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Regional Research of Russia

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• Earth and Planetary Sciences (miscellaneous)
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The set of journals have been ranked according to their SJR and divided into four equal groups, four quartiles. Q1 (green) comprises the quarter of the journals with the highest values, Q2 (yellow) the second highest values, Q3 (orange) the third highest values and Q4 (red) the lowest values.

The SJR is a size-independent prestige indicator that ranks journals by their 'average prestige per article'. It is based on the idea that 'all citations are not created equal'. SJR is a measure of scientific influence of journals that accounts for both the number of citations received by a journal and the importance or prestige of the journals where such citations come from It measures the scientific influence of the average article in a journal, it expresses how central to the global scientific discussion an average article of the journal is.

Evolution of the number of published documents. All types of documents are considered, including citable and non citable documents.

This indicator counts the number of citations received by documents from a journal and divides them by the total number of documents published in that journal. The chart shows the evolution of the average number of times documents published in a journal in the past two, three and four years have been cited in the current year. The two years line is equivalent to journal impact factor ™ (Thomson Reuters) metric.

Evolution of the total number of citations and journal's self-citations received by a journal's published documents during the three previous years. Journal Self-citation is defined as the number of citation from a journal citing article to articles published by the same journal.

Evolution of the number of total citation per document and external citation per document (i.e. journal self-citations removed) received by a journal's published documents during the three previous years. External citations are calculated by subtracting the number of self-citations from the total number of citations received by the journal’s documents.

International Collaboration accounts for the articles that have been produced by researchers from several countries. The chart shows the ratio of a journal's documents signed by researchers from more than one country; that is including more than one country address.

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Ratio of a journal's items, grouped in three years windows, that have been cited at least once vs. those not cited during the following year.

Evolution of the percentage of female authors.

Evolution of the number of documents cited by public policy documents according to Overton database.

Evoution of the number of documents related to Sustainable Development Goals defined by United Nations. Available from 2018 onwards.

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On the banks of the Moskva River, just upstream from the Kremlin and Red Square, sits a grandiose network of interconnected concrete buildings. The tallest two are bejewelled with bulky bronze structures, and this unique aesthetic has earned the Moscow-based Russian Academy of Sciences its nickname — ‘golden brains’. Until very recently, the organization had every reason to think that Russian science was deserving of such an epithet.

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Regional Research of Russia

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ISSN PRINT: 2079-9705 ISSN ONLINE: 2079-9713

Editor-in-Chief: Vladimir A. Kolosov

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RUCARR Portal

VISIT RUCARR IN THE NIAGARA BUILDING

Staff and exchanage phd candidates at a symposium in copenhagen, michel anderlini's phd defence, advisory board chair, ambassador ingrid tersman hosts rucarr meeting in tallinn.

RUCARR Thesis award 2023

Symposium: Language in Confict and War – Ukraine, Caucasus, Russia

Lecture by Prof. Vladimir Gel'man

Roundable “The Caucasus between Turkey and Russia”

Seminar may 21, 15:15-17:00: the inefficiency of eu leverage in serbia during the russia-ukraine war, the inefficiency of eu leverage in serbia during the russia-ukraine war, branislav radeljić.

When : May 21, 15.15-17:00 CET Where : Zoom link https://mau-se.zoom.us/j/69865873540

The war in Ukraine has exposed a rift between Serbia and the Brussels administration. Serbia has been accused of aligning itself with Russia as opposed to the strictly pro-Ukrainian EU. In this talk, Prof. Radeljić will look at the nature of EU–Serbia relations, with a particular focus on (a) the relevance of EU norms and values as policy tools, (b) the foreign policy of Serbia under the Progressivists and the regime of Aleksandar Vučić, and (c) the rising influence of Russia and China in the Western Balkan region, which has been undermining the EU’s push for democratization and Europeanization.

Branislav Radeljić is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Government and Society, United Arab Emirates University. In addition, he serves as Visiting Professor of European Politics at Nebrija University. His scholarly interests focus on European and Middle Eastern political and socioeconomic developments. 

Seminar May 14 – The Georgian-Byzantine literary interaction in the 11th century

The georgian-byzantine literary interaction in the eleventh century, — christian høgel, professor of greek and latin, lund university.

Welcome to this joint seminar with RUCARR and CEMES-network “Thinking the European Academy of Letters”!

When : May 14, 15.15-16.30 CET Where : Zoom link https://mau-se.zoom.us/j/67115473647

After the Georgian nobleman Ioane Tornike supported the young Byzantine emperor Basil II against pretenders to the Byzantine throne, Georgians became much closer connected to Byzantine politics and to Byzantine text culture. The establishment of the Iviron monastery in mount Athos turned out a most productive translation center but also became an aristocratic setting of Georgians within the Byzantine world. Our extant text material witnesses both this Byzantine-Georgian literary exchanges and gives us valuable information on different text cultures along the Silk Road.

Christian Høgel is professor of Greek and Latin at Lund University since 2023. He has published widely on Byzantine hagiography and on translations – on the early Greek translation of the Qur’an and on translations from Georgian. He is co-director of the Retracing Connections research programme (Riksbankens Jubileumsfond).

RUCARR Seminar, April 23, 15:15-17:00: Civil society in the South Caucasus: Resource dependencies, organizational behaviors and shifting environments

Civil society in the South Caucasus: Resource dependencies, organizational behaviors and shifting environments

When? April 23rd, 15:15-17:00

Where?  On Zoom: https://mau-se.zoom.us/j/69994454484

Abstract: Civil society developments in the Eurasia region have been under scholarly scrutiny since the early 1990s, particularly due to their presumed actorness in political and societal transitions. In the meantime, a growing number of challenges, including limited trust and participation, lingering legitimacy, agency and accountability issues, external aid dependence, precarious professionalization, and governments’ increased regulative and political assaults, have faced civil society organizations (CSOs). This talk will draw on research into cases of the South Caucasus countries – Azerbaijan and Georgia – from neo-institutional and resource dependence perspectives. The Azerbaijani case will highlight the transformation of organizational behaviors of CSOs in the wake of government-imposed restrictions over the past decade, focusing on the trend of de-NGOization under entrenched authoritarianism. The Georgian case will discuss the effects of foreign funding on self-regulation in civil society, focusing on agency and accountability practices against the background of government allegations and legislative proposals deeming CSOs as “foreign agents.”

Bio: Najmin Kamilsoy is a doctoral candidate at Charles University Department of Public and Social Policy, where he received a master’s degree in 2019. His current research area is civil society development and organizational behaviors in non-democracies, with a regional and comparative focus on the South Caucasus. Kamilsoy is a co-founder and policy analyst of Agora Analytical Collective, a think tank that has been dealing with the analysis of social and economic policies in Azerbaijan since 2022. He held a visiting Ph.D. fellowship at the University of Zurich in 2021 and he is an upcoming research fellow at Friedrich Schiller University Jena.

RUCARR Roundtable April 29 – Armenia’s Human Rights agenda

Armenia’s human rights agenda: efforts amidst social and security challenges.

Welcome to join us for a RUCARR Roundtable on Monday April 29, 15.15-17.00; Seminar room 9th floor, Niagara Building. Online option: Zoom https://mau-se.zoom.us/j/62708879156

Valentina Gevorgyan : Civil Society actors in Armenia as the main defenders of human rights

The talk will concentrate on Armenian civil society. First, the speaker will present the phases of civil society development in Armenia’s post-Soviet period of troubled transition, followed by current developments and challenges for the civil society. The talk will reflect on one recent study (and research in progress, RWI), highlighting the main areas and functions of civil society actors, as the main drivers of democratisation and defenders of human rights in the republic.

Anna Melikyan : Impact of fighting corruption on human rights in Armenia since 2018

The presentation will focus on the efforts in Armenia to fight corruption after the change of government in 2018 as a result of the peaceful protests with a focus on prosecution. It will encompass how this fight affects the human rights situation in the country given the pressure of public expectations and whether the government and the judiciary are able to ensure the rule of law and human rights principles in corruption-related trials, including recovery of illicit assets. 

Srbuhi Michikyan : Examining Multidimensional Poverty in conflict affected regions. The case of Syunik region in Armenia: Methodological concerns.

In conflict-affected regions worldwide, poverty is intertwined with violence, displacement, instability,  and significantly affects the ability of individuals to lead dignified lives. Conventional poverty measures, focusing solely on income or consumption metrics, fail to capture the complexity of deprivation experienced in such contexts, however, multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) has revolutionized poverty analysis, offering a holistic framework that considers diverse dimensions impacting well-being. The talk explores the methodological considerations specific to conducting MPI research in conflict areas, using Syunik region in Armenia as a case study. It discusses the challenges and opportunities inherent in conducting MPI research in a conflict contexts to understand the limitations of used methodology.

Moderator is Dr Katrine Gotfredsen , Senior Lecturer in Cauasus Studies, Malmö University.

Previously, she worked as a research specialist with Open Society Foundations (Armenia), Academic Swiss Caucasus Net and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation in South Caucasus. Currently, she is Assistant Professor at Yerevan State University, Department of Political Science and a lecturer at University of Fribourg, Department of European and Slavic Studies. She reads courses on Civil Society and Political Culture, and is author of “Civil Society and Government Institutions in Armenia. Leaving Behind the ‘Post-Soviet’ Title” (Routledge, 2024) . Currently she is a Research Fellow with RWI Armenia Programme.

Seminar May 7 “Empire of Refugees: North Caucasian Muslims and the Late Ottoman State” with Dr Hamed-Troyansky

Empire of Refugees: North Caucasian Muslims and the Late Ottoman S tate

When : May 7, 17.00-18.15 CET

Where : zoom https://mau-se.zoom.us/j/62352627321

Between the 1850s and World War I, about one million Muslims from the Russian Empire’s North Caucasus region sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire. In his new book,  Empire of Refugees: North Caucasian Muslims and the Late Ottoman State , Dr. Vladimir Hamed-Troyansky examines how Circassian, Chechen, Dagestani, and other refugees transformed the late Ottoman Empire and how the Ottoman government managed Muslim refugee resettlement.  Empire of Refugees  argues that, in response to Muslim migrations from Russia, the Ottoman government created a refugee regime, which predated refugee systems set up by the League of Nations and the United Nations. The book also revises our understanding of how Russia used migration policies to govern the Caucasus and its Muslim populations.

Seminar with Prof Stefan Hedlund, May 28

Ukraine, Russia and the West

When value promotion met hard power, professor stefan hedlund, uppsala university, institue for russian and eurasian studies.

When : May 28, 15.15-16.30 Where : K3 Studio, C Area, 5th floor, Niagara building, Nordenskiöldsgatan 1 Zoom: https://mau-se.zoom.us/s/65067842259

Why did Russia’s all-out war against Ukraine come as such a surprise to the West? This is the key question considered in this broad-ranging book. It argues that Russia and the West had been playing different games: while Russia under Putin had become obsessed with using hard power to restore the Cold War security architecture in Europe, the major Western powers had become equally obsessed with value promotion that allegedly would ensure a global triumph for the values of the West, touted as “universal values.” While the Russian play for a sphere of interest was clearly defined and demarcated, the Western play for values was by definition without limits. Hence there could be no common ground and no common understanding. When push came to shove, Russian hard power trumped Western value promotion – and Ukraine was left to pay the price.

RUCARR Seminar April 9th, 15:15-17:00: Armenia’s agency in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)

When: April 9th 2024, 15.15-16.30 Where : Niagara building, 9th floor, seminar room or  by Zoom: https://mau-se.zoom.us/j/69798529701

Erik Davtyan is Assistant Professor at Yerevan State University, Armenia.

This talk will examine Armenia’s agency in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). It will demonstrate how Armenia, being the smallest member state and facing a huge power asymmetry, has been able to influence the decision-making in the EAEU. The presenter will talk about three different strategies Armenia used to protect its interests: a) instrumentalizing the opportunities emanating from the institutional settings of the organization, b) negotiating exemptions from the EAEU legislation and securing core interests in the external relations of the union, and c) promoting specific ideas with the purpose of tailoring EAEU’s policy in a particular field to its economic needs.

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By stepping up its military presence along the Ukrainian border, Russian President Vladimir Putin hopes that Ukraine and the West will make concessions and Ukraine will realign itself back to Moscow, says Stanford scholar Steven Pifer . But nothing has alienated Ukraine more than Kremlin policy over the past eight years, particularly Russia’s military seizure of Crimea in 2014 and its role in the Donbas conflict that has claimed more than 13,000 lives, he said.

Steven Pifer (Image credit: Damian M. Marhefka)

Here, Pifer, the William J. Perry Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation ( CISAC ), discusses what Putin hopes to accomplish by amassing military troops along the Ukrainian border and why Ukraine’s democratic ambitions pose such a threat to Russia’s authoritarian leader.

Pifer’s research focuses on nuclear arms control, Ukraine, Russia and European security. Pifer spent more than 25 years working with the U.S. State Department, where he focused on America’s relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as arms control and security issues. He served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs with responsibilities for Russia and Ukraine (2001-2004), ambassador to Ukraine (1998-2000), and special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia on the National Security Council (1996-1997).

How likely is it that Putin will start a war with Ukraine?

The short answer: We don’t know. It may well be that Mr. Putin has not yet decided. The Kremlin undoubtedly hopes that just the threat of a new attack on Ukraine will prompt Kyiv [the Ukrainian capital city] and the West to make concessions.

I believe the costs to Russia of attacking Ukraine would significantly outweigh the benefits. However, Mr. Putin seems to operate on a different logic, and officials in Washington and European capitals have expressed real alarm about the prospect of Russian military action. Western officials would be wise to assume the worst and do everything they can to try to dissuade the Kremlin from war.

