thesis statement in russian

Essay in Russian

Argumentative Essays

Narrative Essays

Comparative Essays

Student Partnership

Hello everyone,

Welcome to our class blog for Essay in Russian !

Here you will find examples of some of the essays written by UCL SSEES undergraduate students studying Russian as part of their degree.

The Essay in Russian module is an elective module of the Russian degree programme and aims to develop general transferable writing skills as well as essay writing in Russian. The content of the course is developed using both Process and Result oriented approaches to teaching writing. The module sets out to allow students to become independent and competent writers and give them the skills needed to produce coherent and cohesive written content in Russian.

Over the course of the 2018/19 academic year we covered four different types of essays: argumentative, narrative, reasoning, and comparative, plus a “review writing” – to all of which you can find sample essays in this blog.

Within the framework of the module, students were asked to create an individual online writer’s blog using the WordPress blogging platform where they published some of their work (essays or other posts). This was done as part of formative assessment and on an entirely voluntary basis.

Four different types of digital technologies were used to deliver this module and blogs were one part of them. The use of blogs was suggested to students in order to facilitate the idea of writing for audiences and to build their skills and confidence when writing. Using blogs also aimed to teach students to be accountable for the content they upload publicly and to serve as a tool of reflection on students’ writing process and progress. It also functioned as a motivational booster letting students see how they have improved over the course of the year. Moreover, in the future students can also use the blogs as Language Portfolios as evidence of their language proficiency to others, such as potential employers or other academic institutions.

I am very grateful to all my students who have contributed essay samples for this blog and who have provided continual valuable feedback on how to improve the module for future students. As a result of this successful pilot module and the feedback given by students this module has been refined, amended and improved and next academic year will run under the title Writing, Editing and Blogging in Russian. Thank you to all who helped to shape this module. Your responsive and positive attitude and collaboration is very much appreciated.

I hope you will enjoy the samples you read and will celebrate the achievements of our students!

With fondest regards,

Maria Sibiryakova ([email protected])

• Copyright © 2018 UCL
• Freedom of Information
• Accessibility
• Privacy and Cookies
• Slavery statement
• Reflect policy

Please check your email to activate your account.

« Go back Accept

Thesis Statements

What is a thesis statement.

Your thesis statement is one of the most important parts of your paper.  It expresses your main argument succinctly and explains why your argument is historically significant.  Think of your thesis as a promise you make to your reader about what your paper will argue.  Then, spend the rest of your paper–each body paragraph–fulfilling that promise.

Your thesis should be between one and three sentences long and is placed at the end of your introduction.  Just because the thesis comes towards the beginning of your paper does not mean you can write it first and then forget about it.  View your thesis as a work in progress while you write your paper.  Once you are satisfied with the overall argument your paper makes, go back to your thesis and see if it captures what you have argued.  If it does not, then revise it.  Crafting a good thesis is one of the most challenging parts of the writing process, so do not expect to perfect it on the first few tries.  Successful writers revise their thesis statements again and again.

A successful thesis statement:

• makes an historical argument
• takes a position that requires defending
• is historically specific
• is focused and precise
• answers the question, “so what?”

How to write a thesis statement:

Suppose you are taking an early American history class and your professor has distributed the following essay prompt:

“Historians have debated the American Revolution’s effect on women.  Some argue that the Revolution had a positive effect because it increased women’s authority in the family.  Others argue that it had a negative effect because it excluded women from politics.  Still others argue that the Revolution changed very little for women, as they remained ensconced in the home.  Write a paper in which you pose your own answer to the question of whether the American Revolution had a positive, negative, or limited effect on women.”

Using this prompt, we will look at both weak and strong thesis statements to see how successful thesis statements work.

While this thesis does take a position, it is problematic because it simply restates the prompt.  It needs to be more specific about how  the Revolution had a limited effect on women and  why it mattered that women remained in the home.

Revised Thesis:  The Revolution wrought little political change in the lives of women because they did not gain the right to vote or run for office.  Instead, women remained firmly in the home, just as they had before the war, making their day-to-day lives look much the same.

This revision is an improvement over the first attempt because it states what standards the writer is using to measure change (the right to vote and run for office) and it shows why women remaining in the home serves as evidence of limited change (because their day-to-day lives looked the same before and after the war).  However, it still relies too heavily on the information given in the prompt, simply saying that women remained in the home.  It needs to make an argument about some element of the war’s limited effect on women.  This thesis requires further revision.

Strong Thesis: While the Revolution presented women unprecedented opportunities to participate in protest movements and manage their family’s farms and businesses, it ultimately did not offer lasting political change, excluding women from the right to vote and serve in office.

Few would argue with the idea that war brings upheaval.  Your thesis needs to be debatable:  it needs to make a claim against which someone could argue.  Your job throughout the paper is to provide evidence in support of your own case.  Here is a revised version:

Strong Thesis: The Revolution caused particular upheaval in the lives of women.  With men away at war, women took on full responsibility for running households, farms, and businesses.  As a result of their increased involvement during the war, many women were reluctant to give up their new-found responsibilities after the fighting ended.

Sexism is a vague word that can mean different things in different times and places.  In order to answer the question and make a compelling argument, this thesis needs to explain exactly what  attitudes toward women were in early America, and  how those attitudes negatively affected women in the Revolutionary period.

Strong Thesis: The Revolution had a negative impact on women because of the belief that women lacked the rational faculties of men. In a nation that was to be guided by reasonable republican citizens, women were imagined to have no place in politics and were thus firmly relegated to the home.

This thesis addresses too large of a topic for an undergraduate paper.  The terms “social,” “political,” and “economic” are too broad and vague for the writer to analyze them thoroughly in a limited number of pages.  The thesis might focus on one of those concepts, or it might narrow the emphasis to some specific features of social, political, and economic change.

Strong Thesis: The Revolution paved the way for important political changes for women.  As “Republican Mothers,” women contributed to the polity by raising future citizens and nurturing virtuous husbands.  Consequently, women played a far more important role in the new nation’s politics than they had under British rule.

This thesis is off to a strong start, but it needs to go one step further by telling the reader why changes in these three areas mattered.  How did the lives of women improve because of developments in education, law, and economics?  What were women able to do with these advantages?  Obviously the rest of the paper will answer these questions, but the thesis statement needs to give some indication of why these particular changes mattered.

Strong Thesis: The Revolution had a positive impact on women because it ushered in improvements in female education, legal standing, and economic opportunity.  Progress in these three areas gave women the tools they needed to carve out lives beyond the home, laying the foundation for the cohesive feminist movement that would emerge in the mid-nineteenth century.

Thesis Checklist

When revising your thesis, check it against the following guidelines:

• Does my thesis make an historical argument?
• Does my thesis take a position that requires defending?
• Is my thesis historically specific?
• Is my thesis focused and precise?
• Does my thesis answer the question, “so what?”

Download as PDF

6265 Bunche Hall Box 951473 University of California, Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA 90095-1473 Phone: (310) 825-4601

Other Resources

• UCLA Library
• Faculty Intranet
• Department Forms
• Office 365 Email
• Remote Help

Campus Resources

• Maps, Directions, Parking
• Academic Calendar
• University of California
• Terms of Use

Social Sciences Division Departments

• Aerospace Studies
• African American Studies
• American Indian Studies
• Anthropology
• Archaeology
• Asian American Studies
• César E. Chávez Department of Chicana & Chicano Studies
• Communication
• Conservation
• Gender Studies
• Military Science
• Naval Science
• Political Science

MIT Center for International Studies

Search form, qualtrics block.

• Faculty + Scholars
• Affiliates + Visiting Scholars
• Middle East and North Africa
• Global Diversity Lab
• International Education (MISTI)
• Policy Lab at the Center for International Studies
• Program on Emerging Technologies (PoET)
• Security Studies Program
• Seminar XXI
• Fellowships + Grants
• Archive of Programs + Initiatives
• Analysis + Opinion
• Research Activities
• Starr Forum
• SSP Wed Seminar
• Focus on Eurasia
• Bustani Middle East Seminar
• South Asian Politics Seminar
• MISTI Events
• MIT X TAU Webinar Series
• International Migration
• News Releases
• In the News
• Expert Guide
• War in Ukraine

You are here

Publications.

• » Analysis + Opinion
• Hypotheses on the implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

Barry Posen provides his perspective on the implications of the war in Ukraine. His analysis is available here  and was published in Defense Priorities .

How will the war in Ukraine shape international politics? In principle there are two ways to address this question. The first is simply to extrapolate into the future any actions or reactions that we can observe today. The second, which is explored below, is to organize our thinking theoretically, to ask what may turn out to be the long-term effects of the major causes set in motion by the war. I organize the discussion in terms of a theory of international politics—realism, mainly structural realism. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine serves as another reminder that war remains an ever-present danger in an international system that is anarchic—ie, devoid of any central authority with the wherewithal to protect states from aggression. States must therefore prepare to defend themselves. In the heady aftermath of the liberal West’s victory over the Soviet empire, and the apparent triumph of the US-led, liberal world order, many instead believed that interstate war would become a thing of the past. States now face strong incentives to reembrace tried and tested tools of self-preservation developed in earlier times.

