a case study of israel palestine conflict pdf

Ontological Insecurity: A Case Study on Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in Jerusalem

Introduction 

The city of Jerusalem constitutes a microcosm of national politics and clashing identities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its highly contested Old City is a focal point for recurring intergroup violence and increasing tensions (Rokem, Weiss, Miodownik, 2018). During May 2021, eviction plans of the Arab neighborhood Sheikh Jarrah in East Jerusalem and violent conflicts at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, a holy site to both Muslims and Jews, have led to ongoing protests, evictions, and polarization of intra-communal sympathies (Aljazeera, 2021). While illustrating the violent history of Israeli-Palestinian contestation of space, Jerusalem remains a space for interaction, dialogue, and localized politics in a securitized setting (Rumelili, 2015). Thus, it is informative about potential ways of desecuritizing the conflict and promoting peaceful dialogue. 

Notably, the role of cultural practice and collective identity for establishing security is frequently sidelined in traditional IR studies. However, the recent events between Israelis and Palestinians and the ongoing history of division and confrontation in Jerusalem is exemplary in understanding the roots of securitization in a more differentiated manner. Hence, the study explores the construction of Israeli security narratives of both physical and ontological nature. Thus, the study asks: How does the Israeli state’s narrative of securitization influence the recurring clashes and violence over contested neighborhoods in the Old City of Jerusalem? The paper sets out by describing the theoretical framework and case study. In answering the research question, the study applies Mitzen’s theory of ontological security of states. It is found that Israeli histories and subsequent narratives of ontological security threats contribute to the segregation and contestation of space in Jerusalem. However, the ongoing exchange and interaction with the Other constitutes an opportunity for a politicization of the conflict on a grassroots level. Hence, deconstructing ontological insecurity and its influence on state practice can support a desecuritization process in the highly contested area of Jerusalem’s Old City.  

The following section outlines how Mitzen’s ontological approach to state security stands in a reciprocal relationship with the politics of home and belonging. Moreover, it argues for the relevance of applying an ontological insecurity perspective to understand the relation of the Israeli state and Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem, and ultimately propose ways to desecuritize the area. 

Mitzen’s ontological security 

Theories of ontological security in critical security studies challenge the traditional realist assumption that actors have sufficient knowledge of their environments to act rationally. Inspired by the field of psychology, ontology looks at underlying questions of existence, being, and reality, in other words, the cognitive ability and confidence to perceive our environments as real (Mitzen, 2006). Thus, the understanding of self is formulated based on profound uncertainties about human life and mortality, creating existential anxiety (Mitzen, 2018). As with individuals, states can struggle to maintain a stable identity and notion of being (Mitzen, 2006). This anxiety debilitates a sense of control and can lead to regressive or irrational behavior (Ejdus, 2020). 

Thus, according to Giddens’s (1991) basic trust system, the process of seeking ontological security is comparable to strategies for managing existential anxiety, such as maintaining routines and predictable relationships with other actors (Mitzen, 2018). This basic trust system aids actors in dealing with the uncertainties of their existence to enable decision-making (Mitzen, 2006). By constructing certainty in categorizing one’s environment, actors can safely assume knowledge and make decisions on the potentially competing threats an environment poses to their entity (Mitzen, 2018). Hence, instability of existence becomes the starting point in any attempt to secure meaning (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Therefore, states, as well as the individuals they comprise of, establish cultural practices, rules, institutions, and relations with other subjects to manage their awareness of existential anxieties, or ontological insecurity (Mitzen, 2018).

Inter-group relations and practices of identity 

Studying states as ontological-security seekers provides a framework to look at how national group identity and autobiographical narratives establish routinized practices (Mitzen, 2006). According to Mitzen (2006), societies resemble the shared cognitive ordering of an environment. Moreover, situating one’s mortality within the immortality of a collective identity can decrease the existential anxieties imposed by death (Mitzen, 2018). Hence, states can solve collective ontological insecurity problems because social order and group identity can cushion the trauma of a states’ members (ibid.). Therefore, state distinctiveness is relevant to establish ontological comfort. Strategies for establishing and maintaining tangible national and group identities are autobiographical narratives, constructed by artifacts, literature, and routines (Ejdus, 2020). For instance, a routinization of inter-societal, or inter-state routines can help maintain coherence in identity and thus, reduce ontological anxieties (Mitzen, 2006). 

The above-mentioned routinization of relations with other actors serves a sense of stability in being and attaches a sense of ontological security to the continuity of those relations (Zobeydi, Ebrahimi, Shafaee, 2019). These relational practices entail positive or antagonistic identification and can be cooperative, as well as conflictual (ibid.). In any way, the linkage of identity and ontological security leads to courses of action that are compatible with the societal or state identity in relation to the Other (Rumelili, 2015). Hence, inevitably, the Other has the potential to be a threat to the stability of ontological security and is often categorized as radical or dangerous (ibid.). The distinction between a notion of differing identities between Us and Them is maintained through social practices and identity discourse. These mechanisms help to prevent any instabilities in the relations with the Other (ibid.). However, it is noteworthy that ontological attachment can both prevent and lead to physical insecurity and depends on the nature of the routinized relationship (Mitzen, 2006).

Ontological insecurity and desecuritization 

Thus, ontological security theory challenges the realist perspective that the primary goal of states is achieving physical security (Ejdus, 2020). In protecting national identity and thereby, a sense of immortal continuity, actors in world politics are often willing to compromise their physical security or other material gains (ibid.). However, pointed out by Rumelili (2015), this distinction of physical and ontological security is what lies at the basis of any desecuritization process. Ontological insecurity does not necessitate that the state’s survival is at risk and vice versa (Zobeydi, Ebrahimi, Shafaee, 2019). However, ruptures in socio-political practices or narratives can hinder the reproduction of discourse on the distinctive other and its potential threat (Mitzen, 2018). This could lead to social disorder and subsequent physical security threats. Thus, the process of desecuritization in an ontologically sensitive environment is a delicate matter. 

Case Study: The Israel-Palestinian conflict in Jerusalem

The history of an Israeli nation-state and narratives of ontological insecurity

Since centuries, Jewish communities are exposed to anti-Semitism and othering, creating a historically isolated identity and the formation of mistrust in its cognitive environment (Adisönmez, 2018). The Zionist movement, on the other hand, offered religion and national identification as tools to provide a notion of home and belonging (Zobeydi, Ebrahimi, Shafaee, 2019). These mechanisms are particularly prevalent in the autobiography of Israelis and Jews who have been persecuted and confronted not only with individual, but also collective mortality in the face of the Holocaust. While death is a shared human experience, the trauma of the Holocaust and Jewish diaspora has been a confrontation with a threat to both physical survival and ethnic ontological security (Ejdus, 2020). Additionally, the Jewish community endured losses of national identity that could have supported the members of the community in coping with their trauma of existential anxiety (ibid.). Hence, the biblical land of Israel was seen as an opportunity of a physical and ontological union (Busbridge, 2020). Thereby, the Israeli state and its land assumed the role of a security provider, protecting the existence of Israeli identity in the perceived hostile political environment of other Arab countries (Lupovici, 2012). Some scholars argue that the fatalistic idea of the future is ingrained in the Israeli national identity and has through its recurrence become a source of ontological security (Ejdus, 2020). 

