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The Ontological Argument Essay Questions

1. Summarize the two versions of the ontological argument given by Anselm and explain the similarities and differences between them.

2. Do you agree with Gaunilo’s criticism of Anselm’s argument? Explain.

3. What is Anselm’s response to Gaunilo, and does it succeed? Explain.

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Essay – Ontological Argument

September 15, 2020.

“It is impossible to argue for the existence of God from his attributes”. Discuss

This essay was submitted by one of my students. At first glance, the ontological argument seems a bit odd: is it really possible to argue God exists by just using defintiions and philosophical ideas? But perhaps Anselm is not trying to prove God exists, more giving grounds for havingthe id ea of a supreme being as something great, profound and on the edge of human understanding. I give my comments as the essay progresses. PB

Arguably, we cannot derive the existence of God from His definition due to the inherently ambiguities of the predicate, existence, and indeed the nature of the subject Himself, God. Beyond this, the definition that would be used – a supremely perfect being – deeply undermines the theological idea of an epistemological space (extolled by John Hick), which allows us to develop a more meaningful relationship with God based on faith.

Excellent opening paragraph which brings in the idea of epistemic distance, introduced by John Hick, and hits at an attack on Anselm’s first premise, that God is that which nothing greater can be conceived.

This type of argument, an ‘ontological argument’ is  a priori, and deductive. Medieval Platonic Monk Anselm produced one, which tries to show that God is ‘de dicto necessary’ (i.e. necessary through language). It begins with Anselm, who argues (in his ‘Prosologion’) that God is ‘that – thus – which – nothing – greater – can – be – conceived’. He makes the case that if we were to compare a log to a horse they might say that the horse is greater (i.e. having movement). Likewise, if they were to compare a horse to a human, they might conclude that the human is greater (i.e. having faculties of reason). Therefore, there must be some ‘supreme good’ which allows these comparisons to be drawn, and from which other matter confers value. This, he knows to be God (akin to Plato’s ‘Form of the Good’).

Again, a good paragraph, which is really discussing the issue of placing a comparison (greater than) at the heart of the first discussion in Prosologion. 

From this definition in Anselm’s ‘Proslogion’, he argues that things can either exist in the mind (in re)/continually or in the mind AND reality (in re & in intellect)/necessarily. And, as God is that – thus – which – nothing – greater – can – be – conceived, He must therefore exist both in the mind AND in reality, for this must be better than to exist in the mind alone (and God is a supremely perfect being. In other words, by virtue of the way we define God, Anselm believes His existence to be necessary; alluding to Psalm 14 (the fool says in his heart, “there is no God”).

Yes, and of course, the idea of the necessary being is something Anselm discusses further in the second version of his ontological argument. Sometimes this is expressed in terms of an a analogy with a triangle. A triangle necessarily has three sides, whereas many attributes (predicates as Kant calls them) of a thing are just contingent (ie grass is only contingently green because if there’s a draught it is actually brown).  Anselm’s argument is that only God has certain qualities by necessity (and so in the end the Gaunilo analogy of the island, see next paragraph, is a false analogy, says Anselm).

A contemporary of Anselm, Gaunilo, responds by writing (his ‘On behalf of the fool’) that this allows anything to be ‘thought into existence’. He imagines a perfect ‘lost island’, with warm seas, white sandy beaches and so on. This island could either exist in the mind, or in the mind AND reality. Since it’s better to exist in the mind AND reality, this island must therefore exist in reality (i.e. being perfect). Clearly, as this island doesn’t exist, the argument falls short for God too (a ‘reductio ad absurdum’). However, this is one of the weaker criticisms of the Ontological argument, as it doesn’t make sense to think of islands necessarily. They are, by definition, dynamic landforms which shift and come into or go out of existence over millions of years. That is, they are wholly contingent.

Exactly Anselm’s point and beautifully expressed here.

As aforementioned, the greatest drawback of this type of argument is its assumption that existence is a predicate at all. As an existent God appears not to add anything to our understanding of Him. A well-educated Theologian and a well-educated atheist have exactly the same conceptions of God, even if there’s disagreement over His existence.

Again this is an excellent point as an atheist would simply reply to Anselm that God necessarily does not exist.

This was the argument set out most notably by German Philosopher Kant, in response to a reformulation of the Ontological argument by Descartes (in brief, that a supremely perfect being must have the ‘perfection’ of existence’). Beyond existence appearing not to be a predicate, there’s arguably no reason why we cannot believe that if such a supremely perfect being existed, He would have existence. (But, since He doesn’t, He does not). For example, one can describe the perfect mermaid as being half-human, half-fish and as having existence, whilst still rejecting the concept of a perfect mermaid in its entirety. Therefore, the problems with understanding both the nature of existence and the essence of God mean that we cannot derive the existence of God from His definition, Anselm argues, that things can either be self-evidently true in themselves, or self-evidently true in themselves and to us. Although, for them to be self-evidently true in themselves and to us, we must have complete understanding of existence and God (i.e. the predicate and the subject), which we do not. As such, one can make the case that God’s definition makes His existence self-evidently true in itself but this form or argument (from definition) does not convincingly show that God’s existence is self-evidently true to us.

Very good paragraph, clearly argued and correctly linking Kant to Descartes, whose version of the ontological argument is not quite as subtle as Anselm’s. It is a good point to stress that something defined as self-evidently true is not the same as something established as self-evidently true. And the whole basis of the argument is rejected by thinkers like Aquinas who felt that God is beyond understanding and so applying such logical and linguistic categories was misplaced.

Finally, many theologians write about a ‘self-limitation’ of God’s divine attributes, in order for Him to allow us a more genuine relationship to develop. In other words if God’s existence was completely known to us by definition, we would have no choice as to whether to believe in Him or not. What makes a relationship with God valuable is the fact that we freely choose to believe in it through faith. 1 Corinthians (i.e. St Paul) refers to this ambiguity when it is written that we ‘see God through a glass, darkly’. There is scant Biblical evidence to the contrary, that God’s definition is completely known to us. Theologian John Hick refers to this as our epistemological space’ (or ‘knowledge gap’) in which to operate.

Yes, sometimes referred to as ‘epistemic distance”.

To conclude, we certainly cannot derive God’s existence from His definition due to the problematic logic, with which He is referred and because taking this to be true would critically undermine our freedom to engage in a relationship with Him. Or, as DZ Phillips suggests, perhaps it doesn’t make sense to question God’s existence at all. Instead, we shall take this as the starting point for theology, in the same way that other academic subjects of integrity have axioms on which further investigation rests (e.g. Maths, Physics, Chemistry).

Excellent essay, very clearly and throughly argued. The student might have referred to some modern thinkers such as Alvin Plantinga who has sought to rehabilitate the ontological argument by defining  God as ‘maximally excellent’, or Norman Malcolm, who argues that that Kant’s criticism of the argument is quite misleading, since the question is not whether existence is a predicate but whether necessary existence is a predicate (1960). Reference might have been made to Anselm’s second version because this embraces the idea of necessary existence being an attribute of God’s perfection.

Total 37/40 A* 

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106 Ontological Argument Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

Inside This Article

The ontological argument is a philosophical argument that seeks to prove the existence of God through the concept of existence itself. It has been a topic of debate among philosophers for centuries, with many different variations and interpretations. If you are studying this argument and need some inspiration for essay topics, look no further! Here are 106 ontological argument essay topic ideas and examples to help get you started:

• An analysis of Anselm's original ontological argument
• The role of faith in the ontological argument
• Descartes' ontological argument for the existence of God
• The ontological argument in the context of modern philosophy
• Kant's critique of the ontological argument
• The ontological argument and the problem of evil
• The ontological argument and the concept of perfection
• The ontological argument and the nature of existence
• The ontological argument and the concept of necessary existence
• The ontological argument and the concept of contingent existence
• The ontological argument and the nature of reality
• The ontological argument and the concept of infinity
• The ontological argument and the concept of causality
• The ontological argument and the concept of time
• The ontological argument and the concept of space
• The ontological argument and the concept of consciousness
• The ontological argument and the concept of free will
• The ontological argument and the concept of morality
• The ontological argument and the concept of truth
• The ontological argument and the concept of beauty
• The ontological argument and the concept of justice
• The ontological argument and the concept of love
• The ontological argument and the concept of freedom
• The ontological argument and the concept of knowledge
• The ontological argument and the concept of power
• The ontological argument and the concept of authority
• The ontological argument and the concept of wisdom
• The ontological argument and the concept of virtue
• The ontological argument and the concept of happiness
• The ontological argument and the concept of suffering
• The ontological argument and the concept of death
• The ontological argument and the concept of life
• The ontological argument and the concept of change
• The ontological argument and the concept of permanence
• The ontological argument and the concept of impermanence
• The ontological argument and the concept of reality
• The ontological argument and the concept of illusion
• The ontological argument and the concept of appearance
• The ontological argument and the concept of essence
• The ontological argument and the concept of existence
• The ontological argument and the concept of non-existence
• The ontological argument and the concept of being
• The ontological argument and the concept of non-being
• The ontological argument and the concept of identity
• The ontological argument and the concept of difference
• The ontological argument and the concept of similarity
• The ontological argument and the concept of dissimilarity
• The ontological argument and the concept of unity
• The ontological argument and the concept of diversity
• The ontological argument and the concept of harmony
• The ontological argument and the concept of conflict
• The ontological argument and the concept of order
• The ontological argument and the concept of chaos
• The ontological argument and the concept of structure
• The ontological argument and the concept of randomness
• The ontological argument and the concept of determinism
• The ontological argument and the concept of indeterminism
• The ontological argument and the concept of necessity
• The ontological argument and the concept of contingency
• The ontological argument and the concept of possibility
• The ontological argument and the concept of impossibility
• The ontological argument and the concept of certainty
• The ontological argument and the concept of uncertainty
• The ontological argument and the concept of doubt
• The ontological argument and the concept of belief
• The ontological argument and the concept of disbelief
• The ontological argument and the concept of faith
• The ontological argument and the concept of reason
• The ontological argument and the concept of emotion
• The ontological argument and the concept of intuition
• The ontological argument and the concept of logic
• The ontological argument and the concept of paradox
• The ontological argument and the concept of contradiction
• The ontological argument and the concept of consistency
• The ontological argument and the concept of inconsistency
• The ontological argument and the concept of coherence
• The ontological argument and the concept of incoherence
• The ontological argument and the concept of simplicity
• The ontological argument and the concept of complexity
• The ontological argument and the concept of clarity
• The ontological argument and the concept of obscurity
• The ontological argument and the concept of falsehood
• The ontological argument and the concept of ignorance
• The ontological argument and the concept of understanding
• The ontological argument and the concept of misunderstanding
• The ontological argument and the concept of insight
• The ontological argument and the concept of oversight
• The ontological argument and the concept of revelation
• The ontological argument and the concept of concealment
• The ontological argument and the concept of mystery
• The ontological argument and the concept of confusion
• The ontological argument and the concept of enlightenment
• The ontological argument and the concept of foolishness
• The ontological argument and the concept of intelligence
• The ontological argument and the concept of stupidity
• The ontological argument and the concept of genius

These are just a few ideas to get you started on your ontological argument essay. Remember to choose a topic that interests you and that you can delve into deeply to provide a strong argument. Good luck!

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A Level Philosophy & Religious Studies

The Ontological argument summary notes

OCR Philosophy

This page contains summary revision notes for the Ontological argument topic. There are two versions of these notes. Click on the A*-A grade tab, or the B-C grade tab, depending on the grade you are trying to get.

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Anselm’s ontological argument

• P1. God is the greatest conceivable being
• P2. It is greater to exist in the mind and reality than in the mind alone
• P3. God exists in the mind
• C1. God exists in reality
• Malcolm interprets the idea of the greatest being as God being unlimited, not dependent on anything else for existence. God has no limitation which could possibly cause God’s non-existence. So, God contains the impossibility of non-existence.
• Gaunilo attempts to show Anselm’s logic is absurd by applying it to another case which yields an absurd result.
• Imagine the greatest possible island. If it’s greater to exist then this island must exist.
• This would work for the greatest possible version of anything.
• Anselm’s argument suggests reality would be overloaded with greatest possible things, which seems absurd.
• Gaunilo is attempting to deny that the ontological argument’s conclusion follows from the premises. So he is denying that it really is a valid deductive argument.  
• However, Gaunilo’s critique is not particularly strong.
• There is no self-contradiction arising from Anselm’s logic also proving the existence of a perfect island. At most this seems counter-intuitive, but Gaunilo has not demonstrated actual absurdity, i.e., inconsistency.

Evaluation:

• However, there is a difference between God and an island (and anything else) which explains why the logic works for God but not anything else.
• An island is contingent by definition. It is land enclosed by water, so it depends on a sea/sun/planet for its existence. Everything else in the world is also contingent.
• You cannot use a priori reasoning to prove the existence of a contingent thing, because the existence of a contingent thing is not a matter of its definition. Its existence is a matter of whether what it depends on happens to exist.
• E.g. whether the island exists is a matter of whether the sea/planet/sun it depends on exists. That cannot be determined merely by thinking about the definition of the greatest island. 
• So, the greatest island would still be the greatest island even if it didn’t exist.
• There is nothing in the definition of the greatest being which implies dependence, however, making it necessary.
• Nothing prevents determining the existence of a necessary being by a priori reasoning, unlike contingent beings.
• So, that is why the argument works for God but not anything else.

Gaunilo’s critique that God is beyond our understanding

• Gaunilo objects to P3, the claim that God is in our mind/understanding. 
• He makes the traditional point that God is meant to be beyond our understanding.
• In that case, Anselm can’t go on to conclude that God being the greatest being requires that he is not just in our understanding, but also in reality.
• So, the ontological argument fails.
• Anselm deals with this kind of criticism, however.
• He points out that we don’t need to have a full understanding of God in our mind for the argument to work.
• We need only know/understand that God – whatever God is – is the greatest imaginable being.
• We don’t have to actually know what God is , or what is involved in being the greatest being – we simply have to understand that God is the greatest being.
• When we combine that with the premises that it is greater to exist, we can understand that God must exist.
• Anselm’s argument is successful because we can understand the concept of a being greater than any other possible being. 
• Anselm’s analogy proves this further – we cannot look directly at the sun, but we can still see sunlight.
• Similarly, we cannot know God’s actual nature, but we can know that whatever God is, God is the greatest possible being.
• Gaunilo is committing a straw man fallacy, he’s attacking a claim Anselm didn’t make. Anselm didn’t mean God is in the mind in the sense of us having full knowledge of God’s nature – he just means we understand that God is greater than any other conceivable being.

