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Critical Thinking: A Model of Intelligence for Solving Real-World Problems

Diane f. halpern.

1 Department of Psychology, Claremont McKenna College, Emerita, Altadena, CA 91001, USA

Dana S. Dunn

2 Department of Psychology, Moravian College, Bethlehem, PA 18018, USA; ude.naivarom@nnud

Most theories of intelligence do not directly address the question of whether people with high intelligence can successfully solve real world problems. A high IQ is correlated with many important outcomes (e.g., academic prominence, reduced crime), but it does not protect against cognitive biases, partisan thinking, reactance, or confirmation bias, among others. There are several newer theories that directly address the question about solving real-world problems. Prominent among them is Sternberg’s adaptive intelligence with “adaptation to the environment” as the central premise, a construct that does not exist on standardized IQ tests. Similarly, some scholars argue that standardized tests of intelligence are not measures of rational thought—the sort of skill/ability that would be needed to address complex real-world problems. Other investigators advocate for critical thinking as a model of intelligence specifically designed for addressing real-world problems. Yes, intelligence (i.e., critical thinking) can be enhanced and used for solving a real-world problem such as COVID-19, which we use as an example of contemporary problems that need a new approach.

1. Introduction

The editors of this Special Issue asked authors to respond to a deceptively simple statement: “How Intelligence Can Be a Solution to Consequential World Problems.” This statement holds many complexities, including how intelligence is defined and which theories are designed to address real-world problems.

2. The Problem with Using Standardized IQ Measures for Real-World Problems

For the most part, we identify high intelligence as having a high score on a standardized test of intelligence. Like any test score, IQ can only reflect what is on the given test. Most contemporary standardized measures of intelligence include vocabulary, working memory, spatial skills, analogies, processing speed, and puzzle-like elements (e.g., Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Fourth Edition; see ( Drozdick et al. 2012 )). Measures of IQ correlate with many important outcomes, including academic performance ( Kretzschmar et al. 2016 ), job-related skills ( Hunter and Schmidt 1996 ), reduced likelihood of criminal behavior ( Burhan et al. 2014 ), and for those with exceptionally high IQs, obtaining a doctorate and publishing scholarly articles ( McCabe et al. 2020 ). Gottfredson ( 1997, p. 81 ) summarized these effects when she said the “predictive validity of g is ubiquitous.” More recent research using longitudinal data, found that general mental abilities and specific abilities are good predictors of several work variables including job prestige, and income ( Lang and Kell 2020 ). Although assessments of IQ are useful in many contexts, having a high IQ does not protect against falling for common cognitive fallacies (e.g., blind spot bias, reactance, anecdotal reasoning), relying on biased and blatantly one-sided information sources, failing to consider information that does not conform to one’s preferred view of reality (confirmation bias), resisting pressure to think and act in a certain way, among others. This point was clearly articulated by Stanovich ( 2009, p. 3 ) when he stated that,” IQ tests measure only a small set of the thinking abilities that people need.”

3. Which Theories of Intelligence Are Relevant to the Question?

Most theories of intelligence do not directly address the question of whether people with high intelligence can successfully solve real world problems. For example, Grossmann et al. ( 2013 ) cite many studies in which IQ scores have not predicted well-being, including life satisfaction and longevity. Using a stratified random sample of Americans, these investigators found that wise reasoning is associated with life satisfaction, and that “there was no association between intelligence and well-being” (p. 944). (critical thinking [CT] is often referred to as “wise reasoning” or “rational thinking,”). Similar results were reported by Wirthwein and Rost ( 2011 ) who compared life satisfaction in several domains for gifted adults and adults of average intelligence. There were no differences in any of the measures of subjective well-being, except for leisure, which was significantly lower for the gifted adults. Additional research in a series of experiments by Stanovich and West ( 2008 ) found that participants with high cognitive ability were as likely as others to endorse positions that are consistent with their biases, and they were equally likely to prefer one-sided arguments over those that provided a balanced argument. There are several newer theories that directly address the question about solving real-world problems. Prominent among them is Sternberg’s adaptive intelligence with “adaptation to the environment” as the central premise, a construct that does not exist on standardized IQ tests (e.g., Sternberg 2019 ). Similarly, Stanovich and West ( 2014 ) argue that standardized tests of intelligence are not measures of rational thought—the sort of skill/ability that would be needed to address complex real-world problems. Halpern and Butler ( 2020 ) advocate for CT as a useful model of intelligence for addressing real-world problems because it was designed for this purpose. Although there is much overlap among these more recent theories, often using different terms for similar concepts, we use Halpern and Butler’s conceptualization to make our point: Yes, intelligence (i.e., CT) can be enhanced and used for solving a real-world problem like COVID-19.