What does Putin hope to achieve by amassing a strong military presence along the Ukrainian border?

Ideally, Mr. Putin wants Kyiv to abandon its Western course and turn back to Moscow. However, nothing has done more to push Ukraine away from Russia and toward the West than Russian policy over the past eight years, in particular, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its role in the conflict in Donbas that has claimed more than 13,000 lives. As a result, more and more Ukrainians see membership in institutions such as the European Union and NATO as necessary for their security.

Mr. Putin also wants NATO to rethink policies, such as enlargement and the deployment of relatively small battlegroups on the territory of Poland and the Baltic states. Nothing suggests that NATO will make those changes.

What diplomatic options are available to prevent conflict from escalating further? Biden has warned Russia with economic sanctions should they take any further military action Ukraine. Is this enough of a deterrent?

The Biden administration has responded to the crisis with a mix of deterrence and dialogue. It has spelled out the costs that would ensue if Russia attacks Ukraine – punishing new sanctions, more military assistance to Kyiv and a stronger NATO military presence in member states near Russia, to say nothing of the casualties the Ukrainians would inflict on Russian troops. At the same time, the administration has expressed a readiness to discuss Russian concerns, making clear that Western and Ukrainian concerns about Russian behavior must also be addressed.

Mr. Putin has demanded security guarantees for Russia, a bit ironic since Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal and the most powerful conventional military in Europe. In mid-December, the Russian foreign ministry proposed draft NATO-Russia and U.S.-Russia agreements incorporating those demands. Many provisions in those agreements are unacceptable, as the Russian officials who drafted them undoubtedly knew. Other elements could offer a basis for discussion and even negotiation, if Moscow is prepared to address reciprocal concerns.

The big question about the draft agreements: Does the Kremlin regard them as an opening bid in what would be a serious and complex negotiation, or does the Kremlin seek rejection, which it could then add to its list of pretexts for assaulting Ukraine? We don’t yet know.

As the former ambassador to Ukraine and a scholar of the region, what do you think leaders in the Kremlin misunderstand about Ukraine, its people and its desire for sovereignty?

Mr. Putin apparently does not understand the desire of Ukrainians to live in a sovereign state and to choose their own course. He regularly refers to Russians and Ukrainians as one people, which is an utterly tone-deaf comment that many Ukrainians hear as a denial of their culture, history and language. The Kremlin’s lack of understanding is one factor that has resulted in a policy that has produced a major strategic failure for Russia; it has pushed Ukraine away and fueled great animosity there toward the Russian state.

How has Russia’s military seizure of Crimea transformed diplomatic relations in the region and with the world at large, especially the U.S., the EU and NATO?

Russia’s illegal seizure of Crimea in 2014 was the biggest land grab in Europe since World War II, and it violated many commitments that Russia had made to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The Kremlin then provoked and supported, in some cases with regular units of the Russian army, the conflict in Donbas. Those actions had major negative repercussions for Russia’s relations with the West, and the West reacted. For example, the United States and Europe coordinated on sanctions targeting the Russian economy. NATO, which had drawn down its military power since the early 1990s, reversed course; member states agreed to increase their defense spending, with a target of 2 percent of gross domestic product by 2024. Moreover, NATO began deploying ground forces in member states on its eastern flank.

Next week will see talks between Russian and U.S. officials on Jan. 10, a NATO-Russia convening on Jan. 12, and a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on Jan. 13. How do you anticipate discussions about Ukraine unfolding at these events? What would make these discussions successful?

The Russia-Ukraine crisis and broader European security issues will come up in all three meetings. When U.S. officials meet their Russian counterparts, they will undoubtedly discuss these issues but will insist there can be no negotiations about European security or Ukraine without Europeans and Ukrainians at the table. U.S. officials will also make clear that Russia needs to de-escalate the military situation. NATO allies will all be taking part in the meeting with Russian officials on Jan. 12. The Jan. 13 OSCE meeting will be the one in which all relevant parties, particularly the Ukrainians, are present.

Following those meetings, Russian officials should return to Moscow with a good sense for which parts of their draft agreements could provide a basis for negotiation and which are non-starters. That gets back to the big question: Does the Kremlin intend its draft agreements as an opening bid in a negotiating process in which its extreme demands will not be met, or does it want a rejection to add to its narrative for war?

Is there anything else you would like to add?

Moscow has sought to frame this crisis as one between Russia and NATO, but the Kremlin’s primary focus is Ukraine. This is partly about geopolitics and Moscow’s desire for a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. However, it is also very much about Russian domestic politics. A Ukraine that charts its own course, consolidates its democracy and enacts reforms that realize the full potential of its economy poses a nightmare for the Kremlin: That Ukraine would cause Russians to ask why they cannot have the same political voice as Ukrainian citizens – and perhaps even challenge Mr. Putin’s authoritarianism.

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Melissa De Witte, Stanford News:  [email protected]

2 Yale researchers are pulling back the curtain on Russia's sanctions-stricken economy — and it's landed them on a list of Putin's enemies

• Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and Steven Tian, two Yale researchers, have issued dire predictions for Russia's economy. 
• Their work has landed them on a list of sanctioned individuals in Russia. 
• In their view, the country's economy is in shambles, and Putin could end up losing support of the people. 

Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and Steven Tian, two researchers at the Yale School of Management, have been targeted for their views on Russia's economy since the war in Ukraine began. 

Over the last few years, they've found themselves on Vladimir Putin's watch list for stating what they see as a simple truth: the Russian economy is in trouble, and there's only so much cherry-picking of the data that can obscure that fact. 

Moscow has fiercely defended its vision of a prospering economy, but the evidence speaks for itself, Sonnenfeld and Tian say. Soaring prices and ailing consumer sentiment have hit key sectors in Russia's economy , and Moscow is paying a huge cost to keep its war machine running.

The nation is in such dire straits that citizens could even start turning on Putin later this year, they predicted, assuming the West continues to supply military and financial aid to Ukraine. 

"We can list for you what Putin has concealed – suddenly – the past three years. If his economy was performing at the level he claims, he'd provide the data ad not hide those facts," Sonnenfeld told Business Insider in an interview. "Putin survives only by cannibalizing Russian businesses – throwing the living room furniture into the furnace to keep the fire burning."

The researchers, who met as a professor-student pair at Yale, have received a lot of criticism for their work on Russia, much of it in the form of hate mail and threatening phone calls.

"I've had a lot of threats on the phone, and my home has been vandalized," Sonnenfeld told BI last summer. "Now we have so many security cameras I can't even have my shirt tails untucked, let alone walk around in my shorts at home."

Both are barred from entering Russia and were put on the nation's sanctioned US citizens list in 2022. 

Still, neither of them regrets their work.

"We're pretty excited about it," they said of their research. "Any of the threats only motivate us to work down much harder."

Putin's top critics

Sonnenfeld, 70, and Tian, 25, didn't plan on getting their names added to a list of Putin's critics.

Related stories

Neither are technically economists, but they began researching Russia's economy while compiling a list of companies that exited or scaled back their operations in Russia in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine.

That list went viral online, and was instrumental in getting more than 1,000 companies to scale back their business in the country, the Yale School of Management says on its website.

At that time, Tian and Sonnenfeld began noticing cracks forming in Russia's economy. Putin has claimed Russia is becoming the new " growth hub " of the world, and the IMF says Russia's economy is on track to grow over 3% this year, more than any other OECD economy, including the US. But that doesn't square with data Sonnenfeld and Tian are seeing, with some pockets of the country's economy in dire shape. 

Activity in Russia's car sector is down around 95%-99%, Sonnenfeld and Tian estimate, and activity in most industries is down at least 60%, they said, despite Putin frequently brushing off the impact of sanctions .

The nation, meanwhile, is still suffering from huge capital losses from when it first invaded Ukraine. Russia lost 1 million citizens , 15% of its millionaires , as well as $19 billion in foreign direct investment in 2022 alone, making its future growth prospects dismal, the researchers say. 

Among their biggest predictions is that the situation in Russia is so bad that the country could eventually turn on Putin , with a shift in the domestic temperament coming as soon as the November US presidential election this year.

That's because if Biden is re-elected, the US will likely continue supplying aid to Ukraine, forcing Russia to continue spending money and lives to keep waging war on Ukraine.  

"Putin has no grand strategy other than to hope Trump wins and cuts a favorable deal with Russia," Tian said. "Russia is in for a world of economic pain for a long time to come."

Positive forecasts on Russia's economy are based on a lack of visibility, Sonnenfeld and Tian say.

The pair began working together when Tian was an undergraduate at Yale, chasing Sonnenfeld around lecture halls. Eventually, Sonnenfeld became Tian's advisor and has mentored Tian for over eight years.

The two researchers are still working on ways to urge the West to tighten and enforce sanctions on Russia. They also continue to update their list of companies that have exited the country in the hope that it will encourage more firms to do the same. 

Colleagues describe Sonnenfeld as opinionated but generous and charismatic. Tian, meanwhile, has a near-photographic memory and is a highly analytical thinker, colleagues mentioned.

"Steven does a lot of the analytic heavy lifting, and I do the flamboyant color," Sonnenfeld said of their work together.

People who have worked with them also say the pair is extremely passionate about their work, and both are often known to answer emails at all hours of the night and early morning.

"We don't believe in regular sleep patterns," Sonnenfeld added. "Actually, we know it's very important, but sometimes when there's a sense of urgency, we do seriously dive into the crisis du jour. We just don't like bullies, whether or not it's Putin or some other bravado."

Watch: The rise and fall of Russian oligarchs

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How Would a New BRICS Currency Affect the US Dollar? (Updated 2024)

May 09, 2024 — 05:00 pm EDT

Written by Melissa Pistilli for Investing News Network  ->

The BRICS nations, originally comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, are looking to establish a new reserve currency backed by a basket of their respective currencies.

The potential BRICS currency would allow these nations to assert their economic independence while competing with the existing international financial system. The current system is dominated by the US dollar , which accounts for about 90 percent of all currency trading . Until recently, nearly 100 percent of oil trading was conducted in US dollars; however, in 2023 one-fifth of oil trades were reportedly made using non-US dollar currencies.

Central to this ongoing situation is the US trade war with China, as well as US sanctions on China and Russia. Should the BRICS nations establish a new reserve currency, it would likely significantly impact the US dollar, potentially leading to a decline in demand, or what's known as de-dollarization . In turn, this would have implications for the US and global economies.

Let's look at the potential for a BRICS currency and its possible implications for investors.

​Why do the BRICS nations want to create a new currency?

The BRICS nations have a slew of reasons for wanting to set up a new currency. Recent global financial challenges and aggressive US foreign policies have prompted the BRICS countries to explore the possibility. They want to better serve their own economic interests while reducing global dependence on the US dollar and the euro.

When will a BRICS currency be released? There's no definitive launch date as of yet, but the countries' leaders have discussed the possibility at length. During the 14th BRICS Summit , held in mid-2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin said the BRICS countries plan to issue a "new global reserve currency," and are ready to work openly with all fair partners.

In April 2023, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva showed support for a BRICS currency, commenting, “Why can’t an institution like the BRICS bank have a currency to finance trade relations between Brazil and China, between Brazil and all the other BRICS countries? Who decided that the dollar was the (trade) currency after the end of gold parity?”

Later last year in the lead up to the 2023 BRICS Summit in August, there was speculation that an announcement of such a currency could be on the table. This proved to be wishful thinking, however.

"The development of anything alternative is more a medium to long term ambition. There is no suggestion right now to creates a BRICS currency," Maasdorp told Bloomberg at the time.

South Africa's BRICS ambassador, Anil Sooklal, has said as many as 40 countries have expressed interest in joining BRICS. At the 2023 BRICS Summit , six countries were invited to become BRICS members : Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. All but Argentina officially joined the alliance in January 2024.

Some experts believe that a BRICS currency is a flawed idea, as it would unite countries with very different economies. There are also concerns that non-Chinese members might increase their dependence on China's yuan instead. That said, when Russia demanded in October 2023 that India pay for oil in yuan, India refused to use anything other than the US dollar or rupees. Russia is struggling to use its excess supply of rupees.

​Will BRICS have a digital currency?

BRICS nations do not as of yet have their own specific digital currency, but a BRICS blockchain-based payment system is in the works, according to Kremlin aide Yury Ushakov in March 2024. Known as the BRICS Bridge multisided payment platform, it would connect member countries' financial systems using payment gateways for settlements in central bank digital currencies.

The planned system would serve as an alternative to the current international cross-border payment platform, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system, which is dominated by US dollars.

“We believe that creating an independent BRICS payment system is an important goal for the future, which would be based on state-of-the-art tools such as digital technologies and blockchain. The main thing is to make sure it is convenient for governments, common people and businesses, as well as cost-effective and free of politics,” Ushakov said in an interview with Russian news agency TASS.

​What would the advantages of a BRICS currency be?

A new currency could have several benefits for the BRICS countries, including more efficient cross-border transactions and increased financial inclusion. By leveraging blockchain technology, digital currencies and smart contracts, the currency could revolutionize the global financial system. Thanks to seamless cross-border payments, it could also promote trade and economic integration among the BRICS nations and beyond.

A new BRICS currency would also:

• Strengthen economic integration within the BRICS countries.
• Reduce the influence of the US on the global stage.
• Weaken the standing of the US dollar as a global reserve currency.
• Encourage other countries to form alliances to develop regional currencies.
• Mitigate risks associated with global volatility due to unilateral measures and the diminution of dollar dependence.

​How would a new BRICS currency affect the US dollar?

For decades, the US dollar has enjoyed unparalleled dominance as the world's leading reserve currency. According to the US Federal Reserve, between 1999 and 2019, the dollar was used in 96 percent of international trade invoicing in the Americas, 74 percent in the Asia-Pacific region and 79 percent in the rest of the world.

