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Law and the Rule of Law

What is a Law?

“don’t run with scissors in your hand”, “don’t drive your car on the sidewalk”, “do not steal your neighbor’s property”.

How many times a day does someone tell you what to do? How often do you have to stop yourself from doing what you want, because you know that this action is prohibited or wrong?

In the United States, it seems like we have laws, rules, and regulations to oversee just about everything. We don’t always like these rules, since they often mean that someone is telling us what to do, or keeping us from doing what we want. Yet to live in a civil society, we must have some rules to follow.

Who gets to make these rules? Where do they come from? What happens when we break them? These are the questions this page will seek to answer for you.

aws are rules that bind all people living in a community. Laws protect our general safety, and ensure our rights as citizens against abuses by other people, by organizations, and by the government itself. We have laws to help provide for our general safety. These exist at the local, state and national levels, and include things like:

Laws about food safety. At the state and local level, health departments have guidelines that restaurants follow for how to store and prepare food in a healthy manner, so that diners won’t get sick. At the national level, the Department of Agriculture and other federal agencies inspect food production plants to be sure that the food that shows up in your supermarket is safe to eat.
Speed limits and traffic laws exist so that we drive in a safe manner.
Licensing for doctors and nurses ensures proper training of the people who look after us, and who often have our lives in their hands.

We also have laws that protect our rights as citizens, and which include things like:

Laws that come from the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution, that guarantee our basic freedoms like freedom of speech, religion, and the press.
Laws that protect us from discrimination because of our race, gender, age, or because of a disability.

Where do Laws come from?

Statutory Law

This law comes from the judicial branch. Though the courts do not pass laws, they do interpret them. This means that the judiciary bases their legal decisions on what is written in the Constitution, and on previous court rulings in similar cases. This is a process called stare decisis which in Latin means “let the decision stand.”

Statutes are laws created by the legislative branch through the lawmaking process. Statutes are written, discussed, argued and voted on in Congress or in the legislature of a state. The courts then apply and interpret these statutes on a case by case basis.

Laws Over Time

The thing about living in a democracy is that the laws change over time. The laws needed in 1789 when the Constitution was born, and in 1890, 1950, or 1990, are different from the laws needed today. The legislative branch of government must seek to update laws as needed, and the judicial branch has to interpret the laws so that they apply fairly to society at the time.

For example, laws about bullying or stalking have had to be updated to consider social networking sites, cyber bullying and cyber stalking. The original laws didn’t take the internet into consideration.

More About Laws

The laws of our nation generally arise out of our shared values and morals. In our nation we have laws at both the national and state levels. As citizens, we tend to be most familiar with state and local laws, since these are the laws we encounter most in our daily lives. These laws protect us against crimes like murder, robbery, rape, and assault. They also insure that we don’t drive too fast, that we mow our lawns and keep our dogs on leashes. In the United States, we also have a national government which makes laws. On the national level, we have laws about internet crime, narcotics, treason, as well as things like copyright and patents. Laws are sometimes controversial, and citizens do not always agree on what should be illegal. Though laws tend to come out of our shared values as a society, not everything that is immoral is illegal. For example:

Foul Language may be offensive to some people, but it isn’t illegal.
Narcotics are illegal in most cases, yet some people would like them to be legal for everyone, while others find them to be a threat to public safety and support current laws.

Recently we have seen state and local governments making some laws that may cause us to question the limits of government’s power. For example:

Should a state be able to limit the sale of large, 40 ounce sodas in the name of supporting good health?
Should teachers be able to use Facebook? Can they “friend” their students?
Should a city be able to limit the number of fast food restaurants in a neighborhood, to try to make residents make healthier food choices?
Should a municipality be able to tell you how “low” to wear your pants?

The Rule of Law

President Theodore Roosevelt once said, " Ours is a government of liberty, by, through and under the law. No man is above it, and no man is below it. "

Rule of Law 1

The American commitment to the rule of law means that every citizen is governed by the same laws, applied through a fair and equal judicial process to resolve disputes peacefully.

Rule of Law 2

Faithfulness to the rule of law allows us to live in a civil society in which everyone’s rights are respected; where each of us is guaranteed liberty and equality of opportunity.

Rule of Law 3

As citizens we respect the laws because they are clearly communicated and fairly enforced. Everyone is held accountable to the same laws, and those laws protect our fundamental rights. This is the foundation of the rule of law in the United States.

Rule of Law 4

The words “Equal Justice Under Law” are engraved on the front of the United States Supreme Court building in Washington, D.C… These words embody the ideal of the RULE OF LAW, which is at the heart of our American democracy.

Rule of Law 5

In the United States, we have written laws in place to help us settle disagreements peacefully through a fair system of justice. It is the job of the courts to interpret the laws. It is up to judges and juries to decide if we have indeed broken the law.

10 Reasons Why Law Is Important

“Law” is a system of rules designed to regulate behavior in both public and private society. Social and/or governmental institutions create and enforce these rules. Humans have been making laws for thousands of years. Early examples include ancient Egyptian law, Babylonian law, ancient Chinese law, and Old Testament law. There are many categories of law, including criminal law, civil law, and so on. Why does law matter at all? Here are ten reasons why:

#1 Laws set the standard for acceptable (and unacceptable) behaviors

At its most basic, the law is about mitigating conflict. When creating laws, societies reckon with what drives conflict. Some things – like murder and theft- are obvious and have been included in laws stretching back to ancient times. However, as time goes on and societies change, what’s considered acceptable changes, too. Legal systems adapt so they can provide clarity and context for unacceptable actions. They also offer guidelines for appropriate consequences.

#2 Laws provide access to justice

If it’s against the law to punch someone in the face, someone who gets punched can do something about it other than simply swinging back. In a perfect world, justice is equal. It doesn’t matter who got punched or who did the punching. What matters is that the law against punching was broken. Everyone in a society – and not just a privileged few – must have equal access to justice through the law.

#3 Laws keep everyone safe

Laws don’t only respond to injustices and harm. They work to prevent them. Food safety laws are a prime example. In the past, the food industry was horrendously unregulated. In the 18th and 19th centuries, American food producers went to extreme measures in their quest for profit. They watered down milk and stirred in materials like chalk for color. They mixed dirt into coffee, tea, and spices and added lead to beer and wine. In 1906, President Roosevelt and Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act, as well as the Meat Inspection Act. This marked the beginning of modern food safety and monitoring. Today, food safety laws protect the public from potentially-fatal food poisoning.

#4 Laws protect the most vulnerable in society

Many laws are specifically designed to protect certain groups of people. Laws like the Civil Rights Act (the United States) and the Sex Discrimination Act (Australia) make it illegal to discriminate. These types of laws protect what’s known as “negative rights,” which is the right to be free from something, like discrimination. Anyone can be discriminated against, but as history shows, certain people are more at risk. Laws designed to prevent discrimination based on race, sex, gender, religion, and more protect these groups and give them better access to justice.

#5 The process of creating laws encourages civil and political engagement

As societies change, laws must change, too. Advancements in technology are a prime example of why. In recent times, the distribution of sexually explicit images or videos of individuals without their consent has become a major issue. According to one study, around 10 million Americans have had explicit photos shared without consent. While there are state laws, there is no federal law. In Australia, an electronic petition called upon the A.C.T. Legislative Assembly to criminalize the distribution of sexually explicit images or videos of individuals without their consent. The Assembly listened. This is a great example of people engaging with the law-making process and making law matter as issues evolve.

#6 Laws offers people a variety of career options

As a career, law is varied and versatile. Because there are so many different areas of law, there are hundreds of job options. Lawyers can specialize in everything from contracts to immigration to criminal law. A person can also become a professor of law, while there are also jobs for paralegals, consultants, and researchers. The legal system is big, so there is room for all kinds of skills and expertise.

#7 Laws are important to maintain peace

Earlier in this article, we touched on how law is essentially about mitigating conflict. That makes law essential to maintaining peace. This is because injustice fuels conflict. If destructive behaviors are allowed to flourish without remedy, people will suffer and become dissatisfied with their government. If justice is applied unequally, this also fans the flames of conflict. For the sake of peace, societies need to strengthen their rule of law and ensure that it’s fair.

#8 Laws are important for social progress

We’ve discussed how legal systems should adapt and evolve with the times. If laws remained stagnant, so would societies. Throughout history, law has been employed as a tool for social change. It was laws that made slavery, segregation, and apartheid illegal. Laws prevent people from getting fired from their jobs because of who they marry or because of a disability. The concept of law as a mechanism for social change is complicated because if the majority of a community doesn’t agree with the law, it’s likely that the law won’t be enforced. However, having a law on the books gives people more power than if the law didn’t exist at all. It’s an important step (though not necessarily the final step) to real social change.

#9 Laws make human rights a reality

Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor once said, “I firmly believe in the rule of law as the foundation for all our basic rights.” Basic rights are the human rights that everyone is entitled to. This includes the right to life, the right to marry, the right to be free from discrimination, and more. These are listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but that document is not legally binding. To make human rights a reality, they have to be protected through laws. Without law, human rights would be an abstract concept. If you would like to learn more about human rights, consider studying a masters .

#10 Laws are not always good for society

The fact that law can be used to harm is the last reason why it’s so important. Laws are not always beneficial to society or they’re only beneficial to a select group. Governments often use laws to increase their power and punish critics. Laws can also be problematic when they fail to address the root causes of a problem and even end up making it worse. Fines, which are meant to encourage people to follow laws, can add up to the point of putting people in debt and criminalizing poverty. The war on drugs is another key example of how laws can hurt people. Instead of treating drug addiction as a public health issue, laws have turned it into a criminal one. In these cases, laws end up violating human rights instead of protecting them.

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The Nature of Law

Lawyers are typically interested in the question: What is the law on a particular issue? This is always a local question and answers to it are bound to differ according to the specific jurisdiction in which they are asked. In contrast, philosophy of law is interested in the general question: What is Law? This general question about the nature of law presupposes that law is a unique social-political phenomenon, with more or less universal characteristics that can be discerned through philosophical analysis. General jurisprudence, as this philosophical inquiry about the nature of law is called, is meant to be universal. It assumes that law possesses certain features, and it possesses them by its very nature, or essence, as law, whenever and wherever it happens to exist. However, even if there are such universal characteristics of law—which is controversial, as we will later discuss—the reasons for a philosophical interest in elucidating them remain to be explained. First, there is the sheer intellectual interest in understanding such a complex social phenomenon which is, after all, one of the most intricate aspects of human culture. Law, however, is also a normative social practice: it purports to guide human behavior, giving rise to reasons for action. An attempt to explain this normative, reason-giving aspect of law is one of the main challenges of general jurisprudence. These two sources of interest in the nature of law are closely linked. Law is not the only normative domain in our culture; morality, religion, social conventions, etiquette, and so on, also guide human conduct in many ways which are similar to law. Therefore, part of what is involved in the understanding of the nature of law consists in an explanation of how law differs from these similar normative domains, how it interacts with them, and whether its intelligibility depends on other normative orders, like morality or social conventions.

Contemporary legal theories define these two main interests in the nature of law in the following terms. First, we need to understand the general conditions that would render any putative norm legally valid. Is it, for example, just a matter of the source of the norm, such as its enactment by a particular political institution, or is it also a matter of the norm’s content? This is the general question about the conditions of legal validity. Second, there is the interest in the normative aspect of law. This philosophical interest is twofold: A complete philosophical account of the normativity of law comprises both an explanatory and a justificatory task. The explanatory task consists of an attempt to explain how legal norms can give rise to reasons for action, and what kinds of reasons are involved. The task of justification concerns the question of whether people ought to comply—morally speaking or all things considered—with law’s demands. In other words, it is the attempt to explain the moral legitimacy of law and the subjects’ reasons for complying with it. A theory about the nature of law, as opposed to critical theories of law, concentrates on the first of these two questions. It purports to explain what the normativity of law actually consists in. Some contemporary legal philosophers, however, doubt that these two aspects of the normativity of law can be separated. (We will return to this later.)

Thus, elucidating the conditions of legal validity and explaining the normativity of law form the two main subjects of any general theory about the nature of law. In section 1, we will explain some of the main debates about these two issues. In section 2, we will discuss some of the methodological debates about the nature of general jurisprudence. In the course of the last few centuries, two main rival philosophical traditions have emerged about the nature of legality. The older one, dating back to late mediaeval Christian scholarship, is called the natural law tradition. Since the early 19th century, natural law theories have been fiercely challenged by the legal positivism tradition promulgated by such scholars as Jeremy Bentham and John Austin . The philosophical origins of legal positivism are much earlier, though, probably in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes . The main controversy between these two traditions concerns the conditions of legal validity. Basically, legal positivism asserts, and natural law denies, that the conditions of legal validity are purely a matter of social facts. In contrast to positivism, natural law claims that the conditions of legal validity are not exhausted by social facts; the moral content of the putative norms also bears on their legal validity. As the famous dictum, commonly attributed to Saint Augustine, has it: lex iniusta non est lex (unjust law is not law). (Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, I, 5; see also Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 96, Art. 4.)

1.1 The Conditions of Legal Validity

1.2 the normativity of law, 2.1.1 conceptual analysis views, 2.1.2 investigating law itself, 2.1.3 the metanormative inquiry view, 2.1.4 the prescriptive view, 2.1.5 constructive interpretation of legal practice, 2.2.1 preliminaries, 2.2.2 is legal theory evaluative in the relevant sense, other internet resources, related entries, 1. general jurisprudence.

The main insight of legal positivism, that the conditions of legal validity are determined by social facts, involves two separate claims which have been labeled The Social Thesis and The Separation Thesis. The Social Thesis asserts that law is, profoundly, a social phenomenon, and that the conditions of legal validity consist of social—that is, non-normative—facts. Early legal positivists followed Hobbes’ insight that the law is, essentially, an instrument of political sovereignty, and they maintained that the basic source of legal validity resides in the facts constituting political sovereignty. Law, they thought, is basically the command of the sovereign. Later legal positivists have modified this view, maintaining that social rules, and not the facts about sovereignty, constitute the grounds of law. Most contemporary legal positivists share the view that there are rules of recognition, namely, social rules or conventions which determine certain facts or events that provide the ways for the creation, modification, and annulment of legal standards. These facts, such as an act of legislation or a judicial decision, are the sources of law conventionally identified as such in each and every modern legal system. One way of understanding the legal positivist position here is to see it as a form of reduction: legal positivism maintains, essentially, that legal validity is reducible to facts of a non-normative type, that is, facts about people’s conduct, beliefs and attitudes.

Natural lawyers deny this insight, insisting that a putative norm cannot become legally valid unless it passes a certain threshold of morality. Positive law must conform in its content to some basic precepts of natural law, that is, universal morality, in order to become law in the first place. In other words, natural lawyers maintain that the moral content or merit of norms, and not just their social origins, also form part of the conditions of legal validity. And again, it is possible to view this position as a non-reductive conception of law, maintaining that legal validity cannot be reduced to non-normative facts. See the entry on natural law theories .

The Separation Thesis is an important negative implication of the Social Thesis, maintaining that there is a conceptual separation between law and morality, that is, between what the law is, and what the law ought to be. The Separation Thesis, however, has often been overstated. It is sometimes thought that natural law asserts, and legal positivism denies, that the law is, by necessity, morally good or that the law must have some minimal moral content. The Social Thesis certainly does not entail the falsehood of the assumption that there is something necessarily good in the law. Legal positivism can accept the claim that law is, by its very nature or its essential functions in society, something good that deserves our moral appreciation. Nor is legal positivism forced to deny the plausible claim that wherever law exists, it would have to have a great many prescriptions which coincide with morality. There is probably a considerable overlap, and perhaps necessarily so, between the actual content of law and morality. Once again, the Separation Thesis, properly understood, pertains only to the conditions of legal validity. It asserts that the conditions of legal validity do not depend on the moral merits of the norms in question. What the law is cannot depend on what it ought to be in the relevant circumstances.

Many contemporary legal positivists would not subscribe to this formulation of the Separation Thesis. A contemporary school of thought, called inclusive legal positivism , endorses the Social Thesis, namely, that the basic conditions of legal validity derive from social facts, such as social rules or conventions which happen to prevail in a given community. But, inclusive legal positivists maintain, legal validity is sometimes a matter of the moral content of the norms, depending on the particular conventions that happen to prevail in any given community. The social conventions on the basis of which we identify the law may, but need not, contain reference to moral content as a condition of legality (see, for example, Waluchow 1994).

The natural law tradition has undergone a considerable refinement in the 20th century, mainly because its classical, popular version faced an obvious objection about its core insight: it is just difficult to maintain that morally bad law is not law. The idea that law must pass, as it were, a kind of moral filter in order to count as law strikes most jurists as incompatible with the legal world as we know it. Therefore, contemporary natural lawyers have suggested different and more subtle interpretations of the main tenets of natural law. For example, John Finnis (1980) views natural law (in its Thomist version) not as a constraint on the legal validity of positive laws, but mainly as an elucidation of an ideal of law in its fullest, or highest sense, concentrating on the ways in which law necessarily promotes the common good. As we have noted earlier, however, it is not clear that such a view about the necessary moral content of law is at odds with the main tenets of legal positivism. To the extent that there is a debate here, it is a metaphysical one about what is essential or necessary to law, and about whether the essential features of law must be elucidated in teleological terms or not. Legal positivists do not tend to seek deep teleological accounts of law, along the lines articulated by Finnis, but whether they need to deny such metaphysical projects is far from clear.

The idea that the conditions of legal validity are at least partly a matter of the moral content or merits of norms is articulated in a sophisticated manner by Ronald Dworkin’s legal theory. Dworkin is not a classical natural lawyer, however, and he does not maintain that morally acceptable content is a precondition of a norm’s legality. His core idea is that the very distinction between facts and values in the legal domain, between what the law is and what it ought to be, is much more blurred than legal positivism would have it: Determining what the law is in particular cases inevitably depends on moral-political considerations about what it ought to be. Evaluative judgments, about the content law ought to have or what it ought to prescribe, partly determine what the law actually is.

Dworkin’s legal theory is not based on a general repudiation of the classical fact-value distinction, as much as it is based on a certain conception of legal reasoning. This conception went through two main stages. In the 1970s Dworkin (1977) argued that the falsehood of legal positivism resides in the fact that it is incapable of accounting for the important role that legal principles play in the law. Legal positivism envisaged, Dworkin claimed, that the law consists of rules only. However, this is a serious mistake, since in addition to rules, law is partly determined by legal principles. The distinction between rules and principles is a logical one. Rules, Dworkin maintained, apply in an “all or nothing fashion.” If the rule applies to the circumstances, it determines a particular legal outcome. If it does not apply, it is simply irrelevant to the outcome. On the other hand, principles do not determine an outcome even if they clearly apply to the pertinent circumstances. Principles provide judges with a legal reason to decide the case one way or the other, and hence they only have a dimension of weight. That is, the reasons provided by the principle may be relatively strong, or weak, but they are never “absolute.” Such reasons, by themselves, cannot determine an outcome, as rules do.

The most interesting, and from a positivist perspective, most problematic, aspect of legal principles, however, consists in their moral dimension. According to Dworkin’s theory, unlike legal rules, which may or may not have something to do with morality, principles are essentially moral in their content. It is, in fact, partly a moral consideration that determines whether a legal principle exists or not. Why is that? Because a legal principle exists, according to Dworkin, if the principle follows from the best moral and political interpretation of past judicial and legislative decisions in the relevant domain. In other words, legal principles occupy an intermediary space between legal rules and moral principles. Legal rules are posited by recognized institutions and their validity derives from their enacted source. Moral principles are what they are due to their content, and their validity is purely content dependent. Legal principles, on the other hand, gain their validity from a combination of source-based and content-based considerations. As Dworkin put it in the most general terms: “According to law as integrity, propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice” (Dworkin 1986, 225). The validity of a legal principle then, derives, from a combination of facts and moral considerations. The facts concern the past legal decisions which have taken place in the relevant domain, and the considerations of morals and politics concern the ways in which those past decisions can best be accounted for by the correct moral principles.

Needless to say, if such an account of legal principles is correct, the Separation Thesis can no longer be maintained. But many legal philosophers doubt that there are legal principles of the kind Dworkin envisaged. There is an alternative, more natural way to account for the distinction between rules and principles in the law: the relevant difference concerns the level of generality, or vagueness, of the norm-act prescribed by the pertinent legal norm. Legal norms can be more or less general, or vague, in their definition of the norm-act prescribed by the rule, and the more general or vague they are, the more they tend to have those quasi-logical features Dworkin attributes to principles. More importantly, notice that if you make the legal validity of norms, such as legal principles, depend on moral argument, you allow for the possibility that an entire legal community may get its laws wrong. Any moral mistake in the reasoning leading to a legal principle might render the conclusion about the principle unsound, and the principle itself thus not legally valid. Since there is nothing to prevent judges and other legal actors from making moral mistakes, there is nothing to prevent a result whereby an entire legal community, and for a long time, gets its laws wrong (Marmor 2011, chapter 4). Perhaps Dworkin would have not found this problematic, but others might; the idea that an entire legal community can be systematically mistaken about its own laws might strike legal theorists as deeply problematic.

In the 1980s Dworkin radicalized his views about these issues, striving to ground his anti-positivist legal theory on a general theory of interpretation, and emphasizing law’s profound interpretative nature. Despite the fact that Dworkin’s interpretative theory of law is extremely sophisticated and complex, the essence of his argument from interpretation can be summarized in a rather simple way. The main argument consists of two main premises. The first thesis maintains that determining what the law requires in each and every particular case necessarily involves interpretative reasoning. Any statement of the form “According to the law in \(S\), \(x\) has a right/duty etc., to \(y\)” is a conclusion of some interpretation or other. Now, according to the second premise, interpretation always involves evaluative considerations. More precisely, perhaps, interpretation is neither purely a matter of determining facts, nor is it a matter of evaluative judgment per se , but an inseparable mixture of both. Clearly enough, one who accepts both these theses must conclude that the Separation Thesis is fundamentally flawed. If Dworkin is correct about both theses, it surely follows that determining what the law requires always involves evaluative considerations.

Notably, the first premise of Dworkin’s general argument is highly contestable. Some legal philosophers have argued that legal reasoning is not as thoroughly interpretative as Dworkin assumes. Interpretation, according to this view, long maintained by H.L.A. Hart (1961, chapter 7), is an exception to the standard understanding of language and communication, rendered necessary only when the law is, for some reason, unclear. However, in most standard instances, the law can simply be understood, and applied, without the mediation of interpretation (Marmor 2011, chapter 6).

Dworkin’s legal theory shares certain insights with the inclusive version of legal positivism. Note, however, that although both Dworkin and inclusive legal positivists share the view that morality and legal validity are closely related, they differ on the grounds of this relationship. Dworkin maintains that the dependence of legal validity on moral considerations is an essential feature of law that derives from law’s profoundly interpretative nature. Inclusive positivism, on the other hand, maintains that such a dependence of legal validity on moral considerations is a contingent matter; it does not derive from the nature of law or of legal reasoning as such. Inclusive positivists accept the Social Thesis; they claim that moral considerations affect legal validity only in those cases where this is dictated by the social rules or conventions which happen to prevail in a given legal system. The relevance of morality is determined in any given legal system by the contingent content of that society’s conventions. As opposed to both these views, traditional, or as it is now called, exclusive legal positivism maintains that a norm’s legal validity is never dependent on its moral content. Legal validity, according to this view, is entirely dependent on the conventionally recognized factual sources of law.

It may be worth noting that those legal theories maintaining that legal validity partly depends on moral considerations must also share a certain view about the nature of morality. Namely, they must hold an objective stance with respect to the nature of moral values. Otherwise, if moral values are not objective and legality depends on morality, legality would also be rendered subjective, posing serious problems for the question of how to identify what the law is. Some legal theories, however, do insist on the subjectivity of moral judgements, thus embracing the skeptical conclusions that follow about the nature of law. According to these skeptical theories, law is, indeed, profoundly dependent on morality, but, as these theorists assume that morality is entirely subjective, it only demonstrates how the law is also profoundly subjective, always up for grabs, so to speak. This skeptical approach, fashionable in so-called post-modernist literature, crucially depends on a subjectivist theory of values, which is rarely articulated in this literature in any sophisticated way.

Throughout human history the law has been known as a coercive institution, enforcing its practical demands on its subjects by means of threats and violence. This conspicuous feature of law made it very tempting for some philosophers to assume that the normativity of law resides in its coercive aspect. Even within the legal positivist tradition, however, the coercive aspect of the law has given rise to fierce controversies. Early legal positivists, such as Bentham and Austin, maintained that coercion is an essential feature of law, distinguishing it from other normative domains. Legal positivists in the 20th century have tended to deny this, claiming that coercion is neither essential to law, nor, actually, pivotal to the fulfillment of its functions in society. Before we unpack the various issues involved in this controversy, it might be worth noting that the debate about law’s coercive aspect is one good example of debates in jurisprudence that focus on what might be an essential or a necessary feature of law, regardless of its particular manifestations in this or that legal system. How to understand these claims about the essence of law, and the question of whether these claims are about metaphysics or something else, perhaps about morality, will be discussed in section 2.1.

Returning to law’s coercive aspect, there are several issues entangled here, and we should carefully separate them. John Austin famously maintained that each and every legal norm, as such, must comprise a threat backed by sanction. This involves at least two separate claims: In one sense, it can be understood as a thesis about the concept of law, maintaining that what we call “law” can only be those norms which are backed by sanctions of the political sovereign. In a second, though not less problematic sense, the intimate connection between the law and the threat of sanctions is a thesis about the normativity of law. It is a reductionist thesis about law’s normative character, maintaining that the normativity of law consists in the subjects’ ability to predict the chances of incurring punishment or evil and their presumed desire to avoid it.

In addition to this particular controversy, there is the further question, concerning the relative importance of sanctions for the ability of law to fulfill its social functions. Hans Kelsen, for instance, maintained that the monopolization of violence in society, and the law’s ability to impose its demands by violent means, is the most important of law’s functions in society. Twentieth century legal positivists, like H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz, deny this, maintaining that the coercive aspect of law is much more marginal than their predecessors assumed. Once again, the controversy here is actually twofold: is coercion essential to what the law does? And even if it is not deemed essential, how important it is, compared with the other functions law fulfills in our lives?

