

The rights, responsibilities and obligations of parties to an agency contract may be affected by the operation of law.

For instance, termination of agency by operation of law occurs when:

• The parties expressly provide for termination by operation of law 
• For defined cause
• The agent’s performance is partially or fully executed

In a contract of agency , the principal does not have an obligation to remain in the contract and can terminate the agency by giving reasonable notice to the agent at any time.

This termination right is granted to the principal by ‘operation of law’.

Assignment by operation of law

Assignment by operation of law is when certain rights are assigned to another.

Title to a patent can be assigned in a financial transaction such as a merger or as a result of operation of law in the event of bankruptcy Author

Termination by operation of law

In contract law , a contract may be terminated by operation of law.

In the following situations, a contract may be terminated without consideration of the intention of the parties:

• An offer may become null and void if the person dies
• A contract may be terminated (or voided) if it was formed based on fraudulent acts
• A contract may be terminated if a person did not have the capacity to sign
• A contract may be deemed unenforceable and voided in full by operation of law

Discharge by operation of law 

Discharge by operation of the law is when a person is freed or liberated from certain obligations by operation of law.

When a person goes bankrupt, the person’s debts are discharged. This means that the person is no longer legally bound to make any payments to his or her creditors. Author

Reset by operation of law

Reset by operation of law is when a court resets the case for a legal reason that it has identified.

When a case is reset, it means that the litigants will need to start the case from the beginning.

Typically, a case is reset by a judge exercising its judicial powers . 

Power of attorney operation of law

In a power of attorney, the person appointing an attorney can define that by operation of law, the power of attorney may lapse or not .

KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS that the undersigned hereby appoint John Doe as my attorney-in-fact. My attorney-in-fact shall have the power to act hereunder. The duration of such powers shall not be affected by the lapse of time, and all such powers shall remain in effect until express revocation of the present power of attorney, the execution of these same powers to any other individual, or expiration by operation of law. Author

Transfer by operation of law

What’s common is the transfer of property by operation of law.

In other words, by applying certain laws, statutes or rules, an asset will be transferred or titled conveyed by operation of law.

The common example is with respect to the following ownership rights :

• Joint tenants with right of survivorship
• Joint tenants in common
• Intestate death

If two people own a property together as joint tenants with right of survivorship , in the event of the death of one, the survivor becomes the full owner of the property. 

In this case, the title to the property is transferred by operation of law.

Similarly, if a property is held by two people as tenants in common , in the event one dies, the deceased share in the property will be transferred to his or her estate.

In a case when a person dies without a will ( intestate death ), the law will determine the heirs and have the person’s assets transferred to those heirs.

Operation of law real estate

A typical example of how the operation of law works in real estate is with regard to the doctrine of adverse possession .

A non-owner of a property , by “operation of law”, may get title to land, property or real estate as he or she has been occupying the same for a certain period of time .

The rights granted to a non-owner of a property are granted regardless of the intention of the property owner or the non-owner.

Operation of law clause

The parties to a contract can include an operation of law clause where they define certain events to trigger certain legal consequences without the need of a party to act in any way.

“Operation of law” means the assignment of Party A’s assets by the court order in the context of a merger. Author

Operation of law examples

There are many examples where, by operation of law, a person acquires certain rights or obligations.

Here are examples of how a person may be impacted by the operation of the law:

• If a person passes away without a will, the heirs will be determined by the operation of law
• A person’s assets may be transferred upon death to his or her heirs without a will through the operation of law
• The title of land can pass to a non-owner by operation of law through adverse possession
• The title to a property or asset held by joint tenants with right of survivorship will be transferred to the survivor in the event one dies by operation of law
• An easement by prescription rights occurs by operation of law
• When a party fails to pursue a complaint will lead to its dismissal by operation of law
• The assets of a bankrupt person or entity will be transferred to the trustee or bankruptcy estate by operation of law through the application of the bankruptcy laws
• When a child turns 18 , by operation of law the guardianship ends
• Operation of law discharge happens when a person’s debt is discharged by filing for bankruptcy 
• Operation of law agency occurs when the law creates a principal and agent relationship not because of an agreement but by application of the law

Operation of law FAQ

What does operation of law mean?

The operation of law legal definition is when a person acquires legal rights or obligations automatically through the application of the law.

A contract may be void by operation of law if the person did not have the capacity to sign.  In this example, for a contract to be legally formed in compliance with contract laws, you must strictly observe the contract formation elements which include capacity.  Without capacity, by operation of law, the contract is void. Author

What does assignment by operation of law mean?

Assignment by operation of law means when certain rights, property or assets are assigned or transferred to another legally without the need of the property owner to act in any way.

In the event of bankruptcy, the assets of the bankrupt are assigned to the bankruptcy trustee by operation of law Author

In the event of a person’s death without a will, the assets of a person are assigned, by operation of law, to the heirs designated by law Author

Can a corporation be created by operation of law?

A de facto corporation or de jure corporation is an enterprise recognized by operation of law although it did not comply with every aspect of the law in regards to its formation.

The law creates a corporation or enterprise by operation of law to provide some protection against third parties.

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Do Change of Control Transactions Constitute an Assignment by Operation of Law?

Commercial l andlords  often  rely on  anti-assignment provisions  to  restrict the ability of tenants to assign their interest in  a  lease to a third party .  Such provisions will often explicitly restrict assignments by  “ operation of law, ”  which are generally considered involuntary assignments  mandated via a  court order. Commercial landlords may assume that a change of control transaction violates a basic anti – assignment cla use, but clear drafting is necessary for Landlords to protect their interests .  Landlords  wishing to restrict change of control of a tenant entity ,  should  have clear  anti-assignment provision s in their leases that   expressly restrict such transaction s  and characterize such “changes of control” as assignments .   

A change of control is a significant change in the equity, ownership, or management of a business entity. This can occur through a merger, consolidation or acquisition.   

The general rule is that change of control of a corporate entity  is  not  an assignment by operation of law ,  and therefore  does not violate a basic  anti- assignment provision. Courts have reasoned that a landlord entering into a lease with a corporate tenant should be aware that a corporation, or limited liability company, is an entity which exists separate and apart from its ownership, and that a change in ownership of the corporate entity does not change the tenant entity under the lease.   

Courts in many states including Florida, New York and Delaware have held that a change of control is not an assignment by operation of law. I n  Sears Termite & Pest Control, Inc. v. Arnold ,  a Florida court held ,  “ [t] he fact that there is a change in the ownership of corporate stock does not affect the corporation’s existence or its contract rights, or liabilities. ”  Further,   i n  Meso Scale Diagnostics LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GMBH , a Delaware court ruled, “ [ g ] enerally  mergers do not result in an assignment by operation of law of assets that began as property of the surviving entity and continued to be such after the merger.”  

Importantly,  the rule is different if the tenant entity does not survive the transaction.   In  MTA Canada Royalty Corp. v.  Compania  Minera Pangea , a  Delaware Superior Court held that a  merger in which the contracting entity does not survive may be held to be an assignment by operation of law.   

If  a  l andlord inten d s for a change of control of a tenant to violate the anti-assignment clause  in its lease, the landlord should ensure that its  lease expressly state s   that a change of control constitutes an assignment .

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A recent Delaware Court of Chancery decision examined whether a reverse triangular merger (“RTM”) qualified as a prohibited assignment by operation of law under Delaware law.  In Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics, GMBH ,  62 A.3d 62 (Del. Ch. 2013), defendants Roche Diagnostics and its affiliates and subsidiaries, including wholly-owned subsidiary BioVeris Corp., became parties to certain patent licensing agreements involving plaintiffs and their affiliates regarding certain patents owned by BioVeris.  As part of the transactions between the entities, the plaintiffs, Roche Diagnostics, BioVeris and certain other parties entered into a related Global Consent and Agreement under which the parties consented to, among other things, the transactions between certain of the parties and their affiliates and the consummation of those transactions.  The Global Consent contained an anti-assignment clause that provided as follows:

“ Neither this Agreement nor any of the rights, interests or obligations under [it] shall be assigned, in whole or in part, by operation of law or otherwise by any of the parties without the prior written consent of the other parties ; provided, however, that the parties acknowledge and agree that the conversion of [BioVeris] in accordance with Section 2.01 of the Restructuring Agreement and the continuation of BioVeris as a result thereof shall not be deemed to be an assignment and shall not require the consent of any party…”

Roche Diagnostics eventually acquired BioVeris through a reverse triangular merger involving a subsidiary of Roche Diagnostics, with BioVeris remaining intact as the surviving entity.  Roche Diagnostics did not seek the consent of plaintiffs prior to consummating the RTM involving BioVeris.  Plaintiffs thereafter commenced suit against Roche Diagnostics, alleging, among other things, that the RTM involving BioVeris constituted a breach of the anti-assignment provisions of the Global Consent.  However, the language at issue in the Global Consent did not expressly prohibit a change of control or ownership of BioVeris.

Roche Diagnostics argued that because BioVeris remained as a surviving entity of the RTM with all of its prior assets, rights and liabilities intact, BioVeris never assigned the license agreements or anything else.  Roche Diagnostics also argued that a RTM was very similar to a stock acquisition, and that Delaware case law generally held that stock acquisitions and other simple changes of ownership generally do not constitute assignments.  Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contended that mergers generally, including RTMs, can result in an assignment by operation of law.  Among other things, plaintiffs argued that Delaware case law on forward triangular mergers (“FTMs”) suggested that a merger could be treated as an assignment by operation of law and cited to a California federal court case holding that a RTM resulted in an assignment by operation of law.

In a 2011 ruling on a preliminary motion to dismiss filed by defendants, the Court of Chancery initially found a lack of clear guidance on the issue under Delaware law.  The Court of Chancery also found that the parties had two competing, but reasonable, constructions of the term assignment “by operation of law” and that there was ambiguity as to whether such terms were intended to apply to RTMs.  The Court of Chancery therefore denied defendants’ preliminary motion to dismiss.

However, in a 2013 ruling on a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants regarding the anti-assignment language, the Court of Chancery, after further examination of the applicable Delaware law and the parties’ arguments, granted Roche Diagnostic’s motion, finding that the language in the Global Consent prohibiting assignment “by operation of law or otherwise” should not be construed to encompass RTMs.  In the 2013 ruling, the Court of Chancery rejected plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the applicability of Delaware cases examining FTMs, finding, among other things, that those cases involved contracts with non-surviving entities that were forward-merged out of existence and into a separate surviving entity.  The Court of Chancery also rejected plaintiffs’ pleas to apply California federal court precedent in this Delaware case.

In support of its determination, the Court of Chancery looked to guidance found in Section 259 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which provides as follows:

“When any merger or consolidation shall have become effective under this chapter, for all purposes of the laws of this State the separate existence of all the constituent corporations, or of all such constituent corporations except the one into which the other or others of such constituent corporations have been merged , as the case may be, shall cease and the constituent corporations shall become a new corporation, or be merged into 1 of such corporations, as the case may be, possessing all the rights, privileges, powers and franchises as well of a public as of a private nature, and being subject to all the restrictions, disabilities and duties of each of such corporations so merged or consolidated; and all and singular, the rights, privileges, powers and franchises of each of said corporations, and all property, real, personal and mixed, and all debts due to any of said constituent corporations on whatever account, as well for stock subscriptions as all other things in action or belonging to each of such corporations shall be vested in the corporation surviving or resulting from such merger or consolidation ….

The Court of Chancery also examined existing Delaware case law examining stock acquisitions and mergers and other outside legal commentary indicating (by a vast majority) that a RTM, like other mere changes in ownership of a business, generally does not constitute an assignment by operation of law as to the surviving entity.  Based upon these findings and an examination of the anti-assignment language in the Global Consent, the Court ultimately found that plaintiffs’ assertions that the contracting parties intended the anti-assignment language in the Global Consent regarding assignments “by operation of law” to apply to RTMs was not reasonable.

