real self and ideal self essay brainly

Ideal self vs Real self: Exploring the Clash of Identities

What do you think about your own personality? You might have a clear image of yourself in your mind, but you still find it difficult to define. The sense of self-worth can only be defined by a person's perception of their own identity. In this post, I'm going to be discussing what your ideal self-image is and why it's different from your real self-image.

Sanju Pradeepa

Who were you hoping to be when you started your day? How do you feel now that it’s drawing to a close? We all strive to live up to our ideals. But oftentimes, our reality doesn’t quite measure up.

It’s easy to get wrapped up in what’s lacking between those two mental snapshots, but that’s not always the most helpful approach. Your self-image is a work in progress, and comparing it to your ideal is an essential part of the process.

To make this journey easier, we’ve put together this comprehensive guide on comparing and reconciling your ideal with your actual self-image. Through this guide, you’ll uncover the underlying reasons why these two may not be in sync and learn practical tips for finding balance between them. Let’s get started!

Table of Contents

What is the difference – ideal self vs real self.

It’s easy to feel like your ideal self-image is light years away from your actual self-image. The truth is, there’s a spectrum between the two and understanding the difference between them can help you close the gap.

So, what’s the difference? Well, an ideal self-image is the version of ourselves that we wish we could be: confident, attractive, and capable of achieving our goals . Your actual self-image is based on reality: it includes all of your strengths, weaknesses, and other aspects that make up who you are.

It’s important to note that these two images don’t exist in isolation. They can influence each other in positive ways. Just because your ideal self-image may be unreachable doesn’t mean it isn’t motivating or inspiring. And just because your actual self-image isn’t perfect doesn’t mean it isn’t strong and wonderful in its own right. By comparing and contrasting these two images you can discover how to bridge the gap between them.

Real self-image and ideal self-image ; how look they could be? I help you understand. How? Take a look at these;

• 17 Ideal Self Examples: Tap into Your Idealized Self-Image
• 5 Types of Self-Image : Find to Embrace Who You Are

Factors that Influence the Ideal Self and Real Self

When it comes to understanding the differences between your ideal self and real self, it helps to consider the factors that can influence them. Let’s break this down and see what we learn.

1. Social Influence

Your environment, especially those closest to you, can have a huge impact on how you view yourself for better or for worse. Studies have shown that people tend to compare themselves to family members, peers, celebrities and other images of perfection that are presented in the media. Unfortunately, these influences can lead to feelings of inadequacy or envy if the comparisons result in finding flaws rather than improved self-esteem.

2. Indirect Self-Concepts

We may not consciously think of ourselves according to various indirect self-concepts , but they do exist. For instance, if you’re an athlete then your ideal self could be someone with an unrivaled level of skill and performance; whereas if you’re an artist, your ideal self could be someone renowned for their creativity and ability to produce work that speaks volumes to various audiences. It’s important to realize that while these indirect concepts may stretch us beyond our limits in helpful ways, they can also lead us away from accepting who we really are right now if taken too far.

3. Life Experiences

Another factor to consider is life experiences – events both positive and negative – can greatly shape how we view ourselves compared with our ideal image. For example, gaining or losing a job or getting promoted in your career can have a strong impact on how you see yourself as related to success or failure when compared with your peers. Life experiences in general often act as feedback loops from which we learn what direction we need to go in order to achieve what we want.

Why People May Strive for Their Ideal Self.

Striving to achieve your ideal self-image can be a fantastic motivator in life, but there’s much more to it. It’s important to ask yourself why you want to achieve this goal and why you’re setting the bar so high.

Is it because of Self-improvement?

It’s human nature to want to push ourselves to do and be better. Striving for excellence is part of the pursuit of continuous self-improvement , and while having a goal is admirable, pushing too hard could lead to disappointment when the unrealistic expectations you’ve set yourself aren’t met.

Or because of the Impact of media on our self-image?

The media also has an impact on how we view our ideal selves, with images of airbrushed bodies featured on billboards or perfect families featured in TV shows often giving us an unrealistic perception of what is real. It’s no wonder so many people are led into thinking they have to live up to ideals that are not actually achievable!

Ultimately, it’s beneficial to take stock of what our motivations are behind wanting to strive for an ideal self.

Benefits of Being Comfortable in Your Own Body

It can be hard to accept your actual self when it differs from your ideal self, but once you do, you may start to reap the benefits. Here are some of the advantages of being comfortable in your body:

1. Improved Mental Well-being.

Research has shown that striving for unattainable physical standards can lead to negative mental health outcomes like low self-esteem , depression and anxiety. On the other hand, when you are comfortable with your body and who you are as a person, you’re more likely to have higher levels of self-confidence and improved mental well-being.

2. Less Impact on Your Time and Money

Having an ideal and real self-image that are similar also means that physical perfectionism takes less of a toll on your time and money. Being comfortable in your own skin means less time spent trying to reach an unattainable level of perfection; leaving time for other things in life. Plus, without having to purchase expensive products or services to meet the standards of an ideal self-image, you won’t have to worry about spending as much money on beauty items or treatments.

3. Greater Satisfaction with Life

When you accept who you are both inside and out greater satisfaction with life can follow. When this inner peace is achieved, it becomes easier to enjoy more meaningful aspects of life such as relationships, job accomplishments and hobbies. With this satisfaction also comes greater happiness both in daily life and in the long run too.

How Can We Work Towards Accepting Our Real Self-Image?

Comparing your ideal self-image to your actual self-image can be discouraging, but that doesn’t mean you can’t do anything about it.

Here are ways you can work towards accepting your real self-image:

Celebrate yourself for what you have achieved : Acknowledge the efforts and successes and look for moments where you have grown or achieved something. This will remind you of your worth and help build a positive self-image .

Recognize the strengths within : Everyone has unique qualities that make them special and unique. Focus on those as well as any other areas in which you excel. This will give you more confidence and help reframe how you view yourself.

Be kind to yourself : Speak positively and kindly to yourself, just like how you would speak to any other person. This will help foster a healthier attitude towards yourself and build more positive feelings about who you are right now.

By focusing on these strategies, we can start to shift our perspective from ideal self-image to real, achievable goals that we can work towards every day!

1. Identify External Obstacles That Impede Self-Image

There are so many external will impedge your self image. So if you are some one who try to work toward your goals it better to find these. What are those? Where did they come from? How to cope with them. There fore it will help you achieve your dreams easily.

These can arise from sources like family, friends, work, or even society at large. Though these external sources of pressure can be difficult to navigate, they don’t have to prevent you from achieving your ideal self-image.

2. Learn Stress Management Strategies

Often, when external sources become difficult to cope with it’s because our stress levels have become too high. It’s important to learn effective strategies for managing stress so you don’t let outside factors overwhelm you or cause negative emotions like guilt and shame that can affect your self-image. Practicing meditation or mindfulness is a great way to cope with external pressures in a healthy way.

3. Talk To Your Loved Ones

If family or friends are part of the source of stress related to your self-image, it may be worth having a conversation with them. Talk openly about why their advice or opinions is causing difficulty for you and ask if there is any way they could offer support instead of criticism. This could help strengthen bonds with those closest to you and set boundaries for how people interact with you in terms of your self-image goals.

4. Social Media Detox

Social media can be a huge source of external pressure on our self-images, as we are constantly bombarded by images and messages that influence how we perceive ourselves and our lives by comparison. Taking a break from social media can help give you some perspective and peace during times when outside pressures become too overwhelming or hinder your progress towards achieving an improved sense of self-worth .

5. Practice Self-Care to Build a Better Self-Image

It’s easy to get wrapped up in the differences between your ideal and actual self-image, but one of the best things you can do is just take some time for yourself to relax and refocus. Practicing self-care is an important step in dealing with a negative self-image and striving towards your ideal.

Here are some tips for cultivating positive self-care:

Make time for yourself every day – set aside some time, even if it’s just 15 minutes, to do something relaxing such as reading a book or listening to music .

Exercise regularly – going for a walk or doing yoga can increase your energy levels and help you relax your mind.

Eat healthy food – eating well can help you feel better about yourself both inside and out.

Spend time with friends and family – these relationships can provide emotional support as well as remind you of all the wonderful qualities that make up who you are.

Get some sleep – getting enough rest helps you reset your mind so that you can start fresh the next day with a better perspective on life.

By taking care of yourself, both mentally and physically, you will be able to foster a healthier self-image which will make it easier to move closer towards your ideal image of yourself.

Lets Try to Balance Ideal and Actual Self-Image.

Self-forgiveness training is one of the steps. This is realizing that despite any faults you may have committed, you are still deserving of love and belonging. To practice, take a deep breath and tell yourself that you are enough.

After accepting who you are , take measures to close the gap between your ideal and real selves:

Accept the reality of who you are in this moment. Acknowledge all the qualities you possess, both good and bad. Be growth-oriented and focus on your strengths and how you can use them to reach your goals.

Set realistic expectations for yourself based on your values, current circumstances, and skillset. Keep in mind that while it is good to stretch yourself beyond what’s comfortable, it is just as important not to set unrealistic expectations or be too hard on yourself if things don’t go as planned.

Focus on progress over perfection by celebrating small wins along the way rather than aiming for a huge end goal right away.

Figure out what triggers negative thoughts or emotions that prompt unwanted behaviors such as procrastination or anxiety so that they can be monitored and managed more effectively in the future.

Finally, avoid comparison; instead, celebrate their successes with them! Not only is this beneficial for your mental well-being, but it is also more enjoyable than envy or jealousy, which can lead to feelings of inadequacy or insecurity about yourself.

Recognizing Internal Obstacles to Personal Growth

When it comes to personal growth, sometimes it’s easier to recognize external obstacles than internal ones. Recognizing these obstacles can help you overcome them and get closer and closer to your ideal self-image.

Negative Thinking

The biggest internal obstacle to personal growth is your own negative thinking . If you constantly doubt yourself and focus on what you can’t do, rather than what you can do, then it will be difficult for you to make progress and grow. By recognizing this thought pattern and actively working to shift it towards more positive thinking , you can open up a whole world of possibilities.

Procrastination

Another common internal obstacle is procrastination. If you’re always putting off tasks or putting them off until the last minute, it will be difficult for you to get any real progress done in terms of your personal growth . Acknowledge that procrastination exists and actively work on strategies that can help you stay focused and motivated; like setting realistic goals for yourself or establishing healthy routines so that it doesn’t become an obstacle on your road to success.

Want to avoid procrastination – Top 17 Ways to Avoid Procrastination

How Can We Achieve Our Ideal Self-Image?

Your ideal self-image is something you can achieve, no matter how far off it may seem. The key is to be honest with yourself and develop realistic goals that will help you slowly move towards the image you have in your head.

Here are a few steps to help you get there:

Identify what it is exactly that you want to achieve – You need to understand what your visionary goal for yourself looks like so you can identify the steps required of reaching it.

Start making changes – Break down your goal into smaller, more achievable goals and start taking action towards them one by one.

Disconnect from comparison – It’s easy to compare yourself to others when their progress seems faster than yours, but it won’t do any good. Stick to your journey and focus on your progress. You’ll get there in time if you stay dedicated.

Believe in yourself again – When times get tough, remember why it was that you set this goal for yourself in the first place. With this mental strength and motivation, you can tackle anything that comes your way.

Remember, no one is perfect and everyone has flaws. It is totally okay to have unrealistic expectations of yourself, but it is also important to remember that what really matters is how you feel about yourself. Comparing your ideal self-image and actual self-image is a great way to get a better understanding of who you are and what you want for yourself.

Acknowledge your accomplishments and flaws and try to focus on the positive aspects of yourself and your life. Let go of the negative self-talk, and always strive to become the best version of yourself. At the end of the day, what matters is loving yourself, flaws and all.

• Ideal Self vs. Real Self: Definition & Difference by Manuela Heberle , published in study.com
• Want to Make a Change? Conjure Your ‘Possible Selves.’ by Joanne Lipman published in The New York Times
• How to Improve Self Image? by https://www.theworldcounts.com/
• Self-concept , From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
• Self-image , From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Call to Action

No matter who you are, where are you from, your gender or social identity , skin color, language or your appearance; everything express the person inside you. You need to accept yourself. if you want to be as you wish, like your ideal or your mentors. Everything is possible when you have the courage to accept “YOU”; the person who were yesterday, who is today and who hope to be in tommorow.

Let’s boost your self-growth with Believe in Mind.

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What is Self-Concept Theory? A Psychologist Explains

You might answer with “ I’m a mother ,” or, “ I’m a therapist, ” or maybe, “ I’m a believer, ” “ I’m a good friend, ” “ I’m a brother. ”

Maybe you answer with, “ I am excellent at my job, ” “ I’m an accomplished musician, ” or “ I’m a successful athlete. ”

Other responses might fall into the category of traits: “ I’m a kind-hearted person, ” “ I’m intelligent and hard-working, ” or “ I’m laid-back and easy-going. ”

These responses come from your internal sense of who you are. This sense is developed early in life, but it goes through constant evaluation and adjustment throughout the lifespan.

In psychology, this sense of self has a specific term: self-concept.

Before you read on, we thought you might like to download our three Self-Compassion Exercises for free . These detailed, science-based exercises will not only help you understand and show more compassion and kindness to yourself but will also give you the tools to help your clients, students or employees improve their self-compassion.

This Article Contains:

What is self-concept a definition, self-concept theory, the components and elements of the self-concept model, the development stages of self-concept, 10 examples of self-concept, research on self-concept, measuring self-concept with scales, tests, and inventories, self-concept activities and lesson plans for preschoolers and older students (pdf), self-concept worksheets (pdf), 8 quotes on self-concept, a take-home message.

Self-concept is an overarching idea we have about who we are—physically, emotionally, socially, spiritually, and in terms of any other aspects that make up who we are (Neill, 2005). We form and regulate our self-concept as we grow, based on the knowledge we have about ourselves. It is multidimensional, and can be broken down into these individual aspects.

For example, you may have a very different idea of who you are in terms of your physical body, and who you are in terms of your spirit or soul.

The influential self-efficacy researcher Roy Baumeister (1999) defines self-concept as follows:

“The individual’s belief about himself or herself, including the person’s attributes and who and what the self is.”

A similar definition comes from Rosenberg’s 1979 book on the topic; he says self-concept is:

“…the totality of an individual’s thoughts and feelings having reference to himself as an object.”

Self-concept is related to several other “self” constructs, such as self-esteem, self-image, self-efficacy, and self-awareness. In the following section, we will explain these slight—yet important—differences.

Self-Concept vs. Self-Esteem

Self-concept is not self-esteem, although self-esteem may be a part of self-concept. Self-concept is the perception that we have of ourselves, our answer when we ask ourselves the question “Who am I?”

It is knowing about one’s own tendencies, thoughts, preferences and habits, hobbies, skills, and areas of weakness. According to Carl Rogers, founder of client-centered therapy , self-concept is an overarching construct that self-esteem is one of the components of it (McLeod, 2008).

Self-Concept vs. Self-Image

Self-image is related to self-concept but is less broad. Self-image is how an individual sees themselves, and it does not have to align with reality.

A person’s self-image is based on how they see themselves, while self-concept is a more comprehensive evaluation of the self, largely based on how a person sees themselves, values themselves, thinks about themselves, and feels about themselves.

Carl Rogers posited that self-image is a component of self-concept, along with self-esteem or self-worth and one’s “ideal self” (McLeod, 2008).