Austin’s reductionist account of the normativity of law, maintaining that the normative aspect of law simply consists in the subjects’ desire to avoid sanctions, was discussed extensively, and fiercely criticized, by H.L.A. Hart. Hart’s fundamental objection to Austin’s reductionist account of law’s normativity is, on his own account, “that the predictive interpretation obscures the fact that, where rules exist, deviations from them are not merely grounds for prediction that hostile reactions will follow…. but are also deemed to be a reason or justification for such reaction and for applying the sanctions” (Hart 1961, 82). This emphasis on the reason-giving function of rules is surely correct, but perhaps not enough. Supporters of the predictive account could claim that it only begs the further question of why people should regard the rules of law as reasons or justifications for actions. If it is, for example, only because the law happens to be an efficient sanction-provider, then the predictive model of the normativity of law may turn out to be correct after all. In other words, Hart’s fundamental objection to the predictive model is actually a result of his vision about the main functions of law in society, holding, contra Austin and Kelsen, that those functions are not exclusively related to the ability of the law to impose sanctions.

It is arguable, however, that law’s functions in our culture are more closely related to its coercive aspect than Hart seems to have assumed. Contemporary use of “game theory” in the law tends to show that the rationale of a great variety of legal arrangements can be best explained by the function of law in solving problems of opportunism, like the so called Prisoner’s Dilemma situations. In these cases, the law’s main role is, indeed, one of providing coercive incentives for the mutual benefit of all parties concerned. Be this as it may, we should probably refrain from endorsing Austin’s or Kelsen’s position that law’s only function in society is essentially tied to its coercive aspects. Solving recurrent and multiple coordination problems, setting standards for desirable behavior, proclaiming symbolic expressions of communal values, resolving disputes about facts, and such, are important functions which the law serves in our society, and those have very little to do with law’s coercive aspect and its sanction-imposing functions.

The extent to which law can actually guide behavior by providing its subjects with reasons for action has been questioned by a very influential group of legal scholars in the first half of the 20 th century, called the Legal Realism school. American Legal Realists claimed that our ability to predict the outcomes of legal cases on the basis of the rules of law is rather limited. In the more difficult cases which tend to be adjudicated in the appellate courts, legal rules, by themselves, are radically indeterminate as to the outcome of the cases. The Legal Realists thought that lawyers who are interested in the predictive question of what the courts will actually decide in difficult cases need to engage in sociological and psychological research, striving to develop theoretical tools that would enable us to predict legal outcomes. Thus Legal Realism was mainly an attempt to introduce the social sciences into the domain of jurisprudence for predictive purposes. To what extent this scientific project succeeded is a matter of controversy. Be this as it may, Legal Realism paid very little attention to the question of the normativity of law, that is, to the question of how the law does guide behavior in those cases in which it seems to be determinate enough.

A much more promising approach to the normativity of law is found in Joseph Raz’s theory of authority, which also shows how such a theory about the normativity of law entails important conclusions with respect to the conditions of legal validity (Raz 1994). The basic insight of Raz’s argument is that the law is an authoritative social institution. The law, Raz claims, is a de facto authority. However, it is also essential to law that it must be held to claim legitimate authority. Any particular legal system may fail, of course, in its fulfillment of this claim. But law is the kind of institution which necessarily claims to be a legitimate authority.

According to Raz, the essential role of authorities in our practical reasoning is to mediate between the putative subjects of the authority and the right reasons which apply to them in the relevant circumstances. An authority is legitimate if and only if it helps its putative subjects to comply better with the right reasons relevant to their actions—i.e., if they are more likely to act in compliance with these reasons by following the authoritative resolution than they would be if they tried to figure out and act on the reasons directly (without the mediating resolution). For example, there may be many reasons that bear on the question of how fast to drive on a particular road—the amount of pedestrian traffic, impending turns in the road, etc.—but drivers may comply better with the balance of those reasons by following the legal speed limit than if they tried to figure out all the trade-offs in the moment. The legitimacy of the legal speed limit would thus be derived from the way in which it aids people in acting in better compliance with the balance of the right reasons.

Now, it follows that for something to be able to claim legitimate authority, it must be of the kind of thing capable of claiming it, namely, capable of fulfilling such a mediating role. What kinds of things can claim legitimate authority? There are at least two such features necessary for authority-capacity: First, for something to be able to claim legitimate authority, it must be the case that its directives are identifiable as authoritative directives, without the necessity of relying on those same reasons which the authoritative directive replaces. If this condition is not met, namely, if it is impossible to identify the authoritative directive as such without relying on those same reasons the authority was meant to rely on, then the authority could not fulfill its essential, mediating role. In short, it could not make the practical difference it is there to make. Note that this argument does not concern the efficacy of authorities. The point is not that unless authoritative directives can be recognized as such, authorities could not function effectively. The argument is based on the rationale of authorities within our practical reasoning. Authorities are there to make a practical difference, and they could not make such a difference unless the authority’s directive can be recognized as such without recourse to the reasons it is there to decide upon. In other words, it is pointless to have an authoritative directive if, in order to discover what the directive is, you have to engage in the same reasoning that reliance on the directive is supposed to replace. Secondly, for something to be able to claim legitimate authority, it must be capable of forming an opinion on how its subjects ought to behave, distinct from the subjects’ own reasoning about their reasons for action; authority requires some authorship.

Raz’s conception of legal authority provides very strong support for exclusive legal positivism because it requires that the law, qua an authoritative resolution, be identifiable on its own terms, that is, without having to rely on those same considerations that the law is there to resolve. Therefore a norm is legally valid (i.e., authoritative) only if its validity does not derive from moral or other evaluative considerations that the law is intended to replace. Notably, Raz’s theory challenges both Dworkin’s anti-positivist legal theory, and the inclusive version of legal positivism. This challenge, and the controversies it gave rise to, form one of the main topics discussed in contemporary general jurisprudence.

Explaining the rationale of legal authority, however, is not the only component of a theory about the normativity of law. If we hold the legal positivist thesis that law is essentially founded on social conventions, another important question arises here: how can a conventional practice give rise to reasons for action and, in particular, to obligations? Some legal philosophers claimed that conventional rules cannot, by themselves, give rise to obligations. As Leslie Green observed, Hart’s “view that the fundamental rules [of recognition] are ‘mere conventions’ continues to sit uneasily with any notion of obligation,” and this Green finds troubling, because the rules of recognition point to the “sources that judges are legally bound to apply” (Green 1996, 1697). The debate here is partly about the conventional nature of the rules of recognition, and partly about the ways in which conventions can figure in our reasons for action. According to one influential theory, inspired by David Lewis (1969) conventional rules emerge as solutions to large-scale and recurrent coordination problems. If the rules of recognition are, indeed, of such a coordination kind, it is relatively easy to explain how they may give rise to obligations. Coordination conventions would be obligatory if the norm subjects have an obligation to solve the coordination problem which initially gave rise to the emergence of the relevant convention. It is doubtful, however, that the conventions at the foundations of law are of a coordinative kind. In certain respects the law may be more like a structured game, or an artistic genre, which are actually constituted by social conventions. Such constitutive conventions are not explicable as solutions to some pre-existing recurrent coordination problem. The conventional rules constituting the game of chess, for example, are not there to solve a coordination problem between potential players. Antecedent to the game of chess, there was no particular coordination problem to solve. The conventional rules of chess constitute the game itself as a kind of social activity people would find worthwhile engaging in. The constitutive conventions partly constitute the values inherent in the emergent social practice. Such values, however, are only there for those who care to see them. Constitutive conventions, by themselves, cannot ground an obligation to engage in the practice they constitute.

From a moral point of view, the rules of recognition, by themselves, cannot be regarded as sources of obligation to follow the law. Whether judges, or anybody else, should or should not respect the rules of recognition of a legal system, is ultimately a moral issue, that can only be resolved by moral arguments (concerning the age old issue of political obligation). And this is more generally so: the existence of a social practice, in itself, does not provide anyone with an obligation to engage in the practice. The rules of recognition only define what the practice is, and they can say nothing on the question of whether one should or should not engage in it. But of course, once one does engage in the practice, playing the role of judge or some other legal official, as it were, there are legal obligations defined by the rules of the game. In other words, there is nothing special in the idea of a legal obligation to follow the rules of recognition. The referee in a soccer game is equally obliged to follow the rules of his game, and the fact that the game is conventional poses no difficulty from this, let us say, “internal-player’s” perspective. But again, the constitutive rules of soccer cannot settle for anyone the question of whether they should play soccer or not. Similarly, the rules of recognition cannot settle for the judge, or anyone else for that matter, whether they should play by the rules of law, or not. They only tell us what the law is . Unlike chess or soccer, however, the law may well be a kind of game that people have an obligation to play, as it were. But if there is such an obligation, it must emerge from external, moral, considerations, that is, from a general moral obligation to obey the law. The complex question of whether there is such a general obligation to obey the law, and whether it depends on certain features of the relevant legal system, is extensively discussed in the literature on political obligation. A complete theory about the normativity of law must encompass these moral issues as well. (See the entries on political obligation and legal obligation .)

More recently, however, a number of philosophers have started to question the idea that there is something unique to the normativity of law, inviting us to see how laws might affect our reasons for action in ways that are not closely tied to the nature of law (Greenberg 2014, Enoch 2011, Marmor 2016 [2018]). Some of these views (e.g., Enoch, Marmor) purport to show that there are different ways in which the existence of various norms bear on people’s reasons for action, present in law as elsewhere, without denying that the law often makes a difference; these views only deny that there is something unique to the way law changes its subjects’ reasons for action, compared with other types normative demands. Others challenge law’s normativity from an opposite angle (Greenberg 2014, Hershovitz 2015), arguing that the only aspect of law that is of normative significance is the moral difference that it makes to people’s reasons for action.

In the last two decades of the 20th century, new challenges to general jurisprudence, and particularly to legal positivism, have taken an interesting methodological turn. This methodological turn gained momentum with the publication of Dworkin’s Law’s Empire (1986), arguing that not only the law, as a social practice, is a profoundly interpretative (and thus partly, but necessarily, evaluative in nature), but that any theory about the nature of law is also interpretative in a similar way, and thus, equally evaluative. Many of those who do not necessarily share Dworkin’s views about the interpretative nature of legal practice, or the specifics of his theory of interpretation, have joined him in this methodological skepticism about the traditional aims of general jurisprudence, that is, about the possibility of developing a theory about that nature of law that would have general application and remain morally neutral. These, and other resultant methodological challenges to traditional general jurisprudence are taken up in the next section.

It would be fair to say, however, that in the last few years, many legal philosophers have expressed a growing frustration with these traditional debates about the nature of law, calling for legal philosophy to move beyond the Hart-Dworkin debates and explore new avenues of research. Some of these new critics are content to abandon the project altogether, declaring the death of general jurisprudence (Hershovitz 2015). Others, however, are engaged in exploring new challenges. One emerging area of research concerns the artifact nature of law, aiming to learn something about the nature of law from the fact that law seems to be an artifact, created and sustained by humans for particular purposes. (See, for example, Burazin et al. eds., 2018.) Others explore connections between law’s features as artifact and fictionalism, suggesting that their underlying logic and metaphysics share a great deal in common (Marmor 2018). Another new and potentially fruitful area of research focuses on applications of philosophy of language to law, brining new developments in philosophy of language, particularly in pragmatics, to bear on questions of legal interpretation and understanding of legal content (Asgeirsson forthcoming, Asgeirsson 2015, Marmor 2014). This linguistic direction is not uncontroversial, however; some legal philosophers express skepticism about the idea that legal content is determined by linguistic factors (Greenberg 2011) and there is an ongoing debate about these issues. Finally, there also seems to be a growing interest in recent developments in metaphysics that might bear on a theory about the nature of law, and even debates about meta-metaphysics are beginning to emerge in the context of general jurisprudence, purporting to show that ways in which we think about the tasks of metaphysical inquiry may bear on ways we think about the law (Rosen 2010). For example, if the main task of metaphysics is to determine what really exists in the world, irrespective of what we think about it or ways in which we represent the world, metaphysics may not have much to say about the nature of law or, perhaps, it may indicate that only a scientific approach to jurisprudence can yield metaphysically respectable results. If, however, the task of metaphysical inquiry is also to figure out what is more foundational than something else, giving us a hierarchical structure of the world, where some things ground others, then metaphysics might be a very fruitful framework to work with in trying to elucidate the foundations of legality and legal phenomena more generally. This potential metaphysical interest in jurisprudence is at its infancy presently, and time will tell if this new approach gets us interesting results.

2. The Methodology of Jurisprudence

When it comes to the methodology of jurisprudence, we find two main issues. While one is not directly concerned with normativity, the second is. The first asks about the aims and success criteria for philosophical theories about the nature of law:

What is the target that first-order theories of law aim to capture, and when do they succeed in doing so?

The second asks about the role of evaluation in jurisprudential methodology:

Are first-order legal theories inherently or necessarily evaluative or can they be purely descriptive?

Each of these questions will be discussed in turn.

2.1 The Target of a Theory of Law

The first important class of methodological questions in jurisprudence concerns the target of first-order theories of law—that is, what phenomenon such theories aim to provide an account of. In taking a stand on what the proper target of a first-order legal theory is, one incurs a number of other methodological commitments. These include adopting a view about when such theories are successful, taking a stand on what sort of data such theories aim to systematize and explain, and determining what sorts of arguments are legitimately used in deciding between one of these theories and its competitors.

There are five main families of views on this question. One view takes jurisprudence to be a form of conceptual analysis, which is to say that theories of law aim to provide an account of some concept of law. This approach is often associated with Hart’s influential work, The Concept of Law (1994). A second sort of view adopts a more skeptical stance towards the methodology of conceptual analysis and takes theories of law to be in the business of offering a reductive explanation of law itself, not some concept of it. Another recent view sees general jurisprudence as just another branch of metanormative inquiry, which renders it continuous with other philosophical fields like metaethics. Fourth, the prescriptive view takes it that the aim of a theory of law is to specify the notion of law that it would be most desirable for us to adopt. A fifth kind of view, associated with Dworkin’s work, takes it that legal theories are in the business of offering a constructive interpretation of legal practice. In what follows, each of these five views, as well as some of the main issues they face, will be discussed in more depth.

On conceptual analysis views, theories of law aim to capture the concept of law and they succeed to the extent that they provide a coherent account of the relevant data about that concept and related concepts. In particular, the data to be systematized are taken to be people’s intuitions involving some shared concept of law (or cognate concepts like legal validity or legal obligation). In their simplest form, such intuitions can be thought of as judgments about whether the relevant concept does or does not apply to particular cases. Accordingly, on this sort of view, a theory of law aims to provide an account of the conditions under which the target concept of law (or one of its cognates) applies.

What’s more, such a theory can be arrived at by employing the method of conceptual analysis, undertaken from the proverbial armchair. The idea is that the theorist starts with a putative set of criteria for the correct application of the target concept, and then she tests this account against her intuitions about that concept. If the account entails that the concept applies to particular cases that it intuitively does not apply to, then this provides reason to reject or revise the account in question. By contrast, if the account entails that the target concept applies to certain cases and this is the intuitively correct result, this tends to provide affirmative support for the account. The account successfully captures the target concept to the extent that it yields intuitively correct results about particular cases, and does so in an explanatorily satisfying way (as opposed to an ad hoc manner). (For a more in depth discussion of the methodology of conceptual analysis as applied to the concept of law, see Shapiro 2011, 16–22.)

Jurisprudence has been influenced by two main ways of understanding the relevant intuitions (or data) that theories of law aim to systematize. This, in turn, is due to the fact that one might understand concepts themselves, and our intuitions about them, in two different ways. Accordingly, we find two main varieties of the conceptual analysis view of methodology.

The first understanding of concepts takes concept possession to be mainly a matter of linguistic competence. That is, to possess the concept of law is to know when the word “law” as used in its juridical sense (not the scientific sense) applies. Thus, intuitions about the concept of law are to be understood as linguistic intuitions about how to use the word “law.” On the present view, then, conceptual analysis is a mode of linguistic analysis. This sort of view was famously discussed in chapters 1 and 2 of Dworkin’s Law’s Empire (Dworkin 1986, 32, 43–46). It arguably traces back to the kind of ordinary language philosophy associated with J.L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle (Marmor 2013, 210–212).

However, this understanding of concept possession has drawbacks. Perhaps the biggest source of concern in the present context is that this sort of view fuels a version of Dworkin’s “semantic sting” argument (Dworkin 1986, 43–46). The argument may be summarized as follows. Suppose legal theories aim to capture the concept of law and that concept possession just is a matter of knowing when the word “law” applies. If so, the argument runs, legal theories cannot explain disagreement about the grounds of law, that is, about the conditions of legal validity. After all, if legal theories are in this way semantic in nature, then disagreement about what the grounds of law are must boil down to disagreement about when the word “law” applies—at least assuming the parties to the disagreement are not merely talking past one another. But now a dilemma arises. Either legal practitioners possess the same concept of law or they do not. If they do possess the same concept, then it seems they cannot fail to agree about what it takes for a norm to count as law. After all, they all know when the word expressing their shared concept of law applies. But this is implausible, since legal practice in fact is rife with disagreement about what the grounds of law are (and thus, what counts as law or as legal). On the other hand, if legal practitioners do not share the same concept of law, then their disagreement about what the grounds of law are must just be due to the fact that they are talking past one another. But that, too, is implausible. Legal practice, as Dworkin puts it, is not “a grotesque joke” (Dworkin 1986, 44). Accordingly, there must be something wrong with construing legal theories as mere semantic accounts of when the word “law” applies.

If, in light of this argument, we are to abandon the idea that first-order legal theories are semantic theories, there are two obvious ways to proceed. First, one might simply abandon the idea that legal theories are exercises in conceptual analysis. This was Dworkin’s preferred response, though, as we’ll see, one can reject conceptual analysis without adopting Dworkin’s own favored methodology. (More on that in sub-section 2.1.2.) Second, if one wants to still say that legal theories are in the business of analyzing the concept of law, then the obvious response to the semantic sting argument is to deny that concept possession just is a matter of knowing how the word “law” in its juridical sense is to be applied. This suggests a second, richer form of conceptual analysis that legal theorists might be engaged in.

The basic idea behind the richer view is to take it that concept possession, rather than merely being a matter of knowing when words apply, involves something meatier: namely, the possession of a wide range of substantive beliefs or intuitions about the concept, its essential features and its proper application. The assumption is that the intuitions one is disposed to have in virtue of possessing the concept of law will be fertile enough to constitute a particular substantive conception of what the law is and how it functions. The aim of a theory of law, then, would be to systematize these pre-theoretic judgments about the concept of law in order to provide an account of some substantive conception of law. (This sort of richer view of concept possession is discussed, e.g., in Raz 2004, 4–7; Stravopoulos 2012, 78–79; Shapiro 2011, 16–22. It is perhaps also the sort of view presupposed by Hart.) On this view, legal disagreement remains possible because while practitioners might all be using the same concept of law, the richness of the concept allows that they nonetheless might not possess the concept determinately enough, or understand its application conditions thoroughly enough, to guarantee consensus on theoretical questions about what the grounds of law actually are.

However, also this richer understanding of concept possession, and the meatier picture of conceptual analysis it gives rise to, has been widely criticized (Marmor 2013, 215–217; Raz 2004, 10; Leiter 2007, 177–79). One question that immediately arises is which concept of law, exactly, constitutes the proper target of a theory of law. Is it the concept of law that is possessed by the legal practitioners in a particular jurisdiction? Or is it some universally shared concept of law? Worries loom either way. If a legal theory only aims to capture the concept of law employed in a particular jurisdiction, then that would render the theory parochial and it might lose its interest for those who are not concerned with that particular jurisdiction. On the other hand, one might doubt that there really is a universally shared concept of law that is employed by practitioners in all jurisdictions—or if there is one, it is doubtful that it is anything more than the sort of thin concept that one possesses in virtue of knowing what the word “law” in its juridical sense means.

A deeper worry about all forms of conceptual analysis is the question of why we should care about anybody’s concept of law in the first place (Marmor 2013, 216–217; Leiter 2007, 177–79). After all, as philosophers, it seems that it is the nature of law itself that we care about understanding (Raz 2004, 7, 10). Granted, there are interesting sociological questions to be asked about what various groups of people believe to be the case about how law functions. But it is not obvious that there is anything distinctively philosophical about such questions. Insofar as philosophers (qua philosophers) are interested in what people believe about a given concept, this would be because understanding people’s beliefs about the concept is a route to understanding that which it is a concept of (Raz 2004, 4, 10). Accordingly, one might think that what theories of law aim to capture is not anybody’s concept of law in particular, but rather the nature of law itself. (See also the entry on concepts , section 5.2.)

A possible response to this objection is to assert that since law is a social phenomenon and is in part constituted by practitioners’ own understanding of the practice they are engaged in, collecting evidence about the concept of law possessed by legal practitioners is an especially useful way to investigate law itself (Stravopoulos 2012, 79). Still, one might wonder whether this route to investigating the nature of law itself would be the most effective strategy to employ, given its indirectness. Why limit ourselves to asking questions about concepts if law can be studied directly?

A very different response would be to adopt a Platonist account of concepts, according to which they are not mental representations at all, but rather abstract objects akin to the objects of mathematical inquiry. The concept of law, then, would be the abstract object one must grasp in order to think about law. Accordingly, it is this abstract object— the concept of law—that philosophers care about and aim to investigate using the method of conceptual analysis (cf. Bealer 1998). Nonetheless, this view of concepts faces familiar objections. For one, an account is needed of how we can have access to the concept of law, conceived of as an independently existing abstract object. Moreover, even if we can access it, a puzzle arises about how different people who all determinately grasp the concept of law could possibly end up disagreeing about its nature (Sarch 2010, 468–73). Finally, while it might be plausible that a priori disciplines like mathematics and logic aim to investigate abstract objects (see the entry on platonism in the philosophy of mathematics ), it is not clear that the investigation of a social phenomenon like the law, which is heavily dependent on human beliefs, attitudes and behavior, can be understood analogously. While mathematicians might be investigating the nature of abstract objects like numbers or sets, it seems more doubtful that legal philosophers are investigating the abstract object law .

Given the above doubts about conceptual analysis, several views have been suggested according to which first-order legal theories are primarily in the business of describing and explaining the nature of law itself , not any concept of it. Reductionist and naturalistic views fall into this category. (As noted below, such views need not completely eschew the armchair methods just sketched, but to the extent these methods remain viable, a very different explanation of their defensibility would have to be given.)

In particular, reductionist views take it that illuminating the nature of law is a matter of explaining what the law is, and how it operates, in terms of more foundational facts. As a result, first-order theories of law succeed to the extent that they accomplish this in an explanatorily powerful way (Marmor 2013). The goal of a first-order theory, on this sort of view, is to offer a metaphysical reduction of law: that is, to show that the phenomenon of law is actually constituted by, and fully reducible to, some other more foundational type of phenomenon (in the way that chemistry could in principle be reduced to particle physics). Thus construed, positivism, for example, would seek to explain the nature of law by reducing facts about what the law is, how it functions and what it requires, to more foundational social facts—e.g., about people’s behavior, beliefs and dispositions. By providing a reduction of this kind, a theory like positivism purports to illuminate the phenomenon of law itself by breaking it down into its constituents and explaining how they together make up the complex social practice that is the law. (For more on metaphysical reduction in general, see Schroeder 2007, 61–83; see also the entry on scientific reduction .)

One well-known type of reductionist view is naturalized jurisprudence. Brian Leiter has been the most prominent defender of this position (Leiter 2007). Like other reductionist views, naturalized jurisprudence takes the aim of legal theories to be to explain the nature of law itself (not anybody’s concept of it). But what is characteristic of naturalized jurisprudence is that it also insists that a purely empirical methodology should be used in doing so (Leiter 2007, 180–81, 183–99). (See also the entry on naturalism in legal philosophy .)

Naturalists might part company with adherents of other reductionist views over whether or not the armchair methods of philosophers, and related appeals to intuitions, thought experiments and the like, are misguided. The naturalist is likely to reject this mode of inquiry, while other reductionists may be more amenable to using it. A reductionist could in principle defend this sort of inquiry, for instance, by claiming that our particular-case intuitions involve a concept that we have acquired from experience with legal practice, and so such intuitions can be one useful source of information about the nature of law itself. Moreover, if legal practice (as a social phenomenon) is partially constituted by practitioners’ own beliefs and attitudes towards the practice they are engaged in, then evidence about legal practitioners’ concept of law might prove especially relevant as evidence about the law itself (Stravopoulos 2012, 79).

By contrast, naturalists tend not to endorse the armchair method of testing theories of law against intuition, given their aim of making “philosophical theorizing continuous with and dependent upon scientific theorizing” (Leiter 2007, 35). Leiter argues that our intuitions about law are too unreliable to be afforded much epistemic weight (as others have argued with respect to intuitions in other areas of philosophy) (Leiter 2007, 180, 184; cf. Cummins 1998). On Leiter’s view, philosophers generally should aim to unpack the “concepts that have been vindicated by their role in successful explanation and prediction of empirical phenomena” (Leiter 2007, 184). Thus, he suggests a methodology that “tak[es] seriously the…social scientific literature on law…to see what concept of law figures in the most powerful explanatory and predictive models of legal phenomena such as judicial behavior” (Leiter 2007, 184). This methodological view, however, raises questions about why the legal philosopher should study only judicial behavior and not something else. More generally, the naturalist owes an account of what features of law are most in need of explication and why.

A different sort of concern that arises for reductionist views (and perhaps naturalistic views as well) is that it may pose particular problems for positivism. Specifically, if law is a normative phenomenon that gives rise to legal obligations, one might worry that it is not possible to reduce legal facts (i.e., facts about what our legal obligations are) to a set of purely non-normative facts, e.g., social ones. One might think that this would impermissibly transgress the familiar (though not uncontroversial) is-ought gap. (For a discussion of this sort of worry about positivism, see Shapiro 2011, 47–49.)

In response, one route that positivists who want to be reductionists could take is to maintain that legal facts really are descriptive in nature, not genuinely normative. In particular, such positivists might claim that facts about what legal obligations we have simply are descriptive facts about what the law holds that we ought to do—not normative facts about what we really ought to do (Shapiro 2011, 188; see also Hart 1994, 110).

Another recent methodological view developed by Plunkett and Shapiro (2017) takes general jurisprudence to be just another branch of metanormative inquiry. The latter kind of inquiry as a general matter aims to explain how normative thought, talk, and entities (if any) fit into reality. Metaethics is another branch of metanormative inquiry, which focuses on how ethical thought, talk and entities fit into reality. Thus, on the present view the subject of inquiry in general jurisprudence would be legal thought, talk and entities (if any), and the aim of the field would be to explain how such thought and talk about law—as well as legal structures and legal properties (if any)—are best accounted for in one’s general philosophical view of reality. On this view, jurisprudential inquiry would be continuous with—and methodologically quite similar—to the work done in other areas of normative inquiry, especially ethics and aesthetics.

