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The Tactics and Targets of Domestic Terrorists

Photo: LOGAN CYRUS/AFP/Getty Images

Table of Contents

Brief by Seth G. Jones , Catrina Doxsee , and Nicholas Harrington

Published July 30, 2020

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CSIS Briefs

With a rise in domestic terrorism, it is increasingly important to analyze trends in terrorist tactics and targets. According to CSIS data, firearms were the most common weapon used in fatal attacks over the past five years by far-right, far-left, and Salafi-jihadist terrorists. In addition, the most common targets were individuals based on their ethnicity, race, or religion (such as African Americans, Latinos, Jews, and Muslims) for right-wing extremists; and government, military, and police targets for left-wing extremists and Salafi-jihadists.

On May 29, Air Force Staff Sergeant Steven Carrillo, a supporter of the “boogaloo boys” who wanted to ignite a civil war, used a firearm to kill protective security officer Patrick Underwood and critically wound a second officer in Oakland, California. 1 On May 24, FBI agents arrested Muhammed Momtaz Al-Azhari in Tampa, Florida, for purchasing multiple firearms to conduct mass-casualty attacks in the Tampa area, including at beaches. He was inspired by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, and he remarked to a confidential human source from the FBI, “I want to die, you know, in a shootout with the kuffar [disbelievers] . . . I want to take at least 50 [lives].” 2 On April 15, FBI agents arrested John Michael Rathbun in East Longmeadow, Massachusetts, after he allegedly placed an improvised explosive device outside the entrance of Ruth’s House, a predominantly Jewish assisted-living residence. 3 In July 2019, Willem Van Spronsen, a self-proclaimed anarchist, attacked a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention center with an AR-15 semi-automatic rifle and attempted to ignite a 500-gallon propane tank. 4

These cases involved a wide range of weapons (such as firearms and homemade bombs) and targets (such as police officers, beaches, a religious-affiliated institution, and a U.S. government facility). While there has been concern about a rise in domestic terrorism in the United States, including before and after the November 2020 presidential election, there has been less public attention about domestic terrorist tactics and targets. Consequently, this analysis asks several questions. What are the major tactics and targets used by domestic terrorists, and how have they evolved over time? How do tactics and targets differ by far-right, far-left, and Salafi-jihadist extremists? What are the policy implications? To answer these questions, this analysis compiles and analyzes an original CSIS data set of terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 1994, and May 8, 2020. There is a link to the methodology at the end of this analysis.

The analysis leads to several conclusions. First, it will be virtually impossible to stop domestic terrorism through reactive, defensive measures alone. The most frequent weapons used by far-right, far-left, and Salafi-jihadist individuals in lethal attacks were firearms, which are widely available in the United States. In fact, FBI data indicate that in 2020 gun purchases were at their highest levels ever . 5 Other types of weapons—such as vehicles, melee devices (including hammers and knives), and the components for homemade explosives—are also widely available. In addition, some of the primary targets include public locations, which are difficult to protect from attacks.

Second, successful prevention will require more proactive measures. One is sustained targeting of extremist ideologies that espouse violence on social media platforms. Another is improving local intelligence. Unlike with international terrorism on U.S. soil—which often requires top-down intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and foreign partners operating overseas—domestic terrorism is inherently bottom-up. State and local law enforcement agencies have a particularly important role to play in collecting intelligence “left of boom”—before an attack—not just the Joint Terrorism Task Forces and Fusion Centers. Yet many state and local law enforcement agencies do not have a single point of contact for counterterrorism intelligence, creating a potential blind spot as the threat from domestic terrorism rises.

The rest of this report is divided into four sections. The first examines targets and tactics of right-wing terrorist individuals and networks. The second section analyzes the targets and tactics of left-wing terrorists. The third assesses targets and tactics of those inspired by a Salafi-jihadist ideology. The fourth section outlines policy implications.

Definitions

As used here, a tactic refers to the method of employing a weapon to achieve a terrorist objective, such as assassinations, armed assaults, bombings, and hijackings. In particular, we focus on the weapons used by domestic terrorists, such as firearms, explosives, melee devices, vehicles, and incendiary devices. A target includes the object of the attack, such as transportation locations, religious institutions, government personnel, or businesses.

This analysis defines terrorism as the deliberate use—or threat—of violence by non-state actors in order to achieve political goals and create a broad psychological impact. 6 Violence and the threat of violence are important components of terrorism. Overall, this analysis divides terrorism into four broad categories: right-wing, left-wing, religious, and ethnonationalist. 7 Terms like right-wing and left-wing terrorism do not—in any way—correspond to mainstream political parties in the United States, such as the Republican and Democratic parties, which eschew terrorism. Instead, terrorism is orchestrated by a small minority of extremists.

First, right-wing terrorism refers to the use or threat of violence by sub-national or non-state entities whose goals may include racial or ethnic supremacy; opposition to government authority; anger at women, including from the involuntary celibate (or “incel”) movement; and outrage against certain policies, such as abortion. 8 Second, left-wing terrorism involves the use or threat of violence by sub-national or non-state entities that oppose capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism; advocate black nationalism; pursue environmental or animal rights issues; espouse pro-communist or pro-socialist beliefs; or support a decentralized social and political system such as anarchism. 9 Third, religious terrorism includes violence in support of a faith-based belief system, such as Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and Hinduism. The primary threat from religious terrorists in the United States comes from Salafi-jihadists inspired by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. 10 Fourth, ethnonationalist terrorism refers to violence in support of ethnic or nationalist goals, which often include struggles of self-determination and separatism along ethnic or nationalist lines. Due to the relatively low levels of ethnonationalist terrorism in the United States, this brief does not address the targets and tactics of ethnonationalist terrorists. 11

There are several other caveats regarding this analysis. To begin with, it does not focus on hate crimes. There is an overlap between terrorism and hate crimes since some hate crimes include the use or threat of violence. 12 But hate crimes can also include non-violent incidents such as graffiti and verbal abuse. Hate crimes are obviously concerning and a threat to society, but this analysis concentrates only on terrorism and the use—or threat—of violence to achieve political objectives.