Self-Concept vs. Self-Efficacy

Self-concept is a more complex construct than self-efficacy. While self-efficacy refers to an individual’s judgments of their own abilities, self-concept is more general and includes both cognitive (thoughts about) and affective (feelings about) judgments about oneself (Bong & Clark, 1999).

Self-Concept vs. Self-Awareness

Self-awareness also influences self-concept. It is the quality or trait that involves conscious awareness of one’s own thoughts, feelings, behaviors, and traits (Cherry, 2018A). To have a fully developed self-concept (and one that is based in reality), a person must have at least some level of self-awareness .

We explore this further in The Science of Self-Acceptance Masterclass© .

Generally, theorists agree on the following points:

• On the broadest level, self-concept is the overall idea we have about who we are and includes cognitive and affective judgments about ourselves;
• Self-concept is multi-dimensional, incorporating our views of ourselves in terms of several different aspects (e.g., social, religious, spiritual, physical, emotional);
• It is learned, not inherent;
• It is influenced by biological and environmental factors, but social interaction plays a big role as well;
• Self-concept develops through childhood and early adulthood when it is more easily changed or updated;
• It can be changed in later years, but it is more of an uphill battle since people have established ideas about who they are;
• Self-concept does not always align with reality. When it does, our self-concept is “congruent.” When it doesn’t, our self-concept is “incongruent.”

Identity and Self-Concept Theory in Psychology vs. Self-Concept in Sociology

Both psychology and sociology share an interest in self-concept, but they use slightly different ways to explore it. Individual researchers vary, of course, but generally, the divide can be thought of in these terms:

• Sociology/social psychology focuses on how self-concept develops, specifically within the context of the individual’s social environment.
• Psychology focuses on how self-concept impacts people (Gecas, 1982).

There are other differences between the two, including psychology’s general focus on the individual versus sociology’s focus on the group, community, or society; however, this difference in focus has led to two diverse research streams. Both have resulted in great insights and interesting findings, and they sometimes overlap, but this divide can still be seen in the literature today.

Carl Rogers and the Self-Concept Theory of Personality

Famed psychologist, theorist, and clinician Carl Rogers posited a theory of how self-concept influences and, indeed, acts as the framework for, one’s personality.

The image we have of who we are contributes to our personality, and our actions—combined with our personality —create a feedback loop into our image of ourselves. Rogers believed that our personality is driven by our desire for self-actualization . This is the condition that emerges when we reach our full potential and our self-concept, self-worth, and ideal self all overlap (Journal Psyche, n.d.).

How we develop our personalities and self-concepts varies, thus creating the unique individuals we are. According to Rogers, we always strive for self-actualization, some with more success than others.

How do people go about striving for self-actualization and congruence? This relates to the idea of how anyone “maintains” their idea of themselves. We explore that next.

Self-Concept Maintenance Theory

Self-concept maintenance refers to how people maintain or enhance their sense of self. It is relatively fixed after a person reaches adulthood, but it can—and does—change based on the person’s experiences.

The theory of self-concept maintenance states that we do not simply sit and wait for our self-concept to develop: we take an active role in shaping our self-concept at all ages (whether we are aware of this or not).

Although there are different theories about the processes of self-concept maintenance, it generally concerns:

• Our evaluations of ourselves
• Our comparison of our actual selves with our ideal selves
• Our actions taken to move closer to our ideal selves (Munoz, 2012).

This may seem like a pretty logical and straightforward process, but we tend to give ourselves room for moral ambiguity. For example, a study by Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2007) showed that people will generally engage in beneficial dishonesty when given the opportunity. However, these same people might not revise their self-concept to incorporate this dishonesty.

When participants in the study were prompted to be more aware of their internal standards for honesty , they were less likely to engage in beneficial dishonesty; on the other hand, when given a “degrees of freedom” (greater separation between their actions and the rewards they would receive for dishonesty), they were more likely to engage in dishonesty—with no impact to their self-concept.

This is one example of the work on self-concept maintenance, as humans constantly assess themselves and their moral code since it influences their identity and actions.

Self-Concept Clarity and Self-Concept Differentiation

Self-concept clarity is different from self-concept.

Self-concept clarity (SCC) refers to how clear, confident, and consistent an individual’s definitions of themselves are (Diehl & Hay, 2011). Self-concept differentiation (SCD) refers to how an individual’s self-representation may vary across contexts or social roles (e.g., self as a spouse, self as a parent, self as a student).

SCC and SCD are hot topics in psychology since they influence thought patterns and behavior.

Higher SCC indicates a firmer and more stable self-concept, while low SCC indicates that an individual is unclear or vague about who they really are. Those with low SCC may struggle with low self-esteem, self-consciousness, and neuroticism.

SCD is not as clear-cut. Having a high SCD may be viewed as a bad thing, but it can also be an effective coping mechanism for succeeding in the modern world where individuals have many different roles. If SCD is very high, it might mean that the individual does not have a stable self-concept and “wears a different mask” for each of their roles.

A very low level of SCD may indicate that the individual is authentically “them” across all of their roles—although it may also indicate that he cannot effectively switch from one role to another (Diehl & Hay, 2011).

Essentially, people who differentiate their roles slightly, yet maintain a clear image of themselves, may succeed most at finding balance in their identity and image.

There are different ideas about what self-concept consists of, and how it should be defined; however, there are some characteristics and dimensions that apply to the basic, agreed-upon conceptualization of self-concept.

Characteristics of Self-Concept

As a brief review, self-concept is the perspective we have on who we are. Each of us has a unique self-concept, different from the self-concept of others and from their concept of us.

However, there are some characteristics that all of our self-concepts have in common.

Self-concept:

• Displays uniquely with each person.
• Vary from very positive to very negative.
• Carries emotional, intellectual, and functional dimensions.
• Changes with the context.
• Changes over time.
• Influence the individual’s life (Delmar Learning, n.d.)

Dimensions of Self-Concept

Different dimensions may constitute different kinds of self-concept; for example, the dimensions that create “academic self-efficacy” will not have as much overlap with “social self-efficacy.”

There are some overarching dimensions that researchers understand with the self-concept puzzle. These dimensions include:

• Self-esteem
• Self-image (physical)
• Identities or roles (social)
• Personal traits and qualities (Elliot, 1984; Gecas, 1982)

Early childhood is a ripe time for young humans to perceive themselves in the world.

The Formation of Self-Concept During Early Childhood

There are three general stages of self-concept development during early childhood:

• Stage 1 : 0 to 2 years-old a. Babies need consistent, loving relationships to develop a positive sense of self. b. Babies form preferences that align with their innate sense of self. c. Toddlers feel secure with gentle but firm limits d. At age two, language skill develops and toddlers have a sense of “me.”
• Stage 2 : 3 to 4 years-old a. Three and four-year-olds begin to see themselves as separate and unique individuals. b. Their self-images tend to be descriptive rather than prescriptive or judgmental. c. Preschoolers are increasingly independent and curious about what they can do.
• Stage 3 : 5 to 6 years-old a. They are transitioning from the “me” stage to the “us” stage, where they are more aware of the needs and interests of the larger group. b. Kindergarteners can use their words to communicate their wants, needs, and feelings. c. Five and six-year-olds can use even more advanced language to help define themselves within the context of the group (Miller, Church, & Poole, n.d.).

Self-Concept in Middle Childhood

During middle childhood (about 7 to 11 years old), children are beginning to develop a sense of their social selves and figuring out how they fit in with everyone else. They reference social groups and make social comparisons more often, and begin to think about how others see them.

Other characteristics of their self-concept at this stage include:

• More balanced, less all-or-none descriptions
• Development of the ideal and real self
• Descriptions of the self by competencies instead of specific behaviors
• Development of a personal sense of self (Berk, 2004)

Culture begins to play a big role at this stage, but we’ll talk more about that later.

The Development of Self-Concept in Adolescence

Adolescence is where the development of one’s self-concept really explodes.

This is the stage in which individuals (about age 12-18) play with their sense of self, including a time when they experiment with their identity, compare themselves with others, and develop the basis of a self-concept that may stay with them the rest of their life.

During this period, adolescents are prone to greater self-consciousness and susceptibility to the influence of their peers and chemical changes happening in the brain (Sebastian, Burnett, & Blakemore, 2008).

They enjoy greater freedom and independence, engage in increasingly competitive activities, compare themselves with their peers, and can value (even over-value) the perspective of others (Manning, 2007).

In adolescence, there are two important factors that influence self-concept and self-worth:

• Success in areas in which the adolescent desires success
• Approval from significant people in the adolescent’s life (Manning, 2007).

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You may have a good handle on what self-concept is but these examples can help explain it more.

Self-concepts are rarely all positive or all negative; someone may have both positive and some negative self-concepts in different domains (e.g., a husband who thinks of himself as a good father but sees his physical self as out-of-shape and unhealthy or a student who think so themselves as a great athlete who struggles academically).

Some examples of positive self-concepts include:

• A person sees herself as an intelligent person;
• A man perceives himself as an important member of his community;
• A woman sees herself as an excellent spouse and friend;
• A person thinks of himself as a nurturing and caring person;
• A person views herself as a hard-working and competent employee.

On the flip side, these people could have negative self-concepts like:

• A person sees herself as stupid and slow;
• A man perceives himself as expendable and a burden on his community;
• A woman sees herself as a terrible spouse and friend;
• A person thinks of himself as a cold and unapproachable person;
• A person views herself as a lazy and incompetent employee.

We all have many of these mini or domain-specific self-concepts that encompass our self-concept. Some may be more positive or negative than others, and each is an important piece of what makes us who we are.

Self concept, self identity and social identity – Khan Academy

Given the marked interest in this topic within sociology and psychology, there is quite a bit of research out there on the subject. Here are a few of the most interesting and impactful findings on self-concept.

Self-Concept in Marketing and How it Influences Consumer Behavior

It probably won’t shock you that the idea of self-concept has made its way into marketing—after all, brands and companies can profit from targeting certain desirable identities. In fact, it is the basis of fashion and consumerism.

Our self-concept influences our wants and needs, and can also shape our behavior. Whether it is true or not, we tend to believe that our purchases will help establish our identity. There is a reason why people buy certain clothing, cars, etc.

And this idea has a name: self-concept attachment.

Self-Concept Attachment

Self-concept attachment refers to the attachment we form to a product as it influences identity. For example, someone who loves their Patagonia jacket may also consider it as a status symbol that also represents their “outdoorsy” side.

Thus, this jacket has a strong self-concept attachment, in addition to its purpose of providing warmth.

Surprisingly, consumers become more attached to a brand when the brands match their “actual selves” rather than their ideal selves (Malär, Krohmer, Hoyer, & Nyffenegger, 2011). We tend to identify more with brands that “meet us where we are” rather than trying to connect with our higher, ideal selves.

Companies understand this and work to (1) get to know their target consumers better, and (2) mold their brand identity to match the self-concept of their consumers. The more they can get consumers to identify with their brand, the more they will buy that brand.

How Does Self-Concept Affect Interpersonal Communication?

Think about a cycle in which we develop, maintain, and revise our self-concept: we have an idea of who we are, and we act in accordance with that self-concept. Consequently, others form an idea about who we are, and they react in accordance with their idea of who we are, thus impacting our idea of who we are.

This feedback loop continues to shape us, and interpersonal communication plays a big role here.

Our self-concept drives our motivations, methods, and experiences with communicating with others. For example, if you see yourself as someone who is always right (or who must always be right), you may struggle in communicating with others when disagreements arise.

If that need is accompanied by an acceptance of aggression, you may use hostility, assertiveness , and argumentativeness to attack the self-concepts of the people you are debating instead of discussing their positions (Infante & Wigley, 1986).

Communication on social media is also a determinant and an outcome of an individual’s self-concept.

Sponcil and Gitimu (2012) suggested that, in general, the more friends an individual has on social networking sites, the more positively they feel about themselves as a whole. Conversely, the anxiety of social media and maintaining one’s image poses separate issues.

Self-Concept and Academic Achievement

Self-concept and academic achievement is also a positive feedback loop, as actions beget similar actions and identity to match.

In a longitudinal study, Marsh (1990) found that students with more positive academic self-concept achieved greater academic success the following year. Later studies confirmed the relationship between the two but indicated that achievement affects self-concept more than self-concept inherently influences achievement success (Muijs, 2011).

Research by Byrne (1986) offered instead that self-concept and academic self-concept can be considered two separate constructs; academic achievement may impact one’s overall self-concept, but it is most directly related to academic self-concept.

Self-Concept and Career Development

Self-concept develops throughout the lifespan and during any career.

According to researcher Donald Super, there are five life and career development stages:

• Growth (Ages 0 to 14)
• Exploration (Ages 15 to 24)
• Establishment (Age 25 to 44)
• Maintenance (Age 45 to 64)
• Decline (Age 65+)

The first stage is marked by the development of one’s basic self-concept. In the second stage, able individuals experiment and try out new classes, experiences, and jobs. Stage 3 sees individuals establishing their career and building their skills, likely starting in an entry-level position.

In the fourth stage, individuals engage in a continuous management and adjustment process to both their self-concept and their career. Finally, the fifth stage is characterized by reduced output and preparations for retirement, activities which can have a huge impact on one’s self-concept (Super, Starishevsky, Matlin, & Jordaan, 1963).

Of course, this model assumes equal access and privilege upon entering the workforce, which is not truthful to reality. Not all humans, for example, have the opportunity to explore and establish themselves as easily as others.

Nevertheless, Super posited that self-concept drives career development and can act as a general framework and inspiration for future research in this area, including a social and racial unearthing of Rogers’ theory on self-actualization.

The research could also be conducted on Bandura’s work on self-efficacy, on role salience, and on the idea of multiple identities in career development (Betz, 1994).

Culture and Self-Concept

Unsurprisingly, culture can have a big impact on self-concept. For example, how children are treated in early childhood influences how their sense of self develops.

Many parents might be more concerned with emotions and satisfying the wants of their children, while others may be more firm and controlling of their child’s behavior, worrying about their needs rather than fulfilling their desires. This is a generalization, but one that holds under scrutiny: culture influence self-concept.

Research suggests that those from more collectivist cultures produced more group self-descriptions and fewer idiocentric self-descriptions than those from individualistic cultures (Bochner, 1994).

Further research also indicated that East Asian cultures are more accepting of contradictory beliefs about the self; this indicates that one’s self-concept in these cultures may be more flexible than, say, American culture (Choi & Choi, 2002).

Findings like these are fascinating, but they also reveal how and why it is difficult to measure self-concept. The next section summarizes those attempts.

One’s self-concept does not always align with “reality” or with how others view a person. However, there are still some tools that can measure self-concept.

If you are interested in using a self-concept measure for research purposes, look first at the development of the instrument, the definition it is based on, and the dimensions or components it measures. It’s important that you choose a tool that aligns with the idea of self-concept that your research uses.

Some of the most prominent tools to measure self-concept include:

• The Robson Self-Concept Questionnaire (SCQ; Robson, 1989)
• The Social Self-Concept Questionnaire (SSC; Fernández-Zabala, Rodríguez-Fernández, & Goñi, 2016)
• The Academic Self-Concept Questionnaire (ASCQ; Liu & Wang, 2005)

Self-Concept Questionnaire by Dr. Saraswat

The Self-Concept Questionnaire from Dr. Saraswat (1984) has become a popular choice for measuring self-concept. It consists of 48 items measuring self-concept across six dimensions:

• Temperamental;
• Educational;
• Intellectual.