The Meso Scale Diagnostics decision serves to reaffirm the understanding that under Delaware law, anti-assignment provisions are generally not triggered by RTMs, even when such anti-assignment provisions reference assignments by operation of law.  In light of the ruling in Meso Scale Diagnostics , parties to contracts (whether in Delaware, New Jersey or elsewhere) wanting a right to consent to an RTM involving any of the other contracting parties would be well-served to include change of control provisions in those contracts.

This blog update is not considered to be legal advice, and is intended for educational purposes only. 

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“By Operation of Law” (Including Draft No-Assignment Language)

30 September 2021 23 June 2011 | Ken Adams

In Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GMBH (go here for a PDF copy), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that it’s not clear whether for purposes of a no-assignment provision a reverse triangular merger constitutes an assignment “by operation of law.” (A reverse triangular merger is when Sub merges into Target.)

I’m not going to go into any detail regarding the case, as that information is readily available elsewhere. (Plucking a couple of examples at random, go here for Milbank’s analysis and go here for Shearman & Sterling’s analysis.)

Transfers by operation of law are generally considered involuntary transfers. They include court-ordered property transfers, bankruptcy-related transfers, and transfers to or from an executor or an administrator. Whether mergers and consolidations are transfers by operation of law is an open question. The cases reach inconsistent results.

That suggests that if you use the phrase by operation of law , you run the risk of getting into a fight over exactly what it means. And the Meso Scale Diagnostics case provides a great example of exactly that.

So what should you do instead? Koncision’s confidentiality-agreement template uses a bare-bones no-assignment provision that doesn’t get into by-operation-of-law territory, so here’s a more detailed version that I’ve just come up with:

Without the prior written consent of the other party, neither party may voluntarily or by court order (1) assign any of its rights under this agreement, whether by contract or by merger (whether that party is the surviving or disappearing entity), consolidation, dissolution, or otherwise, or (2) delegate any of its obligations under this agreement or its performance in satisfaction of any conditions to any obligations of the other party under this agreement. Any assignment or delegation in breach of this section X will be void.

Some observations:

• I’m aware it doesn’t read very easily.
• If you provide for the possibility of consent, it would be safest to assume that consent can’t be unreasonably withheld. If you have a problem with that, omit any mention of consent.
• I think it’s helpful to distinguish the issue of volition (voluntary or or by court order) from the mechanism of assignment (by contract or something else).
• I suggest that “by court order” is what’s left if you eliminate mergers, consolidations, and dissolution from by operation of law .
• The reference to “the surviving or disappearing entity” covers both direct mergers, triangular mergers, and reverse triangular mergers.
• Don’t simply prohibit assigning the entire contract—a court might construe that as prohibiting just delegation of duties.
• The reference to “performance in satisfaction of any conditions” acknowledges that if you promise to pay me $50 if I mow your lawn, I might want to delegate the task of mowing your lawn to someone else. If I do so, I’m not delegating an obligation, I’m delegating performance aimed at satisfying a condition. I got this idea from  Negotiating and Drafting Contract Boilerplate , but I’ve chosen to articulate it differently.
• Saying that any assignment or delegation in breach will be void might be enough by itself. But including a prohibition too would provide a remedy if the other party nevertheless tries to assign or delegate, thereby causing you to incur legal fees.
• Saying that a court-ordered assignment will be void won’t work if the law overrides any restriction on assignment. See this August 2006 post on AdamsDrafting on how that plays out in bankruptcy.
• If you’re worried about a change of control, you might want to handle that by means of an event-of-default provision rather than a no-assignment provision: it’s a bit of a stretch to consider a change in Acme’s ownership as constituting assignment by Acme of its rights under a contract.

But once you have your broad no-assignment wording, you have to determine whether for a given transaction you need the full monty , something less, nothing at all, or a provision authorizing assignment. I won’t get into that here.

About the author

Ken Adams is the leading authority on how to say clearly whatever you want to say in a contract. He’s author of  A Manual of Style for Contract Drafting , and he offers online and in-person training around the world. He’s also chief content officer of LegalSifter, Inc., a company that combines artificial intelligence and expertise to assist with review of contracts.

9 thoughts on ““By Operation of Law” (Including Draft No-Assignment Language)”

Ken, thanks for the mention of the book.  Language involving “by operation of law”, seems a bit specialist for a confidentiality agreement.  As to what it means, I think it is a sweep-up that may cover oddities, eg:

– contracts with an individual that may continue when he dies, eg copyright licence agreements? – contracts that become contracts with a new entity by virtue of a law.

In the latter category, I can cite my former client Royal Free Hospital School of Medicine, which was dissolved and whose assets transferred to University College London under the University College London Act 1996 (see section 5 which deals with automatic transfer of property without any assignment).  See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukla/1996/3/contents/enacted 

To tee up a potential Plan B, counsel for a non-assigning party might ask for a termination right — if the other party engages in a merger that the non-assigning party doesn’t like, and the merger would not be considered an “assignment” under applicable law, then the non-assigning party can terminate the agreement.[1] [2]

[1] Of course, the consequences of termination would have to be thought through and suitably addressed.

[2] I’ve never been 100% comfortable with the concept of terminating the Agreement.  My late partner and mentor Tom Arnold was of the school of thought that contracts per se are historical facts and can never be terminated – only specific rights and duties can be terminated.

I have some nitpicks.

The Texas statute on the effect of a merger (section 10.008 at http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/BO/pdf/BO.10.pdf ) specifically says that a merger vests rights in property in the successor organization without any assignment or transfer having occurred. Someone who knows this law better than me might be able to comment on whether that would include, for example, a lease to either real property or capital equipment. If you nonetheless want to prohibit the lease vesting int he successor, i think your language will have to use a word other than “assign.”

Along the same lines, the statute makes the successor entity be the primary obligor without calling it a delegation, so the non-delegation language might not be effective. The statute does allow a contract to specify additional obligors.

The two points above are important mainly because Texas law allows a merger to have multiple surviving or new entities result from the merger. So, your valuable lease might end up being held by a much less creditworthy entity. I don’t have a solution for this problem that would be generally applicable. I think instead, the drafter will have to look towards protections elsewhere, like warranties that the lessee would breach by becoming less creditworthy or a termination right that kicks in on any organic event.

You might want to change “court order” to “government action” to handle situations where regulatory bodies take control of a company (e.g. banks, insurers) and also have statutory, quasi-judicial power to transfer obligations to successors.

Finally, your construction of “neither party may” seems to run afoul of the guidance in MSCD 2.150. But the meaning of “may” in the construction remains consistent with MCSD and the alternative construction — each party shall not — is a clunky here, so I see why you chose the alternative.

Chris: Hmm. Regarding your first two points, I’ll have to put on my thinking cap. I might take a while to respond.

Yes, I will change “court order” to something that refers to “Government Body” or some such. I did something similar for purposes of Koncision’s confidentiality-agreement template.

I periodically fall foul of my own guidelines, and I’m delighted when people point that out. But regarding “neither party may,” have a look at MSCD 2.152.

“By operation of law” could also cover death, if one of the parties is an individual.  I doubt it would be any more effective than trying to prohibit assignment by court order.  There are, of course, ways of addressing the effect of death directly, if it’s a real issue.

• Pingback: Koncision » Rethinking the “No Assignment” Provision

One senior lawyer advised me a one-sided transfer of shares from A to B under “operation of law” without any transfer deed or court order. He explained the following: 1. A breached the shareholders agreement. The agreement said that in case any shareholder breaches, his shares will be bought by other shareholders. 2. Since the agreement was breached, hence the shares were transferred to other shareholders under “operation of law”. 3. Since it came under operation of law, hence the transfer of shares became “transmission of shares” which needs no court order or transfer deed. I was shocked to listen this approach. Can you comment.

so does permanent disability fall under operation of the law and therefore Transmission applies?

Your page is very useful for us mortals to understand some technical language. I am grateful indeed.

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Assignment provisions in contracts

Author’s note, Nov. 22, 2014: For a much-improved update of this page, see the Common Draft general provisions article .

(For more real-world stories like the ones below, see my PDF e-book, Signing a Business Contract? A Quick Checklist for Greater Peace of Mind , a compendium of tips and true stories to help you steer clear of various possible minefields. Learn more …. )

Table of Contents

Legal background: Contracts generally are freely assignable

When a party to a contract “ assigns ” the contract to someone else, it means that party, known as the assignor , has transferred its rights under the contract to someone else, known as the assignee , and also has delegated its obligations to the assignee.

Under U.S. law, most contract rights are freely assignable , and most contract duties are freely delegable, absent some special character of the duty, unless the agreement says otherwise. In some situations, however, the parties will not want their opposite numbers to be able to assign the agreement freely; contracts often include language to this effect.

Intellectual-property licenses are an exception to the general rule of assignability. Under U.S. law, an IP licensee may not assign its license rights, nor delegate its license obligations, without the licensor’s consent, even when the license agreement is silent. See, for example, In re XMH Corp. , 647 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J; trademark licenses); Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp. , 581 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2009) (copyright licenses); Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp. , 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (patent licenses). For additional information, see this article by John Paul, Brian Kacedon, and Douglas W. Meier of the Finnegan Henderson firm.

Assignment consent requirements

Model language

[Party name] may not assign this Agreement to any other person without the express prior written consent of the other party or its successor in interest, as applicable, except as expressly provided otherwise in this Agreement. A putative assignment made without such required consent will have no effect.

Optional: Nor may [Party name] assign any right or interest arising out of this Agreement, in whole or in part, without such consent.

Alternative: For the avoidance of doubt, consent is not required for an assignment (absolute, collateral, or other) or pledge of, nor for any grant of a security interest in, a right to payment under this Agreement.

Optional: An assignment of this Agreement by operation of law, as a result of a merger, consolidation, amalgamation, or other transaction or series of transactions, requires consent to the same extent as would an assignment to the same assignee outside of such a transaction or series of transactions.

• An assignment-consent requirement like this can give the non-assigning party a chokehold on a future merger or corporate reorganization by the assigning party — see the case illustrations below.

• A party being asked to agree to an assignment-consent requirement should consider trying to negotiate one of the carve-out provisions below, for example, when the assignment is connection with a sale of substantially all the assets of the assignor’s business {Link} .

Case illustrations

The dubai port deal (ny times story and story ).

In 2006, a Dubai company that operated several U.S. ports agreed to sell those operations. (The agreement came about because of publicity and political pressure about the alleged national-security implications of having Middle-Eastern companies in charge of U.S. port operations.)

A complication arose in the case of the Port of Newark: The Dubai company’s lease agreement gave the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey the right to consent to any assignment of the agreement — and that agency initially demanded $84 million for its consent.

After harsh criticism from political leaders, the Port Authority backed down a bit: it gave consent in return for “only” a $10 million consent fee, plus $40 million investment commitment by the buyer.

Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., No. 07-4142 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 2009) (affirming summary judgment)

A customer of a software vendor did an internal reorganization. As a result, the vendor’s software ended up being used by a sister company of the original customer. The vendor demanded that the sister company buy a new license. The sister company refused.

The vendor sued, successfully, for copyright infringement, and received the price of a new license, more than $450,000 as its damages. The case is discussed in more detail in this blog posting.

The vendor’s behavior strikes me as extremely shortsighted, for a couple of reasons: First, I wouldn’t bet much on the likelihood the customer would ever buy anything again from that vendor. Second, I would bet that the word got around about what the vendor did, and that this didn’t do the vendor’s reputation any good.

Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, No. 5589-VCP (Del. Ch. Apr. 8, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss).