Full story by Barry Posen is available here:  https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/hypotheses-on-the-implications-of-the-ukraine-russia-war

• A few members of the Russian Parliament speak out against the war.
• A major Ukrainian internet provider reports a cyberattack.
• After Abe, Japan tries to balance ties to the US and China
• Aid organizations say they are seeing signs of trafficking of people fleeing Ukraine.
• As Brazil’s election day approaches, fear of violence grows
• Attacking Russia in Ukraine means war
• Bolsonaro and Lula are heading to second round in Brazil election
• Boots on the ground, eyes in the sky
• CIS mourns the loss of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
• Can Russia and the West survive a nuclear crisis in Ukraine?
• Causing crisis works
• China and India need to reimagine what is possible on the border
• China's COVID protests are powerful, but they cannot challenge Xi Jinping's regime
• Do armed drones reduce terrorism? Here’s the data.
• Enhancing strategic stability in Southern Asia
• Five books that illuminate the agony and uncertainty of civilians caught in wars
• For this border crisis, Poles extend a warm welcome, unlike last time.
• Four EU countries expel dozens of Russian diplomats suspected of espionage.
• From 1994: Posen's "A Defense Concept for Ukraine"
• Here’s what Western leaders need to remember about Zelensky’s emotional appeals
• History as it happens: Invisible carnage
• How the killing of Iran’s top general squandered US leverage in Iraq today
• How the war complicates Biden's Iran diplomacy
• How the war in Ukraine could get much worse
• How to avoid a war over Taiwan
• In Poland, protesters demand a ban on road cargo traffic between the EU and Russia and Belarus.
• Kishida Becomes First Japanese PM to Attend NPT Review Conference
• Letting go of Afghanistan: Presidents Biden and Trump were right
• Let’s not grant Saudi Arabia a blank check for American support
• Major flip in Iraqi government this week: could crisis be over?
• Moqtada al-Sadr, called on his bluff, retreats for now
• More than 80,000 people have been evacuated from areas near Kyiv and the city of Sumy.
• NATO’s military presence in Eastern Europe has been building rapidly.
• NPT conference collapse, military drills further strain Japan-Russia relations
• Pentagon says Poland’s fighter jet offer is not ‘tenable.’
• Poland will propose a NATO peacekeeping mission for Ukraine at the alliance’s meeting this week.
• Putin’s misleading hairsplitting about who can join NATO
• Republicans will quit any nuclear deal with Iran, scholar predicts
• Reviving war-game scholarship at MIT
• Russia, Ukraine, and European security
• Russian forces abducted four Ukrainian journalists, a union says.
• Sanctions won't end Russia's war in Ukraine
• Science must overcome its racist legacy: Nature’s guest editors speak
• Should the United States pledge to defend Taiwan?
• The American conspiracy against Pakistan that never existed
• The Falklands War at 40: A lesson for our time
• The Russian sanctions regime and the risk of catastrophic success
• The Russo-Ukrainian war’s dangerous slide into total societal conflict
• The UN has documented at least 3,924 Ukrainian civilian deaths in the war.
• The clashing narratives that keep the US and Iran at odds
• The dawn of drone diplomacy
• The ghosts of history haunt the Russia-Ukraine crisis
• The latest round of sanctions on Russia
• The new Iraqi PM is a status quo leader, but for how long?
• The real fallout from the Mar-a-Lago search
• The rewards of rivalry: US-Chinese competition can spur climate progress
• The risk of Russian chemical weapons use
• There is no NATO open-door policy
• These disunited states
• Think COVID has stunted growth? Try 30 years of conflict.
• To prevent war and secure Ukraine, make Ukraine neutral
• US public prefers diplomacy over war on Ukraine
• Ukraine needs solutions, not endless war
• Ukraine war
• Ukraine war revives anxiety about nuclear conflict
• Ukraine: Three divergent stands, three scenarios
• Ukraine: Unleashing the rhetorical dogs of war
• Ukraine’s celebrities are dying in the war, adding an extra dimension to the nation’s shock.
• Ukraine’s implausible theories of victory
• Uncovering the strategic aspects of Sino-India ties
• Watching war in real time, one TikTok at a time
• We call on Biden to reject reckless demands for a no-fly zone
• We need to think the unthinkable about our country
• What Putin’s nuclear threats mean for the US
• What ever happened to our fear of Armageddon?
• What is America's interest in the Ukraine war?
• What to expect from Biden’s big Middle East trip
• When migrants become weapons
• Why Putin went straight for the nuclear threat
• Why the US wants a ban on ASAT missile testing
• Xi broke the social contract that helped China prosper

Publication Audits

• Starr Forum Report

Connect with CIS

Receive e-mail updates about CIS events and news.

MIT CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Building E40-400, 1 Amherst Street, Cambridge, MA 02142 Massachusetts Institute of Technology contact     site credits     accessibility login logout

How to Write War Essay: Russia Ukraine War

Understanding the Purpose and Scope of a War Essay

A condition of armed conflict between nations or between groups living in one nation is known as war. Sounds not like much fun, does it? Well, conflicts have been a part of human history for thousands of years, and as industry and technology have developed, they have grown more devastating. As awful as it might seem, a war typically occurs between a country or group of countries against a rival country to attain a goal through force. Civil and revolutionary wars are examples of internal conflicts that can occur inside a nation.

Your history class could ask you to write a war essay, or you might be personally interested in learning more about conflicts, in which case you might want to learn how to write an academic essay about war. In any scenario, we have gathered valuable guidance on how to organize war essays. Let's first examine the potential reasons for a conflict before moving on to the outline for a war essay.

• Economic Gain - A country's desire to seize control of another country's resources frequently starts conflicts. Even when the proclaimed goal of a war is portrayed to the public as something more admirable, most wars have an economic motivation at their core, regardless of any other possible causes.
• Territorial Gain - A nation may determine that it requires additional land for habitation, agriculture, or other uses. Additionally, the territory might serve as buffer zones between two violent foes.
• Religion - Religious disputes can stem from extremely profound issues. They may go dormant for many years before suddenly resurfacing later.
• Nationalism - In this sense, nationalism simply refers to the act of violently subjugating another country to demonstrate the country's superiority. This frequently manifests as an invasion.
• Revenge - Warfare can frequently be motivated by the desire to punish, make up for, or simply exact revenge for perceived wrongdoing. Revenge has a connection to nationalism as well because when a nation has been wronged, its citizens are inspired by patriotism and zeal to take action.
• Defensive War - In today's world, when military aggression is being questioned, governments will frequently claim that they are fighting in a solely protective manner against a rival or prospective aggressor and that their conflict is thus a 'just' conflict. These defensive conflicts may be especially contentious when conducted proactively, with the basic premise being that we are striking them before they strike us.

How to Write War Essay with a War Essay Outline

Just like in compare and contrast examples and any other forms of writing, an outline for a war essay assists you in organizing your research and creating a good flow. In general, you keep to the traditional three-part essay style, but you can adapt it as needed based on the length and criteria of your school. When planning your war paper, consider the following outline:

Introduction

• Definition of war
• Importance of studying wars
• Thesis statement

Body Paragraphs

• Causes of the War
• Political reasons
• Economic reasons
• Social reasons
• Historical reasons
• Major Players in the War
• Countries and their leaders
• Military leaders
• Allies and enemies
• Strategies and Tactics
• Military tactics and techniques
• Strategic planning
• Weapons and technology
• Impact of the War
• On the countries involved
• On civilians and non-combatants
• On the world as a whole
• Summary of the main points
• Final thoughts on the war
• Suggestions for future research

If you found this outline template helpful, you can also use our physics help for further perfecting your academic assignments.

Begin With a Relevant Hook

A hook should be the focal point of the entire essay. A good hook for an essay on war can be an interesting statement, an emotional appeal, a thoughtful question, or a surprising fact or figure. It engages your audience and leaves them hungry for more information.

Follow Your Outline

An outline is the single most important organizational tool for essay writing. It allows the writer to visualize the overall structure of the essay and focus on the flow of information. The specifics of your outline depend on the type of essay you are writing. For example, some should focus on statistics and pure numbers, while others should dedicate more space to abstract arguments.

How to Discuss Tragedy, Loss, and Sentiment

War essays are particularly difficult to write because of the terrible nature of war. The life is destroyed, the loved ones lost, fighting, death, great many massacres and violence overwhelm, and hatred for the evil enemy, amongst other tragedies, make emotions run hot, which is why sensitivity is so important. Depending on the essay's purpose, there are different ways to deal with tragedy and sentiment.

The easiest one is to stick with objective data rather than deal with the personal experiences of those who may have been affected by these events. It can be hard to remain impartial, especially when writing about recent deaths and destruction. But it is your duty as a researcher to do so.

However, it’s not always possible to avoid these issues entirely. When you are forced to tackle them head-on, you should always be considerate and avoid passing swift and sweeping judgment.

Summing Up Your Writing

When you have finished presenting your case, you should finish it off with some sort of lesson it teaches us. Armed conflict is a major part of human nature yet. By analyzing the events that transpired, you should be able to make a compelling argument about the scale of the damage the war caused, as well as how to prevent it in the future.

Tired of Looming Deadlines?

Get the help you need from our expert writers to ace your next assignment!

Popular War Essay Topics

When choosing a topic for an essay about war, it is best to begin with the most well-known conflicts because they are thoroughly recorded. These can include the Cold War or World War II. You might also choose current wars, such as the Syrian Civil War or the Russia and Ukraine war. Because they occur in the backdrop of your time and place, such occurrences may be simpler to grasp and research.

To help you decide which war to write about, we have compiled some facts about several conflicts that will help you get off to a strong start.

Russia Ukraine War

Russian President Vladimir Putin started the Russian invasion in the early hours of February 24 last year. According to him. the Ukrainian government had been committing genocide against Russian-speaking residents in the eastern Ukraine - Donbas region since 2014, calling the onslaught a 'special military operation.'

The Russian president further connected the assault to the NATO transatlantic military alliance commanded by the United States. He said the Russian military was determined to stop NATO from moving farther east and establishing a military presence in Ukraine, a part of the Soviet Union, until its fall in 1991.

All of Russia's justifications have been rejected by Ukraine and its ally Western Countries. Russia asserted its measures were defensive, while Ukraine declared an emergency and enacted martial law. According to the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the administration's objective is not only to repel offensives but also to reclaim all Ukrainian land that the Russian Federation has taken, including Crimea.

Both sides of the conflict accuse the other of deploying indiscriminate force, which has resulted in many civilian deaths and displacements. According to current Ukraine news, due to the difficulty of counting the deceased due to ongoing combat, the death toll is likely far higher. In addition, countless Ukrainian refugees were compelled to leave their homeland in search of safety and stability abroad.

Diplomatic talks have been employed to try to end the Ukraine-Russia war. Several rounds of conversations have taken place in various places. However, the conflict is still raging as of April 2023, and there is no sign of a truce.

World War II

World War II raged from 1939 until 1945. Most of the world's superpowers took part in the conflict, fought between two military alliances headed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, and the Axis Powers, led by Germany, Italy, and Japan.

If you'd like to explore it more in-depth, consider using our history essay service for a World War 2 essay pdf sample!

After World War II, a persistent political conflict between the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies became known as the Cold War. It's hard to say who was to blame for the cold war essay. American citizens have long harbored concerns about Soviet communism and expressed alarm over Joseph Stalin's brutal control of his own nation. On their side, the Soviets were angry at the Americans for delaying their participation in World War II, which led to the deaths of tens of millions of Russians, and for America's long-standing unwillingness to recognize the USSR as a genuine member of the world community.

Vietnam War

If you're thinking about writing the Vietnam War essay, you should know that it was a protracted military battle that lasted in Vietnam from 1955 to 1975. The North Vietnamese communist government fought South Vietnam and its main ally, the United States, in the lengthy, expensive, and contentious Vietnam War. The ongoing Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union exacerbated the issue. The Vietnam War claimed the lives of more than 3 million individuals, more than half of whom were Vietnamese civilians.