Other factors identified in Israeli narratives of ontological insecurity are unstable borders, and internal incoherence of identities and affiliation. Firstly, borders can aid a group in creating a sense of belonging and affiliation (Lupovici, 2012). Despite the expansionist foreign policy of Israel and engagement in conflict to expand territorial borders the state finds itself in an isolated security environment (Zobeydi, Ebrahimi, Shafaee, 2019). Particularly, Jerusalem’s Old City as a historic basin of biblical and political claims for land has become a source of great insecurity for Israeli sovereignty (Busbridge, 2020). Although religion as an identity factor is weakened in modern societies, divisive discourse on land claims through biblical stories remains prevalent in the de-legitimization of Palestinian claims (Ejdus, 2020). Nevertheless, the vagueness of Israeli borders undermines the states’ ability to realize its role as a security, as well as an identity provider (Lupovici, 2012). Furthermore, the lack of recognized legitimacy of the Israeli state by neighboring countries threatens the Israeli national identity (Zobeydi, Ebrahimi, Shafaee, 2019). To remain in an ontologically secure position, the Israeli state provides a narrative of self-reliance which is fundamental to the Israeli security approach. This is brought forward through a militarized education system and specific social practices of exclusion and inclusion that are sanctioned and rewarded by both state and religious institutions (Svirsky, 2021). 

Constructing the Palestinian Other 

According to Mitzen (2006), state distinctiveness to a constructed narrative of the Other is relevant to establish ontological security. In the case of Israel and Palestine, Zionism is presented as a modernizing project not only for the nation of Israel but the Jewish community (Busbridge, 2020). Hence, in diametrically opposing religious and national identities, Palestinians are often conceptualized as underdeveloped and backward, with the Palestinian land being framed as “uncultivated and effectively empty” (Busbridge, 2020, p.3). Moreover, Israeli narratives of Palestinian identity, particularly by the Israeli populist right-wing elite, are frequently generalizing between different kinds of Palestinian residents and resistance (Hever, 2018). Additionally, Palestinians are conceptualized as Arabs, and thus become a source of existential threat. This discourse is complemented by the notion that historically and religiously there is an exclusively Jewish past and future on the land of Israel (Busbridge, 2020). Although most Israelis show no opposition to living and interacting with the Other, the securitization of the state in opposition to the perceived Arab perpetrator excludes Palestinians from assisting and re-imagining the promised land in collaboration with its Israeli inhabitants (Adisönmez, 2018). Hence, the historical trauma and conceptual rigidity of threats that lie at the core of the Israeli state has become a guide to prioritize ontological security over desecuritization (Zobeydi, Ebrahimi, Shafaee, 2019). 

Effectively, the exclusion and eviction of Palestinian residents in Jerusalem lead to numerous forms of resistance, including military and terrorist attacks with casualties on both sides (Lupovici, 2012). Israeli security practice uses measures of restricting Palestinian movement, disrupting communications, and evicting Palestinian inhabitants based on accusations of Palestinian terrorism (Naser-Najjab & Haver, 2021). However, establishing an internally coherent and uncontested Israeli identity is a considerable factor in the division process (Lupovici, 2012). Identifying an external threat helps differentiate the self from that threat and make decisions, for instance, by imposing an Israeli narrative on uncomfortable information. Frequently, the Israeli state frames Palestinians as terrorists, associating them with suicide operations and bombings in Western media (Zobeydi, Ebrahimi, Shafaee, 2019). However, a careful evaluation of events shows that instances of unrest are often carried out by specific groups, sporadic in nature and most notably, reactive (Naser-Najjab & Haver, 2021). 

For each side of the conflict, the land is crucial for maintaining their identity and thus, reducing existential anxieties by representing their cultures, and religions (Lupovici, 2012). “Loss of that land, or the threat of its loss [. . .] implies the loss of the self.” (Lupovici, 2012, p.822). It is, however, noteworthy, that in the past, international solidarity with Israeli security needs has outweighed similar concerns of Palestinian ontological insecurity and thus, resulted in an effective marginalization of Palestinian populations (Naser-Najjab & Haver, 2021). The consequences of these divisions are particularly evident in the context of Jerusalem. 

The geographies of violence and identity in Jerusalem  

Several factors distinguish the context of Jerusalem from other contested cities, making it an exemplary case to look at how narratives of securitization by the Israeli state influence recurring violence. Firstly, Jerusalem is a religious epicenter and location of numerous historically contested sites with Jewish, Muslim, and Christian communities populating the area (Rokem, Weiss, Miodownik, 2018). Secondly, both Israelis and Palestinian claim Jerusalem as their national capital, making it a focal point for disputes (Ibid.). Thirdly, the United Nations and most of the world’s countries do not acknowledge Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, thereby, increasing the vulnerability of Israeli ontological security in this particular geography (Ibid.). Lastly, the population of Jerusalem is comprised of both Israeli populations (60,7%), and Palestinian populations (39,3%) (ICBS, 2016). Demographically, the city is clustered in homogeneous neighborhoods, both in terms of religion and ethnicity, and thus resembles conditions of apartheid (Rokem, Weiss, Miodownik, 2018). Therefore, Jerusalem is a prime example of ethnonationalist confrontation and resistance. 

Both Israeli and Palestinian residents of Jerusalem experience different forms of violence. Notably, most Palestinians living in Jerusalem do not hold Israeli citizenship but are registered as residents of the city (Avni, 2020). Hence, they must continuously provide evidence of their resident status to Israeli authorities (Ibid.). Losing their status of permanent residency would result in a stateless status for most Palestinians, as they do not hold any other national citizenship (Avni, 2020). Additionally, Palestinian residents are subjected to house demolitions and ongoing evictions, thereby, experiencing ongoing insecurity (Pressman, 2020). Moreover, cultural practices such as religious events are often hindered by the armed forces of the Israeli state (Ibid.) These uncertainties threaten the stability of Palestinian identities and affiliation to the geography of Jerusalem. As a result, hostilities and violence occur in the contested space. Collective violence is more frequent in more segregated neighborhoods, whereas individual violence is more frequent in the more connected parts of the city (Rokem, Weiss, Miodownik, 2018). Hence, both sides endure and perpetrate violent attacks. Although these sentiments decreased since the second Palestinian uprising in 2005, recent riots have led to recurring violent exchanges (Rokem, Weiss, Miodownik, 2018). This shows that localized geographies of citizenship are pivotal in the struggle for ontological security. 

Violent attacks, including Palestinian terrorist attacks, do not only create a physical threat but challenge the ontological security of the Israeli state by interrupting its routines (Lupovici, 2012). Furthermore, it threatens the narrative of the Israeli state as a security provider. In 2014, a series of attacks by Palestinian youths in Jerusalem, prompted by the Israeli invasion of Gaza, led to a militarization of space (Hever, 2018). While encouraging Israeli citizens to carry weapons for self-defense, the Israeli government used a campaign of preventive arrests targeted at Palestinian individuals surveilled by algorithms on social media (ibid.).  However, these efforts had little effect on the sense of security experienced by the Israeli public (ibid.). 