4. Critical Thinking as an Applied Model for Intelligence

One definition of intelligence that directly addresses the question about intelligence and real-world problem solving comes from Nickerson ( 2020, p. 205 ): “the ability to learn, to reason well, to solve novel problems, and to deal effectively with novel problems—often unpredictable—that confront one in daily life.” Using this definition, the question of whether intelligent thinking can solve a world problem like the novel coronavirus is a resounding “yes” because solutions to real-world novel problems are part of his definition. This is a popular idea in the general public. For example, over 1000 business managers and hiring executives said that they want employees who can think critically based on the belief that CT skills will help them solve work-related problems ( Hart Research Associates 2018 ).

We define CT as the use of those cognitive skills or strategies that increase the probability of a desirable outcome. It is used to describe thinking that is purposeful, reasoned, and goal directed--the kind of thinking involved in solving problems, formulating inferences, calculating likelihoods, and making decisions, when the thinker is using skills that are thoughtful and effective for the particular context and type of thinking task. International surveys conducted by the OECD ( 2019, p. 16 ) established “key information-processing competencies” that are “highly transferable, in that they are relevant to many social contexts and work situations; and ‘learnable’ and therefore subject to the influence of policy.” One of these skills is problem solving, which is one subset of CT skills.

The CT model of intelligence is comprised of two components: (1) understanding information at a deep, meaningful level and (2) appropriate use of CT skills. The underlying idea is that CT skills can be identified, taught, and learned, and when they are recognized and applied in novel settings, the individual is demonstrating intelligent thought. CT skills include judging the credibility of an information source, making cost–benefit calculations, recognizing regression to the mean, understanding the limits of extrapolation, muting reactance responses, using analogical reasoning, rating the strength of reasons that support and fail to support a conclusion, and recognizing hindsight bias or confirmation bias, among others. Critical thinkers use these skills appropriately, without prompting, and usually with conscious intent in a variety of settings.

One of the key concepts in this model is that CT skills transfer in appropriate situations. Thus, assessments using situational judgments are needed to assess whether particular skills have transferred to a novel situation where it is appropriate. In an assessment created by the first author ( Halpern 2018 ), short paragraphs provide information about 20 different everyday scenarios (e.g., A speaker at the meeting of your local school board reported that when drug use rises, grades decline; so schools need to enforce a “war on drugs” to improve student grades); participants provide two response formats for every scenario: (a) constructed responses where they respond with short written responses, followed by (b) forced choice responses (e.g., multiple choice, rating or ranking of alternatives) for the same situations.

There is a large and growing empirical literature to support the assertion that CT skills can be learned and will transfer (when taught for transfer). See for example, Holmes et al. ( 2015 ), who wrote in the prestigious Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , that there was “significant and sustained improvement in students’ critical thinking behavior” (p. 11,199) for students who received CT instruction. Abrami et al. ( 2015, para. 1 ) concluded from a meta-analysis that “there are effective strategies for teaching CT skills, both generic and content specific, and CT dispositions, at all educational levels and across all disciplinary areas.” Abrami et al. ( 2008, para. 1 ), included 341 effect sizes in a meta-analysis. They wrote: “findings make it clear that improvement in students’ CT skills and dispositions cannot be a matter of implicit expectation.” A strong test of whether CT skills can be used for real-word problems comes from research by Butler et al. ( 2017 ). Community adults and college students (N = 244) completed several scales including an assessment of CT, an intelligence test, and an inventory of real-life events. Both CT scores and intelligence scores predicted individual outcomes on the inventory of real-life events, but CT was a stronger predictor.

Heijltjes et al. ( 2015, p. 487 ) randomly assigned participants to either a CT instruction group or one of six other control conditions. They found that “only participants assigned to CT instruction improved their reasoning skills.” Similarly, when Halpern et al. ( 2012 ) used random assignment of participants to either a learning group where they were taught scientific reasoning skills using a game format or a control condition (which also used computerized learning and was similar in length), participants in the scientific skills learning group showed higher proportional learning gains than students who did not play the game. As the body of additional supportive research is too large to report here, interested readers can find additional lists of CT skills and support for the assertion that these skills can be learned and will transfer in Halpern and Dunn ( Forthcoming ). There is a clear need for more high-quality research on the application and transfer of CT and its relationship to IQ.

