case study tsunami 2004

Case study: Indian Ocean, 2004

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• On December 20, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake triggered a tsunami across the coastlines of the Indian Ocean
• 1600 km of fault surface ruptured about 15 m along the subduction zone of the Indian plate under the Burma plate, displacing an estimated 30 cubic kilometres of water, sending is at 500 to 1000 km/h to the coast, where the wave reached heights of 30 m
• The earthquake and tsunami were felt in Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and the Maldives
• It is the most devastating tsunami in history
• Over 200 thousand people died
• 5 million people left homeless without adequate food, water or sanitation
• In Indonesia, over 150 thousand people were killed, 30 thousand in Sri Lanka and 15 thousand in India
• 410 houses destroyed
• Local economies devastated, especially coastal fishing communities, where two-thirds of the infrastructure were destroyed
• The earthquake & tsunami caused considerable damage to local ecosystems
• 2 million people lost their jobs and an estimated 4 million fell into poverty
• Tourism was affected, even in places that weren’t closed, due to psychological aversion
• Damage to sewage caused the spread of liquid waste, industrial chemicals and polluted water, further damaging the environment
• Sanitation and fresh water were provided to prevent the spread of disease
• Over $10 billion pledged to help those affected
• The World Food Programme provided food for over 1.3 million people
• The Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning system was set up, and functioned successfully for the 2012 Indian Ocean earthquakes
• The Australian government sent ecological experts to the Maldives to help restore the marine environment

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Case Study: Sumatra and Thailand and the 2004 Tsunami

The Importance of Tsunami Warning Systems and the challenges of warning communication.

Think back to the video you watched in Module 7 – which included scenes of the 2004 tsunami event in Indonesia. The beginning of the video focused on the Banda Aceh area of Sumatra, where fishing communities and small coastal cities were completely destroyed, and the end of the video featured the Phuket area, where more tourist beaches were affected.

Through your reading and watching the videos, you hopefully gained an idea of what it is like to be caught in a tsunami with no advanced warning, and how frantic the attempts to get out of the way must be. Imagine what it would be like to try to move small children, sick or elderly people out of the way of a tsunami with before the wave strikes and with no time to spare!

In Module 7, the events in Phuket, Thailand, are described, with tourists enjoying their vacation on the beach at Christmas 2004. Many are oblivious to the dangers of the approaching tsunami. What could have been done differently? If this were to happen again, would these communities be better informed and prepared?

In Module 7 we also mentioned that early warning systems are very tricky because of the challenges of getting the message out soon enough after the earthquake and before the tsunami waves arrive at a particular shoreline. For example, the towns on the west coast of Sumatra are so close to the Andaman fault that they had almost no time to react, so a warning may not have worked, regardless of how well it was transmitted. Banda Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra, was devastated in 2004 because people did not have time to react, while there is evidence that some small nearby island communities fared better where traditional knowledge of the natural warning signs such as the sudden receding of the tidal waters was employed, and residents were able to flee to higher ground. Meanwhile, the tourist destinations of Phuket and Phi Phi, and nearby locations in Thailand had 2 hours, but the warnings were lacking. Visitors lacked necessary knowledge of nature’s warning signs and how to react, and may not have felt the earthquake, so many lives were lost.

In response to the enormous loss of life in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the Global Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System was put in place. The Indian Ocean tsunami warning system now integrates the signals from seismographs and DART Buoys and transmits data to 26 national centers. Warnings at the local level are generated in the form of SMS messages, mosque loudspeakers, sirens, and other methods to warn citizens. How well the warnings translate into lives saved due to rapid response and appropriate behaviors by the citizens depends on each step working properly. The failure of one of the steps can lead to disaster. If the citizens do not have the knowledge needed to take effective action, then the process will not work, and lives will be lost.

In 2012 another earthquake occurred near Banda Aceh in the Indian Ocean, so the newly implemented warning systems were put to the test. In this case, no tsunami was generated by the earthquake, but unfortunately, the weaknesses in the system were revealed. Despite the efforts expended to increase levels of tsunami preparedness since 2004, including new tsunami evacuation shelters and education programs, chaos ensued. Hearing the tsunami warning, people panicked and tried to flee by car, resulting in gridlock on the roads. It was clear that better guidance from the local government was needed, including clear evacuation route signage and regular drills. For more detail on this topic, read the National Geographic article Will Indonesia Be Ready for the Next Tsunami? Clearly, more work is still needed and ongoing to address these weaknesses.

