write an essay on independent judiciary

Essay on Independence of Judiciary

Students are often asked to write an essay on Independence of Judiciary in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

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100 Words Essay on Independence of Judiciary

Introduction.

The judiciary is an essential part of a democratic system. Its independence means it is free from interference by the legislative or executive branches of government.

Importance of Independence

Independence ensures fair justice. Judges can make decisions without fear, favor, or bias. It upholds the rule of law, protecting citizens’ rights.

Threats to Independence

Threats include political pressure, corruption, and lack of resources. These can undermine the judiciary’s ability to function independently.

Independence of the judiciary is crucial for democracy. It must be safeguarded to ensure justice and protect citizen rights.

250 Words Essay on Independence of Judiciary

The independence of the judiciary is an indispensable part of a democratic society, aiming to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens. It means that judges and other judicial officers are free to make decisions without interference from the executive or legislative branches of government or from any other outside pressure.

The Significance of Judicial Independence

Judicial independence is significant as it ensures the rule of law, upholds the constitution, and safeguards human rights. It ensures that justice is administered impartially, thereby fostering public confidence in the system. Judges free from external pressures can base their decisions solely on the facts and the law, ensuring a fair trial for all parties involved.

Threats to Judicial Independence

Despite its importance, judicial independence faces numerous threats. Political interference, corruption, lack of adequate resources, and public pressure are some of the challenges that can compromise the independence of the judiciary. These threats undermine the ability of the judiciary to perform its functions effectively and impartially.

Safeguarding Judicial Independence

To safeguard judicial independence, it is crucial to implement measures such as the separation of powers, security of tenure for judges, and adequate remuneration. Additionally, transparent appointment processes, judicial accountability, and professional development for judicial officers can reinforce the independence of the judiciary.

In conclusion, judicial independence is a cornerstone of democracy, ensuring justice and upholding the rule of law. Despite the challenges, it is essential to continually strive to protect and enhance this independence for the sake of a fair and just society.

500 Words Essay on Independence of Judiciary

The independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of any democratic society. It ensures that the judicial branch of the government operates independently from the legislative and executive branches, thereby maintaining a system of checks and balances. This independence is critical in preserving the rule of law, protecting individual rights, and ensuring a fair and impartial system of justice.

The Concept of Judicial Independence

Judicial independence refers to the ability of judges to make decisions free from influence or pressure from other branches of government or from private or partisan interests. It is a principle that is enshrined in many constitutions across the world, including the United States and India. It is based on the idea that judges should be able to make decisions based on the law and facts, not on political considerations or public opinion.

The Importance of Judicial Independence

Judicial independence is fundamental to the rule of law and democracy. It ensures that judges can make decisions that are fair, impartial, and in accordance with the law, even if those decisions are unpopular. It also allows the judiciary to act as a check on the powers of the executive and legislative branches of government, preventing abuses of power and upholding the rights and freedoms of individuals.

Despite its importance, judicial independence is under threat in many parts of the world. Political interference, corruption, and lack of resources can all undermine the independence of the judiciary. For example, when judges are appointed based on political considerations rather than merit, it can compromise their ability to make impartial decisions. Similarly, when judges are subject to political pressure or threats, it can affect their ability to uphold the rule of law.

Preserving Judicial Independence

Preserving judicial independence requires a commitment to the rule of law and the separation of powers. Judges should be appointed based on merit and should be protected from political pressure or influence. They should also be adequately resourced and trained to carry out their duties effectively. Furthermore, there needs to be transparency and accountability in the judicial system to maintain public trust and confidence.

In conclusion, the independence of the judiciary is a crucial element of a democratic society. It ensures that the judiciary can fulfill its role in upholding the rule of law, protecting individual rights, and providing a check on the powers of the other branches of government. Despite the challenges, it is essential to safeguard the independence of the judiciary to maintain the integrity of our democratic systems.

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Judicial Independence: Essential, Limited, Controversial

In a constitutional system of government, the role of the judiciary is essential for maintaining the balance of power, protecting individual rights, upholding the rule of law, interpreting the Constitution, and ensuring equal justice for all.

“The Framers established an independent judiciary because they realized that judges would sometime have to make difficult decisions that the law requires but that are unpopular with a majority of the citizenry. Without the protections afforded to the judiciary by the Constitution, the federal courts may not have been able to issue decisions in . . . cases that have had a dramatic impact on American life and law.” (uscourts.gov)

In this lesson, students learn about the role of an independent judiciary in the United States. Through a cooperative learning jigsaw activity, they focus on operational differences, essential functions, limited powers, and controversial issues. Students also consider the importance of an independent judiciary to preservation of a constitutional democracy and the quality of of life for all Americans.

The estimated time for this lesson plan is two class periods.

Download the lesson plan

Standards Alignment

National Standards for Civics and Government Grades 5-8
National Standards for Civics and Government Grades 9-12

Related Resources

Video: A Conversation on the Constitution with Justices Stephen Breyer, Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor: Judicial Independence
Video: An Independent Judiciary: Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Cooper v. Aaron
Handout: An Independent Judiciary: Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Cooper v. Aaron

Essay on Role of Judiciary in the Country for Students and Children

500 words essay on role of judiciary in the country today.

Any judiciary is an integral part of a country, especially democracy . As India is the largest democracy, we have a big judiciary which makes sure it safeguards the interests of its citizens. Similarly, our Supreme Court is at the top of our judiciary system. It is then followed by our high courts which operate at the state level. Further, there are district courts operating at the district level. There are also many more courts below this order. A judiciary has many roles to play.

Role of Judiciary in India

As a judiciary is independent of the executive, it can easily safeguard the rights of the citizen to ensure peace and harmony. However, its role is not just limited to this. It plays different roles to make sure there is smooth functioning in the country.

Firstly, it plays a great role in making new laws. Judiciary is the rightful interpreter of our constitution as well as the current laws. It has the power to create new laws as well as overrule policies that might violate our constitution.

Furthermore, the judiciary also prevents any form of violation of the law. Similarly, it files a lawsuit against the person found guilty of doing the same. After that, a judge passes his verdict after listening to both parties closely and announces the judgment accordingly.

Moreover, it also acts as an advisory body. It happens more than often that the executive or legislature seeks help from the judiciary to clarify issues regarding the constitution.

Moreover, the judiciary decides upon the constitutional questions. For instance, if there is a dispute between states, they are brought to the Supreme Court where it decides how to interpret the constitution on the basis of the on-going dispute. In addition, it also looks after the administrating bit. Like it is responsible for appointing officers, maintaining records, administrating staff and more.

Most importantly, the judiciary is the protector of fundamental rights of the citizens. Everyone has the right to fundamental rights; however, sometimes people try to take them away. Thus, the judiciary ensures no such thing happens and lets every citizen live with harmony.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Importance in Today’s Scenario

A judiciary is very crucial in upholding a democracy like ours. As we all know, cases of injustice against people have risen nowadays. There is unjust discrimination happening and the judiciary must step in to stop all this.

Therefore, it becomes important more than ever to help people feel safe within their own country and homes. Judiciary checks and balances the ones who have power. This helps in preventing people from misusing that power.

In short, in today’s scenario of our country where crimes are happening rapidly, people turn to the judiciary for justice . Thus, we see how it is so very important that judiciary remains just and empowered in the times of darkness. Sometimes, it remains the single ray of hope for people, which is why it is needed more than ever now.

FAQs on Role of Judiciary in the Country Today

Q.1 What is the role of the judiciary in the country today?

A.1 The judiciary plays a major role in a democracy. It safeguards the fundamental rights of the people. Further, it makes new laws and ensures to punish anyone violating these laws. It also administers and appoints officers.

Q.2 Why is the judiciary important in the country today?

A.2 The judiciary is more important than ever now because injustice against people has risen to a great extent in our country. We need it to monitor the people and punish them for their crimes so everyone feels safe and included.

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AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: THE CORE OF THE RULE OF LAW

Related Papers

International Journal of Ethics in Social Sciences

Dr. Mohammad Saiful Islam

Independent judiciary is an essential social institution to guarantee the rights and liberty not only from the maltreatment of the individuals but also from the sovereign authority. It measures the dominant trademarks of a modern democratic society and the rule of law. Personal freedom in judicial decision making, institutional autonomy in the work of the judicature is a meter of the standards of the democratic state. The study of the independent judiciary has established attention for its rectangular role in society. Several UN and Non-UN documents have articulated independent judiciary and formulate standards for the smooth functioning of judiciary as autonomy and neutral body. This study generates broad concept about the nature of an independent judiciary from three different aspects of the international context. Firstly, the conventional and traditional notion of an independent judiciary that comprises the independence of individual judges and institutional autonomy of courts as an autonomous body. Secondly, the article includes structural and behavioral independence, then thirdly, the scholarship highlights the de facto and de jure independence in details. In the last point, the study consists of highlighting the independent judiciary in the various international and regional instruments revealing its prominence.

