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May 15, 2024

Scientists want to know how the smells of nature benefit our health

Tropical forest canopy in Caxiuanã, Brazil. Jake Bryant

Spending time in nature is good for us. Studies have shown that contact with nature can lift our well-being by affecting emotions, influencing thoughts, reducing stress and improving physical health . Even brief exposure to nature can help. One well-known study found that hospital patients recovered faster if their room included a window view of a natural setting .

Knowing more about nature’s effects on our bodies could not only help our well-being, but could also improve how we care for land, preserve ecosystems and design cities, homes and parks. Yet studies on the benefits of contact with nature have typically focused primarily on how seeing nature affects us. There has been less focus on what the nose knows. That is something a group of researchers wants to change.

“We are immersed in a world of odorants, and we have a sophisticated olfactory system that processes them, with resulting impacts on our emotions and behavior,” said Gregory Bratman , a University of Washington assistant professor of environmental and forest sciences. “But compared to research on the benefits of seeing nature, we don’t know nearly as much about how the impacts of nature’s scents and olfactory cues affect us.”

In a paper published May 15 in Science Advances, Bratman and colleagues from around the world outline ways to expand research into how odors and scents from natural settings impact our health and well-being. The interdisciplinary group of experts in olfaction, psychology, ecology, public health, atmospheric science and other fields are based at institutions in the U.S., the U.K., Taiwan, Germany, Poland and Cyprus.

At its core, the human sense of smell, or olfaction, is a complex chemical detection system in constant operation. The nose is packed with hundreds of olfactory receptors, which are sophisticated chemical sensors. Together, they can detect more than one trillion scents , and that information gets delivered directly to the nervous system for our minds to interpret — consciously or otherwise.

The natural world releases a steady stream of chemical compounds to keep our olfactory system busy. Plants in particular exude volatile organic compounds, or VOCs , that can persist in the air for hours or days. VOCs perform many functions for plants, such as repelling herbivores or attracting pollinators. Some researchers have studied the impact of exposures to plant VOCs on people.

“We know bits and pieces of the overall picture,” said Bratman. “But there is so much more to learn. We are proposing a framework, informed by important research from many others, on how to investigate the intimate links between olfaction, nature and human well-being.”

A meadow filled with wildflowers in full bloom on the slopes of Mount Rainier.

A subalpine meadow on Mount Rainier in the summer. Elli Theobald

Nature’s smell-mediated impacts likely come through different routes, according to the authors. Some chemical compounds, including a subset of those from the invisible realm of plant VOCs, may be acting on us without our conscious knowledge. In these cases, olfactory receptors in the nose could be initiating a “subthreshold” response to molecules that people are largely unaware of. Bratman and his co-authors are calling for vastly expanded research on when, where and how these undetected biochemical processes related to natural VOCs may affect us.

Other olfactory cues are picked up consciously, but scientists still don’t fully understand all their impacts on our health and well-being. Some scents, for example, may have “universal” interpretations to humans — something that nearly always smells pleasant, like a sweet-smelling flower. Other scents are closely tied to specific memories, or have associations and interpretations that vary by culture and personal experience, as research by co-author Asifa Majid of the University of Oxford has shown.

“Understanding how olfaction mediates our relationships with the natural world and the benefits we receive from it are multi-disciplinary undertakings,” said Bratman. “It involves insights from olfactory function research, Indigenous knowledge, Western psychology, anthropology, atmospheric chemistry, forest ecology, Shinrin-yoku — or ‘forest bathing’ — neuroscience, and more.”

Investigation into the potential links between our sense of smell and positive experiences with nature includes research by co-author Cecilia Bembibre at University College London, which shows that the cultural significance of smells, including those from nature, can be passed down in communities to each new generation. Co-author Jieling Xiao at Birmingham City University has delved into the associations people have with scents in built environments and urban gardens.

Other co-authors have shown that nature leaves its signature in the very air we breathe. Forests, for example, release a complex chemical milieux into the air. Research by co-author Jonathan Williams at the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry and the Cyprus Institute shows how natural VOCs can react and mix in the atmosphere, with repercussions for olfactory environments.

The authors are also calling for more studies to investigate how human activity alters nature’s olfactory footprint — both by pollution, which can modify or destroy odorants in the air, and by reducing habitats that release beneficial scents.

“Human activity is modifying the environment so quickly in some cases that we’re learning about these benefits while we’re simultaneously making them more difficult for people to access,” said Bratman. “As research illuminates more of these links, our hope is that we can make more informed decisions about our impacts on the natural world and the volatile organic compounds that come from it. As we say in the paper, we live within the chemical contexts that nature creates. Understanding this more can contribute to human well-being and advance efforts to protect the natural world.”

Other UW co-authors on the paper are Peter Kahn , profess of psychology; Connor Lashus , a graduate student in the School of Environmental and Forest Sciences; and Anne Riederer , a clinical associate professor of environmental and occupational health sciences. Additional co-authors are Gretchen Daily of Stanford University; Richard Doty at the University of Pennsylvania; Thomas Hummel of the Dresden University of Technology; Lucia Jacobs of the University of California, Berkeley; John Miller of Wildwood|Mahonia; Anna Oleszkiewicz of the University of Wrocław; Hector Olvera-Alvarez of Oregon Health and Sciences University; Valentina Parma of the Monell Chemical Senses Center; Nancy Long Sieber and John Spengler of Harvard University; and Chia-Pin Yu of National Taiwan University.

For more information, contact Bratman at [email protected] .

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Scientists want to know how the smells of nature benefit our health

Spending time in nature is good for us. Studies have shown that contact with nature can lift our well-being by affecting emotions, influencing thoughts, reducing stress and improving physical health. Even brief exposure to nature can help. One well-known study found that hospital patients recovered faster if their room included a window view of a natural setting.

Knowing more about nature's effects on our bodies could not only help our well-being, but could also improve how we care for land, preserve ecosystems and design cities, homes and parks. Yet studies on the benefits of contact with nature have typically focused primarily on how seeing nature affects us. There has been less focus on what the nose knows. That is something a group of researchers wants to change.

"We are immersed in a world of odorants, and we have a sophisticated olfactory system that processes them, with resulting impacts on our emotions and behavior," said Gregory Bratman, a University of Washington assistant professor of environmental and forest sciences. "But compared to research on the benefits of seeing nature, we don't know nearly as much about how the impacts of nature's scents and olfactory cues affect us."

In a paper published May 15 in Science Advances , Bratman and colleagues from around the world outline ways to expand research into how odors and scents from natural settings impact our health and well-being. The interdisciplinary group of experts in olfaction, psychology, ecology, public health, atmospheric science and other fields are based at institutions in the U.S., the U.K., Taiwan, Germany, Poland and Cyprus.

At its core, the human sense of smell, or olfaction, is a complex chemical detection system in constant operation. The nose is packed with hundreds of olfactory receptors, which are sophisticated chemical sensors. Together, they can detect more than one trillion scents, and that information gets delivered directly to the nervous system for our minds to interpret -- consciously or otherwise.

The natural world releases a steady stream of chemical compounds to keep our olfactory system busy. Plants in particular exude volatile organic compounds, or VOCs, that can persist in the air for hours or days. VOCs perform many functions for plants, such as repelling herbivores or attracting pollinators. Some researchers have studied the impact of exposures to plant VOCs on people.

"We know bits and pieces of the overall picture," said Bratman. "But there is so much more to learn. We are proposing a framework, informed by important research from many others, on how to investigate the intimate links between olfaction, nature and human well-being."

Nature's smell-mediated impacts likely come through different routes, according to the authors. Some chemical compounds, including a subset of those from the invisible realm of plant VOCs, may be acting on us without our conscious knowledge. In these cases, olfactory receptors in the nose could be initiating a "subthreshold" response to molecules that people are largely unaware of. Bratman and his co-authors are calling for vastly expanded research on when, where and how these undetected biochemical processes related to natural VOCs may affect us.

Other olfactory cues are picked up consciously, but scientists still don't fully understand all their impacts on our health and well-being. Some scents, for example, may have "universal" interpretations to humans -- something that nearly always smells pleasant, like a sweet-smelling flower. Other scents are closely tied to specific memories, or have associations and interpretations that vary by culture and personal experience, as research by co-author Asifa Majid of the University of Oxford has shown.

"Understanding how olfaction mediates our relationships with the natural world and the benefits we receive from it are multi-disciplinary undertakings," said Bratman. "It involves insights from olfactory function research, Indigenous knowledge, Western psychology, anthropology, atmospheric chemistry, forest ecology, Shinrin-yoku -- or 'forest bathing' -- neuroscience, and more."

The authors are also calling for more studies to investigate how human activity alters nature's olfactory footprint -- both by pollution, which can modify or destroy odorants in the air, and by reducing habitats that release beneficial scents.

"Human activity is modifying the environment so quickly in some cases that we're learning about these benefits while we're simultaneously making them more difficult for people to access," said Bratman. "As research illuminates more of these links, our hope is that we can make more informed decisions about our impacts on the natural world and the volatile organic compounds that come from it. As we say in the paper, we live within the chemical contexts that nature creates. Understanding this more can contribute to human well-being and advance efforts to protect the natural world."

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Story Source:

Materials provided by University of Washington . Original written by James Urton. Note: Content may be edited for style and length.

Journal Reference :

Gregory N. Bratman, Cecilia Bembibre, Gretchen C. Daily, Richard L. Doty, Thomas Hummel, Lucia F. Jacobs, Peter H. Kahn, Connor Lashus, Asifa Majid, John D. Miller, Anna Oleszkiewicz, Hector Olvera-Alvarez, Valentina Parma, Anne M. Riederer, Nancy Long Sieber, Jonathan Williams, Jieling Xiao, Chia-Pin Yu, John D. Spengler. Nature and human well-being: The olfactory pathway . Science Advances , 2024; 10 (20) DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.adn3028

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Home / Healthy Aging / The mental health benefits of nature: Spending time outdoors to refresh your mind

The mental health benefits of nature: Spending time outdoors to refresh your mind

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Like many others at the height of COVID-19 lockdowns, I was suddenly working remotely, socially distancing from family and friends, and leaving the house only for trips to the grocery store. I craved the ability to get out and escape the overbearing presence screens had in my life.

That ‘ s when I discovered my love of camping. Weekend camping trips let me take advantage of the gorgeous freshwater springs, trails and nature preserves in my area.

I felt the difference almost immediately — out in the woods I wasn’t scrambling for my phone or thinking about work deadlines. My attention span seemed to lengthen and level out. I relaxed. I came home feeling rested and a little more cheerful, and these trips became a way to manage the stress of the pandemic.

Aside from a nice weekend getaway, what I was actually experiencing were the benefits of nature on my mental health — something researchers and healthcare providers have long noted.

“There are many studies that demonstrate how spending time in nature can improve mood, lower anxiety, and improve cognition and memory,” says Mayo Clinic nurse practitioner Jodie M. Smith, APRN., C.N.P., D.N.P., M.S.N. “Making time for nature is important in order for us to maintain resiliency and promote self-care in a world that demands a lot from us.”

Below, Smith discusses exactly why nature is so good for your mental health.

How does nature benefit mental health?

First and foremost, Smith says that nature can be an effective tool to manage stress .

“Stress stimulates our sympathetic nervous system , which is responsible for increasing our blood pressure, heart rate and blood sugar in order to react to a stimulus that is causing us stress,” says Smith.

And while not all stress is bad — for example, stress can motivate you to meet a work deadline or keep an eye on your kids at the pool — prolonged or chronic exposure to stress can chip away at your emotional and mental well-being.

But nature may be able to combat stress and its effects. For example, one study showed that exposure to nature can regulate the sympathetic nervous system in as little as five minutes.

“This means that we can get an almost immediate benefit from stepping outside,” says Smith. And doing so on a recurrent basis may prevent cumulative effects from stress, which could mean a lower risk for chronic disease, illness and mortality .”

In addition to alleviating stress, Smith says research indicates that exposure to nature can be an effective coping strategy for those with chronic mental health conditions, including depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) .

Prolonged immersion in nature and nature-based therapy programs have shown promise as a way of managing PTSD.

Even for those without serious mental health conditions, nature may help you manage emotions like loneliness , irritability and possibly even road rage .

Finally, there is evidence that nature exposure is associated with better cognitive function — like memory, attention, creativity and sleep quality .

But perhaps the best part is that nature makes it easy to soak in these benefits.

“Being present in nature doesn’t ask or require anything of us, so it frees up our mind to think more deeply and clearly about things,” says Smith.

Next time you’re outside, take a moment to listen, touch, smell. Notice the environment around you and simply be present.

What if I live in the city without much nature around?

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), over 55% of people live in urban areas — a number that is expected to rise to 68% by 2050. Increasing urbanization can bring unique health challenges, as WHO estimates that the majority of city-dwellers experience inadequate housing, transportation, sanitation and waste management, as well as low air quality. Combined with the lack of green space in many cities — or open, often walkable areas with plants, natural landscape and water — accessing nature isn’t always as simple as just going outside.

“Cities can be very energetic and exciting but also can contribute to both conscious and unconscious stress from the sensory overload and challenges of maneuvering in those spaces,” says Smith. “If you live in an urban environment, exploring to find even a small natural reprieve can be extremely beneficial.”

If you are unable to fully immerse yourself in nature — like by taking a weekend camping trip — you can still carve out opportunities in your area. This might look like finding a small park near your workplace, taking a moment to sit under a large tree, or taking the time to find a pond or body of water.

“Taking a purposeful five-minute break during the day to refresh your mind in this type of environment can provide a benefit and can be justified by knowing that we will feel better and more productive afterward,” says Smith.

Technology, too, represents a significant distraction — and barrier — to quality time outside and unplugged. Texts, email and social media require a lot of attention , which can take you out of the moment. Instead, Smith recommends leaving your phone behind when seeking green space.

“Slow down, go outside, notice what’s around you,” says Smith. “Listen to the birds and the wind and the crackling of the leaves under your feet, and you really will notice a benefit in your well-being.”

How can I interact with nature if I’m stuck inside all day?

In addition to simply spending more time outdoors, there are several strategies to get more green space into your daily life.