The Delaware Chancery Court refused to rule out the possibility that a reverse triangular merger could act as an assignment of a contract, which under the contract terms would have required consent. See also the discussion of this opinion by Katherine Jones of the Sheppard Mullin law firm.

Assignment with transfer of business assets

Consent is not required for an assignment of this Agreement in connection with a sale or other disposition of substantially all the assets of the assigning party’s business.

Optional: Alternatively, the sale or other disposition may be of substantially all the assets of the assigning party’s business to which this Agreement specifically relates.

Optional: The assignee must not be a competitor of the non-assigning party.

• A prospective assigning party might argue that it needed to keep control of its own strategic destiny, for example by preserving its freedom to sell off a product line or division (or even the whole company) in an asset sale.

• A non-assigning party might argue that it could not permit the assignment of the agreement to one of its competitors, and that the only way to ensure this was to retain a veto over any assignment.

• Another approach might be to give the non-assigning party, instead of a veto over asset-disposition assignments, the right to terminate the contract for convenience . (Of course, the implications of termination would have to be carefully thought through.)

Assignment to affiliate

[Either party] may assign this Agreement without consent to its affiliate.

Optional: The assigning party must unconditionally guarantee the assignee’s performance.

Optional: The affiliate must not be a competitor of the non-assigning party.

Optional: The affiliate must be a majority-ownership affiliate of the assigning party.

• A prospective assigning party might argue for the right to assign to an affiliate to preserve its freedom to move assets around within its “corporate family” without having to seek approval.

• The other party might reasonably object that there is no way to know in advance whether an affiliate-assignee would be in a position to fulfill the assigning party’s obligations under the contract, nor whether it would have reachable assets in case of a breach.

Editorial comment: Before approving a blanket affiliate-assignment authorization, a party should consider whether it knew enough about the other party’s existing- or future affiliates to be comfortable with where the agreement might end up.

Consent may not be unreasonably withheld or delayed

Consent to an assignment of this Agreement requiring it may not be unreasonably withheld or delayed.

Optional: For the avoidance of doubt, any damages suffered by a party seeking a required consent to assignment of this Agreement, resulting from an unreasonable withholding or delay of such consent, are to be treated as direct damages.

Optional: For the avoidance of doubt, any damages suffered by a party seeking a required consent to assignment of this Agreement, resulting from an unreasonable withholding or delay of such consent, are not subject to any exclusion of remedies or other limitation of liability in this Agreement.

• Even if this provision were absent, applicable law might impose a reasonableness requirement; see the discussion of the Shoney case in the commentary to the Consent at discretion provision.

• A reasonableness requirement might not be of much practical value, whether contractual or implied by law. Such a requirement could not guarantee that the non-assigning party would give its consent when the assigning party wants it. And by the time a court could resolve the matter, the assigning party’s deal could have been blown.

• Still, an unreasonable-withholding provision should make the non-assigning party think twice about dragging its feet too much, becuase of the prospect of being held liable for damages for a busted transaction. Cf. Pennzoil vs. Texaco and its $10.5 billion damage award for tortious interference with an M&A deal.

• Including an unreasonable-delay provision might conflict with the Materiality of assignment breach provision, for reasons discussed there in the summary of the Hess Energy case.

Consent at discretion

A party having the right to grant or withhold consent to an assignment of this Agreement may do so in its sole and unfettered discretion.

• If a party might want the absolute right to withhold consent to an assignment in its sole discretion, it would be a good idea to try to include that in the contract language. Otherwise, there’s a risk that court might impose a commercial-reasonableness test under applicable law (see the next bullet). On the other hand, asking for such language but not getting it could be fatal to the party’s case that it was implicitly entitled to withhold consent in its discretion.

• If a commercial- or residential lease agreement requires the landlord’s consent before the tentant can assign the lease, state law might impose a reasonableness requirement. I haven’t researched this, but ran across an unpublished California opinion and an old law review article, each collecting cases. See Nevada Atlantic Corp. v. Wrec Lido Venture, LLC, No. G039825 (Cal. App. Dec. 8, 2008) (unpublished; reversing judgment that sole-discretion withholding of consent was unreasonable); Paul J. Weddle, Pacific First Bank v. New Morgan Park Corporation: Reasonable Withholding of Consent to Commercial Lease Assignments , 31 Willamette L. Rev. 713 (1995) (first page available for free at HeinOnline ).

Shoney’s LLC v. MAC East, LLC, No. 1071465 (Ala. Jul. 31, 2009)

In 2009, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected a claim that Shoney’s restaurant chain breached a contract when it demanded a $70,000 to $90,000 payment as the price of its consent to a proposed sublease. The supreme court noted that the contract specifically gave Shoney’s the right, in its sole discretion , to consent to any proposed assignment or sublease.

Significantly, prior case law from Alabama was to the effect that a refusal to consent would indeed be judged by a commercial-reasonableness standard. But, the supreme court said, “[w]here the parties to a contract use language that is inconsistent with a commercial-reasonableness standard, the terms of such contract will not be altered by an implied covenant of good faith. Therefore, an unqualified express standard such as ‘sole discretion’ is also to be construed as written.” Shoney’s LLC v. MAC East, LLC , No. 1071465 (Ala. Jul. 31, 2009) (on certification by Eleventh Circuit), cited by MAC East, LLC v. Shoney’s [LLC] , No. 07-11534 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2009), reversing No. 2:05-cv-1038-MEF (WO) (M.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 2007) (granting partial summary judgment that Shoney’s had breached the contract).

Termination by non-assigning party

A non-assigning party may terminate this Agreement, in its business discretion , by giving notice to that effect no later than 60 days after receiving notice, from either the assigning party or the assignee, that an assignment of the Agreement has become effective.

Consider an agreement in which a vendor is to provide ongoing services to a customer. A powerful customer might demand the right to consent to the vendor’s assignment of the agreement, even in strategic transactions. The vendor, on the other hand, might refuse to give any customer that kind of control of its strategic options.

A workable compromise might be to allow the customer to terminate the agreement during a stated window of time after the assignment if it is not happy with the new vendor.

Assignment – other provisions

Optional: Delegation: For the avoidance of doubt, an assignment of this Agreement operates as a transfer of the assigning party’s rights and a delegation of its duties under this Agreement.

Optional: Promise to perform: For the avoidance of doubt, an assignee’s acceptance of an assignment of this Agreement constitutes the assignee’s promise to perform the assigning party’s duties under the Agreement. That promise is enforceable by either the assigning party or by the non-assigning party.

Optional: Written assumption by assignee: IF: The non-assigning party so requests of an assignee of this Agreement; THEN: The assignee will seasonably provide the non-assigning party with a written assumption of the assignor’s obligations, duly executed by or on behalf of the assignee; ELSE: The assignment will be of no effect.

Optional: No release: For the avoidance of doubt, an assignment of this Agreement does not release the assigning party from its responsibility for performance of its duties under the Agreement unless the non-assigning party so agrees in writing.

Optional: Confidentiality: A non-assigning party will preserve in confidence any non-public information about an actual- or proposed assignment of this Agreement that may be disclosed to that party by a party participating in, or seeking consent for, the assignment.

The Delegation provision might not be necessary in a contract for the sale of goods governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, because a similar provision is found in UCC 2-210

The Confidentiality provision would be useful if a party to the agreement anticipated that it might be engaging in any kind of merger or other strategic transaction.

Materiality of assignment breach

IF: A party breaches any requirement of this Agreement that the party obtain another party’s consent to assign this Agreement; THEN: Such breach is to be treated as a material breach of this Agreement.

A chief significance of this kind of provision is that failure to obtain consent to assignment, if it were a material breach, would give the non-assigning party the right to terminate the Agreement.

If an assignment-consent provision requires that consent not be unreasonably withheld , then failure to obtain consent to a reasonable assignment would not be a material breach, according to the court in Hess Energy Inc. v. Lightning Oil Co. , No. 01-1582 (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 2002) (reversing summary judgment). In that case, the agreement was a natural-gas supply contract. The customer was acquired by a larger company, after which the larger company took over some of the contract administration responsibilities such as payment of the vendor’s invoices. The vendor, seeking to sell its gas to someone else at a higher price, sent a notice of termination, on grounds that the customer had “assigned” the agreement to its new parent company, in violation of the contract’s assignment-consent provision. The appeals court held that, even if the customer had indeed assigned the contract (a point on which it expressed considerable doubt) without consent, the resulting breach of the agreement was not material, and therefore the vendor did not have the right to terminate the contract.

See also (list is generated automatically) :

• Notebook update: Reverse triangular merger might be an assignment of a contract, requiring consent Just updated the Notebook with a citation to a case in which the Delaware Chancery Court refused to rule out the possibility that a reverse...
• Assignment-consent requirements can cause serious problems in future M&A transactions A lot of contracts provide that Party A must obtain the prior written consent of Party B if it wishes to assign the agreement to a...
• SCOTX rejects implied obligation not to unreasonably withhold consent to assignment of contract In a recent Texas case, two sophisticated parties in the oil and gas busi­ness — let’s call them Alpha and Bravo — were negotiating a contract....
• Ken Adams and the marketplace of ideas I (used to) comment occasionally at Ken Adams’s blog. Recent examples: Here, here, here, here, and here. Ken and I disagree on a number of issues; some...

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Spotting issues with assignment clauses in M&A Due Diligence

Written by: Kira Systems

January 19, 2016

6 minute read

Although not nearly as complex as change of control provisions , assignment provisions may still present a challenge in due diligence projects. We hope this blog post will help you navigate the ambiguities of assignment clauses with greater ease by explaining some of the common variations. (And, if you like it, please check out our full guide on Reviewing Change of Control and Assignment Provisions in Due Diligence. )

What is an Assignment Clause?

First, the basics:

Anti-assignment clauses are common because without them, generally, contracts are freely assignable. (The exceptions are (i) contracts that are subject to statutes or public policies prohibiting their assignment, such as intellectual property contracts, or (ii) contracts where an assignment without consent would cause material and adverse consequences to non-assigning counterparties, such as employment agreements and consulting agreements.) For all other contracts, parties may want an anti-assignment clause that allows them the opportunity to review and understand the impact of an assignment (or change of control) before deciding whether to continue or terminate the relationship.

In the mergers and acquisitions context, an assignment of a contract from a target company entity to the relevant acquirer entity is needed whenever a contract has to be placed in the name of an entity other than the existing target company entity after consummation of a transaction. This is why reviewing contracts for assignment clauses is so critical.

A simple anti-assignment provision provides that a party may not assign the agreement without the consent of the other party. Assignment provisions may also provide specific exclusions or inclusions to a counterparty’s right to consent to the assignment of a contract. Below are five common occurrences in which assignment provisions may provide exclusions or inclusions.

Common Exclusions and Inclusions

Exclusion for change of control transactions.

In negotiating an anti-assignment clause, a company would typically seek the exclusion of assignments undertaken in connection with change of control transactions, including mergers and sales of all or substantially all of the assets of the company. This allows a company to undertake a strategic transaction without worry. If an anti-assignment clause doesn’t exclude change of control transactions, a counterparty might materially affect a strategic transaction through delay and/or refusal of consent. Because there are many types of change of control transactions, there is no standard language for these. An example might be:

In the event of the sale or transfer by [Party B] of all or substantially all of its assets related to this Agreement to an Affiliate or to a third party, whether by sale, merger, or change of control, [Party B] would have the right to assign any or all rights and obligations contained herein and the Agreement to such Affiliate or third party without the consent of [Party A] and the Agreement shall be binding upon such acquirer and would remain in full force and effect, at least until the expiration of the then current Term.