For each item, the respondent rates how well each item describes their ideas about themselves on a 5-point scale. Higher scores indicate high self-concept, while low scores indicate low self-concept.

This self-concept questionnaire is generally thought of as reliable by researchers, but it is dated.

If you’re looking for a great resource with 10 simple but effective activities for cultivating self-concept in young children, Glori Chaika’s article “Ten Activities to Improve Students’ Self-Concepts” can be adapted to fit the context for several age ranges.

We summarize the 10 activities she suggests here:

1 – The Interview

This activity is great for the beginning of the year as students to get to know their peers.

Break the group into pairs, and make sure each student is paired with someone they don’t very well. Give them 10 minutes to interview each other (5 minutes per interview) with fun questions like “would you rather live on a boat or on an island?” or “what is your favorite subject at this school?”.

When all of the interviews have been completed, have each pair come to the front of the class and introduce their partner to the other children.

2 – The Journal

Journals can be beneficial in many ways, as  keeping a journal  allows you to self-examine. Help your students develop their sense of self by assigning journal entries that they keep in one notebook all year.

Tell your students that they can put whatever they want in their journal—they can write a poem, describe a dream they had, write about what they hope for, something they are happy about, something they are sad about, etc.—and that they must make at least three entries (or however many you decide is appropriate) per week.

Make sure to tell them that you will only read the entry if they give you permission, but that you will check to ensure they have at least three dated entries per week.

3 – Designing Self-Collages

Self-collages are a great activity from young children to high-schoolers. Tell the students they need to create a collage that represents who they are by using pictures, words, and/or symbols. They can cut things from magazines, print them out from the internet, or draw pictures themselves.

You may want to guide them by suggesting to focus on things they enjoy or are good at, places they’ve been or would like to go, and people they admire.

When everyone’s collage is complete, you can do an extra activity where students present their collage to the classroom, or maybe everyone tries to guess which collage belongs to which student.

4 – Ranking Traits

This activity is best for older students with writing skills. Have the students rip a piece of paper into ten strips and write a word or phrase on each strip that they feel describes them. Tell them that no one will see the things they write down, so they can be completely honest.

Once the students have written down their ten traits, have them arrange them in order from those they most like about themselves to those they least like about themselves.

Encourage them to reflect on their traits by asking questions like:

• Do you like what you see?
• Do you want to keep it?
• Now give up one trait. How does the lack of that affect you?
• Now give up another. Give up three. Now what kind of person are you?

After the students have reduced their traits to six, have them add the traits back, one by one. For an extra boost to this activity, you can have the students journal about their experience at the end, and how they want to use their strengths.

5 – Accentuate the Positive

Accentuating the positive is all about noticing and sharing the positive things about others (and themselves).

To try this activity, break the students up into groups of four to six. Instruct the groups to pick one person (to start with) and tell that person all the positive things about them. Encourage the students to focus on traits and skills that can be altered (e.g., work ethic, skill in soccer), rather than permanent features (e.g., eyes, skin).

One student in each group will act as a recorder, writing down all the positive things that are said about someone. Each member of the group takes a turn, and the recorder gives the individual the list of all the positive things said about them at the end of the activity.

This exercise can also make a great focus for a journal entry.

6 – Thumbprints

This activity requires an ink pad and the willingness to get a bit messy!

Have each of your students place his or her thumb on the inkpad and then on a piece of paper to get a thumbprint. Show them the five major fingerprint patterns and have them identify their print type. Explain how fingerprints are unique—both across their own fingers and from person to person.

Next, have each student create an animal out of their thumbprint. Bonus points if the animal is one the student feels represents him or her! Encourage them to write about this in their journal, or to add the thumbprint drawing to their journal.

7 – Create a “Me” Commercial

This activity can be especially fun for the drama-loving students. Tell them that they are each going to make a two or three-minute commercial on why you should hire them.

The commercial should focus on their special skills, talents, and positive qualities. It should highlight what is great about them and what they would bring to the fictional position they are auditioning for.

Give the students some time to write their commercial, then have them present their commercials to the class. An alternative method for this activity is to have small groups create commercials for each group member.

8 – Shared Learning

This is a simple activity if you’ve been having your students write in their journal for the whole term.

Tell the students to look through their journal entries and reflect. Have them choose one thing they have learned about themselves during this term.

When each student has chosen something they would like to share, sit in a circle and have each student share out on what they learned over the past three months (or four months, or six months, etc.).

9 – Write Yourself a Letter

This is another activity that is appropriate for older children since it requires somewhat advanced writing skills.

Tell the students that they will be writing a letter to themselves, and to be totally honest since no one else will be able to read it. They can write whatever they’d like in this letter to their future selves, but they may want to add in things that describe them today (e.g., height and weight, current friends, favorite music and movies, special things that happened to them this year).

On another piece of paper or on the back of this letter, tell students to write down ten goals they would like to accomplish by this time next year. Have your students seal the letter and their goals in an envelope, address the envelope to themselves, and give it to you. In one year, mail the letters out to the students.

This is a far-reaching activity that will encourage your students to think about how they change over time, and how they stay the same.

10 – Drawing Self Portraits

Make sure that each student has access to a mirror for this activity. If there isn’t one handy in your classroom, bring some small mirrors in for the students to use.

Tell your students to use the mirror to draw a picture of themselves. It doesn’t have to look exactly like them, but it should be a good representation of them. This simple activity can promote self-reflection in students (beyond the kind that involves a mirror).

To take this activity a bit further, have them divide the drawing in half—on the left side, each student should draw herself as she sees herself, and on the right side, she should draw herself as she thinks others see her. Along with this drawing, the students can make an entry in their journal on the differences between how they see themselves and how they think others see them.

Self-Concept Activities for Preschoolers

For example, a few of the activities that can help preschoolers develop a self-concept include:

• Record each child’s voice during an activity period. Have the children listen to the voices and guess which voice goes with each child.
• Have several children stand in a line in front of the class. Name the child who is first, second, third and so on. Ask the children to change positions. Then have each child in line name his or her new position. To vary the activity, have the children at their seats name each child in line and describe his or her position.
• Make a friendship quilt. Cut several squares of brightly colored construction paper. Give each child one of the squares. Have them decorate the square or even glue a picture of himself, glitter, beads, sequins, or yarn to the square. Staple the squares, side by side, to the bulletin board. If extra squares are needed to fill in empty spaces, print the school’s name or teacher’s name on additional squares and intermingle them with the student’s squares.
• Have the children think of some things they can’t do now, but can do when they grow older. What are some things they can do now that they couldn’t do when they were younger?
• Role-play the growth process from baby to father or mother to grandparent. The child can interpret the process as he or she goes along. Children can also develop a short play about the family.

Any of these activities can be adapted to fit your children’s context, whether that is a classroom, at home, in a playgroup, in a therapy session, etc.

Lesson Plan on Self-Concept

If you’re looking for a good lesson plan on teaching self-concept, this plan from the Utah Education Network is a great choice.

It starts with a description of self-concept as “the person I think I am” and contrasts it with “the person others think I am” and “the person others think I think I am.”

A diagram on the first page shows a cycle with four “stops:”

• As I see myself
• As others see me
• Other’s reactions to me

This diagram shows how each stop on the cycle feeds into the next, influencing each aspect and eventually coming back to the original stop. For example, how we see ourselves influences our actions. Our actions drive how others see us, and their image of us drives their reactions or behavior toward us.

Feedback on ourselves contributes to our overall image of ourselves, and the cycle continues.

Next, it describes several case studies to help drive the point home. There is the case of a 45-year old father who looks in the mirror and thinks about the wrinkle he just found, the weight he would like to lose, his desire to be a stay-at-home dad, his messy and unorganized house, and a commitment he made that has overextended him.

There is also a case of a middle-aged mother thinking about her miserable day at work, the last decade or so of overtime, her struggles to pay the bills and have a little money left for herself, and all the things she has on her to-do list.

A third case focuses on a teenage girl who is concerned about her skin, her haircut, whether her friends truly care about her, and an upcoming chemistry test that she has not studied for.

The final case concerns a teenage guy who was struggling to understand calculus and thinking back to the counselor that encouraged him to take it. He is also comparing himself to his straight-A brother and thinking about how he wished he could be the athlete his father wanted him to be. He is worrying about tryouts and doubting his ability to even make the team.

For each of these cases, the questions are:

• How will the individual see himself or herself?
• How will the individual act toward others?
• How will the individual think others see him or her?
• How will others act toward the individual?
• What effect does this have on how the individual sees him- or herself?
• Where is the spiral headed and how can its motion be reversed?

This is a great lesson for children to learn, whether you introduce it in elementary school (with some extra time and patience set aside!) or in high school.

Follow this link and click on “Self Concept Transparency” to see the example lesson plan for yourself, and feel free to invent examples most relevant to your class or client.

Three of the most useful worksheets on self-concept are described below.

All About Me

This worksheet from the Utah Education Network is a good option for children of all ages.

It is only one page with 15 prompts to complete. These prompts are:

• I feel good about…
• I feel successful when…
• My favorite person is…
• My favorite activity is…
• I wish I could…
• If I could have three wishes, they would be: a. b. c.
• I feel depressed when…
• A character trait I need to improve is…
• I am good at…
• I wish I did not…
• My family is…
• I would like to be…
• The most important thing to me is…
• The thing I like best about myself…

You can find this worksheet and other worksheets and lesson plans on the Utah Education Network’s website here .

17 Exercises To Foster Self-Acceptance and Compassion

Help your clients develop a kinder, more accepting relationship with themselves using these 17 Self-Compassion Exercises [PDF] that promote self-care and self-compassion.

Created by Experts. 100% Science-based.

Learning about how others perceive a construct can be helpful in furthering our own understanding of that construct.

Use the quotes below to see how your idea of self-concept compares to the ideas of others.

What others think of us would of little moment did it not, when known, so deeply tinge what we think of ourselves.

Paul Valéry

Know, first, who you are; and then adorn yourself accordingly.

Seek out that particular mental attribute which makes you feel most deeply and vitally alive, along with which comes the inner voice which says, ‘This is the real me’, and when you have found that attitude, follow it.

William James

Today you are You, that is truer than true. There is no one alive who is Youer than You.

Act as if you are the person you want to be.

Bernie Siegel

The self is not something that one finds. It is something that one creates.

Thomas Szasz

There is but one cause of human failure. And that is man’s lack of faith in his true Self.

An individual’s self-concept is the core of his personality. It affects every aspect of human behavior: the ability to learn, the capacity to grow and change. A strong, positive self-image is the best possible preparation for success in life.

Joyce Brothers

In this piece, we learned about what self-concept is (an overarching idea about who we are), how it comes about (it develops throughout the lifespan, and is most flexible in the early years), what it is related to and affected by (just about everything, but namely consumer behavior, academic achievement, career development, and culture), and whether you can do anything to change it—you can.

Our self-concept is affected by how we feel about ourselves and how we judge our abilities, competencies, and worth as a person. When we put some effort into boosting these self-evaluations, our self-concept will adjust to accommodate these changes.

We have the ability to change how we think about ourselves by working to become more like our ideal selves.

It might seem daunting to put in the effort required to revise your self-esteem and self-image, but like most tasks, getting started is the hardest part. Refer to some of the quotes above to get a dose of inspiration, or find some quotes on the subject that inspire you and keep them nearby whenever you’re in need of some motivation.

What do you think about self-concept? Do you have any other good quotes about self-concept? Do you have a developed self-concept or is it vaguer? Do you think it’s good or bad to have self-concept differentiation?

Let us know in the comments, and thanks for reading.

We hope you enjoyed reading this article. Don’t forget to download our three Self Compassion Exercises for free .

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Help me to make preparations for grade5 class about positive self concept.

Here is an idea: – Brief Introduction: Explain self-concept in simple terms—how we see ourselves, including our abilities, personality, and place in the world. Activities: – Positive Affirmation Cards: Students create and decorate cards with positive statements about themselves. Self-Portrait: Draw or paint self-portraits that express individual personalities and strengths. – Growth Mindset Chat: Discuss how effort and perseverance can improve abilities, showing that self-concept can grow and change. – Role-Playing: Practice scenarios that involve giving compliments, asking for help, and overcoming obstacles to understand how actions affect self-concept. – Reflection: Encourage journaling about personal growth, challenges, and successes to help students see their progress. – Parent Guide: Send home tips on reinforcing positive self-concept, including praise, open discussions, and setting a positive example.

I hope this helps!

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If you don”t mind proceed with this extraordinary work and I anticipate a greater amount of your magnificent blog entries. 

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Table of Contents

Ideal Self vs Real Self

The contents of this article are fact-based except otherwise stated within the article.

Dr Sabina Alispahic, PhD, is a psychologist and gestalt psychotherapist with expertise in clinical and health psychology. 

Dr Sabina Alispahic’s Highlights:

• Associate Professor at the University of Sarajevo for the past 12 years
• PhD in psychology at the University of Zagreb
• European Certificate of Psychotherapy

Professional experience

Dr Alispahic pioneered innovative teaching methods as an associate professor of clinical and health psychology, inspiring a new generation of mental health professionals while contributing to the field for over 12 years. Also, she empowered individuals across the globe as an online psychotherapist, delivering life-changing therapy and earning a reputation for compassionate care and exceptional results. She has demonstrated expertise in a range of therapeutic approaches (CBT, ACT, Gestalt, mindfulness, and family constellations).

Certifications

European Certificate of Psychotherapy (Education in Gestalt Psychotherapy Training of the Malta Institute)

Eight-week stress reduction mindfulness programme, Society of Psychologists in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

2009-2013 University of Zagreb, Faculty of Philosophy, Postgraduate Doctoral Studies in Psychology

2004-2008 University of Sarajevo, Faculty of Philosophy, Master Studies, Department of Psychology

Publications

Alispahic. S. (2021). Selected topics from psychotherapy Sarajevo: TDP.

Alispahic. S. (2020). Online psychotherapy. Handbook for psychotherapists and clients Sarajevo: TDP.

Alispahic, S., and Godinjak, A. (2018). (R)evolution of the doctor-patient relationship. Sarajevo: TDP.

Alispahic, S. (2016). The psychology of pain Sarajevo: Faculty of Philosophy (e-publication, Bosnian language): https://ebooks.ff.unsa.ba/index.php/ebooks_ffunsa/catalog/book/29

Book chapters

Alispahic, S. (2018). Psychological Theory and Therapy of Traumatic Memory In: A. Hamburger (ur.), Trauma, Trust, and Memory: Social Trauma and Reconciliation in Psychoanalysis, Psychotherapy, and Cultural Memory, 23-35. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Link: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003076247-4/psychological-theory-therapy-traumatic-memory-sabina-alispahić

Markovic Pavlovic, M., Alispahic, S., and Dautbegovic, A. (2015). Psychology of Nonkilling in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Knowledge and Attitudes of Students Towards Nonkilling Culture. In: R. Bahtijaragic i J. E. Pim (ur.), Nonkilling Balkans, 171-183. Honolulu: Centre for Global Nonkilling, and Sarajevo: Faculty of Philosophy.

Link: http://nonkilling.org/pdf/nkbalkans.pdf

Alispahic, S., & Alispahic, B. (2021). Definition of police psychology: The role of psychologists in the police. Technium Soc. Sci. J., 17 , 235-244.

Link: https://techniumscience.com/index.php/socialsciences/article/view/2678

Alispahic, S., Hasanbegovic-Anic, E., & Tuce, Đ. (2021). Big Five Personality Traits as Predictors of Mindfulness: A Study on a Bosnian Sample. Epiphany , 14 (1), 146-155.