Learning Check Point

We will spend a few minutes also revisiting the accounts of historic tsunami events – in particular, the 1960 event and its effects in Chile and Hilo, Hawaii, and the important messages about how to survive a tsunami. Please re-read some of the accounts of survival during tsunami events in Heed Natural Warnings .

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• Conflict Mitigation and Peacebuilding

The Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 in Aceh, Indonesia

In the decades between the early 1970s and the beginning of the 2000s, the northern Indonesian province of Aceh was exposed to a civil conflict between the central Indonesian government and the rebel movement GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka; Free Aceh Movement). As a consequence of a devastating tsunami that hit Aceh in 2004, a peace agreement between the two sides was reached in 2005.

Note: This is a case where a natural disaster contributed to resolving a priorly existing civil war. While a very important case, this does not fit closely into the conceptual model focused on the relationship of environmental change and conflict. For this reason, we do not display a full conceptual model for this case.

Conflict history.

Aceh has a population of around four million people of which up to 95% are Islamic-conservative. Thus since 2003, Sharia law officially applies for Aceh. The religious fractionalisation within Indonesia was one of the reasons for the escalation of an internal conflict that began in the 1970s with the formation of the GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – Free Aceh Movement) rebel group and lasted more than three decades, reaching different levels of intensity over time. Differences arose between conservative and moderate Muslims on how to best practice and integrate their religious conviction into daily life. Moreover, Acehnese people feared an increasing migration from Java and other parts of the country and perceived it as a potential threat to their indigenous way of life. Additionally, the Indonesian government was made responsible for discriminating the local population, e.g. by excluding them from resource revenues ( AKUF, 2007 ).

Civil conflict in 1976 and subsequent human rights violations

The civil conflict began in 1976, when the GAM declared the independence of Aceh unilaterally and started its armed fight against the national Indonesian government. This led to a vast increase in human rights violations and conflict deaths, with official statistics pointing to 12.000 to 15.000 people being killed during the violent conflict (Reid 2006). In the first years, the GAM was not successful at all and was almost defeated by the Indonesian military forces at the end of the 1970s. Subsequently, with external support from Libya that was sparked by Muammar Gaddafi’s intention to strengthen separatist movements in their fight against global imperialism and colonialism, the GAM rebels were able to consolidate and withstand further attacks. Till the mid-1990s, they gradually gained approval within the region, especially due to support of the local Acehnese people, who were scared and alienated by the ruthless military action of the Indonesian forces ( AKUF, 2007 ).

Abolition of President Suharto in 1998

In 1998, the dictatorship of President Suharto was abolished by the ruling elite due to political and economic dissatisfaction. When Indonesia started its democratisation process, Aceh was given greater autonomy. Nevertheless, the insurgents perceived the political concessions as insufficient and refused them immediately. Thus, the initial hope to reach a peace agreement between the opposing parties was not fulfilled and armed clashes intensified again ( AKUF, 2007 ).

Situation after the first democratic elections in 2001

After the first democratic elections in 2001, the new President Sukarnoputri intended to strengthen the central government’s legitimacy by negotiating an agreement with the separatist movements. To this end, she signalled to cooperate with those groups and make concessions, e.g. by giving them more autonomy rights to deescalate the on-going civil conflict and consolidate the Indonesian state. However, the GAM was not willing to accept this offer, because they already controlled several parts of Aceh and were trying to further broaden their influence in the region.

Although a fragile peace agreement could be reached in 2002, the implementation did not meet the expectations. For example, the disarming of the insurgents as well as the withdrawal of government troops did not happen as agreed. Confronted with this negative outcome, President Megawati decided to pass martial law for the province of Aceh and proclaimed the state of emergency, leading to a deteriorating humanitarian situation (Human Rights Watch, 2003). On this basis, the Indonesian armed forces conducted one of their largest military interventions in the region, with 40.000 soldiers and 12.000 policemen being involved ( Tapol, 2004 ). As a result, 125.000 people had to migrate internally (IOM, 2004) and more than 2.000 people were killed (Enia, 2008). During this government offensive, which lasted two years, the GAM lost nearly half of its military capacities, but was still willing and able to continue its fight for an independent Aceh.

