essay on internet shutdown

What happens when the internet shuts down? 

Between 2019 and 2021, internet shutdowns in 46 countries resulted in losses of over $20.5 billion, according to the UN. Image:  REUTERS/Damir Sagolj

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• Internet shutdowns are intentional disruptions to internet access and digital communications.
• Shutdowns are a common tactic that governments use to suppress dissent.
• “Shutting off the internet in times of political upheaval, civil unrest and instability is one of the key building blocks for authoritarianism,” a cybersecurity expert at the World Economic Forum said.

There's been a recent wave of demonstrations across Iran with pictures and videos of the unrest flooding the internet, alongside calls for reform.

Yet protesters quickly realized that communications were being stifled, with popular messaging apps like WhatsApp and Signal failing to connect. In many areas, the internet was taken completely offline .

Internet shutdowns are a common tactic that governments use to suppress dissent and quell unrest. In 2021, at least 182 internet shutdowns were documented in 34 countries, according to Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition, an international association of digital advocacy groups.

The practice has also emerged as a major human rights issue, with many arguing that internet shutdowns constitute a violation of freedom of expression and assembly.

How do governments shut down the internet?

While internet networks are often vast and complex, deliberately shutting down the internet is simple for governments—especially for more authoritarian states that maintain broad control over the private sector.

“For too long, internet shutdowns have been too easy a decision for governments to make, and too easy an action for them to implement,” said Felicia Anthonio, the #KeepItOn campaign manager at Access Now.

Governments, in coordination with public and private internet service and utility providers, can shut down the internet in many ways. For instance, governments can cut off the power grid or dismantle internet service infrastructure like cell phone towers and fiber optic cables. Network routers and domain name systems can also be manipulated. Respectively, these techniques entail blocking content from passing through key network gateways, effectively stopping all internet traffic, and redirecting traffic away from intended online destinations.

Governments can also restrict access to specific websites or communication platforms—like Facebook, Telegram or WhatsApp—by blocking specific URLs or IP addresses. Distributed denial-of-service attacks, which entail disrupting internet access by overwhelming a server with a deluge of traffic, can be deployed, too. For example governments have restricted access to platforms such as Google and YouTube during opposition speeches, according to the internet freedom tracking organization NetBlocks.

“The method of internet interruption can give some indications of the intentions behind the shutoff,” said Gretchen Bueermann, a specialist at the World Economic Forum’s Centre for Cybersecurity . “For example, some types of disruptions are relatively easy to circumnavigate for a technologically aware person, while others are nearly impossible, revealing a government’s willingness to paralyse critical infrastructure in the interest of control.”

Moreover, governments can enact shutdowns by slowing the internet to unusable speeds. This tactic is known as throttling and often entails restricting bandwidth capabilities. In particular, throttling can make sharing videos and live streams—key components of modern protest movements—near impossible. In 2021, Access Now recorded throttling in at least 10 countries.

“Again and again, we’re seeing governments plunging people into darkness when they need access to information and communication platforms the most,” Anthonio added.

How internet shutdowns impact society

Internet access has become an integral and essential part of life for much of the world. In fact, in 2016, the United Nations declared that it considers internet access a human right .

Many opponents argue that internet shutdowns are a violation of civil liberties as they effectively hinder the public’s ability to assemble and cut off the free flow of information. This can allow authoritarian governments to silence critics and create distorted information echo chambers.

“Shutting off the internet not only disrupts citizen’s ability to get critical information and communicate with each other, but it digitally obfuscates the affected region from the outside world, further creating a path of least resistance for misinformation, disinformation and malicious propaganda,” Bueermann said.

Internet shutdowns also constitute a collective punishment, negatively impacting not only political opponents and protest groups but society as a whole. This is especially worrisome, experts note, given the widespread dependency on internet connectivity. Such consequences include impeding lifesaving care at hospitals and disrupting schooling. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, researchers found that remote learning was significantly obstructed by internet shutdowns in Bangladesh, Myanmar and India .

“Shutdowns restrict a range of human rights, from freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, to economic and social rights, as people rely on the internet for their livelihoods, education, and health,” said Deborah Brown, a senior technology researcher and advocate at Human Rights Watch. “What’s more, shutting down access to the internet and communications networks can cost lives, especially during periods of unrest or a public health emergency.”

Internet shutdowns significantly impact businesses, too. In Myanmar, for instance, the government imposed several internet shutdowns in the months following a military coup in February 2021. The World Bank estimates that the shutdowns cost Myanmar’s economy roughly $2.8 billion.

Another study found that between 2019 and 2021, internet shutdowns in 46 countries resulted in losses of over $20.5 billion, according to the United Nations .

Efforts to curb internet shutdowns

The frequency and duration of internet shutdowns are increasing, experts say. But so are efforts to document and circumvent shutdowns.

These efforts are largely a result of technological advances that can provide alternative internet connections through tools like virtual private networks and monitoring platforms that record internet manipulation and surveillance.

Technology companies and governments are also working to combat internet shutdowns. Google, for example, took steps to boost its connectivity in Iran last month after protesters were faced with widespread shutdowns. The efforts followed the relaxing of sanctions by the United States to allow more online communication to flow into Iran.

Civil society, tech companies and telcos, governments and international institutions must come together and put an end to authorities’ hitting the kill switch

Moreover, as noted in a recent United Nations report , there is a push to develop international frameworks to better document internet shutdowns and provide legal recourse for human rights infringements that occur as a result. Such efforts also include creating systems that allow for more transparency between governments and internet service providers—and give private companies more legal support to resist shutdown and manipulation requests.

“Under international law, governments have an obligation to ensure that any restrictions to information online are provided by law, are a necessary and proportionate response to a specific threat, and are in the public interest,” Brown explained, adding that governments should “never use broad, indiscriminate shutdowns.”

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Article Contents

Introduction, overview regarding iss and literature, the legal debate regarding iss, iss from the perspective of jst, summary and discussion, acknowledgments, funder information.

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Digital Rights and the State of Exception. Internet Shutdowns from the Perspective of Just Securitization Theory

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Johannes Thumfart, Digital Rights and the State of Exception. Internet Shutdowns from the Perspective of Just Securitization Theory, Journal of Global Security Studies , Volume 9, Issue 1, March 2024, ogad024, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad024

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Addressing cases from Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Spain, Togo, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Zimbabwe, this article discusses the global phenomenon of internet shutdowns (ISs) from the normative perspective of Just Securitization Theory (JST). It focuses on the conflict between arguments used to justify ISs and the negative impact of ISs regarding fundamental and human rights. This article develops strict criteria for when ISs might be legitimate as extraordinary security measures in emergency situations. Following JST, these criteria are based on citizens’ right to physical integrity, the expectation of reasonable success, proportionality, harm minimization, and specificity. I argue that it is not legitimate to use ISs to enact collective punishment, preemptive censorship, or hamper legitimate political protests. While denying the legitimacy of the vast majority of ISs on these grounds, I sketch four exceptional scenarios (“WhatsApp lynchings,” “US Capitol 2021,” “Computer virus,” and “False alarm”) in which ISs can be legitimate. JST also includes states’ duty to desecuritize once a threat has been neutralized. In this way, a balanced discussion of ISs as an exceptional measure from the perspective of JST contributes to the establishment of a customary positive human right to digital connectivity in the normal situation.

Este artículo analiza el fenómeno global de los cierres de Internet (IS, por sus siglas en inglés), a través de casos de Camerún, Egipto, Etiopía, India, Indonesia, Irán, Nigeria, Pakistán, España, Togo, Reino Unido, Estados Unidos y Zimbabue, desde la perspectiva normativa de la Teoría de la Securitización Justa (JST, por sus siglas en inglés). El artículo se centra en el conflicto existente entre los argumentos utilizados para justificar los IS y el impacto negativo que tienen los IS en relación con los derechos fundamentales y humanos. Este artículo desarrolla criterios estrictos con relación a cuándo los IS pueden llegar a tener legitimidad como medidas de seguridad extraordinarias en situaciones de emergencia. Partiendo de la JST, estos criterios se basan en el derecho a la integridad física de los ciudadanos, la expectativa de éxito razonable, la proporcionalidad, la minimización de daños y la especificidad. Argumentamos que no es legítimo utilizar los IS para promulgar castigos colectivos, para hacer una censura preventiva o para obstaculizar protestas políticas legítimas. Al mismo tiempo que negamos la legitimidad de la gran mayoría de los IS por estos motivos, también esbozamos cuatro escenarios excepcionales («linchamientos por WhatsApp», «Capitolio de EE. UU. 2021», «Virus informático» y «Falsa alarma») en los que los IS pueden llegar a ser legítimos. La JST también incluye el deber que tienen los Estados de «desecuritizar» una vez que se ha neutralizado una amenaza. De este modo, se genera un debate equilibrado sobre los IS como medida excepcional desde la perspectiva de la JST, que contribuye al establecimiento de un derecho humano positivo consuetudinario a la conectividad digital en una situación normal.

À partir de cas issus du Cameroun, d’Égypte, d’Éthiopie, d'Inde, d'Indonésie, d'Iran, du Nigéria, du Pakistan, d'Espagne, du Togo, du Royaume-Uni, des États-Unis et du Zimbabwe, cet article s'intéresse au phénomène mondial de suspension de l'Internet (SI) du point de vue normatif de la théorie de sécuritisation juste (TSJ). Il se concentre sur le conflit entre les arguments employés pour justifier les SI et leurs répercussions négatives sur les droits fondamentaux et humains. Cet article met au point des critères stricts quant à la légitimité des SI en tant que mesures de sécurité extraordinaires dans des situations d'urgence. Selon la TSJ, ces critères se fondent sur le droit du citoyen à l'intégrité physique, l'attente d'une réussite raisonnable, la proportionnalité, la minimisation des préjudices et la spécificité. J'affirme qu'il n'est pas légitime d'utiliser les SI à des fins de punition collective, de censure préventive ou pour entraver les manifestations politiques légitimes. Bien que je nie la légitimité de la grande majorité des SI pour ces raisons, j'esquisse quatre scénarios exceptionnels (« Lynchages WhatsApp », « Capitole américain 2021 », « Virus informatique » et « Fausse alarme ») dans lesquels les SI peuvent s'avérer légitimes. La TSJ prévoit aussi le devoir de l’État de désécuritisation une fois la menace neutralisée. Ainsi, un débat équilibré sur les SI en tant que mesure exceptionnelle du point de vue de la TSJ contribue à la définition d'un droit humain positif et coutumier à la connectivité numérique en situation normale.

Internet shutdowns (ISs) are intentional disruptions of internet access within a specific location and for a specific duration. They are usually ordered by governmental officials, but involve a complex assemblage of actors, infrastructure, political drivers, and regulatory discourses with national and transnational dimensions. ISs vary regarding the degree to which public actors need the collaboration of private internet service providers (ISPs) to enact ISs, which depends on who owns the infrastructure; ISs vary regarding the degree to which they are legally formalized, which depends on the degree to which a country abides by the rule of law; and ISs vary regarding the degree to which mobile or landline internet access is affected or only specific apps, which depends on technological feasibility and the aims of ISs. The caveat must be added that the concept of ISs is somewhat of a misnomer, since, due to the decentralized architecture of the internet, it is not possible to shut down the internet in a country completely ( Shah 2021 , 2696). Because digital communication is crucial to civic, economic, and educational participation, access to health services, and the flow of health-related data, ISs have a significant negative impact on the lives and rights of citizens ( Mbah, Nkangu, and Rogoff 2018 ; “Internet Shutdowns Impact” 2022 ; “Infographic” 2023 ).

ISs are increasingly widespread. In 2022 alone, there were 187 ISs globally, 184 in 2021, and 159 in 2020 ( “#KeepItOn: Fighting Internet Shutdowns” n.d .). The number of countries enacting ISs has been rising steadily, from 25 in 2016 to 35 in 2022 ( “#KeepItOn: Fighting Internet Shutdowns” n.d .). While most countries enacting ISs are hybrid or authoritarian regimes, India, the world’s largest democracy with authoritarian features, is, by far, leading the statistics, continuously counting for between 25 and 50 percent of ISs annually enacted since 2016. Consolidated Western democracies, too, have enacted ISs; for example, the United Kingdom in 2019 ( Vincent 2019 ), Spain in 2017 ( Sampedro, López-Ferrández, and Hidalgo 2021 ), and the United States in 2011 ( Lackert 2012 ).

Rather than dismissing the possibility of legitimate ISs in their entirety, such as the #keepiton coalition of activist groups, this article follows more nuanced academic approaches that submit the justifications for ISs to detailed and critical scrutiny ( De Gregorio and Stremlau 2020 ; Ruijgrok 2021 ; Endong 2022 ). I am discussing ISs from the perspective of the underlying conflict of rights and the (often only pretextual) security aims of states regarding real (or often only perceived or constructed) security threats: On the one hand, ISs interfere with the freedom of expression, information, peaceful assembly, association, and political and economic participation; and they have a social justice dimension because they often disproportionately affect underrepresented communities in developing societies—particularly women and members of lower social strata who do not have an alternative to mobile internet access ( Cattle 2016 ; Ruijgrok 2021 , 21; Shoker 2022 , 433ff.). Furthermore, ISs are a tool of authoritarian governments to avoid accountability by quelling the legitimate protests of citizens and preventing their grievances from being documented and shared ( Bhatia et al. 2023 ). ISs have also been identified as an instrument to create an information vacuum, which authoritarian governments can exploit by disseminating disinformation in an unrivaled way ( Wagner 2018 , 3921; Shah 2021 , 2703). For these reasons, ISs can be considered an authoritarian practice ( Glasius and Michaelsen 2018 ; Wagner 2018 ; Ruijgrok 2022 ).

On the other hand, some governmental institutions have cited not entirely implausible justifications for implementing ISs. For example, regarding incidents similar to India’s WhatsApp lynchings stoked by disinformation on social media ( BBC News 2018 ), it has been argued that ISs are necessary to guarantee the physical integrity of citizens threatened by such social media-fueled riots ( Ruijgrok 2021 ; Shah 2021 ). Similar arguments have been made regarding Nigeria’s ISs to prevent kidnappings in a fragile region ( Endong 2022 , 46). In the United States and the United Kingdom, ISs have been enacted to prevent possibly hazardous protests in subway systems ( Kravets 2011 ; Vincent 2019 ). And in 2023, the EU Commission considered the shutdown of social media as a last resort to enforce platform moderation regarding incendiary statements ( Goujard 2023 ).