Psychologically, societies are known to adopt conflict-supporting beliefs to cope with the negative consequences and stress of ongoing threats (Canetti et al., 2017). Although these are valuable coping mechanisms, the perpetuated belief systems on the antagonism of the Other can bias narratives of conflicts and can inhibit peaceful solutions, thereby routinizing the very practice of conflict. By sustaining these narratives, the state of Israel continued to pursue policies of segregation and illegal expansion into East Jerusalem to secure its position of ontological stability (Hever, 2018). Nevertheless, particularly in the context of Jerusalem, both Israeli citizens and Palestinians are becoming increasingly sensitive to the contribution of these routinized relations of conflict to the cycle of violence (Lupovici, 2012). Thus, securitized practices of establishing ontological security by the Israeli state have perpetuated tensions and further complicated the inherent beliefs and identities of Israelis. Consequently, current developments show a rising demand to create space for alternative ways of security and narratives of identity. 

Discussion and Conclusion 

The contestation of Jerusalem’s Old City is a prime example of the process of securitization under a narrative of ontological insecurity. Israel does not only experience physical threats over border disputes with its neighboring countries but an existential identity and stability threat in the form of conflicts between Islamic and Jewish, Arabic, Hebrew, and Zionist identities. Thus, the status of Jerusalem is elevated to an issue of survival. However, the process of securitization sidelines social and political problems by framing the geography of Jerusalem as a security issue that requires military and institutional intervention rather than policies to reduce the tensions. The perceived threats to a coherent Israeli identity and the subsequent militarization of Israeli practices do not strive to reduce the probability of violence and inter-group clashes but rather seek to provide a sense of security through isolated group identity. 

The routinization of conflict and securitization has perpetuated both ontological and physical insecurities in the context of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, simply reminding Israelis and Palestinians of the constructed nature of their identity is likely not an effective strategy for desecuritization. At the same time, the reproduction of antithetical identities undermines political attempts for de-escalation and leaves little theoretical space for the emergence of alternative identities. Hence, to desecuritize, both parties must recognize each other as legitimate counterparts while simultaneously addressing inherent instabilities and the complexity of a multitude of ethnonationalist identities. While Jerusalem remains a highly segregated space, there are also opportunities for grassroots organizations to create dialogue and investigate common identities and experiences. 

Notably, the investigation of Palestinian narratives of securitization lay outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, the research hopes to encourage a more detailed investigation of how the security and existence of a Palestinian identity are influenced by the presence and practices of the Israeli state. 

References 

Adisönmez, U. C. (2017). Ontological (In) securities in Turkey and Israel: Unpacking the Nation-Building, Security Culture, and Conflict Resolution Triangle (Master’s thesis). Retrieved from Lund University: https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/8911688

Alatout, S. (2006). Towards a bio-territorial conception of power: Territory, population, and environmental narratives in Palestine and Israel. Political Geography, 25 (6), 601-621. Doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.03.008

Aljazeera (2021, May 12). Rising attacks in religiously ‘mixed’ Israel towns amid Gaza push. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/12/gaza-crisis-fuels-escalating-violence-mixed-towns-israel  

Avni, N. (2020). Between exclusionary nationalism and urban citizenship in East Jerusalem/al-Quds. Political Geography , 102314. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345759567

Busbridge, R. (2020). Messianic time, settler colonial technology and the elision of Palestinian presence in Jerusalem’s historic basin. Political Geography, 79 , 102158. Doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102158

Canetti, D., Elad-Strenger, J., Lavi, I., Guy, D., & Bar-Tal, D. (2017). Exposure to violence, ethos of conflict, and support for compromise: Surveys in Israel, East Jerusalem, West Bank, and Gaza. Journal of conflict resolution, 61 (1), 84-113. Doi: 10.1177/0022002715569771

Ejdus, F. (2020). Crisis and Ontological Insecurity. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age. Stanford University Press. 

Hever, S. (2018). Securing the Occupation in East Jerusalem: Divisions in Israeli Policy. Jerusalem Quarterly, 75 , 104. Retrieved from https://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/jq-articles/Pages_from_JQ_75_-_Hever.pdf

Hoffmann, N. & van Heeswijk, E. L. S (2018). Thinking across Borders and Boundaries-Separation and Interaction between Palestinian and Isrealis (Bachelor’s thesis). Retrieved from Utrecht University: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/368678

ICBS (2016). Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Retrieved from http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/?MIval=cw_usr_view_SHTML&ID=807  

Lupovici, A. (2012). Ontological dissonance, clashing identities, and Israel’s unilateral steps towards the Palestinians. Review of international studies, 38, 809-833. Doi: 10.1017! S026021

Mitzen, J. (2006). Ontological security in world politics: State identity and the security dilemma. European journal of international relations, 12 (3), 341-370. Doi: 10.1177/1354066106067346

Mitzen, J. (2018). Anxious community: EU as (in) security community. European security, 27(3), 393-413. Doi: 10.1080/09662839.2018.1497985

Naser-Najjab, N., & Hever, S. (2021). Elite and popular contradictions in security coordination: overcoming the binary distinction of the Israeli coloniser and the colonised Palestinian . Critical Studies on Security, 1-14. Doi: 10.1080/21624887.2021.1875712

Peoples, C., & Vaughan-Williams, N. (2010). Critical security studies: An introduction . Routledge.

Pressman, J. (2020). Horizontal inequality and violent unrest in Jerusalem. Terrorism and political violence, 32 (6), 1161-1185. Doi: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1453502

Rokem, J., Weiss, C. M., & Miodownik, D. (2018). Geographies of violence in Jerusalem: the spatial logic of urban intergroup conflict. Political Geography, 66 , 88-97. Doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.08.008 

Rumelili, B. (2015). Identity and desecuritisation: the pitfalls of conflating ontological and physical security. Journal of international relations and development, 18 (1), 52-74. Doi: 10.1057/jird.2013.22

Rumelili, B. (Ed.). (2014). Conflict resolution and ontological security: Peace anxieties. Routledge.

Svirsky, M. (2021). The Reproduction of Settler Colonialism in Palestine . Journal of Perpetrator Research, 4 , 1-36. Doi: 10.21039/jpr.4.1.79Zobeydi, Z., Ebrahimi, N., & Shafaee, S. M. (2019). The Revolutions of 2011-2012 in the Arabic Countries and Ontological Security of Israel. Journal of Contemporary Research on Islamic Revolution, 1( 1), 117-137. Retrieved from https://jcrir.ut.ac.ir/article_72796.html?lang=en

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Settlements and the Israel-Palestine Conflict: Background Reading

Scholarship about Israeli settlement in occupied Palestinian territories provides historical context for recent violence in the region.

After a relatively dormant period, the Israel-Palestine conflict erupted into open war in May of 2021. Hamas in Gaza and the Israeli army engaged in the first sustained exchange of rocket fire and airstrikes in seven years. The near-term cause of the fighting was a series of disputes over the usage of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and nearby Wailing Wall in Jerusalem , as Israel’s national holidays conflicted with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

Moreover, both the governments of Israel and the Palestinian Authority are weak in 2021, discouraging either side from compromise. At that time, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu failed to attract the necessary cohort of far-right wing politicians to form a coalition government in Israel’s parliamentary system. The President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, canceled elections to avoid a potential loss. This emboldened Hamas, which broke with Abbas’ party Fatah in 2007 and has remained in sole control of Gaza since that time.