American Civil War

Consider writing an American Civil War essay where the Confederate States of America, a grouping of eleven southern states that seceded from the Union in 1860 and 1861, and the United States of America battled each other. If you're wondering what caused the civil war, you should know that the long-standing dispute about the legitimacy of slavery is largely responsible for how the war started.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

After over a century, the Israel-Palestine conflict has evolved into one of the most significant and current problems in the Middle East. A war that has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people destroyed their homes and gave rise to terrorist organizations that still hold the region hostage. Simply described, it is a conflict between two groups of people for ownership of the same piece of land. One already resided there, while the other was compelled to immigrate to this country owing to rising antisemitism and later settled there. For Israelis and Palestinians alike, as well as for the larger area, the war continues to have substantial political, social, and economic repercussions.

The Syrian Civil War

Pro-democracy protests broke out in southern Deraa in March 2011 due to upheavals against oppressive leaders in neighboring nations. When the Syrian government employed lethal force to quell the unrest, widespread protests calling for the president's resignation broke out.

The country entered a civil war as the violence quickly increased. After hundreds of rebel organizations emerged, the fight quickly expanded beyond a confrontation between Syrians supporting or opposing Mr. Assad. Everyone believes a political solution is necessary, even though it doesn't seem like it will soon.

Russia-Ukraine War Essay Sample

With the Russian-Ukrainian war essay sample provided below from our paper writing experts, you can gain more insight into structuring a flawless paper.

Why is there a war between Russia and Ukraine?

Final Words

To understand our past and the present, we must study conflicts since they are a product of human nature and civilization. Our graduate essay writing service can produce any kind of essay you want, whether it is about World War II, the Cold War, or another conflict. Send us your specifications with your ' write my essay ' request, and let our skilled writers help you wow your professor!

Having Hard Time Writing on Wars?

From the causes and consequences of wars to the strategies and tactics used in battle, our team of expert writers can provide you with a high-quality essay!

Annie Lambert

specializes in creating authoritative content on marketing, business, and finance, with a versatile ability to handle any essay type and dissertations. With a Master’s degree in Business Administration and a passion for social issues, her writing not only educates but also inspires action. On EssayPro blog, Annie delivers detailed guides and thought-provoking discussions on pressing economic and social topics. When not writing, she’s a guest speaker at various business seminars.

is an expert in nursing and healthcare, with a strong background in history, law, and literature. Holding advanced degrees in nursing and public health, his analytical approach and comprehensive knowledge help students navigate complex topics. On EssayPro blog, Adam provides insightful articles on everything from historical analysis to the intricacies of healthcare policies. In his downtime, he enjoys historical documentaries and volunteering at local clinics.

Related Articles

• News and Statements by President Bacow

Statement on the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Let me begin by offering my thanks to the Davis Center and the Ukrainian Research Institute, its co-sponsors, and our panelists. Universities are built to bring people together, and technology has increased our capacity to draw audiences from around the world. This gathering exemplifies our convening strength—and its tremendous value.

On Friday, I wrote the director and executive director of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute of my deep concern about the capricious and senseless invasion of Ukraine. Since then, the situation has deteriorated further. Over the weekend, members of our community rallied at the heart of our campus and spoke clearly and forcefully against the crisis.

Now is a time for all voices to be raised.

The deplorable actions of Vladimir Putin put at risk the lives of millions of people and undermine the concept of sovereignty. Institutions devoted to the perpetuation of democratic ideals and to the articulation of human rights have a responsibility to condemn such wanton aggression.

Harvard will continue to support in whatever ways we can members of our community who face grave uncertainty. We will continue to share knowledge of Ukraine and advance understanding of its culture, history, and language. And we will continue to speak against cruelty, and to act with compassion as we hold to hope for resolution—and for liberation. 

Today the Ukrainian flag flies over Harvard Yard.  Harvard University stands with the people of Ukraine.

Opening remarks at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University event, Rapid Response Panel: Ukraine Under Attack .

Statement on Russia’s War against Ukraine

We at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University are horrified by the Russian military attack on Ukraine and the pain and suffering it is imposing on Ukrainians and all those who hold them dear. 

The attempt by the Russian president to resolve longstanding grievances with both the Ukrainian government and the post–Cold War international order through violence is a grave mistake. The future historians of Russia, Europe, and Eurasia will describe this dark moment as a regrettable, avoidable turning point of twenty-first century geopolitics.

Since our founding as the Russian Research Center, the Davis Center has sought to understand Russia and the broader Eurasian region with all the tools scholarship has to offer. Not surprisingly, in 75 years we have grown into a community with close ties to the region we study. The social scientists, humanists, and artists in our midst have spent time, energy, and emotion building relationships with these countries and the people who love them. It is devastating to see the Russian government turn against its neighbor Ukraine, with whom it shares part—though far from all—of its history. 

The present-day Davis Center fosters understanding through dialogue, research, and scholarly exchange. Although geopolitical harmony has eluded us for many decades, we have always hoped for and promoted peaceful mutual understanding. Simmering violence in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in the post-Soviet world has been alarming for years, but the Russian invasion of Ukraine marks a definitive change in the political trajectory of the region. 

The Davis Center stands with the people of Ukraine and with the many people around the world who are and will be harmed by this war.

Rawi Abdelal Herbert F. Johnson Professor of International Management, Harvard Business School Director, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies

Alexandra Vacroux Executive Director, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies

February 25, 2022

See also: Statement on Suspension of Linkages with Russian Institutions of Higher Education (March 9, 2022)  

Type to search

Ten Theses on Russia in the 21st Century

Reflections on hybrid administration, algorithms for exiting the conflict, and how to govern the world’s most complex country

Thesis 1: The future of Russian governance is neither necessarily democratic nor strictly non-democratic. This choice is likely too binary for Russia’s extremely complex realities. Instead, a future Russia may well be – and perhaps should be – decidedly hybrid, drawing promiscuously on the best in 21st century structures and practices from around the world.

Russia is a very young country – even if most people, including many Russians, forget that this Russia, in its post-Soviet incarnation, is only just completing its third decade. It is therefore naturally still solidifying and indeed inventing, improvising and legitimating its governing institutions, not to mention forming (with inconsistent success) its future political elites. The country’s constitutional youth, coupled with its present unique internal and international pressures, means that Moscow can look non-dogmatically westward and eastward alike (and elsewhere besides) to adopt the best in governing approaches, even as it indigenizes these and ends up with its own idiom – as is, by history and mentality alike, the Russian wont.

Let me propose that there are two dominant governing paradigms in the world today – on the one hand, the democratic tradition or, more tightly, what I would call ‘argumentative governance’; and on the other, ‘algorithmic governance.’ Argumentative governance prevails in the presumptive West – the deeply democratic countries of North America, Western Europe and indeed much of the EU, Australia and New Zealand. Algorithmic governance is led almost exclusively by the dyad of modern China and Singapore. Most of the remaining countries in the world – in the former Soviet space, the Middle East (including Israel), the Americas, Africa, and much of Asia (including India) – are still in what might be called the ‘voyeur’ world, still stabilizing, legitimizing or relegitimizing their governance regimes and institutions according to one tradition or the other, or actively borrowing from, and experimenting with, both.

Argumentative (or democratic) governance is characterized by fairly elected governments that are constantly opposed, challenged or corrected by deeply ingrained institutions (like political oppositions, the courts or other levels of government) or broad, activist estates (like the media, the academy, and various non-governmental organizations and groupings, not excluding religious organizations). Algorithmic governance, however, is characterized by the centrality of a smaller, select, highly professional group of national ‘algorithm-makers’ who, having been selected largely through intense filtering based principally on technical and intellectual (and perhaps ideological) qualifications (the so-called ‘smartest people in the room’), are constitutionally and culturally protected in their ability to generalize these algorithms throughout the country over the long run. Algorithmic governance lays claim to legitimacy via the securing of visible, concrete results in the form of consistently rising material wealth, advanced physical infrastructure, and general public order and stability – and indeed the rapidity (and predictability) with which such outcomes are realized and real-life problems are solved.

What would hybrid Russian governance look like in the 21st century? Answer: It would draw on the obvious strengths of the dominant algorithmic and argumentative governance models, while guarding against the major weaknesses of each of these idioms.

Argumentative governance, on the other hand, maintains its legitimacy via procedural argument in the contest for power among political parties, and in the information provided to power through various feedback loops. A large number of these argumentative regimes are federal in nature (just as the number of federal regimes globally has grown markedly over the last couple of decades), and so centre-region relations are both another source of procedural argument and a type of feedback to power (from the local to the general or macro).

What would hybrid Russian governance look like in the 21st century? Answer: It would draw on the obvious strengths of the dominant algorithmic and argumentative governance models, while guarding against the major weaknesses of each of these idioms. What are the key strengths of the algorithmic system that Russia should wish to adopt? First and foremost, Russia must invest in properly creating, over time (the next 15-20 years), a deep policy elite, meritocratically recruited and trained, to populate all its levels of government, from the federal centre in Moscow to the regional and municipal governments. Such a deep, professional post-Soviet policy elite is manifestly absent in Russia today, across its levels of government – a problem that repeats itself in nearly all of the 15 post-Soviet states.

Second, Russia must develop a credible long-term national planning capability (as distinct from the current exclusively short-term focus and occasional rank caprice of Russian governments, pace the various longer-term official national strategies and documents), led by the said algorithmic policy elite at the different levels of government, and implemented with great seriousness across the territory of the country.

Third, Russia requires an intelligent degree of very gradual decentralization (rapid decentralization being potentially fatal to national unity, or otherwise fragmenting the country’s internal coherence across its huge territory) and, if necessary or possible, a degree of genuine federalization of governmental power across the Russian territory.

Fourth, Russia’s policy elites must foster the development (and protection) of many more feedback mechanisms from citizens to political power in both the federal centre and in regional governments – not for purposes of democratic theatre or fetish, but rather to avoid making major or even existentially fatal policy mistakes, or indeed to correct policy mistakes and refine the governing algorithms in the interest of on-the-ground results and real-life problem-solving (a major imperative in Chinese algorithmic governance today, where the governing elites, as with past Chinese emperors, are, whatever their intellect, said to be excessively ‘far away’). These feedback loops – from the media, the academy, various groups and, evidently, from all Russian citizens – help to ensure that even the smartest algorithm-makers in the future policy elite do not make catastrophic mistakes based on information that is wholly detached from realities on the ground in Russia, across its massive territory.

