china taiwan issue essay

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As China carries out military exercises around the island of Taiwan – allegedly as retaliation against last week’s visit by Nancy Pelosi to Taipei – Stanford scholar Oriana Skylar Mastro says Beijing has been wanting and waiting to do drills in the region, they were just waiting for a time to blame the U.S.

Oriana Skylar Mastro’s scholarship examines Chinese military and security policy in the Asia Pacific region. (Image credit: Courtesy FSI)

Here, Mastro, whose research focuses on Chinese military and security policy and Asia-Pacific security issues among other topics, explains how the conflict between China and Taiwan escalated in the years after the 1911 Xinhai revolution and why it persists today. Mastro also discusses U.S. relations in the region and how Pelosi’s visit sends a message of deterrence to Beijing.

Mastro is a center fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center .

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Can you explain the context underlying the existing relationship between China and Taiwan?

On and off throughout the 1920s, 30s, and 40s, there was a civil war in China between the Communist Party and the nationalists, who were backed by the United States. It came to an end in 1949 when the communists won. When the communists won, the nationalists fled to Taiwan where they established, for a number of years, a brutal dictatorship before transitioning to a democracy in the 1990s. But their civil war is not over until China has successfully resolved the issue of Taiwan being de facto independent. It’s an emotional and political issue.

How and when did the U.S. get involved?

The United States established a defense treaty in 1950 with Taiwan and continued to support the nationalists and didn’t recognize that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) existed.

After the Sino-Soviet split [when the communist alliance between the PRC and the Soviet Union broke down] the United States thought this was a great opportunity to become closer to China. The first thing on the agenda was there had to be a normalization of relations, which meant that the United States would have to diplomatically recognize the PRC. To do this, they had to figure out what that meant for the U.S. relationship with Taiwan and what we now call the “One China” policy came out of this, which was an ambiguous way for both sides to get what they wanted. Because the United States acknowledged that the Chinese on both sides of the strait believed there is, but one China and Taiwan is part of China. This wasn’t very controversial at the time in 1972 because the nationalist government of Taiwan also thought Taiwan was a part of China. The disagreement was about which was the legitimate government of all of China. So the United States could be ambiguous about whether Taiwan was a part of China and still placate the communists.

As a necessary condition to normalize relations with the PRC, the United States promised not to have any official ties with the government of Taiwan and abrogates the 1950 treaty and with it in 1980, the formal defense relationship. But then in 1979, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which regulated ties between the American people and Taiwan and added in it that the president had to consider defending Taiwan if the PRC used force because, during the negotiations, China refused to promise they wouldn’t use force.

Let’s now flash forward to today. Can you explain why Pelosi’s visit upset Beijing?

Click the map to enlarge. (Image credit: Getty Images)

Because the U.S. is not supposed to have any official ties with the island of Taiwan under the 1979 agreement, the speaker of the U.S. House going to Taiwan to meet with government officials is viewed by the Chinese as a violation of the agreement. But the United States thinks China’s increase in military activity and aggression over the past two years against the island is a violation of their side of the agreement. And so, both sides feel like they’re being provoked by the other. Every time China decides anything aggressive the United States feels like it has to show a sign of commitment to Taiwan, and every time the United States shows a sign of commitment to Taiwan, China feels like they have to be more aggressive.

One big difference between 1979 when we normalized relations with Beijing today is China is much more powerful than it was even the last time a speaker visited the island, which was Speaker Gingrich in 1987. China also feels that the United States is not respecting how the relative balance of power has shifted and should be more careful to not upset China, which is another reason that they reacted so strongly.

What message has Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan sent?

Taiwan cannot defend itself against the PRC. There is no scenario in which, without U.S. intervention, Taiwan could defend itself from a Chinese attack. It becomes very important for deterrence or stability in the region for all to believe that the United States is going to come to Taiwan’s aid. But what Speaker Pelosi, and recently with some comments about Taiwan, President Biden are trying to do is to show they are willing to take risks, willing to accept costs, and that the commitment to Taiwan is real. I think focusing on signaling U.S. commitment is a bit misguided because China, at least militarily, plans for U.S. intervention but the U.S. telling China we’re going to intervene doesn’t actually change any part of China’s calculus. It just provokes them.

Right now, the Chinese rhetoric and the Chinese military capabilities have pointed in the direction of China considering using force – that’s why people like Speaker Pelosi are doing something to convince Beijing not to do this.

Do you think it’s inevitable that China will invade Taiwan, and what would that mean for the U.S.?

I can’t predict the future but given current trends, it seems unlikely that they wouldn’t. That means there would be a major war between two powers in the most important region of the world. It would be huge, economically and politically, at a huge cost to everybody.

What are you most worried about?

I’m most worried that China moves quickly with little early warning and we are left making a really difficult decision, such as weighing whether to try to defend Taiwan even though we would likely lose or not do anything at all. The amount of warning tells us how many good options we have and if we don’t have good options, the situation might resolve itself in a way that the U.S doesn’t like.

Is there anything that you think is misunderstood about the issue?

I think people misunderstand how much China wants and needs to test its military capabilities. China was going to do something like this regardless of Nancy Pelosi’s visit – they were waiting for an opportune time to blame the United States for it.

Taiwan army conducts Chenchiang exercise, Oct 23, 2022 (via Reuters)

Stabilizing the Growing Taiwan Crisis: New Messaging and Understandings are Urgently Needed

Executive summary, introduction.

• A perfect storm continues to build 

Ending extreme rhetoric and hypocrisy

Sending clear messages of deterrence and reassurance, congressional and civil society actions, no time to lose, acknowledgements.

The U.S.–China relationship appears to have stabilized since the November 2023 meeting between U.S. president Joe Biden and China’s president Xi Jinping in San Francisco. The reality, however, is that the features and trends pushing both countries toward a confrontation over Taiwan persist, fueling a dangerous, interactive dynamic that could quickly overcome any diplomatic thaw between the world’s foremost powers.

These underlying forces — increased levels of domestic threat inflation in both the United States and China, the worst–casing of the other side’s motives and intentions, and the resulting erosion in the confidence of the original understanding over Taiwan reached in the 1970s — threaten to push Beijing and Washington into a crisis over Taiwan that both sides say they want to avoid. 

To defuse this worrying dynamic, both the United States and China must reaffirm long standing policy on Taiwan, while also undertaking a set of specific actions to further stabilize the relationship between the two countries.

The Biden administration should explicitly reject extreme rhetoric towards China and deviations from longstanding policy on Taiwan, such as the framing of Sino–American competition as a titanic struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, and the contention that an independent Taiwan is strategically crucial to overall Asian security. The administration can further inject stability into U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan by re–affirming and clarifying the One China policy through a series of statements, including: 

• The United States opposes any Chinese effort to coerce Taiwan or compel unification through force. However, the United States would accept any resolution of the cross–Strait issue that is reached without coercion and that is endorsed by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
• The United States recognizes that the defense of Taiwan is primarily the responsibility of the people of Taiwan. Relatedly, and in accordance with the U.S.–China normalization agreement, Washington is committed to maintaining only unofficial relations with Taiwan and has no desire to alter this commitment. 
• The United States Government reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.

These statements should be made in combination with actions that bolster cooperative engagement with China, such as the initiation of a combined civilian and military Track 1.5 dialogue with Beijing. We believe that this type of reassurance would lead to corresponding commitments from China that would improve stability in the Taiwan Strait, such as reductions in provocative military exercises and potentially high level Chinese declarations that reject coercive measures towards Taiwan and a specific timeline for reunification. 

The recent improvements to the Sino–American relationship shouldn’t go to waste. The United States and China should go beyond the mere appearance of stabilization and  revitalize the original understanding over Taiwan. Otherwise, they risk a continuous spiral towards full–scale conflict. 

In the leadup to Taiwan’s January 13 presidential election, many observers expected a highly belligerent response from Beijing if the very pro–independence Lai Ching–te were elected, a response perhaps greater than the intensive, prolonged saber rattling and strong rhetoric that followed former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s quasi–official trip to the island in 2022. 1 This, by and large, did not occur.  The Sino–American relationship has instead continued on its apparent course toward greater normalcy, made possible by a series of senior-level meetings culminating with the positive November 2023 San Francisco meeting between presidents Xi Jinping and Joe Biden. 

On the surface, both sides might now appear to be committed to maintaining stable, if not highly productive, overall relations. Such a commitment has seemingly emerged out of a mutual need to address their tumultuous domestic political and economic environments — marked in China by a faltering economy and numerous purges within the military and in the United States by the huge uncertainties of the domestic political scene — and avoid adding yet another international crisis to those in Ukraine and the Middle East.  

Some observers have drawn the conclusion from this situation that the contentious Taiwan issue has finally been put on a much more durable footing able to withstand future disruptions. 2 This appearance is deceptive, however. While it is true that such factors arguably work at present to suppress provocative U.S. or Chinese actions regarding Taiwan, they have not altered the many underlying features and trends in both countries that continue to push toward an eventual crisis and possible conflict over the island. These factors include:

• The increasingly high (and arguably growing) stakes the Taiwan issue presents for both Beijing and Washington; 
• Deepening levels of domestic threat inflation on each side;
• The growing tendency on both sides to worst case the motives and intentions of others (fed by a persistent lack of trust) while failing to recognize the interactive nature of the rivalry;  
• A resulting steady erosion of confidence in the original, stabilizing bilateral understanding regarding Taiwan reached between Beijing and Washington during the 1970s normalization process, and a related stress on deterrence over assurance;
• The absence of effective bilateral crisis prevention and management mechanisms.

Unless these factors are countered or corrected, the probability of a severe crisis over Taiwan will grow, not diminish, over the coming years, along with the likelihood that any such crisis will result in military conflict. Either outcome (crisis or conflict) will almost certainly produce disastrous consequences for regional and global stability, economic development, and the overall ability of nations to address growing world threats, from climate change to future pandemics. 3

A perfect storm continues to build

In China, the necessity to uphold the Party’s absolute leadership and strengthen its legitimacy as the defender of Chinese nationalism and development, along with Xi Jinping’s overall assertive foreign policy stance, increase the tendency for the PRC to bolster its legitimacy by treating sensitive sovereignty–related issues such as Taiwan with growing resolve and rigidity. This inclines the regime toward ever greater levels of assertiveness and increases the chance of a Chinese overreaction to any perceived major provocations by the United States or Taiwan.  

While it is true that Beijing wishes to avoid a conflict over Taiwan, the extremely high nationalist stakes involved in the Taiwan situation ensure a strong level of domestic elite and public pressure on the PRC government to look tough and steadfast on this particular issue. Xi Jinping’s apparent heightened stress on making major progress toward unification, if not resolving the Taiwan issue, as a key component of his overall plan for Chinese rejuvenation by mid-century, increases such assertiveness. 4

In the United States, rising public and elite alarm and anxiety toward China as a strategic competitor, a bipartisan consensus in Congress on the need to ever more aggressively counter Beijing, and the U.S. presidential election campaign season combine to engender calls for greater levels of resolve to protect Taiwan.  Support is steadily growing in Congress, among virtually all U.S. presidential contenders, and among many defense analysts, for an approach to the Taiwan issue that is all the more heavily centered on military deterrence of China. 5 In contrast, little if any concern is expressed for providing essential levels of credible reassurance on continuing U.S. support for the long–standing One China policy or a clear U.S. willingness to accept a peacefully negotiated settlement of any kind. American politicians are instead vying with one another to show their anti–China credentials. 6 Especially worrisome, political pressure is growing to remove all strategic ambiguity around the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan independence, and to tighten all ties with Taiwan, especially military and political ties. 7 There is no clear sense of a limit to this process short of the complete unraveling of the Sino–American strategic understanding over Taiwan.   

There is no clear sense of a limit to this process short of the complete unraveling of the Sino–American strategic understanding over Taiwan.

Beijing believes that a combination of the U.S. political trends, trends in Taiwan indicating a growing resistance to any form of unification with China, and Lai Ching–te’s recent victory require ever stronger efforts to deter Taiwan “splittists” from building momentum in favor of the permanent separation of the island from the mainland with Washington’s acquiescence, if not backing.  The clearest expression of such deterrent efforts is military, in the form of increasing numbers of air and naval sorties around Taiwan, more intimidating military exercises, and the acquisition of more military capabilities aimed at the island. 8 China gives little attention to providing credible reassurances of its continued commitment to peaceful unification as a top priority, despite the rote repetition of such a commitment in statements by Chinese leaders. Thus, China’s turn toward military deterrence and away from diplomatic reassurance of peaceful intentions mirrors a similar trend in the United States.

Beijing is also doubling down on its use of the “One Country, Two Systems” formula for cross–Strait relations, despite the fact that such a model has been thoroughly rejected by the Taiwanese population after Beijing’s nullification of its application in the case of Hong Kong. 9 Equally concerning, although it has almost certainly not set a deadline for unification, Beijing may be showing greater impatience regarding the need to achieve significant progress toward unification — a view that could lead to dangerous miscalculations. 10 China currently places all blame for the current Taiwan imbroglio on the activities of Taiwan “splittists” and interference by “external forces” (read: Washington) while refusing to acknowledge that it has contributed to the deteriorating situation through its inflexibility and growing use of military deterrence. These actions all contribute to Beijing’s rigidity and feed Western anxiety regarding the possibility that China will use military force. 11

China’s turn toward military deterrence and away from diplomatic reassurance of peaceful intentions mirrors a similar trend in the United States.

While correctly calling attention to the dangers inherent in Beijing’s policies, Washington fails — at least publicly and likely even privately, in conversations with Chinese counterparts — to acknowledge the possibility that at least some of China’s behavior is a response to U.S. actions regarding Taiwan and that these are contributing to the overall deterioration of the relationship.  Of greatest concern, many China and Taiwan security specialists in the United States believe that the U.S. government is steadily eroding its One China policy, despite Washington’s repeated public assertion that the policy has not changed. 12 This is likely provoking Beijing to increase its deterrence signaling beyond what it would otherwise be doing.  