Kant’s critique that existence is not a predicate

• When Anselm says that if God didn’t exist, God wouldn’t be the greatest being (God), he’s saying that existence is part of what defines God.
• Anselm goes on to conclude that God must exist.
• However, this treats the concept of ‘existence’ like a predicate, like a description of what a thing is, which defines a thing.
• Kant objects that existence is not a predicate. 
• Imagine I was to say ‘the cat exists’. In that sentence, the term ‘exists’ doesn’t seem to actually describe the cat itself. It doesn’t describe a quality that the cat possesses. It simply describes that the cat exists – not the cat itself.
• So, existence is not a predicate. When Anselm says God would not be God if God didn’t exist, Anselm is wrong. God would be just as great/perfect even if non-existent. Anselm can’t go on to conclude that God must exist, therefore.
• Kant’s criticism is stronger than Gaunilo’s because he actually points out the assumption the ontological argument makes rather than pointing to a supposed absurdity.
• However, Kant’s criticism fails for two reasons.
• Firstly, Kant’s criticism fails to attack Descartes’ ontological argument, which therefore seems to be in a stronger position than Anselm’s
• Descartes bases his argument on his rationalist epistemology. He claims that God’s existence can be known through rational intuition. 
• It is not possible to rationally conceive of the most supremely perfect being without existence.
• Descartes’ rejected the aristotelian logic of subject-predicate analysis. So, his argument does not infer God’s existence by assuming that existence is a predicate of God.
• He illustrates with a triangle. You intuitively know that a triangle cannot be without three sides. Similarly, we can intuitively know that God cannot be without existence.
• Secondly, Malcolm defends Anselm and the subject-predicate form of the argument.
• Kant is correct, but only about contingent existence.
• A contingent thing depends on something else for its existence.
• However a necessary being contains the reason for its existence within itself.
• So, necessary existence is a defining quality of a thing, in a way contingent existence is not.
• So necessary existence is a predicate.
• So, both Anselm and Descartes’ versions of the ontological argument succeed against Kant’s criticism.
• Against Anselm, Kant makes the same mistake Gaunilo did – comparing God to contingent beings and thinking the ontological argument fails because it doesn’t work in the case of contingent beings (like cats and coins).

Kant’s critique that existence being a predicate doesn’t establish actual existence

• Kant’s 1st critique is stronger because it doesn’t make the mistake of his other objection of denying that necessary existence is a predicate. 
• Here, Kant argues that even if necessary existence were a predicate of God, that doesn’t establish God’s existence in reality.
• Kant improves on the style of argument Gaunilo was making with his lost island critique.
• Kant is again going to give us a much clearer reason than Gaunilo did for doubting the deductive validity of the ontological argument.
• Gaunilo was trying to argue that we may judge something necessary in our mind, but this doesn’t make it necessary in reality.
• Kant develops this using Descartes’ illustration of a triangle.
• It is necessary that a triangle has three sides. 
• This shows that if a triangle exists, then it necessarily has three sides.
• Similarly, Anselm may have shown that the concept of God necessarily has the predicate of existence.
• However, again similarly, this only shows that if God exists, then God exists necessarily.
• The ontological argument does not show that God does actually exist necessarily.
• Malcolm responds to Kant – he says it makes no sense to say that a necessary being could possibly not exist. Necessary seems to mean ‘must exist’.
• If God is a necessary being then God must exist – it makes no sense to say if a necessary being existed – since a necessary being must exist – there is no if. 
• So, Kant fails according to Malcolm.
• The issue is, Malcolm has only shown that God is a non-dependent being. 
• In his ontological argument, Malcolm argued that if God exists, God exists necessarily because nothing could cause God to cease existing, as God is unlimited and non-dependent. 
• This is what Malcolm established as God’s necessity. But this only establishes that God is necessary in the sense of being non-dependent, not in the sense of must exist.
• A being could be non-dependent and yet not exist. If it existed, then it would be necessary.
• So, the necessity of God’s existence established by the ontological argument only relates to the manner of God’s existence if God exists. 
• Ontological arguments cannot show that God actually exists, then.

Graham Oppy, editor: Ontological arguments

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018, x and 284 pp, $34.99 (paper)

• Book Review
• Published: 27 June 2019
• Volume 86 , pages 91–96, ( 2019 )

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The Many - Faced Argument (ed. Hick and McGill, Macmillan 1967). A very large volume, edited by Miroslaw Szatkowski, appeared in 2013 ( Ontological Proofs Today, Ontos Verlag). That includes much advanced work, but is expensive and much less accessible than the volume under review.

See especially p. 57.

“The Ontological Argument as Cartesian Therapy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35(4), pp. 521–562.

“Ontological Arguments” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ; https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/ , accessed May 22, 2019.

Lewis, David, "Anselm and Actuality," Nous volume 4, number 2 (1970), pp. 175–188.

The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 221.

See his “Three Versions of the Ontological Argument” in Ontological Proofs Today, Miroslaw Szatkowski (editor), Ontos Verlag 2012, pp. 143–162.

NB: Descartes gives such a restriction, but this involves “clear and distinct perception” by the meditator.

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Harrelson, K.J. Graham Oppy, editor: Ontological arguments. Int J Philos Relig 86 , 91–96 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-019-09720-3

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Overview – Does God Exist?

A level philosophy looks at 4 arguments relating to the existence of God . These are:

• The ontological argument
• The teleological argument
• The cosmological argument

The problem of evil

There are various versions of each argument as well as numerous responses to each. The key points of each argument are summarised below:

Ontological arguments

The ontological arguments are unique in that they are the only arguments for God’s existence that use a priori reasoning. All ontological arguments are deductive arguments .

Versions of the ontological argument aim to deduce God’s existence from the definition of God. Thus, proponents of ontological arguments claim ‘God exists’ is an analytic truth .

Anselm’s ontological argument

“Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater. […] Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.” – St. Anselm, Proslogium , Chapter 2

Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) was the first to propose an ontological argument in his book Proslogium .

His argument can be summarised as:

• By definition, God is a being greater than which cannot be conceived
• We can coherently conceive of such a being i.e. the concept is coherent
• It is greater to exist in reality than to exist only in the mind
• Therefore, God must exist

In other words, imagine two beings:

• One is said to be maximally great in every way, but does not exist.
• The other is maximally great in every way and does exist.

Which being is greater? Presumably, the second one – because it is greater to exist in reality than in the mind.

Since God is a being that we cannot imagine to be greater, this description better fits the second option (the one that exists) than the first.

Descartes’ ontological argument

Descartes offers his own version of the ontological argument:

• I have the idea of God
• The idea of God is the idea of a supremely perfect being
• A supremely perfect being does not lack any perfection
• Existence is a perfection
• Therefore, God exists

This argument is very similar to Anselm’s , except it uses the concept of a perfect being rather than a being greater than which cannot be conceived .

Descartes argues this shows that ‘God does not exist’ is a self-contradiction . Hume uses this claim as the basis for his objection to the ontological argument.

Gaunilo’s island

Gaunilo of Marmoutiers (994-1083) argues that if Anselm’s argument is valid, then anything can be defined into existence. For example:

• The perfect island is, by definition, an island greater than which cannot be conceived
• We can coherently conceive of such an island i.e. the concept is coherent
• Therefore, this island must exist

The conclusion of this argument is obviously false.

Gaunilo argues that if Anselm’s argument were valid, then we could define anything into existence – the perfect shoe, the perfect tree, the perfect book, etc.

Hume: ‘God does not exist’ is not a contradiction

The ontological argument reasons from the definition of God that God must exist. This would make ‘God exists’ an analytic truth (or what Hume would call a relation of ideas , as the analytic/synthetic distinction wasn’t made until years later).

The denial of an analytic truth/relation of ideas leads to a contradiction. For example, “there is a triangle with 4 sides” is a contradiction.

Contradictions cannot be coherently conceived . If you try to imagine a 4-sided triangle, you’ll either imagine a square or a triangle. The idea of a 4-sided triangle doesn’t make sense.

So, is “God does not exist” a contradiction? Descartes (and Anselm) certainly thought so.

But Hume argues against this claim. Anything we can conceive of as existent , he says, we can also conceive of as non-existent . This shows that “God exists” cannot be an analytic truth/relation of ideas, and so ontological arguments must fail somewhere.

A summary of Hume’s argument can be stated as:

• If ontological arguments succeed, ‘God does not exist’ is a contradiction
• A contradiction cannot be coherently conceived
• But ‘God does not exist’ can be coherently conceived
• Therefore, ‘God does not exist’ is not a contradiction
• Therefore, ontological arguments do not succeed

Kant: existence is not a predicate

Kant argues that existence is not a property (predicate) of things in the same way, say, green is a property of grass .

To say something exists doesn’t add anything to the concept of it.

Imagine a unicorn. Then imagine a unicorn that exists . What’s the difference between the two ideas? Nothing! Adding existence to the idea of a unicorn doesn’t make unicorns suddenly exist.

When someone says “God exists”, they don’t mean “there is a God and he has the property of existence”. If they did, then when someone says “God does not exist”, they’d mean, “there is a God and he has the property of non existence” – which doesn’t make sense!

Instead, what people mean when they say “God exists” is that “God exists in the world” . This cannot be argued from the definition of God and could only be proved via ( a posteriori ) experience. Thus the ontological argument fails to prove God’s (actual) existence.

Norman Malcolm’s ontological argument

Kant’s objection to the ontological argument is generally considered to be the most powerful argument against it.

So, in response, some philosophers have developed alternate versions that avoid this criticism.

Malcolm accepts that Descartes and Anselm (at least as presented above) are wrong.

Instead, Malcolm argues that it’s not existence that is a perfection, but the logical impossibility of non-existence ( necessary existence , in other words).

This (necessary existence) is a predicate, so avoids Kant’s argument above. Malcolm’s ontological argument is as follows:

• Either God exists or does not exist
• God cannot come into existence or go out of existence
• If God exists, God cannot cease to exist
• Therefore, if God exists, God’s existence is necessary
• Therefore, if God does not exist, God’s existence is impossible
• Therefore, God’s existence is either necessary or impossible
• God’s existence is impossible only if the concept of God is self-contradictory
• The concept of God is not self-contradictory
• Therefore, God’s existence is not impossible
• Therefore, God exists necessarily

Malcolm’s argument essentially boils down to:

• God’s existence is either necessary or impossible (see above)
• God’s existence is not impossible
• Therefore God’s existence is necessary

Possible response:

We may respond to point 8, as discussed in the concept of God section , that the concept of God is self-contradictory.

Alternatively, we may argue that the meaning of “necessary” changes between premise 4 and the conclusion (10) and thus Malcolm’s argument is invalid. In premise 4, Malcolm is talking about necessary existence in the sense of a property that something does or does not have. By the conclusion, Malcolm is talking about necessary existence in the sense that it is a necessary truth that God exists. But this is not the same thing. We can accept that if God exists , then God has the property of necessary existence, but deny the conclusion that God exists necessarily.

Teleological arguments

The teleological arguments are also known as arguments from design.

These arguments aim to show that certain features of nature or the laws of nature are so perfect that they must have been designed by a designer – God.

Hume’s teleological argument

In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion , Hume considers a version of the teleological argument (through the character Cleanthes ), which he goes on to reject (through the character of Philo ).

“The intricate fitting of means to ends throughout all nature is just like (though more wonderful than) the fitting of means to ends in things that have been produced by us – products of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer by all the rules of analogy that the causes are also alike, and that the author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though he has much larger faculties to go with the grandeur of the work he has carried out. By this argument… we prove both that there is a God and that he resembles human mind and intelligence.” – Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part 5

Hume’s argument here draws an analogy between things designed by humans and nature:

• The ‘fitting of means to ends’ in human design (e.g. the fitting of the many parts of a watch to achieve the end of telling the time) resemble the ‘fitting of means to ends’ in nature (e.g. the many parts of a human’s eye to achieve the end of seeing things)
• Similar effects have similar causes
• The causes of human designs (e.g. watches) are minds
• So, by analogy , the cause of design in nature is also a mind
• And, given the ‘grandeur of the work’ of nature, this other mind is God .

William Paley: Natural Theology

William Paley (1743-1805) wasn’t the first to propose a teleological argument for the existence of God, but his version is perhaps the most famous.

The reason for this is that a watch, unlike the stone, has many parts organised for a purpose. Paley says this is the hallmark of design:

“When we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose , e.g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day.” – William Paley, Natural Theology, Chapter 1

Nature and aspects of nature, such as the human eye, are composed of many parts. These parts are organised for a purpose – in the case of the eye, to see .

So, like the watch, nature has the hallmarks of design – but “ with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater and more” . And for something to be designed, it must have an equally impressive designer .

Paley says this designer is God.

Hume: problems with the analogy

Hume (as the character Philo) points out various problems with the analogy between the design of human-made objects and nature, such as:

• We can observe human-made items being designed by minds , but we have no such experience of this in the case of nature. Instead, designs in nature could be the result of natural processes (what Philo calls ‘generation and vegetation’).
• The analogy focuses on specific aspects of nature that appear to be designed (e.g. the human eye) and generalises this to the conclusion that the whole universe must be designed.
• Human machines  (e.g. watches and cars) obviously have a designer and a purpose. But biological things (e.g. an animal or a plant, such as a cabbage) do not have an obvious purpose or designer – they appear to be the result of an unconscious process of ‘generation and vegetation’. The universe is more like the latter (i.e. a biological thing) than the former (i.e. a machine) and so, by analogy, the cause of the universe is better explained by this unconscious processes of ‘generation and vegetation’ rather than the conscious design of a mind.

An argument from analogy is only as strong as the similarities between the two things being compared (nature and human designs). These differences weaken the jump from human-made items being designed to the whole universe being designed.

Hume: Spatial dis order

Hume (as the character Philo) argues that although there are examples of order within nature (which suggests design), there is also much “vice and misery and disorder” in the world (which is evidence against design).