Exclusion for Affiliate Transactions

A typical exclusion is one that allows a target company to assign a contract to an affiliate without needing the consent of the contract counterparty. This is much like an exclusion with respect to change of control, since in affiliate transfers or assignments, the ultimate actors and responsible parties under the contract remain essentially the same even though the nominal parties may change. For example:

Either party may assign its rights under this Agreement, including its right to receive payments hereunder, to a subsidiary, affiliate or any financial institution, but in such case the assigning party shall remain liable to the other party for the assigning party’s obligations hereunder. All or any portion of the rights and obligations of [Party A] under this Agreement may be transferred by [Party A] to any of its Affiliates without the consent of [Party B].

Assignment by Operation of Law

Assignments by operation of law typically occur in the context of transfers of rights and obligations in accordance with merger statutes and can be specifically included in or excluded from assignment provisions. An inclusion could be negotiated by the parties to broaden the anti-assignment clause and to ensure that an assignment occurring by operation of law requires counterparty approval:

[Party A] agrees that it will not assign, sublet or otherwise transfer its rights hereunder, either voluntarily or by operations of law, without the prior written consent of [Party B].

while an exclusion could be negotiated by a target company to make it clear that it has the right to assign the contract even though it might otherwise have that right as a matter of law:

This Guaranty shall be binding upon the successors and assigns of [Party A]; provided, that no transfer, assignment or delegation by [Party A], other than a transfer, assignment or delegation by operation of law, without the consent of [Party B], shall release [Party A] from its liabilities hereunder.

This helps settle any ambiguity regarding assignments and their effects under mergers statutes (particularly in forward triangular mergers and forward mergers since the target company ceases to exist upon consummation of the merger).

Direct or Indirect Assignment

More ambiguity can arise regarding which actions or transactions require a counterparty’s consent when assignment clauses prohibit both direct and indirect assignments without the consent of a counterparty. Transaction parties will typically choose to err on the side of over-inclusiveness in determining which contracts will require consent when dealing with material contracts. An example clause prohibiting direct or indirect assignment might be:

Except as provided hereunder or under the Merger Agreement, such Shareholder shall not, directly or indirectly, (i) transfer (which term shall include any sale, assignment, gift, pledge, hypothecation or other disposition), or consent to or permit any such transfer of, any or all of its Subject Shares, or any interest therein.

“Transfer” of Agreement vs. “Assignment” of Agreement

In some instances, assignment provisions prohibit “transfers” of agreements in addition to, or instead of, explicitly prohibiting “assignments”. Often, the word “transfer” is not defined in the agreement, in which case the governing law of the contract will determine the meaning of the term and whether prohibition on transfers are meant to prohibit a broader or narrower range of transactions than prohibitions on assignments. Note that the current jurisprudence on the meaning of an assignment is broader and deeper than it is on the meaning of a transfer. In the rarer case where “transfer” is defined, it might look like this:

As used in this Agreement, the term “transfer” includes the Franchisee’s voluntary, involuntary, direct or indirect assignment, sale, gift or other disposition of any interest in…

The examples listed above are only of five common occurrences in which an assignment provision may provide exclusions or inclusions. As you continue with due diligence review, you may find that assignment provisions offer greater variety beyond the factors discussed in this blog post. However, you now have a basic understand of the possible variations of assignment clauses. For a more in-depth discussion of reviewing change of control and assignment provisions in due diligence, please download our full guide on Reviewing Change of Control and Assignment Provisions in Due Diligence.

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Courts Consider Anti-Assignment Clauses And Reverse Triangular Mergers

In a reverse triangular merger, the acquiring company forms a subsidiary that merges with and into the target with the outstanding shares of the target being converted into securities of the acquiring corporation or some other consideration.  Does a reverse triangular merger constitute an assignment of a target corporation's contracts?  Because the reverse triangular merger is an exceedingly common acquisition technique, one would expect that this question was answered long ago.  Surprisingly, however, this isn't the case.

Earlier this year, Vice Chancellor Donald F. Parsons  analyzed whether a reverse triangular merger violated an anti-assignment clause that read as follows: "Neither this Agreement nor any of the rights, interests or obligations under this Agreement shall be assigned, in whole or in part, by operation of law or otherwise by any of the parties without the prior written consent of the other parties . . .".  He concluded:

In sum, Meso could have negotiated for a "change of control provision."  They did  not.  Instead, they negotiated for a term that prohibits "assignments by  operation of law or otherwise." Roche has provided a reasonable interpretation of Section 5.08 that is consistent with the general understanding that a reverse triangular merger is not an assignment by operation of law. On the other hand, I  find Meso's arguments as to why language that prohibits "assignments by  operation of law or otherwise" should be construed to encompass reverse  triangular mergers unpersuasive and its related construction of Section 5.08 to  be unreasonable.

Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH , 62 A.3d 62, 88 (Del. Ch. 2013).  See I’ve Been Thinking About Conversion, But I Haven’t Decided To Convert .

Here in California, U.S. District Court Judge Samuel Conti recently addressed the issue even more recently as follows:

No California state court has resolved this matter, and the Court is not inclined to guess at possible conclusions.  The Court therefore begins from the presumption that a reverse triangular merger, which leaves intact the acquired corporation, does not effect a transfer of rights from the wholly owned subsidiary to its acquirer as a matter of law. What little applicable law there is could be analogized from California cases on stock sales, like Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier , 48 Cal. 2d 208, 223, 308 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1957), which suggested that if a plaintiff had sold all of his stock in a corporation, there could be no contention that the corporation's licenses would be extinguished as a matter of law, since the two contracting parties were still extant and in privity.

Florey Inst. of Neuroscience & Mental Health v. Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138904 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013).

Both jurists confronted, and declined to follow, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel's earlier decision in SQL Solutions v. Oracle Corp. , 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21097 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1991) with Vice Chancellor Parsons saying: "I decline to adopt the approach outlined in SQL Solutions , however, because doing so would conflict with Delaware's jurisprudence surrounding stock acquisitions, among other things.  Under Delaware law, stock purchase transactions, by themselves, do not result in an assignment by operation of law."  Judge Conti said "Plaintiff relies solely on SQL Solutions to argue that assignment occurred as a matter of law when an acquired corporation became another corporation's wholly owned subsidiary.  That case did not analyze nonassignment clauses and also found that federal copyright law forbid transfer."

Hollywood, Somali Pirates and Homer

Over the weekend, I saw the recently released film,  Captain Phillips .  The movie tells the story of the takeover of the MV Maersk by Somali pirates.  When the Navy uses a Somali speaker to communicate with the pirates, one of the pirates asks "Who's this?".  The translator answers "nemo", the Latin word for "no one".  The interchange, of course, is an echo of the famous encounter of Odysseus and the Cyclops, Polyphemus in Homer's Odyssey :

Κύκλωψ, εἰρωτᾷς μ᾽ ὄνομα κλυτόν, αὐτὰρ ἐγώ τοι ἐξερέω: σὺ δέ μοι δὸς ξείνιον, ὥς περ ὑπέστης. Οὖτις ἐμοί γ᾽ ὄνομα: Οὖτιν δέ με κικλήσκουσι μήτηρ ἠδὲ πατὴρ ἠδ᾽ ἄλλοι πάντες ἑταῖροι. Cyclops, you are asking my renowned name, nevertheless I will declare: "Give to me the hospitality, you were promising.  My name is no one: no one is what my mother, father and all my comrades call me."

Homer,  Odyssey Book 9, lines 364 -367 (my translation). Matters went downhill from there for both Polyphemus and the pirates.

Keith Paul Bishop

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138. Assignment by operation of law.

The rights and liabilities 1 of either party to a contract may in certain circumstances be assigned by operation of law, as, for example, when a party

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Delaware Court Rules on Reverse Triangular Mergers and Anti-Assignment Provisions

Eduardo Gallardo is a partner focusing on mergers and acquisitions at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. This post is based on a Gibson Dunn alert by David H. Kennedy , Brian M. Gingold ,  Phil Kenny ,  Travis P. Davis , and  James D. Lee . This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here .

On February 22, 2013, in Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, C.A . No. 5589-VCP (Del. Ch. 2013), Vice Chancellor Parsons of the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that a provision in a license agreement prohibiting an assignment by operation of law did not apply to a reverse triangular merger. This ruling eliminates the uncertainty Vice Chancellor Parsons created in his April 2011 motion to dismiss decision in which he indicated that there may be circumstances where a reverse triangular merger could be considered an assignment by operation of law for purposes of an anti-assignment clause.

On June 22, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that the acquisition by Roche Diagnostics GmbH, C.A. (“Roche”) of BioVeris Corporation (“BioVeris”) through a reverse triangular merger violated the anti-assignment clause found in a 2003 agreement between the plaintiffs and the predecessor entity to BioVeris, among others. The anti-assignment clause that the plaintiffs alleged was breached stated as follows:

Neither this Agreement nor any of the rights, interests or obligations under [it] shall be assigned, in whole or in part, by operation of law or otherwise by any of the parties without the prior written consent of the other parties . . .

The Court, in its earlier Memorandum Opinion dated April 8, 2011, denying a motion to dismiss, ruled that there may be circumstances where a provision prohibiting assignment of an agreement by operation of law could be triggered by a reverse triangular merger. [1]

In support of its summary judgment motion, Roche argued that, because the target entity in a reverse triangular merger remains intact and continues to own its own assets, BioVeris did not assign anything at the time it was acquired through a reverse triangular merger. Roche further argued that a reverse triangular merger structure is analogous to a sale of the stock of a target corporation, and Delaware courts had repeatedly held that such a stock sale would not violate an anti-assignment provision that did not expressly prohibit a change in control.

The plaintiffs countered that Delaware case law regarding forward triangular mergers compels the conclusion that a provision covering assignment “by operation of law” extends to all mergers, regardless of their form. [2] The plaintiffs further argued that the Court should embrace an unreported California federal court decision, SQL Solutions Inc. v. Oracle Corporation , 1991 WL 626458 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 1991), that held that an anti-assignment provision in a software license agreement that did not contain a change of ownership or control provision was triggered by a reverse triangular merger. [3]

The Court concluded that Delaware law, and specifically Section 259 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”), supported Roche’s position that a reverse triangular merger generally is not an assignment by operation of law or otherwise. Section 259 provides that:

When any merger or consolidation shall have become effective under this chapter, for all purposes of the laws of this State the separate existence of all the constituent corporations, or of all such constituent corporations except the one into which the other or others of such constituent corporations have been merged , as the case may be, shall cease and the constituent corporations shall become a new corporation, or be merged into 1 of such corporations . . . the rights, privileges, powers and franchises of each of said corporations, and all property, real, personal and mixed, and all debts due to any of said constituent corporations on whatever account . . . shall be vested in the corporation surviving or resulting from such merger or consolidation ; and all property, rights, privileges, powers and franchises, and all and every other interest shall be thereafter as effectually the property of the surviving or resulting corporation as they were of the several and respective constituent corporations. (emphasis added)

The Court pointed to cases holding that Section 259 results in only the transfer of the non-surviving corporation’s rights and obligations to the surviving corporation by operation of law. On the other hand, the language “except the one into which the other or others of such constituent corporations have been merged” in Section 259 implies that the surviving corporation would not have effected any assignment.

As to the plaintiffs’ arguments, the Court distinguished Tenneco and Star Cellular as cases involving forward triangular mergers where the target company was not the surviving entity, whereas in this case BioVeris was the surviving entity in a reverse triangular merger. Further, the Court declined to follow SQL Solutions because doing so would conflict with Delaware’s well-settled law that stock acquisitions, by themselves, do not result in an assignment by operation of law.

The Court also observed that its interpretation of the anti-assignment clause is consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties, noting that the vast majority of commentary discussing reverse triangular mergers indicates that a reverse triangular merger does not constitute an assignment by operation of law.