Many examples exist to show the eroding credibility of Washington’s One China policy, a process that began well before the Biden administration but has accelerated under both Trump and Biden.  Four major sets of U.S. actions should be highlighted.

• Moves towards a commitment to permanent Taiwan independence and away from strategic ambiguity: Washington has virtually stopped affirming, as it did for decades, that it would accept any outcome to the Taiwan situation arrived at peacefully and without coercion. Instead, it appears at times to support the idea that the United States should prevent even a peaceful, uncoerced unification of Taiwan with China.  In this regard, Washington has failed to explicitly reject the increasingly common notion that Taiwan is a strategic location critical to U.S. security and developmental interests, a stance that implies Taiwan must be kept permanently separate from China even if a non–coercive solution could eventually be found. 13 In addition, President Biden has repeatedly stated that the United States will militarily defend Taiwan if China attacks, a view that directly contradicts the long–standing U.S. stance of strategic ambiguity toward the island.  And he has stated that it is up to Taiwan to decide if it wants to become independent, a view that undermines the oft-repeated U.S. stance that it would not support a unilateral Taiwanese move to independence. 14

2. Moves toward official, governmental contacts with Taiwan and efforts to discourage others from dropping such contacts : Washington now increasingly allows or undertakes actions undermining the unofficial nature of U.S.–Taiwan relations under the One China policy. Such actions include using official, governmental types of nomenclature or symbols to describe U.S. offices or maps relevant to Taiwan, and/or sending or permitting very senior government officials and military officers to visit the island (e.g., House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit when she was House Speaker), while receiving senior Taiwan officials in U.S. government offices. 15 The United States also now discourages countries from switching their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, despite the fact that the United States took the same action in 1979, and had avoided taking a stance against diplomatic recognition for decades. 16

3. Redefining the components of the U.S. One China policy to stress pro-Taiwan statements while downplaying original understandings with Beijing : In describing the core elements of the One China policy, U.S. officials and documents now routinely de–emphasize features of the policy that are based on U.S.–China agreements contained in the three key Sino–American communiques, in favor of other documents supportive of Taiwan. For example, officials frequently place the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) first in line as a primary element of the policy ahead of the three communiques, a clear departure from the past practice. 17 In fact, the TRA is a law passed by Congress that was designed to define and protect unofficial relations with Taipei, and to legally ensure continued U.S. military assistance to Taiwan. As such, it was not part of the original One China policy.

In an even more disturbing development, Washington now routinely and publicly asserts the Six Assurances 18 made to Taiwan in the 1980s as a central part of U.S. policy, despite its non–binding nature and original low-profile origins. 19 Though upheld by Congress via a 2016 non–binding “sense of Congress” resolution, the Six Assurances statement is not part of U.S. law and is not worded to convey its permanence in U.S. policy. The Six Assurances also do not represent a U.S.–China agreement. They were originally produced at Taiwan’s request to clarify, privately, the U.S. stance toward Taiwan and the PRC at the time it was issued (in 1982). 20 Although reaffirmed by successive administrations, for decades, it was treated as an ancillary component of U.S. policy, not publicly listed as a core element of the One China policy. 21 They should thus not be treated as core, immutable elements of the U.S. One China policy equal in importance to the three communiques and the TRA.

4. The stationing of U.S. military forces in Taiwan : Finally, Washington continues to dispatch hundreds of U.S. military trainers to Taiwan, some now on a more or less permanent basis, while failing to push back against calls by government–related defense analysts and politicians for the deployment to the island of U.S. combat units or the visitation of U.S. naval vessels. 22 The treatment of Taiwan as a de facto security ally within the U.S. defense perimeter would directly contradict the One China policy.

Many of these actions are no doubt direct responses to more assertive Chinese behavior, which has undermined trust in Beijing’s commitment to peaceful unification as a first priority. But whatever their origins, their effect is to undermine confidence in the One China policy without appreciably increasing deterrence toward Beijing or strengthening the status quo in Taiwan.  They undermine the symbolic and substantive agreements around normalization that have kept the peace for decades, without improving Taiwan’s actual security situation.

These actions undermine the symbolic and substantive agreements around normalization that have kept the peace for decades, without improving Taiwan’s actual security situation.

Instead of addressing the worsening interactive dynamic underway, Washington continues to point publicly to Chinese provocations as a justification for taking the above actions. This mirrors and encourages China’s own one–sided, unreflective behavior.  More broadly, in high–level dialogues between U.S. and Chinese officials, Washington’s efforts to avoid confrontation or conflict focus on the maintenance of communication channels in order to clarify policies and avoid misunderstandings, rather than creating a pattern of constructive, cooperative interactions that could address the core sources of tension between both nations and, in the process, build a modicum of trust between the two leaderships. 

In China, U.S. assertions that the One China policy has not changed, or that its relations with Taiwan remain unofficial, thus fall on deaf ears. 23 And the apparent hypocrisy of U.S. behavior is then used to justify more provocative Chinese actions, which lead many Americans to conclude that Beijing is jettisoning its commitment to peaceful unification.

This worsening situation is made even more dangerous by the absence of substantive crisis prevention and management mechanisms and procedures between the two nations.  It is true that Washington and Beijing have recently agreed to resume a nascent military–to–military crisis communication working group that remained suspended since 2019 and appear to be working to revive a few other more established agreements designed to avoid incidents in the air and at sea. 24 But the mere establishment of communications channels and limited understandings around such communications is a long way from producing the kind of extensive and substantive military and civilian crisis prevention mechanisms required to avert or de–escalate a serious Taiwan crisis. 25      

Reversing the slide

Under conditions marked by deep mutual distrust, the failure to match words with actions, the influence of domestic politics, and the overall refusal to acknowledge the interactive nature of the Taiwan imbroglio, the continued heavy reliance by both Washington and Beijing on deterrence (as opposed to credible signals of reassurance) will simply serve to increase the chance of a severe crisis.  

There are, however, concrete steps that the U.S. government, Congress, and civil society can take to reduce the mounting tension around the Taiwan issue and remove it as a major factor driving the growing rivalry between Washington and Beijing.  Most importantly, both sides must reverse the tendency to regard the island as a surrogate for the overall U.S.–China strategic competition. 

This requires, as a first step, efforts to reduce the overall intensity of the bilateral rivalry, by eliminating the heretofore divisive, often politically–induced, zero–sum rhetoric that has dominated much of the dialogue in Washington and Beijing, and ending, to the extent possible, the mismatch between the words spoken and actions taken on both sides.  The former includes, for example, U.S. references to China as a “predatory” economic actor fixed on creating a Sino–centric global order, 26 and Chinese references to a concerted U.S. campaign to weaken China overall and end the PRC regime. 27 The latter involves the mismatch between Chinese espousals of benign motives and “win–win” policies toward Washington and various concerted efforts taken to undermine U.S. influence, on one side, and American assurances regarding the creation of a stable and mutually productive form of peaceful coexistence with China alongside repeated espousals of a desire to “win” a titanic struggle between U.S. democracy and Chinese authoritarianism on the other side.  

Such overblown rhetoric and hypocrisy deepen distrust and signal that there is no potential common ground on critical issues such as Taiwan’s future.  They reinforce worst–case assumptions about motives and therefore increase the likelihood that manageable crises will become severe conflicts. In the U.S. case, such rhetoric does not create concrete diplomatic or competitive benefits. Instead, it appears aimed at domestic political considerations. Internationally, such rhetoric does not make Washington more competitive or encourage partners and allies to support U.S. policy, given the hesitation of many such nations to fully back what they perceive to be Washington’s radical and overly ideological claims.  Moreover, the growing contention in Congress and the Pentagon that an independent Taiwan is a strategic linchpin critical to overall Asian security and the U.S position in Asia directly contravenes the One China policy, threatening the basic bilateral political foundation established at the time of Sino–American normalization. 28

Overblown rhetoric and hypocrisy deepen distrust and signal that there is no potential common ground on critical issues such as Taiwan’s future.

The Biden administration should explicitly reject all such rhetoric as unhelpful to achieving U.S. goals and, at the same time, call on the Chinese to do the same, while working with Beijing to end the hypocrisy that pervades both sides.

While attempting to improve the overall climate of the relationship, the administration should also, in recognition of the negative interactive dynamic underway regarding Taiwan, issue a set of statements designed to stabilize the overall relationship and reinvigorate and reestablish the credibility of the original One China/peaceful unification understanding that undergirds the Taiwan issue.  These utterances, whether undertaken publicly or privately, could occur over time as part of Congressional testimony or in administration speeches or bilateral meetings.  They are, as follows: 

• The United States believes that a stable, constructive relationship between China and the United States is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.
• The United States has no desire to weaken or overturn China’s government, does not seek a new Cold War with China, much less a conflict, is not strengthening its alliances nor limiting high–technology business with China in order to undermine or weaken the Chinese nation, and does not support Taiwan independence. 29
• Despite the great strides in cross–Strait relations made since the normalization of diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing, the United States believes that conditions have not yet been created for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.  
• Under these circumstances, the United States believes that all parties should display patience, eschew any unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, and avoid actions that would compromise prospects for peaceful resolution.  In this regard, the United States attaches great importance to China’s declaration that its fundamental policy is to strive for peaceful unification. 
• The United States is convinced that it is in the interest of both countries to establish sustained consultations on bilateral and international issues of common interest.  The purpose of such consultations should be not only to reduce the danger of military conflict, but also to strengthen incentives on both sides to cooperate in solving common problems and building a more constructive relationship. 
• In accordance with its long–standing One China policy, the United States will accept any resolution of the cross–Strait issue that is reached without coercion and endorsed by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. To this end, it would welcome talks between Taipei and Beijing to explore avenues toward a peaceful settlement.
• For that reason, the United States does not regard Taiwan as a strategic location vital to the U.S. security position in the western Pacific that is to be kept permanently separate from China. While the United States does not oppose Taiwan eventually becoming part of China peacefully and through mutual consent, it is firmly opposed to any Chinese effort to coerce the island or compel unification through force. 
• Although the United States is committed under the Taiwan Relations Act to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self–defense capacity, and would regard any security threat to Taiwan as a threat to peace and stability in Asia, the defense of Taiwan is primarily the responsibility of the people of Taiwan and requires their utmost efforts, with U.S. support.  As stipulated by the TRA, how the United States should assist Taiwan in the event China were to launch a military attack will be determined by the president in consultation with Congress. 
• In accordance with the U.S.–China normalization agreement, Washington is committed to maintaining only unofficial relations with Taiwan and has no desire to alter this commitment.  It will maintain clear limits on the level and types of contact between Taipei and Washington. However, greater efforts by China to intimidate or coerce Taiwan will inevitably cause the United States to increase its support for Taipei by establishing closer political and military ties. 
• The United States government reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”  However, the United States will continue to maintain strong cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan.

These statements would represent a clear shift from the current drift toward confrontation and abandonment of the “One China” normalization understandings with China over Taiwan.  They would not constitute a new U.S. policy so much as an attempt to restore policy understandings that have maintained peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for decades.

To enhance the credibility of the above statements, Washington should also combine them with several specific actions and call for specific confidence-building actions from Beijing in return.  These should include: 

• A return to unannounced, low–profile U.S. naval transits of the Taiwan Strait, and a reduction of reconnaissance flights along the Chinese coast. But any such U.S. actions should be made conditional on Beijing reducing military tensions by lowering its recently enhanced military activities around Taiwan.
• The initiation of a combined civilian and military Track 1.5 dialogue with Beijing on how to improve both crisis management and crisis prevention capabilities.  This should eventually feed into a Track One dialogue on this subject, aimed at developing a set of crisis guidelines and mechanisms to be used by agencies and leaders at all levels of the crisis decision-making system, both military and civilian. 30  
• In exchange, the United States should also call on  Beijing to confirm and uphold its support for peaceful unification by declaring at the highest level of government that China has no deadline for achieving reunification, will not attempt to coerce Taiwan into political talks, and will avoid coercive measures toward Taiwan in general.

Preliminary discussions the author has held with Chinese specialists on Taiwan and on U.S.–China relations indicate that Beijing would likely be receptive to the above statements and actions by both sides, assuming that they are clearly and consistently made by senior U.S. officials (eventually across administrations), and that they receive some Congressional support.    

Beyond the above statements and actions, U.S. officials should also engage senior Taiwan officials in order to explain why stabilizing the relationship with Taiwan in this manner is in Taiwan’s interest.  The overwhelming majority of Taiwanese people do not support a clear movement toward either independence or unification. 31 Many are increasingly concerned about the island being dragged into a crisis or conflict due to a worsening strategic competition and accompanying arms race between Beijing and Washington, and looking for less dangerous ways to stabilize the current situation. 32 Therefore, many Taiwan citizens could be receptive overall to the above methods for revitalizing the original Sino–American understanding regarding Taiwan and stabilizing the status quo.  