First, consider how you can enjoy nature even if you’re stuck inside. Although it’s not a replacement for fully immersive, outdoor green space, you can still engage your senses by listening to recorded bird songs or a rainstorm instead of music, bringing lush plants into your home and office, decorating with pictures of natural beauty, or using a diffuser with natural scents.

“(These strategies) can improve relaxation and work satisfaction through the same mechanisms that being outdoors can provide,” says Smith.

On a wider scale, you may consider working with your neighbors to plan a community garden, joining or coordinating a walking or bird watching club, and advocating for high-quality parks and environmental centers in your town or city.

How much nature do I need?

Some research suggests that even very quick visits outdoors can be beneficial. But there are indications that certain amounts and types of outdoor time may have greater impacts on well-being. A 2021 study , for example, found that the 20- to 90-minute sessions in nature were most beneficial for mental health, with gardening, nature-based therapy and exercise in green spaces being the most effective for adults.

One large survey found that people who spent at least two hours a week in nature — whether in one longer outing or in multiple smaller chunks of time — were more likely to positively describe their health and well-being than were people who spent no time in nature. If that seems unattainable, Smith recommends that you aim for 15 minutes each day.

“There are added benefits that can come from prolonged immersion, so each week try to spend an hour outside doing something you enjoy, and each month try to spend a half day [outside],” says Smith.

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November 20, 2012

Scientists Probe Human Nature--and Discover We Are Good, After All

Recent studies find our first impulses are selfless

By Adrian F. Ward

When it really comes down to it—when the chips are down and the lights are off—are we naturally good? That is, are we predisposed to act cooperatively, to help others even when it costs us? Or are we, in our hearts, selfish creatures?

This fundamental question about human nature has long provided fodder for discussion. Augustine’s doctrine of original sin proclaimed that all people were born broken and selfish, saved only through the power of divine intervention. Hobbes , too, argued that humans were savagely self-centered; however, he held that salvation came not through the divine, but through the social contract of civil law. On the other hand, philosophers such as Rousseau argued that people were born good, instinctively concerned with the welfare of others. More recently, these questions about human nature—selfishness and cooperation, defection and collaboration—have been brought to the public eye by game shows such as Survivor and the UK’s Golden Balls , which test the balance between selfishness and cooperation by pitting the strength of interpersonal bonds against the desire for large sums of money.

But even the most compelling televised collisions between selfishness and cooperation provide nothing but anecdotal evidence. And even the most eloquent philosophical arguments mean noting without empirical data.

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A new set of studies provides compelling data allowing us to analyze human nature not through a philosopher’s kaleidoscope or a TV producer’s camera, but through the clear lens of science. These studies were carried out by a diverse group of researchers from Harvard and Yale—a developmental psychologist with a background in evolutionary game theory , a moral philosopher-turned-psychologist , and a biologist-cum-mathematician —interested in the same essential question: whether our automatic impulse—our first instinct —is to act selfishly or cooperatively.

This focus on first instincts stems from the dual process framework of decision-making, which explains decisions (and behavior) in terms of two mechanisms: intuition and reflection. Intuition is often automatic and effortless, leading to actions that occur without insight into the reasons behind them. Reflection, on the other hand, is all about conscious thought—identifying possible behaviors, weighing the costs and benefits of likely outcomes, and rationally deciding on a course of action. With this dual process framework in mind, we can boil the complexities of basic human nature down to a simple question: which behavior—selfishness or cooperation—is intuitive, and which is the product of rational reflection? In other words, do we cooperate when we overcome our intuitive selfishness with rational self-control, or do we act selfishly when we override our intuitive cooperative impulses with rational self-interest?

To answer this question, the researchers first took advantage of a reliable difference between intuition and reflection: intuitive processes operate quickly, whereas reflective processes operate relatively slowly. Whichever behavioral tendency—selfishness or cooperation—predominates when people act quickly is likely to be the intuitive response; it is the response most likely to be aligned with basic human nature.

The experimenters first examined potential links between processing speed, selfishness, and cooperation by using 2 experimental paradigms (the “ prisoner’s dilemma ” and a “ public goods game ”), 5 studies, and a tot al of 834 participants gathered from both undergraduate campuses and a nationwide sample. Each paradigm consisted of group-based financial decision-making tasks and required participants to choose between acting selfishly—opting to maximize individual benefits at the cost of the group—or cooperatively—opting to maximize group benefits at the cost of the individual. The results were striking: in every single study, faster—that is, more intuitive—decisions were associated with higher levels of cooperation, whereas slower—that is, more reflective—decisions were associated with higher levels of selfishness. These results suggest that our first impulse is to cooperate—that Augustine and Hobbes were wrong, and that we are fundamentally “good” creatures after all.

The researchers followed up these correlational studies with a set of experiments in which they directly manipulated both this apparent influence on the tendency to cooperate—processing speed—and the cognitive mechanism thought to be associated with this influence—intuitive, as opposed to reflective, decision-making. In the first of these studies, researchers gathered 891 participants (211 undergraduates and 680 participants from a nationwide sample) and had them play a public goods game with one key twist: these participants were forced to make their decisions either quickly (within 10 seconds) or slowly (after at least 10 seconds had passed). In the second, researchers had 343 participants from a nationwide sample play a public goods game after they had been primed to use either intuitive or reflective reasoning. Both studies showed the same pattern—whether people were forced to use intuition (by acting under time constraints) or simply encouraged to do so (through priming), they gave significantly more money to the common good than did participants who relied on reflection to make their choices. This again suggests that our intuitive impulse is to cooperate with others.

Taken together, these studies—7 total experiments, using a whopping 2,068 participants—suggest that we are not intuitively selfish creatures. But does this mean that we our naturally cooperative? Or could it be that cooperation is our first instinct simply because it is rewarded? After all, we live in a world where it pays to play well with others: cooperating helps us make friends, gain social capital, and find social success in a wide range of domains. As one way of addressing this possibility, the experimenters carried out yet another study. In this study, they asked 341 participants from a nationwide sample about their daily interactions—specifically, whether or not these interactions were mainly cooperative; they found that the relationship between processing speed (that is, intuition) and cooperation only existed for those who reported having primarily cooperative interactions in daily life. This suggests that cooperation is the intuitive response only for those who routinely engage in interactions where this behavior is rewarded—that human “goodness” may result from the acquisition of a regularly rewarded trait.

Throughout the ages, people have wondered about the basic state of human nature—whether we are good or bad, cooperative or selfish. This question—one that is central to who we are—has been tackled by theologians and philosophers, presented to the public eye by television programs, and dominated the sleepless nights of both guilt-stricken villains and bewildered victims; now, it has also been addressed by scientific research. Although no single set of studies can provide a definitive answer—no matter how many experiments were conducted or participants were involved—this research suggests that our intuitive responses, or first instincts , tend to lead to cooperation rather than selfishness.

Although this evidence does not definitely solve the puzzle of human nature, it does give us evidence we may use to solve this puzzle for ourselves—and our solutions will likely vary according to how we define “human nature.” If human nature is something we must be born with, then we may be neither good nor bad, cooperative nor selfish. But if human nature is simply the way we tend to act based on our intuitive and automatic impulses, then it seems that we are an overwhelmingly cooperative species, willing to give for the good of the group even when it comes at our own personal expense.

Are you a scientist who specializes in neuroscience, cognitive science, or psychology? And have you read a recent peer-reviewed paper that you would like to write about? Please send suggestions to Mind Matters editor Gareth Cook, a Pulitzer prize-winning journalist at the Boston Globe. He can be reached at garethideas AT gmail.com or Twitter @garethideas .

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Nature and nurture as an enduring tension in the history of psychology.

Hunter Honeycutt Hunter Honeycutt Bridgewater College, Department of Psychology
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.518
Published online: 30 September 2019

Nature–nurture is a dichotomous way of thinking about the origins of human (and animal) behavior and development, where “nature” refers to native, inborn, causal factors that function independently of, or prior to, the experiences (“nurture”) of the organism. In psychology during the 19th century, nature-nurture debates were voiced in the language of instinct versus learning. In the first decades of the 20th century, it was widely assumed that that humans and animals entered the world with a fixed set of inborn instincts. But in the 1920s and again in the 1950s, the validity of instinct as a scientific construct was challenged on conceptual and empirical grounds. As a result, most psychologists abandoned using the term instinct but they did not abandon the validity of distinguishing between nature versus nurture. In place of instinct, many psychologists made a semantic shift to using terms like innate knowledge, biological maturation, and/or hereditary/genetic effects on development, all of which extend well into the 21st century. Still, for some psychologists, the earlier critiques of the instinct concept remain just as relevant to these more modern usages.

The tension in nature-nurture debates is commonly eased by claiming that explanations of behavior must involve reference to both nature-based and nurture-based causes. However, for some psychologists there is a growing pressure to see the nature–nurture dichotomy as oversimplifying the development of behavior patterns. The division is seen as both arbitrary and counterproductive. Rather than treat nature and nurture as separable causal factors operating on development, they treat nature-nurture as a distinction between product (nature) versus process (nurture). Thus there has been a longstanding tension about how to define, separate, and balance the effects of nature and nurture.

nature–nurture
development
nativism–empiricism
innate–learned
behavioral genetics
epigenetics

Nature and Nurture in Development

The oldest and most persistent ways to frame explanations about the behavioral and mental development of individuals is to distinguish between two separate sources of developmental causation: (a) intrinsic, preformed, or predetermined causes (“nature”) versus (b) extrinsic, experiential, or environmental causes (“nurture”). Inputs from these two sources are thought to add their own contribution to development (see Figure 1 ).

Figure 1. The traditional view of nature and nurture as separate causes of development. In the traditional view, nature and nurture are treated as independent causal influences that combine during development to generate outcomes. Note that, during development, the effects of nature and nurture (shown in horizontal crossing lines) remain independent so that their effects on outcomes are theoretically separable.

Because some traits seem to derive more from one source than the other, much of the tension associated with the nature–nurture division deals with disagreements about how to balance the roles of nature and nurture in the development of a trait.

Evidence of Nature in Development

Evidence to support the nature–nurture division usually derives from patterns of behavior that suggest a limited role of environmental causation, thus implying some effect of nature by default. Table 1 depicts some common descriptors and conditions used to infer that some preference, knowledge, or skill is nature based.

Table 1. Common Descriptors and Associated Conditions for Inferring the Effects of Nature on Development

It is important to reiterate that nature-based causation (e.g., genetic determination) is inferred from these observations. Such inferences can generate tension because each of the observations listed here can be explained by nurture-based (environmental) factors. Confusion can also arise when evidence of one descriptor (e.g., being hereditary) is erroneously used to justify a different usage (e.g., that the trait is unlearned).

The Origins of Nature Versus Nurture

For much of recorded history, the distinction between nature and nurture was a temporal divide between what a person is innately endowed with at birth, prior to experience (nature), and what happens thereafter (nurture). It was not until the 19th century that the temporal division was transformed into a material division of causal influences (Keller, 2010 ). New views about heredity and Darwinian evolution justified distinguishing between native traits and genetic causes from acquired traits and environmental causes. More so than before, the terms nature and nurture were often juxtaposed in an opposition famously described by Sir Francis Galton ( 1869 ) as that between “nature versus nurture.”

Galton began writing about heredity in the mid-1860s. He believed we would discover laws governing the transmission of mental as well as physical qualities. Galton’s take on mental heredity, however, was forged by his desire to improve the human race in a science he would later call “eugenics.” In the mid- 19th century , British liberals assumed humans were equivalent at birth. Their social reform efforts were geared to enhancing educational opportunities and improving living conditions. Galton, a political conservative, opposed the notion of natural equality, arguing instead that people were inherently different at birth (Cowan, 2016 ), and that these inherited mental and behavioral inequalities were transmitted through lineages like physical qualities. Because Galton opposed the widely held Lamarckian idea that the qualities acquired in one’s lifetime could modify the inherited potential of subsequent generations, he believed long-lasting improvement of the human stock would only come by controlling breeding practices.

To explain the biological mechanisms of inheritance, Galton joined a growing trend in the 1870s to understand inheritance as involving the transmission of (hypothetical) determinative, germinal substances across generations. Foreshadowing a view that would later become scientific orthodoxy, Galton believed these germinal substances to be uninfluenced by the experiences of the organism. His theory of inheritance, however, was speculative. Realizing he was not equipped to fully explicate his theory of biological inheritance, Galton abandoned this line of inquiry by the end of that decade and refocused his efforts on identifying statistical laws of heredity of individual differences (Renwick, 2011 ).

Historians generally agree that Galton was the first to treat nature (as heredity) and nurture (everything else) as separate causal forces (Keller, 2010 ), but the schism gained biological legitimacy through the work of the German cytologist Auguste Weismann in the 1880s. Whereas Galton’s theory was motivated by his political agenda, Weismann was motivated by a scientific, theoretical agenda. Namely, Weismann opposed Lamarckian inheritance and promoted a view of evolution driven almost entirely by natural selection.

Drawing upon contemporary cytological and embryological research, Weismann made the case that the determinative substances found in the germ cells of plants and animals (called the “germ-plasm”) that are transmitted across generations were physically sequestered very early in embryogenesis and remained buffered from the other cells of the body (“somato-plasm”). This so-called, Weismann’s barrier meant that alterations in the soma that develop in the lifetime of the organism through the use or disuse of body parts would not affect the germinal substances transmitted during reproduction (see Winther, 2001 , for review). On this view, Lamarckian-style inheritance of acquired characteristics was not biologically possible.

Galton and Weismann’s influence on the life sciences cannot be overstated. Their work convinced many to draw unusually sharp distinctions between the inherited (nature) and the acquired (nurture). Although their theories were met with much resistance and generated significant tension in the life sciences from cytology to psychology, their efforts helped stage a new epistemic space through which to appreciate Mendel’s soon to be rediscovered breeding studies and usher in genetics (Muller-Wille & Rheinberger, 2012 ).

Ever since, psychology has teetered between nature-biased and nurture-biased positions. With the rise of genetics, the wedge between nature–nurture was deepened in the early to mid- 20th century , creating fields of study that focused exclusively on the effects of either nature or nurture.