According to the Atlantic Council , the US dollar is used in approximately 88 percent of currency exchanges, and 59 percent of all foreign currency reserves held by central banks. Due to its status as the most widely used currency for conversion and its use as a benchmark in the forex market, almost all central banks worldwide hold dollars. Additionally, the dollar is used for the vast majority of oil trades .

Although the dollar's reserve currency share has decreased as the euro and yen have gained popularity, the dollar is still the most widely used reserve currency, followed by the euro, the yen, the pound and the yuan.

The potential impact of a new BRICS currency on the US dollar remains uncertain, with experts debating its potential to challenge the dollar's dominance. However, if a new BRICS currency was to stabilize against the dollar, it could weaken the power of US sanctions, leading to a further decline in the dollar's value. It could also cause an economic crisis affecting American households. Aside from that, this new currency could accelerate the trend toward de-dollarization.

Nations worldwide are seeking alternatives to the US dollar, with examples being China and Russia trading in their own currencies, and countries like India, Kenya and Malaysia advocating for de-dollarization or signing agreements with other nations to trade in local currencies or alternative benchmarks.

While it is unclear whether a new BRICS currency would inspire the creation of other US dollar alternatives, the possibility of challenging the dollar's dominance as a reserve currency remains. And as countries continue to diversify their reserve holdings, the US dollar could face increasing competition from emerging currencies, potentially altering the balance of power in global markets.

Ultimately, the impact of a new BRICS currency on the US dollar will depend on its adoption, its perceived stability and the extent to which it can offer a viable alternative to the dollar's longstanding hegemony.

​How would a BRICS currency impact the economy?

A potential shift toward a new BRICS currency could have significant implications for the North American economy and investors operating within it. Some of the most affected sectors and industries include:

• Oil and gas
• Banking and finance
• Commodities
• International trade
• Tourism and travel
• The foreign exchange market

A new BRICS currency would also introduce new trading pairs, alter currency correlations and affect market volatility, requiring investors to adapt their strategies accordingly.

​How can investors prepare for a new BRICS currency?

Adjusting a portfolio in response to emerging BRICS currency trends may be a challenge for investors. However, several strategies can be adopted to capitalize on these trends.

• Diversify currency exposure by investing in assets denominated in currencies other than the US dollar, such as bonds, mutual funds or exchange-traded funds (ETFs).
• Invest in commodities like gold and silver as a hedge against currency risk.
• Gain exposure to BRICS equity markets through stocks and ETFs that track BRICS market indexes.
• Consider alternative investments such as real estate or private equity in the BRICS countries.

Prudent investors will also weigh these strategies against their exposure to market, political and currency fluctuations.

In terms of investment vehicles, investors could consider ETFs such as the iShares MSCI BIC ETF (ARCA: BKF ) or the Pacer Emerging Markets Cash COW 100 ETF (NASDAQ: ECOW ). They could also invest in mutual funds such as the T. Rowe Price Emerging Markets Equity Fund, or in individual companies within the BRICS countries.

Simply put, preparing for a new BRICS currency or potential de-dollarization requires careful research and due diligence by investors. Diversifying currency exposure, and investing in commodities, equity markets or alternative investments are possible options to consider while being mindful of the associated risks.

​Investor takeaway

While it is not certain whether the creation of a BRICS reserve currency will come to pass, its emergence would pose significant implications for the global economy and potentially challenge the US dollar's dominance as the primary reserve currency. This development would present unique investment opportunities, while introducing risks to existing investments as the shifting landscape alters monetary policy and exacerbates geopolitical tensions.

For those reasons, investors should closely monitor the progress of a possible BRICS currency. And, if the bloc does eventually create one, it will be important watch the currency's impact on BRICS member economies and the broader global market Staying vigilant will help investors to capitalize on growth prospects and hedge against potential risks.

FAQs for a new BRICS currency

​is a brics currency possible.

Some financial analysts point to the creation of the euro in 1999 as proof that a BRICS currency may be possible. However, this would require years of preparation, the establishment of a new central bank and an agreement between the five nations to phase out their own sovereign currencies; it would most likely also need the support of the International Monetary Fund to be successful internationally.

The impact of its war on Ukraine will continue to weaken Russia's economy and the value of the ruble, and China is intent on raising the power of the yuan internationally. There is also a wide chasm of economic disparity between China and other BRICS nations. These are no small obstacles to overcome.

Would a new BRICS currency be backed by gold?

While Russian President Vladimir Putin has suggested hard assets such as gold or oil, a new BRICS currency would likely be backed by a basket of the bloc's currencies.

That said, speaking at this year's New Orleans Investment Conference, well-known author Jim Rickards gave a detailed talk on how a gold-backed BRICS currency could work . He suggested that if a BRICS currency unit is worth 1 ounce of gold and the gold price goes to US$3,000 per ounce, the BRICS currency unit would be worth US$3,000, while the dollar would lose value compared to the BRICS currency as measured by the weight of gold.

Importantly though, he doesn't see this as a new gold standard, or the end of the US dollar or the euro.

“(With) a real gold standard, you can take the currency and go to any one of the central banks and get some gold,” Rickards said at the event. “With BRICS they don’t have to own any gold, they don’t have to buy any gold, they don’t have to prop up the price. They can just rise on the dollar gold market

​How much gold do the BRICS nations have?

As of Q1 2024, the combined central bank gold holdings of the original BRICS nations plus the five new additions accounted for nearly 17 percent of all the gold held in the world's central banks. Russia, India and China rank in the top 10 for central bank gold holdings .

Russia controls 2,332.74 metric tons (MT) of the yellow metal, making it the fifth largest for central bank gold reserves. China follows in the sixth spot with 2,262.39 MT of gold and India places ninth with 822.58 MT. Brazil and South Africa's central bank gold holdings are much smaller, coming in at 129.65 MT and 125.44 MT, respectively. New BRICS members Egypt and UAE gold holdings are equally pauce, at 126.46 MT and 74.5 MT. Saudi Arabia's come in at 323.07 MT. The remaining two new member nations Ethiopia and Iran do not hold gold reserves.

Don't forget to follow us @INN_Resource for real-time news updates!

Securities Disclosure: I, Melissa Pistilli, hold no direct investment interest in any company mentioned in this article.

The views and opinions expressed herein are the views and opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Nasdaq, Inc.

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Drone Downed in Russia’s Moscow Region, Governor Says

(Reuters) - Russian air defence units downed a drone outside Moscow on Monday, Moscow Region Governor Andrei Vorobyov said.

Vorobyov, writing on the Telegram messaging app, said fragments from the downed drone landed on a private house at about 9 p.m. (1800 GMT) in Balashikha, just east of the capital. Those inside the house escaped unhurt.

The Russian Defence Ministry reported that air defence units had destroyed a "small-scale airborne object".

Tass news agency, quoting aviation services, said aircraft had been temporarily directed away from flight paths northeast of Moscow but airports in the Moscow region were later reported to be operating normally.

(Reporting by Ron Popeski; Editing by Andrea Ricci)

Copyright 2024 Thomson Reuters .

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Zelenskyy says Ukraine has taken back control in areas of Kharkiv region, aerial attacks continue

Russia Ukraine War Firefighters put out a fire after two guided bombs hit a large construction supplies store in Kharkiv, Ukraine, Saturday, May 25, 2024. Writing reads "Garden Center". (AP Photo/Andrii Marienko) (Andrii Marienko/AP)

KYIV, Ukraine — (AP) — Ukrainian forces have secured "combat control" of areas where Russian troops entered the northeastern Kharkiv region earlier this month, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said.

Meanwhile, two people were killed Saturday in an aerial attack on the city of Kharkiv, which is the region's capital, according to local officials.

Kharkiv is about 20 kilometers (12 miles) from the Russian border. Moscow's troops have in recent weeks captured villages in the area as part of a broad push, and analysts say they may be trying to get within artillery range of the city. Ukrainian authorities have evacuated more than 11,000 people from the region since the start of the offensive on May 10.

“Our soldiers have now managed to take combat control of the border area where the Russian occupiers entered,” Zelenskyy said in his nightly video address on Friday evening.

Zelenskyy’s comments appeared to be at odds with those made by Russian officials.

Viktor Vodolatskiy, a member of Russia‘s lower house of parliament, said Russian forces now controlled more than half of the town of Vovchansk, 3 miles (5 kilometers) inside the border, Russian state news agency Tass reported Friday.

Vovchansk has been a flashpoint for fighting since Russia launched the offensive in the Kharkiv region. Vodolatskiy was also quoted as saying that once Vovchansk was secured, Russian forces would target the cities of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk and Pokrovsk in the neighboring Donetsk region.

Independent confirmation of the claims wasn't immediately possible.

Russia’s Kharkiv push appears to be a coordinated new offensive that includes testing Ukrainian defenses in the Donetsk region further south — where Russia's Defense Ministry said Saturday that its forces had taken over the village of Arkhanhelske — while also launching incursions in the northern Sumy and Chernihiv regions.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has said the Kremlin's army is attempting to create a "buffer zone" in the Kharkiv region to prevent Ukrainian cross-border attacks.

The Russian push is shaping up to be Ukraine's biggest test since Moscow's full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, with outnumbered and outgunned Ukrainian forces being pressed at several points along the about 1,000-kilometer (620-mile) front line that snakes from north to south in eastern Ukraine.

In addition to the ground offensive operation along Ukraine's northeastern border, Russia is continuing to bombard the Kharkiv region with missiles, guided aerial bombs and drones.

Regional Gov. Oleh Syniehubov said that two people were killed and 33 others wounded when an aerial bomb hit a large construction supplies store in the city of Kharkiv on Saturday afternoon, causing a huge fire to break out. He said that more than 200 people could have been inside the store, later noting that the fire had been contained. A second bomb hit the city's central park, Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov said.

Zelenskyy called the airstrike on the store “a manifestation of Russian madness" and appealed to Western countries to provide Ukraine with air defense systems.

“When we tell world leaders that Ukraine requires adequate air defense protection ... we are literally talking about how not to allow such terrorist strikes,” he said in a post on X.

Ukraine’s problems have been mounting in recent months as it tries to hold out against its much bigger foe, and the war appears to be at a critical juncture.

Elise Morton reported from London.

Follow AP's coverage of the war in Ukraine at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

Copyright 2024 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission.

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What we know so far about the helicopter crash that killed Iran’s president and others

Iranian state media are reporting that President Ebrahim Raisi, the country’s foreign minister and others have been found dead at the site of a helicopter crash after an hourslong search through a foggy, mountainous region of the country’s northwest. State TV gave no immediate cause for the crash in Iran’s East Azerbaijan province. With Raisi were Iran’s foreign minister, the governor of Iran’s East Azerbaijan province and other officials and bodyguards, the state-run IRNA news agency reported.

The Associated Press’ news director for the Gulf and Iran, Jon Gambrell, explains tensions facing Iran after a helicopter crash killed its president. (AP video shot by Bassam Hatoum)

Sanam Vakil, director of the North Africa and Middle East Programme at the London-based think-tank Chatham House, has said she expects Iran’s political establishment to face challenges with legitimacy following the deaths of the President and Foreign Minister.

People hold up posters of President Ebrahim Raisi during a mourning ceremony for him at Vali-e-Asr square in downtown Tehran, Iran, Monday, May 20, 2024. Iranian President Raisi and the country’s foreign minister were found dead Monday hours after their helicopter crashed in fog, leaving the Islamic Republic without two key leaders as extraordinary tensions grip the wider Middle East. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)

• Copy Link copied

A cleric weeps during a mourning ceremony for Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi at Vali-e-Asr square in downtown Tehran, Iran, Monday, May 20, 2024. President Raisi and the country’s foreign minister were found dead Monday hours after their helicopter crashed in fog, leaving the Islamic Republic without two key leaders as extraordinary tensions grip the wider Middle East. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)

In this photo provided by Moj News Agency, rescue teams members carry the body of a victim after a helicopter carrying Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi crashed in Varzaghan, northwestern Iran, Monday, May 20, 2024. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, the country’s foreign minister and others have been found dead at the site of a helicopter crash after an hours-long search through a foggy, mountainous region of the country’s northwest, state media reported. (Azin Haghighi, Moj News Agency via AP)

In this photo provided by Moj News Agency, rescue teams’ vehicles are seen near the site of the incident of the helicopter carrying Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Varzaghan in northwestern Iran, Sunday, May 19, 2024.(Azin Haghighi/Moj News Agency via AP)

In this photo provided by the Azerbaijan’s Presidential Press Office, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, left, shakes hands with his Azeri counterpart Ilham Aliyev during their meeting in the inauguration ceremony of dam of Qiz Qalasi, or Castel of Girl in Azeri, at the border of Iran and Azerbaijan, Sunday, May 19, 2024. A helicopter carrying Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi suffered a “hard landing” on Sunday, Iranian state media reported, without immediately elaborating. (Azerbaijani Presidential Press Office via AP)

People attend a mourning ceremony for President Ebrahim Raisi as some of them wave the Palestinian flags at Vali-e-Asr square in downtown Tehran, Iran, Monday, May 20, 2024. Iranian President Raisi and the country’s foreign minister were found dead Monday hours after their helicopter crashed in fog, leaving the Islamic Republic without two key leaders as extraordinary tensions grip the wider Middle East. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)

People attend a mourning ceremony for Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, shown in the posters, at Vali-e-Asr square in downtown Tehran, Iran, Monday, May 20, 2024. President Raisi and the country’s foreign minister were found dead Monday hours after their helicopter crashed in fog, leaving the Islamic Republic without two key leaders as extraordinary tensions grip the wider Middle East. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)

BEIRUT (AP) — The helicopter crash that killed Iran’s president and foreign minister has sent shock waves around the region.