Uncontrolled or excessively rapid federalization or decentralization, of course, could lead to the breakup of the country or to generalized chaos (a fact well underappreciated outside of Russia) – so strong are the centrifugal and also regionalized ethnic forces across Russia’s huge territory and regional diversity.

Thesis 2: Beyond this decentralization, Russia should ideally federalize substantively, even if the country is already, according to its present constitution, formally federal. At a minimum, as mentioned, the country must before long effectuate a gradual, controlled decentralization. Uncontrolled or excessively rapid federalization or decentralization, of course, could lead to the breakup of the country or to generalized chaos (a fact well underappreciated outside of Russia) – so strong are the centrifugal and also regionalized ethnic forces across Russia’s huge territory and regional diversity. Unintelligent or careless federalization, for its part, could lead to excessive ethnic concentration, to the detriment of the legitimacy of the federal centre in Moscow and the overall governability of the country – including through the destruction of the critical informational feedback to the centre provided by citizens and local governments in decentralized regimes.

Critically, because there is no felt – instinctual or cultural, rather than intellectual – understanding of how federalism works in any of the post-Soviet states – most of which are not only unitary but indeed hyper-unitary states, built on strict ‘verticals’ of power – it is perhaps appropriate (if not inevitable) that Russia should end up, through iteration and trial and error (the only way of doing policy in Russia), with what the Indians call a federal system with unitary characteristics.

Thesis 3: Mentality is critical to the future of Russia. There once was a ‘Soviet person.’ But what is a ‘Russian’ person, mentally, in the post-Soviet context? Answer: He or she is still being moulded. The Soviet collapse left Russians with at least three types of anomie or general disorientation – strategic, moral and, to be sure, in identity. All three species must be reckoned with – not with fetishistic searches for single national ideas, but rather through deliberate investments in real institutions and public achievements, and through long-term, patient investment in the legitimation of these institutions and achievements, both inside Russia and, to a lesser degree, internationally. Indeed, part of this investment and legitimation must involve the fostering of a far deeper and more robust policy culture in Russia’s intelligentsia, among its still-venerable specialists in various professional disciplines, and for its younger people, who are both the future algorithm-makers and drivers of the feedback mechanisms that are essential to the effective governance of the country. Such a policy culture is dangerously underdeveloped in today’s Russia, which militates against effective pivots to either of the argumentative or algorithmic traditions, and indeed against the creation of a uniquely Russian hybrid governance this century.

Russia has an opportunity to play a pivotal role in constructing a wide array of interstitial bridges and mechanisms that would help both to give its strategic doctrines greater and more constructive focus, and to drive the country’s institutional and economic development this century.

Thesis 4: What of Russia and Europe this century? The conflict between the West (especially Europe) and Russia that erupted over Ukraine in 2014 and that endures, without foreseeable resolution and in multiplying manifestations in several geographic theatres, can be properly and fundamentally understood as having originated in what I would call an ‘interstitial problem’ – that is, as the result of two regional regimes and geopolitical gravities (the EU to the west and Russia or, more loosely, the Eurasian Economic Union to the east) pulling ferociously, in opposite directions, on a poorly governed space (Ukraine), with weak institutions and unstable legitimacy at its own centre (the said problem of the ‘youth’ or ‘newness’ of all post-Soviet states). How can this be fixed? Answer: by creating, to the extent possible, a ‘Europe 2.0’ framework that interstitially – and tendon-like – binds Moscow with Brussels, or indeed the Eurasian and European planes, via Kiev. The ‘thickness’ of the binding mechanisms may well be de minimi s to start, comprising strictly confidence- or trust-building measures and renewed economic exchange, and evolving over time to bona fide security and political arrangements.

To be sure, with the EU significantly weakened by several concurrent crises (Brexit, refugees, economic stasis, the Ukrainian crisis and Turkish authoritarianism at its borders, the growing presence of Eurosceptic governments on the Continent, and now the Catalan crisis), an emerging strategic perspective from Moscow would seem to be that the ‘European’ option or pivot is now no longer on the table for Russia, even if the vision of constructing a common space between Lisbon and Vladivostok has been, with varying degrees of intensity and coherence, in the strategic psyche of, and expressed in many public statements by, Russian leaders going back to Mikhail Gorbachev (‘Big Europe’) in the late Soviet period through to Vladimir Putin from the early 2000s.

As Europe 1.0 transforms, it seems inevitable that, if peace is to be maintained on the continent, and if Russia is to avoid accidental or even narcissistic isolation and find economic and intellectual openings to Europe, then this Europe 2.0, although facially improbable today, will still have to be ‘invented’ and engineered. As such, there is a distinct strategic opportunity here for Moscow, if it is smart and plays its cards properly, to play a key role in its formulation and erection. Indeed, as Russia, on top of its juxtaposition with the EU, shares borders with several existing, emerging or potential economic and political blocs or international regimes in Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and even, via the melting Arctic, North America (a juxtaposition still underappreciated in North American capitals), Russia has an opportunity to play a pivotal role in constructing a wide array of interstitial bridges and mechanisms that would help both to give its strategic doctrines greater and more constructive focus, and to drive the country’s institutional and economic development this century. Moreover, to the extent that collision between two or more of these international blocs or regimes may, as with the Ukrainian case, lead to conflict – including, in extreme scenarios, nuclear conflict early this century – the opportunity for intellectual and strategic leadership in such interstitial ‘knitting,’ as it were, by Russia assumes a world-historical character.

Thesis 5: Russia has a serious succession problem. If this is not negotiated properly and carefully, it could result in civil conflict or chaos, and even the breakup of the country into several parts. (This is a fact that, as mentioned, is deeply misunderstood outside of Russia.) The absence of ‘argumentative’ institutions in Russia, including the peculiar weakness and superficiality of its political parties, means that the identity of, and nature of the contest and process for determining, the next President and other strategic leaders of Russia are not uncontroversially clear. This, again, is not a question of democratic fetish, but indeed one about the ability of the centre in Moscow to project legitimacy across the entire gigantic territory and population of the country. In the absence of a process deemed legitimate and a persona who, in succession to President Putin, is able to command the agreement of the masses to be governed by him (or her), there is a non-negligible risk of civil destabilization of the country. What’s more, should the presidency end more suddenly, for whatever reason, then the country could be seriously destabilized, as the process of relegitimation of the centre in succession will not have been triggered in time.

It is in the interest of Russian leaders to make the succession process extremely plain to the Russian people immediately. It is also manifestly in the interest of outside countries to understand this succession challenge – not least in order to be disabused of any interest in destabilizing the Russian leadership artificially, in the knowledge that a weak governing legitimacy in the aftermath of President Putin (or any Russian president, for that matter) could create not only wholesale chaos in Russia, but indeed major shockwaves in global stability (beginning at Russia’s 14 land and three maritime borders, and radiating outward).

Thesis 6: The creation of a true policy and political elite in the Singaporean or Chinese algorithmic idiom requires significant, long-term investment in education, and the creation of top-tier educational institutions, from kindergarten to the post-secondary levels. The USSR, for all its pathologies, obviously possessed such institutions (including ‘policy’ and administration academies through its Higher Party School). Russia, as a new state, does not. On top of world-class institution-building in education, Russia must, in order to improve the feedback mechanisms of the argumentative tradition, invest in, and deliver, renewed institutions of politics (including federalism), economics (including credible property rights protection), the judiciary (including serious judicial protection of the legitimate constitutional powers of different levels of government), as well as in other spheres of Russian social life (including the religious sphere).

Thesis 7: How to solve the Ukraine conflict and, by extension, Russia’s conflict with the West? We have discussed this extensively in past issues of GB . Moreover, 21CQ has itself, for the last three and a half years, been leading the track 1.5 work around the world, in leading capitals on three continents – from Moscow and Kiev to Paris, Washington, Ottawa and New Delhi – to find ‘exit’ algorithms for this conflict. The recent surge in interest in a peacekeeper-led exit from the conflict has direct roots in 21CQ’s work since the days immediately after the Ukrainian revolution, the Crimean annexation and the start of the Donbass war.

Still, at the time of this writing, I confess that the window for any clean, comprehensive resolution of this conflict may by now have passed (something that both leading Russians and Ukrainians know fairly well, even if some Western analysts may not yet). In 2014 and 2015, a winning algorithm for resolution, in my judgement, would have seen the insertion into the Donbass region (at the ceasefire line and along the Russo-Ukrainian border) of neutral peacekeepers (led by peacekeepers from Asian countries – non-NATO, but also not from the post-Soviet space – that are respected in both Ukraine and Russia), constitutional reform in Ukraine (including possible federalization in toto – recalling the aforementioned need for most post-Soviet states to decentralize or federalize – and/or special status or special economic zones for several regions of the south and east of Ukraine, in concert with the enshrinement of an Australian-style indissolubility clause for the Ukrainian union in the national constitution), and, finally, strong guarantees regarding the permanent non-membership of Ukraine in NATO (including through a possible UN Security Council resolution). These steps would have been accompanied by the removal (at least by the EU) of economic sanctions not related to Crimea.

Today, the paradox of the Ukraine conflict is as follows: Ukraine cannot succeed economically or even strategically without re-engagement with Russia (no amount of Western implication or goodwill will make up for the loss of Russian engagement); Russia cannot succeed (or modernize) economically without the removal of sanctions, and without a deeper reconnection with the EU; and the coherence of Europe suffers for the disengagement and economic weakness of Russia, as well as for the Ukrainian crisis at its borders. No resolution is currently in sight because both Ukraine and Russia remain ‘two houses radicalized’ in respect of this conflict, with key Western capitals not understanding (or believing) sufficiently the finer details of the conflict and its genesis, with Moscow gradually becoming ‘used to’ the economic sanctions and the renaissance of tensions with the West (including in its domestic political narrative), and with the government in Kiev increasingly weak and unstable, and therefore unable either to deliver major domestic reforms or make decisive moves to resolve the Donbass war. In addition, the accelerating disintegration of the Middle East, in Syria and beyond, has grossly complicated any prospects of exit from the crisis – effectively fusing together the European theatre with the Western Asian theatre. (The crisis in North Korea, if it erupts into war, may turn out to be yet another theatre of secondary conflict between Russia and Western countries.)

Leaving aside Russia’s succession issue, there is a clear risk of systemic collapse in one or both of Ukraine (for political and/or economic reasons) and Russia (more likely for economic reasons) in the near to medium term. Collapse of either country’s system would be devastating for both countries, as well as for European and global stability (including in nuclear terms). Ukrainian collapse would accelerate the slide toward direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO.