One question that arises for this position, however, concerns the extent to which this is a distinct methodology from those discussed above. If the focus of one’s metanormative inquiry is legal thought and talk, we seem to get rather close to the conceptual analysis picture of how jurisprudence should proceed. On the other hand, if the focus of inquiry emphasizes how legal entities or properties fit into reality in general, then the view ends up seeming rather close to the naturalist position that the topic of jurisprudential inquiry is phenomenon of law itself. Nonetheless, perhaps a particular attraction of the metanormative view is that it can show how both the conceptual analysis picture and the naturalist picture capture distinct pieces of the bigger enterprise of the task that jurisprudence is engaged in. Thus, rather than purporting to replace the other methodologies discussed above, the metanormative view, if sound, would do away with there being a privileged starting point for jurisprudential inquiry (such as metaphysics of legal content, the semantic analysis of legal statements, or the nature of legal obligations).

A different sort of approach to methodology in jurisprudence takes it that the proper aim of a legal theory is to specify a substantive conception of law that it would be especially desirable for people to adopt. Moreover, even if the conception of law that this inquiry ends up supporting departs radically from our pre-theoretical understanding of law, then the resulting theory would recommend abandoning that prior understanding of law. Accordingly, if jurisprudence is chiefly a prescriptive endeavor, then theories of law might end up being radically revisionist in nature (though, of course, not necessarily).

As explained in the next sub-section, Dworkin’s methodological view incorporates some prescriptive elements. But one prominent advocate of an exclusively prescriptive project is Neil MacCormick (MacCormick 1985; see also Campbell 1996; Murphy 2001; Postema 1989; Schauer 1996; Waldron 2001). MacCormick argues that there are compelling normative arguments in favor of adopting a positivist conception of law. In particular, he suggests that values like autonomy and freedom of conscience demand that the law not regulate with a heavy hand “the sphere of aspirational values, of duties of self-respect and of duties of love,” a sphere that concerns “questing for the good beyond duty, or for the right lines of development of a self, or for the proper regard to bestow upon one’s family, friends or neighbors” (MacCormick 1985, 35–36). Values like autonomy and freedom of conscience, McCormack thinks, support the claim that at least within this sphere of conduct, it is desirable to keep the question of what the law requires entirely separate from the question of what morality requires. (However, MacCormick also allows that the law properly can regulate the sphere of “duties of justice,” as these duties are in some sense weightier (MacCormick 1985, 35).) Accordingly, at least in some spheres of conduct, the question of what the law is ought to be held distinct from the question of what morality requires. Thus, MacCormick seems to be offering a normative argument for a claim that has often been associated with positivism, namely a version of the Separation Thesis. (Though, as seen earlier, it is not clear that all positivists must be committed to a strong version of this thesis.)

While the question of what conception of law it is most desirable that people adopt is surely a significant one, it is important to note that the prescriptive view of methodology in jurisprudence is not genuinely in competition with either the conceptual analysis view or the reductionist approach. After all, it might turn out, for example, that positivism provides the best account of our concept of law, or perhaps is the best reductive account of the phenomenon of law itself, even though there are compelling normative arguments for changing the practice or adopting a new concept of it that, say, comports with natural law theory. Accordingly, accounts of the concept of law, or reductive theories of law, are not necessarily inconsistent with prescriptive accounts of what legal theory it would be most desirable from the moral point of view to adopt.

A final methodological view, which deserves separate treatment both because of its influence and sophistication, is Dworkin’s (Dworkin 1986). This view takes it that (i) the target of a first-order theory of law is existing legal practice and (ii) these theories succeed to the extent that they offer a defensible constructive interpretation (in Dworkin’s sense) of that practice. According to the constructive interpretation view, the aim of a first-order theory of law is not to analyze any concept or to reduce legal facts to other more foundational facts. Rather, the aim of a legal theory is to reconstruct the behavior and self-understandings of participants in legal practice and, moreover, to do so in a way that casts this practice in its best moral light. As a result, a theory of law is more successful the better it both fits with the data about how legal practitioners understand the practice they are engaged in, while also normatively justifying that practice (Dworkin 1986; Perry 1995, 129–31; see also the entry on legal interpretivism ).

One concern about the constructive interpretation view of methodology in jurisprudence is that it may not be in genuine competition with either the conceptual analysis or reductive views of methodology. After all, one sort of project is to explain what law actually is and how it operates (perhaps according to our concept of it). But it is a very different sort of project to explain how we should conceive of the law in order for legal practice to be normatively justified. It seems possible that our account of what law actually is tells us one thing (e.g., that certain features of it are essential and others not), while our account of what law should be like in order for the practice to be as justified as possible tells us to think of law in a rather different way (e.g., as having different essential features). Accordingly, some have argued that the constructive interpretation view engages with the other methodological views mentioned above only if it denies what they assert: viz., that legal theories attempt to provide an explanation (perhaps of some particular kind—e.g., reductive) of the actual nature of law (or perhaps our concept of it).

One way that adherents of the constructive interpretation view might deny what certain other methodological views assert is by denying that it is even possible to give a reductive explanation of law. (For discussion, see Marmor 2013, 218.) The thought would be to claim that law is a normative practice, and normative facts cannot be reduced to purely non-normative facts without losing something essential. In response, the reductionist might either deny that legal facts are genuinely normative (in which case the sought-after reduction would be unproblematic), or she might assert that any successful reduction will have to reduce legal facts to a set of facts that includes normative facts (in which case a version of natural law theory might appear attractive).

2.2 Is Legal Theory Inherently Evaluative?

A second widely-discussed question about jurisprudential methodology is whether first-order legal theories are inherently evaluative. The above views about the proper target of first-order theories of law have different implications about this second question. But before explaining that, we must first get the relevant question more clearly in view.

To begin with, one might wonder where the interest in the question of whether legal theory is inherently evaluative comes from. Some of this interest likely traces to the skeptical worry that legal theories purporting to be purely descriptive in fact are pushing some hidden ideological or political agenda. (For more on this, see, e.g., John Gardner’s introduction to Dickson 2004.) A second source of the interest in this question may be the suspicion (or hope) that if legal theory proves to be inherently evaluative, that would be an independent reason to adopt some version of natural law theory. Whether this is so remains doubtful, however, since meta-questions about the methodology of legal theory prima facie seem to be independent of questions in first-order legal theory like what the determinants of the content of law are. What is more, legal scholars might be drawn to the present issue through consideration of Dworkin’s argument that there is a very tight connection between the evaluative nature of theorizing about the law and the evaluative nature of law itself, rendering the content of law inevitably dependent, at least in part, on moral-political considerations. Regardless of the motivations for engaging in the debate about whether legal theory is inherently evaluative, however, this debate has taken on independent significance and has been a fruitful source of insight in its own right.

To avoid confusion, the question we are concerned with here must be clarified in several ways. For there are a number of uncontroversial ways in which legal theory plausibly is or might be evaluative, and these do not go to the heart of the methodological debates in jurisprudence.

First, there are several trivial ways in which legal theory, like theories about any topic , plausibly cannot be entirely value-free. In particular, it seems that one cannot engage in the business of theorizing about law without evaluating the extent to which various theories are coherent, simple, clear, elegant, comprehensive, and so on (Dickson 2004, 32–33). Granted this means that legal theorists must engage in a form of evaluation. But there is nothing special about legal theory in this regard. After all, these meta-theoretical virtues are criteria for the success of theories about any subject matter.

A second seemingly uncontroversial way in which legal theory is evaluative is that one cannot begin to develop a theory of law without determining which of its central features are to be accounted for (Dickson 2001, 38–45). John Finnis, for example, argues that one cannot do first-order legal theory without taking a stand on what the important features of law are that adequate theories must explain (e.g., the law’s claim to authority). However, this seems to require evaluation (Finnis 1980, 9–15).

Nonetheless, it is not likely to be especially controversial that legal theory is evaluative in this way. To see why, distinguish between (a) thick evaluative claims , which predicate some kind of moral goodness, or perhaps all-things-considered value, of an item and (b) thin evaluative claims , which do not. (This distinction roughly tracks Julie Dickson’s distinction between directly evaluative propositions and indirectly evaluative propositions. See Dickson 2001, 51–55.) Thus, the simplest thick evaluative claims have the form: \(X\) is morally [all-things-considered] good [bad] . Such claims might also be comparative in nature, such that they have the form: \(X\) is morally [all-things-considered] better [worse] than \(Y\). By contrast, thin evaluative claims judge how well some item fares relative to a standard that is neither moral nor all-things-considered normative. Such claims do not entail any thick evaluative claims either. Examples of thin evaluative claims thus would include “\(X\) is important” and “\(X\) is interesting”. Accordingly, even if legal theorists must make thin evaluative claims in order to be able to begin the project of developing a first-order legal theory, this does not mean that they must make thick evaluative claims in order to do so. After all, one might construct a theory that captures a range of legal phenomena that are deemed central or important, while still remaining agnostic about whether these phenomena are themselves valuable.

A third way in which legal theory could in principle be evaluative, though uncontroversially so, is suggested by the prescriptive view discussed in section 2.1.3. If the job of a first-order theory of law is to identify the concept of law it would be most desirable for us to employ, then there is a sense in which the resulting theory of law would of course be evaluative. Nonetheless, as seen above, prescriptive theories aim to answer a different question from theories in the conceptual analysis, reductive or interpretive categories. Thus, what matters to the debate about whether legal theory is evaluative is not whether legal theory in principle could be evaluative, but whether it is inevitably or necessarily so.

Now we are in a position to fully appreciate the question of primary interest here. In particular, it is whether theories about the nature of existing legal practice (or perhaps our concept of it) necessarily involve or entail thick evaluative claims about the law. That is, does offering a first-order theory of law of either the conceptual analysis, reductive or constructive interpretation varieties require one to accept claims about how valuable the law, or some feature of it, is? This is the question to be discussed in the remainder of this entry.

Some answers to the question that was discussed in section 2.1 suggest that theories of law are inherently evaluative in the sense of committing advocates of these theories to thick evaluative claims about the law. As we will see, this is most plausibly the case on the constructive interpretation view of methodology. By contrast, other answers to the question discussed in section 2.1 do not obviously entail that first-order legal theories commit their proponents to thick evaluative claims. In particular, this is the case for the conceptual analysis and reductive views of jurisprudential methodology. At least on their face, both these views seem to allow that there can be purely descriptive accounts of law—i.e., accounts that capture the central features of law without being committed to any moral or all-things-considered evaluation of the law. After all, one might think that a particular account does a good job of capturing some widely shared concept of law, but this does not obviously commit one to saying that law, on this concept of it, is good . Likewise, one might endorse a reduction of legal facts to some more foundational set of facts (e.g., certain social facts) without this committing one to thinking that the law is valuable or morally justified.

As a result, at least on their face, both the conceptual analysis and reductive views seem to allow that there can be first-order theories of law that are purely descriptive. Some argument would be needed if one is to endorse the opposite conclusion. Accordingly, let us consider some prominent arguments for thinking that legal theory must be inherently evaluative in nature. (For an overview, see Marmor 2011, 122–35.)

The argument from legal functions

One central argument to the effect that legal theory must be evaluative in the relevant sense begins from the idea that understanding what the law is requires taking a view about what functions it serves (Finnis 1980, 12–17; Perry 1995, 114–20). Moreover, one might think that functions are evaluative in the sense that attributing a function to something is to endorse a standard by which that thing may be judged as successful or unsuccessful. In this way, one might think that legal theory, too, is inherently evaluative.

While this line of thinking plausibly shows that legal theory requires accepting some evaluative claims, it does not obviously show that legal theory necessarily involves thick evaluative claims (Dickson 2001, 114–125). Claims of the form “the function of \(X\) is \(F\)” are naturally classified together with “\(X\) is important” (or more precisely, “\(X\) is important for some purpose \(Y\)”) as thin evaluative claims. Accordingly, asserting that the function of law is \(F\) does not obviously entail any thick evaluative claims about law. After all, it is not obvious why attributing a function to something requires believing that performing that function is either all-things-considered or morally good . Thus, attributing a function to law need not entail any thick evaluative claims.

The argument from the internal point of view

A second natural argument in favor of seeing legal theory as inherently evaluative in the relevant sense relies on the idea that any adequate theory of law must take account of the internal point of view that legal practitioners tend to adopt towards the law. More specifically, taking the internal point of view towards the law is a matter of adopting some kind of attitude of endorsement towards it, seeing it as in some sense justified or as providing reasons for action (Shapiro 2011, 96–97; Perry 1995, 99–100; see also the entry on legal positivism ). Moreover, it is common to think that a critical mass of the participants in legal practice must adopt the internal point of view towards the practice in order for the practice to genuinely count as law. This is a fact that any adequate theory of law must account for, one might think. Accordingly, since the internal point of view involves a positive evaluation of the law, and since any adequate legal theory must account for this point of view, one might infer that any adequate theory of law must itself be inherently evaluative. (One finds versions of such an argument, e.g., in Perry 1995, 121–25; Waldron 2001, 423–28.)

It is unclear whether this argument succeeds, however. After all, it seems in principle possible to explain what kinds of considerations legal practitioners endorse, and why, without oneself endorsing those considerations. Similarly, a first-order legal theory might be able to plausibly explain the truism that legal practitioners tend to take the internal point of view towards (i.e., endorse) the law in their respective jurisdictions without the theory thereby being committed to the claim that the law in any particular jurisdiction (or the law in general) is valuable or justified. Accordingly, it is not obvious why a theory of law cannot in principle capture the internal point of view taken by legal practitioners towards the law without itself being committed to any thick evaluative claims about the law.

The argument from interpretation

Probably the most influential argument for thinking that legal theory is inherently evaluative proceeds from the idea that legal theory is an interpretive endeavor in Dworkin’s sense (Dworkin 1986; for criticism, see Dickson 2001, 105; Marmor 2011, 126–30). To say that legal theory is an interpretive project is to claim that fully understanding what the law is requires construing it as the best instance it can be of the type of thing that it is. Moreover, one might think that in order to construe legal practice as the best instance of the kind of thing that it is requires making thick evaluative claims about the law. (See the entry on legal interpretivism .)

One might attempt to respond to this argument in two ways. A natural, though ultimately unsuccessful, reply is that construing something as the best instance of its kind that it can be does not require taking that kind to be good . Saying that Bernie Madoff was (for a time) the best fraudster in history does not entail that one approves of fraud. As a result, saying that the law must be thus-and-so in order to be a good instance of its kind does not commit one to any thick evaluative claims. Nonetheless, there is a deeper or more interesting sense in which Dworkin’s view renders legal theory inherently evaluative. For Dworkin, legal theory is an interpretive enterprise, and offering a constructive interpretation of legal practice requires construing it in its best moral light . Thus, offering an interpretation of legal practice would require taking a stand on which of the available ways of construing that practice is morally better than the others. Of course, this does not necessarily require asserting that the law, on any particular construal, is good —full stop. But it does seem to require at least saying that some construals of legal practice are morally better than other construals would be. This looks to be a thick evaluative claim, albeit a comparative one. Moreover, one cannot make such comparative judgments without having a view about what would make one construal of legal practice morally better than another. Thus, in at least this sense, taking legal theory to be an endeavor that is interpretive in Dworkin’s sense would make legal theory count as inherently evaluative in the sense we are concerned with here.

Accordingly, if one wants to maintain the possibility of purely descriptive first-order legal theories, a more promising strategy for responding to the argument from interpretation would be to question its key premise—viz., that legal theory necessarily is an interpretive endeavor in Dworkin’s sense. In order for a proponent of the argument from interpretation to assert this premise, some rationale would have to be given for it. That is, some argument would be needed to explain why we should think that understanding law requires giving a constructive interpretation of it. A critic of the argument from interpretation, then, might claim that the argument’s proponents have not carried their burden of providing a rationale for this premise, on which the argument crucially depends.

One possible rationale that might be offered here is that since social practices essentially involve communication, and understanding any form of communication necessarily involves interpreting speakers’ claims, understanding the social practice of law necessarily involves interpreting it. However, this rationale is too quick. Even if it is true that understanding any social practice requires interpretation of some kind or other , it does not follow that doing so requires a constructive interpretation in Dworkin’s sense —i.e., identifying a construal of the practice that casts it in its best moral light (Marmor 2011, 127–28). But the latter claim, of course, is what proponents of the argument from interpretation need to establish in order to reach their desired conclusion that legal theory is inherently evaluative.

Accordingly, we seem to be left in the following dialectical situation. Whether or not legal theory is inherently evaluative in the relevant sense depends on whether the argument from interpretation succeeds. Whether that argument succeeds, in turn, depends on its key premise, i.e., the claim that understanding the law necessarily requires giving a constructive interpretation of it. If a non-question begging argument can be given for this claim, then there would be reason to think that legal theory necessarily is evaluative in nature. By contrast, if no non-question begging argument can be given for thinking that understanding law requires a constructive interpretation, then one would be free to maintain that there can be purely descriptive first-order legal theories.

Of course, even if the argument from interpretation fails and purely descriptive legal theories remain possible , it could still be a worthwhile project to attempt to give a constructive interpretation of legal practice, and the output of this project would indeed be a partially evaluative theory. Nonetheless, these two types of theory would not genuinely be in conflict, as they would be addressed to answering different questions. In the end, therefore, “methodological pluralism” may be the most apt characterization of the state of play in jurisprudence.

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The Concepts of Law

Thanks to John Gerring, Brian Leiter, Saul Levmore, Simone Sepe, and Lawrence Solum for superb comments.

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Concepts are the building blocks of legal doctrine. All legal rules and standards, in fact, are formed by combining concepts in different ways. But despite their centrality, legal concepts are not well understood. There is no agreement as to what makes a legal concept useful or ineffective—worth keeping or in need of revision. Social scientists, however, have developed a set of criteria for successful concepts. Of these, the most important is measurability: the ability, at least in principle, to assess a concept with data. In this Essay, we apply the social scientific criteria to a number of concepts and conceptual relationships in American constitutional law. We show that this field includes both poor and effective concepts and conceptual links. We also explain how the examples of poor concepts could be improved.

I. A Primer on Conceptualization and Measurement

A. Concepts and Conceptualization

Concepts provide the mental architecture by which we understand the world and are ubiquitous in social science as well as law. Conceptualization involves the process of formulating a mental construct at a particular level of abstraction. 10 A large debate in the philosophy of cognitive science grapples with different views of concepts. 11 Some regard concepts as essentially nominal in character, meaning that they are about definitions of phenomena rather than the phenomena themselves. Some see concepts as marking mental representations of phenomena. 12 Others see concepts as ontological claims or “theories about the fundamental constitutive elements of a phenomenon.” 13

“Concept” itself is a tricky concept. For our purposes, concepts can be distinguished from other phenomena of interest to law such as words or rules. Law is composed of words or labels, but these are different from the concepts that are the building blocks of law. To see why, consider that a single label can refer to multiple concepts: a right means one thing when giving directions, but quite another when discussing the legal system. Even within the law, the concept of a right is different when thinking about an individual’s freedom from torture than when talking about Mother Nature’s right to remediation. 14 Conversely, a similar concept can be represented by different words.

Concepts are also distinct from rules . Rules provide decision procedures to categorize behavior as, for example, legal or illegal. A legal rule is composed of multiple concepts put together in a particular kind of relationship: if someone engages in murder , she shall be subject to a penalty of imprisonment . Each of these concepts might have subconcepts: murder , for example, is killing with malice aforethought or intent . The rule provides the criteria for decision, but relies on abstract ideas—concepts—with more or less intuitive appeal. This simple example demonstrates that law is built of concepts and subconcepts, structured together in particular ways.

Some concepts are developed through necessary, or necessary and sufficient, attributes. It is necessary that a mammal be an animal; it is necessary and sufficient that it be an animal that secretes milk to feed its young. Another way of approaching attributes is to list all the desirable ones, and perhaps to treat them additively, so that more of them will get one closer to the ideal of the particular concept. This is sometimes called a maximal strategy of conceptualization and is exemplified at the extreme by Max Weber’s concept of an ideal type, which may never be met in practice. 15 A third approach relies on the “family resemblance” of phenomena, so that even if no single attribute is necessary or sufficient, the presence of enough attributes will suffice to mark the presence of the concept. 16 Bearing live young, possessing fur, and secreting milk are common or typical attributes of mammals, even though the platypus, a mammal, does not have all of these features. Finally, and most relevant to our project here, some believe that concepts are always embedded in a broader theory, so that their essential features may not be observable at all, but instead are defined as part of the background theory. This is known as the “theory theory” of concepts. 17

Many legal tests are formulated as having necessary and sufficient attributes. If one has a duty to behave in a particular way, has breached this duty, and has caused damage to another, then one has, by definition, committed a tort. But some legal concepts are formulated as multipart tests in which factors are added and weighed, with an eye toward seeing if the ideal is met. In deciding if an attorney in a prevailing ERISA claim is to be awarded fees, for example, courts apply a five-factor test:

(1) the degree of culpability or bad faith attributable to the losing party; (2) the depth of the losing party’s pocket, i.e., his or her capacity to pay an award; (3) the extent (if at all) to which such an award would deter other persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) the benefit (if any) that the successful suit confers on plan participants or beneficiaries generally; and (5) the relative merit of the parties’ positions. 18

The implicit concept here is an ideal type of what might be called appropriate fee-shifting. None of the five elements is absolutely necessary, but if all five are plainly met, the ideal type will be achieved. The closer one gets to the ideal type, the more likely one is to get an award. The internal participant within the legal system, in this case a judge, will engage in the process of running through the attributes to see if they are met.

Legal concepts come in different levels of abstraction, often nested within one another. Private law is more encompassing than tort, which in turn encompasses negligent infliction of emotional distress. Unlike in social science, however, there is not much explicit legal work on concept formation, and few of the rich definitional debates that mark social scientific literatures on, say, democracy or even the rule of law. Our argument is that paying attention to legal concepts can improve the structure of the law.

B. What Makes a Good Concept?

There are several different social scientific conceptualizations about what it is that makes a good concept. A common approach is a listing of attributes, such as parsimony, explanatory power, and distinction from other concepts. These lists vary from scholar to scholar, but we rely on a recent contribution from the prominent social scientist Professor John Gerring, who argues that a good social scientific concept can be evaluated on several dimensions. 19 It should have resonance, in that it should “make[ ] sense” to observers; it should have a stipulated domain over which it applies; it should be consistent, in the sense of conveying the same meaning in different contexts; it should be “fecund,” meaning that it has richness and depth; it should be differentiated from other neighboring concepts; it should have causal utility, meaning that it is useful; and it should in principle be measurable, that is, capable of being operationalized within social scientific frameworks. 20 Let us describe each of these in a bit more detail, with an application to law.

Resonance is a quality that is essentially linguistic in character, and can easily be applied to law. For example, we can ask whether a legal test is resonant with the relevant audience. Does the framework of examining tiers of scrutiny “make sense” to observers? Is proportionality an intuitive concept in terms of advancing ideas about justice? Is it faithful to established definitions? 21 We can also compare legal concepts for linguistic resonance: For example, in considering instances when a government diminishes an investment’s value, is “indirect expropriation” or “regulatory taking” a better concept? Resonance is essentially about labels and how well they communicate an idea to an audience.

Many legal concepts are clearly resonant. However, it is an interesting feature of some legal concepts that they are in fact distinct from the ordinary meaning attached to the same terms. Only in law does “intent” include reckless disregard as well as intending the outcome; “statutory rape” adds the adjective precisely because the conduct it condemns is consensual. There is thus some variation across legal concepts in terms of resonance.

Domain simply refers to the realm in which a concept applies, and is fairly clear when applied to law. 22 The domain of legal concepts is, in fact, the legal system, and is not meant to encompass anything outside it. Thus, specialized language within the law is deployed internally. Common-law marriage refers to the idea that the marriage is legal, even if not formally recorded.

Consistency requires that a concept carry the same meaning in different empirical contexts. 23 If the concept of felony murder is different in Louisiana and California, this would violate the requirement of consistency. Observe that the legal definitions in the two states might diverge, maybe even dramatically, but this does not mean that the concept would differ. But it is also the case that, for example, multipart tests may put pressure on conceptual consistency across contexts. To use the fee-shifting example described above, if an award were based primarily on the wealth of the losing party, it would imply a different purpose than if it were based on deterrence considerations. These might be seen as internally inconsistent applications of the test, ultimately based on different concepts.

Fecundity is defined by Gerring as referring to “coherence, depth, fruitfulness, illumination, informative-ness, insight, natural kinds, power, productivity, richness, or thickness.” 24 This collection of descriptors has to do with a concept’s ability to describe reality in a rich way, and in some sense to reveal a structure that might not be apparent without the concept. 25 It is a desirable feature of social science, though not so important in law in our view, because some legal concepts can be limited to very narrow technical applications. For example, in social science, in thinking about different types of political “regimes,” one might distinguish authoritarian regimes from democracies, or might alternately look at particular subtypes within each category: electoral authoritarians, totalitarians, military regimes, and absolute monarchies, 26 or presidential and parliamentary democracies. 27 An analogously fecund legal concept might be “rights,” which has generated many subtypes. But other legal concepts can be narrow and yet still effective within their specific domain: a lien or a stay, for example, reveals no deep structure.

Differentiation refers to the distinction between a concept and a neighboring concept. 28 Sometimes concepts are defined by their neighboring concepts. As Gerring notes, nation-states are defined in contrast with empires, political parties in contrast with interest groups. 29 It is thus the case that new concepts are best when they fit within existing concepts. When a new legal idea is created—sexual harassment, for example—it is helpful to mark how it differs from existing concepts. 30

Causal utility refers to the usefulness of a concept. 31 Obviously, this is domain specific. Professor Gary Goertz focuses on the utility of concepts for social scientific methods. 32 But in law we might ask how easy the concept is for courts to apply, and how effective it is in differentiating lawful from unlawful behavior.

The requirement that a concept be measurable is a frequent desideratum in social scientific accounts of concepts (in which it is sometimes called operationalizability). The idea here is not that there must be available data or indicators that meet the standard tests of social science. Instead, the point of measurability is that in principle there ought to be data that could be deployed to test theories that use the concept. 33 For legal tests, it may be prudent to consider whether measures can be developed in principle. This might help to ensure that the analyst is proposing a workable test that is capable of achieving its aims.

Consider an example of an internal legal doctrine, drawn again from the five-part test for attorney’s fees in the ERISA context. 34 Some of the elements are more amenable to empirical verification than others: the wealth of the losing party and the potential deterrent effect of an award are, in principle, quantifiable. The other elements—culpability, benefits, and relative merit—are less so. To successfully deploy this conceptual test, courts will thus have to aggregate, by an unknown weighting formula, five different elements that are fairly discrete, possibly incommensurable, and difficult to operationalize. To the extent that the elements are measurable, this exercise could be more precise, transparent, and ultimately legitimate. Our view is that measurability, even in principle, can bring precision and discipline to law.