Iranian state media on Monday said that President Ebrahim Raisi , the country’s foreign minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, and others had been found dead after an hourslong search through a foggy, mountainous region of the country’s northwest. State TV gave no immediate cause for the crash.

Here’s what we know so far.

What to know:

• The crash: Follow AP’s live coverage of the helicopter crash in which Iran’s president and foreign minister were found dead.
• Ebrahim Raisi : Iran’s hard-line president has long been seen as a protégé to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
• Hossein Amirabdollahian: The foreign minister represented the hard-line shift after the collapse of Tehran’s nuclear deal with world powers.
• International reaction : Countries including Russia, Iraq and Qatar have made formal statements of concern about Raisi’s fate.

WHO WAS ON BOARD AND WHERE WERE THEY GOING?

The helicopter on Sunday was carrying Raisi, Amirabdollahian, the governor of Iran’s East Azerbaijan province and other officials, according to the state-run IRNA news agency.

Raisi was returning after traveling to Iran’s border with Azerbaijan to inaugurate a dam with Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev when the crash occurred in the Dizmar forest in East Azerbaijan province.

IRNA said the crash killed eight people including three crew members aboard the Bell helicopter, which Iran purchased in the early 2000s.

HOW DID THE SEARCH OPERATION GO?

Iranian officials said the mountainous, forested terrain and heavy fog impeded search-and-rescue operations, which continued overnight.

In this photo provided by Moj News Agency, rescue teams and people are seen near the site of the incident of the helicopter carrying Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Varzaghan in northwestern Iran, Sunday, May 19, 2024. (Azin Haghighi/Moj News Agency via AP)

In this photo provided by Moj News Agency, rescue teams’ vehicles are seen near the site of the incident of the helicopter carrying Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Varzaghan in northwestern Iran, Sunday, May 19, 2024. (Azin Haghighi, Moj News Agency via AP)

The president of the Iranian Red Crescent Society, Pir-Hossein Koulivand, said Sunday evening that 40 search teams were on the ground despite “challenging weather conditions.” Because of the bad weather, it was “impossible to conduct aerial searches” via drones, Koulivand said, according to IRNA.

It was not until early Monday that officials announced the helicopter had been found and all of its occupants were dead.

HOW WAS THE CRASH SITE FOUND?

Early Monday, Turkish authorities released what they described as drone footage showing what appeared to be a fire in the wilderness that they “suspected to be wreckage of a helicopter.” The coordinates listed in the footage put the fire about 20 kilometers (12 miles) south of the Azerbaijan-Iranian border on the side of a steep mountain.

Footage released by IRNA showed what the agency described as the crash site, across a steep valley in a mountain range. Soldiers speaking in the local Azeri language said: “There it is, we found it.” Shortly after that, state TV in an on-screen scrolling text said: “There is no sign of life from people on board.”

HOW WILL RAISI’S DEATH IMPACT IRAN?

Raisi was seen as a protege to Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and a potential successor for his position within the country’s Shiite theocracy.

Under the Iranian constitution, if a president dies, the country’s first vice president — in this case, Mohammad Mokhber — becomes acting president, with elections mandated within 50 days. Khamenei has publicly assured Iranians that there would be “no disruption to the operations of the country” as a result of the crash.

In this photo provided by the Azerbaijan’s Presidential Press Office, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, left, shakes hands with his Azeri counterpart Ilham Aliyev during their meeting in the inauguration ceremony of dam of Qiz Qalasi, or Castel of Girl in Azeri, at the border of Iran and Azerbaijan, Sunday, May 19, 2024. (Azerbaijani Presidential Press Office via AP)

WHAT HAS INTERNATIONAL REACTION BEEN?

After news broke of the search operation, countries including Russia, Iraq and Qatar made statements of concern about Raisi’s fate and offered to assist in the search.

Azerbaijani President Aliyev offered any support necessary. Relations between the two countries have been chilly due to Azerbaijan’s diplomatic relations with Israel, Iran’s regional arch-enemy.

Saudi Arabia, traditionally a rival of Iran although the two countries recently made a rapprochement , said it stands by “Iran in these difficult circumstances.”

There was no immediate official reaction from Israel. Last month, following an Israeli strike on an Iranian consular building in Damascus that killed two Iranian generals, Tehran launched hundreds of missiles and drones at Israel. They were mostly shot down and tensions have apparently subsided.

The U.S., which has its own history of tensions with Tehran, issued condolences in a State Department statement and added that “we reaffirm our support for the Iranian people and their struggle for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

Russia in the Global Natural and Ecological Space

• CHALLENGES AND POLICY OF SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT OF POST-SOVIET RUSSIA
• Published: 17 April 2023
• Volume 13 , pages 34–57, ( 2023 )

Cite this article

• V. I. Danilov-Danilyan 1 ,
• N. N. Klyuev 2 &
• V. M. Kotlyakov 2  

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The evolution of the role of natural-geographical factors in the spatial organization of society is considered. It is shown that despite the high growth rates of the service sector, the distribution of mineral, water, and forest resources, as well as climatic conditions, remain the key factors in Russia’s spatial development. A brief geoecological description of Russia’s natural resource complex in the global context is presented. On the basis of intercountry comparisons for a wide range of parameters, it is shown that Russia is one of the most environmentally friendly countries in the world. Of planetary and ecological significance are: Russian forests (45% of Russia’s territory), waterlogged lands and swamps (22% of the territory), and the largest array of practically undeveloped lands (almost two-thirds of the territory). Therefore, Russia’s territory acts as a compensatory area for global pollution and natural disturbances in general, and an ecological donor of many national ecosystems. Russia stands out against the world background by the concentration of sources of potential risk and high environmental capacity. However, in general, the contribution of the Russian economy to the global transformation of the natural environment does not exceed the country’s share in Earth’s territorial resources, the population, and the global economy. The features of Russia’s ecological and geographical position are revealed: its location with respect to foreign sources of environmental hazard. In environmental terms, Russia suffers more from neighboring countries than they from it. Due to the western transfer of air masses, atmospheric pollution enters Russia’s territory from all over Europe; their main “exporters” are Ukraine, Poland, and Germany. The centers of concentration of external threats to Russia’s environmental security have been identified: the area of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the Seversky Donets River basin, the Kazakh Irtysh River region, and the Chinese Amur River region. The leading role of natural resources in the country’s economy determines the priority in domestic Earth sciences, including geography and geoecology.

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EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF NATURAL-GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS IN THE SPATIAL ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY

Natural resource factors play a crucial role in the spatial development of any state. Their dominant importance is clearly visible throughout human history. Since his inception, man has inhabited the most favorable natural conditions of the territory (among available), although with the development of mankind, the criteria for favorableness have changed significantly.

In ancient times, these criteria were related to the climate and biological productivity of the territory from the hunter-gatherer standpoint. After the Neolithic revolution, with the advent of agriculture and animal husbandry, the main feature was the natural productivity of the territory for agricultural production, a derivative of climatic characteristics. The development of hydromelioration technologies—regulation of river flow via construction of reservoirs and delivery of water to agricultural fields during dry periods—has again changed the focus: the importance of water resources has increased tremendously. The invention of metallurgy determined the need to develop territories near ore deposits and fuel resources, which were originally represented only by firewood, but over time were replaced by coal.

In the future, all the noted natural resource factors played an important role in spatial development, during which two opposite trends emerged. On the one hand, economic growth and technological development, particularly after the industrial revolution, demanded more and more natural resources, and their diversity constantly expanded; on the other hand, the development of transport made it possible, instead of bringing people closer to resources, to organize the delivery of resources to people’s places of residence, very significantly restraining migration of the population to discoverable deposits.

The “third economic revolution” was informational; if considered in a spatial aspect, it also has two trends, but unidirectional (in terms of location of the economy and territorial distribution of the population). First, the tendencies towards greening production and resource conservation characteristic of this stage reduce the specific (per unit output) needs for natural resources (this has become an additional factor in the relative restraint of population growth in regions with raw materials). Second, the leap in information technology and communications has made it possible for the majority of those employed in the production of information to set up a workplace at their place of residence (in their house or apartment). Owing to this, the importance of a territory’s climatic advantages again increased and the very significant role of its ecological quality in the choice of place of residence was determined (both of these features strongly correlate with the forest cover of the territory).

The growing shortage of fresh water, which proved a low-transportable product given the current scale of its agricultural and industrial use, can have a very significant impact on the long-term spatial development of the global economy.

Whereas industrial development in all countries that underwent the industrial revolution was marked by a decrease in the share of agriculture in GDP in favor of industry, postindustrial development is characterized by a decrease in the share of industry and agriculture in favor of the service sector. This means a decrease in the share in GDP of the primary economy sector—nature-exploiting industries: mining, agriculture, water, forestry, and fishery. However, no matter how much this share is reduced, the volume of activity in this sector, both in physical and monetary terms, is and will not decrease, at least as long as population growth continues. Moreover, population size determines a certain lower limit of the production volume in the primary sector and, in principle, it is possible to give at least rough estimates of this value (also taking into account population distribution by climatic zones). The population size also limits the volume of production in the industrial sector from below, but, although the existence of such a limit is theoretically obvious, even very rough estimates of it are hardly possible: the influence on this sector by factors determined not by population size, but by the level of its development, ideology, culture, ethnic traditions, etc., is too strong.

The service sector is very heterogeneous in composition, and for analysis, it is necessary to structure it at least in the simplest form (Danilov-Danilyan, 2009). Services related to the material side of human life, health care, education, functioning of material production sectors, and production of business information will be attributed to the material segment of the service sector. In addition to this segment, the financial and leisure industries also remain in the service sector. The last segment will be called the entertainment segment; it is represented by all types of activities aimed at satisfying people’s leisure needs, i.e. the entertainment industry in a broad sense, including not only cinema, television, radio, audio and video recordings, printed entertainment materials, and concert activities, but also tourism, all commercial sports, all kinds of Disney-related territories, fitness clubs, casinos, etc. If such services, if not entirely, but at least in their predominant part, met the minimum quality requirements, first of all, in regards to taste, would contribute to a person’s harmonious development and yield real investment in human capital (in addition to education systems, health care, etc.), then we could speak about services aimed at satisfying spiritual needs. The reality is that we have to talk about the ostensible satisfaction of spiritual needs and satisfaction of professed spiritual needs; the same applies to physical development, which is hindered more than helped by commercial sports (by “freezing” people in front of their televisions).

The financial and entertainment segments of the service sector cast on the market produced or “launched” (in particular, in the case of financial derivatives) entities, a significant (possibly dominant) part of which is not intended either to satisfy the normal needs of a person, his spiritual and physical development, or management of economic processes that solve precisely these problems. On the contrary, their social role is purely negative, while at the same time they largely determine the instability of the modern economy. The same applies to the demonstration consumption of secondary sector products, etc.

Since the late 1960s, the financial and entertainment segments of the service sector proved to be the fastest growing in the US economy. They have become the locomotive of the American economy, stimulating the production of all types of products necessary for their release and launch. Other developed countries, lagging far behind the leader of the Western world, were drawn into the competition for the growth rate of these segments. It seems that the financial and entertainment segments are not accidentally found side by side. First of all, these segments have relatively recently reached significant economic positions. In addition to the fastest growth in comparison with other structural units of the economy of developed countries (and, in many cases, developing ones), they also have other features.

Having provided the majority of its population with a high level of well-being, the developed market economy has done nothing to elevate man. On the contrary, brainwashing through advertising and other PR technologies proved beneficial in simplifying spiritual needs, reducing culture to a subculture. A 100 000 seat stadium yields incomparably more income than a philharmonic hall (most symphony orchestras do not pay off at all, they exist only thanks to sponsorship), and if you build a variety stage on the football field and make the same 100 000 people clap their hands to the most primitive rhythm beaten by pop group, income can be further increased. Westernization turned out to be predominantly Americanization; its main sociocultural result is the destruction of national cultural traditions and subcultural zombification of people, the number of which is measured in millions, and its economic result is the creation of a colossal leisure industry.

The volume of production in the material segment of the service sector depends on the population (in terms of services provided directly to people) and the volume of production in the primary and secondary sectors (in terms of services provided to production). Obviously, part of the products of the financial segment plays a positive role in production management processes, being an integral part of the market system. However, the other part of this segment, serving the worst in the entertainment segment, generating frankly speculative processes in the financial sector, ensuring the “self-growth” of capital from scratch, ultimately contributes to the instability of the global financial and economic system. Lastly, the entertainment segment of the service sector seems to be the focus of surplus production of the modern economy, the volume of production in it is most dependent on ideological and social factors, and the lower limit of this volume seems close to zero—in comparison to its current value, which primarily testifies to the sickness of our civilization.

Thus, the sector of the primary economy to the greatest extent depends on the most inertial parameter of human development: the population; the physical volume of production in this sector depends as strictly as possible (in comparison with other sectors) on this parameter, and the possibilities for choosing a territorial structure are determined by the distribution of natural resources and, if their global reserves are not strictly limited, by economic factors, taking into account political risks and other circumstances. Thus, no matter what volumes and growth rates are observed in the service sector (and in developed countries, its share in GDP everywhere exceeded 65%), no matter what the share of the primary economy in the GDP (in the United States, it is about 3%), the distribution of water, forest, and mineral resources, as well as climatic conditions, remain key factors in spatial development.

These factors are all the more significant for Russia’s spatial development, which currently has an industrial-raw material economy and, it seems, in the future, the primary and industrial sectors will retain a significant role in the country’s economy.