If God really did design the world, Hume argues, there wouldn’t be such disorder. For example:

• There are huge areas of the universe that are empty, or just filled with random rocks or are otherwise uninhabitable. This suggests that the universe isn’t designed but instead we just happen, by coincidence, to be in a part that has spatial order.
• Some parts of the world (e.g. droughts, hurricanes, etc.) go wrong and cause chaos. Hume argues that if the world is designed , these chaotic features suggest that the designer isn’t very good.
• Animals have bodies that feel pain and that could have been made in such ways that they could have happier lives. If God designed animals and humans, you would expect He would make animals and humans in this way so that their lives would be easier and happier.

These features are examples of spatial dis order – features that wouldn’t make sense to include if you designed the universe.

Hume argues that such examples of disorder show that the universe isn’t designed. Or, if the universe is designed, then the designer is neither omnipotent nor omnibenevolent (as God is claimed to be).

Hume: causation

Hume famously argues that we never experience causation – only the ‘constant conjunction’ of one event following another. If this happens enough times, we infer that A causes B.

For example, experience (ever since you were a baby) tells you that if one snooker ball hits another (A), the second snooker ball will move (B). You don’t actually experience A causing B, but it’s reasonable to expect this relationship to hold in the future because you’ve seen it and similar examples hundreds of times.

But imagine that you take a sip of tea and at the same time your friend coughs. Would it be reasonable to infer that drinking the tea caused your friend to cough based on this one instance? Obviously not. The point is: You cannot infer causation from a single instance.

Applying this to teleological arguments, Hume (as the character Philo) argues that the creation of the universe was a unique event – we only have experience of this one universe. And so, like the tea example, we can’t infer a causal relationship between designer and creation based on just one instance.

Hume: finite matter, infinite time

“Instead of supposing matter to be infinite, as Epicurus did, let us suppose it to be finite and also suppose space to be finite, while still supposing time to be infinite. A finite number of particles in a finite space can have only a finite number of transpositions; and in an infinitely long period of time every possible order or position of particles must occur an infinite number of times.” – Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part 8

Hume’s objection here assumes the following:

• Time is infinite
• Matter is finite

Given these assumptions, it is inevitable that matter will organise itself into combinations that appear to be designed.

It’s a bit like the monkeys and typewriters thought experiment:

Given an infinite amount of time, a monkey will eventually type the complete works of Shakespeare.

This is the nature of infinity. It’s inevitable that the monkey will write something that appears to be intelligent, even though it’s just hitting letters at random.

The same principle applies to the teleological argument, argues Hume: Given enough time, it is inevitable that matter will arrange itself into combinations that appear to be designed , even though they’re not.

Darwin: evolution by natural selection

Charles Darwin’s (1809-1882) theory of evolution by natural selection explains how complex organisms – complete with parts organised for a purpose – can emerge from nature without a designer.

For example, it may seem that God designed giraffes to have long necks so they could reach leaves in high trees. But the long necks of giraffes can be explained without a designer , for example:

• Competition for food is tough
• An animal that cannot acquire enough food will die before it can breed and produce offspring
• An animal with a (random genetic mutation for a) neck that’s 1cm longer than everyone else’s will be able to access 1cm more food
• This competitive advantage makes it more likely to survive and produce offspring
• The offspring are likely to inherit the gene for a longer neck, making them more likely to survive and reproduce as well
• Longer necked-animals become more common as a result
• The environment becomes more competitive as more and more animals can reach the 1cm higher leaves
• An animal with a neck 2cm longer has the advantage in this newly competitive environment
• Repeat process over hundreds of millions of years until you have modern day giraffes

The key idea is that – given enough time and genetic mutations – it is inevitable that animals and plants will adapt to their environment, thus creating the appearance of design.

This directly undermines Paley’s claim that anything that has parts organised to serve a purpose must be designed.

Swinburne: The Argument from Design

Swinburne’s version of the teleological argument distinguishes between:

• Examples of order in nature ( spatial order )
• And the order of the laws of nature ( temporal order )

Swinburne accepts that science, for example evolution , can explain the apparent design of things like the human eye (i.e. spatial order) and so Paley’s teleological argument does not succeed in proving God’s existence. However, Swinburne argues, we can’t explain the laws of nature (i.e. temporal order) in the same way.

For example, the law of gravity is such that it allows galaxies to form, and planets to form within these galaxies, and life to form on these planets. But if gravity had the opposite effect – it repelled matter, say – then life would never be able to form. If gravity was even slightly stronger, planets wouldn’t be able to form. So how do we explain why these laws are the way they are?

Unlike spatial order, we can’t give a scientific explanation of why the laws of nature are as they are. Science can explain and predict things using these laws – but it has to first assume these laws. Science can’t explain why these laws are the way they are. In the absence of a scientific explanation of the laws of nature, Swinburne argues, the best explanation of temporal order is a personal explanation.

We give personal explanations of things all the time – for example, ‘this sentence exists because I chose to write it’ or ‘that building exists because someone designed and built it’. Swinburne argues that, by analogy, we can explain the laws of nature (i.e. temporal order) in a similarly personal way: The laws of nature are the way they are because someone designed them.

In the absence of a scientific explanation of temporal order, Swinburne argues, the best explanation is the personal one: The laws of nature were designed by God .

Multiple universes

Hume’s earlier argument (finite matter, infinite time) can be adapted to respond to Swinburne’s teleological argument.

But instead of arguing that time is infinite, as Hume does, we could argue that the number of universes is infinite.

This idea of multiple universes is popular among some physicists, as it explains various phenomena in quantum mechanics.

But anyway, if there are an infinite number of universes (or even just a large enough number), it is likely that some of these universes will have laws of nature (temporal order) that support the formation of life. Of course, when such universes do exist, it is just sheer luck. If each universe has randomly different scientific laws, there will also be many universes where the temporal order does not support life.

Is the designer God?

Both Hume and Kant have argued that even if the teleological argument succeeded in proving the existence of a designer , this designer would not necessarily be God (as defined in the Concept of God section).

For example:

• God’s power is supposedly infinite ( omnipotence ), yet the universe is not infinite
• Designers are not always creators. Designer and creator might be two separate people (e.g. the guy who designs a car doesn’t physically build it)
• The design of the universe may be the result of many small improvements by many people
• Designers can die even if their creations live on. How do we know the designer is eternal , as God is supposed to be?

Cosmological arguments

The Kalam Argument

The Kalam argument is perhaps the simplest version of the cosmological argument in the A level philosophy syllabus. It says:

• Whatever begins to exist has a cause
• The universe began to exist
• Therefore, the universe has a cause

Aquinas: Five Ways

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) gave five different versions of the cosmological argument. A level philosophy requires you to know these three:

Argument from motion

Argument from causation.

• Contingency argument

Aquinas’ first way is the argument from motion .

“It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion… It is [impossible that something] should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover… Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.” – Aquinas, Summa Theologica , Part 1 Question 3

A summary of this argument:

• E.g. a football rolling along the ground
• E.g. someone kicked the ball
• If A is put in motion by B , then something else ( C ) must have put B in motion, and so on
• If this chain goes on infinitely, then there is no first mover
• If there is no first mover, then there is no other mover, and so nothing would be in motion
• But things are in motion
• Therefore, there must be a first mover
• The first mover is God

Aquinas’ second way – the argument from causation – is basically the same as the argument from motion, except it talks about a first cause rather than a first mover:

• E.g. throwing a rock caused the window to smash
• C is caused by B , and B is caused by A , and so on
• If this chain of causation was infinite, there would be no first cause
• If there were no first cause, there would be no subsequent causes or effects
• But there are causes and effects in the world
• Therefore, there must have been a first cause
• The first cause is God

Argument from contingency

Aquinas’ third way relies on a distinction between necessary and contingent existence. It’s a similar distinction to necessary and contingent truth from the epistemology module.

Things that exist contingently are things that might not have existed.

For example, the tree in the field wouldn’t exist if someone hadn’t planted the seed years ago. So, the tree exists contingently. Its existence is contingent on someone planting the seed.

So, using this idea of contingent existence, Aquinas argues that:

• Everything that exists contingently did not exist at some point
• If everything exists contingently, then at some point nothing existed
• If nothing existed, then nothing could begin to exist
• But since things did begin to exist, there was never nothing in existence
• Therefore, there must be something that does not exist contingently, but that exists necessarily
• This necessary being is God

Descartes’ Cosmological Argument

Descartes’ version of the cosmological argument is a lot more long-winded than the Kalam argument or any of Aquinas’ .

The key points are along these lines:

• I can’t be the cause of my own existence because if I was I would have given myself all perfections (e.g. omnipotence, omniscience, etc.)
• I depend on something else to exist
• I am a thinking thing and have the idea of God
• Whatever caused me to exist must also be a thinking thing that has the idea of God
• Whatever caused me to exist must either be the cause of its own existence or caused by something else
• If it was caused by something else then this something else must also either be the cause of its own existence or caused by something else
• There cannot be an infinite chain of causes
• So there must be something that caused its own existence
• Whatever causes its own existence is God

There’s a bit more to Descartes’ version than this. For example, he talks about a cause needed to keep him in existence and how there must be ‘as much reality’ in the cause as in the effect. But the points above constitute the main argument.

Leibniz: Sufficient reason

Note: This is another cosmological argument from contingency , like Aquinas’ third way above

Leibniz’s argument is premised on his  principle of sufficient reason. The principle of sufficient reason says that every truth has an explanation of why it is the case (even if we can’t know this explanation).

Leibniz then defines two different types of truth:

• Truths of reasoning: this is basically another word for necessary or analytic truths
• Truths of fact: this is basically another word for contingent or synthetic truths

The sufficient reason for truths of reasoning (i.e. analytic truths) is revealed by analysis. When you analyse and understand “3+3=6”, for example, you don’t need a further explanation why it is true.

But it is more difficult to provide sufficient reason for truths of fact (i.e. contingent truths) because you can always provide more detail via more contingent truths. For example, you can explain the existence of a tree by saying someone planted a seed. But you could then ask why the person planted the seed, or why seeds exist in the first place, or why the laws of physics are the way they are, and so on. This process of providing contingent reasons for contingent facts goes on forever.

“Therefore, the sufficient or ultimate reason must needs be outside of the sequence or series of these details of contingencies, however infinite they may be.” – Leibniz, Monadology , Section 37

So, to escape this endless cycle of contingent facts and provide sufficient reason for truths of fact (i.e. contingent truths), we need to step outside the sequence of contingent facts and appeal to a necessary substance. This necessary substance is God , Leibniz says.

Is a first cause necessary?

Most of the cosmological arguments assume something along the lines of ‘there can’t be an infinite chain of causes’ (except the cosmological arguments from contingency ). For example, they say stuff like there must have been a first cause or a prime mover .

But we can respond by rejecting this claim. Why must there be a first cause? Perhaps there is just be an infinite chain of causes stretching back forever.

• An infinite chain of causes would mean an infinite amount of time has passed prior to the present moment
• If an infinite amount of time has passed, then the universe can’t get any older (because infinity + 1 = infinity)
• But the universe is getting older (e.g. the universe is a year older in 2020 than it was in 2019)
• Therefore an infinite amount of time has not passed
• Therefore there is not an infinite chain of causes

Hume’s objections to causation

Another assumption (or premise) of many of the cosmological arguments above (not so much the contingency ones) is something like ‘everything has a cause’.

But Hume’s fork can be used to question this claim that ‘everything has a cause’:

• Relation of ideas: ‘Everything has a cause’ is not a relation of ideas because we can conceive of something without a cause. For example, we can imagine a chair that just springs into existence for no reason – it’s a weird idea, but it’s not a logical contradiction like a 4-sided triangle or a married bachelor.
• Matter of fact: ‘Everything has a cause’ cannot be known as a matter of fact either, says Hume. We never actually experience causation – we just see event A happen and then event B happen after. Even if we see B follow A a million times, we never experience A causing B, just the ‘constant conjunction’ of A and B.

Further, in the specific case of the creation of the universe, we only ever experience event B (i.e. the continued existence of the universe) and never what came before (i.e. the thing that caused the universe to exist).

This all casts doubt on the premise of cosmological arguments that ‘everything has a cause’.

Russell: Fallacy of composition

Bertrand Russell argues that cosmological arguments fall foul of the fallacy of composition . The fallacy of composition is an invalid inference that because parts of something have a certain property, the entire thing must also have this property. Examples:

• Just because all the players on a football team are good, this doesn’t guarantee the team is good. For example, the players might not work well together.
• Just because a sheet of paper is thin, it doesn’t mean things made from sheets of paper are thin. For example, a book with enough sheets of paper can be thick.

Applying this to the cosmological argument, we can raise a similar objection to Hume’s above : just because everything within the universe has a cause, doesn’t guarantee that the universe itself has a cause.

Or, to apply it to Leibniz’s cosmological argument : just because everything within the universe requires sufficient reason to explain its existence, doesn’t mean the universe itself requires sufficient reason to explain its existence. Russell says: “the universe is just there, and that’s all.”

• Ok, but everything within the universe exists contingently
• And if everything within the universe didn’t exist, then the universe itself wouldn’t exist either (because that’s all the universe is: the collection of things that make it up)
• So the universe itself exists contingently, not just the stuff within it
• And so the universe itself requires sufficient reason to explain its existence

Is the first cause God?

Aquinas’ first and second ways and the Kalam argument only show that there is a first cause . But they don’t show that this first cause is God .

So, even if we accept that there was a first cause, it doesn’t necessarily follow that God exists – much less the specific being described in the concept of God .

So, even if the cosmological argument is sound, it doesn’t necessarily follow that God exists.

This objection doesn’t work so well against Descartes’ version because he specifically reasons that there is a first cause and that this first cause is an omnipotent and omniscient God .

Similarly, you could argue that any being that exists necessarily (such as follows from Aquinas’ third way and Leibniz’s cosmological argument ) would be God.

The problem of evil uses the existence of evil in the world to argue that God (as defined in the concept of God ) does not exist.