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However, the most important long-term factor has been the continuing Israeli efforts to displace Palestinian residents of the occupied Palestine territories and to settle Israeli citizens in their place. Israel occupied the Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank in the 1967 war, which had been formerly under the administration of Egypt and Jordan, respectively. Israel has permitted hundreds of thousands of settlers to make land claims based on pre-1948 ownership in these territories, and to establish entirely new communities on land claimed by the state in the intervening decade. The UN has formally denounced this policy as a violation of international law.

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This long process also arrived at a significant turning point in early 2021, as Israel courts ordered several Palestinian families to vacate their Sheikh Jarrah homes, where many had lived for decades. Those official decrees to remove Palestinian families from their homes in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem near Al-Aqsa triggered Palestinian street protests and violent clashes involving Israeli police by May of 2021.

The following research available for free via the links below offers valuable insight and historical context on the topic of the Israeli settlements.

Joel Beinin, “Mixing, Separation and Violence in Urban Spaces and The Rural Frontier in Palestine,” The Arab Studies Journal , Spring 2013, Vol. 21, No. 1, TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE, pp. 14-47.

Beinin situates the phenomenon of the Israeli settlements in historical context. In the era of Ottoman Palestine and even the British mandate that followed World War I, Christian, Muslim and Jewish communities lived side-by-side in Palestine’s major cities Jerusalem and Jaffa. They socialized together and invested in each other’s business ventures as the Levant entered the industrial world. Although many early Zionist settlers, and the later Labor Zionist movement, idealized rural settlement and agriculture as the principal way of creating a Jewish homeland community, Beinin demonstrates that it was largely cities that Zionist immigrants moved to and sought to transform, both before and after the formation of Israel in 1948 and the 1967 war.

“Despite its preponderantly urban character, the post-1967 settlement project has produced a diametrically opposite model of urban life than the norms of late Ottoman Palestine—in practice and as the settlers’ ideal,” Beinin writes. “Jews exclusively inhabit all settlements—urban, suburban, or rural, ideologically or economically inspired—though Palestinians are often employed in them, even to construct them. All Jews are Israeli citizens with greater rights and subject to different laws and norms than their non-citizen neighbors.”

Janet Abu-Lughod, “Israeli Settlements in Occupied Arab Lands: Conquest to Colony,” Journal of Palestine Studies , Winter 1982, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 16-54.

Written only 15 years after the 1967 war, Abu-Lughod’s research provides valuable insight into Israel’s initial government and settlement strategies of the Palestinian territories. Although some right-wing politicians made immediate demands to annex Gaza and the West Bank, in spite of international law, most Israeli leaders realized that this would raise the question of giving citizenship to Palestinians. They then sought other means of legally expropriating land and diminishing the power of occupied Palestinians.

Indeed, Abu-Lughod argues Israel drew on the experience of urban planning inside Israel between 1948 and 1967 to diminish the concentration of Arab Israeli citizens in certain parts of the country when planning the distribution of occupied territory settlements. The justification for taking possession of this land comes “from the fiction of government succession.” The legal practice of freehold private property developed later in the Muslim world than in Europe, and much of the marginal land in the West Bank remained unregistered or in religious foundations (waqfs), which Israel claimed as state land after 1967. “While the confiscation and reassignment of ‘state land’ to Jewish settlers is inherently no more legitimate than any other form of expropriation, the Israelis have made much of this distinction between public and private ownership in their defensive arguments,” she writes.

Marina Sergides, “Housing in East Jerusalem: Marina Sergides reports on a legal mission to the Occupied Palestine Territory,” Socialist Lawyer , No. 60 (February 2012), pp. 14-17.

This is a deep dive into the social and legal situations of the Palestinian families in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem living on land with disputed ownership. Twenty-eight refugee families with 500 people had been living in homes  they had built on land granted to them by UNRWH after fleeing from other homes inside Israel after its creation in 1948. Since 1967 and the Israeli declared annexation of East Jerusalem, the Nahalat Shimon company has brought Ottoman-era documents claiming some of the land in the neighborhood had been owned by Jewish families in the 19th century. It succeeded in forcing out four of the families in 2009.

Sergides questions of the legal proceedings of applying domestic Israeli law to Palestinians in territory recognized as occupied under international law. “Moreover, the delegation observed that there is an asymmetry in the way the Israeli courts treat the question of pre-1948 property rights,” she writes. “While the courts have been willing to uphold claims by Jewish organisations in relation to property in Sheikh Jarrah allegedly owned by Jewish families before 1948, similar claims by the Palestinian residents of Sheikh Jarrah in relation to lands which their families owned in what is now the State of Israel would not be entertained.” She concludes by highlighting the ways Israeli demolitions of Palestinian homes and restriction on new construction is causing a housing crisis in East Jerusalem.

Raja Shehadeh, “From Jerusalem to the Rest of the West Bank,” Review of Middle East Studies , June 2019, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 6-19.

The most recent installment on this list, Shehadeh reviews the politics of settlement in recent decades in light of the Trump administration’s decision to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem, recognizing it as Israel’s capital on Dec. 6, 2017. In particular, he highlights the failures of the two-state solution to reconcile the existence of settlements within Palestinian territory, an inherent flaw in the 1990s’ Oslo Peace Accords.

The Accords divided land in the West Bank into three areas: A) Palestinian control; B) Palestinian civil control with Israeli military control and C) Full Israeli control. The resulting map is a Swiss cheese of administrative areas. Combined with Israel’s direct annexation of East Jerusalem, it divided Palestinian settlement into a patchwork difficult to govern. Although the PLO made these compromises to win recognition from Israel, the resulting devolution of political power only heightened the distinction between settlers, who enjoy citizenship rights and state services, and the disenfranchisement of Palestinians.

Joyce Dalsheim and Assaf Harel, “Representing Settlers,” Review of Middle East Studies , Winter 2009, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Winter 2009), pp. 219-238.

This review essay is a cultural critique of the way religious Israeli settlers are conceived in the news media and academic works. Works in both fields, Dalsheim and Harel write, depict these Israeli settlers as religious fundamentalists that are seeking both to create socially alienated communities and to fulfill a religious commitment to reclaim what they see as land promised them in the bible, despite international law. However much this reflects the truth for some communities, they argue it does not reflect the huge diversity of people actually settling in the occupied territories. Moreover, it serves as symbolic legitimization of other brands of Zionism.

“These representations of settlers not only portray religious settlers as categorically different from ‘ordinary’ or ‘mainstream’ Israelis, they also project a sense of moral legitimacy for those writing against the settlers,” Dalsheim and Harel argue. “They reaffirm a moral high ground for Israelis by inscribing a deep division between Israel inside its internationally recognized borders and its settlements in the post-1967 occupied territories.”

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The Israeli-Palestinian Case: Current Prospects and Continued Importance of the Two-State Solution

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Samih Al-Abid, "The Israeli-Palestinian Case: Current Prospects and Continued Importance of the Two-State Solution" (Houston: Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, July 1, 2022), https://doi.org/10.25613/XNAR-1M76.