RUSSIA IN THE GLOBAL NATURAL RESOURCE SPACE

Natural resources, for which Russia’s territory has long been renowned, still ensure Russia’s survival and even development (albeit a very unstable development) in the permanent crisis conditions of recent decades. The export of mineral raw materials alone is responsible for 65–70% of the country’s foreign exchange earnings (40–54% in the USSR in the 1980s (Arbatov, 2005)) and at least half of federal budget revenues.

The high demand on the global market for Russian natural resources determines both Russia’s place as a resource-providing zone of the planet, and the paramount (strategic) importance of the natural resource complex in the country’s economy, and the priority of Earth sciences in the Russian scientific sphere, including geography and geoecology.

Russia is one of the few countries that are practically “self-sufficient” in terms of natural resources, which creates all the natural prerequisites for its “sustainable development.” In Russia’s vast territory, mineral resources of global importance are concentrated ( Table 1 ), more than 50% of the world’s chernozems, nearly 25% of its forests, 10% of its river runoff, and more than a 25% of its freshwater lake reserves.

Comparing the values of natural capital and the national wealth of Russia, V.M. Simchera (1998) notes that there is no other country in the world where the gap between the value of natural resources and of accumulated property would be so large. That is, Russia still has many resources not involved in economic turnover, which have not yet been embodied a particular property. Thus, the ratio of timber harvesting to its reserves in the world as a whole is 2%, and in Russia, 0.4%. Footnote 1 During the years of restructuring, crises, and reforms, the role of extraction of fuel and energy resources in the country’s economy has noticeably increased. However, during this time, Russia has significantly reduced its share in world production. For 1990–2017, Russia’s share in global coal production decreased from 8.5 to 5.7%; oil, from 17.1 to 12.6%; and natural gas, from 31 to 19%. And Russian extraction of peat and oil shale has declined many times over.

The study of natural resources. Despite the large-scale exploration of mineral deposits in the Soviet years (based on the funds allocated for these purposes, the Soviet exploration program can be compared with nuclear and space exploration), no more than 40% of Russian territory has been studied geologically to an extent meeting modern-day requirements (Dumnov and Boriskin, 2010). The degree of subsoil exploration varies greatly across the territory: from 50–60% in the Urals to 1.2–8.4% in Eastern Siberia, the Far East, and the shelves of adjacent seas (except for Sakhalin) (Sever …, 2005). According to the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources, the average level of exploration of the Russian shelf is 0.24 m/km 2 . This is eight times less than the level of exploration of the American shelf of the Chukchi Sea and 16 times less than the Norwegian shelf of the North Sea.

In the post-Soviet years, the rate of devastation of Russian subsoil has outstripped the growth of its reserves. For 2000–2005, the increase in explored reserves to production is as followed (in %): uranium, 56.3; coal, 82.9; iron, 12.7; copper, 30; nickel, 20.8; gold, 54.1 (Bavlov, 2006). E.A. Kozlovskii (2007) notes that the mineral resource base of most minerals has declined over the past 15 years, despite a decrease in production volumes (in %): tin, 90; tungsten, 80; lead, 60. Deep exploration drilling in the country decreased from 5 299 000 m in 1990 to 1 155 000 m in 2017. Footnote 2 The pace of development of deposits leads the pace of geological exploration. In addition, much exploration work in the country is done by foreign oilfield services companies. This poses a threat to national security. In conditions of aggravated international relations, projects for development of the shelf and hard-to-recover oil and gas reserves are particularly vulnerable, since almost all of the work is carried out by or in cooperation with foreign companies.

In post-reform Russia, not only the Earth’s interior, but also other natural components and complexes are deprived of researchers’ attention. According to Rosreestr, the cost of cartographic service in the country is USD 7 km –2 year –1 (in the United States, 116; France, 28; Great Britain, 615; Switzerland, 1439). Footnote 3 According to the results of an audit by the Accounts Chamber, the Federal Property Management Agency does not have reliable information on how much land is federally owned. Data on the total area of state land plots contained in different sections of the departmental GIS diverged by almost 200 mln ha (1.08 bln ha in one version and 1.27 bln ha in another). Footnote 4

During the 1990s, meteorological and natural resource satellite constellations were completely lost; they were restored starting only in 2009. The number of hydrological posts decreased from 4481 in 1986 to 3084 in 2006, and observation points for pollution of land surface waters, from 3295 to 1815 (Vodnye …, 2008, pp. 112, 178). The number of observation points for the marine environment has decreased by 30% (Bedritskii, 2004). For 1991–2016, the number of air pollution monitoring stations in cities decreased from 821 to 678, and the number of monitored cities, from 337 to 243. Footnote 5 In the Far North, Siberia and the Far East, the share of reduced observation points for the natural environment is much larger. Thus, measurements of water discharges in the entire cross-border section along the Argun, Amur, and Ussuri rivers to Khabarovsk (extremely important in terms of hydroecology) have not been carried out since the late 1960s (Bolgov et al., 2015). The programs for observing water, air, and soils have also been drastically reduced. Russia’s soil service has practically collapsed (Dobrovol’skii and Zaidel’man, 2004). The level of forest management studies is absolutely insufficient. According to A.S. Isaev, today only 19% of the country’s forests have updated information; over 95% of monitoring data for forest and other terrestrial ecosystems was obtained (including purchased) from foreign satellites. Footnote 6 Geobotanical land surveys are very rarely carried out.

There are still no official statistical cost data on such natural wealth indicators as surface water, subsoil resources, and natural biological resources, which Rosstat includes in the list of tangible economic assets.

The introduction of the All-Russian Classification of Types of Economic Activities (OKVED) into the natural resource sector since 2005, which, according to Rosstat, meets international standards, cannot be considered completely successful. In the OKVED, according to the level of classification significance, “geological exploration, geophysical and geochemical works in field subsoil studies” (code 74.20.2) are on par with “frog and earthworm breeding” (code 01.25.8). Obviously, in this “innovative” classification scheme, the place of natural resources does not reflect their real significance in the Russian economy. A.D. Dumnov and D.A. Boriskin (2007) rightly question the expediency of breaking domestic accounting and statistical realities and their adjustment to foreign schemes (despite the fact that these schemes are also seriously criticized abroad).

Its territory is one of Russia’s most important resources. Geography proceeds from the acknowledgement of the inherent value of the territory, regardless of its how full it is of minerals, forests, and other natural resources. There are no bad, “unprofitable” places on Earth; there is only their incorrect use due to incorrect assessment. For example, an area poor in mineral resources can have extremely valuable biological diversity, recreational resources, out-of-the-way areas with pristine nature, clean water, and air; it may be an effective transit territory, a geopolitical buffer, and lastly, a spatial reserve for the future, etc. The territory is the most important element of the historical, cultural, and natural heritage, as well as a field for economic, political, military, and environmental maneuvers.

Since the concept of economic strategy was organically alien to all post-Soviet governments, their obscure regional policy led to a further strengthening of the historically established powerful regional asymmetry, the hypertrophy of the two capitals and a few other growth poles with the exposure of vast territories, to the desolation and even savagery of the periphery.

Unfortunately, even in the domestic geographical literature, there is still a nihilistic attitude towards the territory. It is declared superfluous, positive processes are acknowledged that “expose” the territories, destroy the infrastructure that has been with great difficulty created on them, putting the millions of people forced to leave habitable lands in a catastrophic situation (Kotlyakov and Tishkov, 2011).

A rational regional policy should also maintain a decent standard of living in places that seem unpromising today. Otherwise, their further desolation, mass exodus of the population, degradation of human potential with the loss of a huge development resource—millions of talented people—are inevitable. Abandoned places, wild landscapes are also a provocation for geopolitical competitors. And the reinvolvement of these lands into economic circulation will require costs comparable to those of the initial development of the territory. Respect for the territory reflects the rationalism of the distant goal, which takes into account long-term consequences, care for descendants, and environmental factors. Footnote 7

If the wealth of the territory and other natural resources contribute to Russia’s sustainable development, then the unfavorable physical, economic, as well as ecological and geographical, positions (Klyuev, 1995) make it difficult. The vast northern territory, by no means with a compact configuration, deprived of access to open and nonfreezing seas, requires many energy resources to overcome cold and distance. However, with a competent territorial policy, the “burden of space and the burden of nature” (so the Russian philosopher I.A. Il’in (1883–1954) defined the Russian territory) are weakened, and the economic and geographical position is improving. Thus, the shortest way from Europe to rapidly growing China and other countries of East Asia lies through Russian territory. Even more than 100 years ago, when the Trans-Siberian Railway was being built, maritime shipowners from England and the United States were in a panic, fearing a formidable competitor in the face of Russian railways. However, our low-speed railways (the speed of which is five times lower than in the United States) are still losing to maritime transport (Problemnye …, 2002, p. 59). Meanwhile, modern technologies and methods of organizing transportation make it possible to make them fast and reliable. The current decrease in the ice coverage of the Arctic seas opens up favorable prospects for year-round navigation along the Northern Sea Route. The transfer to Russia of the main Eurasian transport artery will significantly increase the efficient use of Russian territory.

Russia has a powerful electric and oil and gas system: a dense network of power lines, main gas pipelines (over 170 000 km), oil and product pipelines (over 70 000 km). In the future, on this basis, a single integral Eurasian infrastructure can be created, uniting transport, telecommunications and energy networks, the center of which will be Russia. This will make it possible to receive income from transit, enhance the geopolitical significance of the country—its ability to influence the course of global processes.

RUSSIA IN THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL SPACE

Russia’s ecological image in a global context.

In addition to colossal natural resources, Russia also possesses spatial–ecological potential, which is understood as natural mechanisms of self-purification of the environment from pollution, synthesis and breakdown of organic matter, and maintenance of the global biogeochemical cycle. These mechanisms ensure the purity of air, water, soil, and biodiversity, the importance of which in the system of vital values of society is constantly growing.

Estimates are well known, according to which the areas of acute environmental situations on Russian territory occupy an area of 2.5 mln km 2 , or 15% of the entire territory, which corresponds to 4.5 the area of France (Kotlyakov et al., 1990). Without questioning these figures, note that here and in other sources using these estimates (and they are included in the state reports On the State and Protection of the Natural Environment of the Russian Federation, and in school and university textbooks), the relativity of the applied acuity rating scales is not mentioned. This scale is purely Russian and is not suitable for international comparisons.

This section considers the question of what the role of Russia’s territory is in the biosphere and its contribution to the degradation of the planet’s natural environment? Hence follows the measure of the country’s responsibility and its position in international relations.

The nature and degree of sustainability of landscapes in Russia to anthropogenic impacts are primarily determined by climatic factors. The predominance of low temperatures determines the low rate of natural degradation of pollutants in air, water, and soil; 60% of the territory is occupied by particularly vulnerable natural complexes of the perennial permafrost zone. About half of Russia’s territory consists of mountainous geosystems weakly tolerant to a wide range of economic impacts; 20% of Russia’s territory belongs to seismically active regions (including 5% of the territory is subject to extremely dangerous 8–10 magnitude earthquakes), and 18% is occupied by avalanche-prone areas. Natural disasters can initiate environmental disasters and increase the severity of their consequences. Both permafrost and mountains are located in the very poorly developed East. These vulnerable landscapes are practically undisturbed by economic activity. However, in increasing the “Russian power by Siberia and the Arctic” (the Russian scientist M.V. Lomonosov in the 18th century called upon to) it is necessary to exercise great caution.

The environmentally significant characteristics of Russia are reflected in Fig. 1 . Russia’s ecological role in the planetary geosystem is largely determined by the size of its territory, which occupies 12% of the Earth’s dry land. Russian forests are of planetary importance. In productivity, they are four times inferior to the Amazon rainforests. However, plants of temperate latitudes use 30–40% of the oxygen they emit for respiration, while tropical forests use 80–90%. As G.A. Zavarzin notes, “the idea that tropical forests serve as the ‘lungs of the planet’ has long been forgotten. This role is increasingly assigned to forests of the boreal belt with their slow and seasonally suppressed destruction” (Krugovorot …, 1999, p. 13). In Russia, 60% of annual river runoff is meltwater, which is the most valuable part of the world’s water resources (Alekseev, 2012), since the Earth’s cryosphere is its most effective “dry cleaner,” where cryogenic self-purification of water occurs.

Russia’s ecologically significant characteristics, 2000s, % of world.

Of great ecological importance is the wide distribution of waterlogged lands and swamps in Russia (40% of the world’s peat bogs), which act as geochemical barriers, or pollutant traps. The functioning strategy of the Russian tundra and northern taiga and marsh ecosystems is aimed at removing and accumulating adsorbed pollutants from the biological cycle. With a somewhat inhibited biological cycle, the removal and transformation of pollutants proceeds slowly (Tishkov, 2005). Many researchers consider the largest array of virtually undeveloped “wild” lands concentrated in Russia as a strategic reserve of the biosphere.

A large number of biological species are concentrated in Russia. Among the “eight ecologically dominant countries,” which largely determine the ecological future of the planet, Russia is distinguished by relatively high biological diversity and degree of its conservation ( Table 2 ).

The “material” component of the ecological situation is characterized by the amount of matter removed from nature and the volume of industrial waste. The correlation of these parameters with the scale of industrial production is reflected in Fig. 2 . Footnote 8 According to these parameters, the undisputed leaders are China and the United States. To a decisive extent, these countries form the ecological and industrial situation on the planet. Russia occupies a very modest place on this background.

Ecological and industrial pyramids of individual countries, 2000s.

From the relation of blocs, one can judge the degree of environmental friendliness, which is determined by the relative size of the production cylinder, its relationship with the amount of production and waste. The most environmentally friendly pyramids are typical of Japan, France, and Great Britain. The Russian pyramid is distinguished against the world background by its high specific natural consumption and significant “waste-producing flux.” Russian industry consumes significantly more natural resources per unit of output and generates more industrial waste than the economies of developed countries. Without eliminating these defects, it is difficult for Russia to count on playing the role of an environmental leader on the planet.