In addition, while there is often a desire among government officials and academics to focus on terrorist groups , the terrorism landscape in the United States is highly decentralized, including among right-wing and left-wing extremists. Many are formally or informally organized around the concept of “leaderless resistance,” which shuns a centralized, hierarchical organization in favor of decentralized networks or individual activity. 13 The decentralized nature of terrorism in the United States is particularly noteworthy in regard to the use of violence, which our data suggests is often planned and orchestrated by a single individual or small network. Consequently, this analysis frequently refers to terrorist individuals and networks, rather than groups.

Right-wing Terrorism

Over the past five years, most right-wing attacks targeted individuals—generally because of their ethnic, racial, or religious background—or religious institutions. In addition, firearms were the most frequent weapons in lethal attacks.

There were 411 right-wing attacks in the data set between 1994 and 2020. 14 The most frequent types of right-wing targets over this span included: abortion-related targets, such as women’s health clinics and medical staff (27 percent); private individuals and property, primarily selected due to race, ethnicity, or religion (25 percent); religious institutions, particularly synagogues, mosques, and churches (21 percent); and government, military, and police facilities and personnel (13 percent). But the targets of right-wing terrorist attacks have shifted over time.

Between 2015 and 2020, the largest percentage of targets (42 percent) were against private individuals—such as African Americans and Latinos—and locations associated with them. In August 2019, for example, Patrick Crusius perpetrated an attack against Latinos at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas. Crusius claimed he was acting in response to a “Hispanic invasion of Texas” and warned that white people were being replaced by foreigners. 15 The second-highest percentage of targets (32 percent) were religious institutions. In April 2019, John T. Earnest entered the Chabad of Poway synagogue in Poway, California, with a Smith & Wesson Model M&P 15 Sport II semi-automatic rifle, killing one person and wounding three others. 16 In October 2018, Robert Bowers entered the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and opened fire during a service, killing 11 people and wounding 6 others, including 4 police officers. 17 The third most common type of right-wing target between 2015 and 2020 included government, military, and police locations, which comprised 8 percent of right-wing attacks. In April 2020, Texas police arrested Aaron Swenson, a supporter of the boogaloo movement. He had stockpiled guns, planned to kill a police officer, and then posted his intentions on Facebook Live while driving a late model black Chevrolet truck searching for a police officer to ambush. 18

This shift in targets may have been caused by an upsurge in white supremacist activity and a decline in anti-abortion extremism. During the 1990s, the highest percentage of right-wing attacks focused on abortion-related targets. But a decrease in these types of plots and attacks suggests that there are fewer individuals inspired by anti-abortion views. Instead, there has been a rise in white supremacist activity. The reasons are complex and could include: the effective use of the internet and social media by white supremacists to conduct important tasks, such as issuing propaganda, raising funds, and recruiting members; a growth in physical and virtual contacts between white supremacists across the globe; and exogenous factors, such as the election of Barack Obama as president, the subsequent election of Donald Trump as president, and rising concerns about immigration. 19

Tactics and Weapons

Left-wing Terrorism

Over the past five years, left-wing terrorists primarily targeted government, military, and police facilities or personnel, followed by businesses and infrastructure targets. As with right-wing extremists, firearms accounted for the majority of fatal left-wing attacks.

Based on the 219 left-wing attacks in the data set between 1994 and 2020, the most frequent types of left-wing targets included: businesses, particularly in industries involving animals or lumber (52 percent); government, military, and police facilities or personnel (17 percent); private individuals or property, particularly related to their involvement in environmental issues, animal rights, or right-wing politics (17 percent); and educational institutions, particularly those conducting research on animals (7 percent).

The focus of left-wing terrorist attacks has shifted from 1994 to the present. Between 1994 and 2004, most left-wing targets were businesses, particularly lumber companies and companies in the meat and fur industries. Between 2006 and 2009, there was a particularly heavy focus by extremist animal rights groups on universities and labs conducting research on animals. Over time, however, left-wing terrorists shifted to government, military, and police targets. This change appears to reflect an evolution in left-wing extremism in the United States from a focus on the environment and animal rights to anarchism and anti-fascism—with a particular emphasis on opposing the government and corporations. This shift also appears to be occurring in Europe. According to the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), numerous left-wing extremists are motivated by anarchist views, along with “anti-fascism, anti-racism, and perceived state repression.” 21

Between 2015 and 2019, 36 percent of left-wing attacks targeted government, military, and police facilities or personnel. 22 For example, in July 2019, Willem Van Spronsen attempted to bomb the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention facility in Tacoma, Washington. 23 Prior to the attack he sent several people a manifesto, which argued that detention camps “are an abomination,” complained that “in these days fascist hooligans [are] preying on vulnerable people on our streets,” and apologized that he would “miss the rest of the revolution.” 24 Meanwhile, 22 percent of left-wing attacks since 2015 targeted businesses and 17 percent targeted transportation and infrastructure. The remainder targeted private individuals and property (14 percent), religious institutions (8 percent), or educational institutions (3 percent).

Explosives and incendiaries were by far the most common weapon used by left-wing terrorists. However, firearms have been increasingly common in left-wing attacks, and they account for the majority of fatal left-wing attacks. For example, in June 2017, James Hodgkinson opened fire on a congressional Republican baseball practice. Six people were injured, including House Majority Whip Steve Scalise and Representative Roger Williams, before police shot and killed Hodgkinson. 25 As shown in Figure 5, 81 percent of all left-wing attacks between 1994 and 2019 involved explosives and incendiaries. 26 For instance, in December 2018, Elizabeth Lecron purchased black powder and screws in an attempt to bomb a pipeline she believed was polluting a local river. 27

Religious Terrorism

Salafi-jihadists inspired by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State accounted for most religious attacks in the data set. Over the past five years, Salafi-jihadists primarily attacked government, military, and police targets, though some of the most lethal targets included nightclubs and public locations like pedestrian paths. Much like right-wing and left-wing terrorists, Salafi-jihadists used firearms in most fatal attacks.