A clear factor in the drift toward confrontation and crisis over Taiwan is the pressure from Congress toward increasingly radical rhetoric and actions over both the overall U.S.–China relationship and Taiwan specifically. This has been reflected in a steady stream of legislation, especially from the House, that would undermine the “One China policy” by weakening strategic ambiguity and pushing the U.S. government toward forms of official recognition of Taiwan. 33 To take just one example, HR 1159, which passed the House by an overwhelming majority with support from both parties, would require the State Department to issue regular reports on its “opportunities and plans to lift self-imposed restrictions on relations with Taiwan” — putting pressure on the Executive to lift the restrictions on official relations with Taiwan put in place to support normalization with China in the 1970s. 34 In the U.S. Senate, a bill that passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2022 would have specifically required the U.S. government to reverse key parts of the One China policy by essentially restoring diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, as well as rolling back strategic ambiguity by asserting that Taiwan’s independence was a core U.S. strategic interest and moving toward an explicit commitment to the military defense of Taiwan.  35

In addition, the very large and well–funded Select Committee on the CCP in the House of Representatives has been a steady source of radicalizing and confrontational rhetoric around the U.S.–China relationship and increased the emphasis on highly militarized and one–sided approaches toward the Taiwan issue. The Committee’s “Ten for Taiwan” report includes recommendations to “harden and distribute U.S. force posture in the Indo–Pacific,” “urgently provide Taiwan with essential hard power capabilities,” “expand combined military training between the United States and Taiwan,” and “rapidly increase the number of long–range strike assets in the theater.” 36

Despite the role of Congress in channeling political pressure for a more radical U.S. position on Taiwan, there are in fact a considerable number of (primarily Democratic) members of Congress who are sympathetic to the need to de–escalate tensions around Taiwan. However, they face significant political pressure to avoid appearing “soft on China.”  Standing up for common–sense measures that provide a judicious balance of deterrence and reassurance measures toward China would require clear signals of support from both the administration and civil society to provide them with political cover. In the short run, such support might face seemingly impossible obstacles in the heated environment of the U.S. presidential election season where contenders for office will likely compete to outdo one another in criticizing China while ignoring Washington’s contribution to the current Taiwan imbroglio.  

But such hyperbole could also prompt many public figures who are not directly contending in the election to become more receptive to more pragmatic, restrained approaches to the Taiwan issue (and the overall U.S.–China relationship). It is important to rally civil society to a better understanding of the stakes involved in interrupting the increasing momentum toward a crisis and possible conflict over Taiwan, and the ways in which reaffirming diplomatic understandings and ending zero–sum polemics and hypocrisy can prevent conflict while continuing to support Taiwan’s security. 

The appearance of a newly stabilized Sino–American relationship and accompanying signs of restraint on the Taiwan issue are misleading. The basic dynamic moving the issue toward a future crisis and possible conflict over the island has not changed appreciably in recent months, despite the emergence of a more regularized leadership dialogue and some positive rhetoric.  Nonetheless, Washington and Beijing should take the opportunity provided by the current marginal improvement in their overall relationship to undertake the statements and actions recommended above regarding their overall rivalry and the Taiwan problem in particular. Doing so can help revitalize confidence in the original understanding between the United States and China that has kept the peace across the Taiwan Strait for decades and create a modicum of bilateral trust going forward. This will prove extremely difficult in the near term, for the reasons cited above. It will require courageous leadership on both sides. But without such an effort, Washington and Beijing will continue to slide toward a severe crisis and possible conflict over the Taiwan issue.

Quincy Institute Director of Studies Marcus Stanley and Outreach Coordinator Tori Bateman provided the information contained in this brief regarding Congressional Taiwan-related legislation.

Michael D. Swaine

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Michael D. Swaine is a Senior Research Fellow on East Asia at QI and is one of the most prominent American scholars of Chinese security studies. He comes to QI from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he worked for…

“Experts react: Taiwan just elected Lai Ching-te as president despite China’s opposition. What’s next?” The Atlantic Council, January 13, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-taiwan-just-elected-lai-ching-te-as-president-despite-chinas-opposition-whats-next/ .; Ryan Woo and James Pomfret, “China, Taiwan opposition warn of threat to peace from ruling party candidate,” Reuters, January 11, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-warns-taiwan-ruling-party-presidential-candidate-over-possible-2024-01-11/ .; Adm. Aquilino, John C. and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, “Adm. John C. Aquilino, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Keynote and Q&A at the Pacific Forum,” Transcript of speech given at Pacific Forum in Honolulu, Hawaii, January 16, 2024. https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/3658408/adm-john-c-aquilino-commander-of-us-indo-pacific-command-keynote-and-qa-at-the/ .;Vincent Y. Chao“Taiwan’s Election Isn’t About War. It’s About Clarity,” The Diplomat , December 01, 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/taiwans-election-isnt-about-war-its-about-clarity/ .; Chris Buckley, et al. “In a Setback for Beijing, Taiwan Elects Lai Ching-te as President,” The New York Times , January 13, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/13/world/asia/taiwan-election-china-us.html .; Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “China expected to ramp up pressure on Taipei and Washington after Taiwan’s election,” Axios, January 14, 2024. https://www.axios.com/2024/01/14/china-taiwan-elections-military-political-biden .; David Sacks, “Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Election: Analyzing William Lai’s Foreign Policy Positions,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 20, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-analyzing-william-lais-foreign-policy-positions .  ↩

Patricia M. Kim, “The US–China relationship in 2024 is stabilized but precarious,” Brookings Institution, January 12, 2024. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/us-china-relations-in-2024-are-stabilized-but-precarious/ .; Syaru Shirley Lin, “Taiwan’s 2024 Election Outcomes: Balancing Domestic Challenges and International Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 27, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwans-2024-election-outcomes-balancing-domestic-challenges-and-international-relation ; David Sacks, “China Responds to Taiwan’s Presidential Election: Is Beijing Biding Its Time?” Council on Foreign Relations, January 17, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-responds-taiwans-presidential-election-beijing-biding-its-time.  ↩

Jennifer Welch et al. “Xi, Biden and the $10 Trillion Cost of War Over Taiwan,” Bloomberg , January 8, 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2024-01-09/if-china-invades-taiwan-it-would-cost-world-economy-10-trillion ; Brad Lendon and Oren Liebermann, “War game suggests Chinese invasion of Taiwan would fail at a huge cost to US, Chinese and Taiwanese militaries,” CNN, January 9, 2023. https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/taiwan-invasion-war-game-intl-hnk-ml/index.html .  ↩

“Highlights of Xi’s speech at gathering marking 40th anniversary of Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” Xinhua, January 2, 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-01/02/c_137715300.htm; “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, August 10, 2022. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202208/10/content_WS62f34f46c6d02e533532f0ac.html ; Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” Xinhua, October 18, 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf; “Full text of resolution on 19th CPC Central Committee report,” Xinhua, October 22, 2022. https://english.news.cn/20221022/e9f90843c675417da2753866407612d8/c.html .  ↩

“Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues,” Congressional Research Service, March 1, 2024. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12481#:~:text=Increasingly%2C%20the%20U.S.%20government%20has,strengthening%20U.S.%2DTaiwan%20defense%20ties .; “Ten for Taiwan: Policy Recommendations to Preserve Peace and Stability in the Taiwan Strait,” The House Select Committee on Chinese Communist Party, May 24, 2023. https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/ten-for-taiwan-final-with-cover-page-2.pdf .  ↩

Christopher S. Chivvis and Hannah Miller, “The Role of Congress in U.S.-China Relations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 15, 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/15/role-of-congress-in-u.s.-china-relations-pub-91012 .  ↩

Ibid.  ↩

Amy Chang Chien and Chris Buckley, “China Sends Record Number of Military Planes Near Taiwan,” The New York Times , September 18, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/18/world/asia/china-taiwan-military-planes.html .; “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 19, 2023. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3562442/dod-report-details-chinese-efforts-to-build-military-power/ .  ↩

Ja Ian Chong, “The Many “One Chinas”: Multiple Approaches to Taiwan and China,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 9, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/09/many-one-chinas-multiple-approaches-to-taiwan-and-china-pub-89003/ .  ↩

Dave Lawler, “Xi vows China and Taiwan will “surely be reunified” in New Year’s speech,” Axios , January 1, 2024. https://www.axios.com/2024/01/01/xi-china-taiwan-unification-speech .; Michael D. Swaine, and James Park, “Paths to Crisis and Conflict Over Taiwan,” January 11, 2024. https://quincyinst.org/research/paths-to-crisis-and-conflict-over-taiwan/ .  ↩

Oriana Skyla Mastro, “The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force,” Foreign Affairs , June 3, 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-temptation ; Hal Brands, “Deterrence in Taiwan Is Failing,” Foreign Policy, September 8, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/08/us-military-deterrence-china-taiwan-war-east-asia/ ; Michèle Flournoy, and Michael Brown, “Time Is Running Out to Defend Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs , September 14, 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/time-running-out-defend-taiwan ; Elbridge Colby, “America Must Prepare for a War Over Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs , August 10, 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/america-must-prepare-war-over-taiwan .  ↩

 Antony J. Blinken, “Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken’s Press Availability,” U.S. Department of State, June 19, 2023. https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-antony-j-blinkens-press-availability/#:~:text=That%20policy%20has%20not%20changed,status%20quo%20by%20either%20side .; David Cohen, “Biden hasn’t changed U.S. policy on Taiwan, Jake Sullivan says,” Politico , June 4, 2023. https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/04/china-taiwan-biden-sullivan-00100100#:~:text=President%20Joe%20Biden’s%20national%20security,defend%20Taiwan%20if%20China%20invaded .; Steve Holland, et al, “U.S. does not support Taiwan independence, Biden says,” Reuters, January 13, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-us-does-not-support-taiwan-independence-2024-01-13/ .  ↩

Ely Ratner, “Statement By Dr. Ely Ratner Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo–Pacific Security Affairs Office of the Secretary of Defense Before the 117 Congress Committee on Foreign Relations,” Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 8, 2021. https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120821_Ratner_Testimony1.pdf .  ↩

Kevin Liptak, “Biden’s past promises for US to defend Taiwan under microscope in meeting with China’s Xi,” CNN, November 14, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/13/politics/joe-biden-taiwan/index.html .  ↩

Ben Blanchard, “Former US officials to visit Taiwan for post-election talks,” Reuters, January 14, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/former-us-officials-visit-taiwan-post-election-talks-2024-01-14/#:~:text=TAIPEI%2C%20Jan%2014%20(Reuters),U.S.%20embassy%20in%20Taipei%20said .; David Sacks, “Why Letting Taiwan Change the Name of Its Office in the United States Is a Mistake,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 13, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-letting-taiwan-change-name-its-office-united-states-mistake .; Creery, Jennifer, “US Lawmakers Arrive in Taiwan as Tensions in Strait Simmer,” Bloomberg , February 21, 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-22/us-delegation-led-by-mike-gallagher-lands-in-taiwan .  ↩

Sarahj Kinosianand and Sam Blanchard, “U.S. leans on Honduras to rethink China switch, hopes for reprieve,” Reuters, March 18, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-leans-honduras-rethink-china-switch-hopes-reprieve-2023-03-18/ .; “Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, February 23, 2024. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10275#:~:text=We%20do%20not%20support%20Taiwan,both%20sides%20of%20the%20Strait .; Eduardo Baptista et al, “China rebukes U.S. for changing Taiwan wording on State Department website,” Reuters , May 10, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/china-slams-us-changing-taiwan-wording-state-department-website-2022-05-10/ .  ↩

“Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service.; Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “U.S. Relations With Taiwan,” U.S. Department of State, May 28, 2022. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/ .; Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “Taiwan Relations Act: Time for a Change?” Wilson Center, March 2014. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/TRAPolicyBrief.Hickey.pdf .  ↩

There are at least three differing sets of descriptions of the Six Assurances in the record of the U.S. government.  The version conveyed to Taiwan for its public release in 1982 by then–Secretary of State George Shultz stated them as follows: 1) The U.S. has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; 2) The U.S. has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sale to Taiwan 3) The U.S. will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing; 4) The U.S. has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; 5) The U.S. has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; 6) The U.S. will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.”  Note that assurances 1, 2, 4, and 5 refer to past, not future U.S. behavior and hence do not necessarily constitute permanent commitments. For more detailed information, see Susan V. Lawrence, “President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan,” Congressional Research Service,  June 13, 2023. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11665.pdf .  ↩

For example, the latest State Department factsheet on U.S.-Taiwan relations describes the U.S. approach toward Taiwan to be guided by the Six Assurances, along with the Taiwan Relations Act and the three U.S.-China Joint Communiques. “U.S. Relations with Taiwan,” U.S. Department of State, May 28, 2022. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/ .  ↩

Lawrence. “President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan.”  ↩

Richard C. Bush, “Why assurances matter in U.S.–Taiwan relations,” Brookings Institution, August 29, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-assurances-matter-in-u-s-taiwan-relations/ .  ↩

Nancy A. Youssef and Gordon Lubold, “U.S. to Expand Troop Presence in Taiwan for Training Against China Threat,” The Wall Street Journal , February 23, 2023. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-expand-troop-presence-in-taiwan-for-training-against-china-threat-62198a83 .; Joseph Trevithick, “Air Mobility Command Boss Predicts War With China In 2025 In Dire Memo,” The Warzone , January 27, 2023. https://www.twz.com/usaf-general-warns-of-war-with-china-over-taiwan-in-2025 .; Congress.gov. “S.332 – Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act,” February 22, 2021. https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/332/text .; Bernard Orr, “US Navy sends first warship through Taiwan Strait post-election,” Reuters, January 24, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-navy-says-uss-john-finn-conducted-transit-taiwan-strait-2024-01-24/ ; Matthew Lee, “China objects as US approves military aid to Taiwan under program aimed at sovereign nations,” Associated Press , August 31, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/us-military-aid-taiwan-sovereign-one-china-policy-23dbe7da92c63bc33e93f95ab09b7f2b ; Eric Gomez, “A Costly Commitment: Options for the Future of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relationship,” Cato Institute, September 28, 2016. https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/costly-commitment-options-future-us-taiwan-defense-relationship .  ↩

“​Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, August 2, 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202208/t20220802_10732293.html .; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on January 16, 2024,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, January 16, 2024. http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202401/t20240116_11225146.htm .  ↩