Conflict resolution

The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami had a direct impact on two thirds of the Acehnese people. More than 167.000 people died and 500.000 had to migrate due to this devastating natural disaster (TEC, 2006).

Governmental response to the 2004 Tsunami

Although the tsunami almost exclusively hit Aceh, the Indonesian President saw this a chance to foster the country’s unity and declared: „I call on those who are still fighting, to come out ... [and] let us use this historic moment to join and be united again“ ( Siboro, 2004 ). The GAM was, compared to the rest of the local population, less affected by the disaster, because they traditionally hid in the remote and mountainous area of northern Aceh. This made them one of the first agents to provide humanitarian aid, combined with the intention to raise its legitimacy. Afraid of losing influence in this contested region, the Indonesian government decided to react quickly and send own troops for disaster relief operations ( Nakashima, 2005 ; Huxley, 2005). This predictable confrontation led to a further escalation of the conflict that severely increased the number of casualty for the GAM (Powell, 2005).

Peace treaty and subsequent ceasefire

In the end, several factors were decisive to reach a comprehensive peace treaty between both parties. Following the tsunami, the devastating situation in Aceh made it even harder for the GAM to operate in the region and withstand the pressure by the military forces. Therefore, the GAM unilaterally declared its willingness to negotiate a peace agreement. On the other hand, the Indonesian President Yudhoyono followed a pragmatic and moderate course, taking the concerns of the GAM seriously and leading the way to a ceasefire (Enia, 2008).

Additionally, international attention focused on humanitarian relief operations in the region, putting pressure on both sides to stop fighting and prioritise reconstruction efforts. However, there is no consensus yet, whether the peace negotiations mediated by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari recommenced due to the disaster’s impact (Aspinall, 2005) or if there was no significant effect, because the peace process did already start before the tsunami hit the country (Weizenegger, 2007).

During the negotiations, the GAM gave up their secession claims and was promised greater autonomy, self-government and the foundation of an own regional party (Donnan and Bergstrom, 2005). Furthermore, it was agreed that the local population of Aceh should receive 70% of the revenues of resources exploited in the region Therefore, the rebels agreed to disarm and demobilise completely. Finally, it was agreed to monitor the implementation by the EU and ASEAN states. In 2005, the Memorandum of Understanding entered into force and the Indonesian parliament recognised Aceh’s autonomy status.

The case study on Aceh yields further insights when comparing it with the conflict case of Sri Lanka. Both countries experienced a civil war lasting over several decades and both were hit by the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. Despite these structural similarities, the developments and outcome in the aftermath of the disaster were quite different. While a peace agreement was signed in Aceh, violence escalated in Sri Lanka and the conflict was finally determined by the defeat of the rebel movement after four more years of fighting.

Resilience and Peace Building

In the aftermath of the tsunami, the GAM declared its willingness to negotiate a peace agreement, which was received by the Indonesian government by taking the concerns of the rebel group into serious consideration, leading the way towards a ceasefire.

Humanitarian & Development aid

Both the Indonesian government and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) rebel group prioritized the provision of humanitarian aid for the Aceh province affected by the devastating tsunami.

Changes in constitutional balance of power

In 2005, the Indonesian parliament officially recognized Aceh’s autonomy status after negotiations with the GAM.