The “Middle Ground” Perspective on Nature–Nurture

Twenty-first-century psychology textbooks often state that the nature–nurture debates have been resolved, and the tension relaxed, because we have moved on from emphasizing nature or nurture to appreciating that development necessarily involves both nature and nurture. In this middle-ground position, one asks how nature and nurture interact. For example, how do biological (or genetic) predispositions for behaviors or innate knowledge bias early learning experiences? Or how might environmental factors influence the biologically determined (maturational) unfolding of bodily form and behaviors?

Rejection of the Nature–Nurture Divide

For some, the “middle-ground” resolution is as problematic as “either/or” views and does not resolve a deeper source of tension inherent in the dichotomy. On this view, the nature–nurture divide is neither a legitimate nor a constructive way of thinking about development. Instead, developmental analysis reveals that the terms commonly associated with nature (e.g., innate, genetic, hereditary, or instinctual) and nurture (environmental or learned) are so entwined and confounded (and often arbitrary) that their independent effects cannot be meaningfully discussed. The nature–nurture division oversimplifies developmental processes, takes too much for granted, and ultimately hinders scientific progress. Thus not only is there a lingering tension about how to balance the effects of nature and nurture in the middle-ground view, but there is also a growing tension to move beyond the dichotomous nature–nurture framework.

Nativism in Behavior: Instincts

Definitions of instinct can vary tremendously, but many contrast (a) instinct with reason (or intellect, thought, will), which is related to but separable from contrasting (b) instinct with learning (or experience or habit).

Instinct in the Age of Enlightenment

Early usages of the instinct concept, following Aristotle, treated instinct as a mental, estimative faculty ( vis aestimativa or aestimativa naturalis ) in humans and animals that allowed for the judgments of objects in the world (e.g., seeing a predator) to be deemed beneficial or harmful in a way that transcends immediate sensory experience but does not involve the use of reason (Diamond, 1971 ). In many of the early usages, the “natural instinct” of animals even included subrational forms of learning.

The modern usage of instincts as unlearned behaviors took shape in the 17th century . By that point it was widely believed that nature or God had implanted in animals and humans innate behaviors and predispositions (“instincts”) to promote the survival of the individual and the propagation of the species. Disagreements arose as to whether instincts derived from innate mental images or were mindlessly and mechanically (physiologically) generated from innately specified bodily organization (Richards, 1987 ).

Anti-Instinct Movement in the Age of Enlightenment

Challenges to the instinct concept can be found in the 16th century (see Diamond, 1971 ), but they were most fully developed by empiricist philosophers of the French Sensationalist tradition in the 18th century (Richards, 1987 ). Sensationalists asserted that animals behaved rationally and all of the so-called instincts displayed by animals could be seen as intelligently acquired habits.

For Sensationalists, instincts, as traditionally understood, did not exist. Species-specificity in behavior patterns could be explained by commonalities in physiological organization, needs, and environmental conditions. Even those instinctual behaviors seen at birth (e.g., that newly hatched chicks peck and eat grain) might eventually be explained by the animal’s prenatal experiences. Erasmus Darwin ( 1731–1802 ), for example, speculated that the movements and swallowing experiences in ovo could account for the pecking and eating of grain by young chicks. The anti-instinct sentiment was clearly expressed by the Sensationalist Jean Antoine Guer ( 1713–1764 ), who warned that instinct was an “infantile idea” that could only be held by those who are ignorant of philosophy, that traditional appeals to instincts in animals not only explained nothing but served to hinder scientific explanations, and that nothing could be more superficial than to explain behavior than appealing to so-called instincts (Richards, 1987 ).

The traditional instinct concept survived. For most people, the complex, adaptive, species-specific behaviors displayed by naïve animals (e.g., caterpillars building cocoons; infant suckling behaviors) appeared to be predetermined and unlearned. Arguably as important, however, was the resistance to the theological implications of Sensationalist philosophy.

One of the strongest reactions to Sensationalism was put forward in Germany by Herman Samuel Reimarus ( 1694–1768 ). As a natural theologian, Reimarus, sought evidence of a God in the natural world, and the species-specific, complex, and adaptive instincts of animals seemed to stand as the best evidence of God’s work. More so than any other, Reimarus extensively catalogued instincts in humans and animals. Rather than treat instincts as behaviors, he defined instincts as natural impulses (inner drives) to act that were expressed perfectly, without reflection or practice, and served adaptive goals (Richards, 1987 ). He even proposed instincts for learning, a proposal that would resurface in the mid- 20th century , as would his drive theory of instinct (Jaynes & Woodward, 1974 ).

Partly as a result of Reimarus’ efforts, the instinct concept survived going into the 19th century . But many issues surrounding the instinct concept were left unsettled. How do instincts differ from reflexive behaviors? What role does learning play in the expression of instincts, if any? Do humans have more or fewer instincts than animals? These questions would persist well into the first decades of the 20th century and ultimately fuel another anti-instinct movement.

Instinct in the 19th Century

In the 19th century , the tension about the nature and nurture of instincts in the lifetime of animals led to debates about the nature and nurture of instincts across generations . These debates dealt with whether instincts should be viewed as “inherited habits” from previous generations or whether they result from the natural selection. Debating the relative roles of neo-Lamarckian use-inheritance versus neo-Darwinian natural selection in the transmutation of species became a significant source of tension in the latter half of the 19th century . Although the neo-Lamarckian notion of instincts as being inherited habits was rejected in the 20th century , it has resurged in recent years (e.g., see Robinson & Barron, 2017 ).

Darwinian evolutionary theory required drawing distinctions between native and acquired behaviors, and, perhaps more so than before, behaviors were categorized along a continuum from the purely instinctive (unlearned), to the partially instinctive (requiring some learning), to the purely learned. Still, it was widely assumed that a purely instinctive response would be modified by experience after its first occurrence. As a result, instinct and habit were very much entangled in the lifetime of the organism. The notion of instincts as fixed and unmodifiable would not be widely advanced until after the rise of Weismann’s germ-plasm theory in the late 19thcentury .

Given their importance in evolutionary theory, there was greater interest in more objectively identifying pure instincts beyond anecdotal reports. Some of the most compelling evidence was reported by Douglas Spalding ( 1844–1877 ) in the early 1870s (see Gray, 1967 ). Spalding documented numerous instances of how naïve animals showed coordinated, seemingly adaptive responses (e.g., hiding) to objects (e.g., sight of predators) upon their first encounter, and he helped pioneer the use of the deprivation experiment to identify instinctive behaviors. This technique involved selectively depriving young animals of seemingly critical learning experiences or sensory stimulation. Should animals display some species-typical action following deprivation, then, presumably, the behavior could be labeled as unlearned or innate. In all, these studies seemed to show that animals displayed numerous adaptive responses at the very start, prior to any relevant experience. In a variety of ways, Spalding’s work anticipated 20th-century studies of innate behavior. Not only would the deprivation experiment be used as the primary means of detecting native tendencies by European zoologists and ethologists, but Spalding also showed evidence of what would later be called imprinting, critical period effects and evidence of behavioral maturation.

Reports of pure instinct did not go unchallenged. Lloyd Morgan ( 1896 ) questioned the accuracy of these reports in his own experimental work with young animals. In some cases, he failed to replicate the results and in other cases he found that instinctive behaviors were not as finely tuned to objects in the environment as had been claimed. Morgan’s research pointed to taking greater precision in identifying learned and instinctive components of behavior, but, like most at the turn of the 20th century , he did not question that animal behavior involved both learned and instinctive elements.

A focus on instinctive behaviors intensified in the 1890s as Weismann’s germ-plasm theory grew in popularity. More so than before, a sharp distinction was drawn between native and acquired characteristics, including behavior (Johnston, 1995 ). Although some psychologists continued to maintain neo-Lamarckian notions, most German (Burnham, 1972 ) and American (Cravens & Burnham, 1971 ) psychologists were quick to adopt Weismann’s theory. They envisioned a new natural science of psychology that would experimentally identify the germinally determined, invariable set of native psychological traits in species and their underlying physiological (neural) basis. However, whereas English-speaking psychologists tended to focus on how this view impacted our understanding of social institutions and its social implications, German psychologists were more interested in the longstanding philosophical implications of Weismann’s doctrine as it related to the differences (if any) between man and beast (Burnham, 1972 ).

Some anthropologists and sociologists, however, interpreted Weismann’s theory quite differently and used it elevate sociology as its own scientific discipline. In the 1890s, the French sociologist Emil Durkheim, for example, interpreted Weismann’s germinal determinants as a generic force on human behavior that influenced the development of general predispositions that are molded by the circumstances of life (Meloni, 2016 ). American anthropologists reached similar conclusions in the early 20th century (Cravens & Burnham, 1971 ). Because Weismann’s theory divorced biological inheritance from social inheritance, and because heredity was treated as a generic force, sociologists felt free to study social (eventually, “cultural”) phenomena without reference to biological or psychological concerns.

Anti-Instinct Movement in the 1920s

Despite their differences, in the first two decades of the 20th century both psychologists and sociologists generally assumed that humans and animals had some native tendencies or instincts. Concerns were even voiced that instinct had not received enough attention in psychology. Disagreements about instincts continued to focus on (the now centuries old debates of) how to conceptualize them. Were they complex reflexes, impulses, or motives to act, or should instinct be a mental faculty (like intuition), separate from reasoning and reflex (Herrnstein, 1972 )?

In America, the instinct concept came under fire following a brief paper in 1919 by Knight Dunlap titled “Are There Any Instincts?” His primary concern dealt with teleological definitions of instincts in which an instinct referred to all the activities involved in obtaining some end-state (e.g., instincts of crying, playing, feeding, reproduction, war, curiosity, or pugnacity). Defined in this way, human instincts were simply labels for human activities, but how these activities were defined was arbitrarily imposed by the researchers. Is feeding, for instance, an instinct, or is it composed of more basic instincts (like chewing and swallowing)? The arbitrariness of classifying human behavior had led to tremendous inconsistencies and confusion among psychologists.

Not all of the challenges to instinct dealt with its teleological usage. Some of the strongest criticisms were voiced by Zing-Yang Kuo throughout the 1920s. Kuo was a Chinese animal psychologist who studied under Charles Tolman at the University of California, Berkeley. Although Kuo’s attacks on instinct changed throughout the 1920s (see Honeycutt, 2011 ), he ultimately argued that all behaviors develop in experience-dependent ways and that appeals to instinct were statements of ignorance about how behaviors develop. Like Dunlap, he warned that instincts were labels with no explanatory value. To illustrate, after returning to China, he showed how the so-called rodent-killing instinct in cats often cited by instinct theorists is not found in kittens that are reared with rodents (Kuo, 1930 ). These kittens, instead, became attached to the rodents, and they resisted attempts to train rodent-killing. Echoing the point made by Guer, Kuo claimed that appeals to instinct served to stunt scientific inquiry into the developmental origins of behavior.

But Kuo did not just challenge the instinct concept. He also argued against labeling behaviors as “learned.” After all, whether an animal “learns” depends on the surrounding environmental conditions, the physiological and developmental status of the animal, and, especially, the developmental (or experiential) history of that animal. Understanding learning also required developmental analysis. Thus Kuo targeted the basic distinction between nature and nurture, and he was not alone in doing so (e.g., see Carmichael, 1925 ), but his call to reject it did not spread to mainstream American psychologists.

By the 1930s, the term instinct had fallen into disrepute in psychology, but experimental psychologists (including behaviorists) remained committed to a separation of native from acquired traits. If anything, the dividing line between native and acquired behaviors became more sharply drawn than before (Logan & Johnston, 2007 ). For some psychologists, instinct was simply rebranded in the less contentious (but still problematic) language of biological drives or motives (Herrnstein, 1972 ). Many other psychologists simply turned to describing native traits as due to “maturation” and/or “heredity” rather than “instinct.”

Fixed Action Patterns

The hereditarian instinct concept received a reboot in Europe in the 1930s with the rise of ethology led by Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen, and others. Just as animals inherit organs that perform specific functions, ethologists believed animals inherit behaviors that evolved to serve adaptive functions as well. Instincts were described as unlearned (inherited), blind, stereotyped, adaptive, fixed action patterns, impervious to change that are initiated (released) by specific stimuli in the environment.

Ethologists in 1930s and 1940s were united under the banner of innateness. They were increasingly critical of the trend by American psychologists (i.e., behaviorists) to focus on studying on how a limited number of domesticated species (e.g., white rat) responded to training in artificial settings (Burkhardt, 2005 ). Ethologists instead began with rich descriptions of animal behavior in more natural environments along with detailed analyses of the stimulus conditions that released the fixed action patterns. To test whether behavioral components were innate, ethologists relied primarily on the deprivation experiment popularized by Spalding in the 19th century . Using these methods (and others), ethologists identified numerous fascinating examples of instinctive behaviors, which captured mainstream attention.

In the early 1950s, shortly after ethology had gained professional status (Burkhardt, 2005 ), a series of challenges regarding instinct and innateness were put forth by a small cadre of North American behavioral scientists (e.g., T. C. Schneirla, Donald Hebb, Frank Beach). Arguably the most influential critique was voiced by comparative psychologist Daniel Lehrman ( 1953 ), who presented a detailed and damning critique of deprivation experiments on empirical and logical grounds. Lehrman explained that deprivation experiments isolate the animal from some but not all experiences. Thus deprivation experiments simply change what an animal experiences rather than eliminating experience altogether, and so they cannot possibly determine whether a behavior is innate (independent of experience). Instead, these experiments show what environmental conditions do not matter in the development of a behavior but do not speak to what conditions do matter .

Lehrman went on to argue that the whole endeavor to identify instinctive or innate behavior was misguided from the start. All behavior, according to Lehrman, develops from a history of interactions between an organism and its environment. If a behavior is found to develop in the absence of certain experiences, the researcher should not stop and label it as innate. Rather, research should continue to identify the conditions under which the behavior comes about. In line with Kuo, Lehrman repeated the warning that to label something as instinctive (or inherited or maturational) is a statement of ignorance about how that behavior develops and does more to stunt than promote research.

Lehrman’s critique created significant turmoil among ethologists. As a result, ethologists took greater care in using the term innate , and it led to new attempts to synthesize or re-envision learning and instinct .

Some of these attempts focused on an increased role for learning and experience in the ontogeny of species-typical behaviors. These efforts spawned significant cross-talk between ethologists and comparative psychologists to more thoroughly investigate behavioral development under natural conditions. Traditional appeals to instinct and learning (as classical and operant conditioning) were both found to be inadequate for explaining animal behavior. In their stead, these researchers focused more closely on how anatomical, physiological, experiential, and environmental conditions influenced the development of species-typical behaviors.