Only a systemic solution is possible to the conflict, and yet I do not believe that Europe is sufficiently strong and united at present to be able to drive a solution. The US, for its part, is politically unable to relieve Russia of sanctions, and so Moscow will not see much utility in the American play except insofar as Washington can play a role in pushing or incentivizing Kiev to make or not make certain moves. Therefore, the ‘solution’ to the conflict can for now only be partial , rather than general and global. In my assessment, it is Asia – particularly China, or perhaps India – and not Western countries that must play the pivotal role here. (Indeed, Moscow could cleverly seduce both New Delhi and Beijing, geopolitical rivalry between the two oblige, to play co-leads in this partial resolution.) The two key elements of the winning partial algorithm could include:

i. to stop the fighting, neutral peacekeepers from leading Asian countries (starting with China or India, but perhaps also Indonesia and Singapore) and a police or constabulary force in the Donbass region, as well as along the Russia-Ukraine border; and

ii. to rebuild and stabilize Ukraine, reconstitute the Ukrainian-Russian-European relationship (in new, interstitial terms), heavy Russian state reinvestment into all of Ukraine, and, concurrently, heavy Ukrainian reinvestment into all of Russia, with both countries combining economically to rebuild the Donbass in particular – all with significant loan guarantees from the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the new BRICS bank, the Chinese and Indian governments proper, and with opportunistic but possibly subordinate participation by the EU (including through Donbass-specific sanctions relief for Russia), the US, Canada and other units and countries.

Issues like NATO guarantees of non-membership for Ukraine and also the future status of Crimea, as well as global sanctions relief for Russia, all require deep and coherent Western engagement, and so are not on the table for the foreseeable future. The above algorithm also insulates the Ukraine conflict somewhat from the Middle Eastern conflict – or, in other words, delinks, diplomatically, the resolution of the Ukraine conflict from that of the even less soluble Middle Eastern theatre.

Thesis 8: Despite its cultural dynamism and deep intelligentsia, Russia’s economy is unacceptably primitive. Natural resources and energy products will continue to dominate this economy for the foreseeable future, just as they did in the last century – which also makes the national economy and the federal and regional budgets exceedingly vulnerable to significant commodity price swings (with no serious countervailing revenue sources in sight). However, what appears to be missing in Russia today, in addition to proper investment in infrastructure across the territory, is a matching of state purpose, deep entrepreneurial talent, and large-scale venture investment in export-oriented sectors outside of commodities – the predictable result of which is a disproportionate dearth of great, global Russian companies and brands (again, outside of the commodities sector). And so here the model for Russia is likely Israel, from which algorithmic countries like Singapore have borrowed heavily in fashioning their own state-private sector models. Applied to the Russian context, that model would seem to commend two critical reform vectors for Russian industrial policy: first, the creation of a handful of national educational, military or technical-scientific institutions (elite or quasi-elite) that are able to develop an achievement-oriented mindset among Russia’s young adults, as well as lifelong friendships and ‘thick’ professional networks among these people; and second, assurances that the Russian state, with minimal bureaucratic friction, is positively disposed to giving entrepreneurs from the ‘class’ of young achievers passing through these institutions a first contract (procurement), initial funding, or indeed future contracts of scale.

Thesis 9: A key aspect of the argumentative paradigm of governance is that the marginal value of human life is greater in the societal geist of argumentative states than in that of algorithmic states, given the high importance ascribed to procedure and feedback to political power from citizens. This larger marginal value of life is given expression through very robust constitutional and cultural bulwarks for protecting human life, which is viewed in absolute terms. By contrast, algorithmic states, especially of the Asian ilk, may, at least implicitly, attach greater instrumentality to human life – that is, viewing human life as being in the service of, or subordinating to, the preferred Asian freedom: not freedom from government repression, but instead freedom from chaos. The Singaporeans and Malaysians, for instance, refer to the fear of chaos and death, in the Hokkien idiom, as kiasi, in response to which extreme or radical private or public measures may occasionally need to be taken: consider the death penalty or, more commonly, the use of standing emergency laws and measures. An individual life or, short of that, what Westerners view as fundamental rights, may, on this logic, need to be compromised or traded in the service of the more important general protection and freedom from chaos. This may lead to swifter and less compunctious resort to peremptory punishment (like the death penalty) for what might, in the argumentative states of the West, be considered micro-torts (including some drug offences), or to draconian emergency laws and prerogatives in response to perceived threats of a political ilk (including terrorism).

The policy implication for Russia is that the ‘care’ given to each individual Russian citizen (or the value of the individual Russian life) can be improved indirectly or circuitously – that is, that improvement may come not necessarily through direct legislative, regulatory, judicial or jurisprudential changes (and certainly not from well-intentioned rhetoric and nice proclamations), but indeed through investment in some of the ‘argumentative’ institutions themselves – including through improvement of the health and sophistication of the various estates, from political parties to Russian civil society (and even Russian businesses), that provide the feedback from the governed to the governors, thereby removing some of the edge from the bureaucratic leviathan as it touches the human condition in all corners of the country.

On this same logic of increasing the value of individual life, increased investment in argumentative institutions can arguably lead to better, more porous relations between the ethnic Russian majority and the many important minorities of Russia – from the Tatars, Chechens and Ingush, to the Jews, Ukrainians and Armenians.

The key question for Russian statecraft in the early 21st century is whether, allowing for limited corruption as an informal institution, the governing classes can move the country to greater wealth and stability, improving meaningfully and substantially the daily lives of citizens (and the perceived value of those lives).

Thesis 10: Excellent Russian public policy and administration will never wholly eliminate Russian public corruption. Russian corruption – narrowly conceived – can, to a limited extent, be seen as an informal institution of Russian state and society. In this, Russia is not that far removed from many countries and societies around the world, including the more advanced countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia (or also Israel and India). Instead, the key question for Russian statecraft in the early 21st century is whether, allowing for limited corruption as an informal institution, the governing classes can move the country to greater wealth and stability, improving meaningfully and substantially the daily lives of citizens (and, as mentioned above, the perceived value of those lives). Evidently, it would be best to improve the lot of citizens with negligible corruption, as is the standard in the argumentative states of North America or Western Europe. And just as manifestly, it is unacceptable to remain corrupt while the quality of life for Russians stagnates or deteriorates. But the story of leading algorithmic pioneers like Lee Kuan Yew or, on a more serious scale, Deng Xiaoping, is not one of perfunctory non-corruption – as that would likely remove all lubrication from the administrative system, institutional inertia oblige – but instead public achievement and policy-administrative delivery to citizens in the context of significant corruption that, over time, enjoys a demonstrably downward trajectory.

The paradox of Russian public administration as it applies to matters military versus non-military is instructive in this regard. In Russia, short-term military or emergency orders or decrees (or algorithms) are typically dispatched with remarkable rapidity and efficacy (demonstrating a prodigious national organizational ability to scale very quickly). And yet long-term plans and projects (including military procurement) are delivered with notorious inefficiency, slowness and procedural corruption. For these long-term projects, presidential decrees are issued, with considerable regularity, even to repeat or remind the bureaucratic system about the existence of still-unfulfilled past presidential decrees. Quaere : What type of strategic, policy and administrative seriousness and quality would Russia need to be able to deliver on the long term but prosaic with the same inspiration with which it delivers on various emergency prerogatives? Can the country maintain its focus (and cool)? Can it develop a professional leadership class across the country, at different levels of public power, that has a ‘synoptic vision’ that is sufficiently vast to incorporate Russia’s endless complexity while constantly iterating and refining this vision through citizen input and feedback? Can this class of people both populate and in turn discipline the administrative apparatus of the state? And, whatever the compromises it may require en route, can it deliver the goods for the Russian people?

Irvin Studin is Editor-in-Chief & Publisher of Global Brief Magazine.

(ILLUSTRATION: ARMANDO VEVE)

• Winter 2018
• Irvin Studin
• Russian strategy

You Might also Like

You might also enjoy this in gb.

SUBSCRIBE TODAY TO GB

St Andrews Research Repository

•   St Andrews Research Repository
• Modern Languages (School of)

Russian Theses

• Register / Login

By Issue Date Names Titles Subjects Classification Type Funder

Search within this collection:

The Department if Russian has a proven track record of excellence in teaching and combines this with internationally recognised research in a range of fields including literature and thought from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries.

For more information please visit the Department of Russian home page.

This material is presented to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by other copyright holders. All persons copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright. In most cases, these works may not be reposted without the explicit permission of the copyright holder.

Recent Submissions

Simeon denisov's 'istoria o otsekh i stradal'tsekh solovetskikh' in the old believer tradition in russia , between two worlds : the fairy-tale novels of aleksandr fomich vel'tman , the work of aleksandr grin (1880-1932) : a study of grin's philosophical outlook , 'post-soviet neo-modernism' : an approach to 'postmodernism' and humour in the post-soviet russian fiction of vladimir sorokin, vladimir tuchkov and aleksandr khurgin , the generic originality of iurii tynianov's representation of pushkin in the novels 'pushkin' and 'the gannibals' .

Naval Postgraduate School

Where Science Meets the Art of Warfare

Student Thesis Explores Russian Tactics to Influence U.S. Nuclear Perceptions

Rebecca Hoag   |  April 21, 2020

U.S. Army Maj. Trisha Wyman prepares to present her master’s thesis research during the annual Defense Analysis Research Week. Wyman, a December 2019 graduate of the university, performed a detailed analysis of a Russian disinformation campaign designed to shape U.S. perceptions of nuclear capabilities.

Russian meddling in the United States’ affairs gained media attention in the U.S. following the 2016 presidential election, but the superpower has been manipulating foreign media for decades, says U.S. Army Maj. Trisha Wyman, a recent graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Her thesis, through the university’s Department of Defense Analysis, thesis focused on Russia’s calculated dissemination of nuclear strategy propaganda via Twitter to strike fear and encourage conflicting viewpoints in Americans. It’s difficult to definitely say U.S. residents have fallen for Russian bots and trolls, says Wyman, but they may be successfully confusing the facts surrounding U.S. and Russian nuclear capabilities.

Wyman has been fascinated by Russia and Soviet Union history for a long time, but she never did any formal research on it until her undergraduate thesis which focused on the Soviet-Afghan War. She then was assigned to the U.S. Army’s Security Force Assistance Foreign Weapons Course, which naturally involved understanding at Russia’s weaponry. 