From a two-state solution to a one-state solution to the “Deal of the Century,” Palestinians living under Israeli occupation have endured decades of longing for statehood and its associated benefits, including political independence, economic prosperity, personal and national security, and freedom of movement and thought. Three decades ago, the Oslo Declaration of Principles ushered in the promise of phased liberation from the occupation, but the reality has been the creation of Bantustan-like communities, separated from one another and denied true self-governance. “Area C,” the largest of the Palestinian areas as defined in the Oslo Accords, remains under Israeli control, with Israeli settlers benefiting from this resource-rich region while Palestinians face restrictions that make it virtually impossible to use the land. This is despite the fact that the Oslo Accords included a vision that Area C would gradually be transferred to full Palestinian control. Honoring the original Oslo Accords would buttress the Palestinian economy, reducing the need for foreign aid and alleviating the current dire situation and growing Palestinian frustrations. This paper summarizes the events from Oslo to today, explains the current situation in PalestineIsrael dynamics, and concludes that the only real solution is a return to the two-state paradigm. Peace and security, for both Israelis and Palestinians, will come only through mutual recognition of statehood and clearly defined and respected international borders.

Historical Context: The Promise of Oslo

Two years following the launch of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in Madrid in October 1991, the Declaration of Principles (DOP) on Interim SelfGovernment Arrangements, known as the “Oslo Accords,” 1 was signed between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which represented the Palestinian people, and the government of the state of Israel on September 13, 1993, in Washington, D.C. According to the DOP, both parties agreed to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict. They recognized each other’s legitimate political rights and desire to live in peaceful coexistence with mutual dignity and security. Both parties also agreed that the political process should continue in order to achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation.

Looking into the details and careful language of the Oslo Accords reveals important facts that should not be overlooked. Significantly, Article IV refers to a jurisdiction that would cover the territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The parties agreed to view these territories as a single territorial unit whose integrity would be preserved during the interim period. Article V established a five-year transitional period that would begin upon withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho. Permanent status negotiations were slated to commence no later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period.

In Cairo on May 4, 1994, the agreement on “the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area” 2 was signed by the PLO and the government of the state of Israel. The preamble stated clearly that the interim self-government arrangements, including the arrangements in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on permanent status will lead to the implementation of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 242 and 338. According to Article II of this agreement, Israel shall implement an accelerated, scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, which did begin immediately after signing the document. Accordingly, the established Palestinian Authority held legislative, executive, and judicial powers and responsibilities in the area where Israeli forces withdrew.

On September 28, 1995, the IsraeliPalestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, known as “Oslo II,” 3 was signed in Washington, D.C. In its preamble, the agreement reaffirmed, yet again, the desire of both sides to achieve peace, and recognized that the peace process and the new relationship established between the two parties would be irreversible. It also recognized the determination of both parties to sustain and continue the peace process. Both sides agreed to a peace process that was intended to lead to a permanent settlement based on UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. As per Chapter 2, Annex XI of the agreement, the two sides agreed that—except for areas to be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations—the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories would come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council in a phased manner to be completed within 18 months, with gradual redeployment of Israeli forces from the area.

Accordingly, five redeployment phases were implemented: the first on September 28, 1995, followed three years later by the second on November 20, 1998, and the third on September 4, 1999. The fourth and fifth redeployments were implemented on January 4 and March 20, 2000, respectively. However, the redeployment that was agreed to in Oslo II was never fulfilled. The incomplete redeployments resulted in only 39% of the West Bank (Areas A and B) falling under the Palestinian Authority’s partial jurisdiction. This area is geographically fragmented and made up of noncontiguous Palestinian enclaves surrounded by a fully contiguous Israelicontrolled area that makes up 61% of the area of the West Bank. 4 According to Oslo II, that contiguous area, known as Area C, was to be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction. As of 2022, Area C, containing some of the best agricultural land and resources, remains under Israeli control and is virtually off limits to much-needed Palestinian development. This is contrary to the agreement that Israeli forces withdraw from all areas except those to be negotiated in the permanent status agreement.

While attempts at peace building were ongoing, and while the redeployment of Israeli forces from occupied Palestinian territory was to be implemented, successive governments of Israel did not cease transferring Israeli civilians to live in illegal settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. While the number of illegal settlers was just over a quarter million in 1993 when the Oslo Accords were signed, by 2022 the number reached as high as 700,000 settlers. The growth of the settler population has been systematic. It was neither stopped nor reduced throughout the past three decades. On the contrary, Israel has increased its settler presence in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and maintained its full control of the Palestinian territory and its natural resources—including land, water, minerals, and gas.

The illegal settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and Israel’s insistence on maintaining its control over the West Bank and its resources are major reasons why the redeployment was never fulfilled. They also remain among the primary reasons for the collapse of peace building attempts and efforts at reaching a much-needed peace settlement. Israeli policies in this regard have played a major role in creating the notion that an agreement based on a two-state solution is no longer likely to be a way out of the impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian situation.

A Palestinian State Within a Two-State Solution

In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 5 calling for the partition of Palestine. The partition plan suggested creating two states—a state for the Jewish people and another for the Arabs—within Mandate Palestine, while keeping the city of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum, or “separate entity,” to be governed by a special international regime. The partition plan was completely rejected by all Palestinians and Arab leaders under the argument that the creation of a Jewish state would in fact result in the dispossession of Palestine. 6 It is worth mentioning that, prior to 1947, Jewish land ownership in Palestine was under 2%.

However, without minimizing the negative impacts of the Nakba, also known as the Palestinian Catastrophe, the partition plan, though deemed illegitimate at the time, in retrospect paved a road to a possible, internationally acceptable formula to address the Israeli-Palestinian struggle based on a two-state model.

In the 1990s, an Israeli-Palestinian peace process for negotiation of a two-state solution was launched in Oslo, Norway. Subsequently, the “Oslo Accords” and “Oslo II” agreements were signed in an attempt to achieve peace. The two-state solution was supported by the United States, and in December 2000, President Clinton presented both Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams with parameters for a final status agreement. 7 The Clinton proposal, which did not prove successful, included the creation of a Palestinian state on 94%-96% of the West Bank and all of Gaza, and a plan for Jerusalem and refugees. In 2008, in Annapolis, Maryland, there were attempts to revive and continue negotiations. During his presidency, President George W. Bush called for a Palestinian state and built support for the two-state solution. 8 In his farewell to the U.S. Department of State prior to his departure in 2016, Secretary John Kerry delivered a speech 9 calling for the negotiation of secure and recognized international borders based on the 1967 borders between Israel and Palestine. He also called for fulfilling the vision of UN General Assembly Resolution 181, which called for two states for two peoples with mutual recognition and full equal rights for all their respective citizens. Similar to the pattern of U.S. support for a two-state solution, the governments of Europe, while differing in political sensibilities, still support and are committed to a two-state solution. 10 Indeed, nine of the 27 EU member states have formally recognized the state of Palestine.

For Palestinians, the two-state solution would provide international recognition of the state of Palestine, allowing it to exist side-by-side with the state of Israel in peace and prosperity. Palestinians insist on a sovereign and independent Palestinian state with the right of self-determination— a state with clear borders that is viable, contiguous, and shares international relations with all countries in the region and beyond, including the state of Israel. The vision for the state of Palestine is based on fundamental human rights of freedom, dignity, and equality and is in line with international law and the system of justice and accountability that the international legal order is designed to preserve. Moreover, an agreement on a two-state solution would lead to reconciliation among Palestinian factions, which would need to work together under the new unified government. This would also lead to security for the state of Israel and the region.