Between 1994 and 2020, the most frequent targets of Salafi-jihadists included: government, military, and police facilities and personnel (41 percent); private individuals or property (22 percent); businesses (12 percent); and transportation and infrastructure (12 percent). The proportion of religious terrorist targets remained fairly consistent between 1994 and 2020. 29

Between 2015 and 2020, Salafi-jihadists targeted government, military, and police facilities and personnel (43 percent); private individuals and property (18 percent); businesses (14 percent); transportation and infrastructure (14 percent); educational institutions (7 percent); and religious institutions (4 percent). Unlike right-wing or left-wing terrorists, Salafi-jihadists indiscriminately targeted private individuals and businesses. These attackers frequently intended to send a broad message to American society. Some of the most lethal targets were public venues. For example, in October 2017, Sayfullo Saipov, who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, indiscriminately killed 8 people and injured 11 more when he drove a rental truck on a bike path on the West Side Highway in Lower Manhattan, New York City. 30 In June 2016, Omar Mateen, who pledged allegiance to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, killed 49 people and wounded 53 others at a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida. 31

Unlike right-wing and left-wing terrorists, religious terrorists have not overwhelmingly used one type of weapon. Explosives, incendiaries, and firearms were most commonly used in religious terrorist attacks overall, though firearms and melee weapons (such as knives) were the most common over the last five years.

As shown in Figure 6, terrorists used explosives and incendiaries and firearms in 31 percent of the 49 religious attacks between 1994 and 2020. 32 Melee weapons, particularly knives or other sharp objects, were the second most frequently used weapon, accounting for 20 percent of attacks overall. The remainder of attacks involved either vehicles (10 percent) or threats or hoaxes (8 percent).

Between 2015 and 2020, the proportion of melee attacks increased and matched firearms as the most commonly used weapon type at 32 percent. Salafi-jihadists used explosives and incendiaries in 18 percent and vehicles in 4 percent of attacks—both less frequently than average. The high percentage of attacks using firearms and melee weapons might be caused by the guidance provided by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, which encouraged individuals to use simple and easily accessible weapons. The series “Just Terror Tactics,” which first appeared in Rumiyyah magazine, encouraged individuals to conduct low-budget attacks, such as knife attacks and hostage-taking. 33 An article in al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine titled “The Ultimate Mowing Machine” recommended: “A random hit at a crowded restaurant in Washington, D.C. at lunch hour for example might end up knocking out a few government employees.” It continued that an attack with firearms required little preparation and was the “fastest operation to perform.” 34

Policy Implications: Bottom-up Intelligence

Despite a 50 percent decline in terrorism across the globe between 2014 and 2019, the number of terrorist attacks in the United States has increased over the same period by 141 percent, according to CSIS data. 36 This may explain why public opinion polls show that Americans continue to rank terrorism as a significant threat. According to one poll published in 2020, 73 percent of Americans considered terrorism a major threat, second only to the spread of infectious diseases such as Covid-19. 37

Our data suggest that the threat of terrorism in the United States will likely increase over the next year based on several events, such as the November 2020 presidential election, the response to the Covid-19 crisis, and other polarizing events such as racially-motivated killings. 38 These exogenous events can cause a “tip” or “cascade” that increases the possibility of terrorist violence. 39 Events such as an election can increase political entrepreneurs’ desire to use inflammatory language and raise the perceived stakes of winning and losing to such a degree that it leads to what Nobel Prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling called “excessively polarized behavior” and motivates some individuals to use violence. 40

Consequently, it is important to understand trends in domestic terrorist tactics and targets. Our data indicate that the most common weapons for fatal attacks over the past five years were firearms, which comprised 73 percent of fatal far-right attacks, 100 percent of fatal far-left attacks, and 62 percent of fatal Salafi-jihadist attacks. In addition, the primary targets for right-wing extremists included individuals based on ethnicity, race, or religion (such as African Americans, Latinos, Jews, and Muslims). For left-wing extremists and Salafi-jihadists, the primary targets were government, military, and police personnel and locations. In light of these findings, there are several policy implications.

Third, law enforcement and intelligence agencies need to adapt to the bottom-up aspect of domestic terrorism. Countering international terrorism is often a top-down process. State and local law enforcement agencies often rely on at least some intelligence collected by the CIA, NSA, and U.S. partners, which is then passed down to local Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) for threats in the U.S. homeland. But domestic terrorism is inherently bottom-up. Right-wing, left-wing, and religious extremists in the United States generally do not coordinate with others outside the country to plot and execute attacks. In fact, many attacks involve one or a small number of individuals that do little—if any—coordination with others inside or outside the United States.

Consequently, state and local law enforcement agencies have a particularly important role to play in identifying terrorism “left of boom.” Based on the example of some countries such as the United Kingdom, state and local police departments should have a single point of contact for terrorism intelligence wherever feasible. This person would serve as the main contact with local JTTFs and Fusion Centers and be in charge of outreach with the local community. With roughly 800,000 police officers in the United States, it is impossible to conduct counterterrorism effectively from the top-down for domestic terrorists. 42 The need for a single point of contact is greatest at small- and medium-sized police departments since most metropolitan police forces already have robust intelligence capabilities.

Fourth, the U.S. government, its partners overseas, and the private sector need to continue to aggressively target individuals and groups that espouse violence on digital platforms. This is a war of ideas on virtual battlefields—just as much as on the streets of U.S. cities and towns. Most domestic extremists use the internet and social media platforms to release propaganda, coordinate training, raise funds, recruit members, and communicate with others. They have used various combinations of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Gab, Reddit, 4Chan, 8kun (formerly 8Chan), Endchan, Telegram, Vkontakte, MeWe, Discord, Wire, Twitch, and other online communication platforms. The establishment of the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) and the appointment of Nicholas Rasmussen, former head of the National Counterterrorism Center, as its first full-time executive director is a welcome step in countering terrorist exploitation of digital platforms.