To address the conflict between rights and security justifications related to ISs, this contribution discusses ISs within the framework of Just Securitization Theory (JST), an offspring of just war theory and securitization theory, which assesses the legitimacy of security measures ( Floyd 2019 ). In general, ISs are compatible with a securitization framework because they constitute an “exceptional measure,” infringing on fundamental rights justified by the aversion of security threats ( Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998 ; Ryng et al. 2022 ). Discussing ISs from the perspective of JST (as opposed to, for instance, an exclusively legal perspective) has three advantages: First, since JST is tailored to securitization, it provides a practice-oriented, more detailed normative orientation beyond the abstract principles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and national fundamental rights, which are frequently cited in normative debates regarding ISs. Second, since JST is an ethical theory, it transcends the scope of positive law and approaches the question of the legitimacy of actors and aims involved in ISs in a fundamental way, which, in turn, can inform legal and political debates and policy and law making across jurisdictions. Third, discussing ISs from the perspective of JST also has the paradoxical advantage of stabilizing the norm of digital connectivity. Since, according to JST, securitization requires desecuritization at one point, governments enacting ISs as a security measure are required to desecuritize and restore digital connectivity once the emergency has been resolved. Concretized by the debate about ISs, the (so far hypothetical) right to digital connectivity might surpass its relation to the freedom of expression as a negative right and turn into a customary positive right comparable to the positive human rights to education, literacy, or health ( Reglitz 2023 ).

The first section introduces the issue in an empirical and horizontal sense. It lists the most relevant ISs so far, addressing examples from authoritarian states, democracies, and from a broad range of hybrid regimes ( Bogaards 2009 ).

The second section summarizes the legal debate regarding ISs by focusing on the most relevant court cases from Zimbabwe, India, Togo, and Indonesia. This discussion concretizes how ISs can be understood as an “exceptional measure” and how courts apply the criteria of necessity, legitimacy, and proportionality derived from Article 19 of the ICCPR regarding restrictions on freedom of expression and information and criteria related to Article 4 of the ICCPR regarding the state of emergency. Furthermore, it demonstrates how the notion of a right to digital connectivity emerged from these litigation processes since they demonstrated how central digital connectivity has become to the enjoyment of a broad range of human and fundamental rights.

The third section discusses ISs from the perspective of JST as developed by Rita Floyd. Following Floyd, the criteria of human needs, reasonable success, and proportionality are emphasized. I underline that security measures should not be connected to collective punishment or preemptive censorship, which are generally illegitimate. I mention four exceptional scenarios (“WhatsApp lynchings,” “US Capitol 2021,” “Computer virus,” and “False alarm”) in which ISs can be legitimate if the requirements of JST are respected. A special focus is put on the issue of “just desecuritization,” which, in this case, implies the restoration of internet access after a threat has been averted.

In this overview, I consider widely discussed examples of ISs in authoritarian states, democracies, and hybrid regimes. Next to horizontally introducing these cases, I introduce the relevant scholarly literature. This horizontal overview is not intended to be complete, but to provide a solid base for the normative discussion in the following sections.

Although there is no exhaustive historiography of ISs yet, the first ISs seem to have been reported in 2005 in Nepal and Pakistan and in 2007 in Myanmar (“ Nepal: Out of the Silence” 2005 ; Tran 2007 ; Wagner 2018 ). However, this practice was not widely discussed before the Arab Spring in 2011, when the Egyptian government chose to quell protests by ordering ISPs to shut down connectivity from January 27 to February 2, 2011 ( Cohen 2011 ). Already in this case, internet connectivity was not terminated completely but remained partially intact (“ Egypt’s Internet Blackout” 2011 ; PCMag UK 2011 ). Due to the undisputed fact that this IS exclusively served to keep the authoritarian Mubarak regime in power, it did not produce a balanced debate (which might have also represented a “false balance”). The scholarly literature is largely focused on the Arab Spring as a prime example of “internet revolutions” ( Aouragh and Alexander 2011 ). A legal article published in 2016 discussed the issue from a perspective focused on the freedom of expression, the disproportionate effect of ISs on women, and the issue of the responsibility of private ISPs ( Cattle 2016 ). The case triggered a global debate regarding a human right to digital connectivity, which will be addressed in the next section.

The authoritarian Iranian government is still regularly attempting to stabilize its power through the imposition of ISs. One of the most notable incidents took place in November 2019, when protests erupted across Iran following a significant increase in fuel prices. During these protests, ISs served to quell the resistance by sabotaging accountability, which allowed the government to minimize the public repercussions of its killing of protestors (“ A Web of Impunity” 2020 ). During this partial shutdown, banking and government services continued to function ( Amnesty International 2020 ). Teheran also enacted ISs during the massive protests in 2022 following the killing of Mahsa Amiri ( Strzyżyńska 2022 ). Other authoritarian governments that used ISs to quell dissidents are Sudan ( Bhatia et al. 2023 ), Russia ( Kolomychenko 2018 ), Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan ( Muhamedov and Buralkiyeva 2023 ), and Myanmar and Belarus ( Ryng et al. 2022 ).

The first balanced debate about ISs was triggered by a quantitatively marginal, but qualitatively spectacular IS that occurred in a consolidated Western democracy: the shutdown of mobile internet access by San Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) in August 2011 ( Silverman 2011 ). BART officials cut the electricity to underground service towers in anticipation of planned protests over the shooting death of a knife-wielding man by BART police, which was publicly criticized as an excessive use of force. While these protests had a legitimate reason, BART representatives assumed that they might bring about security issues as observed during preceding protests ( Silverman 2011 , 580). Subsequently, Wi-Fi and mobile phone service were shut down from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. at four selected stations in the city center. The planned protests did ultimately not materialize. The fundamental rights debate regarding this case will be addressed in the next section.

Other ISs in Western democracies had similar characteristics: In April 2019, an IS in London was ordered by the British Transport Police (BTP) regarding protests by the climate activist group Extinction Rebellion (ER). The BTP ordered Transport for London (TfL) and Virgin Media to turn off the Wi-Fi service during the morning rush hour on April 17, 2019, to obstruct activists’ communication and organization ( Scroxton 2019 ). In April 2019, too, ER activists glued themselves to trains at Canary Wharf ( BBC News 2019 ). The BTP ensured that it aimed at “keeping disruption to a minimum” ( Scroxton 2019 ). Virgin Media emphasized that “connectivity will be restored as soon as possible” ( Scroxton 2019 ). Besides being briefly mentioned in order to underline the significance of ISs in consolidated democracies ( De Gregorio and Stremlau 2020 , 3917), this incident is not discussed in the scholarly literature.

In October 2017, another democracy, Spain, experienced an IS that has been characterized as “the first internet shutdown in the EU” ( Sampedro, López-Ferrández, and Hidalgo 2021 , 2). More precisely, the event included the blocking of specific websites and services and reportedly only led to total blackouts in several Catalonian municipalities ( Sampedro, López-Ferrández, and Hidalgo 2021 , 9). The estimates regarding the number of blocked websites range from 70 to 160 ( Sampedro, López-Ferrández, and Hidalgo 2021 , 8). The Catalonian independence referendum had been declared illegal by Spain’s Constitutional Court, and the Spanish authorities have ordered ISPs to block everything that is facilitating or even only promoting the referendum. Interesting are here the different policies of ISPs: some companies cooperated, others disobeyed and were then coerced, and other companies ignored the orders ( Sampedro, López-Ferrández, and Hidalgo 2021 , 7). Sampedro et al. discussed these differences regarding private actors’ compliance and related them to differences regarding their specific interest structures concerning governmental contracts on the national and regional level. Sampedro et al. have also taken the case of the Catalonian IS as a starting point for a classification of ISs, including criteria such as political system, recognition strategy, activation mechanisms, and scope ( Sampedro, López-Ferrández, and Hidalgo 2021 ).

India alone accounts for continuously between 25 and 50 percent of ISs annually enacted since 2016 ( “#KeepItOn: Fighting Internet Shutdowns” n.d .). The reportedly first IS in India was enacted in 2012 in the disputed, partly Muslim-majority border region of Jammu and Kashmir, officially aiming at preventing the dissemination of a video considered offensive to Islam ( India Today 2012 ). Since then, officially on grounds of combating terrorism, the region has repeatedly been subjected to ISs, experiencing the longest shutdown of 18 months, starting with the abrogation of the region’s special status in August 2019 ( The Indian Express 2021 ). However, it must be noted that this shutdown was rarely absolute. At different points in time, it contained different exceptions, for instance, for landlines and postpaid mobile phones, which was partly a reaction to the court decisions discussed in the next section ( The Indian Express 2021 ). Spikes regarding ISs also occurred during the protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act in December 2019, which facilitates non-Muslim immigration (and which many criticized for threatening the secular nature of the Indian state), and the agitation of the Patidar caste at the end of 2015/beginning of 2016 in Gujarat, which concerned conflicts between castes ( Ruijgrok 2021 , 15, 19). One of the most recent ISs in India (March 2023) was enacted because of expected clashes around Hindu and Muslim processions in the city of Nawalgarh, including the shutdown of mobile internet for 12 hours ( Zee News 2023 ). In 2017, the Indian government formalized the use of ISs with the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services Act of 2017, which allows for the “suspension of telecom services due to public emergency or public safety” ( “Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services” 2017 ). India’s complex society is rich in interreligious and interclass/caste conflicts. Therefore, the most frequent justification for ISs in India is to prevent interreligious or intercaste clashes and/or the spread of disinformation that could incite these clashes. However, also other justifications for ISs have been made, for instance, reoccurring ISs to prevent cheating in teacher’s exams ( Sanzgiri 2023 ).

Corresponding to the central significance of ISs in India, most scholarship is centered on this country. India serves as a prime example of a developing country in which mobile ISs have a severe effect because mobile internet use is often without an alternative ( Ruijgrok 2021 , 21). Highlighted is the extent to which these shutdowns are not necessarily effective (in a security sense), but performative displays of the power of the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) ( Shah 2021 ; Ruijgrok 2022 ). Ruijkrok analyzed the governmental justifications, noted that ISs are overused and stressed that ISs can be understood as collective punishment ( Ruijgrok 2021 , 4, 31). Rydzak argued that ISs generally favor violent forms of protest over nonviolent ones since precisely peaceful protest requires sophisticated forms of communication ( Rydzak 2019 , 17). As discussed in the next section, the situation in India was litigated in several court cases.

Indonesia is an interesting case since, comparable to India, the country is a democracy but has authoritarian traces. The country’s government enacted ISs on two widely discussed occasions ( Idris 2019 ; Rahman and Tang 2022 ; Satriawan, Elven, and Lailam 2023 ): First, the government blocked access to selected social media and slowed down internet connections in the whole country for several days in May 2019, which was justified by concerns that fake news would incite violent riots in Jakarta, following the announcement of the presidential election results. Second, on two occasions in August and September 2019, the Indonesian government blocked all internet access in the region of Papua in response to antiracist protests involving rioting, which were sparked by the arrest of students belonging to the country’s Papuan minority. These events triggered a widely discussed, successful lawsuit, which will be addressed in detail in the next section ( Anggraini and Rosnawati 2021 ; Rahman and Tang 2022 ; Satriawan, Elven, and Lailam 2023 ).

Pakistan can be clearly characterized as a hybrid regime ( Talbot 2021 ). Numerous ISs have been enacted in the country from 2012 to 2018 ( Wagner 2018 , 3924). The majority of these ISs lasted somewhere between one day and a week and were enacted as a preemptive measure on grounds of general security threats around mass events such as national or religious holidays, marches, strikes, protests, or high-level political events ( Wagner 2018 , 3925). Another, rarer category of ISs lasted longer and affected the Federally Administered Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan or the province of Balochistan inhabited by the Baloch minority ( Wagner 2018 , 3925). Wagner’s article on ISs in Pakistan (2018) is one of the earliest academic discussions of ISs, applying the concept of authoritarian practices with a focus on the sabotage of accountability. According to Wagner, there is “no form of legal recourse” to contest ISs in Pakistan ( Wagner 2018 , 3927).

Five African countries are important to the debate about ISs since they display democratic, authoritarian, and hybrid features ( Bogaards 2009 ): Cameroon, Ethiopia, Togo, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria. Cameroon started to block specific social media platforms around the general elections of 2011. The country’s first extensive IS lasted for more than 90 days, starting in January 2017, and affected two anglophone Western regions. The IS was a governmental reaction to conflicts related to the status of the anglophone minority ( Ritzen 2018 ). Due to these tensions and despite international condemnation, another shutdown was implemented in the anglophone regions from October 2017 to March 2018 ( Endong 2022 , 46). The case of Cameroon triggered the debate regarding ISs and health issues that became much more popular during the COVID crisis. In a correspondence article in Nature from 2018, two Cameroonian doctors, Mbah and Nkangu, argued that the IS in early 2017 disrupted digital health services and obstructed the flow of health-related data ( Mbah, Nkangu, and Rogoff 2018 ). Endong, who considers the legitimacy of ISs in his research, cites that the government's justification was based on the claim that anglophone secessionists were spreading fake news ( Endong 2022 , 46).

Another relevant case is Togo: Planned anti-government protests by members of the opposition resulted in internet access being disrupted or entirely cut off from September 6 to 8 in 2017. The incident led to a judgment by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice, which will be discussed in the next section ( Krapiva 2020 ).

An extremely important case is Ethiopia: The shutdown in the Tigray region of the country lasted for longer than two years and ranked among the longest shutdowns globally. It was enacted by the government because of the armed conflict between Tigrayan rebels and government forces in November 2020 and was removed starting with the ceasefire in November 2022 ( Anthonio 2023 ). The Ethiopian government claims that this shutdown was unintended and owed to the inability to guarantee the safety of workers needed to repair damaged infrastructure in the conflict region ( Keaten and Anna 2022 ).

In January 2019, the government of Zimbabwe enacted an IS to hide reports about state violence against protesters addressing fuel price increases. The IS had dramatic consequences because it disrupted access to the mobile money used by Zimbabwe’s government to pay public employees ( Al Jazeera 2019 ). The country’s largest ISP confirmed that it received a governmental order to suspend all internet access ( Reuters 2019 ). The legality of the IS has been denied by Zimbabwe’s High Court, which will be addressed in the next section.