These arguments can be divided into two forms:

• The logical problem of evil is a deductive argument that says the existence of God is logically impossible given the existence of evil in the world
• The evidential problem of evil is an inductive argument which says that, while it is logically possible that God exists, the amount of evil and unfair ways it is distributed in our world is pretty strong evidence that God doesn’t exist

And evil can be divided into two types of evil:

One final definition: a theodicy is an explanation of why an omnipotent and omniscient God would permit evil.

The logical problem of evil

“Epicurus’s old questions have still not been answered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then where does evil come from?” – Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part 10

J.L. Mackie: Evil and Omnipotence

Inconsistent triad.

The simple version of Mackie’s argument is that the following statements are logically inconsistent – i.e. one or more of them contradict each other:

• God is omnipotent
• God is omnibenevolent
• Evil exists

Mackie’s argument is that, logically, a maximum of 2 of these 3 statements can be true but not all 3. This is sometimes referred to as the inconsistent triad .

He argues that if God is omnibenevolent then he wants to stop evil. And if God is omnipotent, then he’s powerful enough to prevent evil.

But evil does exist in the world. People steal, get murdered, and so on. So either God isn’t powerful enough to stop evil, doesn’t want to stop evil, or both.

In the concept of God , God is defined as an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being. If such a being existed, argues Mackie, then evil would not exist. But evil does exist. Therefore, there is no omnipotent and omnibenevolent being. Therefore, God does not exist.

Reply 1: good couldn’t exist without evil

People often make claims like “you can’t appreciate the good times without experiencing some bad times”.

This is basically what this reply says: without evil, good couldn’t exist.

Mackie’s response

Mackie questions whether this statement is true at all. Why can’t we have good without evil?

Imagine if we lived in a world where everything was red. Presumably, we wouldn’t have created a word for ‘red’, nor would we know what it meant if someone tried to explain it to us. But it would still be the case that everything is red, we just wouldn’t know.

It’s a similar story with good and evil.

God could have created a world in which there was no evil. Like the red example, we wouldn’t have the concept of evil. But it would still be the case that everything is good – we just wouldn’t be aware of it.

Reply 2: the world is better with some evil than none at all

You could develop reply 1 above to argue that some evil is necessary for certain types of good. For example, you couldn’t be courageous (good) without having to overcome fear of pain, death, etc. (evil).

We can define first and second order goods:

• First order good: e.g. pleasure
• Second order good: e.g. courage

The argument is that second order goods seek to maximise first order goods. And second order goods are more valuable than first order goods. But without first order evils, second order goods couldn’t exist.

Let’s say we accept that first order evil is necessary for second order good to exist. How do you explain second order evil ?

Second order evils seek to maximise first order evils such as pain. So, for example, malevolence or cruelty are examples of second order evils.

But we could still have a world in which people were courageous (second order good) in overcoming pain (first order evil) without these second order evils. So why would an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God allow the existence of second order evils if there is no greater good in doing so?

Reply 3: we need evil for free will

We can develop the second order evil argument above further and argue that second order evil is necessary for free will. And free will is inherently such a good and valuable thing that it outweighs the bad that results from people abusing free will to do evil things.

So, while allowing free will brings some suffering, the net good of having free will is greater than if we didn’t. Therefore, it’s logically possible that an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God would allow evil (both first order and second order) for the greater good of free will.

• An omnipotent God can create any logically possible world
• If it’s logically possible to freely choose to act in a way that’s good on one occasion, then it’s logically possible to freely choose to act in a way that’s good on every occasion
• So, an omnipotent God could create a world in which everyone freely chooses to act in a way that’s good

In other words, there is a logically possible world with both free will and without second order evils.

This, surely, would be the best of both worlds and maximise good most effectively: you would have second order goods, plus the good of free will, but without second order evils. This is a logically possible world – the logically possible world with the most good.

So, why wouldn’t an omnipotent and omniscient God create this specific world? Second order evils do not seem logically necessary, and yet they exist.

Alvin Plantinga: God, Freedom and Evil

Plantinga argues that we don’t need a plausible theodicy to defeat the logical problem of evil. All we need to show is that the existence of evil is not logically inconsistent with an omnipotent and omnibelevolent God.

So, even if the explanation of why God would allow evil doesn’t seem particularly plausible, as long as it’s a logical possibility then we have defeated the logical problem of evil .

Free will defence

Even Mackie himself admits that God’s existence is not logically incompatible with some evil (first order evil). But his argument is that second order evil isn’t necessary .

Plantinga argues, however, that it’s logically possible (which is all we need to show to defeat the logical problem of evil) that God would allow second order evil for a greater good. His argument is as follows:

• A morally significant action is one that is either morally good or morally bad
• A being that is significantly free is one that is able to do or not do morally significant actions
• A being created by God to only do morally good actions would not be significantly free
• So, the only way God could eliminate evil (including second order evil) would be to eliminate significantly free beings
• But a world that contains significantly free beings is more good than a world that does not contain significantly free beings

In short, this argument shows that it’s at least logically possible that God would allow second order evil for the greater good of significant freedom.

Perhaps God could have created the world where everyone chose to only do morally good actions ( as Mackie describes above ) – but such a world wouldn’t be significantly free. Free will is inherently good and so significant free will could outweigh the negative of people using that significant free will to commit second order evils.

Natural evil as a form of moral evil

The free will defence above explains why an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God would allow moral evil. But it doesn’t explain natural evil.

When innocent people are killed in natural disasters, it doesn’t seem this is the result of free will. So, even if an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God would allow moral evil, why does this kind of evil exist as well?

Plantinga argues that it’s possible natural evil is the result of non-human actors such as Satan, fallen angels, demons, etc. This would make natural evil another form of moral evil, the existence of which would be explained by free will.

Even if this doesn’t sound very plausible , it’s at least possible . And remember, Plantinga’s argument is that we only need to show evil is not logically inconsistent with God’s existence to defeat the logical problem of evil.

The evidential problem of evil

Unlike the logical problem of evil , the evidential problem of evil can allow that God’s existence is possible .

However, it argues the amount and distribution of evil in the world provides good evidence that God probably doesn’t exist.

• Innocent babies born with painful congenital diseases
• The sheer number of people currently living in slavery, extreme poverty or fear
• The millions of innocent and anonymous people throughout history killed for no good reason

We can reject the logical problem of evil and accept that God would allow some evil. But would an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God allow so much evil? And to people so undeserving of it?

The evidential problem of evil argues that if God did exist, there would be less evil and it would be less concentrated among those undeserving of it.

Free will (again)

Sure, God could have made a world with less evil. But this would mean less free will. And on balance, having free will creates more good than the evil it also creates.

OK, maybe God would allow some evil for the greater good of free will. But it seems possible – simple, even – that God could have created a world with less evil than our world without sacrificing the greater good of free will.

For example, our world exactly as it is, with the same amount of free will, but with 1% less cancer. God could have created this world, so why didn’t He?

The evidential problem of evil could insist that the amount of evil – or unfair ways it is distributed – could easily be reduced without sacrificing some greater good, and so it seems unlikely that God exists, in this world, given this particular distribution of evil.  

John Hick: Evil and the God of Love

Soul making.

Hick argues that humans are unfinished beings. Part of our purpose in life is to develop personally, ethically and spiritually – he calls this ‘soul making’.

As discussed above , it would be impossible for people to display (second order) virtues such as courage without fear of (first order) evils such as pain or death. Similarly, we couldn’t learn virtues such as forgiveness if people never treated us wrongly.

Of course, God could just have given us these virtues right off the bat. But, Hick says, virtues acquired through hard work and discipline are “good in a richer and more valuable sense”. Plus, there are some virtues, such as a genuine and authentic love of God, that cannot simply be given (otherwise they wouldn’t be genuine).

This explanation goes some way towards explaining why God would allow the amount and distribution of evil we see. He then addresses some specific examples of evils that may not seem to fit with an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God:

Why God allows animals to suffer

The evidential problem of evil can ask Hick why God would allow animals to suffer when there is no benefit. After all, they can’t develop spiritually like we can.

Hick’s response is that God wanted to create epistemic distance between himself and humanity – i.e. a world in which his existence could be doubted. If God just proved he existed, we wouldn’t be free to develop a relationship with him.

Why God allows such terrible evils

Hick argues that it’s not possible for God to just get rid of terrible evil – e.g. baby torture – and leave only ordinary evil. The reason for this is that terrible evils are only terrible in contrast to ordinary evils. So, if God did get rid of terrible evils, then the worst ordinary evils would become the new terrible evils. If God kept getting rid of terrible evils then he would have to keep reducing free will and thus the development of personal and spiritual virtues ( soul making ).

Why God allows such pointless evils

Hick argues that pointless evils – e.g. anonymously dying in vain trying to save someone – are somewhat of a mystery. However, if every time we saw someone suffering we knew it was for some higher purpose (i.e. it wasn’t pointless), then we would never be able to develop deep sympathy.

Again, this goes back to the soul making theodicy: without seemingly unfair and pointless evil, we would never be able to develop virtues such as hope and faith – both of which require a degree of uncertainty.

<<<The Concept of God

Religious language>>>.

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81 Ontology Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

🏆 best ontology topic ideas & essay examples, 👍 good research topics about ontology, 📌 most interesting ontology topics to write about, ❓ ontology questions examples.

• The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God Kant’s objection to the ontological argument stems from his view of the concept that a being that is conceived in the human mind, and which exists in the real world, is superior to an idea […]
• Rene Descartes’ Ontological Reasoning One of the branches of his ontological thought was the discussion of the existence of God. The purpose of this paper is review and analyze the arguments Rene Descartes provided to evidence the existence of […]
• Epistemology, Ontology, and Researcher Positionality However, the awareness of such characteristic features of the qualitative research process and the influential role of the researcher’s positionality allows for predicting the bias and addressing it effectively for more reliability and credibility of […]
• Control Breast Cancer: Nursing Phenomenon, Ontology and Epistemology of Health Management Then, the evidence received is presented in an expert way leading to implementation of the decision on the management of the disease.
• Ontology in Deleuze’s The Fold This power can be presented as the compressive force of the university contributing to the return of all pleats of the matter to the surrounded area.
• Ontology and Events in Architecture. Bernard Tschumi He stresses the change of paradigm and the presence of violence that governs the dynamic, at times incompatible relationships within architectural objects determined by the human intrusion in them and reconsideration of function and form, […]
• Comparison Ontology Modeling With Other Data-Based Model This is the organized representation of the information that the database requires including the information objects, the linkages in between the information objects and the guidelines that are used in the running of the relevant […]
• Philosophy of Science: Paradigm, Ontology, Epistemology On several occasions, it determines the magnitude of truth in a particular set of scientific results, thereby the merits or demerits of the same. This makes it the category of philosophy that studies the nature […]
• Anselm: Ontological Argument for the God’s Existence He considers the understanding of God’s existence as some of the things that exist in the stated place. He states that the love for God is the main aspect of the just among the human […]
• Ontological Views of the Quality of Life Thus, the development of instruments used in the assessment of QoL commenced in the 1970s and aided healthcare providers in making medical decisions. QoL varies according to the nursing environment and perceptions of patients and […]
• Hobbes’ Ontology within “Leviathan” Nevertheless, Hobbes seems to distinguish his writings on the Law of Nature from realistic conditions, with the philosophy based on maxims of the knowledge of human nature and behavior that apply moral precepts on science […]
• Philosophy: St. Anselm’s Ontological Argument One of the earliest ontological arguments, in defense of the de facto existence of God, is that of Anselm of Canterbury.
• Ontological Proof of God’s Existence It is because other marvelous things that cannot be conceived can either be an object or not specifically God, as the argument claims.
• Ontology and Epistemology in Leadership Research In the frames of this research on leadership as a practice, it is impossible to clarify what has been already known, what could be expected, and what lessons could be offered. It is a practice […]
• Ontology and Epistemology in the Contemporary Society Holistic, a term used by the writer, is appropriate as the nature of the writing tends to elaborate the idea of describing the concepts of knowledge as a whole and the differentiation of parts that […]
• Ontology, Free Will, Fate and Determinism On the other hand, fate is simply the predetermined course of the events or the predetermined future. It is pragmatic that people should not believe in the cause and effect.
• Ontological and Wager Argument While Anselm and Wager are major proponents of the ontological argument, Hume and Kant are some of the opponents of the ontological argument. Ontological argument is a controversial argument that supports the existence of God.
• Educational Research: Epistemological and Ontological Perspectives This applies to the statement that the researcher you are is the person you are since the knowledge and truth possessed from the surrounding will influence the researcher’s way of doing things.
• The Ontological Argument to Prove God’s Existence According to Anselm “if the existence of a being is necessary, then, ‘that being is greater than one which existence is not necessary’”.
• Ontological Vision vs. Teleological Argument For instance, one is to keep in mind that the so-called ontological vision is recognized to be one of the most reliable arguments, which proves the existence of the Sole Supreme Being.
• Ontological Difficulties in Literary Works A difficulty in literary criticism in negative terms refers to an element of writing that points to or indicative of a rift between a poet or an author and the reader.
• St. Anselm’s Ontological Proof of God Just as it is contradictory to think of the greater than which nothing greater can be thought as not existing, so it is absurd to think of God as not existing.
• Ontological Arguments: Anselm’s Ontological Argument For example, Descartes notion of existence of a perfectly supreme being is questionable because, unless one proves that the reality of the Supreme Being is coherent, then the argument is void. Anselm’s argument that God […]
• Formalizing Tag-Based Metadata With the Brick Ontology
• Constructing Ontology-based Exclusive Environmental Certification Systems
• Ontology Driven Data Mediation in Web Services
• Visualizing Information Science Knowledge by Modelling Domain Ontology
• Modeling Domain Ontology for Occupational Therapy Resources Using Natural Language Programming
• Difference Between Ontology And Epistemology
• Self-Adaptive Ontology based Focused Crawler for Social Bookmarking Sites
• Facet Theory and the Mapping Sentence As Hermeneutically Consistent Structured Meta-Ontology and Structured Meta-Mereology
• Ontology Enhanced Concept Hierarchies for Text Identification
• Integrated Framework for Semantic Text Mining and Ontology Construction Using Inference Engine
• Ontology-Based Framework for Quality in Configurable Process Models
• Comparing Statistical and Data Mining Techniques for Enrichment Ontology with Instances
• How Empirical Psychology Illuminates Issues In Moral Ontology
• Using Optimal F-Measure and Random Resampling in Gene Ontology Enrichment Calculations
• Justice and the Social Ontology of the Corporation
• Ecological Economics and Philosophy of Science: Ontology, Epistemology, Methodology and Ideology
• Relationship Between Ontology Epistemology And Methodology Philosophy
• Blending Grounded Theory and Ontology Development Methods
• Ontology Development Through Concept Maps Using Text Indices
• Ontology and Epistemology The Development Of Motivation Psychology
• Ontology, Hamartiology, Axiology, And Soteriology
• Untangling Statistical and Biological Models to Understand Network Inference: The Need for a Genomics Network Ontology
• Disambiguating the Twitter Stream Entities and Enhancing the Search Operation Using DBpedia Ontology
• Genetic Resources for Advanced Biofuel Production Described With the Gene Ontology
• The Ontology And Epistemology Psychology
• Ontology, Methodological Individualism, and the Foundations of the Social Sciences
• Research Paradigms and Theme of Ontology and Epistemology
• The Financial Industry Business Ontology: Best Practice for Big Data
• The Plant Ontology Facilitates Comparisons of Plant Development Stages Across Species
• Gene Prioritization for Imaging Genetics Studies Using Gene Ontology
• Strategy Ontology Construction and Learning: Insights From Smart City
• Ontology And The Problem Of The Existence Of God
• What Is the Difference Between Ontologies and Conceptual Models?
• How Are Recommendation-Based Conceptual Modeling and the Ontology Evolution Framework (CMOE+) Related?
• What Are the Different Research Paradigms of Ontology and Epistemology?
• What Is the Ontology of Christianity?
• Is There a Relationship Between Ontology, Epistemology, and Methodology?
• What Are the Basic Types of Ontology?
• Does Ontology Seek to Classify and Explain Entities?
• What Is Meant by Protein Ontology?
• What Are the Main Schools of Ontology?
• How Are Transmedia Fictional Worlds Represented Through Ontology?
• What Are the Main Ideas or Concepts Often Used When Defining an Ontology and What Is Meant by Them?
• What Is the Difference Between Epistemology and Ontology in Research?
• Are There Advantages of an Ontology Over a Database?
• What Is an SVM-Based Multipartite Ontology Learning Algorithm?
• How Do Ontologies and Machine Learning Work Together?
• What Is the Main Point of the Ontological Argument?
• How Is Ontology Used in Education?
• What Are the Basic Concepts of Ontology?
• What Is the Difference Between an Ontology and a Data Model?
• Does Plant Ontology Facilitate the Comparison of Plant Development Stages in Different Species?
• What Is an Ontology in Machine Learning?
• How to Create an Ontological Database?
• What Is the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God?
• How to Do Gene Ontology Analysis?
• What Is Ontology in Literary Criticism?
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