Tinbergen ( 1963 ) was among those ethologists who urged for greater developmental analysis of species-typical behaviors, and he included it as one of his four problems in the biological study of organisms, along with causation (mechanism), survival value (function), and evolution. Of these four problems, Tinbergen believed ethologists were especially well suited to study survival value, which he felt had been seriously neglected (Burkhardt, 2005 ).

The questions of survival value coupled with models of population genetics would gain significant momentum in the 1960s and 1970s in England and the United States with the rise of behavioral ecology and sociobiology (Griffiths, 2008 ). But because these new fields seemed to promote some kind of genetic determinism in behavioral development, they were met with much resistance and reignited a new round of nature–nurture debates in the 1970s (see Segerstrale, 2000 ).

However, not all ethologists abandoned the instinct concept. Lorenz, in particular, continued to defend the division between nature and nurture. Rather than speaking of native and acquired behaviors, Lorenz later spoke of two different sources of information for behavior (innate/genetic vs. acquired/environmental), which was more a subtle shift in language than it was an actual change in theory, as Lehrman later pointed out.

Some ethologists followed Lorenz’s lead and continued to maintain more of a traditional delineation between instinct and learning. Their alternative synthesis viewed learning as instinctive (Gould & Marler, 1987 ). They proposed that animals have evolved domain-specific “instincts to learn” that result from the its genetic predispositions and innate knowledge. To support the idea of instincts for learning, ethologists pointed to traditional ethological findings (on imprinting and birdsong learning), but they also drew from the growing body of work in experimental psychology that seemed to indicate certain types of biological effects on learning.

Biological Constraints and Preparedness

While ethology was spreading in Europe in the 1930s–1950s, behaviorism reigned in the United States. Just as ethologists were confronted with including a greater role of nurture in their studies, behaviorists were challenged to consider a greater role of nature.

Behaviorists assumed there to be some behavioral innateness (e.g., fixed action patterns, unconditioned reflexes, primary reinforcers and drives). But because behaviorists focused on learning, they tended to study animals in laboratory settings using biologically (or ecologically) irrelevant stimuli and responses to minimize any role of instinct (Johnston, 1981 ). It was widely assumed that these studies would identify general laws of learning that applied to all species regardless of the specific cues, reinforcers, and responses involved.

Challenges to the generality assumption began to accumulate in the 1960s. Some studies pointed to failures that occurred during conditioning procedures. Breland and Breland ( 1961 ), for example, reported that some complex behaviors formed through operant conditioning would eventually become “displaced” by conditioned fixed action patterns in a phenomenon they called “instinctive drift.” Studies of taste-aversion learning (e.g., Garcia & Koelling, 1966 ) also reported the failure of rats to associate certain events (e.g., flavors with shock or audiovisual stimuli with toxicosis).

Other studies were pointing to enhanced learning. In particular, it was found that rats could form strong conditioned taste aversions after only a single pairing between a novel flavor and illness. (This rapid “one trial learning” was a major focus in the research from Niko Tinbergen’s ethological laboratory.) Animals, it seemed, had evolved innate predispositions to form (or not form) certain associations.

In humans, studies of biological constraints on learning were mostly limited to fear conditioning. Evidence indicated that humans conditioned differently to (biologically or evolutionarily) fear-relevant stimuli like pictures of spiders or snakes than to fear-irrelevant stimuli like pictures of mushrooms or flowers (Ohman, Fredrikson, Hugdahl, & Rimmö, 1976 ).

These findings and others were treated as a major problem in learning theory and led to calls for a new framework to study learning from a more biologically oriented perspective that integrated the evolutionary history and innate predispositions of the species. These predispositions were described as biological “constraints” on, “preparedness,” or “adaptive specializations” for learning, all of which were consistent with the “instincts to learn” framework proposed by ethologists.

By the 1980s it was becoming clear that the biological preparedness/constraint view of learning suffered some limitations. For example, what constraints count as “biological” was questioned. It was well established that there were general constraints on learning associated with the intensity, novelty, and timing of stimuli. But, arbitrarily it seemed, these constraints were not classified as “biological” (Domjan & Galef, 1983 ). Other studies of “biological constraints” found that 5- and 10-day old rats readily learned to associated a flavor with shock (unlike in adults), but (like in adults) such conditioning was not found in 15-day-old rats (Hoffman & Spear, 1988 ). In other words, the constraint on learning was not present in young rats but developed later in life, suggesting a possible role of experience in bringing about the adult-like pattern.

Attempts to synthesize these alternatives led to numerous calls for more ecologically oriented approaches to learning not unlike the synthesis between ethology and comparative psychology in the 1960s. All ecological approaches to learning proposed that learning should be studied in the context of “natural” (recurrent and species-typical) problems that animals encounter (and have evolved to encounter) using ecologically meaningful stimuli and responses. Some argued (e.g., Johnston, 1981 ) that studies of learning should take place within the larger context of studying how animals develop and adapt to their surround. Others (Domjan & Galef, 1983 ) pointed to more of a comparative approach in studying animal learning in line with behavioral ecology that takes into account how learning can be influenced by the possible selective pressures faced by each species. Still, how to synthesize biological constraints (and evolutionary explanations) on learning with a general process approach remains a source of tension in experimental psychology.

Nativism in Mind: Innate Ideas

Nativism and empiricism in philosophy.

In the philosophy of mind, nature–nurture debates are voiced as debates between nativists and empiricists. Nativism is a philosophical position that holds that our minds have some innate (a priori to experience) knowledge, concepts, or structure at the very start of life. Empiricism, in contrast, holds that all knowledge derives from our experiences in the world.

However, rarely (if ever) were there pure nativist or empiricist positions, but the positions bespeak a persistent tension. Empiricists tended to eschew innateness and promote a view of the mental content that is built by general mechanisms (e.g., association) operating on sensory experiences, whereas nativists tend to promote a view of mind that contains domain-specific, innate processes and/or content (Simpson, Carruthers, Laurence, & Stich, 2005 ). Although the tension about mental innateness would loosen as empiricism gained prominence in philosophy and science, the strain never went away and would intensify again in the 20th century .

Nativism in 20th Century Psychology: The Case of Language Development

In the first half of the 20th century , psychologists generally assumed that knowledge was gained or constructed through experience with the world. This is not to say that psychologists did not assume some innate knowledge. The Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, for example, believed infants enter the world with some innate knowledge structures, particularly as they relate to early sensory and motor functioning (see Piaget, 1971 ). But the bulk of his work dealt with the construction of conceptual knowledge as children adapt to their worlds. By and large, there were no research programs in psychology that sought to identify innate factors in human knowledge and cognition until the 1950s (Samet & Zaitchick, 2017 )

An interest in psychological nativism was instigated in large part by Noam Chomsky’s ( 1959 ) critique of B. F. Skinner’s book on language. To explain the complexity of language, he argued, we must view language as the knowledge and application of grammatical rules. He went on to claim that the acquisition of these rules could not be attributed to any general-purpose, learning process (e.g., reinforcement). Indeed, language acquisition occurs despite very little explicit instruction. Moreover, language is special in terms of its complexity, ease, and speed of acquisition by children and in its uniqueness to humans. Instead, he claimed that our minds innately contain some language-specific knowledge that kick-starts and promotes language acquisition. He later claimed this knowledge can be considered some sort of specialized mental faculty or module he called the “language acquisition device” (Chomsky, 1965 ) or what Pinker ( 1995 ) later called the “language instinct.”

To support the idea of linguistic nativism, Chomsky and others appealed to the poverty of the stimulus argument. In short, this argument holds that our experiences in life are insufficient to explain our knowledge and abilities. When applied to language acquisition, this argument holds children’s knowledge of language (grammar) goes far beyond the limited, and sometimes broken, linguistic events that children directly encounter. Additional evidence for nativism drew upon the apparent maturational quality of language development. Despite wide variations in languages and child-rearing practices across the world, the major milestones in language development appear to unfold in children in a universal sequence and timeline, and some evidence suggested a critical period for language acquisition.

Nativist claims about language sparked intense rebuttals by empiricist-minded psychologists and philosophers. Some of these retorts tackled the logical limitations of the poverty of stimulus argument. Others pointed to the importance of learning and social interaction in driving language development, and still others showed that language (grammatical knowledge) may not be uniquely human (see Tomasello, 1995 , for review). Nativists, in due course, provided their own rebuttals to these challenges, creating a persistent tension in psychology.

Extending Nativism Beyond Language Development

In the decades that followed, nativist arguments expanded beyond language to include cognitive domains that dealt with understanding the physical, psychological, and social worlds. Developmental psychologists were finding that infants appeared to be much more knowledgeable in cognitive tasks (e.g., on understanding object permanence) and skillful (e.g., in imitating others) than had previously been thought, and at much younger ages. Infants also showed a variety of perceptual biases (e.g., preference for face-like stimuli over equally complex non-face-like stimuli) from very early on. Following the standard poverty of the stimulus argument, these findings were taken as evidence that infants enter the world with some sort of primitive, innate, representational knowledge (or domain-specific neural mechanisms) that constrains and promotes subsequent cognitive development. The nature of this knowledge (e.g., as theories or as core knowledge), however, continues to be debated (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007 ).

Empiricist-minded developmental psychologists responded by demonstrating shortcomings in the research used to support nativist claims. For example, in studies of infants’ object knowledge, the behavior of infants (looking time) in nativist studies could be attributed to relatively simple perceptual processes rather than to the infants’ conceptual knowledge (Heyes, 2014 ). Likewise, reports of human neonatal imitation not only suffered from failures to replicate but could be explained by simpler mechanisms (e.g., arousal) than true imitation (Jones, 2017 ). Finally, studies of perceptual preferences found in young infants, like newborn preferences for face-like stimuli, may not be specific preferences for faces per se but instead may reflect simpler, nonspecific perceptual biases (e.g., preferences for top-heavy visual configurations and congruency; Simion & Di Giorgio, 2015 ).

Other arguments from empiricist-minded developmental psychologists focused on the larger rationale for inferring innateness. Even if it is conceded that young infants, like two-month-olds, or even two-day-olds, display signs of conceptual knowledge, there is no good evidence to presume the knowledge is innate. Their knowledgeable behaviors could still be seen as resulting from their experiences (many of which may be nonobvious to researchers) leading up to the age of testing (Spencer et al., 2009 ).

In the 21st century , there is still no consensus about the reality, extensiveness, or quality of mental innateness. If there is innate knowledge, can experience add new knowledge or only expand the initial knowledge? Can the doctrine of innate knowledge be falsified? There are no agreed-upon answers to these questions. The recurring arguments for and against mental nativism continue to confound developmental psychologists.

Maturation Theory

The emergence of bodily changes and basic behavioral skills sometimes occurs in an invariant, predictable, and orderly sequence in a species despite wide variations in rearing conditions. These observations are often attributed to the operation of an inferred, internally driven, maturational process. Indeed, 21st-century textbooks in psychology commonly associate “nature” with “maturation,” where maturation is defined as the predetermined unfolding of the individual from a biological or genetic blueprint. Environmental factors play a necessary, but fundamentally supportive, role in the unfolding of form.

Preformationism Versus Epigenesis in the Generation of Form

The embryological generation of bodily form was debated in antiquity but received renewed interest in the 17th century . Following Aristotle, some claimed that embryological development involved “epigenesis,” defined as the successive emergence of form from a formless state. Epigenesists, however, struggled to explain what orchestrated development without appealing to Aristotelean souls. Attempts were made to invoke to natural causes like physical and chemical forces, but, despite their best efforts, the epigenesists were forced to appeal to the power of presumed, quasi-mystical, vitalistic forces (entelechies) that directed development.

The primary alternative to epigenesis was “preformationism,” which held that development involved the growth of pre-existing form from a tiny miniature (homunculus) that formed immediately after conception or was preformed in the egg or sperm. Although it seems reasonable to guess that the invention and widespread use of the microscope would immediately lay to rest any claim of homuncular preformationism, this was not the case. To the contrary, some early microscopists claimed to see signs of miniature organisms in sperm or eggs, and failures to find these miniatures were explained away (e.g., the homunculus was transparent or deflated to the point of being unrecognizable). But as microscopes improved and more detailed observations of embryological development were reported in the late 18th and 19th centuries , homuncular preformationism was finally refuted.

From Preformationism to Predeterminism

Despite the rejection of homuncular preformationism, preformationist appeals can be found throughout the 19th century . One of the most popular preformationist theories of embryological development was put forth by Ernst Haeckel in the 1860s (Gottlieb, 1992 ). He promoted a recapitulation theory (not original to Haeckel) that maintained that the development of the individual embryo passes through all the ancestral forms of its species. Ontogeny was thought to be a rapid, condensed replay of phylogeny. Indeed, for Haeckel, phylogenesis was the mechanical cause of ontogenesis. The phylogenetic evolution of the species created the maturational unfolding of embryonic form. Exactly how this unfolding takes place was less important than its phylogenetic basis.

Most embryologists were not impressed with recapitulation theory. After all, the great embryologist Karl Ernst von Baer ( 1792–1876 ) had refuted strict recapitulation decades earlier. Instead, there was greater interest in how best to explain the mechanical causes of development ushering in a new “experimental embryology.” Many experimental embryologists followed the earlier epigenesists by discussing vitalistic forces operating on the unorganized zygote. But it soon became clear that the zygote was structured, and many people believed the zygote contained special (unknown) substances that specified development. Epigenesis-minded experimental embryologists soon warned that the old homuncular preformationism was being transformed into a new predetermined preformationism.

As a result, the debates between preformationism and epigenesis were reignited in experimental embryology, but the focus of these debates shifted to the various roles of nature and nurture during development. More specifically, research focused on the extent to which early cellular differentiation was predetermined by factors internal to cells like chromosomes or cytoplasm (preformationism, nature) or involved factors (e.g., location) outside of the cell (epigenesis, nurture). The former emphasized reductionism and developmental programming, whereas the latter emphasized some sort of holistic, regulatory system responsive to internal and external conditions. The tension between viewing development as predetermined or “epigenetic” persists into the 21st century .