Adversarial threats are not just in physical weapons anymore, of course, so for her NPS master’s thesis, Wyman additionally chose to examine open source information of Russia’s use of social media to infiltrate organizations, as Russia has historically done.

“Here, my studies focused not just on data analysis but also on counterproliferation,” she explains. “So basically, the nexus of my interests fell into this research topic.”

In her thesis, Wyman dove into the history of Soviet Union and Russian use of media manipulation to persuade policy and public opinion in other countries. She found India was a susceptible playground for Russia's media and internet organizations to try different propaganda techniques and bot technologies. Because of the invention of the Internet and Wild West social media channels, Moscow has poured money into their “cybernetic” strategies. 

Wyman specifically looks at how Russia strategized the media attention around their Status-6 (also called Poseidon or Kanyon) -- an autonomous, nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed underwater vehicle under development. Information on Status-6 was “accidently” leaked by Russian media on Twitter in 2015, and Russia used methods and principles of authority, scarcity, channeled attention, threats and sexual lures to create a larger-than-life image of the weapon. 

Information spread by Russian media, bots and trolls suggested Status-6 would soon have the capability to blow up the whole U.S. East Coast. While U.S. policy statements of Status-6 prior to the leak suggested the weapon was still many years away from being effective, Wyman says, this information didn’t circulate as seemingly well as Russia’s misinformation.) Wyman says Russia’s goal was to give the impression that Russia was a nuclear powerhouse Americans should fear. They want Americans to think that the cost of going to war with Russia would be too high to consider.

The reveal of Status-6 flared up the pro- versus anti-nuclear weapons conversation in the U.S. and made the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the U.S. and Russia appear weak to some Americans. When the Trump Administration pulled out of the treaty last year, it not clear whether or not the Russians’ campaign influenced the choice. But, as Wyman notes, it is a potential indicator of Russia’s cybernetics being successful in swaying a populace’s perceptions.

Russia has focused its effort and resources into this net-warfare, Wyman reports. In her thesis, Wyman tracked reach of different Twitter accounts believed to be run by either potential Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) bots Russian media itself or trolls.

Although gaining large amounts of Twitter data proved difficult, the data Wyman did gain via the NPS Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab informed her research on the topic. She found Russia’s methods to stir up trouble via Twitter concerningly effective. Surprisingly, she says, research on this topic was few and far between. 

“I think studying what they’re doing in the information space is extremely important to understand what they’re trying to achieve,” Wyman urges.

She found that it’s easier for Russia to spread a narrative because of their media censorship and their authoritarian nationalism. While she emphasizes the importance of America’s freedom of speech, she says it makes it hard for the U.S. to develop a centralized message throughout its social media platforms. A lack of centralized image along with a lack of social media laws can make it difficult for the U.S. to get on top of the netwar.

“Whoever is going to maximize synchronizing and having a common narrative that’s consistent and persistent, I think is really going to dominate and win [the netwar],” Wyman says.

Wyman plans to keep an eye on this research field as she continues her Army service. She’s currently a visiting scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Lab until she begins her next assignment in the summer. She hopes more people will take up this research topic for the sake of national security. Personally, she intends to use what she’s learned to educate her future soldiers and teams about Russian information warfare.

“I will be able to apply what I’ve learned with social media, data analytics and social network analysis...really everything from my research,” Wyman says. “I’ll be able to look at my research methodology and apply that to problem sets in the future and, of course, enable my soldiers and my teams to do the same thing.”

MEDIA CONTACT  

Office of University Communications 1 University Circle Monterey, CA 93943 (831) 656-1068 https://nps.edu/office-of-university-communications [email protected]

• My View My View
• Following Following
• Saved Saved

Putin warns West not to let Ukraine use its missiles to hit Russia

• Medium Text
• Putin hints at risk of global conflict
• Putin warns West over Ukrainian strikes inside Russia
• President singles out European NATO members

RUSSIAN ADVANCES TRIGGER DEBATE IN WEST

Sign up here.

Writing by Guy Faulconbridge; Editing by David Holmes

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles. New Tab , opens new tab

Thomson Reuters

As Moscow bureau chief, Guy runs coverage of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Before Moscow, Guy ran Brexit coverage as London bureau chief (2012-2022). On the night of Brexit, his team delivered one of Reuters historic wins - reporting news of Brexit first to the world and the financial markets. Guy graduated from the London School of Economics and started his career as an intern at Bloomberg. He has spent over 14 years covering the former Soviet Union. He speaks fluent Russian.

Russia is building up forces near the northern part of Ukraine's Kharkiv region where it launched an offensive this month, but it still lacks the troop numbers to stage a major push in the area, Ukraine's top commander said on Thursday.

World Chevron

China suspends tariff concessions on 134 items under Taiwan trade deal

China's Ministry of Finance said on Friday it would suspend tariff concessions given to Taiwan on 134 items under a trade deal, saying Taipei had failed to take "effective measures to lift trade restrictions on the mainland".

A Chinese nonprofit group with ties to the nation's government is coordinating efforts among China's biggest technology firms to develop open-source software with military applications, a U.S.-based defense policy group says.

Opinion Russia shows resilience. There is more to do for Ukraine.

Russia has proved more resilient than expected while Ukraine has been weakened.

When Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, the response of the United States and its European allies was to impose economic sanctions on Russia and arm Ukraine for a prolonged war of resistance against Russian occupation. When Ukraine’s defenses proved much more robust than expected, pushing Russia’s army back and retaking territory, the U.S.-led coalition supporting Kyiv poured in advanced weapons and entertained hopes of outright victory. However, a Ukrainian counteroffensive fizzled last year; Russia has proven resilient, economically and militarily. Now, President Vladimir Putin is preparing for a long war, while Ukraine is struggling to rebound from a debilitating six-month pause in U.S. arms deliveries. The United States, and its allies, need to engage in their own fresh thinking about how best to help Ukraine fight back.

Mr. Putin’s resurgence was on display last week as he met with China’s leader, Xi Jinping, in Beijing. Russian-Chinese bilateral trade has soared since the Ukraine invasion. The United States says China is providing Russia with machine tools, microelectronics and optics that are aiding the war effort, while also purchasing Russian oil. Mr. Putin’s list of wartime enablers also includes North Korea, which is supplying missiles and ammunition, and Iran, which is building drones. Both contribute to the terror Russia visits on Ukraine’s cities.

Yet another sign of Russia’s resilience was the launch of a recent offensive drive in the north near Kharkiv , taking Ukrainian forces off guard. The attack appeared to be, in part, an effort to push Ukrainian lines back before Ukraine begins to receive longer-range missiles from the United States, as part of the $61 billion package Congress belatedly approved last month. The Kharkiv jolt — and the loss of Avdiivka to the south — have demonstrated a renewed Russian military dynamism.

At home, Mr. Putin has long since stamped out the rebellion by the Wagner Group’s Yevgeniy Prigozhin and crushed all civil antiwar dissent; he has imposed total information control, consolidating one-man rule to a greater extent than any Russian dictator since Stalin. And he is trying to build a sustainable war economy. To that end, he has just appointed Andrei Belousov, a 65-year-old economics adviser, as defense minister, replacing Sergei Shoigu, who held the post for 12 years. Mr. Belousov’s departure will elevate influential allies of Sergei Chemezov, a Putin crony and chief executive of the defense production giant Rostec. According to Vladimir Milov of the exile opposition group Free Russia Foundation , Rostec’s revenue has skyrocketed from war spending. Mr. Chemezov “arguably has significantly bigger influence on Putin than the Ministry of Defense,” Mr. Milov says.

Also significant was the May 6 Russian announcement of a military exercise simulating use of tactical nuclear weapons. Although Mr. Putin had previously threatened vaguely to use nuclear weapons, this marked an official exercise. The Kremlin said the exercise was an explicit response to French President Emmanuel Macron’s statement that he would not exclude sending troops to help Ukraine, and confirmation from British Foreign Secretary David Cameron that Ukraine will be able to use British long-range weapons to strike targets inside Russia.

All is not going swimmingly for Mr. Putin. Russian casualties have been enormous , estimated at nearly 900 killed and wounded every day. Also, Russia’s natural gas company Gazprom — source of 10 percent of Moscow’s revenue — suffered a massive $6.9 billion loss for 2023, its first in two decades. Russia deliberately cut gas supplies in 2022 to the European Union, hoping to aggravate the E.U.’s energy situation and undermine support for Ukraine, but Europe has found ample alternative supplies, while Gazprom has not found offsetting new customers.

Still, Western sanctions have failed to collapse Russia’s economy. Oil provides another 30 percent of state revenue, and Russia has found ways around oil price caps imposed by the West; about 45 percent of Russia’s crude and refined product exports now are transported by “gray zone” shipping companies.

More needs to be done to strengthen those sanctions and deny Mr. Putin the resources to carry on the war. An international working group at Stanford University has just published smart recommendations: a further package of oil, gas and metal sanctions, an across-the-board tariff on remaining imports from Russia, as well as stronger enforcement of existing sanctions. It also calls for using Russia’s frozen assets to support Ukraine. They correctly point out that Russia has adjusted to the existing sanctions; its supporters in the United States, Europe and around the world must “counter this with similar creativity and innovations.” Like so many wars throughout history, this one has turned into a contest of smarts and stamina, which Ukraine and the West cannot afford to lose.

The Post’s View | About the Editorial Board

Editorials represent the views of The Post as an institution, as determined through discussion among members of the Editorial Board , based in the Opinions section and separate from the newsroom.

Members of the Editorial Board: Opinion Editor David Shipley , Deputy Opinion Editor Charles Lane and Deputy Opinion Editor Stephen Stromberg , as well as writers Mary Duenwald, Shadi Hamid , David E. Hoffman , James Hohmann , Heather Long , Mili Mitra , Eduardo Porter , Keith B. Richburg and Molly Roberts .

What does the U.S. need to do if it truly wants Ukraine - and not Russia - to win the war?

Russia recently began another offensive against Ukrainian forces, this time in the Kharkiv region. This attack was not a surprise development — Russian forces had been preparing themselves over several months for the offensive.

What has taken many international observers by surprise, however, is that Russian forces are making notable gains in the area. The Russia-Ukraine war over the past several months has been described as a stalemate and Russia's latest attack as a ploy . If so, it's proving to be a successful one.

The Russian advance should not have taken observers by surprise. Part of the reason for the attack's success is that Ukraine's defenses were inadequate . That's primarily due to the haphazard and delayed way that Ukraine's allies have provided military supplies to the country.