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Victoria Rodríguez-Blanco

Defining 'judicial independence' is not an easy task. At the level of theory, formal obstacles exist that arise from the ideological preconception we choose to proceed from; on the practical level, we are confronted with polymorphous materials from the numerous legal experiences accumulated for each domestic law. Likewise, we are not dealing with a monolithic idea, since it is reasonable-and almost mandatory-to delve into multiple layers of semantics that mesh together in unexpected complexity. Whatever obstacles may exist, there is no way to circumvent these dilemmas either, given that judicial independence has been categorised as a key component of democracy and rule of law. This conceptual background seems to point to a reasonable starting point, however, rooted in its wide and general scope. That is the 'Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary' framework adopted in 1985 by the United Nations. *1 It specifi es the following underpinnings: The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper infl uences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

Lavinia Codrea

The issue of the defining elements of a truly fair justice system has become a constant and consistent concern of international and/or regional political and legal organisations. Given the scale of the phenomenon of establishing and resorting to international courts and tribunals, reflecting, among others, the preference and availability of international actors for settling their disputes by independent and impartial decision-makers, the principles and values of the international judiciary have been subjected to discussions in an increasingly elaborate manner. Among these, judicial independence occupies a special position, being tightly connected to the issue of the legitimacy of such institutions, as an essential factor in ensuring voluntary compliance to the internationally adopted decisions. In this context, the present paper addresses the independence of the judiciary in international courts, both in terms of the fundamental theoretical contributions and from a practical perspec...

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The goal of this article is to develop an analytical framework for the conceptualization of international judicial independence. First, it will be argued that judicial independence is not to be conceived as an end in itself but rather as a condition for the legitimacy of international courts (ICs). Also, independence is not a monolithic concept, but one of degree and the optimal degree of independence might vary according to the function and type of ICs. Second, I will provide a taxonomy of judicial independence in the international sphere and identify and systematize the relevant actors and variables. While studies about international judicial independence tend to focus on the mechanisms available to state governments, this work will take into account a broader set of actors and variables. Finally, a notion of interdependence will be advanced as a framework for institutional design that combines the need to enable adjudication free from undue influence or pressure with mechanisms to counterbalance judicial power. Forms of interdependence on the grounds of the principles of accountability and checks and balances might contribute to the overall legitimacy of ICs.

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Independent Judiciary

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First Online: 07 September 2021
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George Tridimas 3

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After describing the closely related concepts of judicial independence and independent judicial review of policy, this entry offers an overview of four issues: (1) reasons for establishing an independent judiciary, including its ability to resolve problems of information asymmetry between citizens – principals and public officials – agents, transform constitutional declarations to credible commitments, and provide a mechanism of political insurance; (2) mechanisms for appointing judges and the jurisdiction of courts; (3) modeling the role of the judiciary as an additional veto player in games of collective decision-making and policy implementation; and (4) empirical work on the judiciary both as an explanatory and as an explained variable.

The Meaning of Judicial Independence

Judicial independence means that courts enforce the law and resolve disputes without regard to the power and preferences of the parties appearing before them (La Porta et al. 2004 ). Its theoretical...

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George Tridimas

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Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Tridimas, G. (2021). Independent Judiciary. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_12-2

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_12-2

Received : 21 June 2020

Accepted : 24 May 2021

Published : 07 September 2021

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Print ISBN : 978-1-4614-7883-6

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_12-2

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32 Judicial Independence

Frank Cross is Herbert D. Kelleher Centennial Professor of Business Law at the University of Texas at Austin.

Published: 02 September 2009
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Few cows are more sacred than judicial independence, yet the concept of an independent judiciary is more commonly apotheosized than analyzed. This article explains how the concept of judicial independence is much more complicated and ambiguous than it is often regarded. After reviewing and explicating the literature on judicial independence, it analyzes the meaning of judicial independence and then considers the degree to which the judiciary is independent, focusing on the federal judiciary of the United States. Independence plays an important role in a system of governance, but it is reasonably compromised to some degree by concerns for judicial accountability. In the United States, federal judges are essentially, but imperfectly, independent. The article proceeds to consider the sources of judicial independence. Although constitutional protections may have some value, the root of independence may derive from the interests of other political institutions. Finally, it considers the implications of judicial selection and retention, with a focus on the U.S. states, which provide a convenient testing ground.

Few cows are more sacred than judicial independence. Yet the concept of an independent judiciary is more commonly apotheosized than analyzed. Article X of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that an independent and impartial judiciary is a fundamental human right, but does not define the precise nature of this independence. Much of the existing research on the subject has failed to identify clearly what is meant by judicial independence or to justify why it is inevitably valuable. Some discussions conflate judicial independence with the “rule of law,” although the two concepts are distinct and not necessarily even associated. I will explain how the concept of judicial independence is much more complicated and ambiguous than it is often regarded. While judicial independence has real value, it is not a feature to be maximized in all regards.

I review and explicate the literature on judicial independence. I begin with an analysis of the meaning of judicial independence, a crucial issue that is elided by too much of the literature on the subject. There is no single definition of such independence, and the concept is a matter of degree rather than a binary determination of dependent or independent. I next consider the degree to which the judiciary is independent, focusing on the United States federal judiciary. The value of judicial independence is uncertain, because its benefits are accompanied by costs, and some measure of dependence or accountability is optimal. The chapter proceeds to consider the sources of judicial independence. Although constitutional protections may have some value, the root of independence may derive from the interests of other political institutions. Finally, the chapter considers the implications of selection and retention systems on judicial independence, with a focus on the states of the U.S., which provide a convenient testing ground.

1 What Is Judicial Independence?

Any careful analysis of judicial independence must begin with a definition of the concept, but this issue is typically assumed away. Independence is generally defined as something like autonomy or freedom to act as one pleases. The first and most critical aspect of this definition in the context of the judiciary is: “independence from what or whom?” Judicial independence has been called a system in which disputes are resolved by a “neutral third,” but this begs the question of neutral of what. Independence assumes a freedom from outside control, but judicial independence need not, and cannot, be absolute. Insofar as “no man is an island,” a state of utter independence is probably unrealistic (Russell 2001 , 11–12).

The judicial hierarchy itself creates a certain dependence for most judges. The commonplace understanding of judicial independence would have federal district courts and other lower courts free from influence from the president but not free from influence from the U.S. Supreme Court or other relevant courts of last resort. Various other social constraints also inhibit judicial independence. Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit has suggested that if a judge were truly and fully independent he might choose to go to the bench “dressed like Ronald McDonald,” or choose to issue all of his or her opinions in French (Kozinski 1998 , 862).

Many commentators, such as Justice Breyer, have declared that judicial independence is grounded in decision-making according to law, which implies a lack of judicial independence of the materials and procedures of the law (Breyer 1996 ). This interpretation, which is not necessarily obvious, makes judges dependent on the materials of the law itself. If judicial independence is not an absolute state in which judges are free to decide cases however they please, there remains the question of what an independent judiciary is to be independent from.

The typical understanding of judicial independence involves the court's freedom from control by other government institutions, such as the executive or legislative branches. The U.S. Supreme Court has defined independence as “judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government” ( U.S. v. Will 1980, 218). The rationale for this independence lies in a separation of powers. In the old Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, courts practiced what was sometimes called “telephone justice,” in which judges would render decisions after receiving instructions from party leaders. The U.S. constitutional system is designed to prevent such actions through a separation of powers. In The Federalist , Hamilton explained that “there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.”

This separation-of-powers aspect of judicial independence is meant to provide something of a bulwark against tyranny (Guarnieri and Pederzoli 2002 , 152–4). In the U.S. and other countries, the judiciary has increasingly played an aggressive role in regulating the exercise of legislative and executive authority, policing the political process, and making public policy decisions (Ferejohn 2002 ). The judiciary appears to be carrying out its independent, separation-of-powers function. There is some quantitative evidence that the separation of powers, including an independent judiciary, effectively reduces governmental corruption and rent-seeking (Panizza 2001 ). Freedom from control by other government institutions also serves the separate interest of promoting justice according to law. Judges who decide cases on politicians' instructions are probably not deciding according to the law.