C. Relationships among Concepts

Many of the central questions in social science involve relationships among different concepts. Does democracy increase economic growth? Does race correlate with voting behavior? Do people behave rationally in their investment decisions? Are military alliances stable across time? Each of these questions features at least two different concepts, which might in theory take on different meanings and surely could be measured in many different ways. Each also features a relationship among concepts, whether causal or correlative.

Examining these relationships among concepts also requires operationalizing them. This means we must come up with tractable indicators or measures that can then be deployed into a research design. Indeed, some argue that this is the central criterion of a good social scientific concept. If a concept is not capable of being operationalized, then it is lacking a central characteristic, and even the presence of many other desirable features may not be able to save it. 35

Law, too, is centrally concerned with relationships among concepts. The variety of conceptual relationships in law is very large. The multipart tests mentioned above aggregate a variety of concepts into a single framework, which is fundamentally an additive approach to linking concepts. In contrast, the famous framework of Professor Wesley Hohfeld distinguished between conceptual correlates and conceptual opposites. 36 Correlative relationships are exemplified by the binary of right and duty, which co-occur so that if someone has a right, someone else has a duty. Opposites, on the other hand, are conceptually distinct. For example, someone with no duty has a privilege to do something or not; privilege and duty are opposites in Hohfeld’s framework. 37 In other cases, concepts are nested within one another in fields: tort includes intentional infliction of emotional distress. Still other concepts can cut across fields: the concept of intent is used in multiple fields of law, sometimes in different ways. Many further types of semantic relationships are conceivable as well.

Rather than try to exhaustively categorize all possible relationships, we are most concerned here with a particular kind of connection among legal concepts: that of a causal character. Causal relationships are very common in legal concepts. At the most basic level, law often seeks to advance particular interests. Some of these interests, such as efficiency, justice, or fairness, are external to the law itself. Others may themselves be defined by the law, and so can be characterized as internal concepts. Either way, there is an assumption that legal rules have some causal efficacy in advancing interests. This is what is sometimes called an instrumental view of law. 38 While it is not the only view on offer, we adopt it for present purposes. We need not offer an absolute defense of the instrumental view, even if we are partial to it; the reader need accept only that it is a common view.

Causation is a good example of a concept that is used in both law and social science, in slightly different ways. Causation in social science is essentially conceived of in probabilistic terms. 39 If we say that X causes Y , we are saying that a change in the value of X will likely be associated with a change in the value of Y , holding all else constant. The tools of social science, and the rules of inference, are designed to help identify such relationships. In contrast, legal causation is more normative, focusing on the kinds of responsibility for harms that warrant liability and the kinds that do not. 40

Other examples of causal legal relationships abound. When we ask if a regulation constitutes a taking of property (or an indirect expropriation, to use the international law term), we want to know whether a change in the level of regulation would lead to a change in one’s ability to use the property to the point that the owner should receive compensation. 41 When we ask whether a policy has a discriminatory impact on a group under the Fair Housing Act 42 or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 we need to identify baseline levels of demographic concentration, and then ask whether a different policy would lead to a different level of treatment for the group. 44 We also want to compare alternative policies. Is it the case that once a particular level of impact is reached, one can stop the inquiry? Or is it a matter of cost-benefit analysis, such that increases in the impact may be outweighed by benefits on the other side? If so, does the disparate impact increase in a linear way with increments of the policy? These types of questions are rarely considered by lawyers or judges, who use causal language in a more heuristic way.

As these examples suggest, recognizing that legal concepts often involve relationships implies that we ought to favor concepts whose connections can in fact be identified and established. This is because such concepts can in principle be applied in consistent and precise ways across cases. While we know that not every concept can be captured by a real-world indicator or variable, we still think it valuable for lawyers and judges to focus on relationships for which the basic logic of X and Y holds.

Of course, the fact that not every relationship between concepts can be measured poses challenges for certain analyses. For instance, legal philosophers have wrestled with the idea of incommensurability, “the absence of a scale or metric.” 45 When values are not capable of being arrayed on a single scale, we think of them as incommensurable. Thinking about relationships that in principle can be ordered and tested on the same scale will, ceteris paribus, make the law more tractable. Similarly, the idea of outright necessity is subtly different from the more feasible notions of causation and correlation. Proving that only X can achieve Y is much more difficult—in fact, impossible in many contexts—than showing that X is one of the factors that drive Y .

II. Conceptualizing Constitutional Law

To reiterate the discussion to this point: Social scientists have developed reasonably determinate criteria for distinguishing between effective and ineffective concepts, and between conceptual relationships that can and cannot be demonstrated. In brief, the hallmarks of effective concepts are resonance, domain specificity, consistency, fecundity, differentiation from other concepts, causal utility, and, above all, measurability. Similarly, conceptual relationships involving correlation or causality are more easily established than ones involving necessity or the weighing of incommensurable quantities.

How well does law perform under these criteria? Are its concepts and conceptual relationships satisfactory or in need of improvement? These questions are far too broad to be answered fully here, but we begin to address them using a series of examples from American constitutional law. These examples include both poor concepts and relationships (for which we suggest improvement) and effective ones (for which we explain why they are useful). Constitutional law also strikes us as an unusually fertile field to plow for illustrations. It is a subject that brims with concepts and complex linkages among them. These concepts and linkages are largely (though not entirely) judicially created, meaning that they can be revised by the courts as well. And, not unimportantly for a project that potentially implicates law’s entire empire, constitutional law is a discrete domain with which we are relatively familiar.

A. Poor Concepts

Before labeling any concept as poor, we must note a number of caveats. First, our tags are based not on a rigorous examination of all constitutional concepts (a daunting task to say the least), but rather on an impressionistic survey of several high-profile areas. In other words, we do not claim to have identified the worst (or best) concepts, but only a few concepts that mostly fail (or satisfy) the social scientific criteria for conceptualization. Second, our treatment of each concept is necessarily brief. We hit what we see as the essential points, but we cannot grapple here with each concept’s full complexity. And third, though our mode is diagnostic, criticizing certain concepts and praising others, our ultimate aim is prescriptive. That is, we are interested in contemplating how constitutional law might look if its concepts were more effective—and in finding ways to push the doctrine in that direction.

Having disposed of these preliminaries, corruption is our first example of a concept that we regard as unhelpful. The prevention of corruption is the only justification the Supreme Court has recognized for burdening First Amendment rights by restricting the financing of political campaigns. 46 Corruption is also unquestionably a resonant and fecund concept, in that it is intuitively undesirable to most observers and conveys a rich array of negative meanings. This rich array, though, is part of the problem. Precisely because corruption can mean many different things, the term can be—and has been—defined in many different ways. 47 The Court, in particular, has toggled back and forth between three conceptions: a narrower version limited to explicit quid pro quos, or overt exchanges of money for official governmental acts; 48 a broader version covering funders’ access to and influence over officeholders; 49 and a still more expansive version extending to the distortion of electoral outcomes due to corporate spending. 50

In terms of the social scientific criteria, these shifting notions mean that corruption lacks domain specificity, consistency, and differentiation from other concepts. Domain specificity is missing because the narrower version applies to only the restriction of campaign contributions, while the two broader versions justify the limitation of campaign expenditures as well. 51 Consistency is absent for the obvious reason that the Court has adopted three in consistent definitions of corruption in the span of just a single generation. And depending on how it is construed, corruption bleeds into bribery (whose trademark is the quid pro quo exchange), skewed representation (responsive to funders rather than voters), or inequality (in electoral influence). 52

One might respond that most of these difficulties would be avoided if the Court could only settle on a single notion of corruption. But there is no easy way in which the Court could do so because, as several scholars have pointed out, corruption is a derivative concept that becomes intelligible only through an antecedent theory of purity for the entity at issue. 53 With respect to legislators, for example, one can say they are corrupt only if one first has an account of how they should behave when they are pure. One thus needs a model of representation before one can arrive at a definition of legislative corruption—a definition that would correspond to deviation from this model. Of course, the Court could choose to embrace a particular representational approach, but this is hardly a straightforward matter, and it is one in which the Court has evinced no interest to date.

Moreover, even if the Court somehow managed to stick to a single notion of corruption, it would run into further issues of measurability and causal utility. These issues stem from the covert nature of most corrupt activities. When politicians trade votes for money, they do so in secret. When officeholders merely offer access or influence to their funders, they again do so as furtively as possible. Precisely for these reasons, social scientists have rarely been able to quantify corruption itself, resorting instead to rough proxies such as people’s trust in government 54 and the volume of public officials convicted of bribery. 55 Unsurprisingly, given the crudity of these metrics, no significant relationships have been found between campaign finance regulation and corruption. 56 Greater regulation seems neither to increase people’s faith in their rulers nor to reduce the number of officials taken on perp walks.

Thanks to its poor performance on almost every criterion, we consider corruption to be an unsalvageable concept. It has not been, nor can it be, properly defined or measured. If it were abandoned, though, what would take its place in the campaign finance case law? We see two options. Less controversially, corruption could be swapped for one of the concepts into which it blurs, such as bribery. More provocatively (because further doctrinally afield), campaign finance regulation could be justified based on its promotion of distinct values such as electoral competitiveness, voter participation, or congruence with the median voter’s preferences. 57 This is not the place to defend these values, though offhand all seem more tractable than corruption. Our point, rather, is that when a particular concept is unworkable, it is often possible to replace it with a more suitable alternative.

We turn next to our second example of a flawed constitutional concept: political powerlessness , which is one of the four indicia of suspect class status under equal protection law. 58 Like corruption, powerlessness is a self-evidently resonant and fecund concept. To say that a group is powerless is to say something important about it, to convey a great deal of information about the group’s position, organization, and capability. Also, as with corruption, the amount of information conveyed is a bug, not a feature. The many inferences supported by powerlessness give rise to many definitions of the term by the Court, including a group’s small numerical size, inability to vote, lack of descriptive representation, low socioeconomic status, and failure to win the passage of protective legislation. 59

And again as with corruption, these multiple notions of powerlessness sap the concept of consistency and differentiation from other concepts. The inconsistency is obvious; the notions of powerlessness are not just multiple, but also irreconcilable. 60 Depending on how it is defined, powerlessness also becomes difficult to distinguish from concepts such as disenfranchisement, underrepresentation, and even poverty. And while the different conceptions of powerlessness do not directly undermine its domain specificity, this criterion is not satisfied either, due to the uncertainty over how powerlessness relates to the other indicia of suspect class status. It is unclear whether powerlessness is a necessary, sufficient, or merely conducive condition for a class to be deemed suspect. 61

However, unlike with corruption, a particular definition of powerlessness may be theoretically compelled—and is certainly not theoretically precluded. The powerlessness factor has its roots in United States v Carolene Products Co ’s 62 account of “those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.” 63 “Those political processes,” in turn, refer to pluralism: the idea that society is divided into countless overlapping groups, from whose shifting coalitions public policy emerges. 64 And pluralism implies a specific notion of group power: one that is continuous rather than binary, spans all issues, focuses on policy enactment, and controls for group size and type. 65 Thus, powerlessness not only can, but arguably must, be conceived of in a certain way if it is to remain true to its pluralist pedigree.

Furthermore, if powerlessness is so understood, it becomes possible to measure and apply it. Social scientists have compiled extensive data on both the policy preferences of different groups and whether these preferences are realized in enacted law. 66 Combining this information, a group’s odds of getting its preferred policies passed can be determined, adjusted for the group’s size, and then compared to the odds of other groups. 67 This method yields the conclusions that blacks and women (both already suspect classes) are relatively powerless compared to whites and men. 68 Interestingly, it also indicates that the poor (not currently a suspect class) have far less clout than the middle class and the wealthy. 69

Because powerlessness can be—even though it has not been—defined and measured properly, we come to a different verdict for it than for corruption. That is, we recommend discarding the Court’s various notions of it and replacing them with the pluralist conception outlined above. Considering corruption and powerlessness in tandem also allows us to hazard a guess as to why the Court sometimes adopts faulty concepts. In both of these (potentially unrepresentative) cases, the Court borrowed complex ideas from democratic theory without fully grasping the ideas’ internal logic. At best (as with powerlessness), this approach leads to the circulation of numerous definitions of the concept, one of which is eventually found to be theoretically and practically defensible. At worst (as with corruption), the approach causes multiple definitions to be bandied about, none of which is theoretically legitimate or capable of being operationalized. Plainly, this is a far cry from textbook concept formation.

B. Effective Concepts

We doubt that the Court ever complies perfectly with any social scientific textbook. But the Court does, on occasion, recognize constitutional concepts that are significantly more effective than the ones analyzed to this point. As a first example of a successful concept, take partisan symmetry , which five justices tentatively endorsed in a recent case as a potential foundation for a test for partisan gerrymandering. 70 Partisan symmetry “requires that the electoral system treat similarly-situated parties equally,” so that they are able to convert their popular support into legislative representation with approximately equal ease. 71 The Court cautiously backed symmetry only after struggling for decades with—and ultimately rejecting—a host of other possible linchpins for a gerrymandering test: seat-vote proportionality (inconsistent with single-member districts), predominant partisan intent (too difficult to discern), district noncompactness (not itself a meaningful value), and so on. 72

Partisan symmetry performs suitably well along all of the relevant dimensions. It is resonant and fecund because it captures the core harm of gerrymandering: a district plan that enables one party to translate its votes into seats more efficiently than its rival. 73 It is limited to the domain of electoral systems. It is defined identically in both the case law and the academic literature. 74 It is distinct from the other concepts the Court has considered in this area—including proportionality, which is a property that symmetric plans may, but need not, exhibit. 75 It is measurable using easily obtained electoral data and well-established statistical techniques. 76 And it is useful in that it conveys in a single figure the direction and extent of a plan’s partisan skew.

However, we do not mean to claim that partisan symmetry is a flawless concept. It does not take into account odd district shape or partisan motivation, both aspects of gerrymandering as the practice is commonly understood. Its calculation requires fairly strong assumptions about uncontested races and shifts in the statewide vote. 77 Two different symmetry metrics exist, which usually but not always point in the same direction. 78 And to form a workable test for gerrymandering, symmetry must be combined with other prongs, thus somewhat diminishing its utility. Somewhat , though, is the key word here. Symmetry is not a perfect concept; no concept is. But symmetry can be defined, measured, and applied coherently, which is the most the law can ask of a concept.

Our second example of an effective concept, racial polarization in voting , has had a doctrinal history similar to that of partisan symmetry. Between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s, the Court struggled to identify the exact problem with racial vote dilution (the reduction of minorities’ electoral influence through means other than burdening the franchise). 79 Unable to crystallize the issue, the Court instead laid out a dozen factors that were meant to be analyzed in unison to determine liability. 80 This unwieldy doctrinal structure finally collapsed in 1986, when the Court held that plaintiffs had to prove racial polarization in order to prevail. 81 The Court also carefully defined polarization as “the situation where different races . . . vote in blocs for different candidates.” 82

Like partisan symmetry, racial polarization in voting complies reasonably well with all of the social scientific criteria for conceptualization. It is resonant and fecund because it reflects the reality that racial vote dilution is possible only under polarized electoral conditions. If polarization does not exist, then neither can a minority group prefer a distinct candidate, nor can the majority thwart a minority-preferred candidate’s election. 83 It is limited to the field of vote dilution, not even extending to the adjacent area of vote denial. 84 It is understood in the same way by both judges and scholars. 85 It is different from other important vote dilution concepts like a minority group’s geographic compactness and elected officials’ responsiveness to the group’s concerns. 86 It is measurable by applying ecological regression techniques to election results and demographic data. 87 And it is useful because it is both the mechanism that drives vote dilution and a metric reducible to a single number.

But also like partisan symmetry, racial polarization in voting has its warts too. Not all commentators agree that it is troublesome when it is caused by forces other than racial prejudice, such as differences in partisanship or socioeconomic status. 88 Nor is there consensus that polarization in voting is the quantity of interest, as some scholars emphasize polarization in policy preferences instead. 89 Furthermore, courts have never resolved how extreme polarization must be to establish liability. And almost from the day polarization became a requirement, it has been clear that its measurement is complicated by residential integration, the presence of more than two racial groups, and the inevitable endogeneity of election results (above all, to the particular candidates competing). 90 All of these shortcomings, though, strike us as fixable rather than fatal. This also has been the judgment of the judiciary, which has productively analyzed polarization in hundreds of cases since 1986. 91

As before, we are wary of generalizing based on only a pair of cases. But considered together, partisan symmetry and racial polarization in voting suggest that the Court does better when it turns for concepts to empirical political science than to high democratic theory. Before they ever appeared in the Court’s case law, symmetry and polarization had been precisely defined and then measured using large volumes of data as well as methods that steadily improved over time. 92 These properties meant that when the ideas came to the Court’s attention, they were ready for prime time. They were not lofty abstractions that had yet to be made concrete, but rather practical concepts whose scope and calculation were already established. Our view is that this approach—adopting concepts previously formulated and refined by empirical social scientists—is generally advisable. It lets the Court benefit from the efforts of other disciplines, while avoiding reliance on concepts articulated at too high a level of generality to be legally useful.

C. Poor Relationships

We turn next to examples of poor and effective conceptual relationships in constitutional law. We also reiterate our earlier caveats: that the cases we highlight are not necessarily representative, that our discussion of each case is relatively brief, and that we mean for our descriptive analysis to have normative implications for the structure of constitutional doctrine.

That said, the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny is our first example of an unhelpful constitutional relationship. As a formal matter, this requirement states that, to survive review, a challenged policy must be “necessary” 93 or “the least restrictive means” 94 for furthering a compelling governmental interest. In practice, the requirement is implemented sometimes in this way and sometimes by balancing the harm inflicted by a policy against the degree to which it advances a compelling interest—with a heavy thumb on the harm’s side of the scale. 95 Narrow tailoring is ubiquitous in constitutional law, applying to (among other areas) explicit racial classifications, 96 policies that burden rights recognized as fundamental under the Due Process Clause, 97 and measures that regulate speech on the basis of its content. 98

The fundamental problem with narrow tailoring is that there is no reliable way to tell whether a policy is actually necessary or the least restrictive means for promoting a given interest. Social scientific techniques are very good at determining whether a means is related (that is, correlated) to an end. They are also reasonably adept at assessing causation, though this is a more difficult issue. Other variables that might be linked to the end can be controlled for, and all kinds of quasi-experimental approaches can be employed. 99 But social scientific techniques are largely incapable of demonstrating necessity. A mere correlation does not even establish causation, let alone that a policy is the least restrictive means for furthering an interest. Even when causation is shown, it always remains possible that a different policy would advance the interest at least as well. Not every conceivable control can be included in a model, and the universe of policy alternatives is near infinite as well. In short, the gold standard of social science is proving that X causes Y —but this proof cannot guarantee that some other variable does not drive Y to an even greater extent. 100

A somewhat different critique applies to the balancing that courts sometimes carry out instead of means-end analysis. Here, the trouble is that the quantities being compared—the harm inflicted by a policy, either by burdening certain rights or by classifying groups in certain ways, and the policy’s promotion of a compelling governmental interest—are incommensurable, in the sense we outlined earlier. Social science has little difficulty with the comparison of quantities that are measured using the same scale. Familiar techniques such as factor analysis also enable quantities measured using different scales to be collapsed into a single composite variable. 101 But there is little that social science can do when the relevant quantities are measured differently, cannot be collapsed, and yet must be weighed against each other. This kind of inquiry, as Justice Antonin Scalia once wrote, is akin to “judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.” 102 Instinct and intuition may assist in answering the question, but more rigorous methods are unavailing.

These faults of narrow tailoring seem irremediable to us. It is simply infeasible to have to determine a policy’s necessity or whether its harms are offset by its incommensurable benefits. Fortunately, an obvious alternative exists: the means-end analysis that courts conduct when they engage in intermediate scrutiny. In these cases, courts ask whether a policy is “substantially related” to the achievement of an important governmental objective. 103 A substantial relationship means either a substantial correlation or, perhaps, a causal connection. 104 Either way, the issue is squarely in the wheelhouse of social science, whose forte is assessing correlation and causation. We therefore recommend exporting this aspect of intermediate scrutiny to the strict scrutiny context—perhaps with an additional twist or two to keep the latter more rigorous than the former. For instance, a strong rather than merely substantial relationship could be required, or a large impact on the relevant governmental goal.

Our second example of a poor constitutional relationship is the undue burden test that applies to regulations of abortion, voting, and (when enacted by states) interstate commerce. 105 In all of these areas, a law is invalid if it imposes an undue burden on the value at issue: the right to an abortion, 106 the right to vote, 107 or the free flow of interstate commerce. 108 An initial problem with this test is the ambiguity of its formulation. It is unclear whether “undue” contemplates a link between a challenged policy and a governmental interest and, if so, what sort of link it requires. Precisely because of this ambiguity, no consistent definition exists of an undue burden. Instead, courts use different versions of the test, even within the same domain, of varying manageability.

For example, an undue burden is sometimes treated as synonymous with a significant burden. “A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation . . . plac[es] a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion,” declared the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey . 109 If an undue burden is understood in this way, we have no quarrel with it. The magnitude of a burden is measurable, at least in principle, and does not involve a policy’s connection with a governmental interest. It is a concept rather than a conceptual relationship.

On the other hand, an undue burden is sometimes construed as one that is unnecessary to achieve a legitimate governmental objective. The Casey joint opinion articulated the test in these terms as well: “Unnecessary health regulations that . . . present[ ] a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.” 110 So conceived, an undue burden falls victim to our earlier criticism of narrow tailoring. That is, there is no good way to tell whether a policy is the least restrictive means for accomplishing a given goal, meaning that there is also no good way to tell whether the burden imposed by the policy is undue.

On still other occasions, the undue burden test devolves into judicial balancing, with the severity of a policy’s burden weighed against the degree to which the policy promotes governmental interests. The burden is then deemed undue if it fails this cost-benefit analysis. As the Court has stated in the Dormant Commerce Clause context, where it “has candidly undertaken a balancing approach in resolving these issues,” a policy “will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is [ ] excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” 111 Plainly, this formulation is also vulnerable to our challenge to narrow tailoring. Burdens on abortion, voting, or interstate commerce are no more commensurable with gains in governmental interests than are other types of rights burdens or the harms of racial classifications. Balancing under narrow tailoring is indistinguishable from balancing under an undue burden test.

Because several notions of an undue burden percolate in the case law, doctrinal progress is possible here without wholesale rejection of the status quo. 112 Instead, courts need discard only the versions that entail least-restrictive-means or balancing analyses, leaving them with the approach that equates an undue with a significant burden. Judicial scrutiny could then vary based on a burden’s magnitude, with a severe burden leading to more stringent review and a lighter imposition prompting a more relaxed appraisal. This is already the method that courts most commonly use in the voting context, 113 and it could be extended to the abortion and Dormant Commerce Clause domains—preferably with our amendment to strict scrutiny stripping it of its narrow tailoring prong.

D. Effective Relationships

In still other areas, no doctrinal revisions seem necessary because the existing conceptual relationships work well enough already. As a first example of effective relationships, take the traceability and redressability elements of standing. After appearing intermittently in the case law for years, these elements were constitutionalized in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife . 114 A plaintiff’s injury must be “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,” meaning that “there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.” 115 Additionally, “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” 116

Traceability and redressability are often analyzed together; in fact, “[m]ost cases view redressability as an essentially automatic corollary of [traceability].” 117 Both relationships are also highly tractable because they explicitly require causation, which is precisely the kind of link that social science is able to demonstrate. The essential traceability issue is whether the defendant’s challenged action caused the plaintiff’s harm. Similarly, the crux of redressability is whether the plaintiff’s desired remedy will cause her harm to be cured. These are pure matters of causation, undiluted by any hint of means-end necessity or incommensurable balancing.

Given that standing doctrine is often deemed “[e]xtremely fuzzy and highly manipulable,” 118 some readers may be surprised by our favorable account. We do not mean to suggest that the causal questions posed by the doctrine—what impact certain measures have had or will have on a plaintiff—are easy to answer. The data needed to address these issues is often unavailable (or uncited), forcing courts to rely on their qualitative judgment. Even when rigorous evidence exists, there is no guarantee that courts will take it into account. Our claim, then, is only that the traceability and redressability elements are appealing in principle because of their emphasis on causation. In practice, the necessary causal inquiries may be difficult to conduct, or overlooked even when they are feasible.

Fewer of these caveats are required for our second example of a successful constitutional relationship: the Necessary and Proper Clause , which authorizes Congress to enact any laws that are “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” its enumerated powers. 119 At first glance, the Clause appears to exemplify a poor relationship because it stipulates that a law must be “necessary” to be permissible. But the Court has held that “‘necessary’ does not mean necessary” in this context. 120 Instead, it means “convenient, or useful or conducive to the authority’s beneficial exercise.” 121 Under this standard, a law will be upheld if it “constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.” 122

So construed, the Necessary and Proper Clause essentially demands that a statute be correlated with the promotion of a textually specified goal. That is, the statute must make the goal’s achievement at least somewhat more likely, or must lead to at least a somewhat higher level of the goal. Needless to say, it is relatively straightforward to identify a correlational link between a means and an end. Doing so, in fact, is one of the simpler tasks that can be asked of social science. This is why we approve of the sort of relationship that must be demonstrated under the Clause; it is the sort whose existence can be proven or rebutted with little room for debate.

However, we note that the Court has recently begun to revive the “Proper” in “Necessary and Proper”—and to infuse into it requirements other than a means-end correlation. In National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius , 123 in particular, the Court held that the Clause authorizes neither the exercise of “great” (as opposed to “incidental”) powers, nor the passage of “laws that undermine the structure of government established by the Constitution.” 124 We regard these developments as unfortunate. Both the significance of a power and a law’s consistency with our constitutional structure are normative matters that are poorly suited to empirical examination. The insertion of these issues into the doctrine has blurred what was previously an admirably clear relational picture.

Our inquiry into the social scientific disciplines of conceptualization and measurement suggests that they may have rich payoffs for lawyers. (To use a recurring term from our discussion, they are fecund.) Examining legal doctrines through the lens of conceptualization, we argue, allows us to evaluate what are good and bad concepts and relationships in law. We draw on one set of social science criteria for good concepts, which includes that they are resonant, have a stipulated domain, can be applied consistently, are fecund, are distinct from neighboring concepts, are useful, and can in principle be measured. Similarly, good relationships are those that involve causation or correlation, but not necessity or the weighing of incommensurable values.