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Ontological Arguments

Ontological arguments are arguments, for the conclusion that God exists, from premises which are supposed to derive from some source other than observation of the world—e.g., from reason alone. In other words, ontological arguments are arguments from nothing but analytic, a priori and necessary premises to the conclusion that God exists.

The first, and best-known, ontological argument was proposed by St. Anselm of Canterbury in the 11th. century C.E. In his Proslogion , St. Anselm claims to derive the existence of God from the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived . St. Anselm reasoned that, if such a being fails to exist, then a greater being—namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived, and which exists —can be conceived. But this would be absurd: nothing can be greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived. So a being than which no greater can be conceived—i.e., God—exists.

In the seventeenth century, René Descartes defended a family of similar arguments. For instance, in the Fifth Meditation , Descartes claims to provide a proof demonstrating the existence of God from the idea of a supremely perfect being. Descartes argues that there is no less contradiction in conceiving a supremely perfect being who lacks existence than there is in conceiving a triangle whose interior angles do not sum to 180 degrees. Hence, he supposes, since we do conceive a supremely perfect being—we do have the idea of a supremely perfect being—we must conclude that a supremely perfect being exists.

In the early eighteenth century, Gottfried Leibniz attempted to fill what he took to be a shortcoming in Descartes’ view. According to Leibniz, Descartes’ arguments fail unless one first shows that the idea of a supremely perfect being is coherent, or that it is possible for there to be a supremely perfect being. Leibniz argued that, since perfections are unanalysable, it is impossible to demonstrate that perfections are incompatible—and he concluded from this that all perfections can co-exist together in a single entity.

In more recent times, Kurt Gödel, Charles Hartshorne, Norman Malcolm and Alvin Plantinga have all presented much-discussed ontological arguments which bear interesting connections to the earlier arguments of St. Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz. Of these, the most interesting are those of Gödel and Plantinga; in these cases, however, it is unclear whether we should really say that these authors claim that the arguments are proofs of the existence of God.

Critiques of ontological arguments begin with Gaunilo, a contemporary of St. Anselm. Perhaps the best known criticisms of ontological arguments are due to Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason . Most famously, Kant claims that ontological arguments are vitiated by their reliance upon the implicit assumption that “existence” is a predicate. However, as Bertrand Russell observed, it is much easier to be persuaded that ontological arguments are no good than it is to say exactly what is wrong with them. This helps to explain why ontological arguments have fascinated philosophers for almost a thousand years.

In various ways, the account provided to this point is rough, and susceptible of improvement. Sections 1–5 in what follows provide some of the requisite embellishments, though—as is usually the case in philosophy—there are many issues taken up here which could be pursued at much greater length. Sections 6–8 take up some of the central questions at a slightly more sophisticated level of discussion. Section 9 is a quick overview of very recent work on ontological arguments:

1. History of Ontological Arguments

2. taxonomy of ontological arguments, 3. characterisation of ontological arguments, 4. objections to ontological arguments, 5. parodies of ontological arguments, 6. gödel’s ontological argument, 7. a victorious ontological argument, 8. st. anselm’s ontological argument, 9. ontological arguments in the 21st century, primary texts, other texts, other internet resources, related entries.

For a useful discussion of the history of ontological arguments in the modern period, see Harrelson 2009.

According to a modification of the taxonomy of Oppy 1995, there are eight major kinds of ontological arguments, viz:

• definitional ontological arguments;
• conceptual (or hyperintensional) ontological arguments;
• modal ontological arguments;
• Meinongian ontological arguments;
• experiential ontological arguments;
• mereological ontological arguments;
• higher-order ontological arguments; and
• ‘Hegelian’ ontological arguments;

Examples of all but the last follow. These are mostly toy examples. But they serve to highlight the deficiencies which more complex examples also share.

Note: I provide no example of a ‘Hegelian’ ontological argument because I know of no formulation of such an argument. Many people assert that Hegel provided an ontological argument; but, when pressed for a list of the premises of the argument, Hegel’s friends fail to deliver. (For a defense of Hegel against these charges—but not for a supply of the premises of ‘the Hegelian ontological argument’—see Redding and Bubbio 2014.)

God is a being which has every perfection. (This is true as a matter of definition.) Existence is a perfection. Hence God exists.

I conceive of a being than which no greater can be conceived. If a being than which no greater can be conceived does not exist, then I can conceive of a being greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived—namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived that exists. I cannot conceive of a being greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived. Hence, a being than which no greater can be conceived exists.

It is possible that that God exists. God is not a contingent being, i.e., either it is not possible that God exists, or it is necessary that God exists. Hence, it is necessary that God exists. Hence, God exists. (See Malcolm 1960, Hartshorne 1965, and Plantinga 1974 for closely related arguments.)

[It is analytic, necessary and a priori that] Each instance of the schema “The F G is F ” expresses a truth. Hence the sentence “The existent perfect being is existent” expresses a truth. Hence, the existent perfect being is existent. Hence, God is existent, i.e. God exists. (The last step is justified by the observation that, as a matter of definition, if there is exactly one existent perfect being, then that being is God.)

The word ‘God’ has a meaning that is revealed in religious experience. The word ‘God’ has a meaning only if God exists. Hence, God exists. (See Rescher 1959 for a live version of this argument.)

I exist. Therefore something exists. Whenever a bunch of things exist, their mereological sum also exists. Therefore the sum of all things exists. Therefore God—the sum of all things—exists.

Say that a God-property is a property that is possessed by God in all and only those worlds in which God exists. Not all properties are God properties. Any property entailed by a collection of God-properties is itself a God-property. The God-properties include necessary existence, necessary omnipotence, necessary omniscience, and necessary perfect goodness. Hence, there is a necessarily existent, necessarily omnipotent, necessarily omniscient, and necessarily perfectly good being (namely, God).

Of course, this taxonomy is not exclusive: an argument can belong to several categories at once. Moreover, an argument can be ambiguous between a range of readings, each of which belongs to different categories. This latter fact may help to explain part of the curious fascination of ontological arguments. Finally, the taxonomy can be further specialised: there are, for example, at least four importantly different kinds of modal ontological arguments which should be distinguished. (See, e.g., Ross 1969 for a rather different kind of modal ontological argument.)

It is not easy to give a good characterisation of ontological arguments. The traditional characterisation involves the use of problematic notions—analyticity, necessity, and a priority —and also fails to apply to many arguments to which defenders have affixed the label “ontological”. (Consider, for example, the claim that I conceive of a being than which no greater can be conceived. This claim is clearly not analytic (its truth doesn’t follow immediately from the meanings of the words used to express it), nor necessary (I might never have entertained the concept), nor a priori (except perhaps in my own case, though even this is unclear—perhaps even I don’t know independently of experience that I have this concept.)) However, it is unclear how that traditional characterisation should be improved upon.

Perhaps one might resolve to use the label “ontological argument” for any argument which gets classified as “an ontological argument” by its proponent(s). This procedure would make good sense if one thought that there is a natural kind—ontological arguments—which our practice carves out, but for which is hard to specify defining conditions. Moreover, this procedure can be adapted as a pro tem stop gap: when there is a better definition to hand, that definition will be adopted instead. On the other hand, it seems worthwhile to attempt a more informative definition.

Focus on the case of ontological arguments for the conclusion that God exists. One characteristic feature of these arguments is the use which they make of “referential vocabulary”—names, definite descriptions, indefinite descriptions, quantified noun phrases, etc.—whose ontological commitments—for occurrences of this vocabulary in “referential position”—non-theists do not accept.

Theists and non-theists alike (can) agree that there is spatio-temporal, or causal, or nomic, or modal structure to the world (the basis for cosmological arguments); and that there are certain kinds of complexity of organisation, structure and function in the world (the basis for teleological arguments); and so on. But theists and non-theists are in dispute about whether there are perfect beings, or beings than which no greater can be conceived, or … ; thus, theists and non-theists are in dispute about the indirect subject matter of the premises of ontological arguments.

Of course, the premises of ontological arguments often do not deal directly with perfect beings, beings than which no greater can be conceived, etc.; rather, they deal with descriptions of, or ideas of, or concepts of, or the possibility of the existence of, these things. However, the basic point remains: ontological arguments require the use of vocabulary which non-theists should certainly find problematic when it is used in ontologically committing contexts (i.e not inside the scope of prophylactic operators—such as “according to the story” or “by the lights of theists” or “by the definition”—which can be taken to afford protection against unwanted commitments).

Note that this characterisation does not beg the question against the possibility of the construction of a successful ontological argument—i.e., it does not lead immediately to the conclusion that all ontological arguments are question-begging (in virtue of the ontologically committing vocabulary which they employ). For it may be that the vocabulary in question only gets used in premises under the protection of prophylactic operators (which ward off the unwanted commitments.) Of course, there will then be questions about whether the resulting arguments can possibly be valid—how could the commitments turn up in the conclusion if they are not there in the premises?—but those are further questions, which would remain to be addressed.

Objections to ontological arguments take many forms. Some objections are intended to apply only to particular ontological arguments, or particular forms of ontological arguments; other objections are intended to apply to all ontological arguments. It is a controversial question whether there are any successful general objections to ontological arguments.

One general criticism of ontological arguments which have appeared hitherto is this: none of them is persuasive , i.e., none of them provides those who do not already accept the conclusion that God exists—and who are reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc.—with either a pro tanto reason or an all-things-considered reason to accept that conclusion. Any reading of any ontological argument which has been produced so far which is sufficiently clearly stated to admit of evaluation yields a result which is invalid, or possesses a set of premises which it is clear in advance that no reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc. non-theists will accept, or has a benign conclusion which has no religious significance, or else falls prey to more than one of the above failings.

For each of the families of arguments introduced in the earlier taxonomy, we can give general reasons why arguments of that family fall under the general criticism. In what follows, we shall apply these general considerations to the exemplar arguments introduced in section 2.

(1) Definitional arguments: These are arguments in which ontologically committing vocabulary is introduced solely via a definition. An obvious problem is that claims involving that vocabulary cannot then be non-question-beggingly detached from the scope of that definition. (The inference from ‘By definition, God is an existent being’ to ‘God exists’ is patently invalid; while the inference to ‘By definition, God exists’ is valid, but uninteresting. In the example given earlier, the premises licence the claim that, as a matter of definition, God possesses the perfection of existence. But, as just noted, there is no valid inference from this claim to the further claim that God exists.)

(2) Conceptual arguments: These are arguments in which ontologically committing vocabulary is introduced solely within the scope of hyperintensional operators (e.g. ‘believes that’, ‘conceives of’, etc.). Often, these operators have two readings, one of which can cancel ontological commitment, and the other of which cannot. On the reading which can give cancellation (as in the most likely reading of ‘John believes in Santa Claus’), the inference to a conclusion in which the ontological commitment is not cancelled will be invalid. On the reading which cannot cancel ontological commitment (as in that reading of ‘John thinks about God’ which can only be true if there is a God to think about), the premises are question-begging: they incur ontological commitments which non-theists reject. In our sample argument, the claim, that I conceive of an existent being than which no greater being can be conceived, admits of the two kinds of readings just distinguished. On the one hand, on the reading which gives cancellation, the inference to the conclusion that there is a being than which no greater can be conceived is plainly invalid. On the other hand, on the reading in which there is no cancellation, it is clear that this claim is one which no reasonable, etc. non-theist will accept: if you doubt that there is a being than which no greater can be conceived, then, of course, you doubt whether you can have thoughts about such a being.