At the same time, however, it should be taken into account that the relative environmental friendliness of the planet’s economic vanguard is largely based on the import of natural resources and the assimilation potential of the natural environment, in particular, from Russia.

Although the share Russia’s in the world production of certain types of industrial waste is 2–4 times higher than its share in the world’s population, it is comparable to the share of the Russian territory. Therefore, the role Russia’s in the global transformation of the environment is generally adequate to the size of the territory occupied by the country.

In terms of emissions of pollutants into the atmosphere currently, China leads the world, and among the highly developed countries, the United States stands out in terms of absolute and per capita emissions. Russia’s “gross” indicators for SO 2 , NO X , and CO 2 are several times lower than America’s. The emission parameters of European countries are lower than Russian ones, but per capita they are generally comparable (Klyuev, 2017). It is important to mention that Russia is located in a much harsher climate than the United States and Western Europe. This also predetermines greater energy consumption (for heating, high-calorie food, heated industrial and residential premises, infrastructure, etc.), and, consequently, more atmospheric emissions and volume of water resources use. More energy is also required for Russian transport, which provides communication over a vast territory of a far from compact configuration. Russian indicators of environmental impacts per unit of territory are incomparably small compared to other countries.

The given data correlate, as a rule, with Russia’s vast territory, so the Russian indicators look favorable against the global background. As for large cities, as far as one can judge from the disparate data, the levels of environmental pollution in Russian and foreign megacities are generally comparable. Thus, 65 mln people live in Russia conditions of pollutants exceeding the threshold limit value (TLV) in the air of cities versus 53 mln in the United States. However, Russian TLV are much stricter (the average daily TLV for NO 2 in Russia is 40 µg/m 3 versus 100 µg/m 3 in the United States) (Revich and Maleev, 2003, p. 113), which, however, makes compliance with the standards hardly realistic. The lead content in Moscow soils (in the most polluted, Eastern District of the capital) is less than in Stockholm, 1.6 times; Madrid, 2.6 times; London, 4.8 times (Nikiforova and Kosheleva, 2012).

However, it is impossible not to notice that cities—these “parasites, dependents of the biosphere”—cannot exist without the landscapes surrounding them. The state of the environment in Russian cities is noticeably improved by vast sparsely populated spaces, full-flowing rivers, vast forests, and much less developed areas than abroad.

Figure 3 presents the dynamics of CO 2 emissions by countries differentiated by per capita GDP. A preliminary hypothesis, reflecting popular belief, was that rich countries reduce pressure on nature, while poor countries increase it. Indeed, an increase in emissions is clearly manifested in developing countries (primarily in Asia, but also in Latin America and Africa), which are characterized by low per capita GDP indicators. However, the hypothetical trend is violated, on the one hand, by the United States, which is increasing emissions, and, on the other hand, by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and republics of the former USSR, where emissions are decreasing. For 1992–2017, Russia’s share in global emissions decreased from 9.4 to 4.6%, while global emissions increased by more than 60% over this period. Footnote 9 True, this reduction occurred due to a decline in production, not greening of the economy. Thus, the Russian Federation produces 4.9% of the world’s electricity, but its share in the production of alternative, progressive, relatively clean energy is only 0.5%. Footnote 10 Whereas in the world the latter occupies 2.8% (Germany, 11.8%; Denmark, 29.8%), in Russia it is only 0.3%.

GDP per capita (at PPP, USD/person per year, 2014) and dynamics of CO 2 emission (1992–2011, 1992 = 100%, %) in countries. Note : Sign value is proportional to amount of CO 2 emission in 2011.

Recent interest in CO 2 emissions is due to the so-called greenhouse theory of climate change, which, in our opinion, is still only a hypothesis. However, even if the greenhouse theory is nothing more than a hypothesis, fighting harmful atmospheric emissions is an environmentally beneficial thing. At the same time, in intercountry comparisons, it is important to take into account not only emissions, but also CO 2 sinks. Calculations show that the net production of photosynthesis on Russian territory exceeds all sources of carbon dioxide, including those of technogenic origin, by 25% ( Table 3 ). Consequently, Russia’s territory acts as an oxygen donor and CO 2 absorber of global significance.

In Russia, the structure of the fuel balance is more environmentally friendly than in the world as a whole. Natural gas accounts for 23% of global fuel consumption, and more than 50% in Russia. The share of coal in the fuel and energy balance is 20% in Japan, 40% in the United States, 45% in Germany, 60% in China, 70% in India, 90% in Poland, and only 12% in Russia. By supplying energy resources to the global market, Russia provides significant environmental assistance to foreign countries, primarily European. It is known that the most toxic emissions enter the atmosphere when coal is burned, and the least toxic, when gas is burned; oil fuel (heavy crude) occupies an intermediate position. The replacement of coal and oil products with Russian gas in European countries has greatly reduced harmful atmospheric emissions.

In Russia, the economy uses only 2% of the available river runoff resources (in the world, 8%; United States, 19%; Germany, 48%; Belgium, 108%). Footnote 11 Among the largest water consumers in the world, the “big four” stand out: India, China, the United States, and Pakistan ( Table 4 ). Russia closes out the top ten countries in terms of total water consumption. However, it is one of the three largest industrial water consumers, although it lags greatly behind the leaders: the United States and China, where this figure is four to five times higher. On the world water management map, Russia is distinguished by high industrial water consumption, concentrated in compact urban areas. This determines the priority task of water conservation activities in Russia.

According to the ratio of shares in water resources and water consumption of the world ( Table 5 ), Russia, along with Brazil, Canada, and Colombia, is also in the lead. In terms of the dilution ratio of wastewater by total river runoff (this indicator reflects the likelihood of water pollution), the situation in Russia is almost ten times better than in the United States and three times better than in the world as a whole (Koronkevich et al., 2014, p. 12).

It is telling to compare the water quality of typical Central Russian and Central German rivers: the Oka and the Elbe. The concentrations of lead, copper, zinc, and chromium near the Oka River are 40% higher than the geochemical background, and near the Elbe River, they are 3–16 times higher than the background. An international research group acknowledged the following: “In general, the state of the environment in the [Volga-Caspian] basin, including water quality, is better than in Western Europe” (Videnie …, 2004).

The most polluted sea washing Russian territory is considered to be the Sea of Azov. However, even in it, the concentrations of pesticides and polychlorinated biphenyls in the muscle tissues of fish are an order of magnitude lower than in fish from the Great Lakes (data from the Canadian Center for Great Lakes Research, the University of Illinois, and the Murmansk Marine Biological Institute) (Matishov and Il’in, 2006).

Russian agriculture is characterized by a relatively low intensity, which has a positive effect on the state of landscapes and the quality of food. Thus, the application of mineral fertilizers in 2012 was (kg per 1 ha of arable land): in France, 137; Germany, 199; the Netherlands, 310; Russia, 24 Footnote 12 (in 1999 it decreased to 15, but by 2017 it had increased to 55 kg/ha). Per hectare of crops, Russia consumes 20 times less plant protection products than Germany. In the amount of fertilizers and pesticides per unit of arable land, Russia used less than other countries until 1992. In Russian conditions, the environmental problems of agriculture were associated not with the amount of chemicals used, but primarily with the technology of their use. Our agriculture is quite competitive in terms of environmental cleanliness. The dissemination by “green” alarmists of unfounded allegations about the deplorable state of the natural environment in Russia does not contribute to the promotion of domestic food on the world agricultural market, where there is a fierce competition.

In the scale of motorization, which determines motor transport impacts on the environment, Russia, of course, is far ahead of Bangladesh (respectively, 305 and 2 personal vehicles per 1000 inhabitants, 2017), but still lags far behind Germany, Italy, and the United States (more than 700 per 1000). Due to industrial and transport underdevelopment in Russia, even in its European part, the moduli of aerial lead input into the soil are close to global ones and are an order of magnitude lower than in Western Europe and North America (Glazovskaya, 1997). The environmental friendliness of railway transport in Russia is ensured by the widespread use of electric traction, which eliminates air pollution. JSC Russian Railways transports 85% of cargo and 80% of passengers via electric traction. In the length of electrified lines, Russia ranks first in the world.

For international environmental comparisons, the integral criterion is the ratio of the load (impacts) on nature and tolerance of the natural environment to anthropogenic impacts. This ratio shows the extent to which each country has used the capacity given by nature, the stability of the environment.

One of the indirect indicators of the impact on nature can be production load—the amount of GDP created in industry and agriculture—per unit of territory. Footnote 13 In Russia, the specific production load is 50–100 times less than in Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea ( Fig. 4 ). This figure also reflects large cities: local centers of large-scale transformation of nature, and areas of “underdeveloped territory” are highlighted, the boundary of which is taken to be a population density of less than 10 people/km 2 . The figure clearly shows that in Russia, north and east of the St. Petersburg–Novosibirsk line, development of the territory has not a frontal, but a focal character.

Production load on territory in countries of Eurasia, 2000s. GDP (at PPP) per unit of territory (USD 1000/km 2 ): 1, >3600; 2, 1500–3300; 3, 500–1400; 4, 200–450; 5, 100–190; 6, 5–70; 7, no data; 8, areas with population density <10 people/km 2 ; largest cities (mln people): 9, more than 10; 10, 5–10; 11, 3–5; 12, 1–3; 13, 0.5–1. Note : map made by A.N. Vasiltsova.

Another generalized indicator of anthropogenic pressure on nature is energy consumption per unit area. Footnote 14 This indicator well reflects the situation in developed countries, but poorly in backward countries, where the main negative ecological processes (deforestation, aridization, and soil degradation) occur without the use of technology and, consequently, without so-called commercial energy, but statistical accounting records only this. There is a distinction between industrial energy consumption and physiological energy consumption—energy used for human nutrition. In developed countries, physiological energy consumption is a very small share of total energy consumption (according to our calculations, in the United States is 2.1%; in Russia, 2.6%), but in poor countries this share is significant (51% in Nigeria, and more than 90% in Chad, Burundi, and Lesotho). The total energy consumption indicator is introduced in order to reduce to a common denominator the parameters of impact on the environment that are difficult to compare in developed (technological pressure) and economically backward countries (demographic pressure).

The idea of summing up two types of energy consumption was implemented by A. Fedotov (1995) to determine the rent for countries for use of the biosphere. He also used the same bioconsumption power indicator for all countries. This is invalid, because the caloric content of food varies greatly: from 1600 kcal/day in Burundi up to 3800 kcal/day in Austria.

Figure 5 shows the distribution of total energy consumption (industrial and physiological) by countries. Three vast zones of destabilization of the natural environment are distinctly revealed: Western Europe, South and Southeast Asia, and North America. These zones were identified by K.S. Losev (2001) at a qualitative level; on the map they are characterized by quantitative indicators. Clearly, the European zone with high load is not limited to the west of Europe, but extends to Russia’s borders. Within the vast high load zones, Western European and Japanese-Korean areal extents are distinguished. In them, the loads are an order of magnitude higher than even those observed on average in the United States, China, and India. In Russia, energy consumption per unit of territory is lower than in South Korea or the Netherlands, by 40–50 times.

Energy consumption per unit area by country, 10 12 J/km 2 , 2000s: 1, >40; 2, 15–35; 3, 5–14; 4, 2–4; 5, 0.5–2; 6, <0.5; 7, no data; 8, total energy consumption in country (area of circle is proportional to energy consumption; for countries with consumption >4 × 10 18 J); 9, share of physiological consumption in total energy consumption. Compiled from : http://unstats.un.org/unsd/syb/ .

As an integral indicator of sustainability of the natural environment, it is proposed to use the natural biological productivity of landscapes. The ecological significance of biological productivity is as follows. A number of authors (Losev, 2001; etc.) consider the conservation of biota (“undisturbed by economic activity”) to be the main lever for resolving the global environmental problem. This position is disputed no less by authoritative experts (Vinogradov et al., 1994). Apparently, this lever cannot be a panacea for all environmental ills, if only because the currently preserved “undisturbed” biota is distributed extremely unevenly over the surface of the Earth. The necessary conservation of this part of the biota must certainly be combined with resuscitation of the disturbed biota, which implies the widespread use of technical means of environmental protection: resource saving, improvement of technologies, including treatment, etc. However, it is obvious that the biota (primarily vegetation), even disturbed, is the most important “purification plant” of the planet. Usually, the importance of vegetation cover for reproduction of oxygen and absorption of carbon dioxide is singled out, although, naturally, these important functions are only part of its role on Earth.

The annual increase in biological production serves as an important indicator of the intensity of the biological cycle, which also corresponds to the intensity of self-purification of the environment and its ability to process anthropogenic waste. Vegetation is a factor of moisture circulation, source of soil nutrition, and replenishment of its fertility. “The developed vegetation cover is the most important condition for stability of the landscape to anthropogenic impacts. It tolerates destructive influences: solifluction, erosion, deflation, mudflows, and landslides” (Isachenko, 2001). In addition to the environment-forming biota, it also performs important resource-reproducing functions, being the main source of food for humans. In the age of fossil fuels, the energy value of vegetation has decreased markedly (with the exception of underdeveloped countries). However, the global environmental crisis could change the situation drastically. If mankind exhausts fossil fuels before it ensures the unconditional purity of nuclear energy or economic efficiency of renewable energy, vegetation will remain the only real promising source of fuel and energy resources.

Environmental donor and dependent countries are clearly distinguished, on the one hand, by the difference in the contribution to the production of biological products and, on the other, their role in global energy consumption ( Fig. 6 ). Thus, in environmental and energy indicators, Russia is among the most prosperous countries on the planet.