The last case to discuss is Nigeria. During the heavily contested elections of 2015, the government shut down an SMS short code used by the opposition ( Endong 2022 , 46). The government’s attempt to stay in power through this and similar repressive measures failed. A more interesting case are the shutdowns enacted from 2013 to 2014 as part of the war strategy against the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram, which included the suspension of all mobile communication in the affected region ( Endong 2022 ). The government argued that the insurgents used mobile phones for detonating explosives and for intelligence. In this case, the Nigerian government might have been sincerely pursuing security goals, but the IS also had severe negative effects on ordinary citizens. Residents affected by the shutdown traveled long distances just to make phone calls in a neighboring town and were killed during this voyage ( Audu 2013 ). Due to these and similar issues, residents doubted that the shutdown was effective. Boko Haram’s violence reportedly increased during the shutdown and decreased afterward ( Audu 2013 ). However, a shutdown regarding a similar situation imposed in northern Nigeria in February and March 2021 was reportedly welcomed by most citizens of the region ( Princewill 2021 ). In this case, the shutdown aimed at disrupting the operations of bandits and ransom-seeking kidnappers and was deemed effective. These differences regarding effectiveness and public opinion are discussed in the literature ( Endong 2022 ).

The legal debate about ISs is closely connected to their context. On the one hand, shutdowns enacted by authoritarian regimes clearly aimed at suppressing the freedom of expression, information, peaceful assembly, and association. These ISs repeatedly constituted an occasion for Western governments, NGOs, and activists to claim a general right to digital connectivity. On the other hand, shutdowns in democracies abiding by the rule of law, particularly India, were accompanied by a more nuanced discussion considering the relevant governmental justifications and legal procedures. The arguments of the plaintiffs against ISs primarily focused on the restriction of digitally enabled freedom of expression and information and the freedom to conduct business, which they largely framed as disproportionate collateral damage of ISs on bystanders.

The events in Egypt were crucial to triggering the global normative debate about this issue. On June 1, 2011, the UN issued a Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet stating that ISs “can never be justified, including on public order or national security grounds” ( “Joint Declaration on Freedom” 2011 ). Correspondingly, in December 2011, the European Parliament drafted a largely rhetorical “no disconnect strategy” to support internet freedom abroad ( Kroes 2011 ; Stupp 2016 ). As Gregorio and Stremlau argue, the legitimacy of this position is highly questionable in legal terms because there is no human right to digital connectivity so far, and restrictions on the freedom of expression and information are not unusual, as long as they pass the three-step test based on legality, legitimacy, and proportionality derived from Article 19(3) of the ICCPR ( De Gregorio and Stremlau 2020 ).

The shutdown in San Francisco in the same year raised a more balanced legal debate regarding the fundamental rights of passengers and protesters to freedom of speech and political assembly ( Lackert 2012 ; Toronto 2018 ). In particular, the question was raised whether the Wi-Fi connection at BART only served the aim of transportation or could be understood as a public forum ( Toronto 2018 , 198). Additionally, there were concerns regarding the efficiency and proportionality of the IS. Those who defended BART's actions stressed that “there is no constitutional right to use a cell phone and that the restriction itself did not prohibit speech, but the manner in which that speech was communicated” ( Kravets 2011 ; Silverman 2011 ). Furthermore, it has been underlined that restrictions regarding the freedom of expression could only be justified on grounds of the concrete content of speech, which could include incitement to violence, but precisely not such restrictions as imposed by BART, which were preemptive ( Toronto 2018 , 198). This discussion, which was one of the only occasions addressing the impacts of ISs on the right to peaceful assembly in the West, did not turn into a court case.

The debates about BART and the Arab Spring provoked an article by Vint Cerf, who is widely recognized as one of the architects of the internet. In the article titled “Internet Access Is Not a Human Right,” he argued that internet access cannot be a human right because “technology is an enabler of rights, not a right itself” ( Cerf 2012 ). Furthermore, he argued that understanding internet access as a human right might be outdated one day due to the development of more advanced technologies.

Cerf’s early assessment was contrasted by several lawsuits focusing on the rights of journalists and the freedom of the press, specifically since the profession of journalists depends on technological amenities. In the case Amnesty International Togo & Ors v. The Togolese Republic (2020), a group of journalists and human rights activists argued that they required internet access in order to enjoy their freedom of expression and information and that they were consequently directly impacted by an IS that occurred during protests in 2017 ( Amnesty International Togo v. The Togolese Republic 2020 ). Their successful complaint was brought before the ECOWAS Court of Justice. The crucial argument was that the ECOWAS treaty included the rights of journalists and that the IS enacted by the Togolese government, therefore, violated the treaty.

In contrast to that, the defense of the Togolese government was based on security arguments. It stressed that “the continuing protests led to the loss of human lives, injuries being sustained on both sides and massive destruction of public and private properties” and “that as a means of countering the effect of the protests, the respondent had to contend with some form of control of the internet as hate speech and incitement were becoming rife” ( Amnesty International Togo v. The Togolese Republic , 2020 , 6). Furthermore, it went as far as stressing “that the fear of drifting into civil war prompted (. . .) (this) reaction (. . .)” ( Amnesty International Togo v. The Togolese Republic 2020 ). The court’s judgment included access to digital communication as a derivative right:

"Access to internet is not stricto sensu a fundamental human right but since internet service provides a platform to enhance the exercise of freedom of expression, it then becomes a derivative right that is a component of the exercise of the right to freedom of expression" ( Amnesty International Togo v. The Togolese Republic 2020 , 11).

In turn, the court stated that “it was imperative for the State to protect the national security (. . .)” and acknowledged the possibility to limit fundamental rights on such grounds ( Amnesty International Togo v. The Togolese Republic 2020 , 13). However, the judges emphasized that this procedure would only be legitimate if national law clearly regulated the suspension of fundamental rights on security grounds ( Amnesty International Togo v. The Togolese Republic 2020 ).

One year earlier, the Zimbabwe High Court had issued a similar judgment. According to this court, the IS in 2019 was illegal due to a procedural error: corresponding to its character as an emergency measure, the shutdown would have needed to be ordered by the President himself, or the President would have needed to officially endow someone with the relevant authority ( “High Court Sets aside Internet Shutdown Directives” 2019 ).

Due to its democratic constitution and the large number of shutdowns enacted there, Indian shutdowns produced the most significant court cases. First, there was the case Banashree Gogoi v. Union of India (2019) in the Gauhati High Court ( Banashree Gogoi v. Union of India and 7 Ors 2019 ). In this case, several public-interest litigations were filed against the ISs in the Indian state of Assam. These ISs were based on India's Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services Rules and enacted on grounds of safety risks resulting from violent protests that followed the Citizenship Amendment Bill in 2019 (discussed in the previous section). The petitioners requested the court to restore internet service as they were not able to continue with their professional activities without internet access. The petitioners argued that, since the violent protests, which served as the original justification for the ISs, stopped, these ISs should also be reversed, and, furthermore, that the shutdown of mobile internet access should not be maintained while landline access was restored ( Banashree Gogoi v. Union of India and 7 Ors 2019 , 5).

The court’s decision contains a detailed description of the negative side effects of ISs: obstructed cashless transactions, the resulting queues in front of ATMs, obstacles to receiving education, and disruption of electricity supply because of e-meters connected to the internet ( Banashree Gogoi v. Union of India and 7 Ors , 5ff.). The judgment also contains an aspect often overlooked in this discussion: The equal treatment of citizens arising from shutdowns only affecting mobile internet. In summary, the court concluded that “in given and specific situations, the law permits suspension (of internet access)” ( Banashree Gogoi v. Union of India and 7 Ors , 8). However, the judges stressed that once the emergency was resolved, it was necessary to also restore internet access as part of a “state of normalcy” ( Banashree Gogoi v. Union of India and 7 Ors ).

In 2020, the case Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India was litigated in the Indian Supreme Court, which was, once again, based on the rights of journalists. This case focused on the ISs in the Indian provinces of Jammu and Kashmir. The plaintiff was the editor of the Kashmir Times Srinagar Edition. She argued the internet is essential for the modern press and that she had been unable to publish her newspaper from August 6, 2019 to October 11, 2019, due to the imposed shutdown ( Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India 2020 , 5).

Referring to Article 4 of the ICCPR regarding the state of emergency ( Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India 2020 , 79) and Article 19 of the Indian constitution regarding the limitation of the freedom of speech and expression ( Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India 2020 , 30), the judgment argued once more that ISs constitute an exceptional measure and they should pass the three-step test based on legality, legitimacy, and proportionality. From these criteria, the judges developed several criteria regarding the legality of ISs. First, transparency, in the sense that shutdown orders should be published ( Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India 2020 , 127). This, they argued, should allow for the contestation of these orders in court. Second, the legality of ISs should be assessed based on the principle of proportionality, since “freedom of speech and expression and the freedom to practice any profession or carry on any trade, business or occupation over the medium of internet enjoy constitutional protection” ( Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India 2020 ). Third, the judges stressed that the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services Rules of 2017 allow for ISs but “for temporary duration only” ( Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India 2020 , 128). Fourth, the judges argued that “any order suspending internet under the Suspension Rules is subject to judicial review based on the parameters set out herein” ( Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India 2020 ). Fifth, the judges stated that attention should be paid to the exact nature of the emergency justifying the IS ( Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India 2020 , 129).

The judges approvingly cited Cerf’s Internet Access Is Not a Human Right from 2012 and warned that “the positive prescription of freedom of expression will result in different consequences which our own Constitution has not entered into” ( Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India 2020 , 24f.). The judges expressed their concerns that the Indian government could hardly comply with the duty to guarantee a positive freedom of speech, possibly including digital connectivity, throughout India with its “different social and economic backgrounds and existing on a different scale of development” ( Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India 2020 ). It is crucial to consider the context of these concerns: On the one hand, India is a rising digital power, having developed, for instance, the world’s largest digital ID system ( Ramnath and Assisi 2018 ); on the other hand, the country has the world's largest offline population ( “Countries with the Highest Offline Populations” 2023 ). Nevertheless, the judgment established a close linkage between digital communication and the freedom of speech and expression as negative rights:

"Expression through the internet has gained contemporary relevance and is one of the major means of information diffusion. Therefore, the freedom of speech and expression through the medium of internet is an integral part of Article 19(1)(a) and accordingly, any restriction on the same must be in accordance with Article 19(2) of the Constitution" ( Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India 2020 , 28).

Although the judgment was broadly welcomed and it forced the government to, at least, exempt some web pages from the shutdown (and make these websites available in a drastically slowed-down manner), legal scholars Mukhopadhyay and Gupta argued that the ruling missed the opportunity to settle the issue. Drawing on the logic of emergency, these researchers stated the following:

"The Indian Constitution (. . .) treats rights as the norm and restrictions as the exception and this foundational logic is inverted when an entire population is made to suffer for the misdeeds of a few" ( Mukhopadhyay and Gupta 2020 , 211).

Furthermore, Mukhopadhyay and Gupta argued that such a far-reaching generalization of exceptional measures would only be legal if these measures were connected to a formal declaration of a general state of emergency, which did not occur ( Mukhopadhyay and Gupta 2020 , 212). Moreover, Mukhopadhyay and Gupta argued that the court missed the full relevance of digital connectivity in terms of fundamental rights by discussing it exclusively in relation to the freedom of speech and expression, whereas, in fact, digital connectivity is a precondition to economic and social participation, and, especially in the context of COVID-related contact tracing, also health ( Mukhopadhyay and Gupta 2020 , 216).

Particularly, this reference to health is noteworthy. The court’s justification for ISs was implicitly based on the plausible assumption that the right to physical integrity trumps the freedom of speech and expression (and usually security justifications for ISs are implicitly based on the same assumption). However, this justification is not so clear once digital connectivity is tied to health issues. As previously argued by Mbah and Nkangu, ISs might prevent violations of physical integrity but also produce such violations by interrupting health-related flows of information ( Mbah, Nkangu, and Rogoff 2018 ).

The case Media Professionals v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir & Anr . (2020) in the Indian Supreme Court followed Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India ( Foundation for Media Professionals 2020 ). Three petitioners argued that mobile internet restrictions and throttling in the aftermath of Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India still excessively impacted citizens’ fundamental rights and that the criteria developed in the judgment of Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India were not adhered to in Jammu and Kashmir’s subsequent internet speed restrictions and blocking of mobile internet access ( Foundation for Media Professionals 2020 , 4). The petition noted that internet access was particularly important during the COVID pandemic, arguing that the shutdown impacted the “right to health, right to education, right to business, and right to freedom of speech and expression” ( Foundation for Media Professionals 2020 , 3). The judges concluded that the petition would “merit consideration” in “normal circumstances” ( Foundation for Media Professionals 2020 , 15), but pointed toward the concrete nature of the security risk at stake by reciting the numbers of dead and injured due to terrorist attacks. The judges concluded that “the fundamental rights of citizens need to be balanced with national security concerns when the situation so demands” ( Foundation for Media Professionals 2020 , 8). Moreover, the court considered that, particularly during the COVID pandemic, fast mobile internet access was not the only option to acquire relevant information, but it was also possible to download via slower mobile internet and landlines (15f.).

Several arguments brought forward in earlier cases can also be identified in the Indonesian case The Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) and Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet) v. the Minister of Communication and Information (2020 )( The Alliance of Independent Journalist 2020 ). Most notably, the Court referred to the three-step test based on legitimacy (a), legality (b), and proportionality (c), whereby they defined particularly the first criterion in a dangerously wide sense:

"a.) the fulfillment of a legitimate aim of human rights limitation, which is to recognize and respect the rights and honor of others, or to protect moral, religious values, national security, decency, public order, or public health in a democratic society;

b.) the restriction must be based on law;

c.) it must be proven that such restriction was necessary and proportionate" ( The Alliance of Independent Journalist 2020 , 249).

Comparable to similar assessments in India, the judges argued that ISs could only be enacted as part of a larger state of emergency ( The Alliance of Independent Journalist 2020 , 275), which would need to be officially declared following Article 4 of the ICCPR ( The Alliance of Independent Journalist 2020 , 37). Indonesian legal scholarship emphasized that the use of ISs should be based on “declaration, proportionality, necessity, and legality,” merging the criteria of Article 19 ICCPR regarding free speech restrictions and Article 4 ICCPR regarding states of emergency, and recommended “alternative Internet policy choices” ( Satriawan, Elven, and Lailam 2023 ). Others concluded that “blocking internet access without any sufficient legal instruments (. . .) indicates (. . .) a failure to uphold democracy” ( Rahman and Tang 2022 , 152).