Preformationism gained momentum in the 20th century following the rediscovery of Mendel’s studies of heredity and the rapid rise of genetics, but not because of embryological research on the causes of early differentiation. Instead, preformationism prevailed because it seemed embryological research on the mechanisms of development could be ignored in studies of hereditary patterns.

The initial split between heredity and development can be found in Galton’s speculations but is usually attributed to Weismann’s germ-plasm theory. Weismann’s barrier seemed to posit that the germinal determinants present at conception would be the same, unaltered determinants transmitted during reproduction. This position, later dubbed as “Weismannism,” was ironically not one promoted by Weismann. Like nearly all theorists in the 19th century , he viewed the origins of variation and heredity as developmental phenomena (Amundson, 2005 ), and he claimed that the germ-plasm could be directly modified in the lifetime of the organism by environmental (e.g., climactic and dietary) conditions (Winther, 2001 ). Still, Weismann’s theory treated development as a largely predetermined affair driven by inherited, germinal determinants buffered from most developmental events. As such, it helped set the stage for a more formal divorce between heredity and development with the rise of Mendelism in the early 20th century .

Mendel’s theory of heredity was exceptional in how it split development from heredity (Amundson, 2005 ). More so than in Weismann’s theory, Mendel’s theory assumed that the internal factors that determine form and are transmitted across generations remain unaltered in the lifetime of the organism. To predict offspring outcomes, one need only know the combination of internal factors present at conception and their dominance relations. Exactly how these internal factors determined form could be disregarded. The laws of hereditary transmission of the internal factors (e.g., segregation) did not depend on the development or experiences of the organism or the experiences the organism’s ancestors. Thus the experimental study of heredity (i.e., breeding) could proceed without reference to ancestral records or embryological concerns (Amundson, 2000 ). By the mid-1920s, the Mendelian factors (now commonly called “genes”) were found to be structurally arranged on chromosomes, and the empirical study of heredity (transmission genetics) was officially divorced from studies of development.

The splitting of heredity and development found in Mendel’s and Weismann’s work met with much resistance. Neo-Lamarckian scientists, especially in the United States (Cook, 1999 ) and France (Loison, 2011 ), sought unsuccessfully to experimentally demonstrate the inheritance of acquired characteristics into the 1930s.

In Germany during the 1920s and 1930s, resistance to Mendelism dealt with the chromosomal view of Mendelian heredity championed by American geneticists who were narrowly focused on studying transmission genetics at the expense of developmental genetics. German biologists, in contrast, were much more interested in the broader roles of genes in development (and evolution). In trying to understand how genes influence development, particularly of traits of interest to embryologists, they found the Mendelian theory to be lacking. In the decades between the world wars, German biologists proposed various expanded views of heredity that included some form of cytoplasmic inheritance (Harwood, 1985 ).

Embryologists resisted the preformationist view of development throughout the early to mid- 20th century , often maintaining no divide between heredity and development, but their objections were overshadowed by genetics and its eventual synthesis with evolutionary theory. Consequently, embryological development was treated by geneticists and evolutionary biologists as a predetermined, maturational process driven by internal, “genetic” factors buffered from environmental influence.

Maturation Theory in Psychology

Maturation theory was applied to behavioral development in the 19th century in the application of Haeckel’s recapitulation theory. Some psychologists believed that the mental growth of children recapitulated the history of the human race (from savage brute to civilized human). With this in mind, many people began to more carefully document child development. Recapitulationist notions were found in the ideas of many notable psychologists in the 19th and early 20th centuries (e.g., G. S. Hall), and, as such, the concept played an important role in the origins of developmental psychology (Koops, 2015 ). But for present purposes what is most important is that children’s mental and behavioral development was thought to unfold via a predetermined, maturational process.

With the growth of genetics, maturational explanations were increasingly invoked to explain nearly all native and hereditary traits. As the instinct concept lost value in the 1920s, maturation theory gained currency, although the shift was largely a matter of semantics. For many psychologists, the language simply shifted from “instinct versus learning” to “maturation versus practice/experience” (Witty & Lehman, 1933 ).

Initial lines of evidence for maturational explanations of behavior were often the same as those that justified instinct and native traits, but new embryological research presented in the mid-1920s converged to show support for strict maturational explanations of behavioral development. In these experiments (see Wyman, 2005 , for review), spanning multiple laboratories, amphibians (salamanders and frogs) were exposed to drugs that acted as anesthetics and/or paralytics throughout the early stages of development, thus reducing sensory experience and/or motor practice. Despite the reduced sensory experiences and being unable to move, these animals showed no delays in the onset of motor development once the drugs wore off.

This maturational account of motor development in amphibians fit well with contemporaneous studies of motor development in humans. The orderly, invariant, and predictable (age-related) sequential appearance of motor skills documented in infants reared under different circumstances (in different countries and across different decades) was seen as strong evidence for a maturational account. Additional evidence was reported by Arnold Gessell and Myrtle McGraw, who independently presented evidence in the 1920s to show that the pace and sequence of motor development in infancy were not altered by special training experiences. Although the theories of these maturation theorists were more sophisticated when applied to cognitive development, their work promoted a view in which development was primarily driven by neural maturation rather than experience (Thelen, 2000 ).

Critical and Sensitive Periods

As the maturation account of behavioral development gained ground, it became clear that environmental input played a more informative role than had previously been thought. Environmental factors were found to either disrupt or induce maturational changes at specific times during development. Embryological research suggested that there were well-delineated time periods of heightened sensitivity in which specific experimental manipulations (e.g., tissue transplantations) could induce irreversible developmental changes, but the same manipulation would have no effect outside of that critical period.

In the 1950s–1960s a flurry of critical period effects were reported in birds and mammals across a range of behaviors including imprinting, attachment, socialization, sensory development, bird song learning, and language development (Michel & Tyler, 2005 ). Even though these findings highlighted an important role of experience in behavioral development, evidence of critical periods was usually taken to imply some rigid form of biological determinism (Oyama, 1979 ).

As additional studies were conducted on critical period effects, it became clear that many of the reported effects were more gradual, variable, experience-dependent, and not necessarily as reversible as was previously assumed. In light of these reports, there was a push in the 1970s (e.g., Connolly, 1972 ) to substitute “sensitive period” for “critical period” to avoid the predeterminist connotations associated with the latter and to better appreciate that these periods simply describe (not explain) certain temporal aspects of behavioral development. As a result, a consensus emerged that behaviors should not be attributed to “time” or “age” but to the developmental history and status of the animal under investigation (Michel & Tyler, 2005 ).

Heredity and Genetics

In the decades leading up to and following the start of the 20th century , it was widely assumed that many psychological traits (not just instincts) were inherited or “due to heredity,” although the underlying mechanisms were unknown. Differences in intelligence, personality, and criminality within and between races and sexes were largely assumed to be hereditary and unalterable by environmental intervention (Gould, 1996 ). The evidence to support these views in humans was often derived from statistical analyses of how various traits tended to run in families. But all too frequently, explanations of data were clouded by pre-existing, hereditarian assumptions.

Human Behavioral Genetics

The statistical study of inherited human (physical, mental, and behavioral) differences was pioneered by Galton ( 1869 ). Although at times Galton wrote that nature and nurture were so intertwined as to be inseparable, he nevertheless devised statistical methods to separate their effects. In the 1860s and 1870s, Galton published reports purporting to show how similarities in intellect (genius, talent, character, and eminence) in European lineages appeared to be a function of degree of relatedness. Galton considered, but dismissed, environmental explanations of his data, leading him to confirm his belief that nature was stronger than nurture.

Galton also introduced the use of twin studies to tease apart the relative impact of nature versus nurture, but the twin method he used was markedly different from later twin studies used by behavioral geneticists. Galton tracked the life history of twins who were judged to be very similar or very dissimilar near birth (i.e., by nature) to test the power of various postnatal environments (nurture) that might make them more or less similar over time. Here again, Galton concluded that nature overpowers nurture.

Similar pedigree (e.g., the Kallikak study; see Zenderland, 2001 ) and twin studies appeared in the early 1900s, but the first adoption study and the modern twin method (which compares monozygotic to dizygotic twin pairs) did not appear until the 1920s (Rende, Plomin, & Vandenberg, 1990 ). These reports led to a flurry of additional work on the inheritance of mental and behavioral traits over the next decade.

Behavioral genetic research peaked in the 1930s but rapidly lost prominence due in large part to its association with the eugenics movement (spearheaded by Galton) but also because of the rise and eventual hegemony of behaviorism and the social sciences in the United States. Behavioral genetics resurged in the 1960s with the rising tide of nativism in psychology, and returned to its 1930s-level prominence in the 1970s (McGue & Gottesman, 2015 ).

The resurgence brought with a new statistical tool: the heritability statistic. The origins of heritability trace back to early attempts to synthesize Mendelian genetics with biometrics by Ronald Fisher and others. This synthesis ushered in a new field of quantitative genetics and it marked a new way of thinking about nature and nurture. The shift was to no longer think about nature and nurture as causes of traits in individuals but as causes of variation in traits between populations of individuals. Eventually, heritability came to refer to the amount of variance in a population sample that could be statistically attributed to genetic variation in that sample. Kinship (especially twin) studies provided seemingly straightforward ways of partitioning variation in population trait attributes into genetic versus environmental sources.

Into the early 21st century , hundreds of behavioral genetic studies of personality, intelligence, and psychopathology were reported. With rare exceptions, these studies converge to argue for a pervasive influence of genetics on human psychological variation.

These studies have also fueled much controversy. Citing in part behavioral genetic research, the educational psychologist Arthur Jensen ( 1969 ) claimed that the differences in intelligence and educational achievement in the United States between black and white students appeared to have a strong genetic basis. He went on to assume that because these racial differences appeared hereditary, they were likely impervious to environmental (educational) intervention. His article fanned the embers of past eugenics practices and ignited fiery responses (e.g., Hirsch, 1975 ). The ensuing debates not only spawned a rethinking of intelligence and how to measure it, but they ushered in a more critical look at the methods and assumptions of behavioral genetics.

Challenges to Behavioral Genetics

Many of the early critiques of behavioral genetics centered on interpreting the heritability statistic commonly calculated in kinship (family, twin, and adoption) studies. Perhaps more so than any other statistic, heritability has been persistently misinterpreted by academics and laypersons alike (Lerner, 2002 ). Contrary to popular belief, heritability tells us nothing about the relative impact of genetic and environmental factors on the development of traits in individuals. It deals with accounting for trait variation between people, not the causes of traits within people. As a result, a high heritability does not indicate anything about the fixity of traits or their imperviousness to environmental influence (contra Jensen), and a low heritability does not indicate an absence of genetic influence on trait development. Worse still, heritability does not even indicate anything about the role of genetics in generating the differences between people.

Other challenges to heritability focused not on its interpretation but on its underlying computational assumptions. Most notably, heritability analyses assume that genetic and environmental contributions to trait differences are independent and additive. The interaction between genetic and environmental factors were dismissed a priori in these analyses. Studies of development, however, show that no factor (genes, hormones, parenting, schooling) operates independently, making it impossible to quantify how much of a given trait in a person is due to any causal factor. Thus heritability analyses are bound to be misleading because they are based on biologically implausible and logically indefensible assumptions about development (Gottlieb, 2003 ).

Aside from heritability, kinship studies have been criticized for not being able to disentangle genetic and environmental effects on variation. It had long been known that that in family (pedigree) studies, environmental and genetic factors are confounded. Twin and adoption studies seemed to provide unique opportunities to statistically disentangle these effects, but these studies are also deeply problematic in assumptions and methodology. There are numerous plausible environmental reasons for why monozygotic twin pairs could resemble each other more than dizygotic twin pairs or why adoptive children might more closely resemble their biological than their adoptive parents (Joseph & Ratner, 2013 ).

A more recent challenge to behavioral genetics came from an unlikely source. Advances in genomic scanning in the 21st century made it possible in a single study to correlate thousands of genetic polymorphisms with variation in the psychological profiles (e.g., intelligence, memory, temperament, psychopathology) of thousands of people. These “genome-wide association” studies seemed to have the power and precision to finally identify genetic contributions to heritability at the level of single nucleotides. Yet, these studies consistently found only very small effects.

The failure to find large effects came to be known as the “missing heritability” problem (Maher, 2008 ). To account for the missing heritability, some behavioral geneticists and molecular biologists asserted that important genetic polymorphisms remain unknown, they may be too rare to detect, and/or that current studies are just not well equipped to handle gene–gene interactions. These studies were also insensitive to epigenetic profiles (see the section on Behavioral Epigenetics), which deal with differences in gene expression. Even when people share genes, they may differ in whether those genes get expressed in their lifetimes.

But genome-wide association studies faced an even more problematic issue: Many of these studies failed to replicate (Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2015 ). For those who viewed heritability analyses as biologically implausible, the small effect sizes and failures to replicate in genome-wide association studies were not that surprising. The search for independent genetic effects was bound to fail, because genes simply do not operate independently during development.

Behavioral Epigenetics

Epigenetics was a term coined in the 1940s by the developmental biologist Conrad Waddington to refer to a new field of study that would examine how genetic factors interact with local environmental conditions to bring about the embryological development of traits. By the end of the 20th century , epigenetics came to refer to the study of how nongenetic, molecular mechanisms physically regulate gene expression patterns in cells and across cell lineages. The most-studied mechanisms involve organic compounds (e.g., methyl-groups) that physically bind to DNA or the surrounding proteins that package DNA. The addition or removal of these compounds can activate or silence gene transcription. Different cell types have different, stable epigenetic markings, and these markings are recreated during cell division so that cells so marked give rise to similar types of cells. Epigenetic changes were known to occur during developmental periods of cellular differentiation (e.g., during embryogenesis), but not until 2004 was it discovered that these changes can occur at other periods in the life, including after birth (Roth, 2013 )

Of interest to psychologists were reports that different behavioral and physiological profiles (e.g., stress reactivity) of animals were associated with different epigenetic patterns in the nervous system (Moore, 2015 ). Furthermore, these different epigenetic patterns could be established or modified by environmental factors (e.g., caregiving practices, training regimes, or environmental enrichment), and, under certain conditions, they remain stable over long periods of time (from infancy to adulthood).