Share of individual countries in annual increase in biological production and energy consumption of the world, 2000s.

The considered ratios of water resources and water intake, energy consumption and production of products by vegetation, the removal of matter from nature, and the introduction of waste into it characterize the matter–energy component of natural resource management. To characterize another side of it, land use, i.e., use of a natural area as land or landscape, such an indicator as the “environmental friendliness of land use” ratio can be used: the ratio of the area of arable land (i.e., land that is certainly environmentally harmful) to the area of forests (land that is environmentally beneficial). Note that for the countries of the arid belt, deprived of natural forests, where man-made oases based on irrigated agriculture serve as centers of life, this situation is invalid. Figure 7 shows the strong overplowing of India, United States, China, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Russia, along with Brazil and Canada, are characterized by favorable ratios of forest and arable land.

Ratio of forest and arable land for individual countries, %.

Other indicators of the environmental friendliness of land use can be (a) the coefficient of naturalness of land—the share of particularly ecologically valuable landscapes in the country, which should include virtually undeveloped, “wild” lands; (b) the share of contaminated land. These indicators in different aspects characterize the degree of preservation of the “primordial” nature of the country’s territory. Virtually undeveloped lands in Russia occupy two-thirds of its territory, which without exaggeration can be considered a unique global environmental asset and of great significance for the country ( Table 6 ). In countries such as India, Japan, France, Germany, and Great Britain, no such lands have been identified. On the other hand, in Western European countries there are large shares of heavily polluted lands, which is clearly seen in Fig. 8 , compiled after (Prokacheva and Usachev, 2004).

Share of land subjected to chronic industrial pollution in selected countries.

Level of water resources’ use and water-resource dependence of Russia and neighboring countries: A, difference between country’s share in water resources and its share in world’s water consumption, %, 2000s; B, total annual river runoff, km 3 /year; C, share of foreign inflow.

Clearly, Russia is one of the most environmentally friendly countries on the planet, far (by an order of magnitude) ahead of the demographic and economic giants of the world: China, India, the United States, Japan. The indicators of the leading European countries already differ from Russia’s by two orders of magnitude. These countries, therefore, are Russia’s major “environmental dependents.”

In Russia, there is no unbridled consumerism (although, unfortunately, it has begun to take shape rapidly), which is characteristic of economically developed countries,—one of the most important environmental threats. Russia’s cultural traditions have never associated happiness with acquisitiveness and excessive accumulation of material wealth. There is also no overpopulation from which the nature of many economically backward countries suffers severely. At the same time, the worldview is characterized by disregard for the law, wastefulness towards resources, and a rudimentary state of ecological consciousness (Losev, 2001).

Russia as a whole stands out against the world background by sources of potential risk: nuclear weapons, the aerospace sector, military-industrial complex enterprises, pipelines, gas storage facilities, nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, chemical industries, etc. Thus, according to estimates, about half the enriched uranium accumulated in the world and, accordingly, about half its enrichment waste is concentrated in the Russian Federation. Russia is responsible for 50% of space debris. In Russia there are very large, on a global scale, radioactive contamination zones and local centers of extremely strong chemical contamination (Karabash, Dzerzhinsk, etc.). However, in general, the contribution of the Russian economy to global transformation of the natural environment does not exceed the country’s share in Earth’s territorial resources, in population, and the global economy. Russia’s territory is the main natural treatment plant of the planet, one of the main areas for compensation of global pollution and natural disturbances in general, and an ecological donor of many national ecosystems. The world is actively developing (note, free of charge) Russia’s ecological potential.

The analysis shows that, provided that a fair international ecological order is established, Russia can expect to receive significant environmental rent.

Russia’s Ecological and Geographical Position

The exposure of the country’s territory to external environmental threats is determined by its geographical position—its location with respect to foreign sources of environmental hazard, channels, and “distribution barriers” (Klyuev, 1995). The specific features of Russia’s ecological and geographical position are as follows.

Russia is characterized by relative natural and geographical isolation from other states, expressed in the significant distance from them to Russia’s main coastline, a high (over 95%) share of local runoff in the amount of water resources, and extended orographic barriers on the southeastern borders. A significant part of the country’s territory, particularly on the East European Plain, is occupied by geosystems closed to inland waterbodies, making it difficult to export environmental threats outside the country. Due to the deep continental location of the country, Russian sources of environmental risk threaten primarily their own, and not foreign territories and water areas.

Despite this, Russia has close environmental ties with its neighbors ( Table 7 ), due to Russia’s huge size; proximity to all the major areas of economic activity on Earth (Western Europe, China, Japan, South Korea, the United States), which therefore act as zones of concentration of environmental threats; noncoincidence of its state borders with watersheds; western transport of air masses.

On more than half of its land border, Russia neighbors former Soviet republics, which, like it, are undergoing socioeconomic transformation. The politics of Russia’s closest neighbors is per force nonenvironmental. Poor countries cannot afford to care for a clean environment. Meanwhile, poverty is no less hazardous to the environment than wasteful Western consumerism. This, of course, is a negative externality on Russia’s external environmental security. The long borders of the Russian Federation, 13 500 km of which are new, with the former Soviet republics, often permeable, create wide opportunities for smuggling, including the illegal export of natural resources and waste transportation. The problem of border security thus acquires an ecological dimension.

The former unified ecological space of the USSR is now fragmented into 15. Coordinated efforts are difficult. As an example, let us mention the aggravated contradictions between Russia and other Caspian states in the developing oil fields on the Caspian shelf, which may be associated with negative environmental consequences. Russia and Iran are mainly interested in preserving the bioresources of the Caspian Sea. Other countries, in particular, Kazakhstan (the leader in oil reserves and production in the water area), are focusing on hydrocarbon resource development.

The inflow of river waters into Russia is three times greater than their outflow. The main suppliers of river water to Russia are China, Finland, and Mongolia; the consumers are Mongolia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. The last three countries also “consume” the main share of polluted wastewater exported by Russia through the river network. For Russia as a whole, the inflow plus outflow of river runoff is very small compared to Russia’s own water resources. However, in some regions, this share is significant. In Omsk oblast, only 16% of water resources are local; the rest come from abroad.

From the ratio of water resources to water consumption in the world (see Fig. 2 ), it can be seen that in Russia, this ratio is favorable, while its southern and southwestern neighbors noticeably “overspend” their share in the global water resources. Such a particularly strong imbalance is observed in China, but it is also significant in Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Water-poor neighbors are a potential source of instability (Danilov-Danilyan and Losev, 2006). The map also shows the degree of water dependence of countries. The high degree of such dependence in Turkmenistan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine draws attention. Russia is self-sufficient in water-resource and water-environmental relations.

An acute shortage of fresh water has arisen in the Chinese part of the Amur River basin. Within China’s program Revival of the Industrial Bases of the Northeast, about 20 large water management facilities are being built and designed: reservoirs, waterworks, and hydroelectric power stations. The total siphoning of runoff from the upper reaches of the Amur River can be up to 70% of the river’s flow (Sovremennye …, 2013, p. 67). In Dauria, the Hailaer River–Lake Dalai Nor canal has already been built (in 2009), which violated the Ramsar Convention, since it altered internationally important wetlands. The possible negative environmental externalities of this canal’s construction are the degraded floodplain habitats of bird populations, including endangered species listed in the Red Book, aridization, and increased pollution of the Argun River. The Great China Water Leap Forward ignores Russia’s national environmental interests.

A similar situation is developing in the Irtysh River basin. In China, transfer of runoff through the Black Irtysh–Karamay Canal was begun, which provides siphoning from the Irtysh River basin of more than 1.5 km 3 of water per year. The implementation of this project threatens navigation, water supply, and ecosystems of the Irtysh, which comes to Russia from China via Kazakhstan. The latter, in turn, plans to increase water supply to the Kanysh Satpaev (formerly, the Irtysh–Karaganda) Canal. Thus, in Omsk oblast in 2011, construction of a reservoir commenced to prevent a possible water shortage. It should be added that even now, the Irtysh and its tributaries are the most polluted waterbodies in Kazakhstan. In addition, China refuses to include Russia in trilateral (China–Kazakhstan–Russian Federation) negotiations on water allocation of the Irtysh River (Ekologicheskie …, 2014, p. 138). Although a government agreement on cooperation in the protection of cross-border rivers was signed between Kazakhstan and China (2001), issues of the legal status of rivers remain unresolved between these countries. Water-resource and water-environmental problems in the basin remain tense and institutionally unresolved.

Judging from Table 7 , cross-border wastewater exchange is dominated by its export from Russia. However, this table does not contain data on polluted wastewater from non-CIS countries. Accounting for these waters, particularly Chinese ones, will undoubtedly change the shares of wastewater exchange that do not favor Russia.

Almost a third of Russia’s land (not sea) borders pass along rivers and lakes (meaning waterbodies that mark the border but do not cross it) (see Table 7 ). More than half the river frontier is along China. Border watercourses and reservoirs are interesting as objects of joint interstate natural resource management, the water quality in which depends on the specifics of the economic use of the territory in the catchment areas on both sides of the border.

According to our calculations, the area of the watersheds, where Russia’s “imported” river flow is formed, is more than 2 mln km 2 (roughly the area of Mexico). The Russia’s zone of hydroecological interests abroad covers the Seversky Donets River basin, all of northern Kazakhstan east of 60° N, almost a third of the area of Mongolia, vast territories of northeastern China, and the Neman River basin bordering the Kaliningrad exclave. More than 100 mln people abroad live in this zone. The Russian parts of international river basins are less developed than the foreign. For example, the production and demographic load on the territory of interstate river basins in China is 10–20 times higher than in Russia (Gorbatenko, 2016).

Russia’s poorly developed Far Eastern areas are directly adjacent to a continuous, highly developed Chinese areas. Currently, China is not only a first-rank demographic power, but also a country with the highest growth rates of economic potential: it consumes a quarter of global energy resources. Although China has recently made efforts to green the economy, its intensive economic growth poses a serious environmental threat, including to its neighbors. Due to the high share of coal in the fuel mix, China ranks first in the world in atmospheric greenhouse gas and sulfur compound emissions. The high growth rate of living standards in China stimulates mass motorization of this country, which entails negative environmental consequences. In connection with the reform of agriculture, erosion, pollution of soils and waterbodies, and aridization are expanding.

At Russia’s southern borders are concentrated countries distinguished by high demographic growth rates and, consequently, an increase in demographic pressure on the environment. In terms of demographic pressure on the natural environment, the ecological and geographical position Russia’s has noticeably deteriorated in the postwar period. The close proximity of the least developed and most vulnerable of Russia’s territory with countries with huge demographic potential and highest economic growth rates creates potential political and environmental tensions in the Far East.

Russia’s contribution to the use and transformation of the basins of inland interstate seas is significant only for the Caspian and Azov seas. Russia’s share in the load on these basins, according to our rough estimates, ranges from 60 to 80% of the total. Russia’s contribution to the anthropogenic change in the basins of other inland seas surrounding its territory does not exceed 10%.

For marginal seas, the main pathways for the spread of environmental risk to Russia are associated with the Norwegian–North Cape Current, which carries pollutants into the Barents Sea from the North and Norwegian seas, where one of Eurasia’s largest economic activity centers is located. The Barents Sea is the largest shelf waterbody in Russia, surpassing in fish productivity the Baltic, White, Black, Azov, and Caspian seas together. The most developed European countries have used the North Sea as a large-scale waste dump for over 150 years. In the postwar years, nuclear energy was used in active development of this sea (France dumped radioactive waste was into it, while Great Britain dumped waste into the Irish Sea) and offshore oil and gas fields. Owing to the Gulf Stream, a wide range of pollutants—from household waste to radionuclides—have made their way to the Kara Sea.

Western environmentalists, politicians, and the media are showing increased concern about the nuclear and radiation hazard in the Barents Sea region. Russia has indeed concentrated here a cluster of hazardous objects: nuclear power plants, bases for nuclear icebreaker and submarine fleets, a nuclear submarine production plant, ship repair facilities, graveyards for decommissioned nuclear ships, storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel, purification plants and a marine repository for radioactive waste, and the former Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site. A Russian–Norwegian expedition found that the background radioactive contamination of the Barents and Kara seas is significantly (by an order of magnitude) lower than that of the Irish and Baltic seas ( Table 8 ). It is estimated that discharges from radiochemical plants—the English Sellafield and French La Hague—responsible for 30% of the Kara Sea’s pollution with strontium-90 and about 60% with cesium-137. Clearly, in this area, domestic potential environmental threats are combined with imported realistic dangers.

In the Far East, the Tsushima Current siphons water from the Yellow Sea, and partly from the northern East China Sea, creating a threat to Primorye from Chinese, Korean, and Japanese sources of environmental risk. Japan is noted for large-scale nuclear power; it ranks third in the world after the United States and France in total nuclear plant capacity. The Alaska Current affects the formation of Bering Sea water masses, which may contribute to pollution of the coasts of Chukotka and Kamchatka from oil fields of the Alaskan shelf.

The cyclonic circulation of Caspian Sea currents causes inflow of pollution in Russia’s direction with the possible development of oil in the Kazakhstan sector of the sea.

Due to the “openness” of Russia’s borders to the west and western transfer of air masses, Russia’s zone of atmospheric and environmental interests extends all the way to the Iberian Peninsula. Sixty percent of anthropogenic sulfur and nitrogen fallout in European Russia comes from Western and Central Europe, but even in Asian Russia, this value is about 10%. The impact of these pollutants from Europe can be traced all the way to Lake Baikal. The main exporters of atmospheric pollution to Russia are Ukraine, Poland, and Germany ( Fig. 10 ).