Regional Normalization of Relations With Israel

The Middle East is experiencing political transformation at an accelerated pace on multiple levels. The last decade saw dramatic changes with regard to normalization of relations between Israel and some Arab countries. The issue of normalization of relations with Israel as a state in the region had previously been linked to the Arab Peace Initiative (API), where normalization was conditioned on Israel’s full withdrawal from all the territories it occupied in 1967. The API was presented in 2002 by Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz, who was then the crown prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This initiative called for:

Full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, reaffirmed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the land-for-peace principle, and Israel's acceptance of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel. 11

The API was preconditioned on Israeli “acceptance of the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 in the West Bank, and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.” Under this condition, the Arab countries affirmed “that they will consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended and enter into a peace agreement with Israel. The Arab countries as well affirmed to establish normal relations with Israel in the context of comprehensive peace.” 12

The year 2020 saw normalization of ties between a few Arab countries and Israel. This came under the auspices of the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. During his presidency, the United States adopted policies that departed radically from his predecessors and violated the understanding that some contentious matters must be resolved in final status negotiations. Trump’s “Deal of the Century” included the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, support for illegal Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank, and encouragement of the normalization of relations between Israel and Arab states.

The United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and Israel signed the declaration of the “Abraham Accords” in 2020, brokered by the Trump administration. The Kingdom of Morocco and Sudan followed suit and announced normalization of relations with Israel soon afterward. The Abraham Accords, departing from the API, in effect bypassed the Israeli-Palestinian issue. For the first time in the history of the conflict, a decision was made that excluded ending the occupation of Palestine as a condition for normalizing ties with Israel. While the Abraham Accords recognized the importance of peace in the Middle East, they were signed in the absence of peace in Palestine.

The Abraham Accords were a result of policies of the Trump administration and Israel to sideline Palestinians and shift the focus toward the broader region. They were and still are condemned by the Palestinians and their leadership. The accords are seen as U.S. and Israeli efforts to undermine Palestinians in their pursuit of independence and their struggle to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine.

Israel’s policies toward Palestine have shifted in the last decade in terms of changing the conflict. With the recent rise of populism in the world and in Israel, emerging populist parties have increased their power. Today, the Israeli political scene is dominated by religious, ideologically right-wing Jewish parties that hold 72 of the 120 parliamentary seats. 13

Getting to the Root of the Conflict

The Oslo Interim Agreement negotiation process did not achieve its goal of reaching a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by ending the Israeli military occupation of Palestine. The concerns and interests of both sides were never met despite the passing of three decades since the signing of the Declaration of Principles. Consequently, proposing new approaches to the conflict has become common. The concept of “conflict management,” associated with conflict containment, focuses on day-to-day issues with regard to managing the economic and security concerns of Israel and thus indefinitely sustains the current situation. Another approach is “shrinking the conflict,” a concept that recently emerged with the goal of enhancing Palestinian freedom without compromising Israeli security. With this approach, the conflict is neither solved nor managed, but “shrunk.” 14 This involves providing the Palestinians with the feeling of autonomy and economic independence, while in reality the occupation of their territories continues, and Palestinian rights to a sovereign, independent state are postponed indefinitely.

Both management of the conflict and shrinking the conflict are seen by Palestinians as Israel’s way of maintaining its grip on the Palestinian people, their land, and their resources, while avoiding the fundamental issue of ending its colonial occupation of their territories.

As of 2022, Palestinian territory that was occupied on June 4, 1967, is still under Israeli occupation—an occupation that has lasted more than five decades. The state of Israel has distorted facts on the ground in attempts to distract the international community and establish the notion that a peace agreement that includes a Palestinian state is far-fetched. Since 1967, more than 700,000 Israeli settlers have been illegally transferred to reside in occupied Palestinian territory. Jerusalem, occupied in 1967, is today isolated from the rest of the Palestinian territories and has become even more inaccessible for Palestinians since the construction of the Annexation Wall that surrounds the city from all sides. Israel controls the land and resources of the West Bank and Gaza. When Israel decided to freeze the implementation of the interim agreement and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territory, fragmented, noncontiguous, “Palestinian-controlled” areas that lack sovereignty and independence were created—resulting in a situation that will impede the future establishment of a Palestinian state. It is clear that Israel is using its own distorted version of reality to remove the possibility of reaching a resolution with Palestine.

Palestinian Public Opinion

During the first quarter of 2022, internal Palestinian developments included the launch of local election campaigns in the West Bank, which were very much needed. Local elections were conducted in the larger cities and communities in the West Bank. According to the main findings of a 2022 public opinion poll 15 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and Gaza, a large majority of Palestinians (72%) support holding elections at the presidential and legislative levels in the near future. Another important finding was that 60% of Palestinians support holding a special session for the PLO Central Council during which important decisions relevant to Palestinian-Israeli relations would be made. A small majority (51%) of West Bank and Gaza residents believe that the current PLO remains the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and most importantly, 65% of the public say that the entry of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad into the PLO would make it more representative of the Palestinian people. On Palestinian-Israeli relations, the support for a two-state solution, at 40%, remains almost the same as it was in the last quarter of 2021.

The publication of a 2022 Amnesty International report that described Israel as an apartheid state led to a shift in Western public opinion in favor of the Palestinians, similar to what occurred in South Africa’s case. On a different note, when comparing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to Russia’s war in Ukraine, which began in February 2022, the PSR poll found that a majority of Palestinians believe the war demonstrates a Western double standard: Although willing to impose sanctions on Russia, the U.S. and Europe show no willingness to do the same for Israel.

The recent introduction of “confidence-building steps” between the Palestinian Authority and Israel has increased the popularity of Fatah, the largest faction of the PLO, and its popularity is rising at similar rates in both the West Bank and Gaza. The confidence-building steps emerged from a meeting between the president of the Palestinian National Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, and the defense minister of Israel, Benny Gantz, in December 2021, 16 after which Gantz announced a number of measures 17 aimed at improving ties with the Palestinian Authority. The measures included the transfer of tax payments that Israel had been collecting on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, as well as travel permits for Palestinian businesspeople, and the approval of residency status for about 9,500 Palestinians. According to the PSR poll, 63% of Palestinians view the confidence-building measures undertaken by Israel and the Palestinian Authority positively. Israel is implementing measures that support the notion of shrinking the conflict, which may bolster Israel’s security in the long run. Yet, Palestinians who believe that ending the occupation is the only means to reach peace do not perceive this to be the case. Israel also claims to be implementing measures to support more “humanitarian policy” toward Palestinians. 18 For example, Israel is increasing the quota of Palestinian workers allowed in Israel.

Social and Economic Trends in the Last Decade

The occupied Palestinian territories are heavily dependent on economic relations with Israel, with the latter enjoying the lion’s share of the benefits. In 2021, Palestinians imported $5.7 billion in commodities from Israel and exported only $1.5 billion to Israel. Palestinians are also dependent on employment opportunities in Israel, with West Bank laborers in Israel and the settlements earning $2.9 billion in 2021. The labor market in Israel is more lucrative than in the West Bank, with an average daily wage in Israel of 260 new Israeli shekels (NIS) compared to between 118 and 126 NIS for employment in the West Bank. In contrast, a Gazan earns only 101 NIS per day in the public sector and only 34 NIS in the private sector, with very limited opportunities for employment in Israel. 19 Coupled with unsustainably low wages, the 18% unemployment rate in Gaza makes conditions particularly untenable.