5. Pandemics: COVID-19 as a Consequential Real-World Problem

A pandemic occurs when a disease runs rampant over an entire country or even the world. Pandemics have occurred throughout history: At the time of writing this article, COVID-19 is a world-wide pandemic whose actual death rate is unknown but estimated with projections of several million over the course of 2021 and beyond ( Mega 2020 ). Although vaccines are available, it will take some time to inoculate most or much of the world’s population. Since March 2020, national and international health agencies have created a list of actions that can slow and hopefully stop the spread of COVID (e.g., wearing face masks, practicing social distancing, avoiding group gatherings), yet many people in the United States and other countries have resisted their advice.

Could instruction in CT encourage more people to accept and comply with simple life-saving measures? There are many possible reasons to believe that by increasing citizens’ CT abilities, this problematic trend can be reversed for, at least, some unknown percentage of the population. We recognize the long history of social and cognitive research showing that changing attitudes and behaviors is difficult, and it would be unrealistic to expect that individuals with extreme beliefs supported by their social group and consistent with their political ideologies are likely to change. For example, an Iranian cleric and an orthodox rabbi both claimed (separately) that the COVID-19 vaccine can make people gay ( Marr 2021 ). These unfounded opinions are based on deeply held prejudicial beliefs that we expect to be resistant to CT. We are targeting those individuals who beliefs are less extreme and may be based on reasonable reservations, such as concern about the hasty development of the vaccine and the lack of long-term data on its effects. There should be some unknown proportion of individuals who can change their COVID-19-related beliefs and actions with appropriate instruction in CT. CT can be a (partial) antidote for the chaos of the modern world with armies of bots creating content on social media, political and other forces deliberately attempting to confuse issues, and almost all media labeled “fake news” by social influencers (i.e., people with followers that sometimes run to millions on various social media). Here, are some CT skills that could be helpful in getting more people to think more critically about pandemic-related issues.

Reasoning by Analogy and Judging the Credibility of the Source of Information

Early communications about the ability of masks to prevent the spread of COVID from national health agencies were not consistent. In many regions of the world, the benefits of wearing masks incited prolonged and acrimonious debates ( Tang 2020 ). However, after the initial confusion, virtually all of the global and national health organizations (e.g., WHO, National Health Service in the U. K., U. S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) endorse masks as a way to slow the spread of COVID ( Cheng et al. 2020 ; Chu et al. 2020 ). However, as we know, some people do not trust governmental agencies and often cite the conflicting information that was originally given as a reason for not wearing a mask. There are varied reasons for refusing to wear a mask, but the one most often cited is that it is against civil liberties ( Smith 2020 ). Reasoning by analogy is an appropriate CT skill for evaluating this belief (and a key skill in legal thinking). It might be useful to cite some of the many laws that already regulate our behavior such as, requiring health inspections for restaurants, setting speed limits, mandating seat belts when riding in a car, and establishing the age at which someone can consume alcohol. Individuals would be asked to consider how the mandate to wear a mask compares to these and other regulatory laws.

Another reason why some people resist the measures suggested by virtually every health agency concerns questions about whom to believe. Could training in CT change the beliefs and actions of even a small percentage of those opposed to wearing masks? Such training would include considering the following questions with practice across a wide domain of knowledge: (a) Does the source have sufficient expertise? (b) Is the expertise recent and relevant? (c) Is there a potential for gain by the information source, such as financial gain? (d) What would the ideal information source be and how close is the current source to the ideal? (e) Does the information source offer evidence that what they are recommending is likely to be correct? (f) Have you traced URLs to determine if the information in front of you really came from the alleged source?, etc. Of course, not everyone will respond in the same way to each question, so there is little likelihood that we would all think alike, but these questions provide a framework for evaluating credibility. Donovan et al. ( 2015 ) were successful using a similar approach to improve dynamic decision-making by asking participants to reflect on questions that relate to the decision. Imagine the effect of rigorous large-scale education in CT from elementary through secondary schools, as well as at the university-level. As stated above, empirical evidence has shown that people can become better thinkers with appropriate instruction in CT. With training, could we encourage some portion of the population to become more astute at judging the credibility of a source of information? It is an experiment worth trying.