The separation-of-powers rationale is commonly invoked as evidence of the importance of judicial independence for protection of individual or minority rights. Yet there is no obvious reason why independent judges would care to protect such rights. Substantive law may not protect the rights, and independent judges may ignore those laws that do. Nothing in the structure of judicial incentives promotes rights protection, though the absence of accountability arguably insulates the judiciary from oppressive majoritarian urges. The existence of majoritarian oppression is not so compelling, though, and there is little evidence that an independent Supreme Court enhances protection of civil rights and liberties (Peretti 2002 , 123).

Another theory of judicial independence suggests that judges should be independent of the litigants appearing before them. These litigants may include the government, but this concept is broader and suggests that judges should also be independent from the control or influence of private parties. The rationale for this form of independence is less the separation of powers than fairness and justice and the rule of law. Such fairness means that a litigant should not prevail simply because of its identity, independent of case facts and the law. Fairness requires that a “decision of a case be independent of the names or identities of the litigants” (Kornhauser 2002 , 49). This is a requisite of judicial impartiality and equality before the law, perhaps of due process of law. The Supreme Court has enforced this precept, vacating a decision because a judge had reason to favor a litigant ( Aetna Life Insurance 1986). Judges themselves have created codes of conduct to protect this independence and provide for their disqualification when their impartiality might be questioned (Administrative Office of the United States Courts 1990 ).

Yet another aspect of judicial independence involves freedom from public opinion. An independent judiciary does not take a poll before rendering its decisions. Justice Stevens has emphasized that judging involves deciding cases according to precedent and not “public opinion polls” ( Republican Party of Minnesota v. White 2002, 799). Through its independence, the judiciary is expected to protect the legal rights of minorities in the face of potential majoritarian oppression. Justice Jackson wrote that one's “right to life, liberty and property, to free speech, free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights” may not be submitted to vote ( West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1943, 638). Thus, federal judges are not subject to election but given life tenure. Some may argue that judicial independence need not be freedom from popular opinion. In a democracy, where judges are invested with political decision-making authority, it is arguably appropriate that this authority be exercised with public sentiment in mind. Although a judge should not be influenced by public opinion in deciding whether a particular defendant deserves the death penalty, public opinion might appropriately be considered in establishing standards for whether the death penalty is permissible and when. In reality, the general public pays relatively little heed to most judicial decisions, so public influence is probably relatively small.

Still another possible aspect of judicial independence involves freeing the judiciary from the constraints of the law. For some, this notion of independence is oxymoronic; judicial independence means decision-making according to law. Although judicial independence is surely meant to free judges to decide according to the law, true independence would also allow judges to depart from the dictates of the law.

Making judges beholden to the law limits the separation-of-powers virtues of judicial independence. Giving the legislature control over the content of the law and making judges dependent upon the law inevitably makes judges more dependent on the legislature (though only in statutory and not constitutional issues). If judges “take a positivist attitude toward law and simply follow the rules laid down by the political branches, then they are not really independent of politics but… completely subservient to it” (Scheppele 2002 , 269). Congress may not overturn the outcomes of adjudicated disputes, but prospective changes can eliminate much effect of adjudications and arguably infringe upon judicial independence (Salzburger 1992 , 349). Judge Kozinski has related how the legislature functionally overruled one of his decisions before he had even finished writing the opinion (Kozinski 1998 , 870).

The constraints of law are often regarded as promoting fairness virtues, rather than inhibiting them, but granting legislatures the power arbitrarily to alter the content of law independent of the judiciary might interfere with fairness. Legislation might be arbitrary or unjust, as in the case of segregation laws. To some degree, a written constitution combined with judicial review power can substantially enhance judicial independence, because it empowers judges to disregard statutory commands on the grounds that they violate that constitution (Scheppele 2002 , 248–9). Judges who “see themselves as something other than the simple applicants of the regime's law should bode well for a high degree of judicial independence” (Larkins 1996 , 612). An independent judiciary might refuse to enforce fascist legislation. This may be more likely when the incumbent political regime is weaker (Helmke 2002 ).

A separate definitional question is “independence to do what?” Judicial independence need not mean that judges are independent of constraint, free to rape or murder with impunity; rather, judicial independence should be limited to the independence to act “judicially.” Such independence might be limited to actions taken in the judge's judicial role, and actions that are consistent with the judicial role and, therefore, do not authorize a judge to exchange rulings for bribes. Independence to act judicially could be accompanied by accountability for non-judicial actions.

Although the limitation of judicial independence to “judicial” actions seems clear in theory, it can be quite complicated in practice. For who is to decide if a judicial action is “judicial” and therefore deserving of independence? If the legislature or executive were permitted to make such decisions, it could eviscerate the independence of all judicial actions, even legitimate ones, because the power could be abused. Indeed, judicial independence may even imply freedom from second-guessing by other judges. For example, judges are not subject to civil liability in court for actions taken in the course of their judging ( Bradley v. Fisher 1872). Judges therefore are independent and unaccountable for damages, even if their decisions were contrary to law or otherwise illegitimate. Of course, illegitimate decisions might still be vacated by a higher judicial authority.

“Judicial” independence must also have an empowering function. It implies that judges truly have judicial powers. A court without constraint would be practically immaterial if it lacked all power, because it had no jurisdiction or because its rulings were ignored (Kornhauser 2002 , 47). The judicial part of judicial independence could be read to mean that judges have the authority to render decisions and have those decisions recognized at law. In Franco's Spain and Pinochet's Chile, the judiciary had a relatively high level of independence from outside control but had so little power that its independence was trivial (Larkins 1996 , 612–13).

There is no single, indisputable definition of judicial independence. At its core, judicial independence means freedom from absolute control by other government institutions. Judicial independence also means some degree of freedom from control by litigants and public opinion and even possibly some freedom from positive law. The breadth of this freedom cannot be absolute, though, and it must in some way be limited to judicial functions. The precise degree of independence, from whom and to do what, is not easily defined; but the concept is roughly understood to involve judges' ability to render decisions in cases without fear of retribution. The next section explores the existence of judicial independence in the United States, under the varying interpretations of its meaning.

2 The Reality of Judicial Independence in the U.S.

Americans generally and even legal academics often take for granted a belief that our judiciary is independent, at least in the fundamental sense of freedom from interference by other branches. The life tenure of federal judges is invoked as proof of such independence, and the federal judiciary is often considered the paradigmatic case of an independent one. The belief in judicial independence is broadly presumed and not proved, though, because it is difficult to establish measures of judicial independence, in part because the lack of an indisputable definition of the term makes it difficult to conceptualize.

In fact, the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. federal government have considerable power to constrain or influence the federal judiciary. Congress may impeach judges, removing them from office. Although exercise of this power is largely dormant, the threat of impeachment remains and may have an intimidating effect. Such a threat apparently caused federal district court judge Harold Baer to reconsider and reverse a ruling that politicians found especially objectionable (Cross and Nelson 2001 , 1461–3).

The judiciary also depends on the other branches of government for its budgetary resources. Although the Constitution prevents Congress from reducing judicial salaries, it may still withhold salary increases or other resources from the federal judiciary and it controls appropriations for supplemental resources that may be material to the interest of judges. Judges have shown considerable concern for their funding, and they regularly appear as supplicants before the legislature (Resnick 1999 , 664). Some research suggests that Congress has punished undesirable judicial decisions with budget cuts, and that Supreme Court justices have responded with decisions more amenable to the legislature (Toma 1996 ). Judge Calabresi reports that budgetary concerns prompted another judge to urge him to rewrite an opinion that might disturb senators (Cross 2003 , 207).

The political branches have other sources of influence over the judiciary. For statutory decisions, the Congress may effectively override judicial interpretations, and judges may correspondingly defer to the risk of such an override (Eskridge 1991 ). The Constitution gives Congress the power to deny the federal judiciary jurisdiction over certain issues. Even if not overridden, the judiciary typically requires assistance from the other branches to implement its decisions, and such assistance may be withheld (Peretti 2002 , 112). In the early twentieth century, Congress abolished the newly created Commerce Court due to dislike of its decisions (Dix 1964 ).