In contrast to the freedom of speech, expression, information, and the freedom to conduct business, the freedom of association and the right to peaceful assembly have rarely been addressed in the discussed court cases. This does not mean that these rights are irrelevant to ISs. However, the litigation strategy of the plaintiffs usually emphasized the violation of their rights in nonpolitical and frequently professional domains as bystanders suffering from the disproportionate collateral damage of ISs. Considering the discussed cases, this strategy was the most promising since the political movements explicitly targeted by ISs were mostly deemed irreconcilable with national security and the rule of law (e.g., violent political radicalism and separatism). However, a recent report cites Indian farmers and union workers complaining about their political protests being obstructed by ISs ( Bajoria 2023 , 36ff.). Such complaints regarding legitimate political assemblies have not been brought to court yet, but the issue will be discussed in the next section.

In the first part of this section, I will discuss JST and apply it to ISs in general terms. In this discussion. I am focusing on identifying a great number of illegitimate ISs based on the cases addressed in the preceding two sections. In the second part of this section, I will discuss the four exceptional scenarios, “WhatsApp lynchings,” “US Capitol 2021,” “Computer virus,” and “False alarm,” which can justify ISs according to my understanding of JST.

Following just war theory’s tripartite structure, JST is divided into three parts: just initiation, just conduct, and just termination, each including several criteria. In total, Floyd lists eleven criteria of JST ( Floyd 2019 , 19ff.). The division of criteria into the three parts of JST can best be clarified by  table 1 .

The eleven criteria of JST in the context of JST’s three parts

Regarding criteria 1 and 2 of JST, legitimate securitization requires “an objective existential threat to a referent object” that meets “basic human needs, defined here as necessary components of human well-being” ( Floyd 2019 , 19f.). I will first address criterion 1 regarding the objectivity of the threat: What makes it difficult to apply JST to ISs is that Floyd’s original JST is relatively silent regarding digital issues. I have already noted and discussed that at length in my previous application of JST to cybersecurity ( Thumfart 2022 ). Only in the discussion of the hypothetical case “hacker,” Floyd underlined that threats to cybersecurity in general are not directly causing physical harm and can, therefore, not be answered with lethal force ( Floyd 2019 , 162ff.). However, if cyberattacks indirectly pose a lethal threat, for example, by attacks on infrastructure, these attacks can be met with lethal force, according to her arguments ( Floyd 2019 , 164). Applying these violence-centered arguments to ISs is difficult since ISs are a security measure that does not include direct or (in the narrower sense) indirect physical force. Therefore, the thresholds for enacting them might be lower than with respect to other, primarily physical security measures. However, ISs infringe on several human and fundamental rights and, due to their health-related effects, possibly also the right to health. Equally important, ISs are a particularly unspecific security measure that produces severe collateral damage to a great number of bystanders. For these reasons, to provide a very high-level form of orientation, it appears that a threat needs to be existential and physical to justify an IS. This qualification is particularly important regarding primarily nonphysical phenomena such as disinformation, hate speech, and incitement to violence, which have frequently served as justifications for ISs and will be discussed in detail in the last part of this section.

Concerning criterion 2 regarding the referent object of securitization, corresponding to her generally human-centric approach, Floyd underlines that national security as such does not qualify as a legitimate referent object of securitization, but only inasmuch as national security relates to basic human needs, including autonomy ( Floyd 2019 , 99ff.). Therefore, criterion 2 disqualifies the case of authoritarian regimes consolidating their power by implementing ISs, such as discussed in the first section. A threat to the stability of authoritarian regimes can even promote human well-being and the satisfaction of basic human needs, particularly regarding autonomy. However, a caveat must be added: Floyd’s JST is not entirely unambiguous in this regard. She explicitly distances herself from the rights-based categories of the just war tradition and pivots toward a needs-based approach combining deontological (i.e., rights-based) and consequentialist (i.e., effects-oriented) elements ( Floyd 2019 , 101, 69). Most importantly, she argues that rights do not guarantee their enjoyment ( Floyd 2019 , 101).

It is important to specify further whether criterion 2 should be understood in a consequentialist or deontological way. This fundamental ethical distinction is highly relevant when it comes to considering authoritarian states as legitimate referent objects of security on the grounds of their ability to guarantee security and satisfy basic human needs. Despite their illegitimacy from a deontological, human rights-centered perspective, authoritarian states might very well constitute the “least worst” solution regarding their effects if compared to the disorder that deontologically legitimate, but poorly organized uprisings might produce, which might, for example, disrupt water and energy supply in a way that is critical to human security. And, of course, although the intentions behind the security measures enacted by authoritarian governments are usually self-serving (see criterion 3), these governments, too, might effectively protect individuals from suffering physical harm.

Drawing on Floyd but going beyond her initial theory, I argue for a gradual solution that also fits the gradual distinction between democratic, authoritarian, and hybrid regimes discussed in the first section: It makes sense to connect deontological (i.e., rights-based) and consequentialist (i.e., effects-oriented) approaches considering the fact that the legally regulated distinction between “exceptional” and “normal” at the basis of securitization theory and JST is a property of states abiding by the rule of law ( Floyd 2019 , 62). Following this rationale, the degree to which rights can be legitimately limited during securitization directly relates to the degree to which governments are able to guarantee the enjoyment of these very rights in the normal situation. For instance, governments that guarantee far-reaching freedom of expression and information and the enjoyment of other rights regarding economic and political participation in the normal situation constitute more likely candidates for being legitimate securitizing actors and referent objects of securitization when it comes to ISs, which restrict these very freedoms and rights in exceptional situations. And vice versa, the degree to which governments can legitimately enact exceptional measures is delimited to the same degree to which these governments restrict fundamental rights in the normal situation or cannot guarantee their enjoyment.

This kind of reasoning, which relates the freedom and rights guaranteed by a political community to the rights that this political community might legitimately limit during emergency measures, also excludes private actors from being legitimate securitizing actors. Since private actors cannot guarantee the enjoyment of fundamental rights, they also cannot decide motu proprio when to infringe on these rights, except in the case of direct and immediate self-defense. However, if private ISPs should switch off their own networks motu proprio , this could also be viewed as a nonfulfillment of contractual obligations that does not touch on fundamental rights directly, particularly if they can provide a nonpolitical justification. Depending on the reach of a privately owned network, this could amount to a far-reaching IS. However, since this scenario is hypothetical and complex, it will not be discussed further in this article.

The legitimacy of authoritarian regimes as securitizing actors regarding ISs is also strictly limited by criterion 3 , which concerns the sincerity of intention. While it is possible that authoritarian or hybrid regimes impose ISs with the sincere intention to increase the security of their citizens, it is usually the case that these governments impose shutdowns to act precisely against the interests of their citizens, so that their grievances remain unheard and their need for autonomy unsatisfied, as illustrated by numerous cases discussed in the first section. However, here, too, a crucial caveat needs to be added: Intentions are strictly speaking nonempirical, purely subjective phenomena ( Floyd 2019 , 78). Floyd tackles this epistemological issue by referring to criminal law processes, in which the reconstruction of intentions is routinely approximated despite this epistemological difficulty. Focusing on one part of such procedures, I argue that intentions should best be assessed by the cui bono question, which was traditionally also part of the jus post bellum discussion in just war theory ( May 2014 , 17). To prevent exclusively “agent-benefiting securitization” ( Floyd 2019 , 126), the power or wealth of the securitizing actor should not be increased through the IS, and if such an increase took place, the status quo ante should be restituted during desecuritization (see criterion 9).

Criteria 4–7 are crucial regarding ISs and best discussed as one complex. ISs conflict with a broad range of fundamental and human rights, including the freedom of expression, information, association, and assembly; the freedom of economic and social participation; the right to education; and, in some cases, the right to health. However, they constitute a relatively limited form of purely technological intervention. This is particularly evident if compared to other “on the ground” methods of securitization, for example, curfews, policing, and more sophisticated work furthering the resolution of specific societal conflicts at the core of the security threats in question (for example, regarding the interreligious, interethnic, and interregional tensions in India, Spain, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Indonesia). In this sense, ISs should always be suspected of constituting a form of technological solutionism, i.e., the illusion that complex societal problems can be solved by operating a kill switch ( Morozov 2014 ). Floyd underlines that other “nonexceptional” options should be considered and, if possible, tried before securitization, and most importantly, prevention ( Floyd 2019 , 140, 97). This should be understood as an imperative. In the context of ISs, proportionality, expectation of success, appropriateness, specificity, and harm minimization should always be assessed: As discussed in the first section, research agrees that in most cases, ISs are not successful in tackling threats, and their (intended or unintended) ripple effects outweigh their benefits. ISs impose far-reaching costs on innocent bystanders ( Floyd 2019 , 132). They are, therefore, very likely surpassed by more targeted, less invasive, and more sustainable security measures.

Criterion 6 of appropriateness and specificity also stands against the legitimacy of ISs to prevent legitimate, but unintentionally hazardous protests, such as in London in 2019 or in San Francisco in 2011. In contrast to the exceptional scenarios regarding legitimate ISs discussed below (“WhatsApp lynchings,” “US Capitol 2021,” “Computer virus,” and “False alarm”), internet access is not the defining factor of the threats posed by such legitimate, but unintentionally hazardous protests. In particular, internet access is not relevant to the promotion of violence accompanying such protests by amplifying hate speech, incitement to violence, or disinformation, as discussed later regarding the scenarios “WhatsApp lynchings” and “US Capitol 2021.” Therefore, the security threats connected to legitimate and—as far as the intention of the organizers and the majority of the participants goes—nonviolent political protests should be tackled with conventional, more targeted security measures.

Criterion 8 is particularly important regarding ISs. While legitimate ISs might limit the freedom of expression, information, association, and assembly, other human rights should be respected in this context, particularly the rights related to procedural fairness summarized in Articles 7 and 8 of the UDHR (Floyd focusses rather on Article 9; Floyd 2019 , 162). According to my understanding, the central issue here is the linkage between contestability and traceability. As argued in numerous court cases, orders of ISs and their justification should be published to facilitate contestation, and their implementation should be formalized in legal procedures to facilitate the traceability of responsibility. While the exact procedures around ISs inevitably vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there generally should be a culture of contestability and traceability guaranteeing the identification of decision-makers, their arguments, and their degree of liability, as well as legalized procedures allowing for contestation as soon as an IS has been enacted. Successful contestation should, of course, include the lifting of ISs, but also compensation for unjustifiable harm. This would provide a strong budgetary incentive for governments to carefully weigh the enactment of a security measure with such a high degree of collateral damage and minimize the degree to which illegitimate ISs further the radicalization of innocent victims ( Floyd 2019 , 201).

Furthermore, security measures should not be confused with punitive measures. For instance, Ruijgrok argued that, because of their long duration and the size of the affected population, the ISs in Jammu and Kashmir can be understood as a form of collective punishment ( Ruijgrok 2021 , 4). This is also the case regarding the enactment of long-lasting ISs on the anglophones in Nigeria, the Tigray in Ethiopia, the Baloch minority in Pakistan, and the Papuan minority in Indonesia (all discussed in the first section). Collective punishment is generally prohibited since criminal responsibility can be attributed only to individuals. Moreover, securitization should not be confused with a punitive process because this is the domain of the judiciary. Securitization is the domain of the executive branch of government and should be focused on averting existential threats.

Criterion 9 is particularly important regarding ISs. Floyd, too, places great emphasis on this issue. She underlines that while criteria 1–5 regarding just initiation are permissive, criteria 9–11 regarding just termination are required ( Floyd 2019 , 21). As also argued in numerous court cases discussed in the previous section, states must reverse ISs once threats have been neutralized. In general, this means that it is highly unlikely that long-lasting ISs are legitimate; their duration alone suggests that they are not specifically enacted to address a concrete threat and not sufficiently successful in doing so (see criteria 5 and 6).

Criterion 10 addresses the need to publicly declare the reversal of securitization ( Floyd 2019 , 196), which is relevant regarding ISs, and raises the question of whether it is not securitization, too, that needs to be declared according to Article 4 of the ICCPR regarding the state of emergency. Floyd explicitly does “not include public declaration in JST,” which is highly problematic from this perspective ( Floyd 2019 , 140 fn 26). I agree with numerous court judgments cited in the previous section that ISs can only constitute a legitimate security measure if their reversal and implementation are publicly declared.

Criterion 11 is also highly relevant regarding ISs since it addresses the sustainability of securitization; securitization should render renewed securitization obsolete ( Floyd 2019 , 199). In this sense, a high frequency of ISs enacted in a country is a strong indicator of their illegitimacy. Accordingly, the judges in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) concluded: “Repetitive orders (. . .) would be an abuse of power” ( Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India 2020 , 129). However, despite their generally low rates of success, governments enacting ISs seem to increasingly rely on ISs instead of considering alternatives. As one governmental official put it: “When there is a communal issue, an internet shutdown is the first thing people do” ( Ruijgrok 2022 , 31). Analogously, a governmental official described the process of implementing ISs as “mechanical,” pointing toward increased normalization of this practice ( Wagner 2018 , 3926).

Particularly if one considers criteria 9–11 regarding “just termination,” i.e., that securitization needs to be reversed, that this reversal should be publicly declared, and that this reversal should be sustainable, JST creates a strong obligation for states to guarantee digital connectivity in the normal situation. Since security measures should be exceptional and are only justified as a means to avert existential threats, their enactment confronts securitizing actors with the high expectation to guarantee security and fundamental human rights in the normal situation. While the Copenhagen School’s dichotomous understanding of “normal” security and “exceptional” insecurity can and should be contested regarding its Eurocentric assumptions ( Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2020 ), this binary logic of exception and normal situation is highly compatible with the legal discourse about ISs following the ICCPR as discussed in the previous section: ISs should produce sustainable results, need to be reversed, and this reversal must be publicly declared. Therefore, the enactment of ISs creates a strong pressure on states to guarantee digital connectivity in the normal situation. With the official announcement of a lifted IS, citizens inevitably will tie their perception of the legitimacy of states to their perception of the quality of the digital networks that these states provide. This issue will be deepened in the final discussion.

In the remaining paragraphs of this section, I will apply JST in a legitimizing sense to ISs by addressing network security and the fight against disinformation, hate speech, and incitement to violence, the three latter having frequently served as justifications for ISs. In this context, I will consider the four exceptional scenarios: “Computer virus,” “WhatsApp lynchings,” “False alarm,” and “US Capitol 2021.” The first highly unlikely and hypothetical scenario, “Computer virus,” regards network security ( Stallings 2017 ). In the unlikely and hypothetical case of a new, highly aggressive computer virus spreading uncontrollably and indirectly threatening the satisfaction of basic human needs (for instance, by attacking critical infrastructure or by deleting financial information), it appears to be legitimate to enact ISs aimed at containing the spread of this virus. De Gregorio and Stremlau mention the example of a cyberattack that could cause human harm and, therefore, might be legitimately stopped by implementing an IS ( De Gregorio and Stremlau 2020 , 9). In scenarios such as “Computer virus,” in which the threat is largely independent of human actors, it could be necessary and effective to implement a far-reaching IS, including landline internet access. However, regarding this scenario and the following, it would be, of course, crucial to comply with all the criteria of JST discussed above.