We emphasize the criterion of potential measurability, which is another way of saying that courts should recognize concepts and relationships that are in principle verifiable. While in many cases this would be difficult to achieve in practice, the discipline of thinking in terms of whether X and Y can be reliably assessed, and whether X is linked to Y , would, we suspect, lead courts to greater consistency and thus predictability. In particular, our analysis suggests that courts should shy away from complex multipart tests that involve the ad hoc balancing of incommensurables. 125 Just as social scientists require dependable measures across cases, legal doctrines that are measurable can be subjected to productive scrutiny, potentially leading to more coherent application of the law. In short, important rule-of-law values can be advanced through an approach to law that draws on what some might see as an unlikely source—social scientific thinking.

10 See Goertz, Social Science Concepts at 28–30 (cited in note 5); Gerring, Social Science Methodology at 112–13 (cited in note 5).
11 The debate goes back to Aristotle. See Gerring, Social Science Methodology at 114–15 (cited in note 5). See also Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, Concepts (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, May 17, 2011), online at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ win2012/entries/concepts (visited Dec 28, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable).
12 See Margolis and Laurence, Concepts (cited in note 11).
13 Goertz, Social Science Concepts at 5 (cited in note 5).
14 See Ecuador Const Art 71, translation archived at http://perma.cc/DKJ5-E3K8 (“Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes.”).
15 See Gerring, Social Science Methodology at 136–37 (cited in note 5), citing Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences 90 (Free Press 1949) (Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, eds and trans).
16 Goertz, Social Science Concepts at 36 (cited in note 5).
17 Margolis and Laurence, Concepts (cited in note 11).
18 Cottrill v Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc , 100 F3d 220, 225 (1st Cir 1996).
19 See Gerring, Social Science Methodology at 117–19 (cited in note 5). See also John Gerring, What Makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences , 31 Polity 357, 367 (1999) (offering a slightly different set of criteria).
20 See Gerring, Social Science Methodology at 117 (cited in note 5) (listing Gerring’s criteria of conceptualization).
21 See id at 117–19.
22 See id at 119–21.
23 See id at 121–24.
24 Gerring, Social Science Methodology at 124 (cited in note 5).
25 See id at 124–26.
26 See Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics 50–53 (Michigan 2003).
27 See José Antonio Cheibub, Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy 26–48 (Cambridge 2007).
28 See Gerring, Social Science Methodology at 127–30 (cited in note 5).
29 See id at 127.
30 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination 57–59 (Yale 1979) (discussing whether sexual harassment fits neatly into the sex discrimination category).
31 See Gerring, Social Science Methodology at 130–31 (cited in note 5).
32 See Goertz, Social Science Concepts at 4 (cited in note 5) (noting that the key features are relevance “for hypotheses, explanations, and causal mechanisms”).
33 See Gerring, Social Science Methodology at 156–57 (cited in note 5).
34 See Cottrill , 100 F3d at 225.
35 See Goertz, Social Science Concepts at 6 (cited in note 5).
36 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning , 26 Yale L J 710, 710 (1917).
37 See id at 710, 716–17.
38 See Alon Harel, Why Law Matters 46 (Oxford 2014).
39 See Ellery Eells, Probabilistic Causality 34–35 (Cambridge 1991).
40 But see Antony Honoré, Causation in the Law (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Nov 17, 2010), online at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/causation-law (visited Jan 23, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (noting the complexity of the relationship between causing harm and legal responsibility).
41 See Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council , 505 US 1003, 1027 (1992) (discussing under what circumstances a state “may resist compensation” for “regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use”).
42 Pub L No 90-284, 82 Stat 81 (1968), codified as amended at 42 USC § 3601 et seq.
43 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 252, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000d et seq.
44 See Metropolitan Housing Development Corp v Village of Arlington Heights , 558 F2d 1283, 1290–91 (7th Cir 1977).
45 Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: Introduction , 146 U Pa L Rev 1169, 1170 (1998).
46 See McCutcheon v Federal Election Commission , 134 S Ct 1434, 1450 (2014) (Roberts) (plurality).
47 See, for example, Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law , 14 Const Commen 127, 128–35 (1997) (discussing three academic and three judicial definitions of corruption); Yasmin Dawood, Classifying Corruption , 9 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol 103, 106–32 (2014) (going through ten separate notions of corruption).
48 See, for example, McCutcheon , 134 S Ct at 1450 (Roberts) (plurality) (“Congress may target only a specific type of corruption[,] . . . large contributions that are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders.”) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
49 See, for example, McConnell v Federal Election Commission , 540 US 93, 150 (2003) (“Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.”) (quotation marks omitted).
50 See, for example, Austin v Michigan State Chamber of Commerce , 494 US 652, 660 (1990) (recognizing “a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form”).
51 Compare Citizens United v Federal Election Commission , 558 US 310, 361 (2010), with McConnell , 540 US at 203, and Austin , 494 US at 660.
52 As should be clear from this discussion, our critique is not that the Court has used inconsistent words to describe the same underlying concept . Rather, each of the Court’s definitions of corruption corresponds to an entirely different notion of what it means for elected officials to be corrupt.
53 See, for example, Burke, 14 Const Commen at 128 (cited in note 47) (“When corruption is proclaimed in political life it presumes some ideal state.”); Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy , 111 Mich L Rev 1385, 1389 (2013) (“[C]orruption is a derivative concept, meaning it depends on a theory of the institution or official involved.”).
54 See, for example, Nathaniel Persily and Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law , 153 U Pa L Rev 119, 145–48 (2004). See also Corruption Perceptions Index 2015 (Transparency International, Feb 1, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/C4XQ-6CE3.
55 See, for example, Adriana Cordis and Jeff Milyo, Do State Campaign Finance Reforms Reduce Public Corruption? *11–16 (unpublished manuscript, Jan 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/9KRP-FC9C.
56 See id at *21–28; Persily and Lammie, 153 U Pa L Rev at 148–49 (cited in note 54).
57 As to the last of these values, see generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law , 101 Va L Rev 1425 (2015).
58 Political powerlessness was first recognized as a factor in San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez , 411 US 1, 28 (1973).
59 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness , 90 NYU L Rev 1527, 1537–42 (2015) (discussing the various judicial versions of powerlessness).
60 See id at 1540 (“The crucial point about these definitions is that they are entirely inconsistent with one another.”). Accordingly, these are not just different ways of expressing the same underlying idea; rather, they are divergent accounts of what it means to be powerless in the first place. See note 52.
61 See, for example, Varnum v Brien , 763 NW2d 862, 888 (Iowa 2009) (pointing out “the flexible manner in which the Supreme Court has applied the four factors [relevant to suspect class status]”).
62 304 US 144 (1938).
63 Id at 152 n 4.
64 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv L Rev 713, 719 (1985) (“[G]enerations of American political scientists have filled in the picture of pluralist democracy presupposed by Carolene ’s distinctive argument for minority rights.”).
65 See Stephanopoulos, 90 NYU L Rev at 1549–54 (cited in note 59) (making this argument at length).
66 See, for example, Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America 57–66 (Princeton 2012).
67 See, for example, id at 77–87.
68 See Stephanopoulos, 90 NYU L Rev at 1583–84, 1590–92 (cited in note 59).
69 See, for example, Gilens, Affluence and Influence at 80–81 (cited in note 66); Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the American States , 40 Am Polit Rsrch 29, 40–44 (2012).
70 See League of United Latin American Citizens v Perry , 548 US 399, 420 (2006) (Kennedy) (plurality) (“LULAC”); id at 466 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 483 (Souter concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 492 (Breyer concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71 Id at 466 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72 See Vieth v Jubelirer , 541 US 267, 285–86 (2004) (Scalia) (plurality).
73 See id at 271 n 1 (Scalia) (plurality) (noting that gerrymandering has been defined as “giv[ing] one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength”).
74 Compare LULAC , 548 US at 466 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part), with Bernard Grofman and Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry, 6 Election L J 2, 6 (2007).
75 See Grofman and King, 6 Election L J at 8 (cited in note 74) (“Measuring symmetry . . . does not require ‘proportional representation’ (where each party receives the same proportion of seats as it receives in votes).”).
76 See id at 10 (noting that symmetry is measured using “highly mature statistical methods [that] rely on well-tested and well-accepted statistical procedures”).
77 See LULAC , 548 US at 420 (Kennedy) (plurality) (criticizing partisan bias because it “may in large part depend on conjecture about where possible vote-switchers will reside”); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos and Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap , 82 U Chi L Rev 831, 865–67 (2015) (discussing the imputation of results for uncontested races).
78 These are partisan bias, which is the divergence in the share of seats that each party would win given the same share of the statewide vote, see Grofman and King, 6 Election L J at 6 (cited in note 74), and the efficiency gap, which is “the difference between the parties’ respective wasted votes, divided by the total number of votes cast,” Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 82 U Chi L Rev at 851 (cited in note 77) (emphasis omitted).
79 See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence , 90 Mich L Rev 1833, 1844 (1992) (noting the “absence of an overriding conception of the precise constitutional harm the courts were seeking to remedy” in this period).
80 See White v Regester , 412 US 755, 765–70 (1973); Zimmer v McKeithen , 485 F2d 1297, 1305–07 (5th Cir 1973).
81 See Thornburg v Gingles , 478 US 30, 51 (1986). Importantly, while the pre- Gingles vote dilution cases were brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, dilution cases from Gingles onward have generally been launched under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, codified at 52 USC § 10301.
82 Gingles , 478 US at 62 (Brennan) (plurality).
83 See, for example, Growe v Emison , 507 US 25, 40 (1993).
84 Minority voters can be disproportionately burdened by an electoral regulation (say, a photo identification requirement) whether or not they are polarized from the white majority.
85 The Gingles Court noted that “courts and commentators agree that racial bloc voting is a key element of a vote dilution claim,” Gingles , 478 US at 55, and endorsed the district court’s use of “methods standard in the literature for the analysis of racially polarized voting,” id at 53 n 20.
86 Geographic compactness is also a prerequisite for liability for vote dilution, while responsiveness is a factor to be considered at the later totality-of-circumstances stage. See id at 45, 50.
87 See id at 52–53 (referring to “two complementary methods of analysis—extreme case analysis and bivariate ecological regression analysis”).
88 See, for example, League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No 4434 v Clements , 999 F2d 831, 854 (5th Cir 1993) (en banc).
89 See, for example, Christopher S. Elmendorf and Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act after Shelby County, 115 Colum L Rev 2143, 2195–2215 (2015).
90 See, for example, Christopher S. Elmendorf, Kevin M. Quinn, and Marisa A. Abrajano, Racially Polarized Voting , 83 U Chi L Rev 587, 611–19 (2016); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America , 83 U Chi L Rev 1329, 1386–87 (2016).
91 See Ellen Katz, et al, Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act since 1982 , 39 U Mich J L Ref 643, 663–75 (2006).
92 See, for example, Andrew Gelman and Gary King, Enhancing Democracy through Legislative Redistricting , 88 Am Polit Sci Rev 541, 545–46 (1994); Bernard Grofman, Michael Migalski, and Nicholas Noviello, The “Totality of Circumstances Test” in Section 2 of the 1982 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: A Social Science Perspective , 7 L & Pol 199, 202–09 (1985).
93 Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena , 515 US 200, 230 (1995).
94 Ashcroft v American Civil Liberties Union , 542 US 656, 666 (2004).
95 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, Strict Judicial Scrutiny , 54 UCLA L Rev 1267, 1330 (2007). It is also worth clarifying how narrow tailoring fits into the terminology of words, concepts, and rules that we introduced earlier. We see it as a conceptual relationship , linking a challenged policy and an asserted governmental interest, that forms part of the doctrine of strict scrutiny.
96 See, for example, Adarand , 515 US at 227.
97 See, for example, Roe v Wade , 410 US 113, 155 (1973).
98 See, for example, Ashcroft , 542 US at 666.
99 See Lee Epstein and Gary King, The Rules of Inference , 69 U Chi L Rev 1, 2 (2002).
100 See Mark A. Graber, Unnecessary and Unintelligible , 12 Const Commen 167, 167 (1995) (“No necessary means exist in many cases for realizing certain purposes.”).
101 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity , 125 Harv L Rev 1903, 1938 (2012).
102 Bendix Autolite Corp v Midwesco Enterprises, Inc , 486 US 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
103 United States v Virginia , 518 US 515, 533 (1996).
104 See, for example, id at 573–74 (Scalia dissenting).
105 Using our earlier terminology, the conceptual relationship here, between a challenged policy and an asserted governmental interest, essentially is the legal rule. This is not a problem for our analysis; it simply reflects the fact that doctrine is sometimes reducible to a single conceptual relationship.
106 See, for example, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey , 505 US 833, 874 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) (plurality) (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
107 See, for example, Crawford v Marion County Election Board , 472 F3d 949, 950, 952–54 (7th Cir 2007) (applying a constitutional test assessing whether a law constitutes “an undue burden on the right to vote”).
108 See, for example, Granholm v Heald , 544 US 460, 493 (2005) (Stevens dissenting) (“[A] state law may violate the unwritten rules described as the ‘dormant Commerce Clause’ [ ] by imposing an undue burden on both out-of-state and local producers engaged in interstate activities.”).
109 505 US 833, 877 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) (plurality). See also Burdick v Takushi , 504 US 428, 434 (1992) (focusing on “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments”).
110 Casey , 505 US at 878 (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) (plurality). See also Burdick , 504 US at 434 (inquiring into whether the policy imposing the burden is “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance”).
111 Pike v Bruce Church, Inc , 397 US 137, 142 (1970). See also Storer v Brown , 415 US 724, 730 (1974) (commenting that there is “no litmus-paper test” for voting regulations, and that “[d]ecision in this context . . . is very much a matter of degree”) (quotation marks omitted).
112 By “doctrinal progress,” we simply mean articulating a more effective conceptual relationship. Of course, improvement on this axis may result in trade-offs along other dimensions.
113 See, for example, Burdick , 504 US at 434 (“[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”).
114 504 US 555 (1992).
115 Id at 560 (brackets and ellipsis omitted).
116 Id at 561 (quotation marks omitted).
117 Richard M. Re, Relative Standing , 102 Georgetown L J 1191, 1217 (2014). See also Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency , 549 US 497, 543 (2007) (Roberts dissenting) (“As is often the case, the questions of causation and redressability overlap.”).
118 Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing after Lujan ? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III , 91 Mich L Rev 163, 228 (1992).
119 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 18. Here too, the conceptual relationship essentially is the legal rule itself. See note 105.
120 Graber, 12 Const Commen at 170 (cited in note 100). See also, for example, United States v Comstock , 560 US 126, 134 (2010) (“[T]he word ‘necessary’ does not mean ‘absolutely necessary.’”).
121 Comstock , 560 US at 133–34 (quotation marks omitted). See also National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius , 132 S Ct 2566, 2591–92 (2012).
122 Comstock , 560 US at 134.
123 132 S Ct 2566 (2012).
124 Id at 2591–92 (quotation marks omitted).
125 For further discussion of this point, see Richard A. Posner, Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary 117–21 (Harvard 2016).

Thanks to Jake Gersen, Todd Henderson, Daryl Levinson, Jens Ludwig, Richard McAdams, Tom Miles, Matthew Stephenson, David Strauss, Adrian Vermeule, Noah Zatz, and participants at a workshop at The University of Chicago Law School for helpful comments.

We are grateful to Susan Bandes, Elizabeth Foote, Jacob Gersen, Brian Leiter, Anup Malani, Richard McAdams, Elizabeth Mertz, Jonathan Nash, Eric Posner, Adam Samaha, Larry Solum, David Strauss, Noah Zatz, and participants in a work-inprogress lunch at The University of Chicago Law School for valuable comments. We are also grateful to the Chicago Judges Project, and in particular to Dean Saul Levmore, for relevant support.

We thank Eric Posner, Richard Posner, Peter Strauss, and Adrian Vermeule for helpful comments. We are also grateful to Rachael Dizard, Casey Fronk, Darius Horton, Matthew Johnson, Bryan Mulder, Brett Reynolds, Matthew Tokson, and Adam Wells for superb research assistance.

Why Study Law?

Studying law offers the opportunity to develop a range of skills and explore many aspects of human life. It gives you the chance to sharpen your mind, strengthen your understanding and deepen your experience across the full range of humanities and social sciences. You acquire both breadth of understanding and depth in the areas that interest you most.

Law should therefore appeal to those who want to develop both abstract thinking and practical problem-solving. It’s easy to see why you don’t have to become a lawyer just because you’ve done a law degree; many choose other paths. A law degree can give you the skills to be a successful lawyer but also a successful producer, politician, manager, journalist, diplomat or police officer; a law degree equips you for almost any profession that requires intellectual strength combined with a practical approach to the world.

So, why bother doing a (demanding) three-year law degree when you could do a (less intense) degree for three years and then do an (intense) one-year law conversion course or spend (an equally intense) five- to six-month period studying for the Solicitors Qualifying Examination (SQE), to end up seeking the same jobs as those who did a law degree? When couched in these terms, the answer may seem a no-brainer: do the less intense course. We disagree. A law degree may come at the price of fewer lie-ins and mid-morning coffees but most law students combine an active social life and extra-curricular activities with the demands of the course. Most importantly, we think they come out much the better for it. Here are just five advantages of reading law at university:

1. Law students acquire both breadth and depth of legal knowledge

Those reading law typically cover 14 subjects in their degree, whereas students taking a law conversion course normally study only seven core subjects, and those preparing for the Solicitors Qualifying Examination will focus on preparing only ‘functional legal knowledge’ relevant to client-based scenarios. Students who have an undergraduate law degree have the opportunity both to pursue specialised areas of particular interest beyond the core and also to appreciate the bigger picture: how the law fits together and how the law relates to other subjects, such as politics, economics, history, criminology and philosophy. We are often asked what makes a successful lawyer. We offer a variety of answers: the ones you would expect — intelligence, determination, drive, hard work; and one you might not — imagination. Creative arguments are derived from thinking laterally around a problem, and the ability to do that is often related to breadth of legal knowledge. A particular line of reasoning in a case involving commercial contracts might be inspired by something you learned in a labour law seminar 20 years earlier.

“In my view, pupils who have done an undergraduate Law degree start with a very considerable advantage over those who have tried to cram in everything in less than a year. A Law degree allows a student to gain a broader and more mature understanding of the subject.” – Jonathan Hirst QC, former Chairman of the Bar of England and Wales

2. Law is as complex and multi-faceted as the scope of human endeavour, intellect and emotion

Yes, the conversion course or SQE preparation course lets you glimpse the delights of the window-climbing burglar dressed only in his socks and the snail in a ginger beer bottle. However, if you only did a conversion course or SQE preparation course you would miss out on learning what Bernard Manning did at a Roundtable dinner and what the supermarket chain Safeways did to the pony-tail wearing Mr Smith. The law reaches into every aspect of human life and a three-year degree plainly offers much a greater opportunity to sample the rich variety of problems and possibilities with which the law engages.

3. Law is more than cramming cases and statutes

Acquiring the skills of thinking like a lawyer comes with practice – lots of practice. Children take years to acquire the skills of communicating, learning from their parents and others not just the vocabulary but also the grammar, intonation, subtleties and structures of the language. The same is true for learning law. Law is the language society uses to define relationships, to explain rights and obligations and to regulate interaction between individuals and society as a whole. Robots can be taught the basics but law students develop an affinity for the subject by being exposed to different writers and arguments, and by exploring the social phenomena and other intellectual disciplines that are implicated in legal problems. In a law degree, you learn to read and interpret the primary sources, put them in context, evaluate them, and make up your own mind. Developing these critical skills and this contextual understanding takes time – more time, we suggest, than is realistically available in a one-year conversion course.

4. A law degree trains students to talk about Law simply and effectively, without the stereotypes of legal language

Just as law involves distinctive ways of thinking, it also involves a distinctive vocabulary – a new language. Students learn this language alongside their peers, who are also struggling with its forms and subtleties. They also learn from their teachers, who often use simple vocabulary to explain difficult concepts, preparing law students them to advise clients who will usually not be legally trained. The same goes for writing about law. Writing verbose and unnecessarily complex opinions or other documents might make lawyers feel good about themselves but are of little use to clients; statutes and contracts drafted in such language can create enormous problems. Again, acquiring these skills takes time and exposure to a wide range of speakers and writers – for which a three-year law degree plainly offers much greater scope than a conversion course or SQE preparation course.

5. Law students acquire skills, not just knowledge

Many law students participate, for example, in mooting competitions, where they develop skills of oral advocacy, or pro bono societies, where they can give legal advice and support to real people with real problems. Such skills prepare students not only for careers as lawyers but also for diverse careers in policy-related fields, such as government, international organisations, the voluntary sector and business.

During my A-level history studies, I became fascinated by how the law reflects societal development. I enjoyed both history and English literature at A level and had considered studying these subjects at university. However, when reading ‘What about Law?’, I became interested in the issues that arise in the course of an undergraduate law degree, and the type of analysis involved. Ultimately, this led me to study law rather than any other subject. – Danielle What excites me most about the study and practice of law is the marriage of theoretical concept and practical application. Engaging with the messiness and complexity of legal doctrines and rules, whilst trying to come up with a workable solution, is intellectually challenging, and rewarding. – Joshua

Other views

Consistently with what we say above about studying law, we encourage you, of course, to listen to competing views and to make up your own mind. If you have time, you might be interested to watch a debate held in Cambridge in 2013 on the topic, “Those who wish to practise law should not study law at university”. The speakers were The Rt Hon. Lord Sumption, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom who read history and became an academic before becoming a leading barrister and judge, and Professor Graham Virgo, Professor of English Private Law and Pro-Vice Chancellor for Education in the University.

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How to write a 'why this law school' essay with examples.

Reviewed by:

David Merson

Former Head of Pre-Law Office, Northeastern University, & Admissions Officer, Brown University

Reviewed: 2/6/24

Entering law school? Knowing how to approach the “why law” school essay is vital—it's your tool to articulate why their institution is the ideal match for your legal goals. Let's get straight to it.

Getting into law school involves more than just grades—it's about convincing the admissions team why their school is the perfect fit for you.

In this guide, we'll walk you through the process of crafting a strong "Why This Law School" essay, using clear examples and practical advice to help your application stand out in the competitive pool of applicants. So, let's get down to the essentials that will make your essay a key asset in securing your spot at the law school of your choice.

Writing the "Why This Law School" Essay

When writing your "Why This Law School" essay, it's important to thoughtfully consider key elements to express your connection with clarity and purpose. So, let’s take a look at how to write a “why law” school essay.

Generating Ideas for Impactful Content

When you're getting ready to write your “why law” school essay, start by doing some research. Dig into the school's culture, mission, faculty, and special projects. Learn about their history and what campus life is like.

Next, think about what genuinely interests you about the school. It could be their commitment to diversity, a specific course they offer, or interesting internship opportunities . Write down these things that catch your attention.

Now, connect your own experiences, events, and skills with the things you found interesting about the school. If they're big on diversity, share your own experiences supporting inclusivity.

If there's a specific course you like, talk about how your past courses and work experiences make you a great fit. Basically, show them why you're not just any applicant but someone who can really add to what makes the school unique.

Stating Academic and Career Goals

A concise statement sets the stage, pinpointing what draws you to the school. Perhaps it's the renowned faculty or the emphasis on practical skills. Illustrate with a personal example—maybe a transformative moment during an internship or a class—that aligns with the school's values. Showcase your connection.

Highlight how your future aspirations intertwine with the school's strengths. Whether it's honing specific legal skills or contributing to a particular aspect of the academic community, paint a vivid picture of what you aim to achieve. Keep it focused, emphasizing the tapestry of alignment between your goals and the school's offerings.

Exploring Unique Opportunities Related to Your Interests

When explaining why a specific law school captures your attention, it's crucial to move beyond generic features and explore the distinctive opportunities the institution offers. For instance, consider the case of the UC Berkeley School of Law .

Dive into specific clinics like the Environmental Law Clinic, renowned professors such as Professor Abhay Aneja , or cutting-edge research projects like the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology. By delving into these unique aspects, you showcase genuine interest in what sets Berkeley Law apart.

Establishing a personal connection to these opportunities is key. It's not just about what Berkeley Law provides; it's about how programs like these align with your personal and professional goals.

This connection adds depth to your application, demonstrating how you'll not only benefit from these opportunities but also contribute positively to the overall Berkeley Law community. Effectively communicating this alignment enhances your case for being an ideal fit for the institution.

Adding Top Academic and Extracurricular/Social Reasons for Application

Crafting a compelling application involves presenting a balanced approach that seamlessly integrates both academic and extracurricular or social reasons for your choice. Showcase a comprehensive understanding of the law school's offerings, not only in terms of curriculum but also in the broader context of the overall student experience.

To demonstrate fit, articulate how your academic pursuits align harmoniously with the school's curriculum. Illustrate how the courses, faculty expertise, and academic environment resonate with your educational goals. Simultaneously, emphasize how your extracurricular interests contribute meaningfully to the broader community.

Whether it's involvement in student organizations, community service, or social initiatives, conveying a holistic engagement paints a picture of a candidate who will not only excel academically but also enrich the social fabric of the law school.

Knowing the Right Essay Length

If there are no guidelines, aim for around one double-spaced page, roughly 250–350 words. Format your essay like your personal statement, using "Interest in School X" in the header unless the application specifies otherwise (e.g., "Supplemental Essay One"). This ensures a smooth and organized flow of your thoughts throughout your application.

Thinking about length isn't just a detail; it's a sign of respecting the application process and the committee's time. This consideration makes your response more impactful and shows you get the importance of being concise without losing depth.

Seeking Professional Assistance

Starting your law school journey involves complexities, from crafting a strong application to excelling in standardized tests like the LSAT , GRE, Bar Exam, or MPRE. At Juris Education, our experienced admissions counselors are here to guide you through every step.

Navigating the details of expressing your achievements and overcoming setbacks can be challenging. Our team offers personalized guidance to help you strategically present your unique strengths, ensuring they connect with admissions committees.

Our consulting services are more than just advice; they make a real difference. Specifically designed for applicants dealing with challenges like low GPAs or LSAT scores, we specialize in turning setbacks into strengths, significantly improving your chances of acceptance.

We work closely with you to identify and highlight your standout qualities, tailoring your application to showcase what makes you exceptional. This personal touch sets you apart and boosts your appeal to admissions committees.

Common Mistakes to Avoid in Your “Why This Law School” Essay

Avoiding common pitfalls in your "Why This Law School" essay is crucial for clarity:

1. Vague Statements

When writing your essay, steer clear of vague language that could apply to any law school. Instead, focus on specific elements that make the institution unique, such as distinctive programs, esteemed faculty, or unparalleled opportunities.