This ruling is noteworthy because it confirms the view that, until the first Meso Scale Diagnostics ruling, practitioners had long taken for granted: a reverse triangular merger does not result in an assignment by operation of law of the acquired corporation’s contracts or other assets. The decision should provide comfort to would-be acquirors that they can structure transactions to which the DGCL is applicable in a manner that ensures that consents to assignment do not need to be obtained where there is no change of ownership or control language in the relevant anti-assignment clause. However, the decision also serves as a reminder that, outside of the confines of the DGCL, there remains uncertainty as to the risks associated with anti-assignment clauses–it may be prudent to require that consents be obtained from applicable third parties where a license or other agreement containing such a clause is important to the target’s business.

[1] At this earlier motion to dismiss stage the Vice Chancellor was required to assume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegation and afford the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. The Court declared that it could grant Roche’s motion to dismiss only if Roche’s interpretation of the anti-assignment clause was the only reasonable construction as a matter of law. Although noting that stock acquisitions do not, in and of themselves, constitute an assignment, the Court noted that the plaintiffs had alleged that the transaction in question involved more than just a change of ownership because the plaintiffs had alleged that, within months of the merger, all of BioVeris’s 200 employees were laid off, its Maryland facility was closed and its existing customers were notified that its product lines were being discontinued. These additional circumstances, in the Court’s view, created a plausible argument “that ‘by operation of law’ was intended to cover mergers that effectively operated like an assignment, even if it might not apply to mergers merely involving changes of control.” (go back)

[2] See Tenneco Automotive Inc. v. El Paso Corporation , 2002 WL 453930 (Del. Ch. 2002) and Star Cellular Telephone Company, Inc. v. Baton Rouge CGSA, Inc. , 19 Del. J. Corp. L. 875 (Del. Ch. 1993) ruling that forward mergers do trigger anti-assignment provisions prohibiting assignments by operation of law. (go back)

[3] Since Vice Chancellor Parson’s motion to dismiss ruling in April 2011, a New Jersey federal court decision, DBA Distribution Services, Inc. v. All Source Freight Solutions, Inc. , 2012 WL 845929 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2012), cited SQL Solutions in support of its holding that, under New Jersey law, a reverse triangular merger does constitute an assignment by operation of law. The issue was one of first impression in New Jersey. No other court appears to have cited with approval the SQL Solutions holding that the acquisition of a licensee under a license agreement through a reverse triangular merger results in an assignment of the license agreement. (go back)

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Case review: non-assignment clauses and transferring the right to arbitrate by operation of law (Court of Appeal decision)

Global |  Publication |  January 2024

Introduction

Factual background, the high court’s decision, the court of appeal’s decision, key takeaways.

Does a non-assignment clause that prohibits assignments “by any party to any third party, for any reason whatsoever” prevent an assignment (akin to subrogation) to an insurer where such assignment takes effect by operation of law? The Court of Appeal had to consider this question in the recent case of Dassault [2024] EWCA Civ 5 . 

Overturning the High Court’s decision, the Court of Appeal found that the assignment in question did not fall foul of the non-assignment clause as the assignment had not been effected “by” a party because the transfer had occurred by operation of law. That being said, the judgment does not establish a general principle as to the relationship between non-assignment clauses and assignments arising by operation of law; rather the Court of Appeal’s decision was heavily focussed on the interpretation and the wording of the non-assignment clause in the contract.

Dassault Aviation SA (“ Dassault ”) had entered into an English law sale contract with Mitsui Bussan Aerospace Co., Ltd (“ MBA ”) for the sale of two maritime surveillance aircraft (the “ Sale Contract ”). MBA had agreed to onward sell those aircraft to the Japanese Coast Guard pursuant to a Japanese law governed contract (the “ Sub-Sale Contract ”). 

The Sub-Sale Contract provided for liquidated damages in case of delayed delivery of the aircraft to the Japanese Coast Guard. MBA had entered into a Japanese law contract of insurance with its insurer (the “ Insurer ”) to insure the risk of MBA being held liable to the Japanese Coast Guard for such late delivery (the “ Insurance Contract ”). 

The aircraft were delivered late by Dassault to MBA, which led to a consequent late delivery of the aircraft by MBA to the Japanese Coast Guard. MBA was therefore liable to pay liquidated damages to the Japanese Coast Guard under the Sub-Sale Contract. Following the payment of such damages, MBA claimed against the Insurer under the Insurance Contract and the Insurer paid out the insured amount to MBA. 

Under Japanese law (the law of the Insurance Contract), when an insurer pays out an insurance claim it is automatically assigned, by operation of statutory law, the assured’s rights of recovery against third parties in respect of that claim. Having been assigned MBA’s rights, the Insurer accordingly commenced (in its own name) ICC proceedings against Dassault, pursuant to the arbitration agreement found in the Sale Contract. 

Dassault challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the Insurer’s claim. It argued that the assignment to the Insurer was in breach of the non-assignment clause found in the Sale Contract, and that as a result the assignment was null and void. Accordingly, the Insurer was not entitled to rely on the arbitration agreement to bring its claim and the Tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction. In response, the Insurer contended that the non-assignment clause did not on its proper construction apply to an assignment effected by operation of law. Since the Insurer’s rights arose by operation of law, the Insurer contended that it was not an assignment caught by the non-assignment clause. 

The Tribunal considered the jurisdictional issue as a preliminary issue and the majority (Lord Collins of Mapesbury and Joe Smouha KC) found in the Insurer’s favour (Mr Crookdenden KC dissenting). Dassault challenged the Tribunal’s decision pursuant to section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996, bringing proceedings before the High Court. 

The High Court found in Dassault’s favour and ruled that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the Insurer’s claim. Mrs Justice Cockerill (the “ Judge ”) reached this decision by considering the two following issues: 

• Was there a general rule/presumption under English law that transfers “by operation of law” would not fall foul of a prohibition on assignment clause (the “ First Issue ”)?
• If there was no such rule, as a matter of interpretation of the Sale Contract, did the non-assignment clause prohibit the assignment of MBA’s rights to the Insurer, notwithstanding this was an assignment to an insurer akin to subrogation (the “ Second Issue ”)?

On the First Issue, the Judge took the view that the caselaw did not support the proposition that an assignment by “operation of law” would be outside the scope of a non-assignment clause. Instead, the Judge noted that the authorities (mainly old insolvency cases) supported a narrower distinction between transfers which can be said to be willing/voluntary (in the sense of consented to/ within the control of the transferor) and those which were truly unwilling/involuntary. On that basis, the Judge considered that a non-assignment clause could apply to an assignment with the sufficient “taint of voluntariness”. 

Turning to the Second Issue, the Judge noted that an iterative process of interpretation had to be followed that gave due weight to the words and commercial purpose of the non-assignment clause, as well as the factual matrix and commercial common sense. The Judge noted that the wording of the non-assignment clause was intentionally broad with the only limitation imposed being the following words which required the assignment to be: “ by any party to any third party” (emphasis added). That wording, the Judge reasoned, invited one to consider the cause of the assignment rather than the mechanism by which it took place – this, the Judge said, was in line with the approach outlined by the authorities. 

Since MBA had, amongst other things, chosen of its own volition to take out insurance, to do so under a system of non-English law which provided for assignment instead of subrogation, and to make a claim under that insurance, the Judge concluded that MBA had voluntarily caused the assignment, thereby falling provisionally within the scope of the wording of the non-assignment clause. 

The Judge then considered the context/commercial purpose indications. Whilst accepting the logic of the Insurer’s argument – that if an English subrogation is not caught by a non-assignment clause then it is inherently unlikely that the parties intended for the subrogation-equivalent of another legal system to be caught by such clause (not least because the only difference would be the name of the claimant on the arbitration documents) – she ultimately concluded that the context/commercial purpose indications were not weighty enough to displace the position indicated by a consideration of the words. 

The Judge accordingly held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the Insurer’s claim, but did so with an “unusual degree of hesitation”. The Insurer appealed the Judge’s findings on both issues.

Overturning the Judge’s decision, the Court of Appeal (consisting of Sir Geoffrey Vos, Master of the Rolls, Lord Justice Coulson, and Lord Justice Phillips) unanimously held that the Tribunal did have jurisdiction to hear the Insurer’s claim. 

On the First Issue, following a close consideration of the authorities, the Court found that “the old insolvency cases d[id] not enunciate a general principle applicable to the interpretation of non-assignment clauses in commercial contracts.” Those cases simply turned on the nature of the insolvency under which the transfer in question took place. 

Turning to the Second Issue, that of interpretation, the Court noted that the words of the non-assignment clause were clear and unambiguous. The key words that had to be considered were the words: “by any party”. The Court of Appeal rejected the causal analysis taken by the High Court and Dassault, and noted that “[t]he correct question was whether the transfer was made by MBA, not whether the transfer was caused as a consequence of certain actions taken by MBA.” 

The Court of Appeal found that the non-assignment clause therefore prevented any assignment which was effected by a party to the sale contract, but not a transfer that was effected by operation of law. As it was common ground between the parties (and had been unanimously decided by the Tribunal) that MBA’s claims against Dassault had been assigned to the Insurer pursuant to Japanese statutory law, that was an assignment by operation of law and not within the scope of the non-assignment clause. 

The Court of Appeal considered that the meaning of the non-assignment clause was clear and unambiguous and that the High Court had erred in thinking that there were two possible meanings to the non-assignment clause. As such, it was not “necessary to consider whether the commercial matrix of fact points in favour of one of two possible meanings of [the clause]”, but the Court did note in obiter that it was “far from clear” that the non-assignment clause was intended to “catch transfers arising from insurance payouts, by whatever law those insurance contracts might be governed”. 

The Court of Appeal accordingly allowed the appeal and reinstated the Tribunal’s award. 

Dassault has sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Court of Appeal’s decision should bring some comfort to insurers that an assignment to an insurer by operation of law is unlikely to fall foul of a prohibition on assignment clause. However, the Court did not go so far as to say that there is a general principle to that effect. Parties will therefore be well advised to closely scrutinise any non-assignment clauses and to ensure that they have been drafted in as clear terms as possible (given the Court of Appeal’s emphasis on the interpretation and wording of the individual clause).

Where the parties envisage insurance being taken out, an express carve out, if possible, should be provided in the non-assignment clause in favour of insurers. Furthermore, when insuring under a non-English law and seeking to rely on subrogation or analogous rights, parties should make enquiries as to the mechanism of transfer under that non-English law to ensure it does not fall foul of any non-assignment/transfer clause. 

Ultimately, the Court of Appeal’s rejection of the Judge’s causal analysis (voluntary vs involuntary) and its application to non-assignment clauses in commercial contracts is welcomed as it avoids an approach that would be replete with practical difficulties.  

The Appellant was represented by Zayba Drabu, Cloudesley Long, and Yiannis Charalambous of Norton Rose Fulbright LLP together with Chris Smith KC and Benjamin Joseph of Quadrant Chambers.

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Delaware Court holds anti-assignment clause prevents enforcement of contract after merger

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On September 16, 2020, the Superior Court of Delaware issued an order with potential implications for companies contemplating acquisitions of businesses or assets.  In MTA Can. Royalty Corp. v. Compania Minera Pangea , S.A. De C.V. , No. N19C-11-228 AML CCLD, 2020 Del. Super. LEXIS 2780 (Sept. 16, 2020), Judge Abigail M. LeGrow held that, following a merger,[1] the surviving company lacked standing to enforce a contract entered into by its predecessor (the non-surviving company in the merger) because the contract’s anti-assignment clause prohibited assignment “by operation of law”. 