The president and the Senate have the power to promote judges to a higher level of the judiciary and grant higher pay or withhold a possible promotion and salary increases. There is some quantitative evidence suggesting that promotion prospects influence judicial decisions (Sisk, Heise, and Morriss 1998 ). Congress tends to expand the size of the judiciary when one party has enough political control to ensure that its candidates will fill the newly created vacancies (de Figueiredo and Tiller 1996 ). The “mere threat of political retribution from Congress seems to have turned the judiciary into an effective self-regulator” (Ferejohn and Kramer 2002 , 977). A study of labor relations decisions found that Supreme Court rulings responded to political changes in Congress (Spiller and Gely 1992 ). Other empirical analyses have shown a varying degree of responsiveness to preferences of other institutions among Supreme Court justices (Cross and Nelson 2001 ).

The sources of outside influence at the federal level in the United States are relatively crude tools not easily used to target individual judges for rendering disfavored opinions. Although the U.S. federal judiciary does not appear absolutely independent from the political branches, there is ample evidence that it possesses a high level of independence. Segal has conducted a broad empirical analysis of the degree to which the Supreme Court's decisions respond to preferences of Congress, using several different models of congressional decision-making, and he found no effect of legislative preferences (Segal 1997 ), though some disagree with the findings.

Segal's findings are roughly confirmed by political science research demonstrating that the best determinant of Supreme Court decisions is the justices' own ideology (Peretti 2002 , 110–11). Although judicial independence is difficult to measure quantitatively, it may be captured indirectly. If one were to hypothesize how a truly independent judiciary would resolve cases, the most likely determinant would be the individual judges' sense of the just resolution of the case. Their respective senses of a just resolution are contingent on their respective interpretations of justice, which would trace to some degree their respective ideologies. Hence, one would anticipate that an independent judiciary would show an ideological pattern of decision-making.

A wealth of research has demonstrated that judicial ideology is a substantial, if not predominant, determinant of the decisions rendered by the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. The “attitudinal model” has demonstrated that the decisions of justices are highly correlated with their ideological inclinations (Segal and Spaeth 1993 ). Nor is there any evidence that other lower courts respond materially to congressional strategic influences in rendering their decisions, as their decisions also are significantly associated with judicial ideology (Pinello 1999 ). The studies are nearly universal in establishing this statistically significant correlation. These findings presumably underestimate the degree of judicial independence, because they fail to capture nonideological determinants of “justice” and boundary cases where an outcome is too conservative for even a conservative judge, or too liberal for a liberal. Thus, the empirical evidence provides strong support for a finding that the U.S. judiciary is relatively independent. The evidence probably understates the degree of independence, insofar as an independent judiciary would also care about adherence to what they consider to be “correct” legal decisions divorced from their attitudes. There is some evidence, though, that judges are at least somewhat constrained and adapt their decisions to some degree to the preferences of other branches (Epstein and Knight 1998 ). This constraint may be greater in state judiciaries, where decisions appear to be affected by factors such as judicial tenure and the political makeup of the other branches (Langer 2002 , 123).

The second aspect of judicial independence, freedom from the influence of litigants, is also imperfectly operationalized in the judiciary. Litigants use various strategies and tactics to manipulate judicial outcomes. If litigants have greater resources and higher quality legal representation, they may skew outcomes in their favor. Litigants may also strategically settle, so that only cases with the most favorable facts are presented to the judiciary. Research demonstrates that certain litigants, including the government and powerful private parties, are more successful in court (Galanter 1974 ). Additional evidence indicates that participation in litigation by outsiders, as amicus curiae , is associated with greater success in court (Baum 1997 , 51). The extent of such influence is not overwhelming, and it is constrained by judicial preferences, but parties clearly do exert some impact on judicial outcomes.

The judiciary may also be influenced by public opinion. Judges live among the public, they read the same media, and they are subject to most of the same influences as the general populace. Judges might also fear for a public backlash against decisions that might compromise their status. Seventh Circuit judge Richard Posner declared that “[j]udges have to worry that if they buck public opinion too strongly,” they may suffer punishment (Posner 2002 , 739).

Research suggests that federal judicial decisions generally conform to public opinion. Dahl proclaimed that “policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States” (Dahl 1957 , 285). Empirical studies of Supreme Court decision-making find that it corresponds with public opinion about as closely as do the elected branches of government (Marshall 1989 ; McGuire and Stimson 2004 ). Presidential success before the Court may be linked to presidential popularity (Yates 2002 ). The evidence is not so strong as to suggest that judges are slaves to public opinion, and it is easy to identify countermajoritarian decisions rendered by courts. Yet, it appears that public opinion may have some impact on judicial decisions.

Independence from the law is not generally considered a feature of the American judiciary. U.S. judges generally do not purport to be independent from the law, but they have implicitly acknowledged the tension between the law and judicial independence and restricted the ability of the legislature to undo judicial decisions. Although the Constitution explicitly prohibits only ex post facto criminalization, the Supreme Court has found that Congress cannot reinstate civil claims finally resolved by the courts ( Plaut v. Spend Farm Inc . 1995).

Empirical analyses have consistently confirmed that lower courts faithfully follow the decisions of the Supreme Court and other aspects of positive law (Klein 2002 ). However, the findings on the impact of judicial ideology on decisions calls into question the degree to which courts perfectly follow the law. Indeed, some researchers of Supreme Court decisions have questioned whether the law is a significant determinant of that Court's decisions (Segal and Spaeth 1999 ). The significance of law is confirmed to a degree by the empirical findings on ideological decision-making. Courts of last resort, which are somewhat less bound by the law in the form of prior judicial decisions, are also the most ideological in their decisions (Pinello 1999 ). American judges plainly are somewhat constrained by law but not to the degree they typically profess. Judicial discretion implies some freedom from the law as well.

In addition, the claim of judicial independence from the law is not terribly meaningful, given the ability of judges to define what the law is. In a common law society, judges themselves create the law; and even after Congress passes a statute, the judiciary declares what that statute means in the context of adjudications. A judge can certainly affect or even alter the meaning of statutes, through his or her interpretation. Even after the legislature attempts to override judicial decisions, the effectiveness of this override may be undermined by judicial interpretation of the overriding legislation (Cross and Nelson 2001 , 1455–7).

The judiciary of the United States is plainly somewhat, but not entirely, independent, regardless of the definition of judicial independence. The relative independence of the judiciary is empirically demonstrated by studies showing that the ideological characteristics of judges and perhaps other judicial characteristics influence decisional outcomes. It appears that judges are largely independent of the other branches of government, materially independent of the litigants and public opinion, and at least somewhat independent of the law itself. Moreover, even insofar as the judicial branch is somewhat dependent, individual judges may exercise considerable independence in particular cases (Ferejohn and Kramer 2002 ). Judicial independence is not a binary condition but exists on a continuum of relative independence and accountability. The next section takes up the question of the desirability of judicial independence along that continuum, which is commonly assumed but seldom demonstrated.

3 The Uncertain Virtue of Judicial Independence

Independence is generally considered a virtue, but so is accountability; and the two terms are roughly antonymous. An utterly independent judiciary could decide cases on a whim, by a coin flip, or in exchange for personal favors from litigants. Such independence would enable judicial arbitrariness. There is no reason to expect a wholly independent judiciary to abide by the rule of law, and the ideological pattern of federal judicial decisions may suggest that these courts have an excessive degree of independence.

Judicial independence carries the clear virtues associated with the separation of government powers, with some ability to check abuses by other branches of government. This may have the attendant virtue of protecting the rights of individuals. Judicial independence also can further fairness virtues in adjudication, by ensuring that the adjudicator of individual cases is free to decide based on the facts of those cases. This role may be of considerable economic value, as investors can have greater assurance that their economic rights will be protected and their agreements enforced (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995 ). Although these are important values, they do not entirely justify an independent judiciary, which may undermine fairness and fail to protect against government oppression, at least when the judiciary does not oppose or even favors oppressive measures.

Indeed, absolute judicial independence could contradict the very separation-of-powers rationale for which it is typically invoked. A perfectly independent judiciary would be unchecked by other government authority. Unchecked judicial independence could yield judicial tyranny; and, as Barry Friedman has argued, “[t]oo much judicial independence may threaten popular sovereignty” (Friedman 2002 , 1). These concerns suggest that judicial independence should not be untrammeled and that the judiciary should be in some way accountable.