Link: http://epiphany.ius.edu.ba/index.php/epiphany/article/view/357

Alispahic, S. & Hodžić Küreç, A. (2021). How does yoga affect health?  Yoga teachers’ experiences. International Scientific Journal of Kinesiology, Vol. 12 , 2, 135-140. 

Link: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Sabina-Alispahic/publication/349140097_How_does_yoga_affect_health_Yoga_teachers_experiences/links/60226c87a6fdcc37a812def3/How-does-yoga-affect-health-Yoga-teachers-experiences.pdf

Hasanbegovic-Anic, E., Sandic, A., and Alispahic, S. (2018). Prevention of substance abuse in children and adolescents: an evidence-based practice approach. Epiphany , 11 (1), 11-30. 

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Alispahic, S. and Hasanbegovic-Anic, E. (2017). Mindfulness: Age and Gender Differences in a Bosnian Sample. Psychological Thought, Vol. 10 (1), 155–166. 

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Self-awareness is a key component of personal development. This worksheet is designed to facilitate a deeper understanding of one’s own identity. By comparing the ‘ideal’ self – the person we aspire to be – with the ‘real’ self – the person we currently are – this worksheet offers insights into our personal goals , values, and areas for growth.

What Are The Theories Behind This Worksheet?

The concept of the ‘ideal self’ is often linked to Carl Rogers’ humanistic approach, which suggests that a mismatch between the ideal self and the real self can lead to feelings of incongruence and dissatisfaction. Additionally, Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, particularly the self-actualization stage, is relevant as it involves realizing one’s full potential and aligning one’s actions with personal values and aspirations.

How Will This Worksheet Help You?

Engaging with this worksheet encourages introspection and self-discovery. It helps identify the discrepancies between who you are and who you wish to be, shedding light on the areas of life that may need attention or change. 

How Should You Use This Worksheet?

Reflect on each aspect of your ‘ideal self’ and compare it with your current realities. It’s important to be patient and non-judgmental during this process. Recognize that this is a tool for growth, not self-criticism. 

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Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review, 50(4), 370–396. https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1943-03751-001

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11(4), 227–268. https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2001-03012-001

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What Is Self-Concept?

Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Rachel Goldman, PhD FTOS, is a licensed psychologist, clinical assistant professor, speaker, wellness expert specializing in eating behaviors, stress management, and health behavior change.

Verywell / Cindy Chung 

• Development
• Can It Be Changed?
• Self-Concept Theories

Frequently Asked Questions

Self-concept is the image we have of ourselves. It is influenced by many forces, including our interaction with important people in our lives. It is how we perceive our behaviors, abilities, and unique characteristics. For example, beliefs such as "I am a good friend" or "I am a kind person" are part of an overall self-concept.

Other examples of self-concept include:

• How you view your personality traits, such as whether you are an extrovert or introvert
• How you see your roles in life, such as whether you feel that being a parent, sibling, friend, and partner are important parts of your identity
• The hobbies or passions that are important to your sense of identity, such as being a sports enthusiast or belonging to a certain political party
• How you feel about your interactions with the world, such as whether you feel that you are contributing to society

Our self-perception is important because it affects our motivations , attitudes, and behaviors . It also affects how we feel about the person we think we are, including whether we are competent or have self-worth.

Self-concept tends to be more malleable when we're younger and still going through self-discovery and identity formation . As we age and learn who we are and what's important to us, these self-perceptions become much more detailed and organized.

At its most basic, self-concept is a collection of beliefs one holds about oneself and the responses of others. It embodies the answer to the question: " Who am I? " If you want to find your self-concept, list things that describe you as an individual. What are your traits? What do you like? How do you feel about yourself?

Rogers' Three Parts of Self-Concept

Humanist psychologist  Carl Rogers believed that self-concept is made up of three different parts:

• Ideal self : The ideal self is the person you want to be. This person has the attributes or qualities you are either working toward or want to possess. It's who you envision yourself to be if you were exactly as you wanted.
• Self-image : Self-image refers to how you see yourself at this moment in time. Attributes like physical characteristics, personality traits , and social roles all play a role in your self-image.
• Self-esteem : How much you like, accept, and value yourself all contribute to your self-concept. Self-esteem can be affected by a number of factors—including how others see you, how you think you compare to others, and your role in society.

Incongruence and Congruence

Self-concept is not always aligned with reality. When it is aligned, your self-concept is said to be congruent . If there is a mismatch between how you see yourself (your self-image) and who you wish you were (your ideal self), your self-concept is incongruent . This incongruence can negatively affect self-esteem .

Rogers believed that incongruence has its earliest roots in childhood. When parents place conditions on their affection for their children (only expressing love if children "earn it" through certain behaviors and living up to the parents' expectations), children begin to distort the memories of experiences that leave them feeling unworthy of their parents' love.

Unconditional love, on the other hand, helps to foster congruence. Children who experience such love—also referred to as family love —feel no need to continually distort their memories in order to believe that other people will love and accept them as they are.

How Self-Concept Develops

Self-concept develops, in part, through our interaction with others. In addition to family members and close friends, other people in our lives can contribute to our self-identity.

For instance, one study found that the more a teacher believes in a high-performing student's abilities, the higher that student's self-concept. (Interestingly, no such association was found with lower-performing students.)

Self-concept can also be developed through the stories we hear. As an example, one study found that female readers who were "deeply transported" into a story about a leading character with a traditional gender role had a more feminist self-concept than those who weren't as moved by the story.

The media plays a role in self-concept development as well—both mass media and social media . When these media promote certain ideals, we're more likely to make those ideals our own. And the more often these ideals are presented, the more they affect our self-identity and self-perception.

Can Self-Concept Be Changed?

Self-concept is not static, meaning that it can change. Our environment plays a role in this process. Places that hold a lot of meaning to us actively contribute to our future self-concept through both the way we relate these environments to ourselves and how society relates to them.

Self-concept can also change based on the people with whom we interact. This is particularly true with regard to individuals in our lives who are in leadership roles. They can impact the collective self (the self in social groups) and the relational self (the self in relationships).

In some cases, a medical diagnosis can change self-concept by helping people understand why they feel the way they do—such as someone receiving an autism diagnosis later in life, finally providing clarity as to why they feel different.

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Other Self-Concept Theories

As with many topics within psychology , a number of other theorists have proposed different ways of thinking about self-concept.

Social Identity

Social psychologist Henri Tajfel developed social identity theory, which states that self-concept is composed of two key parts:

• Personal identity : The traits and other characteristics that make you unique
• Social identity : Who you are based on your membership in social groups, such as sports teams, religions, political parties, or social class

This theory states that our social identity influences our self-concept, thus affecting our emotions and behaviors. If we're playing sports, for instance, and our team loses a game, we might feel sad for the team (emotion) or act out against the winning team (behavior).

Multiple Dimensions

Psychologist Bruce A. Bracken had a slightly different theory and believed that self-concept was multidimensional, consisting of six independent traits:

• Academic : Success or failure in school
• Affect : Awareness of emotional states
• Competence : Ability to meet basic needs
• Family : How well you work in your family unit
• Physical : How you feel about your looks, health, physical condition, and overall appearance
• Social : Ability to interact with others

In 1992, Bracken developed the Multidimensional Self-Concept Scale, a comprehensive assessment that evaluates each of these six elements of self-concept in children and adolescents.

Self-concept development is never finished. Though one's self-identity is thought to be primarily formed in childhood, your experiences as an adult can also change how you feel about yourself. If your self-esteem increases later in life, for instance, it can improve your self-concept.

Our self-concept can affect the method by which we communicate. If you feel you are a good writer, for instance, you may prefer to communicate in writing versus speaking with others.

It can also affect the way we communicate. If your social group communicates a certain way, you would likely choose to communicate that way as well. Studies on teens have connected high self-concept clarity with more open communication with parents.

Self-concept refers to a broad description of ourselves ("I am a good writer") while self-esteem includes any judgments or opinions we have of ourselves ("I feel proud to be a good writer"). Put another way, self-concept answers the question: Who am I? Self-esteem answers the question: How do I feel about who I am?

Our self-concept impacts how we respond to life, so a well-developed self-concept helps us respond in ways that are more positive and beneficial for us. One of the ways it does this is by enabling us to recognize our worth. A well-developed self-concept also helps keep us from internalizing negative feedback from others.

Different cultures have different beliefs. They have different ideas of how dependent or independent one should be, different religious beliefs, and differing views of socioeconomic development.

All of these cultural norms influence self-concept by providing the structure of what is expected within that society and how one sees oneself in relation to others.

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By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

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• Asha Ganesan 3  

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Self-actualization ; Self-ideal

The ideal self is the part of a person’s self-concept that consists of their desires, hopes, and wishes (Higgins 1987 ; Rogers 1959 ). It is a part of the self that is highly prized by the individual; thus, the ideal self is considered to be a motivator within a person’s self-concept (Higgins 1987 ; Rogers 1959 ).

Introduction

The self is theorized as consisting of three domains: the actual self, the ideal self, and the ought self (Higgins 1987 ). Ideal self is “the self-concept which the individual would most like to possess, upon which he places the highest value for himself” (Rogers 1959 , p.200). It is constructed of a person’s hopes, wishes, and goals (Higgins 1987 ). When a person’s ideal self is congruent with their actual self (self-attributes a person believes he/she actually possess), self-actualization occurs and the person is progressing toward becoming a fully functioning person (Rogers 1959 ). Both ideal and ought self are...

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Ganesan, A. (2020). Ideal Self. In: Zeigler-Hill, V., Shackelford, T.K. (eds) Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24612-3_1485

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CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS article

“i” and “me”: the self in the context of consciousness.

• Cognition and Philosophy Lab, Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

James (1890) distinguished two understandings of the self, the self as “Me” and the self as “I”. This distinction has recently regained popularity in cognitive science, especially in the context of experimental studies on the underpinnings of the phenomenal self. The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and attempt to precisely distinguish between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. This distinction was originally based on the idea that the former (“Me”) corresponds to the self as an object of experience (self as object), while the latter (“I”) reflects the self as a subject of experience (self as subject). I will argue that in most of the cases (arguably all) this distinction maps onto the distinction between the phenomenal self (reflecting self-related content of consciousness) and the metaphysical self (representing the problem of subjectivity of all conscious experience), and as such these two issues should be investigated separately using fundamentally different methodologies. Moreover, by referring to Metzinger’s (2018) theory of phenomenal self-models, I will argue that what is usually investigated as the phenomenal-“I” [following understanding of self-as-subject introduced by Wittgenstein (1958) ] can be interpreted as object, rather than subject of experience, and as such can be understood as an element of the hierarchical structure of the phenomenal self-model. This understanding relates to recent predictive coding and free energy theories of the self and bodily self discussed in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy.

Introduction

Almost 130 years ago, James (1890) introduced the distinction between “Me” and “I” (see Table 1 for illustrative quotes) to the debate about the self. The former term refers to understanding of the self as an object of experience, while the latter to the self as a subject of experience 1 . This distinction, in different forms, has recently regained popularity in cognitive science (e.g., Christoff et al., 2011 ; Liang, 2014 ; Sui and Gu, 2017 ; Truong and Todd, 2017 ) and provides a useful tool for clarifying what one means when one speaks about the self. However, its exact meaning varies in cognitive science, especially in regard to what one understands as the self as subject, or “I.”

TABLE 1. Quotes from James (1890) illustrating the distinction between self-as-object (“Me”) and self-as-subject (“I”) and a quote from Wittgenstein (1958) illustrating his distinction between the use of “I” as object and as subject.

The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and take a closer look at the conceptual distinction between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. I will suggest, following James (1890) and in opposition to the tradition started by Wittgenstein (1958) , that in this context “Me” (i.e., the self as object) reflects the phenomenology of selfhood, and corresponds to what is also known as sense of self, self-consciousness, or phenomenal selfhood (e.g., Blanke and Metzinger, 2009 ; Blanke, 2012 ; Dainton, 2016 ). On the other hand, the ultimate meaning of “I” (i.e., the self as subject) is rooted in metaphysics of subjectivity, and refers to the question: why is all conscious experience subjective and who/what is the subject of conscious experience? I will argue that these two theoretical problems, i.e., phenomenology of selfhood and metaphysics of subjectivity, are in principle independent issues and should not be confused. However, cognitive science usually follows the Wittgensteinian tradition 2 by understanding the self-as-subject, or “I,” as a phenomenological, rather than metaphysical problem [Figure 1 illustrates the difference between James (1890) and Wittgenstein’s (1958) approach to the self]. By following Metzinger’s (2003 , 2010 ) framework of phenomenal self-models, and in agreement with a reductionist approach to the phenomenal “I” 3 ( Prinz, 2012 ), I will argue that what is typically investigated in cognitive science as the phenomenal “I” [or the Wittgenstein’s (1958) self-as-subject] can be understood as just a higher-order component of the self-model reflecting the phenomenal “Me.” Table 2 presents some of crucial claims of the theory of self-models, together with concise references to other theories of the self-as-object discussed in this paper.

FIGURE 1. An illustration of James (1890) and Wittgenstein’s (1958) distinctions between self-as-object (“Me”) and self-as-subject (“I”). In the original formulation, James’ (1890) “Me” includes also physical objects and people (material and social “Me”) – they were not included in the picture, because they are not directly related to consciousness.

TABLE 2. Examples of theories of the self-as-object (“Me”) in the context of consciousness, as theories of the phenomenal self, with representative quotes illustrating each position.

“Me” As An Object Of Experience: Phenomenology Of Self-Consciousness

The words ME, then, and SELF, so far as they arouse feeling and connote emotional worth, are OBJECTIVE designations, meaning ALL THE THINGS which have the power to produce in a stream of consciousness excitement of a certain particular sort ( James, 1890 , p. 319, emphasis in original).

James (1890) chose the word “Me” to refer to self-as-object. What does it mean? In James’ (1890) view, it reflects “all the things” which have the power to produce “excitement of a certain particular sort.” This certain kind of excitement is nothing more than some form of experiential quality of me-ness, mine-ness, or similar - understood in a folk-theoretical way (this is an important point, because these terms have recently acquired technical meanings in philosophy, e.g., Zahavi, 2014 ; Guillot, 2017 ). What are “all the things”? The classic formulation suggests that James (1890) meant physical objects and cultural artifacts (material self), human beings (social self), and mental processes and content (spiritual self). These are all valid categories of self-as-object, however, for the purpose of this paper I will limit the scope of further discussion only to “objects” which are relevant when speaking about consciousness. Therefore, rather than speaking about, for example, my car or my body, I will discuss only their conscious representations. This limits the scope of self-as-object to one category of “things” – conscious mental content.

Let us now reformulate James’ (1890) idea in more contemporary terms and define “Me” as the totality of all content of consciousness that is experienced as self-related. Content of consciousness is meant here in a similar way to Chalmers (1996) , who begins “ The conscious mind ” by providing a list of different kinds of conscious content. He delivers an extensive (without claiming that exhaustive) collection of types of experiences, which includes the following 4 : visual; auditory; tactile; olfactory; experiences of hot and cold; pain; taste; other bodily experiences coming from proprioception, vestibular sense, and interoception (e.g., headache, hunger, orgasm); mental imagery; conscious thought; emotions. Chalmers (1996) also includes several other, which, however, reflect states of consciousness and not necessarily content per se , such as dreams, arousal, fatigue, intoxication, and altered states of consciousness induced by psychoactive substances. What is common to all of the types of experience from the first list (conscious contents) is the fact that they are all, speaking in James’ (1890) terms, “objects” in a stream of consciousness: “all these things are objects, properly so called, to the subject that does the thinking” (p. 325).