Lolita C. Baldor, “Biden and Xi agree to restore some military-to-military communications between the US and China,” Associated Press, November 15, 2023.  https://apnews.com/article/us-china-military-relations-339980a0d494bcde92905411838808a4 .  ↩

Michael D. Swaine, “How to Break the Impasse in U.S.-China Crisis Communication,” U.S. Institute of Peace, July 26, 2023. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/07/how-break-impasse-us-china-crisis-communication ; Michael D. Swaine, “The Worsening Taiwan Imbroglio: An Urgent Need for Effective Crisis Management,” Quincy Institute, November 28, 2022. https://quincyinst.org/research/the-worsening-taiwan-embroglio-an-urgent-need-for-effective-crisis-management/ .  ↩

U.S. portrayal of China as a global economic predator became prevalent under the Trump administration and continued under the Biden administration. For example, the Trump administration devoted a section in its China factsheet to call out on Chinese predatory behavior. “The Chinese Communist Party: Threatening Global Peace and Security,” U.S. Department of State.   https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-chinese-communist-party-threatening-global-peace-and-security/#EconomicPractices ; Under the Biden administration, top foreign policy officials, including Jake Sullivan and Tony Blinken, have routinely referred to China as an economic predator. “On-the-Record Press Call by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on the President’s Trip to Europe,” The White House, June 17, 2021.  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/06/17/on-the-record-press-call-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-the-presidents-trip-to-europe/ ; “Blinken Arrives in Tonga, Warns of ‘Predatory’ Chinese Aid,” VOA, July 25, 2023. https://www.voanews.com/a/blinken-arrives-in-tonga-warns-of-predatory-chinese-aid-/7198268.html .  On the FBI website, China is described as “seeking to become the world’s greatest superpower through predatory lending and business practices. “The China Threat,” FBI. https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/the-china-threat .  ↩

 The Chinese leadership has constantly accused the United States of attempting to contain China’s developments and weaken the PRC regime. “Wang Yi Meets with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 24, 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wshd_665389/202209/t20220924_10771042.html ; Keith Bradsher, “China’s Leader, With Rare Bluntness, Blames U.S. Containment for Troubles,” The New York Times , March 7, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/07/world/asia/china-us-xi-jinping.html .  ↩

Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen,“Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs , November 30, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwan-china-true-sources-deterrence ; Michael D. Swaine, “US official signals stunning shift in the way we interpret ‘One China’ policy,” Responsible Statecraft , December 10, 2021. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/12/10/us-official-signals-stunning-shift-in-the-way-we-interpret-one-china-policy/ ; Paul Heer, “Has Washington’s Policy Toward Taiwan Crossed the Rubicon?” The National Interest , December 10, 2021. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/has-washington%E2%80%99s-policy-toward-taiwan-crossed-rubicon-197877 .  ↩

 Although most (but not all) of these points have been stated at various times by U.S. officials, such assurances should be combined and clearly stated together, preferably by the U.S. president, to rebut the notion, expressed by some Chinese officials, that Washington is placing a low priority on them.  ↩

Specifically, this effort could aim at generating: agreed–upon crisis prevention and management guidelines or best practices; a lexicon of commonly used terms and signals employed to avert or manage a serious political-military crisis; and specific mechanisms, such as a regular, semi-official “non–conversation” channel between mutually respected senior former officials.  Such a channel could “test” crisis–related initiatives under consideration at the official level and reduce misunderstandings resulting, e.g., from unclear crisis signaling.  ↩

“Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland (1994/12~2023/12),” National Chengchi University, February 22, 2024. https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963 .  ↩

 Iain Johnston, Chia-hung Tsai, and George Yin. “When might US political support be unwelcome in Taiwan?” Brookings Institution, April 5, 2023. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/when-might-us-political-support-be-unwelcome-in-taiwan/ .  ↩

Blaise Malley, “Congress and the 4 faces of China baiting bills in 2023 Congress and the 4 faces of China baiting bills in 2023,” Responsible Statecraft , December 27, 2023. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/china-congress-2023/ .  ↩

Congress.gov, “H.R.1159 – 118th Congress (2023-2024): To amend the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 to require periodic reviews and updated reports relating to the Department of State’s Taiwan Guidelines,” February 24, 2023. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1159 .  ↩

Congress.gov, “S.4428 – 117th Congress (2022-2023): Taiwan Policy Act of 2022,” June 16, 2022. https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4428 .  ↩

 “Ten for Taiwan: Policy Recommendations to Preserve Peace and Stability in the Taiwan Strait,” The Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, May 24, 2023. “Ten for Taiwan: Policy Recommendations to Preserve Peace and Stability in the Taiwan Strait,” The Select Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/policy-recommendations/ten-taiwan-policy-recommendations-preserve-peace-and-stability-taiwan.   ↩

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Rising to the challenge: taiwan's response to a new era china.

By Chen-Dong Tso Working Paper

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Abstract 

The Tsai administration’s cross-Strait policy has three core elements. First, it aims to eliminate the Kuomintang’s (KMT) political appeal in Taiwan so that the Chinese Communist Pary (CCP) is forced to accept the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as its only negotiation counterpart and to do so on DPP terms. Second, it aims to shift the priority in external engagement from Mainland China to the United States to mitigate the negative impact of a souring cross-Strait relationship on Taiwan’s autonomy. Third, it tries not to explicitly challenge the “one China” position as embodied by the Republic of China (ROC) constitution to maintain stability across Taiwan Strait. Tsai’s cross-Strait policy can be considered as interactions between these three elements. Taiwan’s response to the CCP during the Tsai-Xi era can be divided into four issue-areas: sovereignty contention, diplomatic competition, military muscle-flexing, and people-to-people exchange. The CCP’s approach in these areas is centered around weakening Taiwan’s sovereign statehood. This fact is essential to understand Taiwan’s response. Nonetheless, the Tsai administration also sometimes took initiatives to reinforce Taiwan’s sovereignty. Among the four issue areas, Taiwan was relatively proactive in sovereignty contention and people-to-people exchanges, where it had more room for maneuver, and relatively reactive in diplomatic competition and military tension, where it was more constrained.

The dramatic rise in rivalry between the United States and China brought a fundamental shift to the chessboard and helped Taiwan compensate for losses in the diplomatic competition with improvements in relations with the United States. In response, Mainland China heightened its military coercion to stop any significant breakthroughs Taiwan makes in U.S.-Taiwan relations from creating snowball effects that might dismantle the “one China” structure worldwide. Any thoughtful explanation of cross-Strait interactions should take a holistic view and not narrow its focus to any single part of the causal chain. The incoming Lai administration has stated its intent to continue the Tsai administration’s cross-Strait policies. A major factor will be the improvement in U.S.-China relations, which will likely reduce military pressure on Taiwan but will also reduce U.S. ability to help Taiwan retain its diplomatic allies. The Lai administration will have opportunities to improve people-to-people ties, but contention with Mainland China over Taiwan sovereignty is likely to continue unabated.

This is the second in a series of working papers from the CAPS-RAND-NDU-USIP conference series, intended to make policy-relevant findings available in a timely manner.

United States Institute of Peace

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Why Does China Still Care About Taiwan’s Allies?

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Chinese strategy aimed at eroding Taiwan’s support in the world.
• China seeks international recognition, extraterritorial control over its diasporas and domestic legitimacy.
• Taiwan, however, remains firmly focused on maintaining support from the U.S.

Tuesday, May 28, 2024

/ READ TIME: 8 minutes

By: Graeme Smith

In January of this year, Nauru switched recognition from Taiwan to China, reducing the number of Taiwan’s partners from 13 to 12. It did so two days after Taiwan’s presidential elections produced an outcome that was unwelcome in Beijing: four more years of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taipei.

This practice of switching a Taiwan-supporting country as punishment has precedent : in March 2023, China announced that Taiwan’s largest ally, Honduras, was choosing “the right side of history” just as Taiwan’s then president Tsai Ing-wen was transiting through the United States. Talk to Taiwan’s diplomats privately, and they concede that for most of their remaining allies, the question is not if they will switch but when.

But why does China lavish funds and time on countries that barely register in the consciousness of its people, and that have minimal effect on its broader geopolitical battle with the United States? From China’s perspective, the reasons for investing in this battle are largely found in three different arenas: international recognition, extraterritorial control over Chinese diasporas and domestic legitimacy. All three of these factors are, of course, tightly interrelated.

International Recognition: Telling China’s Story Well

Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been steadfastly focused on the international narrative around China’s role in the world, as the formulation goes, to “tell China’s story well” (讲好中国故事). The China referred to in this phrase is not ordinary Chinese people, but rather the CCP telling China’s story, with itself as the hero in the drama. The core of this formulation is — to put it crudely — a group of old men telling a story about themselves and their infallibility.

Finding allies that are willing to speak on the CCP’s behalf at international fora, most prominently at the United Nations, has become a primary focus. This can relate to issues China is defensive about — such as camps for Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang, island building in the South China Sea or the imposition of the National Security Law in Hong Kong . More allies can be useful in a narrative sense — whenever a motion is put by Western nations condemning China’s actions, a counter motion will be put in support, typically with more signatories supporting China’s position. For some votes in U.N. agencies, a couple of votes can make the difference. One of China’s most notable wins in recent years was in 2022, when the U.N. Human Rights Council voted against discussing a report on human rights abuses in Xinjiang by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 19 to 17, with 11 nations abstaining. Two of the countries that voted in support — the Marshall Islands and Honduras — were Taiwan allies at the time. With the exception of Somalia, no developing nation that recognized China voted in support. Aside from Somalia, all the Muslim-majority nations on the council either voted against (Indonesia, Pakistan, Qatar, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates) or abstained (Malaysia).

International support, which is often more enthusiastic from countries that have recently switched to Beijing, is not simply about gathering support for controversial causes. While Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, ran a mile from any suggestion that China was offering a “ Beijing Consensus ” to rival Washington’s, the current leadership in Beijing is confident that they have a model to offer the developing world, for everything from poverty alleviation to their legal system . The rhetoric of leaders who have recently decided to abandon Taiwan echoes this self-confidence, even though Western media coverage of recent decisions to switch are so excoriating . Reputational concerns seem to have played a role in Tuvalu’s decision to stay with Taiwan in the aftermath of this year’s election.

Extraterritorial Control: The Long Arm of the Law

Visiting Solomon Islands in the lead-up to the country’s switch in 2019, I was struck in conversations with local Chinese traders that nearly all of them were lukewarm, if not outright hostile, to the idea of China opening an embassy in the capital, Honiara. Peter Kenilorea Jr., an opposition politician who argued strongly that Solomon Islands should remain with Taiwan, was surprised to find mainland Chinese shopkeepers stopping him to praise his policy, or if they spoke no English simply giving him a grin, a thumbs up and announcing, “Taiwan, good!”

The lack of enthusiasm was surprising. Having an embassy would save Chinese traders an expensive trip to Papua New Guinea to renew their passports, which in their telling usually involved being shaken down by customs and police at Jacksons International Airport in the capital Port Moresby. In part, their reluctance stemmed from concerns that greater attention would mean more Chinese migrants, and thus more competition. In over a decade of interviewing these shopkeepers, I’ve found a cool and often antagonistic attitude toward China’s diplomats is ever present, envied for what the merchants see as an easy life “eating the emperor’s grain.”

Parallel to this is an increasing ambition on the part of the Chinese state to govern its citizens beyond its borders, encoded in legislation such as the Hong Kong National Security Law, and a broader policy push to spread “foreign related rule-of-law” ( shewai fazhi ). In 2021, Xi urged “the construction of a legal system for the extraterritorial application of our country’s laws” and to “resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests.” Before this, a shift in the agency responsible for managing China’s citizens abroad, from the government-affiliated Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs to the CCP-led United Front Work Department, signalled a shift in the way diasporas were viewed. Overnight, they went from being a seen as a source of investment into China, to diplomats and messengers for China. Taiwan-allied countries, especially those with significant Chinese diasporas, represent a challenge to these ambitions. They’re also a hub for Chinese criminals , many of whom have an ambivalent relationship with the Chinese state.

Chinese businessmen in Honiara, criminal or honest, didn’t need to read Xi’s speeches or parse the National Security Law to see a shift in how they were regarded by the Chinese state. From a state largely indifferent to their troubles, they now faced a state willing to act to defend their interests, but also to police them. Their WeChat feeds regularly buzzed with news of the extraordinary lengths the Chinese state went to in apprehending Chinese citizens abroad, combining these police operations with parading and shaming rituals taken straight from “Strike Hard” anti-crime police campaigns of the 1980s. A 2017 operation in Fiji hit particularly close to home, with 77 alleged Chinese cybercriminals seized and marched onto a China Southern Aircraft to be flown to Changchun in northeast China, with no due process. Dressed in black hoods and blue prison fatigues, each of the detainees was photographed on the tarmac and in the aircraft, flanked by tall police officers on either side. The audience for all this theater was not the people of Fiji, but to assure a domestic audience that the CCP was willing to go to any lengths to track down its enemies.

Domestic Legitimacy: Legitimacy With the Public, and the Party

From the perspective of the CCP, isolating Taiwan diplomatically is a matter of sovereignty, and thus, domestic legitimacy. Much of China’s efforts to shut down Taiwan’s involvement in international fora is for the benefit of its domestic audience, both the Chinese public, and more importantly, members of the CCP. While the rhetoric that accompanies each switch is boilerplate to the point of comedy, phrases such as “the right side of history” reflect consistent CCP narratives which are confirmed by events such as Taiwan losing an ally, or a country signing an extradition treaty with China. Hearing praise and support from foreign leaders is more effective than hearing it from the Chinese government.

Solomon Islands’ former prime minister, Manasseh Sogavare, who led his nation’s switch to Beijing in 2019, took this to another level in an appearance on China Global Television Network in which he described Xi as a “great man” and praised his four-volume (at last count) “The Governance of China.”