Get into the details when discussing academic offerings—highlight faculty members aligned with your interests and pinpoint programs resonating with your academic goals. This specificity not only reveals your research depth but also establishes a thoughtful connection to the school.

2. Overemphasis on Reputation

While acknowledging a law school's prestige is vital, avoid fixating solely on reputation without linking it to your personal and professional goals. Admission committees want to understand how the school's reputation aligns with your aspirations and why it's the ideal place for your legal education.

Connect the school's reputation to your objectives to provide a nuanced perspective. For instance, if a law school is renowned for environmental law , emphasize this alignment if you're passionate about environmental advocacy.

3. Ignoring Extracurricular/Social Aspects

Don't overlook the significance of social and extracurricular factors in your decision-making process. Law school extends beyond academics; it's a comprehensive experience involving a community, networking opportunities, and extracurricular activities . Integrate both academic and extracurricular aspects into your essay.

Discuss how the law school's social environment, student organizations, and community engagement contribute to a holistic educational experience. This showcases a well-rounded understanding of the institution and its role in your overall legal education.

Structuring Your "Why This Law School?" Essay Effectively

Let's dive into how to make your "Why This Law School?" essay stand out by structuring it effectively.

Outlining Key Points and Themes

Making your "Why This Law School?" essay easy to understand involves a strategic approach:

1. Identify School-Specific Elements

Begin by pinpointing specific aspects of the law school that catch your interest—unique programs, esteemed faculty, or notable achievements. This lays the groundwork for a focused and impactful essay.

For instance, if the law school is known for its environmental law program and you're passionate about sustainability, highlight this in your essay. Show a deep understanding of the school's offerings and how they align with your personal and professional goals.

2. Prioritize Impactful Points

Once you've figured out what matters to you, rank them based on how much they affect your decision. What stands out the most to you? What fits well with your career goals? Putting the most impactful points first helps keep your essay clear and persuasive.

For instance, if the law school has a special program where you can work directly with clients, and this lines up with your goal of getting hands-on legal experience, make sure to highlight this. The goal is to show a sincere and careful tie to the institution.

3. Create a Logical Flow

Plan your essay with a clear order, starting with the most important points. Transition smoothly between your academic, extracurricular, and personal experiences to create a cohesive story that highlights your deep understanding of the law school and why it suits you.

For example, if your interest in environmental law relates to your commitment to community service, make sure to emphasize this connection. A well-structured and logically flowing essay enhances readability and strengthens your overall argument for why the law school is an ideal match for you.

Combining Academic and Extracurricular/Social Reasons

Ensuring balance is key when shaping your "Why This Law School?" essay. It's not just about academics; it's about capturing the broader law school experience. Avoid going all-in on one side; try to reflect your appreciation for academic offerings and your potential impact on the law school community.

Discuss how your academic path blends seamlessly with the social dynamics of law school. Share how your classes and extracurricular interests harmonize, illustrating how your involvement in student organizations weaves effortlessly into your coursework.

For instance, if the law school's clinical programs align with your academic groove, delve into how it extends beyond conventional study methods. Emphasize the practical, real-world learning experiences it offers.

By showcasing this interconnected approach, you demonstrate a well-thought-out perspective on your entire law school journey, adding an authentic and profound dimension to your essay.

Using Feedback and Editing Wisely

As you fine-tune your "Why This Law School" essay, let's talk about using feedback and editing in a smart and effective way.

1. Reach Out for Help

Before finishing your essay, get input from people you trust. Share your essay with mentors, peers, or advisors to get helpful feedback. Others can offer insights and spot areas for improvement that you might miss.

Choose people who know about the law school application process and can give constructive feedback on what you've written. Their input is essential for polishing both the content and presentation of your essay.

2. Revision Time

Revise your essay based on feedback, focusing on clarity, coherence, and strengthening your argument. Make sure to pay attention to suggestions that take your narrative to the next level. If feedback aligns with your goals, try to incorporate it. But, most importantly, trust your judgment and maintain the integrity of your narrative if a suggestion doesn't make sense with your vision.

3. Final Polishing

Before you submit your essay, focus on a last edit for grammar, style, and overall coherence. Make sure it fits the word or character limit and stays well-organized. Check how ideas flow, transitions between paragraphs, and the general readability.

A refined essay shows your dedication to a thoughtful application. Spend a moment on this final review to catch any remaining errors and guarantee your essay leaves the intended impression.

3 Examples of Successful “Why This Law School” Essays

Explore three successful examples of "Why This Law School" essays to gain practical insights into crafting compelling narratives and building strategic connections. Each “why law” school essay example has something to offer. Let’s get into them.

1. "Why Northwestern" Essay Example

Prompt : While other parts of your application give us a sense of who you are, we are also excited to hear more about how you see yourself engaging with the larger Northwestern community. In 300 words or less, help us understand how you might engage specific resources, opportunities, and/or communities here. We are curious about what these specifics are, as well as how they may enrich your time at Northwestern and beyond. (300 words max)

Essay Example

“I love Northwestern’s academic flexibility, including the freedom of the curriculum to explore a variety of fields and the emphasis on cross-department study. Also, the quarter system provides a faster pace of learning and the opportunity to take more classes than a semester school.

Specifically, I am excited by the Spanish and Portuguese departments and the classes on Hispanic and Lusophone culture, literature, and phonetics.

For example, the accelerated Portuguese program is a perfect way to pick up the language at a faster pace using my prior knowledge of Spanish. I intend to supplement my language acquisition through the study abroad programs offered at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro or an affiliate program in Santiago, Chile.

Additionally, the GESI program in Costa Rica is another intriguing opportunity through its intersectionality. It will allow me to combine a practical application of my language skills with studies in environmental conservation that I find a pressing and interesting issue. As an open-minded learner keen to forge links between academic fields of study, I believe I would be an excellent fit for the program.

I am also interested in Linguistics and pursuing undergraduate research or possibly undertaking the coterminal BA/MA program. The opportunity to link my research to a modern language of choice and investigate, for example, regional variation in Latin American Spanish or how Portuguese loanwords have infiltrated native Amazonian languages sounds fascinating and exciting.

Finally, the unique sense of community at Northwestern captivated me when I visited campus. The residential college system, the school spirit at Wildcat games, and the friendliness of the students I met, one of whom described the school as “the most welcoming place ever”, were all emblematic of this atmosphere for me. I think I will thrive in such a dynamic and inquisitive place.”

Why This Essay Works

This essay does a great job answering the prompt. It's clear and to the point. The applicant talks about why they're excited about Northwestern, like the flexibility of the curriculum and the quarter system.

They also get specific about their interests, like the Portuguese program and study abroad opportunities. Plus, they mention their enthusiasm for the community at Northwestern, which is a nice touch.

2. "Why Tufts?" Essay Example

Prompt : Which aspects of the Tufts undergraduate experience prompt your application? In short, "Why Tufts?" (150 words max)

“The cross-curricular focus and freedom of study at Tufts would allow me to pursue an interdisciplinary major and draw together my love for Spanish, Portuguese, Linguistics, and the natural sciences. This unique ability to design my own major by combining elements from a variety of academic fields definitely excites me. To support this, I intend to participate in the study abroad program in Chile or a civic semester in Urubamba, Peru that will allow me to practice my language skills while also benefitting the local community and gaining an invaluable cultural understanding through intimate homestay experience. Other than the academics, the vibrant community at Tufts also attracts me, with the warm and compassionate students acting as flattering adverts for the school. One student I spoke with described the average Jumbo as “goofy and loving” which I feel accurately matches my own character and outlook.

(144/150 words)”

This essay works because it clearly shows how Tufts University's cross-curricular approach aligns with the applicant's academic interests in Spanish, Portuguese, Linguistics, and the natural sciences.

It also conveys the applicant's intention to craft a unique major and engage in enriching experiences like studying abroad and contributing to local communities. Additionally, it portrays Tufts as a welcoming and compassionate community through the description provided by a current student, making a strong case for why the applicant is interested in the university.

3. "Why Tulane?" Essay Example

Prompt : Please describe why you are interested in attending Tulane University (optional). (50-800 words)

“Tulane University has a unique history, deeply established in the city it calls home, New Orleans. After transitioning from a medical school to a full college in in 1847, then undergoing a name change from the University of Louisiana to Tulane in 1884, as the city changed, Tulane changed with it. Tulane is the crossroad of two distinctly different ideals: being rooted in tradition and adapting to the needs of modern society.

When the city was devastated by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Tulanians answered the call to serve. Scott S. Cowen, then-President of Tulane, refused to let the hurricane ruin Tulane and the CIty. Tulanians were part of rescue and clean-up teams, devoting time and resources to rebuilding their school and the city it calls home. What was most impressive, however, was their resilience.

It would’ve been easy for the student body and staff to not come back. Being as smart and service-oriented as they are, the students and faculty could’ve found another place to live and learn easily. Yet, they returned. Tulanians have a certain sense of pride and commitment to the school that I admire.

They could’ve stayed home and not gone back, but they wanted to pick up the pieces of the school they love. It’s clear that Tulanians take ownership in their education. I want to go to a school that my peers want to go to; I want to be immersed in a community as excited about being in it as I am. That’s Tulane.

I could go on and on about Tulane’s teacher education program. I could write about how Tulane-educated teachers are leaders in their fields because they have both a degree in their area of study as well as certification to teach. Maybe I could mention the service learning requirements necessary to graduate and enter the teacher certification program, ensuring that the teachers are prepared to instill morals in the students that walk through their classroom door.

Truthfully, I could go almost anywhere to become a teacher, but only schools like Tulane that synthesize in- and out-of-classroom learning produce great ones. Tulane, like I said before, houses a resilient and altruistic student body. They served New Orleans specifically in 2005, but Tulanians serve their community every single day. Newsweek ranked Tulane 19th for service-minded schools. Likewise, the U.S. News & World Report placed Tulane in the top 25 schools for service learning. It is one of the top schools for producing Peace Corps volunteers, a program that interested me for post-graduate work.

Whether it is through Outreach Tulane, CACTUS, Wave of Green, or another similar program, I will be immersed in service work throughout my four years. Tulane stands alone in its commitment to community. Classroom education is married with service learning, producing empathetic, worldly leaders ready to set the world on fire. In my case, that will be through educating the next generation.

I need a meaningful education to be a meaningful educator. Tulane is unparalleled in its dedication to development of the students, on a personal and intellectual level. From when I touch the Victory Bell after Convocation all the way to when I say farewell at the Wave Goodbye Party at Commencement, I’ll have changed and grown, both in my mind and in my heart.

The Tulane study body is diverse and well-rounded; finding people and groups with shared interests is inevitable. I could see myself writing for the Hullabaloo or being a tutor in the After-School Newcomb Tutoring (which will bridge my learning and my intended career and give practical application to my education classes). But more so, I can just envision myself at Tulane, as a Tulanian. The willowing oak, myrtle, and cypress trees, the world-renowned research facilities, the dedicated faculty, the motivated and inspired student body, and the timeless school spirit all lend itself to a picture I can see myself in.”

This essay does a great job of showing why the applicant wants to attend Tulane University. It talks about the university's history, how it responded to Hurricane Katrina, and why the applicant is interested in their teacher education program.

It also mentions the strong commitment to service and personal growth at Tulane. Overall, it makes a strong case for why the applicant is excited about being a part of the Tulane community.

To sum it up, writing your “why law” school essay is all about storytelling. From understanding the unique aspects of law school to combining academic and extracurricular reasons, your essay is a chance to show why you're a perfect fit.

Explore the unique opportunities the school provides, creating a personal connection that enhances your application. Keep it simple: Steer clear of common mistakes, and make sure your essay is well-structured. And don't forget, the right essay length is more than a detail—it shows respect for the application process.

If you find it helpful, consider getting expert advice for a well-guided path to law school. Take inspiration from successful examples as you start your writing journey, creating a narrative that sets you apart in the competitive realm of law school applications.

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Why is Law important in our Society?

Law is a crucial element that shapes the way our society functions. It plays a fundamental role in our daily lives, even if we might not always realize it. In this article, we’ll explore the importance of law in simple, easy-to-understand terms.

Imagine a world without any rules or guidelines for Effective Laws . It would be a place of chaos, where individuals’ rights and freedoms would be constantly at risk. Law serves as the backbone of our society, providing structure, order, and a sense of security.

But what exactly is law, and why is it so significant? To answer these questions, let’s delve deeper into the concept of law and its various aspects. We’ll discover how it helps maintain peace, protect our rights, resolve conflicts, and much more. So, let’s start our journey into the world of law and its importance.

Table of Contents

What Is the Law?

Before we can fully grasp why law is important, it’s essential to understand what law is. At its core, the law can be thought of as a set of rules and regulations that govern human behaviour within a society. These rules are created by governments and other authorities to maintain order and ensure justice.

The law encompasses a wide range of areas, from criminal law which deals with offences like theft and assault to civil law, which governs disputes between individuals or organizations. Additionally, there are specialized fields like environmental law, family law, and intellectual property law, each with its specific set of regulations.

One key feature of the law is that it’s not static; it evolves over time to adapt to changing societal needs and values. This adaptability allows it to remain relevant and effective in addressing new challenges.

Now that we have a basic understanding of what the law entails, let’s explore the multifaceted role it plays in society and why it is so crucial.

The Roles of Law in Society

Now let us move to know why is law important to our society and the major roles of Law in society:

Establishing Order and Stability

Law plays a fundamental role in establishing and maintaining order and stability within society. This function is crucial for several reasons:

Preventing Chaos: Without laws, society would descend into chaos. No clear rules governing behaviour would lead to disputes, conflicts, and potentially violent confrontations. Laws set the boundaries for what is considered acceptable conduct and deter individuals from engaging in harmful or disruptive behaviour.
Defining Rights and Responsibilities: Laws define the rights and responsibilities of individuals and entities within a society. They specify what actions are prohibited and what consequences may follow if these prohibitions are violated. This clarity allows individuals to understand their rights and obligations, reducing uncertainty and potential conflicts.
Providing Predictability: The existence of laws provides predictability in society. People can anticipate the consequences of their actions and plan their lives accordingly. This predictability is essential for personal and economic decision-making, contributing to overall stability.
Supporting Social Contracts: Laws are a reflection of the social contract—the implicit agreement among members of a society to abide by certain rules in exchange for the benefits of living within that society. By upholding this social contract, the law fosters a sense of community and shared responsibility.
Law Enforcement: Law enforcement agencies, such as the police, ensure that laws are upheld and that individuals who violate them are held accountable. This enforcement creates a deterrent effect, discouraging potential wrongdoers and maintaining order.
Dispute Resolution: When conflicts arise, laws provide a structured framework for resolving disputes. Instead of resorting to personal vendettas or violence, individuals can turn to the legal system to seek redress. This not only reduces the potential for violence but also ensures that resolutions are fair and impartial.
Protecting Public Interest: Laws often include regulations and standards that protect the public interest. For example, traffic laws are designed to protect road users, while environmental laws safeguard natural resources and public health.

Promoting Justice and Fairness

Ensuring Accountability: The law holds individuals and entities accountable for their actions. It establishes a system of consequences for wrongful behaviour, ensuring that those who harm others or violate the rules face appropriate penalties. This accountability is a fundamental aspect of justice.
Protecting the Innocent: The legal system is designed to protect the rights of the accused and to ensure that individuals are presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. This principle safeguards innocent individuals from unjust punishment.
Equal Treatment: The law mandates that all individuals are equal before it. Discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or other factors is prohibited. This ensures that everyone has an equal opportunity to access justice, regardless of their background or characteristics.
Fair Legal Processes: The legal system is designed to provide fair and impartial processes for resolving disputes and determining guilt or innocence. This includes the right to legal representation, access to evidence, and the opportunity to present one’s case.
Restitution and Compensation: In cases where individuals have been wronged, the law often provides avenues for restitution or compensation. This helps victims recover losses and regain a sense of justice.
Deterring Wrongful Behavior: The knowledge that there are consequences for wrongful actions deters individuals from engaging in harmful or criminal behaviour. This deterrent effect contributes to overall societal safety.
Preventing Vigilantism: By providing a legal framework for seeking justice, the law discourages vigilantism and personal vendettas. It encourages individuals to rely on established legal processes.
Conflict Resolution: Legal mechanisms provide a peaceful and structured way to resolve conflicts and disputes, reducing the potential for violence or retaliation.
Promoting Ethical Behavior: The law often sets standards of ethical conduct in various professions and industries. It encourages individuals and organizations to behave ethically and responsibly.

Protecting Individual Rights

The protection of individual rights is a fundamental role of the law. It ensures that every member of society enjoys certain rights and freedoms, and it safeguards these rights against infringement. Here’s a more detailed exploration of how the law accomplishes this:

Freedom of Speech: Laws protect an individual’s right to express their thoughts, opinions, and ideas freely without censorship or government interference. This fundamental right underpins democratic societies by allowing for open discourse and the exchange of diverse viewpoints.
Right to Privacy: Legal frameworks prevent unwarranted intrusion into an individual’s private life. This includes protection against unauthorized surveillance, data breaches, and invasive searches, ensuring that personal information remains confidential.
Equality Before the Law: The law mandates that all individuals, regardless of their background, are equal before it. Discrimination based on factors such as race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation is prohibited. This ensures that everyone has an equal opportunity to seek justice and protection under the law.
Right to a Fair Trial: Legal systems guarantee the right to a fair and impartial trial for anyone accused of a crime. This includes the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, the right to legal representation, and the opportunity to present a defence.
Freedom from Torture and Cruelty: Laws prohibit the use of torture and cruel or degrading treatment, safeguarding the dignity and well-being of all individuals.
Right to Property: Property rights are protected by law, ensuring that individuals have the right to own, use, and dispose of property as they see fit within the boundaries set by the legal system.
Freedom of Religion: Individuals have the right to practice their religion or beliefs freely, and the law protects this right from discrimination or persecution.
Right to Education: In many societies, laws mandate that children have access to education, promoting equal opportunities for personal and intellectual growth.
Freedom of Assembly and Association: The law safeguards the right to peacefully assemble and associate with others, allowing for the formation of communities, organizations, and advocacy groups.
Right to Vote: In democratic societies, laws ensure that eligible citizens have the right to vote, participating in the selection of their representatives and shaping the course of their governments.

Resolving Disputes Peacefully

Disputes and conflicts are an inevitable part of human interactions. The law provides a structured and peaceful means of resolving these disputes, offering numerous benefits to society:

Alternative to Violence: In the absence of legal mechanisms, disputes could escalate into violence or personal vendettas. The law provides a non-violent, regulated way to address conflicts.
Impartial Resolution: Legal processes aim to be fair and impartial, ensuring that disputes are resolved based on evidence and the rule of law rather than personal biases or power dynamics.
Legal Framework: The law establishes a framework for dispute resolution, outlining the rights and responsibilities of parties involved. This clarity helps in understanding the process and potential outcomes.
Enforcement of Agreements: When parties enter into contracts or agreements, the law ensures that these agreements are enforceable. This promotes trust and reliability in business and personal relationships.
Access to Justice: Legal systems are designed to be accessible to all individuals, regardless of their background or financial means. This ensures that everyone has a pathway to seek redress and justice.
Protection of Rights: Dispute resolution through legal channels helps protect the rights of individuals and entities, ensuring that they are not unfairly deprived of their assets, properties, or other interests.
Preserving Relationships: Legal dispute resolution often includes mechanisms for mediation or negotiation, allowing parties to preserve relationships while finding mutually acceptable solutions.
Precedent Setting: Legal decisions and rulings can set precedents that guide future cases. This consistency in the application of the law promotes fairness and predictability.
Public Accountability: In some cases, legal proceedings can bring attention to issues of public concern, promoting accountability and transparency.
Expertise and Knowledge: Legal professionals bring expertise and knowledge to dispute resolution, ensuring that cases are analyzed and adjudicated by individuals trained in the law.

Fostering Economic Prosperity

The law plays a pivotal role in fostering economic growth and stability. This aspect of the law’s contribution to society is vital for several reasons:

Protection of Property Rights: The law establishes and protects property rights, ensuring that individuals and businesses have legal ownership of their assets. This protection is essential for encouraging investments, as it provides security and a basis for economic transactions.
Enforcement of Contracts: Contracts are the backbone of economic transactions. The law enforces the terms and conditions of contracts, promoting trust and reliability in business dealings. This enforcement ensures that parties fulfil their obligations, which is crucial for economic cooperation.
Consumer Protection: Consumer protection laws safeguard the rights of consumers. They ensure that products and services meet certain quality and safety standards, which enhances consumer confidence and protects public health.
Regulatory Frameworks: Laws establish regulatory frameworks that govern various industries and sectors. These regulations promote fair competition, prevent monopolies, and protect consumers from unscrupulous business practices.
Intellectual Property Protection: Intellectual property laws protect the creations of individuals and organizations, such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks. This protection fosters innovation, creativity, and the development of new technologies.
Labour Laws: Labor laws establish standards for wages, working conditions, and workers’ rights. They contribute to a fair and equitable labour market, ensuring that employees are treated fairly and paid adequately.
Banking and Finance Regulations: The law regulates the financial sector, including banking and investment practices. These regulations promote financial stability, protect investors, and prevent fraudulent activities.
Taxation Laws: Tax laws provide a framework for collecting revenue for public services and infrastructure. They also offer incentives for economic activities, such as tax deductions for businesses.
Economic Stability: The legal system contributes to economic stability by providing a predictable and enforceable legal environment for businesses and investors. This stability encourages long-term investments and economic growth.
Dispute Resolution in Business: Legal mechanisms for resolving business disputes, such as commercial courts or arbitration, ensure that businesses can address conflicts efficiently and fairly, minimizing disruptions.

Combating Discrimination and Promoting Equality

One of the important functions of the law is to combat discrimination and promote equality among individuals and groups within society. Here’s a more detailed exploration of how the law accomplishes this:

Anti-Discrimination Laws: Laws explicitly prohibit discrimination based on various characteristics, such as race, gender, age, disability, religion, or sexual orientation. These laws establish a legal framework that ensures individuals are treated fairly and without bias in various aspects of life, including employment, education, and access to public services.
Equal Employment Opportunities: Employment laws promote equal opportunities in the workplace. They prohibit discriminatory practices in hiring, promotion, and compensation, aiming to create a level playing field for all employees regardless of their background.
Educational Equality: Laws mandate equal access to quality education for all individuals, regardless of their socioeconomic status, race, or other characteristics. These laws help bridge educational disparities and promote equal opportunities for personal development.
Accessibility Regulations: Laws often include accessibility regulations to ensure that public spaces, services, and digital platforms are accessible to individuals with disabilities. These regulations promote inclusivity and equal access.
Affirmative Action: In some cases, laws may include affirmative action measures aimed at addressing historical inequalities. These measures seek to promote diversity and inclusion by providing targeted opportunities to underrepresented groups.
Marriage Equality: Laws have evolved to recognize and protect the rights of individuals in same-sex relationships, promoting marriage equality and eliminating discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Gender Equality: Legal frameworks support gender equality by addressing issues such as pay gaps, gender-based violence, and workplace harassment. These laws seek to create a society where individuals are treated equally regardless of gender.
Civil Rights Protections: Laws protect the civil rights of individuals, ensuring that they are not subject to discrimination or harassment in various public and private settings.
Hate Crime Legislation: Legal systems often include hate crime laws that enhance penalties for crimes committed with a bias or discriminatory motive. These laws send a strong message that society will not tolerate hate-based violence or discrimination.
Representation and Political Participation: Laws may address representation and political participation to ensure that underrepresented groups have a voice in decision-making processes, promoting inclusivity in governance.

Ensuring Environmental Protection

Environmental protection is a crucial aspect of the law’s role in society, with significant implications for the well-being of both current and future generations. Here’s a more detailed exploration of how the law contributes to environmental protection:

Conservation of Natural Resources: Environmental laws are designed to conserve and protect natural resources such as clean air, clean water, forests, wildlife, and biodiversity. These laws set standards and regulations to ensure that these resources are sustainably managed and preserved.
Pollution Control: Legal frameworks establish limits and regulations on emissions and pollution from industries, vehicles, and other sources. They aim to reduce air and water pollution , minimizing harm to the environment and public health.
Habitat Protection: Laws protect critical habitats for endangered species, ensuring their survival and biodiversity preservation. These measures help prevent the extinction of vulnerable species.
Land Use Planning: Legal zoning and land use regulations guide development and urban planning to prevent overdevelopment, habitat destruction, and the degradation of natural landscapes.
Environmental Impact Assessments: Legal requirements often mandate environmental impact assessments (EIAs) for major projects. These assessments evaluate potential environmental harm and propose mitigation measures.
Waste Management and Recycling: Environmental laws regulate waste disposal and promote recycling and waste reduction practices. They aim to reduce the environmental impact of waste and promote sustainable waste management.
Hazardous Materials Control: Legal frameworks govern the handling, storage, and disposal of hazardous materials to minimize environmental risks and protect human health.
Climate Change Mitigation: Laws address climate change by setting targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, promoting renewable energy sources, and supporting climate adaptation measures.
International Environmental Agreements: Nations enter into international agreements and treaties to address global environmental challenges, such as the Paris Agreement on climate change or the Convention on Biological Diversity.
Public Awareness and Education: Legal provisions often include requirements for public awareness and education about environmental issues. This fosters a sense of responsibility and encourages individuals and communities to take action to protect the environment.

Enhancing Public Safety and Security

Public safety and security are paramount concerns for any society, and the law plays a significant role in ensuring and enhancing them. Here’s a more detailed exploration of how the law accomplishes this:

Criminal Law: Criminal laws define and prohibit behaviours that harm individuals or society. They establish consequences for criminal acts, such as theft, assault, or murder, deterring individuals from engaging in such activities.
Law Enforcement: Law enforcement agencies, such as the police, are responsible for maintaining public safety and security. They investigate crimes, apprehend suspects, and work to prevent criminal activity.
Emergency Response: Legal frameworks establish emergency response systems and procedures to address various crises, including natural disasters, accidents, and public health emergencies. These systems save lives and protect communities.
Traffic Regulations: Traffic laws govern the safe operation of vehicles on the road. They include rules on speed limits, traffic signals, and seat belt use, all of which contribute to road safety.
Product Safety Standards: Laws require manufacturers to meet safety standards for products, such as automobiles, appliances, and children’s toys. This helps prevent accidents and injuries caused by unsafe products.
Fire Safety Regulations: Building and fire safety codes are established by law to ensure that structures are designed and maintained to prevent fires and protect occupants in case of emergencies.
Public Health Laws: Public health laws address issues such as food safety, sanitation, and disease control. They protect the health and well-being of the population by preventing the spread of diseases and ensuring the security of food and water.
Cybersecurity Regulations: In the digital age, laws address cybersecurity and data protection, safeguarding individuals and organizations from cyber threats and ensuring the privacy and security of digital information.
Gun Control Measures: Laws regulate the ownership and use of firearms, promoting safety by reducing the risk of gun-related accidents and crimes.
National Security: Legal frameworks related to national security address threats to a nation’s sovereignty and safety. They include measures to protect against terrorism and other security risks.