Cross-border air pollution in European Russia, 2010. Total deposition of oxidized sulfur (1), oxidized nitrogen (2), and reduced nitrogen (3) on European Russia; (a) share of foreign sources: area of circle is proportional to value of total deposition of pollutants on European Russia. Main cross-border fluxes of oxidized sulfur (4), oxidized nitrogen (5), and reduced nitrogen (6): thickness of arrow is proportional to cross-border fluxes of pollutants from individual countries. Ratio of import and export of pollutants in European Russia: oxidized sulfur (7), oxidized nitrogen (8), and reduced nitrogen (9): thickness of arrow is proportional to cross-border fluxes of pollutants.

Since western transport of air masses prevails in the mid-latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere, when Europe consumes Russian oil and gas products, part of the atmospheric pollutants released are carried by air flows to Russian territory. Thus, the two main environmental problems of where to obtain natural resources and what to do with industrial waste are resolved at Russia’s expense in this case. Its “environmental assistance,” unfortunately, is not yet taken into account in foreign economic calculations and is therefore free of charge.

Southeast Russia is bordered by mountains and mountain ranges with a sublatitudinal distribution, which act as barriers to the free spread of air pollutants from abroad. In the region, stable anticyclonic conditions predominate in winter, also serving as a climatic barrier. Therefore, in particular, only 1.2% of sulfur emitted by Chinese sources enter Russian territory, but even this accounts for 4.2% of the total sulfur fallout in Asian Russia (Bashkin, 2005, p. 134).

The areas of concentration of external threats to Russia’s environmental security are:

The Chernobyl NPP area— a zone of substantial radioactive contamination with a potentially hazardous sarcophagus, where the spread of radionuclides by animals, people, cars, and forest fires is possible.

The Ukrainian part of the Seversky Donets River Basin –Kharkiv urban agglomeration and Ukrainian Donbass—in a highly urbanized region (with a population density of over 100 people/km 2 ), which specializes in coal mining, metallurgy, electric power, and the chemical and petrochemical industries. The Ukrainian contribution to pollution of the Seversky Donets River is at least 70%. Right at Russia’s borders, from the side of the prevailing winds, the most serious center of industrial emissions in the post-Soviet space is concentrated in the Donetsk–Dnieper region of Ukraine. Within this area, almost 40% of emissions came from near-border Donetsk oblast.

The environmental situation in the Donbass is of particular concern in connection with the current acute political crisis in Ukraine, which has resulted in a serious military conflict. Hazardous, technically complex objects and territorial concentration of huge masses of substances capable of burning and exploding are the privilege of countries with highly organized political systems and prosperous economies. Such objects are incompatible with the economic chaos and barbarization of governance and social mores masked in modern Ukraine by the declarative cry “a return to European civilization.”

In Kazakhstan’s Irtysh River region are the Pavlodar–Ekibastuz and Ust-Kamenogorsk industrial regions with specialization in coal mining, electric power, non-ferrous metallurgy. The region is home to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant, which produces fuel for nuclear power plants, four large reservoirs on the Irtysh, the former Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, and the Pavlodar source of mercury contamination of soils.

The Chinese Amur River region comprises the province of Heilongjiang and most of the province of Jilin. In the latter, the population density reaches 300 people/km 2 . The region specializes in “dirty’ sectors of heavy industry, based on the local raw materials and fuel base (coal mining, nonferrous metals, oil, oil refining, petrochemistry, electric power, chemical industry). There are several million-plus cities here, and agriculture is highly intensive. Thus, in Jilin, more than 700 kg of mineral fertilizers are applied per 1 ha of agricultural crops (Baklanov and Ganzei, 2008, p. 111). This is 12 times more than in Russia.

The volume of water consumption in the Chinese part of the Amur River basin is 39 km 3 , and in the Russian part, 1.1 km 3 (Geosistemy …, 2010, p. 478). According to approximate data (data on polluted wastewater in China are closed), China’s share in total wastewater discharge is as follows: in the Argun River basin, 87%; in the Amur River from the mouth of the Argun River to that of the Songhua River, 75%; from the mouth of the Songhua River to the mouth of the Ussuri River, 98%; in the Ussuri River, 97% (On Russian-Chinese …, 2005).

According to Chinese data, the Songhua River is more polluted than the Yangtze River (Ganzei, 2004, p. 171). Since the 1970s, Chinese sources of pollution have made a decisive contribution to degradation of the Amur ecosystem. A major accident at a chemical plant in the city of Kirin in 2005, when benzene, nitrobenzene, and aniline were exported by the Songhua River to Russian territory, which posed a threat to the water supply of Khabarovsk krai, only highlighted the problem of cross-border pollution of the Amur River, which has existed for a long time. It should also be noted that pathogens responsible for cholera, dysentery, hepatitis A, etc., enter the Amur River with Songhua River waters (Voronov, 2006).

In the Russian–Chinese border area, such properties of cross-border natural resource management as asymmetry and asynchrony are clearly manifested (Baklanov and Hanzey, 2008). On Chinese territory, anthropogenic pressure on nature is much stronger and continues to increase, while on the border periphery of Russia’s Far Eastern regions, signs of demographic devastation, economic desertification, and even savagery arises: deserted taiga, abandoned villages, and collapsed fish farms and timber industry enterprises. The level and nature of development of the cross-border Amur region is reflected in Table 9 . Clearly, the Chinese territory is characterized by high development, while the Russian territory is dominated by unused lands, burned areas, and wastelands. In the wild landscapes of the Russian borderlands, where there is no monitoring or control, fires are frequent, which sometimes cross into Chinese territory.

At present, China’s economic policy is becoming more and more ecologically oriented. Commercial logging has been banned in many regions of the country. Paradoxically, the greening of forest management in China is causing serious harm to Russia’s forest resources. Increased Chinese demand for Russian timber (as well as unemployment in remote Russian villages) is spurring illegal logging in the Russian Far East, which, by some estimates, exceeds legal harvesting. Due to weak control and corruption in the forest industry, a large shadow sector has formed, causing environmental and economic damage (Prigranichnye …, 2010, p. 180). Large-scale illegal logging is often carried out in water protection zones, without compliance with forestry regulations. To mask illegal activities, arsonists set forest areas ablaze. A distinct illegal logging gradient has been revealed, the share of which is higher, the more timber is available for export to China. In western Primorsky krai and southern Khabarovsk krai, the amount of illegal logging is 50–70% that of legal logging, and in territories remote from China, 20–30% (Prirodopol’zovanie …, 2005, p. 188).

Illegal harvesting and subsequent smuggling to China affects not only forest, but also other biological resources. Oriental medicine’s high demand for derivatives of Amur tiger, musk deer, bear, as well as pine nuts, mollusks, and medicinal herbs (eleutherococcus, ginseng) has caused an increase in poaching in Russia. In the authors’ opinion, it is impossible to reduce this as long as there is a social basis: chronic poverty, unemployment, and, consequently, the populations high dependence on the use of biological resources in border peripheral regions.

The environmentally friendly decision of the Chinese authorities to ban coal generation (the most environmentally unfavorable practice) from the 1000 km zone around Beijing and incentivize construction of power plants in the north areas of the country bring environmental threats closer to Russia’s borders.

In recent decades, China has been systematically working to strengthen the banks of the Amur River and its tributaries. Russian countermeasures have been discussed but not carried out. As a result, in some sections, the fairway of the river along which the state border passes is shifting towards the Russian coast. Chinese coastal protection measures also play a negative role from an environmental standpoint. Free meandering of rivers is a key functional element of the floodplain ecosystem, disruption of which leads to degradation of spawning grounds and loss of biodiversity. We emphasize that on the Amur River (the right, washed-out bank is Chinese), the Coriolis effect “works” for Russia, but Chinese reclamation engineers neutralize and overcome the natural process. In the case of the Ussuri River (the right bank is Russian), the Coriolis effect aids in China’s “hydroengineering war.” Therefore, a proposal by Moscow State University hydrologists is noteworthy: to establish new rules for demarcation of the Russian–Chinese border by fixing it on land based on geodetic features, which will eliminate the dependence on natural and hydroengineering displacements of the riverbed (Sovremennye …, 2013).

A potential area of external environmental threats to Russia is located in the Mongolian part of the Selenga River basin . The Selenga River is the biggest river running into Lake Baikal, a natural World Heritage site. In the lower, Russian part of the basin, a special environmental regime of economic activity has been established. In the Mongolian part of the basin, there are no restrictions on natural resource management, and here two-thirds of the population, four-fifths of industry, and 90% of the irrigated lands of Mongolia are concentrated, i.e., the lion’s share of the country’s economy. Its planned economic growth is associated with the development of new coal, copper, and gold deposits. To provide them with water and electricity, it is planned to build a hydroelectric power station on the Selenga River; there are also projects to transfer part of the flow of the Orkhon, Selenga, Kerulen, and Onon rivers to the south, to the Gobi; hence the potential contradictions between the economic development of Mongolian regions and preservation of the Baikal ecosystem, recognized by UNESCO as an area of exceptional natural beauty.

The world’s longest land borders between Russia and Kazakhstan passing in the steppe and forest-steppe zones are characterized by specific environmental problems. Due to a significant reduction of economic activity in vast areas on both sides of the border, unused former agrocenoses are overgrown with thickets of weeds and act as breeding grounds for pests and agricultural crop diseases. Saratov oblast, Altai krai, and other regions along the border with Kazakhstan are suffering a locust invasion. An effective measure to combat locusts is to plow up of their larval nesting sites, which has not been done in these vast wastelands for many years. Due to a manifold reduction in livestock, the load on pasture landscapes has sharply decreased. Thus, steppe mat began to accumulate almost everywhere. However, its formation, combined with the spread of tall-weedy overgrowth, sharply increased the fire hazard. Every year, steppe fires span up to a third of the territory in Orenburg oblast and the Trans-Volga regions of Saratov and Volgograd oblasts (Chibilev, 2004). Natural and man-made fires easily cross the state border.

In general, with normal (nonemergency) functioning of the economy, Russia poses less of a danger to its neighbors than the other way around. For example, fluxes of anthropogenic sulfur and nitrogen entering the Russian Plain from Western Europe are three to eight times higher than those going the other way. In reality, Russia suffers more (environmentally) from its neighbors than vice versa. This should be taken into account and used in foreign policy activities.

Not all external environmental threats are determined by the country’s ecological and geographical position. Some of these threats are generated by the mechanisms of international division of labor. A striking example is the export of platinum group metals by Norilsk Nickel to Japan and the United States, where they are used in catalytic converter to combat automobile emissions. The more stringent the requirements on the cleanliness of exhaust, the greater the demand for these products. The struggle for clean air abroad intensifies air pollution in Russia. Note that Norilsk Nickel is the largest air polluter in Eurasia in terms of sulfur oxides.

CONCLUSIONS

Russia’s natural-resource and natural-ecological self-sufficiency favors its sustainable development. The unfavorable features of the country’s geographical position—the burdens of space and nature—make it difficult for its “frontal” inclusion in the international division of labor. A science-based territorial policy can and should fortify Russia’s advantages of location and mitigate its shortcomings. This can be facilitated by the organization on Russian territory and water areas of railway and sea superhighways and the central link of a single integrated Eurasian infrastructure.

Russia’s natural conditions are not fated to lag behind the economic vanguard of the planet. This geographic optimism is related to the targeted search for promising sectors of specialization with which Russia could successfully enter the global market, as well as with the development of its own technologies, its own methods for organizing production, and the territorial organization of society.

Fixing the severity of domestic environmental problems, it is important to understand that in a wide range of parameters, Russia is among the world’s prosperous countries and is a major environmental power (Klyuev, 2015). Because of this, important sectors of Russia’s specialization in the global market are production of pure agricultural products and provision of recreational and environmental services.

Russia’s extrapure, “virgin” territories are concentrated in its northern regions. This implies the importance of agricultural development of the North: development of northern agriculture, pasture–nomadic animal husbandry: reindeer, herd-horse, maral, and yak breeding. In addition to obtaining environmentally acceptable products, the agrarian development of the North will help support its indigenous peoples, as well as improve the extremely unfavorable spatial situation in which Russia now finds itself. Agriculture is the industry that primarily develops the country’s territory. Such development has geopolitical significance that is not measured by economic criteria.

Russia’s natural potential makes it possible with its own resources to compensate for internal disruption of environmental conditions. Moreover, it can withstand negative externalities on nature. The country’s environmental defects are high resource intensity and specific waste output, and concentration of sources of potential risk. Without eliminating these defects, it is difficult for Russia to take on the role of an environmental leader of the planet.

Russia’s role as the world’s main treatment plant should be used to strengthen its positions in international relations, particularly since the weight of environmental factors in global politics is steadily increasing.

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The study was carried out in accordance with Fundamental Research Programs of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences and under the state task of the Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences AAAA-A19-119022190170-1 (FMGE-2019-0008).

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The article was written in 2020 based on the results of research carried out in 2009–2019 (see Glezer, O.B., Shvetsov, A.N., and Kotlyakov, V.M., Reg. Res. Russ ., 2023, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 1–5) and does not reflect the impact on the subject matter considered therein from the latest events stemming from two global crises that erupted suddenly: the COVID-19 pandemic and aggravation of the military–political situation with Ukraine in 2022.

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Danilov-Danilyan, V.I., Klyuev, N.N. & Kotlyakov, V.M. Russia in the Global Natural and Ecological Space. Reg. Res. Russ. 13 , 34–57 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1134/S2079970522700472

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Received : 15 July 2022

Revised : 30 August 2022

Accepted : 10 October 2022

Published : 17 April 2023

Issue Date : March 2023

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1134/S2079970522700472

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