Diminishing returns on this strategy are also apparent, however. When Nauru, the world’s third-smallest nation, switched to Beijing, the reaction on Chinese social media ranged from celebrating a humiliation for Taiwan to openly mocking Nauru as a “weird country”  and “an empire of poop-digging,” referring to its depleted phosphate mines, which used to be its main source of revenue.

This parallels domestic sentiment in Taiwan, where popular opinion is far from supportive of Taiwan’s remaining allies, viewing those that remain as “poor, brown and small.”  Taiwan’s diplomats — and Western strategists — know the main game lies elsewhere. If you can have the military backing of the United States and tacit support from its allies, why focus on keeping small Pacific nations in your orbit? Insiders suggest that Taiwan no longer bothers to send its best diplomats to the countries that support Taiwan.

Politicians in countries such as Solomon Islands have couched support for Taiwan as part of a broader struggle for freedom and democracy. Closer examination suggests canny politicians overlaying saleable geopolitical narratives onto grievances that are deeply local and personal. And as even Taiwan’s diplomats will admit, they didn’t do much for democracy in Solomon Islands, creating Rural Constituency Development Funds that are effectively an instrument of vote buying.

These three motivations — the desire for international standing, extraterritorial control and domestic legitimacy — will continue to underpin China’s logic of competing with Taiwan in the Pacific and beyond. The second factor — the zeal of Xi’s party in controlling their citizens abroad — is the most challenging development for China’s diasporas and the target nations themselves. Without the institutional resources and (in many cases) the interest to push back against these incursions into their sovereignty, smaller states may find themselves caught in the cross fire of battles not of their own making.

Graeme Smith is a senior fellow with the Department of Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University and co-hosts “ The Little Red Podcast .”

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

PUBLICATION TYPE: Analysis

Should the United States change its policies toward Taiwan?

Subscribe to the china bulletin, michael e. o’hanlon , michael e. o’hanlon director of research - foreign policy , director - strobe talbott center for security, strategy, and technology , co-director - africa security initiative , senior fellow - foreign policy , strobe talbott center for security, strategy, and technology , philip h. knight chair in defense and strategy @michaeleohanlon ivan kanapathy , ivan kanapathy nonresident senior associate, freeman chair in china studies - center for strategic and international studies rorry daniels , and rorry daniels managing director - asia society policy institute, senior fellow, center for china analysis - asia society policy institute @rorrydaniels thomas hanson thomas hanson chair - minnesota committee on foreign relations, co-chair - minnesota international business council conveners: ryan hass , ryan hass director - john l. thornton china center , senior fellow - foreign policy , center for asia policy studies , john l. thornton china center , chen-fu and cecilia yen koo chair in taiwan studies @ryanl_hass patricia m. kim , and patricia m. kim fellow - foreign policy , center for asia policy studies , john l. thornton china center @patricia_m_kim emilie kimball emilie kimball senior project manager - foreign policy.

April 16, 2024

• 33 min read

In this written debate, the authors address the title question with essay-length opening statements. The statements are followed by an interactive series of exchanges between authors on each other’s arguments. The goal of this product is not to reach any conclusion on the question, but to offer a rigorous examination of the choices and trade-offs that confront the United States in its competition with China.

As China ramps up its military capabilities and tensions escalate in the Taiwan Strait, there are growing concerns about the risk of conflict that could involve the United States. Given the stakes, it is critical for American leaders and the American public to have a clear understanding of their top interests and objectives in the Taiwan Strait. Is America’s current approach working to protect its top interests? Should the United States change its long-standing policy of “strategic ambiguity” and its “One China” policy? Is conflict avoidable or inescapable? What policy tools will be most effective at upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait?

To dive into these issues and to provide a menu of options for U.S. policymakers grappling with this topic, Ryan Hass, Patricia M. Kim, and Emilie Kimball, co-leads of the Brookings Foreign Policy project: “ Global China: Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World ,” convened a group of leading experts—Rorry Daniels, Thomas Hanson, Ivan Kanapathy, and Michael E. O’Hanlon—to engage in a written debate examining if the United States should change its policies toward Taiwan. These experts also  will participate in a live discussion on this topic moderated by John Rash on April 25. Their opening statements and reactions follow below:

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Should the United States end its long-standing policy of “strategic ambiguity” about whether it would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack? Known more politely as a policy of “dual deterrence,” the idea of maintaining uncertainty about any American role in a future war has been intended to persuade  both  Taiwan  and  China not to take actions that the United States would find unacceptable. For Taiwan, that would mean unilateral pursuit or a declaration of independence (or perhaps the development of a nuclear bomb); for China, that would mean a military attack on Taiwan designed to force reunification with the mainland.

Such deliberate muddying of the deterrence waters has generally been thought to be a bad idea in modern American foreign policy—with an unredeemed legacy from Korea to Kuwait and beyond. For Taiwan, however, such a policy has enjoyed support for four decades.

A number of American scholars and officials now want to end the ambiguity, which they say is bad for deterrence. Given China’s greatly increased power in modern times, the traditional logic of a policy that sought in Goldilocks-style to perfectly balance between hot and cold options is no longer compelling, these critics say. The danger of an emboldened China lashing out has become substantially greater than the risks of Taiwan leaders throwing caution to the wind and pursuing independence recklessly in the false belief that America will always grant them a get-out-of-jail-free card.

At one level, these critics make a valid case. Beijing cannot be allowed to develop the misimpression that the United States might truly do nothing if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attacked Taiwan.

However, it is not that simple. Asserting that the United States should defend Taiwan under any circumstances presupposes that we could do so successfully. It also risks causing a huge crisis just by the simple declaration of Washington’s new stance on the situation.

As authors like Christian Brose have argued, in his recent book, “The Kill Chain,” it is far from clear who would win a fight over Taiwan—and far from clear how escalation would be avoided once the shooting starts. As Ryan Hass points out , this uncertainty is a powerful argument against China undertaking aggression; Beijing cannot be sure it would win, and it can be quite sure there would be serious costs associated with even making the effort. In particular, amphibious assault in the modern era remains a daunting military task. But that said, the United States should not assume that it will be able to regain unambiguous military dominance in regions near China’s own shores just because it develops a National Defense Strategy with that goal.

Indeed, China would likely begin any aggression against Taiwan at much lower levels of warfare, including deniable operations and other “gray-zone” tactics. Because limited attacks, such as a blockade, or gray-zone operations, such as deniable cyberattacks against Taiwan’s infrastructure, are the most likely kinds of aggressions that China would undertake against Taiwan, the United States and allies need better and more proportionate tools to address such eventualities.

I propose that the United States make it unambiguously clear to Beijing that, were it ever to attack Taiwan in a concerted attempt to coerce capitulation and reunification, the U.S.-China relationship could never be the same. War might happen, but we should remain ambiguous and non-committal on that point, partly to deter Taiwan from rash action (according to the original logic of dual deterrence, some of which still applies today). However, Beijing should have no illusions that the rich, broad, mutually beneficial relationship that it built with the United States over several decades could survive such a scenario. For all the setbacks to that relationship during the last decade, and especially since the Donald Trump years, U.S.-China trade remains near record levels in value. China’s trade with key American allies remains robust as well. That is a far cry from what would happen if the two nations wound up in direct combat. If and when such war occurs, the new U.S. policy of “ de-risking ” should indeed become, and would become, one of decoupling. Washington should say so and also announce that it would seek to persuade its allies and close partners to adopt a similar approach.

Raw military power still has a role to play in undergirding deterrence. But whatever the utility of such a capability against a massive invasion attempt, it is less germane against the much more likely scenario of limited aggression, to include a blockade of some type. In situations where China had not necessarily caused large numbers of casualties itself, the practicality or wisdom of a U.S. response that could quickly kill tens of thousands is not obvious. The essence of a better and more credible strategy should therefore be integrated, and asymmetric, deterrence. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has been rightly emphasizing the integrated element, just as I did in my 2019 book, “ The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great-Power War over Small Stakes .”

For this strategy to deter successfully, advance preparations are required. That is especially true in the realms of economic resilience, perhaps even more so than in more technical matters of defense planning. As rough rules of thumb, American friends and allies should not allow themselves to develop dependencies of more than a given percent—perhaps typically 25 to 50 percent, depending on the area of trade and the possibility of finding alternative sourcing fast in a crisis—in everything from life-saving pharmaceutical medications to rare earth metals to key intermediate goods in supply chains for crucial technology such as transformers. Right now, of course, the Western world’s combined dependencies often are more than 25 to 50 percent, so we need to diversify and harden our economies. In other words, we must imagine ourselves in an economic war with China and be sure that our economies and peoples could survive that war (even if they face inevitable hardship in the process). If the threat of economic pain and punishment is to be a cornerstone of our deterrent against limited attacks in particular, the ability of the United States and allies to persevere in the face of inevitable Chinese retaliation in kind must be ensured.

Ivan Kanapathy

The U.S. “One China” policy framework has remained consistent for four decades while retaining flexibility in emphasis and execution to preserve the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. Since the turn of the millennium, however, the scales have tipped dangerously out of balance. To maintain peace, Washington must invest more in hard deterrence. It should also reconsider its messaging posture on “non-support” for Taiwanese independence and how it refers to the collection of relevant U.S. policies.

The first Bush and Clinton administrations began the practices of sending U.S. cabinet members to Taiwan and allowing Taiwanese presidential transit stops in the United States, respectively. But in his second term, President Bill Clinton succumbed to People’s Republic of China (PRC) pressure and publicly articulated U.S. non-support for Taiwanese independence. The George W. Bush administration repeated this line as it worked to constrain the more provocative instincts of a fledgling democracy in Taipei.

Courting PRC cooperation on trade and counterterrorism, the second Bush administration also withheld cabinet-level visits and weapons from Taiwan even as the PLA rapidly modernized. President Barack Obama, pursuing multilateral climate and nonproliferation accords with Beijing, largely continued these policies of keeping Taiwan at arm’s length—despite a deteriorating military balance and a government in Taipei that willingly expanded political and economic ties with China.

Acknowledging the worrying cross-Strait power differential, the Trump administration removed self-imposed barriers to U.S.-Taiwan coordination and accelerated arms transfer approvals. To hammer home the point, the National Security Council declassified President Ronald Reagan’s 1982 internal memo ordering that “Taiwan’s defense capability relative to that of the PRC will be maintained,” and the related six private assurances made to Taipei at that time. President Donald Trump changed the formal articulation of the U.S. “One China” policy framework by adding the six assurances and leading with the Taiwan Relations Act, which obliges the provision of weapons to Taiwan.

To help balance the rising threat, President Joe Biden not only adopted the new formulation but also stated his intent to defend Taiwan against PRC attack, overturning decades of intentional ambiguity on U.S. intervention. Building on a July 2020 U.S.-Australia joint ministerial statement declaring “that any resolution of cross-Strait differences should be peaceful and according to the will of the people on both sides,” the Biden administration broadened and elevated allied statements calling for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait—enhancing deterrence by internationalizing concern over the Taiwan issue.

The above recitation shows that Washington has historically adjusted the emphases and implementations of its cross-Strait policies. But until recently, preserving a stable military balance across the Taiwan Strait was subordinated to other national priorities and challenges—leading to a dangerous erosion of deterrence. Meanwhile, the United States now finds itself dealing simultaneously with competing hot wars in Europe and the Middle East, unprecedented drawdowns of U.S. arms and ammunition, and a withered defense industrial base. The time to act is now.

• Most importantly, the United States must adequately resource its national security strategy—closing the “say-do gap” by significantly raising defense spending. The country will have to make tough choices and sacrifices in the name of peace and prosperity. The president should use his bully pulpit and make the case to Congress and the American people that China is a threat to global stability and that Taiwan is a vital U.S. interest—invoking the great power contests of the last century.

China. Attempts to reassure China regarding U.S. intentions are misguided and fruitless. From Beijing’s view, U.S. weapons and training cannot but support Taiwan’s continued separation. Furthermore, Washington openly opposes the governance methods deployed in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong—presumptive models for a “unified” Taiwan. In the minds of PRC leaders, the United States remains the duplicitous “black hand” stirring anti-China dissent and the “strong enemy” the PLA must prepare to defeat. By its nature, the PRC government cannot meaningfully separate U.S. support for Taiwan’s democracy from perceived U.S. support for Taiwanese independence.

Taiwan. The effects in Taiwan are likely counterproductive. Stating non-support for independence signals to Taiwanese that Washington has made a deal with Beijing that presupposes a resolution for cross-Strait differences. The statement inadvertently supports PRC-promoted “U.S. skepticism” narratives in Taiwan that question American intent and reliability. These in turn weaken U.S. efforts to bolster deterrence on the island. A senior U.S. representative’s January public remarks delivered in Taiwan to this effect were thus likely detrimental to U.S. security objectives.

• The United States should begin referring to its “One China” policy as its “cross-Strait” policy instead. PRC information operations intentionally conflate the PRC’s “One China principle” with the subtler cross-Strait policies of other countries, claiming that “more than 180 countries and international organizations have reaffirmed their commitment to the one-China principle.” This proposed U.S. nomenclature change would make it easier to push back on the PRC’s misattributions and help unwind its narratives that isolate Taiwan from the international community, again potentially enhancing deterrence.

Rorry Daniels

The United States has never had a static Taiwan policy but always ebbed and flowed with shifting dynamics between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. After switching recognition from Taipei to Beijing in the late 1970s, U.S. policy toward Taiwan has been shaped by U.S.-China communiques, congressional acts, and executive branch statements and codified by “transit” visits of key Taiwan leaders to the United States, a growing list of arms sales, and even sending the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet toward the Taiwan Strait during the 1990’s missile crisis. Taiwan policy is best seen as an ongoing process underpinned by the United States’ de facto neutrality—namely, the United States takes no position on the sovereignty of Taiwan but wants to see the issue resolved without the use of force or coercion.