Companies considering acquisitions should carefully review their target’s contracts for anti-assignment clauses that prohibit assignment “by operation of law”, which Delaware courts interpret to include certain mergers.  In addition, where a target’s key contracts contain anti-assignment clauses with such language, companies should carefully consider the preferred transaction structure.  In a reverse triangular merger, the acquirer’s newly formed subsidiary is merged into the target, with the result being that the target survives and becomes the acquirer’s subsidiary.  By contrast, in a forward triangular merger, the target does not “survive” and its rights are transferred to the existing subsidiary, which may implicate anti-assignment clauses.  Reverse triangular mergers do not face the same issue because the target continues its corporate existence as a subsidiary of the acquirer.

Background of the contract and subsequent merger

In 2016, Compania Minera Pangea, S.A. de C.V. (“CMP”) purchased mineral rights in the El Gallo Mine from 1570926 Alberta Ltd. (“Alberta”).  In exchange, CMP paid Alberta $5.25m in cash at closing and agreed to pay Alberta an additional $1m in 2018 subject to certain conditions.  Of note, the agreement contained the following anti-assignment clause (the “Anti-Assignment Clause”):

Neither this Agreement nor any of the rights, interests or obligations under this Agreement may be assigned or delegated, in whole or in part, by operation of law or otherwise, by [Alberta] without the prior written consent of each other party, and any such assignment without such prior written consent shall be null and void. . . . [T]his Agreement will be binding upon, inure to the benefit of, and be enforceable by, the parties and their respective successors and assigns.

In July 2017, Alberta merged with Global Royalty Corp. (“Global”), a subsidiary of Metalla Royalty & Streaming Ltd., and Global was the surviving entity.  Following that transaction, Global changed its name to MTA Canada Royalty Corp. (“MTA”).  In November 2019, MTA brought a breach of contract claim against CMP based on CMP’s alleged failure to pay the $1m in consideration due in 2018.

Superior Court holds that anti-assignment clause extends to certain mergers

CMP argued that MTA lacked standing to enforce Alberta’s contract with CMP because, per the Anti-Assignment Clause, Alberta was required to obtain CMP’s written consent before assigning its rights to MTA.  MTA argued that the Anti-Assignment Clause was meant to prevent third-party assignments, not “successor assignments” like Alberta’s merger.   Id. at *11-12.  To make this argument, it relied on a 1993 Chancery decision, in which then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs had held that, subject to certain conditions, anti-assignment clauses do not apply to mergers unless mergers are explicitly prohibited.   Star Cellular Tel. Co. v. Baton Rouge CGSA ., 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, at *25 (July 30, 1993).  According to MTA, because the last sentence of the Anti-Assignment Clause referred to “successors”, it was clearly not intended to extend to mergers.

The Superior Court disagreed.  It explained that, as a result of the merger, Alberta had ceased to exist, so MTA could only enforce the contract if it showed that the Anti-Assignment Clause did not apply.   MTA , at *6.  It then held that the Anti-Assignment Clause clearly barred Alberta’s transfer of rights through a merger because the clause prevented assignment “by operation of law”, which Delaware case law had interpreted as referring to forward triangular mergers.   Id.  at *7-14.  In light of what it regarded as a straightforward application of the Anti-Assignment Clause, the Superior Court did not engage in the  Star Cellular analysis.  The Superior Court found that the reference to “successors” in the Anti-Assignment Clause meant only that “valid successors” had the right to enforce the contract.   Id. at *13.

Potentially at odds with Chancery precedent?

Of special relevance is the Superior Court’s treatment of existing Delaware case law on anti-assignment clauses and forward triangular mergers.  Existing precedent from the Court of Chancery held that anti-assignment clauses containing both a prohibition on assignment “by operation of law” and a reference to “successors” were ambiguous.  Under the Star Cellular test, this ambiguity was construed against the application of the anti-assignment clause. 

Specifically, MTA  appears at odds with the Chancery ruling in Tenneco Auto. Inc. v. El Paso Corp. , which also involved the impact of an anti-assignment clause following a forward triangular merger.  C.A. No. 18810-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26 (Mar. 20, 2002).  The language of the anti-assignment clause in Tenneco  was similar to that in MTA :  both clauses prohibited assignment “by operation of law” while also referencing “successors”.  In Tenneco , Vice Chancellor Noble found that those conflicting references made the anti-assignment clause ambiguous, meaning that, under the Star Cellular test, the successor company could enforce the contract.   Id. at *7-10.  The MTA Court did not explain why it reached the opposite result.

Similarly, in ClubCorp, Inc. v. Pinehurst, LLC , Vice Chancellor Parsons held that, following a forward triangular merger, an anti-assignment clause with language like that in Tenneco was ambiguous because the agreement both referenced “successors” and prohibited assignment “by operation of law”.  No. 5120-VCP, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 176, at *26-29 (Nov. 15, 2011).  Again, the ambiguity militated in favor of finding that the anti-assignment clauses did not apply to the merger.   MTA did not address Pinehurst.

Insights from MTA

MTA has several significant implications for practitioners.  The first is a reminder to carefully review a target’s contracts for anti-assignment clauses.  Such clauses in important contracts should be flagged and thoughtfully evaluated. 

In addition, practitioners should remain aware that Delaware courts interpret the phrase “by operation of law” in assignment clauses to refer to mergers in which the target company does not survive.  The presence of this language in anti-assignment clauses in a target’s important contracts (if those contracts are governed by Delaware law) should prompt a discussion about the appropriate transaction structure.  For example, in MTA , the Court suggested that MTA would have had standing to enforce the contract with CMP if it had been merged through a reverse triangular merger rather than a forward triangular merger.  The Superior Court cited a 2013 Chancery decision, Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH , in which Vice Chancellor Parsons found that “a reverse triangular merger does not constitute an assignment by operation of law”.  62 A.3d 62, 83 (Del. Ch. 2013). 

If dealing with similar language in anti-assignment clauses in important agreements, practitioners should consider alternative transaction structures that would allow the target to retain its corporate existence.  According to MTA , such alternatives should allow successor companies to enforce agreements without running afoul of anti-assignment clauses prohibiting “assignment by operation of law”.[2]

[1] The transaction was an amalgamation under Canadian law, which the parties and the Court agreed was the equivalent of a merger under Delaware law.  The transaction structure was equivalent to a forward triangular merger. 

[2] This may not be true in other jurisdictions.  For example, under California law, a reverse triangular merger has been found to be a transfer of rights by operation of law .  See SQL Sols. v. Oracle Corp. , 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21097, at *8-12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1991). 

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Canada: Anti-Assignment Provisions And Assignments By 'Operation Of Law': What Do I Have To Do? What Should I Do?

Introduction

One of the key roles of legal due diligence in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is to assist in the efficient and successful completion of any proposed M&A transaction. Due diligence is not merely a procedural formality but can serve as a proactive shield against unforeseen challenges and risks. One essential aspect of the legal due diligence process is reviewing third-party contracts to which the target entity is party, in order to better understand the scope of its commercial relationships and to anticipate any issues that may arise via the underlying contractual relationships as a result of completing the proposed M&A transaction.

A frequent reality in many M&A transactions is the requirement to obtain consents from third parties upon the "change of control" of the target entity and/or the transfer or assignment of a third-party contract to which the target is party. Notwithstanding the wording of such contracts, in many instances, the business team from the purchaser will often ask the question: "When is consent actually required?" While anti-assignment and change of control provisions are fairly ubiquitous in commercial contracts, the same cannot be said for when the requirement to obtain consent is actually triggered. The specifics of the proposed transaction's structure will often dictate the purchaser's next steps when deciding whether the sometimes-cumbersome process of obtaining consents with one or multiple third parties is actually needed.

This article examines what anti-assignment provisionsare and how to approach them, depending on the situation at hand, including in the context of transactions where a change of control event may be triggered. This article also discusses how to interpret whether consent is required when faced with an anti-assignment provision which states that an assignment, including an assignment by operation of law , requires consent from the non-assigning party.

Understanding Anti-Assignment Provisions

Generally, an anti-assignment provision prohibits the transfer or assignment of some or all of the assigning party's rights and obligations under the contract in question to another person without the non-assigning party's prior written consent. By way of example, a standard anti-assignment provision in a contract may read as follows:

Company ABC shall not assign or transfer this agreement, in whole or in part, without the prior written consent of Company XYZ.

In this case, Company ABC requires Company XYZ's prior written consent to assign the contract. Seems simple enough. However, not all anti-assignment provisions are cut from the same cloth. For example, some anti-assignment provisions expand on the prohibition against general contractual assignment by including a prohibition against assignment by operation of law or otherwise . As is discussed in greater detail below, the nuanced meaning of this phrase can capture transactions that typically would not trigger a general anti-assignment provision and can also trigger the requirement to get consent from the non-assigning party for practical business reasons.

To explore this further, it is helpful to consider anti-assignment provisions in the two main structures of M&A transactions: (i) asset purchases and (ii) share purchases.

Context of M&A Transactions: Asset Purchases and Share Purchases

There are key differences between what triggers an anti-assignment provision in an asset purchase transaction versus a share purchase transaction.

i) Asset Purchases

An anti-assignment provision in a contract that forms part of the "purchased assets" in an asset deal will normally be triggered in an asset purchase transaction pursuant to which the purchaser acquires some or all of the assets of the target entity, including some or all of its contracts. Because the target entity is no longer the contracting party once the transaction ultimately closes (since it is assigning its rights and obligations under the contract to the purchaser), consent from the non-assigning party will be required to avoid any potential liability, recourse or termination of said contract as a result of the completion of the transaction.

ii) Share Purchases

Provisions which prohibit the assignment or transfer of a contract without the prior approval of the non-assigning party will not normally, under Canadian law, be captured in a share purchase transaction pursuant to which the purchaser acquires a portion or all of the shares of the target entity. In other words, no new entity is becoming party to that same contract. General anti-assignment provisions are not typically triggered by a share purchase because the contracts are not assigned or transferred to another entity and instead there is usually a "change of control" of the target entity. In such cases, the target entity remains the contracting party under the contract and the consent analysis will be premised on whether the contract requires consent of the third party for a "direct" or "indirect" change of control of the target entity and not the assignment of the contract.

Importantly, some anti-assignment provisions include prohibitions against change of control without prior written consent. For example, the provision might state the following:

Company ABC shall not assign or transfer this agreement, in whole or in part, without the prior written approval of Company XYZ. For the purposes of this agreement, any change of control of Company ABC resulting from an amalgamation, corporate reorganization, arrangement, business sale or asset shall be deemed an assignment or transfer.

In that case, a change of control as a result of a share purchase will be deemed an assignment or transfer, and prior written consent will be required.

A step in many share purchase transactions where the target is a Canadian corporation that often occurs on or soon after closing is the amalgamation of the purchasing entity and the target entity. So, what about anti-assignment provisions containing by operation of law language – do amalgamations trigger an assignment by operation of law? The short answer: It depends on the jurisdiction in which the anti-assignment provision is being scrutinized (typically, the governing law of the contract in question).