The judiciary is often considered the “least dangerous branch,” but this is not necessarily so. Thus, the theocratic judiciary of Iran has essentially assumed control of that nation's government, constraining even who may run for elected office (Cross 2003 , 199–201). Although the American experience is far from that of Iran, some suggest that the U.S. judiciary has assumed excessive policy-making authority, in decisions such as those striking down laws against abortion. Complaints about “judicial activism” have become common from both the right and the left. Internationally, increased judicial power has been challenged as contrary to democratic policy (Hirschl 2004 ).

Untrammeled judicial independence may also contravene fairness values. A perfectly independent judiciary is free to be arbitrary or corrupt in its decisions and is likely to become lazy and inefficient (Cross 2003 , 198). Unaccountable judges have no external incentive to produce fair rulings and are more likely to produce decisions in accord with their personal and perhaps idiosyncratic preferences. There is no obvious reason to turn over governmental authority to the whims of life-tenured judges.

Although few conceptions of democracy argue that the popular will should govern the outcomes of individual cases, the judiciary does more than simply determine outcomes. Judicial decisions set precedents that establish the law and may determine the meaning of statutes passed by Congress. This form of judicial lawmaking may infringe on democratic preferences about the content of law. The more independent the judiciary, the more able it will be to disregard democratic preferences and even the content of the law passed by elected institutions of government. Independent judges may even arbitrarily strike down statutes as unconstitutional.

Judicial independence is not an unalloyed good. Judge Posner has suggested that independence can simply involve the public's “exchanging one set of tyrants for another” (Posner 1990 , 6). The interests of society counsel not the maximization of judicial independence but its optimization on the continuum, though the precise placement of the optimum point is certainly debatable. With this context, I now turn to the sources of judicial independence and how its values may be best implemented.

4 The Sources of Judicial Independence

Some measure of judicial independence furthers important ends of separation of powers and fairness in administering the law. This leads to the important question of how one may produce a judiciary with an appropriate degree of independence. The typical approach to protecting judicial independence involves constitutional provisions, such as life tenure and protection of compensation. Most nations have created some constitutional protections for judicial independence.

Constitutional guarantees are at times derided as mere “paper guarantees,” unable to withstand contrary forces. Formal constitutional protections may be ignored, and the judiciary lacks resources to protect its own independence. In Argentina, the country's supreme court was purged a number of times, notwithstanding constitutional guarantees of tenure for judges. Constitutional protections for Soviet judges did not prevent “telephone justice.” By contrast, the United Kingdom and other nations have generally preserved an independent judiciary without written constitutional protections and a structural dependence of the judiciary on the parliament (Russell 2001 , 22). Given the judiciary's lack of independent financial and military resources, its authority depends to some degree on the interests of other branches.

Of course, anecdotal examples of constitutional failure do not demonstrate that a constitution is useless in protecting some level of judicial independence. A constitution represents a commitment that is considered part of the “rules of the game” around which individuals coordinate their activities. Once such rules are in place, they can become sticky and difficult to change. Even if constitutionalization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for judicial independence, constitutionalization may facilitate the protection of a measure of independence for judges. A constitution may have its greatest benefit by establishing bright-line rules that expose attempts to infringe on judicial independence.

Beyond constitutional or other legal protections, there may be economic or political bases for judicial independence. Particular judges surely want independence, since it is far more satisfying to make one's own judgments than it is mechanistically to follow the will of others. Consequently, preventing independent decision-making will impose monitoring and enforcement costs on congress, or whatever external force would compromise judicial independence. Given the vast number of cases decided by the courts, considerable judicial independence will result simply from the fact that it is not worth the costs for congress to control the results in most cases. Even in the old Soviet Union, judges were independent for a substantial number of cases (Scheppele 2002 , 237). For a few high profile categories of cases, however, congress might choose to bear the considerable monitoring and enforcement costs of compromising judicial independence; and these may be the cases where we might most value judicial independence for separation-of-powers reasons. Even in these cases, however, congress might receive some countervailing benefit from preserving judicial independence.

Economists and positive political theorists have produced various theories why politicians would benefit from creating and protecting an independent judiciary, beyond their own control. Landes and Posner argue that an independent judiciary enables politicians to make credible commitments to interest groups about their bargains (Landes and Posner 1975 ). Others suggest that politicians have an incentive to create an independent judiciary when their own tenure is uncertain (Ramseyer 1994 ). An independent judiciary can protect a party's interests when it is out of power and ensure the continued effectiveness of its legislative enactments. An independent judiciary can also provide an informational function, monitoring the bureaucracy and applying general legislation to individual cases, with appropriate discretion. An independent judiciary might also benefit congress as a “punching bag.” Elected officials may attempt to shift public blame for governance to the judiciary, which must be independent for this shift to have effectiveness. Elected officials may support independent judicial policy-making to evade political responsibility (Graber 1993 , 37).

One additional, commonly overlooked justification for an some level of judicial independence is the “common good.” Democratic governments need have a concern for the common good, lest they be thrown out of power (Olson 2000 ). An independent judiciary provides adjudicatory fairness and furthers the separation of powers that in turn may encourage investment and economic growth and best satisfy the interests of their constituents (Cooter 2000 , 196–7). Although Landes and Posner take a cynical view of the need for credible commitments in interest-group bargains, one could easily take a more generous view of the value of credible commitments to social welfare. As a rising tide lifts all ships, so a commitment to overall public interest may further the private interests of most citizens. This is the logic behind creating independent adjudicators for the World Trade Organization. The maintenance of a system of judicial independence may effectively send a signal to investors and others that the country is committed to certain rights and values (Farber 2002 ).

Moreover, once a system of judicial independence is in place, for whatever reason, it may become a societal norm. This has been called customary independence, and it arguably explains the high level of judicial independence of the U.K., which lacks written constitutional protection. Customary independence can explain why Congress has rarely used its constitutional authority to discipline the U.S. judiciary. It may explain the vigorous reaction against Roosevelt's 1937 “court-packing” plan. The public seems to value the protection of at least a relatively independent judiciary.

There are various explanations for why judicial independence has arisen and been maintained by government. Constitutional structures presumably play some role in sheltering judicial independence, though they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for its fulfillment. The other branches of government may have a self-interest in creating and protecting judicial independence, in part because of its potential benefits to society, including economic benefits.

5 Judicial Selection and Retention Methods

Much of the contemporary controversy over judicial independence involves judicial selection. Although extraconstitutional considerations may insulate judicial independence in a democracy, institutional structures will surely influence the measure and scope of independence. The means by which judges are selected and retained in office are institutional structures that are of concern for judicial independence. Although much of the debate has focused on selection methods, possible methods of judicial removal would pose a greater threat to judicial independence.

At the federal level, judicial selection is highly politicized. Some maintain that this effect compromises judicial independence (Peretti 2002 , 104). But if judges, once selected, are outside the control of the Senate, the most salient aspects of judicial independence are not necessarily compromised. The selection process does have some effect on future outcomes, as the choice of conservatives as federal judges will translate into more conservative decisions. Nevertheless, the judge's decision is purely internal and not directly driven by illegitimate external forces. Indeed, the ability of the political branches to exercise some ex ante control over who becomes a judge may reduce the need for them to exercise an ex post removal control over judges on the bench (Cooter 2000 , 196). Political selection could therefore actually enhance independence on the bench.

Other nations have sought to moderate this ideological selection effect by creating a professionalized judiciary that is more like a civil service bureaucracy (Guarnieri and Pederzoli 2002 , 34). This approach is absent in the U.S. at both the federal and state levels, but the state governments have adopted a variety of selection and retention methods that may influence the independence of state judges. These selection methods include a partisan election of judges with party affiliations, a nonpartisan election, and selection by elected government officials with or without retention elections after a term in office.

Numerous commentators have argued that certain selection methods, especially those involving elections, compromise judicial independence. Elected judges are obviously not independent of the public that elects them and that may later turn them out of office, although the public is typically relatively uninformed about the candidates when voting (Geyh 2003 , 54). In partisan elections, the public will generally cue off party affiliation. Such voting does not ensure judicial accountability, though, as it is largely independent of the decisions of the judicial candidate. Many states have abandoned partisan elections for judges, in favor of nonpartisan or retention elections. In retention elections, reformers have suggested that judicial decisions and qualifications are more likely to matter. In practice, incumbent judges are seldom defeated in such retention elections and typically carry a high percentage of the vote (Hall 2001 , 318–19). This success rate may not demonstrate judicial independence, however; it may simply reflect judges' ability strategically to make decisions that ensure their reelection.