This political ambiguity has allowed a stable status quo in the Taiwan Strait—one of no unification, no independence, and no use of force—and enabled Taiwan to exercise considerable autonomy from Beijing despite Taipei having very few formal diplomatic allies. It has been one of the most successfully durable and flexible U.S. foreign policies in the modern era and it is still the best hope to forestall global catastrophe arising from a conflict over Taiwan.

U.S. de facto neutrality on the settlement of Taiwan’s sovereignty has accomplished two things: first, it leaves open the door for the sovereignty issue to be resolved in either side’s favor, therefore allowing all capitals to kick the can down the road until circumstances most favor their preferred resolution; second and relatedly, it keeps Taiwan’s status in the realm of a political, rather than a military, dispute.

It remains in the U.S. interest to support Taiwan’s thriving democratic system and its political autonomy from Beijing—as well as to forestall or reduce the risk of conflict in and around Taiwan. This is a difficult balance to achieve. Too much unilateral support for Taiwan increases the risk of conflict, and too little erodes Taiwan’s ability to exercise autonomy.

This balance is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain as the Chinese Communist Party modernizes its military and continuously emphasizes the imperative to resolve the Taiwan issue by mid-century. The question for the United States becomes, how can it remain neutral on the overall question of Taiwan’s sovereignty while still pushing back against the PRC’s use of coercion and implied threat of force against Taiwan?

The more Washington leans into a preference for Taiwan independence, the more the threat of force against Taiwan increases. As the United States erodes its neutrality with policy changes, it hardens views in Beijing that there is no hope for a political settlement and that the PRC must rely on military means to achieve its Taiwan goals.

Such policy changes in recent years have been numerous. A non-exhaustive list includes:

• Language shifts in regular policy statements that replace support for an outcome acceptable to both sides of the Strait with an outcome acceptable to (only) the people of Taiwan.
• The declassification in 2020 of the Six Assurances the United States privately provided to Taiwan in the 1980s, which declared no U.S. commitment to stop arms sales at a specific date after agreeing in the third U.S.-China communique to reduce such sales.
• Sloppy references to Taiwan as a “country” in national security policy documents and State Department fact sheets .
• Deletion and reinsertion of language on the State Department website on not supporting Taiwan’s independence.
• The liberalization of the State Department’s Taiwan guidelines governing how officials engage in the unofficial relationship, including allowing officials from both sides to meet at government buildings.
• Very high-level political visits to Taipei, such as that of former U.S. Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi , who was third in the presidential line of succession at the time of the trip.

Supporters of the above policy moves tend to put military competition above all other considerations and see the political support as a necessary deterrence strategy. However, recasting Taiwan as a military problem with political dimensions, rather than a political problem with military dimensions, is a major mistake. It undermines all sides’ ability to handle the sovereignty issue, creating a path dependence toward conflict, by devaluing the effects of political maneuvering and changes.

A security dilemma has developed in the Taiwan Strait in which all sides see their own actions as defensive or deterrent in nature and see the other side’s actions as aggressive enough to warrant a response. Beijing builds up its military capabilities in ways it sees as preparatory defense against a Taiwan declaration of independence, Washington interprets the capabilities as intent to attack Taiwan and strengthens its support for Taipei in ways it sees as necessary defense (including the policy changes referenced above), Beijing reacts to those actions with its own “defensive measures,” and the cycle continues.

This cycle moves ever closer to the fundamental red lines on all sides: the PRC’s red line on independence and permanent separation, Taiwan’s red line on coerced or forced unification, and the U.S. red line on the outbreak of conflict. And the closer the three sides get to crossing each other’s red lines, the more likely that a single action sparks an uncontrollable escalation of conflict—one that is not in the national interests or the public appetite of Taiwan, the United States, and presumably even China.

Pushback is necessary but using U.S. force as a blunt instrument to confront the PRC’s military threat or use of coercion does little to support U.S. and Taiwan interests in peace and stability across the Strait. The optimal approach is not to attempt to meet these threats on Taiwan’s behalf through U.S. guarantees of military support or political showmanship but to help Taiwan prosper under threat by materially supporting Taiwan’s economic and social linkages around the world. In other words, the best defense is to diffuse the power of the threat by complicating the stakes of the conflict.

Successfully supporting Taiwan’s prosperity under threat includes using Taiwan’s economic autonomy to strengthen its resilience and to network its industries with partnerships around the world. Taiwan faces unique challenges as an island economy, particularly as one that has eschewed nuclear power in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. Helping Taiwan through international partnerships with its land, water, and power resilience will further embed other economies in the risk of cross-Strait conflict, raise international awareness about the PRC threat to Taiwan, buy the United States time to explore policy options in the event of a blockade, and prove that democracies can work together to manage shared challenges.

The more uncertain the conflict environment, the less confident Beijing will feel in launching a successful attack. The Taiwan issue’s importance for Beijing’s domestic political legitimacy is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it pushes Beijing toward policy responses, including threats of force or the use of coercion, to bolster and self-justify its position on Taiwan’s sovereignty. But on the other hand, no Chinese leader can risk a failed attempt to settle the sovereignty issue once and for all. Even a more risk-tolerant Xi Jinping is unlikely to shoot for the moon by launching an attack on Taiwan that is not guaranteed to succeed.

In short, the more international attention and support for stability across the Taiwan Strait, due to deepening linkages between today’s Taiwan and the international community, the higher the cost to China for breaking the peace.

This approach may not be satisfying to those who see the Taiwan issue as a mere facet of the U.S.-China great game, or whose exclusive interest is American military advantage. But it does support U.S. interests in regional peace and prosperity, as well as what polls show the majority of Taiwan people want—a durable status quo, officials who can solve economic problems at home, and the continuation of Taiwan’s autonomy and dignity as a self-organized and self-governing body politic.

Thomas Hanson

U.S.-China relations are plagued by mutual distrust and a drift toward potential conflict. In addition to intense competition over new technologies with military implications, the primary driver of tensions involves Taiwan. The security dilemma prevails, with each side reading aggressive intent into the other’s policies and actions. This vicious circle should be met with active diplomacy and a return to predictable adherence to a U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding Taiwan. At the same time, it will be important to maintain deterrence in the Taiwan Strait within this context.

Strains between the United States and China grew with the 2008 financial crisis, leading to the Obama administration’s “pivot” (rebalancing) to reassert U.S. influence in Asia with an initial focus on China’s role in the South China Sea. Ironically, as the United States turned to Asia, China began its own pivot toward Eurasia with an ambitious geoeconomic strategy epitomized in the Belt and Road Initiative. So far, the Chinese challenge globally is more economic and diplomatic than military. It is on the Asian littoral around Taiwan that military confrontation looms with the United States.

When nuclear powers perceive, rightly or wrongly, encroachment and potential aggression on their immediate periphery—whether Ukraine, Cuba, or Taiwan—they predictably react. Chinese concern that the United States seeks to use Taiwan as part of a containment strategy is one driver of worsening tensions. On the U.S. side, there is rare bipartisan agreement in Congress on countering unfair Chinese trade practices, human rights violations, and rapid advances in tech , while also stepping up support for Taiwan as a vibrant democracy and vital link in key supply chains.

An underlying motivation for this more assertive posture is also the long-standing U.S. resolve to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon, or peer competitor, in Eurasia. Realizing this ambition is more complex in a multipolar world of strengthened regional powers, and it increasingly requires buy-in from allies. Such strategic concerns have come to frame U.S. policy on Taiwan more overtly. For example, in a December 2021 Senate testimony , Pentagon official Ely Ratner described Taiwan as “a critical node within the first island chain, anchoring a network of U.S. allies and partners … that is critical to the region’s security and critical to the defense of vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.”

The evocation of vital security interests implies that for strategic reasons the United States opposes the reunification of Taiwan with China, even as it cautions the Taiwanese against declaring outright independence. Prior adherence to “strategic ambiguity” has given way to mixed messaging on the “One China” policy that has provided the basis of U.S.-China reconciliation since 1972.

Given these developments, there is now a need for change in the current trajectory of U.S. policy on Taiwan. To reverse the rising danger of military confrontation between the United States and China, the United States should once again embrace “strategic ambiguity” while engaging in active diplomacy and military confidence-building measures with Beijing. Such steps will be essential to meet the security dilemma that plagues the U.S.-China relationship.

The military balance around Taiwan should be addressed within this context. The escalation of China’s military buildup, including toward Taiwan, has coincided with the unfolding of the U.S. “pivot” to Asia since 2010. For both sides, military distrust has come to dominate bilateral relations in the region. Xi has urged the Chinese military to be prepared to seize Taiwan, if necessary, as early as 2027, although decisions will depend on future developments. U.S. defense planners must also prepare for more likely scenarios involving Chinese quarantines, blockades, or seizure of islands off Taiwan. In addition, China has embarked upon a diversification of its nuclear arsenal , moving away from a “minimum deterrence” posture toward a credible nuclear second-strike capacity based on launch on warning and new strike options such as the fractional orbital bombardment system.

This dangerous escalation should occasion not just spiraling countermeasures but a return to active diplomacy on arms control. In tandem with diplomatic initiatives and confidence-building measures, the United States should take adequate steps to address shifting military balances that are the premise of this discussion, including through a far greater emphasis on naval preparedness within the U.S. defense budget.

The need for cooperation between the United States and China is growing in the face of shared global threats such as climate change, pandemics, and arguably artificial intelligence that are beyond the capacity of any individual country or fragmentary alliance to address. Younger generations are likely to prioritize these global challenges over Cold War paradigms from an outdated threat environment.

Accumulating crises elsewhere are already having some effect. Chinese cooperation could be welcome on Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as on unaddressed nuclear provocations from North Korea. Accordingly, there has been a slight easing of U.S.-China tensions in the wake of the November 2023 meeting between Presidents Biden and Xi and a phone call between both leaders in April. Mixed results from the January 2024 Taiwan elections may also have a mitigating effect. However, cooperative “gestures” that have resulted from this mild thaw, including the resumption of military-to-military contacts, rest on shaky foundations and should be reinforced through active diplomacy, especially in the management of issues concerning Taiwan.

The U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security and prosperity remains essential to any prospect of a peaceful resolution, however long it may take, of Taiwan’s future status. A combination of returning to “strategic ambiguity,” proactive confidence-building measures, and credible naval preparedness in the Indo-Pacific region could reduce the likelihood of sleepwalking into a disastrous conflict. Such a balanced approach could also benefit a Taiwanese population for whom the sufferings of Ukraine may now loom as a cautionary tale. And a renewed emphasis on diplomacy might even lessen our geopolitically questionable urge to push Beijing and Moscow together, the very dynamic that motivated our turn toward China in the first place, a half-century ago.

The other scholars involved in this dialogue bring great expertise and sophistication to the subject; many are regional and country specialists in ways I am not. Therefore, I will use this podium for wrap-up commentary simply to reiterate, strongly and clearly, one key argument about military matters, which I have studied in great depth: A U.S.-China war must never be fought. The uncertainties about which side would win are not resolvable. That will remain true regardless of any plausible military modernization efforts by either side. The potential for escalation in any war is enormous. The possibility of nuclear war cannot be dismissed. All other considerations must be rendered secondary in comparison with these fundamental military and strategic realities. Those who would push either independence or reunification on any fast track are therefore reckless.

As expected, my co-panelists’ well-crafted and thoughtful pieces provide much to consider. I offer these initial reactions as a starting point for our forthcoming in-person discussion:

• O’Hanlon rightly pointed out that “China would likely begin any aggression against Taiwan at much lower levels of warfare, to include deniable operations and other gray-zone tactics.” In fact, we’re already past that point. Analogously, while his proposal for a credible threat of bilateral economic decoupling is sound, I believe that Beijing already assumes this in its planning, just as it predicts U.S. military intervention. Xi is aggressively pursuing technological indigenization and economic self-sufficiency while simultaneously indoctrinating his people to glorify sacrifice and struggle. In other words, China is actively preparing to accept a heavy economic cost (punishment) for aggression. To prevent the worst, Washington should focus on influencing Xi’s perception of military risk (deterrence by denial).
• Hanson’s analysis of congressional sentiment is spot on. On the executive side, he pointed to Ratner’s 2021 testimony. Another senior defense official later said Taiwan “could be used as a platform for the PRC to further project military power deeper into the Pacific.” Coupling these with the administration’s analysis that the PRC is “the only competitor with the intent, will, and capability to reshape the international order” makes Taiwan a vital U.S. interest, even before considering semiconductors (which only make the case stronger). The question, then, is whether Washington should: articulate these fact-based assessments to spur the investments and reforms necessary to compete and deter effectively or return to a posture of “non-provocative” constructive engagement. Accepting further erosion of cross-Strait deterrence in exchange for vague and unkept promises seems the wrong choice at this time.
• Daniels argues for deeper internationalization of the Taiwan issue—I agree. However, we should not underestimate the provocative nature of these proposals. Supporting Taiwan’s “political autonomy from Beijing” and “economic and social linkages around the world,” and raising “international awareness about the PRC threat to Taiwan” are tantamount to supporting Taiwanese separatists in the eyes of Beijing. As such, these prescriptions are hardly a path to lowering U.S.-China tensions. I also agree with Daniels’ assessment that Xi “is unlikely to shoot for the moon by launching an attack on Taiwan that is not guaranteed to succeed,” which is why U.S. policy should focus primarily on the issue recently raised by the top U.S. operational commander: increasing hard deterrence.

All of the authors agree that the current situation in the Taiwan Strait is dangerous and that a war would be catastrophic. All of us agree that a changing balance of power across the Taiwan Strait requires at least a review—if not a rethink—of what has made U.S. Taiwan policy successful and whether it remains fit for purpose. However, we differ on the drivers of risk and prescriptions for maintaining peace and stability.