6. Making Cost—Benefit Assessments for Actions That Would Slow the Spread of COVID-19

Historical records show that refusal to wear a mask during a pandemic is not a new reaction. The epidemic of 1918 also included mandates to wear masks, which drew public backlash. Then, as now, many people refused, even when they were told that it was a symbol of “wartime patriotism” because the 1918 pandemic occurred during World War I ( Lovelace 2020 ). CT instruction would include instruction in why and how to compute cost–benefit analyses. Estimates of “lives saved” by wearing a mask can be made meaningful with graphical displays that allow more people to understand large numbers. Gigerenzer ( 2020 ) found that people can understand risk ratios in medicine when the numbers are presented as frequencies instead of probabilities. If this information were used when presenting the likelihood of illness and death from COVID-19, could we increase the numbers of people who understand the severity of this disease? Small scale studies by Gigerenzer have shown that it is possible.

Analyzing Arguments to Determine Degree of Support for a Conclusion

The process of analyzing arguments requires that individuals rate the strength of support for and against a conclusion. By engaging in this practice, they must consider evidence and reasoning that may run counter to a preferred outcome. Kozyreva et al. ( 2020 ) call the deliberate failure to consider both supporting and conflicting data “deliberate ignorance”—avoiding or failing to consider information that could be useful in decision-making because it may collide with an existing belief. When applied to COVID-19, people would have to decide if the evidence for and against wearing a face mask is a reasonable way to stop the spread of this disease, and if they conclude that it is not, what are the costs and benefits of not wearing masks at a time when governmental health organizations are making them mandatory in public spaces? Again, we wonder if rigorous and systematic instruction in argument analysis would result in more positive attitudes and behaviors that relate to wearing a mask or other real-world problems. We believe that it is an experiment worth doing.

7. Conclusions

We believe that teaching CT is a worthwhile approach for educating the general public in order to improve reasoning and motivate actions to address, avert, or ameliorate real-world problems like the COVID-19 pandemic. Evidence suggests that CT can guide intelligent responses to societal and global problems. We are NOT claiming that CT skills will be a universal solution for the many real-world problems that we confront in contemporary society, or that everyone will substitute CT for other decision-making practices, but we do believe that systematic education in CT can help many people become better thinkers, and we believe that this is an important step toward creating a society that values and practices routine CT. The challenges are great, but the tools to tackle them are available, if we are willing to use them.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, D.F.H. and D.S.D.; resources, D.F.H.; data curation, writing—original draft preparation, D.F.H.; writing—review and editing, D.F.H. and D.S.D. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

No IRB Review.

Informed Consent Statement

No Informed Consent.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

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OPINION article

Redefining critical thinking: teaching students to think like scientists.

• Department of Psychology, MacEwan University, Edmonton, AB, Canada

From primary to post-secondary school, critical thinking (CT) is an oft cited focus or key competency (e.g., DeAngelo et al., 2009 ; California Department of Education, 2014 ; Alberta Education, 2015 ; Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority, n.d. ). Unfortunately, the definition of CT has become so broad that it can encompass nearly anything and everything (e.g., Hatcher, 2000 ; Johnson and Hamby, 2015 ). From discussion of Foucault, critique and the self ( Foucault, 1984 ) to Lawson's (1999) definition of CT as the ability to evaluate claims using psychological science, the term critical thinking has come to refer to an ever-widening range of skills and abilities. We propose that educators need to clearly define CT, and that in addition to teaching CT, a strong focus should be placed on teaching students how to think like scientists. Scientific thinking is the ability to generate, test, and evaluate claims, data, and theories (e.g., Bullock et al., 2009 ; Koerber et al., 2015 ). Simply stated, the basic tenets of scientific thinking provide students with the tools to distinguish good information from bad. Students have access to nearly limitless information, and the skills to understand what is misinformation or a questionable scientific claim is crucially important ( Smith, 2011 ), and these skills may not necessarily be included in the general teaching of critical thinking ( Wright, 2001 ).