Regarding the issue of disinformation in general, which is often cited as a justification for ISs (and which will be addressed below in detail regarding the much more likely scenarios “WhatsApp lynchings” and “False alarm”), it must be underlined that the mere falsity of statements cannot be regarded as a just cause of securitization since falsehood or inaccuracy usually do not constitute existential threats. False information is an abundant phenomenon, and it was not invented with the internet. Classical liberal theorists such as Milton, Jefferson, and Mill even emphasized the importance of falsehood as an antagonistic opponent of truth to keep the public debate running ( Milton 1918 , 58; Mill 2003 , 87f., 118; Jefferson 2004 , 391). While false information is certainly undesirable, conceiving of it in terms of a security threat leads to an overshooting hyper-securitization of the digital public sphere ( Taylor 2021 ). In this sense, demands to securitize on grounds of disinformation are comparable to authoritarian demands to securitize on behalf of traditional narratives or political ideologies and must be submitted to equal scrutiny from a human rights perspective. Since ISs can affect numerous fundamental rights, including the right to health, they are only proportionate if the threat that they are aimed at preventing has a demonstrable physical dimension. I emphasize that ISs on grounds of disinformation should generally only occur if that disinformation threatens the physical integrity of identifiable individual citizens or groups of citizens.

For instance, this is the case regarding incitement to severe violence based on disinformation about individuals similar to India’s WhatsApp lynchings ( BBC News 2018 ). This scenario, “WhatsApp lynchings,” constitutes my second example of legitimate ISs. Taking the historical case as a starting point in abstract terms, this scenario includes unfounded severe accusations against identifiable individuals (e.g., “they kidnap children”) and the appeal to lethal vigilantism, both spread via WhatsApp (or a similar widely used platform). First, this scenario passes the proportionality test since it includes lethal violence (“lynching”) or other severe forms of violence against clearly identifiable individuals. Second, it is not based on digital connectivity in general, but on one or several clearly defined chat apps that can be blocked in a more targeted sense (“WhatsApp”). Third, manhunts are not covered by the right to peaceful assembly, and following Article 22 of the ICCPR, also the freedom of association can be limited on grounds of “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Fourth, in contrast to legitimate protests with unintended hazardous side-effects discussed above regarding criterion 6, the constitution of mobs and their violent aims are likely to be inherently connected to digital connectivity because interactions on social media are likely to promote hate speech and disinformation ( Mathew et al. 2019 ; “Misinformation Amplification Analysis” 2022 ).

In this context, it is worth mentioning that ISs were also discussed by the EU Commission as a last resort to enforce platform moderation regarding incendiary statements: In September 2023, EU Commissioner Breton argued in favor of a controversial interpretation of the EU Digital Services Act as to allowing for “a temporary suspension or restriction of access” to a “very large online platform or search engine” as a “last resort (. . .) if the platform fails to take the necessary and effective actions” to delete content that is “threatening people’s life or safety” ( “Answer for Question” 2023 ). This controversial approach is too imprecise from a JST perspective because it focuses more on the legality of the content than on the successful aversion of concrete threats from concrete individuals. Moreover, Breton’s approach has a punitive dimension, which goes beyond threat aversion. From the perspective of the principles of harm minimization and specificity in JST, a legitimate IS in the scenario “WhatsApp lynchings” should not target a platform generally, but rather its specific role in the organization of specific mobs. For this purpose, a targeted shutdown focused on mobile access to a specific platform in a specific location (as opposed to a general shutdown of a specific platform) would suffice, assuming such a high degree of specificity is technically feasible.

A similar scenario of a legitimate IS regarding disinformation, “False alarm,” regards disinformation that demonstratively creates or is very likely to create a mass panic threatening the physical integrity of citizens. For instance, this could be a convincingly staged pseudo-official warning of a foreign invasion or of a natural disaster, which are most likely to occur as part of hybrid warfare or an action of hackers. In this scenario, too, the disseminated disinformation does not serve a legitimate political purpose and can lead to severe forms of physical harm. However, from a perspective focused on the expectation of success (criterion 5), implementing a complete IS on such grounds might produce even more panic, and targeting specific apps (if adequate) and only mobile access (which is crucial to coordinating human movement) is preferable.

The scenario “US Capitol 2021” constitutes my fourth and final example of a legitimate IS. Taking the historical case as a starting point in abstract terms, this scenario includes the violent attack on central democratic institutions connected to hate speech and incitement to violence disseminated via social networks and facilitated by organizing via digital media ( Frenkel 2021 ). Corresponding to the arguments regarding disinformation, due to the high importance of the rights that ISs infringe on and their effect on bystanders, one should only enact ISs on the grounds of incitement to violence and hate speech if these are related to concrete physical security threats (which does not exclude other measures against this kind of speech). Physical threats are present in this scenario, even though the violence does not need to be as severe as in the case of “WhatsApp lynchings” and might (unlike the historical case) even be limited to violence against objects. This is derived from the following line of reasoning: The scenario “US Capitol 2021” explicitly applies to democratic institutions since they are particularly vulnerable to pressure on deliberative processes and particularly legitimate referent objects of securitization following criterion 2. Even lower levels of violence directed against democratic core institutions might create chilling effects throughout society. Due to these broad societal effects of “US Capitol 2021,” the effects of ISs on bystanders are proportionate in this scenario. Since ISs in such scenarios should target the organization of concrete mobs, they should be restricted to mobile access for the duration of the violent gathering, if feasible and adequate, also to specific platforms. Regarding the effects on the freedom of association and assembly, it must be noted that the right to political assembly does not include violent political assemblies, and the freedom of association can be limited on grounds of national security concerns and the protection of the physical integrity of citizens following Article 22 of the ICCPR.

In neither of these scenarios, ISs should be used to restrict the freedom of expression preemptively, but securitization should be based on concrete evidence that disinformation, hate speech, and incitement to violence directly led to physical harm or violence against identifiable individuals or central democratic institutions or are at least very likely to do so. It is to be debated how significant this degree of harm or violence needs to be, but it should contain a contagious element related to potentially uncontrollable group dynamics directly related to internet access. Like all acts of preemptive securitization, preemptive ISs should be based on a realistic assessment of the relevant actors’ capacities to constitute a threat ( Floyd 2019 , 83f.). It must also be noted that this discussion regarding the exceptional security measures of ISs does not exclude other pathways to persecute hate speech and incitement to violence with regular legal mechanisms.

In this article, I first introduced cases of ISs in authoritarian, democratic, and hybrid regimes, then I summarized and structured the normative debate and the relevant court cases regarding ISs, focusing on human and fundamental rights infringed on through ISs and the structure of legal exceptionality in emergency situations as defined in the ICCPR. In the third section, I have developed a normative position by discussing ISs from the perspective of JST. From the perspective of JST, the assessment of the legitimacy of ISs should be based on eleven criteria (see  table 1 ). Particularly important of these are the following: Regarding sincerity of intention, it must be noted that authoritarian governments usually do not intend to guarantee security to their citizens but rather to enhance their own power by enacting ISs. Regarding the interconnected criteria of proportionality, expectation of success, appropriateness, specificity, harm minimization, and sustainability, ISs have a far-reaching impact on the enjoyment of a number of fundamental and human rights but are highly unspecific and often fail in producing sustainable forms of security. Most importantly, although some of these phenomena can be combatted by regular legal mechanisms depending on the jurisdiction, ISs should not be implemented to combat disinformation, hate speech, or incitement to violence since, by themselves, these phenomena do not constitute security threats severe enough to legitimate ISs. This is only different if disinformation, hate speech, or incitement to violence demonstratively or very likely cause severe physical harm or contagious forms of violence against identifiable individuals, groups, or central democratic institutions. If this applies and a direct linkage between digital connectivity and contagious violence can be empirically established and there is a reasonable chance of preventing violence by enacting an IS, ISs can be legitimate. In cases in which ISs do not demonstratively serve to avert imminent violence, ISs amount to preemptive censorship, which is illegitimate. Regarding human rights, it must be noted that ISs should be connected to legally formalized and transparent procedures that include contestability and the traceability of responsibility, and that they cannot serve as a tool for collective punishment. Regarding desecuritization, it must be noted that ISs constitute an exceptional measure and that states have the duty to reverse them once the relevant security threat has been averted.

In summary, my application of JST to ISs puts high requirements on the legitimacy of ISs but does not exclude the possibility that ISs constitute a legitimate exceptional measure to tackle clearly defined existential threats. Regarding the exceptional but likely scenarios “WhatsApp lynchings” and “Capitol 2021” and the more unlikely scenario “False alarm,” temporally and locally limited ISs in the sense of restrictions on mobile internet access represent a viable and legitimate tool to tackle limited security issues. The scope of ISs could be widened regarding the highly improbable scenario “Computer virus,” which also might include the shutdown of landline internet access. Regarding all these scenarios, the caveat must be added that ISs are part of the larger tendency of technological solutionism that tries to tackle complex societal tensions by operating a kill switch. Where available, less harmful, more specific, and more sustainable security measures are preferable, particularly if containing long-term and noninvasive perspectives regarding social security. The governments of developing nations might emphasize that such ethically preferable and more effective security measures are difficult to implement and too costly. In this case, ISs might constitute a short-term remedy against existential threats, and their enactment should remain an exception.

However, governments sign a Faustian bargain when implementing ISs. The normative and legal debate about ISs demonstrates that ISs paradoxically make a human right to digital connectivity increasingly plausible. The intentional suspension of digital connectivity during ISs demonstrated just how central digital connectivity became to daily life, touching on the freedom of expression and information, economic and political participation, education, and health. While, as of September 2023, this debate is focused on digital connectivity as a negative right, court cases and discussions around ISs are likely to accelerate the debate about digital connectivity as a positive right, comparable to the rights to education, health, and literacy ( Reglitz 2023 ). Governments that display their power over digital networks by enacting ISs in emergency situations will find themselves sooner or later judged by their capacity to provide decent internet access to all their citizens in the normal situation. From this perspective, it is necessary to consider that in the case of India, ISs occur in an environment that includes the world’s largest offline population. Justified complaints about the far-reaching effects of ISs inevitably remind the digitally underprivileged what they are still lacking on a day-to-day basis.

In this sense, the complex interrelation between facticity, norm, and exception in the context of ISs is a reflection of the loopholes in the theories of Carl Schmitt, whose exceptionalism bore an influence on securitization theory and who is generally considered a crucial theorist of the state of emergency ( Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998 ; Dyzenhaus 2006 ; Williams 2015 , 143; Floyd 2019 , 58). In response to Schmitt’s authoritarian pre-WWII decisionist formula “sovereign is he who decides on the exception,” post-WWII esthetic theorist Brock formulated: “sovereign is now only he who guarantees the normal” ( Schmitt 2005 , 5; Brock 2008 , 258). Disrupting digital flows may be the easiest way for states to stage sovereign control in the digital age, but it is by far not the most sophisticated one and, therefore, might be considered a capitulation of state power in face of the complex security threats of the digital age.

This article opens a broad horizon for future research. Most importantly, empirical research should continue to investigate the gap between perception and reality regarding the actual nature of threats that are cited in the justifications for ISs, the efficiency and effectivity of ISs in tackling these threats, and the perception of governmental officials regarding these issues. Furthermore, security experts, lawyers, and ethicists should continue developing realistic norms regarding ISs that can globally provide orientation for governments and civil societies. These norms should also consider the responsibilities of private ISPs, which are only cursorily addressed in this article. Regarding the general interest of the ethics of security, ISs are just one example of how the conflicted relationship between exceptional measures, fundamental and human rights, and emergency situations plays out in a global society characterized by digitalization and the security needs and practices of the Global South. This overall shifting security landscape should be reflected by continuously testing the capacity of fundamental and human rights to accurately address and resolve contemporary ethical dilemmas.

Special thanks are extended to Mireille Hildebrandt and Gianmarco Gori from the research group LSTS at Vrije Universiteit Brussel for their insightful comments that greatly enhanced the drafts of this article. Appreciation is also due to the numerous participants of my workshop titled “Internet Shutdowns—Are Internet Blackouts Ever Justified?” at the CPDP Conference 2023. I am particularly grateful to the co-speakers, Nishant Shah and Kris Ruijgrok, whose expertise on the subject is exceptional. Furthermore, I would like to thank my students from the “Ethical Reasoning in International Security Management” course at the Berlin School of Economics and Law, whose engaging questions about Just Securitization Theory have profoundly enriched my understanding of the topic. Last but not least, I thank the anonymous reviewers for their challenging comments that significantly improved this article.

Johannes Thumfart received funding from the European Union Horizon 2020 research program under MSCA COFUND IMPACT grant agreement 101034352 with co-funding from the VUB-Industrial Research Fund.

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Contesting the Legality of Internet Shutdowns

by Samuel Woodhams

October 1, 2019

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Cyber , Freedom of Association , freedom of expression , India , International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) , internet , Internet freedom , Kashmir , Right to Privacy , United Nations Human Rights Council

As the total communication blackout in Jammu and Kashmir neared the end of its first week last month, Anuradha Bhasin, the executive editor of The Kashmir Times , looked to the law in an attempt to restore connectivity. In a petition to India’s Supreme Court, she wrote that the shutdown was “fueling anxiety, panic, alarm, insecurity and fear among the residents of Kashmir,” and that it stifled freedom of the press and, with it, citizens’ right to information.

As government-imposed communications blackouts like this become more frequent, so have the legal challenges against them. In the first six months of 2019 alone, the international digital rights advocacy organization, Access Now, registered five new cases challenging the practice. From Sudan to Pakistan, individuals and civil society organizations have sought to contest such practices and prove that they contradict national, regional or international human rights law and standards.

The increase in strategic litigation in this area of information and communication technology (ICT) has prompted the Uganda-based Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), to describe such cases as “a new front line in digital rights.” However, the results have been mixed for a range of reasons.