These lags made an advance by Russia all but inevitable.

Misaligned goals

At the outset of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, most analysts expected the country to fall rapidly . Ukraine, however, did not collapse in the face of Russian aggression.

Western aid helped Ukraine weather the initial storm. The training provided by western military personnel to non-commissioned officers played a key role in Ukraine's ability to resist Russian efforts to disrupt Ukrainian military mobilization.

In material terms, the weapons provided by the West — anti-tank missiles and javelins — proved decisive in fending off Russian armored spearheads.

Western states, specifically the United States and the United Kingdom, also provided significant moral support to Ukraine in its moment of crisis. U.S. President Joe Biden referred to Russian leader Vladimir Putin as a "war criminal." Boris Johnson, British prime minister at the time, visited Kyiv in April 2022, when many foreign diplomatic missions had fled the country.

This helped rally international opinion against Putin.

Unfortunately, material aid for Ukraine from western countries has not matched the pace of these comments and actions. Furthermore, when aid has been provided, it's been in a reactive manner and is often far behind developments on the ground.

For example, in the fall of 2022, Ukraine executed a brilliant counteroffensive that pushed back Russian forces around Kherson and Kharkiv. Ukraine accomplished this task despite only receiving a partial amount of what they'd requested from their allies.

In fact, the only thing that prevented greater success was Ukraine's limited supplies . Western allies would later provide the very equipment that Ukraine requested in 2022 for the 2023 summer counteroffensive, but the moment had passed.

Not the time for recriminations

The Russian army in the summer of 2023 was not the Russian army of 2022. In 2022, Russian armed forces were reeling and overextended. In 2023, however, the Russian army possessed extensive fortifications and had learned from its earlier mistakes. What would have proved decisive in 2022 instead produced, at best, the aforementioned stalemate in 2023.

There were many reasons for the failure of Ukraine's 2023 summer counteroffensive , but chief among them was the piecemeal nature of western aid that inhibited Ukraine's armed forces.

The western material aid allowed Ukraine to launch counteroffensives but it wasn't enough to sustain and, subsequently, entrench these offensives. Admittedly, Ukraine's maximalist goal of retaking all its conquered territory magnified these issues because Ukrainian forces did not properly fortify these areas after their limited gains.

This resulted in Ukrainian forces being left exposed over an extended front without adequate reserves . Russia is now exploiting the situation in areas like Kharkiv.

Inconsistent aid a boon to Russia

Ukraine's government has clearly stated its goals and pursued them even with limited means. The West's support of Ukraine, on the other hand, lacks the same consistency.

The disconnect between western statements of support for Ukraine and actual material aid has worked to Russia's advantage. There is growing frustration in western countries over the protracted nature of the conflict and the inability of Ukraine to deliver on the West's expectations, which are unrealistic considering how piecemeal western aid has been over the past year.

Most notably, a Russian disinformation campaign exploiting this disconnect appears to be bearing fruit in the U.S., specifically within the Republican Party. Michael McCaul, Republican chairman on the House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee, has publicly acknowledged that fellow Republicans have embraced Russian propaganda. The House of Representatives' Intelligence chair, Mike Turner, has confirmed that Russian propaganda "is being uttered" in the House.

Russia's success in influencing American domestic politics largely accounted for the delay in passing subsequent aid for Ukraine.

Ukraine had counted on that aid for six months , and the delay helped create its current predicament in Kharkiv and other areas. Unlike the Russians, the Ukrainian armed forces have not had the ability to reconstitute or fortify due to the lag.

Long-term aid

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's visit to Kyiv amid the Russian offensive in Kharkiv illustrates the problems in the current relationship between Ukraine and its allies.

While President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was appreciative of the show of support, he immediately requested that the U.S. provide more air defenses .

The political support provided by the U.S. and Ukraine's other allies is invaluable. But what Ukraine really needs is a long-term aid strategy so that it doesn't suffer from the material shortages it's experienced over the last six months. A long-term aid package, furthermore, would allow Ukraine to properly plan operations for the rest of the year and beyond.

More: Warren Buffett's son, others explain why helping Ukraine is good for Erie, America

Words matter, but so do artillery shells and air defenses . Ukraine lost an opportunity to exploit Russian vulnerability in 2022 due to its allies' unwillingness to provide necessary material aid.

Russia is preparing for a long war, and so should those who want Ukraine to succeed. Crucial to that reality is establishing a long-term, and consistent, material aid program.

James Horncastle is an assistant professor in the Department of Global Humanities and holder of the Edward and Emily McWhinney Professorship in International Relations at Simon Fraser University in British Columbia. This article is republished from  The Conversation  under a Creative Commons license .

• Election 2024
• Entertainment
• Newsletters
• Photography
• Personal Finance
• AP Investigations
• AP Buyline Personal Finance
• AP Buyline Shopping
• Press Releases
• Israel-Hamas War
• Russia-Ukraine War
• Global elections
• Asia Pacific
• Latin America
• Middle East
• Election Results
• Delegate Tracker
• AP & Elections
• Auto Racing
• 2024 Paris Olympic Games
• Movie reviews
• Book reviews
• Personal finance
• Financial Markets
• Business Highlights
• Financial wellness
• Artificial Intelligence
• Social Media

Russia is waging a shadow war on the West that needs a collective response, Estonian leader says

Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, center, speaks to Brig. Giles Harris, commander of British forces in Estonia, left, and Ross Allen, British ambassador to Estonia, at an undisclosed location in Estonia on Wednesday, May 15, 2024. Kallas was visiting the country’s largest defense exercises. (AP Photo/Hendrik Osula)

Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and British Ambassador to Estonia Ross Allen, left, fly back together from NATO exercises in southern Estonia, Wednesday, May 15, 2024. Both the U.K. and Estonia recently announced arrests of people suspected of organizing sabotage operations on behalf of Russia. (AP Photo/Hendrik Osula)

Estonia’s capital of Tallinn is seen from a British Chinook helicopter on Wednesday, May 15, 2024. Estonia, occupied by the Soviet Union until 1991, joined NATO in 2004. (AP Photo/Hendrik Osula)

Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas sits inside a British Chinook helicopter in Estonia, Wednesday, May 15, 2024. Kallas has called for a “serious” coordinated approach to deter and counter Russian hybrid attacks on European soil. (AP Photo/Hendrik Osula)

A British Chinook helicopter waits to take senior Estonian officials back to the capital of Tallinn after they watched military exercises in an undisclosed part of Estonia, Wednesday, May 15, 2024. Estonian, British and French forces took part in the exercises which were dubbed Spring Storm. (AP Photo/Hendrik Osula)

Former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves speaks during an interview with The Associated Press, in Tallinn, Estonia, Thursday, May 16, 2024. Ilves was president of Estonia from 2006-16, including while a large cyberattack was carried out by Russia in 2007. Ilves suggested that if the West does not collectively deter Russia’s hybrid threats, it will pay the price. (AP Photo/Sergei Grits)

Former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves speaks during an interview with The Associated Press, in Tallinn, Estonia, Thursday, May 16, 2024. Ilves was president of Estonia from 2006-16, including while a large cyberattack carried out by Russia in 2007. Ilves suggested that if the West does not collectively deter Russia’s hybrid threats, it will pay the price. (AP Photo/Sergei Grits)

Jonatan Vseviov, secretary general at Estonia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, poses for a photo in Tallinn, Estonia, Friday, May 17, 2024. Vseviov said Estonia is pushing for a European sanctions regime to be created to punish Russia for hybrid attacks. Estonia this year has arrested a university professor on charges of spying for Russia as well as 13 other people. (AP Photo/Emma Burrows)

Kusti Salm of Estonia’s Defense Ministry, speaks during an interview with The Associated Press in Tallinn, Estonia, Thursday, May 16, 2024. Salm said Russia is carrying out attacks in Europe that include violence, sabotage, attacks on opposition figures and cyber threats. (AP Photo/Sergei Grits)

Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, right, and British Ambassador to Estonia Ross Allen fly back from NATO exercises in southern Estonia, Wednesday, May 15, 2024. Both the U.K. and Estonia recently announced they have arrested people on suspicion of organizing sabotage operations on behalf of Russia. (AP Photo/Hendrik Osula)

• Copy Link copied

TALLINN, Estonia (AP) — Perched on the open ramp at the rear of a British Chinook helicopter, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas flew home from the annual Spring Storm military exercises, pleased to see NATO allies cooperating. But she later said that other types of warfare were on her mind.

Her nation, which borders Russia, has seen a rise in sabotage, electronic warfare and spying — all blamed on Moscow.

As the war in Ukraine turns in Russia’s favor, defenses are being bolstered in the front-line nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as in Finland and Poland.

Kallas says Russia is conducting a “shadow war” against the West.

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda urged vigilance, saying Tuesday he had information that “acts of sabotage can happen again.”

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said at least nine people were recently arrested on suspicion of beatings and arson, allegedly directed by Russia’s secret services, and described them as Ukrainian, Belarusian and Polish nationals, some “from the criminal world.”

Not everyone sees the attacks as interconnected, Kallas told The Associated Press, despite NATO’s assertion this month that Moscow is intensifying its campaign against the alliance from the Baltics to Britain. Russia dismissed that allegation.

Because many Russian intelligence operatives already are sanctioned, Western officials and experts say the Kremlin is shifting tactics, hiring others for hybrid operations — nonmilitary strategies including cyberattacks, election interference and disinformation, and attacks on foes of President Vladimir Putin.

With crucial elections in the West, officials say they believe the tempo of such activities will only increase, and some want tougher countermeasures.

Kallas cited a warning from an intelligence agency to a European country that one of its warehouses was targeted by Russian military intelligence. When a fire occurred at the warehouse two weeks later, officials in the country suggested that “we don’t know it is the Russians,” she said. Kallas did not identify the country.

The West must have a “serious discussion of a coordinated approach,” she said. “How far do we let them go on our soil?”

Estonia has taken the challenge of finding Russian agents of influence “very seriously” since regaining independence from the USSR in 1991, rebuilding its security services from scratch, U.S. Ambassador George Kent told AP.

This year in Estonia, a university professor was arrested on charges of spying for Moscow , 13 people were arrested over attacks allegedly organized by Russian military intelligence operating under diplomatic cover, and flights between Finland and the city of Tartu were disrupted by Russian jamming of GPS signals .

In October, a Baltic Sea gas pipeline and telecoms cables were damaged after a Chinese ship dragged its anchor for over 115 miles (185 kilometers) in an incident that is still under investigation. That ship was later seen in a Russian port.