Assignments by Operation of Law

In Canada, the assignment of a contract as part of an asset sale, or the change of control of a party to a contract pursuant to a share sale – situations not normally effected via legal statute or court-ordered proceeding in M&A transactions – will not in and of itself effect an assignment of that contract by operation of law . 1

Still, one must consider the implications of amalgamations, especially in the context of a proposed transaction when interpreting whether consent is required when an anti-assignment provision contains by operation of law language. Under Canadian law, where nuances often blur the lines within the jurisprudence, an amalgamation will not normally effect the assignment of a contract by operation of law . The same does not necessarily hold true for a Canadian amalgamation scrutinized under U.S. legal doctrines or interpreted by U.S. courts. 2

Difference Between Mergers and Amalgamations

As noted above, after the closing of a share purchase transaction, the purchasing entity will often amalgamate with the target entity ( click here to read more about amalgamations generally). When two companies "merge" in the U.S., we understand that one corporation survives the merger and one ceases to exist which is why, under U.S. law, a merger can result in an assignment by operation of law . While the "merger" concept is commonly used in the U.S., Canadian corporations combine through a process called "amalgamation," a situation where two corporations amalgamate and combine with neither corporation ceasing to exist. For all of our Canadian lawyer readers, you will remember the Supreme Court of Canada's description of an amalgamation as "a river formed by the confluence of two streams, or the creation of a single rope through the intertwining of strands." 3 Generally, each entity survives and shares the pre-existing rights and liabilities of the other, including contractual relationships, as one corporation. 4

MTA Canada Royalty Corp. v. Compania Minera Pangea, S.A. de C.V.

As a practical note and for the reasons below, particularly in cross-border M&A transactions, it would be wise to consider seeking consent where a contract prohibits assignment by operation of law without the prior consent of the other contracting party when your proposed transaction contemplates an amalgamation.

In MTA Canada Royalty Corp. v. Compania Minera Pangea, S.A. de C.V. (a Superior Court of Delaware decision), the court interpreted a Canadian (British Columbia) amalgamation as an assignment by operation of law , irrespective of the fact that the amalgamation was effected via Canadian governing legislation. In essence, the Delaware court applied U.S. merger jurisprudence to a contract involving a Canadian amalgamation because the contract in question was governed by Delaware law. This is despite the fact that, generally, an amalgamation effected under Canadian common law jurisdictions would not constitute an assignment by operation of law if considered by a Canadian court. As previously mentioned, under Canadian law, unlike in Delaware, neither of the amalgamating entities cease to exist and, technically, there is no "surviving" entity as there would be with a U.S.-style merger. That being said, we bring this to your attention to show that it is possible that a U.S. court (if the applicable third-party contract is governed by U.S. law or other foreign laws) or other U.S. counterparties could interpret a Canadian amalgamation to effect an assignment by operation of law . In this case, as prior consent was not obtained as required by the anti-assignment provision of the contract in question, the Delaware court held that the parties to that agreement were bound by the anti-assignment provision's express prohibition against all assignments without the other side's consent. 5

To avoid the same circumstances that resulted from the decision in MTA Canada Royalty Corp. , seeking consent where an anti-assignment provision includes a prohibition against assignment by operation of law without prior consent can be a practical and strategic option when considering transactions involving amalgamations. It is generally further recommended to do so in order to avoid any confusion for all contracting parties post-closing.

Practical Considerations

The consequences of violating anti-assignment provisions can vary. In some cases, the party attempting to complete the assignment is simply required to continue its obligations under the contract but, in others, assignment without prior consent constitutes default under the contract resulting in significant liability for the defaulting party, including potential termination of the contract. This is especially noteworthy for contracts with third parties that are essential to the target entity's revenue and general business functions, as the purchaser would run the risk of losing key contractual relationships that contributed to the success of the target business. As such, identifying assignment provisions and considering whether they are triggered by a change of control and require consent is an important element when reviewing the contracts of a target entity and completing legal due diligence as part of an M&A transaction.

There can be a strategic and/or legal imperative to seek consent in many situations when confronted with contractual clauses that prohibit an assignment, either by operation of law or through other means, absent the explicit approval of the non-assigning party. However, the structure of the proposed transaction will often dictate whether consent is even required in the first place. Without considering this nuanced area of M&A transactions, purchasers not only potentially expose themselves to liability but also risk losing key contractual relationships that significantly drive the value of the transaction.

1. An assignment by operation of law can be interpreted as an involuntary assignment required by legal statute or certain court-ordered proceedings. For instance, an assignment of a contract by operation of law may occur in, among other situations: (i) testamentary dispositions; (ii) court-ordered asset transfers in bankruptcy proceedings; or (iii) court-ordered asset transfers in divorce proceedings.

2. MTA Canada Royalty Corp. v. Compania Minera Pangea, S.A. de C.V ., C. A. No. N19C-11-228 AML, 2020 WL 5554161 (Del. Super. Sept. 16, 2020) [ MTA Canada Royalty Corp. ].

3. R. v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co. , [1975] 1 S.C.R. 411.

4. Certain Canadian jurisdictions, such as the Business Corporations Act (British Columbia), explicitly state that an amalgamation does not constitute an assignment by operation of law (subsection 282(2)).

5. MTA Canada Royalty Corp .

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

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• assignments basic law

Assignments: The Basic Law

The assignment of a right or obligation is a common contractual event under the law and the right to assign (or prohibition against assignments) is found in the majority of agreements, leases and business structural documents created in the United States.

As with many terms commonly used, people are familiar with the term but often are not aware or fully aware of what the terms entail. The concept of assignment of rights and obligations is one of those simple concepts with wide ranging ramifications in the contractual and business context and the law imposes severe restrictions on the validity and effect of assignment in many instances. Clear contractual provisions concerning assignments and rights should be in every document and structure created and this article will outline why such drafting is essential for the creation of appropriate and effective contracts and structures.

The reader should first read the article on Limited Liability Entities in the United States and Contracts since the information in those articles will be assumed in this article.

Basic Definitions and Concepts:

An assignment is the transfer of rights held by one party called the “assignor” to another party called the “assignee.” The legal nature of the assignment and the contractual terms of the agreement between the parties determines some additional rights and liabilities that accompany the assignment. The assignment of rights under a contract usually completely transfers the rights to the assignee to receive the benefits accruing under the contract. Ordinarily, the term assignment is limited to the transfer of rights that are intangible, like contractual rights and rights connected with property. Merchants Service Co. v. Small Claims Court , 35 Cal. 2d 109, 113-114 (Cal. 1950).

An assignment will generally be permitted under the law unless there is an express prohibition against assignment in the underlying contract or lease. Where assignments are permitted, the assignor need not consult the other party to the contract but may merely assign the rights at that time. However, an assignment cannot have any adverse effect on the duties of the other party to the contract, nor can it diminish the chance of the other party receiving complete performance. The assignor normally remains liable unless there is an agreement to the contrary by the other party to the contract.

The effect of a valid assignment is to remove privity between the assignor and the obligor and create privity between the obligor and the assignee. Privity is usually defined as a direct and immediate contractual relationship. See Merchants case above.

Further, for the assignment to be effective in most jurisdictions, it must occur in the present. One does not normally assign a future right; the assignment vests immediate rights and obligations.

No specific language is required to create an assignment so long as the assignor makes clear his/her intent to assign identified contractual rights to the assignee. Since expensive litigation can erupt from ambiguous or vague language, obtaining the correct verbiage is vital. An agreement must manifest the intent to transfer rights and can either be oral or in writing and the rights assigned must be certain.

Note that an assignment of an interest is the transfer of some identifiable property, claim, or right from the assignor to the assignee. The assignment operates to transfer to the assignee all of the rights, title, or interest of the assignor in the thing assigned. A transfer of all rights, title, and interests conveys everything that the assignor owned in the thing assigned and the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor. Knott v. McDonald’s Corp ., 985 F. Supp. 1222 (N.D. Cal. 1997)

The parties must intend to effectuate an assignment at the time of the transfer, although no particular language or procedure is necessary. As long ago as the case of National Reserve Co. v. Metropolitan Trust Co ., 17 Cal. 2d 827 (Cal. 1941), the court held that in determining what rights or interests pass under an assignment, the intention of the parties as manifested in the instrument is controlling.

The intent of the parties to an assignment is a question of fact to be derived not only from the instrument executed by the parties but also from the surrounding circumstances. When there is no writing to evidence the intention to transfer some identifiable property, claim, or right, it is necessary to scrutinize the surrounding circumstances and parties’ acts to ascertain their intentions. Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Servs., 295 Ill. App. 3d 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998)

The general rule applicable to assignments of choses in action is that an assignment, unless there is a contract to the contrary, carries with it all securities held by the assignor as collateral to the claim and all rights incidental thereto and vests in the assignee the equitable title to such collateral securities and incidental rights. An unqualified assignment of a contract or chose in action, however, with no indication of the intent of the parties, vests in the assignee the assigned contract or chose and all rights and remedies incidental thereto.

More examples: In Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Servs ., 295 Ill. App. 3d 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998), the court held that the assignee of a party to a subordination agreement is entitled to the benefits and is subject to the burdens of the agreement. In Florida E. C. R. Co. v. Eno , 99 Fla. 887 (Fla. 1930), the court held that the mere assignment of all sums due in and of itself creates no different or other liability of the owner to the assignee than that which existed from the owner to the assignor.

And note that even though an assignment vests in the assignee all rights, remedies, and contingent benefits which are incidental to the thing assigned, those which are personal to the assignor and for his sole benefit are not assigned. Rasp v. Hidden Valley Lake, Inc ., 519 N.E.2d 153, 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). Thus, if the underlying agreement provides that a service can only be provided to X, X cannot assign that right to Y.

Novation Compared to Assignment:

Although the difference between a novation and an assignment may appear narrow, it is an essential one. “Novation is a act whereby one party transfers all its obligations and benefits under a contract to a third party.” In a novation, a third party successfully substitutes the original party as a party to the contract. “When a contract is novated, the other contracting party must be left in the same position he was in prior to the novation being made.”

A sublease is the transfer when a tenant retains some right of reentry onto the leased premises. However, if the tenant transfers the entire leasehold estate, retaining no right of reentry or other reversionary interest, then the transfer is an assignment. The assignor is normally also removed from liability to the landlord only if the landlord consents or allowed that right in the lease. In a sublease, the original tenant is not released from the obligations of the original lease.

Equitable Assignments:

An equitable assignment is one in which one has a future interest and is not valid at law but valid in a court of equity. In National Bank of Republic v. United Sec. Life Ins. & Trust Co. , 17 App. D.C. 112 (D.C. Cir. 1900), the court held that to constitute an equitable assignment of a chose in action, the following has to occur generally: anything said written or done, in pursuance of an agreement and for valuable consideration, or in consideration of an antecedent debt, to place a chose in action or fund out of the control of the owner, and appropriate it to or in favor of another person, amounts to an equitable assignment. Thus, an agreement, between a debtor and a creditor, that the debt shall be paid out of a specific fund going to the debtor may operate as an equitable assignment.

In Egyptian Navigation Co. v. Baker Invs. Corp. , 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30804 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2008), the court stated that an equitable assignment occurs under English law when an assignor, with an intent to transfer his/her right to a chose in action, informs the assignee about the right so transferred.

An executory agreement or a declaration of trust are also equitable assignments if unenforceable as assignments by a court of law but enforceable by a court of equity exercising sound discretion according to the circumstances of the case. Since California combines courts of equity and courts of law, the same court would hear arguments as to whether an equitable assignment had occurred. Quite often, such relief is granted to avoid fraud or unjust enrichment.

Note that obtaining an assignment through fraudulent means invalidates the assignment. Fraud destroys the validity of everything into which it enters. It vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments. Walker v. Rich , 79 Cal. App. 139 (Cal. App. 1926). If an assignment is made with the fraudulent intent to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors, then it is void as fraudulent in fact. See our article on Transfers to Defraud Creditors .

But note that the motives that prompted an assignor to make the transfer will be considered as immaterial and will constitute no defense to an action by the assignee, if an assignment is considered as valid in all other respects.

Enforceability of Assignments:

Whether a right under a contract is capable of being transferred is determined by the law of the place where the contract was entered into. The validity and effect of an assignment is determined by the law of the place of assignment. The validity of an assignment of a contractual right is governed by the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the assignment and the parties.