In a study of the economic and employment impact of the Israeli occupation during the period 2000–2017, the UN Conference on Trade and Development concluded:

The economic costs of occupation resulting from the loss of Palestinian fiscal resources can be estimated at $36.4 billion (real 2015 prices), 2.7 times the size of the Palestinian GDP in 2017. The cost in terms of employment is estimated at 111,000 job opportunities every year. ...

Furthermore, Israel controls borders and crossing points. This has led to severe stunting of the Palestinian economy from 2000 to the present, as seen in the shrinking of the Palestinian productive capacity and base, interrelated economic distortions, high and rising unemployment rates, financial unsustainability, a chronic trade deficit and a high level of dependence on international aid to finance a large and persistent budget deficit. 20

The promise of Oslo included the gradual release of Area C to Palestinian control. To date, this has not happened, and restrictions on Palestinian economic development in Area C abound, while Israeli settlers face no such restrictions. The area is vital to Palestinian independence and the viability of statehood, as it provides space for Palestinian construction to reduce the current density that plagues population centers in Areas A and B—a problem that is predicted to increase markedly in the coming years. Area C also contains significant minerals and quarriable land, which could potentially expand exports and reduce Palestinian dependence on foreign aid. Travel restrictions imposed on Palestinians throughout Area C, as well as through and between the other areas, cause serious transportation delays that impede both commercial and social sectors. This is in addition to Palestinians’ obvious inability to build solar and wind energy resources, as well as other activities of economic value, without access to Area C.

The division of water resources between Palestinians and Israelis was, under Oslo II, designated as a final status negotiation matter. As of 2022, the Palestinian water supply continues to be controlled by Israel. Palestinian water options are limited to:

(a) groundwater pumped to wells or used through springs, or (b) water purchased from Israel’s national water company (Mekorot). Together, the sources supply 365.7 million square meters of water to Palestine, of which 174 million square meters are available for irrigation. In fact, water consumption of Palestinians in the West Bank is around 73 liters per day, while in Area C it is even lower with daily average use of water per capita being around 20 liters. Both of these numbers are well below the World Health Organization’s minimum standard of 100 liters per day. 21

In contrast, Israeli settlers in the West Bank consume approximately 320 liters per day of water. 22 The inequity is glaring.

Why is the Two-State Solution Still the Most Promising?

As of 2022, the population of the state of Israel is 9.5 million citizens. 23 Jewish people constitute 73.9% of the citizens of Israel and amount to 7 million inhabitants. The vast majority of the remaining 26.1% of the population, roughly 2 million people, are Palestinian citizens of Israel. In the occupied territories of Palestine, the population is 5.4 million Palestinians 24 living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Two important notes are to be taken from these statistics. First, it is clear that when looking at Israel and Palestine together, 7 million Jewish people and 7.4 million Palestinians live between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. A second note is that, while the basic law passed by the Israel Knesset in 2018 25 states that Israel is the nation state of the Jewish people, one-fifth of the citizens of Israel are nonJews. This is problematic for a state with a basic law that prefers one faith over others, and the law portends challenges to ensuring equal political rights and socio-economic access for non-Jewish citizens. Another important observation is that in the basic law, actualization of the right of national self-determination in the state of Israel is unique to the Jewish people.

This leads to questions over the possibility of implementing a one-state solution, as it would be very difficult to do so when it contradicts Israel’s basic law. A one-state solution is also difficult for Palestinians to digest, as Israel continues to fight against Palestinian identity and the Palestinian narrative, not to mention Israel’s relentless violations of Palestinian human rights. Today, Israel’s policies and practices are in fact representative of an apartheid state that gives exclusive privileges to one group of people over another. Therefore, it is questionable whether a one-state solution under Israel’s current policies would be sustainable.

On the other hand, the two-state solution envisions a state of Israel and a state of Palestine coexisting side by side in peace and security with both states agreeing to negotiate and agree on fundamental issues. Once resolved, the two states would join the Middle East as two neighboring nations. The security of both states is equally important, and the people in each state would live in freedom and dignity with better prospects for the future generations of both peoples. A two-state solution is more likely to fulfill the aspirations of both peoples and is more likely to be implemented, should it have the support of regional and international players.

A two-state solution would ideally include: (1) An agreement on a border that separates the two states from each other and from neighboring countries, including Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. The border would define the territory for each state and be essential for enabling its sovereignty over its territory and resources while respecting the sovereignty and resources of the neighboring states. (2) An agreement on Jerusalem being the capital of both the states of Palestine and Israel. Negotiations will determine the shape of this capital and its governance. (3) An agreement to respect the right of return of Palestinian refugees. The right is undeniable and should be respected and protected. The means and practical application of this right will be negotiated.

A two-state solution will allow for negotiations between Palestine and Israel on equal terms with the support of the region and the international community. The belief that at the end of such negotiations peace and security will be achieved should be an incentive for both sides to revive the negotiations within a two-state solution framework. This will bring us back to the Arab Peace Initiative that establishes proper peace between Israel and the Arab World after the Palestinian issue is resolved.

The New Paradigm Within a Two-State Solution

With the two-state solution as a base, a new paradigm and a new framework organized in one full package can be sought to initiate negotiations to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine and start an era of peace in the Middle East in general and in Palestine/Israel in particular. This new framework includes five important and inextricable elements; the framework cannot be implemented should one of the elements be lacking.

The first element is recognition. It is essential that Israel and the world recognize a sovereign and independent state of Palestine based on UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 with borders based on those that existed before June 4, 1967. While the state of Israel was recognized by the world in 1948, the state of Palestine has since been seeking similar recognition. In a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on September 9, 1993, from President of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat, the latter confirmed that “the PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security,” and he accepted UNSC resolutions 242 and 338. In return, Prime Minister Rabin confirmed that “the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people,” 26 an important step in peace negotiations but a far cry from recognizing a state of Palestine. That lack of recognition continues.

Today 140 states around the world do recognize Palestine as a state. Palestine is a non-member state of the United Nations, and the time is ripe for full recognition. Options for recognition include a UNSC resolution followed by Israeli recognition within two years of negotiations. A second and very desirable option is upfront recognition of the state of Palestine by Israel followed by the launch of negotiations for a period not to exceed two years. By the end of year two, the state of Palestine would be admitted to the UN General Assembly. A third option is for Israel to recognize the state of Palestine in principle and deposit with the Swiss government a letter of recognition based on UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 and the June 4, 1967, borders. At the end of two years, the UNSC would recommend admission of Palestine to the General Assembly. All three options will need Israel’s commitment to a full settlement freeze and an agreement to negotiate on all final status issues within an agreed upon period of time, not to exceed two years. Reaching an agreement between the state of Israel and the state of Palestine will lead to full implementation of the Arab Peace Initiative. Israel will in turn be a state recognized by all Arab states.

The second element is territory. Territory is a combination of two basic factors: space and time. Negotiation over territory will allow for agreement on the space that is important for both states. The factor of time is crucial to control the process of negotiation. Time will be used to gradually implement the negotiated agreement over territory. In our proposal, the borders separating the state of Palestine from the state of Israel are to be based on the 1967 borders, and the timeframe to reach a detailed agreement on borders is proposed as 12 months, after which the state of Palestine will have clear, recognized borders.