Britain expelled Russia’s defense attache in May after two British men were accused of working with Russian intelligence services to set fire to a London warehouse. In April, two German-Russian nationals were arrested and accused of trying to attack military sites in southern Germany.

“What I would like to see is the recognition that these are not isolated events,” Kallas told AP. “Second, that we share information about this amongst ourselves. Third, make it as public as we can.”

Estonia has a reputation for aggressively pursuing espionage activity and publicizing it, consistently seizing more Russian agents per capita in the country of 1.3 million than other European nations.

It is “not very plausible” that there’s such a large pool of agents in Estonia that makes them easier to catch, said Kusti Salm, permanent secretary at Estonia’s Defense Ministry, in an interview with AP, implying that other countries could work harder at it.

Former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves, in office from 2006-16, told AP that some nations don’t act because they hope to do business with Russia again.

“People are afraid of decisive action, and the absence of decisive action basically tempts bad actors to keep pushing their luck,” added Ilves, who dealt with a major cyber attack blamed on Russia in 2007.

Russian officials, he said, “will push their luck until something bad happens, but they won’t pay the consequence. We will.”

That could lead to unintended deaths and injuries, Estonian officials and security experts say, citing a trend of Russia is outsourcing attacks to locals, sometimes recruited relatively cheaply on video gaming platforms and social media. That makes it harder to identify connections between attacks or to trace them back to Russia.

Bulgarian investigative journalist Christo Grozev, who exposed Russian intelligence involvement in poisoning former spy Sergei Skripal in 2018 in Britain and the late opposition leader Alexei Navalny in 2020, was a victim of such outsourcing.

A former Austrian intelligence officer was arrested in March for supplying Grozev’s address to Russian intelligence, which allegedly hired burglars to break into the journalist’s apartment in 2022 to steal a laptop connected to the Navalny investigation. Grozev had to move from Vienna last year after authorities said they couldn’t guarantee his security.

Grozev said his son was in his room playing computer games when the 2022 break-in occurred, adding: “Imagine if he had walked out.”

He and other journalists discovered links between an attack on a Russian opposition figure in Argentina last year and a Polish organized crime cell. When the information was passed to Polish authorities, they found a connection between the Argentina attack and one on Russian opposition figure Leonid Volkov in Lithuania in March. Lithuania’s security service said that attack was probably Russian-organized.

Grozev said nations need to enforce intelligence sharing between their own security services and police and prosecutors and create a “proactive international working task force” to combat foreign influence operations.

Although Russia has been blamed for attacks in Europe for decades, Estonian officials and security experts indicated there’s no collective mechanism for dealing with them, and suggested the EU do more.

Kallas says Russia uses spies in the guise of diplomats “all the time,” and senior Estonian officials support a Czech initiative limiting visas for Russian envoys to the country where they are posted.

That would make it harder for them to travel in the EU, where IDs aren’t needed at the border. It also could reduce the possibility of one nation expelling spies, only to see them return to another and continue working under diplomatic cover.

Estonia also is pushing for separate sanctions within the EU to counter hybrid threats. Although many Russian intelligence agents already are sanctioned, these could dissuade some “intermediaries” -- local organized crime figures, disillusioned youth and potential spies and collaborators -- from working for Moscow, said Jonatan Vseviov, secretary general of Estonia’s Foreign Ministry.

While some countries feel such exposure could cause instability and erode trust, Grozev called it an important deterrent.

Russian intelligence agents running operations abroad are “extremely averse” to incidents where they are named and shamed, Grozev said. Such individuals can be denied promotion, and proxies will realize they cannot be guaranteed immunity, he said.

The threat of sanctions and reduced opportunities for travel and study abroad can also help discourage younger Russians from joining security services.

Russia seeks “to sow fear” and break Western support for Kyiv, Kallas said.

Vseviov said Putin wants to use every tool available, including the shadowy attacks, to “undermine our unity, collapse our policy and destroy the collective West, as we know it, as a functioning body.”

AP journalists Monika Scislowska in Warsaw, Poland, and Jan M. Olsen in Copenhagen, Denmark, contributed.

Advertisement

Supported by

Russia Starts Tactical Nuclear Drills, in a Warning to Ukraine’s Allies

Moscow has said the exercise is a response to “provocative statements and threats of individual Western officials.”

• Share full article

By Paul Sonne

Reporting from Berlin

Russia sent a pointed reminder on Tuesday that it could use battlefield nuclear weapons in Ukraine, releasing video of its forces beginning exercises to practice their use, two weeks after President Vladimir V. Putin ordered the provocative drills.

Video released by the Russian Defense Ministry showed a caravan of military vehicles moving down a wooded road, as well as mobile Iskander missile systems — which can deliver conventional or nuclear explosives — getting into position to launch, with their warheads blurred out. The footage also showed a supersonic strategic bomber armed with missiles and an attack aircraft being prepared for takeoff.

In a statement, the Russian Defense Ministry said the exercise, carried out near Ukraine, was aimed at preparing the force for the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons. The goal is to “unconditionally ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian state in response to provocative statements and threats of individual Western officials,” the ministry said.

Upon announcing the drills earlier this month, the Kremlin suggested the move was a response to comments by President Emmanuel Macron of France , who refused to rule out sending French troops to Ukraine, and David Cameron, Britain’s top diplomat, who said Ukraine could use British weapons to strike inside Russia .

Dmitri S. Peskov, the Kremlin’s spokesman, at the time called their comments “unprecedented” and described them as a “completely new round of escalation” that merited a response by Moscow.

The exercises were the clearest warning yet from Russia that it might use nuclear weapons in the course of its war against Ukraine.

“It’s transparently an effort at nuclear coercion,” said Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear nonproliferation expert at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies. “They’ve even blurred the warhead on the Iskander ballistic missiles, which seems unnecessary but theatrical.”

The possibility of the conflict going nuclear has been there from the start, with Moscow trying to use its nuclear arsenal to deter Western nations from aiding Kyiv. The day he launched his invasion more than two years ago, Mr. Putin warned nations considering intervening to help Ukraine that they would face “consequences such as you have never seen in your entire history.”

Unlike strategic nuclear weapons, launched from great distances and with the power to obliterate whole cities, tactical nuclear warheads are designed for battlefield use. They are made to be used against limited targets, often from relatively short distances, with yields low enough to limit the destruction to a certain area.

The Russian Defense Ministry said on Tuesday the first stage of the exercise had begun in the Southern Military District, which includes much of southern Russia, in addition to areas of Ukraine that Moscow now occupies.

The drills come amid broader questions about whether Western nations should intervene more forcefully in the conflict to help the beleaguered Ukrainian military, which has struggled with shortages of ammunition and personnel, as well as delayed aid from its biggest backer, the United States.

In an interview with The New York Times published on Tuesday, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine called for NATO countries to become more directly involved in the war, particularly in helping shoot down Russian missiles. He also said he wanted to be able to use American weapons against Russian forces on Russian territory, which Washington has not allowed.

Mr. Zelensky added that fears of nuclear escalation were overblown, saying that Mr. Putin “may be irrational, but he loves his own life.”

During the drills, Russian forces practiced loading “special” warheads on the Iskander systems, which have a range of a few hundred miles, and moving them covertly into position for launch, the ministry said. The exercise also saw forces practice loading warheads onto aircraft.

U.S. officials for years have been concerned about Russia’s vast arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, but efforts to bring them under control through diplomacy have failed amid a broader fraying of Cold War-era arms-control pacts.

Russian state news also reported on Tuesday that a general, Ivan Popov, who spoke out against Moscow’s military leadership in a viral recording released by a Russian lawmaker last year, had been arrested on suspicion of fraud.

General Popov, the former commander of Russia’s 58th Combined Arms Army, was taken into custody as part of a criminal case involving “fraud on a particularly large scale,” the Russian state news agency Tass reported.

He lashed out at the Russian military leadership last year after being removed from his command, saying that the country’s top officer, Gen. Valery V. Gerasimov, had “treacherously and vilely decapitated our army” at a particularly sensitive moment for Russian forces. At the time, his unit had been holding off a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Zaporizhzhia region.

The recording emerged amid the upheaval caused by a failed uprising by the mercenary chief Yevegeny V. Prigozhin.

Sergei Buinovsky, a lawyer for General Popov, told Russian news outlets that his client denied wrongdoing.

The Russian authorities have also arrested top underlings of former Defense Minister Sergei K. Shoigu in recent weeks in an anticorruption drive. The Kremlin brought in a new defense minister , the economist Andrei R. Belousov, and moved Mr. Shoigu to run the Russian security council.

Those arrests were seen as a method to deter top Russian officials from pilfering the deluge of state funds flowing into the defense sector, and as a way to boost morale for the troops, who bristle at the idea of top officials getting rich as they fight in the trenches.

But the arrest of General Popov may have the opposite effect for the Russian troops. He was generally seen as popular among the rank and file, and a number of pro-war military bloggers came to his defense on Tuesday.

“General Ivan Popov is not a thief,” Alexander Sladkov, a war correspondent for Russian state media, wrote on Telegram. “He is a soldier.”

Paul Sonne is an international correspondent, focusing on Russia and the varied impacts of President Vladimir V. Putin’s domestic and foreign policies, with a focus on the war against Ukraine. More about Paul Sonne

Our Coverage of the War in Ukraine

News and Analysis

President Biden, under pressure from his top national security aides and European allies, has authorized Ukraine to conduct limited strikes inside Russia with U.S.-made weapons .

In recent days, Ukraine has conducted a series of drone attacks inside Russia  that target radar stations used as early nuclear warning systems by Moscow.

Top Ukrainian military officials have warned that Russia is building up troops near northeastern Ukraine , raising fears that a new offensive push could be imminent.

Zelensky Interview: In an interview with the New York Times, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine challenged the West  over its reluctance to take bolder action.

Russia’s RT Network : RT, which the U.S. State Department describes as a key player in the Kremlin’s propaganda apparatus, has been blocked in Europe since Russia invaded Ukraine. Its content is still spreading .

Striking a Chord: A play based on a classic 19th-century novel, “The Witch of Konotop,” is a smash hit among Ukrainians who see cultural and historical echoes  in the story of what they face after two years of war.

How We Verify Our Reporting

Our team of visual journalists analyzes satellite images, photographs , videos and radio transmissions  to independently confirm troop movements and other details.

We monitor and authenticate reports on social media, corroborating these with eyewitness accounts and interviews. Read more about our reporting efforts .