Elected judges surely must conform, to some degree, to public preferences in order to gain reelection. There are stories about judges, including but not limited to California's former chief justice Rose Bird, who were defeated because of the content of their opinion or because of a well-funded campaign to defeat them (Geyh 2003 , 53). Crime seems to be a key determinant of judicial elections. The state murder rate is a statistically significant determinant of votes for incumbent judges (Hall 2001 ). Elections and shorter terms for state judges are significantly associated with a greater likelihood of a judge's voting for a defendant to receive capital punishment (Brace and Hall 1995 ). The findings suggest that, for criminal cases, elections appear to increase accountability to the general public and reduce independence at the level of individual case-decisions.

Elected judges must raise contributions for their electoral campaigns. Doing so may compromise their independence from litigants, who may be their campaign contributors. A survey in Texas found that 99 percent of attorneys and 86 percent of judges themselves believe that campaign contributions have some influence on judicial opinions (Feldman 2000 ). Elected judges may also be more dependent on political parties even in states with nonpartisan elections (Hanssen 1999 , 212). This situation may in turn make such judges less independent of elected politicians.

What may be most “essential for judicial independence is that removal should be very difficult and should be based on a demonstration, judiciously arrived at, that the judge is incapable of discharging the responsibilities of judicial office” (Russell 2001 , 15). Under this theory, judges should suffer no personal adverse consequences based on the nature of their decisions. This is the foundation of life tenure for federal judges, and any sort of retention election would seem to compromise this principle.

One study began with the hypothesis that judicial independence would increase outcome uncertainty and that such uncertainty would increase litigation (Hanssen 1999 ). It found that states with appointed judges indeed had more litigation at a level that was statistically significant for the court of last resort, although not significant at the trial court level. Hanssen concluded that appointing judges protected the judiciary “from political co-option by special interests (or the ruling majority)” (Hanssen, 1999 , 232). The common focus on selection methods may be misplaced, however, as judicial retention seems a more relevant measure of independence. Although a “merit” selection system using the bar association was for a time promoted as improving judicial quality and independence, reliance on retention elections has meant that merit plan judges face some of the same pressures as do those subject to partisan elections (Tarr 2003 , 1447–8).

The evidence on the compromising effect of judicial elections is not overwhelming. Although researchers have found a significant effect of state selection and retention methods in some circumstances, the magnitude of the effect has not been consistently large or across-the-board. In some ways, elected judges appear more independent of other branches of government. For example, an elected judiciary is somewhat more likely to strike down a state law as unconstitutional than is an appointed judiciary (Cross 2003 , 215–16).

An elected judiciary has its own constituency. Jacksonians favored elected judiciaries precisely because they were more accountable to the populace. In its accountability to or dependence on public opinion, an elected judiciary may become somewhat less dependent on the law. An accountable but activist judiciary might advance separation-of-powers values, checking the legislative branch much as an independently elected president is expected to check the legislative branch. Of course, this comes at some cost in terms of independence from public opinion and the parties that may appear in court.

6 Conclusion

“Judicial independence” is a far more contested concept than typically recognized. Its meaning and value are uncertain. The judiciary is both a legal institution and a political institution, and judicial independence represents a compromise between these two roles. Independence plays an important role in a system of governance, but it is reasonably compromised to some degree by concerns for judicial accountability.

In the United States, federal judges are essentially, but imperfectly, independent. In the overwhelming majority of cases, such judges are substantially independent of the other branches of government, public opinion, and at least the illegitimate forms of litigant influence, and slightly independent of the law itself. On balance, the federal judiciary has functioned relatively well, to the benefit of the nation, but it is unclear that the current degree of judicial independence is the optimal one. There is a plausible argument that this judiciary has an excess of independence and should be curtailed.

For state courts, the balance is different. Many decry the inappropriate influences on the state judiciary created by electoral demands. Elections inevitably compromise independence in some regard, at least in terms of independence of the public and individuals who may be parties; but they increase judicial accountability, and the trade-off needs to be recognized and analyzed.

The topic of judicial independence warrants additional empirical investigation. We yet have a very limited understanding of the sources of greater levels of judicial independence and of the consequences of such levels. This research requires tools to measure judicial independence, and those tools require researchers to define precisely the nature of the independence they hope to capture.

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The Role of an Independent Judiciary in Protecting Rule of Law

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During the opening session of the Asia Pacific Justice Forum (December 8-9, 2022), Professor Margaret Sattherthwaite, UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers and professor of clinical law at the New York University School of Law, outlined the importance of an independent judiciary for countering rising authoritarianism.

Good morning, thank you. It’s a true honor to address you today as the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers at this important gathering, the Asia Pacific Justice Forum.

I want to thank the World Justice Project for the invitation to speak with you. Over the past decade, World Justice Project has become a trusted source of data and analysis concerning access to justice around the world, and I'm grateful for all that they do. It's exciting to know that representatives of government, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, the academy, and civil society from across Asia, are gathered in Jakarta for this event. I would much rather be with you in person, not only because I would be speaking to you at 9:00 AM instead of 9:00 PM and not only because I love the city of Jakarta, but also because human connections are at the heart of justice and sitting with colleagues is crucially important to collaborative endeavors.

However, as we all learn during these COVID years, technology gives us a very decent second option. And so, my main message to you is this. Today, independent judges, lawyers, and grassroots justice advocates are on the front lines of the rule of law and human rights. Judges play the crucial role of checking executive overreach, protecting against corruption, and upholding core human rights, including freedom of speech and assembly, physical integrity and due process, and the rights of marginalized communities.

For these reasons, an independent judiciary is essential. We in the human rights field know this, and we intend to stand beside judges, civil society organizations, academics, and others who speak out in favor of a judiciary that is independent and acts with the highest integrity. As you know all too well, the recent years have been challenging.

The climate emergency, a global pandemic, rising authoritarianism, high inequality, and rapidly escalating costs of living across the world. These and other factors have contributed to significant suffering and widespread human rights abuses. Many crucial issues related to these crises have come before national courts and judges in all regions have had to grapple with unprecedented legal and factual questions, often without the resources or time they need.

In this context, independent judges have never been more important, and to the shame sometimes of the global community. The very independence, competence, and wisdom these judges bring to their work is sometimes the thing that puts them in danger.

Democratic backsliding and rising authoritarianism are compromising the integrity of legal systems and creating grave risks for judges and lawyers. Powerful actors with a strong interest in capturing and weakening systems that would otherwise provide a check on power are adopting a range of tactics.

This playbook includes overt threats and intimidation, removal from office criminalization and attempts to pay for silence. But the playbook also includes stealth attacks on judicial independence, such as the transfer of independent judges to courts far from their families, amendments to laws and regulations concerning judicial retirement, pensions, and salaries, all in efforts to quiet opposition to creeping authoritarian tendencies.

Another trend that is very concerning was recently highlighted by the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, which found that companies sometimes use courts, “As avenues either to silence criticism, or to influence political outcomes.” And by bringing so-called SLAPP suits—strategic lawsuits against public participation that aim to intimidate and burden critics of a company in order to silence them and others who might speak up.

The situation is very concerning. Judges are asked to spend time on abusive lawsuits when lawyers and paralegals face possible penalties for the simple act of defending the environment, indigenous communities, or human rights defenders. Stepping back for a moment, let's think about why independent judges are so important, even in settings where autocratization is not underway.

An independent judiciary is vital to the protection of all human rights. It's absolutely essential to resisting undue influence, ensuring equality, and providing remedies for justice problems. It's easy to understand why judicial independence is important.

When you think about the forces that could make a judge unfair, imagine a judge who is required to pledge loyalty to a leader to get their position. Imagine a judge who's not paid a decent salary and becomes vulnerable to bribes. Or think about judges who harbor discriminatory attitudes towards some populations or believe women are inferior.

Would you want to bring your case before this judge? No one would. And yet for some this is not unusual. Guarantees of judicial independence and integrity, structural, legal, and individual are all important for ensuring that all people, no matter their station or their situation, can get a fair hearing.

And these fair hearings are important when human rights are on the line. According to the World Justice Project, 2022 is the fifth year in a row that the rule of law has declined in most countries and respect for core human rights and freedoms are falling in two-thirds of the countries this year alone.