The self understood as “Me” can be understood as a subset of a set of all these possible experiences. This subset is characterized by self-relatedness (Figure 2 ). It can be illustrated with sensory experiences. For example, in the visual domain, I experience an image of my face as different from another person’s face. Hence, while the image of my face belongs to “Me,” the image of someone else does not (although it can be experimentally manipulated, Tsakiris, 2008 ; Payne et al., 2017 ; Woźniak et al., 2018 ). The same can be said about my voice and sounds caused by me (as opposed to voices of other people), and about my smell. We also experience self-touch as different from touching or being touched by a different person ( Weiskrantz et al., 1971 ; Blakemore et al., 1998 ; Schutz-Bosbach et al., 2009 ). There is even evidence that we process our possessions differently ( Kim and Johnson, 2014 ; Constable et al., 2018 ). This was anticipated by James’ (1890) notion of the material “Me,” and is typically regarded as reflecting one’s extended self ( Kim and Johnson, 2014 ). In all of these cases, we can divide sensory experiences into the ones which do relate to the self and the ones which do not. The same can be said about the contents of thoughts and feelings, which can be either about “Me” or about something/someone else.

FIGURE 2. A simplified representation of a structure of phenomenal content including the metaphysical “I,” the phenomenal “Me,” and the phenomenal “I,” which can be understood (see in text) as a higher-level element of the phenomenal “Me.” Each pair of nodes connected with a yellow line represents one type of content of consciousness, with indigo nodes corresponding to self-related content, and black nodes corresponding to non-self-related content. In some cases (e.g., pain, emotions, interoceptive, and proprioceptive sensations), the black nodes are lighter and drawn with a dashed line (the same applies to links), to indicate that in normal circumstances one does not experiences these sensations as representing another person (although it is possible in thought experiments and pathologies). Multisensory/multimodal interactions have been omitted for the sake of clarity. All of the nodes compose the set of conscious thoughts, which can be formulated as “I experience X.” In normal circumstances, one does not deny ownership over these thoughts, however, in thought experiments, and in some cases of psychosis, one may experience that even such thoughts cease to feel as one’s own. This situation is represented by the shape with a dashed outline. Moreover, in special cases one can form meta-delusions, i.e., delusions about delusions – thoughts that my thoughts about other thoughts are not my thoughts (see text for description).

Characterizing self-as-object as a subset of conscious experiences specifies the building blocks of “Me” (which are contents of consciousness) and provides a guiding principle for distinguishing between self and non-self (self-relatedness). However, it is important to note two things. First, the distinction between self and non-self is often a matter of scale rather than a binary classification, and therefore self-relatedness may be better conceptualized as the strength of the relation with the self. It can be illustrated with an example of the “Inclusion of Other in Self” scale ( Aron et al., 1992 ). This scale asks to estimate to what extent another person feels related to one’s self, by choosing among a series of pairs of more-to-less overlapping circles representing the self and another person (e.g., a partner). The degree of overlap between the chosen pair of circles represents the degree of self-relatedness. Treating self-relatedness as a matter of scale adds an additional level of complexity to the analysis, and results in speaking about the extent to which a given content of consciousness represents self, rather than whether it simply does it or not. This does not, however, change the main point of the argument that we can classify all conscious contents according to whether (or to what extent, in that case) they are self-related. For the sake of clarity, I will continue to speak using the language of binary classification, but it should be kept in mind that it is an arbitrary simplification. The second point is that this approach to “Me” allows one to flexibly discuss subcategories of the self by imposing additional constraints on the type of conscious content that is taken into account, as well as the nature of self-relatedness (e.g., whether it is ownership of, agency over, authorship, etc.). For example, by limiting ourselves to discussing conscious content representing one’s body one can speak about the bodily self, and by imposing limits to conscious experience of one’s possessions one can speak about one’s extended self.

Keeping these reservations in mind two objections can be raised to the approach to “Me” introduced here. The first one is as follows:

(1) Speaking about the self/other distinction does not make sense in regard to experiences which are always “mine,” such as prioprioception or interoception. This special status may suggest that these modalities underpin the self as “I,” i.e., the subject of experience.

This idea is present in theoretical proposals postulating that subjectivity emerges based on (representations of) sensorimotor ( Gallagher, 2000 ; Christoff et al., 2011 ; Blanke et al., 2015 ) or interoceptive signals ( Damasio, 1999 ; Craig, 2010 ; Seth et al., 2011 ; Park and Tallon-Baudry, 2014 ; Salomon, 2017 ). There are two answers to this objection. First, the fact that this kind of experience (this kind of content of consciousness) is always felt as “my” experience simply means that all proprioceptive, interoceptive, pain experiences, etc., are as a matter of fact parts of “Me.” They are self-related contents of consciousness and hence naturally qualify as self-as-object. Furthermore, there is no principled reason why the fact that we normally do not experience them as belonging to someone else should transform them from objects of experience (content) into a subject of experience. Their special status may cause these experiences to be perceived as more central aspects of the self than experiences in other modalities, but there is no reason to think that it should change them from something that we experience into the self as an experiencer. Second, even the special status of these sensations can be called into question. It is possible to imagine a situation in which one experiences these kinds of sensations from an organ or a body which does not belong to her or him. We can imagine that with enough training one will learn to distinguish between proprioceptive signals coming from one’s body and those coming from another person’s (or artificial) body. If this is possible, then one may develop a phenomenal distinction between “my” versus “other’s” proprioceptive and interoceptive experiences (for example), and in this case the same rules of classification into phenomenal “Me” and phenomenal “not-Me” will apply as to other sensory modalities. This scenario is not realistic at the current point of technological development, but there are clinical examples which indirectly suggest that it may be possible. For example, people who underwent transplantation of an organ sometimes experience rejection of a transplant. Importantly, patients whose organisms reject an organ also more often experience psychological rejection of that transplant ( Látos et al., 2016 ). Moreover, there are rare cases in which patients following a successful surgery report that they perceive transplanted organs as foreign objects in themselves ( Goetzmann et al., 2009 ). In this case, affected people report experiencing a form of disownership of the implanted organ, suggesting that they may experience interoceptive signals coming from that transplant as having a phenomenal quality of being “not-mine,” leading to similar phenomenal quality as the one postulated in the before-mentioned thought experiment. Another example of a situation in which self-relatedness of interoception may be disrupted may be found in conjoint twins. In some variants of this developmental disorder (e.g., parapagus, dicephalus, thoracopagus) brains of two separate twins share some of the internal organs (and limbs), while others are duplicated and possessed by each twin individually ( Spencer, 2000 ; Kaufman, 2004 ). This provides an inverted situation to the one described in our hypothetical scenario – rather than two pieces of the same organ being “wired” to one person, the same organ (e.g., a heart, liver, stomach) is shared by two individuals. As such it may be simultaneously under control of two autonomous nervous systems. This situation raises challenging questions for theories which postulate that the root of self-as-subject lies in interoception. For example, if conjoint twins share the majority of internal organs, but possess mostly independent nervous systems, like dicephalus conjoint twins, then does it mean that they share the neural subjective frame ( Park and Tallon-Baudry, 2014 )? If the answer is yes, then does it mean that they share it numerically (both twins have one and the same subjective frame), or only qualitatively (their subjective frames are similar to the point of being identical, but they are distinct frames)? However, if interoception is just a part of “Me” then the answer becomes simple – the experiences can be only qualitatively identical, because they are experienced by two independent subjects.

All of these examples challenge the assumption that sensori-motor and interoceptive experiences are necessarily self-related and, as a consequence, that they can form the basis of self-as-subject. For this reason, it seems that signals coming from these modalities are more appropriate to underlie the phenomenal “Me,” for example in a form of background self-experience, or “phenomenal background” ( Dainton, 2008 , 2016 ), rather than the phenomenal “I.”

The second possible objection to the view of self-as-object described in this section is the following one:

(2) My thoughts and feelings may have different objects, but they are always my thoughts and feelings. Therefore, their object may be either “me” or “other,” but their subject is always “I.” As a consequence, even though my thoughts and feelings constitute contents of my consciousness, they underlie the phenomenal “I” and not the phenomenal “Me.”

It seems to be conceptually misguided to speak about one’s thoughts and feelings as belonging to someone else. This intuition motivated Wittgenstein (1958) to write: “there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have toothache. To ask ‘are you sure it is you who have pains?’ “would be nonsensical” ( Wittgenstein, 1958 ). In the Blue Book, he introduced the distinction between the use of “I” as object and as subject (see Table 1 for a full relevant quote) and suggested that while we can be wrong about the former, making a mistake about the latter is not possible. This idea was further developed by Shoemaker (1968) who introduced an arguably conceptual truth that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun, or IEM in short. For example, when I say “I see a photo of my face in front of me” I may be mistaken about the fact that it is my face (because, e.g., it is a photo of my identical twin), but I cannot be mistaken that it is me who is looking at it. One way to read IEM is that it postulates that I can be mistaken about self-as-object, but I cannot be mistaken about self-as-subject. If this is correct then there is a radical distinction between these two types of self that provides a strong argument to individuate them. From that point, one may argue that IEM provides a decisive argument to distinguish between phenomenal “I” (self-as-subject) and phenomenal “Me” (self-as-object).

Before endorsing this conclusion, let us take a small step back. It is important to note that in the famous passage from the Blue Book Wittgenstein (1958) did not write about two distinct types of self. Instead, he wrote about two ways of using the word “I” (or “my”). As such, he was more concerned with issues in philosophy of language than philosophy of mind. Therefore, a natural question arises – to what extent does this linguistic distinction map onto a substantial distinction between two different entities (types of self)? On the face of it, it seems that there is an important difference between these two uses of self-referential words, which can be mapped onto the experience of being a self-as-subject and the experience of being a self-as-object (or, for example, the distinction between bodily ownership and thought authorship, as suggested by Liang, 2014 ). However, I will argue that there are reasons to believe that the phenomenal “I,” i.e., the experience of being a self-as-subject may be better conceptualized as a higher-order phenomenal “Me” – a higher-level self-as-object.

Psychiatric practice provides cases of people, typically suffering from schizophrenia, who describe experiences of dispossession of thoughts, known as delusions of thought insertion ( Young, 2008 ; Bortolotti and Broome, 2009 ; Martin and Pacherie, 2013 ). According to the standard account, the phenomenon of thought insertion does not represent a disruption of sense of ownership over one’s thoughts, but only loss of sense of agency over them. However, the standard account has been criticized in recent years by theorists arguing that thought insertion indeed represents loss of sense of ownership ( Metzinger, 2003 ; Billon, 2013 ; Guillot, 2017 ; López-Silva, 2017 ). One of the main arguments against the standard view is that it runs into serious problems when attempting to explain obsessive intrusive thoughts in clinical population and spontaneous thoughts in healthy people. In both cases, subjects report lack of agency over thoughts, although they never claim lack of ownership over them, i.e., that these are not their thoughts. However, if the standard account is correct, obsessive thoughts should be experienced as belonging to someone else. The fact that they are not suggests that something else must be disrupted in delusions of thought insertion, i.e., sense of ownership 5 over them. If one can lose sense of ownership over one’s thoughts then it has important implications, because then one becomes capable of experiencing one’s thoughts “as someone else’s,” or at least “as not-mine.” However, when I experience my thoughts as not-mine I do it because I’ve taken a stance towards my thoughts, which treats them as an object of deliberation. In other words, I must have “objectified” them to experience that they have a quality of “feeling as if they are not mine.” Consequently, if I experience them as objects of experience, then they cannot form part of my self as subject of experience, because these two categories are mutually exclusive. Therefore, what seemed to constitute a phenomenal “I” turns out to be a part of thephenomenal “Me.”

If my thoughts do not constitute the “I” then how do they fit into the structure of “Me”? Previously, I asserted that thoughts with self-related content constitute “Me,” while thoughts with non-self related content do not. However, just now I argued in favor of the claim that all thoughts (including the ones with non-self-related content) that are experienced as “mine” belong to “Me.” How can one resolve this contradiction?

A way to address this reservation can be found in Metzinger’s (2003 ; 2010 ) self-model theory. Metzinger (2003 , 2010 ) argues that the experience of the self can be understood as underpinned by representational self-models. These self-models, however, are embedded in the hierarchical representational structure, as illustrated by an account of ego dissolution by Letheby and Gerrans (2017) :

Savage suggests that on LSD “[changes] in body ego feeling usually precede changes in mental ego feeling and sometimes are the only changes” (1955, 11), (…) This common temporal sequence, from blurring of body boundaries and loss of sense of ownership for body parts through to later loss of sense of ownership for thoughts, speaks further to the hierarchical architecture of the self-model. ( Letheby and Gerrans, 2017 , p. 8)

If self-models underlying the experience of self-as-object (“Me”) are hierarchical, then the apparent contradiction may be easily explained by the fact that when speaking about the content of thoughts and the thoughts themselves we are addressing self-models at two distinct levels. At the lower level we can distinguish between thoughts with self-related content and other-related content, while on the higher level we can distinguish between thoughts that feel “mine” as opposed to thoughts that are not experienced as “mine.” As a result, this thinking phenomenal “I” experienced in feeling of ownership over one’s thoughts may be conceived as just a higher-order level of Jamesian “Me.” As such, one may claim that there is no such thing as a phenomenal “I,” just multilevel phenomenal “Me.” However, an objection can be raised here. One may claim that even though a person with schizophrenic delusions experiences her thoughts as someone else’s (a demon’s or some malicious puppet master’s), she can still claim that:

Yes, “I” experience my thoughts as not mine, but as demon’s.” My thoughts feel as “not-mine,” however, it’s still me (or: “I”) who thinks of them as “not-mine.”

As such, one escapes “objectification” of “I” into “Me” by postulating a higher-level phenomenal-“I.” However, let us keep in mind that the thought written above constitutes a valid thought by itself. As such, this thought is vulnerable to the theoretical possibility that it turns into a delusion itself, once a psychotic person forms a meta-delusion (delusion about delusion). In this case, one may begin to experience that: “I” (I 1 ) experience that the “fake I” (I 2 ), who is a nasty pink demon, experiences my thoughts as not mine but as someone else’s (e.g., as nasty green demon’s). In this case, I may claim that the real phenomenal “I” is I 1 , since it is at the top of the hierarchy. However, one may repeat the operation of forming meta-delusions ad infinitum (as may happen in psychosis or drug-induced psychedelic states) effectively transforming each phenomenal “I” into another “fake-I” (and consequently making it a part of “Me”).

The possibility of meta-delusions illustrates that the phenomenal “I” understood as subjective thoughts is permanently vulnerable to the threat of losing the apparent subjective character and becoming an object of experience. As such it seems to be a poor choice for the locus of subjectivity, since it needs to be constantly “on the run” from becoming treated as an object of experience, not only in people with psychosis, but also in all psychologically healthy individuals if they decide to reflect on their thoughts. Therefore, it seems more likely that the thoughts themselves cannot constitute the subject of experience. However, even in case of meta-delusions there seems to be a stable deeper-level subjectivity, let us call it the deep “I,” which is preserved, at least until one loses consciousness. After all, a person who experiences meta-delusions would be constantly (painfully) aware of the process, and often would even report it afterwards. This deep “I” cannot be a special form of content in the stream of consciousness, because otherwise it would be vulnerable to becoming a part of “Me.” Therefore, it must be something different.