Internet Shutdowns and International Human Rights Law

Despite the well-documented consequences of internet shutdowns on a country’s economy, health care and freedom of expression, governments are employing these tactics with increasing frequency around the world. In 2016, Access Now registered 75 shutdowns. Last year, that figure rose to 196.

The suspension of the internet and landlines that Bhasin was challenging began the day before the Indian government’s Aug. 5 revocation of Article 370, a constitutional provision that granted the state of Jammu and Kashmir significant autonomy from the central government. The shutdown has had widespread impact, including leaving pharmacies low on supplies, businesses unable to trade and families disconnected. Furthermore, “the communication blockade, restrictions and atmosphere of intimidation are making it virtually impossible for newspapers and journalists to function,” Bhasin told me.

In a less-than-clear Sept. 16 hearing and order, the Indian Supreme Court listed the petition for discussion on Sept. 30 and called , in the meantime, for the Jammu and Kashmir administration to “ensure that normal life is restored in Kashmir.” That includes, the court ruled , restoring “all forms of communication, subject to overriding consideration of national security.”

Landline connections were fully restored across the state by Sept. 13 and mobile networks have been intermittently re-connected. However, at the time of writing, the internet blackout continues to affect the region.

Central to many of the cases filed against governments is the argument that internet shutdowns contradict the basic human rights of freedom of expression and the right to information.

Freedom of expression is protected under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which was adopted by the United Nations in 1966. It has some 172 state parties , including India, with only 18 countries having taken no action on it.

The article maintains that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive or impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” It is, however, conditional and may be restricted “for the respect of the rights and reputations of others,” as well as “the protection of national security or of public order.”

In recent years, several directives have been published that make explicit the relationship between freedom of expression and the need to maintain a free and open internet.

In 2018, a resolution adopted by the U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC) affirmed that “the same human rights that people have offline must be protected online,” in a resolution that acquired over 60 co-sponsors.

On the issue of whether an internet shutdown may be a proportionate action taken by a government in the legitimate service of protecting “national security” or “public order,” Barbora Bukovska, the Senior Director for Law and Policy at the international freedom of expression organization ARTICLE 19 , said internet shutdowns “are always a disproportionate restriction on the right to freedom of expression, and have serious repercussions for the protection of other human rights.”

Echoing this, four U.N. special rapporteurs condemned the restrictions in Jammu and Kashmir, stating , “The shutdown of the internet and telecommunication networks, without justification from the Government, are inconsistent with the fundamental norms of necessity and proportionality.”

Despite the relative consensus on the issue on the international stage, however, governments continue to claim that such measures are indeed necessary and proportionate, regularly citing public safety and national security concerns as justifications.

As India’s foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, recently claimed : “How do I cut off communications between the terrorists and their masters on the one hand, but keep the internet open for other people? I would be delighted to know.”

The Success and Limits of Challenging Internet Shutdowns

As internet shutdowns often occur in autocratic states with little judicial independence, it is hardly surprising that many of the cases brought against them have been unsuccessful. However, there have been some notable exceptions.

In a landmark case earlier this year, the Zimbabwe High Court ruled that the government had no power to order the internet shutdown that coincided with widespread protests in January.

The case was filed by the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and the Zimbabwe chapter of the Media Institute of Southern Africa, arguing that the government had exceeded its authority in shutting down the internet. In the ruling, Judge Owen Tagu called for full internet access to be restored, stating that “it has become very clear that the minister had no authority to make that directive.”

Juliet Nanfuka of CIPESA told me, however, that this is far from the norm across Africa. “At a national level, cases are often slow moving and often postponed,” she said.

In another case from this year, lawyer Abdel-Adheem Hassan won a lawsuit against Zain Sudan, the country’s largest telecommunications operator, to force it to lift government-ordered restrictions on connectivity. However, as the case was filed in a personal capacity, the ruling only affected him, meaning he was the only civilian in the country able to access the internet. Full internet connectivity was finally restored the following month, following further legal battles with the three major telecom providers.

The rise of successful cases brought against governments has left Peter Micek, Access Now’s General Counsel and Adjunct Professor at Columbia University, hopeful of the future. He told me that as jurisprudence and an awareness of the impact of internet shutdowns grows, “the judiciary will seize its role in ensuring open, secure, and resilient access expands universally.”

Governments’ Evasive Tactics

As more people are starting to challenge governments who intentionally restrict access to the internet, governments are developing more sophisticated ways of evading accountability.

“States in Southern Africa are aware that an internet shutdown would infringe on constitutional rights, and they have accordingly been hesitant to admit that they tried to limit internet access, citing technical reasons [for access limitations] instead,” Anneke Meerkotter, the Litigation Director of the Southern Africa Litigation Centre, told me.

Further, an increasing number of governments are forcing internet service providers (ISPs) to throttle bandwidth at moments of sociopolitical upheaval and increased sensitivity. Bandwidth throttling slows a connection to such an extent that the internet becomes effectively unusable but doesn’t disable connections altogether, providing plausible deniability. As a report from Access Now noted, “It is often common to confuse throttling with an unstable and congested network,” making deliberate maneuvers harder to detect.

Although the outcome of litigation is rarely straightforward and often intentionally drawn out, such cases remain a significant means of gaining traction for digital rights campaigners. As the Association for Progressive Communications has written: “Whereas litigation may not always lead to a successful ruling, it serves as an opportunity to set precedent and feed jurisprudence not only at country level but sometimes also at the sub-regional or regional level.”

Gaps in Precedent and Expertise

Clearly, however, more needs to be done to support these efforts.

Hija Kamran, program manager at the Pakistan-based nonprofit Media Matters for Democracy , told me her country’s judiciary needs greater knowledge of technology and digital rights to generate “informed decisions that favor the fundamental rights of citizens.”

Peter Micek argued that States must begin by listening to “the groundswell of voices” directly affected by the practice, as “judges will respond to such a public sentiment, acknowledging that the internet is as essential to life and society as food, water and shelter.”

Confusion also arises on the question of who is ultimately responsible for internet shutdowns, due to the opaque nature of the practice and the number of actors involved. Telecom “companies should take all necessary and lawful measures to ensure that they do not cause, contribute or become complicit in human rights abuses, by facilitating Internet shutdowns,” Bukovska said. However, even where telecom operators are not state-owned, they may be threatened, both economically and physically, by regimes looking to limit connectivity.

Citizens are becoming increasingly adept at circumventing internet shutdowns by using mesh networks during total blackouts and Virtual Private Network (VPN)  apps during partial restrictions. Mesh networks, which have recently been used in Hong Kong , allow citizens to stay in contact without internet access by utilizing Bluetooth connections across multiple devices. VPNs, on the other hand, allow users to access servers based in different countries and encrypt internet traffic, thereby bypassing any national- or local-level content blockages.

However, given the general lack of technical understanding in governments and among the public, as well as weak judicial independence in many of the countries where restrictions are used and the ambiguity surrounding the application of necessity and proportionality principles, it is unlikely that government-imposed network disruptions are going to end soon.

Legal challenges against governments will be used increasingly as a recourse. In addition to holding out potential relief in specific circumstances, these cases also will help build jurisprudence and, with it, accountability for governments demonstrating such a blatant disregard for international human rights standards or their own constitutional guarantees.

IMAGE: This photo illustration show a mobile browser unable to connect to Facebook, following the Sri Lankan government’s island-wide social network shutdown, in Colombo on May 13, 2019. (Photo by LAKRUWAN WANNIARACHCHI/AFP/Getty Images)

About the author(s), samuel woodhams.

Freelance journalist and researcher at digital privacy group and VPN review website Top10VPN.com. Follow him on Twitter ( @Samuel_Woodhams )

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Public International Law and Internet Shutdowns: Time to unpack emerging norms

2020, The Groningen Journal of International Law (GROJIL) Blog

Related Papers

Nicole Stremlau

Internet shutdowns are on the rise. In the past few years, an escalation of this blunt censoring practice has affected different regions of the world, particularly Africa and Asia. Scholars and advocates have proposed no substantive solutions to effectively address Internet shutdowns, and analysis has largely been limited to examining the negative effects through data about their frequency, duration, and economic costs. This article attempts to move beyond the polarized debate between “keep it on” and “shut it off” to explore how there can be more transparency around decision-making processes behind Internet shutdowns. We also discuss the limits of law when it comes to the imposition and implementation of shutdowns. Shutdowns tend to be imposed somewhat arbitrarily with little process. Bringing back legal arguments into the exploration of the justifications around shutdowns may make the use of shutdowns less frequent and more limited, when they do occur.

legality of internet shutdowns in a democracy

nishtha gupta

“Where there is freedom of expression there is scope for propaganda.” Social media has become a feature of modern democracy. However in this contemporary era use of web is a boon as well a bane. Miscreants’ activities like exchanging of privileged information, sedition, conspiring against the country, online boycotting and protests are coercing democracies around the globe to resort to internet shutdowns/ internet blackouts for maintaining of accord. Internet shutdown can be defined as the intentional disruption of Internet-based communications, giving them inaccessible or restricted access to a specific person, place, or form of access, usually to facilitate the flow of information. Internet shutdown may occur at a national level, where users across the country are unable to access the Internet, or sub national (local), where Internet and / or limited access is in place, city, or other local area is blocked. Author through this manuscript dwells into the background of Internet shutdowns in a democracy and also highlights the laws that permit these internet blackouts.

Arthur E Gwagwa

Internet shutdowns, carried out for stifling communications amongst protesters, have become increasingly common in African countries during election periods. In this paper, Arthur Gwagwa, a leading expert on internet policy and human rights attempts to answer big questions like the role of telecommunications companies and Internet Service providers during shutdowns; impact of shutdowns on politics and governance and also issues in which the Internet is central to cyber security​ and freedom of expression

Journal of Advanced Research in Journalism and Mass Communication

Shruti Chandra

Access to the internet is fast becoming a basic right given the plethora of information available on the net these days. In the current scenario, the issue of internet shutdown has become an important concern in India. Internet shutdown affects people socially, psychologically and economically. On one hand, many democratic countries of the world are discussing about digital freedom and human rights, while on the other hand, some countries including India are continuously practicing Internet shutdowns in different parts of their countries. India has become the top country of the world in terms of the numbers of Internet shutdowns. The Internet has become such a prominent source of information for all of us that when Internet connectivity is suspended, many people are affected as they depend on the Internet services for various purposes. Internet shutdown is not only harmful to democracy and governance but also to the economy of the country. Internet shutdowns are direct violations of digital freedom and human rights. The main objective of this paper is to argue that access to internet is a basic right and highlight the problem of Internet shutdown in India and its adverse impact on the lives of Indians. In addition, this paper attempts to highlight a brief history of Internet shutdowns in India. The paper shows how frequent clampdowns on internet affects the economy, as has been the case of Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir thereby highlighting the case for internet freedom for the survival of the economy especially in Digital India.

Shikhar Goel

Internet shutdown refers to a deliberate suspension of internet services in a limited area, for a given amount of time, usually on the orders of the government. Through a close reading of various acts, government’s license contracts, rules, and judgments that have come out in the recent past, this paper aims to critically examine the legal regime around internet shutdown orders in India.

Nishant Shah

Various emerging digital information societies like India exercise Internet shutdowns and information blackouts regularly as a way of dealing with different kinds of crises. These

Saurav Datta

Social Science Research Network

Nakul Nayak

CARD Research Report I

Yohannes Eneyew Ayalew

Internet shutdown is a growing menace in Ethiopia. Since 2016, internet shutdown has been implemented more than fifteen times in major events happening in Ethiopia, in the wake of high-profile assassination in Bahir Dar and Addis Ababa, during armed conflict in Tigray, insurgency in Wollega, among others. Despite a repeated pushback from civil society, and digital rights activists, the issue of internet shutdown did not get the attention it deserve, as well as the level of reprehension towards shutdowns remain a tangential agenda in socio-political discussions in Ethiopia. The research report found that the Ethiopian government has been using different narratives which now includes a proposed law to justify internet disruptions. To effectively tackle the problem, this report emphasised that human rights-based approach should be an appropriate normative frame to grill the actions of the government because it situates the issue of internet shutdowns in the broader debates of international human rights law. The report noted that the government must align its actions with the three pillars of human rights-based approach: substantive, process and procedural dimensions. Specifically, the Ethiopian government must align its shutdown measures with substantive standards of international human rights law, i.e., legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality. While the process dimension entails transparency and oversight requirements, the procedural dimension involves the government to follow due processes before imposing shutdowns, and remedial measures after shutdowns. The report maps the human rights impact of internet shutdowns in Ethiopia. It pinpoints various approaches human rights defenders and policy makers can use to frame and respond to the impacts of internet shutdowns in Ethiopia. Internet shutdown impacts a number of human rights, which are grouped into three generation of rights: first generation rights (civil and political rights), second generation rights (socio-economic rights) and third generation rights (solidarity rights). The report found that internet shutdown is an affront to democracy, and digitalisation, as well as it deplumes the normative values of constitutionally protected human rights. The report also found that internet shutdown tarnishes the integrity of elections, and debilitates human rights in the digital age. The report concludes by offering some recommendations for human rights defenders, civil societies and policy makers to keep the internet on in Ethiopia.

Sriwijaya Law Review

Tanto Lailam

In recent years, there has been an increase in the use of harsh censorship in several parts of the globe, notably Africa and Asia. In some cases, the shutdown may be justified, but in other cases, it is driven by the political interest of the regime. The research evaluates the Internet shutdowns in the post-2019 presidential election in Indonesia and during the social unrest in Papua Island. Using normative legal research, which uses statute, case, and comparative approach concludes that although Internet shutdowns in some situations are tolerable, their usage should be less frequent and more restricted. These explanations must be examined using legality, legitimacy, and proportionality principles to limit official arguments for Internet shutdowns because they infringe on human rights. However, since no enforcement mechanism exists, this is only a formality. The Indonesian government&#39;s decision to block Internet access to social media platforms during the 2019 presidential elect...

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When internet shutdowns spill over borders

The mechanics of the internet mean that blocks on access imposed by one country can be felt half a world away

• Governments embrace internet shutdowns as a form of control
• How to shut down the internet – and how to fight back

W hen Myanmar’s military ordered telecom companies to shut down access to Twitter in February 2021, one Twitter user in Mumbai who was posting critically about the Indian government realised he had lost access to the social media platform. He sent a message on Signal to a friend: “Am I imagining this? I may be being paranoid, but why am I having access difficulties with Twitter?” He was not paranoid. Myanmar’s Twitter block had accidentally cut Twitter access to at least half a billion internet users. The same dynamic was repeated in March 2022, when Russia inadvertently cut access to Twitter across Europe with a block designed for its own people .