Facilitating Global Relations

In an increasingly interconnected world, the law plays a crucial role in facilitating relations between nations and ensuring cooperation on various fronts. Here’s a more detailed exploration of how the law contributes to global relations:

International Law: International law provides a framework for relations between countries. It includes treaties, conventions, and agreements that govern issues such as trade, diplomacy, human rights, and the environment.
Diplomacy: Laws establish the legal mechanisms for diplomacy and the conduct of diplomatic relations between nations. Diplomatic immunity, for example, is a legal principle that protects diplomats from legal actions in their host countries.
Trade and Commerce: International trade law regulates the exchange of goods and services between nations. Trade agreements and treaties set rules and standards for trade, contributing to economic cooperation and growth.
Human Rights: International human rights law sets global standards for the protection of human rights and dignity. Nations are bound by these laws and agreements to respect and promote fundamental rights and freedoms.
Environmental Cooperation: International environmental agreements and conventions address global environmental challenges. They promote cooperation in areas such as climate change, biodiversity conservation, and pollution control.
Conflict Resolution: International law includes mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes between nations. These mechanisms, such as international courts and arbitration, provide avenues for resolving conflicts without resorting to armed conflict.
Humanitarian Law: International humanitarian law governs the conduct of armed conflicts, aiming to protect civilians and minimize the suffering of those affected by conflicts.
Treaties and Alliances: Nations enter into treaties and alliances to formalize their commitments and partnerships on various issues, ranging from defence pacts to economic alliances.
Diplomatic Treaties and Agreements: Diplomatic agreements and treaties can address specific issues or disputes between nations, promoting peaceful relations and cooperation.
Global Governance: International organizations, such as the United Nations, play a crucial role in global governance and cooperation. They facilitate dialogue, coordinate efforts, and address global challenges collectively.

Promoting Social Progress

The law is a driving force behind social progress, aiming to improve the well-being and quality of life for individuals and communities. Here’s a more detailed exploration of how the law contributes to promoting social progress:

Social Welfare Programs: Laws often establish social welfare programs that provide support to individuals and families in need. These programs can include unemployment benefits, food assistance, and housing support, helping to reduce poverty and inequality.
Healthcare Access: Legal frameworks ensure access to healthcare services and establish health insurance systems that aim to provide affordable healthcare to all members of society. Law is providing the right to education to everyone.
Education Standards: Laws set educational standards and regulations to ensure that students receive a quality education. They establish the foundation for an educated and skilled workforce.
Labour Rights: Labor laws protect the rights of workers, including fair wages, safe working conditions, and the right to organize. These laws promote dignity and fairness in the workplace.
Disability Rights: Legal provisions protect the rights of individuals with disabilities, ensuring equal access to education, employment, and public services.
Gender Equality: Laws address gender disparities and promote gender equality in various aspects of life, including employment, education, and representation in leadership positions.
Social Inclusion: Legal measures often target social inclusion and aim to reduce discrimination and stigma against marginalized communities, such as ethnic minorities, LGBTQ+ individuals, and refugees.
Ageing Population: Legal frameworks address the needs of an ageing population, including healthcare, retirement, and elder care services.
Criminal Justice Reform: Laws can drive criminal justice reform efforts, aiming to reduce recidivism, promote rehabilitation, and address systemic inequalities in the criminal justice system.
Social Housing: Legal provisions may address housing affordability and homelessness by promoting social housing initiatives and protections for renters.

Supporting Healthcare and Public Health

Healthcare Regulation: Laws regulate healthcare providers, facilities, and services to ensure the quality and safety of healthcare delivery. This includes licensing requirements, standards of care, and patient rights.
Patient Rights: Legal frameworks protect the rights of patients, including the right to informed consent, confidentiality, and access to medical records. These rights ensure that individuals receive appropriate and ethical healthcare.
Public Health Measures: Laws empower public health agencies to take measures to prevent and control the spread of diseases. This includes quarantine and isolation orders during pandemics and vaccination requirements.
Health Insurance: Laws often mandate health insurance coverage for individuals, promoting access to healthcare services. They also regulate private health insurance providers to ensure fairness and affordability.
Medical Research: Legal frameworks govern medical research and clinical trials, setting ethical standards and protecting the rights and safety of research participants.
Pharmaceutical Regulation: Laws regulate the development, approval, and marketing of pharmaceuticals to ensure safety and efficacy. They also address issues such as generic drugs and prescription drug pricing.
Mental Health Care: Legal provisions address mental health care and the rights of individuals with mental health conditions. This includes access to treatment and protections against discrimination.
Emergency Healthcare: Laws establish emergency medical services and provide legal protections to healthcare providers and first responders during emergencies.
Environmental Health: Legal frameworks address environmental factors that impact public health, such as air and water quality regulations.
Health Education and Promotion: Legal measures often promote health education and public health campaigns to raise awareness about preventive measures and healthy behaviours.

In conclusion, the multifaceted role of law in society is undeniably profound and far-reaching. As we have explored various aspects of this role, it becomes evident that the law is not merely a set of rules and regulations but a cornerstone upon which modern civilizations are built. It serves as a guardian of order and stability, a champion of justice and fairness, a protector of individual rights, and a mediator of disputes, all while fostering economic prosperity, combating discrimination, and promoting equality.

The law also extends its influence into the realms of environmental protection, public safety, and global cooperation, contributing to the well-being of current and future generations. It supports healthcare and public health, ensuring that individuals have access to vital services and safeguards for their well-being. Moreover, the law is a driving force behind social progress, championing inclusivity, equal opportunities, and dignity for all members of society.

In essence, the law is not a static entity but a dynamic force that evolves to meet the changing needs and challenges of society. It embodies the principles of fairness, justice, and equity that underpin democratic and civilized nations. As we continue to confront complex global issues, the law remains a cornerstone for building a more just, equitable, and harmonious world. Its role is not only indispensable but also aspirational, inspiring us to strive for a better future where the rights and well-being of all individuals are upheld and protected under the rule of law.

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What is Importance of Law in Society

In our ever-evolving society, the importance of law cannot be overstated. Law serves as the backbone of societal order, providing a structured framework within which individuals can coexist harmoniously. Law helps to keep society moving as without law there would be chaos. Laws are created to serve society and shape morals, promote peace and public policies and to facilitate freedom and future. The law is important because it acts as a guideline as to what is accepted in society . Laws act as the norms of conduct for citizens, offering guidelines that dictate behavior to ensure the equitable operation of society’s various facets. This article delves into the multifaceted importance of law in maintaining societal balance, fostering social change, and upholding justice.

The Importance of Law in Maintaining Societal Order

Law as a guide for behavior.

Law plays a pivotal role in guiding the behavior of society’s members. It outlines what is acceptable and unacceptable, thereby preventing conflicts and misunderstandings between social groups and communities. The importance of law in society is evident through its ability to adapt to societal changes, ensuring that the legal framework remains relevant and effective in governing behavior.

Preventing Chaos and Promoting Equity

Without law, society would descend into chaos, with survival of the fittest becoming the norm. The importance of law lies in its ability to prevent such disorder, ensuring a lifestyle far removed from the anarchic scenario of every man for himself. It sustains the equity among the three branches of government, ensuring that power is not concentrated but rather distributed to maintain balance and prevent abuse.

The Role of Law in Facilitating Social Change

Direct and indirect influences.

The importance of law extends beyond mere governance; it is instrumental in facilitating social change. Through both direct and indirect roles, laws impact society by shaping behaviors and interacting with basic social institutions to foster change. Examples include compulsory education systems and laws prohibiting polygamy, which serve as agents of modernization and societal evolution.

A Catalyst for Social Transformation

Laws have been pivotal in introducing changes in societal structure and relationships. They have acted as catalysts in social transformation, addressing inequalities, and providing protective measures for the weak and vulnerable. The importance of law is evident in its capacity to bring about significant alterations in society’s economic structure, values, beliefs, and social dimensions.

FAQs on the Importance of Law

Q: How does law contribute to social equity? A: Law ensures that all individuals have access to justice and equal treatment under the law, thereby promoting social equity.

Q: Can law alone bring about social change? A: While law is a powerful tool for social change, it requires societal support and adherence to truly effect transformation.

Q: What is the relationship between law and society? A: Law and society are interdependent. Law reflects societal values and norms, while society adapts to changes in law to maintain order and justice.

The importance of law in society is multifaceted, extending from maintaining order and preventing chaos to facilitating social change and promoting equity. It is a vital instrument for governance, shaping politics, economics, and social interactions. As society continues to evolve, the role of law in adapting to and guiding these changes remains indispensable. Through the structured framework of law, we achieve a balanced, just, and progressive society where rights are protected, and individuals can thrive.

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This Essay explains why we should hesitate before throwing full support behind a civil Gideon initiative for family law, regardless of how wholeheartedly we embrace the proposition that parental rights are as important as physical liberty. The comparable importance of these interests does not necess…

Gideon Exceptionalism?

122 Yale L.J. 2126 (2013). There is no doubt that Gideon v. Wainwright is extraordinary, but in thinking about its uniqueness, we are reminded of “American exceptionalism” and the diametrically opposed meanings that advocates have ascribed to the phrase. Gideon too is exceptional, in both the laudato…

Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright

122 Yale L.J. 2150 (2013). In its 1963 ruling Gideon v. Wainwright , the Supreme Court declared the right to a lawyer “fundamental and essential” to fairness in the criminal courts and held that lawyers must be provided for people who could not afford them so that every person “stands equal before the…

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122 Yale L.J. 2176 (2013). A low income person is more likely to be prosecuted and imprisoned post- Gideon than pre- Gideon . Poor people lose in American criminal justice not because they have ineffective lawyers but because they are selectively targeted by police, prosecutors, and law makers. The crit…

Celebrating the “Null” Finding: Evidence-Based Strategies for Improving Access to Legal Services

122 Yale L.J. 2206 (2013). Recent empirical studies tested whether litigants with access to lawyers fared better than litigants with access only to advice or limited assistance. Two of the three studies produced null findings—the litigants with access to lawyers, the treatment group, fared no better …

Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel

122 Yale L.J. 2236 (2013). Critics of the criminal justice system observe that the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright remains unfulfilled. They decry both the inadequate quality of representation available to indigent defendants and the racially disproportionate outcome of the criminal process. Some hop…

Participation, Equality, and the Civil Right to Counsel: Lessons from Domestic and International Law

122 Yale L.J. 2260 (2013). Domestic efforts to establish a right to civil counsel by drawing narrow analogies to Gideon v. Wainwright have met with limited success. In contrast, two principles drawn from international jurisprudence—the human right to “civic participation” and the concept of “equality…

Gideon’s Migration

122 Yale L.J. 2282 (2013). For the past fifty years, immigration law has resisted integration of Gideon v. Wainwright ’s legacy of appointed counsel for the poor. Today, however, this resistance has given way to Gideon ’s migration. At the level of everyday practice, criminal defense attorneys appointe…

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122 Yale L.J. 2316 (2013). As we mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Gideon v. Wainwright decision, the nearly universal assessment is that our indigent defense system remains too under-resourced and overwhelmed to fulfill the promise of the landmark decision, and needs to be reformed. At the same t…

Gideon’s Amici: Why Do Prosecutors So Rarely Defend the Rights of the Accused?

122 Yale L.J. 2336 (2013). In Gideon v. Wainwright , twenty-three state attorneys general, led by Walter F. Mondale and Edward McCormack, joined an amicus brief on the side of the criminal accused, urging the Supreme Court to recognize indigent defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in…

Valuing Gideon’s Gold: How Much Justice Can We Afford?

122 Yale L.J. 2358 (2013). In this Essay, we explore Gideon ’s impact in our community, El Paso, Texas, which has the will to try to meet Gideon ’s challenge, but lacks the resources to deliver fully Gideon ’s promise. We look at the origins of our community’s indigent defense reform and examine our off…

Investigating Gideon’s Legacy in the U.S. Courts of Appeals

122 Yale L.J. 2376 (2013). This Essay investigates the legacy of Gideon by examining the de facto courts of last resort for convicted offenders: the federal courts of appeals. Part I focuses on the U.S. courts of appeals’ judges and caseloads, revealing that very few federal appellate judges have pri…

An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents

122 Yale L.J. 2394 (2013). In evaluating the legacy of Gideon v. Wainwright , it is critical to remember that the Supreme Court’s decision rested on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the accused in criminal cases. American law sharply demarcates between the many rights available to criminal def…

Gideon at Guantánamo

122 Yale L.J. 2416 (2013). The right to counsel maintains an uneasy relationship with the demands of trials for war crimes. Drawing on the author’s personal experiences from defending a Guantánamo detainee, the Author explains how Gideon set a baseline for the right to counsel at Guantánamo. Whether …

Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez

122 Yale L.J. 2428 (2013). This Essay argues that the Court’s effort to expand habeas review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Martinez v. Ryan will make little difference in either the enforcement of the right to the effective assistance of counsel or the provision of competent represen…

Gideon’s Law-Protective Function

122 Yale L.J. 2460 (2013). Gideon v. Wainwright dramatically affects the rights of indigent defendants by entitling them to representation. But Gideon has another systemic consequence as well. In addition to protecting the rights of individual defendants in particular trials, Gideon also protects the…

Gideon’s Shadow

122 Yale L.J. 2482 (2013). The right to counsel is regarded as a right without peer, even in a field of litigation saturated with constitutional protections. But from this elevated, elite-right status, the right to counsel casts a shadow over the other, less prominent criminal procedure rights. Elabo…

Gideon at Guantánamo: Democratic and Despotic Detention

122 Yale L.J. 2504 (2013). One measure of Gideon v. Wainwright is that it made the U.S. government’s efforts to isolate 9/11 detainees from all outsiders at Guantánamo Bay conceptually and legally unsustainable. Gideon , along with Miranda v. Arizona , is part of a democratic narrative shaped over dec…

Fear of Adversariness: Using Gideon To Restrict Defendants’ Invocation of Adversary Procedures

122 Yale L.J. 2550 (2013). Fifty years ago Gideon promised that an attorney would vindicate the constitutional rights of any accused too poor to afford an attorney. But Gideon also promised more. Writ small, Gideon promised to protect individual defendants; writ large, Gideon promised to protect our …

Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisition

122 Yale L.J. 2578 (2013). This Essay asks whether federal criminal defendants receive fairer process today than they did in 1963, when Gideon v. Wainwright was decided. It concludes that in many situations they do not; indeed, they often receive far worse. Although Gideon and the Criminal Justice Ac…

Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacy of State Procedures

122 Yale L.J. 2604 (2013). Everyone knows that excessive caseloads, poor funding, and a lack of training plague indigent defense delivery systems throughout the states, such that the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright is largely unfulfilled. Commentators have disagreed about how best to breathe life int…

Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage

122 Yale L.J. 2626 (2013). Despite the promise of Gideon , providing “the guiding hand of counsel” to indigent defendants remains unmanageable, largely because the nation’s public defender offices are overworked and underfunded. Faced with overwhelming caseloads and inadequate resources, public defend…

Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel

122 Yale L.J. 2650 (2013). Fifty years ago, Clarence Earl Gideon needed an effective trial attorney. The Supreme Court agreed with Gideon that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed him the right to counsel at trial. Recently, Galin Frye and Anthony Cooper also needed effective representation. These two men,…

The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents

122 Yale L.J. 1900 (2013). In IP scholarship, patents are commonly understood as more efficient than other approaches to innovation policy. Their primary ostensible advantage is allocative: as a form of property rights, patents act as a conduit between market signals and potential innovators, ostensi…

Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right

122 Yale L.J. 1444 (2013). This Essay puts forward the conceptual and normative underpinnings of a principle of abuse of property right. Owners abuse their right, I argue, when their decisions about a thing are designed just to produce harm. This is so whether that harm is an end in itself (spite) or…

Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof

122 Yale L.J. 1254 (2013). The preponderance standard is conventionally described as an absolute probability threshold of 0.5. This Essay argues that this absolute characterization of the burden of proof is wrong. Rather than focusing on an absolute threshold, the Essay reconceptualizes the preponder…

Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?

122 Yale L.J. 940 (2013). It is generally assumed that the Constitution requires the Senate to vote to confirm the President’s nominees to principal federal offices. This Essay argues, to the contrary, that when the President nominates an individual to a principal executive branch position, the Senat…

Asymmetries and Incentives in Plea Bargaining and Evidence Production

122 Yale L.J. 690 (2012). Legal rules severely restrict payments to fact witnesses, though the government can often offer plea bargains or other nonmonetary inducements to encourage testimony. This asymmetry is something of a puzzle, for most asymmetries in criminal law favor the defendant. The asymm…

Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality

122 Yale L.J. 384 (2012).

Regularly invoked by the Supreme Court in diverse contexts, the maxim nemo iudex in sua causa —no man should be judge in his own case—is widely thought to capture a bedrock principle of natural justice and constitutionalism. I will argue that the nemo iudex principle is a m…

Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law

122 Yale L.J. 422 (2012). Courts can decide only a small fraction of constitutional issues generated by the American government. This is widely acknowledged. But why do courts have such limited capacity? And how does this limitation affect the substance of constitutional law? This Essay advances a tw…

How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes

122 Yale L.J. 154 (2012). One in five indigent murder defendants in Philadelphia is randomly assigned representation by public defenders while the remainder receive court-appointed private attorneys. We exploit this random assignment to measure how defense counsel affect murder case outcomes. Compare…

One in five indigent murder defendants in Philadelphia is randomly assigned representation by public defenders while the remainder receive court-appointed private attorneys. We exploit this random assignment to measure how defense counsel affect murder case outcomes. Comp…

The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with Each Other

121 Yale L.J. 2216 (2012) . The potential complementarities between antitrust and consumer protection law—collectively, “consumer law”—are well known. The rise of the newly established Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) portends a deep rift in the intellectual infrastructure of consumer law …

Due Process as Separation of Powers

121 Yale L.J. 1672 (2012) . From its conceptual origin in Magna Charta, due process of law has required that government can deprive persons of rights only pursuant to a coordinated effort of separate institutions that make, execute, and adjudicate claims under the law. Originalist debates about whether t…

Income Tax Discrimination: Still Stuck in the Labyrinth of Impossibility

121 Yale L.J. 1118 (2012).

In previous articles, we have argued that the European Court of Justice’s reliance on nondiscrimination as the basis for its decisions did not (and could not) satisfy commonly accepted tax policy norms, such as fairness, administrability, economic efficiency, production o…

Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond

121 Yale L.J. 534 (2011).

State implementation of federal law is commonplace, but has been largely ignored by the interpretive doctrines of legislation and administrative law. We have no Chevron , federalism canon, or anything else for state implementation, nor any doctrines that ask how Congress’s…

The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the Nature of Tort Liability

121 Yale L.J. 142 (2011). When a tort rule is fully aligned, harms are valued equally across the elements. Because the valuation of harm within duty equals the valuation within the damages remedy, a fully aligned rule gives dutyholders the option to fully comply with the duty with respect to any harm by…

Justifications, Power, and Authority

117 Yale L.J. 1070 (2008).

Criminal law theory made a significant advance roughly thirty years ago when George Fletcher popularized the important conceptual distinction between justifications and excuses. In the intervening years, however, very little progress has been made in exploring the structu…

Irreparable Benefits

116 Yale L.J. 1284 (2007)

The conventional approach to preliminary relief focuses on irreparable harm but entirely neglects irreparable benefits. That is hard to understand. Errant irreversible harms are important because they distort incentives and have lasting distributional consequences. But the…

The Efficient Performance Hypothesis

116 Yale L.J. 568 (2006) Notable American jurists and scholars have advanced an approach to contract enforcement that would render breach legally and morally uncontestable, assuming compensation follows. Much of the justification for this endeavor has rested upon claims of judicial and economic effic…

Executive Branch Usurpation of Power: Corporations and Capital Markets

115 Yale L.J. 2416 (2006) Agencies in the executive branch are better situated than other political institutions to take advantage of opportunities to expand their power base by responding quickly and decisively to real or imagined crises. The executive has structural advantages over the other branch…

Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power To Say What the Law Is

115 Yale L.J. 2580 (2006) Under Marbury v. Madison , it is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." But in the last quarter-century, the Supreme Court has legitimated the executive's power of interpretation, above all in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural R…

Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System

This Essay considers the historic weakness of the American mayoralty and recent reform efforts designed to strengthen it. I argue that the strong mayoralty is a potential instrument for democratic self-government to the extent that it is able to amass power on behalf of the city.

Rational War and Constitutional Design

115 Yale L.J. 2512 (2006) Contemporary accounts of the allocation of war powers authority often focus on textual or historical debates as to whether the President or Congress holds the power to initiate military hostilities. In this Essay, we move beyond such debates and instead pursue a comparative …

Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive

115 Yale L.J. 2446 (2006) Proponents of the unitary executive have contended that its adoption by the framers "swept plural executive forms into the ash bin of history." Virtually every state government, however, has a divided executive in which executive power is apportioned among different executiv…

Gubernatorial Foreign Policy

115 Yale L.J. 2380 (2006) In a variety of circumstances, state governors exercise independent decision-making power over matters affecting the foreign policy of the United States. This Essay describes and defends this emerging system of gubernatorial foreign policy on both legal and functional ground…

Setting the World Right

115 Yale L.J. 2350 (2006) Five years after September 11, 2001, America's response to that traumatic day has effectively turned the world of American public law upside down. Claiming that a global war on terror calls for an entirely new legal paradigm, the Bush Administration and its supporters have p…

The President's Completion Power

115 Yale L.J. 2280 (2006) This Essay identifies and analyzes the President's completion power: the President's authority to prescribe incidental details needed to carry into execution a legislative scheme, even in the absence of congressional authorization to complete that scheme. The Essay shows tha…

Quasipublic Executives

115 Yale L.J. 2254 (2006) In this Essay, we first observe the rise of what we call "quasipublic executives": both "nominally private executives," that is, private executives in charge of public functions such as corrections, education, and national defense; and "nominally public executives," that is,…

Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution

115 Yale L.J. 2218 (2006) This Essay examines independent constitutional interpretation from the bottom up. It focuses on San Francisco's recent challenge to the California ban against same-sex marriage and the judicial response it provoked in Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco . The Essay argu…

Inherent Executive Power: A Comparative Perspective

115 Yale L.J. 2480 (2006) In light of recent debates regarding the scope and basis of inherent executive power, particularly with regard to foreign affairs and national security, this Essay examines different conceptions of executive power in five modern democracies. The Essay's study of British and …

Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within

115 Yale L.J. 2314 (2006) The standard conception of separation of powers presumes three branches with equivalent ambitions of maximizing their powers. Today, however, legislative abdication is the reigning modus operandi. Instead of bemoaning this state of affairs, this Essay asks how separation of …

Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain

115 Yale L.J. 1930 (2006) In a Chapter 11 reorganization, senior creditors can insist on being paid in full before anyone junior to them receives anything. In practice, however, departures from "absolute priority" treatment are commonplace. Explaining these deviations has been a central preoccupation…

Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy of Contested Access

115 Yale L.J. 996 (2006) According to conventional law-and-economics theory, private property rights tend to evolve as resource values rise. This optimistic assessment fails to explain the development of open access in many Third World property systems. Indeed, while the evolution of property has bee…

Of Property and Federalism

115 Yale L.J. 72 (2005) This Essay proposes a mechanism for expanding competition in state property law, while sketching out the limitations necessary to protect third parties. The fact that property law is produced by the states creates a unique opportunity for experimentation with such property and…

Democratic Disobedience

114 Yale L.J. 1897 (2005) Traditional justifications for civil disobedience emphasize the limits of legitimate political authority and defend civil disobedience as a just response when governments overstep these limits. Such liberal justifications are well suited to certain classes of civil disobedie…

To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping

114 Yale L.J. 1613 (2005) Many studies have documented seller discrimination against consumers, but this Essay tests and finds that consumers discriminate based on the seller's race. The authors collected data on more than 1000 taxicab rides in New Haven, Connecticut in 2001. After controlling for a …

Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It

114 Yale L.J. 535 (2004) Recent cases and scholarship have debated whether copyright law is consistent with the First Amendment. Much of the discussion has centered on copyright law's ability to suppress transformative, creative reuses of copyrighted works and on copyright's fair use doctrine as a m…

Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production

114 Yale L.J. 273 (2004) This Essay offers a framework to explain large-scale effective practices of sharing private, excludable goods. It starts with case studies of carpooling and distributed computing as motivating problems. It then suggests a definition for shareable goods as goods that are "lump…

Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure

114 Yale L.J. 85 (2004) Criminal procedure largely ignores remorse and apology or, at most, uses them as proxies for an individual defendant's badness. The field is preoccupied with procedural values such as efficiency, accuracy, and procedural fairness, to the exclusion of the criminal law's substan…

The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot

113 Yale L.J. 1753 (2004) INTRODUCTION In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced a campaign of aggressive preventive detention. Invoking Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General announced that just as Kennedy would arrest a mobster for "spitting on the…

Editor's Note: The Constitution in Times of Emergency

113 Yale L.J. 1751 (2004) Earlier in this Volume of The Yale Law Journal, Professor Bruce Ackerman published his essay The Emergency Constitution, in which he advocated a new constitutional regime to confront the potential for recurring terrorist attacks among modern nations--and the United States in…

The Anti-Emergency Constitution

113 Yale L.J. 1801 (2004) INTRODUCTION The season for talk of leaving the Constitution behind, while we grit our teeth and do what must be done in times of grave peril--the season for talk of saving the Constitution from the distortions wrought by sheer necessity, while we save ourselves from the d…

Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat

113 Yale L.J. 1223 (2004) The phrase "adverse selection" was originally coined by insurers to describe the process by which insureds utilize private knowledge of their own riskiness when deciding to buy or forgo insurance. If A knows he will die tomorrow (but his insurer does not), life insurance th…

The Emergency Constitution

113 Yale L.J. 1029 (2004) Terrorist attacks will be a recurring part of our future. The balance of technology has shifted, making it possible for a small band of zealots to wreak devastation where we least expect it--not on a plane next time, but with poison gas in the subway or a biotoxin in the wat…

Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century

113 Yale L.J. 895 (2004) The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on criminal juries has overlooked an important piece of history. This is most notable in the context of its jury discrimination jurisprudence over the past twenty years. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause p…

Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses

113 Yale L.J. 621 (2003) For decades, practitioners and academic commentators who believe that target boards should have broad discretion to resist hostile takeover attempts have put forward the "bargaining power hypothesis" to support their view. This hypothesis states that a target with strong tak…

Insider Abstention

113 Yale L.J. 455 (2003) Scholars writing on insider trading have long believed that insiders can beat the market simply by using nonpublic information to decide when not to trade. Using a simple model, this Essay has shown that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Insiders prevented from trading while …

Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise

113 Yale L.J. 119 (2003) "[M]en are described as I think they are," Adolf Berle writes of his work, "rather than as they think they are." He continues: "Some will be shocked. The businessman will find that he is a politician and a commissar--perhaps even a revolutionary one. The liberal finds himsel…

Digital Architecture as Crime Control

112 Yale L.J. 2261 (2003) The first generation of cyberlaw was about what regulates cyberspace. Led by Larry Lessig's path-breaking scholarship isolating architecture as a constraint on behavior online, a wide body of work has flourished. In a recent article, I took those insights and reverse-engine…

How Much Redistribution Should There Be?