Each of my fellow authors makes their own case for the best deterrence strategy, from Kanapathy’s recommendations to bolster military support and O’Hanlon’s deterrence threat of economic decoupling to Hanson’s plan to address U.S.-China strategic mistrust. I concentrate in my piece on a wider net of deterrence, complicating the decision-making landscape by making better use of Taiwan’s asymmetric advantage—the freedom to pursue economic and social ties with the world.

None of these strategies are actually mutually exclusive. In theory at least, it would be perfectly fine to simultaneously bolster U.S. capabilities to assist Taiwan’s defense, warn Beijing that the use of force against Taiwan would lead to a sharp decoupling, maintain and deepen diplomatic relationships to reassure that U.S. strategic intent is to avoid war, and to seek opportunities to lend support for Taiwan’s international economic and social ties.

But in reality, no strategic plan can be complete without considering and factoring in Beijing’s reactions. This is where cracks in each plan start to emerge.

O’Hanlon’s and Hanson’s plans are incomplete on their own but could be linked together to inform both sides of the deterrence coin: a threat, albeit non-military, to act if Beijing crosses the U.S. red line, and a reassurance delivered by stronger diplomatic contact. Together, they create the carrots and sticks dynamic of a successful deterrence strategy. Of course, China is already preparing for economic struggle against the United States and such a threat would lend credibility to the hawkish voices in Beijing that China needs to be even more self-sufficient—which would deepen strategic mistrust and the security dilemma. Still, muddling through U.S.-China tension may ultimately be the best and only available course.

Of all of the authors, I find Kanapathy’s plan to be the most ambitious but also the riskiest for maintaining cross-Strait peace and stability. Kanapathy’s strategy is to ratchet up political support for Taiwan in order to energize the American public and defense industry to the cause of defending Taiwan against China. This would undermine any reassurances to Beijing that the United States does not seek war (a common-sense policy that Kanapathy dismisses outright), go against public opinion that is wary of war with China, cause Beijing to rethink the value of any other cooperation with the United States on areas where there remain common interests, and potentially stretch U.S. resources to a breaking point with no guarantee that we are preparing well for war scenario we have not yet seen in the modern era.

All of the authors care deeply about Taiwan and its future. That we can bolster and build our own ideas on the U.S. role in maintaining Taiwan’s autonomy from Beijing through civil debate is an enduring strength of free and democratic societies.

All four contributors see the danger of military conflict over Taiwan, but they differ on which tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, or military—should take priority to deter Chinese aggression, reinforce Taiwan’s security and prosperity, and work toward the peaceful resolution of a standoff dating back to 1949. For my part, active diplomacy and military confidence-building measures should become a priority, along with necessary investment to assure a military balance in the Indo-Pacific region, accompanied by political and economic support for a vibrant Taiwan economy.

Daniels and I lament the “security dilemma” of mutual distrust that exacerbates tensions over Taiwan. Kanapathy agrees but feels that attempts to reassure China of our intentions would be “misguided and fruitless.” Daniels would stick to a policy of strategic ambiguity to make sure Taiwan remains a “political problem with military dimensions” rather than vice versa. I emphasize diplomacy and trust building, despite military tensions, in a larger context of global threats that urgently require U.S.-China cooperation.

Daniels and O’Hanlon favor economic tools but in different ways. Daniels maintains that the best way to bolster Taiwan is through support for its democracy, domestic economy, and strengthened ties to the outside world. This could enhance deterrence by complicating the stakes and increasing the cost of aggression. Such a policy might face headwinds, however, given China’s success in peeling away international support for Taiwan in recent years.

O’Hanlon emphasizes economic measures as a key element of “integrated and asymmetric deterrence” that mixes strategic ambiguity with the clear threat of “economic pain and punishment” should China act against Taiwan. He notes that strategic ambiguity serves as a deterrent not only to China but also to Taiwan, reducing the likelihood that Taipei might overreach out of a sense of moral hazard.

O’Hanlon posits that an economic strategy would be most effective against Chinese actions short of military invasion, such as blockades or gray-zone tactics—the most likely scenario. With strong support from allies and close partners, he says, de-risking would become harsh de-coupling. Yet any deterrent effect might lose credibility due to the example of Ukraine, where partners in the Global South such as India have demurred on economic sanctions against Russia.

Kanapathy recommends “hard deterrence” out of justified concern about the military balance around Taiwan. He advocates a comprehensive approach to include increased U.S. defense budgets and clear messaging that Taiwan is a vital U.S. interest. In that regard, he differs from the other three authors by recommending that we drop references to a “One-China” policy and replace it with “cross-Strait” policy in public messaging.

Kanapathy also cites the need to “internationalize” concerns about threats to Taiwan. In fact, the United States has already encouraged countries like Japan to take a stronger stand. In 2021, the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his brother, then-Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi, publicly described Taiwan as a vital Japanese interest, with Abe declaring that “Japan and the United States could not stand by if China attacked Taiwan.” Such statements aligned Japan with U.S. policy but risked evoking ghosts from the past.

One final point: it is perhaps noteworthy that none of the authors mentioned the “porcupine” strategy that would strengthen Taiwan’s homeland defense to allow the island to hold out long enough for the United States to join the fight against China. This scenario differs from Ukraine, where the United States and NATO helped strengthen Kyiv’s defenses after 2014 but with no initial intention of directly going to war with another nuclear power, Russia. Will China’s nuclear buildup eventually induce similar caution in U.S. calculations on Taiwan?

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Explaining the China-Taiwan Conflict, Essay Example

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Mr. President, the upcoming summit between yourself and President Xi Jinping comes at a crucial time in global politics. The tensions between the People’s Republic of China and the United States over the state of Taiwan have escalated to a boiling point creating an urgent need for diplomatic intervention and negotiation. Therefore, the purpose of this memorandum is to take a deeper look into the nature of the conflict from the lens of the political motivations of the main parties.

Both the US and China have vested interests in Taiwan. The United States, a leader in western liberal democratic ideals, has pledged to support Taiwan’s efforts to establish itself as an independent, democratic state. On the other hand, China seeks to reunify Taiwan with its “One China Policy,” effectively asserting its control over what is still considered a Chinese colony. This disparity is important because it speaks to the reasons behind the military actions taken by both states in defense of, or, in China’s case, in support of the future of Taiwan. It is essentially a question of political ideologies, with differing views perpetuating diplomatic dissonance and hindering both the US and China from effectively negotiating this issue.

To decipher the political “languages” illustrated in the actions of the US and China concerning Taiwan, one may look at the concepts of sovereignty and democracy. While a state can be sovereign without being democratic, as is the case for China, a state cannot fully function democratically without some basis of sovereignty. As a communist state, China is operating off of a notion of sovereignty through the unification of Taiwan. In its authoritarian system, democratic ideals are not relevant to a system where one party rules the state. For the United States, however, democratization is an integral part of its foreign relations with Taiwan. Efforts to aid the state in its desire to operate under this political system are openly supported. The US has promised not to interfere with Taiwan’s efforts to establish its independence from China. Yet these assurances fall on deaf ears for the government of China, which operates on the understanding that by aiding Taiwan’s democratic efforts, the US is enabling a notion of independence that threatens their control of the state.

Herein lies China’s issue with US’s involvement in Taiwan. While the US has operated based on supporting Taiwan’s progress, its actions are easily misconstrued by the Republic of China. The US has supplied Taiwan with weapons and military support to support its defensive systems. Its adoption of the Taiwan Resolution Act of 1979 helped establish a US role in advancing Taiwan’s independence and progression in the global area. A main principle of the Act is to promote peace in the region; however, in the context of the differing intentions of the US and China, it places itself in a difficult position. (need help with this point)

Consider the 3 rd Taiwanese strait crisis, for example. When Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui was set to speak at Cornell on the democratization process of Taiwan, the US initially maintained that it would not accept the president into the Honolulu base out of respect for its foreign relations with China – clear deference for the Chinese sentiment of sovereignty concerning Taiwan. Once that promise was rescinded due to a Congressional vote, President Lee was allowed into the US and thus participated in the panel discussion. Infuriated by the US’s change in policy, China took an active effort to intimidate the Taiwanese government, sending numerous warplanes and performing ballistic missile tests. The motivation was to punish the Taiwanese government for its marked derivation from Chinese control and later discourage President Lee’s re-election. The underlying motivation for these actions was to reassert the country’s sovereignty over Taiwan as its colony.

The United States’ response to China’s actions was a clear indicator of its strength and ability to defend Taiwan. By deploying subs, missiles, and warplanes, to name a few, the US illustrated its resolve to defend its ally and the length it would go to do so. As a result, China was deterred from instigating further actions to intimidate the Taiwanese government, and the US military demonstration was a success. But it also sent a subtle message that a country that does not share its democratic ideals could only be interpreted – that the US was encouraging Taiwan to establish itself as a state independent of China. Such differences in perception, although subtle, have a profound impact on the ability of the two countries to negotiate and resolve the tensions that continue to mount effectively.

The United States has an enormous responsibility as a global power to protect democratic ideals and support democratic governments like Taiwan. Still, this responsibility is greatly sensitive in this case. To avoid further escalation of tensions, the United States should clarify that it must support democratic ideals. It should also be understood that China is a communist state while Taiwan is democratic, with which the US has had long cordial foreign relations. The US and Taiwan have long outstanding business relations and a formal contract for the US to provide the island weapons to defend itself. This is part of the US-Taiwan Relations Act. However, the US has a policy of strategic ambiguity. Therefore, unless China engages in aggression against Taiwan, the US will let the Chinese and the Taiwanese governments solve the existing relations and political misunderstanding. China’s testing of hypersonic missiles and the previous missile attacks on Taiwan need to be understood as an act of defiance and a direct threat to a state the US has to defend.

A few things must be understood about the threats China is making to Taiwan. First, any attack on Taiwan in an attempt to repossess the island by force will attract other states in support of or against china or Taiwan. Since the Taiwan government has not made any extensive threats to china, more states will likely support Taiwan than china. The ideology of using high-tech weapons on a state that does not make a direct threat to china is a sign of aggression and defiance of the interests of the Americans. Second, the people of Taiwan are anti-communist, and the Chinese government will have a very tough time controlling the 24 million people who detest the communist rule. Other countries like Australia and Japan have already sided with Taiwan; hence, the US is assured of joining troops with the Taiwan allies to win in case a war erupts. The US must defend itself and its interests, such as Taiwan. Advocating for Taiwan should start with understanding the language of the Taiwanese president of the solidarity and allegiance to the US government.

Despite the escalated relations between the US and China on the issue of Taiwan, the US has an enormous responsibility of ensuring world order, peace, and stability. It is also important to understand the position of the US that the state has no primary intention to start a war with China. The US wants the threat and attacks on Taiwan to seize henceforth, and solutions to the existing problems are amicable, fair, and held democratically. However, should China ignore all these warnings from the US and its allies and attack Taiwan, then the US will have no choice but to defend Taiwan and supply the island with whatever weapons necessary to defend its sovereignty.

Despite the US efforts to move away from interstates relations and the old history between china and Taiwan, the US, as a promoter and supporter of democratic ideals, cannot do so without the Chinese assurance to solve the conflict through peaceful means. Therefore, the US maintains its position in support of Taiwan, should china ignore the peaceful solutions and attack Taiwan anyway. Lastly, agreeing to hold talks is a sign of the US  will to calm the situation down and find an amicable solution to the conflict of interests between the Chinese and US states. as such, it should not be taken as a sign of weakness or retaliation, for the US still has unwavering support for Taiwan and its people.

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Taiwan’s president urges China to end threats as Beijing says independence is ‘dead end’

Nick Schifrin Nick Schifrin

Dan Sagalyn Dan Sagalyn

Ethan Dodd Ethan Dodd

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• Copy URL https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/taiwans-president-urges-china-to-end-threats-as-beijing-says-independence-is-dead-end

Correction: The description for this piece has been updated to more accurately reflect Lai Ching-te's   position   on Taiwanese independence.

Taiwan has a new president with Lai Ching-te inaugurated this past weekend. In the past, he has called himself a “political worker for Taiwanese independence,” words that enrage Beijing, which sees the island as a break-away province to be reunited with the mainland. President Biden has vowed to defend Taiwan, making it a potential flashpoint between the U.S. and China. Nick Schifrin reports.

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Notice: Transcripts are machine and human generated and lightly edited for accuracy. They may contain errors.

Geoff Bennett:

Today, lawmakers in Taiwan scuffled in Parliament one day after the island inaugurated a new president.

Beijing considers Taiwan a breakaway province and accused Lai Ching-te, known as William Lai, of advocating for Taiwanese independence. Lai promises status quo.

Nick Schifrin examines the tension and the history between Beijing and Taipei.

Nick Schifrin:

In downtown Taipei, pomp and circumstance, dancing, and an F-16 flyby to tell Beijing, back off.

Lai Ching-te, Taiwanese President (through interpreter):

I want to call on China to cease their political and military intimidation against Taiwan and ensure the world is free from the world of war.

Lai Ching-te, known as William Lai, is the eighth democratically elected president of Taiwan, known formally as the Republic of China. His inauguration message: Taiwanese democracy is here to stay.

Lai Ching-te (through interpreter):

I hope that China will face the reality of the Republic of China's existence, and engage in cooperation with the legal government chosen by Taiwan's people.

But Beijing is in no mood to cooperate and says the only legal government of Taiwan is the communist People's Republic of China.

Wang Wenbin, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman (through interpreter):

Taiwan independence is a dead end. Condoning support for Taiwan independence is doomed to failure, and no external forces can stop the historical momentum of China's unification.