(3) Modal arguments: These are arguments with premises which concern modal claims about God, i.e., claims about the possibility or necessity of God’s attributes and existence. Suppose that we agree to think about possibility and necessity in terms of possible worlds: a claim is possibly true just in case it is true in at least one possible world; a claim is necessarily true just in case it is true in every possible world; and a claim is contingent just in case it is true in some possible worlds and false in others. Some theists hold that God is a necessarily existent being, i.e., that God exists in every possible world; all non-theists reject the claim that God exists in the actual world. The sample argument consists, in effect, of two premises:

• God exists in at least one possible world.
• God exists in all possible worlds if God exists in any.

A minimally rational non-theist would not accept both of these premises – they entail that God exists in every possible world whereas a minimally rational non-theists would insist that there is at least one possible world in which God does not exist. Given that that a minimally rational non-theist accepts that there is at least one possible world in which God does not exist, such a non-theist could offer the following counterargument:

• God fails to exist in at least one possible world.

These premises entail that God exists in no possible world, and hence that God does not exist in the actual world. Considered together, the argument and the counterargument just mentioned plainly do not give anyone a reason to prefer theism to non-theism, and nor do they give anyone a reason to prefer non-theism to theism. So the sample argument is unsuccessful: it doesn’t supply an all-things-considered reason to prefer theism to non-theism (just as the counterargument doesn’t supply an all-things-considered reason to prefer non-theism to theism).

(4) Meinongian arguments: These are arguments which depend somehow or other on Meinongian theories of objects. Consider the schema ‘The F G is F ’. Naive Meinongians will suppose that if F is instantiated with any property, then the result is true (and, quite likely, necessary, analytic and a priori). So, for example, the round square is round; the bald current King of France is bald; and so on. However, more sophisticiated Meinongians will insist that there must be some restriction on the substitution instances for F, in order to allow one to draw the obvious and important ontological distinction between the following two groups: {Bill Clinton, the sun, the Eiffel Tower} and {Santa Claus, Mickey Mouse, the round square}. Choice of vocabulary here is controversial: Let us suppose (for the sake of example) that the right thing to say is that the former things exist and the latter do not. Under this supposition, ‘existent’ will not be a suitable substitution instance for F—obviously, since we all agree that there is no existent round square. Of course, nothing hangs on the choice of ‘existent’ as the crucial piece of vocabulary. The point is that non-theists are not prepared to include god(s) in the former group of objects—and hence will be unpersuaded by any argument which tries to use whatever vocabulary is used to discriminate between the two classes as the basis for an argument that god(s) belong to the former group. (Cognoscenti will recognise that the crucial point is that Meinongian ontological arguments fail to respect the distinction between nuclear (assumptible, characterising) properties and non-nuclear (non-assumptible, non-characterising) properties. It should, of course, be noted that neither Meinong, nor any of his well-known modern supporters—e.g. Terence Parsons, Richard Sylvan—ever endorses a Meinongian ontological argument; and it should also be noted that most motivate the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear properties in part by a need to avoid Meinongian ontological arguments. The reason for calling these arguments “Meinongian” is that they rely on quantification over—or reference to—non-existent objects; there is no perjorative intent in the use of this label.)

(5) Experiential arguments: These are arguments which try to make use of ‘externalist’ or ‘object-involving’ accounts of content. It should not be surprising that they fail. After all, those accounts of content need to have something to say about expressions which fail to refer (‘Santa Claus’, ‘phlogiston’, etc.). But, however the account goes, non-theists will insist that expressions which purport to refer to god(s) should be given exactly the same kind of treatment.

(6) Mereological arguments: Those who dislike mereology will not be impressed by these arguments. However, even those who accept principles of unrestricted composition—i.e., who accept principles which claim, e.g., that, whenever there are some things, there is something which is the sum or fusion of all of those things—need not be perturbed by them: for it is plausible to think that the conclusions of these arguments have no religious significance whatsoever—they are merely arguments for, e.g., the existence of the physical universe.

(7) Higher-Order arguments: The key to these arguments is the observation that any collection of properties, that (a) does not include all properties and (b) is closed under entailment, is possibly jointly instantiated. If it is impossible that God exists — as all who deny that God exists suppose, on the further assumption that, were God to exist, God would exist of necessity — then it cannot be true both that the God-properties are closed under entailment and that there are properties that are not God-properties. Those who take themselves to have good independent reason to deny that there are any gods will take themselves to have good independent reason to deny that there are God-properties that form a non-trivial collection that is closed under entailment.

Even if the forgoing analyses are correct, it is important to note that no argument has been given for the conclusion that no ontological argument can be successful. Even if all of the kinds of arguments produced to date are pretty clearly unsuccessful—i.e., not such as ought to give non-theists reason to accept the conclusion that God exists—it remains an open question whether there is some other kind of hitherto undiscovered ontological argument which does succeed. (Perhaps it is worth adding here that there is fairly widespread consensus, even amongst theists, that no known ontological arguments for the existence of God are persuasive. Most categories of ontological argument have some actual defenders; but none has a large following.)

Many other objections to (some) ontological arguments have been proposed. All of the following have been alleged to be the key to the explanation of the failure of (at least some) ontological arguments: (1) existence is not a predicate (see, e.g., Kant, Smart 1955, Alston 1960); (2) the concept of god is meaningless/incoherent/ inconsistent (see, e.g., Findlay 1949); (3) ontological arguments are ruled out by “the missing explanation argument” (see Johnston 1992; (4) ontological arguments all trade on mistaken uses of singular terms (see, e.g., Barnes 1972; (5) existence is not a perfection (see almost any textbook in philosophy of religion); (6) ontological arguments presuppose a Meinongian approach to ontology (see, e.g., Dummett 1993); and (7) ontological arguments are question-begging, i.e., presuppose what they set out to prove (see, e.g., Rowe 1989). There are many things to say about these objections: the most important point is that almost all of them require far more controversial assumptions than non-theists require in order to be able to reject ontological arguments with good conscience. Trying to support most of these claims merely in order to beat up on ontological arguments is like using a steamroller to crack a nut (in circumstances in which one is unsure that one can get the steamroller to move!).

Of course, all of the above discussion is directed merely to the claim that ontological arguments are not dialectically efficacious—i.e., they give reasonable non-theists no reason to change their views. It might be wondered whether there is some other use which ontological arguments have—e.g., as Plantinga claims, in establishing the reasonableness of theism. This seems unlikely. After all, at best these arguments show that certain sets of sentences (beliefs, etc.) are incompatible—one cannot reject the conclusions of these arguments while accepting their premises. But the arguments themselves say nothing about the reasonableness of accepting the premisses. So the arguments themselves say nothing about the (unconditional) reasonableness of accepting the conclusions of these arguments. Those who are disposed to think that theism is irrational need find nothing in ontological arguments to make them change their minds (and those who are disposed to think that theism is true should take no comfort from them either).

Positive ontological arguments—i.e., arguments FOR the existence of god(s)—invariably admit of various kinds of parodies, i.e., parallel arguments which seem at least equally acceptable to non-theists, but which establish absurd or contradictory conclusions. For many positive ontological arguments, there are parodies which purport to establish the non-existence of god(s); and for many positive ontological arguments there are lots (usually a large infinity!) of similar arguments which purport to establish the existence of lots (usally a large infinity) of distinct god-like beings. Here are some modest examples:

(1) By definition, God is a non-existent being who has every (other) perfection. Hence God does not exist.

(2) I conceive of a being than which no greater can be conceived except that it only ever creates n universes. If such a being does not exist, then we can conceive of a greater being—namely, one exactly like it which does exist. But I cannot conceive of a being which is greater in this way. Hence, a being than which no greater can be conceived except that it only ever creates n universes exists.

(3) It is possible that God does not exist. God is not a contingent being, i.e., either it is not possible that God exists, or it is necessary that God exists. Hence it is not possible that God exists. Hence God does not exist.

(4) It is analytic, necessary, and a priori that the F G is F . Hence, the existent perfect being who creates exactly n universes is existent. Hence the perfect being who creates exactly n universes exists.

There are many kinds of parodies on Ontological Arguments. The aim is to construct arguments which non-theists can reasonably claim to have no more reason to accept than the original Ontological Arguments themselves. Of course, theists may well be able to hold that the originals are sound, and the parodies not—but that is an entirely unrelated issue. (All theists—and no non-theists—should grant that the following argument is sound, given that the connectives are to be interpretted classically: “Either 2+2=5, or God exists. Not 2+2=5. Hence God exists.” It should be completely obvious that this argument is useless.)

There are many parodic discussions of Ontological Arguments in the literature. A particularly pretty one is due to Raymond Smullyan (1984), in which the argument is attributed to “the unknown Dutch theologian van Dollard”. A relatively recent addition to the genre is described in Grey 2000, though the date of its construction is uncertain. It is the work of Douglas Gasking, one-time Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne (with emendations by William Grey and Denis Robinson):

• The creation of the world is the most marvellous achievement imaginable.
• The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality, and (b) the ability of its creator.
• The greater the disability or handicap of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.
• The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non-existence.
• Therefore, if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator, we can conceive a greater being—namely, one who created everything while not existing.
• An existing God, therefore, would not be a being than which a greater cannot be conceived, because an even more formidable and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist.
• (Hence) God does not exist.

This parody—at least in its current state—seems inferior to other parodies in the literature, including the early parodies of Gaunilo and Caterus. To mention but one difficulty, while we might suppose that it would be a greater achievement to create something if one did not exist than if one did exist, it doesn’t follow from this that a non-existent creator is greater ( qua being) than an existent creator. Perhaps it might be replied that this objection fails to take the first premise into account: if the creation of the world really is “the most marvellous achievement imaginable”, then surely there is some plausibility to the claim that the creator must have been non-existent (since that would make the achievement more marvellous than it would otherwise have been). But what reason is there to believe that the creation of the world is “the most marvellous achievement imaginable”, in the sense which is required for this argument? Surely it is quite easy to imagine even more marvellous achievements—e.g., the creation of many worlds at least as good as this one! (Of course, one might also want to say that, in fact, one cannot conceive of a non-existent being’s actually creating something: that is literally inconceivable. Etc.)

Chambers 2000 and Siegwart 2014 provide nice, recent discussions of Gaunilo’s parody of the Proslogion II argument.

There is a small, but steadily growing, literature on the ontological arguments which Gödel developed in his notebooks, but which did not appear in print until well after his death. These arguments have been discussed, annotated and amended by various leading logicians: the upshot is a family of arguments with impeccable logical credentials. (Interested readers are referred to Sobel 1987, Anderson 1990, Adams 1995b, and Hazen 1999 for the history of these arguments, and for the scholarly annotations and emendations.) Here, I shall give a brief presentation of the version of the argument which is developed by Anderson, and then make some comments on that version. This discussion follows the presentation and discussion in Oppy 1996, 2000.

Definition 1: x is God-like if and only if x has as essential properties those and only those properties which are positive Definition 2: A is an essence of x if and only if for every property B , x has B necessarily if and only if A entails B Definition 3: x necessarily exists if and only if every essence of x is necessarily exemplified Axiom 1: If a property is positive, then its negation is not positive. Axiom 2: Any property entailed by—i.e., strictly implied by—a positive property is positive Axiom 3: The property of being God-like is positive Axiom 4: If a property is positive, then it is necessarily positive Axiom 5: Necessary existence is positive Axiom 6: For any property P , if P is positive, then being necessarily P is positive. Theorem 1: If a property is positive, then it is consistent, i.e., possibly exemplified. Corollary 1: The property of being God-like is consistent. Theorem 2: If something is God-like, then the property of being God-like is an essence of that thing. Theorem 3: Necessarily, the property of being God-like is exemplified.

Given a sufficiently generous conception of properties, and granted the acceptability of the underlying modal logic, the listed theorems do follow from the axioms. (This point was argued in detail by Dana Scott, in lecture notes which circulated for many years and which were transcribed in Sobel 1987 and published in Sobel 2004. It is also made by Sobel, Anderson, and Adams.) So, criticisms of the argument are bound to focus on the axioms, or on the other assumptions which are required in order to construct the proof.

Some philosophers have denied the acceptability of the underlying modal logic. And some philosophers have rejected generous conceptions of properties in favour of sparse conceptions according to which only some predicates express properties. But suppose that we adopt neither of these avenues of potential criticism of the proof. What else might we say against it?

One important point to note is that no definition of the notion of “positive property” is supplied with the proof. At most, the various axioms which involve this concept can be taken to provide a partial implicit definition. If we suppose that the “positive properties” form a set, then the axioms provide us with the following information about this set:

• If a property belongs to the set, then its negation does not belong to the set.
• The set is closed under entailment.
• The property of having as essential properties just those properties which are in the set is itself a member of the set.
• The set has exactly the same members in all possible worlds.
• The property of necessary existence is in the set.
• If a property is in the set, then the property of having that property necessarily is also in the set.

On Gödel’s theoretical assumptions, we can show that any set which conforms to (1)–(6) is such that the property of having as essential properties just those properties which are in that set is exemplified. Gödel wants us to conclude that there is just one intuitive, theologically interesting set of properties which is such that the property of having as essential properties just the properties in that set is exemplified. But, on the one hand, what reason do we have to think that there is any theologically interesting set of properties which conforms to the Gödelian specification? And, on the other hand, what reason do we have to deny that, if there is one set of theologically interesting set of properties which conforms to the Gödelian specification, then there are many theologically threatening sets of properties which also conform to that specification?

In particular, there is some reason to think that the Gödelian ontological argument goes through just as well—or just as badly—with respect to other sets of properties (and in ways which are damaging to the original argument). Suppose that there is some set of independent properties { I , G 1 , G 2 , …} which can be used to generate the set of positive properties by closure under entailment and “necessitation”. (“Independence” means: no one of the properties in the set is entailed by all the rest. “Necessitation” means: if P is in the set, then so is necessarily having P . I is the property of having as essential properties just those properties which are in the set. G 1 , G 2 , … are further properties, of which we require at least two.) Consider any proper subset of the set { G 1 , G 2 , …}—{ H 1 , H 2 , …}, say—and define a new generating set { I *, H 1 , H 2 , …}, where I * is the property of having as essential properties just those properties which are in the newly generated set. A “proof” parallel to that offered by Gödel “establishes” that there is a being which has as essential properties just those properties in this new set. If there are as few as 7 independent properties in the original generating set, then we shall be able to establish the existence of 720 distinct“God-like” creatures by the kind of argument which Gödel offers. (The creatures are distinct because each has a different set of essential properties.)