There seem to be two places where one can look for this deep “I”: in the domain of phenomenology or metaphysics. The first approach has been taken by ( Zahavi and Kriegel, 2016 ) who argue that “all conscious states’ phenomenal character involves for-me-ness as an experiential constituent.” It means that even if we rule out everything else (e.g., bodily experiences, conscious thoughts), we are still left with some form of irreducible phenomenal self-experience. This for-me-ness is not a specific content of consciousness, but rather “refers to the distinct manner, or how , of experiencing” ( Zahavi, 2014 ).

This approach, however, may seem inflationary and not satisfying (e.g., Dainton, 2016 ). One reason for this is that it introduces an additional phenomenal dimension, which may lead to uncomfortable consequences. For example, a question arises whether for-me-ness can ever be lost or replaced with the “ how of experiencing” of another person. For example, can I experience my sister’s for-me-ness in my stream of consciousness? If yes, then how is for-me-ness different from any other content of consciousness? And if the answer is no, then how is it possible to distil the phenomenology of for-me-ness from the metaphysical fact that a given stream of consciousness is always experienced by this and not other subject?

An alternative approach to the problem of the deep “I” is to reject that the subject of experience, the “I,” is present in phenomenology (like Hume, 1739/2000 ; Prinz, 2012 ; Dainton, 2016 ), and look for it somewhere else, in the domain of metaphysics. Although James (1890) did not explicitly formulate the distinction between “Me” and “I” as the distinction between the phenomenal and the metaphysical self, he hinted at it at several points, for example when he concluded the Chapter on the self with the following fragment: “(...) a postulate, an assertion that there must be a knower correlative to all this known ; and the problem who that knower is would have become a metaphysical problem” ( James, 1890 , p. 401).

“I” As A Subject Of Experience: Metaphysics Of Subjectivity

Thoughts which we actually know to exist do not fly about loose, but seem each to belong to some one thinker and not to another ( James, 1890 , pp. 330–331).

Let us assume that phenomenal consciousness exists in nature, and that it is a part of the reality we live in. The problem of “I” emerges once we realize that one of the fundamental characteristics of phenomenal consciousness is that it is always subjective, that there always seems to be some subject of experience. It seems mistaken to conceive of consciousness which do “fly about loose,” devoid of subjective character, devoid of being someone’s or something’s consciousness. Moreover, it seems that subjectivity may be one of the fundamental inherent properties of conscious experience (similar notions can be found in: Berkeley, 1713/2012 ; Strawson, 2003 ; Searle, 2005 ; Dainton, 2016 ). It seems highly unlikely, if not self-contradictory, that there exists something like an objective conscious experience of “what it is like to be a bat” ( Nagel, 1974 ), which is not subjective in any way. This leads to the metaphysical problem of the self: why is all conscious experience subjective, and what or who is the subject of this experience? Let us call it the problem of the metaphysical “I,” as contrasted with the problem of the phenomenal “I” (i.e., is there a distinctive experience of being a self as a subject of experience, and if so, then what is this experience?), which we discussed so far.

The existence of the metaphysical “I” does not entail the existence of the phenomenal self. It is possible to imagine a creature that possesses a metaphysical “I,” but does not possess any sense of self. In such a case, the creature would possess consciousness, although it would not experience anything as “me,” nor entertain any thoughts/feelings, etc., as “I.” In other words, it is a possibility that one may not experience self-related content of consciousness, while being a sentient being. One example of such situation may be the experience of a dreamless sleep, which “is characterized by a dissolution of subject-object duality, or (…) by a breakdown of even the most basic form of the self-other distinction” ( Windt, 2015 ). This is a situation which can be regarded as an instance of the state of minimal phenomenal experience – the simplest form of conscious experience possible ( Windt, 2015 ; Metzinger, 2018 ), in which there is no place for even the most rudimentary form of “Me.” Another example may be the phenomenology of systems with grid-like architectures which, according to the integrated information theory (IIT, Tononi et al., 2016 ), possess conscious experience 6 . If IIT is correct, then these systems experience some form of conscious states, which most likely lack any phenomenal distinction between “Me” and “not-Me.” However, because they may possess a stream of conscious experience, and conscious experience is necessarily subjective, there remains a valid question: who or what is the subject of that experience?

The question of what exactly is the metaphysical subject of experience can have different answers. There has been a long history of theories of the self ( Barresi and Martin, 2011 ) and some of them directly address this issue. Platonic or Cartesian notions of the soul are good examples of an approach providing one answer to this question: conscious experience is subjective, because there exists a non-material being (self, soul) which is the subject of this experience (see Table 3 ). Other solutions tend to either define the self in less metaphysically expensive ways ( Johnston, 1987 ; Strawson, 2000 ; Dainton, 2008 ), define it as a formal feature of consciousness ( Searle, 2005 ), or deny the need to postulate its existence ( Metzinger, 2003 ). What is crucial here, however, is that the problem of the metaphysical self is a different issue and requires a different methodology, than the problem of the phenomenal self.

TABLE 3. Examples of theories of the self-as-subject (“I”) in the context of consciousness, as theories of the metaphysical self, with representative quotes illustrating each position.

What sort of methodology, then, is appropriate for investigating the metaphysical self? It seems that the most relevant methods come from the toolbox of metaphysics. This toolbox includes classical philosophical methods such as thought experiments and logical analysis. However, methodology of metaphysics is an area of open discussion, and at present there are no signs of general consensus. One of the most debated issues in this field, which is especially relevant here, is to what extent the methodology of metaphysics is continuous with the methodology of natural sciences (see Tahko, 2015 , Chapter 9 for an overview). The positions span the spectrum between the claim that science and metaphysics are fully autonomous on the one side and the claim that metaphysics can be fully naturalized on the other. Discussing this issue goes way beyond the scope of this paper. However, if these two areas are at least to some extent related (i.e., not fully autonomous), then one may argue that scientific methods can be at least of some relevance in metaphysics and consequently for investigations of the metaphysical “I.”

One example in which empirical results seem to be able to influence theoretical investigations of the metaphysical self is through imposing constraints on philosophical theories. For example, because the metaphysical self is inherently related to consciousness, we should expect that different theories of consciousness should place different constraints on what a metaphysical self can be. Then, if one theory of consciousness acquires stronger empirical support than the others, we can also treat this as evidence for the constraints on the self that this theory implies.

Let us look at an example of IIT to illustrate this point. According to IIT ( Oizumi et al., 2014 ; Tononi et al., 2016 ) the content of conscious experience is defined by the so-called informational “complex” which is characterized by maximally integrated information (which can be measured by calculating the value of Φ max ). This complex then defines the stream of conscious experience. However, what happens if there is more than one such complex in one person? In this case, as Tononi et al. (2016) wrote:

According to IIT, two or more non-overlapping complexes may coexist as discrete physical substrates of consciousness (PSCs) within a single brain, each with its own definite borders and value of Φ max . The complex that specifies a person’s day to day stream of consciousness should have the highest value of Φ max – that is, it should be the “major” complex. In some conditions, for example, after a split-brain operation, the major complex may split. In such instances, one consciousness, supported by a complex in the dominant hemisphere and with privileged access to Broca’s area, would be able to speak about the experience, but would remain unaware of the presence of another consciousness, supported by a complex in the other hemisphere, which can be revealed by carefully designed experiments. ( Tononi et al., 2016 , p. 455)

This fragment suggests that in IIT the metaphysical “I” can be understood as tied to a complex of maximally integrated information. In this case, a split-brain patient would possess two metaphysical selves, because as a consequence of an operation her or his brain hosts two such complexes. On the face of it, it seems to be a plausible situation ( cf. Bayne, 2010 ). However, in the sentence which immediately follows, Tononi et al. (2016) suggest that:

An intriguing possibility is that splitting of the PSC may also occur in healthy people during long-lasting dual-task conditions – for example, when driving in an auto-pilot like manner on a familiar road while listening to an engaging conversation ( Tononi et al., 2016 , p. 455)

The implications of this possibility are much more severe, because it postulates that in a matter of minutes or seconds a complex can dynamically divide into several complexes, and individual complexes can merge into one major complex. How do the complexes understood in this way then relate to the metaphysical “I”? Unfortunately, IIT is silent about this issue, but there seem to be at least two responses to this question. First, one may argue that the self does not need to be limited to one complex, but that the same metaphysical “I” can be present in all of the simultaneous streams of consciousness (complexes). However, this solution is at odds with both common-sense intuition and IIT itself. It would presuppose not only an extremely disunified view of consciousness, but even lead to self-contradictory consequences. The metaphysical “I” can be thought of as the metaphysical fact that any given stream of consciousness is subjectively experienced by some “self” (regardless of what that self might be). However, in a disunified view of an organism’s consciousness this metaphysical “I” would at the same time a) be the subject of experience of all of the complexes within this organism, and b) be the subject of experience of only one of these complexes while being blind to the others (as claimed by IIT: two complexes are not “co-conscious” with each other). It presents a contradiction and strongly suggests that the metaphysical “I” cannot be underpinned by multiple independent complexes. It leaves us with the second option, which is to bite the bullet and accept that IIT implies that the metaphysical “I” persists either as long as a given complex, or for an even shorter period of time, for example for just up to a few seconds, as suggested by Strawson (2000 , 2010 ). It means that if IIT (and the analysis outlined above) is correct then the metaphysical “I” turns out to be radically different from our intuitive understanding of subject-of-experience as persisting continuously life-long stream of consciousness. However, if empirical evidence in support of the current version of IIT becomes strong enough, it may suggest that our common-sense intuitions about self-as-subject may be mistaken. On the other hand, different theories of phenomenal consciousness (and even different versions of IIT) may imply different constraints on the metaphysical “I,” and the extent to which they are supported by empirical evidence may suggest a way to say something about what the subject of conscious experience is.

Overall, assuming that metaphysics is not fully independent from science, the relevant methodology for investigating the metaphysical “I” is a combination of toolboxes of metaphysics and empirical science. This contrasts with the phenomenal “Me,” where the relevant toolkit includes methods from phenomenology and science. The second point, which has been illustrated with an example of IIT, is that it is important to explicitly spell out the implications of different theories of consciousness in regard to what is the subject of conscious experience, as it may provide the best way forward towards solving this issue.

Understanding Predictive Coding Theories Of The Self

Recently, there has been a huge number of attempts to explain the self through the framework of predictive coding (PC) and the free energy principle (FEP). In this final section of the paper, I will use PC theories of the self as a working example demonstrating practical consequences of implementing the Jamesian distinction between “Me” and “I.” I will suggest that PC theories of the self target different dimensions of self-as-object, understood as a hierarchical structure of self-models ( Metzinger, 2003 , 2010 ), and as such provide a valuable framework to understand the self. However, I will also explain why PC and the FEP do not allow us to say much about self-as-subject (the metaphysical “I”).

According to PC, the brain can be understood as an inference machine which hosts and continuously updates a probabilistic model of the world, which it uses to infer hidden causes behind the sensory data (for a more detailed introduction see: Friston et al., 2006 ; Friston, 2009 , 2010 ; Friston and Kiebel, 2009 ; Hohwy, 2013 ; Clark, 2016 ). It accomplishes this by continuously issuing predictions and comparing them with sensory data, with the discrepancy between predictions and data being propagated further up the hierarchy as prediction errors. As such, PC postulates that the brain can be seen as a hierarchical structure of generative models (which are responsible for issuing predictions). Prediction errors which arise at lower levels serve as data to be compared with predictions at the higher levels. This view of the mind inverts the classical feedforward view in which perception is a predominantly bottom-up process. In PC, instead, perception is mostly driven by top-down predictions, with bottom-up prediction errors serving the function of feedback helping to choose model with the most explanatory power. Moreover, in an extension of PC, which is known as active inference, action is also understood as a way of maximizing the fit of one’s internal models to reality. The main idea behind active inference is that rather than changing the model in order to better fit the data, one can act on the world and change it according to predictions issued by the currently dominating model. As a consequence, the whole perception-action cycle can be understood as driven by one overarching goal, i.e., long-term minimization of prediction errors.

The FEP is a further generalization of PC. It postulates that all living organisms operate under the principle to minimize the so-called “variational free energy,” which is an information theoretical measure which roughly can be understood as a measure of uncertainty ( Friston et al., 2006 ; Friston, 2009 ). One of the main claims of this theory is that organisms which act according to FEP (i.e., they act in a way to minimize free energy in the long term) will, in effect, implicitly approximate Bayesian inference. It means that they will combine their prior knowledge (represented by their model of the world) with the incoming sensory input in a mathematically optimal way.

Both PC and the FEP have recently gained huge popularity and motivated a number of theories attempting to explain various aspects of cognition within this framework. It includes numerous attempts to understand different facets of the self, such as sense of bodily ownership ( Apps and Tsakiris, 2014 ), sense of self in agency and perception ( Hohwy, 2007 ), the influence of interoception on self-consciousness ( Seth et al., 2011 ; Seth, 2013 ), social aspects of the self ( Moutoussis et al., 2014 ; Friston and Frith, 2015 ), the relationship with minimal phenomenal selfhood ( Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013 ), and even psychodynamical interpretations of the self ( Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010 ; Fotopoulou, 2012 ). The most comprehensive treatment of the self from the PC perspective ( Hohwy and Michael, 2017 ) also exemplifies most of the crucial points made by other PC theories of the self. At the beginning of their paper Hohwy and Michael (2017) describe the self in the following words:

We use a general computational framework for brain function to develop a theory of the self. The theory is that the self is an inferred model of endogenous, deeply hidden causes of behavior. (…) we discuss why such a set of hidden endogenous causes should qualify as a self. ( Hohwy and Michael, 2017 , p. 363)

The self, as seen from this perspective, is essentially a hierarchical model of endogenous hidden causes of sensory input. Or, in more classical terms, it can be said that it is a hierarchical representational structure ( cf. Clark, 2016 ; Williams, 2017 ) which allows one to distinguish between endogenous causes (what is caused by me) and exogenous causes (what is caused by something else). This distinction can be illustrated with an example of a comparison between seeing a movement of my virtual hand and of a virtual hand of someone else. If adequately prepared, in both cases the image of a hand and its movement may be identical. However, in one case I can realize that the movement of the hand is congruent with my intentions (manifested through my actions performed using a computer controller) and, as a consequence, infer that the cause of the hand’s movement is me. On the other hand, I may fail to notice any congruence between my intentions and the movement and hence infer that the hidden cause behind the movement I observe is some other person. According to Hohwy and Michael (2017) , the self is just a set of such hidden endogenous causes. Although not necessarily in full agreement with this picture in regard to the details, all other PC theories of the self listed above also speak about the self as underpinned by hierarchy of generative models, which are preoccupied with conducting probabilistic inference aimed to infer hidden causes of observed data patterns. This inference is then postulated to underlie specific types of conscious self-experience, i.e., different facets of the sense of self.