Has the People's Republic of China ever controlled Taiwan?

Sulmaan Khan, International History and Chinese Foreign Relations Professor, Tufts University: Absolutely not. It has never controlled Taiwan.

Sulmaan Khan is an international history and Chinese foreign relations professor at Tufts University and the author of "Struggle for Taiwan: A History of America, China, and the Island Caught Between."

In the pre-modern era, Taiwan was an independent way station for maritime travelers.

Sulmaan Khan:

Let's say you were a pirate or a fisherman or a trader, and you were sailing from Southeast Asia to East Asia. You would probably stop off at Taiwan.

In the 1600s, the Qing Empire conquered the island. In 1895, it's ceded to Japan until World War II.

Now the communist leader Mao Zedong is winning one victory after another.

In the Chinese Civil War in the 1940s, Mao Zedong and his communists defeated nationalist soldiers led by Chiang Kai-shek.

Escaping by sea from communist China, some remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist army.

In 1949, nationalist troops fled from the mainland to the island then known as Formosa.

At Government House, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Chiang became Taiwan's dictator and had his own dream, recapturing the communist mainland. After that, Mao would no longer tolerate Taiwan's self-determination.

The goal in the civil war shifts from holding on to Mao's little piece of China to the complete extermination of Chiang Kai-shek in a fit of anger, more than anything.

And his withdrawal to Taiwan means that Taiwan has to be a part of China, especially because Chiang Kai-shek is still intent on taking back all of the mainland. There's a religious dimension to this. It's a fanaticism that takes hold in the '50s, and the quest to liberate Taiwan is written into everybody's soul in China, at which point walking away from that plan becomes difficult.

He says PRC President Xi Jinping's self-declared dream of reunification is based more on emotion that history.

If you look at Xi's policies towards Taiwan, they policies are calculated to alienate the people there, but they are policies that come from a place of bitter hurt. And bitter hurts does not admit a rational negotiation or historical thinking.

And so, decades later, today's China has new ammunition to feed the dream. China has increased pressure on Taiwan militarily with unprecedented election interference, including cyberattacks and disinformation like deepfakes.

That's the real Lai on the left, manipulated Lai on the right. And as Beijing has became more aggressive, Taiwanese have considered themselves distinct.

In many ways, China has sharpened the sense of independent identity that was already there in Taiwan, but has become more pronounced and more outspoken and more proud of itself than it once was.

That pride is now linked to democracy. Lai continues the legacy of fellow Democratic Progressive Party President Tsai Ing-wen, a quarter-century after Taiwan's first free and fair presidential election.

We are a democracy, not a Chinese democracy, especially younger people would be quick to point out to you. We're a democracy, period, and that makes us different.

As you move through the democratic process and keep building successful power transition upon successful power transition, that sense of pride grows, that sense of we have created something here that's precarious, that's fragile, but that's worth protecting.

Even if that democracy is messy, as it was today in Parliament, Lai inherits divided government, but an island increasingly united in not wanting to be part of China.

For the "PBS NewsHour," I'm Nick Schifrin.

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Watch the Full Episode

Nick Schifrin is PBS NewsHour’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Correspondent. He leads NewsHour’s daily foreign coverage, including multiple trips to Ukraine since the full-scale invasion, and has created weeklong series for the NewsHour from nearly a dozen countries. The PBS NewsHour series “Inside Putin’s Russia” won a 2017 Peabody Award and the National Press Club’s Edwin M. Hood Award for Diplomatic Correspondence. In 2020 Schifrin received the American Academy of Diplomacy’s Arthur Ross Media Award for Distinguished Reporting and Analysis of Foreign Affairs. He was a member of the NewsHour teams awarded a 2021 Peabody for coverage of COVID-19, and a 2023 duPont Columbia Award for coverage of Afghanistan and Ukraine. Prior to PBS NewsHour, Schifrin was Al Jazeera America's Middle East correspondent. He led the channel’s coverage of the 2014 war in Gaza; reported on the Syrian war from Syria's Turkish, Lebanese and Jordanian borders; and covered the annexation of Crimea. He won an Overseas Press Club award for his Gaza coverage and a National Headliners Award for his Ukraine coverage. From 2008-2012, Schifrin served as the ABC News correspondent in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2011 he was one of the first journalists to arrive in Abbottabad, Pakistan, after Osama bin Laden’s death and delivered one of the year’s biggest exclusives: the first video from inside bin Laden’s compound. His reporting helped ABC News win an Edward R. Murrow award for its bin Laden coverage. Schifrin is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a board member of the Overseas Press Club Foundation. He has a Bachelor’s degree from Columbia University and a Master of International Public Policy degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

As the deputy senior producer for foreign affairs and defense at the PBS NewsHour, Dan plays a key role in helping oversee and produce the program’s foreign affairs and defense stories. His pieces have broken new ground on an array of military issues, exposing debates simmering outside the public eye.

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Taiwan's New Government, With an Eye Towards China

A new president in Taiwan was inaugurated this week. Lai Ching-te will now lead a Taiwan that is divided politically on many issues, including on how to confront China. We'll hear from our correspondent in Taipei and from some young Taiwanese preparing for mandatory military service.

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What's the best state for you », us 'deeply concerned' over china military drills in taiwan strait, state dept says.

US 'Deeply Concerned' Over China Military Drills in Taiwan Strait, State Dept Says

May 24, 2024. Taiwan Defence Ministry/Handout via REUTERS

(Reuters) - The U.S. State Department said on Saturday that the United States was "deeply concerned" over China's military drills in the Taiwan Strait and around Taiwan, and strongly urged it to act with restraint.

"Using a normal, routine, and democratic transition as an excuse for military provocations risks escalation and erodes longstanding norms that for decades have maintained peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait," the State Department said in a statement.

The department issued the statement after China ended two days of war games around Taiwan in which it simulated attacks with bombers and practiced boarding ships, exercises that Taiwan condemned as "blatant provocation" on Saturday.

China, which claims democratically governed Taiwan as its own territory, launched the "Joint Sword - 2024A" exercises three days after Lai Ching-te became Taiwan's president, a man Beijing calls a "separatist."

Beijing said the exercises were "punishment" for Lai's Monday inauguration speech, in which he said the two sides of the Taiwan Strait were "not subordinate to each other," which China viewed as a declaration the two are separate countries.

(Reporting by Brendan O'Brien in Chicago; Editing by Bill Berkrot)

Copyright 2024 Thomson Reuters .

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Global Tensions and a Hostile Neighbor Await Taiwan’s New Leader

President Lai Ching-te has pledged to stay on his predecessor’s narrow path of resisting Beijing without provoking it. It won’t be easy.

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By Chris Buckley ,  Amy Chang Chien and Meaghan Tobin

Reporting from Taipei, Taiwan

Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te , was sworn into office on Monday, vowing to keep the island democracy safe in the face of Chinese pressure and wars raging abroad that have fed uncertainty over Western staying power.

In his inaugural address, Mr. Lai was by turns conciliatory and unyielding on how the island should preserve its brittle peace with China , which claims Taiwan as its territory. He said he hoped to hold talks with Beijing. But he set out broad conditions that China’s leaders were unlikely to accept and vowed that Taiwan would keep building ties with fellow democracies as it fortified against China’s military buildup.

Taiwan must not “harbor any delusions,” Mr. Lai said.

“Even if we were to accept China’s proposals in their entirety and forsake sovereignty, China’s attempts to swallow up Taiwan would not disappear,” he said. “In the face of the many threats and attempts of infiltration from China, we must demonstrate our resolution to defend our nation.”

The Chinese government’s office for Taiwanese affairs quickly denounced Mr. Lai’s speech, accusing him of “inciting antagonism and confrontation across the strait.”

Many Taiwanese people want stable relations with Beijing, and want Mr. Lai’s government to focus on fixing Taiwan’s economic and social ills. But even with strong bipartisan support from Washington, Taiwan faces a more perilous world, and a more powerful China, than when Mr. Lai’s predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, took office in 2016.

Back then, the hard-line policies of China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, were starting to galvanize Western opposition. Now Western nations are also weighed down by wars in Ukraine and the Middle East; Mr. Xi has been seeking to weaken American-led alliances forged against China; and the United States’ looming elections are adding to uncertainty about the direction of its foreign policy.

“It’s a much more fraught international environment for Lai in 2024 than Tsai in 2016,” said Kharis Templeman , a research fellow who studies Taiwanese politics at the Hoover Institution, a think tank at Stanford University. “The war in Ukraine, China’s turn toward even greater domestic repression, the deterioration in U.S.-China relations, and the last eight years of cross-strait hostility put Lai in a more difficult position.”

Long before Mr. Lai took office, Beijing made plain that it dislikes him even more than it did Ms. Tsai. Chinese officials often cite a remark he made in 2017 in which he called himself a “pragmatic worker for Taiwanese independence.” Mr. Lai’s supporters say that he meant Taiwan should exercise self-rule without seeking formal independence. That qualification does not mollify China, and it again called him a “worker for Taiwanese independence” on Monday.

In his speech, Mr. Lai called for dialogue with leaders in Beijing — based on accepting Taiwan as a sovereign equal, still officially called the Republic of China. He also urged both sides to agree on reviving tourism between them, and allowing Chinese students to attend Taiwanese universities.

But Mr. Xi was unlikely to accept Mr. Lai’s conditions for talks, said Amanda Hsiao , the senior analyst for China with the International Crisis Group, which seeks to defuse conflicts. China froze high-level contacts with Taiwan after Ms. Tsai took office in 2016, accusing her of failing to endorse a “consensus” that Taiwan and the mainland are part of one China, Beijing’s condition for talks.

“The two sides are far away from a basis for dialogue that both sides can accept,” Ms. Hsiao said. “The utility of these formulations lies in their very ambiguity, but Lai seems to be saying that without more gestures of sincerity from Beijing, the cost of accepting such ambiguity is too high.”

In the coming weeks and months, China may step up military and trade pressure on Taiwan to try to weaken Mr. Lai’s presidency. It has maintained a steady presence of fighter jets near the island and more recently has sent coast guard ships near Kinmen, a Taiwanese-controlled island near the Chinese mainland, moves aimed at intimidating while stopping short of a conflict that could draw in Washington.

But Mr. Xi’s desire to stabilize relations with Washington and focus on repairing China’s economy has reduced his willingness to risk a crisis. And Beijing is also likely to wait for the result of the U.S. presidential election late this year before considering big steps on Taiwan.

“Lai’s speech isn’t going to launch a P.R.C. amphibious invasion of Taiwan, but it’s not going to change Xi Jinping’s conviction that Lai is a dangerous ‘worker for independence’,” Daniel Russel , a former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said of the likely reaction from the People’s Republic of China, or P.R.C.

American support remains vital for Taiwan’s ability to counter China’s military pressure. Mr. Lai used his speech to promote Taiwan’s global significance — as a frontline in countering China, as a trade and technology power, and as an exemplary democracy.

“The future of cross-strait relations will have a decisive impact on the world,” he said. “This means that we, who have inherited a democratic Taiwan, are pilots for peace.”

Congress recently approved a supplemental spending package that released $8.1 billion of military aid for Taiwan and for enhancing the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region . Vessels from the U.S. and Taiwanese navies also held a joint military exercise in the Pacific last month, Taiwan’s ministry of defense said last week.

“Peace through strength is going to be his main posture on cross-strait relations,” Wen-Ti Sung , a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub who analyzes Taiwanese politics, said of Mr. Lai.

There is increasingly sharp debate in Taiwan about how much the United States can help build up the island’s military in the next few years while still addressing Russia’s war in Ukraine and Israel’s offensive in Gaza, neither of which is expected to end soon.

Taiwan’s backlog of undelivered orders of arms and military equipment from the United States had grown to nearly $20 billion by late April, according to estimates from Eric Gomez and Benjamin Giltner of the Cato Institute, a Washington think tank. The additional funds that Congress recently approved for Taiwan would be “helpful, but not a silver bullet,” Mr. Gomez said in an email.

Mr. Lai’s opponents in Taiwan say that he risks driving the island down a security dead end — unable to talk with Beijing and yet ill prepared for any confrontation. Fu Kun-chi, a Nationalist Party member of Taiwan’s legislature who recently visited China, pointed to Ukraine as a warning.

“Since ancient times, people from a small country or region have not gone up against the biggest country next door for a fight,” Mr. Fu said in an interview. “Would it really be in the interest of Americans to have a war across the Taiwan Strait? I really don’t think so, and for the United States to face three battlefields at the same time, is it possible?”

The political divisions that could drag on Mr. Lai’s administration were on raucous display last week in the chamber, called the Legislative Yuan. Lawmakers from the rival parties shoved, shouted and brawled over proposed new rules about scrutinizing government officials. Opponents of the rules have called for demonstrations on Tuesday.

Mr. Lai won a three-way race for the presidency in January with a little over 40 percent of the vote. A former doctor with a humble background, Mr. Lai also pledged to take on domestic problems such as a growing wealth gap and rising costs for housing.

But Mr. Lai could find it hard to push through his agenda, with the two main opposition parties holding the majority of seats in the legislature. In his speech, he called for the rival parties to work together.

“There is nothing he can do as president if the Legislative Yuan is stuck in brawls,” said Lev Nachman , a political scientist at National Chengchi University in Taipei. “He has to find a way to get them to cooperate. If he cannot, then nothing else matters.”

Chris Buckley , the chief China correspondent for The Times, reports on China and Taiwan from Taipei, focused on politics, social change and security and military issues. More about Chris Buckley

Amy Chang Chien is a reporter and researcher for The Times in Taipei, covering Taiwan and China. More about Amy Chang Chien

Meaghan Tobin is a technology correspondent for The Times based in Taipei, covering business and tech stories in Asia with a focus on China. More about Meaghan Tobin

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