Regionally, WJP data demonstrates the same decline in constraints on government powers in Asia over the past several years. The latest varieties of democracy report notes that quote, the Democratic decline is especially evident in Asia Pacific, where the degree of liberal democracy enjoyed by citizens is down to levels last seen in 1986, some 35 years ago.

As the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, I have a unique opportunity to cooperate with rights holders, civil society, UN member states, and other rule of law allies to ensure that our legal institutions and justice systems are really fit for purpose, that they can support the realization of human rights for all.

The mandate is also uniquely positioned to monitor and respond to some of the threats to judges that we've discussed this morning. I plan to respond as those threats occur, but also to connect disparate cases, identify systemic abuses, and name important regional and global trends. Cooperation with civil society, the academy and member states are crucial to this endeavor.

I'm eager to amplify the lessons not only that lawyers and judges have, for those of us trying to protect the rule of law, but also to amplify the lessons that grassroots justice advocates have for other justice operators, those who are excluded from the protection of legal systems. Have often overlooked insights and knowledge for those running the systems.

By listening to those bearing the brunt of injustice, we can focus on the things that need to change. In closing, I invite you to reflect on your role in upholding judicial independence. Decaying norms and the slow degradation of legal systems are sometimes hard to discern. Laws are adopted, executives reach further, judges come under pressure, and this is where you come in.

I encourage you to lift your voices in support of an independent judicial system in which judges of diverse backgrounds and life experience can serve with integrity and insecurity. Thank you very much.

Professor Satterthwaite is an international human rights scholar and practitioner with decades of experience in the field. She is a Professor of Clinical Law at New York University School of Law, where she directs the Global Justice Clinic and serves as a faculty director of the Robert and Helen Bernstein Institute for Human Rights and the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice. She was appointed as the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers in October 2022.

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Essay on Judiciary in India and its working

October 18, 2019 by Sandeep

600+ Words Essay on Judiciary in India

The Indian constitution consists of the legislature, executive and the judiciary. The legislature department is involved in preparing policies and law-making concerns. The executive is involved in implementing the laws created by the legislature body.

The judiciary is an independent department not attached with the legislature or the executive. It is an independent judicial body that is vested with judicial powers and can carry on its judicial activities without direct interference from the government.

Judicial activism in Indian democracy

The judiciary in many ways is closest to the citizens or the nation. The many functions of the judiciary ensure legal protection to the citizens of the country.

If we were to settle a family dispute and go to court seeking relief, we would be advised to apply a case and the proceedings of the court would be held at the respective family courts. Thus, the judiciary ensures fair legal protection to every citizen of this nation.

The judiciary carries out many functions under its umbrella. Every citizen is provided with equal and fair justice under law. Whenever a citizen seeks protection under law, he is ensured such protection under relevant laws of the Indian judicial system. Laws are created by the legislature, executed by the executive and applied by the judiciary.

It is like the father creating the rules of the house, the mother creating suitable environment for its execution and the children applying the rules in their lives. Any country needs a legal framework within which it can operate and make decisions for the country. This legal framework and binding is actually curated by the judiciary to uphold the legal decorum of any nation.

Any violation of the fundamental rights of citizens of the country is acted upon seriously by the judicial system. Every citizen is entitled to certain basic rights termed the fundamental rights under our constitution. The constitution needs protection under law and this is taken care of, by our judicial system. Legal decisions pertaining to every single case is taken by respective judges of courts.

Every such legal decision is brought into enforcement by our judiciary. There are numerous times when we find disputes arising between states, termed inter-state conflicts. The judiciary resolves such inter-state disputes and comes up with an amicable resolution to put an end to such conflicts before they take on political colors.

The water dispute arising every year between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu regarding the sharing of Cauvery waters is a good example in this regard. The case is pending in the Supreme Court and the judiciary is trusted to solve such issues amicably to bring in peace and harmony between the two warring states.

Not just interstate disputes, any conflict that may arise between the centre and the state is also solved by the judiciary. Whenever there is any problem in the country where the legal framework gets violated or people act against the legal system of the country, it attracts punishment under various sections of the constitution.

Any such crimes or anti social elements acting against the dignity of our judicial system and the country as a whole is treated as offence and tried under law. Enquiry commissions headed by expert panels of senior lawmakers and judges are usually formed in cases of dispute resolutions.

The enquiry commissions submit a relevant report to the government to let them know of the impending situation and the previous activities thus ensued, thus revoking further action by the government.

Collegium system

This system is also called the judges’ selection system by a panel of judges. The collegium system actually has no mention or place in the Indian constitution. It was not even placed under any amended section of our constitution. This system came into force, thanks to a judgment pronounced by the Supreme Court in the year 1993.

The functions of the collegiums system include identifying most eligible members for posting them as suitable judges of the Supreme Court. This selection and scrutinizing is carried out by the so called ‘collegium system’. It comprises of a body of five senior judges of the Apex court, who are instructed and directed by the CJI to carry on the task successfully.

Many chief justices of high courts are handpicked in a similar manner to be promoted to the Supreme Court after the above explained scrutiny process.

Famous controversies associated with our judiciary

‘master of roster’ controversy.

Suppose there lies a family dispute between two parties ‘A’ and ‘B’ that has not reached the court doors as yet. Let us also assume that both the parties trust a mutual friend ‘C’ who will now be entrusted with the task of solving the matter between A and B. C is like a neutral friend to both A and B. In case C newly discovers that he is a close relative of A, then he might choose to act more favorably towards A.

He might also not blame A in any way in the controversy between A and B and hold B responsible for the dispute and create an imbalanced decision holding B at fault. This selection of the culprit was not at all fair and does not warranty fair execution of laws under our system either. The master of roster controversy can be understood in a similar light.

In April 2018, Shanti Bhushan who happens to be a former law minister questioned the current practice in our legal system where the Chief Justice decides the allocation of various cases available. He extended a PIL in this respect and spoke against the wholesome powers resting with the chief Justice when he decided to allocate a particular case to a particular judge / bench of judges.

It was not to be seen as a personal attack against any particular Chief Justice of India (CJI), either in the past or the present, but he only questioned the arbitrary power associated with the CJI in deciding the allocation. Any bench comprising of judges chosen by the CJI could be politically influenced or could take on personal interests and thus may not uphold the sanctity of justice as laid down in the constitution.

The CJI could actually consult top brass and senior judges of the Supreme court and then decide on the allocation was the argument that could be understood from this controversy.

Differences between Chief Justice and senior Supreme Court judges

There have been numerous times when the selection of judges for higher courts have become a matter of controversy for the judiciary. The recent one in January 2018 that comprised CJI Dipak Misra and four senior most judges of the Supreme Court is a good example.

The four senior judges raised the issue of assigning cases to supreme courts, among many other issues against the CJI. This matter was discussed between the Supreme Court and the judges in the court for more than fifteen minutes and the CJI led body failed to come up with a resolution stating that it would entertain the issue only when the apex court registry comes up with a suitable petition for the same.

The judiciary of our nation works to provide citizens the much needed civil liberty and highest protection under law. It is the legal framework of the nation, applied by the judiciary that provides every citizen of the country his right to live with dignity.

Be it property disputes, disputes of succession, registration of will, marriage and divorce issues, higher level cases that affect a larger part of the nation etc, the judiciary is the legal umbrella of the nation.

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How to write Essay in Judiciary Exams [Expert Tips and Techniques]

Author : Yogricha

Updated On : January 12, 2024

Overview: Essay writing forms an important part in most state judiciary examinations for Mains and if you want to crack any of these exams you must know how to write Essay in Judiciary Exams. 80% State Judiciary exams have a different paper of essay to test your social and legal knowledge and your writing skills.

Judicial Services exams are highly competitive, and essays play a pivotal role in the evaluation process. For writing a compelling essay you must understand the question and then plan the structure of your answer in advance. Although there isn't a universal formula for essay writing, some fundamental principles can serve as valuable guidance. Primarily, your essay should exhibit strong social and legal arguments. Clarity, conciseness, and error-free writing is equally vital. Following these tips increases your prospects of excelling in your Judicial Services exam.

In this article we will cover:

Overview of How to write Essay in Judiciary Exams?

How to write essay in judiciary exams: a step-by-step guide.

Important Topics for Judiciary Exams
Download Sample Essay for Judiciary

Download FREE Study Material for Judiciary Exam by Judiciary Gold

Essay writing is a skill that we all cultivate during our school years. However, the level of essay writing expected in competitive exams far exceeds what we encountered in middle school. Failing to compose a well-structured and well-informed essay can result in a deduction of marks, making it crucial for aspirants to master this art.