As such, one common theme among all PC theories of the self is the following: aspects of conscious experience of the self are underpinned by a representational structure in the form of hierarchical generative models. In its core, it is the same idea as the one introduced earlier by Metzinger (2003 , 2010 ), i.e., that our phenomenal experience of the self is underpinned by a representational structure of unconscious self-models (see also: Crane, 2003 ; Chalmers, 2004 , for a discussion about the relationship between representational and conscious content). Once an unconscious self-model enters conscious awareness, it generates a corresponding self-related conscious content (see: Metzinger, 2006 , 2014 , for an explicit distinction between the levels of representations and conscious content in regard to the bodily self). The same mechanism is at work in PC theories – the dynamic process of model selection leads to suppression of some models but allows other models to enter awareness in the form of conscious content. This mechanism allows PC to explain self-related content of consciousness, which is essentially nothing else than the James’ (1890) self-as-object of experience. This is how PC and the FEP help to understand the phenomenal “Me” – by describing the structure and dynamics of the underlying representational architecture.

To what extent PC and FEP can provide us with any help when confronted with the task to explain the metaphysical “I”? Here, I will argue that in contrast to the phenomenal “Me,” the issues pertaining to the metaphysical “I” are outside of its reach. The reason for this is a consequence of the fact that PC is in principle agnostic in regard to the issue of what brings representational content into the scope of conscious experience. In general, this can be regarded as an advantage, because this way PC accounts of self-experience can avoid the burden of being hostage to any specific theory of consciousness, and stay in principle compatible with most of them (e.g., see Hohwy, 2013 , Chapter 10 for an attempt to combine PC with ideas from Global Neuronal Workspace theory: Dehaene and Changeux, 2011 ; Dehaene, 2014 ). However, it also makes PC fundamentally underspecified when treated as a theory which is used to explain issues related to consciousness. While, as suggested before, PC is a valuable framework to describe the representational structure underlying conscious content, it runs into problems when used to explain why certain content is conscious in the first place. One way in which PC and FEP can attempt to retain relevance is by aiming to explain access consciousness ( Block, 1995 ) – a functional mechanism which allows that “some of the attended information eventually enters our awareness and becomes reportable to others” ( Dehaene, 2014 ). However, the problem of the metaphysical “I” becomes a relevant issue only when approached in the context of phenomenal consciousness – the type of consciousness which is loaded with the burden of the so-called “hard problem” ( Chalmers, 1996 ).

This is where PS and FEP encounter a dead end, as the problem enters the area which belongs more to metaphysics than empirical science (at least in the light of the current state of affairs). In order to provide an account of the metaphysical self, one needs to begin with at least some form of a theory of phenomenal consciousness and its place in physical reality. At present FEP (and PC) does not provide such a theory. Recently, Friston (2018) suggested that FEP can be used to understand consciousness, although the fact that he discusses consciousness in functionalist terms (consciousness is related to counterfactual inference 7 ) suggests that his proposal aims to explain access consciousness, making it irrelevant for the problem of metaphysical “I.”

To summarize, the fact that PC and the FEP are not theories of phenomenal consciousness, and seem not to impose any constraints on these theories, has important consequences for what type of self they can explain. As I argued, they have the potential to substantially contribute to the issue of different levels of the phenomenal “Me” (self-as-object) by describing the structure and dynamics of the level of representational content, which are reflected at the level of conscious experience. However, they are not suited to explain the metaphysical “I” (self-as-subject) because they do not address the issue of the place of consciousness in nature. Hence, the main claim is that while PC can be seen as a useful framework to investigate phenomenology of “Me,” it is in principle unsuitable to provide answers to questions about the metaphysics of “I.”

I placed the debate of the self in the domain of consciousness (as opposed to the self understood as e.g., a representational structure, a physical object, or a spiritual entity) and argued that (1) conceptually, the distinction between “Me” and “I” may reflect the distinction between theoretical problems of the phenomenal self and the metaphysical self, respectively (although the notion of for-me-ness may complicate this picture), and (2) that what is described in the literature as the phenomenal “I” can be regarded as just a higher-level part of the phenomenal “Me” [which can be understood as Metzinger’s (2018) phenomenal self-model].

The first claim draws attention to the distinction between “I” and “Me,” which suggests that these two theoretical issues should be investigated independently, using two different methodologies. While “Me” can be investigated using phenomenology and scientific methodology, “I” is typically a metaphysical problem (perhaps with the exception of non-deflationary understandings of for-me-ness) and it is arguable to what extent it can be approached using standard scientific methods. Therefore, it is important to clearly state which problem one approaches when discussing the self in the context of consciousness (see Tables 2 , 3 for some examples).

The second claim, the postulate to treat what is usually described as phenomenal “I” as just a part of the phenomenal “Me,” has two implications. The first is constructive. Investigating issues which are typically regarded in cognitive science as “I” from the perspective of “Me” may contribute towards better understanding of self-consciousness by emphasizing that these two research areas may have much more in common than it appears. Rather than using two distinct terms, which suggest that we are dealing with two fundamentally different problems, we may approach them as just two facets of the same multidimensional research problem. One such approach is to treat both of them as just different levels in the hierarchical structure of the phenomenal self-model ( Metzinger, 2003 , 2009 , 2010 ), an approach which can be (and implicitly is) shared by recent theories of the self, especially within the framework of PC.

The second implication is pragmatic. Refraining from using the term “I” when speaking in the context of phenomenology and using it only in the metaphysical context may reduce conceptual confusion in regard to this term. However, it will also mean forfeiting an important distinction (“Me” versus “I”) which has already gained traction in cognitive science. As such, the choice to eliminate the term “I” in the context of phenomenology is a repelling option, but may be beneficial in the long term. Alternatively, one may use more specific terms, such as “sense of ownership over an experience” to reflect what is meant by “I” in the Wittgensteinian tradition, or, e.g., “sense of ownership of interoceptive signals” when discussing the role of interoception. A second option may be to recast the distinction used in cognitive science in different terms. One proposal is to explicitly speak about it as the distinction between the experience/sense of “Me” versus the experience/sense of “I” (rather than just “Me” and “I”). The task here would be, however, to prove that there is a qualitative difference between them, and to demarcate the exact border.

Author Contributions

The article has been solely the work of MW.

This article was supported by the Australian Research Council Grant No. DP160102770.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Jakob Hohwy, Tim Bayne, Jennifer Windt, Monima Chadha, and the members of Cognition and Philosophy Lab at Monash University (especially Julian Matthews) for discussions about the issues described in the paper. The author also wants to thank the reviewers and the editor for helpful comments on how to improve the manuscript.

• ^ Therefore, whenever I use the term “I” I mean self-as-subject (of experience), and whenever I use the term “Me” I mean self-as-object (of experience). This assumption reflects James’ (1890) understanding of these terms (see Table 1 ). I also assume, following James (1890) , that these two categories are mutually exclusive, i.e., if something is an object of experience then it cannot simultaneously be a subject of experience, and vice versa.
• ^ Wittgenstein (1958) himself did not discuss the issue of phenomenology of the self. However, his approach to the distinction between the use of “I” as subject and “I” as object can be seen as a starting point for contemporary discussions of phenomenology of the self-as-subject.
• ^ Whenever I use the prefix “phenomenal” I mean “the conscious experience of.” For example, when I write phenomenal “I”, I mean: the conscious experience of self as subject of experience (“I”). In a similar fashion I use the prefix “metaphysical” when I mean “the metaphysical entity of.”
• ^ Chalmers (1996) also lists “sense of self,” although it is highly controversial whether it can be treated as a distinctive type of conscious content.
• ^ Sometimes referred to as sense of authorship.
• ^ “IIT allows for certain simple systems such as grid-like architectures, similar to topographically organized areas in the human posterior cortex, to be highly conscious even when not engaging in any intelligent behavior” ( Tononi et al., 2016 , p. 460).
• ^ For example, he writes: “So where does consciousness emerge? The proposal offered here is that conscious processing has a temporal thickness or depth, which underwrites inferences about the consequences of action. This necessarily lends inference a purposeful and self-evidencing aspect that has the hallmarks of consciousness” ( Friston, 2018 , p. 1).

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Keywords : self, consciousness, self-consciousness, sense of self, self-as-subject, self-as-object, predictive coding, IIT

Citation: Woźniak M (2018) “I” and “Me”: The Self in the Context of Consciousness. Front. Psychol. 9:1656. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01656

Received: 20 March 2018; Accepted: 17 August 2018; Published: 04 September 2018.

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*Correspondence: Mateusz Woźniak, [email protected] ; [email protected]

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Every human psychic aspect, even the development of the Self, cannot be considered separately from the financial and cultural context in which it is inserted: as a matter of fact the realization of individual freedom is correlated to broader economic and social changes, which influence the individual on self-realization. In the chapter, various theories about this topic and about the ideal self are explored, and it concludes by considering that self expression helps people to satisfy their real emotions and their real self, it also highlights the fact that self-realization and self-expression are among the highest needs on the human needs scale, and they affect human health.

• psychoanalysis

Author Information

Floriana irtelli *.

• Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Italy

Federico Durbano

• Melegnano and Martesana Hospital, Melzo, Italy

Barbara Marchesi

*Address all correspondence to: [email protected]

1. Introduction

Every human psychic aspect cannot be considered separately from the financial and cultural context in which it is embedded. Adopting this perspective, it appears evident that the realization of individual freedom must be closely related to wider economic and social changes, which influence the individual about the realization of his own self, and probably also about his awareness development. Our reflection starts from Fromm’s point of view: man is the center of his life, the growth and realization of human individuality is a target which can never be subordinated to other purposes, which are supposed to have greater dignity. As a matter of fact, according to Fromm, the average man is often not really aware about his life and his reality, since most of what he thinks is real is only a sort of illusion: often he is aware of reality only to the necessary level to carry out his activity in his own social context and cultural context to which he belongs, as his survival targets makes such awareness actually necessary [ 1 ].

2. The self and the culture

Throughout the humanity history we have witnessed a revolution about the reference values, with respect to the man role in culture and in social development. While Western culture fathers (the Greeks and Jews), believed that the supreme life target was man perfection, modern human beings often look more and more to things perfection, and to the knowledge of methods to produce these perfect objects. The long and complex transition from a “humanistic” society to a “technological” society have repercussions on the personality development (and therefore on the human self development [ 2 ]), since it embodies the process through which society transmits its cultural system from one generation to another, creating values, style of life ideals, social roles, habits and customs, language and expressive behaviors. In this regard, during the twentieth century second half, both in the anthropological field and in the psychological area, particular attention was given to the culture study, realizing how it has a strong influence on people’s life, making available different belief systems and values. The questions that man think are therefore affected by his own context: it influences individual experiences, how he perceives reality, how to satisfy fundamental needs, etc. The culture, which in the past was considered an outside objective frame, today is conceived as a sort of individual “internal” dimension, like a part of human self, and as a constitutive basis of individual behaviors: this makes us think on how the limits between “interior spaces” and “exterior spaces” are blurred and mixed. Thus, we can ask ourselves how profound is the culture influence on human being? We know, for example, that the probability that certain emotional experiences became conscious depends from the specific culture context in which they are experienced. According to this point of view, we can therefore affirm that an experience for which a specific language does not have a corresponding word to represent it rarely comes to man’s awareness: language embodies a certain disposition towards life, and can therefore be defined as an expression of a certain way of experiencing life [ 1 ]. According to this perspective, the psycholinguistic analysis that can be made with respect to verbs and nouns use in various languages is really interesting. The cultural paradigm shift from the self development to the technology development is represented by the growing number of people that today prefer to think in terms of having something, rather than in terms of being and acting: there is actually a preference for the use of nouns, instead a preference for verbs. Language, grammar, and words are indicative of the way and perspective of our life experience, and establish which kind of experiences can have access to our awareness (if there is not a term to indicate an experience in our language is difficult to became aware of this specific aspect). It is often believed a language differs from another only because it uses different words to mean the same thing, erroneously assuming some thought pattern and rules are universal, but this fact is not true because thought is influenced by a cultural system, which can show some conflicting logics with other cultural systems logics; thus, the individual often cannot afford to be aware of thoughts and feelings that are incompatible with his cultural models (according to which he grew up), and he is therefore unconsciously forced to remove them. About this topic, Fromm states that the conscience represents the social man and the contingent limitations imposed by his historical situation and context. In summary, we can note that the psychological functioning is therefore “intrinsically cultural”, since persons reason about the world using language and communication systems that acquire in their own culture, which are the product of human generations’ cultural experience; furthermore, we must focus that the themes to which individuals think about have a personal meaning within systems of meaning, based precisely on cultural and social practices, which are different according to context. We must point out, moreover, that the cultures are built by the same people who acquire the sense of being individuals from this same culture: the personality (the self) and culture structure each other; as a matter of fact, the proper significant culture customs and psychological processes of each of its members are mutually interacting [ 2 ]. In this regard, for example, we can also assert that there are collectivist cultures and individualist cultures, present more frequently respectively in East and West countries: how are they related to the constitution of the Self, and vice versa? The collectivist cultures place emphasis on membership, and on the shared rules that govern the community relationships: the person often define himself as part of the social community, since there is an intense emotional attachment to the largest social group to which he belong (not only to the family, but also to wider society); in this context, the self is often very focused on cooperation and social control. Therefore, people who refer to a collectivistic perspective more frequently pay attention to others and attribute greater relevance to contextual and external factors to explain a certain individual action; instead, individualistic cultures, often give emphasis on the “ego”, emphasizing the importance of personal autonomy, success and self-sufficiency: the self is often defined as an distinct entity from the social group in which it is contextualized; this perspective encourages to reach personal objectives. In this cultural framework, the personality is more oriented towards autonomy and competition values. People who refer to an individualistic perspective frequently give importance to individual responsibility in the explanation of the behavior causes [ 2 ]. Finally we have to state that the idea that Oriental culture and Westerners culture have created a sense of a more interdependent human self (in the former case), and a a sense of more independent self (in the second case), is blurred by the globalization phenomenon. This dynamic has been made possible by technological achievements (especially telematic ones), and has involved the entire planet in many areas: international exchanges have increased at an economic level and, consequently, also political, social and cultural one. This fact has led to a new worldwide phenomena emergence, both in the East and in the West countries: individual and context are not independent, but are interacting with each other in a dynamic way, and they really create each other [ 2 ]. The individual considered isolated is therefore a pure abstraction: he is a part of an articulated relationship system not only with the physical environment, but also with the socio-cultural and relational environment that surrounds him: we can therefore also ask, today, how hyper-modern era influences the ideal self and the real self, in various contexts, and vice versa.

3. Self and economy

The communications speed, the reduction of the space–time distance between the various countries has paradoxically caused increasing social disparities, the exploitation of wage labor and the reduction of the local economies autonomy. From an individual level, globalization has also promoted a sort of needs homogeneity, often standardizing the individual tastes to an imposed standard influenced by advertising. Another globalization consequence is the fact that it favors the ideological visions conformity and the lifestyles conformity, determining individual identification with the consumers mass. Paradoxically today in parallel there is also a generalized individualism. Assuming that the specific economic aspect is important for human development, however, it is necessary to explain why, despite the globalization pressures, different populations live in socio-economic conditions which are often very different from each other; even in the same context of the industrialized world, and in the “rich nations”, there are profound social inequalities regarding earnings, and consequently regarding the opportunities that individuals can have: today in many nations, the differences in economic conditions between poor and rich people have widened. At this point we can ask ourselves: which influence do these socio- economic circumstances have on the development of the individual self? In this regard there are some scientific evidences [ 2 ], for example, considering a particularly important and complex issue: it have been observed that individuals living in environments characterized by low and medium socio-economic conditions, often experience higher levels of psychological distress, such as depression and anxiety; this result may appear very ambiguous: it is not clear whether the individual personality characteristics indicate that they reside in more disadvantaged neighborhoods, or if it is on, the contrary, the fact that they live in these neighborhoods which can cause psychological malaise: thanks to scientific research it has emerged that between these aspects there are complex and significant interactions. Some studies have been carried out on this topic [ 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ] and of a very important result emphasize that the relations of cause and effect vary precisely according to the personality characteristics. We can ask ourselves is it the personality that exerts an influence on the social class or if it is the social class that influences the personality? It has been observed that social circumstances and self are deeply connected to each other: the children who grow up in disadvantaged families often become more anxious adolescents, and adolescents who have access to a lower education level often become more anxiety-prone adults; the relationship, however, does not seem to be one-to-one: the available data show how anxiety can develop from predisposing social contexts but that the reverse phenomenon is not so evident. In contrast, the data regarding antisocial disorders revealed a different result: the antisocial behavior has a social class effect; as a matter of fact, individuals who exhibit antisocial conduct show more difficulty at school, which in turn create a negative economic condition when they are adults. In general, scientists are able to explain the mutual influences of personality and economic status/social class but only by specifying the exact personality characteristics and studying the people development over time (through longitudinal studies) [ 2 ]. From what has been explained up to now, it is evident that the social, economic and cultural context can influence the self development, as well as the personality structuring can in turn determine important consequences in the various socioeconomic contexts.