112 Yale L.J. 2291 (2003) Egalitarianism ties people's fortunes together. It takes the good and bad things in people's lives--their blessings and their afflictions--and shares them out, or redistributes them, among their fellows. Where egalitarianism operates, each person's fortunes and misfortunes c…

Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extensionand Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property

112 Yale L.J. 2331 (2003) As intellectual property has become increasingly important to the national economy, a consensus has emerged among academics that courts should scrutinize congressional legislation closely under the Constitution's Copyright Clause. This Essay has challenged the academic conse…

Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle

112 Yale L.J. 1717 (2003) Why do we care about the Framers of the Constitution? After all, they lived long ago, in a world that was different in countless ways from ours. Why does it matter what their views were, for any reasons other than purely historical ones? And if we don't care about the Framer…

The Secret History of Race in the United States

112 Yale L.J. 1473 (2003) In the beginning, there was a man named Looney. George Looney's world was Buchanan County, Virginia, a pocket of Appalachian hills and hollows that juts into Kentucky and West Virginia. In 1911, his place in this world was secure. Where lumber was the only industry in town, …

Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?

112 Yale L.J. 829 (2003) Modern economic analysis of contract law began about thirty years ago and, many scholars would agree, has become the dominant academic style of contract theory. Traditional doctrinal analysis exerts less influence than it did prior to 1970 and enjoys little prestige. Philosop…

Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters

112 Yale L.J. 553 (2002) Does American corporate law work effectively to enhance shareholder value? The recent corporate governance crisis makes this time as good as any for reexamining the basic structure of this body of law. This Essay provides such a reconsideration of a defining feature of U.S. c…

100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System

112 Yale L.J. 261 (2002) We are now in a quiet interlude awaiting the next serious political debate over the nation's tax system. No fundamental tax policy concerns were at stake in the 2002 disputes over economic stimulus or the political huffing and puffing about postponing or accelerating the inco…

Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law

112 Yale L.J. 61 (2002) In this Essay, my central claim has been that the probability of harm is often neglected when people's emotions are activated, especially if people are thinking about the worst-case scenario. If that scenario is vivid and easy to visualize, large-scale changes in thought and b…

Local Policing After the Terror

111 Yale L.J. 2137 (2002) Crime waves always carry with them calls for more law enforcement authority. What happened on September 11, 2001 was, among other things, a crime wave--because of that one day, the number of homicides in America in 2001 will be twenty percent higher than the year before. It…

Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal

111 Yale L.J. 1665 (2002) There is a principle of constitutional law holding that "one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its successors." The Supreme Court recently discussed that principle at length in United States v. Winstar, and although the case was decided on other grounds,…

Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique

111 Yale L.J. 1707 (2002) Following the lead of Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, legal scholars have been obsessed with the countermajoritarian aspects of judicial review. Much of the literature is normative--how can the dilemma of judicial re…

Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing

111 Yale L.J. 941 (2002) This Essay has refocused the predatory pricing debate on ex ante incentives--i.e., the incentives for entry and limit pricing before the predatory period--instead of the traditional focus of high prices after the predatory period. Ideally, a monopoly incumbent should price re…

Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe

111 Yale L.J. 619 (2001) An absence of bounded categories may be unsettling but, in lieu of (false) comfort, multi-faceted federalism offers something else, hopefully more useful if less supportive. Under the rubric of multi-faceted federalism, the deployment of categories is accompanied by a sense t…

Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law

111 Yale L.J. 399 (2001) A veil of ignorance rule (more briefly a "veil rule") is a rule that suppresses self-interested behavior on the part of decisionmakers; it does so by subjecting the decisionmakers to uncertainty about the distribution of benefits and burdens that will result from a decision. …

What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?

111 Yale L.J. 357 (2001) Property has fallen out of fashion. Although people are as concerned as ever with acquiring and defending their material possessions, in the academic world there is little interest in understanding property. To some extent, this indifference reflects a more general skepticism…

Drug Designs are Different

111 Yale L.J. 151 (2001) In an essay published in this Journal entitled Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, George Conk criticizes the American Law Institute and the Reporters of the new Restatement for immunizing prescription drug manufacturers from lia…

Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics

110 Yale L.J. 1407 (2001) Shortly after the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Bush v. Gore, one member of the majority, Associate Justice Clarence Thomas, addressed a group of students in the Washington, D.C., area. He told them that he believed that the work of the Court was not in any way influenced…

Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power

110 Yale L.J. 1187 (2001) Narrowly construed, Pennhurst is a sensible (even if not necessary) process-based limitation on Congress's power to bind states to costly burdens. If read to mean that a state can never be bound by a grant condition when the statute itself does not unmistakably speak to a pa…

The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause

110 Yale L.J. 785 (2001)

Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel

110 Yale L.J. 441 (2000) Last Term, the Supreme Court sent ominous signals about the future of federal antidiscrimination law. The Court twice ruled that Congress lacked power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact laws prohibiting discrimination. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, …

Disaggregating Constitutional Torts

110 Yale L.J. 259 (2000) This Essay has attempted to clarify and reconceptualize constitutional tort law. Current doctrine severs remedies from rights and authorizes money damages on terms that apply indifferently to all constitutional violations. This remedial uniformity is faithful to the Monroe mo…

Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes

110 Yale L.J. 71 (2000) In this Essay, I have discussed the phenomenon of group polarization and explored some of its implications for deliberation generally and deliberative democracy in particular. The central empirical finding is that group discussion is likely to shift judgments toward a more ext…

Volume 133’s Emerging Scholar of the Year: Robyn Powell

Announcing the eighth annual student essay competition, announcing the ylj academic summer grants program, featured content, lock them™ up: holding transnational corporate human-rights abusers accountable, administrative law at a turning point, law and movements: clinical perspectives.

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The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law

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1 The Importance of International Law

Published: April 2001
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This chapter discusses that across the board, international law is an important part of the structure of our international society. It adds that states accept it as such, and their record in observing it bears comparison with the level of law observance in many countries. It stresses that international law is a part of the structure for it is an integral part of it and not an optional extra; and that it is but one part in the overall equation — important, but not to the exclusion of other parts. It explains that the importance of international law is a function of its effectiveness and its ability to respond to change. Both, at the present time and for the most part, are adequate, but perhaps only just. It adds that neither can be taken away for granted. It clarifies that both need attention and development within a framework of respect for the international rule of law, if a stable international order is to prevail.

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What is the Rule of Law?

by Lawprof Team

Essay Outline

3 conceptions of the rule of law, the bare bones conception.

When investigating what the Rule of Law consists of, Elliot’s tripartite distinction extends the traditional dualist debate between the formal and substantive conceptions one layer further. We thus begin with this extension – a barebone principle of legality. This is related to HLA Hart’s rule of recognition – if something is to be regarded a law, it must follow the appropriate procedure recognized by the legal system and constitution at large. In the context of the UK Parliament, this ordinarily requires approval by both Houses of Parliament, as well as royal assent from the Queen – in the circumstances proscribed under the Parliament Acts 1911/49, the consent of the Lords is not required. There are two things to note at this point. Firstly, this barebone principle of legality is morally neutral – to lend Sir Leslie Stephen’s overused example – the Blue Eyed Babies Genocidal Act 2020 would be valid provided it was enacted in the appropriate institutional context. Yet moral neturality does not strip the concept of normative value – to lend an example, Lord Camden’s famous judicial dicta in Entick v Carrington: “ if it is law, it will be found in our books. If it is not to be found there, it is not law.” This strong statement was accompanied with a declaration that then Secretary of State’s Lord Halifax’s order to search Entick’s home was unlawful. We thus already see normative value in this bare bone conception in preventing unfettered executive discretion – If Lord Halifax wished to conduct such search, he would have to either rely on statute or established precedent with regard to the prerogative.

The Formal Conception and the Prevailing Position in the United Kingdom

Many academics however, argue that the rule of law properly understood requires us to go further – beyond respect for the rule of recognition as one precondition for valid law, the rule of law is thought to impose further requirements. This is where the traditional debate between formal and substantive requirements is located. We speak of the former first. With regards to the formal conception of the Rule of law, there are multiple definitions. The high juristic authority of Joseph Raz is chosen here for its brevity and accuracy, as well as contemporaneous context(in comparison with Dicey). According to Raz, the 3 key requirements that the law must conform to are that laws:

Should be publicly and clearly stated
Should not have retroactive effect
Should be stable

These principles manifest themselves in judicial dicta which provide strong evidence that the UK constitution adheres to such a formal conception. Two cases are particularly helpful in this regard. Firstly, Lord Steyn’s invocation of the rule of law in Anufrijeva , where the entitlement to benefits of an asylum seeker was upheld is particularly instructive in demonstrating the application of legal certainty where it was thought that a constitutional state “must accord to individuals the right to know of a decision before their rights can be adversely affected”, with the Kafka-esque antithesis being described as a state where the rights of individuals could be eroded by “knocks on doors in the early hours”. Secondly, the idea that laws should not be retroactive is illustrated by Pierson , where it was held that the home secretary’s retroactive extension of a prisoner’s sentence from 15 to 20 years detention was unlawful on the basis that “a sentence lawfully passed should not retrospectively be increased”.

Further, Raz speaks of practical institutional arrangements which must be secured in order to conform with these 3 requirements – that people must have access to courts, further, their independence and expertise must be secured in order to allow them resolve disputes objectively in accordance with legal principle. Finally, in terms of the practical institutional requirement of access to courts which Raz argues is important – the Witham case involved the declaration that a substantial increase in fees to be paid to initiate litigation under … was held to be ultra vires as it would inhibit people on low incomes from making legal claims. Similar facts, relating to employment tribunals this time may be found in Unison .

At this point, it is clear that the formal conception provides more exacting conditions on our law as compared to the bare bones principle of legality – as it demands a legal framework that constrains in particular, the discretion of the executive, beyond the fact that laws must be passed through a process compatible with the prevailing rule of recognition. Expressed by Hayek, the normative appeal of the formal conception is clear and justifies its existence – legal certainty should be facilitated in order for individuals to be able to plan their behaviour as an individual autonomous agent. The eager constitutionalist is then confronted with a curious question – in pursuit of a more optimum normative state, why stop at the formal conception? Should further rights form the basis of a more onerous rule of recognition in pursuit of moral and normative truth? This is the controversy over the formal conception, which we now consider.

The Substantive Conception of the Rule of Law

The substantive conception of the rule of law, as well as the controversy surrounding it can be explicated paradoxically, by Raz’s argument against it- Citing a 1959 report of the International Committee of Jurists, who adopted the view that the rule of law encompassed values such as “civil and political rights” as well as “social educational and cultural conditions”, rejecting this view, Raz retorts “If the rule of law is the rule of the good law then to explain its nature is to propound a complete social philosophy”. Unpacking this dissent, we are firstly directed towards what the substantive conception entails – whereas the requirements of the formal conception, as explicated earlier are comparatively modest based on the foundational principle of respect for individual autonomy(as Elliot and Hart argue), the substantive conception claims for it what political constitutionalists such as Griffith would argue are simply contested political claims. Before examining Raz’s dissent, it is worth considering how, if at all, the substantive conception of the rule of law applies in the context of the UK’s constitution. “Law and Democracy” and “The Rule of Law” by the late and eminent Laws LJ and Lord Bingham respectively show the existence of a substantive conception, at least in the mind of judicial actors.

The position in case law is more controversial. While the formal and substantive conceptions are not entirely discrete, and debate abounds about at what point certain foundational principles turn into common political claims, there are two cases which arguably demonstrate the existence of such a conception. In Daly , a government policy was held to be unlawful because it conflicted with the right to attorney privilege. Emphasising that the decision was reached through “orthodox applications of common law principles” as opposed to convention rights, Lords Bingham and Cooke affirmed the view that “some rights [were] inherent and fundamental to democratic civilised society.” and that constitutions responded by recognising rather than creating these prior rights. Similarly, the right to equality was underlined by Re M , where a Minister was held in contempt of court for refusing to comply with a court order to stay his hand from deporting an asylum seeker. To hold otherwise according to Lord Templeman would “establish the proposition that the executive obey the law as a matter of grace and not as a matter of necessity, a proposition which would reverse the result of the Civil War”.

Attorney privilege and the right to equality appear to be good to uphold, wherein lies the controversy with the substantive conception? Fundamentally, the argument boils down to the usual concern raised by Griffith and hardline political constitutionalists in general that greater influence on the constitution by the judges will lead to a rise of machiavellian philosopher kings who rule without democratic mandate and cloak their politics in the false neutrality of a substantive conception. Raz thus distinguishes his formal conception as one which is morally neutral. Two points must be raised here, firstly in rebuttal of Raz And secondly in rebuttal of the political constitutionalist argument against the rule of law.

Raz’s Mistake and a rebuttal against Political Constitutionalism

Firstly, the formal conception cannot be said to be morally neutral – it is premised on the basic respect for the functioning of an individual as an autonomous being. This dispels any illusions of a bright line between formal and substantive forms of the rule of law – individual autonomy is potentially as contestable a right as attorney privilege in Daly , or the equality of individuals in Re M . The real distinction is that the formal conception is reliant on a foundationalist view of justification, where individual autonomy serves as the foundation on which all else rests. On the other hand, the substantive conception is reliant on a non foundationalist view, inasmuch as no single principle is taken to be the foundation on which all else depends; rather each belief mutually supports and is supported by the others, and is in that sense justified.

Secondly, deconstructing Griffith’s argument and using the foundational value of individual autonomy as an example, it is essentially the view that a lack of consensus precludes the existence of the virtue of individual autonomy from being objectively true, yet this objection doesn’t count snakes, tigers, and polar bears amongst those whose judgments (about the goodness of autonomy) are to be ascertained, but it is about as indiscriminating in its allowing virtually any member of the human species to count. Demonstrably, the volitionary and fetishistic slave may lack an appreciation of individual autonomy, while some might simply lack the capacity to come to a judgement on the matter. But why should the judgments of such individuals deflect those coming from the majority who have a deep capacity and self-evident certainty that individual autonomy is good? Or in fact, equality or attorney privilege for that matter? Few would dissent the normative value of these concepts. Further, our argument here does not simply rest on the support of the majority(which is assumed here admittedly). As Aquinas noted long ago, while certain propositions “are universally self-evident to all .. . [others] are self-evident only to the wise . . . If any propositions of law is self-evident, surely they are in the latter category, and to be adjudged by a class of individuals selected meritocratically from amongst the foremost institutions of legal practice – the judiciary.

Conclusions

The rule of law in our constitution.

No further justification will be given for the preceding arguments: the reader will either be convinced by the analysis, or will believe I am terribly wrong. Conveniently, there is only time to assume the former here. Proceeding on such a charitable assumption, we might draw two conclusions that illuminates the nature of the rule of law in our constitution. Firstly, that the rule of law is an important part of our constitutional arrangements – not only paid lip service to by the Constitutional Reform Act 2015, but also applied through the common law of the court in constitutional cases of recent memory, for what is hoped are obvious normative reasons, largely premised on a respect for the individual as an autonomous functioning being capable of making individual choices, as Hart puts it. This essay has argued for the existence of all 3 progressive forms of the rule of law within our constitutional framework – but it is conceded that only the bare bones and formal conception exist without dispute. The next conclusion addresses a potential unifying conception of a single rule of law.

A Unifying Conception of the Rule of Law

Regarding the debate between formal and substantive conceptions, this commentator controversially argues that there are no clearly demarcated boundaries – the distinction lies within the choice of epistemic justification proffered – Raz prefers a foundational theory, while late eminent jurists such as Sir John Laws and Lord Bingham of Cornhill for instance would support a non foundational justificatory framework. It is suggested however that we should not further create a false and unnecessary division of a constitutional principle as nebulous as the rule of law on the vagaries of epistemic justification – this is a distinction which outside a highly specialised or philosophical academic setting has little practical importance. Foundational or non foundational, the rule of law simply demands that its constituent principles have some grounds of (surprise) justification. Such justification may exist even though rights are contestable, because it is posited that widespread emotional response and consensus to values such as equality and the value of individual autonomy might serve as grounds of validating the truth of these assertions. It is conceded however, that this is a controversial view.

Allan’s Constitution of Reason

Crucially however, it is not argued that the judiciary employ the Rule of Law as a legal rule to usurp the power of the state on the grounds of intellectual or moral superiority – instead, this commentator believes that we must recognise that while contestable rights may have objective normative value, the more contestable or “substantive” the right, the greater the probability that this is an area where Parliament has better institutional legitimacy and design to tackle. There is thus a need for the courts to respect the constitutional position of the legislature and draw the boundaries accordingly in enforcing the rule of law. While law students certainly crave for bright lines, the constitution of reason is far more nuanced than we would have hoped.

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Essay on Importance of Law (986 Words)

February 19, 2018 by Study Mentor Leave a Comment

Society is a ‘web-relationship’ and social change clearly implies an adjustment in the arrangement of social relationship where a social relationship is comprehended regarding social procedures and social associations.

Along these lines, the term, ‘social change’ is utilized to show alluring varieties in social foundation, social procedures and social association.

It incorporates modifications in the structure and elements of the general public. Nearer examination of the part of law opposite social change drives us to recognize the direct and the roundabout parts of the part of law.

a) Law assumes a vital roundabout part as to social change by forming an immediate effect on society. For instance: A law setting up a necessary instructive framework.
b) Then again, law cooperates as a rule in a roundabout way with fundamental social foundations in a way constituting an immediate connection amongst law and social change. For instance, a law intended to forbid polygamy.

Table of Contents

Law as a medium for reforms

Law plays a specialist of modernization and social change. It is likewise a marker of the idea of societal many-sided quality and its specialist issues of combination.

Further, the fortification of our faith in the deep-rooted panchayat framework, the cancellation of the ab horrible practices of untouchability, kid marriage, sati, share and so forth are run of the mill representations of social change being achieved in the nation trough laws.

Law is a compelling medium or organization, instrumental in realizing social change in the nation or in any locale specifically. Along these lines, we revive our conviction that law has been significant in presenting changes in the societal structure and connections and keeps on being so.

Law positively has gone about as an impetus during the time spent social change of individuals wherein the weakening of station imbalances, defensive measures for the powerless and defenseless segments, accommodating the noble presence of those living under unwholesome conditions and so forth are the celebrated cases in such manner.

Social change includes an adjustment of society; its financial structure, qualities and convictions, and its monetary, political and social measurements additionally experience alteration. Notwithstanding, social change does not influence all parts of society in a similar way.

Social Change and Law

While a lot of social change is achieved by material changes, for example, innovation, new examples of creation, and so forth., different conditions are likewise vital.

For instance, as we have talked about it sometime recently, legitimate disallowance of untouchability in free India has not succeeded as a result of insufficient social help.

In any case, when law can’t achieve change without social help, despite everything it can make certain preconditions for social change.

Also, after freedom, the Constitution of India gave extensive rules to change. Its order guideline proposed a plan for another country.

The de-acknowledgment of the rank framework, correspondence under the watchful eye of the law and equivalent open doors for all in monetary, political and social circles were a portion of the high purposes of the Indian Constitution.

The law is imperative for a general public for it fills in as a standard of direct for subjects. It was additionally made to accommodate appropriate rules and request upon the conduct for all nationals and to manage the value on the three branches of the administration.

It keeps the general public running. Without law there would be disorder and it would be survival of the fittest and every man for himself. Not a perfect way of life for generally part.

The law is important because it acts as a guideline as to what is accepted in society. Without it there would be conflicts between social groups and communities.

It is pivotal that we follow them. The law allows for easy adoption to changes that occur in the society

Law as a system of structure

Law is an arrangement of standards and rules which are upheld through social foundations to represent conduct, wherever conceivable.

It shapes legislative issues, financial matters and society from multiple points of view and fills in as a social middle person of relations between individuals.

On the off chance that the mischief is criminalized in enactment, criminal law offers implies by which the state can indict the culprit.

Established law gives a structure to the making of law, the insurance of human rights and the decision of political delegates.

Authoritative law is utilized to audit the choices of government organizations, while universal law oversees issues between sovereign states in exercises extending from exchange to ecological direction or military activity.

The legitimate reaction to a given social or innovative issue is along these lines in itself a noteworthy social activity which may bother a given issue or ease and help to illuminate it.

Scholars have generally kept up that there are sure wide perspectives on the substantive criminal law. One arrangement of such imperatives concerns the sorts of conduct that may genuinely be disallowed.

Is it appropriate, for instance, to criminalize a specific sort of activity in light of the fact that a great many people in a single’s general public see it as shameless?

The other arrangement of limitations which concern what is required keeping in mind the end goal to build up criminal duty that is obligation, autonomously of the substance of the specific statute whose infringement is being referred to.

The Legal System

Legitimate framework mirrors all the vitality of life inside in any general public. Law has the unpredictable essentially of a living being. We can state that law is a sociology portrayed by development and adjustment.

Tenets are neither made nor connected in a vacuum, then again, they made and utilized on numerous occasions for a reason. Tenets are expected to move us in a specific course that we accept is great, or deny development in bearing that we accept is terrible.

The social tenets are made by the individuals from the general public. Insubordination of the social guidelines is trailed by discipline of social objection. There is no positive punishment related with the infringement of tenets aside from banning or shunning.

Then again, law is authorized by the state. The target of law is to get arrange the general public so the individuals from society can advance and create with a type of security in regards to what’s to come.

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A Passion for Immigration Law

W. Paul Alvarez, '16

W. Paul Alvarez’s (’16) passion for immigration law is rooted in his own immigration story. Paul was born in Ecuador and later became a naturalized citizen of the United States. "My parents believed that the best chance we had for a better life was to immigrate to the United States. We wanted a chance to live the ‘American Dream’ that we had heard so much about. Therefore, my family settled in New York and we assimilated quickly. However, as assimilated as we were, we were still living unlawfully in this country. My father knew that the key to our survival was to obtain lawful status that would allow us to live freely in this country. Through an employment sponsorship, my father was able to obtain permanent resident status for our family. I knew at that moment that our life had changed because becoming a permanent resident of the United States would open so many different opportunities for my family. There and then I knew that I wanted to help other immigrants achieve the ‘American Dream’ that I was blessed to have been given."

From that point, every educational step that Paul took was with the motivation to become someone who could help others achieve their "American Dream" as he and his family had achieved theirs. Attending SUNY Oneonta, Paul was a political science and Spanish major. He was frequently on the Dean’s List, a member of the pre-law society and President of the fraternity Tau Kappa Epsilon. "I knew that my ultimate journey would be law school."

After receiving his Bachelor’s degree, Paul decided to help run his family owned business, Alvarez Cleaning Service, Inc. To date, he has served as an owner, manager, and bookkeeper for the company. In 2016 he was awarded Business Person of the Year by the Pleasantville Chamber of Commerce. While still working for his family business, Paul also applied for and was offered a paralegal position at Julie Mullaney Attorney at Law, a small law firm in Westchester, focusing on immigration law. "It was great experience. I was able to see what an immigration attorney did from A to Z, ranging from larger issues to day-to-day issues. And, most importantly, it re-solidified my desire to attend law school and become an immigration attorney."

As for choosing Pace Law – "it just made sense," and had everything Paul was looking for – from location in Westchester, but close to New York City to a top-notch immigration law program featuring practical and classroom learning. While at Pace, Paul immersed himself in as much as he was able. "I was a member of the Pace Law Advocacy Honor Board as the Director of Internal Competitions; I participated in every oral advocacy competition that I was able – from immigration, to criminal law, to sports arbitration. I was the president and one of the founding members of the Immigration Law Student Organization, Vice-President of the Public Interest Law Student Organization and the Vice President of the Latin American Law Students Association, a representative for BARBRI, and Admissions Ambassador and Mentor, part of the Faculty-Student band, and player on the Pace intramural soccer team. I looked at every opportunity as a way to broaden my perspective and meet new people. And, I was fortunate to have so many opportunities."

Significantly, while Paul was at Pace he was a student attorney with the Pace Criminal Justice Clinic and the Pace Immigration Justice Clinic. He gained practical, hands-on, real-life, attorney experience through both of these opportunities. "I was doing things in these Clinics that most law students experience for the first time only as admitted attorneys. It was fascinating." His three most influential professors in law school were Vanessa Merton, David Dorfman and Lou Fasulo because each one of them taught him so many important lessons on becoming a zealous attorney that he will carry on for the rest of his career.

Today, Paul is an Associate Attorney at the office of Julie Mullaney Attorney at Law, the same firm that gave him his start as a paralegal before attending Law School. "I have worked in the immigration field as a paralegal, law clerk, and now an attorney for the last ten years. I have experience representing detained and non-detained clients in a variety of immigration matters. While working in the immigration field, one recurring theme that I have observed is the lack of knowledge that immigrants have regarding their rights. It is sad and frustrating to see that the lives of many immigrants are put in jeopardy because they either did not understand the gravity of their situation or they were taken advantage of by "notarios" who prey on the vulnerability of immigrants. My mission has been to guide my clients in the complex immigration matters and to coordinate community outreach programs that inform immigrants about their rights and opportunities for immigration relief. In this very difficult immigration climate, I’m willing to do everything that I can to keep families together."

Paul is also involved in various legal organizations – he is a member of the New York State Bar Association and the Westchester County Bar Association. Within the New York Chapter of the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) he has served as the Secretary of the Student Liaison Committee and is also a member of the Citizenship Day Committee and a member of the UPL and Ethics Committee.

In his spare time, Paul enjoys spending time with his family and friends. He is die-hard Yankee fan who also roots for the NY Giants and Rangers. He is enjoys playing in recreational soccer and kickball leagues.

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