This is an issue of more than semantics. While some definitions of CT include key elements of the scientific method (e.g., Lawson, 1999 ; Lawson et al., 2015 ), this emphasis is not consistent across all interpretations of CT ( Huber and Kuncel, 2016 ). In an attempt to provide a comprehensive, detailed definition of CT, the American Philosophical Association (APA), outlined six CT skills, 16 subskills, and 19 dispositions ( Facione, 1990 ). Skills include interpretation, analysis, and inference; dispositions include inquisitiveness and open-mindedness. 1 From our perspective, definitions of CT such as those provided by the APA or operationally defined by researchers in the context of a scholarly article (e.g., Forawi, 2016 ) are not problematic—the authors clearly define what they are referring to as CT. Potential problems arise when educators are using different definitions of CT, or when the banner of CT is applied to nearly any topic or pedagogical activity. Definitions such as those provided by the APA provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the multi-faceted nature of CT, however the definition is complex and may be difficult to work with at a policy level for educators, especially those who work primarily with younger students.

The need to develop scientific thinking skills is evident in studies showing that 55% of undergraduate students believe that a full moon causes people to behave oddly, and an estimated 67% of students believe creatures such as Bigfoot and Chupacabra exist, despite the lack of scientific evidence supporting these claims ( Lobato et al., 2014 ). Additionally, despite overwhelming evidence supporting the existence of anthropogenic climate change, and the dire need to mitigate its effects, many people still remain skeptical of climate change and its impact ( Feygina et al., 2010 ; Lewandowsky et al., 2013 ). One of the goals of education is to help students foster the skills necessary to be informed consumers of information ( DeAngelo et al., 2009 ), and providing students with the tools to think scientifically is a crucial component of reaching this goal. By focusing on scientific thinking in conjunction with CT, educators may be better able design specific policies that aim to facilitate the necessary skills students should have when they enter post-secondary training or the workforce. In other words, students should leave secondary school with the ability to rule out rival hypotheses, understand that correlation does not equal causation, the importance of falsifiability and replicability, the ability to recognize extraordinary claims, and use the principle of parsimony (e.g., Lett, 1990 ; Bartz, 2002 ).

Teaching scientific thinking is challenging, as people are vulnerable to trusting their intuitions and subjective observations and tend to prioritize them over objective scientific findings (e.g., Lilienfeld et al., 2012 ). Students and the public at large are prone to naïve realism, or the tendency to believe that our experiences and observations constitute objective reality ( Ross and Ward, 1996 ), when in fact our experiences and observations are subjective and prone to error (e.g., Kahneman, 2011 ). Educators at the post-secondary level tend to prioritize scientific thinking ( Lilienfeld, 2010 ), however many students do not continue on to a post-secondary program after they have completed high school. Further, students who are told they are learning critical thinking may believe they possess the skills to accurately assess the world around them. However, if they are not taught the specific skills needed to be scientifically literate, they may still fall prey to logical fallacies and biases. People tend to underestimate or not understand fallacies that can prevent them from making sound decisions ( Lilienfeld et al., 2001 ; Pronin et al., 2004 ; Lilienfeld, 2010 ). Thus, it is reasonable to think that a person who has not been adequately trained in scientific thinking would nonetheless consider themselves a strong critical thinker, and therefore would be even less likely consider his or her own personal biases. Another concern is that when teaching scientific thinking there is always the risk that students become overly critical or cynical (e.g., Mercier et al., 2017 ). By this, a student may be skeptical of nearly all findings, regardless of the supporting evidence. By incorporating and focusing on cognitive biases, instructors can help students understand their own biases, and demonstrate how the rigor of the scientific method can, at least partially, control for these biases.

Teaching CT remains controversial and confusing for many instructors ( Bensley and Murtagh, 2012 ). This is partly due to the lack of clarity in the definition of CT and the wide range of methods proposed to best teach CT ( Abrami et al., 2008 ; Bensley and Murtagh, 2012 ). For instance, Bensley and Spero (2014) found evidence for the effectiveness of direct approaches to teaching CT, a claim echoed in earlier research ( Abrami et al., 2008 ; Marin and Halpern, 2011 ). Despite their positive findings, some studies have failed to find support for measures of CT ( Burke et al., 2014 ) and others have found variable, yet positive, support for instructional methods ( Dochy et al., 2003 ). Unfortunately, there is a lack of research demonstrating the best pedagogical approaches to teaching scientific thinking at different grade levels. More research is needed to provide an empirically grounded approach to teach scientific thinking, and there is also a need to develop evidence based measures of scientific thinking that are grade and age appropriate. One approach to teaching scientific thinking may be to frame the topic in its simplest terms—the ability to “detect baloney” ( Sagan, 1995 ).