Resources and Materials

• Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF) (2007). 255 Indonesien (Aceh II). 31. Dezemeber 2007. Retrieved on 10.03.2015.
• Nakashima, E. (2005). Aceh Rebels Describe Effort to Aid ‘Our Own’, in: Washington Post. 18. January 2005. Retrieved on 10.03.2015.
• Siboro, T. (2004). Anti-GAM raids continue despite catastrophe, in: Jakarta Post. 31 December 2004. Retrieved on 10.03.2015.
• Tapol (2004). Military operations in Aceh fail. Tapol Bulletin 176. Retrieved on 10.03.2015.
• Aspinall, E. (2005). The Helsinki Agreement: a more promising basis for peace in Aceh?. Policy Studies 20 East-West. Washington DC.
• Enia, J. (2008). Peace in its Wake? The 2004 Tsunami and Internal Conflict in Indonesia & Sri Lanka, in: Journal of Public & International Affairs 19(1), 7–27.
• Human Rights Watch (2003). Aceh under Martial Law. Muzzling the Messengers: Attacks and Restrictions on the Media. Vol. 15 No. 9.
• Huxley, T. (2005). The Tsunami and Security: Asia’s 9/11?, in: Survival 47(1), 123-132.
• International Organization for Migration - IOM (2004)- Update on the IDP situation in Aceh. December 2004.
• Powell, S. (2005). Aceh’s Elusive Peace. The Weekend Australian, 29. January 2005.
• Reid, A. (2006). Verandah of Violence: The background to the Aceh problem. University of Washington.
• TEC (2006). Joint evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Final Report. London.
• Waizenegger, A. (2007). Armed Separatism and the 2004 Tsunami in Aceh. APF Canada - Canada Asia Commentary No. 43.

Comprehending the Indian Ocean Tsunami: Dec 26, 2004

Case study: e-book.

This web-exhibit should be cited as the following: Vernekar, S. & Kant, V., Comprehending the Indian Ocean Tsunami:Dec 26, 2004. Retrieved from https://www.dsource.in/case-study/comprehending-indian- ocean-tsunami

"Hazards are natural, disasters are not - Terry Canon"

The book revisits the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and it’s aftermath from the viewpoint of resilience and vulnerability. Vulnerability is a multi-faceted concept that lies at the intersection of diversity of risks and their actualization in everyday lived experience. Vulnerability is not the property of people but it is a relational outcome of complex relationships between people and their ecologies in the face of hazards. Understanding disasters such as these from the viewpoint of vulnerability presents real insights into realizing how the disaster is an outcome of multiple interweaving processes at several layers of abstraction. These range from local and global processes related to the social, economic and cultural abilities and coping mechanisms of communities in transition. In this book we emphasize the adaptibility, capacity, vulnerability and resilience in the wake of disasters.

Click here to view at the D'Source portal

Lessons from the 2004 Tsunami Response

Amid all the headlines about the COVID-19 pandemic, a notable development may have escaped the attention of observers. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun organized a conference call with close allies and partners to discuss the crisis and ways to coordinate their responses. The call featured senior officials from the governments of India, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Vietnam. The participants plan to meet in weekly conference calls.

Most of the populations in these countries are currently under lockdowns or stay-at-home orders. While the COVID-19 crisis continues to unfold, it is important to recall another time when the U.S. and its close allies and partners conferred intensely after another black swan event with tremendous transnational effects: the December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean tsunami.

In the aftermath of an earthquake in the Indonesian archipelago, a tsunami swept through the region, killing more than 200,000 people, mostly in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Nations from around the world responded by providing disaster relief to the affected countries. The U.S. military conducted Operation Unified Assistance to deliver relief. The USNS Mercy , which is currently operating off the U.S. West Coast, was among the ships that participated in relief efforts.

This episode illustrated the critical importance of diplomatic cooperation and operational coordination when the U.S. works with its treaty allies and strategic partners. The U.S., India, Australia and Japan formed an active coordination group known as the Tsunami Core Group, run by senior diplomats from the four countries. CNA examined this crisis response coordination, particularly between the U.S. and India, in a 2014 study, Improving U.S.-India HA/DR Coordination in the Indian Ocean .

Fifteen years later, the COVID-19 crisis presents operational differences with the tsunami relief efforts. There is no critical infrastructure damage around which militaries can focus relief efforts. However, there are some similarities at the strategic level. All four governments have considerable stakes in how they address this crisis within their own borders and how they demonstrate leadership in planning their overseas responses. At present, all are summoning the power of their militaries in various ways . At the same time, all four are currently engaged in larger, strategic-level competition with China over the rules and norms in international politics and economy. Notably, Biegun’s conference call did not include a representative from China, the source of the outbreak.

It is too early to tell if we are witnessing the beginning of a “COVID Core Group.” While the pandemic advances, we will need to track how diplomatic cooperation develops and to what extent these nations will activate response forces such as militaries for international assistance. Still, a few lessons from the Tsunami Core Group cooperation are relevant to the COVID-19 crisis response.