The United States will never be able to stop every attack, but it can prevent most of them. The Provisional Irish Republican Army reminded British prime minister Margaret Thatcher in 1984 after failing to kill her at the Grand Brighton Hotel: “Remember, we only have to be lucky once. You have to be lucky always.” 43 While some luck may be required to counter a wave of domestic terrorism, proactive steps—such as improving bottom-up intelligence collection in the United States and countering extremism on digital platforms—can help mitigate the threat.

Seth G. Jones is the Harold Brown Chair and director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Catrina Doxsee is a program manager and research associate with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS. Nicholas Harrington is a research associate for the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS.

The authors give special thanks to James Suber and Grace Hwang for their research assistance and helpful comments, including their involvement in building the terrorism data set.

For an overview of the methodology used in compiling the data set, please see here .

This brief is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this brief.

CSIS Briefs   are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).  © 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Please consult the PDF for references.

Seth G. Jones

Catrina Doxsee

Nicholas harrington, programs & projects.

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The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW Washington, DC 20500

FACT SHEET: National Strategy for Countering Domestic   Terrorism

On his first full day in office, President Biden directed his national security team to lead a 100-day comprehensive review of U.S. Government efforts to address domestic terrorism, which has evolved into the most urgent terrorism threat the United States faces today. As a result of that review, the Biden Administration is releasing the first-ever National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism to address this challenge to America’s national security and improve the federal government’s response.

Domestic terrorism is not a new threat in the United States, yet it is a threat Americans have endured too often in recent years. The comprehensive strategy provides a nationwide framework for the U.S. Government and partners to understand and share domestic terrorism related information; prevent domestic terrorism recruitment and mobilization to violence; disrupt and deter domestic terrorism activity; and confront long term contributors to domestic terrorism. Our approach will protect both the nation and the civil liberties of its citizens.

Under Federal law, “ domestic terrorism ” is defined as “activities that involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”

The review was rooted in an expert assessment of the domestic terrorism threat provided by the intelligence and law enforcement communities. An unclassified summary of that assessment was released in March so the public could see the key findings. It found that the two most lethal elements of today’s domestic terrorism threat are (1) racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists who advocate for the superiority of the white race and (2) anti-government or anti-authority violent extremists, such as militia violent extremists.

To develop a government-wide strategy to counter domestic terrorists, the Biden Administration consulted extensively with a wide array of experts across the U.S. Government as well as with leaders in Congress, state and local governments, academia, civil society, religious communities, and foreign governments. Throughout the process, we embraced the protection of civil rights and civil liberties as a national security imperative . The strategy we are releasing today is carefully tailored to address violence and reduce the factors that lead to violence, threaten public safety, and infringe on the free expression of ideas. It is organized around four pillars – the core elements of how the Biden Administration will improve the U.S. Government’s response to this persistent, evolving, and lethal threat to our people, our democracy, and our national security:

PILLAR 1: UNDERSTAND AND SHARE DOMESTIC TERRORISM-RELATED INFORMATION

The U.S. Government will enhance domestic terrorism analysis and improve information sharing throughout law enforcement at the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial levels, and, where appropriate, private sector partners. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have implemented a robust system to methodically track domestic terrorism cases nationwide. The Department of State as well as the intelligence and law enforcement communities are learning more from foreign partners about the international dimensions of this threat.

The Department of State will continue to assess whether additional foreign entities linked to domestic terrorism can be designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations or Specially Designated Global Terrorists under relevant statutory criteria. The Department of the Treasury, in coordination with law enforcement, is exploring ways to enhance the identification and analysis of financial activity of domestic terrorists. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is enhancing its analysis of open-source information to identify threats earlier and will create a structured mechanism for receiving and sharing within government credible non-governmental analysis.

PILLAR 2: PREVENT DOMESTIC TERRORISM RECRUITMENT AND MOBILIZATION TO VIOLENCE

Drawing on the expertise of a variety of departments and agencies, the U.S. Government has revamped support to community partners who can help to prevent individuals from ever reaching the point of committing terrorist violence . The U.S. Government will strengthen domestic terrorism prevention resources and services . For the first time, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has designated “Domestic Violent Extremism” as a National Priority Area within the Department’s Homeland Security Grant Program, which means that over $77 million will be allocated to state, local, tribal, and territorial partners to prevent, protect against, and respond to domestic violent extremism. DHS and FBI are working to strengthen local prevention, threat assessment, and threat management frameworks. The Department of Defense (DOD) is incorporating training for servicemembers separating or retiring from the military on potential targeting of those with military training by violent extremist actors. The U.S. Government will improve public awareness of federal resources to address concerning or threatening behavior before violence occurs.

The U.S. Government will augment its efforts to address online terrorist recruitment and mobilization to violence by domestic terrorists through increased information sharing with the technology sector and the creation of innovative ways to foster digital literacy and build resilience to recruitment and mobilization. The United States also recently joined the Christchurch Call to Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online , an international partnership between governments and technology companies that works to develop new multilateral solutions to eliminating terrorist content online while safeguarding the freedom of online expression.

PILLAR 3: DISRUPT AND DETER DOMESTIC TERRORISM ACTIVITY

The work of Federal law enforcement as well as our state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners is critical to countering domestic terrorism. The U.S. Government will increase support to Federal, state, and local law enforcement in addressing domestic terrorism nationwide . U.S. Attorney’s Offices and FBI field offices across the country have formally made domestic terrorism a top priority and are tracking comprehensively domestic terrorism-related cases, reallocating or requesting appropriate funding and resources as needed to target the threat. That includes over $100 million in additional resources for DOJ, FBI, and DHS included in the President’s Fiscal Year 2022 Budget to ensure that the Federal Government has the analysts, investigators, prosecutors, and other personnel and resources it needs to thwart domestic terrorism and do justice when the law has been broken. State, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement will have access to increased intelligence sharing and training on domestic terrorism and associated threats. DOJ is closely examining whether new legislative authorities that balance safety and the protection of civil liberties are necessary and appropriate. The U.S. Government is improving employee screening to enhance methods for identifying domestic terrorists who might pose insider threats . The Office of Personnel Management will consider updates to the forms used to apply for sensitive roles in the Federal Government that could assist investigators in identifying potential domestic terrorism threats. DOD, DOJ, and DHS are similarly pursuing efforts to ensure domestic terrorists are not employed within our military or law enforcement ranks and improve screening and vetting processes. Training and resources will be developed for state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners as well as sensitive private sector partners to enable them to enhance their own employee screening programs and prevent individuals who pose domestic terrorism threats from being placed in positions of trust.