Sagan (1995) has promoted the tools necessary to recognize poor arguments, fallacies to avoid, and how to approach claims using the scientific method. The basic tenets of Sagan's argument apply to most claims, and have the potential to be an effective teaching tool across a range of abilities and ages. Sagan discusses the idea of a baloney detection kit, which contains the “tools” for skeptical thinking. The development of “baloney detection kits” which include age-appropriate scientific thinking skills may be an effective approach to teaching scientific thinking. These kits could include the style of exercises that are typically found under the banner of CT training (e.g., group discussions, evaluations of arguments) with a focus on teaching scientific thinking. An empirically validated kit does not yet exist, though there is much to draw from in the literature on pedagogical approaches to correcting cognitive biases, combatting pseudoscience, and teaching methodology (e.g., Smith, 2011 ). Further research is needed in this area to ensure that the correct, and age-appropriate, tools are part of any baloney detection kit.

Teaching Sagan's idea of baloney detection in conjunction with CT provides educators with a clear focus—to employ a pedagogical approach that helps students create sound and cogent arguments while avoiding falling prey to “baloney”. This is not to say that all of the information taught under the current banner of “critical thinking” is without value. In fact, many of the topics taught under the current approach of CT are important, even though they would not fit within the framework of some definitions of critical thinking. If educators want to ensure that students have the ability to be accurate consumers of information, a focus should be placed on including scientific thinking as a component of the science curriculum, as well as part of the broader teaching of CT.

Educators need to be provided with evidence-based approaches to teach the principles of scientific thinking. These principles should be taught in conjunction with evidence-based methods that mitigate the potential for fallacious reasoning and false beliefs. At a minimum, when students first learn about science, there should also be an introduction to the basics tenets of scientific thinking. Courses dedicated to promoting scientific thinking may also be effective. A course focused on cognitive biases, logical fallacies, and the hallmarks of scientific thinking adapted for each grade level may provide students with the foundation of solid scientific thinking skills to produce and evaluate arguments, and allow expansion of scientific thinking into other scholastic areas and classes. Evaluations of the efficacy of these courses would be essential, along with research to determine the best approach to incorporate scientific thinking into the curriculum.

If instructors know that students have at least some familiarity with the fundamental tenets of scientific thinking, the ability to expand and build upon these ideas in a variety of subject specific areas would further foster and promote these skills. For example, when discussing climate change, an instructor could add a brief discussion of why some people reject the science of climate change by relating this back to the information students will be familiar with from their scientific thinking courses. In terms of an issue like climate change, many students may have heard in political debates or popular culture that global warming trends are not real, or a “hoax” ( Lewandowsky et al., 2013 ). In this case, only teaching the data and facts may not be sufficient to change a student's mind about the reality of climate change ( Lewandowsky et al., 2012 ). Instructors would have more success by presenting students with the data on global warming trends as well as information on the biases that could lead some people reject the data ( Kowalski and Taylor, 2009 ; Lewandowsky et al., 2012 ). This type of instruction helps educators create informed citizens who are better able to guide future decision making and ensure that students enter the job market with the skills needed to be valuable members of the workforce and society as a whole.

By promoting scientific thinking, educators can ensure that students are at least exposed to the basic tenets of what makes a good argument, how to create their own arguments, recognize their own biases and those of others, and how to think like a scientist. There is still work to be done, as there is a need to put in place educational programs built on empirical evidence, as well as research investigating specific techniques to promote scientific thinking for children in earlier grade levels and develop measures to test if students have acquired the necessary scientific thinking skills. By using an evidence based approach to implement strategies to promote scientific thinking, and encouraging researchers to further explore the ideal methods for doing so, educators can better serve their students. When students are provided with the core ideas of how to detect baloney, and provided with examples of how baloney detection relates to the real world (e.g., Schmaltz and Lilienfeld, 2014 ), we are confident that they will be better able to navigate through the oceans of information available and choose the right path when deciding if information is valid.

Author Contribution

RS was the lead author and this paper, and both EJ and NW contributed equally.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Keywords: scientific thinking, critical thinking, teaching resources, skepticism, education policy

Citation: Schmaltz RM, Jansen E and Wenckowski N (2017) Redefining Critical Thinking: Teaching Students to Think like Scientists. Front. Psychol . 8:459. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00459

Received: 13 December 2016; Accepted: 13 March 2017; Published: 29 March 2017.

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Copyright © 2017 Schmaltz, Jansen and Wenckowski. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Rodney M. Schmaltz, [email protected]

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