Even if the above considerations are sufficient to cast doubt on the credentials of Gödel’s “proof”, they do not pinpoint where the “proof” goes wrong. If we accept that the role of Axioms 1, 2, 4, and 6 is really just to constrain the notion of “positive property” in the right way—or, in other words, if we suppose that Axioms 1, 2, 4, and 6 are “analytic truths” about “positive properties”—then there is good reason for opponents of the “proof” to be sceptical about Axioms 3 and 5. Kant would not have been happy with Axiom 5; and there is at least some reason to think that whether the property of being God-like is “positive” ought to depend upon whether or not there is a God-like being.

The “victorious” modal ontological argument of Plantinga 1974 goes roughly as follows: Say that an entity possesses “maximal excellence” if and only if it is omnipotent, omnscient, and morally perfect. Say, further, that an entity possesses “maximal greatness” if and only if it possesses maximal excellence in every possible world—that is, if and only if it is necessarily existent and necessarily maximally excellent. Then consider the following argument:

• There is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
• (Hence) There is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.

Under suitable assumptions about the nature of accessibility relations between possible worlds, this argument is valid: from it is possible that it is necessary that p , one can infer that it is necessary that p . Setting aside the possibility that one might challenge this widely accepted modal principle, it seems that opponents of the argument are bound to challenge the acceptability of the premise.

And, of course, they do. Let’s just run the argument in reverse.

• There is no entity which possesses maximal greatness.
• (Hence) There is no possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.

Plainly enough, if you do not already accept the claim that there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness, then you won’t agree that the first of these arguments is more acceptable than the second. So, as a proof of the existence of a being which posseses maximal greatness, Plantinga’s argument seems to be a non-starter.

Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Plantinga himself agrees: the “victorious” modal ontological argument is not a proof of the existence of a being which possesses maximal greatness. But how, then, is it “victorious”? Plantinga writes: “Our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm’s argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion” (Plantinga 1974, 221).

It is pretty clear that Plantinga’s argument does not show what he claims that it shows. Consider, again, the argument: “Either God exists, or 2+2=5. It is not the case that 2+2=5. So God exists.” It is just a mistake for a theist to say: “Since the premise is true (and the argument is valid), this argument shows that the conclusion of the argument is true ”. No-one thinks that that argument shows any such thing. Similarly, it is just a mistake for a theist to say: “Since it is rational to accept the premise (and the argument is valid), this argument shows that it is rational to accept the conclusion of the argument”. Again, no one thinks that that argument shows any such thing. But why don’t these arguments show the things in question? There is room for argument about this. But it is at least plausible to claim that, in each case, any even minimally rational person who has doubts about the claimed status of the conclusion of the argument will have exactly the same doubts about the claimed status of the premise. If, for example, I doubt that it is rational to accept the claim that God exists, then you can be quite sure that I will doubt that it is rational to accept the claim that either 2+2=5 or God exists. But, of course, the very same point can be made about Plantinga’s argument: anyone with even minimal rationality who understands the premise and the conclusion of the argument, and who has doubts about the claim that it is rationally permissible to believe that there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness, will have exactly the same doubts about the claim that it is rationally permissible to believe that there is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.

For further discussion of Plantinga’s argument, see—for example—Adams 1988, Chandler 1993, Oppy 1995 (70–78, 248–259), Tooley 1981, and van Inwagen 1977).

There is an enormous literature on the material in Proslogion II-III . Some commentators deny that St. Anselm tried to put forward any proofs of the existence of God. Even among commentators who agree that St. Anselm intended to prove the existence of God, there is disagreement about where the proof is located. Some commentators claim that the main proof is in Proslogion II , and that the rest of the work draws out corollaries of that proof (see, e.g., Charlesworth 1965). Other commentators claim that the main proof is in Prologion III , and that the proof in Proslogion II is merely an inferior first attempt (see, e.g., Malcolm 1960). Yet other commentators claim that there is a single proof which spans at least Proslogion II-III —see, e.g., Campbell 1976 and, perhaps, the entire work—see, e.g., La Croix 1972. I shall ignore this aspect of the controversy about the Proslogion . Instead, I shall just focus on the question of the analysis of the material in Proslogion II on the assumption that there is an independent argument for the existence of God which is given therein.

Here is one translation of the crucial part of Proslogion II (due to William Mann (1972, 260–1); alternative translations can be found in Barnes 1972, Campbell 1976, Charlesworth 1965, and elsewhere):

Thus even the fool is convinced that something than which nothing greater can be conceived is in the understanding, since when he hears this, he understands it; and whatever is understood is in the understanding. And certainly that than which a greater cannot be conceived cannot be in the understanding alone. For if it is even in the understanding alone, it can be conceived to exist in reality also, which is greater. Thus if that than which a greater cannot be conceived is in the understanding alone, then that than which a greater cannot be conceived is itself that than which a greater can be conceived. But surely this cannot be. Thus without doubt something than which a greater cannot be conceived exists, both in the understanding and in reality.

There have been many ingenious attempts to find an argument which can be expressed in modern logical formalism, which is logically valid, and which might plausibly be claimed to be the argument which is expressed in this passage. To take a few prime examples, Adams 1971, Barnes 1972 and Oppenheimer and Zalta 1991 have all produced formally valid analyses of the argument in this passage. We begin with a brief presentation of each of these analyses, preceded by a presentation of the formulation of the argument given by Plantinga 1967, and including a presentation of some of the formulations of Lewis 1970. (Chambers 2000 works with the analysis of Adams 1971.)

8.1 Formulation 1

God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (Assumption for reductio )

Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone. (Premise)

A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality can be conceived. (Premise)

A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality is greater than God. (From (1) and (2).)

A being greater than God can be conceived. (From (3) and (4).)

It is false that a being greater than God can be conceived. (From definition of “God”.)

Hence, it is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (From (1), (5), (6).)

God exists in the understanding. (Premise, to which even the Fool agrees.)

Hence God exists in reality. (From (7), (8).)

See Plantinga 1967.

8.2 Formulation 2

The Fool understands the expression “the being than which no greater can be conceived”. (Premise)

If a person understands an expression “ b ”, then b is in that person’s understanding. (Premise)

If a thing is in a person’s understanding, then the person can conceive of that thing’s existing in reality. (Premise)

Each thing which exists in reality is greater than any thing which exists only in the understanding. (Premise)

If a person can conceive of something, and that thing entails something else, then the person can also conceive of that other thing. (Premise)

If a person can conceive that a specified object has a given property, then that person can conceive that something or other has that property. (Premise)

Hence the being than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality. (From (1)-(6), by a complex series of steps here omitted.)

See Barnes 1972.

8.3 Formulation 3

There is a thing x , and a magnitude m , such that x exists in the understanding, m is the magnitude of x , and it it not possible that there is a thing y and a magnitude n such that n is the magnitude of y and n > m . (Premise)

For any thing x and magnitude m , if x exists in the understanding, m is the magnitude of x , and it is not possible that there is a thing y and magnitude n such that n is the magnitude of y and n > m , then it is possible that x exists in reality. (Premise)

For any thing x and magnitude m , if m is the magnitude of x , and it it not possible that there is a thing y and a magnitude n such that n is the magnitude of y and n > m , and x does not exist in reality, then it is not possible that if x exists in reality then there is a magnitude n such that n is greater than m and n is the magnitude of x . (Premise)

(Hence) There is a thing x and a magnitude m such that x exist in the understanding, and x exists in reality, and m is the magnitude of x , and it it not possible that there is a thing y and a magnitude n such that n is the magnitude of y and n > m . (From 1, 2, 3)

See Adams 1971.

8.4 Formulation 4

For any understandable being x , there is a world w such that x exists in w . (Premise)

For any understandable being x , and for any worlds w and v , if x exists in w , but x does not exist in v , then the greatness of x in w exceeds the greatness of x in v . (Premise)

There is an understandable being x such that for no world w and being y does the greatness of y in w exceed the greatness of x in the actual world. (Premise)

(Hence) There is a being x existing in the actual world such that for no world w and being y does the greatness of y in w exceed the greatness of x in the actual world. (From (1)-(3).)

See Lewis 1970.

Lewis also suggests an alternative to (3) which yields a valid argument:

(3′) There is an understandable being x such that for no worlds v and w and being y does the greatness of y in w exceed the greatness of x in v .

and two alternatives to (3)—not presented here—which yield invalid arguments. (Of course, there further two alternatives are crucial to Lewis’ overall analysis of the passage: essentially, Lewis suggests that Anselm equivocates between an invalid argument with plausible premises and a valid argument with question-begging premises. In this respect, Lewis’ analysis is quite different from the other analyses currently under discussion.)

8.5 Formulation 5

There is (in the understanding) something than which there is no greater. (Premise)

(Hence) There is (in the understanding) a unique thing than which there is no greater. (From (1), assuming that the “greater-than” relation is connected.)

(Hence) There is (in the understanding) something which is the thing than which there is no greater. (From (2), by a theorem about descriptions.)

(Hence) There is (in the understanding) nothing which is greater than the thing than which there is no greater. (From (3), by another theorem about descriptions.)

If that thing than which there is no greater does not exist (in reality), then there is (in the understanding) something which is greater than that thing than which there is no greater. (Premise)

(Hence) That thing than which there is no greater exists (in reality). (From (4) and (5).)

(Hence) God exists. (From (6).)

See Oppenheimer and Zalta 1991.

Oppenheimer and Zalta 2011 provides a “simplified” version of this argument, in which the number of controversial assumptions is reduced. Since they also provide a clear reason for thinking that this new version of the argument is not persuasive, I shall not consider it further here.

8.6 Critical Appraisal

Considered as interpretations of the argument presented in the Proslogion , these formulations are subject to various kinds of criticisms.

First , the modal interpretations of Lewis 1970 and Adams 1971 don’t square very well with the rest of the Proslogion : the claim that “being than which no greater can be conceived” should be read as “being than which no greater is possible” would have us render the claim of Proslogion 15 to be that God is a being greater than any which is possible. And that is surely a bad result.

Second , the Meinongian interpretations of Barnes 1972, Adams 1971 and Oppenheimer and Zalta 1991 produce arguments which, given the principles involved, could easily be much simplified, and which are obviously vulnerable to Gaunilo-type objections.

Consider, for example, the case of Oppenheimer and Zalta. They have Anselm committed to the claim that if anyone can understand the phrase “that than which F ”, then there is something in the understanding such that F (see their footnote 25); and they also have him committed to the claim that if there is something which is the F -thing, then it—i.e., the F -thing—has the property F (see page 7). Plainly though, if Anselm is really committed to these principles, then he could hardly fail to be committed to the more general principles: (1) if anyone can understand the phrase “an F ”, then there is at least one F -thing in the understanding; and (2) if there are some things which are the F -things, then they—i.e., the F -things—must have the property F . (It would surely be absurd to claim that Anselm is only committed to the less general principles: what could possibly have justified the restrictions to the special cases?)

But, then, mark the consequences. We all understand the expression “an existent perfect being”. So, by the first claim, there is at least one existent perfect being in the understanding. And, by the second claim, any existent perfect being is existent. So, from these two claims combined, there is—in reality—at least one existent perfect being.

This argument gives Anselm everything that he wants, and very much more briefly. (The Proslogion goes on and on, trying to establish the properties of that than which no greater can be conceived. How much easier if we can just explicitly build all of the properties which want to “derive” into the initial description.) So, if Anselm really were committed to the principles which Oppenheimer and Zalta appear to attribute to him, it is hard to understand why he didn’t give the simpler argument. And, of course, it is also hard to understand why he didn’t take Gaunilo’s criticism. After all, when it is set out in this way, it is obvious that the argument proves far too much.

Third , some of the arguments have Anselm committed to claims about greatness which do not seem to correspond with what he actually says. The natural reading of the text is that, if two beings are identical save that one exists only in the understanding and the other exists in reality as well, then the latter is greater than the former. But Barnes 1971, for example, has Anselm committed to the much stronger claim that any existing thing is greater than every non-existent thing.

Given these kinds of considerations, it is natural to wonder whether there are better interpretations of Proslogion II according to which the argument in question turns out NOT to be logically valid. Here is a modest attempt to provide such an analysis:

We start with the claim that the Fool understands the expression “being than which no greater can be conceived”, i.e., even the Fool can entertain the idea or possess the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived. Now, entertaining this idea or possessing this concept requires the entertainer or possessor to recognise certain relationships which hold between given properties and the idea or concept in question. For example, given that you possess the concept of, or entertain the idea of, a smallest really existent Martian, it follows that you must recognise some kind of connection between the properties of being a Martian, really existing, and being smaller than other really existing Martians, and the concept or idea in question.

Following Anselm, we might say that, since you understand the expression “smallest really existent Martian”, there is, in your understanding, at least one smallest really existent Martian. (Or, apparently following Descartes, one might say that real existence is “part of”—or “contained in”—the idea of a smallest really existent Martian.) However, in saying this, it must be understood that we are not actually predicating properties of anything: we aren’t supposing that there is something which possesses the properties of being a Martian, really existing, and being no larger than any other Martian. (After all, we can safely suppose, we don’t think that any Martians really exist.) In other words, we must be able to have the concept of, or entertain the idea of, a smallest really existing Martian without believing that there really are any smallest Martians. Indeed, more strongly, we must be able to entertain the concept of a smallest really existent Martian—and to recognise that the property of “really existing” is part of this concept—while nonetheless maintaining that there are no smallest existent Martians.

It will be useful to introduce vocabulary to mark the point which is being made here. We could, for instance, distinguish between the properties which are encoded in an idea or concept, and the properties which are attributed in positive atomic beliefs which have that idea or concept as an ingredient. The idea “really existent Santa Claus” encodes the property of real existence; but it is perfectly possible to entertain this idea without attributing real existence to Santa Claus, i.e., without believing that Santa Claus really exists.