PILLAR 4: CONFRONT LONG-TERM CONTRIBUTORS TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM

Every component of the government has a role to play in rooting out racism and bigotry and advancing equity for all Americans. The U.S. Government, in close partnership with civil society, will address the long-term contributors that are responsible for much of today’s domestic terrorism. This includes reducing and protecting Americans from racial, ethnic, and religious hatred, and stemming the flow of firearms to individuals intending to commit acts of domestic terrorism. We will work to ensure that law enforcement operates without bias in countering domestic terrorism and provides for the public safety of all Americans. In a true democracy, violence cannot be an acceptable mode of seeking political or social change .

The U.S. Government is committed to strengthening trust in American democracy and its ability to deliver for the American people, including through relief and opportunity provided by the American Rescue Plan, the American Jobs Plan and the American Families Plan. The U.S. Government will also work to find ways to counter the polarization often fueled by disinformation, misinformation, and dangerous conspiracy theories online , supporting an information environment that fosters healthy democratic discourse.

In implementing this strategy, and at the direction of President Biden, we will remain focused on addressing violence and reducing the threat of violence while vigilantly safeguarding peaceful expression of a wide range of views and freedom of political association. 

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U.S. Government Accountability Office

The Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism in the U.S. and Federal Efforts to Combat It

Domestic terrorism is on the rise. Several attacks have been widely reported in the last few years. For example, in May 2022, a racially-motivated individual shot and killed 10 people in Buffalo, New York. A 2018 attack on a Pittsburgh synagogue left 11 people dead. All but eight states across the U.S. experienced at least one incident of domestic terrorism between 2010 and 2021. And over the last 10 years, domestic terrorism-related investigations have grown by 357%.

Today’s WatchBlog post looks at our new report on the rising threat of domestic terrorism and federal efforts to combat it.

What do we know about domestic terrorism incidents?

Domestic terrorism is generally defined by law as involving criminal acts dangerous to human life on U.S. soil that appear intended to coerce a civilian population or influence or affect the conduct of government.

There were 231 incidents (meaning attacks or plots) that met the definition of domestic terrorism between 2010 and 2021, according to DHS. They occurred across the United States, but the greatest number of incidents occurred in states with major metropolitan areas—such as California (Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco), New York (New York City), and Washington, D.C.

Domestic Terrorism Incidents by State, 2010 through 2021

Why are these attacks happening?

According to DHS, there were 231 domestic terrorism incidents between 2010 and 2021. Of these, about 35% (the largest category) were classified as racially- or ethnically-motivated. These attacks were also the most lethal. For example, in July 2016, a racially-motivated individual killed five police officers in Dallas. More recently, in May 2022, a racially-motivated individual shot and killed 10 people in Buffalo, New York.

Anti-government or anti-authority motivated violent extremism was the second largest category of incidents, and resulted in 15 deaths over the same time period.

There were also domestic terrorism incidents linked to animal rights extremists and abortion-related violent extremists, among other motivations. Animal rights-related incidents did not result in any deaths during this time period; incidents related to abortion-related violent extremists led to 3 deaths.

Domestic Terrorism-Related Incidents by Category, from 2010 through 2021

What is being done to combat domestic terrorism threats?  

The FBI is responsible for leading domestic terrorism-related investigations and intelligence efforts involving terrorist activities or plots. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) tracks terrorism-related incidents, and is responsible for gathering and sharing intelligence on emerging terrorist threats with federal, state, and local governments and private entities. 

The federal government has been actively investigating and prosecuting acts of domestic terrorism. The number of FBI domestic terrorism investigations has more than doubled since 2020, and the number of open FBI investigations specifically has more than quadrupled from 1,981 in FY 2013 to 9,049 in FY 2021.

The annual number of federal district court prosecutions and charges has also increased, including a sharp increase in FY 2021 (see chart below). We found that prosecutors charged 1,584 defendants in 1,255 cases in federal district court with crimes that were related to domestic terrorism from October 2010 through July 2021. 

Number of Federal Defendants Charged in Domestic Terrorism-Related Cases, October 2010 through July 2021

Domestic terrorism and other threats are rapidly evolving, and combatting these threats requires close collaboration between FBI, DHS, and other federal, state, and local agencies.

In our new report , we found that the FBI and DHS generally followed leading collaboration practices—sharing information with each other and their federal, state and local partners. However, they haven’t assessed whether their collaboration agreements fully reflect their needs or how they should work together. Additionally, they did not submit comprehensive data to Congress in required reports. For example, FBI officials told us they did not use the data DHS collects on domestic terrorism incidents because they weren’t aware DHS was collecting it. DHS officials in turn told us they didn’t share their incident data with their FBI counterparts because they weren’t asked for it.

We recommended in our report that FBI and DHS assess their existing collaboration agreements to see if they have a fully integrated way to share information and stop threats. We also recommended that they periodically evaluate the effectiveness of their collaborative practices. Having up-to-date, relevant formal agreements would address some of the concerns officials shared with us, and would make the FBI and DHS better partners to combat domestic terrorism.

Learn more about federal efforts to combat domestic terrorism in our new report .