The third element of this package focuses on state building. Enhancing Palestine’s readiness for statehood will depend on building a viable state with the capacity to function independently and democratically, including building its economy. A strong economy will require developed infrastructure networks, arrangements for commerce and trade across the state and internationally, and strong income-generating projects to provide employment and reduce poverty and dependence on foreign aid. Clearly, gaining administration of Area C and having a contiguous Palestine are essential for this to be achieved.

The fourth and fifth elements address the regional and international aspects, respectively. The regional aspect includes regional security with a bilateral or multilateral core group including Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel that will be created based on the success of the negotiations and once the borders of the state of Palestine and the state of Israel are defined. The international aspect will allow for the creation of an international commission to discuss the refugee issue and its mechanisms. Both regional and international aspects should support state building in Palestine and will allow for a body that will oversee the implementation of this package.

Under this framework and with a commitment to a two-state solution, Israel and Palestine may finally be able to achieve lasting peace and security.

1. “Agreement – Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements (a.k.a. “Oslo Accord”),” UN, The Question of Palestine, October 8, 1993, https:// www.un.org/unispal/document/autoinsert-180015/.

2. “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (Cairo Agreement),” United Nations Peacemaker, April 5, 1994, https://peacemaker.un.org/israeloptcairoagreement94.

3. “Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (a.k.a. “Oslo II”),” UN, The Question of Palestine, December 27, 1995, https://www.un.org/unispal/ document/auto-insert-185434/.

4. According to Oslo II, the areas in the West Bank that are to be under full or partial Palestinian control are referred to as Areas A and B, while Israel maintained control over the rest of the West Bank in an area referred to as Area C. See Chapter 2, Article XI for definitions.

5. “Resolution 181: The Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947,” 1948: Lest We Forget, November 29, 1947, http:// www.1948.org.uk/un-resolution-181.

6. “Zionist FAQs: Why did Arabs reject the proposed UN GA partition plan which split Palestine into Jewish and Arab states?” PalestineRemembered.com, n.d., https:// www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/ Palestine-Remembered/Story448.html.

7. “The Clinton Parameters: Clinton Proposal on Israeli-Palestinian Peace Meeting with President Clinton,” White House, December 23, 2000, https://ecf.org.il/ media_items/568.

8. Yitzhak Benhorin, “Bush: Two-state solution will be realized,” ynetnews.com, December 6, 2008, https://www.ynetnews. com/articles/0,7340,L-3634085,00.html.

9. “Full text of John Kerry’s speech on Middle East peace, December 28, 2016,” The Times of Israel, December 28, 2016, https:// www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-of-johnkerrys-speech-on-middle-east-peacedecember-28-2016/.

10. Javier Soria Quintana, “Europe's last stand for the two-state solution?” EU Observer, June 4, 2020, https://euobserver. com/opinion/148543.

11. “The Arab Peace Initiative,” European External Action Service, 2002, accessed April 24, 2022, https://eeas.europa.eu/ archives/docs/mepp/docs/arab_peace_ initiative_2002_en.pdf.

13. Dahlia Scheindlin, “Even if the Ceasefire Holds, the Far-Right Will Dominate Israel's Future,” Time, May 21, 2021, https:// time.com/6050286/israel-ceasefire-farright-politics/.

14. Micah Goodman, Catch-67: The Left, The Right, and the Legacy of the Six-Day War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019).

15. “Public Opinion Poll No (83),” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, March 16-20, 2022, https://www. pcpsr.org/en/node/906.

16. “Israel approves 'confidence-building' steps to improve ties with Palestine,” Business Standard News, December 30, 2021, https://www.business-standard. com/article/international/israel-approvesconfidence-building-steps-to-improveties-with-palestine-121123000099_1.html.

17. Yet many of the announced measures from Gantz were not fulfilled.

18. Emanuel Fabian, “Israel to boost number of Palestinian workers from Gaza, Gantz says,” The Times of Israel, March 1, 2022, https://www.timesofisrael.com/ israel-to-boost-number-of-palestinianworkers-from-gaza-gantz-says/.

19. Haggay Etkes and Esteban F. Klor, “INSS Briefing: Palestinian-Israeli Economic Relations,” Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University, May 8, 2022, https://www.inss.org.il/event/inss-briefingpalestinian-israeli-economic-relations/.

20. “The Economic Costs of the Israeli Occupation for the Palestinian People: Cumulative Fiscal Costs,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2019, https://unctad.org/system/files/officialdocument/gdsapp2019d2_en.pdf.

21. “Annexation of ‘Area C’ During the COVID-19 Crisis,” Palestinian Farmers Union, Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, Factsheet, April 2020.

22. “Agriculture and Water in Area C,” Palestinian Farmers Union, Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, Factsheet, April 2020.

23. “Israel’s Independence Day 2022,” Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, Media Release, May 1, 2022, https://www.cbs.gov. il/en/mediarelease/Pages/2022/IsraelsIndependence-Day-2022.aspx.

24. “Estimated Population in the Palestine Mid-Year by Governorate, 1997-2026,” Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, May 26, 2021, https:// pcbs.gov.ps/statisticsIndicatorsTables. aspx?lang=en&table_id=676.

25. “Full text of Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People,” Knesset News, Press Release, July 19, 2018, https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/News/ PressReleases/Pages/Pr13978_pg.aspx.

26. “Israel-PLO Recognition: Exchange of Letters Between PM Rabin and Chairman Arafat,” U.S. Department of State Archive, September 9, 1993, https://2001-2009. state.gov/p/nea/rls/22579.htm#.

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. The views expressed herein are those of the individual author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

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Cite this chapter.

• Jonathan Fox &
• Shmuel Sandler  

Part of the book series: Culture and Religion in International Relations ((CRIR))

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To examine the claims of our book and to explain them, we chose to analyze a case where religion played or conceivably could have played a most important role—the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A salient event that demonstrates the importance of religion in recent times is the title or name given to the outburst of violence at the end of September 2000 — “the Al-Aqsa intifada.” Al-Aqsa is the name of the mosque situated on the Temple Mount in the middle of Jerusalem, holy both to Jews and Muslims. The official reason to this title was that on September 28, 2000, then Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, an event considered by the Palestinians as the provocation to the second Intifada. A prelude to the outbreak of violence occurred in September 1996 when the right-wing Netanyahu government (1996–1999) authorized the opening of a tunnel in Jerusalem that led to the Haram al-Sharif as the Temple Mount is called by the Muslims. To the Jews the place was holy since it was the location of the first and second Temples, and the Western Wall was the only remnant left from those holy shrines. Two Mosques are located on this domain, Omar and Al-Aqsa, the latter built at the spot where, Islam’s founder, the prophet Mohammed is believed to have risen to heaven. Religion and international relations are tied up in this conflict because of the worldwide religious lookouts toward the Holy Land.

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© 2004 Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler

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Fox, J., Sandler, S. (2004). The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: A Case Study of Religion and International Politics. In: Bringing Religion into International Relations. Culture and Religion in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403981127_7

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403981127_7

Publisher Name : Palgrave Macmillan, New York

Print ISBN : 978-1-4039-7603-1

Online ISBN : 978-1-4039-8112-7

eBook Packages : Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies Collection Political Science and International Studies (R0)

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