We can then apply this distinction to Anselm’s argument. On the one hand, the idea “being than which no greater can be conceived” encodes the property of real existence—this is what the reductio argument establishes (if it establishes anything at all). On the other hand, it is perfectly possible to entertain the idea of a being than which no greater can be conceived—and to recognise that this idea encodes the property of real existence—without attributing real existence to a being than which no greater can be conceived, i.e., without believing that a being than which no greater can be conceived really exists.

Of course, the argument which Anselm actually presents pays no attention to this distinction between encoding and attributing—i.e., between entertaining an idea and holding a belief—and nor does it pay attention to various other niceties. We begin from the point that the Fool entertains the idea of that than which no greater can be conceived (because the Fool understands the words “that than which no greater can be conceived”). From this, we move quickly to the claim that even the Fool is “convinced”—i.e., believes—that that than which no greater can be conceived possesses the property of existing in the understanding. And then the reductio argument is produced to establish that that than which no greater can be conceived cannot exist only in the understanding but must also possess the property of existing in reality as well (and all mention of the Fool, and what it is that the Fool believes, disappears).

As it stands, this is deeply problematic. How are we supposed to regiment the references to the Fool in the argument? Is the reductio argument supposed to tell us something about what even the Fool believes, or ought to believe? Are the earlier references to the Fool supposed to be inessential and eliminable? How are we so much as to understand the claim that even the Fool believes that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in the understanding? And how do we get from the Fool’s understanding the words “that than which no greater can be conceived” to his believing that that than which no greater can be conceived possesses the property of existing in the understanding?

Following the earlier line of thought, it seems that the argument might go something like this:

(Even) the Fool has the concept of that than which no greater can be conceived.

(Hence) (Even) the Fool believes that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in the understanding.

No one who believes that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in the understanding can reasonably believe that that than which no greater can be conceived exists only in the understanding.

(Hence) (Even) the Fool cannot reasonably deny that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality

(Hence) That than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality.

While this is not a good argument, it could appear compelling to one who failed to attend to the distinction between entertaining ideas and holding beliefs and who was a bit hazy on the distinction between the vehicles of belief and their contents. When the Fool entertains the concept of that than which no greater can be conceived he recognises that he is entertaining this concept (i.e., he believes that he is entertaining the concept of that than which no greater can be conceived—or, as we might say, that the concept is in his understanding). Conflating the concept with its object, this gives us the belief that than which no greater can be conceived possesses the property of existing in the understanding. Now, suppose as hypothesis for reductio , that we can reasonably believe that that than which no greater can be conceived possesses the property of existing only in the understanding. Ignoring the distinction between entertaining ideas and holding beliefs, this means that we when we entertain the idea of that than which no greater can be conceived, we entertain the idea of a being which exists only in the understanding. But that is absurd: when we entertain the idea of that than which no greater can be conceived, our idea encodes the property of existing in reality. So there is a contradiction, and we can conclude that, in order to be reasonable, we must believe that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality. But if any reasonable person must believe that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality, then surely it is the case that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality. And so we are done.

No doubt this suggestion about the interpretation of Anselm’s argument is deficient in various ways. However, the point of including it is illustrative rather than dogmatic. In the literature, there has been great resistance to the idea that the argument which Anselm gives is one which modern logicians would not hesitate to pronounce invalid. But it is very hard to see why there should be this resistance. (Certainly, it is not something for which there is much argument in the literature.) The text of the Proslogion is so rough, and so much in need of polishing, that we should not be too quick to dismiss the suggestion that Anselm’s argument is rather more like the argument most recently sketched than it is like the logically valid demonstrations provided by commentators such as Barnes, Adams, and Oppenheimer and Zalta. (For a more complex analysis of Proslogion II that has it yielding a valid argument, see Hinst 2014.)

Many recent discussions of ontological arguments are in compendiums, companions, encylopedias, and the like. So, for example, there are review discussions of ontological arguments in: Leftow 2005, Matthews 2005, Lowe 2007, Oppy 2007, and Maydole 2009. While the ambitions of these review discussions vary, many of them are designed to introduce neophytes to the arguments and their history. Given the current explosion of enthusiasm for compendiums, companions, encylopedias, and the like, in philosophy of religion, it is likely that many more such discussions will appear in the immediate future.

Some recent discussions of ontological arguments have been placed in more synoptic treatments of arguments about the existence of God. So, for example, there are extended discussions of ontological arguments in Everitt 2004, Sobel 2004, and Oppy 2006. Sobel’s examination of ontological arguments is exemplary. He provides one chapter on ‘classical ontological arguments’: Anselm, Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant’s critique of ontological arguments; one chapter on ‘modern modal ontological arguments’: Hartshorne, Malcolm and Plantinga; and one chapter on Gödel’s ontological argument. His analyses are very careful, and make heavy use of the tools of modern philosophical logic.

There has been one recent monograph devoted exclusively to the analysis of ontological arguments: Dombrowski 2006. Dombrowski is a fan of Hartshorne: the aim of his book is to defend the claim that Hartshorne’s ontological argument is a success. While Dombrowski’s book is a useful addition to the literature because of the scope of its discussion of ontological arguments—for example, it contains a chapter on Rorty on ontological arguments, and another chapter on John Taylor on ontological arguments—even reviewers sympathetic to process theism have not been persuaded that it makes a strong case for its central thesis.

Swatkowski (2012) is the most recent collection of papers on ontological arguments. A significant proportion of papers in this collection take up technical questions about logics that support ontological derivations. (Those interested in technical questions may also be interested in the topic taken up in Oppenheimer and Zalta (2011) and Gorbacz (2012).)

Finally, there has been some activity in journals. The most significant of these pieces is Millican 2004, the first article on ontological arguments in recent memory to appear in Mind . Millican argues for a novel interpretation of Anselm’s argument, and for a new critique of ontological arguments deriving from this interpretation. Needless to say, both the interpretation and the critique are controversial, but they are also worthy of attention. Among other journal articles, perhaps the most interesting are Pruss 2010, which provides a novel defence of the key possibility premise in modal ontological arguments, and Pruss 2009, which kick-started recent discussion of higher-order ontological arguments. There is also a chain of papers in Analysis initiated by Matthews and Baker (2010)

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up this entry topic at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Kurt Gödel’s Ontological Argument (Christopher Small, University of Waterloo)
• Medieval Sourcebook: Philosophers’ Criticisms of Anslem’s Ontological Argument for the Being of God (Paul Halsell, Fordham University)
• Handout for a Talk on the Ontological Argument (J. R. Lucas, Oxford University)
• Ontological Argument Revisited by Two Ottoman Muslim Scholars (Umit Dericioglu)
• The Ontological Argument (Kenneth Himma, University of Washington)
• Anselm’s Ontological Argument (Gideon Rosen, Princeton University)
• Hegel and Kant on the Ontological Argument (Maria de Lourdes Borges, Federal University of Santa Catarina)
• Ontological Argument (links to papers on ontological arguments)
• “ Formalization, Mechanization and Automation of Gödel’s Proof of God’s Existence , unpublished manuscript.
• “ Automating Gödel’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence with Higher-order Automated Theorem Provers , published in ECAI 2014, T. Schaub et al . (eds.), IOS Press.

Anselm, Saint [Anselm of Bec, Anselm of Canterbury] | a priori justification and knowledge | Descartes, René | existence | God: concepts of | Gödel, Kurt | Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich | Kant, Immanuel | logic: informal | logic: modal | Meinong, Alexius

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As Bird Flu Looms, the Lessons of Past Pandemics Take On New Urgency

By John M. Barry

Mr. Barry, a scholar at the Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, is the author of “The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History.”

In 1918, an influenza virus jumped from birds to humans and killed an estimated 50 million to 100 million people in a world with less than a quarter of today’s population. Dozens of mammals also became infected.

Now we are seeing another onslaught of avian influenza. For years it has been devastating bird populations worldwide and more recently has begun infecting mammals , including cattle, a transmission never seen before. In another first, the virus almost certainly jumped recently from a cow to at least one human — fortunately, a mild case.

While much would still have to happen for this virus to ignite another human pandemic, these events provide another reason — as if one were needed — for governments and public health authorities to prepare for the next pandemic. As they do, they must be cautious about the lessons they might think Covid-19 left behind. We need to be prepared to fight the next war, not the last one.

Two assumptions based on our Covid experience would be especially dangerous and could cause tremendous damage, even if policymakers realized their mistake and adjusted quickly.

The first involves who is most likely to die from a pandemic virus. Covid primarily killed people 65 years and older , but Covid was an anomaly. The five previous pandemics we have reliable data about all killed much younger populations.

The 1889 pandemic most resembles Covid (and some scientists believe a coronavirus caused it). Young children escaped almost untouched and it killed mostly older people, but people ages 15 to 24 suffered the most excess mortality , or deaths above normal. Influenza caused the other pandemics, but unlike deaths from seasonal influenza, which usually kills older adults, in the 1957, 1968 and 2009 outbreaks, half or more deaths occurred in people younger than 65. The catastrophic 1918 pandemic was the complete reverse of Covid: Well over 90 percent of the excess mortality occurred in people younger than 65. Children under 10 were the most vulnerable, and those ages 25 to 29 followed.

Any presumption that older people would be the chief victims of the next pandemic — as they were in Covid — is wrong, and any policy so premised could leave healthy young adults and children exposed to a lethal virus.

The second dangerous assumption is that public health measures like school and business closings and masking had little impact. That is incorrect.

Australia, Germany and Switzerland are among the countries that demonstrated those interventions can succeed. Even the experience of the United States provides overwhelming, if indirect, evidence of the success of those public health measures.

The evidence comes from influenza, which transmits like Covid, with nearly one-third of cases transmitted by asymptomatic people. The winter before Covid, influenza killed an estimated 25,000 here ; in that first pandemic winter, influenza deaths were under 800. The public health steps taken to slow Covid contributed significantly to this decline, and those same measures no doubt affected Covid as well.

So the question isn’t whether those measures work. They do. It’s whether their benefits outweigh their social and economic costs. This will be a continuing calculation.

Such measures can moderate transmission, but they cannot be sustained indefinitely. And even the most extreme interventions cannot eliminate a pathogen that escapes initial containment if, like influenza or the virus that causes Covid-19, it is both airborne and transmitted by people showing no symptoms. Yet such interventions can achieve two important goals.

The first is preventing hospitals from being overrun. Achieving this outcome could require a cycle of imposing, lifting and reimposing public health measures to slow the spread of the virus. But the public should accept that because the goal is understandable, narrow and well defined.

The second objective is to slow transmission to buy time for identifying, manufacturing and distributing therapeutics and vaccines and for clinicians to learn how to manage care with the resources at hand. Artificial intelligence will perhaps be able to extrapolate from mountains of data which restrictions deliver the most benefits — whether, for example, just closing bars would be enough to significantly dampen spread — and which impose the greatest cost. A.I. should also speed drug development. And wastewater monitoring can track the pathogen’s movements and may make it possible to limit the locations where interventions are needed.

Still, what’s achievable will depend on the pathogen’s severity and transmissibility, and, as we sadly learned in the United States, how well — or poorly — leaders communicate the goals and the reasons behind them.

Specifically, officials will confront whether to impose the two most contentious interventions, school closings and mask mandates. What should they do?

Children are generally superspreaders of respiratory disease and can have disproportionate impact. Indeed, vaccinating children against pneumococcal pneumonia can cut the disease by 87 percent in people 50 and older. And schools were central to spreading the pandemics of 1957, 1968 and 2009. So there was good reason to think closing schools during Covid would save many lives.

In fact, closing schools did reduce Covid’s spread, yet the consensus view is that any gain was not worth the societal disruption and damage to children’s social and educational development. But that tells us nothing about the future. What if the next pandemic is deadlier than 1957’s but as in 1957, 48 percent of excess deaths are among those younger than 15 and schools are central to spread? Would it make sense to close schools then?

Masks present a much simpler question. They work. We’ve known they work since 1917, when they helped protect soldiers from a measles epidemic. A century later, all the data on Covid have actually demonstrated significant benefits from masks.

But whether to mandate masks is a difficult call. Too many people wear poorly fitted masks or wear them incorrectly. So even without adding in the complexities of politics, compliance is a problem. Whether government mask mandates will be worth the resistance they foment will depend on the severity of the virus.

That does not mean that institutions and businesses can’t or shouldn’t require masks. Nor does it mean we can’t increase the use of masks with better messaging. People accept smoking bans because they understand long-term exposure to secondhand smoke can cause cancer. A few minutes of exposure to Covid can kill. Messaging that combines self-protection with communitarian values could dent resistance significantly.

Individuals should want to protect themselves, given the long-term threat to their health. An estimated 7 percent of Americans have been affected by long Covid of varying severity, and a re-infection can still set it off in those who have so far avoided it. The 1918 pandemic also caused neurological and cardiovascular problems lasting decades, and children exposed in utero suffered worse health and higher mortality than their siblings. We can expect the same from the next pandemic.

What should we learn from the past? Every pandemic we have good information about was unique. That makes information itself the most valuable commodity. We must gather it, analyze it, act upon it and communicate it.

Epidemiological information can answer the biggest question: whether to deploy society-wide public health interventions at all. But the epidemiology of the virus is hardly the only information that matters. Before Covid vaccines were available, the single drug that saved the most lives was dexamethasone. Health officials in Britain discovered its effectiveness because the country has a shared data system that enabled them to analyze the efficacy of treatments being tried around the country. We have no comparable system in the United States. We need one.

Perhaps most important, government officials and health care experts must communicate to the public effectively. The United States failed dismally at this. There was no organized effort to counter social media disinformation, and experts damaged their own credibility by reversing their advice several times. They could have avoided these self-inflicted wounds by setting public expectations properly. The public should have been told that scientists had never seen this virus before, that they were giving their best advice based on their knowledge at the time and that their advice could — and probably would — change as more information came in. Had they done this, they probably would have retained more of the public’s confidence.

Trust matters. A pre-Covid analysis of the pandemic readiness of countries around the world rated the United States first because of its resources. Yet America had the second-worst rate of infections of any high-income country.

A pandemic analysis of 177 countries published in 2022 found that resources did not correlate with infections. Trust in government and fellow citizens did. That’s the lesson we really need to remember for the next time.

John M. Barry, a scholar at the Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, is the author of “The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History.”

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