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What NIJ Research Tells Us About Domestic Terrorism

Over the last 20 years, the body of research that examines terrorism and domestic violent extremism has grown exponentially. Studies have looked at the similarities and differences between radicalization to violent domestic ideologies and radicalization to foreign extremist ideologies. Research has found that radicalization processes and outcomes — and perhaps potential prevention and intervention points — vary by group structure and crime type. This NIJ Journal article discusses the findings of several National Institute of Justice-supported domestic radicalization studies that cover a range of individual and network-centered risk and protective factors that affect radicalization processes, including military involvement and online environments. This article also explores factors that shape the longevity of radicalization processes and their variation by group structure and crime type, and the article examines factors that affect pathways away from domestic extremism. The article concludes with a discussion of how these findings can inform terrorism prevention strategies, criminal justice policy, and community-based prevention programming.

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Hot Topics: Domestic Terrorism

Background information, news and groups, radicalization and deradicalization.

• Events to Know
• Extending Your Research

Some Types of Domestic Terrorism

• What is QAnon, the Viral Pro-Trump Conspiracy Theory? - New York Times
• QAnon: A Timeline of Violence to the Conspiracy Theory - The Guardian
• The QAnon Conspiracy Theory: A Security Threat in the Making? - Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point
• QAnon Emerges as Recurring Theme of Criminal Cases Tied to US Capitol Siege - ABC News

White Supremacy

• The Militia Movement - Anti Defamation League
• "The Great Replacement": an explainer - Anti Defamation League
• The Symbols of Hate and Far Right Extremism on Display in Pro-Trump Capitol Siege - ABC News
• The Deadly Collaboration Between White Supremacy and Gun Rights - Columbia Political Review
• The Proud Boys are Part of America's Long History of Vigilante Violence  - Time
• Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism, White Supremacy, and Far Right Militancy in Law Enforcement -  The Brennan Center
• Viral: Antisemitism in Four Mutations - PBS (Video)

Librarian, Head of Research & Instruction

A comparison of political violence by left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and the world - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Domestic Terrorism  - RAND

Domestic Terrorism amid Polarization and Protest  - Center for Strategic & International Studies

Domestic Terrorism and the Attack on the US Capitol - Congressional Research Service

The Extremist Files - Southern Poverty Law Center

Far-right Violence a Growing Threat - PBS

The Hate Map - Southern Poverty Law Center

Hot Yoga Tallahassee : A Case Study of Misogynistic Extremism - US Secret Service, National Threat Assessment Center

Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism in the U.S . - GAO

Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism -  FBI

White Supremacy Groups in the United States - Counter Extremism Project

• ABC News - Domestic Terrorism
• AP News - The Capitol Siege
• PBS - Domestic Terrorism
• The Marshall Project - Domestic Terrorism
• The Conversation - Domestic Terrorism
• Anti Defamation League
• START - The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
• SPLC - The Southern Poverty Law Center

• Statista Searchable statistical tables, reports, and infographics

Radicalization

• Radicalization in the Digital Era - RAND
• Youtube's Algorithm Seems to Be Funneling People to Alt-right Videos - MIT Technology Review
• The Online Radicalization We're Not Talking About - New York Magazine 
• How to Root Out Extremism in the US Military - RAND
• Violent Far-Right Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Military - Council on Foreign Relations

Deradicalization

• Deradicalizing Domestic Extremists - APA
• Deradicalization Programs: A Counterterrorism Tool  - American Security Project
• Following Capitol Siege, Veterans Hope For More Deradicalization Programs - NPR
• How a Washington State Plan Could Be a Model - PBS
• The US Needs Deradicalization - For Christian Extremists - Foreign Policy
• What Do Former Extremists and Their Families Say About Radicalization and Deradicalization in America? - RAND
• Why Extremists Need Therapy - The Atlantic

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• Is the threat of domestic terrorism exaggerated?
• Does America's violent culture lead to terrorism?
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• Should journalists practice censorship when covering terrorism?
• Should abortion center bombings be considered acts of terrorism?
• Focus on one incident of terrorism: World Trade Center bombing (1993); Oklahoma City bombing (1995); TWA Flight 800 bombing (1996); Atlanta Olympic bombing (1996); the Unabomber (1996); Boston Marathon bombing (2013)
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State of the Union 2024: Where Americans stand on the economy, immigration and other key issues

Ahead of President Joe Biden’s third State of the Union address Americans are focused on the health of the economy and immigration.

Public’s Top Priority for 2022: Strengthening the Nation’s Economy

Dealing with coronavirus has declined as a policy priority, especially among Republicans. This marks a shift from last year, when the economy and the coronavirus both topped the public’s policy agenda.

Two Decades Later, the Enduring Legacy of 9/11

Twenty years ago, Americans came together – bonded by sadness and patriotism – after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. But a review of public opinion in the two decades since finds that unity was fleeting. It also shows how support for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was strong initially but fell over time.

Americans See Spread of Disease as Top International Threat, Along With Terrorism, Nuclear Weapons, Cyberattacks

Most say cooperation with other countries is important in dealing with global threats, especially on the spread of infectious diseases.

Defending against terrorism has remained a top policy priority for Americans since 9/11

Around seven-in-ten Americans or more have seen defending against terrorism as a top priority for the White House and Congress since early 2002.

Facts on Foreign Students in the U.S.

The U.S. has more foreign students enrolled in its colleges and universities than any other country in the world. Explore data about foreign students in the U.S. higher education system.

Partisans Have Starkly Different Opinions About How the World Views the U.S.

Today, 68% say the U.S. is less respected by other countries than it was in the past.

About a fifth of Americans cite 9/11 response as event that made them most proud of U.S.

The Sept. 11 attacks united Americans in a way that few other historical events have.

Like most Americans, U.S. Muslims concerned about extremism in the name of Islam

About eight-in-ten U.S. Muslims (82%) say they are either very (66%) or somewhat concerned (16%) about extremism committed in the name of Islam around the world.

Majorities in Europe, North America worried about Islamic extremism

People across Europe and in the U.S. and Canada have pervasive concerns about the threat of Islamic extremism in their countries.

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• A Research Guide
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40 Terrorism Research Paper Topics

Read also: How to start off a research paper ?