Because epigenetic research investigates the physical interface between genes and environment, it represents an exciting advance in understanding the interaction of nature and nurture. Despite some warnings that the excitement over behavioral epigenetic research may be premature (e.g., Miller, 2010 ), for many psychologists, epigenetics underscores how development involves both nature and nurture.

For others, what is equally exciting is the additional evidence epigenetics provides to show that the genome is an interactive and regulated system. Once viewed as the static director of development buffered from environment influence, the genome is better described as a developing resource of the cell (Moore, 2015 ). More broadly, epigenetics also points to how development is not a genetically (or biologically) predetermined affair. Instead, epigenetics provides additional evidence that development is a probabilistic process, contingent upon factors internal and external to the organism. In this sense, epigenetics is well positioned to help dissolve the nature–nurture dichotomy.

Beyond Nature–Nurture

In the final decades of the 20th century , a position was articulated to move beyond the dichotomous nature–nurture framework. The middle-ground position on nature–nurture did not seem up to the task of explaining the origins of form, and it brought about more confusion than clarity. The back-and-forth (or balanced) pendulum between nature- and nurture-based positions throughout history had only gone in circles. Moving forward would require moving beyond such dichotomous thinking (Johnston, 1987 ).

The anti-dichotomy position, referred to as the Developmentalist tradition, was expressed in a variety of systems-based, metatheoretical approaches to studying development, all of which extended the arguments against nature–nurture expressed earlier by Kuo and Lehrman. The central problem with all nativist claims according to Developmentalists is a reliance on preformationism (or predeterminism).

The problem with preformationism, they argue, besides issues of evidence, is that it is an anti-developmental mindset. It presumes the existence of the very thing(s) one wishes to explain and, consequently, discourages developmental analyses. To claim that some knowledge is innate effectively shuts down research on the developmental origins of that knowledge. After all, why look for the origins of conceptual knowledge if that knowledge is there all along? Or why search for any experiential contributions to innate behaviors if those behaviors by definition develop independently of experience? In the words of Developmentalists Thelen and Adolph ( 1992 ), nativism “leads to a static science, with no principles for understanding change or for confronting the ultimate challenge of development, the source of new forms in structure and function” (p. 378).

A commitment to maturational theory is likely one of the reasons why studies of motor development remained relatively dormant for decades following its heyday in the 1930–1940s (Thelen, 2000 ). Likewise, a commitment to maturational theory also helps explain the delay in neuroscience to examine how the brain physically changes in response to environmental conditions, a line of inquiry that only began in the 1960s.

In addition to the theoretical pitfalls of nativism, Developmentalists point to numerous studies that show how some seemingly native behaviors and innate constraints on learning are driven by the experiences of animals. For example, the comparative psychologist Gilbert Gottlieb ( 1971 ) showed that newly hatched ducklings display a naïve preference for a duck maternal call over a (similarly novel) chicken maternal call (Gottlieb, 1971 ), even when duck embryos were repeatedly exposed to the chicken call prior to hatching (Gottlieb, 1991 ). It would be easy to conclude that ducklings have an innate preference to approach their own species call and that they are biologically constrained (contraprepared) in learning a chicken call. However, Gottlieb found that the naïve preference for the duck call stemmed from exposure to the duck embryos’ own (or other) vocalizations in the days before hatching (Gottlieb, 1971 ). Exposure to these vocalizations not only made duck maternal calls more attractive, but it hindered the establishment of a preference for heterospecific calls. When duck embryos were reared in the absence of the embryonic vocalizations (by devocalizing embryos in ovo ) and exposed instead to chicken maternal calls, the newly hatched ducklings preferred chicken over duck calls (Gottlieb, 1991 ). These studies clearly showed how seemingly innate, biologically based preferences and constraints on learning derived from prenatal sensory experiences.

For Developmentalists, findings like these suggest that nativist explanations of any given behavior are statements of ignorance about how that behavior actually develops. As Kuo and Lehrman made clear, nativist terms are labels, not explanations. Although such appeals are couched in respectable, scientific language (e.g., “X is due to maturation, genes, or heredity”), they argue it would be more accurate simply to say that “We don’t know what causes X” or that “X is not due to A, B, or C.” Indeed, for Developmentalists, the more we unpack the complex dynamics about how traits develop, the less likely we are to use labels like nature or nurture (Blumberg, 2005 ).

On the other hand, Developmentalists recognize that labeling a behavior as “learned” also falls short as an explanatory construct. The empiricist position that knowledge or behavior is learned does not adequately take into account that what is learned and how easily something is learned depends on (a) the physiological and developmental status of the person, (b) the nature of the surrounding physical and social context in which learning takes place, and the (c) experiential history of the person. The empiricist tendency to say “X is learned or acquired through experience” can also short-circuit developmental analyses in the same way as nativist claims.

Still, Developmentalists appreciate that classifying behaviors can be useful. For example, the development of some behaviors may be more robust, reliably emerging across a range of environments and/or remaining relatively resistant to change, whereas others are more context-specific and malleable. Some preferences for stimuli require direct experience with those stimuli. Other preferences require less obvious (indirect) types of experiences. Likewise, it can still be useful to describe some behaviors in the ways shown in Table 1 . Developmentalists simply urge psychologists to resist the temptation to treat these behavioral classifications as implying different kinds of explanations (Johnston, 1987 ).

Rather than treat nature and nurture as separate developmental sources of causation (see Figure 1 ), Developmentalists argue that a more productive way of thinking about nature–nurture is to reframe the division as that between product and process (Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2015 ). The phenotype or structure (one’s genetic, epigenetic, anatomical, physiological, behavioral, and mental profile) of an individual at any given time can be considered one’s “nature.” “Nurture” then refers to the set of processes that generate, maintain, and transform one’s nature (Figure 2 ). These processes involve the dynamic interplay between phenotypes and environments.

Figure 2. The developmentalist alternative view of nature–nurture as product–process. Developmentalists view nature and nurture not as separate sources of causation in development (see Figure 1 ) but as a distinction between process (nurture) and product (nature).

It is hard to imagine any set of findings that will end debates about the roles of nature and nurture in human development. Why? First, more so than other assumptions about human development, the nature–nurture dichotomy is deeply entrenched in popular culture and the life sciences. Second, throughout history, the differing positions on nature and nurture were often driven by other ideological, philosophical, and sociopolitical commitments. Thus the essential source of tension in debates about nature–nurture is not as much about research agendas or evidence as about basic differences in metatheoretical positions (epistemological and ontological assumptions) about human behavior and development (Overton, 2006 ).

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Study Suggests Genetics as a Cause, Not Just a Risk, for Some Alzheimer’s

People with two copies of the gene variant APOE4 are almost certain to get Alzheimer’s, say researchers, who proposed a framework under which such patients could be diagnosed years before symptoms.

A colorized C.T. scan showing a cross-section of a person's brain with Alzheimer's disease. The colors are red, green and yellow.

By Pam Belluck

Scientists are proposing a new way of understanding the genetics of Alzheimer’s that would mean that up to a fifth of patients would be considered to have a genetically caused form of the disease.

Currently, the vast majority of Alzheimer’s cases do not have a clearly identified cause. The new designation, proposed in a study published Monday, could broaden the scope of efforts to develop treatments, including gene therapy, and affect the design of clinical trials.

It could also mean that hundreds of thousands of people in the United States alone could, if they chose, receive a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s before developing any symptoms of cognitive decline, although there currently are no treatments for people at that stage.

The new classification would make this type of Alzheimer’s one of the most common genetic disorders in the world, medical experts said.

“This reconceptualization that we’re proposing affects not a small minority of people,” said Dr. Juan Fortea, an author of the study and the director of the Sant Pau Memory Unit in Barcelona, Spain. “Sometimes we say that we don’t know the cause of Alzheimer’s disease,” but, he said, this would mean that about 15 to 20 percent of cases “can be tracked back to a cause, and the cause is in the genes.”

The idea involves a gene variant called APOE4. Scientists have long known that inheriting one copy of the variant increases the risk of developing Alzheimer’s, and that people with two copies, inherited from each parent, have vastly increased risk.

The new study , published in the journal Nature Medicine, analyzed data from over 500 people with two copies of APOE4, a significantly larger pool than in previous studies. The researchers found that almost all of those patients developed the biological pathology of Alzheimer’s, and the authors say that two copies of APOE4 should now be considered a cause of Alzheimer’s — not simply a risk factor.

The patients also developed Alzheimer’s pathology relatively young, the study found. By age 55, over 95 percent had biological markers associated with the disease. By 65, almost all had abnormal levels of a protein called amyloid that forms plaques in the brain, a hallmark of Alzheimer’s. And many started developing symptoms of cognitive decline at age 65, younger than most people without the APOE4 variant.

“The critical thing is that these individuals are often symptomatic 10 years earlier than other forms of Alzheimer’s disease,” said Dr. Reisa Sperling, a neurologist at Mass General Brigham in Boston and an author of the study.

She added, “By the time they are picked up and clinically diagnosed, because they’re often younger, they have more pathology.”

People with two copies, known as APOE4 homozygotes, make up 2 to 3 percent of the general population, but are an estimated 15 to 20 percent of people with Alzheimer’s dementia, experts said. People with one copy make up about 15 to 25 percent of the general population, and about 50 percent of Alzheimer’s dementia patients.

The most common variant is called APOE3, which seems to have a neutral effect on Alzheimer’s risk. About 75 percent of the general population has one copy of APOE3, and more than half of the general population has two copies.

Alzheimer’s experts not involved in the study said classifying the two-copy condition as genetically determined Alzheimer’s could have significant implications, including encouraging drug development beyond the field’s recent major focus on treatments that target and reduce amyloid.

Dr. Samuel Gandy, an Alzheimer’s researcher at Mount Sinai in New York, who was not involved in the study, said that patients with two copies of APOE4 faced much higher safety risks from anti-amyloid drugs.

When the Food and Drug Administration approved the anti-amyloid drug Leqembi last year, it required a black-box warning on the label saying that the medication can cause “serious and life-threatening events” such as swelling and bleeding in the brain, especially for people with two copies of APOE4. Some treatment centers decided not to offer Leqembi, an intravenous infusion, to such patients.

Dr. Gandy and other experts said that classifying these patients as having a distinct genetic form of Alzheimer’s would galvanize interest in developing drugs that are safe and effective for them and add urgency to current efforts to prevent cognitive decline in people who do not yet have symptoms.

“Rather than say we have nothing for you, let’s look for a trial,” Dr. Gandy said, adding that such patients should be included in trials at younger ages, given how early their pathology starts.

Besides trying to develop drugs, some researchers are exploring gene editing to transform APOE4 into a variant called APOE2, which appears to protect against Alzheimer’s. Another gene-therapy approach being studied involves injecting APOE2 into patients’ brains.

The new study had some limitations, including a lack of diversity that might make the findings less generalizable. Most patients in the study had European ancestry. While two copies of APOE4 also greatly increase Alzheimer’s risk in other ethnicities, the risk levels differ, said Dr. Michael Greicius, a neurologist at Stanford University School of Medicine who was not involved in the research.

“One important argument against their interpretation is that the risk of Alzheimer’s disease in APOE4 homozygotes varies substantially across different genetic ancestries,” said Dr. Greicius, who cowrote a study that found that white people with two copies of APOE4 had 13 times the risk of white people with two copies of APOE3, while Black people with two copies of APOE4 had 6.5 times the risk of Black people with two copies of APOE3.

“This has critical implications when counseling patients about their ancestry-informed genetic risk for Alzheimer’s disease,” he said, “and it also speaks to some yet-to-be-discovered genetics and biology that presumably drive this massive difference in risk.”

Under the current genetic understanding of Alzheimer’s, less than 2 percent of cases are considered genetically caused. Some of those patients inherited a mutation in one of three genes and can develop symptoms as early as their 30s or 40s. Others are people with Down syndrome, who have three copies of a chromosome containing a protein that often leads to what is called Down syndrome-associated Alzheimer’s disease .

Dr. Sperling said the genetic alterations in those cases are believed to fuel buildup of amyloid, while APOE4 is believed to interfere with clearing amyloid buildup.

Under the researchers’ proposal, having one copy of APOE4 would continue to be considered a risk factor, not enough to cause Alzheimer’s, Dr. Fortea said. It is unusual for diseases to follow that genetic pattern, called “semidominance,” with two copies of a variant causing the disease, but one copy only increasing risk, experts said.

The new recommendation will prompt questions about whether people should get tested to determine if they have the APOE4 variant.

Dr. Greicius said that until there were treatments for people with two copies of APOE4 or trials of therapies to prevent them from developing dementia, “My recommendation is if you don’t have symptoms, you should definitely not figure out your APOE status.”

He added, “It will only cause grief at this point.”

Finding ways to help these patients cannot come soon enough, Dr. Sperling said, adding, “These individuals are desperate, they’ve seen it in both of their parents often and really need therapies.”

Pam Belluck is a health and science reporter, covering a range of subjects, including reproductive health, long Covid, brain science, neurological disorders, mental health and genetics. More about Pam Belluck

The Fight Against Alzheimer’s Disease

Alzheimer’s is the most common form of dementia, but much remains unknown about this daunting disease..

How is Alzheimer’s diagnosed? What causes Alzheimer’s? We answered some common questions .

A study suggests that genetics can be a cause of Alzheimer’s , not just a risk, raising the prospect of diagnosis years before symptoms appear.

Determining whether someone has Alzheimer’s usually requires an extended diagnostic process . But new criteria could lead to a diagnosis on the basis of a simple blood test .

The F.D.A. has given full approval to the Alzheimer’s drug Leqembi. Here is what to know about i t.

Alzheimer’s can make communicating difficult. We asked experts for tips on how to talk to someone with the disease .

Inorganic Chemistry Frontiers

Research progress of optimized membranes for vanadium redox flow battery.

Energy storage systems are considered as one of the key components for large-scale utilization of renewable energy which are usually has an intermittent nature for production. Vanadium redox flow battery (VRFB), as one of the most promising electrochemical energy storage systems for large-scale application, has attracted great attention in recent years. To achieve high efficiency of VRFB, the polymer electrolyte membrane between positive electrode and negative electrode, is expected to effectively transfer protons for internal circuits, and also to prevent the cross-over of catholyte and anolyte. However, the high cost of membrane materials is currently a crucial factor hindering the large-scale installation of VRFB. In this review, the key aspects related to polymer electrolyte membranes in VRFB are summarized, including functional requirements, characterization method, transport mechanism, and classification of typical membranes. According to the classification, the latest research progresses of polymer electrolyte membrane in VRFB are discussed in each section. In the end, the research and development of next generation membrane materials for VRFB is proposed, aiming to present a future perspective of this component in full battery and to inspire the coming effort for building high efficiency VRFB in grid.