In some jurisdictions, the traditional conflict of laws rules governing assignments has been rejected and the law of the place having the most significant contacts with the assignment applies. In Downs v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co ., 14 N.Y.2d 266 (N.Y. 1964), a wife and her husband separated and the wife obtained a judgment of separation from the husband in New York. The judgment required the husband to pay a certain yearly sum to the wife. The husband assigned 50 percent of his future salary, wages, and earnings to the wife. The agreement authorized the employer to make such payments to the wife.

After the husband moved from New York, the wife learned that he was employed by an employer in Massachusetts. She sent the proper notice and demanded payment under the agreement. The employer refused and the wife brought an action for enforcement. The court observed that Massachusetts did not prohibit assignment of the husband’s wages. Moreover, Massachusetts law was not controlling because New York had the most significant relationship with the assignment. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the wife.

Therefore, the validity of an assignment is determined by looking to the law of the forum with the most significant relationship to the assignment itself. To determine the applicable law of assignments, the court must look to the law of the state which is most significantly related to the principal issue before it.

Assignment of Contractual Rights:

Generally, the law allows the assignment of a contractual right unless the substitution of rights would materially change the duty of the obligor, materially increase the burden or risk imposed on the obligor by the contract, materially impair the chance of obtaining return performance, or materially reduce the value of the performance to the obligor. Restat 2d of Contracts, § 317(2)(a). This presumes that the underlying agreement is silent on the right to assign.

If the contract specifically precludes assignment, the contractual right is not assignable. Whether a contract is assignable is a matter of contractual intent and one must look to the language used by the parties to discern that intent.

In the absence of an express provision to the contrary, the rights and duties under a bilateral executory contract that does not involve personal skill, trust, or confidence may be assigned without the consent of the other party. But note that an assignment is invalid if it would materially alter the other party’s duties and responsibilities. Once an assignment is effective, the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and assumes all of assignor’s rights. Hence, after a valid assignment, the assignor’s right to performance is extinguished, transferred to assignee, and the assignee possesses the same rights, benefits, and remedies assignor once possessed. Robert Lamb Hart Planners & Architects v. Evergreen, Ltd. , 787 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1992).

On the other hand, an assignee’s right against the obligor is subject to “all of the limitations of the assignor’s right, all defenses thereto, and all set-offs and counterclaims which would have been available against the assignor had there been no assignment, provided that these defenses and set-offs are based on facts existing at the time of the assignment.” See Robert Lamb , case, above.

The power of the contract to restrict assignment is broad. Usually, contractual provisions that restrict assignment of the contract without the consent of the obligor are valid and enforceable, even when there is statutory authorization for the assignment. The restriction of the power to assign is often ineffective unless the restriction is expressly and precisely stated. Anti-assignment clauses are effective only if they contain clear, unambiguous language of prohibition. Anti-assignment clauses protect only the obligor and do not affect the transaction between the assignee and assignor.

Usually, a prohibition against the assignment of a contract does not prevent an assignment of the right to receive payments due, unless circumstances indicate the contrary. Moreover, the contracting parties cannot, by a mere non-assignment provision, prevent the effectual alienation of the right to money which becomes due under the contract.

A contract provision prohibiting or restricting an assignment may be waived, or a party may so act as to be estopped from objecting to the assignment, such as by effectively ratifying the assignment. The power to void an assignment made in violation of an anti-assignment clause may be waived either before or after the assignment. See our article on Contracts.

Noncompete Clauses and Assignments:

Of critical import to most buyers of businesses is the ability to ensure that key employees of the business being purchased cannot start a competing company. Some states strictly limit such clauses, some do allow them. California does restrict noncompete clauses, only allowing them under certain circumstances. A common question in those states that do allow them is whether such rights can be assigned to a new party, such as the buyer of the buyer.

A covenant not to compete, also called a non-competitive clause, is a formal agreement prohibiting one party from performing similar work or business within a designated area for a specified amount of time. This type of clause is generally included in contracts between employer and employee and contracts between buyer and seller of a business.

Many workers sign a covenant not to compete as part of the paperwork required for employment. It may be a separate document similar to a non-disclosure agreement, or buried within a number of other clauses in a contract. A covenant not to compete is generally legal and enforceable, although there are some exceptions and restrictions.

Whenever a company recruits skilled employees, it invests a significant amount of time and training. For example, it often takes years before a research chemist or a design engineer develops a workable knowledge of a company’s product line, including trade secrets and highly sensitive information. Once an employee gains this knowledge and experience, however, all sorts of things can happen. The employee could work for the company until retirement, accept a better offer from a competing company or start up his or her own business.

A covenant not to compete may cover a number of potential issues between employers and former employees. Many companies spend years developing a local base of customers or clients. It is important that this customer base not fall into the hands of local competitors. When an employee signs a covenant not to compete, he or she usually agrees not to use insider knowledge of the company’s customer base to disadvantage the company. The covenant not to compete often defines a broad geographical area considered off-limits to former employees, possibly tens or hundreds of miles.

Another area of concern covered by a covenant not to compete is a potential ‘brain drain’. Some high-level former employees may seek to recruit others from the same company to create new competition. Retention of employees, especially those with unique skills or proprietary knowledge, is vital for most companies, so a covenant not to compete may spell out definite restrictions on the hiring or recruiting of employees.

A covenant not to compete may also define a specific amount of time before a former employee can seek employment in a similar field. Many companies offer a substantial severance package to make sure former employees are financially solvent until the terms of the covenant not to compete have been met.

Because the use of a covenant not to compete can be controversial, a handful of states, including California, have largely banned this type of contractual language. The legal enforcement of these agreements falls on individual states, and many have sided with the employee during arbitration or litigation. A covenant not to compete must be reasonable and specific, with defined time periods and coverage areas. If the agreement gives the company too much power over former employees or is ambiguous, state courts may declare it to be overbroad and therefore unenforceable. In such case, the employee would be free to pursue any employment opportunity, including working for a direct competitor or starting up a new company of his or her own.

It has been held that an employee’s covenant not to compete is assignable where one business is transferred to another, that a merger does not constitute an assignment of a covenant not to compete, and that a covenant not to compete is enforceable by a successor to the employer where the assignment does not create an added burden of employment or other disadvantage to the employee. However, in some states such as Hawaii, it has also been held that a covenant not to compete is not assignable and under various statutes for various reasons that such covenants are not enforceable against an employee by a successor to the employer. Hawaii v. Gannett Pac. Corp. , 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Haw. 1999)

It is vital to obtain the relevant law of the applicable state before drafting or attempting to enforce assignment rights in this particular area.

Conclusion:

In the current business world of fast changing structures, agreements, employees and projects, the ability to assign rights and obligations is essential to allow flexibility and adjustment to new situations. Conversely, the ability to hold a contracting party into the deal may be essential for the future of a party. Thus, the law of assignments and the restriction on same is a critical aspect of every agreement and every structure. This basic provision is often glanced at by the contracting parties, or scribbled into the deal at the last minute but can easily become the most vital part of the transaction.

As an example, one client of ours came into the office outraged that his co venturer on a sizable exporting agreement, who had excellent connections in Brazil, had elected to pursue another venture instead and assigned the agreement to a party unknown to our client and without the business contacts our client considered vital. When we examined the handwritten agreement our client had drafted in a restaurant in Sao Paolo, we discovered there was no restriction on assignment whatsoever…our client had not even considered that right when drafting the agreement after a full day of work.

One choses who one does business with carefully…to ensure that one’s choice remains the party on the other side of the contract, one must master the ability to negotiate proper assignment provisions.

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Assignment is a legal term whereby an individual, the “assignor,” transfers rights, property, or other benefits to another known as the “ assignee .”   This concept is used in both contract and property law.  The term can refer to either the act of transfer or the rights /property/benefits being transferred.

Contract Law   

Under contract law, assignment of a contract is both: (1) an assignment of rights; and (2) a delegation of duties , in the absence of evidence otherwise.  For example, if A contracts with B to teach B guitar for $50, A can assign this contract to C.  That is, this assignment is both: (1) an assignment of A’s rights under the contract to the $50; and (2) a delegation of A’s duty to teach guitar to C.  In this example, A is both the “assignor” and the “delegee” who d elegates the duties to another (C), C is known as the “ obligor ” who must perform the obligations to the assignee , and B is the “ assignee ” who is owed duties and is liable to the “ obligor ”.

(1) Assignment of Rights/Duties Under Contract Law

There are a few notable rules regarding assignments under contract law.  First, if an individual has not yet secured the contract to perform duties to another, he/she cannot assign his/her future right to an assignee .  That is, if A has not yet contracted with B to teach B guitar, A cannot assign his/her rights to C.  Second, rights cannot be assigned when they materially change the obligor ’s duty and rights.  Third, the obligor can sue the assignee directly if the assignee does not pay him/her.  Following the previous example, this means that C ( obligor ) can sue B ( assignee ) if C teaches guitar to B, but B does not pay C $50 in return.

            (2) Delegation of Duties

If the promised performance requires a rare genius or skill, then the delegee cannot delegate it to the obligor.  It can only be delegated if the promised performance is more commonplace.  Further, an obligee can sue if the assignee does not perform.  However, the delegee is secondarily liable unless there has been an express release of the delegee.  That is, if B does want C to teach guitar but C refuses to, then B can sue C.  If C still refuses to perform, then B can compel A to fulfill the duties under secondary liability.

Lastly, a related concept is novation , which is when a new obligor substitutes and releases an old obligor.  If novation occurs, then the original obligor’s duties are wiped out. However, novation requires an original obligee’s consent .  

Property Law

Under property law, assignment typically arises in landlord-tenant situations.  For example, A might be renting from landlord B but wants to another party (C) to take over the property.   In this scenario, A might be able to choose between assigning and subleasing the property to C.  If assigning , A would be giving C the entire balance of the term, with no reversion to anyone whereas if subleasing , A would be giving C for a limited period of the remaining term.  Significantly, under assignment C would have privity of estate with the landlord while under a sublease, C would not. 

[Last updated in May of 2020 by the Wex Definitions Team ]

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Crime and Public Safety | Arrests, car recoveries and gun seizures rise…

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Crime and Public Safety

Crime and public safety | arrests, car recoveries and gun seizures rise in oakland after state law-enforcement surge, naacp leader says it’s a good start but more is needed to make oaklanders feel safe.

OAKLAND — A law enforcement surge involving several undercover sting operations over the past eight weeks has led to 181 arrests, the seizure of more than 30 guns linked with crimes and the recovery of 414 stolen vehicles, state authorities said Wednesday.

It may even get Oaklanders — fatigued by headlines and frequent complaints about the city’s crime problem — feeling a bit safer if the trend continues, observers said.

The surge by the California Highway Patrol began in February and has targeted auto theft, cargo theft, retail crime, violent crime and added high-visibility traffic enforcement. Gov. Gavin Newsom said in March that the state was installing a network of 480 high-tech cameras in Oakland and the East Bay to help state and local law enforcement identify vehicles linked to crimes.

“Carjackers, drug traffickers and thieves need to be arrested and held accountable for their crimes,” Newsom said in a statement. “The state will continue to support local law enforcement in Oakland and across California to effectively combat criminal activity and hold perpetrators accountable.”

Among the charges facing those who have been arrested are possession of stolen property, auto theft, transportation of narcotics, DUI and felony gun possession, authorities said. Suspects also were arrested on outstanding warrants.

The initial surge in January and February resulted in 71 arrests, 145 stolen cars recovered and the seizure of four guns used in crimes.

“No question about it,” Harris said, when asked if the surge by authorities has been noticeable. “Anytime you can have that many vehicles recovered, that makes a difference. And all of those arrests — all of these are critical to Oakland in terms of increasing the safety goals.”

According to Newsom, California has invested $1.1 billion since 2019 to fight crime.

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