• How does the development of technologies affect the tactics of terrorists?
• The tragedy of 9/11
• The Incels movement: a growing danger?
• Terrorism and religion
• Using minors and vulnerable social groups in terrorist acts
• The role of terrorism in the creation and development of Israel
• The most powerful international terrorism groups: Boko Haram, Al Qaeda and others
• Partisan movements and terrorism
• The history of terrorism
• What methods are justified when fighting terrorism?
• Hiroshima bombing: can it be considered terrorism?
• Terrorism in media and films
• The process of radicalization. The creation of terrorist groups
• Motivations of terrorist groups
• Terrorism and Mafia: similarities, differences and cooperation
• Terrorism as a tool for politics. Can it be used to benefit some particular political forces?
• Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp: was it justified?
• Suicide bombing and psychological conditioning of suicide bombers
• Bioterrorism
• Terrorism and human trafficking
• Terrorism threat and the international travel safety
• Is non-violent response to terrorism possible?
• The ways to work with society to prevent terroristic acts
• The first psychological aid to the victims or witnesses of terrorist act
• Why terrorists use hostages? What shall the potential hostages do to survive?
• The main differences between political and non-political terrorism
• The recruiting strategies of terrorists
• Counterterrorism all over the world
• The most prominent terrorist leaders
• The most famous counterterrorist operations
• What can society do to prevent terrorism?
• The future of terrorism. May it evolve?
• The process of taking responsibility for terrorist act: why and how the terrorists do this?
• The model of Israel society. Is it good for fighting terrorism?
• Terrorism as international crime
• Nuclear terrorism
• Terrorism and blackmailing
• Is it possible to exit a terrorist cell?
• Ideological terrorism
• The different definitions of terrorism and the cause of their creation

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From domestic violence to terrorism and war, social media is a thread that connects all the issues that now challenge us

Analysis From domestic violence to terrorism and war, social media is a thread that connects all the issues that now challenge us

It has become a standard, if unfortunate, part of Australian politics in recent years for politicians to pick up and run with some incident to crystallise public sentiment on an issue and let the media debate rage on it.

Think African gangs, needles in strawberries, Woolworths not selling enough Australia Day merchandise.

You might notice that these have tended to be the preserve of the Coalition side of politics more than the Labor side.

That Labor doesn't do it so much may be a testament to their better angels, or to the fact they have just never been good at the particular style of politics.

But we now face a perfect firestorm of issues that both challenge our community cohesion and present us with Australian society in all its ugliness.

It is a particularly complex set of issues that cannot be untangled from each other.

That makes this particular modus operandi dangerous for both those who might be tempted to practice it — and the rest of us.

We all know social media has become an unwieldy force in politics around the globe. But our political leaders are now being forced to confront, in very specific terms, the really difficult questions thrown up about when enough is enough.

A debate that has largely been framed in terms of freedom of speech has become conflated with a whole range of issues that now challenge us: from social cohesion, to terrorism, to domestic violence.

The killings, predominantly of women, at Bondi Junction and the stabbing attack on a bishop in the Western Sydney suburb of Wakeley have come at a time of horrendously relentless killings of women and amid heightened tensions provoked by the Gaza conflict.

Social media is a thread that has run through all these stories: from the misinformation and disinformation spread about the Bondi attacker while the attacks were still underway; to the live-streaming of the bishop's church service and subsequent misinformation that led to a violent riot; to questions about the growing aggression of misogynistic online content directed towards young men; to online abuse and threats of violence levelled at anyone on either side of the Gaza conflict.

Two mighty struggles

This week, e-Safety Commissioner Julie Inman-Grant took on X and Elon Musk in the Federal Court seeking to force the platform to take down 65 postings of graphic footage of the Wakeley knife attack.

She is seeking to do that under the powers the parliament granted her — under the Morrison government — in the Online Safety Act in 2021.

While there had been a lot of political noise made in the wake of the Bondi attacks 48 hours earlier, about dealing with the disinformation and misinformation that had circulated at the time, social media platforms are currently only subject to voluntary codes of conduct about removing inflammatory commentary and misinformation.

Legislation dealing with these issues is currently being considered, as are changes to the Online Safety Act — which was already under review before these attacks all happened.

The ground has now shifted under the political debates about the specifics of both those legislative developments.

But in the meantime, there are now two mighty struggles going on over how we communicate and debate each other in future.

One concerns the fight in the courts with Musk and his assertion that, in trying to force his company to take down the posts, the Australian government is not only hindering free speech, it is over-reaching into an attempt to dictate what can be seen online outside Australia's borders.

The second struggle concerns the general position of our politicians about if, and how, we reset the terms of social media's social contract.

The challenges for Dutton

The political leader in the more difficult position on this is Peter Dutton, who not only faces divisions on this in his party — and in the conservative base — but also the problem of reconciling those divisions with his own strong views about social media when it comes to issues like law and order and child abuse.

It is instructive to look at comments Dutton made on April 8 — before the Sydney attacks — about social media and its role in facilitating things like young people posting crimes, like housebreaking or car theft, online.

The social media companies, he said, have to "make sure that they take content down so that these young offenders don't get the publicity that they're seeking".

The Coalition's private members bill would set up the power to do this, he said.

"Because at the moment, a lot of people are living in fear and they're worried about whether they're going to be broken into again. It's devastating, it's confronting to have somebody coming into your bedroom or coming into your living area, particularly when you've got young children."

In the wake of the Bondi Junction and Wakeley attacks, Dutton told Insiders on Sunday that there was "no question at all" that tougher action needed to be taken against social media companies and "I think there's a bipartisan position concerning this".

"We know that the companies — and we've seen some of the comments from Elon Musk overnight — they see themselves above the law. The Australian law here should apply equally in the real world as it does online ... you would be sued for defamation and you would be taken before the courts under various acts for publishing some of that which freely flows on the internet.

"They're allowing paedophiles to distribute through their networks, images and videos of children being sexually abused, they're impeding the investigations of the police."