The mechanics of the internet mean that blocks on access imposed by one country may leach over the borders on to neighbouring populations, or even be felt half a world away by users in different continents.

“We want to recognise what one country does within its borders doesn’t stay there. The techniques and pressure they bring against telecom operators interconnect globally, as all telecom companies do,” says Raman Singh from the digital rights non-profit group Access Now.

The routing decisions of private telecoms companies play a huge role in determining internet freedom, censorship, and online surveillance. Whether malicious or unintentional, obscure telecommunications instructions can have unforeseen and far-reaching consequences.

How a shutdown can spread

Behind the scenes, the internet resembles a map, filled with digital pathways called Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routes that direct internet traffic. The directors operate like a fleet of figurative Fat Controllers. They manage a map that is constantly on the move. New websites are created, new routes are added, and existing routes are changed, all without the luxury of a centralised control room.

All updates are communicated along the chain of command. When an operator makes a change to one of their routes, they signpost it; neighbouring operators notice and then order their computerised cartographers to redraw the map. A website block follows the same formula, except that the re-routed pathway resembles a cul-de-sac.

When Russia and Myanmar separately instituted unintentional intercontinental Twitter blocks it was due to local telecoms providers redirecting traffic down such dead-end routes. This is officially referred to as a “leak”. In Myanmar’s case, the Singapore-headquartered telecoms provider Campana inadvertently shut off access to the social media platform in India and Bangladesh, with impact stretching across the Asian region and as far as the US. While the problem was quickly resolved, experts estimated it temporarily disrupted access to at least 500 million internet users, more than a tenth of the global online population.

This event echoed another outage in 2008, when Pakistan blocked access to YouTube for two-thirds of the global internet for several hours. Pakistan’s government had wanted to block the trailer to an anti-Islamic film by the controversial Dutch politician, Geert Wilders, but a BGP leak unintentionally redirected global users to Pakistan’s dead-end version of the video sharing site. Traffic piled up and YouTube crashed. As Doug Madory from the network management and internet monitoring platform Kentik put it, “It was like a self-inflicted denial-of-service attack because they weren’t used to handling the world’s volume of YouTube.”.

Another example of the unintended consequences of internet blocks happened in 2010, when Chilean-based DNS administrator Mauricio Vergara Ereche noticed he was sporadically blocked from Facebook and other sites he could normally access. It turned out that one in every thirteen searches was being subject to China’s great firewall . The reason traced back to the internet’s collaborative approach to mapping, which relies on thirteen ‘route nameservers’, each operated by a different company in a different location around the world. Whenever a user plugs in a search term, the internet needs to find a starting point on the map before it can find an appropriate pathway. As Doug Madory explains, “It’s a round robin process of how it chooses which of the thirteen. Each time it looks up it goes to a different one.”

One of the thirteen members, the Swedish company Netnod, ran a server in China , which required it to comply with Chinese censorship laws. Thus, one in every thirteen times, Ereche’s Chilean internet was subjected to China’s censorship. He was not alone. All across the Pacific Rim there were reports of users subjected to a Chinese version of the internet censoring all manner of content deemed sensitive by China’s Communist party. A headquartering decision by a technology company had inadvertently caused millions of people to be placed inside the Great Firewall, even though they were not inside China.

Private actors’ capacity to impact internet freedom is intense, yet very few global bodies police their activities. Although the United Nations declared internet access to be a human right in a non-binding vote in 2016, the increasing number of countries that use the kill switch means there is little political will to tackle the problem at an institutional level, according to David Kaye, a law professor at the University of California Irvine and the former UN Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.

He says: “The problem is the same governments that vote on those resolutions are the ones that are in fact engaging in internet shutdown.”

This story was funded by the Judith Neilson Institute

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Internet shutdowns hurt much more than we realise: UN rights office

Shutting down internet affect people’s safety & well-beng, hamper information flow and harm the economy    

By Madhumita Paul

Published: tuesday 28 june 2022.

Governments across the world have resorted to shutting down internet citing a range of reasons. Now a  United Nations-backed report has flagged that the effect of such shutdowns on the lives of millions have been largely underrated. 

Internet shutdowns are measures taken by a government or on behalf of a government, to intentionally disrupt access to and the use of information and communications systems online, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) mentioned in the report.

The episodes make it difficult to share and watch videos, live broadcasts and other journalistic work, OHCHR said. 

The shutdowns are often ordered during civil society movements, security measures as well as electoral proceedings, and severely restrict human rights monitoring and reporting, the global agency added. 

The restrictions also have considerable economic impacts, the authors noted in Internet shutdowns: Trends, causes, legal implications and impacts on a range of human rights .

History of repression

The first major internet shutdown that captured global attention took place in Egypt in 2011 and was accompanied by hundreds of arrests and killings, the authors noted.

The #KeepItOn coalition, which monitors internet shutdown episodes across the world, documented 931 shutdowns in 74 countries from 2016-2021, the report cited.

As many as 12 countries implemented more than 10 shutdowns during that period.  Globally, all regions have experienced multiple shutdowns, but the majority reported occurred in Asia and Africa, according to the report. 

India blocked or disrupted internet connections 106 times and at least  85 of India’s internet shutdown episodes were in Jammu & Kashmir, according to digital right advocacy group Access Now’s report. 

Almost half of all shutdowns recorded by civil society groups from 2016-2021 were carried out in the context of protests and political crisis, with 225 shutdowns recorded during public demonstrations relating to a vast range of social, political or economic grievances, as stated in the report. 

Shutdowns affected at least 52 elections in the period, according to the findings. In 2019 alone, 14 African countries disrupted access to the internet during electoral periods.

Such disruptions undermine or eliminate access to digital tools that are critical for campaigning, promoting public discussion, conducting voting and overseeing the electoral processes, the authors said. 

Disruptions severely inhibit the work of journalists and the media in general, a key element of fair elections. In Uganda, shutdowns undermined media coverage of the elections in 2021, amid reports of violent repressive measures, the researchers observed. 

Shutdowns following protests during electoral periods were also reported in countries such as Belarus and Niger, they added.

As many as 132 of the shutdowns recorded by civil society groups were officially justified by the need to control the spread of hate speech, disinformation or other forms of content deemed illegal or harmful, according to the researchers. 

Impact on economy, access to education, health

Internet shutdowns also carry major economic costs for all sectors, disrupting financial transactions, commerce and industry, the authors said. 

The World Bank recently calculated that Internet shutdowns in Myanmar alone had cost nearly $2.8 billion from February-December 2021, reversing economic progress made over the previous decade.

The episodes undermine learning outcomes and interfere with education planning and communication among teachers, school administrators and families, they added. 

"Hospitals being unable to contact their doctors in cases of emergency, voters being deprived of information about candidates, handicraft makers being cut off from customers and potentially facing imminent economic ruin, peaceful protesters who fall under violent attack being unable to call for help, when an Internet and telecommunications services shutdown occurs,” the report said.

Shutdowns also directly put people’s safety and well-being at risk.

Peggy Hicks, Director of the Thematic Engagement, Special Procedures and Right to Development Division, OHCHR, said:

199 shutdowns were justified by public safety concerns, and 150 were based on national security grounds. But many of those shutdowns were followed by spikes in violence.

The report noted that one of the greatest obstacles to reversing the trend towards a greater frequency of Internet shutdowns is the limited visibility of those measures and their impacts. 

The report urged states to refrain from imposing shutdowns, to maximise Internet access and remove the multiple obstacles standing in the way of communication.

It also called upon companies to speedily share information on disruptions and ensure that they take all possible lawful measures to prevent shutdowns they have been asked to implement.

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How Internet Shutdowns Wreak Havoc in India

F or nearly three months, the Indian state of Manipur had been raked with bloody violence between the majority Hindu Meitei and predominantly Christian Kuki-Zo tribes. But when a shocking 26-second video—which showed armed Meitei men stripping two Kuki women and parading them naked through the streets of Kangpokpi district—went viral in mid-July, the crisis sparked international condemnation and finally broke the Indian government’s silence .

The criticism grew after police records showed the incident occurred on May 4, raising questions over why the video only surfaced 78 days later.

The answer, experts tell TIME, is that the authorities shut off the internet in Manipur on May 3. The state government, led by the ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), says it did so to curb rumors and disinformation and quell the violence. But digital rights activists say there is no evidence that turning the internet off helped keep anyone safe—and that the move may have even fueled violence. 

“The Manipur shutdown crippled the ability for information to reach the rest of the world,” says Mishi Choudhary, an Indian technology lawyer based in the U.S. who founded the Software Freedom Law Center, or SFLC.in, to fight for digital rights back home. “If we had seen the videos hidden from us for almost 80 days back in May, we could have reacted to it sooner.”

While the internet shutdown in Manipur may be one of India’s longest shutdowns yet, it is hardly unprecedented. “By and far, India is the most brutal censor of the internet in the democratic world,” says Choudhary.

India has ranked first in the world for shutting off the internet over the past five years, according to SFLC.in and other digital rights watchdogs. In the first six months of this year, it imposed almost as many shutdowns as it did in all of 2022, according to Surfshark, a Netherlands-based virtual private network (VPN) provider.

In addition to cutting off the internet, the government also routinely blocks specific websites or successfully pushes social media platforms to block content in India. Last year, that included nearly 7,000 posts and social media accounts, according to the nonprofit Access Now.

In Manipur, the government’s first course of action after the viral video triggered global outrage was to ask Twitter and other social media platforms to take it down because it could “further disrupt the law and order situation in the state,” a senior government official told The Indian Express on July 21. Four days later, Manipur’s high court intervened to direct the government to restore the internet, but in a “limited fashion.”

This means that social media websites, WiFi hotspots, VPNs, and mobile internet—used by the vast majority of Manipur’s 2.2 million people— remain blocked . The Internet Freedom Foundation in New Delhi has called this “illegal” and a deprivation “of basic human rights.”

As Manipur entered its 100th day of an internet shutdown on Friday, a far broader debate has emerged across India about the use of shutdowns, whether they work, and what social and economic costs they bring on.

The current era of total internet shutdowns began in India on Aug. 5, 2019, when the Muslim-majority region of Kashmir entered what would eventually be the world’s longest internet shutdown—lasting 552 days—which the Indian government imposed after controversially revoking the state’s constitutional autonomy. Authorities eventually reinstated 4G mobile services in 2020, after the Supreme Court determined the ban could not be indefinite.

Although internet access had been restricted around the country before, Kashmir was a “complete communications blockade,” says Choudhary.

Since then, the Indian government has imposed total shutdowns in many cases of communal unrest or public protests occurring across the country. To date, India has experienced a whopping 752 shutdowns since 2012, SFLC.in estimates . 

The Indian government has not released a detailed accounting of the use of shutdowns. In July, Minister of Electronics and Information Technology Rajeev Chandrasekhar said the government does not maintain “centralized data” on the number of shutdowns imposed in India, and added that there was “no report available” to assess the economic loss. (Chandrasekhar was not available for comment.)

India had no laws to regulate Internet shutdowns until 2017, when the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 was amended to say that shutdowns could only be ordered by a state government’s home secretary when deemed “necessary” or “unavoidable” in public emergencies or in the interest of public safety. The amendments also dictate that a district magistrate, the administrative officer in charge in every state, must regulate shutdowns by clearly stating the rationale behind the decision in writing, which is then reviewed by a bureaucratic committee within three days.

But there is considerable latitude because terms like “public safety” and “public emergency” are not defined. In 2021, the internet was switched off when Indian farmers staged a months-long protest against new farm laws in the nation’s capital; in 2022, it was switched off in the city of Udaipur, in western India, when a Hindu tailor was murdered by a Muslim man in an incident that prompted fears over communal violence; and earlier this year, it was switched off once more when Punjab was placed under a three-day cellular blackout as police went on a manhunt to track down Amritpal Singh, a separatist Sikh leader on the run.

Sometimes the government implements shutdowns for seemingly mundane reasons—like preventing cheating in school exams or entry tests for competitive government jobs. A report by the Internet Freedom Foundation and Human Rights Watch found that almost a third of the disruptions counted from 2020 to 2022 were intended to prevent exam cheating.

The Supreme Court sought to toughen the rules against imposing shutdowns when it heard the case “Anuradha Bhasin versus the Union of India” regarding Kashmir. In a landmark verdict, the court prohibited the government from suspending the internet indefinitely and limited shutdowns to 15 days or less, providing a detailed set of guidelines to regulate such orders.

But the new guidelines did not prevent the shutdown in Manipur, which continues to be enforced through orders re-posted every few days. To SFLC.in’s Choudhary, the implications of this are clear. “Whether it's 78 days in Manipur or 552 days in Kashmir, internet shutdowns constitute a digital war in today’s India,” she says.

The impact of internet shutdowns is only growing as more and more people rely on an internet connection for their social and economic livelihoods.

In large part, that’s because India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, has for years pushed for a “Digital India” to transform the country’s economy and boost growth. India has built an extensive, public-facing digital infrastructure over time that includes a biometric identity system, a digital payment interface that allows payments through QR codes (and which now accounts for over 70% of all non-cash retail payments in India), and an online data management system containing IDs, tax documents, vaccine certificates, and more.

“On the one hand, the government pushes us all to live online, and on the other, it maintains a kill switch and uses it often,” Choudhary says. “And once you use that, you bring the entire economy and the entire social services to its knees.”

Top10VPN, a global digital privacy and research organization, estimates the overall cost of shutdowns in India was $184.3 million in 2022. The figure is likely an underestimate; it excludes the informal work sector and not every shutdown is reported. The cost estimate also masks the ways in which shutdowns affect specific communities, typically poor or marginalized ones. In Kashmir, for example, at least 500,000 people—mostly in the tourism sector—became unemployed as a result of the shutdown in 2019, according to a report by the Kashmir Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

And many experts say the shutdowns don’t work, even judging by the rationale the government uses for them. “What helps people keep safe in any crisis is the ability to access and exchange information,” says Namrata Maheshwari, who serves as Access Now’s Asia Pacific legal counsel, “and shutdowns can never be justified because they’re always inherently a disproportionate measure.”

They say that India’s situation is especially concerning given that in 2013 it joined many countries to proclaim , under Article 19 of the U.N.’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that the right to freedom of expression and information “must also be protected online.” “There could not be a clearer basis for the illegitimacy of Internet shutdowns,” wrote Tanja Hollstein and Ben-Graham Jones, in an op-ed for the Westminster Foundation for Democracy.