This article is part of the themed collection: 2024 Inorganic Chemistry Frontiers Review-type Articles

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v.9; 2013 Dec

Perceptions of nature, nurture and behaviour

Mairi levitt.

Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religious Studies, Lancaster University, County South, Lancaster, LA1 4YL UK

Trying to separate out nature and nurture as explanations for behaviour, as in classic genetic studies of twins and families, is now said to be both impossible and unproductive. In practice the nature-nurture model persists as a way of framing discussion on the causes of behaviour in genetic research papers, as well as in the media and lay debate. Social and environmental theories of crime have been dominant in criminology and in public policy while biological theories have been seen as outdated and discredited. Recently, research into genetic variations associated with aggressive and antisocial behaviour has received more attention in the media. This paper explores ideas on the role of nature and nurture in violent and antisocial behaviour through interviews and open-ended questionnaires among lay publics. There was general agreement that everybody’s behaviour is influenced to varying degrees by both genetic and environmental factors but deterministic accounts of causation, except in exceptional circumstances, were rejected. Only an emphasis on nature was seen as dangerous in its consequences, for society and for individuals themselves. Whereas academic researchers approach the debate from their disciplinary perspectives which may or may not engage with practical and policy issues, the key issue for the public was what sort of explanations of behaviour will lead to the best outcomes for all concerned.

Trying to separate out nature and nurture as explanations for behaviour, as in classic genetic studies of twins and families, is now said to be both impossible and unproductive. The nature-nurture debate is declared to be officially redundant by social scientists and scientists, ‘outdated, naive and unhelpful’ (Craddock, 2011 , p.637), ‘a false dichotomy’ (Traynor 2010 , p.196). Geneticists argue that nature and nurture interact to affect behaviour through complex and not yet fully understood ways, but, in practice, the debate continues 1 . Research papers by psychologists and geneticists still use the terms nature and nurture, or genes and environment, to consider their relative influences on, for example, temperament and personality, childhood obesity and toddler sleep patterns (McCrae et al., 2000 ; Anderson et al., 2007 ; Brescianini, 2011 ). These papers separate out and quantify the relative influences of nature/genes and nurture/environment. These papers might be taken to indicate how individuals acquire their personality traits or toddlers acquire their sleep patterns; part is innate or there at birth and part is acquired after birth due to environmental influences. The findings actually refer to technical heritability which is, ‘the proportion of phenotypic variation attributable to genetic differences between individuals’ (Keller, 2010 , p.57). In practice, as Keller illustrates, there is ‘slippage’ between heritability, meaning a trait being biologically transmissible, and technical heritability. This is not simply a mistake made by the media or ‘media hype’ but is, she argues, ‘almost impossible to avoid’ (ibid, p.71).

While researchers are aware of the complexity of gene-environment interaction, the ‘nature and nurture’ model persists as a simple way of framing discussion on the causes of behaviours. It is also a site of struggle between (and within) academic disciplines and, through influence on policy, has consequences for those whose behaviours are investigated. There is general agreement between social scientists and geneticists about the past abuses of genetics but disagreement over whether it will be possible for the new behavioural genetics to avoid discrimination and eugenic practices, and about the likely benefits that society will gain from this research (Parens et al. 2006 , xxi). In a special issue of the American Journal of Sociology ‘Exploring genetics and social structure’, Bearman considers the reasons why sociologists are concerned about genetic effects on behaviour; first they see it as legitimating existing societal arrangements, which assumes that ‘genetic’ is unchangeable. Second, if sociologists draw on genetic research it contaminates the sociological enterprise and, third, whatever claims are made to the contrary, it is a eugenicist project (Bearman, 2008 , vi). As we will see all these concerns were expressed by the publics in this study. Policy makers and publics are interested in explaining problem behaviour in order to change/control it, not in respecting disciplinary boundaries, and will expect the role of genetics to be considered alongside social factors. 2

Social and environmental theories of criminal behaviour have been dominant in criminology, and in public policy (Walsh, 2009 , p.7). Genetic disorders and mental illness have provided explanations for a small minority of offenders with specific conditions. A 2007 survey of American criminologists found that ‘criminologists of all ideological persuasions view alleged biosocial causes of crime (hormonal, genetic, and evolutionary factors and possibly low intelligence) as relatively unimportant’ compared with environmental causes (Cooper et al., 2010 ). Sociology textbooks have typically discussed biological theories of criminality only as discredited (Haralambos and Holborn, 2004 , Giddens, 2009 ). Biosocial theories are seen as attractive to ‘agents of social control’ and to be more likely to lead to abusive treatment of offenders. However, with increasing research and public interest in genetics more attention has been paid to biological aspects of crime and to genetic variations within the normal range. Research has focussed on violent and antisocial behaviours which are criminal or may be seen as a precursor to criminal behaviour, for example, antisocial behaviour in young people. Media reports have headlined ‘warrior genes’, ‘the aggressive gene’ and the ‘get out of jail free gene’, all referring to levels of monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) (Lea and Chambers, 2007 ; Levitt and Pieri, 2009 ) 3 . Think tanks and ethics groups have considered the ethics and practicalities of genetic testing for behavioural traits (Campbell and Ross, 2004 ; Dixon, 2005 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002 ).

An attraction of research into genes and behaviour is the hope that identifying a genetic factor that is correlated with an increased incidence of, say, violent and antisocial behaviour, will point to a way of reducing such behaviour. Fotaki discusses the attraction of biological explanations of inequalities in health based on the assumption that genetic interventions ‘would succeed in addressing the causes of ill health that public health policies cannot.’ (Fotaki, 2011 , p.641). The danger is that biological explanations ‘are once more employed for political purposes to explain away the social roots of health inequalities.’ (ibid). Social scientists, and criminologists, have presented biological/genetic explanations of behaviour as dangerous in terms of their potential effect on the individuals or groups identified as genetically at risk. There are obvious dangers of discrimination against, and the stigmatisation of, already vulnerable groups who would be the first to be tested i.e. ‘problem’ families or minority ethnic groups. Discrimination could affect education, employment and family life. The effect of an individual being told s/he has a risk based on a genetic test has been much discussed in relation to health risks (Claassen et al., 2010 . While such information could be motivating, because it is personalised, it can also induce a fatalistic attitude that discourages the person from taking preventative measures. Claasen et al. conclude that it is important to identify those vulnerable to the fatalistic impact and to tailor health risk information (ibid p.194). Identifying risk for behaviour, rather than for disease, is likely to be more problematic because of the difficulty of finding preventative measures that are within the individuals’ own control.

..using DNA to assess risk, make a diagnosis or tailor treatments, may weaken beliefs in the efficacy of preventive behaviour and reinforce biological ways of reducing risk, resulting in a preference for medication as opposed to behavioural means to control or reduce risk (ibid, xiv).

Claasen et al.’s comment on genetic tests for health conditions could apply equally to parents given a behavioural risk for their young child from a genetic test, perhaps before any problem behaviour was evident. The test result could weaken parents’ belief that they could take action to prevent/reduce the risk of the behaviour developing in their child and pharmaceutical solutions, as posited by Caspi et al. might not be available (Caspi et al., 2002 , xvii). However, it is not necessarily the case that evidence of genetic or biological influence on behaviour leads to more punitive treatment. DeLisi et al. give the example of the use of findings from adolescent brain science in the case of Roper v. Simmons in the US which abolished the death penalty for adolescents. On the basis of the research it was stated that young people under the age of 18 ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures including peer pressure’ (DeLisa et al., 2010 , p.25) When evidence on genetic traits associated with criminal behaviour has been allowed by courts, mainly in the US, it has so far more often been accepted as a mitigating rather than an aggravating factor in the offenders’ behaviour (Denno, 2009 , Farahany and Coleman, 2006 ).

Environmental explanations of behaviour can, of course, also be presented as deterministic, claiming a closed future for those experiencing poverty and disadvantage. However, it is biological explanations that have caused more concern not only because of the history of eugenics but also because they may be seen as more fundamental, being there from birth, and as harder to change. The public in surveys are reported to see the greatest role for genetic factors in physical features, a lesser role in health conditions and a smaller role still in human behaviour (Condit, 2010 , p.619).

Public perceptions

The model of nature/genes and nurture/environment is still used in behavioural genetics, as well as in popular culture, and has implications for public policy, including the treatment of offenders who claim that a genetic trait has influenced their criminal behaviour. The aim of this research was to explore ideas on the causes of behaviour, particularly violent and antisocial behaviour and examine how respondents use the nature/nurture model. This qualitative research looks at the ways in which lay publics in different age groups conceptualise the factors and influences that made them who they are and their explanations for the behaviour of other people; especially violent behaviour. It was hypothesised that the increased research and media emphasis on the role of genetic factors in health and behaviour might result in an increasing interest in ‘nature’, biology and genes as explanations for behaviour particularly among the young, but, when explaining their own behaviour people might prefer to see themselves as agents with control over their lives. By exploring explanations of behaviour with respondents from different generations, age differences should be apparent.

The views of 78 respondents from 3 generations were gathered by individual interview and questionnaires, using the same open ended questions and responses to two real-life criminal court case studies where environmental or genetic factors had been used by the defence team. Respondents were drawn from a group of retired people participating in an informal ‘senior learners’ programme at Lancaster University, a group of their mainly younger relatives and, in order to recruit more third generation respondents, a group of first year students taking a criminology module. The senior learners group had a programme of talks and discussions and could attend undergraduate lectures. They had, by definition, shown an interest in current issues in a range of fields. There were no educational or age requirements for the group but all the volunteers were retired from paid work and were aged from around 65 years to over 80 years.. They had had similar careers to those popular with social science students; social work, probation, teaching and administrative positions. The senior learners were asked to pass on questionnaires to younger relatives to investigate age differences in attitudes. The first 13 senior learners who responded were interviewed but as only 15 questionnaires were received from their relatives ethical approval was obtained to distribute the same questionnaire to Lancaster University students taking the criminology first year module. Most students were enrolled on social science degrees, including psychology and sociology, and age 18 or 19. While the sample of senior learners and relatives had only a few more women than men, 78 per cent of the students were female reflecting the gender balance on the module as a whole. This makes it difficult to comment on any gender differences in responses. No claims to generalisability are made for this exploratory study. Responses were coded and entered on SPSS and also analysed thematically using Atlas-ti.

The introduction to the interviews and questionnaire was ‘I am interested in your views and ideas on what makes us the people we are; what makes people behave the way they do? What is the influence of nature and nurture?’ The terms, nature and nurture were not used again until the final question. Although the terms were not defined all respondents readily used them with consistent meanings. They identified ‘nature’ with biology, ‘what you are born with’ and genes or DNA and nurture with all aspects of the environment including parenting, socio-economic conditions, the food you eat, culture and other people. Their understanding of environment was therefore similar to that used by genetic researchers; environment as everything that is external to the individual, although they tended to refer more to the social than the biological environment.

A general warm-up question asked whether, in their own family, there was anything they thought of as a ‘family trait’. Then respondents were asked; ‘Imagine a baby swapped at birth and brought up in a completely different family– which influences do you think would be most important – the influence of the birth parents or the influences of the new family- and why?’ 4 The rest of the interview schedule, and the subsequent questionnaire, consisted of open-ended questions.

Respondents were asked how they would explain different kinds of behaviour if they came across a child who is kind and considerate; a young person who displays antisocial and aggressive behaviour adult and an adult with criminal convictions for violence. This was to tap into any differences in general explanations of good and bad behaviour in young people and adults. A quotation about the child killers in the Bulger case being ‘unreformable’ was used to ascertain whether they saw some types of violent behavior, and the actors concerned, as immutable. In order to see how respondents conceptualized the influences of nature/biology/genes and environment/people/experiences in their own lives, respondents were asked to write down ‘what or who made you what you are today’ and any explanation of their responses. Comments were gathered on the introduction of an environmental factor (childhood neglect) by the defence in a violent attack by two young boys in England, and on a genetic factor (MAOA levels) introduced by the defence in an criminal court in Italy. Respondents were asked how they thought such evidence should be dealt with; whether it should affect the degree of blame and whether it should affect criminal responsibility. The final question asked if it mattered ‘for individuals or society’ whether nature or nurture was seen as most important in explaining problem behaviour. Those interviewed were asked if they had any further comments and there was a space for any additional comments on the questionnaire.

This paper focuses on the ways in which respondents employed nature/genes and nurture/environment in their responses as a whole and what other concepts they drew on when explaining behaviour.

Respondents’ explanations of what makes people behave the way they do are discussed through three themes.

Nurture is more influential than nature
Nature and nurture interact
Emphasising nature (but never nurture) can be dangerous

Theme 1: Nurture is more influential than nature

Whether asked about influences on a baby adopted at birth, on their own lives, on an aggressive child or a violent young person, almost all respondents emphasised nurture. Parents and family were seen as the most important influences for babies and young children, moving to peer group and other relationships and experiences for a young person. The explanation for the violent behaviour of an adult had more to do with the individual and the importance of nurture/environment in explaining behaviour weakened. The quotations below explaining behaviour in a child adopted at birth, a young person and an adult illustrate the widening of influences from infancy through childhood and the onus on adults to take responsibility for themselves.

[a child] The environment in which a child grows up in, particularly the influence and role of the parents shapes how a child will grow up and what sort of adult they will be (77 Student). [a young person] I believe that upbringing shapes a person’s personality. Provisions of education, lifestyle opportunities and friendship groups all determine ….outlook. You can see evidence in young people at the school I teach at (20 Relative). Once adult they have to take responsibility for themselves and address whatever has been in their background. An adult can’t turn round and say it’s not my fault (5 Senior Learner).