The more difficult question

This issue of removing explicit content is the same one Inman-Grant is trying to deal with over the bishop's stabbing.

For some, including Senate crossbenchers Pauline Hanson and Ralph Babet, and the Institute of Public Affairs, this amounts to an attack on free speech.

Dutton also faces questions about his approach from some in his own ranks.

But he can't really go too far on the question of removing violent content, given his position on things like kids posting themselves breaking the law or child exploitation.

The fact that the Australian Federal Police and ASIO emerged this week to explicitly link the violent content with terror threats also highlights the difficulties for Dutton, given his tough line on national security.

Our national security officials told us the Wakeley footage could be used just as footage of the Christchurch terror attacks had been used by IS as part of their recruitment of young men.

And we subsequently saw the arrest of five teenagers linked to the Wakeley attacker, some of whom we were told had just as graphic content on their phones.

The even more difficult question becomes how parliaments and governments deal with misinformation and disinformation, since it involves not just removing graphic images but people's opinions and, therefore, becomes a much clearer debate about censorship and free speech.

When the government put up some draft laws to deal with this last year, the Coalition howled it down.

You would have to think the optics and the policy imperatives have changed.

Who wins and loses in the Federal Court is just one aspect of the battle ahead.

Laura Tingle is 7.30's chief political correspondent.

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FBI Director Wray says he fears domestic terror attack

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Expiring TCJA Tax Provisions in 2026 Would Produce Substantial Tax Hike across the U.S.

At the end of 2025, the individual tax A tax is a mandatory payment or charge collected by local, state, and national governments from individuals or businesses to cover the costs of general government services, goods, and activities. provisions in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act ( TCJA ) expire all at once . Without congressional action, most taxpayers will see a notable tax increase relative to current policy in 2026.

In 2026, business taxes will also be higher as 100 percent bonus depreciation Bonus depreciation allows firms to deduct a larger portion of certain “short-lived” investments in new or improved technology, equipment, or buildings in the first year. Allowing businesses to write off more investments partially alleviates a bias in the tax code and incentivizes companies to invest more, which, in the long run, raises worker productivity, boosts wages, and creates more jobs. continues to phase down and TCJA base broadeners like research and development (R&D) amortization and a tighter limit on interest deductions remain in effect.

Policymakers may consider extending the current TCJA policy for individual tax provisions and canceling the business tax hikes. Tax Foundation estimates that permanence for the individual and business provisions (excluding the estate tax An estate tax is imposed on the net value of an individual’s taxable estate, after any exclusions or credits , at the time of death. The tax is paid by the estate itself before assets are distributed to heirs. changes) would cost about $3.8 trillion over the 10-year budget window from 2025 through 2034.

To visualize what’s at stake, Tax Foundation has estimated the average change in taxes paid per taxpayer under TCJA expiration relative to current policy across each congressional district. The congressional district map below shows the tax increase households will face if TCJA individual tax provisions expire and business taxes increase as scheduled.

The tax hikes from TCJA expiration would vary across the United States . The largest average tax hikes would be experienced by taxpayers who reside in California ’s congressional districts. For example, the congressional district covering the San Francisco area would see an average tax hike of $16,127 per taxpayer, the highest in the U.S.

By contrast, northern New York City would see an average tax increase of $807 per taxpayer under TCJA expiration. Across all congressional districts, the average tax increase costs each taxpayer about $2,853 compared to current policy where TCJA remains in place and the business tax hikes are canceled.

Individual tax provisions also exhibit geographic variation. For example, the $10,000 cap on state and local tax (SALT) deductions tends to have the greatest impact on taxpayers in higher tax localities on the coasts of the U.S.

Tax Foundation estimates permanence for TCJA would create about 904,000 full-time equivalent jobs, ranging from more than 136,000 jobs in California and 75,000 jobs in Texas to about 1,660 new jobs in Vermont .

The resulting increase in employment would otherwise not occur if the TCJA is allowed to expire as scheduled in 2026 or is not made permanent. The map provides a state-level breakdown of the full-time equivalent jobs that would be lost if the TCJA individual provisions are not made permanent and the domestic TCJA-related business tax hikes are not canceled. In other words, it illustrates the potential job gains forfeited by allowing the TCJA to expire rather than be made permanent.

The choice to let TCJA provisions expire or to extend them will also forfeit broader economic gains. Making the TCJA individual tax provisions permanent and canceling TCJA-related business tax hikes would raise long-run GDP by about 1.1 percent, increase wages by about 0.3 percent, and create a 0.9 percent larger national capital stock.

The Impact Of TCJA Expirations By Congressional District, 2026

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Methodology

We estimate the geographic distribution of tax changes under an extension of the TCJA individual provisions and cancellation of domestic business provisions using conventional revenue estimates at the national level generated by the Tax Foundation’s General Equilibrium Model. In this map, we do not include the impact of making permanent the TCJA’s estate tax changes.

We then allocate to filers in congressional districts using data from the IRS Statistics of Income for individual tax returns in 2021. (Conventional revenue estimates do not include impacts on GDP and other economic aggregates.) The IRS data provides various tax characteristics broken down by congressional district (CD). For consistency with the latest SOI data, we use CDs as they existed in 2021, which may not map onto existing CDs due to redistricting.

From the IRS data, certain tax characteristics are used to allocate to CDs the conventional national revenue estimates for each of the TCJA provisions, as described in Table 2, and then averaged by the number of filers in each CD. This analysis’s accuracy is limited by the extent of the IRS data at the CD level.

For the TCJA business provisions, we assume these fall partly on capital income and partly on labor income, in accordance with several studies . In particular , we assume the corporate tax is initially borne mainly by capital income (90 percent in the first year), and over time the burden shifts to labor income until it is evenly split across capital and labor income in the long run (50 percent capital income and 50 percent labor income in the fifth year and beyond).

Our state-level jobs impacts are allocated based on the national jobs estimated from the Tax Foundation General Equilibrium Model and the distribution of labor and capital income across the states.