First, after banding together to address a transnational, non-traditional security crisis, the Tsunami Core Group members moved on to traditional security cooperation based on shared geopolitical interests and threat perceptions. The group laid the foundation for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of the U.S., Japan, Australia and India. In particular, the tsunami response advanced U.S.-India strategic relations by providing an example of how the bilateral defense relationship could function in operations. At the height of cooperation under the Quad grouping in 2007, the four countries participated in a naval exercise called MALABAR, which Beijing criticized as being focused on containing China.

Although this grouping eventually dissolved due to differing threat perceptions of China, the Quad consultations have been resurrected in the past few years, even at the ministerial level. In September 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with counterparts from India, Australia and Japan. Will cooperation on the pandemic, another non-traditional security issue, intensify the geopolitical, traditional security cooperation between these democratic powers as they continue to view China’s rise with concern?

The second takeaway from 2004 is that China was not a member of the Tsunami Core Group, nor did it provide significant relief assistance to affected countries. In 2004, however, China was not the economic and military powerhouse that it is today. Allies and partners coordinating on COVID-19 should consider opportunities to work with Beijing where useful. As Washington envisions a new era of great-power competition with China, there is room for cooperation between competitors as outlined in a recent CNA report and demonstrated in other non-traditional security experiences such as counterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden and the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. U.S.-China relations during the response to the pandemic will inform our understanding about the full spectrum of U.S. strategic options going forward in this era of great power competition.

The third lesson from the Tsunami Core Group is the clear value of allies and partners to U.S. crisis response operations. In addition to the former Tsunami Core Group countries, Biegun’s call included South Korea, New Zealand and Vietnam. The weekly meeting so far appears to have a regional focus, but long-standing, global U.S. allies such as France and the U.K . should eventually be invited to participate. These countries are often conceived of in the transatlantic context, but they are close U.S. allies with global territories, responsibilities and operations. For its part, France is deploying two Mistral-class naval ships to the Caribbean and western Indian Ocean for COVID response under Operation Résilience. Meanwhile, the U.K. navy continues to maintain its overseas deployments and stands ready to deliver humanitarian assistance when requested.

As Biegun continues his diplomatic efforts and as the State Department has announced financial assistance to global partners, the time is ripe for the U.S. military to follow this lead through coordinated operations with other countries. While policymakers are understandably focused on mitigating the domestic crisis, the U.S. will soon need to demonstrate its ability as the leading global power to deliver relief when requested overseas. Although the majority of confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths are now in the advanced economies, the outbreak is expected to worsen in developing countries , which could quickly become overwhelmed. At present, six Indian navy ships are reportedly on standby to deliver relief to neighboring countries when requested, while the country remains on lockdown and Indian military services are responding domestically. Given the unknown trajectory of the pandemic, U.S. military officials should begin discussions with allied and partner counterparts such as India and France to explore options for coordinating operations.

Nilanthi Samaranayake directs the Strategy and Policy Analysis program and studies non-traditional security issues affecting U.S. allies and partners globally. The views expressed are solely those of the author and not of any organization with which she is affiliated.

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For the Instructor

Case study 1: 2004 sumatran earthquake, the boxing day 2004 earthquake: a holiday's worst nightmare.

In order to explore what a tsunami is and how tsunamis are formed, we will use the 2004 Sumatran Tsunami to illustrate exactly how earthquake events can produce such destructive outcomes. You will rely on topics covered in Unit 1 (modules 2 and 3) to help understand the plate tectonics responsible for earthquake activity, but we will use the USGS's Pacific Coastal and Marine Science Center's website to explore the specific geologic details that gave rise to the tsunami. The day after Christmas (December 26, 2004), a large magnitude earthquake occurred just west of the island of Sumatra along a subduction boundary between two tectonic plates. The date couldn't be worse for such an event to occur, with thousands of people on holiday in the region and with very few people working in government offices, it was a recipe for disaster. Tourists from all over the world were vacationing in seaside resorts in Thailand, Indonesia, India, and elsewhere. Unplugged as they were, it was next to impossible to inform them or the residents of the region of the impending hazard once the earthquake and tsunami were detected. The result was that over 150,000 people lost their lives. But how? Let's take some time and work through a series of questions whose answers can be found on the website.

• Summary of 2004 Sumatran Earthquake

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