Yet Indian authorities continue to double down on their approach. After the sexual assault video in Manipur garnered international headlines last month, the state’s chief minister, N. Biren Singh, said that  “hundreds of similar cases have happened, that is why the internet is banned.”

For digital rights activists, not to mention the people in Manipur left in the darkness, such comments are dismaying. “When they say there are hundreds of crimes like the one we've already seen, then what is the point of all the shutdowns?” asks Choudhary.

— This story was supported by The Global Reporting Centre and The Citizens.

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Home / Press Releases / Unabashed and unabated: India leads the world shutdown count for sixth year 

Unabashed and unabated: India leads the world shutdown count for sixth year 

Read in Bengali , Hindi , Kannada , Marathi , Meitei (Romanized) , Punjabi , Thadou , Telugu or Urdu .

By almost every measure, 2023 was the worst year of internet shutdowns on record . Authorities deliberately interrupted the internet at least 283 times in 39 countries concealing, enabling, and exacerbating violence, war crimes, attacks on democracy, and other atrocities, crushing the human rights of millions of people. For the sixth year in a row, India led the world in internet shutdowns, disrupting the internet at least 116 times.

Launching today, May 15, Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition ’s new report, Shrinking democracy, growing violence: Internet shutdowns in 2023 , exposes the unparalleled impact and destruction of these brutal attacks on human rights throughout a dangerous year of extremes. Read the full report , global snapshot , and Asia Pacific deepdive .

Key India findings include:

• The record : India, for the sixth time, carried the shameful mantle of the world’s internet shutdown leader with at least 116 recorded shutdowns;
• The scope : in the last five years, Indian authorities have hit the kill switch over 500 times , repeatedly plunging millions in the world’s largest democracy into darkness;
• The worst affected : between May and December, roughly 3.2 million people in Manipur suffered under a statewide shutdown for 212 days ;
• The offenders : a total of 13 states and union territories imposed shutdowns in 2023, where seven of them disrupted internet services five or more times ;
• The duration: shutdowns spanning over five days or more shot up from 15% of all shutdowns in 2022 to more than 41% in 2023
• The digital divide : 59% of shutdowns exclusively targeted mobile networks in a country where almost 96% of people with internet access depend on wireless services; and
• The challenge : four years after the historic Bhasin versus Union of India judgment, officials continue to fail to publish shutdown orders and have been repeatedly corrected by courts for failing to comply.

In 2023, authorities and warring parties continued to abuse shutdowns in the Asia Pacific region from China to Myanmar . Pakistan and Bangladesh entrenched themselves further in suppression of protests and dissent, online and off, while Nepal joined the shame list with its blocking of TikTok.

Read the full report , global snapshot , and Asia Pacific deepdive .

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Millions in Sudan Are Facing an Internet Blackout as Elon Musk’s SpaceX Shuts Down Starlink

I n the heart of Africa, Sudan finds itself at a crossroads not just geopolitically but also digitally. The recent decision by SpaceX to discontinue Starlink’s internet service in Sudan has sparked a major outcry from both the local populace and the international community. This move, set to take effect by April 30, has left millions of Sudanese disconnected from the world amidst ongoing military conflicts that have already severed mobile network connections.

The war, which has raged since April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, has not only claimed thousands of lives but has also devastated infrastructure, displacing countless individuals. Amid this chaos, Starlink had emerged as a vital lifeline, enabling internet connectivity against a backdrop of nationwide telecom blackouts.

Human Rights Concerns and the Potential Impact of Starlink’s Withdrawal

A collective of 94 rights organizations has voiced stern opposition to Starlink’s impending shutdown, emphasizing the critical role of telecommunications in modern society. “Any shutdown of telecommunication services is a violation of human rights and may be considered to be a collective punishment that will not only isolate individuals from their support networks but also exacerbate the already dire economic situation facing millions,” the coalition stated.

This sentiment reflects a broader consensus that access to information and communication is not merely a convenience but a fundamental human right, especially crucial during humanitarian crises. The potential impact of this shutdown extends beyond mere isolation; it threatens the efficacy of aid operations and the basic survival mechanisms of millions who rely on digital cash transfers from relatives abroad.

Economic Repercussions and the Role of International Aid

The cessation of Starlink’s services could have profound economic repercussions. For a population already deprived of regular salaries due to the ongoing conflict, the internet serves as a critical conduit for receiving essential financial support from the diaspora. The lack of connectivity not only hinders personal communications but also stalls the operations of numerous humanitarian agencies striving to deliver aid and coordinate relief efforts across the region.

Conclusion: The Path Forward for Starlink and Sudan

As the international community watches closely, the decision by Elon Musk and SpaceX to reconsider the Starlink shutdown could set a precedent for corporate responsibility in crisis zones. Restoring service would not only support the basic human rights of the Sudanese but could also reinforce the role of private sector enterprises in addressing global humanitarian challenges.

The ongoing situation in Sudan serves as a stark reminder of the interconnectedness of technology, rights, and corporate governance. As we continue to navigate these complex terrains, the actions of influential figures like Elon Musk will undoubtedly play a crucial role in shaping the future not just of nations like Sudan, but of digital access as a universal right.

In this era of global connectivity, ensuring that internet services reach the most vulnerable populations remains not just a technical challenge but a moral imperative.

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Israel’s Shutdown of Al Jazeera Highlights Long-Running Tensions

The network will keep covering the war in Gaza, but it will be harder for Israelis to watch. Israel calls the network a security threat, while Al Jazeera says Israel wants to conceal its brutality.

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By Vivian Yee ,  Emma Bubola and Liam Stack

Vivian Yee reported from Cairo, Emma Bubola from London and Liam Stack from Jerusalem.

When Israel ordered Al Jazeera on Sunday to shut down operations there, the network had a reporter covering a government meeting in West Jerusalem, another in an East Jerusalem hotel room, a third in northern Israel to cover clashes on the border with Lebanon and a fourth in Tel Aviv.

But the cameras stopped rolling when Walid al-Omari, the network’s bureau chief in Ramallah, in the West Bank, ordered all of them to go home. Israeli authorities descended on a room used by Al Jazeera in the Ambassador Hotel in East Jerusalem, confiscating broadcast equipment. Israeli television and internet providers cut off its channels and blocked its websites, though people were still able to find it online.

Al Jazeera, the influential Arab news network, says it will continue reporting and broadcasting from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. But its departure from Israel marks a new low in its long-strained history with a country that much of Al Jazeera’s audience in the Arab world and beyond sees as an aggressor and an occupier.

The shutdown order , which lasts 45 days and can be renewed, was a break long in the making. Mr. al-Omari said that soon after the Israel-Hamas war began in October, the network stopped using an office in West Jerusalem, saying that far-right Israelis had used intimidation tactics against the staff there.

The network has played a major role in amplifying stories of the killing and suffering of Palestinians in Gaza, heightening worldwide outrage at Israel’s conduct. Many defenders of Al Jazeera argue that its work is so strong that Israel wants to intimidate and censor it.

But its focus on bloodshed in Gaza has also generated controversy, with some Arab analysts saying it cheerleads for what it portrays as legitimate armed resistance to Israel, and presents commentary from Hamas officials and fighters with little critical pushback. The network is backed by the government of Qatar, which allows Hamas political leaders to live and operate in its country.

That makes it a compelling target for critics in Israel and beyond who say it is, at best, presenting a one-sided view of the war. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Al Jazeera of inciting violence against Israel and harming Israel’s security.

“We knew it was a question of time,” Mr. al-Omari said of the shutdown in an interview on Tuesday. Israel’s government, he said, had long pursued what he called “a war against Al Jazeera.”

Emotionally charged reporting

Since the Oct. 7 Hamas-led attack on Israel and the devastating Israeli military campaign in Gaza that followed, Al Jazeera has relied on its network of journalists in the territory — the most robust of any news outlet — to produce a steady stream of harrowing and emotionally charged reporting.

Its broadcasts about Gaza’s spiraling hunger crisis fill the screens in many Arab households. Its videos of agonized parents clutching their dead children and bodies being pulled from the rubble flood social media.

With other foreign news media blocked by Israel and Egypt from gaining access to Gaza, no outlet with Al Jazeera’s global audience can match the breadth of its coverage there.

Al Jazeera has seven correspondents stretching from north to southern Gaza, according to its managing editor, Mohamed Moawad, along with a large team of camera people, producers and others. He said in an interview that Israel was “trying to delegitimize our coverage because we are the only organization covering it from inside.”

“They want to conceal what’s happening in Gaza,” he added.

Shuruq Asad, spokeswoman for the Palestinian Journalists’ Syndicate, said that without Al Jazeera’s journalists in Gaza, “we couldn’t have known anything, and they have paid for this with their lives.”

She cited the two Al Jazeera journalists killed there, among at least 92 Palestinian journalists killed since the war began.

“Unfortunately our badges, vests and helmets in Gaza did not provide any protection for us,” Hisham Zaqout, an Al Jazeera correspondent in Gaza, wrote in a WhatsApp message.

Israeli authorities did not specify their reasoning for barring Al Jazeera except to say that it harmed Israel’s security. But given that the network can continue broadcasting from Gaza and that its mainly Arab audience can still view the channel using virtual private networks or YouTube, many Israeli commentators called the move symbolic at most.

The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, which appealed the order with Israel’s High Court, said its limited practical effect “suggests that it was made to shut down critical voices and to mark Arab media and its viewers as a fifth column.”

Condemnation by rights activists

Experts who track the network say its mix of searing footage from Gaza and on-air commentary echoing many of Hamas’s claims boosts support for the group’s actions, not just sympathy for Palestinians. That applies especially to its Arabic-language channel; it also has channels in English and other languages.

“The fact that it just gives the primary platform to Hamas, Hamas officials, Hamas spokesmen, et cetera, the fact that it cuts off any voices that are critical of Hamas — it has basically made it such that on Al Jazeera, Hamas is really the spokesman for the Palestinian people,” said Ghaith al-Omari, a Palestinian affairs analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a former adviser to Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority president.

Al Jazeera rejects accusations that it is a mouthpiece for Hamas, saying in a statement that Israel’s ban is a “criminal act” that violates “the basic right to access of information.”

The closure of Al Jazeera’s operations has added fuel to allegations, denied by Israel, that Israel is attempting to hide the devastation in Gaza.

“Israel is trying to control the narrative, and it is trying to deprive even the Israeli audience from seeing the atrocities in Gaza,” said Jamil Dakwar, a law professor at New York University and a founding attorney of Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel.

Sunday’s decision drew condemnation from rights advocates. A spokesman for the U.S. State Department, Matthew Miller, said on Monday, “We think Al Jazeera ought to be able to operate in Israel, as they operate in other countries.”

Analysts who follow Al Jazeera’s coverage say the network differentiates itself from other Arabic-language channels by broadcasting Israeli officials’ news conferences and inviting Israeli analysts and officials to appear on air.

But in general, Al Jazeera tends to embrace views held by many Arabs, broadcasting analysis “that glorifies the act of resistance” against what it portrays as “aggression by the occupation settler army,” that is, Israel, said Mahmoud Khalil, a media studies professor at Cairo University.

He added that Al Jazeera’s military analysts often exaggerated Palestinian battlefield successes and downplayed Israeli gains.

Mr. al-Omari, of the Washington Institute, said the network had also elided the worst of the Oct. 7 attacks on Israel, helping to give rise to persistent denials among some Arabs of some of the bloodiest acts that Palestinian attackers had committed there.

Early in the war, Al Jazeera posted to social media a video released by Hamas that purported to show its assailants taking care of children at an Israeli kibbutz they had attacked on Oct. 7, leaving out the context: They had killed the children’s mother. It attracted 1.4 million views on Facebook.

Asked about the video, Mr. Moawad said that the network had also aired live footage of an Israeli military spokesman saying that Hamas attackers had taken women and children from the kibbutz.

“We air and broadcast footage from both sides without editing to ensure our viewers are up-to-date with the developments and have heard both sides,” he said in a statement.

Al Jazeera has been banned in other countries, including Arab states who accused the network of biased reporting and support for Islamist political movements — some of them violent — that those countries have suppressed.

For many Arabs wary of Islamist groups, Al Jazeera’s amplification of Hamas voices is a turnoff, said Mr. Khalil, of Cairo University.

Ms. Asad, of the Palestinian Journalists’ Syndicate, said that imbalances or omissions in coverage should not be grounds for a ban, which critics of the decision said put Israel in the same category as other authoritarian governments that have cracked down on unfriendly news media.

“No one has the right to close Israeli television or to silence CNN or to silence anybody,” she said.

Reporting was contributed by Adam Rasgon and Johnatan Reiss from Jerusalem, Emad Mekay from Cairo, and Iyad Abuheweila from Istanbul.

Vivian Yee is a Times reporter covering North Africa and the broader Middle East. She is based in Cairo. More about Vivian Yee

Emma Bubola is a Times reporter based in London, covering news across Europe and around the world. More about Emma Bubola

Liam Stack is a Times reporter covering the Israel-Hamas war from Jerusalem. More about Liam Stack

Our Coverage of the Israel-Hamas War

News and Analysis

Israel said that it would send more troops to Rafah, the southernmost city in Gaza and the current focal point in the war between Israel and Hamas. Fighting in the city has closed off a vital border crossing, forced hundreds of thousands to flee  and cut off humanitarian aid.

President Biden is pushing for a broad deal that would get Israel to approve a Palestinian nation  in return for Saudi recognition of Israel. But officials need to overcome Israeli opposition.

The Arab League called for a United Nations peacekeeping force to be deployed in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli-occupied West Bank until a two-state solution can be negotiated , in a statement that also called for the U.N. Security Council to set a time limit for that process.

FIFA Delays a Vote: Soccer’s global governing body postponed a decision to temporarily suspend Israel  over its actions in Gaza, saying it needed to solicit legal advice before taking up a motion submitted by the Palestinian Football Association.

PEN America’s Literary Gala: The free-expression group has been engulfed by debate  over its response to the Gaza war that forced the cancellation of its literary awards and annual festival. But its literary gala went on as planned .

Jerusalem Quartet Will Perform: The Concertgebouw in Amsterdam, one of the world’s most prestigious concert halls, said that it would allow the Jerusalem Quartet to perform , two days after it had canceled the ensemble’s concerts amid security concerns.

A Key Weapon: When President Biden threatened to pause some weapons shipments to Israel if it invaded Rafah, the devastating effects of the 2,000-pound Mark 84 bomb  were of particular concern to him.

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