4. Real self and false self

The individual grows up and evolves influenced by his genetic characteristics and by the events that he has experienced during his life, in various contexts in which he lives; perceptions that the individual harvested from his experiences form his own inner world. When reality reaches awareness (and is psychologically represented), it substantiates the perceptions set that represent individual experiences; we must therefore focus that the human being does not react to reality as it is, but he reacts to his own perception of reality itself: therefore, each person can develop a different perception of a specific situation, and in general of the surrounding world, this process is also based on the concept that a person has of himself. At the development beginning, the child recognizes a part of his own experience as “me”, “I”, “myself”: this is the first part of “self “; therefore emerges the awareness of existing: the set of perceptions relating to oneself, which influence the perception of the surrounding reality. The set of meanings that the child attributes to what he calls “me” or “I” constitutes “ the self core”, which continues to develop during human growth. The self is a conceptual, organized and coherent perception configuration of personal characteristics: it is a fundamental personality structure, and it is very complex [ 7 ]. In summary, term self refers to the whole person as a reality, including his body and his psychic organization [ 7 ]. It may also be observed that one of the first and most important experiences that a child has of the self is the experience of being loved by his parents; as a matter fact, an important variable in the pattern towards self-realization is precisely the need to receive positive consideration by others: this is a particularly strong desire of the infant, who expects that the people who take care of him are ready to love it and accept him. Parents positive consideration can be, however, “unconditioned” or “ conditioned “, but what do we mean with these terms? In the first case the child is fully accepted as a person, regardless his behaviors, in the second case, child is welcomed and accepted only if he adapts to the parents expectations: “value conditions” are therefore set. Basically, the child feels to be considered and loved only if he welcomes certain parents’ needs; we also must specify that, according Alfred Adler, the feeling to be inferior is an experience that has its origins in infancy: the children feel inferior, because they are always surrounded by more powerful individuals (adults). The child then is very influenced by adults, and usually try to emulate them because he is motivated by the social environment that drives him to achieve some results [ 8 ]. How can we contextualize this situation today? The subjectivity affirmation, a last century conquest which appears to be historically consolidated, is perhaps not really guaranteed today as regards the possibilities of individual development. Today attitudes towards offspring appear to be diverse and complex. According to some authors, children today are often objects of emotional consumption [ 9 , 10 ], because they can satisfy the parents needs (who can therefore set more often than in the past “value conditions” for the child acceptance: “you have to behave in this way to be loved”); as a matter of fact, it is not infrequent parents pour their unprocessed emotional needs both in the couple relationship and on the offspring, and they express also their existential problems in the relationship with their sons: when you feel you have not been able to give meaning to your life, then you try to reach one by dedicating yourself voraciously to your children [ 9 , 10 ]. According to other authors, however, today children are also often valued as owner of rights and needs and as the family affectivity fulcrum [ 10 ]. We can ask ourselves if perhaps children today are often the protagonists of a family affectivity based not infrequently on emotional consumerism (and therefore, implicitly, on “value conditions”)? Consumer goods meet the desires, and even a child can satisfy many specific aspirations: he metaphorically opens the door to the “joys of parenting, “ which nothing else can provide, and many parents expect an emotional satisfaction that justifies this expensive investment [ 10 , 11 ]. As a matter of fact, often parents have high expectations towards the children: the offspring is therefore invested with vital expectations for parents ‘self-esteem, and the child is therefore often aware of always being judged, and can internalize the continuous judgment his own [ 12 ]. Parents can manifest narcissistic needs towards children, and they can create the conditions for the institution of the children inability to distinguish between their real feelings and the efforts to please or d impress others. The ambiguous message of being appreciated, but only in the particular role that they play, can let the children believe that if their real feelings are discovered, they will be rejected and humiliated. Thus, the creation of the “false self” of which Winnicott wrote can therefore be stimulated [ 13 ]: only those aspects which are considered acceptable are shown to others, according to what has been learned in the primary infant experiences [ 14 ]. When the child experiences a “conditioned” positive consideration in the relationship with his parents, he will therefore tend to behave in a way that neglects his true nature, in order not to lose respect and love. When his experiences are in contrast with the “value conditions” set by the parents, the child will perceive a discrepancy between the real self and external the experience. He will then use his own defense mechanisms, but he will no longer feel really himself, he will find difficult to recognize himself, maybe he will experience a state of inauthenticity, and this leads to an alienation state [ 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 15 ].

5. Real self and ideal self

Real self: the one who reflects the individual true qualities, his aptitudes, inclinations and characteristics.

Ideal self: that is constituted by the characteristics to which the individual aspires. It is a guide of the self.

Imperative self: what the individual feels he must be [ 13 , 16 ], it a guide of the self too.

Evaluate yourself means also to compare with your inner canons (also called the self guides), these comparisons can arouse negative or positive feelings about yourselves; it is also appropriate to specify that while most of the time our thoughts are turned outward, some events can create a state of intensified self-awareness, which confronts you with your inner canons (this may be the case of the comparison with with some social idols, like the perfect rich top model). Focusing the attention on the self makes also obvious discrepancies with respect to the self guides: this happens because the knowledge of the self includes beliefs about you, and also about the comparison with the royalties to which you try to conform to. Self-esteem is therefore influenced not only by what happens outside, but also by what happens “inside us”, that is the comparisons with the ideal self, which includes the traits that help to achieve some aspirations, and the imperative self which instead includes the traits that spur to fulfill one’s obligations. The self guide are useful for the auto-adjustment function: the discrepancy theory says that there is a the difference between the self guide and what people think to be, and this discrepancy can influence the individual emotional state and the well-being, it also influence our self-esteem. Focusing on these topics, we can assert that the ideal self represents the positive outcomes that people try to achieve, therefore their goals for advancement: discrepancies with respect to the ideal self can produce disappointment feelings, sadness and depression. On the contrary, when you actually achieve progress targets the emotion that derives is joy. The imperative self is focused on the negative outcomes that people try to avoid, that are the prevention goals. The deviations from the self imperative stimulate anxiety and restlessness feelings. Achieving the objectives of the imperative self produces instead relief and relaxation feelings [ 17 ]. Thinking about our inner canons can make us aware of our self discrepancies, activating an emotional response among those mentioned above, and one’s own canons can also focused by thinking to specific people who represent them, that is, who can embody idols (i.e. a perfect top model). The construction of ideal self and imperative self often refers to idols supported by the propagation dynamics of globalization both in the Western and Oriental Countries. The propagation of certain myths and idols can therefore constitute a real problem when the real self and the ideal and imperative self come into conflict: the person experiences incongruity: an unpleasant experience, which causes a sense of inadequacy, anxiety, malaise and maladjustment [ 16 ]. Incongruent experiences with respect to the self, on the other hand, are perceived as threatening and anxious, and often activate some defense mechanisms, such as the distortion of the meaning of the experience, i.e. the manipulation of the experience itself (because this dynamic can make it compatible with the self), or even denial of experience. On the contrary, a smaller the discrepancy between the real self and the ideal self and imperative self can create wellness: the subject is in harmony with himself. The so-called “white psychosis” can have a diffusion in these conditions of discrepancy. They are characterized by confusion, loss of the sense of reality, denial of reality itself, disorganization. These states are also called “private psychoses”, perhaps also to underline the dimension of individual closure that generates them, the inability to open up in a sane way to the world and to the other, maintaining their own authentic individual identity: they therefore reveal themselves conditions that prevent a process of healthy individualization [ 18 ]. A cause of psychological malaise can therefore also be living constantly trying to correspond to the environment expectations, precisely to fill the incongruity between the real self, the ideal self and imperative self. As a matter of fact, the self, in its formation and evolution follows the law of congruence: it constantly aims to seek coherence between its own self-perceptions and between these and external reality [ 16 , 18 , 19 ]: when the self is congruent with experience, the individual is fully functional and healthy. On the contrary, when the incongruity between the self and personal experience is so strong that it does not allow the successful application of the defense mechanisms, the person can develop a psychological state of disorganization, as anticipated.

6. Self-esteem and self-expression

As anticipated, in the independent cultures (Western, especially “Protestant” ones) the positive characteristics of the individual are the ones which are the most important for self-esteem, while for interdependent cultures (Oriental ones) is more considered the affiliation to others [ 2 ]. Beyond these differences, in all cultures self esteem performs the function to indicate how the person is behaving in life (in a right way or not). According to Alfred Adler, children and adults with a balanced and healthy personality, universally acquire confidence and self-esteem every time they are aware of being able to reach a goal: in synthesis, the sense of inferiority is resolved when a new challenge is overcome [ 19 ]. The self-esteem levels therefore play a crucial role in this process, precisely because they are signals how effectively the individual is acting. An accurate knowledge of own capabilities and preferences is also important because can guide a person through his existence, and d helps him to live in a manner more appropriate regarding his own needs and abilities. Self knowledge also represents as a reference for perceiving other people, and it influences what types of social aspects are more considered. It must also be noted that sometimes we act in such a way as to express our authentic self, other times, as anticipated, we can act because we want to shape others opinions about themselves, in order to gain power, influence or approval [ 2 , 13 ]: in this consists the difference between self-expression and of self-presentation. When you dedicate yourself to self- expression, you try to convey the concept you have of yourself through your actions. The self-expression and communicates it to other people, and it that can even work as a powerful reaction strategy when we are under stress, and can also beneficially affect out auto-immune system [ 16 ]. The self-presentation is however only our attempt to create a good impression, to please other people and to obtain confirmations by others, to increase self-esteem and strengthen out ego. Well-being, on the other hand, goes in another direction. According to Fromm [ 1 ] the well-being is different to narcissism. Well-being means becoming what one is really, it means being fully open to joy and sadness. Wellness means being fully awake, it also means being creative and authentic, being able to express our real self [ 1 ].

7. Finally becoming yourself

A true purpose and a sense of direction in life;

Personnel development;

Good relationships with others;

Persona control and effectiveness;

Self-acceptance, self-respect, self-esteem;

A autonomy [ 17 , 22 , 23 , 24 ].

This is non-definitive list and will certainly be reviewed or expanded [ 17 , 22 , 23 , 24 ], but in any case we can say that regardless of the reference culture there are some dimensions which focus on a healthy individualization: the overcoming of the limits of a selfish ego, the conquest of love, objectivity and humility and respect for life, until the end of life is there life itself and man becomes what he is in potential [ 25 ]. The malaise can instead be represented by the alienation from ourselves, a malaise creeps into the awareness that life slips from our hands like sand, that we will die without having lived. Today there is also a more and more frequent paradox: while narcissistic individualism as an unlimited self-affirmation increases on a world scale, the idea of a subject who feels he is part of a human and natural totality often disappears. As a matter of fact, being an individual often coincides with the claim of the right to the immediate and mandatory satisfaction of one’s desires, where the one who has more economic power, can impose himself on the weaker people. We must also consider in this regard, as Byung-chul Han reminds us, that we live in a society that is becoming increasingly narcissistic, and narcissism is definitely not a form of self-realization or self-love; following this narcissistic attitude today almost nothing has a long shelf life, and everything is disposable, also relationships, and this has harmful consequences [ 26 , 27 ]. We can therefore ask: what can psychoanalysis can offer to those suffering from sickness of the century (ie. narcissism and alienation)? This is an aid that must be different from the only treatment aimed at the removal of symptom, which can preserve the normal performance of social functions. Because for those who are alienated (ie for those who are far from living fully their real self), the goal cannot be only in the absence of disease, but in the presence of wellness. A first definition of Wellbeing can therefore be the following: wellbeing is being in harmony with the nature of man. However, if we go beyond this formal statement, a question arises: what does it mean to be in harmony with the conditions of human existence? And what are these conditions? The human existence arises a problem. Man is thrown into this world not by his will and so he is torn from it. According to Fromm [ 1 , 25 ], unlike the animal, man does not have an immediate innate mechanism in his instincts, which allows him to adapt immediately and completely to nature. The questions that life poses are many: how can we overcome the pain, slavery, shame caused by the experience of isolation? How we can find the harmony with ourselves, with our fellow humans, with nature? Man is required to give some answers; he even responds in case of madness, rejecting external reality and living completely enclosed in his selves, to overcome the fear of loneliness. Therefore, the solutions that can be worked out, in response to the existential questions, are basically reducible to two. One is to overcome isolation, to find unity through regression to the state of primordial harmony, existing before the awareness development (ie before birth). The other solution consists in being metaphorically completely born, in strengthening one’s awareness, one’s reason, one’s ability to love to the point of overcoming one’s self-centeredness and narcissism and thus reaching a new harmony, a new communion with the world. However, most proceed along the life pattern are far from wellness: attached to their family (in a symbiotic way), or attached to the state, the social rank, to idols, myths, and etc. To be able also to understand the individual patient, and d in general any individual, it is important therefore to understand what his response than human existence to these question, ie what is the object of all his passions and all his efforts. According to Fromm what are considered psychological problems are often consequences of this fundamental answer: it is very important to know the fundamental answer that the subject has given to the existence problem, in a certain sense his secret and private religion. As a matter of fact, man often tries to compensate for his depression with idolatry, with destructive tendencies, or with the fame desire and the desire for possession. And when any of these solution fails, his fragile sanity crumbles. The cure for potential madness therefore lies in the passage from alienation to the creative perception of the world and harmony with it: a man cannot be truly free if he is a slave to his passions. He can be free only if he has an ideal and a philosophical attitude which makes it possible for him to have a consistent activity in life [ 1 , 25 ]. By ideal we obviously do not mean an idol. As Zoj a stated [ 28 ] modern culture is characterized by the conviction that in each of us there exists a personal psychological dimension, which everyone has the right to explore and to consider a source of knowledge, aiming to broaden it. However, it often happens that this disposition arouses a sense of solitude and incompleteness. The current situation of frequent alienation can therefore be considered as a symptom, not to be healed in order to return to a previous situation, considered healthy, but as a signal and message: the subject produces a symptom, as a sign of a discomfort that has now exploded, so that he himself can change the its situation. The first step, therefore, is to become aware of the current limit condition: the split between self-perception, emotion and thought, which has become the norm and narcissistic closure in one’s own needs. The further step is the acceptance of the limit of our human being not as a condemnation, but as a push to increase knowledge and creativity in the essential relationship with others with whom we are linked in a common destiny.

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