Participants also saw themselves as shaped by the people surrounding them, starting with their parents, or those who brought them up. Several mentioned the illness and/or death of a parent during their childhood and older respondents talked about separation due to the second world war. Students were especially likely to mention the influence of morals instilled in them by their parents, the core values and discipline that they were taught at home. Educational experiences were important to all. For the senior learners the school leaving age had been age 15, so whether or not they stayed on at school and took public examinations was crucial for their future, and, this decision depended largely on their parents and environment. For the student respondents who had come to university from school, life so far has been ‘kind of set-out’ (41 Student), in the sense that they had progressed through the education system to gain qualifications for university. For their peer group it was normal still to be in education or training at the age of 18.

The lasting effects of early influences were particularly striking among the senior learners, because they were much further removed in years from their childhood. Many related stories about parental influence and also about teachers who taught them at least 50 years ago and had affected them for better or worse. For example a senior learner recalled one of her teachers;

I hated primary school – the teacher in 3rd or 4th year juniors [for ages 9–11] I hated her she was not a nice woman….. I passed to go to the grammar school and it shocked her. She made a derogatory comment – may not have been directed at me but felt it was- about some who should have passed and didn’t and some passing who should not have done…… I always vowed I would never be like that when I was teaching….(11 Senior Learner).

Those who related negative influences presented themselves as active in response, not necessarily at the time but later in their lives. For example a student whose mother had died wrote that ‘it made me more independent’ and another student who was bullied at school wrote that ‘it made me stronger’. The adult had to deal with all the influences (negative or positive) and take control.

Theme 2: Nature and nurture interact

While respondents’ view of themselves and of a child adopted at birth assigned greater influence to environment this did not mean that they held a simplistic model of, for example 60:40 nurture to nature. In this one question when they were asked to choose one or other as the major influence, almost all chose nurture, as many social scientists might do. However, in open questions and comments more complex interactive models were expressed. Environment/nurture can affect genes/nature and vice versa. No one used the term epigenetics but responses referred to the possibility of environmental influences affecting gene expression, for example;

People with certain predispositions (e.g. to violence) are affected by society, and society affects how their genes are expressed (40 Student).

An older respondent reflects on personal experience of child rearing and asks whether nurture is influenced by nature;

I think the nature nurture debate is very interesting. In my family I can see where my children have their own natures that have developed despite being brought up in the same family with the same boundaries etc. However, as a parent did I alter how I nurture them to take into account their nature? (14 Senior Learner).

This quotation illustrates the inseparability of nature and nurture. The child is developing within the family and the parent is developing parenting strategies informed by previous experiences and by other influences including the reactions of the children.

It was obvious to respondents that both genetic and environmental factors impact on everyone (although the role of genes is not yet understood) and it will be harder for some than for others to behave well because of their genes and environment. These people may need different treatment or extra help if they have committed violent and aggressive crimes but that does not excuse their behaviour. Only in exceptional cases, like insanity, can a young person or adult be said to have no choice but to act in a particular way. It is important that people are seen as responsible while also giving them the help they need. In these two comments the treatment for environmental problems and ‘biology’ are similar; the individual can be helped to modify his/her behaviour.

No, [nature and nurture] both play a part, but they can’t be the explanation for everything. Some people grow up in broken homes and get treated appallingly- yet they seem to understand right + wrong and accept responsibility for their actions. There are too many excuses and we never solve any problems, just make them harder to resolve.......I think if you are sane and you know right from wrong you need to suffer the consequences if you’ve committed a crime, but I do appreciate you may need help psychologically if you have anger issues, for example. If we constantly find reasons to diminish blame from people who have committed heinous acts of crime more people will think they can get away with it and it will cause more harm than good (78 Student). Some say you can’t fight your biology, but there are social factors that can stop bad behaviour like learned restraint (72 Student).

The desire to leave a space for individual agency may be linked to the finding that emphasising nature, but never nurture, could be dangerous. It is clear that as children grow up they can exercise more control over their environment, although some have more control and choices than others. On the other hand, whatever the individual is born with (genes and nature) is, or seems to be, less malleable which could lead to different criminal justice policies and different social perceptions of the criminal.

Theme 3: Emphasising nature (but never nurture) can be dangerous for society as a whole as well as for the criminal and victims

The question asked was whether it mattered ‘for individuals or society’ if either nature or nurture was seen as most important in explaining problem behavior. The two most popular answers were that both nature and nurture were needed to explain behaviour, or, that nurture was more important and that there were dangers in emphasising nature. No one in the sample regarded an emphasis on nurture as dangerous or detrimental to the individual or society. On the contrary, emphasising nurture was thought more likely to lead to non-punitive treatment of offenders. There would be attempts to alter future behaviour through improved education and parenting and spreading of knowledge in society about the impact nurture has on young people. Society as a whole would share the blame rather than the individual. As a student put it; ‘society as a whole [would be] open for criticism’ (55 S). An emphasis on nurture was therefore seen as more likely to lead to understanding of problem behaviours and effective treatment, however, the individuals were still to be held responsible for their behaviour.

In contrast there was a mistrust of nature/genetic explanations that again centred on the practical consequences for individuals. It would affect the way criminals were treated by others but could also change their view of themselves. Behaviour would be seen as unchangeable, out of the control of the individual or social action. As a consequence, individual accountability might be removed. The idea that individuals must normally be held responsible for their actions was constantly emphasised (Levitt, 2013 ).

It does [matter] because [if nurture is emphasised] people will care, parent and look after and raise people with more care. However if it’s proven it is nature, then people may lose the will to live (60 Student).

Several SLs referred to the examination at the end of primary education (the ‘eleven plus’) when explaining why they emphasised environment/nurture rather than nature, or, in this case, innate intelligence. The ‘eleven plus’ examination was used to decide which children would be offered a place at an academically selective grammar school and was based on the idea that intelligence, and future academic achievement, could be accurately measured and predicted at the age of 10 or 11.

‘The 11+ was a nature thing. I did the 11+ − it had an effect. Saying children not going to improve or change. Very embedded in the whole idea of nature – it can’t really be true’ (8 Senior Learner).

An emphasis on nature has practical detrimental consequences for individuals. Their status is fixed, for example as ‘not academic’ or ‘born evil’ and suggests, to them and to others, that their ‘nature’ is unchangeable or very difficult to change by individual or social action.

Yes, [it matters] hugely as position of blame is dependent on whether a person chose to do what they did .....nature suggests no control (35 Student).

Those who thought an emphasis on nature meant people were irredeemable either gave that as a reason not to emphasise nature or to suggest that in fact ‘defects’ of nature could be overcome, as in this comment by a student emphasising the power of education;

Yes it is very important because it helps to understand if people are reformable (nurture) or irredeemable (nature). I believe we are determined by our education and thus with the proper help we can change. In the case of people with major biological defects, education is still a way to get over these obstacles and society should be ready to help these people (38 Student).

It might be thought that offenders themselves would embrace a genetic explanation of their behaviour if this was interpreted, as the respondents feared, as meaning they were not responsible for their crimes. However, a small study of juvenile offenders in the Netherlands found that they gave social explanations of their crimes and most rejected the idea that biology might be a factor. They committed a crime for a specific purpose like to get money or to impress others or they gave environmental reasons such as a deprived background or peer pressure or explained their offences were due to psychological conditions brought on by the use of alcohol and soft drugs (Horstkötter et al., 2012 , p.291). Whether they gave goal directed or environmental reasons ‘most of them also state that they had a choice and that it was their choice to commit the crime’ (ibid p.292). As one young offender said in interview;

In the end the person makes the choice himself… The choices I have made also had a share in my past. But in the end I am the one who has made these choices (ibid).

Genes and environment

Respondents were at ease with the language of nature and nurture which was only used in the introduction to the questionnaire or interview. They readily equated genes with nature and nurture with all sorts of environmental influences. There was an acknowledgement that our understanding of environmental factors is greater than our understanding of genetics but that that would change. Older respondents were more likely to be concerned about such a change.

They're going to be doing a lot more with genetics. Influences policy profoundly and people have to be very careful. It worries me that seen to be [more determining]. The complexities don’t get looked at. If you emphasise environment it is safer from a policy point of view because given that most people don’t know what they are talking about it is safer to see the person as redeemable than to come down on the side of genetics and write people off (3 Senior Learner).

This quotation is typical in its view that nature/genes are seen as determining even though the influences on behaviour are, in reality, complex. Like the studies quoted at the beginning of the article respondents often acknowledged the complexities as nature and nurture interact but separated them when explaining the causes of specific behaviours. Students were less likely to be fearful of genetic explanations of behaviour despite their academic interest in social science. However, the hypothesis that young people might be more likely to be interested in genetic explanations for behaviour was not shown in this small study. The senior learners were more likely to refer to reading on genes and display knowledge of genetics. Older respondents and their relatives more often echoed the sociologists’ concerns about behavioural genetics discussed by Bearman earlier (Bearman, 2008 ). For those who feared the practical consequences of genetic explanations, like the respondent quoted above, ‘it is safer’ to keep away from them.

Some respondents in all age groups were prepared for advances in genetics to change their understanding of behaviour and prepared for current views of genes/nature as more basic, fixed and unchanging to change too. One of the youngest relatives, in her 20s, emphasised our incomplete knowledge of genetic influences on behaviour as a reason for focussing on nurture ‘at present’;

It is very tricky as we cannot see genes and I am not sure that I totally trust the idea of blaming genes for violent behaviour- maybe the person has a gene for passive behaviour as well. …….In any case we can change nurture but at present we cannot change nature so let’s do one thing at a time (20 Relative).

As respondents in this small study grappled with explanations for their own and others’ behaviour they focussed on the practical consequences leading to a greater concern over explanations based on nature than the more familiar ones based on a complex web of environmental factors. Whereas academic researchers approach the debate from their disciplinary perspectives which may or may not engage with practical and policy issues, the key issue for the public was what sort of explanations of behaviour will lead to the best outcomes for all concerned.

1 Behavioural epigenetic research has indicated that life experiences can affect gene expression. While controversial the research suggests the possibility of further complications for the nature-nurture relationship as nurture may be said to shape nature (Buchen, 2010 Powledge, 2011 ). 2 Bearman op cit iv. The ESRC Cambridge Network Social Contexts of Pathways into Crime (SCoPiC) promoted multidisciplinary research into the causes of crime and included the E risk longitudinal twin study led by Terri Moffitt which investigated how genetic and environmental factors shape children's disruptive behaviour http://www.scopic.ac.uk Accessed 3 Sep 2013. 3 Violent and antisocial behaviour in this longitudinal study was correlated with a common genetic trait (low expression of MAOA) only where the person was severely maltreated in childhood. Behaviour was measured on 4 outcomes; diagnoses of conduct disorder, psychological tests of aggression and anti-social personality disorder and convictions for violent crime. Caspi et al. 2002 (supplementary material). 4 This initial warm-up question implied that the influences of nature and nurture could be separated and quantified as in common usage both in academic and popular discourses. As discussed respondents were able to express their views more fully (and with more complexity) in the subsequent open questions.

Acknowledgement

The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is gratefully acknowledged. This work was part of the Research Programme of the ESRC Genomics Network at Cesagen (ESRC Centre for Economic and Social Aspects of Genomics).

Competing interests

The author declares that she has no competing interests.

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We propose a research agenda on nature contact and health, identifying principal domains of research and key questions that, if answered, would provide the basis for evidence-based public health interventions. Discussion: We identify research questions in seven domains: a) mechanistic biomedical studies; b) exposure science; c) epidemiology of ...
Research articles
Research articles. Filter By: Article Type. All. All; Article (1467) ... Nature Physics (Nat. Phys.) ISSN 1745-2481 (online) ISSN 1745-2473 (print) nature.com sitemap. About Nature Portfolio ...
Perceptions of nature, nurture and behaviour
Trying to separate out nature and nurture as explanations for behaviour, as in classic genetic studies of twins and families, is now said to be both impossible and unproductive. In practice the nature-nurture model persists as a way of framing discussion on the causes of behaviour in genetic research papers, as well as in the media and lay debate.

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The mental health benefits of nature: Spending time outdoors to refresh your mind

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Nature and Nurture in Development

Evidence of Nature in Development

Table 1. Common Descriptors and Associated Conditions for Inferring the Effects of Nature on Development

The Origins of Nature Versus Nurture

The “Middle Ground” Perspective on Nature–Nurture

Rejection of the Nature–Nurture Divide

Nativism in Behavior: Instincts

Instinct in the Age of Enlightenment

Anti-Instinct Movement in the Age of Enlightenment

Instinct in the 19th Century

Anti-Instinct Movement in the 1920s

Fixed Action Patterns

Biological Constraints and Preparedness

Nativism in Mind: Innate Ideas

Nativism in 20th Century Psychology: The Case of Language Development

Extending Nativism Beyond Language Development

Maturation Theory

Preformationism Versus Epigenesis in the Generation of Form

From Preformationism to Predeterminism

Maturation Theory in Psychology

Critical and Sensitive Periods

Heredity and Genetics

Human Behavioral Genetics

Challenges to Behavioral Genetics

Behavioral Epigenetics

Beyond Nature–Nurture

Study Suggests Genetics as a Cause, Not Just a Risk, for Some Alzheimer’s

The Fight Against Alzheimer’s Disease

Inorganic Chemistry Frontiers

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Research articles

Bending rigidity, sound propagation and ripples in flat graphene

Active hole formation in epithelioid tissues

Quantum spherical codes

Structural anisotropy results in mechano-directional transport of proteins across nuclear pores

Laser-driven high-energy proton beams from cascaded acceleration regimes

Polarity-driven three-dimensional spontaneous rotation of a cell doublet

Spectral evidence for Dirac spinons in a kagome lattice antiferromagnet

Single-component superconductivity in UTe 2 at ambient pressure

A quantum critical Bose gas of magnons in the quasi-two-dimensional antiferromagnet YbCl 3 under magnetic fields

Strong tunable coupling between two distant superconducting spin qubits

Anisotropic exchange interaction of two hole-spin qubits

Enhancement of magnonic frequency combs by exceptional points

Constant-overhead fault-tolerant quantum computation with reconfigurable atom arrays

Estimates of the reproduction ratio from epidemic surveillance may be biased in spatially structured populations

Spin Berry curvature-enhanced orbital Zeeman effect in a kagome metal

Room-temperature flexible manipulation of the quantum-metric structure in a topological chiral antiferromagnet

Irreversible entropy transport enhanced by fermionic superfluidity