Read More : Short Tricks to Memorize Bare Acts for Judiciary exams

In judicial exams language paper, essay writing typically falls into three categories:

Essays on Social Themes : These essays revolve around topics like women's empowerment and corruption, often addressing contemporary socio-legal issues.
Essays on Current Affairs: In this category, candidates are assessed on their capacity to analyze and express informed opinions regarding significant global developments.
Essays on Cultural Heritag e: These essays serve to evaluate a candidate's knowledge of cultural heritage of the respective state, providing insight into their understanding of this aspect.

Important Topics for Judiciary Exams:

For a judiciary aspirant it is important to know to the topics that have been previously asked in the judiciary examination, here are some topics you can focus on:

RBI Regulation of crypto currency
Independence of Judiciary
Regulation on import of Drones in India
Child Labor in India
Uniform Civil Code
Women Reservation
Reservation on the basis of caste
Courts power to decide religious issues
Human Rights in India
Data Privacy and protection
Right to speeh and expression
Hate speech / Free speech limits
Right to Information
Mob lynching
Global Warming
Living wills / Euthanasia
Media responsibility in reporting
Future pf democracy in India
Judicial activism and overreach
Honor Killing
Right to privacy
National Education Policy
Role of women in nation building
Marital Rape
Death sentence

Sample Essay for Judiciary:

In this article we have covered all the important details needed for you for your preparation. Download the sample essay from the button given below to get the correct idea of how to write an essay for judiciary.

Download FREE Sample Essay by Judiciary Gold

Read about: How to Prepare for Judiciary Exams from Scratch

Conclusion:

Essay writing is an esay yet and important skill set that you must achieven in order to score better in Judiciary Exams. Follow the tips given above on How to write Essay in Judiciary Exams, practice as much as possible, and get you essasys checked by your Mentors or faculty to know your mistakes and weak areas. Key points to note while writing an essay for judiciary are as follows:

Read well written essays and articles to gain an understanding of the essence of effective essay writing.
Cultivate a daily practice of reading newspaper editorials, as essay prompts often draw from current events.
Jot down quotes from books and newspapers that can be used in your essays.
Curate compelling opening and closing lines to enhance your essay-writing skills.

All the best Judiciary Aspirants!

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January 12, 2024

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Essay on Independence of Judiciary
Students are often asked to write an essay on Independence of Judiciary in their schools and colleges. And if you're also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic. ... 500 Words Essay on Independence of Judiciary Introduction.
PDF Why Should We Care About Independent And Accountable Judges?
destructive of judicial independence. It strips the judicial process of its most important attribute-a neutral arbiter willing and able to listen to arguments from both sides before making a decision. Once a judicial nominee has been forced, under oath, to voice an opinion regarding the correctness of a Supreme Court
The Independence of the Judiciary
The Independence of the Judiciary. Independence of the judiciary (also judicial independence) is the principle that the judiciary should be politically insulated from the legislative and the executive power. That is, courts should not be subject to improper influence from the other branches of government, or from private or partisan interests.
An Independent Judiciary
An Independent Judiciary. Independent and professional judges are the foundation of a fair, impartial, and constitutionally guaranteed system of courts of law known as the judiciary. This independence does not imply judges can make decisions based on personal preferences but rather that they are free to make lawful decisions -- even if those ...
Judicial Independence: Essential, Limited, Controversial
Summary. In a constitutional system of government, the role of the judiciary is essential for maintaining the balance of power, protecting individual rights, upholding the rule of law, interpreting the Constitution, and ensuring equal justice for all. "The Framers established an independent judiciary because they realized that judges would ...
Essay on Role of Judiciary in the Country
500 Words Essay on Role of Judiciary in the Country Today. Any judiciary is an integral part of a country, especially democracy. As India is the largest democracy, we have a big judiciary which makes sure it safeguards the interests of its citizens. ... As a judiciary is independent of the executive, it can easily safeguard the rights of the ...
AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: THE CORE OF THE RULE OF LAW
Doctrine of Separation of Powers 2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats of interferences, direct of indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. 4.
Judicial Independence Essay
The doctrine of judicial independence, put simply, is that the judiciary is independent and impartial, independent of the other branches of government, and impartial in its application of the law. The doctrine is a component of the rule of law which, following Joseph Raz's interpretation, requires an independent judiciary that can therefore ...
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Judicial Independence. The Division for Public Education and Federal Judicial Center held a virtual program for teachers in 2021 in which a group of respected experts, including judges, attorneys, and law professors discussed the importance of judicial independence. An independent judiciary is necessary to ensure the rule of law is respected.
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Judicial review of the acts of government is the most politicized aspect of the behavior of courts. Judicial involvement in the political process and collective choice raises a fundamental question: Decision-making by an independent but unelected judiciary may go against deep-seated notions of majority decision-making and electoral accountability.
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After reviewing and explicating the literature on judicial independence, it analyzes the meaning of judicial independence and then considers the degree to which the judiciary is independent, focusing on the federal judiciary of the United States. Independence plays an important role in a system of governance, but it is reasonably compromised to ...
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Today in all democratic countries, the independence of judiciary is considered essential so that the fundamental rights of the people are protected. That is why in democratic countries, judiciary is considered the guardian of the freedom of the people and also of the constitution. In countries, where there is no democracy, the judiciary is not ...
PDF Securing the Independence of the Judiciary
Judicial Independence and Independent Judges, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745 (1997); Stephen B. ... of appointments and promotions, the hierarchy within the judiciary, and the lack of power to write dissents may also have an adverse impact on the independence of the judges. Although accountability of the judiciary is a
Effects of an Independent Judicial System on the Democracy of the State
An independent judiciary plays a vital role in a democratic society as principles of judicial independence align with principles of democracy such as fairness and the rule of law. This is laid out in judicial independence as undue political influence is important and offers protection for minority rights and checks against other abuses of power.
(PDF) STUDY ON INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY
Page 242. Volume - 36 No. (V I) 2021. STUDY ON INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY. Dr. Arun Verma. H.O.D., School of Law, Raffle University Rajasthan. Vinod Kumar. LL.M, School of Law, Raffle University ...
Independence of the Indian judiciary : as demonstrated in relevant
The independence of the judiciary is one of the central elements of India's democratic system. It is a unique feature that separates India from other countries. However, time and again, the independence of the judiciary has been challenged by external or political influence and this has raised some doubts on the provisions mentioned in the ...
The Role of an Independent Judiciary in Protecting Rule of Law
During the opening session of the Asia Pacific Justice Forum (December 8-9, 2022), Professor Margaret Sattherthwaite, UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers and professor of clinical law at the New York University School of Law, outlined the importance of an independent judiciary for countering rising authoritarianism. Good morning, thank you.
Independence Of Judiciary Essay
Independence Of Judiciary Essay. 994 Words4 Pages. The importance of the independence of the judiciary is much like the relationship between law and religion, morality and justice - it is subjective. The concept of judicial independence states that the arm of government known as the judiciary must be separated from the other two arms of ...
What is Independent Judiciary: Role & Significance
Overview: The evaluation of judicial independence should be conducted within the context of the Indian Constitution, rather than as an abstract concept. The objective is to ensure that the process of adjudication remains uninfluenced by external or governmental constraints, with judicial independence confined to the realm of adjudicatory authority as outlined in the Indian Constitution.
Autonomy and independence of judiciary in Zambia: Realities and challenges
The period prior to and after the introduction of multiparty system of politics in Zambia witnessed a flood of unprecedented litigation involving political cases in the Zambian Courts. The judiciary became the focal point and 'battlefield' of political cases. The political cases that were litigated during that period were all test cases on how independent the Zambian judiciary was.
Essay on Judiciary in India and its working
600+ Words Essay on Judiciary in India. The Indian constitution consists of the legislature, executive and the judiciary. The legislature department is involved in preparing policies and law-making concerns. The executive is involved in implementing the laws created by the legislature body. The judiciary is an independent department not ...
How to write Essay in Judiciary Exams [Expert Tips and Techniques]
The following are some of the best essay writing preparation tips for the Judiciary exam: Daily Reading and Essay Writing: To master the art of writing an Essay in Judiciary Exams, begin your journey by immersing yourself in editorials and engaging in essay writing. Consistency is key, so aim to write essays daily or every alternate day.